Malaysia’s United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1960–2010) 981334136X, 9789813341364

Table of contents :
Acknowledgements
Contents
Abbreviations
List of Figures
List of Tables
1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Aim
1.3 Literature Review
1.3.1 International Intervention and Peacekeeping (Nature, Achievements and Failures)
1.3.2 States’ Interests in UNPKO
1.3.3 Malaysia’s UNPKO
1.4 Theoretical Framework
1.5 Scope of the Book
1.6 Structure of the Book
References
2 Theoretical Framework
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Contending Mainstream International Relations Theories
2.2.1 Liberalism
2.2.2 Constructivism
2.2.3 Realism
2.3 Analytical Framework
2.3.1 The International System and States’ Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Perspective
2.3.2 Neoclassical Realism Framework on States’ Peacekeeping
2.3.3 Neoclassical Realism Hypotheses on Malaysia’s UNPKO
2.4 Conclusion
References
3 UNPKO: Structure and Process
3.1 Introduction
3.2 UNPKO as a Conflict-Resolution Mechanism
3.2.1 Doctrine or Framework
3.2.2 Department of Peacekeeping Nations Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS)
3.2.3 Authorization Process
3.2.4 Financing
3.2.5 States’ Participation
3.3 Malaysia’s UNPKO: Structure and Process
3.3.1 National Defence Policy
3.3.2 Decision-Making Process
3.3.3 Nature/Level/Size of Malaysia’s UNPKO
3.4 Malaysia’s Foreign Policy Posture Vis-à-Vis UNPKO
3.4.1 Pro-west Posture
3.4.2 Neutrality
3.4.3 Globalization
3.5 Conclusion
Appendix 1: Malaysia’s UNPKO Decision-Making Process
Appendix 2: Scope of Duty of Malaysia’s UNPKO
References
4 Systemic-External Pressures and Malaysia’s UNPKO
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Power Rivalry Vis-à-Vis UNPKO
4.3 Voting Pattern of Permanent Members of UNSC Vis-à-Vis UNPKO
4.3.1 The Soviet Union and Russia
4.3.2 The United States of America (US)
4.3.3 China
4.3.4 United Kingdom (Great Britain)
4.3.5 France
4.4 The Geostrategic Milieu of UNPKO
4.5 The Impact of UNPKO on the International System
4.5.1 Systemic Self-Preservation
4.5.2 Power Politics Balancing
4.6 Conclusion
References
5 Domestic-Internal Pressures and Malaysia’s UNPKO
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Malaysian Prime Ministers and Peacekeeping
5.2.1 Middlepowermanship
5.3 National Power
5.3.1 Malaysian Prime Ministers and the Legislature
5.3.2 Malaysian Prime Ministers and Politico-Military Institutions
5.3.3 Malaysian Prime Ministers and the Civil Society
5.4 Conclusion
References
6 Malaysia’s UNPKO in the Cold War and Post-Cold War Eras
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Malaysia’s UNPKO During the Cold War and Post-Cold War Era
6.2.1 Malaysia’s UNPKO in Its Strategic Interests Zone (SIZ) and Non-strategic Interests Zone (NSIZ)
6.3 Other Considerations Influencing Malaysia’s UNPKO
6.3.1 Malaysia’s Commitment to UNSAS
6.3.2 Trade Opportunities
6.3.3 Distance and Logistics
6.3.4 Health Risks and Facilities
6.4 Conclusion
Appendix 1: MAP 1: Malaysia’s Strategic Interests Zone and Non-strategic Interests Zone
Appendix 2: Map 2: Locations of Malaysia’s UNPKO (1960–2010)
Appendix 3: Malaysia’s UNPKO Fatalities in Its Strategic Interests Zones
Appendix 4: Malaysia’s UNPKO Fatalities in Its Non-strategic Interests Zones
Appendix 5: Malaysia’s Non-participation in UNPKO According to Its Strategic Interests Zones
Appendix 6: Malaysia’s Non-participation in UNPKO in Its Non-strategic Interests Zones
References
7 The Interplay of Systemic-Domestic Determinants of Malaysia’s UNPKO
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Malaysian Prime Ministers and UNPKO
7.2.1 Tunku Abdul Rahman
7.2.2 Tun Abdul Razak and Tun Hussein Onn
7.2.3 Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad
7.2.4 Tun Abdullah Badawi
7.3 Conclusion
Appendix: List of Malaysia’s UNPKO According to the Prime Ministers’ Eras
References
8 Conclusion
8.1 Empirical Findings
8.1.1 The Salience and Limit of Systemic-External Pressures
8.1.2 The Salience and Limit of Domestic-Internal Pressures
8.2 Theoretical Findings and Reflections on the Neoclassical Realism Analytical Framework
8.3 Implications for Future Research
Appendix A Malaysia’s UNPKO Decision-Making Process
Appendix B Scope of Duty of Malaysia’s UNPKO
Appendix C MAP 1: Malaysia’s Strategic Interests Zone and Non-strategic Interests Zone
Appendix D Map 2: Locations of Malaysia’s UNPKO (1960–2010)
Appendix E Malaysia’s UNPKO Fatalities in Its Strategic Interests Zones
Appendix F Malaysia’s UNPKO Fatalities in Its Non-strategic Interests Zones
Appendix G Malaysia’s Non-participation in UNPKO According to Its Strategic Interests Zones
Appendix H Malaysia’s Non-participation in UNPKO in Its Non-strategic Interests Zones
Appendix I List of Malaysia’s UNPKO According to the Prime Ministers’ Eras
About the Authors
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Asri Salleh Asmady Idris

Malaysia’s United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1960–2010)

Malaysia’s United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1960–2010)

Asri Salleh Asmady Idris •

Malaysia’s United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1960–2010)

123

Asri Salleh Faculty of Administrative Science and Policy Studies Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM) Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia

Asmady Idris Faculty of Humanities, Art and Heritage Universiti Malaysia Sabah (UMS) Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia

More on this book is at: http://afes-press-books.de/html/SA_06.htm. ISBN 978-981-33-4136-4 ISBN 978-981-33-4137-1 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4137-1

(eBook)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Copyediting: PD Dr. Hans Günter Brauch, AFES-PRESS e.V., Mosbach, Germany. Language editing: Dr. Vanessa Greatorex, Chester, England. The cover photo was provided by Mejar Ahmad Zawawi bin Mohamad Nor, UNP 2-1, Kem Ma’rakah, Lebanon who granted permission to use it for this book This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

For Peacekeepers Around The World

Acknowledgements

In the course of completing this book, we met and talked to a great number of people. Indeed, we owe them a lot. Firstly, we would like to thank Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, the fourth and seventh Prime Minister of Malaysia, and Tan Sri Syed Hamid Albar and Tan Sri Dr. Rais Yatim, both of whom were former foreign ministers of Malaysia, for their invaluable views, insights and inputs, not forgetting Datuk Anuar Kasman, Malaysian former Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Loh Seck Tiong, and Colonel Nazari Abdul Hadi, Defence Adviser, Malaysia Permanent Mission to the United Nations, for facilitating our requests for information and key meetings in the United States of America and Bosnia–Herzegovina. That said, we would like to highlight the assistance and support given to us by Ms. Mujenira Turcimovic, Mr. Fuad Botonic and Dr. Mirsad Karic, Vice Rector, International University of Sarajevo. Next, we are pleased to offer our sincerest thanks to our US-based respondents, such as Dr. William M. Wise of Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University; Dr. Marvin Ott, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University; Dr. Thomas J. Vallely, ASH Centre, Harvard Kennedy School; and Dr. Richard C. Bush III of Brookings Institute. Back home in Malaysia, we would like to thank Major General Datuk Baharom Hamzah, Chief of Staff, Joint Force Headquarters, Malaysian Ministry of Defence; Major Mohd Ranizal Ismail, MA Joint Force Commander, Ministry of Defence; and Colonel Badrul Hisham Muhammad, Commandant of Malaysia’s Peacekeeping Centre, Port Dickson. It is only through these great figures with great hearts that we managed to pull off the enormous amount of work this book entailed. Going forward, without a doubt, our special appreciation must go to the series editor, PD Dr. Hans Günter Brauch for his amazing enthusiasm, fortitude and hard work in making this book a reality. To our wives, children and parents, please know that your love, encouragement and patience are second to none. All of you truly helped us to keep pushing and going to the end, especially when the going just got tough. We know that we could never return that support in kind, but we pray that Allah bless all of you with his unconditional love and mercy. To Dr. Paridah Samad

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and Associate Professor Dr. Abdul Kadir, thank you for never giving up on us. To Mr. Hasbi Tangge and Mr. Haslan Tamjehi, thank you for believing in us. Finally, we humbly offer our deepest apologies to many others whose names do not make it here. We wish we had met and thanked all of you in person. From the bottom of our hearts, please accept our sincerest thanks. Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia April 2020

Asri Salleh Asmady Idris

Contents

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2 Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Contending Mainstream International Relations Theories . . . 2.2.1 Liberalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2 Constructivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.3 Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Analytical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1 The International System and States’ Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.2 Neoclassical Realism Framework on States’ Peacekeeping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.3 Neoclassical Realism Hypotheses on Malaysia’s UNPKO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Aim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.1 International Intervention and Peacekeeping (Nature, Achievements and Failures) . . . . . . 1.3.2 States’ Interests in UNPKO . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.3 Malaysia’s UNPKO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 Scope of the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 Structure of the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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3 UNPKO: Structure and Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 UNPKO as a Conflict-Resolution Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1 Doctrine or Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.2 Department of Peacekeeping Nations Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.3 Authorization Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.4 Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.5 States’ Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Malaysia’s UNPKO: Structure and Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1 National Defence Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2 Decision-Making Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.3 Nature/Level/Size of Malaysia’s UNPKO . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Malaysia’s Foreign Policy Posture Vis-à-Vis UNPKO . . . . . . . 3.4.1 Pro-west Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.2 Neutrality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.3 Globalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix 1: Malaysia’s UNPKO Decision-Making Process . . . . . . . Appendix 2: Scope of Duty of Malaysia’s UNPKO . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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4 Systemic-External Pressures and Malaysia’s UNPKO . . . . . . . 4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Power Rivalry Vis-à-Vis UNPKO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Voting Pattern of Permanent Members of UNSC Vis-à-Vis UNPKO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.1 The Soviet Union and Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.2 The United States of America (US) . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.3 China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.4 United Kingdom (Great Britain) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.5 France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 The Geostrategic Milieu of UNPKO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 The Impact of UNPKO on the International System . . . . . . 4.5.1 Systemic Self-Preservation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5.2 Power Politics Balancing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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5 Domestic-Internal Pressures and Malaysia’s UNPKO . 5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Malaysian Prime Ministers and Peacekeeping . . . . . 5.2.1 Middlepowermanship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 National Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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5.3.1 Malaysian Prime Ministers and the Legislature . . 5.3.2 Malaysian Prime Ministers and Politico-Military Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.3 Malaysian Prime Ministers and the Civil Society . 5.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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6 Malaysia’s UNPKO in the Cold War and Post-Cold War Eras . . 6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Malaysia’s UNPKO During the Cold War and Post-Cold War Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.1 Malaysia’s UNPKO in Its Strategic Interests Zone (SIZ) and Non-strategic Interests Zone (NSIZ) . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 Other Considerations Influencing Malaysia’s UNPKO . . . . . . . 6.3.1 Malaysia’s Commitment to UNSAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.2 Trade Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.3 Distance and Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.4 Health Risks and Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix 1: MAP 1: Malaysia’s Strategic Interests Zone and Non-strategic Interests Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix 2: Map 2: Locations of Malaysia’s UNPKO (1960–2010) . Appendix 3: Malaysia’s UNPKO Fatalities in Its Strategic Interests Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix 4: Malaysia’s UNPKO Fatalities in Its Non-strategic Interests Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix 5: Malaysia’s Non-participation in UNPKO According to Its Strategic Interests Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix 6: Malaysia’s Non-participation in UNPKO in Its Non-strategic Interests Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 The Interplay of Systemic-Domestic Determinants of Malaysia’s UNPKO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 Malaysian Prime Ministers and UNPKO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.1 Tunku Abdul Rahman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.2 Tun Abdul Razak and Tun Hussein Onn . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.3 Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.4 Tun Abdullah Badawi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix: List of Malaysia’s UNPKO According to the Prime Ministers’ Eras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1 Empirical Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1.1 The Salience and Limit of Systemic-External Pressures . 8.1.2 The Salience and Limit of Domestic-Internal Pressures . 8.2 Theoretical Findings and Reflections on the Neoclassical Realism Analytical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3 Implications for Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Appendix A: Malaysia’s UNPKO Decision-Making Process . . . . . . . . . . 185 Appendix B: Scope of Duty of Malaysia’s UNPKO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 Appendix C: MAP 1: Malaysia’s Strategic Interests Zone and Non-strategic Interests Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 Appendix D: Map 2: Locations of Malaysia’s UNPKO (1960–2010) . . . . 197 Appendix E: Malaysia’s UNPKO Fatalities in Its Strategic Interests Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 Appendix F: Malaysia’s UNPKO Fatalities in Its Non-strategic Interests Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201 Appendix G: Malaysia’s Non-participation in UNPKO According to Its Strategic Interests Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203 Appendix H: Malaysia’s Non-participation in UNPKO in Its Non-strategic Interests Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 Appendix I: List of Malaysia’s UNPKO According to the Prime Ministers’ Eras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227

Abbreviations

ABIM ALIRAN AMDA APC ASEAN ATGM CIS CIVPOL CPKF DFS DOMREP DPKO ECOWAS EO G-77 GCC GDP ICJ IFV INTERFET ISA JFH MAB MAFHQ MALBATT MALCON MBM MBT MINDEF

Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia Aliran Kesedaran Negara Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement Armoured Personnel Carrier Association of Southeast Asia Nations Anti-Tank Guided Missiles Commonwealth of Independent States United Nations Civilian Police Collective Peacekeeping Forces Department of Field Support Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic Department of Peacekeeping Operations Economic Community of West African States Emergency Ordinance Group 77 Gulf Cooperation Council Gross Domestic Product International Court of Justice Infantry Fighting Vehicle International Force East Timor Internal Security Act Joint Force Headquarters Markas Angkatan Bersama Malaysia Armed Forces Headquarters Malaysia’s Battalion Malaysia’s Contingent Majlis Belia Malaysia Main Battle Tank Malaysian Ministry of Defence

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MINUGUA MINURCA MINURSO MLRS MONUA MONUSCO MOOTW MPC M-UNPKO NAM NATO NDP NGO NSIZ ONUC ONUMOZ ONUSAL OSA PKPIM PMO PPPA SADC SIZ SUARAM Treasury UK UN UNAMA UNAMIC UNAMID UNAMIR UNAMSIL UNASOG UNDOF UNEF I UNEF II UNFICYP UNGA UNIFIL UNIIMOG UNIKOM UNIMEE UNIPOM UNMIBH

Abbreviations

United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara Multiple Launcher Rocket System United Nations Observer Mission in Angola United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Military Operations Other Than War Malaysia Peacekeeping Centre Malaysia’s UNPKO Non-Aligned Movement North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Defence Policy Non-Governmental Organizations Non-Strategic Interests Zone United Nations Operations in the Congo United Nations Operation in Mozambique United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador Official Secrets Act Persatuan Kebangsaan Pelajar Islam Malaysia Prime Minister Office Printing Presses and Publications Act Southern African Development Community Strategic Interests Zone Human Rights Organization of Malaysia Malaysia Ministry of Finance United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone United Nations Aouzou Observer Group (Chad) United Nations Disengagement Observer Force First United Nations Emergency Force Second United Nations Emergency Force United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus United Nations General Assembly United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Abbreviations

UNMIK UNMIL UNMIN UNMIS UNMISET UNMIT UNMLT UNMOGIP UNMOT UNOB UNOGIL UNOMIG UNOMIL UNOSOM UNPKO UNPREDEP UNPROFOR UNSAS UNSC UNSF UNSGRC UNSMIH UNTAC UNTAES UNTAET UNTAG UNTMIH UNTSO UNYOM US Wisma Putra

xv

United Nations Mission in Kosovo United Nations Mission in Liberia United Nations Mission in Nepal United Nations Missions in Sudan United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor United Nations Mission in East Timor United Nations Military Liaison Team (Cambodia) United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan United Nations Operation in Burundi United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia United Nations Operations in Somalia United Nations Peacekeeping Operation(s) United Nations Preventive Deployment Force, Macedonia United Nations Protection Force United Nations Standby Arrangement System United Nations Security Council United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea United Nations Secretary-General Representative to Cambodia United Nations Support Mission in Haiti United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (Namibia) United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti United Nations Truce Supervision Organization United Nations Yemen Observation Mission United States of America Malaysia Ministry of Foreign Affairs

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Fig. 4.1

Neoclassical realism framework on States’ Peacekeeping. Sources Adapted from Taliaferro (2009) and Lai (2008) . . . . . . . . Veto vis-à-vis UNPKO. Source Patil (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29 71

xvii

List of Tables

Table 2.1

Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 5.1

Table 5.2

Table 6.1

Table 6.2

Table 6.3

Table 6.4 Table 6.5

Neoclassical realism hypotheses on Malaysia’s’ UNPKO. Sources Adapted and modified from Lai (2008) and Lobell et al. (2009a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary of the use of veto in UNSC (1946–2010). Source Global Policy Forum (n.d.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . UNPKO’s regions of operation. Source United Nations: List of Peacekeeping Operations 1948–2012 (2013) . . . . . . . Malaysia as a non-permanent member of the UNSC. Source United Nations Security Council, ‘Membership: Malaysia’ (2016); United Nations: List of Peacekeeping Operations 1948–2012 (2013); Malaysia’s National Defence Policy, Map 2: Locations of ATM Deployment under UN Peacekeeping Operations (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Malaysia’s UNPKO to Muslim and Non-Muslim Majority Countries. Source Malaysia’s National Defence Policy 2010 (NDP-2010), Map 1 and Map 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Malaysia’s UNPKO during the Cold War. Source United Nations (2013); Malaysia’s National Defence Policy, Map 2 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Malaysia’s UNPKO in the post-Cold War era. Source United Nations (2013); Malaysia’s National Defence Policy (2010), Map 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Malaysia’s UNPKO in Cold War and post-Cold War eras according to its SIZ and NSIZ. Source Malaysia’s National Defence Policy, Maps 1 and 2 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Malaysia’s UNPKO in its SIZ. Source United Nations (2013); Malaysia’s National Defence Policy, Map 2 (2010) . . . . . . . . Malaysia’s UNPKO in its NSIZ. Source United Nations (2013); Malaysia’s National Defence Policy, Map 2 (2010) . .

..

31

..

73

..

79

..

