Manitoba's French-Language Crisis: A Cautionary Tale 9780773571914

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Manitoba’s French-Language Crisis

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Manitoba’s French-Language Crisis A Cautionary Tale r ay m o n d m . h é b e rt

McGill-Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Ithaca

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© McGill-Queen’s University Press 2004 isbn 0-7735-2708-7 (cloth) isbn 0-7735-2790-7 (paper) Legal deposit second quarter 2004 Bibliothèque nationale du Québec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper that is 100% ancient forest free (100% post-consumer recycled), processed chlorine free. This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Collège universitaire de Saint-Boniface. McGill-Queen’s University Press acknowledges the support of the Canada Council for the Arts for our publishing program. We also acknowledge the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Book Publishing Industry Development Program (bpidp) for our publishing activities.

National Library of Canada Cataloguing in Publication Hébert, Raymond, 1944– Manitoba's French-language crisis: a cautionary tale/ Raymond M. Hébert. Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 0-7735-2708-7 (bnd) isbn 0-7735-2790-7 (pbk) 1. French language – Political aspects – Manitoba – History. 2. Language policy – Manitoba – History. 3. Manitoba – English-French relations. 4. Canadians, French-speaking – Legal status, laws, etc. 4. Manitoba – History. I. Title. fc3370.l3h47 2004 323.1′111407127 c2003-906821-8

This book was typeset by Dynagram Inc. in 10/12 Sabon.

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À mes parents Georges Roland Hébert et Juliette Couture Hébert

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Contents

Acknowledgments Introduction

ix

xi

1 French-Language Rights in Manitoba, 1870–1976

3

2 French-Language Rights in Manitoba, 1977–81: The Lyon Years 26 3 The Pawley Government and Section 23: Confronting a Conundrum 50 4 The Gathering Storm

72

5 The Long Hot Summer

104

6 “Let the People Speak!”

118

7 The Pawley Government Capitulates 8 “To Court We Go”

153

173

9 The Language of Bigotry: Reason and Unreason in the Language Debates

199

10 Explaining the Crisis: Symbolism, Status, and Right-Wing Authoritarianism 209

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viii Contents

appendices 1 Samples of the Manitoba Gazette (1874) and the Statutes of Manitoba (1888) Published in French 225 2 Draft Tripartite Agreement on the Constitutional Amendment, Dated 18 May 1983 227 3 Draft Proposed Amendments to the Manitoba Act, 17 May 1983 (Schedule to the Draft Constitutional Amendment of 18 May 1983) 230 4 Resolution to Amend the Manitoba Act Introduced in the Manitoba Legislative Assembly by Attorney-General Roland Penner, 4 July 1983 235 5 Members of the Manitoba Legislative Assembly during the French-Language Crisis 239 Notes

241

Bibliography Index

287

281

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Acknowledgments

This book would never have seen the light of day without the advice and help of many people. In providing unconditional access to their files, former attorney-general Roland Penner and former premier Howard Pawley allowed the story to be told in its most complete form to date. Information from their archives was supplemented with information gleaned from the archives of the Société Franco-Manitobaine (sfm) and from documentation made available unconditionally by lawyers Renald Guay and Rémi Smith, both major participants in the crisis. Roger Turenne, the province’s senior advisor on French-language services during the crisis, in addition to providing unconditional access to his files, was always available to share his time and his personal knowledge of the events with the author. Roger Bilodeau also provided unconditional access to his files, as did Winnipeg Free Press columnist Frances Russell. Winnipeg Free Press editor Nicholas Hirst graciously allowed me to reproduce photographs belonging to his newspaper. Staff at Manitoba’s Provincial Archives, particularly provincial archivist Peter Bower and Mr Alex Ross, were unfailingly generous with their time and helpful in many ways. Executive Council secretary Don Leitch provided timely access to the Penner and Pawley archives after the Conservatives came into power in Manitoba in 1988. Many thanks as well to the Honourable Ronald Duhamel and Professors Tom Peterson and Rita Bienvenue for their assistance in the early stages of this study. Roland Penner and Léo Robert, former president of the sfm, both read extensive portions of the manuscript and made many useful suggestions; any remaining errors of fact or interpretation in the description of the complex events recounted here are mine alone.

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x Acknowledgments

Bob Altemeyer, who has spent a lifetime doing empirical research on right-wing authoritarianism and whose work (not to mention his wit!) I have read and admired over many years, agreed to read portions of the manuscript, adding many useful insights. I alone am responsible for any remaining misinterpretations of his work. Very special thanks to my editor at McGill-Queen’s, Joan Harcourt, for having spontaneously expressed her interest in this project at the outset and for her ongoing patience and encouragement as I ran into the inevitable technical obstacles and delays all authors are familiar with. Finally, I wish to thank my home institution, Collège universitaire de Saint-Boniface, for the encouragement and active support given to this project over the years in the form of leave and in countless other ways. Special thanks in particular to Sylvia Cadieux for technical assistance and especially for her moral support at various stages of the project. To all, un grand Merci!

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Introduction I discovered a face of Manitoba I didn’t know existed. mla Andy Anstett1

From May 1983 to the end of February 1984 Manitoba was racked by one of the most intense, divisive debates in its history, a debate that left no segment of the population untouched and that in its final stages virtually paralyzed the government of the province. In its last weeks, an eerie air of anarchy hung over the province, as day after day the legislature lay deserted, its visitors and staff assailed by raucous buzzers calling the mla s to sit. One journalist even wrote that there had been an attempted coup d’état by the minority party in the legislature towards the end of the crisis in February 1984.2 In the end the government capitulated, fearing that funding for government operations would be denied by the legislature, which would have brought the administrative machinery of government itself to a standstill. At some point during those last weeks, the debate became literally a crisis, since the duly elected government of the day came perilously close to being unable to govern. The debate – and the crisis – was about language. Seeking at the same time to redress long-standing injustices perpetrated on the province’s French-speaking minority by successive governments since the end of the nineteenth century and to avoid potential legislative chaos or massive expenditures that might result from a challenge to the constitutionality of Manitoba’s English-only laws, the government ran into a stone wall of opposition in the legislature and among various segments of the population. From the start, as an academic I was confronted by a dilemma: the story cried out to be told and explained, but every theoretical framework I considered seemed inadequate. Indeed, the interlacing of rational

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xii Introduction

debate and raw emotion that marked the crisis at every turn over many months, if not years, poses tremendous challenges to the analyst, since it brought to the surface many facets of Manitoba society that had lain dormant for much of the twentieth century. In addition, as a FrancoManitoban I was caught up at various points in the debate, and I must therefore be considered a participant observer in it. However, I have not hesitated to point out the disagreements within the French community during the crisis; to me they are an indication of a vibrant democratic community, one in which several points of view can be debated and decided upon. In earlier drafts of this work I had laid out an “authoritarian personality” explanatory model based on work begun in 1950, in the wake of World War II, by T.W. Adorno and his associates.3 The manuscript eventually went to two scholars for assessment: one of them told me to scrap the analytical model altogether and to focus on the story, while the other encouraged me to drop major parts of the story and develop my application of the model more thoroughly! In the end, since my first objective was to tell the story as completely and as objectively as I could, I decided to do so. I was assisted in this decision by the fact that in the wake of postmodernism, a growing number of authors are opting for approaches that allow more room for the reader to develop his or her own analysis. I shall therefore boldly forego the presentation of a theoretical framework that is traditionally de rigueur in a work such as this and call it simply a narrative history, thereby also perhaps foregoing any claim that this work contributes to any body of theory. However, I do harbour the modest hope that it will assist in our comprehension not only of the crisis itself and the social forces that were at work in it but also of the inherent dangers of any attempt at constitutional change (as if we Canadians need a further reminder of this after Meech and Charlottetown!). On both these levels, then, it can truly be called a cautionary tale. This study is also a cautionary analysis of our society in general: there are forces that, in the right circumstances and with the right leadership, can be aroused and made to wreak havoc on an otherwise peaceful and tolerant citizenry. All of this is not to say that I do not have a point a view – far from it. Among the possible theoretical explanations presented in the conclusion, my emphasis remains on the authoritarian personality model, although, as I make clear, other explanations may be advanced that have as much, or perhaps even more, power. Using the evidence presented in the text and the arguments presented in the conclusion, the reader may decide whether my predilection is valid or not. Second, as a participant observer in the crisis and a Manitoba francophone I have always believed that the Pawley government was right in pursuing a constitu-

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xiii

Introduction

tional amendment as a reasonable and honourable way of resolving the imbroglio created by the Bilodeau case, and twenty years later I see no reason to change my opinion. This predisposition is reflected at various points in the text, and again, the reader will decide whether, in the context, it is well-grounded. I should also point out that although this is the first major work in English devoted entirely to the French-language issue in Manitoba, it is by no means a general history of French in Manitoba. In particular, the evolution of French-language education in Manitoba, especially since the adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and culminating in the establishment by the Filmon government of a province-wide French-language school division in 1994, would be the subject of another book. The first chapter, which recalls the early history of Manitoba, relies almost entirely on secondary sources, and its purpose is simply to describe the political and social context in which the Manitoba Act, 1870, was framed; this is essential to any understanding of the French-language crisis that hit Manitoba in the 1980s, but it is not a definitive nineteenth-century history of the French in Manitoba. Frances Russell’s recent work The Canadian Crucible (2003), published while this work was in press, provides much more extensive historical background, particularly in chapters 1 to 5. In one crucial way, however, this study contributes to ongoing constitution-making in Canada: in my opinion, the link between Frenchlanguage services and the Manitoba Act, 1870, has now been definitively established, not only or even mainly by the crisis itself or by the Filmon government’s rapid move to implement French-language services early in its first mandate but more directly by the political compromise the Pawley government made with the sfm in 1985 in the wake of the Reference judgment, which required that all Manitoba legislation, regulations, sessional documents, and so on, be translated. The quid pro quo was the provision of French-language services, and within days after the agreement had been concluded Pawley created an institutional structure to begin implementing these services (see chapter 8). Subsequently, the Conservative Filmon government (1988–99) strengthened this policy considerably.

methodological note When I began this study, there was little secondary documentation of Manitoba’s language crisis. The only major study was Jacqueline Blay’s L’Article 23: Les péripéties législatives et juridiques du fait français au Manitoba, 1870–1986 (1987). It suffered from trying to do two things at once: almost half the work was devoted to a history of Franco-Manitobans, while the

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xiv Introduction

rest summarized the main events in the French-language crisis itself. In addition, Blay did not have access to many of the archival sources. While this book was in press, Winnipeg Free Press columnist Frances Russell published The Canadian Crucible, a major new work on Manitoba’s linguistic duality. Russell follows Blay’s structural approach, devoting roughly half her book to a history of Manitoba’s linguistic tensions and the rest to the language crisis and its sequel. Russell’s historical account is exemplary and should be required reading for anyone who wishes to understand the linguistic tensions that shaped Manitoba during its formative years. However, in her treatment of the language crisis itself, Russell, like Blay, does not appear to have had access to the archives of most of the major actors and relies almost entirely on media accounts. In contrast to the work of Blay and Russell, my own work might be called “Manitoba’s French-Language Crisis: The Inside Story,” since my main sources were the archives of several of the key actors in the crisis. In addition, I attempt to formulate some theoretical explanations of the forces that generated the crisis. Another secondary source is Gordon Mackintosh’s excellent article on the topic published in the Manitoba Law Journal in 1986,4 which summarizes the major events of the crisis. In addition, law professor Joseph Magnet summarized the crisis as a “case study” in 1995.5 Finally, Russell Doern, a key opponent of the Pawley government’s proposed constitutional amendment, published his own take on the crisis in 1985.6 Doern’s account is anecdotal in style, fragmentary in its sources, and superficial in its analysis, but it is useful because it presents the crisis from the point of view of the opponents of the constitutional amendment. While this book was in press, a major new work on the Supreme Court of Canada was published. It contains an eight-page section on the Manitoba language issue and describes a Court that was deeply divided on the question.7 Justice Antonio Lamer in particular is quoted as saying that he had “a hard time finding [in favour of the doctrine of] necessity,” adding, “If Manitoba wants chaos, let them have chaos.” This is another indication of the risk that was taken by the Opposition in driving the issue to the Supreme Court; the vagaries of judicial interpretation and the dynamics of relations among the judges could well have led the Court in that direction. Fortunately for Manitoba a compromise was arrived at, thanks to Chief Justice Brian Dickson; however, this episode reveals that the fears of chaos descending upon Manitoba expressed by Attorney-General Roland Penner and by many others during the crisis were by no means as farfetched as Opposition leader Sterling Lyon and his caucus made them out to be.

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Introduction

In addition to archival materials, I also scrutinized the entire series of legislative debates on the issue, as well as over a thousand pages of public hearings. In all, I consulted the equivalent of twenty-five archival boxes of written materials. The present study has some methodological limitations. The narrative is essentially built upon textual sources. Some personal interviews were done with the main actors involved, though relatively few, since even in these limited interviews it turned out that either many events were unknown to the respondents (since they involved other actors) or the exact sequence of events had long been forgotten. Opponents of the constitutional amendment were not interviewed, since the hundreds of pages of legislative debates and hearings made their positions abundantly clear as the crisis evolved: any further words from them would have amounted to historical revisionism. On balance, then, it became obvious that this work would have to reconstruct the events of the crisis through written sources. The textual approach has the great advantage of providing incontrovertible evidence; the disadvantage is, perhaps, a certain loss of immediacy and human passion. But then, what are academics for?

abbreviations The following abbreviations are used to denote various archival sources: atg Attorney-General Roland Penner’s files ec Executive Council, Premier Howard Pawley’s files g/s The Guay-Smith files, used in the two lawyers’ court case against the sfm sfm Files of the Société Franco-Manitobaine Other primary sources are identified in full in the text. The Pawley and Penner files are in the Manitoba Archives and can be consulted there with the authorization of the former premier and the former attorney-general, respectively, along with the authorization of the government. The Guay-Smith files belong to the two lawyers, and the sfm archives are at the Société historique de Saint-Boniface.

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Manitoba’s French-Language Crisis

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1 French-Language Rights in Manitoba, 1870–1976

The history of French-language rights in Manitoba is complex, turbulent, and tragic; only recently has significant progress been made in righting historic wrongs. Initially part of the francophone Métis heritage, French-language rights were soon appropriated by Francophones from Quebec and Europe as the Métis nation disintegrated progressively through the nineteenth century. The network of religious and language safeguards painstakingly erected and fought for by Louis Riel and Fathers Jean-Noël Ritchot and Alexandre Taché in 1869 and 1870 was systematically dismantled within a single generation by federal and provincial interpretation of the Manitoba Act. The judicial system was unwilling to halt the process, and when it tried, it was simply ignored by the legislative and executive authorities. Riel’s victory in 1870 quickly became a resoundingly hollow one as the weight of demographics and the rapid imposition of a simple majoritarian ideology aimed at imposing a single set of linguistic and religious values by Ontario immigrants combined eventually to assimilate large numbers of Francophones and to crush the Métis nation in the West.

louis riel and the lists of rights The story of the creation of Manitoba and of the Riel resistance to the arbitrary assumption of authority over the Red River settlement by Canada has been told several times, and there is remarkable agreement among historians as to the basic facts and their interpretation. The geographical area now known as Manitoba was originally settled by various

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4 Manitoba’s French-Language Crisis

Indian tribes over three thousand years.1 The first European explorers, drawn by the fur trade, arrived in the seventeenth century via Hudson’s Bay and the Great Lakes and launched an era in which “native and European co-operated peacefully for two centuries, between 1640 and 1840.”2 This cooperation extended to all areas of life, and inevitably, the European-born men took native wives à la façon du pays, leading to “two patterns of family formation, one associated with the Montreal and one with the Hudson’s Bay operations.”3 However, “the children of the Montreal trade, offspring mainly of French and Objibwa parents, were the most numerous and settled of the new native-born population.”4 In the early nineteenth century, another demographic factor intervened with the arrival, in September 1811, of the first Selkirk settlers from Scotland.5 The population of the Red River settlement grew from about 400 in 1821 to about 7,000 in the mid-1840s, of whom only about 1,000 were of European and Canadian origin and about 6,000 were French- and English-speaking Métis.6 Not surprisingly, “perceptions of race, class, and religion sustained numerous social divisions in Red River.”7 Despite these divisions, life in the Red River settlement through the early 1800s was generally peaceful, as the French- and English-speaking Métis, the Scottish settlers, and the few Europeans and Canadians found ways to accommodate each other under the umbrella administration of the Hudson’s Bay Company. As Don Bailey says, “the first churches, schools, community governments, courts, newspapers, and the legal records of much of this daily life were established in French as well as in English, and … for over three generations the region functioned in French or English or both languages simultaneously.”8 Gerald Friesen points out that this social equilibrium, which had been built up through the 1800s and was based to a great extent upon mutual understanding and tolerance among the various components of the Red River population, began to be threatened in the 1850s as in Upper Canada and Britain “The land came to be seen not as a wilderness but as a potential home for a great civilization.”9 Friesen adds that The Canadian movement to annex the West had acquired strength and influence in 1856–57 … It was led by a handful of men, perhaps twelve to fifteen in number, but their positions were so important and their commitment so genuine that they determined the fate of the western interior and, consequently, of the northern half of North America … As the powerful Toronto Reform party leader George Brown wrote in his paper, the Globe: “Let the merchants of Toronto consider that if their city is ever to be made really great … it must be by the development of the great British territory lying to the north and west.”10

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5 French-Language Rights, 1870–1976

This commitment was so all-consuming and contagious that it swept all before it, including, and perhaps especially, any opposition that might have arisen from the inhabitants of the region itself. It reached the Canadian parliament, which set out, immediately after Confederation, to negotiate a final transfer of the territory to Canadian jurisdiction. The Hudson’s Bay Company, in a typical display of insensitivity to the population of the region, viewed the transfer as a simple legal transaction. As William Morton puts it, “One of the greatest transfers of territory and sovereignty in history was conducted as a mere transaction in real estate.”11 The annexationist commitment was also greatly in evidence within Red River itself throughout the 1860s, as George Stanley points out: The newcomers who had entered the colony within the last ten years felt no sense of loyalty to the Hudson’s Bay Company or to the local government in the Settlement. On the contrary, many of them regarded themselves as the advance guard of a new economic and social order. All of them brought in their trunks and valises the political ideas and prejudices of the part of Canada from which they had come. Almost to a man they had come from Canada West or Ontario.12

The increasing agitation of this small group, under the leadership of John Christian Schultz, of whom it has been said that “Fate had manufactured a scoundrel out of material meant by Nature for a gentleman,”13 served to destabilize the settlement and generate anxiety among the settlers, especially among the French-speaking Métis: “What would happen to the old settlers, to their lands, to their simple economy, to their easy-going live and let-live bi-culturalism?”14 The upshot was the Riel resistance of 1869, which culminated in the establishment of a provisional government broadly representative of the entire settlement – French- and English-speaking Métis, Scots, Europeans, and Canadians – which was determined to negotiate the terms of Manitoba’s entry into the Canadian confederation.

th e l i s t s o f r i g h t s The French-speaking Métis spearheaded the resistance to the arbitrary annexation of the Red River territory by Canada. They were motivated mainly by fears about their economic, political, and social status within the “new order” and by a concomitant desire to ensure that their rights to their land, their religion, their language, and their schools would be guaranteed in it. These demands were codified in a first “list of rights” drawn up by the French Métis and ratified by the first provisional

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6 Manitoba’s French-Language Crisis

council on 1 December 1869. This first list provided, inter alia, “That the English and French languages be common in the Legislature and Courts and that all Public Documents and Acts of the Legislature be published in both languages” (section 10) and “That the Judge of the Supreme Court speak the English and French languages” (section 11). This first list, approved by both the English- and French-speaking representatives at the convention, made no mention of denominational or bilingual schools, perhaps because it was drawn up hastily during a two-hour meeting.15 A second list was drawn up and approved during the so-called Convention of Forty (consisting of twenty representatives chosen by the French-language community and twenty by the English) and approved, clause by clause, in early February 1870. Of this list George Stanley writes that “Throughout [it] one could see Riel’s anxiety to protect the lands, the local customs, the usages and languages of the people of his native country. Here too would be solid guarantees against a too violent change once the country should become part of Canada.”16 The clauses relating to language were identical, but this time they were numbered 12 and 13, respectively.17 The third list was drafted by Riel and the executive of the newly installed provisional government and on 22 March 1870 became the “terms and conditions” upon which the three delegates of the provisional government who were sent to Ottawa (Judge John Black, Abbé Jean-Noël Ritchot, and Alfred H. Scott) were to negotiate the entry of Manitoba into Confederation. Several major changes had been made to the second list, notably a demand for a bilingual lieutenant-governor. The wording of this new demand is almost a cri de coeur, an impassioned defence of the existing order in Red River and an appeal for unity following the execution of Thomas Scott on 4 March 1870: 17. That whereas the French and English-speaking people of Assiniboia are so equally divided in numbers, yet so united in their interests, and so connected by commerce, family connections, and other political and social relations, that it has happily been found impossible to bring them into hostile collision, although repeated attempts have been made by designing strangers, for reasons known to themselves, to bring about so ruinous and disastrous an event. And whereas, after all the trouble and apparent dissensions of the past, the result of misunderstanding among themselves, they have, as soon as the evil agencies referred to above were removed, become as united and friendly as ever; therefore, as a means to strengthen this union and friendly feeling among all classes, we deem it expedient and advisable;

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7 French-Language Rights, 1870–1976 That the Lieutenant-Governor, who may be appointed for the Province of Assiniboia, should be familiar with both the English and French languages.18

The fourth list of rights, which Ritchot, Black, and Scott actually took to Ottawa,19 contained two significant changes, the first relating to the nature of the constitution of the new province (there was provision, inter alia, for a legislative assembly and an upper house) and a demand for a separate school system. It would appear that Mgr Taché had a hand, directly or indirectly, in drafting this demand, since neither Riel nor the others involved in the earlier drafts (Ritchot, Georges Dugast, and W.B. O’Donoghue, among others) had included it.20 This omission may have been the result of simple naïveté on their part, since the denominational school system was taken for granted in the Red River in 1870; they may simply not have envisaged a potential change as radical as the abolition of this system, but the more sophisticated and worldly Taché certainly did. In the end, the negotiations in Ottawa proceeded on the basis of the fourth list;21 section 1 set out the government structure, section 7 the demand for separate schools, and sections 16, 17, and 18 demands regarding the use of English and French in the legislature and the courts and demands for a bilingual lieutenant-governor and a bilingual judge of the Supreme Court.22

th e m a n i t o b a a c t , 1 8 7 0 Negotiations with Ottawa were conducted at the highest level and included Sir John A. Macdonald himself and his Quebec lieutenant, Sir Georges-Étienne Cartier. They did not go smoothly; in the end, however, the provisional government achieved most of its objectives.23 On 6 May 1870 the House of Commons adopted the Manitoba Act by a vote of 120 to 11; it was assented to on 12 May and proclaimed on 15 July 1870.24 Section 9 of the act provided for an upper house and a Legislative Council, along with the Legislative Assembly. Sections 10 to 13 related to the Legislative Council, which was intended as a continuing, balanced linguistic and religious counterweight to the assembly. The act provided for appointment by the lieutenant-governor of up to twelve persons to the council, as of 1874. Section 14 provided that the Legislative Assembly would be composed of “twenty-four Members, to be elected to represent the Electoral Divisions into which the said Province may be divided by the Lieutenant-Governor,” as stipulated in section 16.

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8 Manitoba’s French-Language Crisis

Among the most important provisions for the French and Métis of the old Red River settlement were sections 22 and 23 of the new act: 22. In and for the Province, the said Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Education, subject and according to the following provisions: (1) Nothing in any such Law shall prejudicially affect any right or privilege with respect to Denominational Schools which any class of persons have by Law or practice in the Province at the Union: (2) An appeal shall lie to the Governor General in Council from any Act or decision of the Legislature of the Province, or of any Provincial Authority, affecting any right or privilege of the Protestant or Roman Catholic minority of the Queen’s subjects in relation to Education: (3) In case any such Provincial Law, as from time to time seems to the Governor General in Council requisite for the due execution of the provisions of this section, is not made, or in case any decision of the Governor General in Council or any appeal under this section is not duly executed by the proper Provincial Authority in that behalf, then, and in every such case, and as far only as the circumstances of each case require, the Parliament of Canada may make remedial Laws for the due execution of the provisions of this section, and of any decision of the Governor General in Council under this section. 23. Either the English or the French language may be used by any person in the debates of the Houses of the Legislature, and both those languages shall be used in the respective Records and Journals of those Houses: and either of those languages may be used by any person, or in any Pleading or Process, in or issuing from any Court of Canada established under the British North America Act, 1867, or in or from all or any of the Courts of the Province. The Acts of the Legislature shall be printed and published in both those languages.25

For most mainstream historians, these sections of the Manitoba Act made Manitoba a bilingual province where confessional rights were guaranteed. W.L. Morton, for example, whose definitive history of Manitoba was first published in 1957, writes that the Manitoba Act provided for “the official use of the French language,” which perpetuated in the new province “the old duality of Red River and the balance of English and French nationality on which Confederation rested.”26 In a more recent work, Manitoba historian Gerald Friesen writes that “the official status of the French language in the province” went unchallenged for the first twenty years of Manitoba’s existence.27 In J.A. Lower’s view, the Manitoba Act ensured that in the new province of Manitoba “The French and English languages were to be officially equal.”28 That most conservative of historians, Donald Creighton,

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9 French-Language Rights, 1870–1976

wrote in 1970 that Manitoba entered Confederation as a province “with a top-heavy bicameral legislature, modelled on that of Quebec, two official languages, and confessional schools.”29 Finally, in his seminal, though now dated, work Claude-Armand Sheppard wrote in 1971 that “official bilingualism” was provided by section 23 of the Manitoba Act,30 although he believed that the bna Act (and therefore section 23 of the Manitoba Act, which is virtually identical to section 133 of the bna Act, 1867) was “totally unsatisfactory and does not even provide minimum guarantees to either the French or the English minorities in Canada.”31 The 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms went a long way towards correcting this deficiency in Canada, and the Frenchlanguage crisis and its eventual resolution restored Manitoba’s bilingual status.

abrogation of rights, 1870–1890 The process of abrogating the hard-won rights of the provisional government led by Louis Riel, rights that by all appearances were guaranteed by the Canadian parliament and by the Imperial authority in language that could not be clearer, began almost immediately after proclamation of the Manitoba Act. The model of democracy to be implemented in Manitoba was to be the simple majoritarian one, the model of democracy in the mid-1800s in Ontario, where the Loyalists imposed their language and culture upon all others by majoritarian rule through the legislature. As the “Canadian” faction, members of which were virtually all from southern Ontario, grew from a few hundred in 1870 to thousands and then tens of thousands in the late 1870s and the 1880s, the authoritarian, intolerant nature of this “democracy” was clearly revealed. There can be no more obvious symbol of it than the elevation in 1889 of Sir John Christian Schultz to the position of lieutenant-governor, Schultz the “scoundrel” and sworn enemy of Riel and all that he stood for, the values and mores of the old settlement. A “new class” of Ontario Anglo-Saxons had come into power in Red River, and it dealt with the Métis more ruthlessly than even the most pessimistic among them must have envisaged in 1870, sweeping away, in a single generation, all the language, religious, and land rights they had wrested from the Canadian government. In 1875 Prime Minister Alexander Mackenzie made increases in federal aid conditional upon the abolition of the upper house; the Manitoba legislature concurred, with the apparent support of the French community, as expressed by Hon. Joseph Royal.32 The francophone (French-Canadian) community still believed that fair play and moderation would prevail in the end; otherwise it would not have agreed so

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10 Manitoba’s French-Language Crisis

readily to the elimination of one of the structural guarantees established precisely to ensure continued respect for their rights. Henceforth they were left only with the federal Parliament and the courts. Both, as subsequent history was to demonstrate, were but straw houses in the path of the emerging Ontario majority in Manitoba. In Morton’s words, “the modification of the Constitution of 1870 and of the principle of duality … by the growing weight of Ontario settlers in the electorate had begun.”33 And how had the new Ontario settlers acquired this growing weight? Paradoxically, through the implementation of sections 30 to 33 of the Manitoba Act, which had reserved 1.4 million acres of land for Métis children, mainly along the Red and Assiniboine Rivers beyond the existing settlements. Conversion of this land into “scrip” that was exchangeable on the market resulted in what became perhaps the greatest land grab in Canadian history: according to one estimate, over 90 percent of the children’s allotments, or over 1.3 million acres, was quickly sold by the Métis and became available on the open market, through speculators whose main market, in turn, was in Ontario.34 This did not occur by chance; according to D.N. Sprague, in the 1860s it became apparent that the main ambition of J.C. Schultz, one of the main speculators, was “cornering the land market in anticipation of the migration of pioneers from his native Ontario.”35 Thus, the Métis snatched defeat from the jaws of victory: the land that had been allotted to them in the Manitoba Act quickly turned into the means by which thousands of Ontarians could settle in Manitoba and subsequently challenge the Métis’ language, values, and religion. Their negotiators in 1870 could not have imagined a worse outcome or one more contrary to their aims.36 Many of the Manitoba Métis, who were mainly, but not exclusively, French-speaking, emigrated westward to Saskatchewan, where they met their final defeat in 1885, after which they became increasingly marginalized in Canada.37 In 1879 “an electoral redistribution reduced the French to about 6 or 7 instead of 9 seats in the 24-seat house.”38 This was inevitable in light of the growing influx of Ontario settlers; it was also another concrete sign of the vulnerability of the French and the Métis in the emerging political system. However, the worst by far was yet to come. In 1890, the imposition of Ontario-style majoritarian democracy in Manitoba was completed by the Liberal government of Thomas Greenway, which had come to power in January 1888. In that year, following an inflammatory speech in Portage la Prairie against Roman Catholic “special privileges” by Conservative and Protestant mp Dalton McCarthy,39 Joseph Martin, Manitoba’s attorney-general, “matched McCarthy’s fervour by promising to abolish the official use of French in

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Manitoba’s legislative publications and to terminate the dual educational system.”40 However, Friesen points out that the decision regarding abolition had in fact been taken before the Portage meeting and that “if McCarthy’s speech in Portage had an effect, it was to encourage the elimination of French-language rights, not Roman Catholic schools, because opposition to French was the burden of his message.”41 Be that as it may, it is clear that McCarthy’s words fell on fertile ground and encouraged the Manitoba government to go all the way in the abrogation of linguistic and religious rights. In 1890 three laws were adopted that were to sweep away virtually all guarantees enshrined in the Manitoba Act in 1870. These were, first, An Act Respecting the Department of Education, which abolished the former board of education, in which both Protestant and Catholic groups were represented, and established an advisory board of seven members with powers to authorize texts and prescribe religious exercises. Second, An Act Respecting Public Schools repealed all former laws relating to education and established a system of nondenominational schools instructing only in the religious exercises authorized by the advisory board. The word “nondenominational,” which, along with the word “nonsectarian,” is often used to describe these schools, is highly misleading; in fact, the intent of the Manitoba government of 1890 was to establish Protestant schools for all, in effect imposing one type of religious practice on the entire population. As Morton points out, “The Protestant clergy … were not prepared to accept schools which should be merely secular, or, as it was conventional to put it, ‘godless›; hence the “religious exercises” provision in the legislation.42 The third piece of legislation, the intent of which was to abolish section 23 of the Manitoba Act, was the Official Language Act, which declared English to be the only official language of Manitoba. With this act the last link with Canadian duality was ruptured. The Manitoba Act and the Canadian Constitution were shown to be worthless as guarantors of religious and language rights in the eyes of Francophones and anglophone moderates in Manitoba and elsewhere in Canada. Morton describes the scene in Manitoba’s legislative assembly at its proclamation: For one moment, as the Lieutenant-Governor stood before the legislature giving the royal assent one by one to the bills passed during the session, a wild hope rose in the breasts of the French as the titles of language and school bills were not read out in the order in which they had been passed. Were they to be reserved? But they had only been placed inadvertently at the bottom of the pile by the clerk. The harsh voice of Schultz intoned the formula of assent, the work of Taché and Riel was swept away, and the bills became the law of the province.43

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It has now been established that Schultz had acted on instructions of the prime minister himself. In a coded telegram dated 27 March 1890, MacDonald told Schultz that he thought it was “safer to assent to all Bills, leaving them to be dealt with here, afterwards.”44

th e l a u r i e r- g r e e n w a y c o m p r o m i s e , 1896 The Manitoba School Question quickly became a national issue and even led to the publication of a papal encyclical in 1897.45 The Macdonald government refused to intervene, forcing opponents of the legislation in Manitoba to appeal to the courts. Two cases, Barrett and Brophy, made their way to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London. The first was a crushing defeat for the Catholic opponents of the school legislation and, it has been argued, changed forever the character of the fledgling confederation.46 The second, in many ways contradicting the first, allowed that the federal government could indeed intervene should it so desire and, by the controversy it generated, “hastened the collapse of the federal Conservative government in 1896 and thus was an important factor in the victory of the Liberals under Wilfrid Laurier in that year.”47 Laurier immediately set about resolving the issue and the results of his negotiations with the Greenway government, which became known as the Laurier-Greenway compromise, were adopted by the Manitoba legislature as section 258 of the Public Schools Act in 1897. There were three elements in the compromise. First, where a specified number of Catholic children attended a school (forty in urban areas, ten in rural areas), Catholic teachers would be employed. Second, where the parents of ten children so requested, religious instruction would be held at the end of the school day by a priest or minister of their faith. Finally, in explicit recognition that the language issue was directly related to the religious issue, where ten children or more in a school spoke a language other than English, instruction could be in English and in the other language, “upon the bi-lingual system.”48 This provision applied to all ethnic groups, not only the French; it was to cause perhaps even more problems for Manitoba’s social and political system than would have been caused by a simple return to the pre-1890 status quo. Another effect of the provision was to equate the religious and linguistic demands of the Francophones with those of other ethnic groups who were beginning to arrive by the thousands from Eastern Europe and elsewhere. In other words, the Laurier-Greenway compromise was elaborated independently of the constitutional provisions of section 23 of the Manitoba Act, as though these provisions did not exist. The ef-

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fect was to reduce francophone Manitobans to the status of an ethnic group like the others and to provide some legal basis, however specious, for the argument that all ethnic groups, including Francophones, had essentially the same linguistic rights.

th e a b o l i t i o n o f b i l i n g u a l s c h o o l s , 1916 In abolishing the right of the French-language minority to its own schools in 1890, the Greenway government had sown the seeds of a much greater crisis for Manitoba society as a whole. A by-product of the 1890 school legislation was that school attendance was no longer compulsory; in addition, there was tremendous variation in the quality of education offered by the bilingual schools after 1897, with the result that The backwardness of Manitoban schools was becoming notorious in Canada and the English-speaking world, as the comment of Mr Herbert Samuel revealed in 1913 when he remarked that in the matter of education Manitoba was a generation behind the civilized world. The comment stung, and public opinion was at last being aroused to face the shortcomings of the rural schools. A series of sixty-four articles exposing the defects of the bilingual schools in the Manitoba Free Press during 1913 made it quite impossible thereafter to avoid the issue.49

In 1915, the Liberal government of T.C. Norris replaced Rodmond Roblin’s Conservatives, who had become embroiled in a scandal over construction of the legislative building. The following year, in the context of the First World War, which may have contributed to an increase in xenophobia among Manitobans and especially among the AngloSaxon majority, the Norris government decided to abolish the bilingual schools entirely and to outlaw instruction in any language other than English. The clause of the School Act providing for bilingual teaching, enacted as part of the Laurier-Greenway compromise in 1897, was simply abolished; French-speaking Manitobans were treated like other ethnic groups, even though as recently as 1915 “the Free Press and Premier Norris had been careful to admit the special position of French under the School Act.”50 Thus disappeared the last institutional guarantee of the French community’s rights – its schools – and thus began a fifty-year period of quiet resistance and the maintenance of a shadowy, illegal school system by the new Association d’éducation des Canadiens-Français du Manitoba, with the tacit cooperation of the Department of Education.51

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Apart from weakening even further the French-Canadians’ faith in British fair play, constitutions, and the rule of law, not to mention the judicial system, this latest legislative act had another, more profound divisive effect. A semblance of unity had been built up since 1890 among several recently arrived ethnic groups, notably the Ruthenians (Ukrainians) and Poles, through the efforts of Mgr Adélard Langevin. His strategy was quite simple: linking the Catholic faith with language. Thus, Ukrainian children, isolated from mainstream Manitoba society by language, could, in effect, be raised in a thoroughly Catholic environment.52 The “cement” uniting the groups across language barriers was the Catholic religion. This edifice crumbled at one stroke with the adoption of the 1916 Thornton Act, with an unfortunate sociological result. A former president of the Société Franco-Manitobaine (sfm), Gilberte Proteau, has described the process from the francophone perspective: Between 1890 and 1916, the French-Canadians had worked in close cooperation with other language groups in their struggle to preserve their language and their institutions, and to try to regain what they knew to be basic constitutional rights. Now, ironically, their alliance had backfired on them. The proliferation of multilingual schools had resulted in complete abolishment of all languages of instruction other than English … Thus died the strategy of cooperation between various ethnic groups and the Franco-Manitobans after 1920. Both World Wars, massive immigration and government insensitivity to encourage cultural diversity caused both groups to go their way. The Franco-Manitobans … lost all interest in the ethnocultural cause, preferring to struggle internally in order to preserve their language and religion. In some instances, Franco-Manitobans blamed ethnic groups for having been the reason that the provincial government abolished the rights of the Franco-Manitobans.53

th e j u d i c i a l s y s t e m a n d f r e n c h lan guage r ights, 189 0–19 16 For many decades, it was thought that Francophones in Manitoba had hotly contested the schools legislation of 1890 because they perceived the attack on their religion as even more fundamental than the attacks on their language, which started with the 1890 Official Language Act and culminated in the abolition of bilingual schools in 1916. At the same time, it was erroneously thought that Francophones had not tested the constitutionality of the language legislation in the courts. Thus, someone as well-informed and moderate as former Manitoba premier Duff Roblin could state in 1984 that

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15 French-Language Rights, 1870–1976 From 1890 up until 1978, everyone believed that the constitutional position was ok … Everyone! No one had apparently tested that. It never occurred to me. It just came out of the blue as far as I was concerned … It seems to me when looking at it now, it should be clarified because if you don’t, you always get the thing ticking around … For many, many years, we got along without anyone complaining about it, and I think a lot of people probably thought that Georges Forest was being a bit fussy in complaining about it, but it appears it led to a very, very important constitutional decision.54

It is true that throughout most of the twentieth century Franco-Manitobans did not prioritize judicial initiatives in their attempts to survive linguistically and culturally. There are at least two major reasons for this. First, the fifty years after Manitoba’s entry into Confederation had demonstrated how easily the Manitoba Constitution could be ignored as a source of protection of their basic rights: from 1890 on, the AngloSaxon majority simply did as it pleased, regardless of the constitution, with or without the support of the judiciary. Second, Franco-Manitobans were acutely conscious of their minority status from the mid1870s onward, which led to profound differences within the community itself as to the best strategies to adopt. Franco-Manitobans were confronted by a fundamental dilemma, being placed between the solid basis of their constitutional position, later fully substantiated by the Supreme Court decisions in the Forest case and the federal Reference on French-language rights in Manitoba, on one hand, and the need to arrive at some modus vivendi with the majority, on the other.5 In spite of these misgivings, Franco-Manitobans did go to the courts very quickly in 1892 and 1909 to have their constitutionally entrenched language rights upheld, and in both cases they won.56 Pellant v. Hébert, 12 r.g.d. 242 (St Boniface County Court) Joseph Hébert, a resident of La Broquerie, was a candidate in the mayoralty elections in his municipality. His candidacy was contested by Pellant on grounds that Hébert was semiliterate and could therefore not properly represent his electors. The documents submitted by Pellant’s lawyer to the court were in both French and English. Hébert’s lawyer countered that these documents were not admissible, being contrary to the Official Language Act of 1890. Judge L.A. Prud’homme ruled in favour of Pellant, stating unequivocally that the Official Language Act was unconstitutional. He pointed out the relationship between the wording of section 23 of the Manitoba Act and section 133

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of the bna Act, 1867, and indicated further that section 92 of the bna Act could not be used by a legislature to change its own constitution. In Prud’homme’s words, There is no doubt that s. 23 of the Manitoba Act, and s. 133 of the b.n.a. Act are analogous. The word “Manitoba” is substituted for the word “Quebec,” and that is all … The provincial legislatures have no inherent powers beyond those granted by this statute … I am therefore of the opinion that c. 14, 53 Vict. is ultra vires of the Manitoba legislature, that it cannot be changed much less abrogated by the legislature of this province. (tr.)57

The Greenway government simply ignored the decision: it neither appealed it to a higher court nor attempted to change the offending legislation. The government was thus in contempt of court, but the authoritarian Ontarian mentality that had led to adoption of the 1890 measures was not about to be transformed by a mere court judgment, and one rendered by a francophone judge, at that. This modus operandi was to be adopted by another Manitoba government in 1909 and again in 1976 by Attorney-General Howard Pawley in the first Forest decision handed down by Judge A. Dureault. Bertrand v. Dussault and Lavoie (1909), 77 d.l.r. (3rd) 458 Once again, in the Bertrand case documents had been submitted in French only, and the presiding judge, again Judge L.A. Prud’homme, established the parallel between section 23 of the Manitoba Act and section 133 of the bna Act. Judge Prud’homme reiterated his argument that provincial legislatures were not empowered to change elements of the section of the bna Act under which they had been established.58 Section 23 could thus not be modified unilaterally by Manitoba, and the Official Language Act was ultra vires. The government of the day adopted the same tactic in response to the judgment as the Greenway government had adopted in response to Pellant v. Hébert: total inaction, both at the judicial and at the legislative levels. Yet, as Jacqueline Blay points out, In these 1892 and 1909 judgments can be found all of the arguments used in the Forest case: the relevance of s. 23 of the 1870 Manitoba Act to s. 133 of the b.n.a. Act, the powers of, and restrictions upon, the provincial legislatures, the intentions of the Fathers of Confederation. And the conclusion was the same: there had been violation of the rights of a minority by a majority. (tr.)59

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bills 59 and 113 With the creation of the Association d’éducation des CanadiensFrançais du Manitoba in 1916, Franco-Manitobans, having lost all the constitutional guarantees enshrined in the Manitoba Act, in effect acted covertly to establish a minimal structure to maintain their linguistic and religious identity; that structure was the school. A curriculum for the teaching of the French language (and other subjects), especially in the lower grades, was developed and revised on an ongoing basis by the association, and a modus vivendi was developed with the Department of Education, particularly the school inspectors. Given the strong rural base of Francophones in Manitoba throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the worst effects of the school legislation could be obviated, with the result that the rate of language transfer, or assimilation into the anglophone majority, remained very low from 1916 to the 1950s. The initial distaste of Francophones for the urban environment had its cost, however. In the middle of the twentieth century, Francophones were virtually absent from the economic decision-making structures of the province. In addition, when urbanization hit the community, its members were almost totally unprepared to adapt their linguistic and cultural values to the city environment, with the result that assimilation rates began to shoot upwards during the 1950s. This change is dramatically noticeable in the 1961 Canadian census and in subsequent censuses. However, Francophones retained substantial influence in the political and educational spheres, an influence that was sometimes disproportionate to their actual numbers. For almost fifty years, from 1916 to the early 1960s, the matters of denominational schools and French-language rights, including the right to instruction in French, remained off the political agenda in Manitoba. Almost three generations of Manitobans were raised and schooled in the belief that Manitoba was an English-language province. Where there was a vague awareness of the French element in the history of the province, it was more often than not related to the fact that there were many other ethnic groups in Manitoba, and indeed that two of the non-British groups, the Germans and the Ukrainians, were more important numerically than the French. In the sixties, however, the winds of change were blowing across the Canadian federation, including Manitoba. Somewhat earlier, in 1952, the Campbell government had authorized teaching a “Français” course to the extent of one hour per day from grades seven to twelve, and the Department of Education had assumed responsibility for the development of

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curriculum, textbooks, and inspection for this instruction from the Association d’éducation des Canadiens-Français du Manitoba. In 1963, following introduction of a private member’s bill by St Boniface mla Laurent Desjardins, the Français course was legalized, by regulation, starting from grade one. In 1965 and again in 1966, Desjardins presented two amendments to the Public Schools Act that would have allowed the use of French as a language of instruction for other subjects; both bills were defeated. On 20 March 1967 George Johnson, minister of education in a Conservative government led by Duff Roblin, presented Bill 59 to the House, a bill providing for “the use of the French language for instruction in social studies and for such other subjects as the Minister may by regulation stipulate.” However, total French instruction could not exceed one-half the instructional time in any day.60 Members of all parties rose to speak to the bill, all of them favourably. Most of them pointed out the relationship between the bill and Canadian dualism and established a link between tolerance for the French language and the enhancement of the Manitoba “mosaic,” of other cultures and languages. New Democratic Party mla for Elmwood, Russell Doern, for instance, stated: I think that the people who phrased the Bill, the Minister and his advisors, have attempted to look at this very complicated question which tore this province apart many years ago, with some depth and some insight and I think they put it in a national context. They apparently did not look upon Manitoba as an isolated province or as an isolated area, but they seemed to regard our province as it should be; namely, a part of the Canadian framework.61

New Democratic Party mla Sid Green also clearly situated the legislation in the Canadian historical and constitutional context and eloquently pointed out the benefits to all ethnic groups of a tolerant, heterogeneous society that would allow such legislative recognition of a second language: Mr. Speaker, the people who are interested in maintaining some ties with their background, some tie with their language and some tie with their traditions, are wrong to argue that French is a minority grouping like every other minority grouping and should have the same privileges and rights as these minority groups. I think it’s to the benefit of the ethnic minorities that we recognize that Canada is not a homogeneous country, it’s a heterogeneous country, that it is a country which makes possible the living together of two founding nations, two founding people, in this case the French and English founders of our country.62

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Bill 59 was adopted unanimously by the Manitoba Legislature on second reading on 20 April 1967 by a vote of fifty-two to zero and on third reading on 26 April 1967. A new spirit of renewal and militancy within the francophone community brought about by the election of the Trudeau government in 1968 and the adoption of the federal Official Languages Act in 1970 led a growing number of Francophones to believe that perhaps the impossible could come true; perhaps instruction in the French language could be fully legalized again in Manitoba. The ndp had never held power in Manitoba, and the results of the provincial elections held on 25 June 1969, after which the npd needed a single seat to form a majority government, heightened the air of expectancy in the FrancoManitoban community, since public attention quickly focused on the riding of St Boniface. Long-time liberal Larry Desjardins kept winning re-election there, regardless of the vagaries of political life elsewhere in the province, and he found himself in a unique position on election night. On 26 June 1970, in the Manitoba legislature, he described the basis upon which he had decided to support the ndp under Edward Schreyer in forming a new government: The day after the election, I chose to support Mr. Schreyer in order that he could form a majority in the House and consequently form the present government of Manitoba. In short, the question for me was to make a choice between two men rather than two parties: Mr. Weir, leader of the Conservative party who had not shown himself to be sympathetic to the French Canadians or to the idea of a bilingual Canada; and Mr. Schreyer, who had during his campaign and on many other occasions, stated without ambiguity, his desire to see a bilingual Canada which would allow all Canadians to progress according to one or the other of the two official languages of Canada.63

Desjardins’s decision was endorsed enthusiastically at a large public meeting of his constituents in St Boniface, and he became a key member of the Schreyer cabinet. On 1 June 1970, Saul Miller, minister of education and youth in the Schreyer government, introduced Bill 113, an amendment to the Public Schools Act, to legalize instruction in the French language for all subjects except English where twenty-eight elementary pupils or twentythree secondary school students could be grouped together at their parents’ request for such instruction. A course in English was made compulsory from grades four to twelve. In practice this meant that instruction in Manitoba schools could be entirely in French from kindergarten to grade three and that up to 75 percent of total instruction

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time could be devoted to French from grade four to grade twelve. This amendment became the new section 258 of the Public Schools Act. Again this legislation gained the support of all parties in the House. Miller, speaking on behalf of the government, pointed out that during debate on the Official Languages Act, 1970, in the House of Commons, the representatives of all parties had made the point that “the provinces should follow the federal initiative in their own areas of jurisdiction wherever practicable and that in fact the real tasks involved in the nationwide implementation of the official languages principle lay with the provinces.”64 He went on say that at the constitutional conference of February 1968, where Manitoba was represented by the Conservative government of Walter Weir, “There was recognition that French-speaking Canadians outside of Quebec should have the same language rights as English-speaking Canadians within Quebec. Further, it was recognized that governmental action required to implement that principle had to be taken as quickly as possible in all provinces.”65 Adding that “Therein lies for the most part the motivation behind the bill that I am introducing today,” Miller went on: “needless to say we believe that the extension of official language rights in the provinces is both correct and a necessary measure geared to strengthening the bonds of Confederation and of course as long as the Canadian Federation remains, and so long as Manitoba is part of it, the two official languages of Canada must be enhanced as official languages in Manitoba.”66 As Russell Doern and Sid Green had done in 1967, Miller linked Canadian dualism with a heterogeneous, multicultural society – the Canadian mosaic – and announced that Bill 113 would provide, as well, for teaching of a language “other than the official languages of French or English” as a subject from as early as kindergarten or grade one with the approval of the local school board.67 On 26 June 1970, Bill 113 was adopted unanimously in the Manitoba legislature by a vote of forty to zero.

forest The adoption of Bill 113, along with the Official Languages Act, 1970, and the growing financial support of the secretary of state, provided a tremendous impetus to the Franco-Manitoban community, which became increasingly militant in demanding more funding and programs from government, mainly at the federal and provincial levels. At the provincial level, education remained the primary focus. Yet after two or three years under the new section 258 of the Public Schools Act (Bill 113), virtually nothing had changed within the schools of the province.

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With one or two exceptions, no French-language schools had resulted from this “permissive” legislation. It became clear to the Franco-Manitoban community that administrative support and a proactive approach were essential if French-language education was to develop in Manitoba. The creation of the Bureau de l’éducation française and of l’Institut pédagogique at the Collège universitaire de Saint-Boniface, both in 1974, and the appointment of the first assistant deputy minister responsible for French-language education in Manitoba in 1976 were milestones in the evolution of the French-language school system in Manitoba. The judicial saga of Georges Forest began in this context of renewed hope and enthusiasm within the French community and of militancy born of a new awareness of French-language rights in Canada and Manitoba. Almost single-handedly, Forest mounted the most important constitutional challenge to the linguistic status quo in Manitoba since the 1890s; this time, however, the outcome was to be victory for the French minority. The story began in March 1975, when Forest, a St Boniface insurance broker, found a ticket from the City of Winnipeg on his car for illegal overnight parking in front of his home at 44 Champlain St.68 Forest was known in the Franco-Manitoban community as a bit of a loose cannon. He had been active in the political arena, having been president of the Social Credit Party in Manitoba. He was a candidate for Social Credit in the 1968 federal election and had run for the presidency of the sfm during the 1970s; on both occasions he was soundly defeated.69 However, the summons changed his life forever; he decided to challenge the city’s right to issue summonses in English only and argued that the ticket was contrary to section 80(3) of the City of Winnipeg Act, which stated that “All notices, bills or statements sent or demands made to any of the residents of St. Boniface community in connection with the delivery of any service, or the payment of a tax, shall be written in English and in French.”70 In April 1975 he argued before city council that this section of the city’s charter should be respected. In October 1975 the city replied that the City of Winnipeg Act, and specifically section 80(3), did not apply, since a summons was a police service and thus was not covered by this section of the act. In November 1975, Forest returned to city council and requested that they ask provincial attorney-general Howard Pawley to define the extent of section 80(3). The city did not respond. On 6 February 1976, Georges Forest’s daughter Nicole left his car parked over the limit of one hour in front of his business at 160 Marion St in St Boniface; the car was ticketed a second time.71 This time Forest went to the St Boniface law firm headed by Rhéal Teffaine, who felt the case was minor and transferred it to his junior partner, Alain

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Hogue.72 Hogue would ultimately argue the case before the Supreme Court of Canada. However, as francophone lawyer Renald Guay later pointed out, Forest “just basically took off on everyone … on his own, and it was not at the initiative of the sfm or the community.”73 The Lone Ranger of Manitoba’s French-language rights was on the road to his place in history. Several months later, the city’s lawyer reiterated his position that the parking ticket did not come under the City of Winnipeg Act, and since it had not been paid, Forest received a summons to appear in the Traffic Division of Provincial Judges’ Court. Judge J.S. Walker gave the case an entirely new dimension by ruling, on 27 July 1976, that the ticket was not a mere notice from the City of Winnipeg but, on the contrary, a judicial document and that, as such, it came under the Official Language Act, 1890. Judge Walker ruled that the “specific provisions of the Official Languages [sic] Act take precedence over the more general provisions of the City of Winnipeg Act”74 and fined Forest $14.90 (the original $5.00 ticket plus costs).75 According to Blay, this is when Forest resolved to undertake his “crusade”; Judge Walker, in invoking the Official Language Act, 1890, had not only given him a cause; he had also given him a solid legal argument for taking the case to superior courts. The appeal was heard on 17 and 18 November 1976 in St Boniface County Court. Despite a warning by the crown attorney that the judge should consider the consequences of a ruling in favour of Forest,76 Judge Armand Dureault ruled that the 1890 law was unconstitutional. In arriving at his decision, Dureault quoted Supreme Court justice Bora Laskin, the Privy Council decisions on the schools question, and an article written by F.R. Scott in 1949, among other sources. He concluded, as had Prud’homme in 1892 and 1909, that section 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870, was a substitute for section 133 of the bna Act, 1867, “and consequently could not be amended by the legislature” (tr.).77 Finally, addressing the fears expressed by the crown attorney, Judge Dureault quoted Lord Mansfield: “The constitution does not allow reasons of State to influence our judgments: God forbid it should! We must not regard political consequences, how formidable soever they might be: if rebellion was the certain consequence, we are bound to say ‘fiat justitia, ruat caelum’ [Let justice be done even though the Heavens fall].”78 The affair now rebounded to the Schreyer government. The premier said his government would formally react the following January. The judgment, because of its far-reaching implications, also forced the French community itself to react. The initial reaction of the sfm was

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23 French-Language Rights, 1870–1976

lukewarm at best, certainly hesitant, and above all skeptical as to the ultimate impact upon the daily lives of Francophones in Manitoba. On 15 December, sfm president Gérard Archambault told a radio reporter, “We can demand all sorts of things, all sorts of institutions, if we don’t eventually work directly with the population, all of these institutions, these laws and these things we obtain will be of no use, and in that sense we are saying that our priorities are first to work with the population, to do community development so that one day we will benefit from the laws and institutions that are in place” (tr.).79 A key actor in the later Bilodeau case, lawyer Vaughan Baird, confirmed that “Mr. Bilodeau when he asked for assistance from the sfm … was rejected as was Forest. In the beginning they tried to discourage him from taking the case onward and they felt that he had caused a disruption of relations within the province.”80 Baird also pointed out that it was only when the Bilodeau case reached the Supreme Court level that the sfm intervened; it did not intervene at all in Forest. Beneath this difference in emphasis between Forest and Bilodeau (legalistic) and Archambault (pragmatic) lies the fundamental dilemma that has confronted the French-language community almost since the founding of the province: in pressing for respect of its rights, it would raise the ire of the majority, which has either been ignorant of or antagonistic to these rights. Francophones’ natural instinct to be “good neighbours” in their towns and villages has conflicted with their need to assert their fundamental rights, which, if Forest was right, went far beyond the modest gains that the 1960s and 1970s had brought until then. While the initial instinct of the sfm’s president was to come down in favour of a pragmatic and “gradualist” approach to French-language rights, the organization, as the political umbrella of the French community, could not stand by passively without providing some support to Forest. This was announced in a press release by the sfm on 16 December 1976: “For over three months, the sfm has given moral support to the struggle undertaken by Mr. Forest. It is obvious that this struggle directly concerns all Franco-Manitobans who care about their language. That is why the sfm believes it is essential to set up a special fund that will allow Franco-Manitobans to support Mr. Forest’s legal battle financially” (tr.).81 In the end, the sfm’s special fund contributed only $5,500 to Forest’s total legal costs. The balance was covered by Forest himself ($3,000) and by the federal government (over $70,000).82 In mid-January of 1977, Attorney General Howard Pawley’s department released its official reaction to the Dureault judgment:

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24 Manitoba’s French-Language Crisis 1 The Crown is prepared to proceed to hear the merits of this particular case. We do not intend to appeal the court’s ruling on the preliminary objection at this time, but do not accept the ruling of the court with respect to the constitutionality of the Official Languages [sic] Act. 2 The Crown specifically indicates that it does not accept the ruling of the Court vis-à-vis the Official Languages [sic] Act and is proceeding without prejudice to its position concerning this question. 3 The Crown wishes to indicate that in any case where the Act is brought into question it will not regard this ruling on a preliminary objection, which it now waives, as creating a binding precedent and reserves the right to argue the question in a case where it is material in issue.83

In short, while the Schreyer government had always professed and demonstrated goodwill towards the Franco-Manitoban community, in this statement the community learned precisely where the limits were. The Schreyer government was attempting a juggling act that, though juridically nonsensical, nonetheless made good political sense: to the Francophones it could point out its many accomplishments, especially in the field of French-language education; for the anglophone Manitobans who would never accept that Francophones had any special “rights,” especially not provincial ones, it would maintain a hard line, even to the extent of being in contempt of court. Its only rationale for this latter course of action, an extraordinarily groundless one, was that it would wait for a circumstance where the Official Language Act, 1890, would be “material in issue.” If it was not “material in issue” in this case, when would it be? How many other court decisions would be similarly ignored before the main issue of section 23 was confronted? In short, the Schreyer government reacted in exactly the same manner as the Greenway government did in 1892 to the first Prud’homme judgment and as the government of Rodmond Roblin did in 1909 to the second: it was to be business as usual, and the rule of law be hanged, at least in the area of language rights. Forest was caught in a bind. He could not appeal his own case, having won it; yet the victory was meaningless, since the government would simply ignore the Dureault court’s decision. A way had to be found to bring the issue to the next level, the Court of Queen’s Bench. Hogue, his lawyer, now had three precedents: the two early Prud’homme judgments and the new Dureault judgment. On this basis, he wrote the Queen’s Printer, with copy to the minister responsible, René Toupin, requesting the French versions of four laws. As Forest recalled it, Toupin said he could have them if he agreed to pay $50,000.84 On 23 February 1977, Attorney-General Pawley answered that nothing in the Dureault judgment would prevent the case being heard in En-

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25 French-Language Rights, 1870–1976

glish only, including the use of English-language statutes.85 The province also reduced the cost of translation of the four laws requested to $17,000. On 17 March 1977, Hogue attempted to file certain documents in French with the clerk of the Court of Queen’s Bench; they asked the court to order the attorney general of Manitoba and the minister of consumer affairs to translate the laws relevant to his case. The documents were initially accepted but subsequently, after discussion between the clerk and the Chief Justice, refused. Only one avenue was left: the Court of Appeal. Again, after consultations between the clerk and Chief Justice Samuel Freedman, the documents were refused. On 5 April 1977, Forest’s lawyers filed a request for a mandamus order forcing the government to give Forest satisfaction and to apply the Dureault judgment and informed the court that a constitutional matter would be placed before it.86 On 13 May 1977, while the matter was still before the court, Premier Schreyer announced he had no intention of abrogating the 1890 law, a gesture that maintained intact the lack of respect for the constitution demonstrated by the earlier Manitoba governments. Hogue’s attempt to have the case heard by the Court of Appeal failed; on 22 June 1977, the court directed that it should be heard by a lower court, the Court of Queen’s Bench, in the first instance. Chief Justice Freedman wrote the judgment for the majority and Justice Alfred Monnin dissented. Chief Justice Freedman confirmed Judge Dureault’s opinion that section 23 was indeed a part of the Canadian Constitution, having been adopted by the British Parliament; however, he also noted that section 2 of the Official Language Act, 1890, stipulated that “This Act applies only so far as Legislature has jurisdiction to enact.” Thus, Freedman wrote, if a court ruled that the 1890 act should not have been promulgated by the province of Manitoba, a declaration of unconstitutionality would not be appropriate, since the law clearly already did not apply where the legislature had no authority to act. In such a situation, the court should more appropriately declare that the act was inoperative in terms of the parameters defined by section 23 or, again, not applicable to such questions. This argument was to become a major element in the Court of Appeal’s own judgment on the Forest case some months later.87 Justice Alfred Monnin’s dissenting opinion is destined to be remembered mainly for its scathing comments on the January 1977 decision of the Schreyer government to ignore the Dureault judgment. Justice Monnin wrote that he had yet to encounter “a more arrogant abuse of authority,” adding that it was also “highly discourteous to the trial Judge.”88

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2 French-Language Rights in Manitoba, 1977–81: The Lyon Years

Though the right to instruction in French had been restored by the Roblin and Schreyer governments in 1967 and 1970 and though administrative measures had been taken to ensure the establishment of French-language schools in Manitoba through the 1970s, none of these initiatives had involved the Manitoba Act. Indeed, one could argue that these new “rights” were really not constitutionally grounded at all at the time, since they did not involve recognition of denominational schools, the only educational “right” stipulated in section 22 of the Manitoba Act.1 At another level, one could also argue – and several court decisions in the 1970s and 1980s have done so – that the historical context was crucial in defining the actual rights granted in 1870. By that test, if one goes beyond the “black letter of the law,” it is clear that the denominational schools protected in 1870 were also Frenchlanguage schools and that the legislative initiatives of 1890 were meant to abolish not only denominational schools but also schools where French was the language of instruction. In any event, it was clear in the eyes of politicians of all political parties throughout the 1970s that the school rights granted did not involve Manitoba’s constitution; therefore, in a certain sense the granting of these rights was an act of generosity on the part of the Manitoba legislature. For the French community, of course, it was a long-overdue recognition of fundamental rights guaranteed upon Manitoba’s entry into Confederation. With Forest, the ground shifted. Whereas for three generations Francophones in Manitoba had gone underground, concentrating upon sur-

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27 The Lyon Years

vival within their well-delimited, mainly rural communities and ensuring this survival through maintenance of de facto Frenchlanguage schools through subterfuge or accommodation with the Department of Education,2 Forest was a signal that the time of quiet accommodation was over and that for some Francophones at least, it was time to re-establish fundamental rights at all levels: in the courts, in the legislature, and in government services, as well as in the schools. Sterling Rufus Lyon was elected premier of Manitoba as leader of the Progressive Conservative Party in the general elections of 11 October 1977; his government was sworn in on 24 October 1977. Lyon, a direct descendant on his mother’s side of Ontario settlers who had established homesteads in the Portage la Prairie area in the 1870s and early 1880s, had been elected leader of the Conservative Party in 1975 after defeating the incumbent, Sidney Spivak, in a controversial election pitting rural against urban Tories.3 For Francophones, the Lyon years were years of denial, of denial that they were entitled to anything more than the legislature, out of the goodness of its heart, was willing to grant them and of continued denial of the existence of sections 22 and 23 of the Manitoba Act. Though there were attempts by the Lyon administration to head off what the attorney general’s department was surely pointing out as a potential crisis, there was no attempt to confront the problem at its root, at the constitutional level.

forest in the manitoba court of appeal In its judgment of 22 June 1977, the Manitoba Court of Appeal had refused to hear the Forest case, accepting the Crown’s argument that it should first be heard in the Court of Queen’s Bench. Following the Lyon government’s election in the fall of that year, the Crown retained the services of a new attorney, Kerr Twaddle, a former partner in Sterling Lyon’s law firm.4 Hogue alleged that the new government was employing delaying tactics in preventing a date for the hearing in Queen’s Bench, most significantly in calling into question, on 2 December 1977 (after sixteen months of court proceedings), Georges Forest’s standing in a case involving the constitutionality of legislation. Finally, on the initiative of Gerry Mercier, the new Lyon government’s attorney general, Twaddle, Hogue, and Forest met in Twaddle’s office on 10 February 1978. The meeting allowed an assessment of the parties’ respective positions but did not lead to a resolution.5 The following month, Forest received a guarantee of federal funding of his case.6 The stage was now set for a judicial confrontation of epic proportions.

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28 Manitoba’s French-Language Crisis

The Court of Queen’s Bench Judgment The Court of Appeal, in its decision of 22 June 1977, had clearly stated that it desired a first opinion on the constitutionality of the Official Language Act, 1890, from the Court of Queen’s Bench, holding that “the Queen’s Bench is the appropriate forum for the first hearing of this matter.”7 Chief Justice Dewar of the Court of Queen’s Bench, in his judgment handed down on 18 July 1978, refused to offer this opinion beyond stating that Judge Dureault had already provided an “unequivocal answer” to Forest’s first question to the Court, that is, whether the Official Language Act, 1890, was constitutional or not. Hogue’s appeal of Dewar’s judgment was heard by the Court of Appeal on 21 February 1979. Again the attorney general pursued his attempt to deny Forest standing in the Court of Appeal, leading to two hearings, the first to deal with Forest’s standing and the second with the substantive constitutional issue. The matter of standing was decided in Forest’s favour within an hour by the court.8 As to the substantive issue, Forest’s lawyers again argued that section 23 established the same rights as section 133 of the bna Act, 1867, and that both were constitutionally entrenched. Neither section, therefore, could be amended without the consent of both the Manitoba legislature and the Canadian Parliament. The rights of Francophones in Manitoba thus closely paralleled those of Anglophones in Quebec established under section 133 of the bna Act, 1867. However, taking note of Chief Justice Freedman’s comments in the earlier Court of Appeal judgment, Forest’s lawyers also argued that should the Official Language Act, 1890, not be found to be ultra vires of the Manitoba legislature, at the very least it should be found “inoperative.”9 In retrospect, this position may have been a tactical error on the part of Forest’s lawyers, since it opened the way for a compromise judgment by the Court of Appeal. The federal government argued in favour of Forest, while the provincial government argued strongly against him. The attorney general’s arguments were based mainly upon section 92 of the bna Act, 1867, which sets out matters that fall exclusively under provincial jurisdiction. In addition, the Crown pointed out that from 1871 to 1890, the provincial statutes were first promulgated in English, then translated into French. Section 23, then, imposed an obligation that was essentially procedural: the main stages were adoption by the legislature and the governor general’s assent; therefore the laws adopted since 1890 were valid.10 The Manitoba Court of Appeal Judgment Chief Justice Freedman delivered the judgment of the Manitoba Court of Appeal on 25 April 1979. At the outset, the chief justice chastised

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29 The Lyon Years

both Chief Justice Dewar of the Court of Queen’s Bench and the attorney general.11 On the substantive issue, the Court of Appeal’s unanimous judgment was a major, though not unmitigated, victory for Georges Forest. First, Chief Justice Freedman established, and accepted, the parallel between section 23 of the Manitoba Act and section 133 of the bna Act, 1867: “That conclusion flows inevitably from the similarity of language of the two sections. It is supported as well by their similarity of purpose, namely, the protection of minorities with regard to language rights. In Quebec, it would primarily be the English-speaking persons who would need this protection; in Manitoba, it would be the French-speaking persons.”12 Manitoba therefore entered Confederation essentially on the same basis in terms of language rights as Quebec. The chief justice then referred to the Blaikie case, a recent decision of Chief Justice Deschênes of the Supreme Court of Quebec that struck down several sections of the Charter of the French Language enacted by the Lévesque government in 1977 on grounds that they abrogated rights enshrined in section 133 of the bna Act, 1867.13 These rights, in Deschênes’s opinion, could not be unilaterally abolished by the provincial legislature without the approval of the Canadian Parliament. Freedman endorsed the point of view expressed in the following passage of the Deschênes judgment: It was the intention of the Fathers of Confederation to remove the question of the use of the two languages, English and French, from the possibility of the arbitrary, or capricious or even very simply of the wish perceived legitimate by the majority, whether English in the central Parliament or francophone in the Legislature of Quebec. They intended that this provision remain intangible and secure from all legislative intervention by one or other of the elected assemblies.14

As for Manitoba’s section 23, therefore, Freedman concluded that “It is plain that what confronts us here is the counterpart of what confronted the Quebec courts in the Blaikie case. There, the anglophone group was the victim. Here, it is the francophone group.”15 Freedman went on to make the link between the Deschênes judgment (which he endorsed) and the Official Language Act, 1890: The constitutionality of the Official Language Act must rest on the thesis that the provisions of section 23 of the Manitoba Act can be amended by a unilateral act of the legislature of Manitoba. In my view, that thesis is untenable … Section 23 cannot be amended unilaterally by Manitoba any more than other sections relating to the constitution of the union, such as ss. 91 and 92, dealing with the distribution of powers under the b.n.a. Act.