97

. . 100

. . 131

. . 132

. . 135 . . 136 . . 137

xix

xx

Table 6.6

Table 6.7

Table 8.1

List of Tables

The value of Malaysia’s imports from selected UNPKO host countries (1999–2003). Source Malaysia’s Statistic Department, 2004 (adapted from Ramli Abu Bakar 2004) . . . . . 141 Value of Malaysia’s exports to selected UNPKO host countries (1999–2003). Source Malaysia’s Statistic Department, 2004 (adapted from Ramli Abu Bakar 2004) . . . . . 142 Malaysia’s UNPKO in numbers. Source United Nations: List of Peacekeeping Operations 1948–2012 (2013); Malaysia’s National Defence Policy, Map 1 and Map 2 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . 181

Chapter 1

Introduction

Abstract This chapter presents a background of the fifty years of Malaysia’s United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), i.e. from 1960 to 2010. It aims to examine the dynamics of Malaysia’s UNPKO, especially the decision-making processes, by analysing the related causal factors, external and domestic, contributing to them. In doing so, this chapter first reviews the extant literature, grouped under three broad themes of (i) UNPKO, (ii) states’ interests in UNPKO and (iii) Malaysia’s UNPKO. It employs neoclassical realism as the analytical framework and the theoretical lens through which Malaysia’s UNPKO is analysed. The scope of this book covers the administration of the first five prime ministers by focusing on: (i) the UNPKO of each prime minister (ii) the UNPKO which Malaysia did and did not join during the Cold War and in the post-Cold War era and (iii) Malaysia’s UNPKO in its Strategic Interests Zone (SIZ) and Non-Strategic Interests Zone (NSIZ). This book has eight chapters. Chapter 1 reviews UNPKO and Malaysia’s UNPKO. While Chapter 2 addresses the theoretical underpinning, Chapter 3 presents the structural and processes background of UNPKO and those of Malaysia’s. Chapters 4 and 5 deliberate on the external and domestic variables of Malaysia’s UNPKO respectively. Chapter 6 discusses Malaysia’s UNPKO during the Cold War and in the post-Cold War as the case-studies, while Chapter 7 analyses the ways in which the interplay of systemic and domestic variables influence Malaysia’s participation in UNPKO. Chapter 8 presents the empirical concluding highlights. Keywords International relations · Security · United nations · Peacekeeping operations · Malaysia · Cold-war · Post-cold war · Geopolitics · Neoclassical realism · Mahathir Mohamad

1.1 Introduction Malaysia joined the United Nations (UN) on 17 September 1957. In total, Malaysia participated in only one UNPKO during Tunku Abdul Rahman’s era, twenty-five during Tun Dr Mahathir’s and seven during Tun Abdullah Badawi’s. Its first involvement with UNPKO was in 1960–1963 (Congo/Zaire-ONUC) and involved 3000 Malayan Special Forces (MSF) (Chang/Mejoh 1995, p. 60). In total, between © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Salleh and A. Idris, Malaysia’s United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1960–2010), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4137-1_1

1

2

1 Introduction

1960 and 2010, Malaysia participated in thirty-three of the sixty-five UNPKO (51% involvement). In relation to this, it is worth noting that the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 1948–2012 (UNPKO 1948–2012) mentions sixty operations between 1960 and 2010. However, it excludes UNSGRC, UNMLT, UNMIN, UNAMA and UNSOGI, which Malaysia includes as part of its peacekeeping operations, as indicated in Malaysia’s National Defence Policy 2010 (Malaysia Ministry of Defence, National Defence Policy – NDP, 2010, p. 32). Thus, as far as UNPKO 1948–2012 is concerned, Malaysia joined twenty-seven UNPKO. If NDP 2010 is considered, the total numbers of Malaysian peacekeeping become thirty-three and those of UN sixty-five. For the purpose of this study, both the lists – i.e. UNPKO 1948–2012 and NDP 2010 – are combined. The thirty-three operations involved 25,000 personnel, of which Malaysia lost twenty-eight (“United Nation: Peacekeeping: Fatalities by Nation up to 31 January 2013” n.d.). Fatality-wise, as a comparison, other South-East Asian countries which suffered similar losses during UNPKO include Indonesia at thirty-one, the Philippines at twenty-two and Thailand at seven (“United Nation: Peacekeeping: Fatalities by Nation up to 31 January 2013” n.d.). While Brunei and Singapore did not suffer any loss, India’s was the highest at 150, followed by Pakistan’s at 132, Ghana’s at 130, Canada’s at 121 and Bangladesh’s at 112 (“United Nation: Peacekeeping: Fatalities by Nation up to 31 January 2013” n.d.). As of December 2010, in terms of military and police contributions to UN operations, Malaysia was ranked 21st out of 115 troop-contributing countries (TCC) to UNPKO (“United Nations Peacekeeping, Troop and Police Contributors Archive, 1990–2014” n.d.). To put this into perspective, for the same year, Malaysia’s contribution of 1163 personnel was dwarfed ten times by Pakistan’s 10,652, which was the highest TCC in 2010 (“United Nations Peacekeeping, Troop and Police Contributors Archive, 1990–2014” n.d.). It is important to note that the participation of states in UNPKO has always been voluntary since the first UNPKO in 1948 (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization-UNTSO). Inevitably, this leads to states’ selective participation, whereby some actively engage in UNPKO while others do not. Accordingly, such a selective participation has led to mixed outcomes for UNPKO and the host state as well as the participating ones. Malaysia’s UNPKO, as the focus of this book, is correspondingly found to be selective. It is sporadic and, to some extent, paradoxical in nature. It is selective in the sense that from 1960 to 2010, out of a possible sixtyfive UNPKO, Malaysia participated in only thirty-three and did not join thirty-two, twenty-five of which took place in the post-Cold War era and eight during the Cold War. In addition to that, it is paradoxical in the sense that, as a Muslim-majority state, it joined more UNPKO sent to non-Muslim majority countries, i.e. twenty-one as opposed to twelve to Muslim-majority countries. Additionally, as far as its strategic interests zone (SIZ) and non-strategic interests zone (NSIZ) are concerned, again Malaysia’s UNPKO suggest a contrasting pattern, considering the logical assumption that Malaysia, given its limited resources as a small power, should have sent more UNPKO to its SIZ than its NSIZ. As it is, Malaysia’s UNPKO to its NSIZ outnumber those to its SIZ by three. Hitherto, Malaysia’s UNPKO are precarious,

1.1 Introduction

3

underlining the fact that Malaysia has neither a definite peacekeeping doctrine nor legal provisions to regulate or guide its UNPKO, making it incoherent overall.

1.2 Aim This book aims to examine the dynamics of Malaysia’s UNPKO, especially the decision-making processes. It seeks to analyse the related causal factors, external and domestic, contributing to them. Pursuant to that, the following key questions will be addressed: How, why and under what conditions and contexts did Malaysian elites assess the international threats and opportunities necessitating their decisions over UNPKO? Which, how and when did the domestic actors play a role in facilitating or constraining Malaysia’s UNPKO i.e. in extracting and mobilizing its resources to pursue its UNPKO policy? What, how and to what extent did UNPKO affect Malaysia? Building on these major questions, the following sub-questions are in order: who and what were the relevant actors with respect to Malaysia’s policy visà-vis UNPKO? What was the stance and how influential were they? Did civil society – i.e. media and public opinion – matter, and if so, why and how? Similarly, what kind of interaction occurred between the elite and the legislature and how did it play out between them? Why was Malaysia’s UNPKO less active during the Cold War but more active in the post-Cold War? To what extent did Cold War and post-Cold War matter to Malaysia’s UNPKO? How influential was SIZ and NSIZ to Malaysia’s UNPKO? How and when did co-religionist and humanitarian factors play a role in Malaysia’s UNPKO? And finally, what were the tangible and non-tangible impacts of UNPKO on Malaysia? To what extent did they matter? In order to address the central problem of this book, whilst considering the complexity of analysing the characteristics of all thirty-three Malaysia’s of UNPKO, this book will also focus on: (i) the significant stages of Malaysia’s UNPKO timeline, (ii) the zoning deployment pattern, and (iii) thematic classifications of Malaysian foreign policy, i.e. pro-West, neutrality and globalization (Jeshurun 2008b; Dhillon 2009; Saravanamuttu 2010). There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the extant literature on Malaysia’s UNPKO so far has no specific or dedicated time frame. Instead it offers scattered case studies of Malaysia’s UNPKO. For example, Soo’s work focuses only on the Congo in the 1960s, while Hasnan’s focuses only on Cambodia in the 1990s (Soo 1989; Hasnan 2007). Secondly, these case studies are sporadically chosen and consequently unable to lead to or result in exhaustive analysis of the decisionmaking processes, the nature of Malaysia’s UNPKO, deployment patterns, or the tangible and non-tangible impacts of UNPKO on Malaysia. In other words, detailed analysis of Malaysia’s UNPKO between 1960 and 2010 is scarce. This book’s time frame will thus help fill the gap.

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1 Introduction

1.3 Literature Review 1.3.1 International Intervention and Peacekeeping (Nature, Achievements and Failures) Literature on UNPKO is rich, hence the myriad of focuses, including the theoretical, legal and operational aspects of UNPKO. From the perspective of international law, some experts argue that the present system runs short of an effective mechanism, making the unlawful use of armed force unpreventable (Henkin et al. 1993). In more ways than one, this also serves to reinforce the legal-conceptual manifestation of a certain geopolitical balance in the international community (Tanca 1993). Taking the Cold War as an example, the geopolitical balancing, manifested mainly by the voting patterns of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), led to the authorization of only fourteen UNPKOs throughout the entire Cold War era of more than forty years. However, towards the end of the Cold War, there was a significantly dissipating effect of geopolitical balancing, which resulted in as many as forty-two UNPKOs within the following fourteen years (1988–2002) (Belloni 2007). Yet, in no absolute terms can the number of UNPKO represent the definitive role of a characteristically geopolitical balancing power-play in international intervention. The fact is that the end of the Cold War considerably weakened geopolitical rivalry between world superpowers, hence its inherent link, even to the least relative degree, to the huge difference in the number of UNPKO during and after the Cold War. Aksu (2003), however, sees international intervention in intra-state conflicts from the perspective of norms. He attempts to identify the perceptions and normative preferences of relevant players which constitute the UN’s objectives, functions and authority vis-à-vis intra-state conflicts. Aksu points out that the role and conduct of the UN (in the sense that the UN is an actor) is constrained and facilitated by the international community’s (state and non-state actors’) interpretation (ideas/values) of the UN Charter (institutionalized ideas/values) within a given power configuration (material capabilities) (Aksu 2003). While not denying in total the impending role of geopolitical rivalry as highlighted by Tanca, Aksu seems to have built his argument around the seminal role of actors’ normative views, arguing that, due to the UN’s ambiguous constitutional basis, the objectives, functions and authority assigned to UNPKO are the product of the actors’ normative internalized perspectives. In contrast, Coleman deliberates on the legitimacy aspect, i.e. the acquisition of authorization and mandates from and by the UNSC prior to any international intervention overture (Coleman 2007). Drawing the analysis from five of such peacekeeping missions by four international organizations, i.e. the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the Congo and Lesotho, NATO in Kosovo and the UN in East Timor, Coleman highlights the central roles of international organizations in the politics of international legitimacy surrounding peace enforcement operations, concluding that

1.3 Literature Review

5

international relations are structured by ‘commonly accepted rules’ (i.e. the legitimacy of international intervention in peace enforcement), that both democratic and authoritarian states care about it in their actions, and that international organizations have a key function in world politics (Coleman 2007). On a whole, UNPKO seems to fit Coleman’s contention well. However, this contention of Coleman, to some extent, also appears to illustrate the role of the hegemonic power. It is even more evident that the commonly accepted rules relating to UNPKO have to be enforced by some type of powers that wield so global an influence that they become accepted by the international community. This, therefore, has several implications. One needs to bear in mind that the workings and even the finances of many international organizations depend greatly on the material and financial support of hegemonic powers. For example, the US’s financial contribution to the UN accounts for up to 22% of the UN annual regular budget, making it the single biggest donor-country to the UN (United Nations, “Assessment of Member States’ advances to the Working Capital Fund for the biennium 2016–2017 and contributions to the United Nations regular budget for 2016”, 28 December 2015). It is likely that such a massive contribution will inevitably lead to commonly accepted rules that favour the donor-country the most, one way or the other. In other words, UNPKO’ rules, conditions, nature and characteristics have to suit the terms deemed fit by the biggest donor, among other things. Whether a UNPKO can be considered a success or a failure, either partly or wholly, remains a debatable subject. Sitkowski examines the actors of the mechanisms of UNPKO and the impact of the guiding principles of the UNPKO doctrine according to the outcome of the operations (Sitkowski 2006). Summing up nineteen UNPKO from 1948 to 2005 in the Middle East, the Congo, Namibia, Somalia, Cambodia, Rwanda and ex-Yugoslavia, Sitkowski asserts that the UNPKO is a weak conflict resolution mechanism because the peacekeepers were in part allowed to keep peace only when and if the belligerents allowed them to do so, making UNPKO an ineffective response to maintaining international peace (Sitkowski 2006). Additionally, having classified UNPKO in the Congo, Somalia and ex-Yugoslavia as disastrous, and Namibia as successful, Sitkowski claims that, pending a much-improved solution, an efficient military mechanism could prove to be the only choice available (Sitkowski 2006). However, he is convinced that the key to improving the frustrating state of affairs lies in the US’s respective policy and action, despite the fact that it seldom contributes troops to UNPKO (Sitkowski 2006). In short, Sitkowski’s proposition affirms the prevailing role of systemic imperatives or the hegemonic power of the US. There are other compelling reasons as well, such as the lack of financial support from member states, followed by the lack of accountability and the difficulty of measuring the performance of UNPKO (Jett 1999). Jett’s proposition is subsequently corroborated by Onumajuru’s examination of UNPKO in Africa, concerning which he finds similar problems ranging from poor logistics to ill-defined mandates and delays in intervention (Onumajuru 2005). Murphy names the familiar problems that have been frustrating UNPKO, i.e. financial constraints, flawed mandates, unrealistic goals, lack of accountability, poorly planned missions, the shortage of troops from developed countries, and the paradoxical interests of UNSC permanent members,

6

1 Introduction

whose command of 85% of global arms exports inevitably puts them in a delicate situation regarding their responsibility to keep international peace and security (Murphy 2007). Much in the same vein, Kent (2007); Koyama and Myrttinen (2007); Megret (2007); Lee (2007); and Hampson and Kihara-Hunt (2007) highlight the peacekeeper-related issues of inflation, lack of accountability, indemnity claims and human rights violations, such as sexual misconduct, rape, prostitution, human trafficking, child abuse and the spread of HIV/AIDS cases. There are more violations than meet the eye. Even the former Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, of his own accord, admitted the pervasiveness of all these issues across UNPKO in Cambodia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Mozambique, West Africa, the Congo, Eritrea and Kosovo (United Nations, “Meetings, Coverage and Press Releases – UN Press Release: Secretary-General ‘Absolutely Outraged’ By Gross Misconduct By Peacekeeping Personnel in Democratic Republic of Congo”, 19 November 2004). Aoi et al. (2007) argue that among the root causes of these violations are the presence of a permissive environment, such as the breakdown of law, and the prevailing ailing socio-economic structure (Aoi et al. 2007). These, however, should not be accepted as a given. Although such factors are regrettably present during ‘successful’ peace operations, Aoi et al. suggest that the UN must institutionalize mechanisms to deal with them up close (Aoi et al. 2007). The outcome notwithstanding, all is not lost for UNPKO, as the UN plays a key role as the regulator of the state-based international system, representing a selfinterested response by the international system to mitigate the effects of powerplay by suppressing conflicts before they spiral out of control and consequently cause irreversible damaging spillover to the very existence of the system as a whole (MacQueen 2006). As the systemic self-preservation mechanism or response, UNPKO defused the threat to the stability of the entire Southern Africa region following conflicts in Angola and Mozambique, the West Africa region following conflict in Sierra Leone, the Central Africa region following conflict in the Congo, South-East Asia following conflict in Cambodia, and Europe following conflict in Bosnia (MacQueen 2006). As a result, UNPKO must continue because its absence could lead to a hostile clash of national interests and disintegrating structures of governance (MacQueen 2006).

1.3.2 States’ Interests in UNPKO States’ interests in participating in international interventions, i.e. UNPKOs, almost always resemble or contrast with one another. In general, states start with national interests, followed by the desire to promote common international values, such as global peace, good international citizenry and respect for states’ self-determination. Obviously, these are at best subjective in nature. Yet, such subjectivity provides states with independent, unlimited leverage and expansive, unrestricted room for subsequent strategic political and tactical manoeuvres. Nevertheless, all of them appear to boil down to several identifiable causes. Spooner’s analysis of Canada’s foreign

1.3 Literature Review

7

policy during the Congo crisis (1960–1964) leads him to conclude that Canada’s Congo policy was motivated by both its domestic and international interests, i.e. to support the UN, prevent the expansion of the influence of the Soviet Union (USSR) in Africa, avoid the superpowers’ conflict within the Congo, advocate respect for state sovereignty and self-determination, moderate tension between Belgium and the UN, and rally support from Afro-Asian states (Spooner 2009). For Uruguay, two reasons stand out: diverting the military’s attention from domestic affairs, and seizing UNPKO’s profitable monetary incentive (Sotomayor 2007). Argentina’s interests were driven primarily by its resolve to prove that it was a Western, reliable and predictable nation, divert the military’s attention from domestic affairs, democratize it and realign its interests with those of the US (Sotomayor 2007). All this, in all probability, was simply about satisfying the interests of the US (Norden 1996; Tulchin 1998). Ghana’s reasons overlap with Argentina’s and Uruguay’s. Additionally, despite Ghana seeing its participation in UNPKO as a means to advance its national interests and contribute towards global peace, Aning contends that Ghana uses UNPKO as a resource-generating investiture in order to secure foreign funding, which, as a result, helps to justify its acquisitions of military hardware, equipment and structural development (Aning 2007). With few exceptions, much the same can be said of India’s, Pakistan’s and Bangladesh’s participation in UNPKO. Apart from the three common aspirations to emulate good international citizenry and the infamous India-centric thrust/Pakistan-centric thrust policy, UNPKO keeps Pakistan’s and Bangladesh’s armies occupied, and this helps to minimize the recurrence of military coups in both of those countries (Murthy 2007). Moreover, the UNPKO is also considered to be a vital contributor to Bangladesh’s economy. Between 1988 and 2004, on account of 40,793 troops contributed, Bangladesh earned $766 million in foreign exchange (Rahman 2004). India, however, is more interested in furthering the active and independent influence so instrumental for its visionary global and regional leadership, making it less economically dependent on UNPKO (Murthy 2007). Nevertheless, India does have its own peculiar motivations. Other than the commonly cited reasons of solidarity, humanitarian concern, source of revenue and regional rivalry, India’s concerns for geostrategic interests – i.e. the free flow of oil and gas and its desire to become a UNSC non-permanent member ahead of Pakistan, Egypt, Brazil, Argentina, Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa – are among the top agendas of its foreign policy (Bullion 2005). Similarly, analyses of a number of states’ motivations for joining UNPKO indicate that they include, but are not limited to, international status and prestige (Germany) (Hampton 2005), (Austria) (Schmidl 2005); regional influence (Nigeria) (Howe 2005); regional stability (Australia) (Smith 2005); humanitarian concerns (Canada) (Rudd 2005), (Britain) (Woodhouse/Ramsbotham 2005); and source of revenue (Argentina) (Watson 2005). Ascertaining the motivations for major powers’ participation in UNPKO may prove to be just as challenging. In contrast to many other UN member states’ fervour to readily contribute troops to UNPKO, the US’s commitment is a paradox; it is the largest assessed financial contributor to peace operations, and yet, as of May 2002, the

8

1 Introduction

US troops accounted only 1% of 45,159 UN troops (Sorenson/Wood 2005, p. 119). However, the US participated more fully in UN-mandated peacekeeping operations (UN-authorized but fully operated by non-UN regional/international organizations), such as the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) operated by NATO in Bosnia, as opposed to the UN-operated PKO (both authorized and operated by the UN), such as the UNPROFOR, also in Bosnia. The fact that the US respectively contributed 3000 troops to the SFOR and 4800 troops to the Kosovo Stabilization Force (KFOR) but only 584 troops to the UNPROFOR (as of September 1993) (United Nations n.d.), among others, reflects the US strategic interests in the Balkans more than its support for UNPKO (Sorenson/Wood 2005, p. 115). Another contentious issue that contributed to such different levels of commitment from the US is its own demand for immunity from the International Court of Crime (ICC) for its participation in UNPKO. Looking from another perspective, since the US appeared to have a major control in NATO-operated peacekeeping operations, the issue of immunity did not arise. This, however, could help to partially shed light on the US’s high level of commitment to NATO and, accordingly, its low level of commitment to UNPKO. France, on the other hand, does not share the US’s stance on UNPKO. Wood lists France’s motivations for being an internationally responsible permanent member of the UNSC as strategic/geographic interests, especially on the European frontier, as well as power interests (Wood 2005). Accordingly, Coleman reckons that France’s leadership on UNIFIL (Lebanon) helps to advance France’s three major interests: (a) to bolster its profile in the Middle East, (b) to satisfy domestic demands, and (c) to reaffirm its status in the international system (Coleman 2007, p. 320). As for Japan, it regarded UNPKO as instrumental in enhancing its international prestige, which proved to be the key to its appointment as a UNSC non-permanent member (Dobson 2003, p .47). Writing on British perceptions of, and policies towards, UNPKO from 1948 to 1967, Briscoe concludes that, within the time period studied, British peacekeeping policy was designed to guarantee UNPKO responsiveness to British interests (Briscoe 2003, p. 230). Ultimately, the primary aim for British participation in the UN’s pioneer peacekeeping mission, the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO-1948-Middle East), and the UN Emergency Force (UNEF-1956-Egypt) was to prevent Soviet Union involvement in the region (Briscoe 2003, p. 37). If anything, following the end of World War II, Britain was no longer able to act as a hegemonic power. Consequently, Britain had to hand the responsibility for keeping peace in the Middle East to the UN via UNTSO and UNEF, causing it to be labelled the ‘father’ of UNPKO (Urquhart 1990). China wanted to play a more constructive role in international politics and began to see UNPKO more in terms of its functionality rather than from an ideological perspective (Zhongying 2005). Wanting to justify its position as one of the major powers in the world, being part of the UN system, i.e. UNPKO, is important for China, as a country’s high-profile position within the UN system may act as testimony of a state’s legitimacy (Taylor 2005, p. 81). It may also provide China with the leverage to exploit its status as a permanent member of the UNSC in order to project its image as a ‘responsible country’ (Zhongying 2005, p. 81). The UNPKO is invariably instrumental in promoting the Chinese idea of ‘New Security Concept’, which

1.3 Literature Review

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emphasizes the settlement of international conflict through dialogue and cooperation and not through the use of force and threat (Zhongying 2005). This, as China sees it, is one of the critical components in its international relations in order to ‘cope with power politics and post-Cold War environment’ (Zhongying 2005). Invariably, states are predominantly concerned with satisfying their narrow shortterm interest vis-à-vis peacekeeping, noting that states’ interests consist of the specific strategic, economic and domestic imperatives of a specific time for a specific action (McQueen 2005, p. 19). Thus, in order to understand states’ ulterior motives, one must not attempt to see states operating in an exclusively strategic, material environment or in a totally normative and legal prism. States, therefore, inevitably operate in both milieus simultaneously (McQueen 2005, p. 54).

1.3.3 Malaysia’s UNPKO Like general literature on UNPKO, specific literature on Malaysia’s UNPKO is also extensive. Chang and Mejoh outline Malaysia’s sixteen UNPKO from the 1960s to the 1990s (1995). Similarly, Sidhu (1998) provides an account of eleven of Malaysia’s UNPKO that include, among others, ONUC (Congo 1960), UNTAC (Cambodia 1991) and UNPROFOR (Bosnia 1992) (Jatswan 1998). Nevertheless, other works prefer to focus on a single or two of Malaysia’s UNPKO. While Harisi’s focuses on Malaysia’s UNPKO in Namibia (Harisi Hasih 1996), Mohd Zamakh (1996) and Wan Shawaluddin (2000) focus on Malaysia’s UNPKO in Bosnia, Shauqi (1996) on Malaysia’s UNPKO in Somalia and Mohamed Shafie (1996) on Malaysia’s UNPKO in Cambodia. As with Sidhu’s work, these works on the whole concur with Sidhu’s observation that Malaysia’s UNPKO have so far substantially contributed to the modernization of Malaysia’s security forces, i.e. equipment, experience and doctrine, inasmuch as they helped to elevate Malaysia’s international prestige and status, i.e. soft power, and international as well as regional leadership. A recent study by Kamarulnizam (2014) offers a different perspective of Malaysia’s UNPKO. By grouping all Malaysian peacekeeping operations abroad under a single category, including those under NATO, Kamarulnizam identifies three major factors motivating Malaysia’s UNPKO, namely a multilateral approach to Malaysia’s foreign policy, tactical risk assessment and troop availability. Ramli’s work, on the other hand, examines the achievement, challenges (weaknesses) and implications of Malaysia’s UNPKO in Congo, Namibia, Cambodia, Somalia and Bosnia (Ramli 2004). Ramli argues that, among other things, Malaysia gains immense benefits from its involvement in UNPKO, such as Malaysia Armed Forces (MAF) modernization and inter-operability, positive international prestige, and favourable economic gains (Ramli 2004, p. 154). On Malaysia’s policy-making level vis-à-vis UNPKO at the UN, Rajmah argues that, based on Malaysia’s positions on selected international issues, specifically on the Cambodia conflict, Malaysia’s diplomatic initiative over UNPKO in Cambodia has to be examined in the light of

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ASEAN solidarity, its concern about conflict spillover, and its desire to prevent the intervention of superpowers in regional conflict (Rajmah 2009). Overall, the extant literature on UNPKO is obviously abundant. Among other things, the literature on international intervention and peacekeeping (nature, achievements and performances) indicates that the failure or the success of UNPKO considerably hinges on the interplay of power politics between major powers, the UNSC and UN member states, including domestic imperatives. In addition to that, reviewing the literature about states’ interests in peacekeeping reveal two central themes: (a) small states/powers are more concerned with satisfying domestic needs through their involvement, and (b) major powers, including regional powers, on the other hand, are more concerned with the exertion, maintenance and expansion of their influence either globally or regionally. Similarly, the extant literature on Malaysia’s UNPKO is also rich. However, quite a large number of these works on Malaysia’s UNPKO correspond more to historical studies, preferring to focus on ‘practical, policy-related issues like the design and conduct of particular missions’, and do not attempt to synchronize the nexus between theory and policy analysis (Paris 2000, p. 27). They are largely concerned with lessons learned from a single or a number of peace operations, and include too little theory informing the work of policy analysis (Paris 2000, p. 29). Conspicuously absent in these literatures is the theoretical aspect which can operationalize and address the question of the roles played by Malaysia’s domestic actors (foreign policy executives, legislature, the military, the media, public opinion) in the respective decision-making processes, as well as those at external level, such as international power politics and geopolitical considerations. Instead, they focus more on chronological, operational and logistical matters, which make them even more practical for policy purposes, i.e. lessons learned from Malaysia’s UNPKO that lack the theoretical discourse which could have made them even more reliable and useful to the worlds of both political science and non-political science. In short, they are disinterested, and thus disconnected from the efforts to bridge theory with policy analysis. Hence, the absence of theoretical discourse serving as the background to the work of Malaysia’s UNPKO causes them to possibly miss the chance to analyse other more and equally important factors of Malaysia’s UNPKO. There appears to be a scarcity of studies on the respective decision-making processes, especially from the Malaysian point of view, which take into account both the theoretical and the practical impacts of Malaysia’s UNPKO in understanding international politics. This is another gap this book seeks to fill. Not only will it contribute towards exploring the largely ignored connections between peace operations and international relations theory, but it will also help enrich ‘intrinsically interdisciplinary’ types of peacekeeping study, in which the linkages between those missions and theoretical controversies in fields other than international relations such as psychology or sociology can be made (Paris 2000, pp. 8–9).

1.4 Theoretical Framework

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1.4 Theoretical Framework The study of Malaysia’s UNPKO warrants a theoretical approach in order to understand why and how it behaves vis-à-vis UNPKO. To that end, this book employs neoclassical realism (NCR) as the analytical framework. Principally, NCR is used to seek explanations as to why states of similar structures or conditions behave differently i.e. adopt a different security policy, and vice versa. In other words, it looks for reasons that can account for the variations or dissimilarity in states’ foreign policies despite them possessing similar institutional structures, among other things. Essentially, NCR attempts to rationalize why states with different institutional structures adopt identical foreign policy, and to make the variations explicable. As such, it allows for the operationalization of the roles of the external and domestic imperatives which affect a state’s UNPKO. The application of the neoclassical realism analytical framework will be further discussed in Chap. 2.

1.5 Scope of the Book This book studies Malaysia’s UNPKO over a period of fifty years, i.e. 1960–2010. Covering the administration of the first five prime ministers, this book focuses on: (i) the UNPKO of each prime minister, (ii) the UNPKO which Malaysia did and did not join during the Cold War and in the post-Cold War era, and (iii) Malaysia’s UNPKO in its Strategic Interests Zone (SIZ) and Non-Strategic Interests Zone (NSIZ). Nevertheless, this book limits its scope to include only those UN-mandated and operated peacekeeping operations such as United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia from 1992 to 1995. Accordingly, it excludes those operations which were UN-mandated but operated by other international organizations, such as the Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR), which was operated and led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from 1996 to 2005. The chief reason for this is that the UN itself does not regard such operations as its own, i.e. it excludes them from the UN’s ‘List of Peacekeeping Operations 1948–2012’ (United Nations 2013).

1.6 Structure of the Book This book has eight chapters. This chapter discusses how Malaysia’s UNPKO serve as an example of the way states’ interests evolve through different external and internal settings. Chapter 2 deliberates on traditional international relations theories in order to settle upon a general pattern of interests that have influenced Malaysia’s UNPKO. Chapter 3 highlights the background of UNPKO and that of Malaysia by a trajectory through which the subsequent chapters take place. Accordingly, Chaps. 4, 5, 6 and 7

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examine empirically how, when and in what contexts systemic-domestic pressures have influenced Malaysia’s UNPKO. The concluding chapter (Chap. 8) highlights the main findings of this book by commenting upon the changes that occurred over the time frame with reference to Malaysia’s UNPKO. It addresses the primacy of systemic pressures, the changing nature of prime ministers’ perceptions, and how both eventually made their way into Malaysia’s UNPKO between 1960 and 2010. It concludes by providing an evaluation of the theoretical/analytical approach that focuses on the feasibility and relevance of NCR as the analytical framework.

References Aksu, E. (2003). The United Nations, Intra-State Peacekeeping And Normative Change. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Aning, K. (2007). Unintended Consequences of Peace Operations for Troop-Contributing Countries from West Africa: The Case of Ghana. In C. Aoi, C. de Coning, & R. Tahakur (Eds), Unintended Consequences of UN Peacekeeping Operations (pp. 133–155). Hong Kong: UN University Press. Aoi, C., de Coning, C., & Tahakur, R. (Eds.). (2007). Unintended Consequences of UN Peacekeeping Operations (pp. 269–272). Hong Kong: UN University Press. Belloni, R. (2007). State Building and International Intervention in Bosnia. New York, NY: Routledge. Briscoe, N. (2003). Britain and UN Peacekeeping 1948–1967. London: Macmillan. Bullion, A.J. (2005). India. In D.S. Sorenson & P.C. Wood (Eds.), The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era (pp. 196–212). London: Frank Cass. Chang, L.F., & Mejoh, D. (1995). Malaysia in United Nations Peacekeeping Missions. Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Coleman, K.P. (2007). International Organizations and Peace Enforcement: The Politics of International Legitimacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dhillon, K.S. (2009). Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981–2003: Dilemma of Independence. Singapore: NUS Press. Dobson, H. (2003). Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping: New Pressures, New Responses. New York, NY: Routledge. Hampson, F.J., & Kihara-Hunt, A. (2007). The Accountability of Personnel Associated With Peacekeeping Operations. In C. Aoi, C. de Coning, & R. Tahakur (Eds.), Unintended Consequences of UN Peacekeeping Operations (pp. 195–220). Hong Kong: UN University Press. Hampton, M.N. (2005). Germany. In D.S. Sorenson & P.C. Wood (Eds.), The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era (pp. 29–51). London: Frank Cass. Harisi, H. (1996). Malaysia Di Pertubuhan Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu (PBB): Satu Kajian Ke Atas Pasukan Pengaman Malaysia Di Namibia. Undergraduate thesis, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Hasnan, Samian. (2007). Malaysia’s Participation in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation and its Contribution to Global Peace and Stability: Case Studies of Cambodia and Bosnia Herzegovina. M.A. thesis, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Bangi, Malaysia. Henkin, L., Pugh, R.C., Schachter, O., & Henkin, H.S.L. (1993). International Law Cases and Materials (3rd edn.). Andover: Cengage Learning. Howe, H.M. (2005). Nigeria. In D.S. Sorenson & P.C. Wood (Eds.), The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era (pp. 176–195). London: Frank Cass. Jatswan, S.S. (1998). Keamanan Sejagat: Satu Tinjauan Tentang Penglibatan Malaysia Dalam Misi Pengaman (Peacekeeping Operation) Pertubuhan Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu (PBB), 1960–1996. In

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Prosiding Sejarah Dan Proses Pemantapan Negara-Bangsa, vol. II. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya. Jeshurun, C. (2008b). Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957–2007. Singapore: Talisman Publishing. Jett, D.C. (1999). Why Peacekeeping Fails. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Kamarulnizam, A. (2014). Malaysia’s Peacekeeping Operation Contributions. In C. Aoi & Y.K. Heng (Eds.), Asia Pacific Nations in International Peace Support and Stability Operations (pp. 149–171). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Kent, V. (2007). Protecting Civilians from UN Peacekeepers and Humanitarian Workers: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. In C. Aoi, C. de Coning, & R. Tahakur (Eds). Unintended Consequences of UN Peacekeeping Operations (pp. 44–66). Hong Kong: UN University Press. Koyama, S., & Myrttinen, H. (2007). Unintended Consequences of Peace Operations on Timor Leste from a Gender Perspective. In C. Aoi, C. de Coning, & R. Tahakur (Eds.), Unintended Consequences of UN Peacekeeping Operations (pp. 23–43). Hong Kong: UN University Press. Lee, S.-W. (2007). Unintended Consequences of Peace Operations on Humanitarian Action. In C. Aoi, C. de Coning, & R. Tahakur (Eds.), Unintended Consequences of UN Peacekeeping Operations (pp. 90–108). Hong Kong: UN University Press. MacQueen, N. (2006). Peacekeeping and the International System. New York, NY: Routledge. Malaysia Ministry of Defence. (2010). National Defence Policy. Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Haji Jantan. Malaysia Peacekeeping Centre. (n.d.). MAF Involvement: 35 Missions Around the World. Retrieved January 5, 2015, from http://www.mahfq.mi.my/mpc/index.php/en/2014-06-26-04-07-27/mafmissions. McQueen, C. (2005). Humanitarian Intervention and Safety Zones: Iraq, Bosnia and Rwanda. New York, NY: Macmillan. Megret, F. (2007). The Vicarious Responsibility of the United Nations. In C. Aoi, C. de Coning & R. Tahakur (Eds.), Unintended Consequences of UN Peacekeeping Operations (pp. 250–267). Hong Kong: UN University Press. Mohamed Shafie, H. (1996). Kemboja: Satu Kajian Ke Atas Peranan UNTAC dan MALBATT. Undergraduate thesis, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Mohd Zamakh, S.I. (1996). Malaysia dan Keamanan Antarabangsa: Satu Kajian Ke atas Pasukan Pemerhati Malaysia di Bosnia-Herzegovina. Undergraduate thesis, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Murphy, R. (2007). UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo: Operational and Legal Issues in Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Murthy, C.S.R. (2007). Unintended Consequences of Peace Operations for Troop-Contributing Countries from South Asia. In C. Aoi, C. de Coning, & R. Tahakur (Eds.), Unintended Consequences of UN Peacekeeping Operations (pp. 156–170). Hong Kong: UN University Press. Norden, D.L. (1996). The Transformation of Argentine Security. In R.L. Millet & M. Gold-Biss (Eds.), Beyond Praetorianism: The Latin American Military in Transition (pp. 241–260). Miami, MI: North-South Center Press. Onumajuru, E.V. (2005). United Nations Peacekeeping Operation and Conflict Resolution in Africa. United Nations Institute for Training and Research Programme of Correspondence Instruction. Paris, R. (2000). Broadening the Study of Peace Operations. International Studies Review, 2(3). Rahman, I. (2004). Dhaka Facing Problems in Peacekeeping. Arab News. Retrieved 29 September 2004, from http://www.arabnews.com/node/255883. Rajmah, H. (2009). Malaysia at the United Nations: A Study of Foreign Policy Priorities 1957–1987 (1st edn.). Putrajaya: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia. Ramli, A.B. (2004). Peranan Malaysia Dalam Pasukan Pengaman Perubuhan Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu (PBB). M.A. thesis, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Rudd, D. (2005). Canada. In D.S. Sorenson & P.C. Wood (Eds.), The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era (pp. 156–175). London: Frank Cass.

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Saravanamuttu, J. (2010). Malaysia’s Foreign Policy, The First Fifty Years: Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism. Singapore: ISEAS. Schmidl, E.A. (2005). Austria. In D.S. Sorenson & P.C. Wood (Eds.), The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era (pp. 140–157). London: Frank Cass. Shauqi, M.N. (1996). Malaysia dan Misi Pengaman PBB: Satu Kajian Mengenai Sumbangan MALBATT dalam Operasi UNISOM II di Somalia. Undergraduate thesis, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Smith, H. (2005). Australia. In D.S. Sorenson & P.C. Wood. (Eds.), The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era (pp. 9–28). London: Frank Cass. Sitkowski, A. (2006). UN Peacekeeping: Myth and Reality. London: Praeger Publisher Inc. Soo, T.S. (1989). The Malayan Special Force in the Heart of Africa. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications. Sorenson, D.S., & Wood, P.C. (Eds.) (2005). The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era. London: Frank Cass. Sotomayor, A.C. (2007). South America: The Cases of Argentina and Uruguay. In C. Aoi, C. de Coning, & R. Tahakur (Eds.), Unintended Consequences of UN Peacekeeping Operations (pp. 171–191). Hong Kong: UN University Press. Spooner, K.A. (2009). Canada, the Congo Crisis and UN Peacekeeping, 1960–64. Canada: UBC Press. Tanca, A. (1993). Foreign Armed Intervention In Internal Conflict. Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff. Taylor, P. (2005). International Organization in the Age of Globalization. Cornwall: MPG Books. Tulchin, J.S. (1998). Continuity and Change in Argentine Foreign Policy. In J.S. Tulchin & A.M. Garland (Eds.), Argentina: The Challenges of Modernization (pp. 163–197). Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources. United Nations (2013). List of Peacekeeping Operations 1948–2012. Retrieved 4 March 2013 from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf. United Nations (n.d.). United Nations Peace Operations. Retrieved 3 February 2013 from http:// www.unmissions.org. United Nations (n.d.). Peacekeeping: Fatalities by Nation up to 31 January 2013. Retrieved 3 March 2013, from https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities. United Nations (n.d.). Troop and Police Contributors Archive (1990–2014). Retrieved 11 November 2015, from https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors. United Nations (n.d.). Assessment of Member States’ Advances. See also Congressional Research Service, United Nations Regular Budget. United Nations (2004, 19 November). Secretary-General ‘Absolutely Outraged’ by Gross Misconduct by Peacekeeping Personnel in Democratic Republic Of Congo [press release]. Retrieved 5 October 2015 from http://www.un.org/press/en/2004/sgsm9605.doc.htm. United Nations (n.d.). Troop and Police Contributor Archive: 1990–2014. Retrieved 10 January 2015 from https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors. Urquhart, B. (1990). UN Peacekeeping: From Observers to the Peace Prize. In E. Jensen & T. Fisher (Eds.), The United Kingdom: The United Nations. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Wan Shawaluddin, W.H. (2000). Malaysia dan Krisis Bosnia. Jurnal Kinabalu,6, 25–41. Watson, C.A. (2005). Argentina. In D.S. Sorenson & P.C. Wood (Eds.), The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era (pp. 52–67). London: Frank Cass. Wood, C.P. (2005). France. The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era. In D.S. Sorenson & P.C. Wood (Eds), The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era (pp. 68–94). London: Frank Cass. Woodhouse, T., & Ramsbotham, A. (2005). The United Kingdom. In D.S. Sorenson & P.C. Wood (Eds.), The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era (pp. 95–113). London: Frank Cass. Zhongying, P. (2005). China’s Changing Attitude to UN Peacekeeping. In M. Caballero-Anthony & A. Acharya (Eds.), UN Peace Operations and Asian Security (pp. 73–77). New York, NY: Routledge.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Framework

Abstract In order to identify a general pattern in the interests that influenced Malaysia’s UNPKO, this chapter provides a review of the contending traditional international relations theories. After a thorough review, this chapter settles on neoclassical realism (NCR) as its analytical framework. Specifically, NCR helps to identify the systemic-domestic imperatives and their roles in explaining Malaysia’s UNPKO. Measured through the level of dominance, it follows that systemic pressures, as an independent variable, play a more dominant role, followed by domestic pressures, as the intervening variable. Nonetheless, in certain situations, the domestic factors might also assume an independent role vis-à-vis a state’s i.e. Malaysia’s UNPKO. Ultimately, the key to understanding why and how inter-states interactions come about in the international system is to study what states have actually stated, decided and done in relation to other states, best represented by a state’s foreign policy. NCR proves to be no less reliable in executing that. Keywords Realism · Liberalism · Constructivism · Neoclassical realism · Systemic pressure · Domestic pressure · Intervening variables

2.1 Introduction The basis of this book is the activity of peacekeeping undertaken by states in pursuit of their own preferences. Preference, as a term, generally points to the outcome (highest expected pay-off from an interaction) or action (co-operating with state A in order to gain that pay-off) (Powell 1994). This book, then, examines the key determinants of Malaysia’s UNPKO. Being a small power, Malaysia’s commitment to UNPKO depends on a lot of considerations. Invariably, a small state has limited capabilities, resources and interests, and is therefore vulnerable to coercion, pressure and threats from within and without (Gerger 1975, p. 110). Essentially, as a small power, Malaysia recognizes that it cannot secure its security on its own and that it has to depend on the aid of other states, institutions, processes or developments to do so (Rothstein 1968). Putting such a limitation into the equation helps to account

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Salleh and A. Idris, Malaysia’s United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1960–2010), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4137-1_2

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for Malaysia’s (and other states’) varying responses and commitment to UNPKO. Some states are active in it, while others are not. States’ different or similar ways of responding to UNPKO relate, among other things, to how much importance an individual state places on peacekeeping – i.e. the position of peacekeeping in its list of preferences. On the international stage, states are predisposed towards promoting and preserving the interests that are crucial for their survival. Up to a qualified extent, this applies to the major powers as well, because as far as the international status quo system is concerned, the major powers see peacekeeping as integral for their survival (Stern 2000, p. 12). Accordingly, it is in the interests of the major powers (who are also the permanent members of the UNSC) to address international peace and maintain the status quo through UNPKO, and vice versa. Subsequently, it is also in the interests of states to contribute and participate in UNPKO, and vice versa.