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30 Manitoba’s French-Language Crisis

Freedman eloquently recalled the link between Manitoba’s constitution, specifically sections 22 and 23, and Manitoba’s history, should there be any doubt on that score among the various intervenors in the case, and ruled that “the Manitoba Act embodies a constitutionally based right to the use by any person of English or French in the courts of Manitoba, and that that right cannot be unilaterally abrogated by the legislature of the province of Manitoba.”16 However, he stopped short of declaring the Official Language Act, 1890, in its entirety ultra vires of the Manitoba legislature. He rejected the argument that section 2 of this act was a “colourable attempt to make an ultra vires statute intra vires.” Regarding the adoption of statutes in both languages, he pointed out that “an agreed statement of facts suggests that so far as can be ascertained statutes were not adopted in French in Manitoba even before 1890”17 and added, as a further argument against declaring section 23 in its entirety ultra vires, that “Since this court was established by a statute enacted wholly in English after 1890, it could hardly be that we could make any declaration at all if the statute providing for our existence were not valid.”18 The chief justice conceded, with Chief Justice Deschênes, that perhaps there was a requirement under both section 133 and section 23 that there be official versions of statutes in both languages; however, It does not follow … that a failure to comply with the provisions of s. 133 or s. 23 has the effect of rendering the statutes invalid … I do not think it can be said that s. 23 of the Manitoba Act takes away the power of the Manitoba legislature to enact laws in relation to the subject matter of s. 23 … I think it is obvious that there is a need for regulatory legislation on language rights in Manitoba, in order to make s. 23 effective.19

In the end, and for the reasons advanced in his judgment, Chief Justice Freedman declared that “[T]he Official Language Act is inoperative insofar as it abrogates the right to use the French language in the courts of Manitoba, as conferred by s. 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870, confirmed by the b.n.a. Act, 1871.”20 Finally, Chief Justice Freedman admonished all concerned that constitutions can be made to work only if the spirit of them is observed as well as the black letters they contain, and if there is a disposition on the part of all concerned to make them work in a practical and reasonable way without, on the one hand, intransigent assertion of abstract rights and without, on the other hand, a cutting down and chipping away of those rights.21

Chief Justice Freedman’s judgment had several effects. First, it backed away from the global declaration of unconstitutionality of the

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31 The Lyon Years

Official Language Act, 1890, found in the Dureault judgment. Second, it narrowed the focus of unconstitutionality to the use of French in the courts. Third, it did not involve any declaration of unconstitutionality of other laws, apart from the Official Language Act, 1890, adopted in English only since 1890. Finally, it clearly indicated to the political authorities that the rights involved were indeed the rights of the French minority in Manitoba and that negotiations should be undertaken in the political arena to arrive at some accommodation as to the application of these rights. The Lyon government’s first reaction was to appeal the Freedman judgment to the Supreme Court of Canada. This reaction is understandable, since even with the reduced scope found in the Freedman judgment as compared to the Dureault judgment, a definitive interpretation was required. With great reluctance, it also undertook to implement minor measures aimed perhaps at preventing further legal action on the part of the francophone minority and perhaps also to indicate a certain amount of goodwill towards it. Significantly as well, in light of their subsequent intemperate attacks upon the sfm’s legitimacy, the Progressive Conservatives under Sterling Lyon held several high-level meetings with the organization in the years following the Manitoba Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of Canada judgments in the Forest case.

forest in the supreme court o f ca n a da One month after the Manitoba Court of Appeal delivered its judgment, Georges Forest requested and received from the court a broadening of the judgment making the Official Language Act, 1890, ultra vires in its entirety. There was thus no reason for Forest to proceed further.22 The provincial government immediately appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. In the meantime, the Lyon government had been granted intervenor status in the Quebec government’s appeal of the 1978 Deschênes decision in the Blaikie case to the Supreme Court of Canada. In that forum, Kerr Twaddle, on behalf of the province of Manitoba, argued in favour of Quebec’s Bill 101, stating that the bna Act, 1867, did not guarantee the language rights of minorities, either for Anglophones in Quebec or for Francophones in Manitoba.23 In effect, the Quebec and Manitoba governments were arguing that the powers of provincial legislatures had precedence over the rights of official language minorities and that provincial legislatures had exclusive powers in defining these rights. The federal government insisted upon the primacy of section 133. The appeal in the Forest case was heard by the Supreme Court of Canada on 10 October 1979. In anticipation of the judgment, the sfm set up an ad hoc committee to examine various scenarios. As they were

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32 Manitoba’s French-Language Crisis

to do often during the gathering crisis, the sfm’s advisors accurately foresaw the situation the Franco-Manitoban community would face should one scenario in particular come to pass: “Unless the decision is mandatory, which it will not be, it will be a Pyrrhic victory, therefore a defeat. The Manitoba government will be under no greater obligation to act than it was before the Dureault decision … In any case … we will soon have to start over from scratch” (tr.).24 The distinction here was between a mere declaratory decision and a mandatory one: the sfm’s advisors did not anticipate a mandatory one, given the Freedman judgment, which, though positive for Forest, left much leeway to the legislature to do as it wished in remedying Forest’s complaint, and given the actual question that had been placed by the province before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of Canada handed down its decisions on the Blaikie and Forest cases on the same day, 13 December 1979. The Blaikie decision struck down several clauses of Quebec’s Bill 101; this meant that all 311 laws that had been adopted in French only since adoption of the Charter of the French Language in 1977 were unconstitutional. The Quebec legislature sat through the night of December 13 and the early hours of 14 December 1979 formally adopting the “unofficial” English-language versions of these laws adopted since late 1977 to ensure they would remain in force.25 In the Forest case, the Supreme Court rejected the appeal of the attorney general of Manitoba, thereby letting the Freedman judgment stand. This judgment, as we have seen, simply declared the Official Language Act, 1890, to be “inoperative.” In separate reactions to the press, both Premier Lyon and Attorney General Mercier indicated that they would refer to the Manitoba Court of Appeal’s judgment in determining how the government should implement the Supreme Court’s ruling.26 When asked whether a constitutional amendment to the bna Act would be considered as a way out of the impasse, Mercier replied that “I’d rather not get into that at this stage.”27 Several years later, Roger Turenne28 recalled that he did “know from conversations with political staff of the former AttorneyGeneral [Mercier] that there had been discussions regarding a possible amendment. The hope was that if a Conservative Government less sympathetic to minority language rights were ever elected in Ottawa, an attempt might be made to reverse the gains made by Georges Forest in the Supreme Court.”29 The Manitoba government’s counsel, Kerr Twaddle, was prescient in recommending against going back to the Supreme Court to clarify its judgment, since he felt “it [was] likely that the Court [would] rule that the interpretation of ‘statute’ [was] more extended than Manitoba’s position.”30 It is obvious, then, that from the start the Lyon government wanted to be as miserly as legally possible in the recognition of French-

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33 The Lyon Years

language rights in Manitoba. Further, there is some evidence that it seriously considered the option of actively rolling back existing, judicially recognized French-language rights in the province. This is, of course, entirely consistent with the position taken by Manitoba in support of the separatist Lévesque government, as expressed by Twaddle in the Blaikie case. Other Manitobans had similar reactions. Sid Green, for instance, the former minister in the Schreyer cabinet, now repudiated his former position in favour of official bilingualism, arguing in favour of the supremacy of Parliament and stating that French should be an official language only in Quebec.31 This at a time when many Manitobans and other Canadians were overwrought with the possibility of Quebec voting “yes” in its referendum on sovereignty-association: on 6 February 1980, for instance, the City of Winnipeg piously adopted a resolution, drafted by councillor and future lieutenant-governor Pearl McGonigal, appealing to Quebec to remain in Confederation. What in reality was the status after the Forest judgment of all the laws adopted in the English language only by the Manitoba legislature from 1890 to 1979? What were the consequences of a law not having been adopted, published, and printed in French and English, as required by section 23? As Professor Joseph E. Magnet, who was soon to become one of the sfm’s lawyers, wrote in 1980: “Never has a judgment of the Supreme Court deliberately been more silent on such an important effect of its rulings; never has such silence brooded more portentous in Canadian law.”32 In retrospect, Forest’s victory was a hollow one. Two future presidents of the sfm would go so far as to say, years later: “Except for M. Forest, we at the sfm were convinced that, at the practical level, we had won nothing with the Forest decision” (tr.).33 Its major significance was in laying down a solid foundation for the ultimate challenge: a challenge that would aim at seeking justice for ninety years of unconstitutional legislative behaviour on the part of the province of Manitoba, a challenge that, if successful, would not only redress the existing injustices to the French-language minority in Manitoba but would also, as a by-product, invalidate most of the current laws of the province. The jurisprudence elaborated by Dureault, Freedman, and Deschênes and, finally, by the Supreme Court of Canada itself in the Blaikie No. 1 and Forest cases all led to the same conclusion, at least in the eyes of the Franco-Manitoban community: all Manitoba laws adopted since 1890 were invalid, period, even though no court, to date, had been willing to go all the way in declaring it. sfm staff read more into the judgment than was warranted. An internal document written by Ronald Bisson and dated 8 January 1980 reflected on the implications of Forest; it stated categorically that the judgment established “certain fundamental principles,” one of which

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34 Manitoba’s French-Language Crisis

was that henceforth “Every resident of Manitoba has the right to receive, in French, services provided by the various levels of government in the province” (tr.).34 Forest, of course, did nothing of the kind. This line of argument was, however, to be advanced repeatedly in the course of the crisis itself, particularly by sfm counsel Joseph Magnet himself, and was to lead to profound divisions within the Franco-Manitoban community. Indeed, if the existing section 23 of the Manitoba Act provided for French in the courts and the legislature and bilingual legislation, as well as French-language government services, why change it? Yet negotiations between the French community and the provincial government from 1982 to 1984 were to proceed on the assumption that existing section 23 did not in reality guarantee such services, an assumption that was later substantially but not, in my view, definitively borne out by the Supreme Court itself. In any case, the sfm immediately grasped the importance of the Forest judgment, if not its true implications. In a letter to Premier Lyon dated 16 January 1980 the organization’s president, René Piché, requested a meeting with Lyon “to exchange points of view on the recent Supreme Court judgment concerning the Official Language Act of Manitoba, 1890.” The sfm wanted to discuss “the practical and reasonable implementation of this Supreme Court judgment.”35 At Lyon’s suggestion, Piché redirected his request to the attorney general.36 The Lyon government, however, already had an implementation plan in mind. In a submission to Treasury Board dated 21 January 1980 the attorney general requested “translation resources to implement Supreme Court decision” involving over $500,000 in supplementary expenditures for the 1980–81 fiscal year.37 This expansion of the province’s translation services was announced in a press release by the government on 25 January 1980.38 If nothing else, these measures were an indication of the importance the Lyon government attached to the judgment. Another indication was the fact that Attorney General Mercier requested assistance in translation from his federal counterpart or the secretary of state on at least three occasions in 1980. A letter from Mercier to Secretary of State David MacDonald lists no less than eight ways in which the federal government could help.39 Help was solicited from elsewhere as well: on 29 February 1980 the Lyon government announced that Quebec was lending Manitoba three French translators for at least three months.40 On another front Attorney General Mercier moved quickly. On 21 March 1980 he wrote to Chief Justice Freedman informing him of a decision taken by Cabinet the previous day “to provide a translation service for all court documents, where necessary, and without cost to

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35 The Lyon Years

the litigants.” For the Court of Appeal, the Crown intended to develop “a simultaneous translation service for oral submissions where necessary.”41 A few months later, Twaddle pointed out that it was “not a requirement of the law that Court process be in both official languages and that a process in English only is entirely valid.”42

th e s m i t h a n d g u a y c a s e s Some lawyers and constitutional experts immediately saw the possibilities for legislative chaos inherent in the Supreme Court’s Forest judgment, although none reacted as dramatically as Professor Stephen Scott of McGill University who, on 14 December 1979, a few hours after the fall of the federal Progressive Conservative government of Joe Clark, sent a telegram to Governor General Edward Schreyer to Respectfully recommend that before dissolving parliament you require government to secure joint resolution of Senate and House of Commons in the following or like terms: resolved that the government be authorized to secure from the United Kingdom Parliament such legislation as may appear urgently required to render valid some or all the laws or purported laws of the province of Manitoba, during such reasonable time as may be required to bring the province into compliance with section 23 of the Manitoba Act, and to deal with related matters.43

Schreyer responded three days later, telling Scott the prime minister had been informed of his concerns; however, no further action was taken.44 Certainly, there was no shortage of younger Franco-Manitoban lawyers who were willing to go to court to attempt, as it were, to grab the gold ring. Forest had rendered inevitable the ultimate challenge – the challenge to the validity of virtually all Manitoba laws on grounds that they had been adopted in English only. If the courts at all levels were unwilling to answer the question, Franco-Manitobans were certainly not unwilling to ask it. Indeed, several of them suddenly became rather careless in their driving habits: Renald Guay, himself a brash, young Jesuit-trained Franco-Manitoban lawyer with a Machiavellian mind,45 later recalled those heady days: “I felt that the sfm rather than being an intervener in the Forest case should be the party … so a lot of lawyers, including myself and Robert Bétournay were going up and down the highways speeding all the time, I mean I’m being a little bit facetious, but we did manage, the three of us, in different cars on the same date all to pick up speeding tickets on Highway 59. Do you believe that? Just by coincidence.”46

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36 Manitoba’s French-Language Crisis

The first to go to court was Rémi Smith, a young Franco-Manitoban lawyer from St Boniface.47 On 10 October 1978 Smith had received a speeding ticket under the Highway Traffic Act. He had appeared in Provincial Judges’ Court on 13 July 1979 and lodged an appeal in County Court, where he appeared on 5 February 1980, arguing that the act was unconstitutional under section 23 of the Manitoba Act, having been enacted, printed, and published in the English language only. Judge Jewers had agreed to reserve his judgment, given that the matter was under consideration in the Supreme Court of Canada. On 5 February 1980 Judge Jewers handed down his judgment and held section 23 to be directory only,48 adding that if laws of Manitoba were to be found invalid on grounds that they had not been adopted in both English and French, this would lead, if not to “chaos” then at least to “serious inconvenience to an innocent public.”49 On these grounds, Jewers rejected Smith’s appeal. Hard on the Smith decision, Renald Guay appeared in St Boniface County Court on appeal of a decision handed down by Judge J.B. McTavish of the Provincial Judges’ Court on 23 May 1979. Judge McTavish had ruled that the word “shall” used in section 23 of the Manitoba Act “was a directory, not a mandatory ‘shall’ and, therefore, in my opinion, Section 133 of the b.n.a. Act as well as Section 23 of the Manitoba Act use the directory ‘shall.’”50 In Guay’s appeal, Judge A. Dureault, who had found the Official Language Act, 1890, to be ultra vires of the Manitoba legislature by virtue of section 23 of the Manitoba Act in the first place, this time sided with Judge Jewers. Judge Dureault first pointed out that The very question raised … has already received judicial consideration. My brother Jewers Co. Ct. J., in the yet unreported judgment of The Queen and Smith … has dealt fully and extensively with the same ground of appeal. There is now an authoritative decision upholding the constitutional validity of the Highway Traffic Act notwithstanding its enactment, printing and publication in the English language only, in apparent contravention to sec. 23 of the Manitoba Act. The principle of stare decisis makes this judgment binding on the court.

Quoting extensively from the Jewers judgment in the Smith case, Judge Dureault concluded, “That reasoning appeals to me and I adopt it without reservation. Indeed I find myself in full accord.”51 Thus the judge who was willing in 1976 to uphold the law even if the heavens should fall found himself four years later backing down in the face of the concrete implications of his own earlier decision.

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The flurry of judicial activity regarding language rights in this period was not confined to Manitoba. On 6 April 1981, the Supreme Court of Canada handed down a decision that became known as Blaikie 2, stating that section 133 of the bna Act did not extend to municipalities or school boards. In view of the parallel drafting of this section and section 23 of the Manitoba Act, this judgment became relevant during the 1983–84 language crisis. In subsequent years, it became relevant for another reason: Blaikie 2 established the language requirements in the area of delegated legislation (regulations) and to rules of practice enacted by the courts and quasi-judicial tribunals. Kerr Twaddle quickly pointed out to Attorney General Gerry Mercier that in light of this judgment, most orders-in-council adopted in Manitoba would have to be bilingual.52

b i l l 2 : th e ly o n g o v e r n m e n t r e a c t s The initial response of the Lyon government to the Forest decision was narrowly legalistic; Chief Justice Freedman’s admonition for government to go beyond the “black letters” of the constitution and his implied suggestion that negotiations should be initiated with the Frenchspeaking community to develop a compromise approach to implementation of section 23 fell on deaf ears. Though initially the Lyon government gained credit among Francophones by announcing its intention to move quickly on translation of statutes, their hopes for rapid gains, especially in the field of French-language services, were quickly dashed.53 The sfm invited Attorney General Mercier to speak at its March 1980 annual meeting. Given the constitutional breakthrough represented by Forest’s victory, it was felt by the sfm organizers that the Lyon government should be given this forum to announce its intentions for the future. The Mercier speech was a major disappointment to the Franco-Manitoban community, and it merely confirmed its long-standing cynicism towards most previous Manitoba governments. Mercier intimated that the province had already gone beyond the letter of the law in deciding to provide, at cost, translation services for litigants to permit witnesses and counsels to speak in either official language. The message was clear: bilingualism in an officially bilingual province would be limited to the legislature and the judicial system. Nothing was said about making French-language schools or immersion programs more widely available, about having drivers’ licences or birth certificates in either official language, about providing social, cultural, recreational, or agricultural services in French.54 The message was made even more explicit a few days later, when a spokesman for the

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Lyon government indicated to the Winnipeg Free Press that the government did not have any “immediate plans to make the full range of … [its] services available in both languages.”55 The Lyon government’s narrow approach to the Forest decisions was reflected above all in the tabling, on 7 April 1980, of Bill 2, An Act Respecting the Operation of Section 23 of the Manitoba Act in Regard to Statutes. (The bill itself was in both languages; however, neither the clerk nor the administrator understood French well enough, so both decided not to sign it.)56 Bill 2 repealed the Official Language Act, 1890, and replaced it with provisions for the adoption of bills in both English and French. However, such adoption was not obligatory, as the wording of section 4(1) clearly indicates: Where a Bill for an Act that was introduced in the Legislature was printed in only one of the official languages and was enacted before a translation thereof into the other official language was available, if subsequently there is deposited with the Clerk of the House a translation of the Act into that other official language … that translation of the Act into that official language shall, for all purposes, be valid and of the same effect as the Act in the official language in which the Bill for the Act was printed, from and after the date of the enactment of the Act.57

In addition, provisions were included to ensure that the authoritative version of laws adopted by the Manitoba legislature would, in effect, be the English-language version. Section 2 reads as follows: Where the meaning of a provision of an Act in one official language conflicts with, is repugnant to or is inconsistent with the meaning of the corresponding provision of the Act in the other official language (a) the provision in the official language in which the Bill for the Act was printed when copies thereof were first distributed to the members of the assembly in the assembly prevails over the corresponding provision in the other official language.

As for the statutes adopted from 1890 to 1980, 3(2) For greater certainty in the interpretation of the statutes of the province heretofore enacted, the Bills for all Acts heretofore enacted shall be conclusively deemed to have been printed in the English language when copies thereof were first distributed to the members of the assembly in the assembly.

In other words, it was to be business as usual. A great constitutional victory for the francophone community was turning out to be virtually

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meaningless. Not only had the Lyon government attempted to legitimize ninety years of unconstitutional legislative behaviour, it had enshrined in law the primacy of the “official” English language over the “official” French language. The government had thus turned the Forest decisions, which had reestablished the equality of both languages, on their head. Sterling Lyon had used the “black letters” of the Freedman judgment to absolve the legislature of virtually any obligation to adopt statutes in both languages. Indeed, had not Chief Justice Freedman stated clearly that “It does not follow … that a failure to comply with the provisions of s. 133 or s. 23 had the effect of rendering the statutes invalid”? Had he not implied that section 23 was merely “directory” and not “mandatory”? To many Francophones, the judicial system and the Manitoba legislature had once again conspired to grind their hardwon language rights to dust. Sterling Lyon’s patronizing attitude towards the French-speaking community and his refusal to couch even the tabling of Bill 2 in terms of rights stands out in the remarks he made in the House on second reading of the bill on 7 April 1980. First he recalled Manitoba’s history, with particular reference to the demographic evolution of the province through immigration. Without specifying them, he then referred to “certain informal or unofficial accommodations made under which the French language continued to be used, more through a spirit of fair play and compromise which motivated, as I suggest, Mr. Speaker, and continues to motivate most Manitobans, rather than by legal decree.”58 The Supreme Court judgment had restored “the full effect of Section 23 of the Manitoba Act.”59 Finally, the premier situated the legislation in the context of the Canadian nation, stating that “The provisions of Bill No. 2 are of a technical nature – it is true – but they will be understood throughout Canada as an indication of our loyalty to the national identity of Canada, and of our firm commitment to the rule of law and to our respect for the guaranteed rights of Canadians as set forth in our constitution.”60 Towards the end of his remarks, Lyon gave a muted indication of the pressures against any kind of recognition for the French language which he may have felt personally through his constituents or in his caucus: “I recognize, Mr. Speaker, that not all Manitobans will support wholeheartedly the actions which the government is now bound to take. Those actions, however, I suggest are absolutely necessary in the national interest and in fairness and equity to our fellow Manitobans whose mother tongue is French.”61 The leader of the ndp opposition, Howard Pawley, told the House that “the general nature of this bill will be supported by the opposition.” However, he pointed out that action was also required in major areas

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related to the French language in Manitoba, including the extension of immersion programs, the training of civil servants to provide French-language services to Francophone communities, bilingual facilities for mlas, and the provision of services to local government districts and municipalities “to assist and to facilitate growth of those services in French in those communities.”62 The mla for St Boniface, Larry Desjardins, deplored the government’s “strict interpretation of the letter of the law.”63 However, Desjardins’s grievance related only to the translation into English in Hansard of remarks he had made previously in the House. He pointed out that he had spoken French in the House, “as is my right, only to discover that if I have the right to speak French I do not, however, have the right to be understood.”64 New Democratic Party mla Russell Doern told the House that through Bill 2, “we will become officially bilingual … I have no problem in supporting this measure,” adding that “many more steps must be taken.”65 The ndp opposition did not denounce Bill 2 but tacitly accepted that this was about as far as the legislature could go in putting the Forest judgment into effect. Several Franco-Manitoban lawyers, however, quickly came to the conclusion that Bill 2 was a subterfuge on the part of the Lyon government to allow it to ignore its obligation to translate any statutes at all; further, in light of the government’s minimalist interpretation of the Forest judgments in Bill 2 and its lack of commitment to action in areas relating to the French language but not strictly covered by section 23, the Forest decisions would have to be tested to the limit, again in the courts.

ro g e r b i l o d e a u g o e s t o c o u r t On 29 May 1980, Roger Bilodeau, a native of Ste-Agathe, Manitoba, and a University of Moncton law student who had returned to Manitoba to article with a Winnipeg law firm, received a speeding ticket, thus joining a growing number of his lead-footed colleagues.66 The lawyer chosen by Bilodeau to represent him, Vaughan Baird, a bilingual Progressive Conservative francophile, requested that the charges against his client be dismissed, arguing that the summons issued to him was invalid because the Highway Traffic Act and the Summary Convictions Act were ultra vires and therefore inoperative, having been printed in English only, contrary to the provisions of the Manitoba Act. Chief Justice Harold Gyles of the Provincial Judges Court dismissed Bilodeau’s motion on 29 August 1980.67 The Bilodeau case, coming on the heels of Smith and Guay, prompted some soul-searching on the part of the sfm: on one hand, a

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growing number of Francophones impatiently wanted to test the limits of the Forest judgment; on the other hand, the process, in the sfm’s view, should not be anarchical, since a careless, willy-nilly approach to testing Forest could be disastrous in the long run for the Francophone community.68 Bilodeau’s appeal to the Manitoba Court of Appeal was heard on 23 February 1981 and the Court’s decision handed down on 7 July 1981. The federal government was granted intervenor status at the hearing; significantly, it argued against Bilodeau, on grounds of “the compelling logic of reality.”69 The Court of Appeal’s decision constituted a major setback, not only for Bilodeau but also for the entire French-speaking community of Manitoba. Chief Justice Freedman summarized the import of the Bilodeau appeal: “If M. Bilodeau is right, then not only are these two statutes invalid but all statutes enacted since 1870 (except the few enacted in both languages during the 1980 session) are equally invalid. The issue now confronting us is whether the non-compliance with the provisions of s. 23 rendered the statutes invalid.”70 The chief justice then referred to his own court’s previous judgment on the Forest case, to the effect that “It does not follow, however, that a failure to comply with the provisions of s. 133 or s. 23 has the effect of rendering the statutes invalid.” He elaborated on the distinction between “mandatory” and “directory” statutes, mainly using the factum of the attorney general of Manitoba presented by Kerr Twaddle: “There is an impressive body of jurisprudence emphasizing the distinction between statutes that are mandatory or imperative, on the one hand, and statutes that are directory, on the other. Mr. Twaddle, counsel for the Attorney General of Manitoba, has dealt with this subject in his factum, and I have derived great assistance from it.”71 Chief Justice Freedman then came to his main point: “Virtually every statute in Manitoba is invalid, if we give to s. 23 a mandatory effect. The result is indeed chaos.”72 He then succinctly summarized the Court of Appeal’s position on section 23, namely, that “the language requirements of s. 23 are directory only, and not mandatory.”73 Justice Monnin distinguished between the situation before the Supreme Court’s Forest judgment and after it, pointing out that even after Forest, the Manitoba legislature was still in breach of section 23, adding that since 13 December 1979 “the invalidity can no longer be excused. The statute is clear – it gives rights which must be complied with.”74 He also accurately summed up the feeling of defeatism among many members of the Franco-Manitoban community in the face of the Lyon government’s obdurate refusal to attempt to come to grips with the major constitutional change brought about by Forest in ways that would have been meaningful for the French community. Some months earlier,

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these feelings of virtual despair in some Francophone quarters had led the sfm to take a dramatic and controversial position in the Quebec referendum on sovereignty-association.

th e sfm a n d t h e q u e b e c r e f e r e n d u m The Lévesque government had set its referendum requesting a mandate to undertake negotiations with the government of Canada on sovereignty-association for 20 May 1980. On 1 April 1980 (April Fool’s Day, as some of the sfm’s francophone critics pointed out), Gilberte Proteau, who had been elected president of the sfm only a week earlier, called a press conference and announced that the sfm was supporting the “yes” side in the Quebec referendum. At the annual sfm meeting held a week earlier, the new executive had been given a mandate only to study the effects of taking a position on the “yes” or the “no” side. The resolution adopted at that time read as follows: “That the sfm undertake a study of the effects of a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’ in the Quebec referendum upon the Franco-Manitoban community” (tr.).75 In light of this innocuous directive from the general membership (about six hundred sfm members attended the annual meeting), the sfm’s support for the “yes” side was a bombshell within the Frenchspeaking community. Several francophone leaders immediately denounced the sfm’s position, including the mla for St Boniface, Larry Desjardins, prominent lawyer Rhéal Teffaine (whose law firm had taken Forest’s case to the Supreme Court and won), and city councillors Guy Savoie and Georges Provost.76 The damage, however, had been done. Rumblings among certain francophones against the sfm’s isolation from the concerns and opinions of ordinary French-speaking Manitobans became more explicit, and a group centred around Maurice Prince, director of the St Boniface Museum, and Georges Forest set up a splinter organization called Le comité Pro-Canadien. This group, though it rarely, if ever, held public meetings of its own and though its membership was always nebulous at best, subsisted through the 1983–84 language crisis. It caused considerable embarrassment to the sfm by disagreeing publicly with it on several occasions, thereby playing into the hands of the opponents of the government’s language proposals. The sfm’s support of the “yes” side in the Quebec referendum was to have another effect, which was to confirm the suspicions of those Manitobans who wanted to see in any Francophone a transplanted Quebecer or, worse, a closet separatist. Here was proof: FrancoManitobans were not really Manitobans at all but were virtually traitors in supporting the separatist cause at a critical moment in the his-

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tory of Confederation. These feelings, which were strongly held by many Manitobans, were to have a significant impact in the coming crisis. For the record, Gilberte Proteau’s position as presented at her press conference, however naive it may have been, was that the sfm’s “yes” was a “yes” to negotiation of a new deal for the French language throughout the country, including Manitoba, since the status quo was untenable. Her position, it must be recalled, was elaborated in the wake of an annual meeting where, following the greatest constitutional victory for Franco-Manitobans since Manitoba’s entry into Confederation, the attorney general for Manitoba and other government spokesmen were indicating that the Francophones had, in effect, won nothing; it was going to be “business as usual” within the provincial government, with perhaps a few bilingual laws thrown in as token recognition that French could indeed be used occasionally within government, as a matter of “courtesy” and “goodwill.” In addition, Attorney General Mercier’s comments at the sfm’s annual meeting had generated such frustration among sfm staff that they saw a radical gesture as the only solution.77

th e n a t i o n a l d e b a t e o v e r constitu tional chan ge, lan guage rights, and the charter of rights The process of constitutional reform that had been ongoing throughout the 1970s and that gained renewed impetus with Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s re-election in 1980 was critical in shaping Sterling Lyon’s approach to language rights in Manitoba. Lyon had consistently opposed the entrenchment of rights generally, at least since the 1960s. The crucible of the patriation process initiated by Trudeau in 1980 and Lyon’s personal antipathy to the prime minister solidified this opposition to the proposed entrenchment of a bill of rights generally and, eventually, of language rights specifically. On 16 April 1981, the Gang of Eight premiers (excluding the premiers of Ontario and New Brunswick) met to determine their final position regarding constitutional change; the consensus excluded a Charter of Rights, and there were reports that Premiers Lévesque and Lyon were primarily responsible for having ensured that a charter proposal would be excluded from the premiers’ final position. Under heavy questioning in the legislature on 20 April 1981, Premier Lyon repeated his position (which had now become the stated position of the eight premiers) that “[W]e should not be asking the Parliament at Westminster to be enacting as part of the law of Canada substantive

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provisions with respect to a Charter of Rights or any other matter that do not carry the support of eight of the ten provinces of this country. That is fundamentally wrong, and the provinces will not, and have not, and will not agree to that.”78 On 12 May 1981, Premier Lyon tabled a constitutional resolution in the legislature that reflected the solidarity of the eight premiers, among whom it is certain that René Lévesque played a major role, and that also reflected the great personal antipathy of both Lévesque and Lyon towards Prime Minister Trudeau. It also demonstrated a bunker mentality that, in effect, dared the federal government to “invade” what, in the eyes of Quebec and of Manitoba, was their sacred preserve, their provincial rights. The preamble succinctly laid out the premier’s political philosophy: “whereas the Legislative Assembly of Manitoba is committed to a united Canada under a Federal, Parliamentary, Monarchical system of government, and to our traditional constitutional methods of maintaining and enhancing the basic rights of all our citizens.” The resolution went on to denounce “the current unilateral action by the Government of Canada to amend the Constitution” as “divisive and destructive of the federal nature of our country” and resolved that the legislative assembly reject the amendments to the Constitution proposed by the federal government and “approve the patriation of the British North America Act with an amending formula to be agreed by the Parliament of Canada and the provincial Legislatures.” The resolution also urged the “resumption of negotiations” between the federal and provincial governments on an amending formula.79 The euphoria following the victory of the “no” side in the Quebec referendum had thus come down to maintaining the status quo, with the sole exception that Canada would have patriated its own constitution with no change and no amending formula. Sterling Lyon’s firm anti-Charter position and his visceral antipathy to Pierre Trudeau had combined with René Lévesque’s astute manipulation of the provinces against any substantive constitutional change to produce a draft constitutional resolution in the Manitoba legislature that was so limited in scope as to be virtually meaningless as a tool for renewing the federation. For the last time as premier of Manitoba and as a participant in the process that led to ultimate adoption of the Constitution Act, 1982, Sterling Lyon set out his philosophy regarding the Constitution of Canada. After denouncing the “basic affront that is being made by the Federal Government,” Premier Lyon couched his subsequent comments in terms of “the part that we have to play today to enhance the preservation of that unity [of Canada] against forces that are aligned against the

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unity of Canada in a way that has not been seen before perhaps in our history.” However, these “forces” were not defined: were they the separatists, led by Lyon’s colleague René Lévesque, or were they Trudeau’s Liberals? Later in his remarks, Lyon denounced the separatists but did not, at any point, explain how he and Lévesque could find common cause in the fight against Trudeau. The only explanation appears to be that provincial rights and parliamentary supremacy, in both these premiers’ eyes, superseded human rights and minority language rights. On 26 May 1981, the Lyon government’s constitutional resolution was adopted without amendment by a vote of twenty-nine to eighteen.

th e f r e n c h l a n g u a g e s e r v i c e s secretariat In the spring of 1979 the Lyon government had obtained the secondment from the federal government of René Préfontaine, whom Duff Roblin had abortively attempted to recruit to his Cabinet in 1962. A former secretary of the Association d’éducation des CanadiensFrançais du Manitoba, a position he held in 1959 and 1960, Préfontaine had also been secretary-general of the Manitoba School Trustees Association; he thus had credibility among both Francophones and Conservative Anglophones. In 1979, Préfontaine was appointed Manitoba’s deputy minister of cultural affairs and historical resources. Following the Forest judgments, Préfontaine was asked by the premier to draft a position on French-language services in Manitoba; his report was submitted by Premier Lyon to Cabinet on 6 October 1980. The Lyon Cabinet, having already recognized the principle of English and French as official languages of Manitoba in Bill 2, was about to embark, however modestly, in the direction of provision of government services in both languages that would give tangible form to the principle. On 5 December 1980 the minister of cultural affairs and historical resources, Norma Price, and Attorney General Gerry Mercier met with the president of the sfm, Gilberte Proteau, and the organization’s executive director, Lucille Roch. A working document presented by the sfm at that time suggested “that the government organize a ‘Service de langue française du gouvernement› under the Department of Cultural Affairs. This “service” would have two functions: “a) explain and promote French language services internally to government employees and departments; b) explain and promote the use of these services to the French language clientele of this province; this of course includes Francophones, Immersion schools, Parents for French, etc.” The sfm also requested additional recreational services in French in francophone areas of the province.80

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On 20 March 1981, Premier Lyon announced the establishment of a new French Language Services Secretariat in the legislature, pointing out that French was the “official minority language.”81 However, Lyon took care not to relate provision of French-language services to the province’s obligations under section 23 of the Manitoba Act in the wake of the Forest decisions. The sfm’s reaction to the premier’s announcement was positive, though privately many of its members knew that establishment of the section was only a small step towards a much larger goal, implementation of French-language services throughout the provincial government apparatus. In April 1981, the Civil Service Commission approved a classification at the executive level of a “senior consultant,” one of only five positions reporting directly to the deputy minister of cultural affairs and historical resources. The “Position Description Form,” under the heading “Authority and Freedom to Act,” explicitly established the link between the Forest decisions (and hence section 23 of the Manitoba Act) and provision of French-language services in Manitoba: By a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada made in December, 1979, Section 23 of the Manitoba Act was restored and to the degree of its effectiveness, Manitoba became a province on [sic] which the French and English languages are recognized. The Supreme Court decision of April 6, 1981 [Blaikie No. 2] whereby documents approved and signed by Ministers and the Cabinet of the Province of Manitoba related to Government Departments and Crown Corporations excluding municipalities and school boards are to be in the two official languages of the Province of Manitoba. These court decisions along with Cabinet policy direction validate the need and general thrust of the French Language Services program.82

The incumbent’s mandate was very broad; he or she was to “establish policy for the Secretariat within broad policy guidelines laid down by Cabinet” and “initiate advice, alternatives and delineate key issues which have an impact on government at large including the political, bureaucratic and the general public.” As well, “the incumbent must make decisions, take positions and make statements on behalf of the Government regarding French Language Services.”83 On 26 June 1981, Cultural Affairs Minister Norma Price announced the appointment of Roger Turenne, an alumnus of Collège universitaire de SaintBoniface and a politicial science graduate of the University of Manitoba, to the new position. Turenne assumed his new position on 1 August 1981. On 29 September 1981, Premier Lyon, accompanied by no fewer than four of his cabinet ministers, met with representatives of the sfm

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and of three other francophone organizations, the Fédération provinciale des comités de Parents, the Éducateurs Franco-Manitobains, and the Collège universitaire de Saint-Boniface, along with a representative of the federal official languages commissioner, at which time the sfm formally presented its document to the premier.84 Apart from this additional high-level recognition of the legitimacy of the sfm as representative of the francophone community by the Lyon government, the meeting itself constituted a major breakthrough: indeed, internal sfm notes on the meeting indicate that “For the first time, the government accepts the principle of services in the French language, as well as in the legal and legislative arena.”85 This important meeting is also referred to in the 1981 annual report of the commissioner of official languages; one government participant, Roger Turenne, later recalled that this was indeed “a very important and a very large meeting.”86 The sfm held a closed meeting on 1 October 1981 to discuss the implications of the Bilodeau case. That same day, an editorial in the Winnipeg Free Press, following on the heels of the sfm’s meeting with the Lyon government, praised the moderate nature of the sfm’s “shopping list” in these words: The sfm’s list establishes limits to the linguistic claims of the French-speaking community. It is not asking for French-language services in parts of the province where few French-speakers live. It is not asking for French to become a working language within the civil service. Those who fear that there will be no end to the French community’s demands for French in government can rest easy. The community has listed its demands and they lie within feasible limits.87

Clearly the sfm was hedging its bets: in light of the disappointing progress throughout the Lyon years in winning government recognition of their now judicially recognized rights, the sfm felt it had no option but to pursue its objectives through the judicial route to the fullest extent possible, while at the same time maintaining dialogue with the politicians in the hope that some small breakthrough might occur. On 16 November 1981, the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to Roger Bilodeau to appeal the 16 July judgment of the Manitoba Court of Appeal. The following day, 17 November, the Lyon government went down to defeat in a general provincial election.

ov e r v i e w o f f r e n c h - l a n g u a g e r i g h t s d u r i n g t h e ly o n y e a r s The most significant development in terms of language through the Lyon years was the growing, and explicit, recognition of French as an

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official language of Manitoba. Clearly, section 23 as defined by the courts began increasingly to be interpreted by the Lyon administration as conferring official status on the French language in the legislature and indeed in government administration generally. The Mercier-Price memos and the Civil Service Commission directive are direct evidence of this trend. At a broader level, French-language rights during the Lyon years were evolving rapidly along two separate tracks that rarely met. The first was judicial: the Forest decisions had let the genie out of the bottle. If section 23 was still valid and its language so clear, then surely all Manitoba laws had to be in both languages. But if that were the case, the great majority of them would be invalid, having been drafted and adopted in English only. This, in turn, would mean, as Chief Justice Freedman himself had pointed out, that there was a real risk of the province being thrown into chaos. On the other hand, the initial reaction of the Lyon government was a thinly veiled attempt to maintain the status quo, leading the French-language community to conclude that the great Forest victory was a hollow shell: it would be business as usual in Manitoba, and the Francophone minority’s historical grievances would once again be buried in legislative subterfuge. This was confirmed, in the community’s view, with Premier Lyon’s increasingly strident and vociferous opposition, first to entrenchment of human rights within a bill or charter of rights, then to entrenchment of language rights. Yet the record shows that during 1980 the Lyon government was actively seeking ways to go somewhat farther in providing French-language services to the Francophone community. These tentative steps suffered a setback with the sfm’s misguided public stand in favour of the “yes” side in the Quebec referendum, which delayed serious consideration of establishment of a French-language services section by several months. However, by the spring of 1981 the Lyon government had established the French-Language Services Secretariat and had given it a broad mandate, if not substantial resources. Here, then, was a base that could have been built upon. When Price and Mercier met with the sfm on 5 December 1980, relations between the government and the Franco-Manitoban community began to warm, reaching their high point, perhaps, with the establishment of the secretariat. Other events confirmed this warming trend, including the top-level meeting between Sterling Lyon himself and four of his ministers with sfm representatives in September of 1981. In addition, Premier Lyon had had automobile drivers’ licences printed in a bilingual version in 1981 but had refrained from issuing them before the November provincial elections. New Democratic Party mla Wilson Parasiuk raised the issue in the legislature on 25 July

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1980, stating that drivers’ licenses were ready to be issued bilingually but that Highways Minister Don Orchard was refusing to do so. At one level, it is difficult to reconcile Premier Lyon’s adamant stand against the entrenchment of rights of any kind with his increasingly supportive view of French-language services. Yet the two positions are not necessarily inconsistent. First, Premier Lyon had, on several occasions in early 1980, emphasized the distinction between entrenchment of human rights within a bill or charter of rights and entrenchment elsewhere in the Canadian Constitution of language rights alone. This position appears to have evolved significantly through 1980 and 1981, perhaps because of Lyon’s constant contact with René Lévesque at the Gang of Eight meetings; Lévesque, it will be recalled, abhorred entrenchment of language rights even more than entrenchment of human rights generally, because of the limits such rights would have imposed upon the Quebec government’s treatment of its anglophone minority. Yet at no time did Lyon explicitly repudiate his earlier distinction between entrenchment of general human rights and entrenchment of language rights specifically; the distinction simply disappears from the record. Second, Premier Lyon constantly argued in favour of the wisdom of the legislature as the best guarantor of human rights. Yet, with Forest he was confronted with the stark reality of past injustices perpetrated by successive legislatures upon the French-speaking minority of Manitoba. He could not logically maintain that the legislature was the best guarantor of rights, and specifically of language rights, without going some way towards correcting these past injustices. Finally, it is perhaps significant that most of Lyon’s initiatives in terms of French-language services occurred in the last year of his mandate and that the warming that appears to have occurred between the premier and the Frenchspeaking community happened only during his final months in office, under duress. There may thus have been some electoral motivation behind these initiatives, since the Francophone vote was significant in several provincial ridings. It is probable, as well, that there were forces within Lyon’s caucus and Cabinet that were urging him to “go slow” in light of the sensitivity of other ethnic groups towards any granting of “privileges” to the French community; the initial announcement of the French-langage services secretariat having been uncontroversial, perhaps the premier was willing to go one or two steps further by the end of his term. One thing is certain: the Lyon government had on several occasions recognized that Manitoba was officially bilingual and had granted unequivocal status to the sfm as the francophone community’s leading organization; at no point did the Lyon government question the organization’s representativeness.

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3 The Pawley Government and Section 23: Confronting a Conundrum

The one-term Lyon government was swept away by a rejuvenated ndp led by Howard Pawley on 17 November 1981. With a majority of thirty-four seats out of fifty-seven, the Pawley government, including Roland Penner as attorney general and government house leader, was sworn in on 1 December 1981. The new government, and Penner in particular, were soon confronted with the Bilodeau case and its implications. For the Lyon government, the problem had been open and shut: let the case proceed to the Supreme Court and take the consequences, which were perceived as minimal in any event. For the Pawley government, with its concern for human and minority rights and a more realistic view of the possible consequences for the administration of justice in Manitoba, in addition to its closer ties to the Franco-Manitoban community, Bilodeau took on much greater proportions.1 During its first few months in office, the Pawley government took stock of Bilodeau and of its options, eventually choosing the constitutional amendment route. On 29 November 1981 the sfm decided to request intervenor status before the Supreme Court in the Bilodeau case, following a 1 October consultation with members of the community.2 The sfm’s application for leave was heard by the Supreme Court on 3 February 1982; the Ottawa agent for the Manitoba government was instructed not to object.3 In early January 1982 Premier Pawley met with a delegation from the sfm headed by Gilberte Proteau.4 It was at this meeting that the idea of a constitutional amendment was raised for the first time; Paw-

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51 The Pawley Government and Section 23

ley suggested the sfm take it up with Penner.5 The sfm met with Penner in late February. The sfm delegation included its new counsel, Joseph Magnet, and participants at the meeting immediately noticed the sfm’s new, aggressive tone.6 There appears to be no doubt that the meeting jolted Penner and his colleagues; for the first time Penner came face to face with representatives of the French community and heard their concerns firsthand. Until this point, Penner had thought these concerns related almost exclusively to the lack of progress in translation since Forest; however, he reaffirmed his intention that section 23 should become a reality in Manitoba.7 The government was indeed experiencing great difficulty in finding qualified translators and attracting them to Manitoba, and the backlog of legislation that should have been adopted in both languages was growing inexorably. The government was also becoming deeply concerned with the possible invalidation of statutes by the Supreme Court.8 In a statement to the House on 8 March 1982 Penner admitted that in the two years since Forest and the expenditure of four hundred thousand dollars, only 9 of 450 statutes adopted had been translated. For Turenne, this backlog underscored “the urgency of our reaching a decision on the question of a constitutional amendment.” Following his January meeting with the sfm, Pawley established a French-Language Services Committee at the Cabinet level, chaired by Pawley himself.9 The committee drafted its “Policy on FrenchLanguage Services in the Government of Manitoba,” which was approved by Cabinet on 3 March.10 Meanwhile, Turenne was slowly beginning to piece together a strategy as a way out of the “Bilodeau conundrum,”11 a strategy based upon a “services for translation” quid pro quo: “In return for entrenchment (of services), we might obtain their [the sfm’s] agreement to a constitutional amendment relaxing the requirements of Section 23 to include only the translation of new Public Acts, certain Regulations, and the Legislative Journals. Successful negotiations with the sfm would open the way to Federal concurrence and eventually in the saving of some millions for the Province.”12 A few days later Stephen Scott of McGill University asked Penner to support his group in its attempt to gain intervenor status in the Bilodeau case,13 since it intended to “draft and propose a constitutional amendment to validate unilingual Manitoba legislation for an appropriate period.”14 Penner asked Scott to send him a copy of his proposed constitutional amendment.15 Scott proposed a twenty-year time limit for translation of all Manitoba statutes as required under section 23 and a further ten years for translation of records and journals.16 His solution would have amounted to a virtually painless legitimization of unconstitutional behaviour by Manitoba for almost a century, along the lines of Lyon’s Bill 2.

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52 Manitoba’s French-Language Crisis

paw l e y s p e a k s t o t h e sfm Several strands of policy on language and multiculturalism developed by the ndp government after its November 1981 election came together on 21 March 1982. At 3:45 in the afternoon, before several hundred sfm delegates assembled at Collège universitaire de SaintBoniface for the organization’s annual meeting, Premier Pawley rose to give one of the more pleasant speeches of his first term of office, and certainly one of the best received. It was significant, he began, “that the subject of French-English relations in Manitoba is no longer a matter for political partisanship, that the principle of providing French language services is now accepted on both sides of the House – something that would have been unthinkable a few decades ago.”17 He then unveiled a plan including the following elements: 1 French language services would be provided in areas with significant concentrations of French-speaking people in Manitoba. 2 Correspondence received by the government in French would receive a reply in French. 3 Forms, certificates, and so on would be published in French. 4 Drivers’ licenses would be issued in both languages. 5 Government services would be provided to the population in areas with high concentrations of French-speaking citizens; priority would be on services to youth and senior citizens.18

A wave of emotion gripped the crowd as the full impact of Premier Pawley’s words sank in, and he sat down basking in a thundering standing ovation. Many of the sfm delegates had tears in their eyes: finally they had a provincial leader who understood them, a premier whose sense of justice and fair play would not only lead him to redress past wrongs but one who would even, slowly perhaps but surely, begin to create conditions in their province that would allow them to survive and thrive as Francophones. Print and electronic media coverage of the Pawley speech was extensive, and editorial reaction in the Winnipeg area was unanimously supportive of the Pawley plan. One group, however, reacted quickly and negatively: the mayors and reeves of Manitoba’s Interlake region, members of the Union of Manitoba Municipalities, condemned Pawley’s plan to extend French-language services “by an almost unanimous show of hands.”19 At the same general meeting of the sfm, two persons were elected to the organization’s new board who were to play key roles in subsequent events: Léo Robert, a schoolteacher from Ste-Agathe, Manitoba, was elected president, and lawyer Rémi Smith was elected director. Robert

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became leader and chief spokesman for the organization; Smith’s role as it evolved was more complex and less obvious; his associate Renald Guay later called him the “key player,” the “person who holds it all together.”20

th e g o v e r n m e n t e x p l o r e s i t s legal options On 14 April 1982, Kerr Twaddle informed Penner that Bilodeau’s Supreme Court hearing date had been set for 2 November 1982. This date was critical, since the idea of a constitutional amendment, once linked to the Bilodeau case, became linked at the same time to the vagaries of Court decisions on it. In this context, the hearing date became a deadline. In the course of the winter, Penner had requested an opinion from Twaddle on the Bilodeau case. Twaddle’s fourteen-page opinion consisted of a review of the consequences of an adverse finding by the Supreme Court, remedial action that might be taken by the Manitoba government, and possible constitutional amendments to avoid an adverse ruling.21 Twaddle summarized the gravity of the province’s position; it was open to the Court to find a That all statutes not enacted in both English and French are invalid, or b That all statutes passed prior to December 13, 1979 are, of necessity, valid, but those subsequently enacted in English only are invalid, or c That all statutes passed prior to its decision in Bilodeau are, of necessity, valid, but those enacted subsequently in English only are invalid.22

Twaddle then described the implications of a finding of invalidity, total or partial: Not only are the statutes themselves invalid, but institutions created by them would be non-existent and the abolition of the legislative council would have no validity. Thus the present legislature would have no validity. Thus the present legislature would be totally incompetent as would all Courts not created prior to or by the Manitoba Act 1870. A legislative assembly would have to be elected under the provisions of the 1870 Act and a legislative council appointed. Even if this could be done, the time factor in doing so and in replacing the invalid statutes with statutes printed and published in English and French would result in total chaos.

If the Supreme Court were to find all Manitoba statutes passed prior to December 1979 valid on the basis of necessity, the constitutional problem would be alleviated, but not solved.23

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54 Manitoba’s French-Language Crisis

Regarding a possible constitutional amendment, Twaddle pointed out that section 43 of the 1981 Constitution Act allowed that an amendment relating to the use of the English or French language in a province could be made by the federal Parliament and the legislative assembly of the province involved. However, “The difficulty is that if the Supreme Court rules that the statutes of Manitoba are invalid, the present legislative assembly will likely not be properly constituted and vested with authority to pass the necessary resolution.”24 Assuming that a constitutional amendment was possible under section 43 of the Constitution, what should be the content of this amendment? “Obviously provision should be made for the validation of all Manitoba statutes hitherto enacted in English only. Presumably the federal government would only agree to this on condition that some or all existing statutes are translated into French within a stipulated period.”25 Twaddle then alluded to a quid pro quo that could be negotiated with the sfm, since “Obviously the Société would require something in return for its agreement”:26 In return for waiving their existing right to have all statutes translated the Société franco-manitobaine would require a constitutional extension of their language rights. This … essentially would give a constitutional right to French speaking Manitobans to receive bilingual services from government and its agencies where there is a significant demand for such a service or where it is reasonable due to the nature of the office that communications be in both official languages. 27

However, Twaddle cautioned against the dangers he saw in this option, mainly that “the the extent to which bilingual services must be made available is unknown.”28 Finally, Twaddle summarized the two options that, in his view, were open to the government; these were “1 To proceed to respond to Bilodeau’s appeal in the hope that the Court will decide that section 23 is directory only … 2 To seek the constitutional amendment now to ensure (as far as possible) that chaos would not result from an adverse decision.”29 In many ways this is a seminal document in the language crisis. Many important elements of the crisis are found in the Twaddle opinion: the risks facing the government in pursuing the judicial route, up to and including “total chaos,” the possibility of negotiations with the sfm, the role of the federal government, the possibility of entrenchment of French-language services, and the difficulty of defining with precision what such services might mean to the Courts.

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55 The Pawley Government and Section 23

However, another consideration weighed heavily in Penner’s overall analysis of the situation: Twaddle’s conviction that Manitoba had a good chance of winning in the Supreme Court (“there remains an excellent chance of success in Bilodeau before the Court”)30 was surely balanced in Penner’s mind and among his departmental advisors by the fact that Twaddle, as counsel for the province of Manitoba, had already lost once before the Supreme Court, in the Forest case in 1979; he had also been on the losing side of the Blaikie decision, where Manitoba had supported the Lévesque government. There was no allusion in Twaddle’s opinion to those defeats nor to the national dimension involved, specifically the links between section 133 of the bna Act and section 23 of the Manitoba Act. Yet such links could not be ignored by the Court. This meant that a decision on the meaning of section 23 in terms of the rights of the French-speaking minority of Manitoba had a direct impact on the rights of the English-speaking minority in Quebec; the Court had already clearly highlighted this link in its Forest (Manitoba) and Blaikie (Quebec) decisions, delivered on the same date. Penner decided to ask his colleague Professor Dale Gibson of the University of Manitoba law faculty to provide an opinion on the various documents he now had in his possession.31 Gibson believed there was a “significant risk” that the Supreme Court would not find the requirement of bilingual legislation in section 23 to be directory;32 it was therefore wiser to seek an amendment before the Supreme Court rendered its decision.33 Other elements increased the “risk” factor, and these provided a “strong reason for seeking an immediate solution to our language-of-legislation problem through constitutional amendment.”34 Gibson also pointed out “certain constitutionally questionable provisions” of section 2 of the Lyon government’s Bill 2.35 The Gibson opinion proved to be a turning point in the government’s approach to the Bilodeau case: henceforth, Bilodeau and the idea of a constitutional amendment became intertwined. The Gibson opinion crystallized the idea of a constitutional amendment as a way out of a constitutional impasse while maintaining, extending, or “modernizing” the constitutional rights of the French-speaking minority as entrenched in the 1870 Manitoba Act. According to Turenne, “It appeared that the weight of Gibson’s argument is the one that swayed the Attorney-General. The Attorney-General didn’t give a final decision that we should go with a constitutional amendment, because that wasn’t his decision to make. He would have to consult with Cabinet. But he did say something like: ‘Well o.k., let’s see what kind of text we can come up with.›36

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56 Manitoba’s French-Language Crisis

A draft constitutional amendment was finalized by Tallin, Gibson, and Twaddle on 20 May 1982.37 Penner brought the issue to Cabinet on 26 May 198238 and formally requested a mandate to negotiate a constitutional amendment with the sfm and the federal government.39 Cabinet agreed, but only on the basis that French-language services would be excluded.40 With the Cabinet mandate, preparations for negotiations began in earnest. On 8 June 1982 Turenne forwarded to Penner a list of statutes to be proposed for translation to the sfm;41 Penner instructed Twaddle not to ask for a delay in the Bilodeau hearing before the Supreme Court, which was still set for 2 November 1982.42 On 17 June Penner formally informed the sfm that the government was considering a constitutional amendment as a way out of the Bilodeau impasse and presented the draft amendment approved by Cabinet earlier in the month.43 The sfm was shocked by the content of the draft presented by Penner, for two reasons.44 First, Penner proposed the outright repeal of section 23 of the Manitoba Act. Given the great wave of enthusiasm within the French-speaking community that followed the Forest victory, the repeal of this “rampart” of French rights in Manitoba just two years after the judgment could only have this symbolic effect. Second, in accordance with the mandate given Penner by Cabinet, the draft amendment contained no quid pro quo: the French-speaking community was being asked, in effect, to reduce substantially the government’s obligations in terms of translation of statutes without receiving anything in return. Why not, in this context, go to the Supreme Court and hope to get the whole translation loaf rather than the quarter loaf Penner was offering? Penner requested a formal response from the sfm by the following week, since he anticipated meeting with Justice Minister Chrétien on 6 July. The sfm was not the only party that was concerned about the government’s proposed amendment. The main concern of Vaughan Baird, Bilodeau’s counsel, was that “S. 23 of the Manitoba Act of 1870 should not be repealed. It is ‘the Gibralter’ [sic] of the constitutional rights of both the English and French speaking people in our province. A ‘Gibralter’ [sic] must remain inviolate.” In addition, the Court of Appeal’s Bilodeau decision must not be allowed to stand, since “to say that ‘shall’ is permissive … especially in a constitutional matter would render our constitution a eunuch.”45 Bilodeau sent these comments on to the sfm’s Rémi Smith.46 Thus began an uncomfortable relationship, akin to the relationship of chain-gang prisoners, between Bilodeau, his counsel, and the sfm that lasted throughout the year-long negotiations and the language crisis itself. On 8 July 1982, Roland Penner told the Toronto Globe and Mail that a constitutional amendment to section 23 had been drafted to

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57 The Pawley Government and Section 23

avoid the possibility that all of Manitoba’s laws could be declared invalid, saying the changes the government would make to section 23 would be “for the benefit of Francophones.” He added that “What we are attempting to do is to find a political solution to a legal conundrum.”47 The Winnipeg Free Press added, on 13 July 1982, that a draft of Penner’s proposals had been forwarded to the sfm for their views. Penner’s statement was immediately denounced by Baird, who made public his position that the amendment the government had in mind would “destroy the Gibraltar of English and French language rights in Manitoba.”48 The negotiations were also reported in the Winnipeg Sun on 14 July.49 Tory mla Gerry Mercier, reacting on behalf of the Conservative opposition, told the press the provincial government did not have the authority to amend the Manitoba Act of 1870; he added that Penner should wait until after the Supreme Court ruled on the Bilodeau case before considering an amendment. However, he did not comment negatively on the Pawley government’s approach in negotiating with the sfm. Georges Forest, on the other hand, said he was “shocked and disappointed” at the Pawley government’s attitude; Forest likened the government’s action to that of a “legislator who gets caught raping someone and then tries to change the laws so rape is no longer an offence.”50 In a 14 July 1982 editorial the Winnipeg Free Press reacted positively to the process outlined by Penner, and argued that settling out of court “may produce a result highly advantageous both to the province and to its French-speaking population.” It lauded the “creative approach Mr Penner has adopted” in his attempt to meet the “real needs” of the French-speaking community. La Liberté, however, reacted negatively to the government’s first proposal, and in an attempt to reduce the antagonism his first proposal generated in the French-speaking community, Penner responded, pointing out that court services in French were being implemented and outlining the government’s policy regarding French-language services.51 Penner finally met with Justice Minister Chrétien on 29 July 1982.52 He told Chrétien that the government of Manitoba proposed a political solution to Bilodeau in the form of a constitutional amendment to section 23; he also assured Chrétien that no proposal would be made “unless it has the concurrence of the Franco-Manitobaine [sic] community.”53

th e sfm c o n s u l t s f r a n c o - m a n i t o b a n s In early August 1982 the sfm consulted members of the FrancoManitoban community on two separate occasions and received several written opinions regarding the direction it should adopt in what was becoming perceived within the French-speaking community as a

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58 Manitoba’s French-Language Crisis

historic opportunity for a full-fledged recognition of long-standing French-language rights, yet one that was fraught with danger, since the mechanism would be the modification of the fundamental law of the province and of Canada. A consensus emerged among the francophone lawyers and others to keep section 23 intact and to ask Penner to entrench Franco-Manitoban rights in the Charter, which included the right to French-language services.54 Georges Forest, on the other hand, was more categorically negative towards the Penner proposals; he also objected to the sfm proposals, especially their abandonment of the government’s obligation to translate Hansard. Forest’s position amounted to a radical official language agenda for Manitoba, which, he believed, flowed from section 23: French should be compulsory for all Manitoba schoolchildren; all government services should be provided in both languages; the province’s lieutenant governor should always be bilingual; all Manitoba judges should be bilingual; and it should be possible to study law in both official languages after, say, 1990.55 Forest concluded that Bilodeau should be allowed to proceed in the Supreme Court, since all of this flowed from the existing section 23. Forest’s position, which might be described as “radical bilingualism” for Manitoba, became a constant source of tension within the Frenchspeaking community as it struggled to develop a strong but reasonable bargaining position vis-à-vis the provincial government. At its root lay a profound misunderstanding as to the scope of section 23. To Forest, section 23 automatically established English and French as official languages in Manitoba. One might logically draw this conclusion from even a cursory reading of the history of Manitoba’s entry into Confederation (see chapter 1); however, between the probable intent of section 23, in Louis Riel’s and others’ eyes, and the actual text of this section, there is a wide gap. A further complication is section 23’s link with section 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867; no informed person, in Quebec or elsewhere, would argue that this section makes Quebec officially bilingual; on the contrary, with the adoption of Bill 101 in 1977, Quebec signified to all of Canada its rejection of that interpretation of section 133. If English and French were to be the official languages of Manitoba constitutionally, then words to that effect had to be adopted. This was one of the few positive elements that the sfm saw in Penner’s initial proposal, and it was ultimately to become the downfall of the Pawley government’s proposals; yet to Forest and his small coterie, section 23 already made Manitoba officially bilingual. On 18 August, Léo Robert met with Penner and told him that the consensus within the Franco-Manitoban community was in favour of keeping section 23 intact, since, because of its link with section 133 of

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59 The Pawley Government and Section 23

the bna Act, 1867, any amendment to it “would limit the scope of Section 23.”56 Second, Robert asked Penner that his government entrench the fundamental rights of Franco-Manitobans in the Charter. In Robert’s view, this would “modernize” the rights contained in the 1870 Manitoba Act.57 The sfm and Penner were still worlds apart. At the outset Penner had wanted an essentially administrative adjustment incorporated into the Manitoba Act to reduce the province’s constitutional obligations in the translation of statutes. Not only had he run into a brick wall of opposition to this approach from the French-speaking community during the summer; now the community, confident of its ultimate victory in the Supreme Court, not only wanted to maintain section 23 intact but also wanted Manitoba to adhere to the language provisions of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, thereby ensuring full bilingual services in all of Manitoba! At this stage, not only did a quid pro quo not exist in the government proposals but the sfm was attempting to turn the tables on the government by simultaneously maintaining section 23 intact in addition to obtaining entrenchment of French-language services. Just as Penner’s proposal of 17 June was a nonstarter because its advantages were all on the government side, so the sfm’s October position was doomed at the outset because it provided no advantages to the government. After a meeting with the sfm in early October, Penner drafted a Cabinet paper describing the consultative process to that point and other aspects of the issue.58 Three meetings had been held between Penner and the sfm; the previous Cabinet position, which specifically excluded the provision of French-language services, had been rejected by the sfm. Penner pointed out to Cabinet problems with the sfm’s position, especially the fact that the province’s constitutional obligations would be extended far beyond section 23, with no quid pro quo. Finally, he requested a new mandate from Cabinet based upon six counterproposals he had developed; these would provide for “considerably less than the sfm demands which, apparently, would obligate municipalities and school boards as well as the government itself to provide French-language services.”59 Cabinet accepted Penner’s recommendations at its meeting of 13 October and gave him a new, expanded mandate to negotiate with the sfm, including discussion of Frenchlanguage services to be provided by the provincial government.60

bilodeau gets an adjournment The pressure of the deadline imposed by the Supreme Court’s hearing date for the Bilodeau case, still set for 2 November, was beginning to be felt by all parties; finally, in the light of new government proposals,

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specifically on French-language services, Bilodeau and the sfm agreed to an adjournment.61 Magnet’s attack on Penner’s new proposals proposals was scathing.62 His premise was that Section 23 of the Manitoba Act means to insure the equality of the French and English languages in the machinery of provincial government operations … it goes on to guarantee bilingual government operations by requiring use of both French and English in legislative records, Journals, and Acts … there is, therefore, comprehensive protection for both languages in the machinery of government.63

He doubted that the services clause would change much “in the existing provision of government services in Manitoba … it would appear to place existing practices on a constitutional plane, immune from legislative abridgment. I can see that it does little more.” His premises, in my view, were fundamentally flawed. Through no interpretation, except perhaps the most liberal, historically based one, could it be said that section 23 “guaranteed bilingual government operations,” or that there was “comprehensive protection for both languages in the machinery of government.” Most mainstream interpretations, not to speak of common sense, would hold that section 23 said what it said, that is that both French and English could be used in the legislature, that laws and legislative documents had to be available in both languages, and that trials had to be conducted in French where required; this is a far cry from “comprehensive protection for both languages.” The conclusion seems inescapable: in Magnet’s view section 23 contained virtually everything Manitoba Francophones could want, including French-language government services; it would suffice only to pressure the province, presumably by repeated recourse to the courts, until the Frenchspeaking community obtained full implementation of section 23, including the provision of services. Magnet apparently did not conceive that citizens (or the courts) could interpret section 23 literally, in which case the words merely said what they purported to say. From this second perspective, section 23 was weak indeed, and it had to be substantially improved if the Franco-Manitoban community was to have guaranteed access to government services in its own language. In the hothouse negotiating atmosphere of the fall of 1982, Magnet’s opinions inflicted considerable damage upon the Franco-Manitoban community’s attempt at developing solidarity on the issue. In early November, Penner’s draft constitutional amendment proposals were made public; they were the main item in both French radio and tv news.64 The only immediate public comment on the draft proposals within the French community came from Georges Forest, who “vowed to fight the proposal every way he could, through the courts,

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and through lobbying of various kinds in both Manitoba and Ottawa.”65 On 18 November the sfm board examined the Penner proposals and considered the response recommended by the working group in consultation with Bilodeau and Baird and decided to continue negotiations with Penner.66 Robert made it clear to Penner that the sfm’s preferred option still remained Manitoba’s adherence to sections 16 to 20 of the Charter.67 In early December, Cabinet approved a draft constitutional amendment68 to be submitted as a “final proposal” to the FrancoManitoban community.69 The proposal included a declaration that “The English language and the French language are the official languages of Manitoba”; in addition, it included a validation date, a schedule of private acts or public municipal acts to be translated, and a remedies section. It also provided for entrenchment of French-language services. Penner pointed out in the paper that the sfm was now prepared to drop its requirement for an amendment to the Charter. On 16 December Penner informed Léo Robert that the province agreed with most of the sfm’s proposals, although the province could not agree with the sfm’s request that Manitoba adhere to sections 16– 20 of the Charter (a response the sfm had anticipated).70 Penner pointed out there was agreement on a date for validation of the statutes, on translation of certain private acts and public municipal acts (a list of which was to be provided by the sfm), and a remedies clause. Feeling confident that he had, in effect, a “done deal” following his meetings and his correspondence with the sfm, Penner wrote to Opposition justice critic Gerry Mercier on 17 December summarizing the Bilodeau process, informing him of the status of the negotiations with the sfm, and enclosing a copy of the draft constitutional amendment. Penner also sent a copy of this letter to the leader of the Opposition, Sterling Lyon.71 The Opposition did not respond.72 On 20 December 1982, Roland Penner and Léo Robert both went public. Léo Robert told the Winnipeg Sun that the province and Manitoba’s francophone community were on the brink of an “historic agreement” on bilingualism; Penner said he expected an agreement soon.73 A few days later, vandals attacked Georges Forest’s offices at 160 Marion St in Saint-Boniface, spraying anti-French graffiti on the outside walls and windows.74

h a p p y n e w ye a r The new year began with an unpleasant surprise for Roland Penner, Léo Robert, and Rémi Smith: on 5 January 1983, Vaughan Baird informed the government’s counsel, Kerr Twaddle, that he was going

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back to the Supreme Court, since no provision had been made in the draft constitutional amendment agreed to between the government and the sfm in December that the meaning of “shall” in section 23 be made explicitly mandatory.75 On 13 January 1983 the sfm met for over two hours with Opposition leader Sterling Lyon and with members of the Progressive Conservative caucus,76 including Brian Ransom, Gary Filmon, Gerry Mercier, and Bud Sherman, to inform them of the status of the negotiations between the sfm and the government and of the sfm’s position in these negotiations.77 That same day, the sfm board of directors discussed the state of negotiations with Penner; the result was a significant hardening, if not a reversal, of the position it had taken in December.78 On 15 January about two hundred Franco-Manitobans and members of the general public converged upon Collège universitaire de Saint-Boniface for a special meeting of the sfm.79 The meeting revealed profound disagreement among Franco-Manitobans concerning both the content of the negotiations and the strategy to be adopted vis-à-vis the provincial government. Maurice Prince of the Association des proCanadiens du Manitoba accused Léo Robert of usurping the right to represent the Franco-Manitoban community and even of betraying its interests. In his view, the existing section 23 and the Forest judgment already contained everything the community could want. Georges Forest joined in the fray, attacking the sfm’s position and calling into question its right to be the sole representative of the francophone community on the issue. Finally, apart from his evident antagonism towards the sfm, expressed in terms that would subsequently be taken up gleefully by the anglophone opponents of the section 23 amendment, Forest presented his position, which I have described above as “radical bilingualism.”80 The press accounts highlighted the disagreements among Franco-Manitobans and especially Forest’s accusations that the sfm was falling into Penner’s “trap” and that any “compromise” over section 23 would create French “ghettos.”81 Just four days after the sfm’s general meeting, Vaughan Baird announced that he and Bilodeau were going back to the Supreme Court. “We set our term, the government didn’t meet it, so to court we go,” Baird told the Winnipeg Sun.82 In the meantime, Georges Forest stepped up his campaign against any kind of agreement. On 22 January, he sent an eight-page letter to Penner, with copy to an extensive list of federal and provincial politicians, saying that the negotiations were “chipping away” at section 23 and that the sfm was “killing the hen that lays the golden egg.” Adding that “conspirators are about to sabotage our section 23” and suggesting that Penner had “overstepped his authority by commenting on a matter that is before

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the Supreme Court,” Forest appealed to Penner to “withdraw your proposals for amending section 23 of the Manitoba Act 1870.”83 Penner disagreed with Forest, stating “There is absolutely nothing in section 23 which guarantees to Franco-Manitobans any provincial government services in the French language,” and adding that the proposed amendment “is plainly and obviously an extension of the French language rights currently guaranteed in section 23 of the Manitoba Act.”84 Penner’s opinion, in addition to being diametrically opposed to Forest’s, also contrasted sharply with that of the sfm’s own counsel, Joseph Magnet.

th e l o w ro a d On Sunday, 25 January 1983, a columnist for the Winnipeg Sun and well-known local talk-show host, Peter Warren, wrote a vituperative column denouncing the entire process of negotiations between the provincial government and the sfm. Under a bold headline entitled “Blackmail’s the Name of the sfm Game”, Warren wrote in part that “These closed-door meetings between a simple society executive (paid with tax dollars) negotiating with a duly-elected government are deplorable … The government of Manitoba has no business negotiating with the society.” Referring to the fact that Penner had given a copy of his draft constitutional amendment to the justice critic, Gerry Mercier, and to the leader of the opposition, Sterling Lyon, Warren added: “Unusual, you say, for a provincial government to offer a draft proposal of new legislation to the opposition before it’s ready to roll. You bet your sweet life it is.”85 Warren made no mention of the government’s by now well-documented and publicized dilemma regarding the Bilodeau case. The quid pro quo required by the sfm in return for withdrawing the Bilodeau case from the Supreme Court had become simple blackmail. Finally, Warren directly impugned the legitimacy of the sfm as an official spokesman for the Franco-Manitoban community without any explicit justification. The idea had been planted in the public mind that the sfm was an illegitimate organization engaged in criminal activities; criminal acts against it were therefore justified. The low road in the language debate had been staked out; it soon became a highway. On the night of 30 January 1983, five days after the Warren column, the sfm’s offices were gutted by fire; Manitoba’s fire commissioner, Auguste Thorimbert, confirmed two days later that the cause was arson.86 Two days before the fire, anti-French graffiti had been painted on the sfm building; the front window of the building had been

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smashed in for the second time in a week.87 The sfm fire constituted a dramatic escalation of violence against property that had begun some time before with the graffiti scrawled on Georges Forest’s Marion St office. Richard Cleroux of the Globe and Mail called it the most serious, “but not the first nor the last in a series of continuing racist attacks in the past six months against the province’s francophone community.”88 The sfm board of directors was badly shaken by these events. Léo Robert presented a report on the events at a board meeting on 3 February 1983, stating that Fire Commissioner Thorimbert had confirmed the criminal nature of the fire and describing the indications of financial, material, and moral support received from many FrancoManitoban organizations, including Collège universitaire de SaintBoniface, which provided temporary quarters to the organization. The destruction of the sfm’s offices greatly heightened tensions within the francophone community, and from then on death threats delivered periodically to various francophone leaders were taken much more seriously.89 The previous day, one Douglas Lockhart had announced the formation of the Manitoba Unity Committee against “creeping bilingualism.”90 A few days later, K. Krysansk, claiming to represent the same group, sent a letter to Winnipeg Free Press columnist Gordon Sinclair describing the organization’s objectives. Sinclair commented that “It is views like theirs that give root to the acts of arson and vandalism and, above all, of racism that are flaring in St Boniface.”91 On 7 February 1983, in the wake of Warren’s column in the Winnipeg Sun and of the gutting of the sfm’s offices, fifteen francophone organizations representing thousands of Franco-Manitobans held a joint press conference confirming the sfm as their official spokesman. The following day, the Sun reported that police had stepped up their surveillance of Winnipeg’s francophone neighbourhoods.92 Following the weeks of consultations on the content of his latest proposals, Penner felt sufficiently confident to transmit them to his federal counterpart for reactions. On 8 February, he sent a copy of the latest draft proposals to Justice Minister Mark MacGuigan, adding that the Manitoba government could not accept an amendment to the Constitution Act, 1982 (as still requested officially by the sfm). Penner emphasized the nature of the quid pro quo: limits to the numbers of statutes to be translated and the time needed to do so, in exchange for Frenchlanguage services.93 On 31 March, Twaddle informed Penner that Baird intended to ask the Supreme Court to set a new hearing date on 12 April 1983; the hearing would be set for either 26 May or 16 June 1983.94 The sword

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of Damocles again began to sway over Penner’s head. At that point, the unresolved issues were the definition of the “mandatory” nature of section 23, translation deadlines, the wording of the French-language services clause (the sfm preferred the Charter wording, since it could be construed to include municipalities and school boards), and the date of implementation of the services clause (the sfm wanted almost immediate implementation).95

th e f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t e n t e r s the fray Meanwhile, the federal government’s role in the issue was about to take on new dimensions. The Justice Department was of course already involved, but now the federal government’s involvement became explicitly political. On 19 March, Secretary of State Serge Joyal flew into Winnipeg to deliver a major speech at the sfm’s annual meeting. Since his appointment to the federal Cabinet a few months earlier, he had quickly established a reputation as a defender and promoter of Frenchlanguage rights across the country, a reputation that was reinforced by his sfm speech.96 Joyal told his audience that “My priority as Secretary of State is simple: it is to strengthen the French fact in Canada” (tr.).97 He reminded them that it was French that was endangered in Canada, not English; that assimilation was continuing unabated across the country, as the 1981 census data had revealed; and that the sfm’s negotiations with the provincial government on section 23 were critical to the future of the Franco-Manitoban community. Then Joyal outlined a multifaceted approach that would ensure the survival of the French community in Manitoba in the long run, an approach that included management of French schools by Francophones, economic development, communications (including links between French-language communities across the country via cable television), libraries, and so on. His main message, however, was that the best safeguards for French-language rights in Manitoba would be found in Manitoba’s adherence to sections 16 to 20 of the Charter.98 Joyal also formally committed his government to providing financial assistance to the Franco-Manitoban community in initiatives aimed at meeting the federal government’s constitutional objectives in matters of language. The Joyal speech was remarkable in several ways. First, it set out clearly the context within which the federal government viewed the Manitoba negotiations: to Joyal (though not, as we shall see below, to Justice Minister MacGuigan), Manitoba was a crucial test of bilingualism in Canada. Having just emerged from the bruising referendum debate in Quebec in 1980 and the subsequent constitutional debate

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leading to patriation in 1982, many federal Liberals, especially Quebec mps, saw the extension of bilingualism across the country, in provincial jurisdictions as well as the federal one, as being critical to the “new deal” they had promised Quebec in 1980. Second, as has been noted above, Joyal, through his speech and his suggestions that Manitoba adhere to the Charter, directly involved himself in the Manitoba negotiations and thereby became a major actor in an already complicated process. Third, Joyal’s promise of financial assistance was taken at face value by the French-speaking community; it was a promise he came to rue, as the subsequent debate became a crisis that generated everincreasing demands on his department’s budget. With Bilodeau returning to the Supreme Court, a new sense of urgency gripped all the actors involved; sufficient progress had been made on a draft that senior officials of the two levels of government could now meet face to face. On 8 April 1983, Deputy Justice Minister Tassé met with Penner in the Legislative Building. Three outstanding issues remained: 1 the definition of “regulations,” 2 the translation of Hansard, and 3 whether or not municipalities and school boards should be covered by the “services” clause.99 Regarding municipalities, the federal government had partly come around to the province’s position that they would not have to provide bilingual services. Finally, it was agreed that a further postponement of the Bilodeau hearing would be sought. There appears to have been “agreement on all substantive questions” between the two parties.100 On 12 April Penner sent the sfm a new draft that took into account most of the federal concerns.101 That same day, the Supreme Court set the Bilodeau hearing for 26 May 1983. Turenne informed Penner of this development also on the same day, pointing out that “Counsel for both Bilodeau and the sfm opposed any postponement.”102 Penner felt betrayed by the sfm for not having supported postponement, in light of what he felt had been significant progress achieved in the previous days. He also felt that the tight deadline would lead to hasty decisions and to improper management of the issue, not least in his own caucus, which had been kept in the dark on the negotiations as they had unfolded over the previous months. Penner later admitted that “in retrospect, [his] caucus was not involved soon enough or sufficiently enough.”103 According to Penner, Cabinet and caucus were split right from the beginning; opponents within Cabinet such as Vic Schroeder and Wilson Parasiuk were sometimes quite vociferous, although they were opposed mainly on tactical grounds.104 After another round of discussions among the francophone lawyers,105 a new lawyer for the sfm, Rhéal Teffaine, forwarded new sfm proposals to Penner;106 Turenne commented that the sfm “still do not

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have their act together.”107 On 27 April, Penner and Justice Minister MacGuigan agreed that the amendment would cover the Manitoba Act only and would not involve Manitoba’s adherence to the Charter. In MacGuigan’s view, bilingual services could be extended “selectively” to municipalities and school boards; however, Penner believed that here, “politics” was a problem. Hansard, as well, remained an outstanding issue. Finally, it was agreed that a three-person federal working group would be in Winnipeg on 4 May to “try to work out a final draft.”108 Clearly, negotiations had entered a critical phase for all parties, with the outstanding issue being the compulsory provision of French-language services to selected municipalities and school divisions. Penner’s exasperation with the sfm was also showing through; he pointed out that the sfm’s latest proposals had “arrived too late to be assimilated and discussed with the Minister of Justice.” Then he vented the frustration that had been building over the course of months of negotiations and the betrayal he had felt at the sfm’s decision not to oppose Bilodeau’s request for a rapid Supreme Court hearing: You no doubt realize that because of the opposition of Bilodeau and yourselves to the requested adjournment we are now working against a nearly impossible deadline. In that context your new proposals are astonishing since … they raise issues not heretofore discussed. Frankly, I cannot comprehend how, on the one hand, you force upon us a hearing date which provides virtually no time for negotiations, particularly of new proposals, and, at the same time place new proposals and new drafts before us.