2.2 Contending Mainstream International Relations Theories International peace (and therefore UNPKO) is a fundamental aspect of international relations. Thus, befitting the objectives of this book, it is appropriate for the corresponding deliberation on contending mainstream international relations theories and analytical approaches to chiefly revolve around the international system, the international security environment, peacekeeping and states’ interests. Having these key terms in view, a deliberation on liberalism, constructivism and realism (but not Marxism, which is less relevant for explaining the peacekeeping context), is in order.

2.2.1 Liberalism Among the chief proponents of liberalism and its strands is Robert Keohane through his seminal work After Hegemony: Power and Discord in the World Political Economy (1984). Keohane maintains that international organizations (IO) matter because they help states, as rational actors, gain joint benefits from mutual interstate cooperation in order to serve their own national interests (Coleman 2007, p. 65). Cooperation goes hand in hand with the increasing roles and proliferating numbers of international organizations which have redefined their roles in the post-Cold War period so engrossed in multilateralism euphoria (Dobson 2003, p. 13). International institutions are so “pervasive in every functional domain of international politics in today’s world that they are as much institutional as intergovernmental” (Stein 2008, p. 201). Chief among them, to name but a few, are the United Nations (UN), the World Bank (WB), the European Union (EU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the North Atlantic

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Treaty Organization (NATO). These IOs are just not there to serve states’ interests, as realism would have argued. As a matter of fact, they influence states’ behaviour by serving as the reference point that results in mutual adjustments to policies, e.g. states affecting certain policies to gain admission into a certain IO. At its root, liberalism, otherwise known as liberal institutionalism, with its own neo variants, specifically neoliberal institutionalism, places emphasis on states’ cooperation and international institutions. Young (1986) asserts that cooperation within IOs leads to the creation of “identifiable social conventions”, commonly known as norms and regimes, which are central in affecting states’ behaviour. Krasner (1982) offers a concise definition of international institutions (regime) as “principles, norms and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area.” As the defining characteristics of a regime, principles and norms refer to beliefs of facts and standards of behaviour defined as rights and obligations. Conversely, rules and decision-making, taken as the functional behaviour within a regime, correspondingly refer to prescriptions and proscriptions for action and the prevailing practices for making/implementing collective choices (Krasner 1982). Liberalism seeks not to replace realism. Rather, by embracing realism’s definition of the structural international system, it takes into account the key roles of policy-making and actors beyond the exclusive realm of the state. Emphasis is given to the state’s decision-making process (the black box), IOs’ variances (Dobson 2003, pp. 10–11), and even ‘ideas’ as an additional intervening variable between power/interest and outcomes (Wendt 1999). Essentially, liberalism attempts to locate the key causes of the attributes and interactions of states (Wendt 1999, p. 12), among other ways through sovereignty and autonomy concepts, reinterpreted as duty as opposed to right. This subsequently creates permissive international institutions that allow states to enter into some forms of cooperation, the purpose of which is to secure the security and sovereignty of states themselves. For liberalism, treating sovereignty and autonomy as a duty for good governance is critical to the maintenance of global stability and security governed by an anarchic international system. This is where states rid themselves of some rights in favour of autonomy and sovereignty (Chandler 2010). This is not impossible because liberalism does not rule out the evolution of expectations during interstate interactions that permit states to develop cooperation-bound international regimes even in the absence of binding structural forces (Wendt 1999, p. 19). Simply put, liberalism argues that IOs matter, that they make a difference in states’ behaviour and in the nature of international politics (Stein 2008, p. 212). In a liberal world, states are moving away from war, but closer to peace, due to significant facilitating roles, immersed in norms invoked and created by IOs. As such, IOs deserve no less attention, primarily because of their “agency, agenda-setting influence and socializing influences” (Simmons/Martin 2002, p. 192). However, liberalism also attracts its own fair share of criticism which, among other things, makes its usability as an analytical framework for studying states’ variable behaviour vis-à-vis UNPKO less convincing. Central to the criticism is that liberalism overemphasizes and exaggerates the existence and roles of IOs. With no independent standing, no independent causal role, and hence no effect on mitigating the anarchy

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of the international system, IOs are at best epiphenomenal, as they merely reflect power and interest (Stein 2008, p. 206). IOs exist typically in ‘low politics’, such as communication and transportation, but play a very minimal role in ‘high politics’, such as national security and defence (Mearsheimer 1994). Liberalism has its focus fixed more on explaining the likelihood of economic and environmental cooperation between states than on addressing the issue of war prevention. Mostly, it disregards security issues and instead focuses more on economics and the environment, and, in the process, pays no attention to the relative-gain concerns which often prove to be one of the main stumbling blocks to cooperation (Mearsheimer 1994). Liberalism also fails to prove, from an empirical perspective, that cooperation would still occur even in the absence of IOs (Mearsheimer 1994). Mearsheimer additionally claims that the outbreak of wars in Bosnia, Rwanda and former Soviet Union states in the 1990s and the subsequent failure of IOs to prevent them makes a solid point for dismissing the peace-causing effects of IOs (Mearsheimer 1995). Speaking of relative gains, critics maintain that potential joint benefits or gains do not guarantee cooperation. This is especially so if and when states are convinced that cooperative behaviour might expose them to potential abuse/exploitation or that unilateral defection is preferable, more beneficial and more rewarding an option than joint cooperation (Martin 1992). For Grieco, states would abandon cooperation if they believed other states would reap even greater benefits (Stein 2008, p. 210). This is what Stein sees as states’ overriding, ubiquitous concerns of relative standing and relative gains (Stein 2008). Institutions are relatively helpless when it comes to stopping states from pursuing short-term power maximization (relative gains). Besides, although great powers cannot entirely dismiss the usefulness of international institutions like alliance to maintain or increase their share of world power, it does not downplay the major fault of IOs as mirroring the reflection of balance of power with no significant independent effects on international outcomes (Mearsheimer 1995, pp. 82–93). Liberalism, however, accepts the role of the nationstate as an important actor in the international system, thus rendering it the positivist criterion associated with realism. And since liberalism takes inter-states cooperation as a given, just as realism does with regard to the structural balance of power, both qualify as ‘Westphalian’ theories of international relations which underscore states’ sovereignty (Dobson 2003, p. 17). Finally, liberalism recognizes the existence of norms and regimes as a product of cooperation but regards them only as regulating, not constitutive. However, for constructivism, it is constitutive norms that matter, as explained in the ensuing discussion.

2.2.2 Constructivism Constructivism, which can trace its roots to sociology, is commonly associated with Nicholas Onuf and Alexander Wendt, with the former being credited with coining the term ‘Constructivism’ and the latter with constructivism’s renowned quote, ‘Anarchy is what states make of it’. Constructivism claims that ‘ideas matter’.

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Essentially, constructivism is about the social construction of reality. Therefore, it is inter-subjective (shared) ideas, norms, thoughts and beliefs that constitute the patterns, cause-and-effect relationship and practices (institutionalized or expressed in practices and identities) in the international system, not materialism or the structural distribution of capabilities. Ultimately, constructivism refers to the social and relational construction of what states are and what they want (Hurd 2008). Hence the sense of another quote by Wendt: “500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons” (Wendt 1995, p. 73). Constructivism has two basic principles: (a) shared ideas, not material forces, determine the structures of human association; and (b) shared ideas construct the identities and interests of purposive actors; they are not supplied by nature (Wendt 1999, p. 1). It rejects positivism by arguing that every social concept and social reality in international relations is socially constructed; that amity, enmity, power, conflict, war and other substantive phenomena are not naturally pre-determined or pre-distributed; that the social world is not independent of man’s control. Besides, the fact that social reality is man-made makes it even more comprehensible. Naturally, the structure of international politics as perceived by states is also not a given. It is what and how they think and make of it. In other words, since social reality is not imposed but is constructed by actors, the social reality is and can be subjected to actors’ control. That sort of control underscores the importance of understanding material forces, such as power and influence, and material objects, like weapons and bombs, through the social concepts that define their meaning in international relations. Having raised this, it is critically important to highlight two key facts, namely that constructivism does not dismiss the notion that: (a) states’ actions are designed to pursue their interests and (b) states are concerned with power and interests, as are realism and liberalism. What differentiates these approaches, Hurd writes, are the “sources that they identify as states’ interests and the content of those interests” (Hurd 2008, p. 310). Since constructivism does not claim to be a theory of foreign policy (Wendt 1999, p. 11), the core of Wendt’s analysis is inherently systemic because it focuses on the interaction between states in the international system and disregards the role of domestic factors (Barnett 2008). The difference between constructivism and realism in explaining states’ interests therefore lies in the former striving to explain the formation of states’ interests and the latter striving to satisfy states’ interests (Reus-Smit 2005, p. 203). After all, constructivism sees “the world as a community organized by shared norms, values and understandings that shape human action” (Dobson 2003, p. 18). Power and interests should therefore be considered norms too. Moreover, constructivism highlights the role of ideas in defining international structure, the ways the structures attach meanings to the ideation and interests of states, and subsequently how both state and non-state actors approach and respond to the structure. Therefore, the study of international relations, according to Barnett, centres on ideas and beliefs that inform the actors as well as the shared understandings between them:

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2 Theoretical Framework The international system exists only as an inter-subjective awareness, or a common understanding, among people; in that sense the system is constituted by ideas, not by material forces… it is a set of ideas, a body of thought, a system of norms, which has been arranged by certain people at a particular time and place… change becomes possible in a big way because people and states can start thinking about each other in new ways and thus create new norms that may be radically different from old ones. (Barnett 2008, p. 160)

This assertion implies that international relations are not predominantly inclined to either conflict or cooperation. Their direction entirely depends on states’ identities and interests, which constantly change over time, just as a state’s foreign policy does. Consequently, states can affect desired changes in the international system, such as institutionalization and the promotion of norms like peace and cooperation as well as hostility and intolerance. Nevertheless, since norms, regimes, concepts, interests, identities and needs are of social origin, it follows that the examination of the historical, language and ideational backgrounds leading to their emergence should be subsequently examined (Dobson 2003, p. 19). Such a historical analysis is important, for example, to gain useful insights into the social construction of key concepts like anarchy, agent-structure relationships and even national interests. It is a rigorous process but necessary in order to produce a comprehensive understanding of how the structure of the social world works, and the ways agents respond to it and vice versa, especially in international relations. On a final note, constructivism makes the world of international relations less fixated on ubiquitous anarchy, which paves the way for change made possible through the creation and institutionalization of both new and old norms. Yet, as a potential analytical framework for this study, constructivism also has several weaknesses. The first derives mainly from its inability to adequately address the problem of uncertainty about states’ motives (Copeland 2000). Notwithstanding the motives, the mere presence of intention can lead security-seeking states to enter into conflict. It is rather over-simplistic to argue that states can learn about other states inside out, especially when what Copeland terms “impression management” is used to camouflage a state’s true intentions (Copeland 2000). Copeland stresses that it is what is not shared – at least in the area of intentions – that remains the core stumbling block to cooperation (Copeland 2000). In relation to this, methodologically, Hurd argues that constructivism does not specify any particular unit of analysis as fundamental to the study of international relations (Hurd 2008). This renders the constructivist unit of analysis closer to pluralism of the units of analysis, whereas such a pluralism of actors and structures prevents constructivism from being able to determine which level provides the most leverage (Hurd 2008). Conversely, the analytical separation of actors, practices and structures does not solve the problem either. Constructivism, therefore, is in a dilemma over what to problematize and what to take as given (Hurd 2008). For example, in constructivist research, comprehension of the concept of ‘state’ is taken as a ‘given’ in order to understand how states’ interactions are shaped and led to certain international norms. However, this is highly problematic, as taking the concept of state as a ‘given’ dismisses early on the probably significant role that the historical, social construction of states (priori) as a sovereign institution in international relations may

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play in how states interact with each other (Hurd 2008, p. 306). Consequently, this raises a dilemma over what to problematize and what to take as given in a constructivist analytical framework, thereby making the findings of constructivist research debatable as well. Moreover, Reus-Smit highlights the debate about the application of interpretive methodology (genealogical) versus methodological conventionalism (quantitative) in constructivist research. Interpretive methodology insists that the study of ideas, norms and other meanings requires its proposed methodology since it is able to grasp the relationship between inter-subjective meanings derived from self-interpretation and self-definition and the embedded and constitutive social practices (Reus-Smit 2005). Methodological conventionalism, on the other hand, dismisses interpretive methodology on two grounds: that methodological conventionalism does not need to rely on separate ‘interpretive methodology’ nor does this bear any difference from theirs (Reus-Smit 2005). This rivalry, Adler notes, lies in the question of “whether one should start from ontology or from epistemology” (Adler 2002, p. 105). Besides, in the pursuit of a general theory of international relations, constructivists are divided into two camps: positivist versus post-positivist. Positivism maintains that socially constructed international relations possess patterns that are amenable to generalization and falsifiable hypotheses produced by identifiable laws governing social relations that can be used to explain cause-and-effect relationships believed to exist independently of the observer’s presence (Hurd 2008). Post-positivism, on the other hand, takes a totally opposite stand. It dismisses data measurability, rejects observers’ autonomy, refuses to separate social relationships into cause-and-effects, and maintains that social laws are inherently contingent, not existing naturally and objectively (Hurd 2008). It confines constructivism to providing strong interpretations and explanations of discrete aspects of world politics and therefore dismisses the pursuit of a general theory of international relations as an absurdity (Reus-Smit 2005). Furthermore, the objective of research is to interpret how social meaning and power produce the apparent stability in the social world (Devetak 2005), not to identify and test hypotheses about law-like regularities. Such a division, Reus-Smit clarifies, occurs between those Constructivists who remain cognizant of the critical origins and potential of their sociological explorations and those who embrace constructivism simply as an explanatory or interpretive tool (Reus-Smit 2005). At its root, this signifies a deep disagreement between those who emphasize that constructivism is not a theory, but an analytical framework, and those who argue otherwise (Reus-Smit 2005). Finally, on the hierarchical/anarchical nature of the international system, constructivists are also divided into two camps – conventional versus post-anarchy. The conventional camp acknowledges the existence of a formal condition of anarchy among states and makes it a crucial element of the international structure (Hurd 2008). Unlike positivism, it infuses change into anarchy due to factors like coordinating institutions and shared culture. Nonetheless, the basic structural condition of anarchy as the foundation of the international system remains intact. The postanarchy camp, on the other hand, implies that the anarchic international system could

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transform into something different due to hierarchical changes in the social relations between states (Wendt 1999). A good example would be the practice of international authority in IOs such as that within the UN system. Whether or not anarchy is susceptible to change, this position, intentional or not, gives constructivism a significant affinity with the English School’s international society, which constructivism denies (Hurd 2008). With these factors in mind, this discussion now turns to realism.

2.2.3 Realism Central to realist tradition are the thoughts and works of, among others, Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Kautilya, Machiavelli, Burke, Hegel and even Hobbes (Stern 2000). Among its prominent modern works are Hans Morgenthau’s Politics among Nations (1954), Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (1979), Gideon Rose’s World Politics (1998) and John Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001). At its most basic level, realism takes on a Hobbesian (pessimistic) view of human nature, which is then assumed to be the nature of international politics. A pessimistic view of the nature of men suggests that, in the absence of clear central authority, people are conflictual and overridden by self-interest and egoism. Therefore, Hobbesian international relations are, as Stein puts it, “anarchic and characterized by conflict and struggle as each state attempts to secure its objectives at the expense of others” (Stern 2000, p. 11). Gilpin sums it up well, arguing that realism simply revolves around human selfishness (egoism) and the absence of international government (anarchy) that imposes constraints on politics (Gilpin 1986, p. 305). Realism, as a systemic theory school of thought, uses the causal factor of the structural distribution of material capabilities (the logics of anarchy) to explain patterns of state behaviour. Realism’s primary principles and core assumptions differ from one scholar to another. For Wohlforth, realism converges on four central propositions of ‘groupism’, ‘egoism’, ‘anarchy’ and ‘power politics’. That is, group solidarity (groupism), being the core of conflict and cooperation – derived principally from the pursuit of narrow self-interests (egoism) – dominates an environment with no central authority (anarchic), which justifies the politics of power and security (power play) in international relations (Wohlforth 2008). However, Lobell et al. put forth three propositions: all variants of realism are inherently ‘group-centric’; politics is a ‘perpetual struggle’ among self-interested groups; and ‘power’ is a necessary requirement for any group to secure its goals (Lobell et al. 2009a, p. 15). For Wendt, the basic core assumptions of realism can be narrowed down to individualism and materialism, among other things (Wendt 1999). Due to the logics of anarchy, states constantly compete or cooperate, not necessarily in rational ways, for power or security in order to guarantee survival in an anarchic international system devoid of a central authority that can impose an overarching order. By and large, realism espouses a pessimistic view of the human condition and the prospects for change in human behaviour by rejecting the political conception of an ‘end of history’, maintaining its scepticism for ‘pacific international order’

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while arguing that material interests, including power, produce ethics and morality, not the other way around (Wendt 1999). Generally, the signature realist argument claims that provided that there is a central authority to enforce order, that if indeed human affairs are characterized by groupism, egoism and power-centrism, the prevalence of anarchy is inevitable and consequently drives “politics to be conflictual and states’ security problematic”, from which sources of war can commonly be drawn (Wohlforth 2008, p. 135). Generally, realism has three major theoretical sub-schools: classical, neorealism, and neoclassical realism. According to Lobell et al., classical realism focuses on the sources and uses of states’ national power in international politics and the problems faced in the conduct of a state’s foreign policy. It places more emphasis on state and national power, such as power distributions between states and the character of states and their relation to domestic society, and less on the constraints of the international system or its relative distribution effects on states’ behaviour (State + Society → International System) (Owen IV 2010, p. 29). Next, neorealism focuses on commonly recurring patterns of international behaviour or outcomes resulting from the interaction of two or more units in an anarchic environment, such as war and hegemony versus balance of power and patterns of alliance and/or cooperation (Owen IV 2010, p. 29). It identifies the link that connects the recurring patterns of states’ behaviours – meant to guarantee security and survival – to the structure of the international system and its anarchic characteristic. The relative distribution of capabilities or the balance of power is the most important variable. Neorealism is a systemic theory that predicts systemic outcomes (International System → State’s Actions) (Owen IV 2010, p. 29). Finally, neoclassical realism focuses on the variations in states’ behaviour (diplomatic, economic and military responses) when facing similar external constraints. But it seeks neither to provide an explanation for broad patterns of systemic or recurring international outcomes nor to come up with one universal theory of international politics (Lobell et al. 2009a). It represents a synthesis of both classical and neorealism by regarding states as the most important actors (classical) in international politics but considering their actions or behaviours to be ultimately driven by systemic forces (neorealism) (Lobell et al. 2009a). Domestic variables are added as the intervening variable between systemic imperatives and states’ behaviour (International System → State → Domestic Variables → State Behaviour). Since realism sees the international system as an anarchic international realm with states being the major actors and security as the highest goal (Resende-Santos 2007, p. 5), it logically follows that realism treats other actors such as IOs, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and even transnational companies (TNCs) as primarily a product of states’ interactions and subsequently as a tool to further states’ interests (Dobson 2003, p. 8). As such, Dobson observes, IOs like the UN, seen through realism’s perspective, are subservient/constrained by states’ interests; nonautonomous entities due to their dependence on states for resources; and primarily manipulated by states as a channel to pursue their own interests (Dobson 2003, p. 8). International institutions, Mearsheimer insists, are basically “a reflection of the distribution of power in the world, are based on self-interested calculations of