Penner told the sfm he would be negotiating with the federal government on the basis of his own last draft, hoping for agreement among all parties before 26 May; in the absence of agreement, “Manitoba reserves the right to withdraw its proposal completely.”109 The meeting of federal and provincial officials took place as scheduled on 4 May 1983. Two issues remained outstanding at the end of the meeting.110 The first related to the deadlines for completion of translation required under the agreement: Penner wanted over ten years (to 1995) to complete translation, while the federal government wanted translation to be completed by 1985. Second, the federal government wanted the provision of French-language services at the municipal and school board level to be included in the amendment, at least on a selective basis, while the province wanted them excluded entirely.111 On 6 May the Justice Department transmitted an alternative draft amendment to the province that explicitly eliminated the requirement for a bilingual Hansard under section 23; however, it substituted the

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word “institution” for “agency” of the government of Manitoba, a word that, as we have seen, could be interpreted to include municipalities and school boards.112 Bilingual services would be provided where there was “significant demand” or where it was “reasonable,” due to the “nature of the office,” that the government provide such services. In response, Turenne suggested yet another formula for the provision of bilingual services by municipalities that would have effectively limited the requirement to about 30 of Manitoba’s 202 municipalities.113 Under this formula, a municipality with either eight hundred Frenchspeaking residents or a population that was at least 8 percent Frenchspeaking would be constitutionally obligated to provide French-language services to its residents. Penner transmitted this latest draft to Léo Robert on 9 May, stressing that there was as yet no agreement between the two governments regarding municipalities and that there was only a “limited possibility” that the province could agree to extend constitutionally entrenched bilingual services to the municipal level.114 On 10 May the sfm met with Justice Minister Mark MacGuigan and Secretary of State Serge Joyal to learn that the two federal ministers had agreed in principle to fund 50 percent of all costs related to the constitutional amendment, including 50 percent of the cost of translation of statutes (estimated at $3.5 million), 50 percent of the cost of setting up a special unit to translate regulations, and 50 percent of a four-hundred-thousand-dollar program to assist and encourage municipalities to offer French-language services.115 Smith returned almost immediately to Ottawa, and the final agreement was hammered out at an all-day “tripartite officials meeting” there on 12 May.116

a deal is sealed It was a jubilant Rémi Smith who entered the sfm boardroom late in the evening of 12 May to announce that the elements of an agreement were in place. The board proceeded to a detailed, clause-by-clause analysis of the province’s proposals relative to its own and agreed on a final position: translation of Hansard would be dropped, only laws adopted since 1970 would be translated, municipalities and school boards would be excluded from the amendment, and a remedial clause would be retained.117 Board members agreed that negotiations should proceed on this basis with the provincial and federal governments, in an attempt to reach an agreement that would then be submitted to the sfm’s membership at a special general meeting scheduled for 24 May.118 Clearly the 12 May meeting in Ottawa was the critical one in terms of the agreement ultimately concluded between the parties. The Hansard issue had been left unresolved, to the great chagrin of

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Forest, Magnet, and Baird, and Penner had held fast against entrenching bilingual services at the municipal and school board levels, despite great pressure on the part of the sfm and the federal government. On the other hand, the sfm had won for Manitoba’s French-speaking community what it considered to be an honourable trade-off between mounds of useless translation and the constitutional entrenchment of bilingual services at the provincial level. There remained the delicate task of informing Baird and his client, Roger Bilodeau, of the results of the 12 May negotiations. On 15 May a group including Robert, Smith, Sabourin, and Baird met with Bilodeau at Baird’s residence in Ste-Agathe, Manitoba, and reviewed the results of the negotiations with him for almost three hours; finally the two men decided to support the agreement.119 With all the major actors now on side, one last step was required to confirm the elements of the agreement, which was now taking the shape of a constitutional amendment to the Manitoba Act, on one hand, and a federal-provincial funding arrangement, on the other. This step was taken during a telephone conference call on 16 May 1983 involving Mark MacGuigan, his deputy Roger Tassé, and Serge Joyal for the federal government; Roland Penner, Kerr Twaddle, Gil Goodman, and Roger Turenne for the province; and Léo Robert, Rémi Smith, and Réal Sabourin for the sfm. Penner had obtained Cabinet authorization to conclude the deal that same day.120 According to Léo Robert, one major substantive point remained, revolving around the nature of the official languages declaration in the new section 23: Penner wanted a symbolic declaration, and Bilodeau and Baird would have accepted it, whereas Robert and Smith were pushing for a more substantive declaration. They decided to request another meeting with MacGuigan to enlist federal support for their preferred wording.121 Otherwise, the call confirmed the agreement in principle that had been concluded on 12 May, except that firm deadlines were now set: after 31 December 1985 the provincial government would begin enacting all new legislation in both English and French, provincial bilingual services would be in place by 1 January 1987, and the province would have until 31 December 1993 to publish its revised statutes in both languages.122 The requirements to translate Hansard and to provide bilingual services at the municipal and school board levels were dropped. It was also agreed that the agreement would be announced publicly on 25 May.123 A three-page draft federal-provincial agreement dated 18 May 1983 can be found in the files of all major actors (see appendix 2). It stipulated that the prime minister of Canada and the premier of Manitoba would present to their respective legislative assemblies resolutions “to

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amend the Manitoba Act, 1870 as specified in the Schedule hereto with a view to adoption of the resolution on or before December 31, 1983.”124 It also stated under item 2 that “The Government of Manitoba and the Société Franco-Manitobaine will use their best efforts to reach agreement on or before September 1, 1983 on a list of Acts to be re-enacted in both official languages pursuant to subsection 23.5(1) of the proposed amendments.” Any dispute regarding the list would be resolved by reference to the Statute Revision Commission of Canada in the case of public acts or to “a third party acceptable to Manitoba and the sfm” in the case of private acts. The agreement also stipulated the federal financial contribution to the various elements of the agreement: a contribution of four hundred thousand dollars “to assist the province in acquiring the capability to enact new legislation in both official languages” and “a contribution of 50% of provincial expenditures incurred for preparation to print and publish in both official languages a general revision of the public general statutes of Manitoba and certain other statutes to be set out in a schedule to the resolution … to an overall maximum federal contribution of $1,750,000.” Finally, the federal government would cover 50 percent of all expenditures incurred “to develop the provision of municipal services” to a maximum of two hundred thousand dollars. The provision of such services by municipalities would be voluntary; however, the agreement stipulated under item 4 that “The Government of Manitoba will negotiate an arrangement with the Société Franco-Manitobaine, in consultation with [appropriate municipal bodies] to enable certain municipalities [including those in an agreed list] with a substantial population of persons whose mother tongue is French to provide services to the public in both official languages by January 1, 1987.” The agreemeent provided lines for signatures by “Canada” and “Manitoba”; a third line appeared beneath the words “And with the participation of … sfm.” The federal Cabinet gave its final approval to the text of the proposed amendment and to the federal-provincial costsharing arrangements on 17 May.125 The agreement was never signed, however, and Guay called it “a tremendous foul-up by our Premier here in Manitoba,”126 but it would seem the full Cabinet never received a full, final text of the accord to consider.127

tr u d e a u b l u n d e r s On 16 May Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau flew to Winnipeg to speak before the Laurier Club, an exclusive Liberal club. In the course

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of his speech, Trudeau revealed, in an off-hand comment in French, that Manitoba would soon be officially declared a bilingual province.128 The comment was picked up by the French media and was reported on cbwft (Radio-Canada), Winnipeg’s French television news station, that evening. It was only the next day that the English media realized that Trudeau had made the statement and realized as well its implications in the context of Manitoba politics. The manner in which the agreement became known was a God-send to the Opposition, which was still led by the fire-breathing, antiTrudeau, Charter-loathing Sterling Lyon, heading a viscerally antibilingualism, rural-based caucus. Months later, journalists were still analyzing the fall-out of Trudeau’s error, undoubtedly one of the worst of his career. Penner himself said that Trudeau’s statement “frightened the hell out of a lot of people.”129 The government’s public relations staff were already admitting, on 30 May 1983, that because of Trudeau’s comment, the provincial government had “lost control of the issue.”130 Winnipeg Free Press columnist Frances Russell quoted a Manitoba Cabinet source to the effect that “we were pre-empted by the Prime Minister … the damage was done.”131 On 17 May, Penner told Turenne that “due to the premature announcement of an ‘agreement’ between Manitoba and Canada” regarding section 23, he needed to take the issue to his caucus at noon that day and to Cabinet the following day. Penner asked Turenne to provide information immediately on the agreement, especially on the financial arrangements and on the implications of the agreement for municipalities, which, Penner said, are “likely the major hurdle[s] I will have to cross in Caucus.”132 Turenne summarized the agreement as confirmed in the previous day’s conference call; this information was put in the form of a draft Cabinet paper that Turenne transmitted to Penner on the same day.133 The text of the proposed constitutional amendment had been approved by the federal Cabinet that same day, along with the subsidiary federal-provincial cost-sharing arrangements.134 On 18 May Premier Howard Pawley rose in the legislative assembly of Manitoba to confirm that an agreement had been concluded with the federal government on bilingualism in Manitoba. Thus began one of the worst political and legislative crises in Manitoba history, a crisis that was to divide Manitobans profoundly and that, at its height, repeatedly threw the provincial legislature into chaos and virtually paralyzed the provincial government.

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4 The Gathering Storm

The public debate on the tripartite constitutional amendment to section 23 began inauspiciously with Trudeau’s premature announcement of the federal-provincial agreement, and the Pawley government struggled frantically to regain control of the agenda. It never did. The debate began in the Manitoba legislature in late May and continued in that forum throughout the summer, while Manitoba’s rural municipalities began a sustained attack on the proposed amendment. The first legislative debates set the tone, and the Opposition, including renegade ndp mla Russell Doern, along with the rural municipal leadership, incited other segments of the population to rise up and force the government to withdraw the amendment. Their efforts bore fruit through the fall of 1983 and the winter of 1984 as thousands of Manitobans attended public meetings, legislative hearings, and demonstrations against the amendment. On 17 May 1983 Penner circulated the final draft of the agreement, along with the draft constitutional amendment, to his ndp caucus; the following day, he went to Cabinet to outline the “agreement in principle” with the federal government and the three subsidiary cost-sharing agreements. The agreement was approved in principle by Cabinet.1 Just after 2 p.m. on the afternoon of 18 May Premier Pawley confirmed in the House that an agreement had been concluded with the federal government. Opposition leader Sterling Lyon launched his first offensive against the amendment that day, asking for legislative committee hearings on the issue.2 A few minutes later, contradicting his own earlier

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statement in the House that “these negotiations have been in the public domain now for some several months,” Lyon opened up a second front against the government, attacking the “secret” nature of the negotiations between the provincial government and the sfm. While acknowledging that a “communication” had been received by his justice critic on the matter and that his party appreciated “having the original draft of what was being discussed last December,” Lyon complained that neither the opposition nor the people of Manitoba now knew what was being contemplated. Pawley replied that to his knowledge there had been “no substantial change” to the proposals initially transmitted to the Opposition and added that “in the normal process there would be public hearings.”3 Later, justice critic Gerry Mercier asked Penner whether he would reveal to the House the advice he had received from his lawyers regarding the probability of success of the Bilodeau case.4 Penner was still fighting a rearguard action within the government and caucus due to Trudeau’s premature announcement and was not in a position to make a full statement to the House; he promised to do so the following day, adding that the situation raised by Bilodeau posed “grave legal risks for the Province of Manitoba as I estimated it.” The risk was not the invalidation of statutes by the Supreme Court but the possibility that the Court “might put this province under constraints with respect to fulfilling that constitutional obligation at a time when we were not ready for it and at a cost we could not afford to pay.” In effect, Penner described the quid pro quo, saying that the government had “found it advisable in those circumstances, rather than have a solution imposed, to negotiate a solution which gave us the time and gave us the resources and the funds to do the job.” Mercier questioned this assumption.5 Several elements of the government’s position are already to be found in these first statements by Penner: the risk, admittedly minor but still real, that the Supreme Court might find all Manitoba’s laws to be invalid; the risk of the Supreme Court imposing unrealistic deadlines for translation, given limited available resources; the desirability of a “consensual solution,” given Manitoba’s history and the “current constitutional context”; and, finally, the importance of Ottawa’s financial contribution. What is not found in these statements is a recognition that the wrongs inflicted on Manitoba’s francophone community over almost one hundred years of unconstitutional behaviour by successive Manitoba legislatures were being righted by the agreement in a way that was thoroughly acceptable to the community (even Georges Forest had been moved to say that the deal “looks good” and had encouraged “the dissidents to approve this”).6

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On 20 May press statements by Justice Minister Mark MacGuigan for the federal government and by Attorney General Roland Penner for the Manitoba government described the terms of the agreement. The federal release described it as “provisional” and added that it was expected to be signed “next week.” It was also expected that “a formal constitutional amendment will be presented and adopted by the end of 1983,” which in effect put a 31 December deadline on its adoption in Manitoba. In his remarks in the House of Commons and to the press, MacGuigan was reported as emphasizing the fact that henceforth Manitoba was to be a bilingual province and that he hoped Ontario would follow Manitoba’s lead.7 The Manitoba government’s release pointed out that the agreement “does not affect any individual, corporation, or non-governmental institution nor any municipality or school board.”8 At 10 a.m. that morning, Roland Penner finally made a formal statement in the House. He recalled the Forest case and the wording of section 23, as well as the Blaikie judgment, concluding that “the net effect of all of this was a requirement that some 14,000 pages of our laws and regulations would have to be translated.” Penner pointed out “the enormity … and cost of this task,” given the difficulty the province was experiencing in recruiting translators. He raised the possibility of all Manitoba’s laws being declared invalid, which would “amount to a legal disaster for Manitoba.” He acknowledged that such an outcome was “unlikely”; however, it was “a situation which we thought cried out for a negotiated rather than an imposed solution.” Penner then announced that an agreement had been concluded with the federal government and the sfm and described the terms of the agreement, adding that on the previous day, all parties had applied to the Supreme Court to have the Bilodeau case adjourned indefinitely. He took care again to point out that the amendment would “not apply to any municipality or school board.” However, the province was prepared, with federal assistance, “to help those municipalities with significant numbers of Franco-Manitobans who voluntarily wish to provide French language services.” This service was to be targeted to “approximately 30 out of the 200 municipalities in this province where Manitoba Francophones are concentrated.” Finally, Penner described in precise terms the underlying basis of the negotiations, the quid pro quo that had motivated the parties throughout the difficult process and that could allow both the francophone community and the provincial government to claim that the agreement represented a significant gain, since the government had traded the possibility of massive amounts of translation for the constitutionalization of French-language services. Recalling Premier Pawley’s 1982 statement that “the subject of French-English relations in Manitoba is no longer a matter for political partisanship,” Penner ended on a principled, upbeat note:

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75 The Gathering Storm This agreement … builds upon the foundations which were established and it recognizes that it takes time to build on those foundations. Franco-Manitobans are an essential and a vital part of our province and its diverse cosmopolitan culture. This agreement recognizes the unique place that Franco-Manitobans have in Manitoba as well as the province’s constitutional obligations. I believe that it is an achievement of which all Manitobans can be proud.9

If Pawley and Penner still truly believed that “French-English relations in Manitoba [were] no longer a matter for political partisanship,” they were in for a rude awakening.

th e o p p o s i t i o n s t a k e s o u t i t s g r o u n d In his response, Sterling Lyon began by listing his own government’s accomplishments following the Forest judgment and then formulated his first, formal objection to the government’s strategy in the case, denouncing “the practical absurdity of the position being advanced by Mr. Bilodeau and his council [sic] to say that all laws passed since 1870 would be invalid.” If the Supreme Court had agreed with Bilodeau, “chaos would have resulted and no court would have permitted chaos to result.” In Lyon’s view, it was the services section of the amendment “that I think the people of Manitoba will be more concerned with than the translation.” At one stroke, Lyon rejected the quid pro quo upon which the negotiations had been based from the start. Lyon attacked the notion of Manitoba as a bilingual province, since section 23 “provided for bilingual services to be provided in certain stated institutions in Manitoba, period, paragraph.” Lyon denounced the provision in the draft amendment for court-ordered redress as “very dangerous” and a “violation of our whole tradition of parliamentary supremacy in this country.” Regarding the funding provided by the federal government, “the amounts … may or may not be satisfactory, but for $1.7 million, I don’t think this province should be capitulating in the way that it is with respect to the draft agreement as we see it now.” The “nub of the problem,” as Lyon saw it, was in “providing for services to be given to the people of Manitoba in both languages.” Twice Lyon referred to language “zealots.” Early in his speech, he used the word in relation to the pace of implementation of changes in language policy following the Forest judgment: “Some, I fear mostly zealots, would say the work that was undertaken by the former government, and the present government, was not moving fast enough.”10 Towards the end of his speech, he used the word again, this time raising the spectre of a small minority imposing its will unfairly on the population

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generally. Lyon warned that “we must be ever vigilant that we do not create a tyranny by that very minority, because that … in some ways, is what has happened with respect to the implementation of The Official Languages Act in other parts of this country.” Lyon also attacked the nature of the negotiations themselves: “it does not appear to be a negotiation in which the Government of Manitoba, on behalf of the people, ended up with something that will be seen to be fair in the interests of the totality of the public interest in Manitoba.” He then drew a line in the sand, the first of many, asking the government to refer the whole matter to a standing legislative committee that would sit intersessionally, between the end of the 1983 session and the beginning of the 1984–85 session. The committee, after holding public hearings, would report to the House at the beginning of its next session. Finally, Lyon rejected the 31 December 1983 deadline agreed upon by all parties, arguing there was “no rush for this agreement” and that “agreements which go beyond the spirit and the intent of section 23, which could divide our province and its social fabric are not in the public interest.” His implicit goal was clear: to kill the amendment and allow Bilodeau to proceed to the Supreme Court. Many of the major themes that were to be developed by the opposition to the constitutional amendment can be found in this, Lyon’s first major speech on the issue: a “secret deal” had been negotiated that could rend the province’s “social fabric” and a public debate was therefore required; progress on French-language translation and services was satisfactory, and there was no need to accelerate their implementation; the threat of “chaos” to the province resulting from a negative Supreme Court judgment was so minor as to be virtually nonexistent; section 23 did not make Manitoba a bilingual province, and the proposed amendment went “far beyond the spirit and intent of section 23”; there was a danger the province would be held hostage by a small minority of “language zealots”; and the proposed amendment was taking the province into “uncharted waters.” A few days later, on 24 May, Tory justice critic Gerry Mercier was interviewed on the cbc phone-in show Questionnaire. He voiced additional concerns, including the cost of implementing the agreement, the expanded role of the courts if the agreement were implemented, and the adverse impact he predicted on the civil service. He added that the Conservative solution would be to let the Bilodeau case go to the Supreme Court.11 The following day, Lyon was interviewed on the cbc television supper news program 24 Hours. He refused to admit that “social divisiveness” would arise because of “comment in the Legislature”; in his view, it would arise because the constitutional amendment

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meant “importing,” “embedding in the Constitution” an Official Languages Act in Manitoba, which would mean that, based on the federal experience, “the merit principle would be put to one side in the civil service … in crown corporations, in departments and so on because of the preoccupation … by linguistic zealots with bilingualism.”12 Finally, Lyon raised the possibility of a referendum on the issue and, failing that, the government should call provincial elections. Lyon’s comments added several important new elements to the debate: the government was attempting to “shove” the agreement “down the throats of the people of Manitoba.” It had no mandate to do so; therefore it should consult the people directly on the issue, preferably in a general election. This seems to be the first recorded point at which the possibility of a referendum on the issue was raised by a member of the legislature, although the idea must already have been circulating in certain rural areas, since that same day the Carman Valley Leader published an article with the heading “We Demand a Referendum!” Though the Winnipeg Free Press and other media reacted positively to the proposed constitutional amendment at the outset,13 the government knew from Lyon’s speech of 20 May and his and Mercier’s subsequent interviews that it was in for a rough ride on the issue. Many calls were already coming in from around the province, and a memo from Penner’s office to all ndp mlas, senior assistants, and executive assistants designated Turenne to handle all enquiries regarding section 23.14 The sfm’s special general meeting on 24 May 1983 attracted a crowd of six hundred people. All the major actors in the negotiations were present; Jacqueline Blay even called it “an evening of reconciliation” between the sfm and Georges Forest. For three hours, Léo Robert and Rémi Smith explained the agreement in detail, clause by clause. Twice the sfm’s board of directors was saluted with standing ovations. In the end, the sfm’s membership overwhelmingly approved the agreement, by a vote of 576 to 11. Observers noted the barely contained emotion in many speakers’ voices as they heard that the long-awaited reversal of the historical injustice visited on the Franco-Manitoban minority in 1890 was at hand.15 In those first few days after the announcement of the agreement, press reaction began to emerge in Manitoba and across the country. Frances Russell described the agreement, and Lyon’s initial reaction to it, in this way: The calm non-partisan accord by which Manitoba was proceeding to end “93 years of injustice” to the province’s French-speaking people came to a sudden, shuddering halt in the legislature last Friday. Opposition Leader Sterling Lyon

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78 Manitoba’s French-Language Crisis served notice that his party will fight the Manitoba government’s proposals to implement the 1979 Supreme Court judgement returning the province to its original bilingual status. Lyon’s stand … ignores Canadian and Manitoban history and ignores constitutional reality.16

A Montreal Gazette editorial, entitled “Lyon Proves the Point,” was more blunt: “Sterling Lyon is living, breathing proof that minority rights need protection in the constitution.”17 On cjob’s open-line morning program hosted by Peter Warren, callers, encouraged by Warren himself, began to discredit the sfm as a legitimate voice for the Francophone community in Manitoba. A letter by one Neil Fraser published in the Winnipeg Free Press on 28 May 1983 reflected this sentiment: without any evidence, Fraser stated baldly that the sfm did not represent the majority of French-speaking citizens of Manitoba. Though this claim was to remain unsubstantiated throughout the language crisis (indeed, virtually all available evidence pointed to the contrary), it was soon taken up by the Opposition in the legislature and by various other adversaries of the constitutional amendment. Sterling Lyon, for instance, described the sfm as “a fraternal society without standing,” a group that was best at “organizing bazaars.”18 Which begged the question: what had he been doing holding cabinet-level meetings with it while he was premier?

ru r a l m u n i c i pa l i t i e s m o b i l i z e Within days after the announcement of the tripartite agreement, a number of resolutions from municipal councils, some dated as early as May 1983, rained down upon Penner’s office.19 In the legislature, Municipal Affairs minister Pete Adam described the offer from the federal government to assist municipalities to provide services in French-speaking communities on a voluntary basis.20 Following a meeting Adam had with the Municipal Advisory Council, Union of Manitoba Municipalities (umm) secretary-manager Bill Rusk wrote all members expressing his fear that bilingualism would “infiltrate” school divisions and municipalities and suggested that local councils adopt resolutions against the French-language proposals and send them on to the premier and the attorney general.21 These resolutions poured into the offices of the premier, the attorney general, and the minister of municipal affairs throughout June 1983. Several pointed out that, despite assurances to the contrary, they “believed” or “feared” that bilingualism would “infiltrate” the municipal level.22 Some, such as the Rural Municipality of Russell, adopted resolutions linking the issue of bilingualism with the implementation of the metric

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system in Canada.23 Many said the government was “misleading” the people of Manitoba, and some, the Rural Municipality of Clanwilliam for instance, expressed their concern that Manitoba was about to be declared a “bilingual province.” Some expressed concerns about the cost of bilingualism.24 A resolution adopted by the Rural Municipality of Shellmouth stated that the affairs of the country and especially the province “should be conducted in Canadian only.”25 From the outset, the urban municipalities took a more reserved approach. The Manitoba Association of Urban Municipalities (maum) circulated results of a survey to all mayors and councillors represented by the organization indicating that 57 percent of the organization’s membership was opposed to the government’s language proposals; maum president Greenslade said the results made it “difficult for the Executive to express with great vigor total opposition to the resolution.” However, Greenslade also told his membership he had met with Pawley and Penner on the issue and that he had indicated to them the organization was “extremely concerned with the possible costs to municipalities.”26 Parallel to the increasingly complex political story, the judicial story was evolving as well. On 30 May a decision by the Quebec Superior Court provided an additional indication to the Pawley government and to the Conservative opposition of the national context within which the Supreme Court would ultimately make its ruling in the Bilodeau case should it finally be heard there. This decision, one of several Collier decisions, was itself destined to be heard in the end by the Supreme Court. The court found invalid a decree issued by the Quebec government because it had been adopted in French only, contrary, in the court’s view, to section 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867. The implications were clear, both for the Quebec and Manitoba governments: the requirement for bilingualism under the terms of section 133 and of section 23 of the Manitoba Act, with its virtually identical wording, was much more extensive than had been believed. In the Pawley government’s view, this was all the more reason to pursue a negotiated settlement with francophones in Manitoba rather than risk going to the Supreme Court. In the House, Penner emphasized that “This is the first instance in which a superior court has held in effect that the failure, in this case the failure of the Province of Quebec, to use both official languages, amounts to an invalidity.”27

ly o n r e d u x All of this was lost on Sterling Lyon. On 6 June he launched a second major offensive in the legislature against the government’s proposed

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constitutional amendment, adding new arguments to the ones he had already presented and fleshing out the previous ones, all the while ignoring the new judicial context. He rejected the tendency on the part of some academic, some writers, on this topic, to make the easy transference between the situation in Quebec and the situation in Manitoba. I suggest that neither history, the law, or any of the touchstones that one would ordinarily look to, support that kind of easy transference as to, if something is done in Quebec, it must be done in Manitoba. There is no convention, that I am aware of, historical, legal, political or otherwise that makes that the case.28

A parallel could not be drawn between Manitoba and Quebec in terms of convention and practice, since “conventions and practice” between the two provinces had been “radically different.” Lyon ignored the fact that even Manitoba’s Court of Appeal had accepted the parallel between section 133 of the bna Act, 1867, and section 23 of the Manitoba Act.29 He also conveniently ignored the possibility that “conventions and practice” might have been radically different in Manitoba had successive governments not acted unconstitutionally after 1890 and that conventions based on illegal and unconstitutional acts should be challenged, even though he accepted that Manitoba had indeed acted unconstitutionally since 1890. Penner repeatedly placed the Manitoba agreement in the national context; repeatedly, Lyon refused to do so, preferring to argue that the Twaddle and Gibson opinions led to the conclusion that the fear that “statutes passed in one language only invalidated the statutes” was “hollow.” He referred often to the Manitoba Court of Appeal judgment, which said that it would be wrong to find that all Manitoba laws would be invalid, since this would lead to “chaos.” Pawley pointed out that in Gibson’s opinion there was a “signifiant risk” of a finding of invalidity and that since even a favourable ruling would have unfortunate ramifications, it would, in Gibson’s view, “be wise to seek an appropriate constitutional amendment as either a substitute for or a supplement to a decision by the Supreme Court of Canada.” As to Lyon’s summary dismissal of a court ruling that could create chaos, Pawley reminded him that on the heels of the Collier decision, René Lévesque was now faced with “a very chaotic type of situation in the Province of Quebec” and that the wording was “near identical except for the exchange of the names of the provinces.” Lyon responded with an alternative to which he was to return many times in the ensuing debate: he proposed an “agreement” with the Francophone community that would deal with translation only, conveniently

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ignoring the fact that if there was to be any agreement at all, the government had to give something in return. As Penner pointed out, “it takes two to tango. You can’t just put your conditions for a settlement, and say sign here … What resulted was the result of a lot of give-and-take in a situation in which both sides stood to lose enormously, but both sides could gain by a calm, sensible approach to this problem.” Penner also reminded the Opposition that services provided by quasi-judicial agencies were already covered by the Supreme Court’s Blaikie 1 decision, independently of the proposed constitutional amendment. Lyon replied that the “bilingualization” of Manitoba was not contemplated in section 23 and that Penner should give “very serious consideration to the results that may accrue from this kind of a quantum leap that they have negotiated with respect to what was, heretofore, a very simple legal case,” since “I know something of the depth of the feeling of this matter in the Manitoba community.” Pawley replied that the “quantum leap forward” that Lyon had described was merely “the policy that was announced in March of 1982, and I did not hear the Leader of the Opposition at that time demur … It has been my understanding, in fact, that it was a continuation of the policy that the Leader of the Opposition, when he was First Minister, foresaw, when he established the French Language Services Division.” Lyon replied that “It is one thing to state a policy or a plan by a government, it is another thing to make it an entrenched constitutional provision,” adding: “When you take a matter of policy and entrench it in a constitution and call it a ‘right,’ and then give anyone, be he a reasonable citizen of Manitoba, a language zealot or whomever, a right of enforcement, then you have created a form of potential tyranny in the hands of a few people who can cause chaos.” To which Penner replied: “I don’t know why I’m reminded of that line from, I guess it’s Hamlet, ‘Cry havoc and let loose the dogs of war.’30 The alarmist kind of rhetoric that the Leader of the Opposition has indulged in in the last few moments is precisely the kind of thing that can … appeal to the few, thank God few, language zealots that there are in the Province of Manitoba.” Then, for the first time, the legislative debate took a vicious, personal twist. Referring to Penner, Lyon retorted: My honourable friend favours alien remedies; I don’t. I favour the system that we have; it has worked very very successfully for well over a hundred years in this country … I don’t think we need alien importations of European or even, to some extent, United States concepts, grafted on like a third arm, onto our Constitution …

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82 Manitoba’s French-Language Crisis What we need is better understanding among all of our people here, something that will not be used as a form of tyrannical weapon by minorities … who have no concerns … for the social fabric of this province.31

No member of the legislature had any doubt as to Lyon’s meaning: he was referring to the fact that Penner was born of European immigrants and that he had, as a young man, been a member of the Communist party.32 In the final minutes of the debate that evening of 6 June he had set the tone for a vicious, personalized debate in the House that was to last another eight months.

doern breaks out In early June 1983, work was continuing on final wording of the agreement between the province and Ottawa on the constitutional amendment and funding arrangements. The main stumbling block on the provincial side was a suitable draft of the section in the amendment relating to municipal services: the province wanted to be sure that municipal and school services were specifically excluded from the scope of the amendment. However, opposition to the tripartite agreement and the constitutional amendment was now surfacing from other quarters, including the ranks of the government itself. Russell Doern, the ndp mla for Elmwood, as well as most other members of the ndp caucus, had been silent on the issue since the beginning; according to Doern, the matter had been on the agenda of two caucus meetings, on 24 May and 31 May 1983; it was finally discussed for the first time on 6 June.33 Doern described that meeting as follows: At 7:15 p.m. on Monday, June 6th, chairman Lecuyer suddenly introduced the question. In a huff, he turned to me and said: “You have put this matter on the caucus agenda. You have asked that it be discussed. You have three minutes”… Nevertheless, I plunged ahead. I attempted to outline my major concerns, especially the bilingualization of our boards, commissions and agencies. About fifteen speakers participated in the debate, while the premier listened. Two or three members expressed mild reservations but another dozen endorsed the proposals. Roland Penner’s forces carried the day. The die was cast. Penner had persuaded Pawley, the cabinet and the caucus.34

Having lost the battle in caucus, Doern decided to break ranks and go public. On 9 June he sent a letter to his constituents asking their opinion. With no indication as to the content of the tripartite agreement or of the constitutional amendment, much less to the context in which they had been negotiated, the letter asked:

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Georges Forest celebrates his historic victory in Ottawa on 13 December 1979. Reprinted by permission of La Liberté

Roger Bilodeau, a young Franco-Manitoban lawyer, who launched his challenge in 1980 to the constitutionality of two Manitoba laws on the grounds that they had been adopted and enacted in English only, contrary to section 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870. Reprinted by permission of La Liberté

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Pat Maltman, an early antiamendment activist, displaying a petition against the Pawley proposals in front of Manitoba’s legislative building, 16 June 1983. Reprinted by permission of the Winnipeg Free Press

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Winnipeg Free Press, 23 June 1983. Reprinted by permission

Winnipeg lawyer Sid Green launches his first major attack against the constitutional amendment at a public information meeting in Winnipeg, 14 July 1983. Reprinted by permission of the Winnipeg Free Press

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New Democratic Party mla Russell Doern with volunteers collecting results of his antibilingualism mail-in campaign, 26 July 1983. Reprinted by permission of the Winnipeg Free Press

Russell Doern deposits thousands of antibilingualism ballots at the door of the premier’s office in the Manitoba Legislative Building, 18 August 1983. Reprinted by permission of the Winnipeg Free Press

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87 The Gathering Storm What do you think? The question is complex: some people argue that Canada is a bilingual nation and therefore French-Canadians have special rights and privileges, while other citizens contend that French-language services in Manitoba would be costly at this time, should be limited in a province with a large ethnic population and that the ability to speak French could become a condition of employment.35

The description of the issue could lead to only one answer. Doern asked his constituents to return an enclosed ballot to him within seven days; he would then total up the responses, make the results public, and “take your views into consideration when speaking and voting on the matter.” He mailed seventy-five hundred copies of the ballot to his constituents as his annual constituency mailing on 8 June; he also sent a letter to ministers and mlas and a press release to the media.36 An account of Doern’s actions was carried on the front page of the Winnipeg Free Press on 10 June, and he was interviewed by several radio stations that morning.37 The party leadership and caucus members were furious about Doern’s unexpected break with party ranks on the issue. Dan O’Connor, of the premier’s office, attempted to contact Doern by telephone several times on the morning of 10 June in the midst of his radio interviews; finally he reached him at 10:40 a.m. and asked him to cease giving interviews to the press until a caucus meeting later that day.38 Nancy Allan told the Elmwood executive that Doern had been asked that day to “stop expressing his views to the general public” until he met with his fellow mlas on Monday afternoon.“39 The same day, caucus chairman Lécuyer asked the caucus secretaries not to handle any work for Doern related to his constituency poll.40 Predictably, at caucus reaction was, in Doern’s words,”cold and icy.“41 There was indeed a general feeling of betrayal among many Cabinet and caucus members.42 Penner finally received a draft of the full text of the constitutional amendment from Ottawa on 14 June;43 he circulated it to the ndp caucus on 15 June.44 The French-language issue was discussed at length in the ndp caucus during three different sessions on 16 June.45 That same day, between caucus sessions Doern began assisting in organizing a citizens’ committee against the constitutional amendment, meeting with a person who was to become one of the key organizers of the movement, Patricia Maltman.46 In the afternoon of 16 June, Doern was called into a meeting with the premier and ministers Len Evans and Sam Uskiw. According to Doern, it was agreed to “leave the basic discussion for the full caucus meeting at 5:30 p.m.”47 At this meeting, several caucus members attacked Doern’s position and his actions over the previous days, includ-

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ing Penner, Andy Anstett, and Myrna Phillips. In the end, again according to Doern, three conditions were laid down for Doern’s continuing membership in the ndp caucus: “1 Do not release the poll results. 2 Apologize to caucus, and 3 Promise never to do anything like this again.”48 At the resumption of the caucus meeting at 8 p.m., an unrepentant Doern refused to accept the conditions.49 Within the ndp, party members were also beginning to make their voices heard: the Reverend Bill Hutton, for example, a former president of the party’s provincial association, wrote to caucus expressing “concerns” over the issue and the government’s position.50 Meanwhile the rural municipalities were stepping up their pressure against the government’s constitutional proposals. The board of directors of the umm met on 16 June in Portage la Prairie to discuss a draft resolution to be proposed to their member municipalities in opposition to these proposals. The umm’s position was that the government should guarantee that municipal services would be specifically excluded from the constitutional amendment and that municipalities would have no obligation to provide French-language services. The Winnipeg Sun reported that of two hundred rural municipalities, fifty had already adopted resolutions condemning the government’s proposed constitutional amendment.51 Municipal Affairs minister Pete Adam was becoming increasingly concerned about the mushrooming opposition to the proposed amendment at the municipal level. On 20 June he asked Penner to include in the amendment “a specific section precluding any formal requirement for municipalities to provide French-language services,” barring which “I expect the emotional pleas on this matter to gather momentum.”52 Penner replied that it was “neither possible nor desirable to include in a constitutional provision a negative statement such as the kind suggested by you.” He suggested that a “positive” letter be sent to the umm “explaining the nature of the assistance available” in implementing bilingual services at the municipal level and the “voluntary nature of the program.”53 The umm’s leadership in promoting opposition to the government’s proposals was already reaping results: articles appeared in the local rural press around the province throughout the month of June informing readers of resolutions adopted by municipal councils against the government’s proposals.

th e p u b l i c i n f o r m a t i o n m e e t i n g s On 17 June, in the wake of the “highly heated” ndp caucus meeting that had gone on late into the previous evening, Roland Penner announced in the legislature the holding of “public information meet-

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ings” on the constitutional amendment.54 Far from appeasing the opposition, Penner’s announcement had the effect of further provoking it. Sensing the government’s unease and internal tensions, the Conservative Opposition pressed its advantage. Sterling Lyon repeated his party’s request for legislative committee hearings to be held intersessionally; the House could then reconvene and deal with the resolution “after it has heard from the people of Manitoba.”55 He badgered the government throughout question period; Pawley rejected his call for legislative hearings, arguing it was not “an instance where we could fairly say that intersessional committee hearings could change the nature of the agreement that has been arrived at.”56 Calling the meetings a “sales pitch,” Lyon asked whether “the First Minister [was] saying that the government is going to go out and propagandize its point of view, and to hell with the people of Manitoba, we’ll pass it anyway?”57 Penner recalled the context in which the constitutional agreement had been negotiated, noting that with the Bilodeau case there was “the possibility of a decision which could have created legal chaos in the Province of Manitoba.” He added that at that stage it was “open to us to do one thing, but one thing only, that is, to reject the agreement completely … What we can do, and I hope we won’t because of the importance to Canadian unity of what we’re doing, is pull back from the agreement entirely.” Lyon replied that “the Bilodeau case represents no real threat to … constitutional stability in Manitoba in any case,”58 and once again called for legislative hearings on the issue.59 Penner could barely conceal his exasperation. Pointing out that once the resolution was introduced, it would be fully debated in public, he expressed his hope that “there is an opposition capable of rising to the occasion just once, capable of demonstrating statesmanship just once, capable of looking at the question of Canadian unity just once, capable of putting aside narrow partisanship just once. If they could only demonstrate that, what a marvellous reaffirmation of the worth of this Legislature we will have.”60 Dismissing Penner’s comments as “rather wild declamations” of an attorney general who is “losing track of his equilibrium,” Lyon turned to the premier, who repeated that the public information meetings would be held and that a resolution would be tabled and debate begun in the House in ten days. Lyon again denounced the process and challenged Pawley to call a provincial election immediately on the issue and then moved adjournment of the House; the speaker ruled the motion out of order. The Conservatives, taking a page from parliamentary tactics used the previous year by their federal counterparts,61 walked out of the House, leaving the division bells to ring for ninety minutes.62 The tension-laden debate in the legislature and the Opposition walkout were extensively reported and analyzed in the press; one reporter

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described the scene in the House as “chaotic.”63 Another report highlighted the government’s ineptitude in managing the issue: “having stumbled into a decision to hold ‘information meetings’ on a matter they themselves say is non-negotiable, the ndp has opened up the whole bag of worms again. Nobody, least of all the government caucus, knows exactly how it happened.”64 The Sun described the situation in the legislature as “the gathering storm”65 and pointed to a “growing wave of public opposition” to the government’s constitutional amendment.66 Internally, the government was still wrestling with the “Doern problem.” By his own account, Doern met with the premier, Roland Penner, Jay Cowan, Gérard Lécuyer, and Pawley assistant Bill Regehr in the morning of Tuesday, 21 June, at which time “there was agreement that I would not attack the government and would make moderate public statements.” The following morning he arranged for an interview on Peter Warren’s hot-line show.67 The government was once again taken aback by what it viewed as this further betrayal, occurring as it did within hours of the “agreement.” On the air, Doern laid out the main elements of his criticism of the proposed constitutional amendment: some 240 or 250 boards, commissions, agencies, and Crown corporations “would in fact require communication in French and English.” He concluded, absurdly, that hundreds of staff would be hired to do nothing else but speak French: “Just what does this mean? If this means that we’re going to have one person in each of these 250 boards and commissions and agencies sitting around for the day when somebody might drop in and want to speak to somebody in French, then I say this is a waste of money – a colossal waste of money!”68 Doern’s second major point was that public hearings should be held on the issue. He formulated no further specific criticisms of the proposed amendment; he simply cast himself as a spokesman for “the people.” Later in the program, Georges Forest called; though Doern and Forest disagreed about the bilingual nature of Manitoba, Forest said they did agree on one thing: it was not necessary to entrench Frenchlanguage services in Manitoba.69 The Warren program, in Doern’s own words, “blew the lid off.”70 He was called to a meeting with Pawley and Muriel Smith that afternoon in the premier’s office and was asked to withdraw from caucus until the language issue was resolved.71 Doern’s actions during those days indicate that, far from being a helpful fixer attempting to find ways for the government to resolve the issue, he was actively involved in organizing all-out opposition to the constitutional amendment. Following the Warren program, again by his own account, five women showed up at his office offering “encouragement to fight the good fight”:

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91 The Gathering Storm This was the origin of a long relationship with this group which consisted of Lynn, Sally, Brenda, Valerie and Joan. These enthusiastic women played a major role in the language debate; passing out literature, attending the public informational meetings and hearings, writing letters and making phone calls. They played a key role in the establishment of Manitoba Grassroots and the Interlake Citizens’ group. Joan and Valerie fanned throughout the province and made contact with other centres in Western Canada. Roland Penner was later to characterize this dynamic group as “Hell’s Grannies.”72

On 23 June, Doern released the results of his constituency poll; they were published that day in the Winnipeg Sun73. Out of seventy-five hundred brochures distributed, Doern had received over four hundred replies, 90 percent of which were opposed to the constitutional agreement. The next day, Doern’s status within the ndp caucus was again discussed; though some ndp mlas wanted to expel him outright, it was decided that no further action would be taken against him. Editorial reaction to these various events in the local press was virtually unanimous in condemning the Opposition and Russell Doern. While the Winnipeg Free Press took a stand in favour of public consultation to “be sure that the amendment rests on the solidest possible foundation of public consent,”74 and asked the government to explain the amendment,75 it also criticized Sterling Lyon for proposing “a narrow, defensive and mean-spirited policy on the protection of language rights for French-speaking Manitobans.”76 The Winnipeg Sun wrote that “the Tory-Doern opposition seems to be based on a belief that Manitoba is a unilingual province.”77 Meanwhile, the Pawley government began taking some initiatives on the public relations front. In June 1983 it retained Wordsnorth Communications Services to develop a public relations strategy. In June and July, the firm produced forty-five hundred copies of a tabloid entitled “Constitutionally Speaking” and a brochure to be mailed to every household in Manitoba (four hundred thousand copies). Wordsnorth was also involved in organizing the public information meetings, and it ran a public opinion survey for the government on 30 June.78 On 23 June, at the request of Penner (presumably prompted by Doern’s statements on the Warren program about the 250 boards and commissions), Kerr Twaddle identified the boards, commissions, corporations, and agencies that would be subject to the bilingual requirements of the proposed section 23.8 of the constitutional amendment.79 The following day, Penner circulated a memo to the ndp caucus refuting Doern’s claims: the real number of agencies covered by the amendment would be closer to 60. However, Penner emphasized that under

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the Blaikie 11 Supreme Court judgment, “we are already under a legal obligation to provide service in the French language on demand for such quasi-judicial bodies.”80 Penner concluded that “Measured against these facts Mr. Doern’s continued public objections and criticisms becomes [sic] even more incomprehensible than it [sic] already is.”81 In June 1983 the national implications of the Pawley government’s proposed constitutional amendment were becoming increasingly clear. Quebec’s English-speaking community strongly supported the constitutional amendment from the outset. Eric Maldoff, president of AllianceQuebec, the Quebec anglophone community’s umbrella organization roughly equivalent to Manitoba’s sfm, congratulated Pawley on his initiative.82 Léo Robert was talking to Alliance Quebec at that time to enlist their public support of the amendment;83 Stephen Scott also offered support on behalf of Anglo-Quebecers.84 On 24 June, Maldoff met with Pawley and with both the ndp and the Conservative caucuses; Maldoff impressed on both caucuses the importance of the constitutional amendment for national unity.85 Sterling Lyon stood firm: after the meeting he said he agreed with the intent of the proposals, but “we would never in a month of Sundays entrench it in the Constitution.“86 While Alliance Quebec was urging the Manitoba Conservatives to drop their opposition to Pawley’s constitutional amendment, the Lévesque government in Quebec was vigorously denouncing the sfm for having had the temerity to intervene in the Collier case before the Supreme Court. The case was critical in terms of defining language rights in Quebec under section 133 of the bna Act and, by extension, in Manitoba under the Manitoba Act, given the parallel texts. The question posed by the case was simply, Must documents accompanying legislation be bilingual under section 133 of the bna Act? The immediate issue was a challenge launched by Quebec school teachers against Bill 105, legislation outlawing strikes by public school teachers. Collier and others argued that the text accompanying the legislation, a collective agreement modified by the legislation, was illegal, since it had been drafted in French only. The broader issue was whether there was an obligation to adopt all “sessional papers” in both languages under section 133. Joseph Magnet strongly urged the sfm to intervene in the case and the sfm agreed with him; it did not, however, anticipate the Quebec government’s anger at this intervention.87 In a letter dated 22 June 1983, Adrien Boulanger, Director of the Programmes d’aide et de coopération in the Canadian Affairs section of the Department of Intergovernmental Affairs, vigorously denounced the sfm’s decision to intervene: “[T]his inimical gesture is all the more surprising in that it

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does not seem to me that attacking Quebec’s policies will in any way help the francophone minorities of Canada. On the contrary, it seems to me that a strong Quebec constitutes the best guarantee that these minorities will receive a minimum of attention from their respective governments” (tr.).88 Boulanger then strongly intimated that Quebec’s financial support for the rebuilding of the sfm’s burnt-out headquarters might be called into question by the sfm’s intervention in the Collier case.89 The Boulanger letter was discussed at the 4 July sfm board meeting, and directors of the sfm pointed out that when the shoe had been on the other foot, the Quebec government had not hesitated to intervene against the sfm before the Supreme Court in Forest. In any case, it was agreed that its best protection was respect for the Constitution.90 The visit of Alliance Quebec to Manitoba, the various press analyses and editorial comments, and the Pawley government’s own reasoned defence of the constitutional agreement had no effect on the Opposition, which, on the contrary, was already becoming firmly entrenched behind the position established in the House by Sterling Lyon. The Opposition was also encouraged by various signs that the government was weakening in its resolve. The Winnipeg Sun reported that Penner would consider changes to its bilingualism proposals before putting them to a vote.91 On 27 June, Premier Pawley said in the House that a suggestion to hold a free vote on the issue in the legislature was “worthy of serious consideration.” Later that day he repeated that the public information meetings would not be the only forum in which the constitutional amendment would be presented; he would also, in due course, hold legislative hearings on the issue.92 At the same time, the government would not agree to intersessional hearings.93 However, Pawley’s more precise statement on the hearings indicated to the opposition that it was making progress on that front. Two days later, Penner announced that the public information meetings would be held in Dauphin and Brandon on 7 July, in Thompson on 13 July, and in Winnipeg on 14 July. The meetings would be chaired by Jack London, dean of the law faculty at the University of Manitoba. Penner added that in addition to these meetings, the resolution as announced would be referred to a standing legislative committee. Finally, Penner announced that the constitutional resolution itself would be introduced formally in the House on 4 July 1983.94 Lyon denounced the public information hearings as the government’s “little propaganda venture … a unilateral, authoritarian decision being made by an incompetent government to deal with one of the most fundamental constitutional amendments that this province has seen.” Lyon even denied that Penner had committed himself to referring the matter to a standing

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committee.95 Again the Tories walked out, leaving the division bells ringing for an hour. “We’ll stay here ‘til hell freezes over if that’s what it takes,” Lyon told a reporter.96 The Conservatives were no doubt encouraged by the presence in the legislative building of seventy to eighty “angry protesters.”97 A heated exchange occurred in a committee room between Penner and Doern, and the protesters “burst into applause” at Lyon’s comments and gave Doern a standing ovation.98 The demonstration, according to the Winnipeg Sun, was a “no-name affair,” since, as both Winnipeg dailies reported, none of the participants were willing to give their names. Doern attempted to link the protests with civil servants but was unable to back up his statements at a press conference he held the following day.99 “Hell’s Grannies” had helped organize the protest, which, in Doern’s words, was “carefully planned.”100 The sfm, meanwhile, was also mobilizing. Realizing that the constitutional amendment for which it had fought so hard over the previous year was now in jeopardy, Léo Robert, Rémi Smith, and other board and staff members began making contacts within the two major Manitoba political parties and with the federal government. Rémi Smith had already had discussions with Andy Anstett, and he and Léo Robert had met with the ndp caucus on 24 June.101 On 29 June, Smith phoned Tory Senator Nathan Nurgitz to express his concerns about the hard line being taken by the Tories in the House, and Léo Robert and Smith met with the Conservative caucus on 5 July.102 During the month of June, Smith also communicated several times with the regional director of the Department of the Secretary of State, Roger Collet, and on July 1 he talked to Secretary of State Serge Joyal himself.103 Thoughout July and August he spoke on a regular basis with Martial Fontaine and Bill Balan, members of Collet’s staff; most of his conversations involved additional funding for the sfm in its ongoing struggle to have the constitutional amendment adopted.104 The sfm’s (and Collet’s) problem was that no federal government programme existed to fund community activities in a context such as the one facing the organization. It was at these meetings, as well, that the idea of alliance-building between francophones and ethnocultural groups was first floated; assistance was provided by the Winnipeg regional office of the Secretary of State in the form of lists of contact persons among the various ethnocultural groups. On 4 July, Léo Robert told the sfm board that he had met with the Secretary of State the previous day and that Joyal would consider the sfm’s request that his department reimburse the sfm’s legal expenses on the issue.105 At this stage the sfm was not seeking other types of special financial assistance, although “legal fees” could cover a lot of ground.

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f i n a l l y, a r e s o l u t i o n On 4 July, Roland Penner rose in the House to table the government’s French-language constitutional resolution.106 The most significant and controversial amendments to the Manitoba Act were as follows: 23.1

English and French are the official languages of Manitoba;

23.7(1) Any member of the public in Manitoba has the right to communicate in English or French with, and to receive available services in English or French from: (a) the head or central office of any department of the Government of Manitoba; (b) the head or central office of (i) any court; (ii) any quasi-judicial or administrative body of the Government of Manitoba; (iii) any Crown corporation; (iv) any agency of the Government of Manitoba established by or pursuant to an act of the Legislature of Manitoba; (c) the office of the Chief Electoral Officer; (d) the office of the Ombudsman for the Province of Manitoba. (2) Any member of the public in Manitoba has the right to communicate in English or French with, and to receive available services in English or French from, any office not referred to in subsection (1) of an institution described in paragraph 1(a) or (b) where: (a) there is significant demand for communications with and services from that office in that language; (b) due to the nature of the office, it is reasonable that communications with and services from that office be available both in English and French.

The resolution also provided for redress in the form of Court of Queen’s Bench declarations and administrative plans “where the court finds that these rights have been infringed or denied.”107 Penner then launched into an impassioned speech, recalling in detail the historical and constitutional background leading to the resolution. He tabled the Twaddle and Gibson opinions, pointing out that both lawyers believed a ruling of invalidity was possible, if not likely. Given this possibility, Penner felt that as attorney general he could not take the risk: “after all, if they do find our laws invalid, well we just don’t have any courts, we don’t have any laws, we don’t have any Legislature;” this was therefore not a course of action he could commend “if there was a

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reasonable and an honourable alternative.” Penner also tabled exhibits documenting Manitoba’s existing language obligations under the Charter of Rights and recent court judgments, including the Quebec Superior Court’s judgment in the Collier case, which supported his view that “there was a real possibility that the Supreme Court of Canada, in this new constitutional era, could have found the Statutes of Manitoba invalid.”108 Penner then returned to the Bilodeau case facing the Pawley government. He reminded the House that twice Manitoba had gone to the Supreme Court on language issues and that twice the province had lost, in the Forest and Blaikie cases. Suppose, on the other hand, the court did not rule that all laws were invalid; suppose the court gave a certain period, say five years: the result would be that “we would have had to translate all of our statutes, 4,500 approximately of our statutes.” A complete victory for the province would be a Pyrrhic victory, since the highest court in the land would have decided that “shall” really means “may”; in that case, “we could all warm our hands over the ashes of constitutional guarantees.” Regarding the legitimacy of the sfm as a negotiating partner, Penner pointed out that the Lyon government itself had established the tradition of the government dealing with the sfm on such matters and that the sfm was “clearly the most representative” of the organizations of the French community in Manitoba.109 Penner described how the negotiations had evolved; how the government’s initial position, a mere reduction of the translation load without a quid pro quo, was rejected out of hand, since, in the other parties’ view, “You’re asking us to give something for nothing. There is no quid pro quo; no this for that. You can’t be serious.” What, then, was the quid pro quo? “Essentially it was that there should be some constitutional guarantee for French language services which were already being delivered by the government; and that then became the key negotiating issue.” Penner added that Serge Joyal’s earlier suggestion before the sfm that Manitoba adhere to sections 16–20 of the Charter had been rejected by the government, since a key word, the word – “institution” at section 20(1) of the Charter in terms of provision of bilingual services – “would include municipalities, school boards, a whole range of institutions,” which the government had refused to do. Penner then responded directly to the concerns expressed by Manitoba municipalities, pointing out that the agreement provided only for a grant program “available only where numbers warrant and only on a voluntary basis. So we prevailed in this respect.”110 Penner described the contents of the agreement itself as reflected in the resolution: first, it contained “a validation of our laws passed in one language only; an extension of time to

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complete the translation of the major public statutes as they appear in the consolidated Statutes of Manitoba until the end of 1993; and a drastic reduction in the number of those statutes which don’t ordinarily appear in the consolidated statutes – from approximately 4,000 of them – about 150 of those … which appear in the schedule to the resolution.” A second part of the agreement dealt with the quid pro quo, provision of French-language services in return for large cuts in the number of laws and regulations to be translated. Finally, a third part dealt with the question of remedies. Again, Penner pointed out how the government had rejected the remedies found in the Charter in favour of courtordered administrative plans and how such remedies would work: “The only thing the court can do is say to the particular government agency or department, well what is your plan? Would you please bring in your plan of how you propose to deal with what are alleged to be inadequacies? And the government may do that, bring in a plan and the court cannot alter that. It may say well, if we don’t think that’s good enough come back with another plan but that’s it.”111 Penner then turned to what he called the “main bone of contention,” French-language services, and dropped a bombshell, tabling as exhibits documentation of decisions taken by the Lyon government itself regarding French-language services: the Cabinet memorandum of 6 October 1980 on French-language services, “arrived at … by negotiating with the Société Franco-Manitobaine”; a Treasury Board submission of 19 January 1981 establishing the senior advisor’s position; documentation of the meeting of 5 December 1980 between two Lyon government ministers and the sfm; the submission of 6 February 1981 to Cabinet; and a Lyon letter to the civil service dated 4 September 1981 on Roger Turenne’s appointment and mandate. Despite its howls of protest, the opposition was clearly taken aback at the tabling of these documents. For a rare moment during the language crisis, Penner appeared to enjoy himself in debate: “I detect, Sir, by the agitation over there there’s a certain amount of unease about the record finally being made public. Oh no, oh no, but they heckle and they squirm, and they grow a little red in the face. Let the record speak for itself lest there be any suggestion that there’s a little hyprocrisy on that side.”112 Penner then contrasted what the government was currently obliged to do with what was proposed in the constitutional amendment. Quoting from Twaddle’s analysis of the Blaikie judgments, which did not attempt to distinguish between “quasi-judicial” and “administrative” bodies, Penner said the number of such agencies covered by the constitutional proposal would be 59:

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98 Manitoba’s French-Language Crisis Of these 59, I have done a quick analysis, some 22 of these 59 quasi-judicial, administrative bodies, Crown corporations, agencies of the Government of Manitoba and some borderline cases, of these 59, twenty-two are quasijudicial; that is, they are already required, by the Blaikie decision of the Supreme Court in 1979, to deliver services, as requested, in English or French. So you’re down to a balance of 37 and … of those 37, approximately a little better than half already have persons there able to carry out their functions bilingually, so that we’re down to something like 15 or 20 – that is in terms of these boards and commissions and agencies – we’re down to 15 or 20. That’s the extension by this agreement.113

Penner quoted Turenne’s analysis according to which only 400 positions in the entire civil service were considered to be “essential” or “preferred” in terms of bilingualism, and, given the numbers of positions already filled by persons meeting these requirements, the requirement in terms of new hiring might be, at most, 160. Penner pointed out that the net cost to the province over a ten-year period with the agreement would about be $3 million, and without the agreement, $5.4 million, and he tabled an exhibit documenting the cost differential. Penner ended with a plea for national unity, relating the resolution to the future of the Canadian federation: “Let no one underestimate the strain that Canadian unity is under, and no more so than with our fellow Canadians in Quebec. These are all our fellow-Canadians, FrenchCanadians and English-Canadians alike. The Franco-Canadians of Quebec beguiled, all too many of them, with the notion that they cannot exist as a culture in Canada, these people are looking to the leadership that Manitoba can give.”114

th e o p p o s i t i o n r e s p o n d s The Opposition took a week to respond to Penner’s hour-and-a-halflong speech, described in the Winnipeg Sun as a “ringing defence” of the constitutional amendment.115 The first group to react publicly was the Manitoba Government Employees Association (mgea), whose president, Gary Doer, deplored the fact that his organization had not been consulted on the issue.116 Penner met with Doer on 5 July and addressed the organization’s concerns, including concerns about hiring and promotion of public service staff, in a confidential letter the following day.117 Doer replied that his organization would be finalizing its position the following week.118 On 5 July, as well, Pawley met again with representatives of the Union of Manitoba Municipalities and received a legal opinion transmitted to the umm by Alan W. Scarth on 5 July.119 Scarth expressed his

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concern that the Courts of Revision (which fulfilled a significant quasijudicial function of municipal bodies) might be required to provide services in French under the government’s resolution. Scarth’s overall conclusion, however, was that this was the only area involving municipal activities that might be affected by the resolution.120 After the meeting, both parties appeared to be guardedly optimistic in their comments. umm executive director David Harms appeared to have fewer objections to the government’s proposal than he had had before the meeting. He was, however, “uncertain whether the proposal could be sold to the members of his group, but ‘surely we could make the thing go a little easier.›121 This glimmer of a truce between the government and the umm was snuffed out in a matter of hours. On 7 July the Sun reported that Harms had “met with executive members yesterday morning and found that some things Pawley had said may not have been accurate. At the least, the municipalities want a constitutional guarantee they will never have to provide bilingual services.”122 Surveys of 48 members of the Manitoba Association of Urban Municipalities and 162 members of the Union of Manitoba Municipalities revealed that the “anti-bilingual sentiment is fiercer among smaller rural municipalities, towns and villages.”123 Within the Pawley government, debate was heating up about the type of communications strategy to adopt. Wordsnorth Communications advised an overall communications strategy, since “Research has proven that if people are supplied with sufficient information, delivered in a manner which is acceptable to them, their attitudes on a particular issue can be changed.”124 On this basis, Wordsnorth recommended public information meetings; the Pawley government decided to take this advice, a decision that quickly proved disastrous. On 7 July 1983, several elements of the Pawley government’s hastily developed communications strategy on the language issue came together. Armed with a consensus among its main political advisors on the issue, the government launched a belated “low-profile public information” campaign, coinciding with the first of the public information meetings.125 Penner issued a press statement describing his French Services Plan, emphasizing that it was a “practical, limited approach” to French-language services in Manitoba.126 The following day, the Information Services Branch issued two press releases summarizing the main elements of the resolution Penner had introduced in the House on 4 July.127 The releases quoted him as saying the agreement was not only “honorable and defensible, but was one which would make a significant contribution to Canadian unity” and pointed out the constitutional limits on the bilingualism provisions that protect “the rights of school boards and municipalities to do as they will.”128

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On 7 July, as well, the government released a four-page brochure in tabloid format developed by Wordsnorth and entitled Constitutionally Speaking. The brochure described the government’s position and included most of the specific data already mentioned in Penner’s speeches and in the press releases under various headings, in an effort to counter “misinformation.” The brochure included a map of Manitoba showing areas where French-speaking Manitobans lived “in substantial numbers.” The caption made the point that “It is these areas that may voluntarily join the French Language Services program or where the provincial government may offer additional language service where there is significant public demand. No municipalities or school boards will be required to join.”129 Ginny Devine circulated the brochure to all ministers, mlas, and senior civil servants on 7 July.130 Pawley advised ministers that henceforth only they should answer questions addressed to the government regarding French-language services.131 Meanwhile, on the morning of 7 July in Dauphin, Jack London was calling the first of the public information meetings to order. Richard Cleroux of the Globe and Mail described the scene: “About 75 people, most of them elderly, retired men, were waiting for Mr. Penner, a remarkable turnout considering the time of day and the short notice given for the meeting. The hall was not the hotbed of bigots some of the national news media had half-expected, but a gathering of genuinely worried, skeptical and upset townspeople who politely spoke their discontent and sat down again to applause from the audience.” Winnipeg Sun reporter Andrew Coyne described the meeting more melodramatically: In Dauphin, Penner faced a crowd of about 80 townspeople and national and local media representatives in the sweltering heat of the town’s Ukrainian Catholic Hall. He gave it his best shot, reiterating the government’s defence of the plan. But with the first salvo from the floor microphone, it became evident Penner had changed no minds. In voices crackling with suppressed anger, speaker after speaker rose to denounce the bilingual amendment to applause and cheers from the crowd.132

In Cleroux’s account, after Penner had pointed out that the agreement “would not force anything on individuals, private businesses, municipalities or school boards,” one speaker, Gerry Wachsmann, asked, “Where will it stop? It will mushroom.” Clarence Kiesman, reeve of Grahamdale, said, “he had ‘no sympathy, no time and no money’ for minority groups. He said no other minority group except francophones are pressing for rights, except for ‘the Indians, and who

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are they learning it from?› Cleroux quoted several other Dauphinarea residents: Tom Smart, the reeve of Ochre River, said he was neither “anti-Indian nor antiUkrainian” but the Government’s money would be better spent creating jobs than translating laws into French. Elwood Birss, a retired post office employee from Dauphin, said the only solution is for Quebec to be French and the rest of Canada to be English. Earl Moberg, 40, an unemployed teacher, said: “I can’t agree with a small group … having more rights than larger minority groups.”133

These first expressions of concerns on the part of the general public established patterns that held through the information meetings and the two sets of public hearings in the fall and winter. From the start, as well, the irrational and often emotional nature of these concerns defied rational explanation or debate. The opponents’ major themes were the fear that the Penner proposal constituted the “thin edge of the wedge” that would lead to greatly expanded official bilingualism in Manitoba; concern with costs, both of services and translation; concern that the French would have more rights than other minorities in the province; and the notion that no minority group should be treated differently from the others. The second information meeting unfolded that evening at the Red Oak Inn in Brandon, where, according to Coyne’s account, “it was much the same story [and] 150 predominantly elderly people grilled the attorney-general. One man said the next step will be ‘martial law’ while another said francophones should learn to speak ‘the Canadian language.› The Winnipeg Free Press reported that one speaker said “The sky is the limit once they [language rights] are entrenched.” According to the Montreal Gazette, one speaker insisted that “the person calling the shots” in the language debate was “the master himself, Trudeau.”134 Penner was clearly taken aback at the force of the opposition to the amendment. Back in his office, he sent an “urgent” memo to Regehr and Cramer of the premier’s office and to his assistants Devine and Allan: the Dauphin and Brandon meetings “demonstrated the need to redouble our efforts with respect to getting out our own support and having a number of people prepared to make statements.” Penner added that “The opposition clearly succeeded in outgunning us at both meetings” and concluded that “it is a matter of top urgency that the Party be mobilized.” He wanted “at least 100 of our people” at the forthcoming Winnipeg meeting and suggested that the premier’s office and his aides also contact the university.135

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The third information meeting held in Thompson on 13 July was eclipsed by the “main event,” the Winnipeg meeting that was held the following day. According to the Winnipeg Free Press, 850 people turned out at the International Inn and “of the 42 people to question Penner, 23 were in favour of the government and 19 against.”136 Opposition to Penner was vociferous: Penner’s remarks were interrupted frequently by hecklers shouting: “Go back to Russia,” “How much is this going to cost?” “Who’s going to pay for it?” and “How many will lose their jobs?” One speaker accused the government of stacking the meeting with its own supporters. “A good number of people supporting your policy with their neat little notes are from groups funded by the ndp. The rest are card-carrying ndpers,” said Fred Debrecen, a former ndp organizer.137

One opponent, Ian McPherson, said: “I’ve watched this country become slowly Canadian. The French are separate. They don’t want to become Canadian. You’ll have to speak French to get a job. A person who can’t speak French is a second-rate person in this country.” These concerns were to be repeated over and over again in the course of the ensuing debate: the fear that future government employment would require knowledge of French and the status anxiety expressed in the feeling that the French, through the bilingualism policies, were somehow becoming “superior” to other Canadians. One significant aspect of the meeting was the active public participation of other ethnic groups in the debate. According to the Winnipeg Free Press, “Many representatives of Winnipeg minorities were present. Speaking in support of the proposed amendment were spokesmen from the Portugese, Irish, Ukrainian, Dutch, French, Chinese, Indian and Metis associations. Leo Robert, president of the Société Franco-Manitobaine, did not take the floor. ‘There’s a vocal minority here tonight … I’m surprised at the number of ethnic groups who came out in favor of this,’ he said privately.”138 Support for the constitutional amendment had indeed been building among ethnic organizations in the previous days, no doubt due at least in part to the sfm’s new, proactive approach to relations with them. At its 4 July board meeting, the sfm had authorized Léo Robert and executive director Raymond Théberge to meet with other ethnocultural groups and to back their “reasonable and legitimate demands.” This was a major policy shift for the sfm, which had always maintained an attitude of aloofness towards other ethnic minorities.139 On 11 July, a letter from “concerned members of the Ukrainian-Canadian community of Manitoba” went out to various groups, the media, and politi-

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cians, including the attorney general. The authors extended their support for the agreement and expressed hope for its speedy passage.140 On 13 July the Winnipeg Free Press reported that the leaders of eight ethnic groups had come out in favour of the Pawley government’s constitutional proposals. Letters of support from ethnic groups began to reach the offices of various ministers; the first on record, dated 14 July 1983, was from Mrs Pushpa Chandra, president of the Winnipeg chapter, National Association of Canadians of Origins [sic] in India, who expressed the “unqualified support of the East Indian Community” of Winnipeg, numbering twenty thousand, for the constitutional amendment to entrench French-language rights.141 Another, also dated 14 July, was received by Eugene Kostyra from the Vietnamese community.142 Three days later, a new organization, the Manitoba Association for Bilingual Education, issued a statement supporting the proposed amendment.143 The letter was signed by Myron Spolsky, chair of the new group, and was published in the Winnipeg Free Press in mid-July. The Winnipeg Jewish Community Council supported the amendment and sent a letter to that effect to several newspapers on 22 July and a copy to the attorney general on 25 July.144 A group of Mennonites, including John Klassen, ndp caucus communications and research director, held two meetings on 18 and 22 July. Klassen reported to Penner on four initiatives that were to be taken by this group.145 Several themes crystallized during this first phase of the language crisis: the well-intentioned but fumbling nature of the Pawley government’s performance, due in part to the unfortunate circumstances in which the conclusion of the agreement was made public; the mean-spirited, narrowly focused, and uncompromising position taken by Sterling Lyon and the Conservative caucus, along with Russell Doern; the nativistic perspective developed by the Opposition regarding the federal government and any form of official bilingualism; the mobilization of rural municipalities against the amendment; and the alignment of leaders of ethnocultural groups in favour of the sfm and the provincial government’s constitutional initiative. All these trends amplified as debate in the legislature dominated the political scene in Manitoba through the summer of 1983.