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great powers with no independent effect on state power, and [are] not an important cause of peace” (Mearsheimer 1994). Realists reduce international institutions to an insignificant and immaterial part of international relations, and mostly they are “reducible to the twin realist verities of power and interest” (Stein 2001). International institutions wield a very minimal, if not insignificant, effect on states’ behaviour. Hence, they provide very little to guarantee such a comprehensive concept as collective peace. Accordingly, UN’s peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions, to an extent, reflect or mirror states’ selfish interests, particularly those of the major powers, whether they wish peace to be restored or otherwise. Going by the same token, international norms defined as standards of behaviour or in terms of rights and obligations (Krasner 1983, p. 2), for example humanitarian intervention, can therefore be seen to primarily serve the interests of the world’s most powerful states (Paris 2000, p. 37). ‘Ethical’ behaviour is also, in the event of accepted international hierarchy, due to the wish of the major powers to maintain the status quo to preserve peace (Stern 2000, p. 11). Ultimately, as far as international relations are concerned, “the interests of the state predominate all over other interests and values” (Haslam 2008). Both classical realist and neorealist schools see states as unitary and rational units. Both depend only on either states’ characteristics as ‘billiard balls’ or systemic determinants responsible for shaping states’ behaviour. As such, they dismiss the equally important explanatory roles exuded by domestic determinants to, among other things, predict states’ behaviour. Waltz contends that although unit-level variables may lead states to defy the power structure, this will only be short-lived or ephemeral because the structure will ultimately ‘punish’ states (Owen IV 2010, p. 30) so harshly that they will be dissuaded from ‘deviating’ (Owen IV 2010, p. 30). Using the analogy of railway tracks, the systemic determinants will ensure the trains will not derail or leave the tracks on purpose. Hence, in due course, for fear of disrupting the existing structural balance of power that could necessitate a structural backlash, reprisals, conflict or war, states will be encouraged to behave in accordance with the given structural distribution of power. However, according to structural realism, domestic-political variables are equally responsible for causing states’ anomalous behaviour. Steiner argues that, contrary to classical and neorealist beliefs, states are not rational, unitary actors: that leaders or states often act out of ignorance and misperception – they simply misperceive the power equation and hence engage in anomalous state behaviour (Steiner 2010, p. 130). In order to explain such an anomaly, Owen stresses that unit-level factors like domestic politics, such as a regime or leadership change or a degree of domestic coherence, may cause a state to be more or less ambitious than structural realism would have predicted (Owen IV 2010, p. 31). Hence the greater level of Germany’s aggression under the reign of Nazi dictatorship compared with the era of the Weimar Republic (Owen IV 2010, p. 31). Similarly, from 1985 to 1991, the Soviet Union turned from a “Marxist-Leninist view of inevitable conflict between capitalism and socialism to an idealist vision of cooperation between states in solving global problems” (Larson/Shevchenko 2010).

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2.3 Analytical Framework Having discussed the mainstream theories of international relations, this book will now discuss the analytical framework derived from the theories. Some notable works, such as those of Dobson (2003), Spooner (2009), MacQueen (2006), Aksu (2003), Lynch (2000), Macfarlane (2001) and Mackinlay/Cross (2003), apply different analytical frameworks in order to study a state’s peacekeeping. Dobson’s work, for example, applies constructivism to explain Japan’s UNPKO. While Dobson’s analysis offers sound insights on the causal role of norms – i.e. from militarism to antimilitarism and internationalism – vis-à-vis the Japanese contribution to UNPKO, his emphasis on the independent role of international norms espoused by international institutions – i.e. the UN on Japanese UNPKO – is, to a degree, arguable. If internationalism as a norm matters for Japanese UNPKO – keeping in view the power politics within the UN (UNSC and UNPKO) – this is because the major powers allow it to be. The fact is that the collusion of internationalism as a norm with the interests of the UNSC’s permanent members vis-à-vis UNPKO matters, as indicated by the extant literature on UNPKO in Chapter One. The frequency of UNPKO during the Cold War and post-Cold War would affirm this as well. However, if Japanese UNPKO is, after all, anything to go by, then Dobson’s constructivist analytical framework is useful for generalizing about Japanese UNPKO, but cannot account for an anomaly within the framework. Specifically, Dobson’s framework could not explain the reasons why the Japanese would participate in some UNPKO and not others. Logically, if the norms such as anti-militarism and internationalism really do matter for Japanese UNPKO, they should all have been all-encompassing and inclusive. Equally, the norms could have not been selective, as far as Japanese UNPKO is concerned. In short, though Dobson’s analytical framework is useful for generalization, it is less adequate when it comes to accounting for the state’s anomalous behaviour vis-à-vis UNPKO. In addition to that, a work by Aksu (2003) which attempts to elucidate peacekeeping through the constructivist approach is highly commendable. Yet, since Aksu focuses on peacekeeping as an international outcome of international politics, not as a state’s foreign policy, it follows that his book does not offer a full explanation for a state’s participation in it, much less the anomaly thereafter. Working from a similar lens of international relations, by applying neorealism, MacQueen’s study on peacekeeping is considerably more comprehensive. Yet, due to the focus and scope of his study, MacQueen’s neorealism proves to be more like an alternative perspective to Aksu’s i.e. peacekeeping as an international outcome, not a state’s foreign policy. Thus, both explanations are less relevant in accounting for states’ varying responses to UNPKO. Without doubt, Spooner’s study on Canadian peacekeeping is a significant study on a state’s UNPKO. Using the neoclassical realism perspective, Spooner examines both systemic and domestic variables that play a role in Canada’s involvement in UNPKO. However, Spooner’s limited scope, which covers only Canada’s UNPKO in the Congo, somewhat reduces the generalizability and explanatory power of his neoclassical analytical framework.

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Other works by Lynch (2000) and Mackinlay/Cross (2003) make a genuine attempt to analyse an exclusively Russian peacekeeping effort in the Soviet Union’s former states or Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). By focusing on both internal and external factors, Lynch, for example, has convincingly found that Russian peacekeeping in CIS, dominated exclusively by Russian troops, with none from Western Europe or any other countries for that matter, is poised towards restoring hierarchical power relations between Russia and the CIS involved. Specifically, Russia wants to ensure that only regimes friendly to its interests will take power in those CIS countries. Likewise, based on their analysis of both Russian external and internal imperatives, Mackinlay/Cross (2003) have also found that Russian peacekeeping in CIS is chiefly about protecting Russia’s strategic interests, such as securing oil-bearing railways in Abkhazia. As a result of previous studies on Malaysia’s peacekeeping – for example, those by Harisi (1996), Mohd Zamakh (1996), Shauqi (1996) and Mohamed Shafie (1996) – analysing only one or two Malaysia’s UNPKOs, the findings have somehow reduced the adopted analytical frameworks’ explanatory powers, which generally revolve around the realism tradition, hence the generalizability of Malaysia’s UNPKO. Yet, most of these studies point towards common unit-level variables, such as the prevailing international security environment, i.e. bipolar and unipolar; the elite perception; and Malaysia’s foreign policy orientation. Thus, since our study essentially centres on a similar unit-level analysis of Malaysia’s UNPKO, which are in turn central to the realism perspective, the analytical framework of neoclassical realism appears to be the most reasonable and suitable one, especially since it fits adequately with the objectives of this book.

2.3.1 The International System and States’ Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Perspective For Rose, who coins the term ‘Neoclassical Realism’ in his seminal article ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’, written specifically in reference to the works of Michael E. Brown, Thomas Christensen, Randal Schweller, William C. Wohlforth and Fareed Zakaria, neoclassical realism basically incorporates both external (systemic) and internal (domestic) variables (Rose 1998). Rose argues that a state’s relative material power sets the broad parameter of the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy, which is made possible by the intervening role of the elite’s perception and the state structure which filter the systemic pressures brought about by the structural distribution of material power (Rose 1998). Most importantly, neoclassical realism seeks to explain international politics by taking the properties and interactions of states (agents) as reference points (Wendt 1999). States constantly look for ways to control and manipulate external circumstances in order to respond to the obscurities of the international system (Rose 1998, p. 152). For neoclassical realism, the international system is neither Hobbesian nor benign, as classical and neorealism would have it. Rather, it is a murky area in which states

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have to interpret partial and problematic evidence subjectively, not knowing for sure if “security is plentiful or scarce” (Rose 1998). The subjective interpretation, as Rose suggests, is what makes the intervening variable so instrumental in neoclassical realism that it plays a considerably important role in explaining the reasons why elites’ perceptions of relative power and domestic imperatives matter, and in due process, the reasons why states with virtually similar domestic settings act differently in the international setting and why dissimilar states in similar situations often act alike (Rose 1998). At its most basic, neoclassical realism suggests a ‘top-down’ concept of a state in which states’ external behaviour is substantially influenced and shaped by domestic factors, preceded by systemic forces. Specifically, the national security executive (NSE) sits at the helm of a state’s foreign-policy-making structure, pitted against both the state and the international system. Next, being at the helm, the NSE is privy to a wealth of information from the state’s politico-military apparatus and has the intellectual capacity to ‘perceive systemic constraints and deduce the national interest’. Yet, even though the NSE is potentially autonomous, in light of the prevailing political arrangements, it still has to weigh up the influence of domestic actors, such as the legislature, political parties and the public, before a policy can be enacted and the subsequent extraction of resources can begin in earnest (Lobell et al. 2009a). By no means does this suggest that the state function is limited to aggregating demands. Lobell et al., on the other hand, argue that states’ leaders “define the national interests and conduct foreign policy based upon their assessment of relative power and other states’ intentions, but always subject to domestic constraints” (Lobell et al. 2009a). Consequently, neoclassical realism recognizes the importance of sub-state actors and the controversy which arises from different definitions of what constitutes a state. Without doubt, the complexity of processes like threat assessment, strategic adjustment, and policy implementation means they are best carried out within and by the state’s leadership circle with the other related domestic stakeholders (Lobell et al. 2009a). Notwithstanding the importance which neoclassical realism attaches to the international system in influencing states’ foreign policy, the outcome of the intervening variables’ interaction is not pre-conditioned solely by the systemic imperatives. Using David Dessler’s office-building analogy to illustrate the neoclassical realism argument, the configuration of the internal space will condition the “broad behavioural patterns for the people working within them” (Dessler 1989). In other words, the movement and the position of the staff, anarchic though they might be, will not be unambiguous and hence generally not necessarily unconventional. Nevertheless, neoclassical realism stresses that “pervasive uncertainty and potential threats are central to the conception of anarchy” (Lobell et al. 2009a). As such, putting the ‘office-building’ analogy back into the equation, staff may have knowledge of fatal non-entry or exit points and yet possess no prior control over the assignment of those points. For neoclassical realism, such an anarchic situation does not, by design, make war inevitable. In other words, the anarchic environment, with no guidance in place to avoid mishaps, makes accidents, even death, something that is to be expected (Sterling-Folker 2002, p. 73). Ultimately, the anarchic international system renders itself a self-help configuration, which is filtered and sorted out by the

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complex operation of the intervening variables that serve to mitigate or magnify the overarching structures of the international system. This, consequently, allows a state to respond to or counter a perceived threat or uncertainty posed by the international system, in particular other states’ actions and/or reactions. Nonetheless, a state’s response may or may not necessarily be the most correct or proper one. As a result, this is one of the reasons why the dynamics of the international system cannot be the sole reason that could account for states’ differing actions – which is in clear contrast to what structural realism, such as neorealism, would have assumed. The fact that matters is that this is a prime reason why the pre-eminence of domestic-political variables in explaining states’ anomalous behaviour towards structural realism cannot be discounted (Owen IV 2010, p. 31). These domestic variables, such as a change of government (leadership), a change of regime, or a degree of domestic coherence, play a significant role in shaping states’ preferences and their “ability to read and transmit information to other states” (Owen IV 2010, p. 31). This eventually transpires through a state’s behaviour towards another state or the powers that be. The end of the Cold War and the pursuant much-changed behaviour and policies (formerly mostly antagonistic) against the only superpower left – i.e. the US – is a good example to support Owen’s point. This, among others, also serves to support the structural argument that the anarchic environment continues to provide the incentives or leeway for states’ actions/reactions to systemic imperatives, albeit with no means in sight to ascertain the appropriateness of those because “the most powerful generalizable characteristic of a state in international relations is its relative position in the international system” (Rose 1998, p. 151). Furthermore, inputs that states receive from the international system and thereafter process come in two forms: (a) positive (or self-amplifying); and (b) negative (or dampening) (Lobell et al. 2009a, p. 30). Often, on top of the interaction of different states’ strategies resulting in unintended systemic outcomes, the decision-making elites and national security bureaucracies do not necessarily, and usually will not, come to one single, homogeneous interpretation (Lobell et al. 2009a, p. 30). In other words, as individuals, the elites almost always interpret those inputs remarkably differently from each other before coming to an agreement, resulting, among other things, in states’ anomalous responses to structural realism, as Owen has suggested. Therefore, such an anomaly or the normalcy, as far as states’ behaviours are concerned, serves only to substantiate the unmistakable and plausible emphasis of neoclassical realism on the “importance of domestic competitive pressures and socialization effects” (Lobell et al. 2009a, p. 30). Often, this forms the basis for states coveting power to preserve or strengthen their position or simply to survive (hence the competitive edge in relation to other states) – also seen as the key underlying cause of states’ behaviour (Lobell et al. 2009a, p. 30). Likewise, Lai’s study of the role of nationalism in Japan’s policy towards China also shows that the combination of Japanese external circumstances and domestic politics do mitigate and magnify the state’s subsequent policy towards China (Lai 2008). Contrary to what is perceived as the traditional Japanese and Chinese loathing for each other, Lai sheds light on the anomalous logic of Japan’s policy and behaviour towards China, which, to an extent, reflects the overriding role of both the external

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and internal imperatives on the Japanese decision-making process. In many ways, neoclassical realism draws its significant explanatory power from its two distinct features: (a) it focuses on the explanation of a specific puzzle or event, i.e. takes into account the specific features of a given situation; and (b) it recaptures important realist insights, i.e. the international system as distinct from the internal properties of state (Wohlforth 2008, p. 140). Neoclassical realism assesses both the international conditions which states face (external constraints) and the specific features of a given situation (internal incentives) a state has in order to generate a more complete explanation of states’ behaviours (Wohlforth 2008, p. 140). These are what make neoclassical realism a theory of foreign policy – i.e. state actions vis-à-vis systemic pressures – and not primarily of international outcomes, i.e. war and alliance. Hence its significant explanatory power compared with classical realism and neorealism.

2.3.2 Neoclassical Realism Framework on States’ Peacekeeping Drawing on the neoclassical realism-based works of Lobell (2009b) on threat assessment, the state and foreign policy; Dueck (2009) on the effects of elites and domestic politics towards military intervention; Ripsman (2009) on domestic interest groups; Schweller (2009) on states’ mobilization; Owen IV (2010) on the domestic imperatives of a state’s behaviour or policy; Taliaferro (2009) on resource extraction; and Lai (2008) on the role of nationalism in effecting a state’s foreign policy, this book accordingly proposes the following adapted neoclassical realism analytical framework (Fig. 2.1):

Level of Pressure (Independent variable) - International security environment -Geostrategic milieu -State’s relative power position

Level of State Power (Intervening variable with alternating independent function) -Ideology -National power -State institutions -Civil Society: International advocacy

Fig. 2.1 Neoclassical realism framework on States’ Peacekeeping. Taliaferro (2009) and Lai (2008)

(Dependent variable) Peacekeeping (UNPKO)

Sources Adapted from

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This book identifies the level of systemic-external pressure as the independent variable, which in turn is the function of the international security environment, the geostrategic milieu and Malaysia’s relative power position. Being a small power, Malaysia’s international overtures are mostly reactive to systemic causal factors. That is, since it lacks the material capability to affect systemic changes, not only does its international action reflect its relative power position, but it also represents the prevailing international security environment it is facing at a given time. Apparently, as a small power, Malaysia faces limited foreign policy choices or actions, hence its need to balance and secure its survival through a certain domestically-induced security strategy, among other things. As shown by the above neoclassical realism analytical framework, it acknowledges that the effects of these independent variables on Malaysia’s actions are indirect, as they will be filtered and processed by the intervening domestic imperatives. Yet, this framework also highlights the alternating ability of these intervening variables – depending on the prevailing time and situational contexts – to assume or take up an independent variable function (Lai 2008, p. 61). This is possible particularly if and when the clarity level of the threat to the international system is perceived to be indeterminate or ambiguous by the elite. Subsequently, for the intervening variable, this book identifies the level of state power which entails the elite’s relative ability to extract and mobilize the resources deemed necessary by the state to achieve its objectives (Taliaferro 2009). Unless indicated otherwise, the state basically refers to the leaders with the most power and influence to affect the state’s foreign policy (Lai 2008, p. 61). Specifically, the elite, i.e. prime ministers, are treated as the key domestic actors vis-à-vis Malaysia’s UNPKO. The prime ministers’ ideology and national power ostensibly affect the state’s foreign policy choices, which, in turn, are compounded or otherwise by the institutional arrangements (Taliaferro 2009, p. 215). Ideology, then, represents “causal relationships, widely held beliefs and assertions about the nature of relationship between the state and the domestic society and the role of the state in the international system across a multitude of issues like military, political, economic and even social” (Taliaferro 2009, p. 221). National power, on the other hand, denotes “the ability of state leaders to mobilize their nation’s human and material resources behind security initiatives” (Christensen 1996, p. 11). National power is crucial for the prime ministers in order to generate and sustain the public support for their particular national policy or strategy of choice (Taliaferro 2009, p. 217). As far as the focus of this book is concerned, unless stated otherwise, the state institutions, then, refer to three major UNPKO-related agencies, namely the Wisma Putra, MINDEF, and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO).

2.3 Analytical Framework

31

2.3.3 Neoclassical Realism Hypotheses on Malaysia’s UNPKO Building on the neoclassical realism basic assumption that emphasizes the relative importance of systemic versus domestic and individual-level variables suggests that the clarity of the systemic imperatives, i.e. high or low, and the degree of information they supply on how best the prime ministers respond to them play a significant role in influencing and determining Malaysia’s national security strategy, i.e. Malaysia’s UNPKO. Pursuant to that, this book proposes the following six hypotheses (Table 2.1): H1 When the systemic-external pressure is perceived as low (definitely favourable international security environment, geostrategic milieu and state’s relative power position), with the state possessing a high extraction and mobilization power (highly favourable ideology, national power and state institutions), Malaysia tends to join a UNPKO. H2 When the systemic-external pressure is perceived as high (definitely unfavourable international security environment, geostrategic milieu and state’s relative power position), with the state possessing a high extraction and mobilization power (highly favourable ideology, national power and state institutions), Malaysia tends not to join a UNPKO. H3 When the systemic-external pressure is perceived as mixed/indeterminate (ambiguous international security environment, geostrategic milieu and state’s relative power position), with the state possessing a high extraction and mobilization power (highly favourable ideology, national power and state institutions), Malaysia may or may not join a UNPKO. H4 When the systemic-external pressure is perceived as low (definitely favourable international security environment, geostrategic milieu and state’s relative power position), with the state possessing a low extraction and mobilization power (highly unfavourable ideology, national power and state institutions), Malaysia tends not to join a UNPKO. H5 When the systemic-external pressure is perceived as high (definitely unfavourable international security environment, geostrategic milieu and state’s Table 2.1 Neoclassical realism hypotheses on Malaysia’s’ UNPKO. Sources Adapted and modified from Lai (2008) and Lobell et al. (2009a) Levels of state power/systemic – external pressure

Low systemic – external pressure

High systemic – external pressure

Mixed/indeterminate level of systemic – external pressure

High state power

H1: – UNPKO likely

H2: – UNPKO unlikely

H3: – UNPKO likely – UNPKO unlikely

Low state power

H4: H5: – UNPKO less likely – UNPKO less likely

H6: – UNPKO less likely

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relative power position), with the state possessing a low extraction and mobilization power (highly favourable ideology, national power and state institutions), Malaysia tends not to join a UNPKO. H6 When the systemic-external pressure is perceived as mixed/indeterminate (ambiguous international security environment, geostrategic milieu and state’s relative power position), with the state possessing a low extraction and mobilization power (highly favourable ideology, national power and state institutions), Malaysia tends not to join a UNPKOUnited Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO). For H1–H3, the state is assumed to have high state power while the systemicexternal pressure is perceived as low, high and indeterminate respectively. It is hypothesized that for each situation, Malaysia’s UNPKO varies. In H1, when systemic-external pressure is perceived to be low and state power is high, Malaysia is expected join a UNPKO with a contingent level, as opposed to observer level, being more likely. For H2, when both systemic-external pressure and state power are perceived to be high, Malaysia is expected not to join a UNPKO. This represents the complete opposite of H1. For H3, when the systemic-external pressure is perceived to be ambiguous or mixed and the state power is high, Malaysia might or might not join a UNPKO. On the other hand, for H4–H6, the state is assumed to possess low state power with the systemic-external pressure being low, high and indeterminate respectively. For all these last three hypotheses, Malaysia is not expected to join a UNPKO. This neoclassical analytical framework allows this book to operationalize different external and internal conditions to determine and systematically assess the causal factors of Malaysia’s variable UNPKO during different times and contexts. It is expected, therefore, that this will help to shed more light on and generate more useful insights into the dynamics of Malaysia’s decision-making processes vis-à-vis UNPKO, which will, in turn, also contribute towards enriching the explanatory power of neoclassical realism as opposed to the other variants within realism’s own school of thought as well as those of others, like liberalism and constructivism.

2.4 Conclusion Virtually, all the theories help elucidate and analyse a state’s UNPKO, one way or the other. Liberalism, for one, draws its strength from its basic assumption that states are inherently and innately drawn to cooperation, mostly due to the important roles played out by international organizations. Yet, liberalism’s over-emphasis on international organizations make it less than able to provide an independent causal role in explaining states’ varying behaviour. Perhaps, more importantly, liberalism is so fixed on cooperation that it ignores security issues and their possibility of preventing, delaying and even ruining cooperation. Constructivism, on the other hand, proves to be no less qualified in explaining states’ behaviour. Its basic assumption is built on

2.4 Conclusion

33

‘idea’ and its perpetual construction and development. Thus, the world is what and how one sees it. It is the idea that matters. Yet, its inability to sufficiently specify any unit of analysis as fundamental in the study of international relations eventually reduces its employability as this book’s analytical framework. As for realism, among its three major variants, as discussed above, neoclassical realism, with its basic assumption that underlines the importance of domestic factors without discounting the potential salience of systemic ones, suits this book’s research questions and objectives well. Specifically, neoclassical realism’s analytical framework helps to identify the systemic-domestic imperatives and their roles in explaining Malaysia’s UNPKO. Measured according to the level of dominance, it follows that systemic pressures, as the independent variable, play a more dominant role, followed by the domestic ones, as the intervening variable. Nonetheless, in certain situations, the domestic factors might also assume an independent role vis-à-vis a state’s – i.e. Malaysia’s – UNPKO. Ultimately, the key to understanding why and how interstates’ interactions come about in the international system is to study what states have actually stated, decided and done in relation to other states, best represented by a state’s foreign policy. Foreign policy is essentially about the ways states interact with one another in the international arena to achieve their respective national interests (Goldstein 1999; Harun 2009). Foreign policy can alternatively be described as the adaptive means or actions of a state towards the external environment, and the domestic conditions under which those actions are formulated, in order to achieve the state’s goals and objectives. It may also be described as those actions undertaken by a state to influence circumstances or situations that fall beyond its control (Liow 2001; Singh 1988).

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Owen IV, J.M. (2010). Domestically Driven Deviations: Internal Regimes, Leaders and Realism’s Power Line. In E.R, May, R. Rosecrance & Z. Steiner (Eds.), History and Neorealism (p. 29). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Paris, R. (2000). Broadening the Study of Peace Operations. International Studies Review, 2(3). Powell, R. (1994). Review: Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate. International Organization, 48, pp. 314–314. Resende-Santos, J. (2007). Neorealism, States, and the Modern Mass Army. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Reus-Smit, C. (2005). Constructivism. In S. Burchill, A, Linklater, R. Devetak, J. Donelly, M. Peterson, C. Reus-Smit, & J. True (Eds.), Theories of International Relations (3rd edn., p. 203). New York, NY: Palgrave. Ripsman, N.M. (2009). Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups. In S.E. Lobell, N.M. Ripsman & J.W. Taliaferro (Eds.), Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (pp. 170– 193). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Rose, G. (1998). Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy. World Politics, 51(1), pp. 144–177. Rothstein, R.L. (1968). Alliances and Small Power. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. pp. 27–29. Ruhanas, Harun. (2009). In Pursuit of National Interest: Change and Continuity in Malaysia’s Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East. International Journal of West Asian Studies, 1, p. 25. Schweller, R.L. (2009). Neoclassical Realism and State Mobilization: Expansionist Ideology in the Age of Mass Politics. In S.E. Lobell, N.M. Ripsman & J.W. Taliaferro (Eds.), Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (pp. 227–250). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Shauqi, M.N. (1996). Malaysia dan Misi Pengaman PBB: Satu Kajian Mengenai Sumbangan MALBATT dalam Operasi UNISOM II di Somalia. Undergraduate thesis, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Simmons, B.A., & Martin, L.L. (n.d.). International Organizations and Institutions. In W. Carlsnaess, T. Risse-Kappen & B.A. Simmons (Eds.), Handbook of International Relations. London: Sage Publications. Singh, R.M. (1988). Kenegaraan Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: Federal Publications. Spooner, K.A. (2009). Canada, the Congo Crisis and UN Peacekeeping, 1960–64. Canada: UBC Press. Stein, A.A. (2001). Realism/Neorealism. In N.J. Smelser & P.B. Baltes (Eds.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, pp. 12,812–12,815. New York, NY: Pergamon Press. Stein, A.A. (2008). Neoliberal Institutionalism. In Reus-Smit & D. Snidal (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Steiner, Z. (2010). British Decisions for Peace and War 1938–1939: The Rise and Fall of Realism. In E.R. May, R. Rosecrance & Z. Steiner (Eds.), History and Neorealism (p. 130). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Sterling-Folker, J. (2002). Theories of International Cooperation and the Primacy of Anarchy: Explaining US International Monetary Policy-Making after Bretton Woods. New York, NY: State University of New York Press. Stern, G. (2000). The Structure of International Society: An Introduction To The Study of International Relations (2nd edn). New York, NY: Continuum. Taliaferro, J.W. (2009). Neoclassical Realism and Resource Extraction. In S.E. Lobell, N.M. Ripsman & J.W. Taliaferro (Eds.), Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (pp. 194–226). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Wendt, A. (1995). Constructing International Politics. International Security, 20, p 73. Wendt, A. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

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Wohlforth, W.C. (2008). Realism. In C. Reus-Smit & D. Snidal (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Young, O.R. (1986). International Regimes: Toward A New Theory of Institutions. World Politics, 39(1), pp. 104–122.

Chapter 3

UNPKO: Structure and Process

Abstract An understanding of the structure, principles of engagement, doctrinal and financial aspects of UNPKO is important in order to understand the background of Malaysia’s UNPKO, its national defence policy and the related domestic decisionmaking hierarchy and processes. Upon the examination of Malaysia’s foreign policy stance vis-à-vis UNPKO, classified according to specific themes of Malaysia’s foreign policy orientations, this chapter offers general pointers of key principles which underpin the authorization, operation and management of a UNPKO and, consequently, that of Malaysia. This chapter argues that Malaysian foreign policy was markedly dictated by systemic pressures. Accordingly, Malaysia’s foreign policy stances, in general, during the Cold War era were inherently pro-West and antiCommunist before it was distinctively moderated by its neutrality stance and later by its globalization stance, especially in the post-Cold War era. This chapter concludes that these stances influenced Malaysia’s participation in UNPKO so much that the pattern of Malaysia’s UNPKO shows the dynamism and pragmatism of its behaviour on the international stage. Keywords Peacekeeping · United nations · Foreign policy · Cold war · International relations · Malaysia · Defence policy · Anti-communist · Pro-western · Conflict-resolution mechanism

3.1 Introduction This chapter has three major sections. The first section overviews UNPKO’s structure, principles of engagement, doctrinal and financial aspects. It is then followed by a deliberation on the background of Malaysia’s UNPKO, particularly its national defence policy, including the related domestic decision-making hierarchy and processes. On the backgrounds of these two, the final section overviews Malaysia’s foreign policy posture vis-à-vis UNPKO, classified according to specific themes of Malaysia’s foreign policy orientations. The first two sections are important in the sense that they help to provide a general understanding of the founding principles which underpin the authorization, operation and management of a UNPKO, and consequently also Malaysia’s UNPKO. With this in mind, the last section then sets © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Salleh and A. Idris, Malaysia’s United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1960–2010), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4137-1_3

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Malaysia’s UNPKO within the context of Malaysian foreign policy, which should allow a succinct understanding of Malaysia’s UNPKO in practice, interpreted from the perspective of neoclassical realism. The concluding part summarizes this chapter.

3.2 UNPKO as a Conflict-Resolution Mechanism UNPKO is one of the first and most used conflict resolution mechanisms of the UN. It has survived since the Cold War to the present mostly because it works in the best interests of all parties. As such, it is appropriate for the following section to deliberate on the structural background of UNPKO in order to provide a general idea of the way it works. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) have twice received the Nobel Prize Award – in 1988 and 2001. The award marks a significant recognition of the role that UNPKO plays in helping to keep and maintain international peace. Peacekeeping enables belligerent parties to reach peace agreements, which are vital for public order restoration and nation-building initiatives to take place. They do not just help to defuse existing unrest, but also play an important part in preventing the collapse of peace-making efforts and minimising the risk of peacekeeping in the first place. Among the central elements of UNPKO are: (a) they provide essential security and support to post-conflict victims and institutions; (b) they are deployed to conflict areas where no one else is willing or able to go, and prevent conflict from returning or escalating; (c) they have a legitimate international character; (d) they offer impartial and reliable burden-sharing and effective action; (e) they provide a secure environment to enable peace efforts to take place; (f) they support a peace process; they are not a substitute for one (United Nations, “Background Note: United Nations Peacekeeping – DPI/2429/Rev.18”, April 2014). On the whole, peacekeeping strives to end hostilities between belligerent parties before peace-making efforts and peace-building initiatives can take place. According to the United Nations peacekeeping manual, Peacekeeping Operations: Principles of UN Peacekeeping, UNPKO is essentially governed by three major principles (United Nations 2008). Firstly, consent of the parties. This refers to the permission by the belligerent parties to accept the presence of a peacekeeping operation mandated and operated by the UN. However, this permission does not necessarily guarantee total security for the UNPKO force, particularly in an area of conflict where a central government is weak or absent, resulting in splinter armed groups capable of compromising a UNPKO. Still, despite the lack of such a security guarantee, consent of the parties in conflict holds the key to insulating a UNPKO from becoming a party to the conflict itself. Also, it endows UNPKO with the necessary sphere of action to execute and complete its mandate. Secondly, impartiality – which stands for neither neutrality nor inactivity. A UNPKO force will be impartial in its approaches to the conflict but will not be neutral in the execution of the mandate, i.e. it will act upon infringement of peace terms. This is critical to eliminate the possibility of misinterpretation, retaliation, or – worse – withdrawal of consent

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by any one of the parties in conflict, which could be detrimental to the execution of the UNPKO mandate by turning UNPKO itself into a party of the conflict. Thirdly, the principle of non-use of force implies that a UNPKO, first and foremost, does not arrive at the conflict area as an enforcer. The use of authorized, tactical force is confined to self-defence and defence of the mandate. In certain circumstances, a UNPKO may be issued with a mandate authorizing it to ‘use all necessary means’ to neutralize any attempts to sabotage the political and peace process, protect the civilians under impending armed attack and help local/national authorities maintain law and order. Yet such a use of force must be kept to a minimum, used as the last resort, and directed in a precise, optimum and appropriate manner to achieve the desired effect with minimal repercussions (United Nations 2008, pp. 31–40).

3.2.1 Doctrine or Framework UNPKO has its own doctrine framework, underpinned by six guidelines series, numerically coded to indicate the level of importance from the most to the least, i.e. 1000–6000 series, as follows (United Nations 2008, pp. 92–93): i.

ii.

iii.

iv.

v.

1000-Series: The Capstone Doctrine – this series outlines the basic principles and key concepts of the planning and conduct of UNPKO, the core functions and factors of success. 2000-Series: Headquarters Support to Operations – this series outlines the roles of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) in supporting field missions, such as command and control and executive direction; mission planning and budgeting; recruitment and force generation; and deployment and mission start-up. 3000-Series: Management and Integration of Operations – this series covers the management and integration of United Nations peacekeeping operations in the field. Among other things, it contains guidance on the effective planning, management and integration of operational and support capabilities in the mission, such as mission command and control; political analysis and diplomatic activity; mission planning; safety and security; and crisis management. 4000-Series: Multi-Dimensional Operations – this series contains guidance on the employment of military, police and substantive civilian capabilities within a UNPKO for political and civil affairs, military, policing, judicial procedures, and elections. 5000-Series: Field Operations Support: this series provides guidance on methods to integrate and employ support resources in a timely and precise manner in a mission to meet mandate priorities, such as logistics support, movement control, engineering, communications, information technology, medical support and even finance.

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vi. 6000-Series: Headquarters Management and Administration n the 6000-series sets out the managerial and administrative procedures of the DPKO and the DFS, such as planning, budgets and oversight, human resources and travel. In general, the most important series is the 1000-series – otherwise known as the ‘Capstone Doctrine’ – as it sets out the core principles and concepts of how a UNPKO is to be run, i.e. peace enforcement or peacekeeping. Closely following the Capstone Doctrine are the other five series, i.e. 2000–6000, which provide the guide to the administration, organization and management of DPKO/DFS as the UN’s body-representatives in the field.

3.2.2 Department of Peacekeeping Nations Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) The UN Office of Special Political Affairs handled peacekeeping operations from 1948 to 1990 before DPKO took over in 1992. This was done in order to better streamline and coordinate UNPKO. As set out in the UNPKO Doctrine, in accordance with the 2000–6000 series mentioned above, the DPKO’s primary duties are to plan, manage, deploy, support and provide executive direction to all UNPKO on behalf of the UN Secretary-General (UNSG). In essence, the DPKO is the point of contact – the intermediary between the UNSC, troop and financial contributors, and parties to the conflict in the implementation of the UNSC’s mandates. Specifically, the DPKO integrates the efforts of UN, governmental and non-governmental entities in the context of UNPKO by providing guidance and support on military, police, mines clearance and other relevant issues to other UNPKO. In order to better facilitate its duty, the DPKO is assisted by its four main arms: (a) the Office of Operations, which provides political and strategic policy and operational guidance and support to the missions; (b) the Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions, which bolsters the links and coordinates DPKO activities such as disarmament and demobilization; (c) the Office of Military Affairs, which deploys appropriate military capability in support of United Nations objectives in addition to improving UNPKO military components’ efficiency and effectiveness; and lastly, (d) the Policy Evaluation and Training Division, which develops, evaluates and disseminates policy and operational frameworks, evaluates missions, and delivers standardized training (UN, “Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping operations”, 2003, p. 3). The DFS, on the other hand, is tasked with providing field support in the areas of finance, logistics, information, communication and technology (ICT), human resources and general administration. It has seven main offices, which include: (1) the Office of the Assistant Secretary-General (2) the Field Personnel Division (3) the Field Budget and Finance Division (4) the Logistics Support Division (5) the Information & Communications Technology Division (6)

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the Policy Evaluation and Training (PET) Division (7) the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi (UNLB) (UN, “Department of Field Support” n.d.).1

3.2.3 Authorization Process Essentially, on orders from the UNSC (discussed further in Chapter Four), the UN Secretariat plays a role in assisting the UNSC prior to it making a decision. To start with, the Secretariat coordinates consultations among parties of interest that include, among others, the member states, parties on the ground, regional actors, intergovernmental organizations, the potential host government and potential troops/policecontributing countries (TCC/PCC). This may require the UN Secretary-General to call for a Strategic Assessment meeting to allow for a system-wide analysis central to identifying the UN’s appropriate response, i.e. resolution and peace-building priorities and the framework of engagement (United Nations Peacekeeping, “Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations” 2003a, p. 3). Subsequently, the Secretariat will send a Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) to the conflict area/territory, its mission being to evaluate the overall security, humanitarian, human rights and military situations on the ground, and the implications for UNPKO. The members of the TAM are representatives from the Secretariat’s various departments and agencies and from other specialized agencies, funds and programs, and the relevant actors from the UN Country-Team (UNCT). Upon completing its missions, the TAM will submit a report to the UN Secretary-General, who will, in turn, issue a report to the UNSC with detailed recommendations for possible deployment of a UNPKO. On receiving the report, the UNSC decides whether or not to pass the UNPKO deployment resolution detailing the appropriate mandate, size and resources (United Nations Peacekeeping, “Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations” 2003a, p. 3). Usually, prior to authorizing a UNPKO, the UNSC takes into account the presence of six factors, namely: (i) the threat to international security if a particular crisis continues or gets worse; (ii) the possibility and availability of willing regional and sub-regional organizations and arrangements to resolve a conflict; (iii) any standing ceasefire and the commitment of belligerent parties to a peace process and subsequent political settlement; (iv) the existence of a realistic political goal achievable by the UNPKO mandate; (v) favourable circumstances for a UNNPKO mandate; and finally (vi) an acceptable risk level for UN troops (United Nations 1994). Ultimately, all these factors point to three vital aspects which form the basis for a UNSC decision over a conflict: the threat which a continuing conflict poses to international order; whether an alternative conflict settlement or resolution mechanism is available; and the likely success or failure rate of a UNPKO. 1 The Department of Field Support ceased to exist on 31 December 2018 – eight years after the core

period dealt with in this book (1950–2010) – and was replaced by the Department of Operational Support.

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3.2.4 Financing In accordance with Article 17 of the UN Charter, every UN member state has the legal obligation to pay its share befitting each respective category as per the ‘Scale of Assessments for the Apportionment of the Expenses of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’ (United Nations 2012). The scale of assessment for the regular budget is calculated against the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and external debt of each member country. The scale is reviewed every three years. Currently, the twenty-five largest contributors pay over 90% of UNPKO costs (Ilmonen 2014). Combined, the estimated cost of UNPKO from 1948 to 2010 was USD 69 billion, while the member states’ arrears stood at USD 2.46 billion (United Nations 2010). Meanwhile, the UNPKO budget for the 2010 fiscal year was USD 7.26 billion. In 2010, the US was the biggest assessed contributor of UNPKO at 27.17%, followed by Japan at 12.53%, the United Kingdom (UK) at 8.16%, Germany at 8.02%, France at 7.56%, Italy at 5.00%, China at 3.94%, Canada at 3.21%, Spain at 3.18% and the Republic of Korea at 2.26% (United Nations, “United Nations Peace Operations: Year in Review – 2010”, March 2011, p. 81). Accordingly, the combined contributions of the US, UK, France and China – as permanent members of the UNSC – stood at 46.83% while the remaining UN member states provided 53.17% of the financing. The distribution of the financing outlined above varies over the years, as the costs of UNPKO have steadily increased. According to “Peacekeeping Expenditures: 1947–2005”, the first UNPKO in 1948 (UNTSO) cost about USD 4 million before rising to USD 7 million in 1950. The next decade saw the cost rise to USD 26 million in 1957. In the years that followed, the cost kept going up, reaching USD 126 million in 1961. However, the cost fell to USD 24 million in 1970 before rising once again in 1980 to USD 141 million. From the 1980s onwards, the UNPKO costs recorded an increase, reaching USD 634 million in 1989. In the year 1992, i.e. the beginning of the post-Cold War era, the cost reached its first billion milestone when the cost stood at USD 1.767 billion, followed by USD 3.364 billion in 1995, USD 2.139 billion in 2000 and USD 4.737 billion in 2005 (Renner 2005). In order to better illustrate the peacekeeping budget, for the same fiscal year, UNMOGIP in India and Pakistan received the lowest allocation at USD 16.15 million, with UNAMID in Darfur receiving the highest at USD 1808.13 million, followed by MONUSCO in Congo at USD 1369 million and UNMIS in Sudan at USD 938 million (UN, “United Nations Peace Operations: Year in Review – 2010”, March 2011, p. 77). The sharp increase in cost was matched by a quadruple increase in the number of UNPKO troops, i.e. from about 18,000 in 1992 to 78,444 troops in 1993 (United Nations n.d.). The estimated cost of UNPKO from 1948–2010 is USD 69 billion (UN, “United Nations Peace Operations: Year in Review – 2010”, March 2011, p. 76). Accordingly, the highest numbers of UNPKO troops recorded within the time span of this book were 101,939 in 2010 (UN, “United Nations Peace Operations: Year in Review – 2010”, March 2011, p. 81). For the same year, the top five troops contributors were Pakistan at 10,707 (10.7%), followed by Bangladesh at 10,615 (10.6%), India at 8805 (8.8%), Nigeria at 5815 (5.8%) and Egypt at 5426

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(5.4%) (UN, “United Nations Peace Operations: Year in Review – 2010”, March 2011, p. 81). States participating in UNPKO usually receive reimbursements for equipment, personnel and support services rendered. In addition to this, the UN also acknowledges member states which voluntarily contribute additional resources – ranging from transportation to supplies, personnel and finance – for UNPKO on a non-reimbursable basis (UN, “How We Are Funded” n.d.).