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5 The Long Hot Summer

During the summer of 1983, new actors emerged in the language debate, not least of which was the Manitoba Government Employees Association, a natural ally of the ndp, which voiced the concerns of its membership with a reasonableness that contrasted sharply with the vituperative denunciations of the rural municipalities. The language debate was also attracting attention outside the province; in particular, anglophones in Quebec voiced their support for Manitoba’s francophone minority. However, it was the debate in the legislature that dominated the headlines in Manitoba and galvanized public opinion through the hot summer months of 1983.

ly o n d r aw s t h e l i n e On 12 July, Sterling Lyon rose in the House to formally launch the debate on the constitutional amendment. In a three-and-a-half-hour speech, Lyon laid out his party’s position in detail, ranging from a detailed review of the content of the resolution to attacks on the credibility of the sfm as a negotiator of the constitutional agreement and on the “incompetent, socialist” government that had agreed to it. At the heart of Lyon’s opposition to the resolution was the notion that not only was bilingualism being extended in Manitoba but that this extension was being irrevocably entrenched, creating “prejudice” for “generations of Manitobans yet unborn.” Later, in a blatant distortion of Manitoba’s history, Lyon declared that having English and French as official languages had “never been part of our history, never been part

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of our politicial traditions at all in this province,” adding that “the statement of Manitoba being a bilingual province just isn’t true; it’s not true historically; it’s not true politically; it’s not true legally. It has never been true that Manitoba was conceived as a bilingual province.” Towards the end of the evening Lyon raised the spectre of a major transformation of the province due to entrenched bilingual services that would affect future generations: “I worry about the children and the grandchildren of Members of this House and of Manitobans generally who are going to find … as surely as I stand here tonight that a form of tyranny will have been made out of these entrenched and irreversible sections just as surely as a form of tyranny has been made out of The Official Languages Act by unthinking bureaucrats, by zealots and by others who don’t care about the unity of this country at all.”1 Although the entrenchment argument was the touchstone of his speech, Lyon made a number of other points. One of these was the nefarious role of the federal government in the development of the constitutional amendment. He quoted extensively from Joyal’s 19 March sfm speech, taking it not as advice from a federal francophone minister to a small, isolated French-speaking community but as evidence of collusion, if not conspiracy, between the federal and Manitoba governments: “I suggest … that we can see the guiding hand with respect to the agreement that this Legislature is now being asked to ratify, an agreement that was consummated in a form of political perfidy between the Trudeau Government and the socialist government of this province, which pays very little attention to what the people of this province want to see happen.”2 Lyon then combined his distorted view of Manitoba history with a conspiracy theory about the perfidious role of the federal government in terms that would be taken up over and over again by the most extreme, sometimes racist, opponents of the constitutional amendment: So we’re only left to conjure that my honourable friends opposite in their zeal to co-operate with the Federal Government and to get money from the Federal Government are trading off the birthright of Manitobans. Trading off the constitutional history of this province, trading off, Mr. Speaker, the total history of this province for their own petty, partisan purposes and trying to leave this province with an entrenched irreversible constitutional amendment which is not in sympathy with or in accord with the background or the history or the tradition of this province in anyway [sic] whatsoever.3

Over the three and one half hours, Lyon mentioned the “secret” nature of the negotiations between the sfm, the Manitoba government, and the federal government several times, to the extent that it must be

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counted as a major theme of the speech. Lyon started with Joyal: “In March of 1983 he [Joyal] knew that the Societe [sic] was in negotiation with this government, with the ndp Government; nobody else did, but Mr. Joyal knew that.” Later in the same speech, however, he again admitted having been let in on the “secret” during the negotiations and recalled that “we had a meeting with the Franco-Manitoban Society after we had had this notification.”4 On the matter of the Bilodeau case itself, Lyon made three major points. First, he claimed that the possibility of the government losing the case before the Supreme Court was virtually nonexistent, quoting Twaddle’s opinion extensively to that end but conveniently ignoring Penner’s point that Twaddle had already lost twice before the Supreme Court. As for the sfm, Lyon added his voice to those, like Peter Warren a few months earlier, who had attacked its legitimacy and the appropriateness of its being a party in the negotiation of the constitutional amendment: Manitobans discovered, after a public meeting held by the sfm, that their future and the future of generations yet unborn was being negotiated by this government with a private society in Manitoba, the Franco-Manitoban Society, an honourable society but nonetheless a society, no greater or no lesser than the St. Andrew’s Society, the St. David’s Society or any other society representing any other group in Manitoba … The fact that they had voluntarily made themselves a party to the action of Bilodeau vs. the Attorney-General of Manitoba was of interest but of no greater consequence at all.5

Regarding the translation burden that the Pawley government was trying to avoid, Lyon felt the government should negotiate only to reduce it without giving anything to Francophones in return. If, ultimately, the issue was placed before the Supreme Court and this resulted in much more translation, then so be it, despite the cost: “translation is an obligation that the Supreme Court laid on the province, and the negotiation has to be how much, how pragmatic, how reasonable. What are the statutes that Franco-Manitobans work with and want to have translated today … you don’t give away the farm to avoid a million dollars worth of translation.”6 Lyon offered only two specific suggestions to the government as to how to proceed. The first, repeated several times, was his previous proposal for a legislative committee that would hold public hearings intersessionally. Twice he expanded this proposal to include the federal parliament: “what would be wrong with canvassing the idea that the Parliament of Canada and the Manitoba Legislature have a joint committee that would travel throughout Manitoba and have hearings with

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the people of Manitoba?” Failing this – and Lyon ended on this note – “Let them immediately call a provincial election on this problem.”7 Throughout June and early July, the Manitoba Government Employees Association (mgea), representing most provincial government employees, analyzed the implications of the government’s constitutional proposals and formulated its position. On 12 July, mgea President Gary Doer called a press conference where he released two documents: a “preliminary opinion” on the government’s proposals by the organization’s lawyers8 and a letter to Premier Pawley criticizing the government for failing to circulate the precise wording of the proposed amendment at the public meetings and to the provincial employees.9 Doer added that his association would not support the measure unless it was modified.10 Specifically, Doer and the mgea board of directors asked Pawley to incorporate three changes to the government’s proposals: 1 deletion of the term “central office” from sections 23.7(1)(a) and (b); 2 deletion of the term “administrative body” from the proposed Section 23.7(1)(b)(ii); and 3 a more precise definition of the term “significant demand” in the proposed section 23.7(2)(a), since “we are unclear as to what is intended by this terminology.” Doer pointed out, however, that “the Manitoba Government Employees’ Association fully supports the reinstatement of the constitutional language rights that existed in the Manitoba Act of 1870 … We further support a limited extension of those rights in the provision of practical bilingual government services. Any extended rights must be implemented in a realistic and workable manner in order to avoid future conflicts.”11 The day after the mgea press conference, Penner instructed his legal advisors to examine the issues raised by the organization. On 18 July, he met with representatives of all public service unions to explain the government’s French-language services program. Penner told them that the government was open to getting the best wording possible. However, he pointed out that there were two main constraints: time and the fact that other parties were involved. The concerns expressed were essentially those of the mgea; cupe, for example, did not disagree with entrenchment but had concerns with the wording.12 A second meeting with the unions was held on 2 August; Penner and Kostyra represented the government.13 An example of the concerns expressed is contained in a letter to Penner from the Communications Workers of Canada, which asked how the bilingualism policy would be implemented in the Manitoba Telephone Company’s phone stores and regional centres, such as the one in Dauphin.14 Within Cabinet, some ministers were becoming increasingly concerned about the government’s handling of the issue; among them were

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Vic Schroeder, Sam Uskiw, and Eugene Kostyra.15 On 3 August, after the second meeting with the unions, Kostyra communicated a number of his concerns in writing to Penner, suggesting “we initiate briefing meetings with Chairmen of the major Crown corporations” and their general managers and legal counsel.16 Regarding the unions, Kostyra suggested some form of lay-off protection, to lay the ground for a compromise.17 On 15 July, Penner spoke with Roger Tassé, deputy minister of justice in Ottawa, who confirmed that the purpose of the terminology used was “to cover every possible type of agency of the government of Manitoba other than a department.”18 As debate on the constitutional resolution droned on, Gérard Lécuyer recalled the long, bitter history of the French community and of the abolition of its rights over nearly a century, and he responded emotionally both to the ongoing heckling that greeted his speech and to Lyon’s earlier taunts: “Some of those guilty of scare tactics, guilty of trying to portray the proposed amendment as something that it isn’t sit right here in this House. These are people who in the past, and even today, see me and those of other ethnic backgrounds as people less worthy than they, who are [sic] white Anglo-Saxon background. That is why we are sometimes told by members of this House that we are not worthy of sitting in this Chamber since – and I quote the words of the Leader of the Opposition – “We don’t have the right background.”19 He pointed out the implications of the constitutional resolution for the French-speaking minority in Manitoba and for Canadian duality in general: “it cannot be true that for me to be a Canadian I must deny my heritage, renege on my culture and limit the use of my mother tongue to the home, to the courts, or the Legislature. For me to accept to speak only English, or to speak ‘white,’ or to speak ‘Canadian’ – as some ignorant people will sometimes tell me – would mean that I also have to accept that this country is forever divided. It would also mean that there is no place for me in this province and in this House.”20 Franco-Manitobans had not been unreasonable; they only wanted things that were important for them to live fully in French. They could have pushed their demands to the limit, he said, but had chosen instead to negotiate a reasonable compromise.21 By mid-July, Attorney General Roland Penner knew his proposal for amending the constitution was in deep trouble; indeed, he was already contemplating changes to the agreement that had been negotiated over the previous year with the sfm and the federal government. The immediate cause of this reassessment was the position taken by the Manitoba Government Employees Association.

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The mgea made its position public on 12 July 1983. On 16 July the Winnipeg Free Press reported that Penner might soften his stand on changes to the tripartite agreement. Penner admitted he had been “too categorical” in his original stand of refusing to renegotiate any part of the original agreement; however, he said he would not back away from the basic principles. Penner was not the only member of the government caucus to be shaken by the mgea position. Part of Cabinet’s 20 July meeting was taken up with discussion of the French-language issue, and “it was agreed that an amended resolution would be proceeded with as soon as possible.”22 Predictably, Léo Robert told the press that the sfm would not accept major changes to the agreement.23 He opened the door, however, to discussing “minor changes” with Penner, pointing out that both Ottawa and Bilodeau would have to agree with any changes. In the legislature, debate on the resolution continued and began to settle into a pattern, with various speakers reiterating points already made by their respective leaders, sometimes with embellishments and shifts of emphasis. Occasionally new points were made. As the debate progressed, it increasingly took on the characteristics of a filibuster. It is not surprising, therefore, that it was generally dominated by the Conservative opposition, which repeatedly indulged in vicious personal attacks. Their leader, Sterling Lyon, was one of the worst offenders. A typical exchange occurred on 7 July, when Lyon called Lécuyer a “zealot” and a “fool.” Pawley denounced Lyon’s behaviour, adding that “this is the type of intemperate language that is unduly frustrating the normal course of proceedings in this Chamber.” Lyon retorted that Pawley himself was “acting like a fool.”24 On 19 July, an incensed Sterling Lyon rose on a point of order; he had read the English translation of Lécuyer’s comments of 15 July and his reference to the leader of the opposition in the context of the setbacks suffered by the French-speaking community in 1890. Lyon asked Lécuyer to withdraw his comments regarding himself, calling him “an embarrassment to this House and to this province. When I finish with him he may not want to stay around … let the Honourable Member for Radisson, if [he] has the guts, sit here and take his cowardly medicine instead of trying to skivver out from under the words that he uttered in Hansard the other day.” He added, for good measure, “I don’t need any half-baked Member for Radisson telling me, or imputing motives to me, about what our government did with respect to French language services in this province.”25 Lécuyer refused to withdraw the comments. New Democratic Party mla Don Scott then jumped in and, referring to Lyon, said: “When he is talking about attitudes of persons, and if the Leader of

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the opposition wishes to link himself with those previous attitudes, he is doing a very good job of it. When he refers to the Member for Radisson as a zealot fool; when he refers to the Member for Radisson as Kermit the frog; when he tells him to go back and get on his lilypad.” A chorus of protests rose from the opposition benches. Conservative mla Don Orchard shouted that “no such name calling was done in this House. No member in this House referred to any member of this House as Kermit the frog and I wish he would withdraw that remark.” Scott persisted: “I cannot withdraw a comment that the Member for Pembina repeats sometimes 15 times in 10 minutes. He does it constantly from his Chair and if Hansard hasn’t picked it up, it is not for me to refute the words from the member for Pembina. He does it constantly incessantly, Mr. Speaker, and it shows you the racious tone and the bigotry that belies [sic] upon that man.”26 Orchard again asked Scott to withdraw his remarks or apologize to him; again Scott said, “I will not withdraw a comment that that member has put forward in this House numerous times, Mr. Speaker, countless times. If he wishes to withdraw remarks, he is the one that should stand and apologize to the Member for Radisson.”27 The deputy speaker pointed out that the “Rules of this House refer specifically to the language used in debate. If these words are not on the record they are not used in debate.” Scott persisted: “Mr. Speaker, I am sad to say that I cannot withdraw remarks that I have heard no less than a hundred times from the Member for Pembina … It is time, Mr. Speaker, that the members of this House be accounted [sic], not only for when they’re on their feet, but also for the slurs and the attacks that they throw from their chairs.”28 Orchard again denied having referred to a member of Scott’s caucus as Kermit the frog, “whoever that member may be,” and again asked that Scott withdraw his comments. In the end, Scott did, but suggested to the deputy speaker that “we instruct Hansard … to pick up more of the comments that come across this floor. For Hansard not to have heard his screaming time and time again across this House – I’m referring to the Member for …” Again Scott was drowned out by the opposition. The deputy speaker, however, ruled that Scott had “withdrawn his remark sufficiently for the purposes of this House.”29 The speaker’s definitive ruling on Lyon’s point of order regarding Lécuyer’s speech came on 25 July, when he concluded that “no point of order exists for the Chair to decide.” On Friday, 22 July 1983, Penner moved to refer the constitutional amendment to the Standing Committee on Privileges and Elections “to hold … public meetings” and moved also that “the Committee report

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to the Assembly at this Session of the Legislature.” Penner emphasized that the government wanted full public participation in the debate and that the process might well lead to amendments. On 25 July, Tory mla Bud Sherman moved an amendment to Penner’s motion that the committee sit intersessionally.30 Outside the legislature, Russell Doern was still very much in the news. On 22 July, the Winnipeg Sun published an article entitled “The Sins of Russ Doern,” in which it listed a number of statements made by Doern on the language issue and compared them with the facts. The article reported the “Kermit” comments and attributed them to Doern. The Winnipeg Free Press reported that Doern was spending thirty-five hundred dollars of his own money on an advertising campaign against the government’s proposals.31 The first ad appeared the following day: headed “Against Bilingualism,” it covered a quarter of a page and included a mail-in ballot. On 26 July, Penner told the House about a new government initiative to inform the population about the government’s language proposals: “Members will have before them a leaflet entitled ‘The Facts About French Language Services.’ I wish to inform the House that this is a household mailer being distributed to every home and business in the Province of Manitoba.”32 Penner added that the mailer would cost each Manitoba resident 2.8 cents and was “a method which [was] far less costly than television advertising.”33 There is some doubt about the ultimate efficacy of Penner’s leaflet. One of Penner’s files entitled “Synopsis of Response to fls Pamphlet” contains sixty-three of the pamphlets that had been returned to his office with assorted comments such as the following: “Garbage”; “Propaganda”; “Crap”; “Rubbish”; “Junk Mail”; “You have lost my vote”; “Metric and bilingualism is bad for your health”; “Stuff it”; “Would someone define what a ‘French’ Canadian is? They are all metric”; “Pea soup garbage”; “Bullshit”; “Go to Russia if you don’t want freedom. Leave us alone.”34 The file also contains over twenty-five letters, the great majority of which were opposed to the government’s proposals. Notes in the file indicate that over one thousand telephone calls were received at the attorney general’s office over three days, from 27 to 29 July, most of which were opposed to the proposals. The file also contains a trenchant analysis of the usefulness of the pamphlet by Penner assistant Nancy Allan, who wrote: “There is approximately a 12% base of the Manitoba population that is vehemently opposed to any mention of ‘bilingualism.’ Any attempt at educating the public on this issue is fruitless because it incites the immoral minority to riot.”35

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In the House, Penner confirmed that discussions were indeed going on within the government to tighten aspects of the French-language services section of the amendment and with Bilodeau regarding the Supreme Court timetable. Penner said the government was “prepared … to bring in amendments on specific wordings re the services.”36 He then tackled the “secrecy” argument, which had been made repeatedly by Lyon and others, along with the idea that the government was proceeding with undue haste in having the amendment adopted. Penner referred to the public discussion that had been ongoing in the press over the issue throughout the previous year, identifying fourteen articles published in three newspapers between 12 July 1982 and 8 April 1983, including Terence Moore’s “full analysis” published in the 8 April 1983 edition of the Winnipeg Free Press. Penner said all these articles indicated “the issue has been the subject of protracted, prolonged, indepth, and on the whole responsible public debate by those who would treat this issue responsibly.”37 As debate on the constitutional amendment dragged on during July and opposition backbenchers were dragooned into it, comments became more and more emotional and irrational. Tory mla Gerrie Hammond, for instance, said simply that the people of the province “don’t believe they’re being told the whole story, and they are not.” She then described a politician as an essentially amoral person: “When I was elected to this Legislature, and I said it time and time again, said it before I ever thought of running for any political office: A politician does not have a conscience of his own. His conscience is what the people think. If you don’t believe that and if you don’t follow that, you are not going to be in government very long.” On the role of minorities in society, she echoed statements made by her own leader and others of her party in stark and absurd terms: “We agree that the minority groups in our province should be protected from injustices by the majority, but not to the point where it could and will give the minority the power to rule the majority through the courts, thus destroying the democratic rule.”38 Tory mla Abe Kovnats recognized that “the Francophone has waited for over 100 years for what is considered an injustice – a little longer ain’t going to hurt. It’s like chicken soup, Mr. Speaker, it ain’t going to hurt.” Kovnats acknowledged the interest the anglophone population of Quebec had in the constitutional amendment, but “my interests are towards the people of Manitoba first and foremost, and Canada second – Manitoba first, but Canada second.” In a reference to his own Jewish background, Kovnats recalled that he had been through “the discrimination bit,” but acknowledged that “I am somewhat protected by existing legislation.”39 He did not specify whether

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this protection flowed from the constitution, from the Charter, or from the parliamentary supremacy principle, which meant transferring all powers, including power over minority rights, to people like his own leader.

th e l o s t we e k e n d On that evening of 28 July, the House almost ceased to function altogether, as the test of wills over the timing of the legislative committee’s work spilled over into the general organization of House business and a series of procedural wrangles took up a good portion of the evening sitting. In the end, the bells rang in the Manitoba legislature through the night of 28 July and the early morning of 29 July, as the government stumbled into a procedural morass that led the House to sit through the sweltering August long weekend. The imbroglio was a direct result of the generalized mistrust that now pervaded relations between the two parties in the House. Pawley eventually took the floor and bore the full brunt of Lyon’s unparliamentary interruptions. Early in his speech, the following exchange occurred: hon. h. pawley: Mr. Speaker, why did not the former First Minister have the nerve to put to the people of this province his opposition to the entrenchment of a Charter of Rights? Why did the former First Minister indeed hide … hon. s. lyon: You’ve lied in the campaign – you’ve lied throughout the campaign. hon. r. penner: Mr. Speaker, on a point of order, this is disgraceful. mr. speaker: Order please. Order please. The Honourable Attorney-General on a point of order. hon. r. penner: On a point of order, the First Minister is addressing … hon. s. lyon: Sit down, you communist. mr. speaker: I would ask the right honourable gentleman to conduct himself in a right honourable manner … Does the honourable member have a point of order? hon. s. lyon: Yes, Mr. Speaker, if I were the First Minister of a government that had lied so openly to the people as this Minister did in 1981, I would never have a point of order, I would hide my head in shame. mr. speaker: The Honourable Leader of the Opposition did not have a point of order. He is also well aware that he is not allowed to use the word “lies” or “lied” in this House. I would ask him would he please withdraw that word. hon. s. lyon: Anytime, Mr. Speaker, to say that my honourable friend, the First Minister, his statements and the truth seldom coincide; seldom have, seldom will.40

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Later, Pawley listed various organizations that had expressed an interest in appearing at the public hearings; when he came to the Manitoba Association of Rights and Liberties, Lyon interjected, “Oh, great bunch, funded by the Attorney-General, a communist, yeah, great bunch!”41 Pawley tried to continue only to be interrupted several times by Lyon, who warned him, “We’ll read the record back and show you to be a liar in your mouth.” Finally, Lyon was suspended from the House for three days, muttering, “Well, now we know the communists are really in charge.” Before the standing vote on his suspension, he yelled, “You’ll hear the bells for quite a long time, you bloody reds.”42 The tone of the debate changed considerably after Lyon’s ejection from the House, and comments on both sides seemed to indicate a willingness to identify common ground; this was particularly evident in speeches made by Pawley himself and by Bud Sherman, Harry Enns, and Gerry Mercier for the Opposition. A consensus was evolving around the mandate and operations of the legislative committee that would examine the issue, and the government was signalling clearly to the Opposition that changes could be brought to the proposed amendment. The only remaining bone of contention was the Opposition’s demand that the committee hearings be held intersessionally. During that first week in August, speaker after speaker on the Opposition side read large portions of the umm’s press release into the record, thereby giving the organization a credibility and a legitimacy that was unwarranted, since the organization’s stand was based on an erroneous reading of the amendment’s implications for local governments and on the irrational fear that it was deliberately fostering, based on this misinterpretation. By contrast, that same week the Manitoba Association of Urban Municipalities announced that the results of a poll of its members regarding the government proposals indicating that 66 percent of its members opposed them were “not substantial enough to launch a full attack” against them.43 Nothing further was heard from the organization during the rest of the crisis. In the afternoon of 3 August, the House voted on Oleson’s subamendment that intersessional hearings on the language issue be completed “in any case not later than December 31, 1983,” defeating it by a vote of twenty-six to nineteen. Jim Downey led off when debate resumed on the morning of 4 August, saying the opposition “was not here to obstruct the government.” He then stunned the House by introducing a new subamendment to Sherman’s amendment, changing the deadline for the legislative committee’s report by one day, from 31 December 1983 to 30 December.44 The effect of Downey’s motion was to allow every member of the House to speak once again for forty

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minutes on the new subamendment. No one on the government side objected, and it took some time for the impact of this tactic to sink in.

b r e a k i n g t h e i m pas s e On Friday, 5 August, the subamendment was declared defeated by the speaker on a voice vote. Ransom called for a standing vote, and the bells rang through the night of 5 August into the morning of 6 August. Just after 10 a.m. on 6 August, the subamendment was defeated in a standing vote. Frank Johnston, seconded by Brian Ransom, then moved a new subamendment: “That the amendment be further amended by adding after the words ‘next Session of the Legislature’ the following words ‘and in any case not later than December 19, 1983.’”45 Al Mackling immediately objected that the new subamendment was out of order, since it was “substantially the same; it deals with the same principle.” Ransom argued to the contrary, saying the most powerful argument in favour of the speaker accepting the motion as being in order was that the House itself, two days earlier, had accepted a subamendment that changed the date from 31 December to 30 December: “A precedent has been established and a solid precedent, Sir has been established by the decision that this House made two days ago and I submit that the subamendment is entirely in order.”46 The procedural wrangling continued, as this time the government dug in its heels against the introduction of yet another frivolous subamendment. Anstett argued that Johnston’s motion was “really a facade to continue a charade and a filibuster designed to delay the right of the people of Manitoba to be heard on this issue.”47 On 10 August, Speaker Jim Walding ruled the subamendment out of order. Ransom challenged the ruling, but it was sustained on a standing vote. The speaker’s ruling took some wind out of the Opposition’s sails, and discussions between the two House leaders led to a cryptic announcement by Penner on Friday, 12 August, that “There will be no sitting of the House this evening or tomorrow, nor will there be any committees this evening or tomorrow … I may have further announcements later in the day.”48 Later, there was indeed a dramatic development as the logjam was broken. Hansard’s record of the event is anticlimactic; the speaker recognized Penner, who said simply: “Mr. Speaker, this will surprise some members. Would you please call the motion with respect to the referral of the proposed amendment to section 23 of the Manitoba Act, a referral motion in my name on the Order Paper, as it appears on Page 10 of the Order Paper?”49 In a matter of minutes, Sherman’s amendment requiring intersessional public hearings was defeated and Penner’s main motion adopted.

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The Opposition had, for now, abandoned any further bell-ringing or stalling tactic. The House then adjourned for the weekend. What had happened? Outside the House during the previous days, negotiations had been ongoing between the government and the Opposition and within each of the caucuses, which led to a formal agreement on the future process to be followed. In summary, “the referral motion was passed after both sides of the House signed an agreement which guaranteed that up to three weeks would be allowed for Committee hearings throughout the province during a House recess and that all subsequent bell-ringing would be limited to two weeks’ duration.”50 Penner commented that the limits on the use of the bells to stall House business was a key part of the agreement.51 It had also been agreed that the hearings would be held between 6 and 24 September in eight different locations in Manitoba.52 On Tuesday, 16 August, Howard Pawley rose in the House to make a speech that brought to a close the first series of legislative debates on the French-language constitutional amendment. He formally announced that the Standing Committee on Privileges and Elections would begin public hearings shortly. However, the premier surprised many in the House and most Manitobans by announcing his government’s intention to propose a number of amendments to the original constitutional proposal, saying this would only be done “following public input at the meetings of the standing committee, and following discussions with all directly affected parties.” Amendments would also be proposed that would “much more sharply define the government’s obligation and we hope meet the major concern of the public sector employees.”53 Finally, Pawley made it clear that one amendment would “specifically exclude municipalities and school boards from any constitutional obligation under The Manitoba Act, as amended.” This did nothing to mollify the rural municipal leaders, however. The umm called the changes “worthless,” adding that it wanted the bilingual services clause deleted entirely.54 Immediately after stating his government’s intention not to formulate specific amendments until the legislative committee had completed its hearings and reported back to the legislature, Pawley began to backtrack under questioning by Lyon. Lyon asked whether Pawley was “in a position to table those amendments, so that the members of the Legislature and the general public will have an ample opportunity to review them before public hearings commence in two or three weeks?”55 Pawley replied that the amendments would be tabled only after the legislative committee had reported to the House. Finally, under close questioning by Lyon, Pawley agreed to table draft amendments before the committee began its work or shortly thereafter.56 Within a few minutes

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under Lyon’s unrelenting pressure, Pawley had effectively reversed himself, giving the Conservative opposition more grist for its strategy mill. A few minutes later, the House adjourned for the day. On 18 August, as part of the compromise worked out between the government and the Opposition, the work of the Second Session of the Thirty-Second Legislature of the Legislative Assembly of Manitoba was suspended indefinitely to allow the Standing Committee on Privileges and Elections to hold public hearings on the constitutional amendment in the fall. At 134 days, it had already been the longest session in Manitoba history.57 The session resumed on 5 January 1984.

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Several developments marked the following stage of the crisis, which began in late August 1983 and ended in December. First, the Pawley government drafted a number of changes to its original draft constitutional amendment. Second, the legislative hearings extended the debate to all regions of the province and to all segments of the population.1 Third, the federal Parliament was seized with the issue, avoiding divisive debate through an all-party agreement on a resolution. Fourth, public opinion in Manitoba, by now thoroughly whipped up by the interminable legislative debates, demanded plebiscites everywhere in the province, and more than twenty cities and municipalities, including Winnipeg, accomodated. The plebiscites, especially in Winnipeg, further stimulated acrimonious debate on the issue. At the end of December, the government’s new strategy lay in tatters, and, along with the sfm, it was forced to adopt a radically new approach to the constitutional amendment.

new proposals By mid-August, the Pawley government had accepted that its original constitutional proposals would have to be modified. On 11 August, Penner had reported to the ndp caucus on the “concerns identified” by various groups, mainly municipalities and the unions, and raised the possibility of amendments.2 Caucus had agreed it was time to consider amendments, despite “two vigorous dissents”;3 and this had led to

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Pawley’s announcement of 16 August in the House. Specifically, the Pawley government wanted to redefine what constituted “significant demand” for French-language services. On 18 August, Penner talked to Justice Minister MacGuigan and his deputy. MacGuigan strongly urged that the original services section be left as it was and that the province “develop administrative criteria … as a means of dealing with the issue rather than changing the constitutional language.”4 At the same time, Léo Robert was telling the press that services were “absolutely essential” to the French community; it was “the only advantage we have in not going to the Supreme Court.”5 On 23 August, Penner sent MacGuigan his proposed amendments in the form of changes to the tripartite agreement, which, it should be recalled, had still not been signed.6 That same day, he met with public sector union representatives to inform them about the latest ndp caucus position on the constitutional amendment, asking them for reactions before 31 August, since the caucus and Cabinet were to finalize the changes on 5 September.7 The mgea’s response was generally positive.8 Meanwhile, there was growing unrest among the party’s rank and file: the government was perceived as being “indecisive and unsure,” and party members “didn’t expect the opposition and they didn’t have a strategy” to respond, according to columnist Frances Russell.9 At a joint meeting between the caucus and party members on 28 August, the government was berated for the lack of a communications strategy. Why was the sfm consulted at all, some asked; others pointed out that people hate having things such as metric shoved down their throats. Some asked that Doern be disciplined more severely, while others defended him. Cabinet members pointed out that the government was simply attempting to correct a historical injustice. Finally, it was agreed the government would get an information package on the issue out as soon as possible.10 On the evening of 5 September, Cabinet met with the ndp caucus for a final review of the changes proposed by Penner; he presented them the following day to the Standing Committee on Privileges and Elections as it began holding public hearings on the issue.11 The major changes to the original constitutional amendment were as follows: 12 • •

• •

“Significant demand” was to be defined more precisely. The declaration of “official languages” (section 23.1) was to be limited by adding the words “as provided for in section 23 and sections 23.2 to 23.9 inclusive.” Any reference to the term “central office” was to be deleted. There was to be formal exclusion of municipalities and school boards from the purview of the constitutional amendment.

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There was to be recognition of concerns expressed by ethnocultural groups through addition of the following clause (a new section 23.9): “Nothing in section 23 and section 23.7 abrogates or derogates from any legal or customary right or privilege acquired or enjoyed either before or after the coming into force of this amendment with respect to any language that is not English or French.”13

Though he did not say so publicly, Penner’s intention regarding the definition of “significant demand” was to go the “designated-regions” route, and he asked Twaddle to draft a clause that would incorporate a formula developed by Turenne based upon a minimum of eight hundred people or 8 percent of the population of a given region.14 The changes were widely viewed as constituting a major retreat by the government. The Globe and Mail said the government had “watered down” its proposal, and the Winnipeg Free Press argued that with the new wording, “the assertion that both languages are official is clearly pointless except as a symbolic gesture.” The Free Press also pointed out that municipalities were now specifically excluded but added that “municipalities were never included in what the government proposed” in any case. Forest baldly accused Penner of “treason,” and argued strongly against entrenchment of French-language services. La Liberté called the changes a “slap in the face” of Francophones.15 The changes posed a major challenge to the sfm leadership. The sfm told the media it was considering withdrawing its support for the constitutional amendment; at a minimum, the new Penner proposals meant a re-opening of negotiations that it thought had ended on 16 May.16 In addition, the sfm indicated it would have to consult the Franco-Manitoban community once again. Huddled in an emergency meeting on 7 September, the sfm heard Joe Magnet warn that the government’s statement of principle was much narrower than that contained in the proposal’s sister provisions, section 2 of the Official Languages Act, 1970, and section 16 of the Charter.17 In his view, the government’s new section 23.1 restricted the generality of the official languages principle. However, the “most chilling effect of the proposed amendment might well be on the generality of s. 23 itself.” Therefore, Magnet concluded, the proposed changes were “potentially damaging to Franco-Manitoban language rights.” In the end, however, the board decided to maintain its support for the constitutional agreement, despite the fact that the government’s new proposals constituted a “substantial dilution” of the original agreement.18 At the same meeting, it established a list of its members who would be speaking on its behalf at various locations during the public hearings.

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Eric Maldoff, president of Alliance Quebec, an English-language rights group in Montreal, leads off the first round of legislative hearings on the language issue, 6 September 1983. Reprinted by permission of the Winnipeg Free Press

Franco-Manitoban lawyer Rémi Smith, left, and Société Franco-Manitobaine (sfm) president Léo Robert on 6 September 1983. Reprinted by permission of the Winnipeg Free Press

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Sterling Lyon, leader of Manitoba’s Progressive Conservative Party and a member of the legislative committee on the language issue on the first day of the legislative hearings, 6 September 1983. Reprinted by permission of the Winnipeg Free Press

Roland Penner, attorney General in the Pawley government, on the first day of the legislative hearings, 6 September 1983. Reprinted by permission of the Winnipeg Free Press

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Winnipeg Free Press, fall 1983. Reprinted by permission

Gary Doer, president of the Manitoba Government Employees Association and future premier of Manitoba, testifies at the legislative hearings, 8 September 1983. Reprinted by permission of the Winnipeg Free Press

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Léo Robert, accompanied by University of Ottawa law professor Joseph Magnet, enters a packed hall in Ste-Anne, Manitoba, on the evening of 27 September 1983 to testify at the legislative hearings. Reprinted by permission of the Winnipeg Free Press

The scene in the hall in Ste-Anne on the evening of 27 September 1983, with the legislative committee in the foreground and about five hundred supporters of the constitutional amendment in the background. Reprinted by permission of the Winnipeg Free Press

Some of the two thousand supporters of the constitutional amendment outside the hall in Ste-Anne on 27 September 1983. Reprinted by permission of the Winnipeg Free Press

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Herb Schulz, one of the most vehement opponents of the constitutional amendment, testifies at the legislative hearings on 29 September 1983. Reprinted by permission of the Winnipeg Free Press

Winnipeg Free Press, 7 October 1983. Reprinted by permission

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th e n a t i o n r e a c t s On 6 September, Prime Minister Trudeau challenged the newly elected leader of the Progressive Conservative Party, Brian Mulroney, to support French-language rights in Manitoba. Trudeau suggested an allparty resolution that would be supported jointly by the Liberals, the Progressive Conservatives, and the ndp. Mulroney quickly accepted Trudeau’s offer to meet with him within twenty-four hours to agree on the text of a motion. According to one later report, Trudeau’s actions “seemed intended to spread mischief in Conservative ranks where bilingualism is not regarded with universal approval.”19 On 13 September, Mulroney took his seat in the House of Commons, and Trudeau again proposed an all-party resolution supporting the Manitoba government. Mulroney met with Trudeau the following day for twenty-five minutes, and the two only agreed to meet again soon. Trudeau met with ndp leader Ed Broadbent the same day. Jake Epp, a Manitoba member of the federal Progressive Conservative caucus, told the press there was a “widespread feeling [in the pc caucus] that the bill should pass the Manitoba legislature first,” before Parliament adopted a resolution on the matter. This statement was disingenuous, since Epp knew by now, if only by their behaviour at the legislative hearings, that his provincial counterparts were determined to ensure that a provincial resolution would never be adopted. A couple of days later, he added that Trudeau’s effort to put pressure on Manitoba was “short-sighted and divisive.” However, the federal Progressive Conservative caucus itself was deeply divided on the issue; Bud Sherman described the federal Tories as being “nervous” and “apprehensive” at a joint meeting of the federal and provincial caucuses in July 1983.20 In Quebec, sovereignist Gérald Godin called Trudeau’s attempt to “force” French on Manitoba a “stupid move,” since it was a “lost cause”; he dismissed “Mr. Trudeau’s pipedream” of bilingualism. His solution was to make Quebec French and the rest of Canada English.21 The Fédération des Francophones hors-Québec,22 appearing before a Senate committee on 28 September 1983, denounced Godin’s statement as an “unacceptable insult.”23 A leading Quebec historian, Michel Brunet, congratulated Sterling Lyon and expressed the hope that English Canada would finally recognize Quebec’s right to “adopt necessary measures” relative to its anglophone minority.24 Quebec minister Jacques-Yvan Morin said Quebec would not actively support the Franco-Manitoban community, since what the Manitoba government does “is their business.”25

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On 22 September, Prime Minister Trudeau met with Premier Howard Pawley for two and a half hours.26 Pawley told Trudeau that a parliamentary resolution would be counterproductive. He also was promised by Trudeau that “the prime minister’s office [would] quash a plan by Secretary of State Serge Joyal to fund probilingualism forces in the coming Manitoba referendums.” Pawley wanted no “manipulation or federal inducement.”27 Pawley’s admonitions fell on deaf ears, and Trudeau’s promise not to fund probilingualism forces in the referendum proved empty, as we shall see below. He also moved quickly on a House of Commons resolution, sending a draft to Mulroney on 26 September and meeting once again with Mulroney and Broadbent on 5 October.28 Finally, on 6 October 1983 an all-party resolution was adopted in the House of Commons without a formal vote, by agreement among the leaders. It had been agreed that each leader would speak to the resolution before its adoption without debate, and Mulroney made his maiden speech in the House of Commons on this occasion.29 However, as the Winnipeg Free Press described it, “in that marvellously unanimous House, the Tories sat sullenly in their places as Trudeau spoke”; there simply was “too much hostility in the air for great moments.” Manitoba mps Lee Clark and Jack Murta confirmed that Mulroney’s stand on the issue received caucus support only after “long, hard sessions,” and many provincial Tory mlas and constituents felt betrayed and outraged by Mulroney’s stand on the federal resolution.30 According to Frances Russell, “Mulroney’s decision to debate the matter and to force unanimity on his caucus was a double repudiation of the provincial Tories. It rejected their position that language rights should not be entrenched. And it also denied their claim that the matter concerned only Manitoba at this time.”31 Sterling Lyon denounced Trudeau’s “unwarranted intrusion into the affairs of Manitoba,” and Tory mla Bud Sherman said the move was “unnecessary, premature and untimely,” later adding that “This is not a fight for minority rights … This is the exclusive, individual, singleminded mission being undertaken by La Société Franco-Manitobaine.” Lyon also condemned the resolution as “trampling democracy in the dirt.” In his view, the Commons action was “historically, legally and constitutionally inaccurate”; the federal Progressive Conservatives were wrong in supporting it, since his government had already restored French-language rights in Manitoba. Tory mp Dan MacKenzie said he did not support entrenched French rights in the Constitution, “because that would take it out of the hands of the people”; he was supported in this position by Manitoba senator Duff Roblin.32 Some prominent provincial Tories did support the amendment; these included Myra Spivak, wife of former provincial Progressive Conserva-

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tive leader Sid Spivak, and Elizabeth Willcock.33 Sid Spivak said that although he was annoyed at “the ineptitude of the provincial government,” which knew “it was going to be contentious,” he confirmed that there were a “substantial number” of Conservatives who supported the government’s initiative and that the decision to oppose it was caucus’s alone.34

th e sfm m o b i l i z e s The sfm, meanwhile, had begun organizing a major event to highlight its participation in the public hearings and to answer, once and for all, the charge that the sfm’s position was “unrepresentative” of Manitoba’s French-language community. On the evening of 27 September about twenty-five hundred people crammed into the Ste-Anne Legion Hall and overflowed onto the parking lot in a massive demonstration in favour of the sfm’s position.35 Gary Hunter, of the Winnipeg Free Press, described the scene as follows: Leo Robert … was greeted with a standing ovation when he entered the hall at 8.30 p.m. … Twenty buses … were lined up in the parking lot and marshalls outfitted in fluorescent vests directed drivers to parking spots … Two large tents and a stage were erected in the parking lot. Piles of placards prepared earlier in the day proclaiming “Justice for one, Justice for all” and “Vivre en français chez-nous” were distributed to the crowd, along with sfm buttons. t-shirts and flags were on sale. Chairs and benches were supplemented with hay bales for the crowd outside, which could watch the committee proceedings on two large screens being fed a closed-circuit television signal. After Robert’s presentation, musicians and actors took over the outdoor stage and provided a concert for the crowd.36

Speaking in both French and English, Robert emotionally and, at times, eloquently recalled the history of francophones in Manitoba, from the optimism generated by adoption of the Manitoba Act in 1870, through the brutal repeal of their rights in 1890 and 1916, to the rebirth of the French language at the official level in Manitoba starting in the late 1960s. Turning to the issue at hand, Robert recalled the concessions made during the negotiations with the government leading to the agreement of 17 May: abandonment of the demands that the province adhere to sections 16–22 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and that the constitutional amendment apply to municipalities and school boards, and abandonment of demands for translation of thousands of pages of

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legal documents that could be expected should the Bilodeau case go to court and for a short deadline for translation of statutes. (The tripartite agreement provided for a grace period of up to ten years.) Robert described the “original vision of Manitoba as fundamentally tolerant, both in linguistic and cultural terms,” a province that “values diversity, both ethnic and cultural,” and he thanked the ethnocultural groups that had supported the sfm in its struggle. Finally, Robert spoke to his community, succinctly summarizing their contemporary aspirations: Our dream is above all that the rights negotiated by Louis Riel be fully respected. Our dream is that we may use our language freely in our relations with government beyond our homes and our schools. Our dream is that one day we may appear before a committee like this one speaking only our language and be understood by all. Our dream is that our fellow citizens in Manitoba cease once and for all to question our identity and the fundamental role our ancestors played in the creation of this province. Our dream is full equality before all governmental institutions of this province, wherever we live. (Tr.)37

Thunderous applause rose inside the hall, and as it subsided several minutes later, the roars of approval from the crowd gathered outside could still be heard inside; Robert, overcome with emotion, slumped to his chair.

th e m u n i c i p a l p l e b i s c i t e s After adjournment of the legislative session, opponents of the constitutional amendment had turned their attention to the movement to hold referenda in the fall municipal elections across the province. In late July, Doern had called on the City of Winnipeg to hold a referendum on the province’s language proposals during the forthcoming elections; “Let the people speak!” he later demanded.38 Councillors’ first reaction was to oppose Doern’s proposal; however, following a legislative change adopted by the Pawley government allowing municipalities to hold plebiscites, Winnipeg had already decided to hold one on nuclear disarmament. At first blush, it was difficult to distinguish between the two issues, and council referred the matter to its Executive Policy Committee.39 Mayor Bill Norrie was in a quandary over the issue. In early September he was quoted as saying: “I don’t think it’s a good idea for the city but I think Council will support it.”40 A few days later, it was reported that Norrie had “quietly appealed to the provincial govern-

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ment to find some way of preventing the municipal referendum on the province’s proposed French-language rights legislation.”41 He later added that although he did not generally support plebiscites, he had had “a tremendous number of calls” from people wanting a vote on the issue.42 Doern was also putting considerable pressure on the City of Winnipeg’s elected officials. In early September he sent letters to individual councillors indicating the number of electors in their wards who were opposed to the government proposals. For instance Doern informed ndp councillor Alice Balsillie that “239 of your constituents are opposed to the government’s proposals.”43 On 8 September he met with mayor Norrie to deliver fifty-two hundred responses to newspaper ads run by his organization titled “Against Bilingualism” and “For a Plebiscite”; ultimately he reckoned he had received a total of twenty-four thousand responses to the ads.44 A new pro-amendment group, Manitoba 23, ran a half-page ad in the Free Press encouraging citizens to oppose the referendum, but the ad backfired, prompting a large number of phone calls to the mayor in favour of the referendum.45 The provincial government was also lobbying Winnipeg councillors. In early September, Penner sent letters to several councillors in their capacity “as ndp members of City Council,” including Councillors Chornopyski, Skowron, Smith, Wade, Promislow, Balsillie, and Eliason.46 Clearly, the two major provincial parties were bringing pressure to bear on their supporters in city council.47 On 13 September, an ad hoc committee of the Executive Policy Committee recommended that the city hold a referendum on the issue and also proposed wording for the referendum question.48 The following day, the Executive Policy Committee endorsed this position; however, it adopted wording that required citizens who were opposed to the government’s proposals to vote “yes.” According to Doern, Bill Norrie and several councillors had accepted wording of the question suggested by Bill Hutton that reversed the proposition.49 The plebiscite was a major item on the agenda when Winnipeg City Council met on 14 September. A Free Press editorial that morning pointed out the harsh reality that “the exercise [councillors] are asked to authorize is a profoundly undemocratic one.”50 In an attempt to get the city off the hook, Councillor Guy Savoie of St Boniface tabled a motion requesting that the province hold a province-wide referendum.51 At 3:30 a.m. on Thursday, 15 September, after many hours of heated debate, council approved a fall plebiscite on the proposed constitutional amendment by a vote of sixteen to fourteen, with mayor Bill Norrie casting his two votes in favour. (Councillor Bill Neville later said Norrie “got spooked.”) Two ndp councillors, Bill Chornopyski

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and Alf Skowron, broke ranks and voted in favour of the plebiscite. The party’s municipal executive met to decide what action to take and finally decided not to discipline the councillors. Several councillors admitted, in the days following the decision, that they did not understand the question.52 On 28 September an attempt by Councillor Frank Johnson to have council vote a second time on holding the plebiscite failed by a vote of fourteen to thirteen, and another vote on the issue was held on 19 October, since opinion regarding the appropriateness and validity of the plebiscite remained profoundly divided. Neil McDonald of Manitoba 23 met with Norrie on 28 September; the meeting, according to McDonald, was a “waste of time”; Norrie, he said, seemed “surprisingly confused and muddled” on the issue. One reporter asked several pollsters to comment on the validity of the plebiscite question and on the process generally; all, including Angus Reid, Greg Mason, crop, and datacom were critical. On the other hand, Fred Cleverley of the Winnipeg Free Press opined that to hold a referendum on Frenchlanguage services was just as valid as holding one on nuclear weapons. Others, such as Lloyd Axworthy, pointed out that it was “very dangerous to have a majority vote on minority rights.” Penner was even more categorical: council’s decision constituted “political fraud,” and he would consider the results “worthless”; Norrie either “does not understand the enormity of the legal issues involved or if he does he is taking the kind of calculated risk which in all conscience I, as AttorneyGeneral of the Province, feel that I cannot take.” The Manitoba Association for Rights and Liberties (marl) condemned the plebiscite as a “dangerous” opinon poll; its spokesman, David Matas, said the issue “should be resolved by reaching a consensus.” Jack London said that “the essence of a democratic society” was that “the rights of minorities be protected not by a majority vote but by the responsible acts of politicians.”53 The francophone community’s first reaction to council’s decision to hold a plebiscite was to get an injunction against it. The idea originated with Georges Forest, who mentioned it in a radio interview on 15 September.54 However, the following day Forest dropped a bombshell: he announced he would be voting against the government proposals in the plebiscite, since the amendment “doesn’t go far enough for French,” adding that “the Supreme Court will go further in the Bilodeau case than the Government has.”55 Behind the scenes, however, Forest was arguing against holding the plebiscite: the sfm board heard Forest’s arguments in favour of an injunction on 19 September and rejected the idea.56 Manitoba 23 considered an injunction on grounds that the Winnipeg Act had been adopted in English only. In any event, an injunction

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was eventually filed against the plebiscite on 27 September by a law student, John Shields. Léo Robert told the press that “we don’t feel there should be an injunction.” The case was thrown out by the Court of Queen’s Bench on 5 October.57 On 27 September full-page ads paid for by the sfm were published in the two Winnipeg dailies encouraging Winnipeg voters to support the government’s language proposals. Large ads in support of the government’s proposals were also published by the official pro-amendment umbrella group, Concerned Manitobans for the Constitutional Amendment (cmca), in the dailies on 16 and 17 October. The opponents’ ads featured a list of forty-seven “prominent” Manitobans. Former provincial Liberal leaders Douglas Campbell and Bobby Bend joined the opposition, and Campbell told the press Joyal and Trudeau wanted to create a “French state.” Large cmca ads again appeared in the two Winnipeg dailies on 24 October. In the meantime, the opponents of the amendment, the Concerned Citizens for a Yes Vote, had sent a telegram to Secretary of State Joyal requesting funds equivalent to those provided to the “no” side.58 The Winnipeg plebiscite also attracted national attention. On 4 October, in Ottawa, a national coalition of churches and human rights organizations condemned it, since a “referendum or plebiscite is not an appropriate means of determining minority rights … What appears democratic is in fact deeply undemocratic.” The coalition included the Canadian Council of Christians and Jews, the Canadian Human Rights Foundation, the United Church of Canada, the Canadian Jewish Congress, the Anglican Church of Canada, the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, the Association des Canadiens-Français de l’Ontario, Alliance Quebec, and the Quebec chapter of the Canadian Polish Congress.59 In the early hours of 20 October, council decided by a vote of sixteen to fourteen to keep the plebiscite on the ballot, despite passionate arguments against it by Jack London and Archbishop Antoine Hacault of the St Boniface Roman Catholic Archdiocese. The Reverend Bill Hutton argued in favour.60 Two days later, Forest confirmed he had joined the ranks of the opponents of the constitutional amendment; he issued a formal statement and told the press that “The Supreme Court will do a better job ensuring French rights – and we’re not asking for new rights, only restoration of the old ones,” adding “I’d rather have long-term peace by having the case settled in court.” Forest said the sfm was guilty of “unacceptable shilly-shallying” on the issue, adding that the government proposal had become “a resolution to entrench multilingualism without having improved the status of the French language so blatently [sic]

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violated in 1890 and 1916.” Léo Robert said Forest’s position on the issue was “diametrically opposed to the sfm’s” and encouraged the population to vote in favour of the government proposals.61 Privately, the sfm leadership was seething at this untimely act of betrayal.

manitoba 23 Through July and August 1983, another movement was slowly emerging, fuelled by the sfm’s search for allies on the political landscape and by a growing sense among many Manitobans of diverse origins that constitutional change involving language could strengthen languages other than French and English. The movement had begun with informal contacts between Francophones and members of other ethnocultural groups following the sfm building fire, and more specifically in the regional offices of the secretary of state, as we have seen.62 In its first incarnation, it was called the Committee of Community and Business in Favor of the Proposed Agreement on French-Language Services.63 Ultimately it led to the creation of a multi-ethnic organization called Manitoba 23, but it also spawned other organizations and initiatives. It was controversial from the start because of persistent questioning on the part of opponents of the constitutional amendment about the groups’ sources of funding and their imputed ephemerality. Francophones in Manitoba and elsewhere in Canada have historically been leery of other ethnocultural groups, fearing they would would be relegated to the status of “just another ethnic group.” In early 1983, for instance, debate raged within the Franco-Manitoban community as to whether it should participate in the Intercultural Conference organized by Cultural Affairs Minister Eugene Kostyra and to be held in April of 1983. At a meeting of presidents of francophone organizations chaired by the sfm, it was decided that the organizations would not participate in the conference.64 Another controversy had erupted earlier within the francophone community around the decision of the dance troupe Les Danseurs de la Rivière Rouge to join Winnipeg’s summer multicultural festival Folklorama.65 In August, Léo Robert met with Kostyra and indicated to him that in light of the growing support of ethnocultural groups for the constitutional amendment, the sfm was now more favourable to participation in the Manitoba Intercultural Council. He also told Kostyra it would be easier for the francophone community to participate if the constitutional amendment was adopted.66 The key links between the Franco-Manitoban community and Winnipeg’s ethnocultural groups were Rémi Smith and Réal Sabourin, and

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the key movers among the ethnocultural groups were Myron Spolsky and Neil McDonald. After a number of contacts between Smith, Spolsky, and McDonald,67 the founding meeting of a group called Manitoba 23 was held at the Rendez-Vous building in St Boniface on 24 August. The membership of the earlier “community and business” group was collapsed into the new organization. The meeting was chaired by Spolsky; McDonald was elected president of the new organization, and the board was to be made up of one representative from each ethnocultural organization.68 The meeting attracted twenty-two participants representing eighteen organizations from eight ethnocultural groups, as well as three multi-ethnic organizations.69 A draft budget of $615,804 was drawn up for the period from 29 August 1983 to 31 March 1984.70 There is no indication in the files where funding would have come from, but clearly, given the size of the budget, only the federal government could have pockets deep enough to provide funding in these amounts. Nevertheless, Spolsky wrote in the Free Press that “Manitoba 23 will not be making any applications for federal or provincial funding,” adding that “our resources will be sought from the community at large and organizations which support us.” Later, Neil McDonald told the press that “No money is coming from the secretary of state. No money is coming from the provincial government. All our money is coming from private citizens.”71 Manitoba 23 held its first press conference on the steps of the legislative building on 30 August. McDonald described the organization as “a coalition of concerned citizens, community leaders, and associations supporting the Resolution to provide limited French-language services,” adding that its objective would be to pursue “primarily an educational role” through informational meetings and the distribution of information packages. Its first full board meeting was held the following day at its offices at 205 Alexander Avenue in Winnipeg; a total of sixty-five individuals and organizations attended. In September another new group, the Manitoba Association for the Promotion of Ancestral Languages (mapal), was formed; about 250 delegates representing 30 language groups attended the founding meeting.72 The linkages that developed in August and September 1983 between Francophones and other ethnocultural groups led to agreement on another modification to the constitutional package that would involve the recognition and promotion of languages other than French and English. The proposal was presented to Cultural Affairs Minister Eugene Kostyra on 24 September 1983 by representatives of Manitoba 23.73 On 27 September, the Manitoba Intercultural Council recommended changes to the constitutional amendment recognizing multiculturalism

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and the right to education in languages other than English or French.74 The proposal had evolved at meetings of Manitoba 23 and mapal through the month of September; it was made public on 30 September.75 The founding convention of mapal was held on 24 September; it was attended by three hundred people representing thirty linguistic groups whose purpose was to lobby for an amendment allowing for instruction in a third language.76 A few days before mapal’s founding meeting, Léo Robert informed the sfm board of the proposal, and the board agreed with it.77 mapal presented its request for a new section 23.10 that would provide for teaching in languages other than English or French at the legislative hearings,78 and Myron Spolsky wrote Anstett on behalf of mapal indicating the organization’s unanimous support for inclusion of the proposed section 23.10 in the text of the constitutional amendment.79 Kostyra told Penner that Manitoba 23 felt “very strongly that there should be further amendments to section 23, regarding the issues of multiculturalism and ancestral language” and sent him the text of the proposed changes, an amended section 23.1(2) and 23.9, along with a new section 23.10 and amendments to the Public Schools Act.80 Secretary of State Joyal reacted positively, saying the federal government would see no problem with this, adding that the involvement of other ethnic groups in the battle was a “positive development.”81 On 13 October, Spolsky informed Pawley that a resolution in favour of the proposed section 23.10 had been adopted unanimously the previous day by representatives of ethnic communities, who had “strongly emphasized that their respective communities were deeply divided” on the constitutional amendment but that their communities’ support would be unanimous with the inclusion of a section 23.10. Some would support the amendment only if it included section 23.10. Spolsky also set out the conditions upon which the ethnic groups would support section 23, making the link with the historic events of 1890 and 1916. mapal met with Pawley and other ministers on 24 October. In the meantime the premier had received a letter from Léo Robert saying that the sfm “fully supports the principles underlying Article 23.10.”82 Georges Forest fumed that “the ethnics” were choosing this moment to put forth their claims regarding ancestral languages, thus weakening Manitoba as a bilingual province. He wanted Robert to reject Penner’s amendments of 6 September, since any change in the agreement of 17 May would result in French being relegated to the ranks of the “multiethnics.” Despite this opposition from a not-unexpected quarter, the sfm expressed its full support for the principles underlying article 23.10.83

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pa n i c i n t h e b o a r d s A good illustration of the alarmism (some might say hysteria) generated by otherwise rational people in the course of the crisis can be found in the rumour that swept the boardrooms of many of Manitoba’s oldest institutions that their very existence was threatened by the constitutional amendment. Justice Joseph O’Sullivan of the Court of Appeal, acting as “a member of the corporate charities administration committee of the Grey Nuns,” first sounded the alarm. Justice O’Sullivan wrote to lawyer E.A. Wehrle, counsel for the Grey Nuns, pointing out that section 23.5(2) of the amendment provided that “Charters for a large number of corporations” would cease on 31 December 198384 unless reenacted in two languages. Since there would be “no guarantee reenactment will take place,” the Grey Nuns Corporation would be “placed in jeopardy” by the amendment, as would the archiepiscopal corporations of both Winnipeg and St Boniface. Justice O’Sullivan concluded, “I think your clients and others should be alarmed by what is being proposed.”85 Wehrle responded with due alarm, writing to the deputy justice minister that section 23.5(1) would “pose a grave threat to the continued existence of Manitoba organizations established by Special Act of the Manitoba Legislature.” Penner replied that the effect of the proposed amendment was to limit translation to about five hundred statutes, “a relatively easy task” that he expected to have completed one or two years before the deadline. Unconvinced, Wehrle circulated a letter to various organizations warning them of the risk, a “slight” but “unfair” and “unacceptable” one, and suggested they present a brief to the legislative committee. Penner referred the letter to Legislative Counsel Rae Tallin, who agreed with Wehrle that the risk was slight, “so slight as to be, in my opinion, almost non-existent.”86 Wehrle appeared at the legislative hearings on behalf of St Boniface Hospital a few days later to make the same argument; the hospital was faced with “potential extinction,” along with ninety or one hundred other organizations. Wehrle added that “more care could have been taken in preparing the wording of section 23.5 and that if the wording were not changed to require that the government of Manitoba “republish” or “reprint” these acts in French and English, “then this organization shall cease to legally exist.”87 Unfortunately, Penner engaged Wehrle in debate on the matter, which gave Wehrle’s argument greater weight than it had intrinsically; since it was clearly not the government’s intention to abolish ninety or one hundred private corporations, the matter could be resolved by a simple change in wording. Penner’s

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response, which speculated about the creation of new corporations to replace the old ones, only exacerbated the problem. After the public exchange, Wehrle became even more upset; he wrote to Anstett, saying that to create new corporations, as Penner had suggested, “would be to breach present debenture covenants which would cause many millions of dollars to become immediately due and payable.” The risk of possible extinction if the requirement was entrenched constitutionally would also raise the cost of debentures.88 In response, Penner urgently asked Greg Yost to prepare a rough estimate of the amount of translation involved; Yost estimated that it would take one translator a year and a half and that the total cost would be $125,000.89 Meanwhile, of course, the press had got hold of the story. Peter Warren, ever keen to fan the flames of fear and paranoia, rose again to the occasion. Under the heading “Language Bill’s Hidden Threats,” Warren breathlessly reported that “The bilingualism proposals threaten to dismantle several of this province’s most-respected institutions and service organizations – including the Winnipeg Stock Exchange and the ywca. Only through costly and time-consuming translation and rewriting of their acts of incorporation will these groups – and dozens like them – survive the madness of the ndp language proposals.” Warren concluded that “what we all thought was going to happen could happen – language police will be the next move.” On the same page, another columnist quoted Penner as saying the argument was “ridiculous,” and that “Mr. Wehrle is making a proverbial mountain out of a molehill.” A few days later Penner wrote Wehrle informing him that the text of section 23.5 would be changed and that the word “reenactment” would be changed to read “printed and published”; the sfm concurred. Again, a few days later he wrote all of the organizations affected informing them of the change, and when the constitutional amendment was tabled in the legislature in its final form on 5 January 1984, he sent a copy of the modified text to Wehrle and to the other organizations. He was warmly thanked by many organizations, such as the Anglican Church, the Grey Nuns, the Jesuits, and the Manitoba Institute of Registered Social Workers, all of whom expressed relief that they would not be extinguished after all.90

“ ye s ” a n d “ n o ” After the City of Winnipeg Council’s vote confirming that a plebiscite would be held, the two sides began organizing in earnest. On the “yes” side (“yes” meaning “yes” to a referral of section 23 to the Supreme Court and “no” to the constitutional amendment), the Concerned Citi-

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zens’ Committee for a Yes Vote on the Winnipeg Plebiscite regarding Official Bilingualism was established in early October. It was made up of twenty-five residents co-chaired by Pat Maltman and the Reverend Bill Hutton and held its first press conference on 11 October. Doern had arranged for the group to use the press conference theatre in the Legislative Building, a venue normally available only to cabinet ministers and mlas.91 On the “no” side, supporting the government’s constitutional amendment, the Committee for Manitoba’s Constitutional Amendment (cmca) was formed on 14 October. Members of the committee included former Liberal mla June Westbury, Senator Joseph Guay, Olga Fuga, Léo Robert, Dr Joseph Du, and Neil McDonald. The inaugural press release stated that some initial funding had been received from the Federation of Francophones outside Quebec but that no funds had been requested or would be accepted from any level of government. A publicity campaign was being launched immediately, and would continue to 26 October, the date of the referendum. Spokesperson Sylvia Mouflier said that two or three thousand dollars had been raised by the ffhq and that support would be sought from francophone organizations in other provinces.92 The plebiscite battle was fought mainly through newspaper ads and press conferences. However, one significant high-profile event generated considerable public interest on both sides: the so-called Great Debate between Léo Robert and Russell Doern at Winnipeg’s Red River Community College on 18 October; the debate was moderated by Peter Warren. The two were presented as “gladiators” in one report, which added that “Doern was the clear favorite” of the audience, which was made up of over one thousand students and spectators. During the debate Doern worked over the same now-familiar ground, saying the amendment was a “back-room deal” between the Liberal government and the sfm, to which Robert replied that “the Liberal government was only involved after a year of negotiations. To say it was a secret deal is false.” French was a “dead language,” Doern told the crowd, and bilingualism a “slippery slope.” Doern added that “About the only thing the feds haven’t done is send 57 Liberals into the legislature, occupy the building, and pass whatever legislation they want.” Robert later rued his decision to participate in the debate, calling it a “major mistake,” among those he most regretted. As he and his advisors walked into the hall, they realized that “it was a set-up: the average age of the students had gone up by 20 years”; in addition, they had not asked who would act as moderator and what the debating rules would be.93

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A veritable deluge of large newspaper ads rained down on Winnipeggers in the last days before the plebiscite. Ads run by Doern’s antibilingualism group were outnumbered by those of the proamendment forces, as all three proamendment organizations (the cmca, Manitoba 23, and the sfm) ran ads in support of the government.94 On referendum day, 26 October, both sides engaged in a “battle of the telephones.” Pat Maltman of the “yes” side said many callers were elderly and “very confused by the question on the ballot.” The sfm engaged in a last-ditch attempt to get out the “no” vote, with two hundred people working telephones, “trying to contact everyone on the east side of the river.” Journalist Fred Youngs described the “small army of volunteers” working the phones at Collège universitaire de Saint-Boniface in the days leading up to the plebiscite. However, in the run-up to election day, speculation had already begun as to what the plebiscite results would mean. Jack London and some polling and research experts felt the results of the plebiscite should be thrown out because they were meaningless indicators of public opinion. This was disputed, of course, by Doern and Hutton.95 Finally, within an hour after the polls had closed across the province, the results poured in. The growing wave of antibilingualism sentiment had crystallized in an overwhelming rejection of the government’s constitutional proposals: the Winnipeg Sun reported that 77 percent of electors in rural areas had voted against the French-language proposals and that in some areas the rate of rejection had reached 90 percent.96 In a somewhat different compilation, the Free Press reported that, in twenty-one rural jurisdictions, 79 percent (20,349) had voted against and 21 percent (5,440) in favour. In Winnipeg the results were 76.5 percent (155,408) against the proposals and 23.5 percent (47,771) in favour. Disappointed but not surprised at the results, hundreds of supporters of the amendment gathered that evening at a Collège universitaire de Saint-Boniface gym to party; the following day, they crashed. Renald Guay later described the toll the referendum effort had taken on the key organizers: they were, and I wouldn’t go so far as to describe them as burn-out cases, but I mean they were pretty tired and under an awful lot of stress and it showed. It showed in Léo Robert, you know, he had great difficulty in taking any kind of decision and indeed even teaching. Remi Smith was supposed to come back to the office and start to do regular legal work and in fact was unable to work. And Réal Sabourin was wiped out and resting. And Ronald Bisson, I think, slept for ten days. I mean, they were exhausted.97

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Left to right, Léo Robert, talk-show host Peter Warren, and Russell Doern, at the so-called Great Debate on the constitutional amendment at Red River Community College, 18 October 1983. Reprinted by permission of the Winnipeg Free Press

Part of the largely antibilingualism crowd at the Great Debate at Red River Community College, October 18, 1983. Reprinted by permission of Winnipeg Free Press.