3.2.5 States’ Participation Both on principle and in practice, states’ participation in UNPKO is on a voluntary basis. This began to be more standardized and better organized when the UN adopted the ‘UN Standby Arrangements System’ in 1996 (UNSAS). UN member states conditionally pledge to contribute specific resources to UNPKO within an agreed response time and within agreed restrictions (United Nations 2003b). According to Colonel Badrul Hisham Muhammad, Commandant of Malaysia’s Peacekeeping Centre at Port Dickson, in reference to the UNSAS, the UN has a list of countries which have agreed to support a given PKO with pre-determined military personnel and other assets at 7, 15, 30, 60 or 90 days’ notice (Badrul Hisham Muhammad, personal communication, 10 February 2015). Nevertheless, the decision whether or not to eventually participate remains with the UN member states. In effect, the UN literally commands no guarantee of UN member states’ participation in its UNPKO. However, not only does the UNSAS help to ensure that signatory states are organized and prepared to participate and contribute resources when the need for a UNPKO arises, it also helps address issues such as the shortage of troops and the arrival of poorly equipped troops, as in the case of UNAMIR (Rwanda) (Khairol Amali 2002, p. 7) and UNOSOM (Somalia). For UNOSOM, only 564 troops came out of the authorized 3500 (Ramli Abu Bakar 2004, pp. 126–127). These were some of the issues which the UNSAS was designed to minimize, among other things.

3.3 Malaysia’s UNPKO: Structure and Process Small and developing countries have generally made up the larger state-contributing troops for UNPKO. Malaysia is one of those. The following section delves into the general principles underpinning Malaysia’s UNPKO and the related state bureaucratic structures responsible for it before fitting it into the general themes of Malaysia’s foreign policy postures. All these are vital in order to encapsulate Malaysia’s UNPKO within one single large coherent background.

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3.3.1 National Defence Policy Malaysia’s National Defence Policy (NDP-2010) states that the primary objective of Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) is the protection and defence of its strategic interest areas – i.e. primary areas, offshore economic areas and strategic maritime routes and air space – from both internal and external threats (Ministry of Defence 2010). Primary areas refer to the country’s land area proper of the Malaysian Peninsula, Sabah and Sarawak, while the offshore economic areas consist of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the national continental shelf (Ministry of Defence 2010). Strategic maritime routes and air space, on the other hand, include the sea lines and airways linking the Malaysian Peninsular with Sabah/Sarawak, the Strait of Malacca, and the Strait of Singapore, as well as all the entrance and exit points. Additionally, the development and modernization of MAF are fundamentally geared towards attaining Minimum Deterrent Capability (MDC) (Global Security 2013). This makes deterrence one of the pillars of Malaysian defence (Chang/Mejoh 1995, p. 17). Accordingly, MAF is guided by the concepts of self-reliance, regional cooperation and external assistance, hence Malaysia’s small but credible standing armed forces (Chang/Mejoh 1995). In 2005, Malaysian active-duty armed forces personnel numbered 110,000, out of which 80,000 served in the Malaysian Army and 15,000 apiece in the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force (Global Security 2013). Pursuant to the above, according to Nazari Abdul Hadi, Defence Adviser, Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the United Nations, MAF’s secondary responsibility is assisting Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) and other public agencies in charge of internal security and natural disasters (Nazari Abdul Hadi, personal communication, 22 October 2013). UNPKO, therefore, is considered to be an additional task for MAF (Nazari Abdul Hadi, personal communication, 22 October 2013). Nevertheless, being a small power, MDC or “Total Defence” (Chang/Mejoh 1995) is vital in order to ward off and dissuade the enemy from attacking the country and in due process to protect and defend Malaysia’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and areas of strategic economic interests (Ministry of Defence 2010, pp. v–vi). Six principles underpin such a capability: (i) independence/self-sustaining defence; (ii) defence diplomacy; (iii) total defence – HANRUH; (iv) commitment to UN’s efforts for global peace; (v) anti-terrorism; and (vi) commitment to Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) (Ministry of Defence 2010, pp. 29–36). Not only do these principles form the essence of Malaysia’s comprehensive and collective defence policy, they also serve as the background for Malaysia’s non-alignment and globalization approaches in its foreign policy. These approaches, in return, underscore Malaysia’s military global adaptation as it sees asymmetric threats as a new dimension in its strategic security. In more ways than one, regional and global securities also serve as the catalyst and determinant of Malaysia’s national security. This invariably makes UNPKO important to Malaysia’s survival.

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3.3.2 Decision-Making Process The decision-making process usually begins with the UN’s request for Malaysia to participate in a peacekeeping mission. It will first reach the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Wisma Putra), which will subsequently study the request and provide its own inputs before communicating its point of view to the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF), which also deliberates on the UN’s request. The deliberation process is handled by the Ministry’s Policy Division, which forms a coordination committee to coordinate the request and comments/inputs from Wisma Putra and Malaysian Armed Forces Headquarters (MAFHQ). Members of the committee consist of representatives from MINDEF, Wisma Putra and the Ministry of Finance (Treasury). Next, the committee will evaluate and establish the probability (and non-probability) of participating in the peacekeeping mission. Once a consensus is reached, it will then be brought to the attention of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) for approval or disapproval. Upon approval, the Treasury, together with the Establishment & Service Division of MINDEF (ESD-MINDEF), will work on the details of the financing/allocation and establishment (permanent/temporary) of the peacekeeping mission to the Central Agency. In the case of disapproval, there is no need for either of them to work out the details. The decision for approval or disapproval will then be communicated to MAFHQ (Hamid Mohd. Amin 2002). Subsequently, MAFHQ will relay Malaysia’s decision to the UN Headquarters in New York through the Malaysian Permanent Representative to the UN (Nazari Abdul Hadi, personal communication, 22 October 2013). On another note, upon receipt of the UN’s request, it falls to the Defence Advisor to evaluate the need for Malaysia to join or not join the peacekeeping mission (Nazari Abdul Hadi, personal communication, 22 October 2013). The evaluation considers primarily the threat and security factors that such a peacekeeping mission will expose Malaysian peacekeepers to. The evaluation report will then be briefed to MINDEF for the MAFHQ to make its final assessment. Should MAFHQ agree to participate in the peacekeeping mission, a paper called ‘Cabinet Paper’ will be prepared and presented to the Cabinet for approval/disapproval. Specifically, some of the aspects considered by MINDEF are the level of UN mandate clarity in terms of the roles and tasks of Malaysian troops; the compatibility of Malaysian foreign policy’s goals vis-à-vis the peacekeeping operation, i.e. humanitarian, global peace and stability; benefits to Malaysian armed forces; costs; logistic support needed; risk assessment vis-àvis Malaysian armed forces’ capability; and Malaysia’s other current international commitments. The simplified decision-making process is shown in Appendix 1. Joint Force Headquarters (JFH) serves as the Operational Level Command that organizes, manages and handles Malaysia’s UNPKO. JFH was officially set up on 6 September 2004. It is part of MAF long-term planning to enable itself to rise to the challenge of the present and future concepts of operations and warfare. This is integral to realizing the objectives of the national defence policy and the national military strategy. JFH, as an institution, also facilitates the consolidation of national

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mobilization and force multiplication of the three arms of the military, i.e. land, sea and air, authorizing them to be put under a single integrated command centre capable of countering any threats, present and future, while at the same time remaining adept at maintaining the sustainability and continuity of any given operation. In addition to that, JFH is responsible for planning and conducting joint military operations codenamed ‘Joint Operations’, ‘Potentially Joint Operations’, ‘Combined Operations’, ‘Integrated Operations’ and ‘Multinational Operations’. Multinational operations, specifically, refer to those operations mounted and authorized by the UN. The following is the organizational structure of JFH.

3.3.3 Nature/Level/Size of Malaysia’s UNPKO The standard size of a Malaysian Army Battalion is 850 troops (Badrul Hisham Muhammad, personal communication, 10 February 2015). Following Malaysia acceding to UNSAS in 1996, Malaysia pledges to send a minimum of a 600-strong battalion (Kamarulnizam 2014, p. 151). A 600 to 900-strong army component is the usual, variable size of a Malaysian Army Battalion sent for UNPKO (Badrul Hisham Muhammad, personal communication, 10 February 2015). The designated tasks of Malaysian peacekeepers depend on the UN’s mandate. In general, Malaysian peacekeepers cover a multitude of tasks such as operations-stabilization, observers, peacebuilding and peace enforcement. Usually, there are two levels of Malaysia’s UNPKO: in a contingent or in a small team. For Malaysia, a contingent comprises an army battalion complete with units of infantry, observers, a medical team, police personnel, light weapons, armoured personnel carriers and even mission experts. Observer-level, on the other hand, usually consists of small numbers of military observers, mission experts, interpreters, civilian police and headquarters staff. Malaysia’s contingent usually has two main divisions: Military Observer (MILOB) and Peacekeeping Team. The Military Observer (MILOB) consists of a small team of personnel equipped with light weapons, e.g. pistols, while the Peacekeeping Team, consists of an infantry unit equipped with appropriate weaponry, assets and equipment. It has two sub-categories, namely Mechanized Infantry Battalion and Regiment Armour. These two are collectively known as the Malaysian Battalion or MALBATT, headed by a Commander. Subsequently, the Commander of MALBATT is put in charge of three units: (a) Mechanized Infantry Company, (b) Armour Squadron, and (c) Administrative and Logistic Support. The components of the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) and the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMA) in Malaysian peacekeeping contingents are normally responsible for logistic and transport. RMN and RMA especially played an integral part in Malaysia’s UNPKO during UNOSOM II in Somalia and UNTAC in Cambodia. Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) were

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also part of several of Malaysia’s UNPKO. For example, RMP joined the operations in Angola (UNAVEM II: 1991–1995), Cambodia (Western Sahara: 1993– 1994), Cambodia (UNTAC: 1992–1993), Somalia (UNOSOM II: 1994), and Mozambique (ONUMOZ: 1993–1994) (Chang/Mejoh 1995, p. 59). RMP is part of the UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL), which is tasked, among other things, with training local police, maintaining public order, monitoring local police professionalism, helping the Refugees’ Commission and even helping aid agencies (Abdul Razak Amin 1996, p. 36). Overall, the UN actors in a conflict area are usually composed of diplomats, human rights agencies, military forces, civilian police, development agencies and democratic support agencies. As previously mentioned, Malaysia is a signatory to the UN Standby Arrangements System 1996 (UNSAS) (Ministry of Defence 2010, p. 33). This was signed by Tan Sri Razali Ismail, Malaysian Permanent Representative to the United Nations on 6 September 1996. In 2006, pursuant to UNSAS requirements, Malaysia formed a specialized Infantry Battalion to serve under UNPKO (Ministry of Defensc 2010). In addition to that, Malaysia has also built its own peacekeeping training centre (MPTC) in Negeri Sembilan, Malaysia. Specifically, based on the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU-UN 2147/96) between Malaysia and the UN, under the instrument of UNSAS, Malaysia has agreed to provide to the UN: an Infantry Mechanism with a Battalion strength of about 900 troops (90 days’ notice), 50 Observers (21 days’ notice), 50 Headquarters Staff (21 days’ notice), 50 Police Personnel (21 days’ notice), 20 Election Commission Officers (21 days’ notice), 25 Logistic Staff (21 days’ notice) (Malaysia Ministry of Defence, Docket (Am 435A -Pin. 1/82 – Soalan Temuramah MK AB-J3 Op Global, 26 November 2013). Following the MoU, Malaysia has also agreed that the mobilization of the MAF contingent for a UNPKO will not be more than a brigade or three battalion groups, 200 military observers and UN Headquarter staff, 150 technical support staff, not more than two navy logistic ships and two mine counter measure vessels, an air force helicopter on board the logistic ship, and transport aircraft (Hamid Mohd. Amin 2002, pp. 31–32). As for Malaysia’s UNPKO’s scope of duty, it had been assigned as either military observers and peacekeepers or combat troops, but over the years, the scope of duty has expanded from Military Observer, Battalion Group, Headquarter Staff and the UN Technical Specialists. Generally, Malaysian peacekeepers are not only confined to the implementation of peacekeeping duties but also act as ceasefire observers and provide peace enforcement, as well as humanitarian assistance (Ministry of Defence 2010, p. 33). Specifically, they have been tasked with: (a) supervising ceasefire, withdrawal or disengagement, demobilization and armament control, prisoner exchange; (b) manning checkpoints, observation posts and road blocks; (c) providing patrol and escort duties, force protection, Quick Reaction Force (QRF), humanitarian assistance, electoral support and mine clearance (Malaysia Peacekeeping Training Centre n.d.). Thus, depending on the UNPKO’s mandate, Malaysia’s UNPKO troops assist newly formed governments to maintain law and order; maintain territorial integrity and political independence; prevent the occurrence of civil war; secure the removal from the host-country

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of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel not under UN Command; secure the removal of all mercenaries; monitor, confirm and supervise the ceasefire; as part of UNPKO’s administrative group, assist the return of war refugees’ properties and the formulation of policies for the maintenance of law and order; verify elections in accordance with the peace accord between the parties in conflict; observe human rights; conduct free and fair general elections; undertake civil administration; maintain law and order; repatriate and resettle refugees and displaced persons; rebuild essential infrastructure; provide protection and security for UN personnel, equipment and supplies; escort and protect deliveries of humanitarian supplies to the distribution centres; protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence; maintain continuous liaison with local authorities; and conduct civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) activities. The specific scope of duty for some of Malaysia’s UNPKO is shown as Appendix 2.

3.4 Malaysia’s Foreign Policy Posture Vis-à-Vis UNPKO As far as Malaysia’s foreign policy is concerned, Malaysia’s UNPKO indicates a certain stance in its foreign policy that complements its participation and nonparticipation in UNPKO. Up to a qualified extent, Malaysia’s prime ministers have hitherto generally differed in their views regarding UNPKO. Their perceptions have been moulded and shaped by a host of factors from different contexts and times. Working on extant studies of Malaysia’s foreign policy regarding its UNPKO, this study has identified three related distinctive stances of Malaysia’s foreign policy: pro-West, neutrality and globalization.

3.4.1 Pro-west Posture Tunku Abdul Rahman (Tunku 1957–1970), the first Prime Minister of Malaysia and the first Minister of Foreign Affairs (then called the Ministry of External Affairs), was explicit in Malaysia’s foreign policy orientation during his time, i.e. pro-West and anti-Communism (Shanti 1997, pp. 56–60). As such, while maintaining close relations with the Western bloc countries, during Tunku’s era Malaysia did not have diplomatic relations with the Communists. Even the formation of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963 was intended, among other things, to contain the expansion of communism in the Southeast Asia region (Mohd Noor 2017). Tunku’s favouring of the Western bloc and anti-Communism can be related to his personal outlook on world events, Communism insurgency in Malaysia and his own British upbringing (Rajmah 2009).

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Such a foreign policy posture, shaped by Western ideals, practices and principles, was translated into close alignment with the Western bloc nations in various international forums, especially the UN (Paridah 1998, p. 148). Accordingly, Tunku welcomed the UN’s request for Malaysia to contribute troops to the latter’s peacekeeping operation in the Congo (ONUC; 1960–1963). As a relatively new country, ravaged by its own internal war against the local Communist insurgents since 1948, Malaysia could have turned down the UN’s request. On the contrary, Tunku agreed to join ONUC, arguing that it was an opportune time for Malaysia, as a member of the UN, to show and prove physically and morally its commitment to the principle of international peacekeeping in the spirit of the UN Charter itself (Jeshurun 2008b, pp. 22–24). Malaysia was the sixteenth country to answer the call, and one of the few Third World countries accorded with such an invitation to participate in global affairs (Jeshurun 2008b). ONUC was important for Malaysia for two reasons, at the very least: firstly, it allowed Malaysia to gain the trust of most Third World countries; and secondly, it offered Malaysia the legitimacy of a sovereign, newly independent country (Jeshurun 2008b). Additionally, ONUC, as Malaysia’s sole UNPKO during Tunku’s era, also, among other things, paved the way for the foundation of Malaysia’s subsequent activism in UNPKO, which was instrumental in maintaining the country’s status, prestige, visibility and international awareness in later years (Kamarulnizam 2014, pp. 150–151).

3.4.2 Neutrality The premierships of Tun Abdul Razak (Tun Razak 1970–1976) and Tun Hussein Onn (Tun Hussein 1976–1981) characterize the neutrality posture of Malaysian foreign policy vis-à-vis UNPKO. Tun Razak succeeded Tunku in 1970 and held the posts of both Prime Minister of Malaysia and Minister of External Affairs except in the final year of his administration. From 1975–1981 (continued into Tun Hussein Onn’s premiership), Tengku Ahmad Rithaudeen was the Malaysian Foreign Minister. Fundamentally, Tun Abdul Razak was a realist who wanted to accept the world the way it is – i.e. accept the real situation – not the way one would like it to be (Rajmah 2009, p. 31). Malaysia’s foreign policy posture during Tun Razak’s term, then, marked a significant step away from Tunku’s pro-West orientation. Putting it differently, Malaysia’s foreign policy during Tun Abdul Razak’s era, also known as the ‘Policy of Equidistance’, principally sought to balance its existing pro-West ties with similar harmony with the Communist powers (Paridah 1998). Embracing pragmatism, Tun Razak was convinced that Malaysia’s current anti-Communism posture (as adopted and put in place by the first Prime Minister) was no longer workable (Shahriman 2013). This culminated in his first state visit to China in 1974, making Malaysia the first ASEAN state to do so (Mohd Noor 2017, p. 104). Additionally, Malaysia’s “conservatism and over-dependence upon alignment with the Western democratic powers were no longer adequate to serve Malaysia’s needs”

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(Paridah 1998). Tun Razak maintained that Malaysia could be an enemy to neither any regional nor any major powers. This explains his hastened move to make a non-alignment and neutrality approach the new strategy in Malaysia’s foreign policy (Paridah 1998, p. 150). This could account for Malaysia’s noticeably more-focused activism in regional and international organizations such as ASEAN, OIC and NAM. This markedly different foreign policy orientation, among other things, also contributed to the absence of Malaysia from any of the available UNPKO. For the record, during Tun Razak’s era, there were only two new UNPKO: UNEF II (Second United Nations Emergency Force in Sinai, 1973–1979) and UNDOF (United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, 1974 – present). Both were in the Middle East. Since UNEF II and UNDOF, authorized following the Arab-Israeli war, involved certain states considered to have belonged to either one of the Cold War blocs (Israel to the US and Syria to the Soviet Union), not participating in either in some ways validated and substantiated Tun Razak’s neutrality or equidistant policy. Besides, reasons for the non-participation also vary. Apart from the absence of the UN’s invitation for Malaysia to participate, Tun Razak’s changed prioritization of domestic over foreign matters also made a difference. By and large, Tun Razak wanted Malaysia to be friendly with every nation in the world, irrespective of the ideology and government system, as long as its sovereignty and principle of co-existence were respected (Paridah 1998, p. 155). Fundamentally, this marks the beginning of Tun Razak’s active equidistant policy overtures with all countries within and beyond the pro-Western enclave of his predecessor. Following the death of Tun Razak in 1976, Tun Hussein took power. Unlike his predecessors, Tun Hussein assigned the foreign affairs portfolio to Tunku Ahmad Rithaudeen. As for Malaysia’s foreign policy, Tun Hussein did not embark on any major new international initiatives, preferring instead to sustain the existing policies of Tun Abdul Razak, especially that of non-alignment (Balakrishnan 2006, p. 38). Invariably, it was due to his preoccupation with domestic issues like the Communist insurgents and his own failing health. On another note, as the successor to the helm, Tun Hussein was the immediate benefactor of Tun Abdul Razak’s Policy of Equidistance. Thus, Tun Hussein Onn became the first Prime Minister to receive a reciprocal visit from China – in 1978, five years after Tun Abdul Razak first visited China in 1974, which was, in turn preceded by the US President’s visit to China in 1972. Tun Hussein also paid a state-visit to the Soviet Union from 20 to 25 September 1979 (Buszynski 2013, p. 230). During both visits, Tun Hussein Onn made it clear that Malaysia wanted the major powers to recognize and respect, primarily, Malaysia’s (and ASEAN’s) neutrality policy (Hishamuddin Hussein 2012). Like Tun Razak, although there was one new UNPKO, i.e. UNIFIL (Lebanon, 1978-present), Malaysia under Tun Hussein Onn did not join it. Since Tun Hussein preferred to stick with Tun Razak’s policy, on top of the pressing domestic issues, it was only logical that UNPKO was not a priority during his era. Besides, it can also be argued that by not participating in UNIFIL at this time, Malaysia’s policy of neutrality, in more ways than one, bore testament of the ever-present and overriding

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influence of Cold War rivalry. In other words, Malaysia was better off not disrupting the international fabric of the prevailing bipolar world order by staying put with its current neutrality posture. By steadfastly placing more emphasis on its domestic and regional concerns, Malaysia’s neutrality – i.e. non-engagement in any UNPKO, which, most of the time, were initiated and supported by the Western or US-bloc – was boosted by the major powers’ corresponding reciprocity. China’s (and the Soviet Union’s) diminishing support for the local communist insurgency might be able to support such a contention. UNPKO notwithstanding, Malaysia’s pronounced neutrality stance afforded it more leeway vis-à-vis UNPKO.