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Anti-amendment demonstration in favour of the “yes” side (“yes” to referral of the Bilodeau case to the Supreme Court) on the streets of downtown Winnipeg on 24 October 1983. Reprinted by permission of the Winnipeg Free Press

Winnipeg Free Press, October 1983. Reprinted by permission

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Winnipeg Free Press, December 1983. Reprinted by permission

Winnipeg Free Press, 5 January 1984. Reprinted by permission

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Winnipeg Free Press, 7 January 1984. Reprinted by permission

Winnipeg Free Press, early 1984. Reprinted by permission

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Winnipeg Free Press, early 1984. Reprinted by permission

Tories debate French-language issue, Winnipeg Free Press, January, 1984. Reprinted by permission

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146 Manitoba’s French-Language Crisis

In the Winnipeg civic elections, the ndp was devastated at the polls. Party officials said bilingualism “most damaged the civic wing’s aspirations,” and ndp mayoral candidate Brian Corrin admitted that “We were simply overwhelmed by the French-language issue.” The following day, the Sun noted that the ndp was outnumbered four to one in the new council. Later, Doern quoted Norrie as saying that “he had the ndp ‘in a box› over the language issue.98 A committee of the Quebec legislature observed a minute of silence to mark the plebiscite results. The move was proposed by sovereignist Gilles Rhéame of the Société St-Jean-Baptiste; it was opposed by a Liberal committee member but supported, hypocritically, by the Lévesque government minister Gérald Godin who had earlier described the constitutional amendment as a “stupid move.”99 The Pawley government was, at least publicly, unmoved. The day after the referendum, Penner held a press conference saying the government would proceed with its proposals. However, the Sun pointed out that “Before the polls had closed, he [had] allowed that the latest proposal for extending French-language services might not be the last one.” Pawley said the decision to go ahead with the proposal had been made long before the ballots were cast. Lyon called for an immediate provincial election, while Doern called for Penner’s resignation. According to Winnipeg Sun columnist George Stephenson, the Tories felt the vote had handed them “a mandate to use all means to block the government’s proposals when they are reintroduced in the Legislature.” He quoted Lyon as saying that “We may have to filibuster” and that other tactics, such as walkouts, bellringing, and lengthy speeches were not ruled out.100 The government’s response prompted an anti-French demonstration in the streets of downtown Winnipeg on 28 October; one of the eightyfive demonstators said, “The government isn’t listening, so we have to keep the dust flying.” The march was sparked by a letter written by Allan Fostey and read by Peter Warren during his hot-line show on radio station cjob; one of the organizers of the march was Frank Cameron of the extreme right-wing Western Canada Concept.101 In the wake of the fall referenda, opponents of the constitutional amendment coalesced into a new organization, Manitoba Grassroots. It was probably founded in Doern’s office; certainly the name of the new organization was discussed there. Its founding members, though based in the city, intended that it would become a province-wide umbrella organization. Grassroots worked closely with Hell’s Grannies, according to Doern.102 The new organization held its first press conference on 6 December.

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147 “Let the People Speak!”

b a c k t o t h e d r aw i n g b o a r d Despite its brave public stance, the Pawley government was deeply shaken by the results of the plebiscites, by the poor showing of ndp candidates in the Winnipeg municipal elections, and by the vociferous opposition it had encountered during the public hearings process.103 By October, the government had decided to develop a radically new approach whereby the constitutional amendment itself would be reduced to a bare-bones declaration of official languages accompanied by adoption of ordinary legislation governing the administration of French-language services in the province. It was hoped this would take the wind out of the opposition’s sails, since by far the greatest bone of contention was entrenchment. According to Guay, the idea originated with the sfm, which raised it with Penner.104 It was perhaps spurred on in this approach by a little-noticed column in the Winnipeg Free Press by Fred Cleverley, who could generally be counted upon to voice, and defend, the Conservative point of view in the debate. On 28 October, Cleverley wrote, “There is absolutely nothing to prevent the government from withdrawing its constitutional amendment and substituting in its place a provincial bill extending rights in exactly the same way as the amendment proposes.” Then the Tories, “if they chose to oppose it … would make it quite clear that their opposition to entrenchment was more firmly based in bigotry than they have been willing to admit to date.” In fact, by late October, Penner and Anstett were already heading in that direction. On 24 October, Gene Szach sent an “issues paper” outlining a “French-Language Services Administration Act” to Penner, who circulated an abbreviated version of the paper to the ndp caucus in preparation for its meeting of 27 October, the day after the plebiscites.105 On the day of the plebiscites, Pawley had received a resolution adopted by the mgea at its annual meeting the previous weekend; it supported “limited, practical bilingual services in Manitoba,” but the organization still had concerns about “significant demand”; it wanted the government to find some way to limit the number of employees affected by the amendment.106 The government was also considering a fundamental shakeup of its decision-making process on the issue by establishing a “French Language Services Strategy Committee” at the Cabinet level.107 The most important public sign that the government was rethinking its strategy was Premier Pawley’s decision to bring backbenchers Andy Anstett and Gérard Lécuyer into Cabinet. On 4 November, Anstett became minister of municipal affairs and also assumed Penner’s duties as

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house leader and minister responsible for the French-language proposals. In his first statement, Anstett said the government would not reopen negotiations on the proposals, though some informal discussions would be held.108 But in fact, Anstett almost immediately began sounding out the sfm on a radical new approach based upon the sfm’s earlier feelers concerning “disentrenchment” of the services sections of the amendment. The legislative committee’s report was released on 21 November 1983. It contained only five paragraphs, filling a page and a half. The report supported the constitutional amendment, while recommending unspecified changes, saying only that the government would proceed with plans to extend French-language services. The government’s final proposals would be kept under wraps until the next legislative sitting. Sterling Lyon described the report as “ludicrous” and called the government representatives on the committee “cowering idiots.” Doern denounced the report as “an insult to the people of Manitoba,” while Léo Robert told the press he was worried about possible changes to key sections of the amendment. The report thus “sent shockwaves of anger and concern among partisans on both sides of the issue.” In its editorial analysis, the Winnipeg Free Press wrote that “No one [was] better equipped than the members of that committee to search for the solution that best reconciles the needs, fears and wishes of the government, of the French-speaking minority and of other Manitobans … The committee that listened to the people should have a full opportunity to take action on the basis of what it heard.” Columnist Frances Russell had a more cynical but more realistic view: “If the government had given the committee a detailed draft of its resolution and amendments, the Tories would have had a golden opportunity to launch another campaign of distortion on what the resolution will do to the province … The opposition’s conduct on the issue has been irresponsible … [and has] created unprecedented divisions in the province.”109 In the meantime, the government was now more resolutely setting out on its new path, which it hoped would allow it to regain the initiative and put the opposition on the defensive by acceding to its most fundamental demand, that of “disentrenching” most of its proposals. Indeed, when word of the new proposals leaked to the press, even Sterling Lyon was moved to say his caucus would have to give “careful consideration” to this approach.110 Not coincidentally, the government also hoped in this way to silence the critics within its own ranks and to raise morale among the troops. Work on the new approach intensified, including renewed and intensive communications with the sfm, and on 22 November a meeting of the ndp caucus strategy committee heard Anstett present two options:

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149 “Let the People Speak!”

option 1 was the agreement of 16 May with the amendments of 6 September; option 2 was a constitutional amendment that would no longer entrench French-language services, which would now be provided for by ordinary statute. The committee endorsed the new approach.111 The sfm volunteered to come up with a draft bill on official language services, and on 28 November, Magnet transmitted a tenpage draft Official Languages Act for Manitoba to Léo Robert. The document was radical, providing, for instance, that “the Official Languages Act [would] take primacy over all other Manitoba legislation” and containing provisions for French as a language of work in government, two supervisory mechanisms, and an enforcement clause.112 A revised version of Magnet’s draft was transmitted to Penner, and it became the basis for renewed substantive negotiations between the sfm and the government.113 It must be recalled that by early December both the government and the sfm were becoming increasingly concerned with the fast-approaching deadline of 31 December 1983 imposed by the Supreme Court for resolution of the issue. Vaughan Baird’s position was simply that if “they don’t proceed, I just go to court.” Penner was trying to get Bilodeau and his counsel to request a further extension of the Supreme Court hearing. A week after discussions between Baird and Penner on 14 December, Baird confirmed that a postponement to 15 January 1984 had been requested. However, Baird again raised the “shall” issue. Penner responded on 6 January 1984, transmitting new opinions by Twaddle and Gibson and adding that “shall” truly meant “shall” in the revised constitutional amendment. On the other issue raised by Baird, Penner agreed that “Mr. Bilodeau would be entitled to some costs.”114 On 2 December, Penner expressed concerns about Magnet’s draft bill, and the Caucus Strategy Committee met again for four hours on 4 December.115 On 7 December the government and the sfm met for seven hours in Anstett’s office in a sort of summit meeting to hammer out their differences on the new approach.116 Guay later recalled the meeting, which was the first he had attended formally as part of the sfm’s political committee: I’m fresh on the scene, okay, so what happens which is probably a mistake on my part, I, in effect, told them, “Look, forget about this document that Bisson has submitted to you117 and forget what Léo is saying as President of the sfm, and we’re just going to take this document and we’re going to put it in the waste paper basket, right, so we now have a clean table, so if you want to talk, let’s talk, like forget about the dream. If you’re looking for a political way out, we can talk about it.” When I said that, we had already been in the room for

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150 Manitoba’s French-Language Crisis an hour and a half and they weren’t leaving, right. What happened at that point, no one wants to use the word, negotiations, discussions began again, all right, and other people would leave and come back and whatever because you’re dealing with the Provincial Government. Execs are there and so on. And the whole thing, the whole idea of using an ordinary statute, which in fact became eventually … Bill 115, to provide French language services is basically offered as a possible solution by the Provincial Government.118

The result was agreement between the government and the sfm on a new joint initiative involving a minimal constitutional amendment, a new section 23.1 of the Manitoba Act beginning with the words “As English and French are the official languages of Manitoba,”119 and a draft official languages bill. From the sfm’s perspective, the key issue was the wording of section 23.1, since this recognition, however symbolic, was by now its bottom line. However, Twaddle was already signalling the critical issue of the timing of its enactment, which was to become central in the subsequent debate in the House: “the proposed provincial Act should not be enacted until after the amendment is proclaimed or the rights granted by it would be included in the ‘freedom’ as now enjoyed under the law.”120 In other words, they would be guaranteed constitutionally. In mid-December, increasingly confident that the new approach would silence its most vociferous critics, the government dropped a bombshell. On 12 December the press reported that the government had drafted “new, substantial changes” to its French rights resolution. Léo Robert responded to the news by warning that the sfm would “encourage Roger Bilodeau to take his case back to the Supreme Court if the changes [were] too drastic” and adding that his organization had had some discussions with the government but that it did not know what changes the government would propose.121 Robert’s reaction was strictly for public consumption, since, as we have seen, the sfm was being consulted by the government at every turn. By then, the government’s new approach had crystallized into an eighteen-page draft bill, an “Act re Operation of S. 23 of the Manitoba Act.”122 The government sent its draft changes to the Resolution to Amend the Manitoba Act to Léo Robert on 15 December 1983, along with a draft copy of the language bill, and distributed them to the media the same day.123 Joe Magnet blasted the government’s proposed changes; in his opinion, “The proposed Act [was] utterly without merit to further the interests of the Franco-Manitoban community which the Société Franco-Manitobaine represents … It would be a cruel deception to offer this Act to the Franco-Manitoban community as representing a fair settlement of the Government’s constitutional obligations under s. 23.”124

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151 “Let the People Speak!”

Guay later recalled that Magnet had started openly disagreeing with the sfm’s strategy, especially regarding the bill, in late December 1983. In Guay’s words, Magnet “started to buck the tide … He wanted the court challenge into the Supreme Court of Canada.”125 Guay felt that Magnet was becoming increasingly unrealistic in the face of a difficult political context that provided fewer and fewer options to the sfm.126 In any event, Penner presented a package of new proposals to the sfm on 20 December, and the sfm sent them on to Winnipeg lawyer John Lamont for comments, a sign that Joe Magnet was by this time indeed falling increasingly out of favour with the sfm.127 On 23 December 1983, the Winnipeg Free Press reported that Anstett and the sfm had agreed to the new plan. However, just a few days later, on 28 December, the paper reported that the sfm might withdraw its support for the government’s proposals because the government had decided to exempt municipalities and school divisions from official-language guarantees. Robert had also complained to Anstett the previous week about the new restrictions on the declaratory clause, adding that many Franco-Manitobans now believed the issue should go to the Supreme Court. Robert’s comments prompted another flurry of telephone calls and meetings. Anstett and Lécuyer met with Robert, Guay and Théberge on 29 December 1983. The meeting lasted four hours, following which Robert told the press he was optimistic the government’s final proposal would meet with the society’s approval. That same day Guay met again with Bilodeau to keep him apprised of developments, and finally the sfm board approved the government’s new proposals.128 The federal government had a number of disagreements with the province on principle, for instance as to whether the declaration of bilingualism (the new section 23.1) would cover the “right” as opposed to the “freedom” to use French in communications with the government and regarding the exclusion of local governments, which, it argued, were already covered by the recent Blaikie 2 decision.129 Other federal officials also gave their views, and on 4 January, Prime Minister Trudeau himself asked Pawley to consider incorporating three changes reflecting the concerns of his justice officials in the language of the new draft constitutional amendment; the Pawley government did not agree.130 Ultimately these differences were hammered out in person: on 5 and 6 January 1984 Robert and Guay met with several high-level officials in Ottawa, including Justice Minister Mark MacGuigan and his deputy, Roger Tassé.131 The final draft of the new proposals was debated in the ndp caucus on 3 January. The mgea had also received a copy of the draft, and president Gary Doer told Anstett the new draft met “90 percent” of

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the organization’s concerns. The mgea board endorsed the government’s new proposals at a weekend meeting on 7 and 8 January. Anstett told the press that a few changes in wording had been brought to the draft of 14 December that had been made public; these, Anstett said, were “key to the proposal”; now, the amendment could not “be expanded by court interpretation.”132 At the end of 1983, by meeting most of the Opposition’s demands, the government was poised to launch a major new initiative in its attempt to constitutionalize full bilingualism in Manitoba. But it was met with a stone wall of intransigence and intensified bigotry.

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7 The Pawley Government Capitulates

The last stage of Manitoba’s language crisis unfolded during the months of January and February 1984; it is highlighted by a second series of legislative debates on the Pawley government’s proposed constitutional amendment begining in early January 1984 and ending on 27 February with the prorogation of the House without the amendment being adopted. During this period, public opposition to the amendment, which was fanned by the leaders of the Opposition, reached a fever pitch, culminating in demonstrations around the province and in the legislature and in an extraordinary four-day series of legislative hearings insisted upon by the Conservative opposition where vituperation and expressions of outright hatred attained levels never seen in Manitoba’s contemporary history. At the end of this stage, the provincial and federal governments, along with the sfm, became resigned to the inevitable dénouement and began preparing for a definitive judicial resolution of Manitoba’s language issue.

a n e w to r y l e a d e r In December of 1983 the Manitoba Tories were in the throes of a leadership race, called after Lyon’s resignation in the wake of his 1981 defeat. All three candidates for the Tory leadership, Gary Filmon, Brian Ransom, and Clayton Manness, said at a bearpit session that they wanted caucus, not Lyon, to call the shots on the bilingualism issue. All three were opposed to entrenchment, and they all wanted a “rational” approach. Clayton Manness said Lyon would be a “resource person”

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to the new leader.1 On 10 December, Gary Filmon was elected leader of the Progressive Conservative Party of Manitoba by a vote of 296 to 251; within hours, Pawley sent him a letter asking to meet with him to discuss the language issue.2 Filmon agreed to meet at 2:30 p.m. on Monday, 12 December, but wanted the meeting to cover a broader agenda; he suggested four new items. That day, Pawley informed Filmon of the government’s new proposals. Baird also wrote Filmon on 13 December, appealing to him to demonstrate “statesmanship” and adding that “minority rights are too important an issue to be used as a tool in partisan politics.”3 The Tories were initially taken aback by the new proposals. According to one early report, sources who had seen the new proposals felt “the Tory opposition [would] be hard-pressed to reject the deal. It goes a long way to meeting Tory concerns.”4 On 13 December 1983 Pawley optimistically informed his ministers and mlas of the meeting: “This is to confirm the news report that Andy Anstett and I had a productive meeting yesterday with Gary Filmon and Bud Sherman. Without setting any preconditions, they agreed to discuss our proposal with their Caucus. They also agreed that it would be more fair to them if the proposals remain confidential at this time. We are honoring that request.”5 The Tory caucus discussed the government’s new proposals for several hours on 14 December and rejected them outright.6 The Tory response to the new proposals was unequivocal: Filmon told Pawley that “we are unanimous in our rejection of them … Section 23.1 represents, by itself, a vast extension of constitutional rights beyond anything ever contemplated in the original Manitoba Act or thereafter.”7 Filmon also denounced the government’s “refusal to refer the proposals to the Standing Committee on Privileges and Elections.” He later told the press that the restrictions on the declaratory clause (section 23.1) made it more confusing: “What has been done confuses it and doesn’t improve it. The specific exclusion of municipalities and school boards now leaves it open to any other aspect of life in Manitoba.”8 The government couldn’t win: it was damned by the Tories if it did not explicitly exclude municipalities and damned if it did. It quickly became clear that the new proposals would do nothing to pacify the opposition. Columnist George Stephenson wrote that “Those in favour are still fullbore behind the government. Those opposed are still gung-ho against.” Grant Russell of Grassroots was more adamantly opposed than ever: “We are getting into higher gear now,” he said. “The situation is worse. It isn’t a compromise; if anything, it’s worse than the original.” He added that his organization would continue to circulate a petition to Lieutenant-Governor McGonigal.9

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155 The Pawley Government Capitulates

Pawley met again with Filmon on 3 January 1984 to explain the text of the new proposals that would be presented in the legislative assembly two days later.10 Filmon acknowledged receipt of them and requested copies of all legal opinions.11 Later, he told the press that his party would “remain opposed to entrenching anything that will expand French-language rights in Manitoba.” Filmon said the only thing that might change the party’s position would be legal opinions on the issue, adding he was seeking such opinions. In any case the bill should be sent to a standing committee of the legislature and be subject to public hearings. Filmon expressed the fear that “official languages” could be legally interpreted in future to extend French-language services beyond what was intended and added that “if you’re expanding any minority rights at the expense of a majority then you have to be concerned with the effects.” The Winnipeg Free Press sarcastically pointed out that there was also a risk that “when Mr. Filmon gets out of bed each morning … he will fall and break his bones.” For his part, Doern said that “No matter what the qualifiers are, they are giving special, official status to French.” On the substance of the new proposals, the Free Press commented that it was “still worth saying, even in the muted, parenthetical way the government now proposes, that French and English are both official languages.”12 On the first day of the session, 5 January, Gary Filmon took his seat as leader of the Opposition in the Manitoba legislature. Later that day Anstett tabled the amendment to the resolution. It provided for a redrafted section 23.1 that would guarantee that “As English and French are the official languages of Manitoba, the freedom to use either official language enjoyed under the law of Manitoba in force at the time this section comes into force shall not be extinguished or restricted by or pursuant to any Act of the Legislature of Manitoba.”13 The second change was a technical one aimed at alleviating the fears of organizations incorporated under acts in the schedule to the original resolution. The third part had three components. It provided that section 23 would be “in no way affected by the changes being proposed in section 23.1 and 23.2.” Second, the amendment would “place no responsibilities upon municipalities, school divisions or other forms of local government to provide for their by-laws, etc. to be in both the English and French languages,” eliminating any possible challenges, even under the Blaikie II decision. The third component provided for “the enhancement and protection of the multicultural heritage of Manitobans.” This was a much-reduced constitutional amendment that, in effect, contained a bare-bones recognition that French and English had been and were the official languages of Manitoba, but strictly within the

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context of the original section 23. The substantive changes in Frenchlanguage services and redress would now be provided by ordinary legislation, rather than being entrenched, the key opposition demand throughout the debate. The opposition immediately launched a procedural offensive against the government, attempting to split Anstett’s constitutional resolution into separate motions.14 Debate could then have extended over several weeks on the resolution alone. In addition, the opposition could have cherry-picked the elements of the resolution it favoured (simple validition of the province’s statutes with no quid pro quo for the French community) and stonewalled the rest; the opposition would thus have appeared less intransigent in the public’s eyes while not in fact modifying their position in any way. The opposition lost the first procedural round of the new session when Speaker Walding ruled, on the evening of 5 January, that the government’s omnibus resolution was in order. However, amendments to the resolution could be moved.15 On 9 January federal cabinet minister Jake Epp met with the provincial Tory caucus as an “emissary from Mulroney.” During the twohour meeting, caucus members told Epp they could not change their position, since constituents were exerting a lot of pressure for the provincial mlas to fight the proposals as long and as hard as possible. Tensions in the Tory caucus were palpable; columnist Frances Russell wrote that “Twice prior to the [legislative] session’s opening, Filmon opened the door to some accomodation with the government and twice had his caucus tear his olive branch apart.” Rumours were emerging of a split within the pc caucus between the “Lyonites” and a “new breed of Filmonites.”16 It was in this pressure-cooker atmosphere that Filmon made his maiden speech as leader of the opposition, presenting a detailed response to the government’s resolution.17 Though conciliatory in tone, Filmon’s comments in the House did not differ substantively from any of the scores of speeches that had already been made by the Tories in previous months; their main effect was to provide an opening, however small, to the moderates in his caucus to speak out more openly in the House.18 When Bill 115, An Act respecting the Operation of Section 23 of the Manitoba Act, was finally presented for second reading by Anstett on 11 January, Tory Justice critic Gerry Mercier immediately asked when the act would be proclaimed; Anstett assured him that there was “no intention to proclaim this bill prior to the proclamation of the amendment,” since “obviously” this would be “the equivalent of entrenching the Bill.” Filmon asked whether Anstett would be willing to provide that assurance “in the form of an amendment to the bill”; Anstett re-

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plied that he could and that such an amendment could be introduced at the committee stage.19 Later that day the Tories walked out, and the first incident of bell-ringing of the new session began; the bells rang for four consecutive days, as the Opposition maintained that the bill should be dealt with after the constitutional amendment. On the following Monday, 16 January, Tory house leader Harry Enns again informed the government that the Opposition was “not prepared to deal with Bill 115 at this … time.”20 Following another motion to adjourn the House, the Opposition again walked out, leaving the bells to ring until the end of the sitting. The following day, referring to legislative counsel Rae Tallin’s opinion, Enns told the House: “there is legal opinion available to us … that should this bill by some manner pass before the constitutional resolution is dealt with, then everything in this bill would be entrenched … we will not take that chance.” Anstett agreed with Enns, saying the government planned to pass the resolution “prior to giving Third Reading and Royal Assent to the bill.”21 Despite this assurance, the Opposition walked out again, letting the bells ring for the rest of the day, and they used the same tactic during the two days that followed. Virtually no support for the bill was voiced by the Opposition in the weeks that followed, despite the fact that the government had come round “170 degrees,” by the Opposition’s own reckoning, in meeting their concerns by further watering down the constitutional resolution itself and by providing for French-language services and redress by ordinary legislation rather than by entrenchment. However, Sterling Lyon, in a momentary lapse, again recognized, as he had during his years as premier, that “English and French are the official languages of Manitoba for the purposes of Section 23 – period; they always have been.”22 Meanwhile, the sfm was deeply split on the Pawley government’s new proposals and caught up, as well, in its own internal political dynamics. On 9 January, Magnet had submitted a twenty-page opinion on the new proposals, one that contradicted the opinions of Twaddle and Gibson as to the effect of the revised proposals on Bilodeau, and he recommended against them.23 Winnipeg lawyer John Lamont, at Guay’s request, provided his own nine-page opinion to the sfm; Lamont disagreed with Magnet regarding the potential success of the Bilodeau appeal, since it was “unlikely the court would throw laws and the political structure into chaos.”24 In Lamont’s view the amendment still had the “great virtue of enshrining English and French as the official languages of Manitoba.” Lamont recommended accepting the changes, saying the bill “would appear to be quite a significant positive step

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forward, first in terms of a recognition of a general principle respecting the provision of French language services, and also as a detailed framework for making provision for such services.” Guay also disagreed with Magnet, a position supported unanimously by the francophone lawyers’ group, while the sfm staff sided with Magnet in opposing the changes.25 On 10 January, the sfm board split evenly on the new proposals; however, the context changed again on 16 January, when the sfm was informed by Joyal that the new Pawley package was acceptable to Ottawa.26 The sfm board met at 5 p.m. on 17 January and decided, by a vote of six to two, to recommend adoption of the proposals to its membership, which had been convened to a general meeting that evening. In the end, the sfm members voted 506 to 112 in favour of the proposals.27 After the meeting, Forest wrote to Robert, Guay, and others accusing the sfm of “capitulation,” quoting from Magnet’s analysis, and he sent his comments to Pawley. Magnet’s document had been leaked to the press and made public on 17 January, the day of the sfm’s general meeting. Magnet denounced the government’s new proposals at the meeting; subsequently, an employee of the sfm publicly criticized the sfm board’s rejection of the Magnet position and later resigned.28 Once again, Magnet’s dogmatic, and in my view misguided, position on the fundamental significance of section 23 had served to divide the sfm profoundly. Penner later recalled that Magnet had “rained on every parade” and had been unrealistic in seeing the need for compromise. In Penner’s view, “if there had been compromise early on, we might have been able to do it.”29

bells and demonstrations Meanwhile, Grassroots was again mobilizing antibilingualism forces in Manitoba, culminating in the “Grand Rally against Official Bilingualism” at Winnipeg’s Convention Centre on 2 February 1984.30 The rostrum featured the now-familiar cast of Lyon, Doern, Sid Green, Herb Schulz, Grant Russell, and Pat Maltman, augmented by the two former provincial Liberal leaders Doug Campbell and Bobby Bend. According to Doern, participants at the rally came from ninety towns and villages, as well as the City of Winnipeg.31 The crowd, estimated at between two and three thousand, gave a standing ovation to every speaker.32 Members of the right-wing Western Canada Concept were in the audience.33 The sfm was again accused of “blackmail,” this time by Herb Schulz, and this accusation became the headline of a column by Fred Cleverley in the Free Press the following day.34 Campbell, a vigorous eighty-nine-year-old, called the gathering “the finest demonstration of

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democracy in action that I have ever seen in my many years of public life.” He drew the audience to its feet with his warning that “this legislation is dangerous for Manitoba.”35 Lyon described it as “the largest political gathering that I have ever addressed in twenty-six years of political life in this province.”36 Unfortunately, he had not attended the legislative hearings in Ste-Anne a few months earlier, where he would have had the opportunity to see first-hand twenty-five hundred people gathered there in support of the “unrepresentative” sfm and of the government proposals. After more rounds of bell-ringing on 16 and 17 January on a motion by Anstett to begin debate on Bill 115, the House reconvened at 10 a.m. on Friday, 20 January and agreed to hear Filmon speak to the bill. Filmon repeated his party’s line that the government was responsible for “the convulsion that we’re in here in the Legislature” and picked up on the “blackmail” theme, saying the sfm was “hold[ing] the province up to ransom.” “The gun is at your head,” he continued, and he warned that these were “not reasonable people.”37 Filmon then surprised the House by moving that Bill 115 “be not now read a second time but read this day six months hence.”38 The government took the motion at face value and started arguing against the delay; Lyon sneeringly told Pawley that the purpose of the move, called a “hoist,” was “to kill the bill,” and that if Pawley didn’t understand that, he shouldn’t be sitting in the premier’s chair.39 The motion was defeated by a vote of twenty-nine to twenty-two.40 On Tuesday, 24 January, Anstett moved closure on debate of the bill, to a chorus of protests by the Opposition; it was the first time this procedure had been used in the Manitoba legislature since 1929. Anstett’s motion carried by a vote of twenty-eight to twenty-three and imposed a thirty-minute time limit on speeches.41 At 2 a.m. the following morning, Bill 115 passed on second reading by a vote of twenty-nine to twenty-two. Anstett moved closure on the constitutional amendment on Thursday afternoon, 26 January 1984. The Opposition immediately walked out, letting the bells ring until 10 p.m. 42 That evening, with the sound of buzzers permeating every crevice of the legislative building, hundreds of demonstrators organized by Grassroots filled the building’s lobby and staircase; speakers included Lyon, Doern, Herb Schulz, Filmon, and Grant Russell.43 According to one reporter, “the size and white-hot anger of the crowd was at times overwhelming”; in addition, the speed with which the demonstration was organized was “stunning.”44 Premier Pawley met in his office with the leaders of the demonstration, Bobby Bend, Bill Hutton, Grant Russell, and Dennis

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Heeney; the last of the foursome left his office at 10:10 p.m. 45 The following morning, Grassroots finally presented the petition initiated by Conrad Kelly to Lieutenant-Governor Pearl McGonigal, asking her to dissolve the legislature.46 Tory mla Jim Downey informed the House of the event that day;47 neither he nor Doern, who had described the petition in glowing terms in the House a few days earlier, mentioned the fact that the petition had originated with a person with known ties to an extreme right-wing organization.48 Through the procedural histrionics during that period, there was no indication whether the Pawley government might support the Tory subamendment except for comments Pawley made to a reporter from the Montreal daily Le Devoir indicating he might be prepared to drop reference to “official languages” from the amendment.49 Though the Opposition made much of the article, Pawley never confirmed this position in the House. One reason, no doubt, was that the sfm had just voted in favour of the government’s proposals of 5 January; gutting any reference to official languages in section 23.1 would have been the last straw. Every time the government had watered down its proposals, support for them had decreased, and over a hundred sfm members had voted against the proposals of 5 January. On the other hand, there was no indication on the Opposition side that it was willing to accept Bill 115; indeed, there was growing evidence in the Opposition speeches that the Bill itself was not acceptable, despite the fact that, for months, the Opposition had righteously insisted that it was not against bilingualism, only against entrenchment. Yet public appearances and political reality had once again parted ways: the sfm secretly initiated a meeting with the Tory caucus, and the Tory leadership, despite its public denunciations of the sfm as “unrepresentative” of Franco-Manitobans, agreed to meet with leaders of the organization on 25 January.50 Equally incredibly, given its public position, the sfm indicated to the Tories that it was willing to accept the subamendment abolishing any reference to official languages “on the basis that the Conservatives would support the resolution as so amended.”51 This position had not been discussed with the sfm membership, and clearly it would have been a hard sell. However, the initiative indicates how far some sfm leaders, Robert and Guay included, were willing to go to get a deal.52 In effect, according to Lamont, the sfm would be trading a “symbolic designation for greatly increased public support.” Lamont recommended that the sfm’s offer to the Tories be made public, since “there are many advantages to making the disclosure,” one of which might be to split the Tory caucus. Guay strongly recommended to Léo Robert that the sfm go public as a way to put pressure on the Tory caucus, but Robert did not act on the recommendation and the meeting remained secret.53

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From left, Conrad Kelly, former Manitoba Liberal Leader Bobby Bend, and Grassroots leader Grant Russell present a petition against the constitutional amendment to Lieutenant-Governor Pearl McGonigal on 27 January 1984. Reprinted by permission of the Winnipeg Free Press

Lieutenant-Governor Pearl McGonigal and Premier Howard Pawley walk past the Tories as they enter the legislative chamber to prorogue the session on 27 February 1984. Reprinted by permission of the Winnipeg Free Press

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An empty legislative chamber after one of numerous walkouts by Conservative mlas, occuring on 7 February 1984. Reprinted by permission of the Winnipeg Free Press

sfm President Léo Robert meets with Prime Minister P.-E. Trudeau on 23 February 1984; the possibility of a federal reference on the constitutionality of all of Manitoba’s laws was raised for the first time as a serious option at this meeting. Reprinted by permission of Canadian Press (Fred Chartrand).

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Premier Howard Pawley in the Legislative Assembly during the last stages of the language debate in February, 1984. Reprinted by permission of the Winnipeg Free Press

Winnipeg Free Press, January 31, 1984

About twenty-five hundred people from across Manitoba attend antibilingualism rally at the Winnipeg Convention Centre on 2 February 1984. Former Liberal premier Douglas Campbell is at the podium. Reprinted by permission of the Winnipeg Free Press

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Anti-French sign at 574 Strathcona St. in Winnipeg during the language debate. Reprinted by permission of the Winnipeg Free Press

Progressive Conservative premier Gary Filmon (1988–99), who introduced a vigorous French-language services policy early in his first mandate

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166 Manitoba’s French-Language Crisis

In early February, as demontrations against government ministers and backbenchers multiplied, Penner requested police protection for Pawley, Anstett, Lécuyer, Desjardins, and himself.54 An “angry mob” of about one hundred River East residents confronted Pawley and other government members at a reception in the River East riding on 4 February 1984.55 Government mla Doreen Dodick met with a group of disgruntled constituents at the legislature on 6 February and received a petition signed by 1,278 of her constituents.56 A group of two hundred Selkirk residents hoping to confront Pawley met on 6 February 1984 at Centennial School; Pawley declined to attend, and the crowd was informed that he would be holding his own meeting later. The meeting was held on 8 February; the crowd that evening was estimated at between 450 and 500. According to Doern, it was 70 to 80 percent opposed to the government’s proposals, but the press reported it was evenly split.57 Supporters on both sides had been mobilized to converge on Selkirk that evening.58 One reporter noticed that “many of the same protesters show up at meeting after meeting along with former New Democrat Herb Schulz.”59 Even Speaker Walding was not immune to the wave of demonstrations. The St Vital ndp association met with him on 21 February “to clarify his position”; according to Doern, Walding was called on the carpet.60 A rally against the government proposals was held at Brandon University on 13 February; speakers included Ransom, Henry Carroll, University of Manitoba professor Al Pressey, Grant Russell, and Doern.61 The rally, timed to coincide with an ndp convention in Brandon that weekend, was organized by Dennis Heeney.62 Another rally, held in Beausejour on 18 February, attracted 300 people; featured speakers were Grant Russell, Darren Praznik, Al Pressey, Conservative mla Gerrie Hammond, Herb Schulz, and Bobby Bend.63 A public meeting in Dauphin on 20 February attracted 175 people; speakers included Pressey, Campbell, Bend, Orchard, Gourlay, and Grant Russell.64 The last Grassroots public meeting was held in Eriksdale on 23 February 1984, with 150 people in attendance. Speakers included Harry Enns, Russell, Bend, and Doern. The Interlake Citizens’ Committee called off a rally scheduled for Sunday, 26 February, at the legislature.65

gridlock On Monday, 6 February, Filmon asked the government to withdraw its entire proposal; undeterred, Anstett moved a two-hour limit on bellringing later that day and again moved closure; the bells rang till 10 p.m. that evening. The same scenario unfolded on 7 February.66

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Within the government, senior officials were increasingly concerned that the deepening crisis would begin to impede normal government operations. On 7 February, Executive Council secretary Michael Decter warned that the “continuing stalemate in the Assembly is beginning to pose a very real obstacle to the proper governance of the Province.” Decter’s concern revolved around the need for special warrants and the estimates process; he laid out options to deal with the situation and strongly recommended removal of the speaker.67 The Pawley government was facing the prospect of a budget crisis, since the end of the fiscal year was drawing near and Cabinet orders are illegal while the House is sitting; at the same time, the House could not deal with the new budget while it was tied up with the language issue.68 Meanwhile, the bipartisan agreement of August 1983 limiting bellringing to two weeks was on its deathbed. As recently as 25 January 1984 Enns had said, “We honour and want to work under the agreement that was signed.” However, on 10 February, Enns pointed out that Anstett’s motion to impose a two-hour limit on debate blatantly contravened this provision of the agreement. Anstett replied that “we, on this side, accept with grace the suggestion … that the agreement has been abrogated and no longer stands and is not binding on either party.”69 Following that exchange, debate droned on in the days that followed on Anstett’s motion to limit bell-ringing to two hours, with most Opposition mlas, along with a few government members, using up their allotted forty minutes. The Opposition’s “last stand” ended with a four-hour speech by Filmon. Finally, on Thursday, 16 February, after a final plea by Anstett in favour of the resolution, the Opposition walked out one last time, leaving the bells to ring twenty-four hours a day for twelve consecutive days. “You’re watching the end of the government,” Lyon gloated to one reporter. “Enjoy it.”70 Tuesday, 21 February was perhaps the most critical date in the entire crisis, with major developments unfolding simultaneously at a furious pace in Ottawa, at the Manitoba legislature, and within the sfm. In Ottawa, Trudeau announced in the House of Commons that the federal government would reject an amendment that would eliminate section 21.1 and any reference to official languages in Manitoba. Trudeau was immediately denounced by both Anstett and Filmon, and the Tories told the press they would just let the bells ring.71 In fact, heated negotiations were unfolding in various offices of the House that day; within the Tory caucus itself, a three-way split had emerged.72 At the legislative building, Filmon wrote Pawley asking him to support the Opposition’s subamendment; Pawley replied, urging Filmon’s

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caucus to be present in the House at 2 p.m. that afternoon to vote on the government’s proposals to limit debate to two hours (a matter of privilege). At the same time, he wrote Speaker Walding asking him to “notify both whips of a specific time when the two votes will be conducted to decide the question of privilege before the house,” adding that the government caucus would be in the House that afternoon for a vote. Copies of his letter were circulated to Filmon, the two caucus chairmen, and the press. Walding tersely replied, “I cannot accede to your request to contravene our rules and procedures,” adding that he was “surprised that you would request that I contravene the existing Rules and Procedures at this time.” On 23 February 1984, Walding wrote to Anstett, with copy to Harry Enns, suggesting that he meet with the two House leaders “with a view to satisfactorily resolving this situation.” Only Enns responded, saying he was again ready to meet with the speaker and the government on the basis that the government support the Tory subamendment, failing which the alternatives were “the dropping of the government’s language proposal, prorogation or dissolution.”73 Winnipeg Free Press columnist Frances Russell construed these events as an attempted coup d’état on the part of the Opposition, writing that the Tories had “tried to take over as government” during those three days.74 The evidence, in her view, was to be found in Enns’s letter of 24 February to Walding, which “constituted the attempted coup.” This interpretation of the correspondence was surely overly dramatic, since nowhere in his letter did Enns threaten to take over the government, much less by extraparliamentary means; at most he asked the government to call an election. The Free Press editorial that day was closer to the mark; it described the proposals in the Enns letter as being “as cynical as they were arrogant.”75 As the raucous sound of the buzzers assailed every visitor to the legislative building without respite day after day, the sfm realized that the constitutional amendment, first proposed by Penner as an honourable correction of a great historical injustice, was in its death throes. The sfm board met on 22 February and reviewed its options; finally, it decided to abandon the political solution that had absorbed all of its energy over the previous two years and to ask Bilodeau to proceed to the Supreme Court. It also decided to ask the federal government to submit a reference directly to the Supreme Court in order to broaden the scope of Bilodeau to all of Manitoba’s laws.76 On 23 February, Trudeau called for an all-party resolution supporting the Pawley language proposal and sent a draft resolution to the two opposition parties.77 Filmon lambasted the federal ndp and the Liberals for trying to “interfere with an area of provincial jurisdiction,”

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arguing that “Language rights are the responsibility of the provincial government.”78 Meanwhile, Anstett was beginning to hint broadly that prorogation was imminent, since “We are now, for all intents and purposes, in a state of anarchy.”79 The three national party leaders met for an hour and a quarter in Trudeau’s office on the morning of 24 February to determine the final wording of their joint resolution; it was softened from an earlier version, which had called on the Manitoba legislature to vote on the constitutional amendment “without further delay.”80 The all-party resolution was moved by Lloyd Axworthy and adopted in the House of Commons the same day.81 Some commentators noted the eloquent speech made by the recently elected Tory leader, Brian Mulroney, on that occasion; sourly, Filmon said Mulroney was being “manipulated.” He lambasted the federal ndp and Liberals for trying to “interfere with an area of provincial jurisdiction … Language rights are the responsibility of the provincial government.” Léo Robert was present in the House gallery to listen to the debate. However, all five Tory mps from Manitoba were absent from the House when four of them could easily have been there: Manitoba Tory mps Lee Clark, Dan MacKenzie, Charlie Mayer, and Jack Murta disagreed with Mulroney’s position.82 Anstett still hoped for a final-hour breakthrough. He had asked caucus chairman Harapiak that a caucus meeting scheduled for the morning of 24 February be postponed to twelve noon, after his meeting with Speaker Walding and Enns. The breakthrough never came. At 2:58 p.m. on 27 February 1984, at the request of Premier Pawley, Lieutenant-Governor Pearl McGonigal prorogued the House. The bells had rung continuously over the twelve days since 16 February, for a total of 263 hours and 10 minutes. Opposition members wore broad smiles as they intoned God Save the Queen and later toasted the death of the constitutional amendment at a party in the basement of the legislative building.83

th e b e l l s Since the bells had not rung for fourteen consecutive days, a tantalizing question will remain forever unanswered: would the Opposition have returned for a vote if the government had waited another two days? Did the Opposition still feel bound to respect the two-week limit it had agreed to on 12 August 1983? Press reports indicate that it was still willing to abide by the terms of the agreement; according to George Stevenson of the Winnipeg Sun, “Filmon said the Opposition is still committed to that agreement, even though the government has said it is no longer binding.” In the Free Press, Mary-Ann Fitzgerald wrote that

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“Opposition Leader Gary Filmon told reporters his caucus honors an agreement signed last summer to limit bell-ringing to two weeks at a time.” As late as 21 February, Filmon again reiterated at a press conference that the Tories would abide by the agreement on the two-week limit, adding that the Tories were “honor bound” to do so.84 The official reason given for prorogation was that there was, in Anstett’s words, a “very real danger” that the government could find itself without the ability to obtain legislative authority for the funding of government operations if the stalemate continued. This is unconvincing, since only two days remained to test the Opposition’s intentions. The most realistic explanation is that public pressure and the possibility that the ndp would lose power in the next elections over the issue finally wore down the Pawley government. There will also be endless debate as to the options open to a government in a face of a speaker who does not wish to do its bidding. Former ndp minister Sid Green and Executive Council secretary Michael Decter had both argued that the speaker should be changed if he was unwilling to call a vote; on this view, the government should have forced Walding to end the walkouts in the legislature and replace him as speaker if necessary. Two weeks after prorogation Harry Enns, as well, said he “would not have tolerated the bell-ringing.” Enns said he would have pressured the speaker to hold a vote in those circumstances but did not indicate what the alternative might be. His comments also ignored Pawley’s own almost desperate attempts to do so, and the vociferousness with which Enns himself and his own party would have denounced such a move, thus further inflaming opponents of the proposals.85 The Pawley government never forgave Walding for not having forced a vote, and in 1988, after Desjardins had resigned his seat, thus eliminating its one-seat majority (excluding the speaker who by then was Myrna Phillips), Walding brought down the government, paving the way for a Conservative victory over the ndp. Given this dramatic sequel, the question that must be asked is, how fair were Walding’s rulings, and, in particular, was he right in refusing to force a vote in the absence of the Opposition? The record indicates that Walding was scrupulously even-handed in his conduct of House affairs through one of the most turbulent periods in Manitoba history. As for the bell-ringing, one might even argue that he was stretching the limits of the precedents under which he was operating (most notably the precedent set by Jeanne Sauvé in the House of Commons in 1982), in allowing Anstett’s motion to impose a two-hour limit on bell-ringing, since Anstett’s motion contravened the usual procedure used in effecting changes to House rules.86 However, both Walding and the Pawley government appear to have neglected one possibility: invoking section 15 of the Man-

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itoba Act, which provides only that “a majority” of members “shall be necessary to constitute a meeting of the House for the exercise of its powers” and that “for that purpose, the Speaker shall be reckoned as a Member.”87 Arguably, since the Manitoba Act itself is a constitutional document, this could have insulated the Manitoba legislature from precedents in other jurisdictions, allowing the speaker to end the bell-ringing by a simple majority vote.

prequel to the sequel At a press conference in the afternoon of 27 February, sfm president Leo Robert announced his organization would request that the federal government submit a reference to the Supreme Court on section 23, judicially contest the validity of Bill 2, and initiate further, unspecified judicial action. Vaughan Baird immediately asked the Supreme Court to set a date to hear the Bilodeau challenge to Manitoba legislation, and the mgea admitted to being “nervous” about the sfm court challenge. Prime Minister Trudeau briefly considered introducing a third resolution in the House of Commons. In a statement to the House, Trudeau said Cabinet would soon decide whether to introduce a constitutional resolution or support a court bid to protect French-language rights in Manitoba. Trudeau also challenged Ontario to adopt official bilingualism as a model for Manitoba; Premier Bill Davis quickly declined.88 Gary Filmon, under tremendous pressure from the various factions of his caucus and from the national Conservative leadership, attempted to put the issue behind him. “Enough is enough,” he said. “[T]he issue is over.” However, he later added that the ndp had backed down because of “political expediency”; he said the ndp knew his party would have returned to the House within three days, honouring an agreement signed the previous summer that placed a two-week limit on bell-ringing episodes.89 Prorogation also unleashed a flood of reaction, both local and national. Official Languages Commissioner Max Yalden said opponents of expanded French-language services in Manitoba had “greatly exaggerated” the potential problems. Gordon Fairweather, head of the Canadian Human Rights Commission, said the Manitoba Tories had “subverted democracy.” According to Winnipeg journalist Fred Youngs, history would record that Manitobans had been “too harsh, too rigid, and not willing to be generous to a minority.” University of Ottawa professor John Trent wrote that the “refusal to extend Frenchlanguage rights in Manitoba is a sombre and shameful moment in Canadian history.” The Council of National Ethnocultural Organizations of Canada accused the Manitoba Tories of being “narrow-minded” and wanting a “unicultural Canada.”90

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Tory icon Dalton Camp pointed out that prorogation posed a serious challenge for Mulroney. Other reports had Brian Mulroney “reading the riot act” to his caucus members on the French language issue; he told his mps to “back bilingualism or quit.” Filmon reacted predictably, telling him to “keep out of [the] language dispute” and continued to express his fear that entrenching French in Manitoba would lead to the blanket use of French in the province, which he said was impractical. Filmon also accused Trudeau of trying to influence the Supreme Court by considering an “anticipatory resolution.”91 In a candid moment that no doubt reflected his true feelings on the matter, given his subsequent policies on French-language services as premier of Manitoba,92 Filmon admitted to a reporter who had asked him how history would judge the Manitoba Tories’ behaviour that there “will be a tendency to suggest that we were too harsh, too rigid, and not willing to be generous to a minority.”93 Jack London noted the split within ethnic groups and the fact that, in his view, Howard Pawley himself “did not lead”; however, the true culprits in the debacle were Lyon, Filmon, and Doern.94 Doern himself quit the ndp ten days after prorogation.95 In Quebec the reactions of sovereignists and federalists reflected their views of federalism. Premier Bourassa said national unity was hurt by Manitoba’s decision, while a minister in the Lévesque cabinet, longtime sovereignist Jacques-Yvan Morin, said the outcome would “strengthen Quebec.” He added that henceforth Quebec would let Manitoba Francophones fight for their rights on their own, even though a few months earlier, he had already said that the Quebec government would not actively support the Manitoba Francophones, since what the Manitoba government did was “their business.”96 However, a few days before prorogation, a movement called the Champ de Mars had been formed in Quebec in sympathy with the Franco-Manitoban community; it petered out within a few months. Penner warned that Ottawa might have to invoke emergency powers to prevent “legal chaos” in Manitoba if all laws adopted in English only were struck down.97 Privately, he fumed at the “unprincipled” opposition, as he recalled the fact that the “basic text of our proposal was first given to the Leader of the Opposition in December 1982, [and] for the next five months neither the Leader of the Opposition nor the former Attorney-General … saw fit to convey to me the fact that they had any concerns with the proposal.”98 On 29 February, Pierre Elliott Trudeau stepped down as leader of the Liberal Party.

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8 “To Court We Go”

The demise of the constitutional amendment on 27 February 1984 meant, inevitably, that the Manitoba French-language issue would once again end up in the Supreme Court of Canada. However, the form the submission would take was by no means preordained. Sterling Lyon and his cohorts had assumed it was the Bilodeau case that would go to court; the French community’s leadership, and its lawyers in particular, had other ideas. Indeed the dynamics within the Franco-Manitoban community and its relations with the federal government were much more complex than was apparent publicly. The Forest and Bilodeau cases had always generated tension within the francophone community. In the judicial vacuum after Forest in 1979, Guay described lawyers “going up and down the highways speeding all the time,” trying to get tickets to push the Forest decision further. “The key thing for them,” Guay recounted, was “to have control of the case because you cannot control Georges Forest.” Forest “basically took off on everyone … on his own, and it was not at the initiative of the sfm or the community.” However, Guay and the others were soon to learn that “unknown to me … you can’t control Roger Bilodeau either.”1 By 1982 the francophone lawyers’ group had three speeding tickets on hold.2 According to Guay, “We had positioned ours on hold waiting to move in concert with this informal group of French-speaking lawyers and the sfm. Bilodeau grabbed the strategy and took off on us.” As the Bilodeau case progressed, it became increasingly clear that it was “not going to yield what they wanted [it] to yield.” The basic problem with the case was its very narrow focus: any judgment on it would

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have been applicable strictly to the Highway Traffic Act and the Summary Convictions Act; it would not have applied to all the other Manitoba laws. With Bilodeau, it was “just a little piece of the pie again … [we were] not getting to the root cause of the entire problem.” In Guay’s recounting, Smith got involved with the sfm “specifically in order to get this whole thing coordinated and to move along again.”3 Needless to say, this is not how Bilodeau and his counsel, Vaughan Baird, saw it. These conflicting perspectives on objectives had contributed greatly to the complexity of the negotiations. However, after prorogation of the House, Guay, Smith, and others at the sfm and among the FrancoManitoban lawyers’ group quickly returned to their original focus, which was to get a definitive ruling on all of Manitoba’s laws. They had realized as well that their best hope of doing this was through the federal government. Their most significant and decisive initiative of the entire crisis occurred on 23 February in Ottawa, when Léo Robert and Rémi Smith met first with Justice Minister MacGuigan and then, in the prime minister’s office, with Trudeau, MacGuigan, Serge Joyal, and Lloyd Axworthy, among others. At this meeting, the sfm argued that the Bilodeau case was too limited in scope and that a federal reference regarding the constitutionality of all of Manitoba’s laws was necessary. Trudeau agreed in principle and gave the sfm the green light to begin working on draft questions that could be presented to the Supreme Court in a reference. The possibility of the federal Parliament adopting the constitutional amendment to the Manitoba Act unilaterally was also discussed, and Trudeau indicated to the sfm and to his ministers that this was indeed an option.4 Robert and Smith reported to the sfm board on these meetings on 26 February, and it was agreed that the sfm would support the judicial route by means of a federal Reference. Henceforth, Bilodeau would proceed on a separate track, taking a back seat to the federal reference.

th e f e d e r a l c a b i n e t s p l i t s The original federal factum in the Bilodeau case heard by the Manitoba Court of Appeal wanted the appeal dismissed on the basis, inter alia, of the doctrine of necessity, as did the Manitoba government.5 Thus, in early March of 1984 Ottawa was still siding with Manitoba in arguing the “necessity” doctrine.6 The sfm’s first goal was to get the federal government to change its position; to do so would be a major coup, since a reference by the federal government on the language issue would be a “sharp break with the Trudeau government’s past attitudes in language disputes,” specifically on Quebec’s Bill 22 and Bill 101, as

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well as on Forest.7 In fact, Trudeau had already agreed that this was the best approach, although this was not yet known publicly, and by 29 February, Guay and Magnet had already drafted four questions that could form the basis for the reference.8 At about this time, Guay and Smith uncovered a memo from Mark MacGuigan to mps and senators saying that the sfm would lose in court9 and advocating the federal government’s previous position on Bilodeau, namely, that the validity of Manitoba’s laws had to be maintained by virtue of the doctrine of necessity, to avoid chaos. Rémi Smith made MacGuigan’s position public.10 The ensuing publicity in Ottawa, Montreal, and elsewhere revealed a major rift within the Trudeau government on the issue, with Justice Minister MacGuigan on one side and Secretary of State Joyal on the other.11 On 8 March, Joyal and MacGuigan consulted Pawley on the Frenchlanguage issue, saying the talks were “on-going.” Joyal informed Pawley that two federal options were being considered, the introduction of a new “anticipatory” Manitoba language resolution in the House of Commons and a reference to the Supreme Court asking for a clarification of the Forest judgment. On 12 March, MacGuigan told the press the federal government would be asking the Supreme Court to rule on the validity of Manitoba’s laws, adding that his department was already drafting the questions that would be asked. He added that the decision had not yet been taken by Cabinet but that it would be announced later in the week. Two days later MacGuigan announced that the federal government would be changing its position regarding the validity of the laws of Manitoba; it would no longer be arguing that the laws must be found valid in order to prevent chaos.12 The federal Cabinet’s Priorities and Planning Committee was to consider its position on the Manitoba reference at its meeting of Monday, 16 March; Trudeau asked Joyal to attend the meeting.13 The decision was delayed, however, because of the absence of Lloyd Axworthy, the senior Manitoba mp.14 The sfm, through Guay and his father, Senator Jos. Guay, were following events in Ottawa closely.15 On 16 March, the sfm sent a telegram to Trudeau and wrote to MacGuigan asking that the sfm be consulted in the drafting of any reference questions; in addition, the sfm wanted “party” status in the case, rather than mere “intervenor” status.16 The divisions within Cabinet became even more pronounced with John Turner’s entry into the Liberal leadership race. During his press conference, called for 16 March to announce his candidacy, Turner made his first major political error: he said the Manitoba language issue was a provincial responsibility, adding, “I would hope that it would be resolved by the political process and not by the judicial

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process.” Turner thus distanced himself from the stands taken by both Trudeau and Mulroney.17 “By the next morning,” Turner biographer Greg Weston later wrote, “Turner’s campaign was engulfed in controversy, even as it was barely across the starting line. The notion that language rights should be left to provincial jurisdiction sent prominent Liberals into orbit, especially those in Quebec where the Trudeau government had opposed that province’s restrictive language laws at considerable political risk.”18 The sfm told Turner that his position reflected a “surprising naivety” on his part, adding that “the position of the Conservative Party of Manitoba is an aberration and you seem to endorse it.”19 Lloyd Axworthy was also softening his previous hard line on the issue. On 19 March he said he had told the federal Cabinet to slow down on the Manitoba language issue and fully consider the implications of federal action. In the view of one reporter, Axworthy “seemed to step back from the consistently tough stand he [had] taken up till now.” The following day the Winnipeg Free Press reported that Axworthy had convinced the federal Cabinet to drop plans to place a reference before the Supreme Court on the Manitoba language issue. Sources said the plan was “effectively dead.” In Axworthy’s view, Turner was not out of step, since the issue should be resolved through “accommodation.” In Manitoba, Sharon Carstairs said Turner was “naive” about the French-language issue in Manitoba, adding, “What are we supposed to do? It [the political solution] failed.” The Financial Post wrote that “John Turner probably wondered what hit him.”20 The Axworthy-Turner group lost in cabinet as a whole: a decision in principle to move forward on the reference was taken by Cabinet on the morning of 22 March 1984. Later that day Trudeau rose in the House of Commons to announce that the federal government would be taking the Manitoba language issue to the Supreme Court, adding that “We are … at the last stage of consulting the Manitoba government.” MacGuigan sent Penner a list of four draft questions to be submitted to the Court and asked for his views; Penner wanted the reference to be heard at the same time as Bilodeau’s appeal.21

th e s u p r e m e c o u r t b e c k o n s Despite his highly successful lobbying effort to obtain a federal reference, Renald Guay was in for a rude shock later that month. At the sfm’s annual general meeting held 10 and 11 March 1984, Gilberte Proteau was elected to replace Léo Robert as president of the sfm.22 In late March or early April, Proteau instructed Guay to drop his attempt at obtaining a federal reference; Proteau further instructed Guay not to undertake any further political or judicial activity on behalf of the sfm.

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Guay urged Proteau to press for a federal reference and reminded the sfm of the importance of getting a reference before the Supreme Court set a date for Bilodeau’s hearing on 10 April. He emphasized the need for “insistent political interventions … this week” to obtain a federal reference, preferably before a federal Cabinet meeting scheduled for 5 April. That same day, Guay informed the sfm that Senator Guay was to raise the matter of a federal reference in the Liberal caucus on 4 April 1984. A few days later, the sfm also instructed Magnet to drop the sfm’s intervention in the Collier case.23 Despite her decision to fire Guay as a legal and political advisor to the sfm, Proteau took his advice one last time, reversing her position on the reference. On 3 April she sent a telegram to Trudeau requesting a reference regarding the status of English-only laws in Manitoba. By that time Guay already had in hand a draft of a press release announcing the federal reference, along with the four questions he and Magnet had helped draft, faxed to him by the Justice Department.24 On 5 April, MacGuigan announced that the federal government would be submitting a four-question reference to the Supreme Court of Canada and that the federal government would be submitting a new factum in the Bilodeau case. Penner’s position was to defend the validity of Manitoba’s laws; in his view, the province would have fared better in its court case without the reference. A few days later he announced he would seek to delay the Supreme Court hearing of the Bilodeau case and the federal reference to the fall.25 Since the French-language crisis had left the matter of Frenchlanguage services in abeyance, the sfm now resumed its pressure on the Pawley government on this front. On 8 June Proteau wrote Pawley informing him of a resolution on French-language services adopted at the sfm’s 1984 annual general meeting in March and thanked him for having agreed to meet with the sfm later that month. Proteau proposed an agenda centred on French-language services, including the establishment of a “consultative mechanism.”26 Cabinet established the French Language Services Strategy Committee on 13 June, chaired by Pawley and including Penner and Anstett. Neither Desjardins nor Lécuyer was appointed to the committee, whose mandate was to “develop strategy for Cabinet consideration.” In retrospect, this was a watershed decision, since it marked the creation of the nonconstitutional, nonlegislative mechanisms within the constitutional and judicial framework that exist in Manitoba to this day.27 Despite Penner’s attempt to delay it, the Supreme Court decided on 10 April that the Bilodeau hearing would be held on 11 June 1984.28 Opponents of the constitutional amendment, led by Russell Doern, applied for intervenor status before the Court on 17 April.29 Members

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of this “Group of Six” were Doern, James Richardson, former Manitoba Premier Douglas Campbell, Pat Maltman, C. Patrick Newbound, and Herb Schulz.30 The Manitoba government opposed their request for intervenor status,31 and the Winnipeg Sun noted that Penner and this group were “strange bedfellows” in arguing for the validity of Manitoba’s laws. In any case, the Supreme Court granted intervenor status to the Group of Six on 2 May 1984, along with the government of Quebec and the Federation of Francophones outside Quebec.32 The Supreme Court hearing was held on 11–13 June 1984. Throughout the summer and fall of 1984, the government was still trying to come to grips with the translation problem. The prospect of a Supreme Court decision involving massive amounts of translation magnified the slow pace of legal translation and the on-going turf war between the Departments of Cultural Affairs and the Attorney General over translation services, as well as financial and personnel problems. All of this came to a head in early November, when Penner’s deputy, Tanner Elton, recommended the transfer of the Legal Translation Unit to the attorney general’s department.33 Its purpose was to integrate French-language legal drafting within the office of the legislative counsel to ensure that drafting of new legislation would proceed simultaneously in both languages. At the same time, the government was becoming more aggressive in demanding federal funds for legal translation. On 27 September, Penner sent the new secretary of state, Walter McLean, a list of Manitoba’s objectives and priorities in that area, estimating the cost of legal translation to December 1988 at $3 million. Penner suggested the federal government should cover 80 percent of the cost, based upon federal funding practices in that field in Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island.34 McLean informed Penner that $400,000 would be provided for 1984–85, covering “all projects relating to bilingualism including general translation, provision of bilingual public services and translation of statutes and regulations.” McLean left open the possibility of a three-year agreement along the lines of the 1983 provisional agreement with the province, which had provided for $3 million for translation and revision of statutes.35

th e d e c i s i o n The Supreme Court of Canada handed down its eighty-eight-page decision on the federal reference on 13 June 1985.36 In response to the four questions posed by the federal government, it ruled 1 that section 23 of the Manitoba Act was mandatory and therefore that all Manitoba laws had to be adopted in both languages and the Records and Journals of

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the province had to be bilingual as well; 2 that all laws not “printed and published” in both English and French were invalid but were deemed “temporarily valid for the minimum period of time necessary for their translation, re-enactment, printing and publication”; 3 that laws “not printed and published in English and French” had “no legal force,” but that the “current Acts” would be deemed to have “temporary force and effect” for the “minimum period of time necessary” for translation, etc.; and 4 the main sections of the Lyon government’s Bill 2 were declared “invalid and of no force and effect,” while the section repealing the 1890 Official Language Act was maintained. Thus, all of Manitoba’s unilingual laws were unconstitutional, but the province was allowed time for translation in order to avoid “legal chaos,” since, from the date of the judgment, the province had an “invalid and therefore ineffectual legal system.” In the Court’s view, the province was “in a state of emergency” because of its persistent violation of the Constitution. The province and the other intervenors had four months to present submissions regarding the minimum period necessary to translate and reenact the statutes. A hearing to establish deadlines was set by the Court for 15 November 1985. The decision, ironically, was a victory for both sides. On one hand, the sfm and the francophone community had been completely vindicated: the word “shall” in section 23 indeed meant “shall,” and although the extent of the translation required had yet to be determined, it was clear it would be a huge task. The quid pro quo it had offered the provincial government – exchanging large amounts of translation for more practical and useful French-language services – which had been consistently denounced by the Opposition – looked very attractive the day after the decision. As the Winnipeg Sun editorial said, “The original proposal was a good deal, pure and simple.” Two days later, the Sun suggested that the ndp and the Tories should get together and work out a compromise based on the original proposal. The Winnipeg Free Press wrote that the decision meant that “bilingualism is a central, permanent and essential part of the life of this province and always has been, that without bilingualism Manitoba has no constitutional validity.” Sharing this reading of the decision, Globe and Mail columnist Jeff Simpson wrote of Lyon, Filmon, and Doern that “Theirs has been a complete miscalculation, which, given its base motivation, deserves all the contempt which irony can provide.” On the other hand, the Opposition could find comfort on one count: the Court had indeed found a way to avoid chaos, prompting Sterling Lyon to say that the “position taken by the people of Manitoba, the position taken by the Opposition, the position taken by Doern was completely vindicated in that judgment.”37

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In the legislative assembly, following his aides’ advice, Premier Pawley concluded a low-key statement by saying, “The Supreme Court decision brings to a close a difficult period for many Manitobans.”38 Pawley said Manitoba needed time and financial help from the federal government; in the meantime, Manitoba would continue to improve services for Francophones and embark on a gradual extension of those services. Pawley correctly pointed out a wrinkle in the decision that meant that spent laws and repealed laws would also have to be translated, at huge cost.39 sfm president Réal Sabourin said that the federal government should refuse to help Manitoba translate its English-only laws unless the province provided more bilingual services to its francophone citizens; since their rights had been violated for ninety-five years, the “federal government ought to help out the victim.”40 Léo LeTourneau, of the Fédération des Francophones hors-Québec (ffhq), also said the province deserved no federal aid. Later, Sabourin said Manitoba francophones could sue for damages for ninety-five years of illegality; he added, however, that this was purely speculative. LeTourneau said this could perhaps take the form of services. Armed with the fact that the amount of translation had yet to be determined, Sabourin deplored the potential cost, thereby implicitly opening the door to another quid pro quo. Indeed, he made this possibility explicit to one reporter, saying that “Franco-Manitobans [were] still ready to trade.” However, Premier Pawley said the decision had killed for good the government’s plans to legislate bilingual services. Although Brian Mulroney, who was now prime minister, praised the Court for its “rigor and wisdom” and said he would be pleased to discuss with Manitoba the extension of services, federal justice minister John Crosbie quickly indicated he would not be using federal funding as a “big stick” to require Manitoba to expand its French-language services in return for federal help in translation, as the sfm had suggested the federal authorities should do.41 Interpretations of the scope of the decision varied widely. Rémi Smith said the decision covered French-language services,42 as did Georges Forest. Having swallowed Magnet’s ongoing argument completely, Forest said baldly that the “court ruling now opens the door for French services anywhere in Manitoba. All Franco-Manitobans have to do is ask for services.” Professor Dale Gibson disagreed: “This has utterly nothing to do with language services.”43 Forest also said the ruling made Manitoba a bilingual province. Joe Magnet proclaimed the judgment “a complete victory”; however, he added that it was only a first step and called on Manitoba to return to the negotiated settlement of 1983. Magnet added that few people realized the extent of the deci-

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sion: he said that not only was the translation of English-only laws required but also the translation of all spent and repealed laws, all records and journals, all regulations going back to 1890, and even all government Hansards going back to 1958. The cost of the package, according to Magnet, was astronomical.44 Russell Doern assailed the cost of translation, saying the federal government should pay for all of it; he added that francophones would find laws in French “of very little practical value or need.”45 Later, Doern said the Pawley government’s proposal would have cost more than the Supreme Court decision, and then he derided the decision itself.46 Sid Green had a simple solution to circumvent the Supreme Court and to validate one hundred years of unconstitutional behaviour by the province of Manitoba: pass a bill validating the “consequences” of the invalid laws. Even though both the government and the Tory opposition dismissed the idea, Doern introduced Green’s bill in the House on 5 July 1985: the bill would have left the invalid laws in place but would have said people must obey these invalid laws nevertheless. Doern’s bill died on the order paper on 11 July 1985. Opposition justice critic Gerry Mercier said he had obtained an opinion from Legislative Counsel Dennis Moylan saying the bill would likely be ruled invalid by the courts.47 Manitoba Liberal leader Sharon Carstairs proposed a constitutional amendment bearing a “striking resemblance” to the ndp proposal at a press conference on 27 June 1985.48 Carstairs proposed that the matter of French-language rights in Manitoba be settled by 1 adopting an amendment to the Manitoba Act rendering unnecessary the translation of laws adopted between 1890 and 1985; 2 providing French-language services at central offices and elsewhere, “where numbers warrant”; and 3 providing additional funding for heritage-language training. Some reactions were less temperate. Fred Debrecen, who had shocked legislative committee members with his venomous presentations during the public hearings, wrote his “Open Letter to the Justices of the Supreme Court,” calling their decision “both reprehensible and treasonous” and “totally undemocratic, unreasoned, racial [sic] and exceedingly subversive.” The decision had “effectively brought an end to democracy in Canada,” and for that “the court is contemptible.” Debrecen hoped for a “u.s. military takeover of Canada” to end the threat of “the communist/French takeover.”49 Confederation of Regions leader Elmer Knutson said the ruling was a “slap in the face” to all Manitobans, adding he had no respect for the opinion of the Supreme Court, since its members were cronies of Trudeau, who had appointed them. He criticized the ndp for standing idly by and allowing “the freedom of the majority in Manitoba [to] slip away.”50 A remarkably similar view, without the

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purple prose, was voiced by a member of Manitoba’s Court of Appeal. In an unrelated case involving a divorce settlement, Justice Joseph O’Sullivan said that the Supreme Court “has proposed some ideas which with respect appear on the surface to be truly revolutionary … I do not understand how it can be said that emergency situations justify a usurpation by a court of the royal power.” Justice O’Sullivan added, “I do not know of anyone ever until this time disputing the Queen’s royal prerogative in this respect.” Finally, he wrote, “I have difficulty in reconciling the solution proposed by the Supreme Court of Canada with the constitutional law of the country.”51 Justice O’Sullivan’s statement clearly constituted a challenge to the authority and the legitimacy of the highest court in the land in terms that could flow from the most right-wing extremists. Chief Justice Monnin denounced O’Sullivan’s comments as “gratuitous, unnecessary, injudicious and perhaps impertinent.” Monnin quoted Rinfret to the effect that the “authority of decisions [must] be scrupulously respected by all courts upon which they are binding”; otherwise “the confidence of the public in [the law] is undermined.” Penner himself later publicly rebuked O’Sullivan for his comments, and the president of the Canadian Bar Association said O’Sullivan’s remarks fell within the category of cases normally investigated by the Judicial Council. According to the Winnipeg Free Press, the fracas “sent heads spinning in the legal community,” but Justice O’Sullivan was never disciplined.52

a n e x t r a o r d i n a ry m e e t i n g In late June 1985, Deputy Attorney General Tanner Elton flew to Ottawa to meet with Deputy Justice Minister Roger Tassé and, extraordinarily, with Chief Justice Brian Dickson of the Supreme Court. Elton reported to Penner on these meetings on 25 June 1985. The most important was his meeting with Chief Justice Dickson, which was also attended by Deputy Justice Minister Roger Tassé and Guy Goulard, registrar of the Supreme Court. In the course of the meeting, which lasted an hour and a half, the Chief Justice indicated to Elton a process that might be envisaged, including 1 a position paper to be drafted by Manitoba, 2 time for the parties to consider it, 3 examination of evidence by the parties before the hearing, and 4 a hearing to determine procedures and rules and to set a date for the final hearing, at which the Supreme Court would expect to receive recommendations from Manitoba. The position paper and the evidence were to be submitted to the Supreme Court by mid-September; the parties would then have three weeks to consider Manitoba’s evidence. Additional evidence

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could be submitted during the first week of October, and the hearing itself would be held some time in November. Elton wrote that “we had quite a discussion as to what could be done and in what time frames.” He and the chief justice also discussed the matter of the spent laws: As regards the delicate question related to spent laws, it was clear from my discussion with the Chief Justice that the application of the de facto doctrine, res judicata and mistake of law would be to substantially narrow the need for massive translation. In addition to the above, the Chief Justice mentioned that a careful look at statutes of limitation and the re-enactment of those statutes might also eliminate the need for much translation.53

During the same visit, Elton had lunch with another Supreme Court justice, Antonio Lamer, and talked briefly with his colleague Justice Jean Beetz. “Somewhat to my surprise,” Elton wrote, “both Justices spoke quite freely about the [June 13] Judgment and the reasons behind it.” There is no evidence in any of the files examined that similar private access to the chief justice or to the other judges was granted to the other intervenors. These extraordinary meetings gave the province the inside track in developing its strategy; they would have constituted a serious blow to a new sfm political strategy of trading useless translation for French-language services had the sfm decided to adopt such a strategy. The Court had therefore inserted itself directly into the political process. Following the meeting, Elton developed a thirty-six-page “workplan” that subsequently became a twenty-six-page document entitled “The French Language Reference: Developing the Validation Plan.”54 In this second document, Elton 1 summarized the consequences of the decision, 2 outlined the tasks that had to be completed to ensure compliance with the decision of the Court, 3 identified the resources required, both immediate and future, and 4 suggested a method for managing the various activities. He wrote that he had “already had extensive discussions with officials of Federal Justice and with the Supreme Court” and that the “Chief Justice suggested that Manitoba take the lead in recommending the procedures to be followed at the hearing.” Elton set out a timetable of events leading to the hearing. He recalled that the stages required under the Supreme Court decision were to “translate, re-enact, print and publish” the statutes. Regarding the spent laws, Elton wrote that Discussions with the Court and Federal Justice have tended to confirm my own opinion that the Court purposefully created a substantial escape hatch which can be used to avoid much of the translation of old statutes.

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184 Manitoba’s French-Language Crisis It is clear that it is in this area that we are most likely to have difficulties with the other parties to the case, and on which a good deal of preparatory work is necessary in preparing for the Special Hearing before the Supreme Court. Careful legal development of this area is necessary, as is in-depth consultation with Federal Justice. On this specific point, Justice has indicated that they would make several of their lawyers from the Constitutional Law area available to work with us.55

Elton suggested a strategy, the “working assumption” of which was “through careful analysis, to avoid a substantial amount of the translation of the old statutes”; in this objective, “the doctrines outlined by the Supreme Court provide the way out, and they should be used.” “Nonetheless,” Elton continued, “a very substantial period for bringing the old laws into compliance with the requirements of the Constitution should be sought … This will ensure the time to allow most current statutes of limitations to take effect.” As for private laws (4,750 pages of translation), “a significant number of these Acts are no longer required … these could simply be abandoned,” and “wherever appropriate, we should try to find an alternative to re-enactment,“such as incorporation of institutions under appropriate legislation. Finally, regarding ongoing needs, “some work … could be avoided if the development of the legislative program of the government was planned more methodically and managed more rigorously.” Elton had it from Deputy Justice Minister Tassé that the stance of the federal Justice Department would be to, in Elton’s words, “await the lead of Manitoba and then to offer whatever assistance is necessary.“56 This stance was a major shift from the activist position consistently adopted through the Trudeau years. A fundamental political shift had now occurred: first, the federal government, as Justice Minister Crosbie had indicated publicly earlier, was much more willing to cooperate with the government of Manitoba, rather than imposing its own agenda as it had done under Trudeau. This approach resulted inevitably in a lessening of the sfm’s influence on both governments. Second, Elton’s brilliant manoeuvring had, in effect, left the sfm out in the cold, even judicially, since he now knew how to frame the government’s approach before the Court. Unaware of these events, the sfm was focussing on its own defence. On 12 July the sfm pointed out to Penner that henceforth all items adopted by the government as defined in the Blaikie 1 and 2 judgments must be bilingual.57 On 29 July, Michel Bastarache agreed to represent the sfm at the November Supreme Court hearing,58 replacing Joe Magnet, and he said he would work towards reaching agreement be-

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tween the ffhq, Alliance Québec, and Roger Bilodeau. Shortly thereafter the sfm met with Pawley, and Bastarache attended the meeting. Tanner Elton was favourably impressed with him, writing subsequently to Penner that “his appointment as counsel should be very useful, given the indications we have that he is very much on the same wave-length as we are.”59 At the meeting with Pawley, the sfm stressed implementation of French-language services and French-language education.60 On 7 August, Chief Justice Dickson held an in-chambers hearing with the intervenors. The sfm argued, in a four-page position statement, that 1 the government of Manitoba should produce evidence regarding the laws and other official documents to be translated. Its position was that all laws and regulations must be translated. If some were not, then the government had to justify why they should not be. Second, regarding the mode de preuve, the sfm argued that it should not be limited to affidavits but that it should also have the possibility of questioning the persons signing the affidavits and of analyzing the data presented. Hence, the sfm wanted to see the Manitoba factum by 30 September, and it would respond if necessary within thirty days.61 The Supreme Court set the special hearing date on translation deadlines for 15 November 1985 at 10:30 a.m. Manitoba was instructed to submit its evidence on or before 16 September and its factum by 30 September. Intervenors had until 14 October to respond in writing; any cross-examination would be by leave of the Court.62 Penner presented a paper on Elton’s validation plan to Cabinet on 3 September, in preparation for the special hearing; he recommended that the plan include the government’s intention to produce official English and French versions of • • • •

•

•

orders of the day, bills and amendments to bills, votes and proceedings, all regulations, orders-in-council and other delegated legislation as defined by Blaikie 2, the part of the Gazette required to complete the enactment of the regulations, and the rules and procedures of all Manitoba courts and administrative bodies.

The plan would exclude translation of Hansard and the Sessional Papers. On this matter, Penner argued that a “study of current and historical practices in the other Canadian jurisdictions with similar linguistic obligations indicates that these are not required to be translated under section 23 of the Manitoba Act.” A total number of

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450 public statutes would have to be translated, for a total of 7,850 pages and 2,708,000 words. Spent laws were of strategic importance in the negotiations, Penner pointed out. Therefore, they had been discussed with the federal government and the following position had been arrived at: •

•

•

past laws would be translated and re-enacted back to 1970, in a bilingual format as annual volumes; an act would be passed affirming prior rights and obligations prior to that date that might not be covered by the saving doctrines; all of this would be done by 31 December 1990.

The province would not be required to translate • • • •

spent regulations, spent procedures and rules of courts and tribunals, matters relating to the operation of the House, all statutes enacted prior to 1970.

Penner pointed out that the approach taken substantially reduced the translation task, concentrated efforts within the Province and minimized contracting out, and shifted a significant amount of work into legal revision, analysis, and consolidation; it would improve the legal regime and legislative process in Manitoba in both official languages.63 The next day, Elton provided Penner with an analysis of the cost of translation and assumptions regarding the tasks to be completed, the methods to be used, and the time frames. He estimated the total cost of the translation program over five years, to 1990–91, at $8.5 million.64 The government of Manitoba filed its casebook of evidence with the Supreme Court on 16 September; the validation plan was to be filed on or before 30 September. The casebook contained 570 pages in three volumes, and included affidavits, judgments, and evidence. It was factual only and included no opinions.65 On 19 September, Bastarache sent his analysis of the casebook of evidence to Sabourin; to Bastarache, it was clear that “Mr. Elton prefers to negotiate than to face strong opposition in the Court on Nov. 15” (tr.).66 On 25 September, Bastarache responded to Elton, saying that in the Manitoba casebook “a great deal of information presented is, in my estimation, of no real value.” Bastarache noted discrepancies in word counts and the fact that no information was provided regarding translation resources. The main difficulty was that separate lists were required for statutes, regulations, rules, private acts, and spent acts. Bastarache also raised the issue of translation of Hansard.67 The sfm

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told Secretary of State Benoît Bouchard that it was not satisfied with the province’s factum, adding that the province was doing the “strict minimum” and was giving no indication it would follow the spirit of the Supreme Court decision of 13 June.68 In mid-October the sfm, the federal government, Alliance Quebec, and Roger Bilodeau met in Montreal to attempt to reach an agreement on the scope and timetable of translation before the Supreme Court hearing.69 Meanwhile, on 18 September, Rhéal Teffaine wrote Penner on behalf of the francophone lawyers group, arguing that all of the Gazette should be translated, along with the Votes and Proceedings, the Order Paper and Hansard.70 Penner responded on 8 October, saying the main difference between Teffaine and the government in its factum was over the translation of Hansard; this translation was impossible, Penner said, in view of the province’s limited resources.71 On 26 September, Vaughan Baird wrote Pawley and Penner to inform them that Bilodeau would consent to “a constitutional amendment … to eliminate the requirement of translating” the spent acts; however, Bilodeau “would appreciate” the publication of parallel French and English versions of statutes.72 Once again, Bilodeau and his counsel had broken ranks with the sfm, this time on a major issue. On 2 October, the government of Manitoba filed a new factum with the Supreme Court for the hearing of 15 November. It estimated that over five years, 15.26 million words would have to be translated. However, Hansard would be excluded.73 Meanwhile, the sfm had received the “post-Supreme Court judgment” position document it had commissioned earlier. The working document, entitled “Énoncé de politique en vue de poursuivre l’application de l’Article 23 de la Loi sur le Manitoba,” linked the intent of the section 23 Supreme Court judgment with French-language services; it was circulated by sfm executive director René Fontaine to leaders of the community.74 The document is a key one, since it appears to have been the basis of the sfm’s negotiating position, leading to the ultimate resolution of the language crisis. The “Énoncé de politique” was the basis of two further documents drafted shortly thereafter; there is strong evidence that they led to a compromise with the government at the highest level on the scope of translation, which was to be severely limited, in exchange for a strong commitment that it quickly implement a French-language services program. The two documents, prepared as background for the sfm’s factum for the special hearing of 15 November, are entitled “A New Beginning … Policy Statement re Application of Section 23 of the Manitoba Act,” and “Recommendations for the implementation of the Government of Manitoba French Language Policy.”75 Both are dated 7 October 1985. The first notes that the original

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Supreme Court decision mentioned “equal access to the law in either the French or the English language.” Therefore, in the sfm’s view Franco-Manitobans “have the right not only to read their laws in their language but also to receive in that language all the services delivered under those laws … Consequently, the establishment of services in French is a responsibility which rests with the Manitoba government.” Thus, “in light of a refusal from the Provincial Government to negotiate, Franco-Manitobans will have no other option but to demand the complete and literal implementation of the Supreme Court’s decision.” The document argues for the “preservation and development of the present Franco-Manitoban institutional base” (the Centre culturel Franco-Manitobain, the Collège universitaire de Saint-Boniface, etc.) but adds that French-language services should be provided in areas with sizeable francophone populations and according to the priorities identified in the 1981 document entitled “Vers des services en langue française.“The objective of the Francophone community was “the development of its institutional base as well as the implementation of French-language services where it is concentrated. The implementation process should be carried out according to a comprehensive plan which should include a reasonable and yet precise calendar.” The document argued that the “Supreme Court’s decision goes far beyond minimal requirements with respect to the translation of statutes and regulations. This means that as Francophones, we are entitled to use our own language when dealing with all government institutions.” In the view of its authors, a bipartisan agreement in the legislature regarding Frenchlanguage rights would be preferable; otherwise, Franco-Manitobans “will have no other option but to demand the complete and literal implementation of the Supreme Court’s decision … Whenever required, Franco-Manitobans will not hesitate to turn to the courts to ensure strict adherence to the Supreme Court’s directives.” The “Recommendations” document argued in favour of new legislation guaranteeing French-language services. It also recommended, for implementation of these services, establishment of a six-person committee including three members of the francophone community and three representatives of the government. A timetable for implementation of French-language services was also proposed: the program would be implemented between November 1985 and January 1987.76 The sfm met with Decter and Turenne on 8 October. The sfm’s briefing notes to them, which included the documents described above, state that they were for discussion purposes, “to see if there isn’t any practical solution that is satisfactory to both the Government and the French community.” The sfm wanted to meet with Pawley, Desjardins, and Lécuyer “to discuss the Government’s intentions with French-

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language services and the November 15, 1985 Supreme Court ruling.”77 Turenne responded positively to the drafts, except for an sfm request for a new French-language services bill (“I dare not comment!”). Turenne thought the sfm translation deadlines realistic; regarding the mechanisms for implementation of French-language services, Turenne told Decter that “The important thing is that some mechanism be established” and that “the essential ingredient is a decision to proceed.”78 The meeting with the premier was held on 28 October.79 The purpose of the meeting, in the eyes of the sfm, was to “discuss the Manitoba Government’s commitment to its French language services policy in light of the sfm’s implementation proposals.” The two documents mentioned above constituted the first part of the agenda; the third item was the Supreme Court special hearing of 15 November.

a new deal for french in manitoba On 31 October the Winnipeg Free Press reported that an agreement had been reached the previous day between the sfm and the government regarding translation deadlines. The newspaper described the crisis that had occurred earlier when the sfm had said the government brief was too thin on details; the sfm was about to seek a court order to force the provincial government to produce more information when meetings that led to the agreement began.80 At 9:30 a.m. on 4 November the Supreme Court heard a request that the Court’s special hearing be heard at 10:30 a.m. that day instead of 15 November 1985, as originally scheduled. The request was signed by Stu Whitley for the province and the consent order was signed by Michel Bastarache.81 What had happened? All available evidence points to only one possibility: at the sfm’s meeting of 28 October with the premier and two of his ministers, a compromise was worked out whereby the sfm would agree to drop its demands for extensive translation and accept the government’s more limited translation proposals. In return, the government would proceed immediately with a strong implementation program of French-language services. The fact that implementation of services was an integral part of the compromise is highlighted in the minutes of the first meeting of the new joint Advisory Committee on French Language Services held on 15 November 1985. According to the minutes, the work of the advisory committee “would enable the Cabinet Subcommittee on French Language Services to review the implementation plans by the target date of June 20, 1986, as agreed to during the Premier’s meeting with the President of the sfm in October.”82 This conclusion is reinforced by a letter sfm president Réal

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Sabourin wrote on 13 November saying that of the sfm’s four objectives, three (relating to translation) had been met, and the fourth, French-language services, was “being implemented.”83 No minutes of the meeting of 28 October between Premier Pawley and the sfm exist, and the apparent “gentlemen’s agreement” was not made public. On the basis of the compromise, the agreement on translation was sealed very quickly: on 31 October Bastarache received the draft agreement between Manitoba and the parties that formed the basis of the Supreme Court decision four days later.84 Upon learning that the government and the sfm had agreed on the translation process, Georges Forest flew into a rage. On 3 November he sent a widely publicized telegram to the Supreme Court to stop the “deal” between the sfm and the provincial government and applied for leave to intervene, arguing that the agreement should be publicly discussed before the Court ruled. Forest told the press that the sfm had no right to sign the consent order on behalf of its members without discussing it with them first,85 adding that the order had not been approved at a public meeting held by the sfm and that it could not be, since the meeting was scheduled for 5 November. Forest’s affidavit was made as “a person interested in and opposed to this proposed order.”86 The Court rejected his request. On Monday, 5 November, the Supreme Court set translation deadlines based on the agreement between the provincial government and the sfm. The agreement provided for a three-year limit for translation of major laws and statutes and five years for all the rest. It also provided for a format of side-by-side English and French publication of legislation and regulations. On 21 October, Penner had asked Cabinet for additional resources for the validation plan, estimating the total cost at $10.5 million.87 However, two months later he told the Tories that although he could not give firm figures, he estimated the cost to be about $15 million, adding that provision of services would have cost “a fraction of that amount.”88 Six months later, a departmental estimate put the figure at $10.7 million for the period 1985–91;89 and a year later Penner predicted the final cost of translation would be about $10 million over the five-year period (based on a final estimate by his officials), of which Ottawa would contribute about $2 million.90 On the evening of 5 November, the sfm held a special general meeting of its membership to inform them about the agreement between the sfm and the Manitoba government.91 sfm president Réal Sabourin said the sfm had four objectives, of which three had been met in the agreement; the fourth was French-language services.92 The sfm was keeping the judicial doors open to provincial implementation of such services, and Sab-

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ourin said there was always the possibility of returning to the Supreme Court for an interpretation as to whether its original decision included services. Sabourin was critized for concluding an agreement with the province: “Several speakers slammed the agreement, saying the community had more to gain by waiting for a November 15 ruling by the Supreme Court.“93 The sfm was also critized for not consulting the francophone community and for rejecting advice given by francophone lawyers. Lawyer Mary-Jane Bennett said ambiguous wording in the agreement had left the government room to manoeuvre and that not all laws might be translated.94 Some Franco-Manitoban lawyers, such as Guy Jourdain, felt that the sfm had caved in, that it should have insisted even at this late stage upon translation of all laws including spent ones, since “this was the way we could have forced a constitutional amendment.”95 According to Jourdain, this strategy could have succeeded, since the federal government was sympathetic and Chief Justice Dickson did not want to be placed in a position where the Court would have to establish the list of laws to be translated. Yet the Court had opened up this possibility itself in its Reference decision, writing that “the repealed or spent Acts of the Legislature … may need to be enacted, printed and published, and then repealed, in both official languages.”96 However, this strategy was rejected, probably because a general fatigue had set in at the sfm, and no one, least of all Sabourin, could envisage another protracted public battle over the issue. Reactions to the agreement and the court order came from many quarters. Sabourin told the press bilingual services would naturally flow from the ruling; “If not, we’ll be back in court.” He added that “Manitoba is officially bilingual.” Initially, Opposition leader Gary Filmon’s reaction was reasonable; Filmon said a Tory government would strive to meet the court terms for translation and validation.97 The next day, however, no doubt after having been pressured by the old conspiracy theorists in his caucus, Filmon once again raised the spectre of an unholy deal, as if the very idea of two parties to a legal case talking and perhaps even agreeing on its resolution was evil: “That appears to indicate some very tangible discussions have taken place and I believe that is wrong.” Filmon said any extension of services by a Conservative government would be done in a public forum and not by some backroom agreement. His cry was taken up by Fred Cleverley of the Free Press (“ndp and sfm Jump Back into Bed Together Again”) and by Grassroots leader Grant Russell, who wrote Pawley on 5 November asking him for details of the agreement between the government and the sfm. Russell asked, “What did you agree to in order to obtain the co-operation of the sfm?”98

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Other reactions were more thoughtful. Paul Thomas, a University of Manitoba political studies professor, suggested a constitutional amendment to avoid excessive translation, accompanied by a federal-provincial agreement to set up a foundation to administer the funds thus saved to help underpin the institutional base of a vibrant French community; the notion of redress was central to his proposal. Columnist Frances Russell wrote that “the link between French language services and translation has still not been broken.” Deriding Filmon’s talk of another “secret deal,” Russell pointed out that the Court had asked for submissions, which implied negotiations, and that, in any court case, lawyers always talk to each other. A Free Press editorialist denounced these “thoroughly irresponsible efforts to arouse groundless fears” and the “Tories’ irresponsible and opportunistic conduct over the language issue.” Columnist Arlene Billinkoff wrote that when it comes to the language issue, “the Tories appear to be unable to change their tune. If the threat does not exist, they seem willing to conjure it out of thin air.” However, within a few months even Tory leader Gary Filmon had caught the spirit of the times, writing to an opponent of bilingualism that the Supreme Court had ruled that “Manitoba is officially a bilingual province.”99 Roland Penner said the government would negotiate with Ottawa on cost-sharing. Federal justice minister John Crosbie said that the federal government was “delighted this agreement has been reached” and that generous consideration would be given to helping pay the translation costs.

b i l o d e au l o s e s h i s cas e On 1 May 1986 the Supreme Court rendered its judgments on the Bilodeau, MacDonald cases and on another one, the Société des Acadiens case. Regarding Bilodeau and MacDonald, the Court ruled that under section 23 of the Manitoba Act and section 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867, it was preferable but not compulsory to have summonses issued in both languages, and summonses could constitutionally be issued in either language.100 Bilodeau’s conviction was therefore upheld; however, Bilodeau was awarded court costs of up to five thousand dollars.101 In the greatest paradox of his entire saga, Bilodeau managed to snatch defeat from victory: his initiative had led to a fundamental reordering of the administration of justice in Manitoba, yet in the end he had lost his own case. The MacDonald and Bilodeau decisions have other, more ominous implications for linguistic minorities across Canada, since they have weakened the link between bilingual legislation and regulations, on one hand, and bilingual services on the other. This

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interpretation is reinforced by the Société des Acadiens decision, where the Court ruled that there is no constitutional guarantee that a judge hearing a case must understand the language chosen, French or English. Five of seven Supreme Court judges agreed with this ruling; Chief Justice Brian Dickson and Justice Bertha Wilson disagreed.102 Opposition to the Supreme Court decision continued for another two years. As was so often the case during the crisis itself, the Union of Manitoba Municipalities was again at the vanguard. By February of 1987, resolutions adopted by municipalities opposing the bilingual, side-by-side format decreed by the Court had piled up on Pawley’s desk; to Penner this appeared to be “an orchestrated campaign led by the umm and does not, it would appear, reflect a careful consideration of the issues by the councils.”103 But then, what else was new? Opposition to the bilingual format boiled over into the legislature. On 8 April 1987, Tory mla Gilles Roch, seconded by the indomitable Charlotte Oleson, introduced a motion to have Manitoba’s statutes published in two separate volumes. The next day, the sfm reminded Pawley that the motion went against the Supreme Court decision of November 1985.104 On 15 April 1987, Vaughan Baird sent the two mlas a letter to that effect; Oleson replied on 1 May 1987, refusing to withdraw the motion and ignoring Baird’s point that the bilingual format was part of the Court’s decision. Implementation of the Supreme Court order within the Manitoba bureaucracy began shortly after 4 November. Elton pointed out to Penner the changes in the order relative to the position of the province in its factum: “In most essentials, the Order of the Court is the same as that proposed in Manitoba’s Factum. It differs in three ways.”105 First, the order provided for two “legal” dates, 31 December 1988 and 31 December 1990, for translation and re-enactment (three years and five years); second, the province committed itself to a particular bilingual format; and third, the validation of regulations was shifted from a five-year time frame to three years. The major change that had occurred involved regulations: “There simply will not be enough time to properly revise the regulations prior to translation.” Elton therefore proposed a five-year “review” of the regulations. He also proposed an administrative structure: “Rather than treating the Validation Plan as a one-time project to be done by a special team to be dismantled after completion, the implementation will be integrated within the current organization of the Department.”106 A muscular implementation of French-language services, by now firmly linked to the Supreme Court decision through the negotiations that led to it, began eleven days later, with the first meeting of the Advisory Committee on French Language Services, held on 15 November 1985.107

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ov e r v i e w o f t h e f r e n c h - l a n g u a g e serv ices policy Throughout the language crisis in 1983 and early 1984, Pawley’s French-language services policy announced in March of 1982, had languished. Roger Turenne, the province’s senior advisor on Frenchlanguage services, had organized a network of French-language services coordinators on a departmental basis soon after Pawley’s announcement; the first meeting of this group was held on 13 May 1982.108 However, by that time the government was already becoming increasingly involved in discussing the constitutional amendment with the sfm and with Bilodeau, and it became embroiled a year later in the political battle that erupted when the proposed amendment became public. In addition, the government’s will to move on the services front had been shaky at best from the outset. However, with the death of the amendment and the filing of the federal reference, the Pawley government was faced with the real possibility of the invalidation of all Manitoba’s laws and with an unpredictable Court judgment that might extend to French-language services. The francophone community, as well, was becoming increasingly frustrated with the fact that very little had been accomplished in this area since Pawley’s announcement, and on 27 June 1984, Pawley heard its concerns first-hand.109 By that time, the Pawley Cabinet had established the French Language Services Strategy Committee, as we have seen. However, the federal reference weighed much more on the Pawley government at that time than the sfm’s admonitions; the Cabinet committee met specifically to discuss the reference on 4 July. However, on the Frenchlanguage services side, Turenne was quite dissatisfied with the functioning of the French-language coordinators system and sent his assessment on to Michael Decter on 10 July. A few days later, Decter sent a memo to all deputy ministers asking them to designate French language services coordinators. Some time later, Turenne complained that one coordinator, Laurent Bisson, had been removed by his deputy, G. Forrest, “because he did such a good job.”110 On 19 September, Cabinet approved Pawley’s recommendation for a “low profile” on French-language services; clearly, the message to all ministers and their deputies was, “go slow.” The government’s resolve in the area of French-language services did not strengthen the following year. A few months later, in a confidential memo to Pawley, Turenne proposed two options: first, he could go on voluntary leave for a few months “or until such time as services are once more required following the Court decision”; or, alternately, the government could “get flss back in gear.”111 Shortly afterwards, Turenne went on a four-month leave.

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On 18 March 1986, even though it had presided over one of the most divisive and emotional eras in Manitoba’s history, the Pawley government was re-elected with a majority of seats in the Manitoba legislature; ironically, both Anstett and Doern went down to defeat.112 A few days later, the sfm requested a meeting to discuss the Supreme Court order of 4 November 1985 and the “situation regarding the translation of the Manitoba statutes,” as well as implementation of the French-language policy. The sfm met with Penner on 15 May, and both items were on the agenda. Later in the year, implementation of French-language services finally firmed up: on 26 November 1986, Cabinet approved voluminous “Instructions to Departments“developed by the departments themselves under the direction of the advisory committee; these instructions were circulated to all ministers on 12 December. Pawley also requested an implementation plan from each minister by January or February, depending on the size of the department. The new resolve was filtering down to the bureaucracy as well: Turenne, back by then in his prickly saddle, summarized the issues to be raised at the deputy ministers’ level for Decter’s successor, George Ford.113 Not surprisingly, this new approach generated new tensions in the civil service. On 21 January 1987, the mgea wrote to Pawley expressing major reservations regarding the implementation procedure of 26 November 1986, requesting that it “be reviewed and revised before proceeding further.”114 The upshot of the mgea’s intervention was a consultation procedure with the employees’ group that evolved over several months. For instance, on 30 July, Turenne transmitted three implementation plans for various departments to Peter Olfert of the mgea and asked for Olfert’s comments and suggestions.115 (Premier Pawley was directly involved in this process.)116 He also informed the leaders of the other political parties of the new implementation procedure.117 There is also evidence of a new determination in the implementation of the policy. For instance, on 4 August George Ford followed up on the meetings of the fls Advisory Committee of 10 and 27 July, asking several deputy ministers to modify the implementation plans proposed by their departments.118

french-language services under t h e f i l m o n g ov e r n m e n t Gary Filmon and his Progressive Conservative Party were sworn in as the new government of Manitoba on 9 May 1988. Just a year and a half later, on 6 November 1989, perhaps as a form of atonement for the virulence of its opposition during the French-language crisis, the Filmon government tabled its French-language services policy in the

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legislature. It is one of the supreme ironies of Manitoba history that it was a stronger policy than that of the Pawley government, although it was applied somewhat haphazardly through the 1990s. Finally using the dreaded word “official” in conjunction with “language” (as the Lyon government had done a decade earlier), the Filmon government stated that the “services provided by the Government of Manitoba shall be offered, to the extent possible, in both official languages in areas where the French-speaking population is concentrated.”119 The statement was accompanied by a map of Manitoba outlining designated areas in which such services would be provided. The areas corresponded essentially to those that would have been designated under the Pawley’s government’s draft Bill 115. As well, the policy included the following provisions. •

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

All correspondence with individuals or groups shall be in the official language preferred by the recipient. Generally, all forms, identity documents and certificates intended for the general public shall be in a bilingual format.120 All information documents destined for the general public shall be in a bilingual format, unless cost and distribution considerations justify separate language versions. Generally, signs and public notices in the designated areas shall be in both official languages.121 Departments and agencies to whom the policy applies shall use the French-language media to advertise vacant staff positions where French is a requirement or an asset. Public information campaigns in the English language shall have a counterpart in the French language, subject to cost and distribution considerations. Nominations to boards, commissions, agencies, etc., shall take due account of the language dimension of government policy, as well as the right of any Manitoban to appear before quasi-judicial tribunals in the official language of his or her choice. When reorganizations and new policy developments are planned, departments and agencies shall consider possible impacts on the francophone community. The policy applies to all government departments, to quasi-judicial agencies subject to the requirements of section 23 of the Manitoba Act, and to the following Crown corporations and agencies: Manitoba Hydro, the Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation, the Manitoba Telephone System, the Manitoba Liquor Control Commission, the Manitoba Arts Council, the Manitoba Health Services Commission, the Alcoholism Foundation of Manitoba, Legal Aid Manitoba,

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•

the Manitoba Human Rights Commission, Elections Manitoba, and Ombudsman Manitoba. Designated health care and social services institutions serving French-speaking areas are to ensure that their services are available in French.

The Manitoba government also began publishing the two-hundredpage French Language Services Guide, which provides detailed information on services available in French from every government department and designated agency, in every region of the province. The French Language Services Secretariat was transferred out of the premier’s office and, in another historical irony, the minister responsible for French-language services under the Filmon government from 1993 was Darren Praznik who, in his early twenties, had been a Grassroots supporter during the French-language crisis.122 After becoming responsible for French-language services, Praznik developed an excellent working relationship with the Franco-Manitoban community. In 1996, Frances Russell, one of the strongest critics of the Manitoba Tories during the crisis, wrote that to “the credit of the Filmon government it has fulfilled the spirit as well as the letter of the court decision.”123 This assessment was somewhat overly enthusiastic with respect to implementation, as we shall see below. On the translation front, however, progress was even more limited, and the sfm had to return to the Supreme Court yet again to accelerate the process.124 Another Supreme Court decision in 1993 led to the creation in 1994 of a French-language school division controlled by Francophones and covering all French-language (but not immersion) schools in Manitoba.125

th e c h a r t i e r r e p o r t In November of 1997 the Filmon government commissioned an evaluation of its French-language services policy by provincial court judge Richard Chartier, who submitted his report in May 1998.126 The report found that although 576.5 positions out a provincial labour force of 14,373 had been designated as bilingual and 413.5 of these had been filled by bilingual employees, major gaps remained in the provision of French-language services.127 It recommended sweeping changes to the policy and to its implementation. Among its twenty-nine recommendations, perhaps the key one was the creation of bilingual community service centres centralizing the provision of French-language services from several key provincial departments, as well as some federal and municipal services. This model was based more or less directly upon the ill-fated “bilingual districts”

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model developed by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the 1960s. By 2002, two of these centres had been established, and more were being planned, showing a continuity of commitment by the new Doer government, elected in 1999, to the improvement of French-language services in the province. In addition, a bilingual multidisciplinary primary health care clinic was established in the late 1990s in St Boniface. These developments, along with the blueprint for the future provided by the Chartier report, are all indications of a strong commitment by successive governments to the provision of French-language services in Manitoba in the new millenium, linked directly, I believe, to the trauma of the French-language crisis and its convoluted judicial outcome. In the words of Judge Chartier, the Frenchlanguage services policy “is based on the Canadian Constitution and the Manitoba Act and has its roots in the province’s very history.”128

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9 The Language of Bigotry: Reason and Unreason in the Language Debates

One of the most disquieting facets of the language crisis was the symbiosis that developed between extreme right-wing elements and the Conservative Opposition. During the first months of the crisis, the Tories took care to distinguish between their views and those of the extremists; however, in January and February 1984, extremists and Tories increasingly sought each other out, both socially (in demonstrations and so on) and ideologically. This phenomenon became increasingly evident during the legislative hearings, where the most extreme positions were echoed in the legislative building itself.

debate in the legislature When the House resumed sitting in early January 1984, most of the speeches came from the Opposition benches, as the government struggled simply to get the constitutional amendment and the bill through as quickly as possible. Strikingly, some of the Opposition discourse by then reflected the more extreme and authoritarian views heard during the first round of public hearings. Arguments made by supporters of the amendment and even those of its more moderate opponents were brushed aside or ignored. Harry Enns, in a rare moment of reflection, regretted the continuation of a session “that many of us would have liked to put well behind us, in the back pages of history. Perhaps at some point in time, a revisionist of history could just expunge it from the records of the Journals of this House because I truly believe it’s not one Session that we particularly take a great deal of joy in or sense of accomplishment in.”1

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Initially the Conservative Opposition had scrupulously avoided supporting the notion of plebiscites and referenda on the issue throughout the public hearings process, leaving Russ Doern alone to carry this malodorous can. However, it later reversed itself, strongly, though belatedly, supporting plebiscites as a means of gauging public opinion on the language issue. In its response to the government’s draft committee report, presented to the committee on 21 November 1983, Tory mla Gary Filmon expressed the view that some account should have been taken of the plebiscites, especially the one in the city of Winnipeg, “because it was a legitimate expression of public opinion on the matter.” Filmon then moved that the committee’s report include the following passage: Your committee cannot make its report on this question without reference to the plebiscites held on this question by the City of Winnipeg and various municipalities on October 26, 1983. The results of the Winnipeg plebiscite indicated that 76 percent of those voting were opposed to the government proceeding with an entrenched amendment. The combined results of the plebiscites indicated that well over three-quarters of the people of Manitoba who voted wanted the amendments to Section 23 withdrawn. Your committee is therefore unable to recommend proceeding with the entrenched amendment.2

The conspiracy theme surfaced regularly among Opposition members. Filmon himself felt the government had “some hidden agenda, some timetable,” that it had concluded a “secret deal.”3 Through January and February, Opposition members repeated the canard that the Lyon government’s Bill 2, adopted in 1980, had restored French-language rights in the wake of the Forest decision, even though there was a strong possibility, given the Blaikie decisions, that the Supreme Court would strike it down. The Opposition had legal opinions before it to that effect, including those of Penner and Magnet, dating back to the very beginning of the crisis in May 1983, yet in early 1984 it was still repeating by rote the “fact” that Bill 2 had restored section 23. On 10 January, for instance, Enns told the House that the rights of 1890 had been restored by the legislature and that it “was the Conservative administration that restored the original constitutional Francophone rights in Manitoba.” This claim was repeated by A. Driedger the same day, by D. Gourlay on 11 January, by C. Oleson on 12 January, and by R. Nordman on 24 January. As late as 9 February 1984 Lyon himself was still arguing that section 23 had been restored by Forest “and by an act of this Legislature in 1980 which repealed the 1890 statute. The restoration was done.” Sometimes this view was accompanied by simple obtuseness; for instance, on 13 February, Mercier said “Bill 2 has

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nothing to do with the Bilodeau case. For the record, Mr. Bilodeau lost his case in the Manitoba Court of Appeal by a unanimous decision. That’s where the case sits.”4 Of course that’s where the case sat; the question was, what was the Supreme Court likely to rule? The indications on that score, which were available to the Opposition, were much less certain. Penner and the government had to deal with this new reality, where there was a real risk that the Supreme Court decision would go against the government. By consistently denying this possibility, the Opposition was presenting only a portion of reality; to that extent, the Opposition misrepresentation of Bill 2 went beyond debate and became demagogy. Some of the Opposition comments simply mirrored the bigotry that had been expressed by some during the hearings. Warren Steen, for instance, told the House: “my colleague, the Member for Minnedosa [David Blake], says, ‘That’s Pierre Trudeau’s master plan, to make French first all across Canada and English second,’ and if I am considered by members opposite to be a bigot if I take that approach, then I am prepared to be a bigot.”5 By late January and February, the distance between the Conservative Opposition and the more extreme right-wing elements among opponents of the government proposals had virtually disappeared. Opposition members repeatedly defended Grant Russell in the House, even though Russell had by now discredited himself by his association with known right-wing radicals such as Conrad Kelly. Don Orchard deplored the government having “closed off” public hearings on 31 January, with fifteen people still on the list, but given the fact that many of the presentations during the second round of hearings were clearly bigoted, Orchard’s comment was a clear indication that the Tories felt these views should continue to be heard and legitimized through the hearings process.6 The fiction, often mentioned in the 1983 debates, that the Opposition was merely reflecting “the will of the people” had evaporated by early 1984, as even the Opposition acknowledged that its stonewalling in the House was fanning hostility to the government proposals. Filmon said in the House on 31 January that “public opinion is strengthening,” adding that he was getting phone calls and letters every day. Two weeks later, Arnold Brown told the House that support “seems to be growing every day, every time that I go home for the weekend and so on. People are saying that we are doing the right thing.”7 One of the most disturbing elements in the Opposition’s discourse during January and February 1984 was the streak of xenophobia that sometimes ran through it: the idea was that the ndp government was somehow illegitimate because some of its members were recent arrivals

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to Manitoba. Harry Enns at one point called members of the ndp government “strangers.” Later that day Enns returned to this theme, saying that the Conservatives “understood Manitoba … by virtue of the fact that our roots, by and large, on this side of the House are far deeper than are many on that side of the House … the fact of the matter is that we have an inordinately large number of persons on that side whose roots go back to not more than five or six or ten years in the history of Manitoba, whether it’s from Ontario, whether it’s from Wisconsin, whether it’s from Chicago.” That same day, Frank Johnston said of Don Scott, “He doesn’t understand. He’s only been here eight years. He doesn’t know anything about Manitobans; he’s only been here awhile.” Sterling Lyon, calling the ndp “strangers,” said the government was “a bedraggled collection of … individuals who by accident and mistake, some of them, wandered into a seat, got a nomination, were elected here.”8 The Tories’ xenophobia extended not only to the geographical origins of government members but also to what they considered to be their “alien” ideology. By consistently and deliberately refusing to distinguish between social democracy and marxism or communism, the Tories painted the New Democrats as foreigners not only in terms of their origins but also in terms of their political principles; only such people – foreigners with alien ideologies – could possibly have come up with the idea of recognizing that Manitoba was, and had always been, a bilingual province. Thus, Wally McKenzie railed about the “wildeyed socialists running rampant over here,” and Warren Steen argued that the “socialists in Winnipeg are the people that have got the roseglasses on and are forcing bilingualism.”9

th e l e g i s l a t i v e h e a r i n g s Two series of public hearings were held in the course of Manitoba’s language crisis by the legislative assembly’s Standing Committee on Privileges and Elections: the first ran from 6 September to 4 October 1983 and the second from 27 to 31 January 1984. The first allowed expression of a mix of reasoned argument, passion, and bigotry by the people of Manitoba; the second, ignored or boycotted by most supporters of the constitutional amendment, provided a forum for unbridled vituperation and hatred, generally unleavened by any rational debate. During the first series of hearings, supporters of the amendment included virtually all francophone individuals and organizations, as well as virtually all leaders of ethnocultural organizations who appeared before the committee. A number of high-profile English-speaking personalities from Quebec also supported the amendment. Opponents of the amend-

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ment were mainly rural municipalities and a large number of private citizens, many of whom identified themselves as being of German or Anglo-Saxon background. Supporters of the amendment did so on grounds of national unity, history, respect for minority rights, and the positive impact the amendment would have on heritage languages and cultures. Many of them also expressed strong opposition to the use of plebiscites in the language debate. The arguments used by opponents of the amendment were both rational and emotional. Arguments that might be described as rational included a belief in simple majoritarian democracy, a particular definition of “equality,” concerns about cost, and the ungrounded belief, promoted by the Conservative Opposition, that the section 23 problem had been resolved by the Lyon government’s Bill 2. In addition, it was argued that the size of the francophone minority relative to Manitoba’s other ethnic groups did not warrant a constitutional amendment. Arguments that can be described as irrational included a belief that a conspiracy was at work (specifically, a “French takeover”), fear (of loss of jobs, of bilingualism spreading to municipalities, and so on), concerns about status (francophones “elevating themselves” above others) and chauvinism (“outsiders have no right to tell Manitoba what to do”). Opponents of the amendment, mainly opposition mlas, also engaged in many ad hominem attacks on persons and groups appearing before the committee, questioning their funding sources, political affiliation, and so on. Finally, some opponents of the amendment spewed outright bigotry or prejudice. The second series of public hearings, held from 27 to 31 January 1984, took on a tone dramatically different from that of the fall hearings, due to at least two factors: first, supporters of the government’s initiative decided to ignore the hearings, knowing that whatever they said would have no effect on the Conservative Opposition, which was by now openly supporting even the most extreme opponents of the constitutional amendment. Of fifty-eight witnesses (including one with a written brief), only five supported the government’s new proposals; all other witnesses were opposed to them, most of them virulently so. The second factor was that all hearings were held in one place, a committee room in the legislative building in Winnipeg, which allowed a small but noisy group of bigots to assemble day in and day out, creating an emotional and highly charged environment that severely impeded rational debate. They were supported procedurally at every turn by the Conservative Opposition. The tone among opponents of the government’s proposals was set by the first witness, Sid Green, on 27 January 1984. Green’s fiery oratory touched on every theme raised by the least rational of the amendment’s

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opponents: there was “a conspiracy between the Province of Manitoba, La Société Franco-Manitobaine and the Federal Government”; the sfm believed it had “the right to dictate the language policy of the Province of Manitoba” and was attempting to “dictate the terms of the Canadian Constitution”; the sfm had conspired “not to make French an official language in this province, but … to provide a special ethnic status for certain people within the Province of Manitoba.” Francophones who wanted their own schools were “worse rednecks than anybody in this room”; the legislation was “being established by dictate and by a federally financed intrusion into a provincial matter.”10 Later that day, Herb Schulz took up the banner, denouncing Bill 115 as a “blueprint for apartheid”; this “sinister doctrine of apartheid” was being “insinuated in our society and … promoted by this government,” thanks to whom, “children, currently innocent of racial or religious prejudices, will be consciously taught to hate each other.” All this was being caused by the “racial agitators of the sfm, paid for by the taxes of the people of Canada.”11 The tone had now been firmly set by these two stalwart opponents of the government proposals: many others followed, taking up the emotion-laden themes of conspiracy, status displacement, and foreign intrusion into Manitoba’s affairs; worse, the minority whose rights had been trampled upon for almost a century turned out to be conspirators, rednecks, racists, and profiteers. A few days later, for good measure, Schulz added “blackmail” to the sfm’s crimes.12

f r o m o p p o s i t i o n t o b i g o t ry a n d vi o l e n c e As we have seen in previous chapters, opposition to the government proposals occasionally became violent, the most serious incident being the torching of the sfm headquarters in January 1983.13 However, there were other signs of underlying potential violence over the issue, signs echoing the explicit threats some witnesses had made at the legislative hearings. Authors of several letters in Premier Pawley’s files, for instance, yearned for a dictator that would “put the French in their place” or for violence against them.14 Fred Debrecen, who testified twice at the legislative hearings, had a sign in front of his Strathcona St home in Winnipeg that read, “My prayer: God Save the Queen and Damn the French.”15 Many political leaders, mainly those in support of the government proposals, received death threats. Premier Pawley received such threats on 26 January 1984, the day hundreds of people demonstrated at the legislature against the government proposals.16 At Penner’s request, po-

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lice increased their patrols of the homes of Anstett, Desjardins, Lécuyer, Penner, and Pawley. Léo Robert received death threats throughout the crisis, but at its height in February 1984 the threats became so violent that police recommended Robert move out of his home. One of the threats came in the form of a picture of Robert wrapped around a .22calibre bullet delivered to his home. Robert, while refusing police protection, became increasingly concerned for his family and moved them to an undisclosed location. Gilberte Proteau also received death threats, though not in such an extreme form, and according to one press report leaders of the opposition to the proposals, including Russell Doern, Grant Russell, and Patricia Maltman, had also received such threats.17 Members of several extreme right-wing organizations were actively involved in the campaign against the government proposals, particularly under the Grassroots umbrella. In April 1984 journalist David Roberts revealed that members of the Ku Klux Klan had joined Manitoba Grassroots; Roberts’s source was Anne Farmer, the Klan’s national director in Vancouver.18 This information was particularly chilling for Franco-Manitobans, since the Klan had been linked to a fire that destroyed Collège universitaire de Saint-Boniface in 1922 killing ten people: as with similar fires in Quebec, which destroyed or damaged several Catholic institutions, “the Klan had sent a warning message beforehand; after the fire, Klan officials in the United States denied their organization had anything to do with the affair.”19 Other extreme right-wing organizations were involved in the movement in opposition to the constitutional amendment. In 1983, Reeve Dennis Heeney, a key spokesperson for the Union of Manitoba Municipalities throughout the crisis, twice booked a hall for the extreme right-wing Canadian League of Rights. Contacted by the press, because of his high-profile role in the Union of Manitoba Municipalities in opposition to the proposals, Heeney said he was not a member of the league but suggested they “talk to Conrad Kelly of Winnipeg … He’s the one to talk to … he’s a member.”20 One who did talk to Kelly was Lieutenant-Governor Pearl McGonigal: as we have seen above, Kelly accompanied Grant Russell in presenting the Grassroots petition to the lieutenant-governor on 27 January 1984.21 Among the signatories of the petition was Ron Gostick, founder of the Canadian League of Rights and editor of the Canadian Intelligence Service (cis), organizations described by leaders of the Manitoba Association of Rights and Liberties as racist and antisemitic. Gostick also personally assisted Kelly in circulating the petition, but this was not the full extent of his involvement.22 Columnist Frances Russell revealed that in his newsletter of 21 November 1983, Gostick described Kelly as

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“the Manitoba contact” for the cis; in the same newsletter, he proposed the idea of a petition to Manitoba’s lieutenant-governor and, if that failed, to the queen. The petition drive, spearheaded by Kelly, was launched by Grassroots in early December 1983; according to Russell, “Grassroots’ petitions were similar to the wording outlined in Gostick’s Dec. 16 newsletter to all Manitoba subscribers to his publications.” Because of these close linkages between Grassroots and Gostick’s racist organizations, it is difficult to say who, in the final analysis, initiated the petition and formulated its wording, although it is known that it was largely thanks to Kelly’s zeal that so many thousands of names appeared on it.23 Given the prominence Heeney and Kelly quickly gained in the populist movement against the government proposals, it would be difficult to imagine that the Grassroots leader himself, Grant Russell, would not have known of their links with racist organizations. When asked if the presence of these elements among the opposition to the government proposals bothered him, Sterling Lyon said, “Sure, but what can you do? It doesn’t dim the value of the opposition to what the government is doing.” According to columnist Frances Russell, “That was the extent of comment from the Tory caucus on the appearance of cis on the Manitoba language scene.”24 Another right-wing organization, the Western Canada Federation, founded in Alberta by Elmer Knutson, also demonstrated against the government’s proposals.25 Dennis Epps, leader of WestFed’s Manitoba chapter, participated in a demonstration of about eighty people at the legislature on 29 June 1983. Epps told the press his organization was not to be confused with the Western Canada Concept, since they were Western separatists: “All we want to do is have Quebec leave us.” This contradicted testimony he had given in 1980 before another provincial legislative committee, where, again speaking for WestFed, he had “urged committee members to consider a new independent union” of the four Western provinces.26 Epps also appeared at the second set of legislative hearings, which, as we have seen, served no purpose but to provide an outlet for the most vicious anti-French sentiment. Another anti-French group, the Manitoba Unity Committee, was homegrown; made up of twelve people, it came into being on 23 January 1983. Its purpose was to oppose “creeping bilingualism,” but its spokesman, Douglas Lockhart, said that if enough letters flowed to the premier’s office, he “might introduce laws making the province officially unilingual.” The group ran a small ad urging Manitobans to return their vehicle registration forms and driver’s licences, which had recently begun to be issued in a bilingual format, to the government and to request that the forms be issued in English only.27

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b i g o t ry a f t e r t h e c r i s i s One might have thought that the outpouring of vituperation and occasional outright bigotry during the hearings had reached its paroxysm during the last days of January 1984. One might have thought as well that the government’s capitulation in late February would have meant the end of the movement. However, this was not to be. In the months following prorogation, activity that can only be described as antiFrench continued sporadically in the province. For instance, an antiFrench rally organized by the Confederation of Regions Party (cor) in St Boniface on 30 May 1984 attracted eighty people.28 The Supreme Court judgment of 13 June 1985 on the reference sparked renewed activity among the radical opponents of bilingualism in Manitoba and served in some ways to separate the true bigots from other opponents of the government proposals. One of the first to denounce the judgment was Fred Debrecen. On 17 June, Debrecen wrote an “Open Letter to the Justices of the Supreme Court of Canada,” telling them that their decision was “both reprehensible and treasonous,” and that it had “effectively brought an end to democracy in Canada.” The rcmp had been “infiltrated and subverted by French communists early in Trudeau’s reign”; the judges had “couched [their] poison in such terms that the unknowing would think that [they] were speaking of all generic minority rights.” Their decision was “totally undemocratic, unreasoned, racial and exceedingly subversive.”29 The judges’ actions “mocked democracy and the parliamentary system” and constituted an “unlawful enactment” of the Charter. Debrecen’s fervent wish was for a u.s. military takeover of Canada to put an end to the threat of a communist takeover, “the communist/French takeover.” Finally, Debrecen told the judges, “If you should find me in contempt of court, it is because the court is contemptible.”30 Elmer Knutson, by now leader of the Confederation of Regions party, said his members had to fight the ruling, which was a “slap in the face” to all Manitobans. He said he had no respect for the opinion of the Supreme Court, because they were cronies of Trudeau, who had appointed them. He critized the ndp for standing idly by and allowing “the freedom of the majority” in Manitoba slip away.31 Frank Cameron, writing for the Western Canada Concept (wcc), also denounced the judgment,32 and in early 1986, Ivan Merritt, wcc’s membership committee chairman, took Filmon to task publicly over his position on bilingualism and asked him whether as premier he would return to English-only vehicle registrations and driver’s licences.33 Merritt had also appeared twice at the legislative hearings, providing the committee with some of its most

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emotional anti-French testimony.34 In the summer of 1985, Doern launched a campaign to make Manitoba an English-only province, and Tory Clayton Manness said a Conservative government in Manitoba would never allow French-language school boards in Manitoba, regardless of Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms. A few months later, in one of its regular monthly mailings, the Union of Manitoba Municipalities circulated a petition to mlas and mps on behalf of a group calling itself One-Nation, One-Language Inc. The petition was endorsed by the Regional Municipality of Stanley.35 According to columnist Fred Cleverley, the petition was being circulated by three women, Vivian Friesen, Bertha MacKenzie, and Una Johnstone.36 Some of the comments made by opponents of the proposals could be described as comical in their absurdity if they did not reflect an underlying virulent racism. One of these can be found in Penner’s files: the author maintains, in all seriousness, that “The French from Quebec and St Boniface are working hard behind the scenes to make Manitoba bilingual and French … Just drive east on the Trans-Canada Highway and see all the cars which are coming into Manitoba from Quebec. You can’t tell me that they aren’t planning to take over Manitoba.”37 Bigotry and prejudice are at the heart of right-wing authoritarianism, and I shall argue in the concluding chapter that this type of authoritarianism was indeed at work during the French-language crisis.

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10 Explaining the Crisis: Symbolism, Status, and Right-Wing Authoritarianism

Manitoba’s French-language crisis can be viewed through many analytical perspectives. The sheer volume and complexity of the events comprising the Manitoba French-language crisis, the intermingling of passion and rational debate over a prolonged period, the conflicting ideologies and principles at play, and the numerous and varying motivations of the actors involved render analysis of the crisis exceedingly difficult. We shall focus here on two approaches that, we believe, have perhaps the greatest explanatory power.

th e s t a t u s / s y m b o l i s m m o d e l One of the most powerful theoretical explanations of the crisis can be found in the status/symbolism model first proposed in the Canadian context by sociologist Raymond Breton in 1964. Breton starts from a simple proposition: “individuals expect to recognize themselves in public institutions. They expect some consistency between their private identities and the symbolic contents upheld by public authorities, embedded in the societal institutions, and celebrated in public events. Otherwise, individuals feel like social strangers; they feel that the society is not their society.”1 Historically, “nation-building in its symbolic-cultural dimension was oriented toward the construction of a British-type of society in Canada.”2 However, with the emergence of a strong sense of collective identity in Quebec, the federal government responded with a number of symbolic initiatives: the creation of the notions of bilingualism and

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biculturalism, adoption of a new Canadian flag, and the transformation and renaming of numerous institutions (Trans-Canada Airlines became Air Canada, the Bureau of Statistics became Statistics Canada, and so on). These changes have been seen by many as “disruptions of their symbolic universe.”3 More fundamentally, these changes have been seen as having an impact upon the actual structure of Canadian society in terms of social status. Breton believes that if we carried out a systematic content analysis of the public debate on issues related to bilingualism and multiculturalism, we would observe that many of its themes and key words concerned relative status, the possible loss of status in the society, the fear of definition as “second class citizens,” the disapproval of recognition given to groups out of proportion with their perceived importance, and the perception that one’s culture or language is being degraded.4

All these themes can be found throughout the legislative debates and public hearings during the French-language crisis in Manitoba. Perceived attacks on symbols can also explain, at least partially, how legitimate opinion becomes prejudice. Martin Robin explains the process in the context of the rise of the Ku Klux Klan in Saskatchewan at the turn of the century: “The Ku Klux Klan did not invent prejudice in Saskatchewan. It was already there in abundance, rooted in groups and processes – economic, social, and political – perceived as threatening to the status and power of native, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant Saskatchewanians.”5 This fear, which was exploited by the Klan, led directly to the abolition of French-language rights in Saskatchewan in 1905. A ground-breaking analysis by University of Manitoba historian J.E. Rae, published in 1969, describes the process by which status and symbols were created in Manitoba and the West, starting with the arrival of the Ontario immigrants. In Rae’s view, “the most persistent social theme of the Prairies has been the struggle for cultural dominance.”6 Since the 1850s, Ontarians had considered the West to be “the patrimony of English Canada.” When they had arrived in sufficient numbers in Manitoba and found themselves “freed from the restraints and traditions of Ontario,” they proceeded, among other things, to dismantle the safeguards for the French-language community contained in the Manitoba Act, as we saw in chapter 1. However, the appropriation of status and symbols was rendered much more urgent at the turn of the century with the arrival of hundreds of thousands of European immigrants: On the part of the dominant English group there was an implicit assumption of racial superiority – racial, that is, in the popular sense. From this followed a determination to maintain the cultural and social patterns and institutions they

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211 Explaining the Crisis had established. By casting themselves as Canadians, and their society as Canadian society, the immigrant’s hunger for acceptance in this new land could be channelled into sustaining rather than threatening [English culture].7

In effect, then, immigrants, despite opposition from some quarters, especially the Catholic Church, were tossed into a vast “melting pot,” of which “it was the English majority who wrote the recipe and stoked the fire.”8 The technique used was “a persistent extolling of the [English] value system … until it became the instrument of the immigrant’s absorption. The means could be blatant or subtle, from open derision of his culture – the creation of the ‘Hunky’ image – to the propagation of the ‘right’ values of industry, thrift, sobriety and loyalty.” According to Rae, the defense of the Anglo-Ontarian culture was “strident and at times vicious,” and the immigrant “was made plainly aware that his language and his culture were his badges of inferiority, and a continuing obstacle to assimilation.” In other words, the dominant values in Manitoba and the West in the twentieth century did not come down from the Heavens; they came from the Ontarians of the 1870s and 1880s who despised the local values and customs they found in the Red River Valley and proceeded to impose their own by every social, economic, and legislative means at their disposal. No wonder then that by the 1980s, descendants of European immigrants were among the most vociferous in defending the Anglo-Ontarian (or “Canadian”) values they had so painfully acquired, or been forced to acquire, over generations. To Rae, this set of values and the process by which they were imposed were crystallized into a “Western Canadianism, a kind of substitute nationalism.”9

rig ht-wing authoritar ian ism In my view, Manitoba’s French-language crisis can best be explained as a concrete example of politically expressed and legitimized right-wing authoritarianism. Let us start with the most obvious fact: the Manitoba French-language crisis was manufactured by a few leaders, with Sterling Lyon and Russell Doern at the forefront. When the Supreme Court handed down its decision on the Reference, a Globe and Mail editorial, referring to the opposition, quoted historian Alexander Begg, who at the height of the Manitoba Schools Question in the 1890s, had written that “unscrupulous politicians use issues of race or creed to stir up the spirit of bigotry that unhappily underlies the surface of our social and political fabric.”10 One is also tempted to recall Richard Hofstadter’s definition of the paranoid style in American politics, which finds its expression in “heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy.”11 All these elements were present in spades among most

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opponents of the language proposals, as we have seen in earlier chapters. More to the point here is that there is indeed strong evidence that the aggressive, unbending position taken by the Opposition against the government proposals had a dramatic effect on public opinion in Manitoba; this evidence can be found by comparing four separate public opinion polls conducted from 1982 to late 1983. In November 1982 a nation-wide federally commissioned survey was conducted by crop of Montreal, and in July 1983, Wordsnorth Communication Services ran a survey for the provincial government. The results were as follows: “To the crop question, ‘Are you personally in favour or not in favour of bilingualism in your province?’ 39% of Manitobans declared themselves in favour, and 52% against. This compares to 38.6% and 51.1% respectively for the equivalent question in the Woodsnorth [sic] survey.”12 By October 1983, the months of unremitting opposition to the constitutional amendment in the legislature and elsewhere had had a dramatic effect: support for bilingualism in Manitoba had fallen to 26 percent according to a poll conducted in October 1983, a few days before the municipal plebiscites, by the University of Manitoba’s Institute for Social and Economic Research.13 The press had noticed the effect the opponents had had on public opinion; one commentator, for instance, wrote that Doern had “built up a constituency composed of bigotry, confusion and genuine concern and has unleashed it like an unguided missile.”14 The Globe and Mail wrote that Lyon’s “unpleasantness” had “produced such noisy bigotry” that the Pawley government was “unwisely” considering watering down its proposals.15 By 1985, a couple of years after the end of the crisis, support for bilingualism in Manitoba had returned to the 1982 levels. A Canadian Facts survey conducted among four thousand Canadians on behalf of the Commissioner of Official Languages in the fall of 1985 found that levels of support for bilingual provincial services on the Prairies were about where crop and Wordsnorth had found them in 1982 and early 1983.16 The Conservatives themselves boasted about the effect their stone wall of opposition was having on public opinion during the summer of 1983. On 3 August 1983, Tory mla Albert Driedger said in the House that at the beginning of June none of his constituents were asking him about the bilingualism issue; by early August, however, thanks to the work of his caucus, “The reaction is coming.” On 4 August 1983, Tory mla Wally McKenzie said, “As we stand here … and debate day after day, the heat of the subject matter grows, the number of phone calls grows.” The following day, Tory Bob Banman said opinion among the media was shifting, after their initial enthusiasm for the constitutional amendment. “A large part of the credit,” Banman added, “has to go to

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members of the opposition who are really doing their job in this Chamber.” Conservative mla Arnold Brown told the House on 14 February 1984 that support “seems to be growing every day, every time I go home for the weekend and so on. People are saying that we are doing the right thing.”17 Beyond the political parties, the behaviour of other actors with a leadership role in Manitoba’s political system is also instructive. The Union of Manitoba Municipalities, for instance, remained vociferously opposed to the government proposals throughout the debate, even though municipalities had been excluded from the scope of the draft constitutional amendment from the outset. Even the umm’s own counsel effectively told the organization’s leadership that this was the case.18 This behaviour contrasts sharply with that of the Manitoba Government Employees’ Association, representing thousands of provincial civil servants who had much more at stake in the constitutional amendment: rather than rejecting the amendment out of hand, and despite grassroots pressure to do so among its membership, the mgea executive charted a critical yet constructive course. In July 1983 and January 1984 it proposed several changes to the proposed amendment and in so doing, prompted the government to re-examine its provisions. Indeed, it would seem that the mgea’s brief to the premier in mid-July provided the point at which the government decided that changes would have to be made to the proposed amendment.19 The umm’s behaviour can also be contrasted with that of the Association of Urban Municipalities, a majority of whose membership (66 percent) was also opposed to the government’s proposals but whose leadership decided that this was not sufficient for the organization’s executive to “express with great vigor total opposition to the resolution.”20 Given that the umm’s interests were not threatened in any significant way by the government’s language proposals, its absolute, vociferous opposition to the amendment is difficult to understand without having recourse to explanations that have nothing to do with the content of the constitutional amendment. The umm’s position would be of only passing interest were it not for the fact that its members were all locally elected leaders; the level of prejudice and sheer ignorance that emerged from the testimony of many reeves and councillors is truly appalling. Their tendency blindly to follow their own organization’s leadership on the French-language issue came perilously close to authoritarian submission.21 In some cases at the hearings, reeves or councillors could not provide answers to even the most basic questions asked by committee members, and they mechanically repeated the umm leadership’s position. Given these fundamental flaws in the reeves’ testimony and in the umm’s position statements in general, it is difficult to understand why

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the Conservative Opposition repeatedly read into the record lengthy excerpts from that organization’s press releases and statements by its leadership. Reading the debates, one would think that the umm was of central importance to the language issue, whereas in fact it represented a level of government that was excluded from the scope of the constitutional amendment from the start. Nevertheless, a symbiotic relationship developed early on in the language debate between the umm and the Conservative Opposition, with the umm issuing often inaccurate statements on the scope of the amendment and the Official Opposition repeatedly reading these statements into the record, thereby giving them a weight and a credibility they did not inherently have. Again, the Opposition had a choice: it could have adopted a critical, yet constructive, course (such as that taken, for instance, by the mgea), or it could have aligned itself with forces in Manitoba that were opposed to the amendment on purely emotional and even bigoted grounds. It chose the latter course.22

ethnocentrism: in-groups and ou t- groups i n manitoba Psychologist Bob Altemeyer first developed an instrument for measuring ethnocentrism in the 1970s and continued refining it through the 1980s and early 1990s. He and other researchers consistently found a substantial correlation between authoritarianism and ethnocentrism.23 The concept of ethnocentrism usually refers to a tendency to attribute the highest inherent worth to one’s own ethnic group. In the context of Manitoba’s French-language crisis, however, this definition is problematic, since opposition to the government proposals appeared to transcend ethnic boundaries. Upon closer examination, however, one finds that the most vociferous opposition came mainly from persons of selfdescribed British and German background, which indicates that ethnocentrism in the classic sense was certainly at work during the crisis.24 However, ethnocentrism as defined in contemporary authoritarianism theory refers to a tendency to see the world in terms of in-groups and out-groups. In the context of the French-language crisis, for many people the in-group consisted of the anglophones and the out-group, of the francophones. However, in-groups and out-groups in Manitoba are also related to an objective reality rooted in the historical evolution of the province. It is therefore useful to define the demographic reality behind in-groups and out-groups in the Manitoba context. To understand this reality, one must turn once again to history and to the evolution of the terms “Canadian” and “Manitoban.” Clearly, in the view of a majority of residents of Manitoba, a “Manitoban” is

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one who has become assimilated into the “mainstream,” which is defined largely by Anglo-Saxon Protestants from Ontario between 1870 and 1890. According to Morton the fall of the Norquay government in 1887 was the turning point: it “ended completely the Red River era in Manitoban politics” and marked the confirmation of a new order based on Ontario-style, majoritarian democracy and rooted in a society that was British in ethnicity and Protestant in religion.25 With the abolition of the language-based schools in 1916, the last remnants of the old order were eliminated, and the triumph of the Ontario immigrants was complete. Languages other than English virtually disappeared as the children of the successive waves of immigrants in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were assimilated into the dominant culture. Later in the twentieth century, this phenomenon was assisted immeasurably by the rise of the mass media, particularly Americanbased television. There were pockets of resistance to this broad trend, notably in Mennonite and Hutterite communities, but one group alone systematically and structurally resisted these developments: the Franco-Manitobans. In addition, Francophones never forgot the constitutional origins of the province and the historical role the community had played in its creation. In a real sense, the language crisis was history confronting sociology: by the late twentieth century, virtually everyone in the province, including most Francophones, spoke English. This assimilation into the dominant culture usually came at a very high human cost, at least for the first generation. John Marlyn’s classic novel Under the Ribs of Death, which is about a young Hungarian struggling to become integrated into Winnipeg’s middle-class society, is an unforgettable depiction of this wrenching process. Several witnesses at the legislative hearings poignantly described the evolution of their towns, villages, or families into homogeneous communities where linguistic and cultural differences had gradually fallen away over generations; the adversity of conquering a hostile landscape and hostile circumstances had forged bonds of cooperation and unity in which a common language, English, came to be used by all. This process has been called the “Prairie compact,” a term that refers to the emergence of a tacit social contract whereby immigrants to the Prairies simultaneously agreed to assist each other in order to survive in the harsh conditions often faced by the first generation and to eliminate or minimize their cultural and linguistic differences by progressively adopting the common language, English.26 The common sense question that comes to many who have lived through this process is, quite naturally, Why should one group want to maintain its language, which is not the majority language, and why does it insist on the maintenance of rights granted in another era?

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Can’t we all live together in harmony, in English? The answer of many Manitoba Francophones is, We want to maintain our language and our culture; we were co-founders of this province, and as such we have entitlements that have nothing to do with numbers or with the prairie compact. We want to preserve these entitlements and redefine them in contemporary terms. In other words, Francophones are expressing not only their desire but their historical right to be different and to be recognized as such in the delivery of government programs and services. A simple difference of opinion? Unfortunately not. The Manitoba French-language crisis became a debate between the anglophone ingroup and the out-group, the Franco-Manitobans, supported, at least officially, by virtually all other ethnic groups in Manitoba. An element of status anxiety was also present in the mix, reinforcing ethnic difference.27 In the 1950s, Richard Hofstadter had already identified the sociological mechanics of the process in the American context: the intense status concerns of present-day politics are shared by two types of persons who arrive at them from opposite directions. The first are found among some types of old-family, Anglo-Saxon Protestants, and the second are found among many types of immigrant families, most notably among the Germans and Irish, who are very frequently Catholic. The Anglo-Saxons are most disposed toward pseudo-conservatism when they are losing caste, the immigrants when they are gaining.28

Research on authoritarianism confirms that “high” authoritarians “have somewhat lower economic and socioeconomic standing than others do.”29 There is empirical evidence that some members of the ethnic groups mentioned by Hofstadter did indeed behave in accordance with this theory during the Winnipeg plebiscite on the language issue in October of 1983. A microcosmic neighbourhood analysis of voting patterns in the referendum revealed that the government’s language proposals had the least appeal in German and low-to-moderateincome Anglo-Saxon neighbourhoods, such as River East and St James, where over 90 percent of voters rejected the government’s proposals, compared to a city-wide average of 76.5 percent.30

fear and the loss of inhibitions There were many examples of aggressive and even violent behaviour among opponents of the Pawley proposals, ranging from the torching of the sfm’s offices to graffitti on buildings in St Boniface to personal insults against government mla Gérard Lécuyer in the legislature to the use of slanderous language against the sfm to mass demonstrations

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217 Explaining the Crisis

against the proposals, sometimes organized by known bigots. Never since the nineteenth century had such behaviour occured in Manitoba on an issue related to language and culture. What led to these dramatic displays of aggressive behaviour? Research conducted by A. Bandura indicates that “aggressive behaviors are instigated by some aversive stimulus, but acted out only if the inhibitions against aggression can be overcome.”31 There can be many disinhibitors, including obvious ones such as anger, extreme envy, and drunkenness. However, “the principal instigator and releaser appear to be fear and self-righteousness … fear puts the high [authoritarian’s] finger on the trigger, and self-righteousness releases the safety.”32 Both were in plentiful supply during Manitoba’s French-language crisis, thanks to the Conservative Opposition, the Union of Manitoba Municipalities, and other leaders of the movement against the Pawley proposals. Sterling Lyon himself set the tone. In his first formal response to the draft amendment, he denounced the Pawley proposals as a “form of tyranny” that would be imposed on Manitoba society, creating “prejudice” for “generations of Manitobans yet unborn.”33 All of this was being perpetrated upon the Manitoba population through a conspiracy between a “perfidious” federal government and an “alien” socialist provincial government. Later, during the public hearings, many witnesses expressed their fears of change, both real and perceived, that were engulfing their society: the fear of a disintegrating society, including its metrification, and the perceived increase in lawlessness, immorality, and so on, were all pressed into service against the constitutional proposals. The line had to be drawn somewhere: here, in the Pawley government’s proposals, was a concrete target, though it had nothing to do with the other felt concerns raised by their most vociferous opponents. The Conservative Opposition’s vigorous and emotional denunciation of the proposals, regardless of its shaky relationship to the facts, served to mobilize the movement in many ways, first by setting clear lines around the in-groups and the out-groups; second, by demolishing the legitimacy of the proposals and their proponents; and, most importantly, by harnessing the fear among the more authoritarian members of Manitoba society by putting up an aggressive stand against what had been the quintessential out-group since 1870, the French-language community. The very aggressiveness of the Opposition’s leadership, combined with their social standing, disinhibited many high authoritarians among the general population by their example, while simultaneously increasing their self-righteousness. The Opposition’s denunciations were fuelled by a self-righteousness rooted, on one hand, in its ethnically grounded belief in its right to define who was a true

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218 Manitoba’s French-Language Crisis

“Canadian,” and, on the other, in a spurious belief that it was pursuing the highest good for all, equality. However, the “equality” it was peddling was of a particular sort: it was an equality conditional upon acceptance of a homogeneous, English-language, prairie-compact identity, where linguistic and cultural differences are minimized if not eliminated; it was thus by definition limited to the in-group and inaccessible to the out-groups that rejected or did not share these values.

use of code Altemeyer has found through empirical research that even high authoritarians react negatively to blatantly racist messages, since they do not believe themselves to be prejudiced. Therefore, care must be taken by political leaders who appeal to them to couch their message in acceptable or respectable terms. Altemeyer adds that bigotry “sells much better if one can find other grounds, socially defensible ones such as ‘states’ rights’ [in the u.s.] or ‘immigration needs’ that will achieve discriminatory ends.”34 Their true message must therefore be presented in code. Opponents of the government proposals used code extensively. The “secret deal,” despite the fact that it was no such thing, is a striking example. A second is the “cost” argument, used by many witnesses at the public hearings, though less so by the Conservative Opposition (since the government had estimated cost savings of up to twenty-five million dollars with the amendment). A third is the notion that the Tories had already reestablished French-language rights in Manitoba with Bill 2 of 1980, even though, as we have seen, in the context of rapidly evolving jurisprudence at the federal level in the early 1980s, this argument was not credible. Finally, the equality argument (all Manitobans are equal; therefore the French are not entitled to any special treatment), perhaps the most powerful of all, was also specious, since it rested upon a particular definition of equality. Surely one can imagine, even in the Western Canadian context, a notion of equality that can include official bilingualism, multiculturalism, and other legislative frameworks that enhance languages and cultures other than English. The extensive use of this particular code word is especially galling when one understands that right-wing authoritarians are in reality much less concerned about equality than people who rank lower on the authoritarianism scale.35

th e “ s c o r c h e d - e a r t h ” a t t i t u d e Sterling Lyon’s Conservatives were willing to go to any lengths to defeat the Pawley government’s constitutional amendment; they were un-

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219 Explaining the Crisis

perturbed, at least publicly, by the growing incidence of unrest, including acts of violence, death threats against government ministers, and increasingly unruly demonstrations in January and February 1984. At no point did they denounce the extremist elements, such as Conrad Kelly and others who had assumed leadership roles in organizing opposition at the grass-roots level; on the contrary, they argued that such elements should be heard even more than they had been. The Conservative Oppposition argued, for instance, that the January legislative hearings should be prolonged, even though these hearings had generated more vituperation and expressions of hatred in four days than had been heard publicly over the preceding nine months.36 Lyon’s absolute resolve was evident throughout. In the final days of the crisis, as an air of anarchy hung over the Manitoba legislature and the government teetered on the brink, Lyon had these chilling words to say to a reporter: “You’re watching the end of the government; enjoy it.”37 Lyon’s supporters might well describe his uncompromising stand as a sign of great courage and might argue that he was simply “being true to his principles” or “doing what the people wanted.” As we saw earlier, “the people” were often simply responding to months of harangue in the legislature based upon half-truths and omission, amplified by the media and spread by word of mouth. On the other hand, if Lyon was simply following his conscience (something his colleague Charlotte Oleson said a politician should never do), then it must be pointed out that even the most principled person must take situational factors into account; clearly, Lyon’s position and that of his party ignored most of these factors. In my view, the most plausible explanation of Lyon’s scorched-earth approach to the Pawley proposals can also be found in right-wing authoritarianism theory: the self-righteousness evident in many of the speeches made by Opposition members and in their ad hominem depiction of government members as aliens allowed them not only to open the floodgates of unrestrained popular opposition to the Pawley proposals but also to push this opposition to the extreme limits of socially acceptable behaviour. At that stage of the crisis, with one word from Lyon the true bigots might indeed have rioted in the streets. For a few weeks in early January of 1984, democracy in Manitoba rested on this single thread, a very tenuous one indeed. How much more preferable for all Manitobans would a compromise settlement have been; yet throughout the nine months from May 1983 to February 1984 compromise was the last thing on Sterling Lyon’s mind. Rational analysis and the spirit of compromise, which, along with passionate commitment, constitute true political leadership, had long since departed Opposition quarters by early 1984.38

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220 Manitoba’s French-Language Crisis

l e a d e rs a n d f o l l ow e rs Leaders, of course, are nothing without followers. As Altemeyer says, “without supporters, demagogues are just comical eccentrics on soapboxes, as Hitler himself was before World War I … They pose no great threat to an established democracy until multitudes lift them aloft.”39 There is empirical evidence that in Manitoba’s French-language crisis leaders of the opposition and their followers shared a strong authoritarian streak. In the midst of the French-language crisis in 1983, Altemeyer established, by administering his right-wing authoritarianism (rwa) scale directly to members of Manitoba’s legislative assembly, that members of the Conservative caucus ranked highest by far on this scale, with ndp mlas scoring a mean of 95.7 and the Conservatives 190.7. Even more striking, the “least authoritarian Conservative respondent scored 15 points higher than the most authoritarian New Democrat.”40 In subsequent research Altemeyer compared data from similar surveys of provincial and federal legislators, including Western Reform mps; again the Manitoba Conservatives of 1983, with their score of over 190, outranked them all on the rwa scale.41 It is thus empirically established that the 1983 Manitoba Conservative caucus under Sterling Lyon’s leadership was highly authoritarian. But what of their supporters? Altemeyer had twigged early on to the possibility that a Manitoban’s position on the French-language rights issue might be an indicator of that person’s ranking on the rwa scale. Two items relating to French-language rights in Manitoba administered to a group of 475 parents of university students in the fall of 1984 established that “there was some justification to the charge that opponents of the plan were, in general, prejudiced persons”; further, one of the items42 “could easily take its place on the [prejudice] scale; subjects who wanted an English-only Canada also tended to agree that Jews have too much power, blacks are naturally violent, Indians are naturally lazy, and so on.”43 Certainly, the Conservatives’ position found vociferous support among many individuals and groups in Manitoba society, most remarkably the rurally based Union of Manitoba Municipalities, many of whose members made impassioned and clearly prejudiced presentations at the legislative hearings (despite the fact, as I have already pointed out, that their interests were not at stake, since municipalities were excluded from the scope of the Pawley government’s constitutional amendment and from Bill 115). One can conclude from Altemeyer’s findings and from this analysis of the French-language crisis that authoritarian leaders and followers indeed found each other as the cri-

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221 Explaining the Crisis

sis unfolded and that together they reached a paroxysm of vituperation during the demonstrations and the second round of legislative hearings in late January of 1984. The French-language crisis is a sorry part of Manitoba’s history, and it cannot be expunged from it, as some Tory mla’s would have liked to do. Paradoxically, however, it has led to major improvements in French-language rights and services in the province. Indeed, Frenchlanguage services have now become irrevocably linked to section 23 of Manitoba’s constitution through judicial interpretation and the political events leading to the implementation of French-language services in the context of the French-language crisis. Only the two words “official languages” are missing from the Manitoba Act; the reality is that in all significant respects, Manitoba is now officially bilingual. The crisis had a more sombre effect in revealing that in contemporary Manitoba there are still pools of bigotry and prejudice that can be tapped into by demagogues and directed against any minority group. The history of the French-language crisis has proven to be a cautionary tale that may help prevent such responses to minority and language rights issues from ever occurring again.

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appendices

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appendix one Samples of the Manitoba Gazette (1874) and the Statutes of Manitoba (1888) Published in French

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226 Appendix One

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appendix two Draft Tripartite Agreement on the Constitutional Amendment, Dated 18 May 1983

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228 Appendix Two

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229 Draft Tripartite Agreement

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appendix three Draft Proposed Amendments to the Manitoba Act, 17 May 1983 (Schedule to the Draft Constitutional Amendment of 18 May 1983)

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231 Draft Proposed Amendments

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232 Appendix Three

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233 Draft Proposed Amendments

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234 Appendix Three

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appendix four Resolution to Amend the Manitoba Act Intoduced in the Manitoba Legislative Assembly by Attorney-General Roland Penner, 4 July 1983

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236 Appendix Four

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237 Resolution to Amend the Manitoba Act

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238 Appendix Four

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appendix five Members of the Manitoba Legislative Assembly during the French-Language Crisis

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Notes

introduction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Toronto Globe and Mail, 22 September 1983. F. Russell in the Winnipeg Free Press, 5 March 1984. Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, et al., The Authoritarian Personality. Mackintosh, “Heading Off Bilodeau.” Magnet, Official Languages of Canada. Doern, The Battle over Bilingualism. Sharpe and Roach, Brian Dickson, 415–22.

chapter one 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Friesen, The Canadian Prairies, 10–21. Ibid., 4. Ibid., 68. Ibid., 69. Morton, Manitoba, 44; Friesen, The Canadian Prairies, 73. Ibid., 89–90. Ibid., 97. Bailey, “French-Language Rights,” 5. Friesen, The Canadian Prairies, 109. Ibid., 111. Morton, Manitoba, 117. Stanley, Louis Riel, 45. Friesen, The Canadian Prairies, 115. Stanley, Louis Riel, 52.

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242 Notes to pages 6–11 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

37 38 39 40 41 42

Ibid., 74. Ibid., 93. Morton, Manitoba: Birth of a Province, 243 Ibid., 247 Ibid., xviii. Stanley, Louis Riel, 126. Morton, Manitoba: Birth of a Province, xviii. Ibid., 248–50. For a brief account of the negotiations, see Sprague, Canada and the Métis, chap. 4. Stanley, Louis Riel, 143. 33 Victoria, c. 3. Morton, Manitoba, 141–2. Friesen, The Canadian Prairies, 217. Lower, Canada, 125. Creighton, Canada’s First Century, 19. Sheppard, The Law of Languages, 77. Ibid., 105. Morton, Manitoba, 149. Ibid. Flanagan, Métis Lands in Manitoba, 121. Sprague, Canada and the Métis, 35. The question of the Métis lands in Manitoba is a highly convoluted and disputatious one, and I do not wish to wade into those waters here. Suffice it to say that there are two main streams of scholarship on the issue. D.N. Sprague, who takes the view in Canada and the Metis, 1869–1885, that the new settlers in Manitoba such as Schultz, forming the “Ontario faction,” colluded with Ontario politicians, including those in Ottawa, to limit if not negate the victory the Métis had gained in the Manitoba Act regarding their land claims. On the other hand, in Métis Lands in Manitoba, Thomas Flanagan takes a narrowly legalistic perspective and argues that, by and large, the Métis received fair value when they disposed of their lands, and that it was a matter of personal preference and of economic exigency for them to dispose of their lands in return for cash. Whichever analysis ones follows, the end result was the same: the door was thrown wide open to great waves of new settlers, most of them from Ontario, whereas it had been effectively shut before 1870. For a recent analysis of this process, see St-Onge, Canada and the Métis. Friesen, The Canadian Prairies, 201. Morton, Manitoba, 243. Ibid., 216; see also Sheppard, The Law of Languages, 79, 84. Friesen, The Canadian Prairies, 216. Morton, Manitoba, 246.

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243 Notes to pages 11–20 43 Ibid., 250. 44 Factum of the Attorney-General of Manitoba submitted in Reference re Language Rights under Section 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870, and Section 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867, 1985. 1 s.c.r. 721, 19 d.l.r. (4th) 1, 1985. w.w.r. 385, 35 Man. R. (2nd) 83, 16 and 39–40. 45 Comeault, Manitoba School Question, 30. 46 Bale, “Manitoba School Question”; see below. 47 Friesen, The Canadian Prairies, 218. 48 Ibid., 218; Comeault, Manitoba School Question, 23. 49 Morton, Manitoba, 333. 50 Ibid., 351. 51 See Leblanc, L’enseignement français. 52 Comeault, “Manitoba School Question,” 255. 53 Proteau, “Official Bilingualism.” 54 Blay, L’Article 23, 52. 55 Ibid., preface. 56 Friesen states that “Franco-Manitobans did not attempt to recover official status for their language by reference to the courts at this time” (The Canadian Prairies, 217). While he was writing these words, legal researchers were uncovering the two cases in point. 57 Il n’y a pas de doute que la S. 23 de l’Acte de Manitoba, et la S. 133 de l’Acte de l’Amérique Britannique du Nord sont analogues. Le mot Manitoba est substitué au mot Québec, c’est tout … Les legislatures provinciales ne possèdent aucun pouvoir inhérent en dehors de ceux que leur accorde le statut … Je suis donc d’opinion que le c. 14, 53 Vict., est ultra vires de la législature de Manitoba, ne peut pas être changée [sic] et encore moins abrogée [sic] par la législature de cette province. Quoted in Blay, L’Article 23, 34–5. 58 This judgment is reproduced in Deschênes, Ainsi parlèrent les tribunaux. 59 Dans ces jugements de 1892 et 1909, il y a le fondement de tous les arguments utilisés dans l’Affaire Forest: la pertinence de l’Article 23 de l’Acte du Manitoba de 1870 face à l’Article 133 de l’Acte de l’Amérique du Nord britannique, les pouvoirs et les restrictions des legislatures provinciales, les intentions des Pères de la Confédération. Et la conclusion est la même: il y a eu spoliation des droits d’une minorité par une majorité. Blay, L’Article 23, 39. 60 Debates and Proceedings, 1st Session, 18th Legislature, 1966–67, 1821. 61 Ibid., 2545. 62 Ibid., 2731–2. 63 Debates and Proceedings, 2nd Session, 29th Legislature, 26 June 1970, 3370. 64 Ibid., 24 June 1970, 3163. 65 Ibid.

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244 Notes to pages 20–7 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79

80 81

82 83 84 85 86 87 88

Ibid. Ibid. Frances Russell, undated interview with G. Forest. Ibid. 5m c. 105, s.80(3). Frances Russell, undated interview with G. Forest. Ibid.; also, personal interview with G. Forest, 7 June 1988. Guay, Examination for Discovery, 83. Quoted in Blay, L’Article 23, 93. Frances Russell, undated interview with G. Forest. Ibid. Et par conséquent ne pouvait pas être amendé par la législature. Quoted in Blay, L’Article 23, 95. 1976, 74 d.l.r. (3rd) 704. Regina v. Forest. On a beau réclamer toutes sortes de choses, toutes sortes d’institutions, si à un moment donné on néglige de faire un travail d’animation de la population, toutes ces institutions, ces lois et ces choses qui nous sont accordées n’auront plus leur raison d’être et c’est dans ce sens-là qu’on dit que nos priorités sont d’abord de travailler avec la population, de l’animer, de faire du développement communautaire, de sorte qu’un jour, on bénéficie des lois et des institutions qui sont en place. Blay, L’Article 23, 96–7. Baird to Prof. Donald Bailey, 27 November 1985; in F. Russell files. Depuis plus de trois mois, la sfm appuie moralement la lutte engagée par M. Forest. Il est évident que cette lutte concerne directement tous les Franco-Manitobains attachés à leur langue. C’est pourquoi la sfm croit essentiel de mettre sur pied un fonds spécial qui permettra aux Franco-Manitobains d’apppuyer financièrement la lutte légale [sic] engagée par M. Forest. Blay, L’Article 23, 97. R. Hébert, interview with G. Forest, 7 June 1988. Undated departmental press release, quoted in Blay, L’Article 23, 99. Frances Russell, undated interview with G. Forest. Blay, L’Article 23, 106. Ibid., 106–7. Ibid., 108–9. 1977, 77 d.l.r. (3rd) 445. Re Forest and Registrar of Court of Appeal of Manitoba.

chapter two 1 The Charter of Rights and Freedoms was adopted only in 1982. 2 See Leblanc, L’enseignement français. 3 Ella Mae Lyon’s grandparents, Charles W. Cuthbert and James Thomson Gibb, were original homesteaders who settled on the Portage Plains in 1876 and 1881, respectively. Winnipeg Free Press, 24 February 1988.

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245 Notes to pages 27–33 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

18 19 20 21 22 23 24

25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

Blay, L’Article 23, 113. Ibid., 114. Ibid., 115. 1977, 77 d.l.r. (3rd) 445. Blay, L’Article 23, 122. Ibid. Ibid., 124. 1979, 4 w.w.r. 229. Ibid. Blaikie v. A.G. Que., 1978, 85 d.l.r. (3rd) 252. 1979, 4 w.w.r. 229. Ibid. Ibid. It was assumed, when the Freedman judgment was written that section 23 had been ignored right from the start; it was only subsequently that researchers rooting in the legislative library found that, on the contrary, section 23 had been observed between 1870 and 1890. Appendix 1 contains pages photocopied from the original Gazette de Manitoba of 1874 and from Les Statuts de la Province de Manitoba, 1889, containing texts of laws in French. (1979) 4 w.w.r. 229. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., emphasis added. Blay, L’Article 23, 127. Ibid., 128. A moins que la décision soit exécutoire, ce qu’elle ne sera pas, une telle décision est une victoire à la Pyrrhus. Alors … une défaite. Le gouvernement manitobain ne sera pas plus dans l’obligation d’agir qu’il ne l’était après le jugement Dureault … De toute façon … nous serons dans l’obligation de recommencer à zéro d’ici peu de temps. Quoted in Blay, L’Article 23, 129. Ibid., 131. Winnipeg Tribune, 14 December 1979. Ibid. The province’s senior advisor on French-language services; see below. Comments by Turenne accompanying a draft memo for Decter to Schroeder, 16 June 1983; in Turenne files. Twaddle to Mercier, 19 February 1980, in Turenne, Forest file. Winnipeg Free Press, 14 December 1979. Magnet, “Validity of Manitoba Laws,” 244. Sauf Monsieur Forest, on était convaincu à la sfm que, dans le domaine pratique, on n’avait rien eu avec la décision Forest. L. Robert and R. Sabourin, quoted in Blay, L’Article 23, 138.

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246 Notes to pages 34–40 34 Tout résidant du Manitoba a le droit de recevoir en français les services offerts par les divers niveaux des gouvernments de la province. sfm, box 41, file 24.8/4. 35 Ibid. 36 Piché to Mercier, 14 February 1980; in Turenne, Forest file. 37 Ibid. 38 g/s, box 4, file 32, 248–9. 39 Mercier to MacDonald, 8 February 1980, in Turenne, Forest file. 40 Ibid. 41 Mercier to Freedman, 21 March 1980, in atg, box 19, fls – Transl. – Stat. – Doc. 42 Twaddle to Mercier, 3 September 1980, in atg, box 18, fls – Courts. 43 Scott telegram quoted in Blay, L’Article 23, 138–9. 44 Ibid., 139. 45 Renald Guay’s father was Joseph-P. (“Jos.”) Guay, a minister in the Trudeau cabinet during the 1970s and later senator. During the language crisis he became the link in Ottawa between the sfm and various ministers, including Trudeau himself. Renald Guay played a key role in his father’s three election campaigns. 46 Guay, Examination for Discovery, vol. 1, 90–1. 47 Rémi Smith, Renald Guay’s first cousin, was raised in the Guay household from the time he was only three days old; his mother died at childbirth. 48 R. v. Smith, w.c.c., 5 February 1980. 49 Ibid. 50 R. v. Guay, p.j.c. (unpublished), 23 May 1979. 51 R. v. Guay St. b. c.c. 3 March 1980. 52 Twaddle to Mercier, 20 April 1981, in Turenne, Forest file. 53 See La Liberté, 3 January 1980. 54 Comeault, “L’Affaire Forest,” 106. 55 Ibid., 105. 56 W. Newman, letter to S. Scott, 11 May 1981, in F. Russell files. 57 s.m. 1980, c. 3; emphasis added. 58 Debates and Proceedings, 30th Legislature, 1980. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid., 2004. 62 Ibid., 2005. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid., 16 April 1980. 66 The incident occurred about 5 p.m. on Lyndale Drive in the Norwood area of Winnipeg. Bilodeau was driving a yellow 1978 Ford ltd and was travelling sixty-eight kilometres per hour in a fifty-kilometre speed zone. Winnipeg Sun, 9 October 1983.

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247 Notes to pages 40–50 67 1981, 1 w.w.r. 474. 68 These concerns are reflected in a confidential internal sfm document dated 15 October 1980, which attempted to lay out a rationale for the sfm backing individual court cases. sfm, box 41, file 24.8/4. 69 1980, 5 w.w.r. 393. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 Que la sfm initie une étude des effets d’un “oui” ou d’un “non” au référendum québécois sur la communauté franco-manitobaine. La Liberté, 27 March 1980. 76 La Liberté, 10 April 1980, 3. 77 Ibid. 78 Debates, vol. 29, 2847. 79 Ibid., vol. 30, 3532. 80 sfm, box 41, file 24.8/4. 81 Debates, vol. 30, 1941. 82 Manitoba Civil Service Commission, “Position Description Form,” Position no. ex 005, April 1981. In Turenne files. 83 Ibid. 84 Lyon was accompanied by Attorney-General Gerry Mercier, Minister of Education Keith Cosens, Cultural Affairs Minister Norma Price, and the minister responsible for the Civil Service Commission, Ken McMaster. 85 sfm, box 41, file 24.3/2; emphasis added. 86 Undated interview with Turenne by Paul Thomas, a University of Manitoba professor of political studies; in author’s personal files. 87 Winnipeg Free Press, 1 October 1981.

chapter three 1 Three members of the ndp caucus were francophone, and two occupied Cabinet positions; Laurent (Larry) Desjardins, long-time mla for St Boniface and A.R. (Pete) Adam held Cabinet portfolios, while mla Gérard Lécuyer chaired the caucus. 2 La Liberté, 3 December 1981. 3 Twaddle to Penner, 12 January 1982, atg, box 0149, box 17, Bilodeau, R. 4 The following people attended: Premier Pawley, Health Minister L. Desjardins, Education Minister M. Hemphill, G. Lécuyer, Clerk of the Privy Council M. Decter, and Turenne himself (Penner was absent). The sfm was represented by its president, G. Proteau, its first vice-president, Léo LeTourneau, and Executive Director Lucille Roch. Turenne summary, in atg, box 19, fls-sfm.

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248 Notes to pages 51–6 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

39 40 41

Paul Thomas, undated interview with Turenne. Ibid. Penner to Proteau, 26 February 1982; in atg, box 19, fls – sfm. Turenne to Tallin, 5 March 1982, ibid. The other members of the committee were Desjardins, Pete Adam, Lecuyer, and Turenne. Submission to Cabinet, 3 March 1982, ec 0016, box 7. Paul Thomas, undated interview with Turenne. Turenne to Penner, 2 March 1982, in atg, box 19, fls – sfm. The group was the Positive Action Committee, which represented Quebec anglophone language interests. Scott to Penner, 9 March 1982, in atg, box 4, fls – 1982–83. Penner to Scott, 12 March 1982, ibid. Scott to Penner, 7 April 1982, in atg, box 4, fls – 1982–83. Notes for Premier Howard Pawley, sfm Annual Meeting, 21 March 1982, atg, box 19, fls – sfm. Ibid. Winnipeg Free Press, 25 March 1982. Guay, Examination for Discovery, 25–27 February 1985. Twaddle opinion to Penner, 14 April 1982, 2, in atg 0149, box 18, fls – Legal Opinions. Ibid., 2–3. Ibid., 4. Ibid., 5. Ibid., 7. Ibid., 8; emphasis added. Ibid., 11. Ibid., 12. Ibid. Ibid., 11. Penner to Gibson, 15 April 1982; ibid. D. Gibson opinion, 10 May 1982, 1; in atg, box 4, fls – 1982–83, 4–6. Ibid., 7. Ibid., 9. Ibid., 15. Paul Thomas, undated interview with Turenne. Tallin to Penner, 21 May 1982; in atg, box 17, Bilodeau, R. atg, box 4, fls – 1982–83. Penner’s Cabinet paper was based on a document drafted by Twaddle titled “Rationale for a Constitutional Amendment,” 25 May 1982. Ibid. Ibid. This condition is made clear in a Cabinet paper dated 7 October 1982. Ibid. atg, box 19, fls – sfm.

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249 Notes to pages 56–61 42 Penner to Twaddle, 15 June 1982, in atg, box 17, Bilodeau, R. 43 Ibid., 6–7. Robert recalled that the meeting was held on 22 June 1983, but archival documents indicate the meeting was held 17 June. 44 See Blay, L’Article 23, 161. 45 Baird to Bilodeau, 18 June 1982, in sfm, box 41, 24.8/4. 46 g/s, box 3, file 17, 51. 47 Globe and Mail, 9 July 1982. 48 Winnipeg Sun, 12 July 1982. 49 Ibid., 14 July 1982. 50 Winnipeg Free Press, 13 July 1982. 51 La Liberté, 22 July 1982. 52 Penner to Chrétien, 3 August 1982, in atg, box 19, fls – Transl.–Stat. 53 Ibid. 54 Summary of consultations to sfm board drafted by Lucille Roch, 11 August 1982, in sfm, box 41, 24.8/3. 55 In g/s, box 3, file 17, 8–16. 56 The following persons attended the meeting: Penner; his deputy, Gordon Pilkey; Assistant Deputy Attorney-General G. Goodman; and Roger Turenne. The sfm was represented by L. Robert, R. Smith, and L. Roch. 57 Robert to Penner, 18 August 1982, in atg, box 4, fls – 1982–83. sfm briefing notes for this meeting containing the same points also exist in g/s, box 3, file 16, 29–30. 58 There is some confusion as to the exact date of this meeting, since a Cabinet paper dated 7 October 1982 says the meeting occurred on 4 October. All other documents, however, indicate the meeting was indeed held on 5 October. In attendance were L. Robert, R. Smith, and L. Roch for the sfm and R. Penner, G. Pilkey, G. Goodman, R. Tallin, and R. Turenne for the government. 59 The Cabinet paper is dated 7 October 1982, in atg, box 18, fls – Draft proposals and Statutory Options. 60 Decter to Penner, 15 October 1982, in Turenne, January 1982 to May 1983. 61 La Liberté, 12 November 1982. 62 In g/s, box 3, file 17, 93–111. 63 Ibid., 1–2. 64 Press clippings in Turenne file, January 1982 to May 1983. 65 Turenne to Penner, 9 November 1982, in Turenne file, January 1982 to May 1983. 66 sfm board minutes, 18 November 1982, in g/s, box 6, sfm minutes. 67 Robert to Penner, 26 November 1982, in g/s, box 3, file 28, 43. There were several reasons why this was the sfm’s preferred option. First and most important was the use in the Charter of the word “institution,” which could be interpreted to include municipalities and school boards, as well as the

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250 Notes to pages 61–4

68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78

79

80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89

90

provincial government. Second, the remedies provided under the Charter for noncompliance were seen as stronger than those proposed at this point by Penner. Third, there was the link with other francophone minorities, specifically the Acadian community in New Brunswick: by adhering to the Charter, Manitoba would be strengthening minority language rights across the country, and this could only have a positive effect on the FrancoManitoban minority itself. Finally, the federal government itself, through Serge Joyal, was nudging the sfm in this direction (see below). Dated 7 December 1982, in atg, box 4, fls – 1982–83. Cabinet probably approved the draft on 8 December 1982; see Penner to Pilkey, 14 December 1982, in atg, box 4, fls – 1982–83. Penner to Robert, 16 December 1982, in atg, box 4, fls – 1982–83. Penner to Mercier, 17 December 1982, in atg, box 18, fls – Fed.-Prov.; box 17, Bilodeau – 12 November – ; box 4, fls – 1982–83. Mackintosh, “Heading off Bilodeau,” 277. Winnipeg Sun, 21 December 1982. Winnipeg Sun, 30 December 1982. Baird to Twaddle, 5 January 1983; in atg, box 17, 12 November. g/s, box 4, file 35, 21. sfm, box 51, 24.3/3. g/s, box 4, file 35, 10. The state of negotiations between the sfm and Penner in early January was summarized by Richard Cleroux in the Globe and Mail on 13 January. Though the meeting was organized by the sfm, participation was not limited to members; indeed, many members of the press, as well as interested non-Francophones, attended. An account ran in the Winnipeg Sun, 16 January 1983. Blay, L’Article 23, 167. Winnipeg Sun, 16 January 1983; Winnipeg Free Press, 17 January 1983; Toronto Globe and Mail, 17 January 1983. Winnipeg Sun, 20 January 1983. Forest to Penner, 22 January 1983, in atg, box 17, Bilodeau – November 1982. Penner to Forest, 7 February 1983, ibid. Winnipeg Sun, 25 January 1983. Winnipeg Free Press, 3 February 1983. Ibid., 1 February 1983. Globe and Mail, 10 February 1983. R. Hébert interview with R. Guay and R. Smith, 31 December 2001. After the fire, some younger francophones began patrolling the streets of St Boniface at night, vigilante-style, in an attempt to prevent the graffiti spraying and other incidents. Winnipeg Free Press, 2 February 1983.

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251 Notes to pages 64–8 91 Ibid., 9 February 1983. 92 Winnipeg Sun, 8 February 1983. 93 Penner to MacGuigan, 8 February 1983, atg, box 17, Bilodeau, November 1982. 94 Twaddle to Penner, 31 March 1983; ibid. 95 The Guay-Smith files contain many different government and sfm drafts produced during this period, most of which are undated; the files also contain side-by-side comparisons of the various government proposals, along with the sfm reactions. g/s, box 3, file 16, 70–110. 96 A copy of the speech is in g/s, box 3, file 19, 10–28. 97 Ma priorité est très simple comme Secrétaire d’État du Canada, c’est de raffermir le fait français au Canada. Ibid., 2. 98 Ibid., 5–6. 99 According to Tassé’s notes on the meeting; in Turenne file, January 1982 to May 1983. 100 Turenne to Penner, 11 April 1983; in atg, box 17, Bilodeau, R., November 1982 – . 101 Noted in g/s, box 4, file 35, 24. 102 Turenne to Penner, 12 April 1983; in atg, box 17, Bilodeau, R., November 1982 – . 103 R. Hébert interview with Penner, 4 June 1998. 104 The majority of Cabinet staunchly supported the amendment; supporters included Penner, Pawley, Lécuyer, Desjardins, Adam, Kostyra, Muriel Smith, and Maureen Hemphill. 105 g/s, box 4, file 35, 24. 106 Teffaine to Penner, 27 April 1983; in g/s, box 3, file 16, 61–6. 107 Turenne to Penner, 27 April 1983, in atg, box 17, Bilodeau, R., November 1982–. 108 Ibid. 109 Penner to Robert, 3 May 1983, atg, box 19, fls – sfm. 110 Turenne’s summary, Turenne to Penner, 4 May 1983, in atg, box 3, fls – 1983. 111 Reynolds to Turenne, 6 May 1983, in Turenne file, January 1982 – May 1983. 112 g/s, box 4, file 33, 141–6. 113 Turenne to Penner, 9 May 1983; in atg, box 17, Bilodeau, R., November 1982 – . 114 Penner to Robert, 9 May 1983, atg, box 17, Bilodeau, R., November 1982 – . 115 Turenne to Penner, 11 May 1983; in atg, box 3, fls – 1983. 116 The description is Turenne’s; in Turenne to Penner, 16 May 1983, Turenne file, January 1982 to May 1983.

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252 Notes to pages 68–74 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126

127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134

Ibid. Ibid. Turenne to Penner, 17 May 1983, in Turenne file, January 1982 to May 1983. Decter to Pawley, 20 May 1983, in ec 0016, box 7. R. Hébert interview with L. Robert, 18 October 1997. Notes in g/s, box 2, file 12, pp. 146 ff. See also Turenne summary in 17 May 1983 memo below. R. Guay, handwritten notes in box 2, file 12, 148. atg, box 3, fls – 1983; Turenne files; g/s, box 4, file 33, 164–6; see appendix 2. Turenne to Penner, 17 May 1983; in atg, box 3, fls – 1983. R. Guay, Examination for Discovery, 219. The draft agreement itself is dated 18 May 1983, and the first line, in capital letters and underlined, reads: draft; the second line reads: for discussion purposes only. It is accompanied by a second text, dated 17 May 1983, headed for discussion purposes only – proposed amendments to manitoba act (see appendix 3). These two different documents, dated 18 May and 17 May, along with the fact that the agreement itself was concluded verbally on 16 May, account for the fact that various actors subsequently mentioned these different dates in referring to the agreement. Turenne to Penner, 17 May 1983; in atg, box 3, fls-1983. “Bilingual hint dropped in French only,” Winnipeg Free Press, 18 May 1983. Financial Post, 24 September 1983. Communications Strategy Document, 30 May 1983, in Turenne, Communications file. Winnipeg Free Press, 24 August 1983. Penner to Turenne, 17 May 1983, Turenne file, January 1982 to May 1983. Ibid. Ibid.

chapter four 1 Penner submission to Cabinet, 18 May 1983, ATG , box 17, FLS – CaucusCabinet. 2 Debates, 18 May 1983, 2878. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid., 19 May 1983, 2908. 5 Ibid., 2909–10. 6 Winnipeg Sun, 19 May 1983. 7 Winnipeg Free Press, 20 May 1983. 8 In SFM, box 41, 24.8/2.

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253 Notes to pages 75–82 9 10 11 12 13

14 15 16 17 18

19 20 21 22 23

24 25 26 27 28 29 30

31 32

Debates, 20 May 1983, 2974–5. Ibid., 2976. Notes by Ginny Devine, 24 May 1983, in Turenne, Communications File. Turenne transcription of interview; in Turenne, Communications File. The Winnipeg Free Press concluded in its editorial of 21 May 1983 that “the amendment that is proposed, or one very like it, ought to be adopted”; the Winnipeg Sun wrote that “Manitoba is constitutionally bilingual, and has been for nearly a century.” G. Devine memo, 26 May 1983; in atg, box 17, fls – Communications. Blay, L’Article 23, 175. Winnipeg Free Press, 25 and 28 May 1983. Montreal Gazette, 27 May 1983. Lyon’s comment was reported in the Montreal newspaper La Presse, 1 October 1983; he was quoted as saying of the sfm (in a French translation) that “C’est un organisme qui n’est pas plus important que le club Kiwanis ou le club Richelieu. Une société fraternelle qui n’a pas de statut. Un organisme du genre de ceux qui organisent des bazars.” In atg, box 3, fls – 1983. Debates, 24 May 1983, 2994. Rusk, letter to rural municipalities, 31 May 1983, ec 0016, box 4. Ibid. At least four towns or rural municipalities linked bilingualism with “metric,” and sent Premier Pawley letters or resolutions to that effect. They were Portage la Prairie, Woodlands, Russell, and Gilbert Plains. See ec 0016, box 4. atg, 0149, box 18, fls – Municipalities. Resolution adopted 9 June 1983, atg, box 3, fls – 1983. atg, 0149, box 18, fls – Municipalities. Debates, 31 May 1983, 3262–3. Ibid., 6 June 1983, 3462–4. See chap. 2. The author is indebted to Prof. Tom Peterson for pointing out that the quote “Cry ‘Havoc!’ and let slip the dogs of war” comes not from Hamlet, as Penner suggests, but from Julius Caesar (3.1). Debates, 6 June 1983, 3477–88. For the record, Penner served with the Royal Canadian Artillery overseas, from 1943 to 1946. (The fact that he was a veteran of the Second World War was not mentioned once by the Conservatives.) After his return, he became active in the Labour Progressive Party on the University of Manitoba campus, eventually becoming a member of the provincial executive. Upon his graduation with a b.a. degree in 1949, he became executive director of the National Federation of Labour Youth and a member of the Communist Party. After the Khrushchev denunciation of Stalinism in 1956, Penner

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254 Notes to pages 82–90

33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61

62 63

drifted away from the party and was inactive politically for many years, until he joined the ndp around 1979. He was elected mla for Fort Rouge in 1981 and re-elected in 1986. R. Hébert, interview with Penner, 4 June 1998. Doern, The Battle over Bilingualism, 22. Ibid., 22–3. Ibid., 24. Ibid., 25. Ibid. O’Connor, memo to caucus, in atg, box 17, fls – Communications. Allan was a member of Penner’s staff; Allan letter to Elmwood executive members, 10 June 1983, atg 0149, box 17, fls – comm. Doern, The Battle over Bilingualism, 26; Blay, L’Article 23, 186. Doern, The Battle over Bilingualism, 27. See, for instance, a memo from G. Devine to Penner, 13 June 1983, atg, box 18, fls – R. Doern. Turenne to Penner, 14 June 1983, in atg, box 3, fls – 1983. Penner to ndp caucus, 15 June 1983, ibid. Doern, The Battle over Bilingualism, 27, 35. Ibid., 28. Ibid., 31. Ibid., 32. Ibid., 33–5. Hutton, letter to ndp caucus, 16 June 1983, ec 0016, box 8. Winnipeg Sun, 17 June 1983. Adam to Penner, 20 June 1983, in atg, box 3, fls – 1983. Penner to Adam, 22 June 1983, in atg, box 18, fls – Municipalities. Winnipeg Sun, 22 June 1983. Debates, 17 June 1983, 3769. Ibid., 3770. Ibid., 3771. Ibid., 3771–2. Ibid. Ibid. The tactic of walking out during a debate, thereby preventing the work of the House from proceeding, had first been used in Canada between 2 March and 17 March 1982 during a House of Commons debate on the omnibus Energy Security Act. At that time, the work of the House had ground to a halt when the federal Conservatives, led by Joe Clark, called for a recorded vote on the bill and then walked out of the House. The impasse continued until an agreement between the parties ended it. In reality, the “bells” were buzzers whose volume could be controlled. Winnipeg Free Press, 18 June 1983.

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255 Notes to pages 90–4 64 Winnipeg Sun, 22 June 1983. The decision to hold “information meetings” appears to have been based on a recommendation by Wordsnorth Communications, the government’s communications consultants. See below. 65 Winnipeg Sun, 19 June 1983 66 Ibid., 22 June 1983. 67 Doern, The Battle over Bilingualism, 37. 68 Ibid., 40. 69 Ibid., 61. 70 Ibid., 71. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid., 71. 73 Ibid., 72. 74 Winnipeg Free Press, 21 June 1983. 75 Ibid., 27 June 1983. 76 Ibid., 22 June 1983. 77 Winnipeg Sun, 26 June 1983. 78 The billings of Wordsnorth to the government began 23 June 1983 and continued through 29 July 1983; they eventually totalled $106,390.06. (A detailed cost breakdown is contained in a memo from B.W. Arnason to Penner dated 23 September 1983, in atg, box 19, fls – Promotional Costs.) 79 atg, box 18, fls – Draft Proposals and Statutory Options. 80 Emphasis in text. 81 Penner to ndp caucus, 24 June 1983, ec 0016, box 17. 82 Maldoff to Pawley, 1 June 1983, g/s, 2nd Supplementary Documents, 116–18. 83 Turenne to Penner, 10 June 1983, atg, box 17, Alliance Quebec file. 84 Ibid. 85 Toronto Globe and Mail and Winnipeg Free Press, 25 June 1983. 86 Ibid. 87 Magnet to Robert, 27 May 1983, p. 2, g/s, box 2, file 12, 155. 88 [C]e geste d’inimité est d’autant plus étonnant qu’il ne m’apparaît pas que d’attaquer les politiques québécoises soit de nature à aider de quelque façon que ce soit les minorités francophones du Canada. Au contraire, un Québec fort m’apparaît la meilleure garantie que ces minorités recevront un minimum d’attention de la part de leur gouvernement respectif. 89 A. Boulanger to L. Robert, 22 June 1983, in g/s, box 2, file 11, 13–15. 90 sfm Board minutes, 4 July 1983, g/s, box 4, file 35, 35. 91 Winnipeg Sun, 26 June 1983. 92 Debates, 27 June 1983, 3957. 93 Ibid. 94 Ibid., 29 June 1983, 4046. 95 Ibid., 4046–7. 96 Winnipeg Sun, 30 June 1983.

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256 Notes to pages 94–100 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127

128 129 130 131

Winnipeg Free Press, 30 June 1983. Ibid. Ibid., 2 July 1983. Doern, The Battle over Bilingualism, 80. The discussions with Anstett took place on 15 and 22 June 1983; g/s, box 3, file 25, 179–80. Ibid., 181. Ibid., 180, 181. Ibid., 180 ff. sfm, 4 July 1983 Minutes, g/s, box 4, file 35, 35. The text in full is found in Debates, 4056–7, and is reproduced in appendix 4. Debates, 4 July 1983, 4057. Ibid., 4059. Ibid., 4059–60. Ibid., 4060, 4061. Ibid., 4062. Ibid., 4063. Ibid. Ibid. Winnipeg Sun, 5 July 1983; see also Winnipeg Free Press, 5 July 1983. Winnipeg Free Press, 5 July 1983. Ibid.; Penner to Doer, 6 July 1983, atg, box 19, fls – unions. Doer to Penner, 7 July 1983, ibid. Winnipeg Free Press, 6 July 1983; Scarth to umm, 5 July 1983, atg, box 19, fls – Unions. Ibid. Winnipeg Sun, 6 July 1983; see also Winnipeg Free Press, 6 July 1983. Winnipeg Sun, 7 July 1983. Winnipeg Free Press, 7 July 1983. In an undated eight-page document entitled Public Information Meetings – Amendment to Manitoba Act, in atg, box 1, Misc. – fls. Garth Cramer and Dan O’Connor of the premier’s office and Ginny Devine in Penner’s office were the advisors. atg, box 17, fls – Communications. The releases were entitled “Language Resolution Presented in House” and “Penner Outlines French Language Services Plan.” In g/s, box 2, file 11, 20–3. Ibid., 20. Emphasis in text. Devine memo, 7 July 1983, in atg, box 17, fls – Communications. Pawley to all Ministers, 8 July 1983, ec 0016, box 7.

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257 Notes to pages 100–7 132 133 134 135 136 137

138 139 140

141 142 143

144 145

Winnipeg Sun, 8 July 1983. Toronto Globe and Mail, 8 July 1983. Winnipeg Free Press, 8 July 1983; Montreal Gazette, 11 July 1983. Penner to Regehr, Cramer, Devine, and Allan, 8 July 1983; in atg, box 3, fls – 1983. Winnipeg Free Press, 15 July 1983. After the meeting, Penner described the charges as “absolutely ridiculous.” The record shows, however, that the ndp had indeed called out its members, at his own initiative, as we have seen above. Winnipeg Free Press, 15 July 1983. sfm, 4 July 1983 minutes, g/s, box 4, file 35, 35. The letter was signed by N. Budyk, D.M. Lega, L.C. Melosky, J.S. Petryshyn, T.J. Prychitko, M.J. Spolsky, R. Yereniuk, and A.J. Yaremovich. In Turenne, Communications file. Chandra to Penner, 14 July 1983, atg, box 3, fls – 1983. Kostyra to Vietnamese in Central Canada, 3 August 1983, in atg, box 4, fls – 1983. In atg, box 4, fls – 1983. The association was made up of representatives of Manitoba Parents for German Education, Manitoba Parents for Hebrew Bilingual Education, and Manitoba Parents for Ukrainian Education. Manitoba Jewish Community Council letter to various media, 22 July 1983, atg, box 3, fls – 1983. Klassen to Penner, 25 July 1983, atg, box 3, fls – 1983.

chapter five 1 Debates, 4284, 4272, 4288–9. 2 Ibid., 4262, 4272–4, 4279–80. Several of the Joyal quotes were taken up a few days later by Fred Cleverley of the Winnipeg Free Press, in a column published on 18 July 1983. 3 Debates, 4280. 4 Ibid., 4273 (emphasis added), 4280. 5 Ibid., 4268–70, 4280. 6 Ibid., 4288. 7 Ibid., 4264 (see also 4293); 4264. 8 The Winnipeg law firm of Thompson, Dorfman, Sweatman. 9 Winnipeg Free Press, 13 July 1983. 10 Winnipeg Sun, 13 July 1983. 11 Doer, letter to Pawley, 12 July 1983, in g/s, box 3, file 26, 16–18, 2–3. 12 From minutes taken by G. Devine, 18 July 1983, in atg, box 19, fls – Unions. Premier Pawley also attended, along with Turenne and Paul Hart of the Civil Service Commission.

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258 Notes to pages 107–11 13 G. Devine, notes dated 8 August 1983 in atg, box 4, fls – 1983. 14 Communications Workers of Canada to Penner, 5 August 1983, in atg, box 19, fls – Unions. 15 R. Hébert, interview with Penner, 4 June 1998. 16 Letters were indeed starting to flow into various ministers’ offices from some Crown corporations; letters from Manitoba Hydro, the Manitoba Telephone System, and the Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation to Penner and Parasiuk are in atg, box 4, fls – 1983. A briefing session with representatives of seven major Crown corporations was held on 8 August 1983. 17 Kostyra to Penner, 3 August 1983; in atg, box 19, fls – Unions. On 7 September, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers wrote Parasiuk requesting a change to the collective agreement between its members and the Manitoba Telephone System whereby implementation of French-language services would not result in job losses among its existing employees (in atg, box 19, fls – Unions). Penner agreed the issue should be discussed before the government’s next joint council with the unions (in a confidential memo to Labour Minister M.-B. Dolin; atg, box 4, fls – 1983.). 18 In a subsequent letter to Penner dated 20 July 1983, in atg, box 19, fls – Unions. 19 Debates, 15 July 1983, 4353. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Excerpt of Cabinet minute, in Decter memo to Penner, 21 July 1983, atg, 0149, box 17, fls – Comm. 23 Winnipeg Free Press, 18 July 1983. 24 Debates, 7 July 1983, 4163, 4162, 4163. 25 Ibid., 19 July 1983, 4405. 26 Ibid., 4407. Lécuyer himself confirmed that the taunt came mainly from Orchard (R. Hébert, interview with Lécuyer, 3 September 1998). Penner also confirmed this in R. Hébert, interview 6 June 1998. 27 Debates, 19 July 1993, 4407. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid., 4408. 30 Ibid., 22 July 1983, 4489, 4508. 31 Winnipeg Free Press, 22 July 1983. 32 Debates, 26 July 1983, 4520. 33 In the end, the cost of the mailer was higher than Penner had estimated. A letter from the post office dated 10 November 1983 indicates that the mailing costs alone incurred for distribution of the pamphlet from 27 to 29 July were $25,930.93. Letter from A. Komher, Post Office, 10 November 1983, in atg, box 17, fls – Correspondence, 1 October 1983. 34 atg, box 19, fls – sfm.

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259 Notes to pages 111–19 35 36 37 38 39 40 41

42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57

Allan to Penner, 3 August 1983, ibid. Debates, 26 July 1983, 4533. Ibid., 4533–4. Debates, 28 July 1983, 4607. Ibid., 4614. Ibid., 4784–5. Ibid., 4786. On 29 September, during the legislative hearings, Lyon went even further, telling Penner, “At least … I’ve never subverted my country the way you have.” Hearings of the Standing Committee on Privileges and Elections, Second Session, Thirty-Second Legislature of the Legislative Assembly of Manitoba, 29 September 1983, 941. Debates, 2 August 1983, 4786. Winnipeg Free Press, 5 August 1983. Debates, 4 August 1983, 4878. Ibid. Ibid., 5016, 5017. Ibid., 5018. Ibid., 12 August 1983, 5274. Ibid., 5287. Mackintosh, “Heading Off Bilodeau,” 279. Winnipeg Sun, 14 August 1983. Winnipeg Free Press, 13 August 1983; Toronto Globe and Mail, 13 August 1983. Winnipeg Sun, 14 August 1983. Ibid., 18 August 1983. Debates, 16 August 1983, 5314. Ibid. Winnipeg Free Press, 31 December 1983.

chapter six 1 An analytical and comparative account of the two sets of hearings can be found in chapter 9. 2 Penner, confidential memo to ndp caucus, 11 August 1983; in atg, 0149, fls – Caucus/Cab. 3 Alluded to in a later undated Report to Caucus, in atg, 0149, box 17, fls – Caucus/Cab. 4 Penner memo to file, 18 August 1983; in atg, box 4, fls-1983. 5 Toronto Globe and Mail, 19 August 1983. 6 Penner, confidential letter to MacGuigan, 23 August 1983; in atg, box 4, fls – 1983. 7 Penner memo to Kostyra, 23 August 1983; in atg, box 4, fls – 1983. 8 Doer to Penner, 31 August 1983; in atg, box 19, fls – Unions.

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260 Notes to pages 119–29 9 Winnipeg Free Press, 27 August 1983. 10 Notes on the meeting are in atg, 0149, box 12, fls – Caucus-Cab. 11 See chapter 9 for an analysis of the two sets of hearings held in September 1983 and January 1984. 12 See appendix 2 for text of original amendment. 13 See Legislative Hearings, 6 September 1983, 61. 14 Penner to Twaddle, 7 September 1983, in atg, 0149, box 4, fls – 1983. 15 Toronto Globe and Mail, 7 September 1983; Winnipeg Free Press, editorial, 8 September 1983; Winnipeg Sun, 9 September 1983; Legislative Hearings, 8 September 1983, 228–32; La Liberté, editorial, 9 September 1983. 16 Winnipeg Sun, 7 September 1983. 17 In a nine-page opinion dated 14 September 1983, to R. Smith on the impact of the 6 September changes and in response to the mgea brief to the legislative committee. atg, box 4, fls – 1983. 18 Winnipeg Free Press, 8 September 1983; sfm Board Minutes, 7 September 1983, in g/s, box 4, file 35, 43–4. 19 Toronto Globe and Mail, 6 October 1983. 20 Toronto Globe and Mail, 15 September 1983; Winnipeg Free Press, 15, 17 September 1983; Toronto Globe and Mail, 22 September 1983. 21 Winnipeg Free Press, 17 September 1983. Similar comments by Quebec premier René Lévesque and his minister of education are quoted in Doern, The Battle over Bilingualism, 125. 22 Federation of Francophones outside Quebec. 23 Montreal Gazette, 29 September 1983. 24 Le Droit (Ottawa), 30 September 1983. 25 Montreal Gazette, 30 September 1983. 26 Maclean’s, 3 October 1983. 27 Winnipeg Free Press, 23 September 1983; see also Toronto Globe and Mail, 23 September 1983. 28 Toronto Globe and Mail, 27 September 1983. 29 Winnipeg Sun, 6 October 1983. 30 Winnipeg Free Press, 8 October 1983; Winnipeg Sun, 9 October 1983. 31 Winnipeg Free Press, 12 October 1983. Another version of events holds that Mulroney, far from selling out his less enthusiastic caucus members, had actually prevented Trudeau from presenting a much more radical resolution to the House, one that would have formally sought to amend the Manitoba Act directly, thereby entrapping the new Tory leader. See Joan Cohen column in Winnipeg Free Press, 8 October 1983. 32 Winnipeg Sun, 6 October 1983; Winnipeg Free Press, 7 October 1983; Winnipeg Sun, 7 October 1983; Toronto Globe and Mail, 7 October 1983; Winnipeg Free Press, 7 October 1983. 33 Winnipeg Free Press, 5 October 1983.

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261 Notes to pages 129–31 34 Frances Russell column in Winnipeg Free Press, 19 October 1983. 35 Estimates of the size of the crowd varied between a low of 2,150 (Winnipeg Free Press, 28 September 1983) and 3,000 (Léo Robert of the sfm, in R. Hébert, interview, 18 October 1997). The figure of 2,500 was often used later by various commentators. 36 Winnipeg Free Press, 28 September 1983. 37 Notre rêve, c’est d’abord que les droits négociés par Louis Riel soient respectés intégralement. Notre rêve, c’est de pouvoir utiliser notre langue librement face au gouvernment en-dehors de nos foyers et de nos écoles. Notre rêve, c’est qu’un jour nous puissions nous présenter devant un comité comme celui-ci en parlant notre langue seulement et être compris de tous. Notre rêve, c’est que nos concitoyens manitobains cessent une fois pour toutes de remettre en question notre identité et le rôle fondamental qu’ont joué nos ancêtres dans la fondation du Manitoba. Notre rêve, c’est l’égalité complète face à toutes les institutions gouvernementales de notre province, partout où nous sommes présents. The Robert speech can be found in the Legislative Hearings, 27 September 1983 at 789–92. 38 Winnipeg Sun, 27 July, 6 September 1983. 39 On a motion by Councillor Don Mitchelson, seconded by Councillor Abe Yanofsky (Winnipeg Free Press, 28 July 1983). Mitchelson’s motion referred to a referendum: some commentators distinguish between referenda and plebiscites, arguing that a plebiscite is, in effect, a nonbinding opinion poll. I shall adopt this distinction here and refer generally to plebiscites, since municipalities were not affected by the government proposals and therefore had no specific decision to take regarding them. The Mitchelson motion included a draft text of the plebiscite question, which indicates that Doern had already been lobbying some city councillors on the issue. 40 Winnipeg Sun, 1 September 1983. 41 Winnipeg Sun, 7 September 1983. Norrie informed Premier Pawley of the early draft of the plebiscite question on 29 July; Pawley responded on 9 August, pointing out that the question was based on an “erroneous premise,” namely, that the city of Winnipeg was an agency of the government of Manitoba, which clearly it was not; therefore, the city would “not [be] affected directly or indirectly by the proposed resolution.” Pawley to Norrie, 9 August 1983, in ec 0016. As with all the rural municipalities, this fact ultimately had no effect on the supporters of the plebiscite on city council, including Norrie himself. 42 Winnipeg Free Press, 9 September 1983. 43 Doern to Balsillie, 6 September 1983, ec 0016, box 8. 44 Doern, The Battle over Bilingualism, 124. 45 Winnipeg Sun, 13 September 1983. The ad ran in the Winnipeg Free Press on 10 September. For a discussion of Manitoba 23, see the next section.

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262 Notes to pages 131–4 46 atg, box 19, fls – Referendum. 47 See the detailed analysis by Terry Moore in “How the City Councillors Voted,” Winnipeg Free Press, 16 September 1983. 48 atg, box 19, fls – Referendum. Members of the ad hoc committee were Councillors Don Mitchelson, Evelyn Reese, and Phil Rizzuto. The wording proposed by Executive Policy Committee on 28 July was as follows: “Do you favour the proposal by the Government of Manitoba and Canada, and the Franco-Manitoban Society [sic] to amend the Constitution by making English and French the official languages of Manitoba, and entrenching French language services in Government Offices, Boards and Agencies? Yes or No.” 49 Doern, The Battle over Bilingualism, 126. The Executive Policy Committee finally recommended the following wording: “Should the Provincial Government withdraw its proposed constitutional amendment and allow the Bilodeau case to proceed to be heard and decided by the Supreme Court of Canada on the validity of the English only laws passed by the Legislature of Manitoba since 1890? Yes or No.” 50 Winnipeg Free Press, 14 September 1983. 51 G. Savoie motion, 14 September 1983, g/s, box 3, file 30, 200. 52 Winnipeg Free Press, 27 September 1983; Winnipeg Sun, 16 September 1983; Winnipeg Free Press, 21 September 1983, 17 September 1983. 53 Winnipeg Sun, 2 October 1983; Winnipeg Free Press, 16 September 1983; Toronto Globe and Mail, 16 September 1983; Letter to Winnipeg Free Press, 23 September 1983, atg, 0149, box 18, fls Corresp., to 30 September 1983; Winnipeg Free Press, 23, 24 September 1983. 54 Winnipeg Sun, 16 September 1983; the Winnipeg Free Press, however, said two unidentified lawyers had mentioned the same possibility that same day. 55 Toronto Globe and Mail, 17 September 1983. 56 sfm Board Minutes, 19 September 1983, in g/s, box 4, file 35, 46. 57 Winnipeg Sun, 18 September 1983; also Toronto Globe and Mail, 19 September 1983; Winnipeg Sun and Winnipeg Free Press, 28 September 1983; Winnipeg Sun, 29 September 1983; Winnipeg Sun and Winnipeg Free Press, 6 October 1983. 58 Doern, The Battle over Bilingualism, 136; Winnipeg Free Press, 22 October 1983; “Concerned Citizens for Yes Vote” telegram to S. Joyal, 16 October 1983, g/s, box 6, Loose Documents. 59 Montreal Gazette and Winnipeg Free Press, 5 October 1983. 60 Winnipeg Free Press, 20 October 1983. 61 Winnipeg Sun, 23 October 1983; Winnipeg Free Press, 22 October 1983; L. Robert, press release, 26 October 1983, sfm, box 30. 62 See “Ethnic Groups Back French” and “Francophones Find Allies,” Toronto Globe and Mail, 27 July 1983, and “Jewish Group Backs French,” Winnipeg Free Press, 30 July 1983.

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263 Notes to pages 134–6 63 Winnipeg Free Press, 20 and 23 August 1983; Toronto Globe and Mail, 20 August 1983. 64 sfm Board Minutes, 4 April 1983 and 18 April 1983; in g/s, box 6, sfm Minutes. 65 g/s, box 4, file 31, 7–28. 66 sfm Board Minutes, 30 August 1983; in g/s, box 6, sfm Minutes. 67 g/s, box 3, file 25, 186–7. 68 Other executive members elected were Dr Yantay S. Tsai, first vicepresident; Tony Tavares, second vice-president; Ferdinand Guiboche, secretary; and Myron Spolsky, treasurer. 69 Minutes of inaugural meeting, in sfm, box 42, 24.8.2. 70 sfm, box 51, 24.8.2. The September-October budget alone called for expenditures of $71,500, with a note indicating that these figures could double. 71 Winnipeg Free Press, 2 September and 19 September 1983; ibid., 22 October 1983. 72 Winnipeg Free Press, 31 August 1983; Manitoba 23 press release, 31 August 1983, in g/s, box 2, file 11, 26; Winnipeg Free Press and Winnipeg Sun August 1983; Winnipeg Free Press, 14 September 1983. 73 Kostyra to Penner, 7 October 1983, atg, box 4, fls – 1983. 74 Manitoba Intercultural Council to Kostyra, 27 September 1983, atg, box 4, fls – 1983. 75 Toronto Globe and Mail, 30 September 1983. 76 Winnipeg Free Press, 19 October 1983. 77 sfm Board Minutes, 19 September 1983, g/s, box 4, file 35, 45. 78 Legislative Hearings, 30 September 1983, 1002–3. 79 Spolsky to Anstett, 4 October 1983, atg, 0149, box 18, fls – mapal. 80 Kostyra to Penner, 7 October 1983; in atg, 0149, box 18, fls – mapal The text of the new section 23.10 was also presented at the public hearings. It read as follows: “Every resident in every school division in Manitoba shall have the right to receive his/her primary and secondary education in English and/or French and in any other language, provided, however, that the right to receive his/her education in a language in addition to English and/or French shall only occur when there is a sufficient number of students located in a school division which warrants the provision to them, out of public funds, of such education, including the necessary educational facilities and transportation.” Legislative Hearings, 30 September 1983, 1002. 81 Le Devoir (Montreal), 4 October 1983. 82 Spolsky, confidential letter to Pawley, 13 October 1983, ec 0016, box 8; W. Regehr, memo to Pawley, 27 October 1983, in ec 0016, box 7, Special File; Robert to Pawley, 17 October 1983, ec 0016, box 8. 83 Forest to Robert, 13 October 1983, sfm, box 42, 24.4/10; The sfm “appuie sans réserve le principe sous-jacent à cet article.” g/s, binder 9–12, file 12, 199.

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264 Notes to pages 137–47 84 This statement was an egregious error on O’Sullivan’s part; the date specified in the government proposal was 1 January 1994. 85 O’Sullivan to Wehrle, 28 July 1983, in atg, box 19, fls – Priv. Acts. 86 Wehrle to Pilkey, 12 August 1983, in atg, 0149, box 18, fls – Legal Opinions (Wehrle specified that “those organizations will expire on Jan. 1, 1994”); Penner to Wehrle, 18 August 1983, in atg, box 19, fls – Priv. Acts; Wehrle to “Dear Sir or Madam,” 19 September 1983, in g/s, box 3, file 30, 201–2; Tallin to Penner, 27 September 1983, in atg, box 19, fls – Priv. Acts. 87 Hearings, 30 September 1983, 999–1000. 88 Wehrle to Anstett, 3 October 1983, in atg, box 19, fls – Priv. Acts. 89 Yost to Penner, 12 October 1983, in atg, box 4, fls, 1983. 90 Winnipeg Sun, 12 October 1983; column by George Stephenson, ibid; Penner to Wehrle, 17 October 1983, in atg, box 4, fls – 1983; atg, box 19, fls – Priv. Acts; Penner to Wehrle, 4 January 1984, in atg, box 19, fls – Priv. Acts. 91 Winnipeg Free Press, 12 & 13 October 1983. 92 cmca press release, 14 October 1983, in sfm, box 42, 24.4/10; Winnipeg Free Press, 15 October 1983. 93 Doern, The Battle over Bilingualism, 141; Winnipeg Free Press, 19 October 1983; Winnipeg Sun, 19 October 1983; R. Hébert, interview with L. Robert, 18 October 1997. 94 The ads included the following: cmca ads in the Winnipeg Free Press, 16 October 1983 and in the Winnipeg Sun, 17 October 1983; cmca ads in the Winnipeg Sun, 20, 24, and 25 October 1983; sfm, full-page ad in the two Winnipeg dailies, 25 October (“A Message to our Friends and Neighbours,” featuring a large photo of Léo Robert’s bearded face); and two earlier ads financed by Manitoba 23, along with several radio spots. 95 Winnipeg Sun, 26 October 1983; Winnipeg Free Press, 25 October 1983. 96 Winnipeg Sun, 27 October 1983. 97 R. Guay, Examination for Discovery, vol. 1, 280–1. 98 Ibid.; Winnipeg Sun, 28 October 1983; Doern, The Battle over Bilingualism, 127. 99 Winnipeg Free Press, 28 October 1983. 100 Penner press release, 27 October 1983, atg, box 4, fls – 1983; Winnipeg Sun, editorial, 30 October 1983; Canadian Press report in Winnipeg Free Press, 28 October 1983; Winnipeg Sun, 28 October 1983. 101 Winnipeg Sun, 29 October 1983; see chapter 9. 102 Doern, The Battle over Bilingualism, 149, 150. 103 See chapter 9. 104 According to Guay, “The sfm first offered the Bill 115 scenario to the Province and not vice-versa.” See g/s, box 5, Print-Out, q. 959. Léo Robert recalled that Penner’s first reaction was, “What are you guys trying to do to

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265 Notes to pages 147–51

105 106 107

108 109

110 111

112 113

114

115 116

117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125

me!” (Hébert, interview with L. Robert, 14 August 1997). Robert later added that “After the results of the plebiscites, we knew it was lost, and that’s when we proposed a Bill” (Hébert, interview with Robert, 18 October 1997.) Szach to Penner, 24 October 1983, in atg, 0149, box 17, file – French Language Services Admin. Act. Doer to Pawley, 26 October 1983, in atg, box 4, fls – 1983. A confidential two-page document entitled “Option 2 – Timetable for French Language Services Strategy Committee is in atg, 0149, box 17, file – French Language Services Admin. Act. Winnipeg Sun, 8 November 1983. Ibid., 22 November 1983; Winnipeg Free Press, 23 November 1983; Winnipeg Sun, 23 November 1983; Winnipeg Free Press, 23 and 26 November 1983. Ibid., 16 November 1983. Smith talked several times with Anstett on 17 and 18 November 1983 (g/s, box 3, file 25, p. 193) and with Penner between 21 and 29 November 1983 (ibid., 194). On 1 December 1983, Smith had a long meeting with Penner. (g/s, box 5, Print-Out, q. 14, III). The Strategy Committee of the ndp Caucus was made up of fourteen members. See Anstett, 2 December 1983, memo to members, atg, 0149, box 17, fls – Caucus-Cabinet. g/s, box 3, file 22, 25–34, 224–34. Another draft of the Magnet bill is dated 2 December 1983; this is the draft that was transmitted by the sfm to Penner. atg, 0149, box 18, fls – Draft proposals and Stat. – Options. Winnipeg Free Press, 1 December 1983; Baird to Penner, 22 December 1983, in g/s, box 3, file 13, 35–41; Penner to Baird, 6 January 1984, g/s, Binder 9, file 13, 36; box 4, file 33, 207–8. ATG, box 4, FLS – ’83–’82. g/s, box 3, file 25, 204. Participants at the meeting included Anstett, Penner, and Lécuyer for the government (along with their advisors Kerr Twaddle, Rae Tallin, and Eugene Szach) and Léo Robert, Guay, and Ronald Bisson for the sfm. Magnet’s draft Official Languages Act. Guay, Examination for Discovery, 288–9. In g/s, box 3, file 27, 8–10. Twaddle to Anstett, 7 December 1983, atg, box 4, fls – 1983–82; emphasis added. Winnipeg Sun, 12 December 1983. In atg, box 18, fls – Draft proposals and Stat. Options. g/s, box 3, file 27, 32–50. Magnet opinion to sfm, 20 December 1983, g/s, box 3, file 27, 104–23; Magnet opinion, 14–15. Guay, Examination for Discovery, vol. 1, 326.

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266 Notes to pages 151–5 126 Personal interview with R. Guay, 31 December 2001. 127 Guay to Lamont, 28 December 1983, g/s, file 1a, 127 ff. Lamont accepted, in a letter to Guay dated 3 January 1984; in g/s, box 3, file 24, 100. Lamont was selected in part because he had been providing informal input to the Conservative Party in Manitoba (Guay, Examination for Discovery, vol. 1, 329) and was a counterweight to Magnet (R. Hébert, interview with R. Guay, 31 December 2001.) In early January, Lamont sent a copy of the new proposals to former Conservative premier Duff Roblin, in an attempt to get his support for them (Lamont to Roblin, 3 January 1984, g/s, box 3, file 24, 101). 128 Winnipeg Free Press, 23 December 1983; g/s, box 3, file 25, 207; Winnipeg Sun and Winnipeg Free Press, 30 December 1983; g/s, box 3, file 25, 207; g/s, box 6, file 24, 102. 129 Fax from L. Reynolds to E. Szach, 29 December 1983, atg, box 4, fls – 1983–82. 130 Trudeau fax to Pawley, 4 January 1984, atg, box 3, fls – 1983. Trudeau’s fax proposed changes to section 23.1 (the “right” instead of the “freedom” to use …); section 23.7 (any right, privilege or obligation) and section 23.8 (nothing in this Act shall be construed as requiring …). Szach and Twaddle sent their analysis of the prime minister’s proposed changes to Anstett on 5 January. They questioned why the word “right” should be substituted for “freedom” in section 23.1, since “right” was narrower than “freedom” and suggested drafting options. 131 Documented in g/s, box 3, file 25, 209, and file 18, 22. 132 Doer to Anstett, 3 January 1984, in atg, box 4, fls – 1984; Winnipeg Sun, 10 January 1984; ibid., 4 January 1984.

chapter seven 1 Winnipeg Free Press, 10 December 1983. 2 By Filmon’s own account, the request was hand-delivered; see Debates, 9 January 1984, at 5413. 3 Filmon to Pawley, 12 December 1983, atg, box 4, fls – 1983–82; Baird to Filmon, 13 December 1983, atg, 0149, box 18, fls – Legal Opinions. 4 Winnipeg Sun, 13 December 1983. 5 Pawley memo to ndp Caucus, 13 December 1983, ec 0016, box 7, 042. 6 Winnipeg Sun, 15 December 1983. 7 Filmon to Pawley, 14 December 1983, ec 0016, box 7, special file. 8 Winnipeg Free Press, 21 December 1983. 9 Winnipeg Sun, 20 December 1983. 10 Mackintosh, “Heading Off Bilodeau,” 280. 11 Filmon, letter to Anstett dated 3 January 1984, atg, 0149, box 17, fls – Caucus-Cab.

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267 Notes to pages 155–9 12 Winnipeg Sun, 5 and 6 January 1984; Winnipeg Free Press, 5 January 1984; Winnipeg Sun, 4 January 1984; Winnipeg Free Press, 5 January 1984. 13 Anstett speech, in Debates, 5 January 1984, 5376–8; the full text of the revised draft constitutional amendment is at 5378. 14 Ibid., 5379–80. 15 Ibid., 5387. 16 Winnipeg Sun, 10 January 1984; Winnipeg Free Press, 11 January 1984; Doern, The Battle over Bilingualism, 173. 17 Debates, 9 January 1984, 5412–26. 18 Ibid., 5420. 19 Debates, 11 January 1984, 5487, 5489, 5490. 20 Debates, 16 January 1984, 5578. Enns had been appointed by Filmon to replace Brian Ransom. 21 Debates, 20 January 1984. The legal opinion referred to is in Tallin to Mercier, 16 January 1984, and can be found in atg, 0149, box 17, fls – Caucus -Cab. 22 Debates, 5558–9. 23 Magnet to Robert, 9 January 1984, in g/s, binder 9, file 13, 42 ff. 24 17 January 1984; in sfm, box 51, 24.8/4. 25 Guay, Examination for Discovery, 332. 26 Winnipeg Free Press, 17 and 25 January 1984. 27 sfm Board Minutes, g/s, box 6, sfm Minutes; Blay, L’Article 23, 250. 28 Forest, Open Letter to sfm, 24 January 1984, in g/s, box 3, file 25, 215; Winnipeg Free Press, 18 January 1984; Toronto Globe and Mail, 19 January 1984. The employee was Gérald Boily; his letter is in g/s, binder 9, file 31, 264. See also Winnipeg Free Press, 1 February 1984. 29 R. Hébert interview with Penner, 4 June 1998. 30 Grassroots advertisement in the Winnipeg Free Press and the Winnipeg Sun, 1 and 2 February 1984. 31 Doern, The Battle over Bilingualism, 161. 32 Winnipeg Sun reporter Linda Williamson estimated the crowd at 2,000 (3 February 1984), Doern at 3,000 (The Battle over Bilingualism, 161). Winnipeg Free Press reporter David O’Brien counted “almost 2,500,” as did Free Press columnist Fred Cleverley (3 February 1984). 33 Winnipeg Free Press, 3 February 1984. The Western Canada Concept was an anti-French right-wing group espousing Western separatism and was founded by Doug Christie, the well-known defender of Holocaust deniers such as Ernst Zundel and Jim Keegstra. See Kinsella, Web of Hate, 87, 89. 34 Winnipeg Free Press, 3 February 1984. 35 L. Williamson, report in Winnipeg Sun, 3 February 1984. 36 Debates, 9 February 1984, 5927.

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268 Notes to pages 159–66 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

51

52

53

54 55 56

57 58

Ibid, 20 January 1984, 5615, 5623. Filmon was seconded by Bud Sherman. Ibid., 5624. Ibid., 5692. Ibid., 5738. Mackintosh, “Heading Off Bilodeau,” 281; Debates, 24 January 1984, 5678. Ibid., 26 January 1984, 5773. The crowd was estimated by reporters at eight hundred; Winnipeg Sun, 27 January 1984. Ibid. Debates, 27 January 1984, 5774–5. See chapter 9. Debates, 27 January 1984, 5777. See ibid., 5704. See Filmon speech, in Debates, 1 February 1984, 5828; ibid., 5883. The meeting had been engineered by Guay and came about through a contact made by John Lamont with Bud Sherman. See Lamont to Sherman, 23 January 1984, in g/s, box 2, binder 9, file 34, 235–6. Lamont to Guay, 28 January 1984; in g/s, Binder 9, file 34, 255–8. The text the sfm was willing to accept read as follows: “The English and French languages are of equal status in Manitoba for the purposes of this Act.” In g/s, box 3, file 24, 134. Guay and Smith later recalled that the initiative was a calculated risk, since no one among the sfm leaders believed the Tories would agree. An indication that they were right is found in the fact that Sterling Lyon himself did not attend the meeting of 25 January, and without his assent there would be no movement in the Opposition position. R. Hébert, interview with R. Guay and R. Smith, 31 December 2001. Draft letter from Guay to Robert, 28 January 1984; in g/s, box 3, file 18, 28–32, and binder 9, file 18, 28; also, Guay to Magnet, 31 January 1984, sfm, box 51, 24.8.3. Doern, The Battle over Bilingualism, 157. Winnipeg Sun, 5 February 1984. Winnipeg Free Press and Winnipeg Sun, 7 February 1984. A few days later, she received a new petition; along with the previous one, signatures now totalled twenty-four hundred. Dodick was a prime target of opponents of the proposals, since she was considered “soft” on the issue. Winnipeg Sun, 14 February 1984. Doern, The Battle over Bilingualism, 164, 166; Winnipeg Sun and Winnipeg Free Press, 9 February 1984. According to Doern, a group from the Interlake was present (The Battle over Bilingualism, 166), and in the House the next day, the opposition pointed out that ndp supporters had come from other ridings.

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269 Notes to pages 166–9 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72

73

74 75 76 77 78 79

80 81

George Stevenson, Winnipeg Sun, 7 February 1984. Ibid., 23 February 1984; Doern, The Battle over Bilingualism, 184. Ibid., 168. Ibid., 180. Ibid., 170. According to the Winnipeg Free Press (21 February 1984), the rally, which organizers called a “public meeting,” occurred on 19 February 1984. Winnipeg Free Press, 21 February 1984; Doern put the figure at 250 (The Battle over Bilingualism, 170). Ibid., 171, 189. Debates, 6 February 1984, 5862, 5870; ibid., 7 February 1984, 5882. Decter, confidential memo to Pawley, 7 February 1984, ec 0016, box 7, special file. Mackintosh, “Heading Off Bilodeau,” 287. Debates, 25 January 1984, 5743; 10 February 1984, 5973. Article by Don Braid in the Toronto Sun, 19 February 1984. Winnipeg Sun, 22 February 1984. This is documented in a memo from Greg Yost to Penner dated 21 February 1984, in which Yost describes a meeting with Lyon and the situation in the Conservative caucus; in atg, 0149, box 18, fls – Final. Doern, The Battle over Bilingualism, 184; Winnipeg Free Press, 22 February 1984; Walding to Anstett, 23 February 1984, ec 0016, box 7, Special File; Enns quoted in Russell article entitled “Six Letters That Led to Prorogation,” Winnipeg Free Press, 5 March 1984. Ibid. Winnipeg Free Press, 5 March 1984. Minutes of this meeting are in g/s, box 3, binder 10, 93. Montreal Gazette, 24 February 1984. Winnipeg Free Press, 24 February 1984. Anstett made this statement in an address to the West Winnipeg Rotary Club on 23 February 1984; it was reported in the 24 February editions of the Winnipeg Sun, Winnipeg Free Press, Toronto Star, and Toronto Sun. Toronto Globe and Mail, 25 February 1984. The resolution read as follows: “whereas the House, in a resolution adopted on October 6, 1983 with unanimous support from all Parties, invited the Government and Legislative Assembly of Manitoba to take action as expeditiously as possible to fulfil their constitutional obligations and to protect effectively the rights of the French-speaking minority of the province; whereas the House also endorsed on that occasion the essence of the agreement reached on 16 May 1983 by the Government of Canada and the Government of Manitoba, with the participation of the sfm; whereas the Government of Manitoba introduced in the Legislative Assembly of the province, on July 4, 1983, a constitutional resolution providing for the amendment of the Manitoba Act, 1870 and subsequently, amendments

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270 Notes to pages 169–72

82

83

84 85 86

87 88 89 90 91

92 93 94 95 96 97

thereto as well as a bill respecting public services which, together, are consistent with the essence of the agreement reached on May 16, 1983 by the Government of Canada and the Government of Manitoba; whereas the Legislative Assembly of Manitoba, after several months of debate, is being prevented from bringing the constitutional resolution to a vote, and therefore from fulfilling its constitutional obligations; (1) the House urges the Government of Manitoba to persist in its efforts to fulfil the constitutional obligations of the province and protect effectively the rights of its Frenchspeaking minority in a spirit of tolerance and civility, amity and generosity; (2) the House urges the Legislative Assembly of Manitoba to consider such resolution and legislation in an urgent manner so as to ensure their timely passage.” Hansard, 24 February 1984, 1710. See, e.g., Toronto Globe and Mail, 25 February 1984; St John TelegraphJournal, 25 February 1984; Winnipeg Free Press, 24 February 1984; Blay, L’Article 23, 263; London Free Press, 25 February 1984; Blay, L’Article 23, 260–1; Winnipeg Free Press, 27 and 28 February 1984. Anstett to Harapiak, 24 February 1984, ec 0016, box 7, special file; Debates, 27 February 1984, 6097; Canadian Press report published in St John Telegraph-Journal, 28 February 1984; Canadian Press report in Halifax Chronicle-Herald, 29 February 1984; Canadian Press report, 28 February 1984. Winnipeg Sun, 9 February 1984; Winnipeg Free Press, 9 and 22 February 1984. Ibid., 14 March 1984. House of Commons Debates, 18 March 1982, 15555–7. A good analysis of Walding’s dilemma, citing specific precedents and Sauvé’s decision, was published in the Winnipeg Free Press, 5 April 1984. 33 Victoria, chapter 3, 15. The sfm’s press release on that occasion is in g/s, binder 9, file 19, 44–8; Winnipeg Sun, 2 and 7 March 1984; Ottawa Citizen, 7 March 1984. Winnipeg Sun, 2 and 7 March 1984. Winnipeg Free Press, 5 March 1984; Winnipeg Sun, 6 April 1984; Montreal Gazette, 3 March, 10 April and 29 February 1984. London Free Press, 7 March 1984; Montreal Gazette and Toronto Globe and Mail, 8 March 1984; Montreal Gazette, 9 March 1984; Winnipeg Free Press, 10 March 1984, 9 March 1984. See chapter 8. Montreal Gazette, 3 March 1984. Toronto Star, 4 March 1984. Blay, L’Article 23, 272–3. Winnipeg Sun, 29 February 1984; Montreal Gazette, 29 February 1984, 30 September 1983. Ibid., 8 March 1984.

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271 Notes to pages 172–6 98 Penner to Baird, 29 February 1984, atg, 0149, box 17, file – Bilodeau – Supreme Court hearing.

chapter eight 1 Guay, Examination for Discovery, 91, 96, 83. 2 The tickets were issued to Manitoba lawyers Bob Betournay, Léa Duval, and Renald Guay; ibid., 96–7. 3 Ibid., 97, 101, 106, 111. 4 R. Hébert, interview with R. Guay and R. Smith, 31 December 2001. The meetings had been arranged by Senator Jos. Guay, who had assisted Smith, Guay, and the sfm in Ottawa on various occasions during the crisis. 5 In g/s, box 3, file 24, 67 ff. 6 See La Presse (Montreal), 5 March 1984. Smith also revealed the federal position to the Ottawa daily Le Droit, which denounced this “betrayal.” Le Droit, 9 March 1984. 7 Article by Peter Cowan in the Ottawa Citizen, 17 March 1984. 8 The four questions are in Guay’s handwriting, and the page is headed, questions (Rémi). In g/s, box 2, binder 10, file 36, p. 31; box 4, file 36, 31–2. 9 Ibid., file 18, 47. 10 See Le Droit (Ottawa), 9 March 1984. 11 See, e.g., article by M. Adam in La Presse (Montreal), 10 March 1984. 12 Winnipeg Free Press, 9 March 1984; Ottawa Citizen, 13 March 1984; Winnipeg Free Press, 15 March 1984. 13 Hand-written notes by Guay in g/s, box 2, binder 10, file 36, 38. 14 Winnipeg Free Press, 16 March 1984. 15 Renald Guay spoke to his father in Ottawa by phone several times between 14 and 16 March. Notes in g/s, box 4, file 32, 344. 16 g/s, box 2, Binder 10, file 24, 165. Notes concerning the MacGuigan letter are in g/s, box 3, file 18, 56. 17 Winnipeg Free Press, 17 March 1984. 18 Weston, Reign of Error, 47. 19 By telegram, 19 March 1984; in sfm, box 5, 24.8/9. 20 Winnipeg Free Press, 20, 21 March 1984; Financial Post, 31 March 1984; see also Weston, Reign of Error, 47. 21 Trudeau statement, in atg, 0149, box 17, file – Bilodeau – Supreme Court Hearing; Winnipeg Sun, 23 March 1984; MacGuigan to Penner, 21 March 1984, in atg, box 4, fls – 1984; Penner to MacGuigan, 28 March 1984, ibid. 22 She was the same Gilberte Proteau who, in an earlier term as sfm president, had taken a stand in favour of the “yes” side during the 1980 Quebec referendum.

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272 Notes to pages 177–80 23 Guay to Proteau, 2 April 1984, in g/s, box 3, file 2, 25; Proteau to Guay, 3 April 1984, g/s, box 2, binder 10, file 21, 26; g/s, box 3, file 21, 28; sfm Board Minutes, 8 April 1984, in g/s, box 6, loose documents. 24 Trudeau to Proteau, 7 May 1984, in sfm, box 51, 24.8/1. The fax is dated 3 April 1984, in g/s, box 3, file 33, 266–72. It contains a draft of MacGuigan’s 5 April 1984 statement (see below), including the reference questions. The four draft questions announced by MacGuigan bear a striking resemblance to the skeletal 29 February handwritten questions in Guay’s files referred to above. This means that through most of March, MacGuigan and his supporters had expended most of their energy resisting the reference. When Cabinet took the decision to go ahead with it in late March, MacGuigan finally adopted wording developed essentially by Guay and Magnet. All of this corroborates a statement made by Guay during his Examination for Discovery, to the effect that “very interestingly, we [Magnet and himself] in fact framed the question” (396). 25 Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, News Release, 5 and 10 April 1984. 26 Proteau to Pawley, 8 June 1984, in sfm, box 51, 24.3/4. 27 See below. 28 Winnipeg Sun, 11 April 1984. 29 Copies of the Notice of Motion and Affidavits are in sfm, box 52, 24.8/16. 30 In his affidavit, Newbound said he was president of a group called Canadians for One Canada. 31 Twaddle to Penner, 2 May 1984; in atg, 0149, box 17, Bilodeau – Supreme Court hearing. 32 Winnipeg Sun, 19 April 1984, 3 May 1984; Le Devoir and La Presse (Montreal), 26 April 1984; Winnipeg Sun, 25 April 1984. 33 Elton to Penner, 5 November 1984; in atg, box 19, fls – Transl. – Stat. 34 Penner to McLean, 27 September 1984; in atg, fls – 1984. 35 McLean to Penner, 3 December 1984; ibid. 36 Reference re Language Rights under Section 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870, and Section 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867. [1985] 1 s.c.r. 721, 19 d.l.r. (4th) 1, [1985] w.w.r. 385, 35 Man. R. (2nd) 83; hereinafter, The Reference decision. 37 Winnipeg Sun, 14 and 16 June 1985; Winnipeg Free Press, 15 June 1985; Toronto Globe and Mail, 14 June 1985; Winnipeg Free Press, 14 June 1985. 38 Full text is also in ec 0016, box 7, 042. 39 Toronto Globe and Mail, 14 June 1985. 40 Sabourin was elected president of the sfm on 2 March 1985. 41 Toronto Globe and Mail, 14 June 1985; Winnipeg Free Press, 5 July 1985; Toronto Globe and Mail, 14 and 15 June 1985; Winnipeg Free Press, 14 June 1985; Toronto Globe and Mail, 28 June 1985; Winnipeg Free Press, 15 June 1985.

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273 Notes to pages 180–7 42 Winnipeg Sun, 16 June 1985. 43 Quoted in a Frances Russell column, Winnipeg Free Press, 13 July 1985. 44 Winnipeg Sun, 16 and 23 June and 1985; Toronto Globe and Mail, 14 and 15 June 1985. 45 Ibid. 46 In a letter to the Winnipeg Free Press, 29 June 1985. 47 Winnipeg Sun, 19 June and 7 July 1985; Winnipeg Free Press, 12 July 1985. 48 Winnipeg Sun, 28 June 1985. 49 17 July 1985; in atg, box 1, fls – Correspondence. 50 Winnipeg Free Press, 5 July 1985. 51 In atg, box 1, fls – Correspondence. 52 Winnipeg Free Press, 3, 4 and 5 July 1985. 53 T. Elton to Penner, 25 June 1985, in atg, box 1, “Current House Business,” June 1985. 54 atg, box 1, fls – Validation and Action Plan; the second document is dated 8 July 1985. 55 Ibid. 56 In his 25 June 1985 memo to Penner; see note 53. 57 sfm to Penner, 12 July 1985; in sfm, box 52, 24.8/16. 58 In a letter to Sabourin dated 29 July 1985; in sfm, box 52, 24.8/16. 59 Elton memo to Penner, 2 August 1985; in atg, box 1, fls – Corresp. 60 Sabourin to Decter, 31 July 1985; in sfm, box 51, 24.3/4. 61 sfm, box 52, 24.8/16. 62 Winnipeg Free Press, 8 August 1985 and undated Supreme Court order in atg, box 1, fls – Validation and Action Plan. 63 atg, box 1, folder – Validation Plan. 64 Elton to Penner, 4 September 1985; in atg, box 1 – folder – Validation Plan. 65 In the atg files there is a binder containing 1 the factums of the parties – atg Canada and atg Manitoba; 2 factums of the intervenors, sfm, N. Brunswick, R. Bilodeau; 3 the Affidavits; 4 the decision of the Supreme Court (88 pages). atg, 0149, box 2. 66 Il paraît clair que M. Elton préfère négocier que de faire face à une opposition farouche en cour le 15 novembre. Bastarache to Sabourin, 19 September 1985, in sfm, box 52, 24.8/16. 67 Ibid. 68 At a meeting with sfm president Réal Sabourin on 3 October 1985. sfm, box 51, 24.7/1. 69 Winnipeg Free Press, 17 October 1985. On 26 September 1985, sfm lawyer Michel Bastarache invited counsel for various parties – Gérald Beaudoin, Stephen Scott, Brad Smith, and Rhéal Forest – to a meeting scheduled for 11 October at McGill University, “en vue de nous entendre sur une position commune.” sfm, box 52, 24.8/16.

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274 Notes to pages 187–92 70 Ibid. The group was the Comité pour l’intégration du français à la pratique du droit au Manitoba. 71 atg, box 1, fls – Corresp. 72 Baird to Pawley and Penner, 26 September 1985; ibid. 73 Winnipeg Free Press, 2 October 1985. 74 R. Fontaine, letter dated 2 October 1985; in sfm, box 52, 24.8/16. 75 In sfm, box 51, 24.8/5. 76 Ibid. 77 Emphasis added. 78 atg, box 1, fls – Corresp. 79 R. Fontaine to Decter, 25 October 1985, in sfm, box 51, 24.3/2. The meeting was set for 5 p.m., 28 October, in the Cabinet room. In attendance were Pawley, Desjardins, Lécuyer, Decter, and Turenne for the government and sfm president Réal Sabourin, vice-president Lucille Blanchette, executive director René Fontaine, and political analyst Charles Gagné. 80 Winnipeg Free Press, 31 October 1985. 81 In sfm, box 52, 24.8/16. 82 Minutes of the 15 November 1985 Advisory Committee on French Language Services, as amended at the 31 January 1986 meeting, in Turenne files; emphasis added. 83 Sabourin to Forest, 13 November 1985; in sfm, box 51, 24.8/3. 84 Ibid. 85 Winnipeg Sun, 4 November 1985. 86 Forest’s affidavit, dated 4 November 1985, is in atg, box 1, Validation Plan – Misc. 87 Penner, “Submission to Cabinet,” 21 October 1985; in atg, box 1, Validation Plan – Misc. 88 Penner to Mercier, 23 December 1985, in atg, box 3, untitled. 89 The estimate is in a document entitled “The Validation of Manitoba’s Laws,” dated 3 June 1986, in atg, box 1, Misc. – fls. 90 Winnipeg Free Press, 9 September 1986. A two-page document in Manitoba’s Legislative Library entitled “The Validation of Manitoba’s Laws – A Summary of Departmental Activity” confirms this estimate, which was the final one. 91 Blay, L’Article 23, 299. 92 Sabourin’s eight-page speech is in sfm, box 51, 24.8.8. 93 Winnipeg Free Press, 6 November 1985. 94 Ibid. 95 R. Hébert, interview with G. Jourdain, 5 April 1988. 96 Reference decision, at 66. 97 Winnipeg Free Press, 5 November 1985. 98 Winnipeg Free Press, 7 and 8 November 1985; ec 0016, box 4. 99 Winnipeg Free Press, 8, 9, 10, 13, and 19 November 1985; Filmon to I.

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275 Notes to pages 192–6 Merritt, 4 February 1986, quoted in Winnipeg Sun, 19 February 1986. Filmon hastily reversed his stand in a second letter to Merritt on 17 February 1986, saying, “Manitoba has never been officially bilingual.” 100 Blay, L’Article 23, 308; emphasis added. Many year later, the Supreme Court adopted a different doctrine that strongly implies that summones indeed have to be issued in both languages. See R. v. Beaulac [1999] 1 R.S.C. 101 Winnipeg Sun, 2 May 1986. 102 Toronto Globe and Mail, 2 May 1986. 103 Penner to Pawley, 18 February 1987, in ec 0016, box 17. 104 atg, box 19, fls – sfm. 105 In a memo dated 18 November 1985. 106 atg, box 1, Validation Plan – Misc. 107 ec 0016, box 7, 042. Members of the Advisory Committee for the Pawley government were Executive Council Clerk Michael Decter, Roger Turenne, and Paul Hart of the Civil Service Commission. sfm representatives were René Fontaine, sfm executive director; Paul Ruest, rector of Collège universitaire de Saint-Boniface; and Raymond Hébert, a political studies professor at Collège universitaire de Saint-Boniface. 108 A report on this meeting was sent by A.E. Proulx to Gordon Pilkey on 14 May 1982. In atg, box 19, fls – Transl. – Stat., 1 November 1981 to 31 December 1983. 109 Pawley to Proteau, 13 August 1984; in atg, box 4, fls – 1984. 110 atg, box 3, 1984 – Press Clippings; ec 0016, box 7, 042; 20 July 1984 memo from Decter to all Deputy Ministers, in ec 0016, box 7; ec 0016, box 7. 111 ec 0016, box 7, special file – 1983; Turenne to Pawley, 17 May 1985. The Cabinet subcommittee was scheduled to meet on 21 May 1985. In ec 0016, box 7, special file. 112 The results were ndp, 30; pc, 26; Liberals, 1. 113 Sabourin to Penner, 26 March 1986; in atg, box 1, fls – Corresp; ec 0016, box 7; Turenne to Ford, 7 January 1987, in ec 0016, box 7. 114 ec 0016, box 7. 115 Ibid. 116 See Turenne’s analysis of the mgea’s position and follow-up memo to Ford, 4 March 1987, and Pawley’s response, 25 March 1987, ibid. 117 On 27 January 1987, Pawley sent letters to Filmon and Carstairs regarding the implementation of French-language services, attaching copies of his government’s new policy. Ibid. 118 Ford to G. Doer, D. Zasada, G. Forrest, D. Chenier, and C. Kang, ibid. 119 “French-Language Services in Manitoba,” a brochure published by the Manitoba government’s French-language services secretariat. 120 Unless specified otherwise by the Minister responsible for Frenchlanguage services. 121 Subject to the qualification in note 120.

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276 Notes to pages 197–205 122 123 124 125

See chapter 7. Winnipeg Free Press, 7 October 1996. Reference Re Manitoba Language Rights [1992] 1 s.c.r. 212. La Division scolaire franco-manitobaine, or dsfm. The history of Frenchlanguage education in Manitoba would fill another book and is obviously beyond the scope of the present study. 126 Chartier, Above All, Common Sense. 127 Ibid., vii, 44–6; The Current Situation of French-Language Services in Manitoba – The Dubé Report, quoted in the Chartier report. 128 Chartier, Above All, Common Sense, 110.

chapter nine 1 Debates, 5460. 2 Standing Committee on Privileges and Elections, 31–32, Elizabeth II 1983–84; hereinafter Hearings, 1303. 3 Debates, 5830, 5835. 4 Ibid., 5461, 5471, 5501, 5529, 5728, 5929, 5992–3. 5 Ibid., 5567. 6 Ibid., 6007. 7 Ibid., 5817, 6026. 8 Ibid., 5895, 5900, 5928. 9 Ibid., 5920, 5935. 10 Hearings, 1329, 1331–3. 11 Ibid., 1343–7. 12 Schulz used the word “blackmail” at the antigovernment rally in Winnipeg’s Convention Centre on 2 February 1984. See Winnipeg Free Press, 3 February 1984. 13 See chapter 3. 14 ec 0016, boxes 4, 7, and 8. 15 Photo in Winnipeg Free Press, 26 July 1984. 16 See chapter 7. 17 Winnipeg Free Press, 28 January and 27 February 1984; ibid., 1 February 1983; Winnipeg Sun, 27 February 1984. 18 Winnipeg Free Press, 16 April 1984. 19 Sher, White Hoods, 24–5. 20 Winnipeg Free Press, 24 February 1984. 21 See chapter 7. 22 Winnipeg Free Press, 28 January 1984. For more information on Gostick, his associates, and his activities, see Kinsella, Web of Hate. According to Kinsella, the league, founded by Gostick in 1968, had over ten thousand members across Canada by the early 1980s; it “opposed foreign aid, sex-

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277 Notes to pages 206–10

23

24

25 26 27 28 29 30

31 32

33 34 35

36 37

ual permissiveness, abortion, gun control, the Anti-Defamation League of the B’nai Brith, the United Church, pro-Communist Jews, race-mixing and fluoridation.” Ibid., 382–3. Premier Pawley estimated at 5,500 the number of names collected by Kelly; he deplored the fact that Kelly and the others were afraid to leave the names with the lieutenant-governor. Debates, 8 February 1984, 5886. Winnipeg Free Press, 1 February 1984. The author has not found on the record any Tory denunciation of extreme right-wing elements among opponents of the government proposals; apparently they were glad to get the help. Kinsella, Web of Hate, 87. Winnipeg Free Press, 18 November 1980. Ibid., 2 February 1983. Ibid., 31 May 1984. Emphasis added. Emphasis added. A copy of this letter is in Penner’s files (atg, box 1, fls – Correpondence); a signed copy is in Pawley’s files (ec 0016, box 7, special file). Winnipeg Free Press, 5 July 1985. In letters to the Winnipeg Free Press, 6 July 1985 and 13 February 1986. The wwc had earlier participated in the Grassroots rally at the Winnipeg Convention Centre on 2 February 1984; see chapter 7. Winnipeg Sun, 19 February 1986. See e.g., Hearings, 1429. Blay, L’Article 23, 304; Winnipeg Free Press, 8 November 1985; Blay, L’Article 23, 303; Winnipeg Free Press, 31 January 1986; ibid., 28 January 1986; see also article by Peter Warren, Winnipeg Sun, 9 February 1986. Winnipeg Free Press, 31 January 1986. Letter to Penner, in atg, 0149, box 18, Corresp. – to 30 Sptember 1983.

chapter ten 1 Breton, “The Production and Allocation of Public Ressources,” 125; emphasis in text. 2 Ibid., 127. 3 Breton adds a laconic note that goes a long way towards explaining the link between metrification and bilingualism that several municipalities and others made during the language crisis: “One could perhaps add the introduction of the metric system as another illustration, since I suspect it was perceived by many as part of the same movement away from a Britishmodelled symbolic order.” Ibid., 129. 4 Ibid., 132.

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278 Notes to pages 210–15 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

22 23 24 25 26

Robin, Shades of Right, 50. Rae, “Roots of Prairie Society,” 46. Ibid., 51; emphasis added. Ibid. Ibid., 50. Toronto Globe and Mail, 14 June 1985. Hofstadter, Paranoid Style, 3. Turenne’s summary, in memo to Pawley et al., 6 July 1983; in atg, box 3, fls – 1983. Institute for Social and Economic Research, Research Bulletin, 11. The iser question was as follows: “In general, are you for or against the Manitoba government’s proposal to secure French-language rights in this province?” Among Winnipeg respondents, 53.7 percent were opposed and 29.4 percent were in favour. Among non-Winnipeg respondents, 58.9 percent were opposed and 21.6 percent in favour. Among all respondents, 55.9 percent were opposed and 26.2 percent were in favour. iser used a simple random sampling procedure to obtain 1,500 residential telephone numbers from within Manitoba, and a total of 954 useable interviews were obtained. Tests were made to measure sample quality, and the sample was “shown to be closely representative of the province as a whole.” Frances Russell, in Winnipeg Free Press, 17 September 1983. Toronto Globe and Mail, editorial, 15 September 1983. Churchill and Smith, “The Time Has Come.” Debates, 3 August 1983, 4814; 4 August 1983, 4900; 5 August 1983, 4974, 6026. See chapter 4. Ibid. Ibid. Authoritarian submission involves a “high degree of submission to the authorities who are perceived to be established and legitimate in the society in which one lives” (Altemeyer, The Authoritarian Specter, 6). For opponents of the government proposals, Lyon and Doern were the legitimate leaders of Manitoba society, and Pawley and Penner were “aliens,” in the Opposition’s own words. The legitimate leaders were to be followed unquestioningly. See chapter 9. Altemeyer, Enemies of Freedom, 53, 101; see also The Authoritarian Specter, 24–5, 274–6. See chapter 9. Morton, Manitoba: A History, 229. Thorsell, “Has the West Been Won?”, 21–3.

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279 Notes to pages 216–20 27 In his work, Altemeyer also found that “Highs [persons ranking high on the right-wing authoritarianism scale] have somewhat lower economic and socioeconomic standing than others do.” Altemeyer, Enemies of Freedom, 165. 28 Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style, 54. 29 Altemeyer, Enemies of Freedom, 165. 30 Hébert, “The Ethnicity Factor.” 31 Quoted in Altemeyer, The Authoritarian Specter, 40. Emphasis added. 32 Ibid. 33 See chapter 5. 34 Altemeyer, The Authoritarian Specter, 346; emphasis in text. 35 Ibid., 282–3. 36 Conservative mla Don Orchard deplored the government’s “closing off” the public hearings on 31 January, with fifteen people still on the list. Debates, 6007. 37 See chapter 7. 38 Altemeyer also pointed out to the author various other links one might make with authoritarianism theory in analyzing the French-language crisis. For instance, “Highs” have trouble reasoning, especially in forming correct inferences (see The Authoritarian Specter, chapter 4). Because the debate revolved around technical issues and distant historical facts, Highs were probably glad to have it reduced to the simple terms of “us” versus “them.” In addition, Highs have low standards for “evidence” that leads to conlusions they like; thus, if their leaders’ arguments did not make sense, it did not much matter to them. Finally, Highs are dogmatic, and they were thus more receptive to the Tories’ unbending stand. Personal communication, B. Altemeyer to R. Hébert, August 1997. 39 R. Payne, in Altemeyer, The Authoritarian Specter, 310. 40 Altemeyer, Enemies of Freedom, 243. 41 Altemeyer, The Authoritarian Specter, 268. Average scores of Conservative legislators from other provinces ranged from about 170 to just over 180; the average score of Western Reform mps was just over 170. If one compares the Manitoba Conservative (1983 caucus) scores with those of u.s. legislators, one finds they are exceeded only by Republicans in Southern states and a group of Republican legislators from New Jersey. Ibid., 292. 42 “Canada should be an English-speaking country from shore to shore; French speakers are no more entitled to special rights than any other minority group.” 43 Altemeyer, Enemies of Freedom.

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p r i m a ry s o u rc e s Manuscript Collections Bilodeau, Roger. Complete personal files on the Manitoba French-language crisis, courtesy of Roger Bilodeau. Guay-Smith files on the French-language crisis, courtesy of Renald Guay and Rémi Smith. 6 boxes. Manitoba Attorney-General. Office files on the French-language crisis, 1981– 86. Manitoba Archives. atg 0149, boxes 1–4 and 16–20. Manitoba Executive Council. Files on the French-language crisis, 1981–86. Manitoba Archives ec, boxes 7 and 8. Manitoba French-Language Services Secretariat. Various internal documents. Russell, Frances. Complete personal files on Manitoba French-language crisis, courtesy F. Russell. Société Franco-Manitobaine (sfm). Files on French-language crisis. In sfm Archives. Government Records Attorney-General of Manitoba v. Forest, 1979. 2 s.c.r. 1032, 101 d.l.r. (3rd) 385, 1980. 2 w.w.r. 758, 2 Man. r. (2nd) 109; aff’g., 1979. 98 d.l.r. (3d) 405, 1979. 4 w.w.r. 229 (Man. c.a.). A.G. (Quebec) v. Blaikie et al. (Blaikie No. 2), 1981. s.c.r. 312.

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282 Bibliography Bilodeau v. Attorney-General of Manitoba, 1981. 5 w.w.r. 393, 10 Man. r. (2nd) 298 (c.a.). Blaikie v. Attorney General of Quebec et al., Dec. 13, 1979. (Blaikie No. 1). 30 n.r. 226. Canada. The Constitution Act, 1982. – Secretary of State. Address by the Honourable Serge Joyal to the Annual Meeting of the Société Franco-Manitobaine, 19 March 1983. Manitoba. Civil Service Commission. Position Description, Position ex 005. – Debates and Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of Manitoba. 1st Session, 28th Legislature, 1966–67. – Debates and Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of Manitoba. 2nd Session, 29th Legislature, 1970. – Debates and Proceedings, 31st Legislature, 1977–81. – Debates and Proceedings, 32nd Legislature, 1981–86. The Manitoba Act, 1870. 33 Victoria, c. 3. Manitoba Archives. List of Rights Drawn Up by the Provisional Governing Council of the Métis Nation as the Formal Conditions for the Entry of Rupert’s Land into Confederation, December 1, 1869. Manitoba Information Services Branch. Various press releases. R. v. Beaulac [1999] 1 S.C.R. Reference re Language Rights under Section 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870, and Section 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867, 1985. s.c.r. 721, 19 d.l.r. (4th) 1, 1985. w.w.r. 385, 35 Man. r. (2nd) 83. Newspapers and Periodicals La Liberté. Language and Society. Toronto Globe and Mail. Winnipeg Free Press. Winnipeg Tribune. Winnipeg Sun.

s e c o n da ry s o u rc e s Adorno, T.W., Else Frenkel-Brunswick, et al. The Authoritarian Personality. New York: W.W. Norton, 1982 (first published, New York: Harper & Row 1950). Allport, Gordon W. The Nature of Prejudice. Reading, ma: Addison-Wesley 1979 (first ed. pub. 1954, 2nd ed. 1958). Altemeyer, Bob. The Authoritarian Specter. Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press 1996. – Enemies of Freedom: Understanding Right-Wing Authoritarianism. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass 1988.

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283 Bibliography – Right-Wing Authoritarianism. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press 1981. Bailey, Donald A. “French-Language Rights in the Province: What Should Manitobans Know?” Talk given before the Manitoba Social Studies Teachers’ Association, Winnipeg, 17 October 1986. – “The Plight of Manitoba French.” Winnipeg Free Press, 28 May 1988. Bale, Gordon. “Law, Politics and the Manitoba School Question: Supreme Court and Privy Council.” Canadian Bar Review 63, no. 3 (1985): 461–518. Blay, Jacqueline. L’Article 23: Les péripéties législatives et juridiques du fait français au Manitoba, 1870–1986. Saint-Boniface, mb: Les Editions du Blé 1987. Borins, Sandford F. Le français dans les airs: Le conflit du bilinguisme dans le contrôle de la circulation aérienne au Canada. Montréal: Chenelière et Stanké 1983. Breton, Raymond. “The Production and Allocation of Symbolic Resources: An Analysis of the Linguistic and Ethnocultural Fields in Canada.” Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 21, no. 2 (1984): 123–44. Breton, Raymond, Jeffrey G. Reitz, and Victor F. Valentine. Les frontières culturelles et la cohésion du Canada. Montréal: L’Institut de recherches politiques 1981. Chartier, Richard. Above All, Common Sense – Avant toute chose le bon sens. Winnipeg: Government of Manitoba 1998. Churchill, Stacey, and A.M. Smith, “The Time Has Come.” Language and Society 19 (April 1987): 4–8. Comeault, Gilbert-Louis. “‘L’Affaire Forest’: Franco-Manitobans in Search of Cultural and Linguistic Duality.” In Raymond Breton and Pierre Savard, eds., The Quebec and Acadian Diaspora in North America. Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario 1982, 101–21. – The Politics of the Manitoba School Question and its Impact on L.-P.-A. Langevin’s Relations with Manitoba’s Catholic Minority Groups. ma thesis, Department of History, University of Manitoba, 1977. Creighton, Donald. Canada’s First Century. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada 1970. Dauphinais, Luc. Histoire de Saint-Boniface. Vol. 1, À l’ombre des cathédrales. Saint-Boniface, mb: Les Éditions du Blé 1991. Delisle, Esther. Le Traître et le Juif. Montréal: L’Étincelle 1992. Deschênes, Jules. Ainsi parlèrent les tribunaux: Conflits linguistiques au Canada, 1968–1980. Montréal: Wilson et Lafleur 1980. – Ainsi parlèrent les tribunaux: Conflits linguistiques au Canada. Vol. 2, 1968–1985. Montréal: Wilson et Lafleur 1985. Doern, Russell. The Battle over Bilingualism: The Manitoba Language Question, 1983–85. Winnipeg: Cambridge Publishers 1985. Dorge, Lionel. Introduction à l’étude des Franco-Manitobains. Saint-Boniface, mb: La Société Historique 1973.

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284 Bibliography Flanagan, Thomas. Métis Lands in Manitoba. Calgary: University of Calgary Press 1991. Friesen, Gerald. The Canadian Prairies: A History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1984. Graham, Ron. One-Eyed Kings: Promise and Illusion in Canadian Politics. Don Mills, on: Collins Publishers 1987. Guay, Renald. Examination for Discovery. 2 vols. In Renald Guay vs La Société Franco-Manitobaine and La Société Franco-Manitobaine vs. Renald Guay, Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench, 25, 26, and 27 February and 26 March 1985. Hébert, Raymond. “The Ethnicity Factor in the 1983 City of Winnipeg FrenchLanguage Plebiscite.” Unpublished paper presented to Professor Rita Bienvenue, Sociology 77.735, University of Manitoba, 12 May 1988. – “Historique de la législation scolaire au Manitoba.” Revue de l’Association canadienne d’éducation de langue française 6, no. 2 (1977), 11–15. – “Les implications de décisions juridiques récentes pour l’éducation française dans l’Ouest.” In La langue, la culture et la société des francophones de l’Ouest: Actes du quatrième colloque du Centre d’études franco-canadiennes de l’Ouest. Winnipeg: Collège universitaire de Saint-Boniface 1984, 171–80. – “The Manitoba French-Language Crisis, 1983–84: Origins and Early Legislative Debates.” phd diss., University of Manitoba, 1991. Hofstadter, Richard. The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1964. Institute for Social and Economic Research. Research Bulletin: Attitudes of the Manitoba Population toward Bilingualism Policies Proposed by the Provincial Government. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba 1983. Kinsella, Warren. Web of Hate: Inside Canada’s Far Right Network. Toronto: HarperCollins Perennial 1995. Leblanc, Paul-Emile. “L’enseignement français au Manitoba, 1916–1968.” ma thesis, Université d’Ottawa 1968. Lower, J.A. Canada: An Outline History. Toronto: Ryerson Press 1966. Mackintosh, Gordon H.A. “Heading Off Bilodeau: Attempting Constitutional Amendment.” Manitoba Law Journal 15, no. 3 (1986): 271–93. Magnet, Joseph Eliot. Official Languages of Canada. Cowansville, qc: Les Éditions Yvon Blais 1995. – “Validity of Manitoba Laws after Forest: What Is to Be done?” Manitoba Law Journal 10 1980: 241–52. Manguel, Alberto. “Our Town.” Saturday Night, November 1985, 46–54. Morton, W.L. Manitoba: A History. 2nd ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1967. – Manitoba: The Birth of a Province. Altona, mb: D.W. Friesen & Sons 1965. Newman, Warren. “Linguistic Rights in Manitoba: The Strange Case of Georges Forest.” Research paper presented to the Civil Liberties Class, Faculty of Law, McGill University, 1979.

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285 Bibliography Painchaud, Robert. Un rêve français dans le peuplement de la Prairie. SaintBoniface, mb: Les Éditions des Plaines 1987. Proteau, Gilberte. “Official Bilingualism and Multiculturalism.” Speech given to the Twenty-fifth Congress of the Union of Ukrainian Canadian Students, University of British Columbia, August 1984. Rae, J.E. “The Roots of Prairie Society.” In David P. Gagan, ed., Prairie Perspectives: Papers of the Western Canadian Studies Conference. Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada 1969, 46–55. Robin, Martin. Shades of Right: Nativist and Fascist Politics in Canada, 1920– 1940. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1992. Romanow, Roy, John Whyte and Howard Leeson. Canada … Notwithstanding: The Making of the Constitution, 1976–1982. Toronto: CarswellMethuen 1984. Russell, Frances. The Canadian Crucible: Manitoba’s Role in Canada’s Great Divide. Winnipeg: Heartland Associates 2003. St-Onge, Nicole J.M. Race, Class and Marginality: A Métis Settlement in the Manitoba Interlake, 1850–1914. phd diss., University of Manitoba, 1990. – “Métis and Merchant Capital in Red River: The Decline of Pointe à Grouette, 1860–1885.” ma thesis, University of Manitoba, 1983. Sharpe, Robert J., and Kent Roach. Brian Dickson: A Judge’s Journey. Toronto: University of Toronto Press and Osgoode Society 2003. Sheppard, Claude-Armand. The Law of Languages in Canada. Study no. 10 of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Ottawa: Information Canada 1971. Sher, Julian. White Hoods: Canada’s Ku Klux Klan. Vancouver: New Star Books 1983. Sprague, D.N. Canada and the Métis, 1869–1885. Waterloo, on: Wilfrid Laurier University Press 1988. Stanley, George F.G. Louis Riel. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson 1985 (first published, Ryerson Press 1963). Thorsell, William. “Has the West Been Won?” Language and Society 16 (1985): 21–3. Wardaugh, Ronald. Language and Nationhood: The Canadian Experience. Vancouver: New Star Books 1983. Weston, Greg. Reign of Error: The Inside Story of John Turner’s Troubled Leadership. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson 1988. Wordsnorth Communication Services. Attitudes towards Constitutional Amendment: French Language Services in Manitoba. Winnipeg: Wordsnorth Communication Services 1983.

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Index

Adam, Pete, 78, 88 Allan, Nancy, 87, 111 Alliance Quebec, 92 Altemeyer, Bob, 214, 218, 220 Anstett, Andy, 88, 94, 166, 195; bell-ringing agreement, 167, 170; House vote wrangle, 168, 169; joins Cabinet, 147– 8; role in disentrenchment, 148–9, 151– 2, 155, 156 Archambault, Gérard, 23 Association d’éducation des CanadiensFrançais du Manitoba, 13, 17 Association of Urban Municipalities (aum), 213 authoritarianism, 211–14, 220–1 Axworthy, Lloyd, 169; on plebiscite, 132; and Supreme Court reference, 174, 175, 176 Baird, Vaughan: as amendment advocate, 154, 193; as Bilodeau’s lawyer, 40, 187; opinion of draft amendment, 56, 57, 61–2, 69; on timidity of sfm, 23 Balan, Bill, 94 Balsillie, Alice, 131 Bandura, A., 217 Banman, Bob, 212–13 Barrett case, 12 Bastarache, Michel, 184–5, 186–7 Beetz, Jean, 183

Begg, Alexander, 211 Bend, Bobby, 161 Bennett, Mary-Jane, 191 Bertrand v. Dussault and Lavoie, 16 Bétournay, Robert, 35 bilingual community service centres, 197 bilingual services: bartered in amendment negotiations, 59, 61, 64–5, 66, 67–9; federal money for, 178; Lyon government policy, 37–8, 45–7; in Pawley government amendments, 97–8, 188. See also translation of laws and statutes Bill 2: Conservatives belief in, 200–1; declared invalid, 179; passed, 38–40 Bill 59, 18–19 Bill 101 (Quebec), 31, 32 Bill 113/section 258, 19–20 Bill 115: Conservatives’ blocking of passage, 154, 156–7, 159–60, 166–8; death of, 169; drafting, 148–50, 151; made public and reaction to, 150–2, 154, 157–9, 166; parliamentary resolutions, 168, 169, 171; passed without amendment, 159; procedural trouble with, 156–7, 159; reaction to its death, 171– 2; response to 23.1 clause, 154–6 Bilodeau, Roger, 47, 56, 69, 83, 187 Bilodeau case, 40–1; adjournment, 60, 63, 149; Lyon’s rejection of “chaos” theory, 75, 76; Pawley government and, 50, 67,

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288 Index 73; problems with, in advancing language rights, 173–4; setting new hearing, 61–2, 64, 66, 171, 177–8; sfm and, 23, 50; Supreme Court decision, 192; Twaddle’s assessment of, 53, 54, 55 Bisson, Ronald, 33–4, 140 Blaikie case, 29, 32 Blaikie 2, 37 Blay, Jacqueline, 16 Bouchard, Benoît, 187 Boulanger, Adrien, 92–3 Bourassa, Robert, 172 Breton, Raymond, 209, 210 Broadbent, Ed, 127 Brophy case, 12 Brown, Arnold, 201, 213 Brown, George, 4 Brunet, Michel, 127 Bureau de l’éducation française, 21 Cameron, Frank, 146, 207 Camp, Dalton, 172 Campbell, Douglas, 133, 158–9, 165, 178 Campbell government, 17 Canada, government of, 28, 41, 178. See also Trudeau government Canadian Intelligence Service (cis), 205–6 Canadian League of Rights, 205 Carstairs, Sharon, 176, 181 Champ de Mars, 172 Chartier Report, 197–8 Chornopyski, Bill, 131 Chrétien, Jean, 57 churches, national coalition of, 133 Clark, Lee, 128 Cleroux, Richard, 64, 100–1 Cleverley, Fred, 147, 158, 208 Collège universitaire de Saint-Boniface, 64 Collet, Roger, 94 Collier case, 79, 80, 92–3 Comité Pro-Canadien, 42 Committee for Manitoba’s Constitutional Amendment (cmca), 139 Concerned Citizens Committee for a Yes Vote, 133, 138–9 Concerned Manitobans for the Constitutional Amendment (cmca), 133 Confederation of Regions Party (cor), 207 Conservative Opposition: belief in Bill 2, 200–1; blocking Bill 115, 154, 156–7,

159–60, 166–8; filibusters, 114–16, 159, 167; Filmon leadership election, 153–4; in House debate on amendment, 109–10, 112–17, 200, 201; informed of amendment, 61; leading anti-amendment drive, 75–7, 94, 146, 211–13, 214, 217–18; meeting with Alliance Quebec, 92; on ndp’s “secret” negotiations, 105–6, 200; talks with sfm, 62, 160; walking out of House, 89, 94, 157, 159, 167. See also Filmon, Gary; Lyon, Sterling Conservative Opposition (federal), 128–9 constitutional amendment/resolution: alarmism caused by, 98, 102, 137–8, 258n17; beginnings, 50–1, 52; changes to, 108–9, 119–20, 136; Conservative opposition to, 73, 75–7, 93–4, 104–7, 146, 200–2, 211–13, 214, 217–18; costs, 98, 111, 138; disentrenchment, 147, 148–9; Doern’s fight against, 82, 87–8, 90–2, 94, 111; draft made public, 60, 61; draft text, 230–4; explained by Penner, 74–5; federal-provincial negotiations, 57, 64, 66, 67–8, 69–70; final text, 235–8; first considered, 50–1, 52; Free Press cartoons, 85, 126, 143–5; House debate on, 79–82, 89–90, 108, 109–10, 112–17; idea of “secret” negotiations, 73, 105–6, 112, 139, 200; Joyal speech, 65–6; legislative hearings, 110–11, 116–17, 121, 123–4, 148; ndp-sfm negotiations, 56–7, 58–9, 61; opposition to, 62–4, 78–9, 88, 98–9, 107, 111, 138, 142, 146; Parliamentary resolution, 127–9; Pawley government public relations on, 91–2, 99–100, 107– 8, 111; plebiscite, 130–3, 138–40, 146, 216, 262n49; presented in the House, 95–8; public hearings on, 88–9, 93, 100–2, 129–30, 202–4; recommended by lawyers as way past Bilodeau, 53–5; reduced after disentrenchment, 150; Robert-Doern debate, 139, 141; support for, 102–3, 107, 125, 134–6; tripartite agreement, 68–70, 71, 74; Trudeau speech, 70–1. See also Bill 115; federal reference Constitutionally Speaking, 100 Convention of Forty, 6 Corrin, Brian, 146

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289 Index Coyne, Andrew, 100, 101 Creighton, Donald, 8–9 Crosbie, John, 180, 192 Davis, Bill, 171 Debrecen, Fred, 181, 204, 207 Decter, Michael, 167, 188, 189, 194 Deschênes, Jules, 29 Desjardins, Laurent, 18, 19, 40 Dewar, A.S., 28 Dickson, Brian, 182, 185 Dodick, Doreen, 166 Doer, Gary, 98, 107, 123, 151–2 Doern, Russell, 177, 195, 205; anti-bilingualism campaign, 86, 94, 111, 130, 131, 146, 147, 208; debate with Robert, 139, 141; on disentrenched amendment, 155; on federal reference ruling, 181; on passing of Bills 2 and 59, 18, 40; role in plebiscite, 139, 140; split with government, 82, 87–8, 90–2, 119, 172 Downey, Jim, 114, 160 Driedger, Albert, 212 Dureault, Armand, 22, 36 Elton, Tanner, 178, 193; role in federal reference, 182–5, 186 Enns, Harry, 114, 157, 167; on Bill 2, 200; in House debate, 199, 202; House vote wrangle, 168, 170 “Enoncé de politique en vue de poursuivre l’application de L’Article 23 de la Loi sur le Manitoba,” 187–8 Epp, Jake, 127, 156 Epps, Dennis, 206 ethnic groups and amendment, 102–3, 134–6 ethnocentrism, 214–16 Fairweather, Gordon, 171 federal reference: drafting, 175–6; implementation, 193, 195; Pawley government’s position paper, 182–4, 185–6; sfm requests, 171, 174; sfm’s defense, 184–5; submission to Supreme Court, 177; Supreme Court decision and reaction, 178–82; translation agreement and reaction, 190–2, 193; translation negotiations, 186–7, 189–90 Fédération des Francophones hors-Québec (ffhq), 127, 139, 180

Filmon, Gary: on federal interference, 168, 172; picture, 164; on public support for stand, 200, 201; reaction to sfm-government language deal, 191, 192; view of Bill 115, 154, 155, 156, 159, 171, 172 Filmon government language policy, 195– 7 Fontaine, Martial, 94 Fontaine, René, 187 Ford, George, 195 Forest, Georges, 42, 77, 83; attacked, 61; on federal reference ruling, 180; parking ticket, 21–2, 24–5; stand on French rights, 58; turn against amendment, 132, 133–4, 136, 158, 190; view of draft amendment, 57, 60–1, 62–3, 73, 90 Forest, Nicole, 21 Forest case: in Appeal Court, 27–31; importance of, to Franco-Manitobans, 26– 7; in Supreme Court, 31–3 Franco-Manitobans: early court cases over language, 15–16; feeling of being excluded and denigrated, 108, 215–16; reaction to Thornton Act, 14; support of sfm, 129–30; view of section 23, 57–9. See also Société franco-manitobaine Fraser, Neil, 78 Freedman, Samuel, 25, 34; Bilodeau ruling, 41; Forest ruling, 25, 28–31 Friesen, Gerald, 4 fur trade, 4 Gibson, Dale, 55, 80, 180 Godin, Gérald, 127, 146 Gostick, Ron, 205–6 Green, Sid, 18, 33, 85, 181, 203–4 Greenway government, 10–11, 16 Guay, Renald, 22, 70, 147, 160; on Bilodeau, 173–4; court case, 35, 36; on effect of plebiscite, 140; and federal reference, 175, 176–7; role in disentrenchment, 149–50, 151 Gyles, Harold, 40 Hacault, Antoine, 133 Hammond, Gerrie, 112 Harms, David, 99 Heeney, Dennis, 166, 205 Hell’s Grannies, 91, 94

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290 Index Hofstadter, Richard, 211, 216 Hogue, Alain, 22, 24–5, 27, 28 Hudson’s Bay Company, 5 Hunter, Gary, 129 Hutton, Bill, 88, 131, 133, 139 Institut pedagogique, 21 Interlake Citizens’ group, 91 Jewers, Gerald, 36 Johnson, Frank, 132 Johnson, George, 18 Johnston, Frank, 202 Jourdain, Guy, 191 Joyal, Serge: and amendment changes, 136, 158; contact with sfm, 65–6, 94; and federal reference, 174, 175 Kelly, Conrad, 161, 205–6 Klassen, John, 103 Knutson, Elmer, 181, 207 Kostyra, Eugene, 107, 108, 134, 135, 136 Kovnats, Abe, 112–13 Ku Klux Klan, 205, 210 Lamer, Antonio, 183 Lamont, John, 151, 160; view of Bill 115, 157–8 Langevin, Adélard, 14 language crisis: models for understanding, 209–21 Laurier-Greenway compromise, 12–13 Lécuyer, Gérard, 82, 87, 90, 151; in House debate, 108, 109; joining Cabinet, 147–8 LeTourneau, Léo, 180 Lévesque, René, 43, 44, 49 Lévesque government, 127, 172; denunciation of sfm, 92–3 Liberté, La, 57, 120 lieutenant governor, bilingual, 6, 7 Lockhart, Douglas, 64, 206 London, Jack, 93, 132, 133, 140, 172 Loyalists, 9 Lyon, Sterling, 122; background, 27; Bill 2 speech, 39; in House debate on amendment, 79–82, 89, 109, 113–14, 116, 202; as leader of amendment opposition, 61, 94, 128, 148, 159, 179, 206, 217; objections to his views, 78, 91, 179; obstructionist tactics, 146, 159, 167; on public hearings, 72–3, 93, 106–

7; rejection of “chaos” theory, 75, 76; role in constitutional talks, 43–5; scorched-earth strategy, 218–19; speeches on amendment, 75–6, 104–7; view of language rights, 49, 157 Lyon government: assessment of, 47–9; bilingual policy, 45–7; Bill 2, 38–40; in Blaikie case, 31; constitutional resolution, 44–5; defeated, 47; and Forest, 27, 31, 32; translation policy, 34–5, 37–8. See also Lyon, Sterling MacDonald, Sir John A., 12 MacDonald case, 192 MacGuigan, Mark, 151; role in drafting amendment, 64, 67, 74, 119; role in federal reference, 174, 175, 176 MacKenzie, Dan, 128, 169 Mackenzie government, 9 Mackling, Al, 115 Magnet, Joseph, 34, 124, 149; and federal reference, 175, 180–1; on Forest ruling, 33; view of amendment, 60, 120; view of Bill 115, 150–1, 157–8 Maldoff, Eric, 92, 121 Maltman, Patricia, 84, 87, 139, 140, 178, 205 Manitoba 23, 131, 132, 134–5 Manitoba Act of 1870: and French school rights, 26; inviolability of, 29–30; and Métis land, 10; proclaimed, 7–9. See also Section 23 of Manitoba Act Manitoba Association for Bilingual Education, 103 Manitoba Association for Rights and Liberties (marl), 132 Manitoba Association for the Promotion of Ancestral Languages (mapal), 135, 136 Manitoba Association of Urban Municipalities (maum), 79 Manitoba Government Employees Association (mgea), 98; and Bill 115, 147, 151–2; compared to umm, 213; forces changes to amendment, 107, 108–9, 119; response to French implementation, 195 Manitoba Grassroots: beginnings, 91, 146; extremist connections, 205–6; rallies, 158–9, 159–60, 165, 166 Manitoba Intercultural Council, 134, 135–6

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291 Index Manitoba Unity Committee, 64, 206 Manness, Clayton, 153, 208 Martin, Joseph, 10 Matas, David, 132 McCarthy, Dalton, 10, 11 McDonald, Neil, 132, 135 McGonigal, Pearl, 33, 161, 169 McKenzie, Wally, 202, 212 McLean, Walter, 178 McTavish, J.B., 36 Mercier, Gerry: on Bill 2, 200–1; and Forest, 27, 32; opposition to amendment, 57, 61, 76, 156, 181; speech to sfm, 37; translation policy, 34–5 Merritt, Ivan, 207–8 Métis land sale, 10, 242n36 Miller, Saul, 19, 20 Monnin, Alfred, 25, 41, 182 Montreal Gazette, 78 Moore, Terence, 112 Morin, Jacques-Yvan, 172 Morton, W.L., 8 Mouflier, Sylvia, 139 Mulroney, Brian: on federal reference, 180; quelling of opposition in caucus, 128, 172, 260n31; role in parliamentary resolution, 127, 169 Mulroney government, 184 Murta, Jack, 128 ndp Opposition, 39–40 Neville, Bill, 131 Norrie, Bill, 130–1, 132, 146 Norris government, 13 Nurgitz, Nathan, 94 O’Connor, Dan, 87 Official Language Act (1890): passed, 11– 12; ruled unconstitutional, 15–16, 22, 28, 29–30, 31 Oleson, Charlotte, 193, 200 Olfert, Peter, 195 Ontario emigration to Manitoba, 10 Orchard, Don, 49, 110, 201 O’Sullivan, Joseph, 137, 182 Parasiuk, Wilson, 48, 66 parliamentary resolutions, 127–9, 168, 169, 171 Pawley, Howard: announcement of agreement on amendment, 71; as attorney-

general, 23, 24–5; on Bill 2, 39–40; Doern rebellion, 90; and Filmon, 154, 155, 167–8; in House debate on amendment, 80, 81, 89, 109, 113, 114; meetings with local groups, 52, 98–9, 136, 159– 60; meetings with Trudeau, 128; picture, 163; prorogation of House, 167–8, 169; pushing of French implementation, 194, 195; resolve on amendment wavers, 93, 116, 160; role in federal reference, 180; threats against, 166, 204; election win, 50 Pawley government: accused of bad management, 119; amendment confirmed in principle, 69–70, 74; commitment to legislative hearings, 93, 114, 116–17; disentrenchment, 147, 148–52, 155–6; Doern’s split from caucus, 82, 87–8, 90–2; French-language services policy, 51, 177; in House debate on amendment, 79–82, 89–90, 108, 109–10, 112– 17; implementation of federal reference, 193, 195; movement of closure, 159, 166; position paper on reference ruling, 182–7; presentation of Bill 115 in House, 156–7; proroguing of House, 169–71; reaction to plebiscite results, 146, 147; “selling” of amendment, 91– 2, 99–100, 101, 107, 111; threats against, 166, 204–5; translation negotiations with sfm, 186–7, 189–90; weakening of resolve on amendment, 93, 118–19; worry over Bilodeau and legal chaos, 53–5, 74, 79–80. See also Pawley, Howard; Penner, Roland Pellant v. Hébert, 15–16 Penner, Roland: announcement of amendment agreement, 71, 74–5; announcement of public hearings, 88–9, 93, 110– 11; background, 253n32; clash with Doern, 91–2, 94; on cost of French language service, 190; defense of amendment, 62, 99, 101, 111, 112, 182; first notion of constitutional amendment, 51, 55; in House debate, 81, 89, 113, 114, 115; meetings with local groups, 88, 96, 107, 119, 137–8; negotiation with federal government, 57, 64, 66, 67–8; oversees changes to amendment, 108–9, 112, 118, 119–20; picture, 122; and plebiscite, 131, 132; presentation

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292 Index of validation plan, 185–6; at public hearings, 100, 101–2; relations with sfm, 51, 56–9, 61, 66, 67, 158, 184–5; role in disentrenchment, 149, 151; role in federal reference, 176, 177; tabling of constitutional amendment, 95–8; and translation policy, 178, 187; worry over Bilodeau and legal chaos, 53–5, 73, 74, 79–80, 149, 172 Phillips, Myrna, 88 Piché, René, 34 plebiscite, Winnipeg, 130–3, 138–40, 216; questions, 262n49 Praznik, Darren, 197 Préfontaine, René, 45 Price, Norma, 45, 46 Prince, Maurice, 42, 62 Proteau, Gilberte, 45, 205; on effect of Thornton Act, 14; and Quebec referendum, 42, 43; replacement of L. Robert, 176–7 provisional government, 5, 6–7 Provost, Georges, 42 Prud’homme, L.A., 15–16 Quebec referendum, 42–3 Rae, J.E., 210–11 Ransom, Brian, 115 Red River settlement, 4, 5–7 Rhéame, Gilles, 146 Riel, Louis, 6 Robert, Léo, 121; attacked, 62, 205; debate with Doern, 139, 141; and federal reference, 174; fight to save amendment, 94, 119; as sfm president, 52–3, 77, 92, 102, 133, 134, 140, 150, 160; relations with Penner, 58–9, 61, 68, 109; speech to Franco-Manitobans, 129–30 Roberts, David, 205 Robin, Martin, 210 Roblin, Duff, 14–15, 128 Roblin government, 18–19 Roch, Gilles, 193 Roch, Lucille, 45 Royal, Joseph, 9 Rusk, Bill, 78 Russell, Frances, 71, 148; on Conservatives, 77–8, 128, 197; on federal reference agreement, 192 Russell, Grant, 154, 191, 201, 205, 206

Sabourin, Réal, 134, 140, 180, 190–1 Samuel, Herbert, 13 Savoie, Guy, 42, 131 Scarth, Alan, 98–9 school rights, separate, 7, 8, 11; LaurierGreenway compromise, 12–13; from 1916 to the 1970s, 17–21 Schreyer, Edward, 35 Schreyer government: Bill 113, 19–20; and Forest, 22, 24, 25 Schroeder, Vic, 66 Schultz, John, 5, 9, 11, 12 Schulz, Herb, 126, 158, 178, 204 Scott, Don, 109–10 Scott, Stephen, 35, 51, 92 Scott, Thomas, 6 Section 23 of Manitoba Act: Franco-Manitobans’ view of, 34, 58–9, 60, 62–3; Freedman’s ruling on, 30, 245n17; mandatory v. directory argument, 36, 41, 60, 179; repealed in Penner’s draft amendment, 56; Supreme Court ruling on, 178, 179; text, 8; text of amendments to, 230–4, 235–8 sfm. See Société franco-manitobaine Sheppard, Claude-Armand, 9 Sherman, Bud, 111, 114, 127, 128, 154 Simpson, Jeffrey, 179 Sinclair, Gordon, 64 Skowron, Alf, 132 Smith, Rémi, 121; court case, 36; and federal reference, 174, 175; as sfm director, 52–3, 77, 94, 134, 140 Société des Acadiens case, 193 Société franco-manitobaine (sfm): amendment negotiations, 56–7, 58–9, 61, 62– 3, 66–9; attacked, 63–4, 92–3, 205; and Bilodeau, 23, 40–1, 50, 168; as not representing Francophones, 78, 96, 106, 129–30; dealings with Conservatives, 31, 34, 37, 45–7, 62; details of “Enoncé de politique” document, 187–8; in federal reference negotiations, 171, 174–7, 184–91, 197; and Forest, 23, 31–2, 33– 4, 40–1; Joyal’s speech to, 65–6; meetings with ethnic groups, 102–3, 134–6; mobilization to save amendment, 77, 94, 129–30; and plebiscite, 132–3; and Quebec referendum, 42–3; role in disentrenchment, 148–52; secret meeting to scrap “official” language, 160; view of

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293 Index Bill 115, 157–8; view of changes to amendment, 120. See also Proteau, Gilberte; Robert, Léo Spivak, Myra, 128 Spivak, Sid, 129 Spolsky, Myron, 135, 136 Stanley, George, 5 Steen, Warren, 202 Stephenson, George, 154 Supreme Court of Canada: Bilodeau and MacDonald decisions, 192–3; Blaikie 2 decision, 37; federal reference ruling, 178–84, 190, 197; Forest ruling, 31–3 Szach, Gene, 147 Taché, Alexandre-Antonin, 7 Tallin, Rae, 137, 157 Tassé, Roger, 66, 108, 151, 182, 184 Teffaine, Rhéal, 21, 42, 66, 187 Théberge, Raymond, 102, 151 Thomas, Paul, 192 Thornton Act (1916), 14 Toupin, René, 24 translation of laws and statutes: bartered in amendment negotiations, 59, 61, 64– 5, 66, 67–9; federal reference ruling, 178–81; Filmon government implementation, 196–7; in Forest, 24–5; impact of reference ruling on, 183, 184; Lyon policy, 34–5, 106; Pawley government and sfm deal on, 189–92, 193; Pawley government implementation, 51, 178, 193, 195; Pawley government negotiations over, 183–7, 189–90; projected cost, 186; sfm position on, 185–7 Trent, John, 171 Tripartite Agreement, 68–70, 74; text, 227–9 Trudeau, Pierre: and Bill 115, 151, 167; meeting with sfm, 162, 174; and parliamentary resolutions, 127, 128, 168, 169, 171; speech at Laurier Club, 70–1 Trudeau government: and federal reference, 174–6; financial assistance for sfm, 94, 128; as force behind amend-

ment, 105–6, 133, 201; Joyal’s speech to sfm, 65–6; role in amendment negotiations, 66, 67–8, 69–70, 74, 119 Turenne, Roger, 32, 47, 189; hired by Lyon government, 46; organization of French coordinators, 194, 195; role in amendment draft, 51, 55, 56, 66, 68, 71 Turner, John, 175–6 Twaddle, Kerr, 31; and Bilodeau, 41, 53, 56; and Forest, 27, 32; and government translation policy, 35, 37, 91; view of amendment, 54–5, 150 Ukrainian Manitobans, 14, 102–3 Under the Ribs of Death (Marlyn), 215 Union of Manitoba Municipalities (umm), 52, 88, 114, 116, 193, 208; analysis of anti-amendment stand, 213–14; worry over municipal bilingualism, 98–9 Walding, Jim, 115, 166; refusal to force vote, 168, 170–1 Walker, J.S., 22 Warren, Peter, 63, 78, 90, 138, 139, 146 Wehrle, E.A., 137–8 Weir, Walter, 19 Western Canada Concept, 207–8 Western Canada Federation, 206 Weston, Greg, 176 Willcock, Elizabeth, 128 Winnipeg Free Press: amendment cartoons, 85, 143–5, 163; on amendment opposition, 91, 192; on changes to amendment, 120; on Enns letter to Walding, 168; support for amendment, 47, 57, 179 Winnipeg plebiscite, 130–3, 138–40, 216; questions, 262n49 Winnipeg Sun, 91, 179 Wordsnorth Communications Services, 91, 99, 100, 212 Yalden, Max, 171 Yost, Greg, 138 Youngs, Fred, 140, 171

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