3.4.3 Globalization The eras of Tun Dr Mahathir Mohammad (Tun Dr Mahathir, 1981–2003) and Tun Abdullah Badawi (Tun Abdullah: 2003–2009) mark a distinctive era of Malaysia’s foreign policy orientation vis-à-vis UNPKO. In general, Malaysia’s foreign policy under Tun Dr Mahathir was renowned for being almost exclusively run by the premier himself, not the foreign ministers. Most of the time, the foreign ministry was, to many, nothing more than a mere extension of the Prime Minister’s Office (Ahmad Kamil 2013, p. 219). By and large, Tun Dr Mahathir had a more pronounced and expanded perspective of world politics than the preceding prime ministers. Tun Dr Mahathir made clear his priorities in international relations. Geopolitically arranged, he put ASEAN as the first of Malaysia’s foreign relations priorities, followed by Pacific and African countries, Islamic countries, the Commonwealth, and lastly the West (Mahathir Mohamad 2011). Collectively known as the ‘Concentric Circles of Interests’ (Shanti 1997, pp. 80–81), ASEAN countries, Pacific and African countries, OIC countries and the Commonwealth countries were top of Malaysia’s ‘prosper thy neighbours’ and ‘Look East’ policies, among other things. Cooperation in business and trade opportunities were central to Malaysia’s foreign policy under Tun Dr Mahathir (Mahathir Mohamad 2011). Among other things, this also proved to be vital for Malaysia when it came to these countries’ votes in favour of Malaysia’s initiatives and campaigns in the Commonwealth and the UN (Mahathir Mohamad 2011, p. 420). When Tun Dr Mahathir became the Prime Minister in 1981, there was no new UNPKO in the same year. The most recent UNPKO began in 1978 and it was only ten years later that new UNPKO began to take place. In other words, only in the seventh year of Tun Dr Mahathir’s premiership were two UNPKO launched, namely UNIIMOG (Iraq, 1988–1991) and UNGOMAP (India-Pakistan, 1988–1990). From 1988 onwards, Malaysia actively participated in quite a number of UNPKO. They were, among others: UNIIMOG (Iraq, 1988–1991), UNAVEM I (Angola, 1989–1991), UNTAG (Namibia, 1989–1990), UNIKOM (Iraq-Kuwait, 1991–2003), MINURSO (Western Sahara, 1991-present), UNAVEM II (Angola,

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1991–1995), UNAMIC (Cambodia, 1991–1992), UNPROFOR (Bosnia, 1992– 1995), UNTAC (Cambodia, 1992–1993), UNOSOM II (Somalia, 1993–1995) and UNOMIL (Liberia, 1993–1997). All in all, in the history of Malaysian UNPKO, Tun Dr Mahathir was credited with twenty-five of Malaysia’s thirty-three UNPKO from 1960 to 2010 (76% participation). Tun Abdullah became the Prime Minister in 2003. Tun Abdullah’s era resembled Tun Hussein Onn’s, in that he preferred to continue his predecessor’s policy (Paridah 2008). On top of being the Chairman of NAM and OIC, among other things, Tun Abdullah expanded Malaysia’s international profile along the path of the voice of reason and moderation and the principled defence of the weak and exploited, albeit with a much lower tone (Paridah 2008, p. 95). In terms of UNPKO, out of the eight available during his time in office, Tun Abdullah oversaw seven of Malaysia’s UNPKO. Thus far, in view of Malaysia’s thirty-three UNPKO, Tun Abdullah was responsible for 21% of them (seven out of thirty-three). Such activism represents the continuation of Malaysia’s UNPKO from the era of Tun Dr Mahathir. Besides, participation in UNPKO greatly improved the chances of success for states vying for one of the non-permanent seats on the UNSC. For the record, Malaysia was elected to the UNSC for the fourth time for the 2015–2016 term during the administration of the sixth Prime Minister, i.e. Najib Razak. The campaign and the preparation leading up to the fourth election, however, had already been under way since 2001, with Malaysia’s UNPKO during the eras of both Tun Dr Mahathir and Tun Abdullah helping to contribute to Malaysia’s re-election to the UNSC. Malaysia was a nonpermanent member of UNSC in 1965, 1989–1990 and 1999–2000. All said, Tun Abdullah’s premiership sought to sustain a forward-looking and pragmatic foreign policy, and, among other achievements, he was singled out for making Malaysia the international centre for fighting cyber-terrorism in 2006, for continuing to support the Palestinian cause, for aiding Iraq’s post-war rebuilding efforts, and, for the first time, for enabling Australia to participate in the ASEAN leaders’ forum in 2004 (Paridah 2008). All in all, the preceding discussion shows that the core of Malaysian Prime Ministers’ perceptions which have influenced the country’s foreign policy have virtually all been conventional, orthodox and therefore predictable, despite some having a relatively distinct world-view. What set them apart, though, was the individual way each conducted the country’s foreign policy and the policies each introduced. Nevertheless, each change of political leadership did not necessarily result in significant shifts in Malaysia’s foreign policy. So far, the most significant shift has been from an anti-communist and pro-western posture under the first Prime Minister to one of non-alignment, neutrality and peaceful co-existence under the second, and globalization under the fourth and the fifth. Each subsequent Prime Minister has consolidated Malaysia’s foreign policy based on pragmatism deeply entrenched in and reflective of his world-view (Rajmah 2009, p. 50).

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During the period under study, Malaysia’s adherence to its previous tenets and stable practices with regard to foreign relations is noteworthy (Saravanamuttu 2010, p. 327). As with other states, Malaysia’s foreign policy is a combination of external factors (predetermined by a fixed world order) and domestic needs, formed and shaped by political leaders whose actions are tied to certain social and cultural contexts – nationally, regionally and globally (Saravanamuttu 2010), p. 329). So far, Malaysia’s foreign policy has neither seen nor experienced radical, dramatic or unexpected changes apart from its reorientation from being pro-West to neutral. In other words, it embraced both divides of the Cold War powers and their inherent heirs after the conclusion of the Cold War. In explaining the dominance of the Malaysian Prime Minister in overseeing Malaysia’s role in international affairs as well as domestic ones, it may be necessary to look into the Prime Minister’s authority, which does not appear to be explicitly defined in the state’s Federal Constitution, therefore giving him almost unlimited executive power in Malaysian administration (Malaysia Constitution, Part IV: The Federation, Chapter 3: The Executive). The fact is that the domination of the Prime Minister in the policy process has been a feature of Malaysian administrations since independence (Shanti 1997, p. 83). Nonetheless, what all of these Malaysian Prime Ministers had in common was their perception of the importance of diplomacy and international representation as a means towards the achievement of Malaysia’s national interests.

3.5 Conclusion UNPKO as a conflict resolution mechanism acts on the physical aspect of a conflict. This is invariably to put a stop to the most dangerous part of a conflict before the subsequent stage, i.e. peace-making, takes place. As world politics change and evolve, so do the conflicts. The complexity, structure and process of UNPKO have also undergone phases of improvement over the years in order to, among other things, improve on their success rate and encourage as many states as possible to participate and contribute. Malaysia has been one of the regular contributor states. Upon achieving independence in 1957, as with other newly independent states, Malaysian foreign policy was markedly dictated by systemic pressures. Accordingly, Malaysia’s foreign policy stance during the Cold War era was inherently pro-West and anti-Communist before it was distinctively moderated by its neutrality stance and later by its globalization stance, especially in the post-Cold War era. These stances have accordingly influenced its participation in UNPKO. The pattern of Malaysia’s UNPKO shows the dynamism and pragmatism of its behaviour on the international stage. True to form, the frequency of Malaysia’s UNPKO invariably corresponds to the Cold War and the post-Cold War eras. In sum, the prevailing international security system, the major powers’ stance vis-à-vis a UNPKO-bound conflict, and Malaysia’s foreign policy

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3 UNPKO: Structure and Process

stances all matter in Malaysia’s UNPKO (Syed Hamid Albar, personal communication, 4 December 2013). The only questions that remain are how, when, to what extent, and in what contexts have these played their part, which is dealt with in following chapters.

Appendix 1: Malaysia’s UNPKO Decision-Making Process

UN

WISMA PUTRA

PMO

WISMA PUTRA

MINDEF

Source Nazari Abdul Hadi (2013). Malaysia’s Defence Adviser, United Nations

Appendix 2: Scope of Duty of Malaysia’s UNPKO

3000 troops Malaysian contingent • 2nd Battalion Royal Malay Regiment • 4th Battalion Royal Malay Regiment • 6th Battalion Royal Malay Regiment • 7th Battalion Royal Malay Regiment • 1st and 2nd Reconnaissance Regiments

Congo-Zaire: United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC): 1960–1963

Iran/Iraq: United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG): 1988–1991

Iraq: United Nations Office of Secretary General in Iraq (UNOSGI): 1991–1992

1

2

3

3 Military Observers

45 Military Observers 3 groups of 15 Military Observers each at a time

Forms of involvement

No. UNPKO

• UN administrative group in Iraq following the end of UNIIMOG

• Monitor, confirm and supervise the ceasefire between Iraq and Iran as well as the withdrawal of all forces to the internationally recognized boundary pending a comprehensive settlement

• Assist the newly formed government and maintain law and order • Maintain the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo • Prevent the occurrence of civil war • Secure the removal from the Congo of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel not under UN Command • Secure the removal of all mercenaries

Missions

Remarks

(continued)

Appendix 2: Scope of Duty of Malaysia’s UNPKO 55

891 troops • MALBATT, Military Observers, HQ Staff • Malaysian contingent • 3 groupings of a battalion group (851 officers and men of 17th and 21st Battalions Royal Malay Regiment) • UNTAG HQ Staff group (15 Officers) and Military Observers group (25 observers)

Namibia: United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG): 1989–1990

Iraq: United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM): 1991

Angola: United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II): 1991–1995

Western Sahara: United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO): 1991-ongoing (as of 2010)

4

5

6

7

25 Military and Police Observers Between 2 and 15 Observers at a time

37 Military and Police Observers Between 1 and 20 Observers at a time

28 Military Observers Between 6 and 8 at a time

Forms of involvement

No. UNPKO

(continued)

• Monitor the ceasefire, the confinement of troops of both sides to the agreed locations, custody of certain arms and ammunitions and the reduction of troops

• Verify the implementation of the ceasefire • Observe and verify the elections in accordance with the peace accord between parties in conflict

• Assist the return of Iraq/Kuwait war properties and the formulation of policies for the maintenance of law and order along the 200 km demilitarized zone

• Observe and check on the withdrawal of the South African Defence Force (SADF) • Observe the disbandment of the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF)

Missions

Remarks

(continued)

56 3 UNPKO: Structure and Process

Forms of involvement

2 Military Observers

No. UNPKO

Cambodia: United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC): 1991–1992

Cambodia: United Nations 2119 troops Transitional Authority in Cambodia MALBATT, Military Observers, (UNTAC): 1992–1993 Military Police, HQ Staff, Police, Technical Specialists Malaysian contingent: • Malaysian Battalion I (Royal Ranger Regiment, March 1992-July 1993), Malaysian Battalion II (Royal Malay Regiment, July 1993-November 1993) • UNTAC HQ Staff (7 Malaysian Officers & 3 other ranks, 29 Officers as Military Observers, 20 Military Police, 25 Air Force Officers & 52 of other ranks) • 226 police personnel

Cambodia: United Nations Military Military Observers Liaison Team: 1993–1994

8

9

10

(continued) Remarks

(continued)

• Maintain close liaison with the • Not listed in UN Peacekeeping Cambodian Government and Operations 2014, but listed in report to the Secretary-General on Malaysian Defence Policy 2010, matters affecting security in Map 2, p. 32 Cambodia • Number of MAF Personnel: 4 • Assist Government in dealing with residual military matters related to the Paris Agreement

• Observe Human Rights • Conduct free and fair general elections • Civil Administration • Maintain law and order • Repatriate and resettle Cambodian refugees and displaced persons • Rebuild essential Cambodian infrastructure during the transitional period

• Maintain ceasefire

Missions

Appendix 2: Scope of Duty of Malaysia’s UNPKO 57

3206 troops • Monitor ceasefire in Mogadishu UN Force Commander, MALBATT, • Provide protection and security HQ Staff, Technical Specialists and for UN personnel, equipment and security elements and Police supplies • Escort and protect deliveries of Malaysian contingent: humanitarian supplies to the • MALBATT: 3 rifle companies (2 distribution centres mechanized and 1 from 7th Battalion Royal Malay Regiment, 870 Military personnel from mechanized 19th Battalion Royal Malay regiment, combat support and service support elements • MALBATT II: 7th Battalion Royal Ranger Regiment • MALBAT III: 7th Battalion Royal Malay Regiment • UNOSOM HQ Staff: 8 military officers • 5 officers of Royal Malaysian Police

Missions

Forms of involvement

11

Somalia: United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II): 1993–1995

No. UNPKO

(continued)

(continued)

• 6 January 1994: General Datuk Aboo Samah was appointed as the Force Commander • UNOSOM II consisted of 20,000 UN force

Remarks

58 3 UNPKO: Structure and Process

Military Observers and Police Peronnel Between 20 and 24 military observers at a time & 35 police officers in a single tour assignment

Mozambique: United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ): 1993–1995

Bosnia-Herzegovina/Croatia: United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR): 1993–1995

12

13

• Monitor and verify ceasefire, collection, storage and destruction of weapons • Monitor and verify complete withdrawal of foreign troops • Monitor and verify disbanding of private and irregular armed groups • Coordinate and monitor humanitarian assistance operations • Provide technical assistance and monitor electoral process

Missions

4639 troop • Monitor ceasefire Military Observers, HQ Staff, • Provide protection and security Military, Police Detachment, Police. for UN personnel, equipment and Malaysian contingent supplies • Escort and protect deliveries of • MALBATT I: 23rd Battalion humanitarian supplies to the Royal Malay Regiment & 3rd distribution centres Armour Regiment • MALBATT II: 5th Battalion Royal Malay Regiment & 2nd Armour Regiment • 12th Battalion Royal Malay Regiment & 1st Armour Regiment • 4 Air Traffic Control Team of the Air Force • 25 Police Officers

Forms of involvement

No. UNPKO

(continued) Remarks

(continued)

Appendix 2: Scope of Duty of Malaysia’s UNPKO 59

37 Military Observer

Liberia: United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL): 1993–1999

Cambodia: United Nations Secretary-General Representative to Cambodia (UNSGRC): 1994–1995

Chad: United Nations Aouzou Observer Group (UNASOG): 1994

United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH): 1995

United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA): 1997–1999

United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT): 1998-1999

United Nations Assistance Mission Staff/Observer (numbers in Afghanistan (UNAMA): unspecified) 1998–1999

United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK): 1999

United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL): 1999–2005

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

Staff/Observer (numbers unspecified)

Military Observer (numbers unspecified) 1 Liaison Officer

Staff/Observer (numbers unspecified)

Staff/Observer (numbers unspecified)

Military Observer (numbers unspecified)

2 Military Observers

Military Observers

Forms of involvement

No. UNPKO

(continued)

Observer

Observer

Observer

Observer

Observer

Observer

Observer

Observer

Observer

Missions

(continued)

Not listed in UN Peacekeeping Operations 2014, but listed in Malaysian Defence Policy 2010, Map 2, p. 32

Remarks

60 3 UNPKO: Structure and Process

United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET): 2000–2005

United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET): 2002–2005

United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL): 2003-present

United Nations Operation in Burundi (UNOB): 2004–2006

United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNMIT): 2005–2012

United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN): 2007

25

26

27

28

29

30

Staff/Observers (numbers unspecified)

Individual Police Mission Experts (numbers unspecified)

3 Military Observers

Experts on Mission (numbers unspecified)

20 Military Observers

20 Military Observers 20 interpreters

United Nations Mission in Ethiopia 9 Staff/Observers and Eritrea (UNIMEE): 2000–2008

24

Forms of involvement

Democratic Republic of the Congo: 52 Military Observers United Nations Organization 143 Police Stabilization Mission in the 50 Troops Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC/MONUSCO): 2000

23

No. UNPKO

(continued)

Observer

Contribute to the effectiveness of security activities

Observer

Contribute to the effectiveness of security activities

Observer

Observer

Observer

Observer

Missions

Remarks

(continued)

Appendix 2: Scope of Duty of Malaysia’s UNPKO 61

Individual Police (numbers unspecified) Mission Experts (numbers unspecified) 13 Troops

African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID): 2009–present

United Nations Missions in Sudan (UNMIS): 2009-2011

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL): 2007-present

31

32

33

• Contribute to the effectiveness of security activities • Develop situational awareness • Monitor and report violation of UNSCR 1701 • Escort convoys • Maintain a battalion mobile reserve • Establish a crowd and riot capability • Protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence • Maintain continuous liaison with local authorities • Conduct civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) activities

Observer

Contribute to the effectiveness of security activities

Missions

Remarks

Sources United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2014); ASEAN Regional Forum (2015); Malaysia Peacekeeping Training Centre (n.d.); Malaysia Armed Forces Official Website, ‘UN Missions’, (2016); Chang/Mejoh (1995)

Experts on Mission Contingent Troops (numbers unspecified)

3 Military Observers 10 Adjutant Officers 1 SSO Air Ops

Forms of involvement

No. UNPKO

(continued)

62 3 UNPKO: Structure and Process

References

63

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Saravanamuttu, J. (2010). Malaysia’s Foreign Policy: The First Fifty Years: Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism. Singapore: ISEAS. Shanti, N. (1997). Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy. London: Routledge. Shahriman, L. (2013, April 24). Why Malaysia isn’t afraid of China (for now). Retrieved 27 January 2015 from: http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-malaysia-isnt-afraid-of-china-for-now. United Nations. (2003a). Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations. New York, NY: United Nations. United Nations. (2003b). United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System Military Handbook. Retrived 4 March 2013 from: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/peacekeeping-han dbook_un_dec2003_0.pdf United Nations. (2008). Peacekeeping Operations: Principles of UN Peacekeeping. New York, NY: United Nations. United Nations. (1994, May 3). Statement by the President of the UN Security Council. Retrieved 3 November 2014 from https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/pko-spr st199422.php United Nations. (2010, December 31).Background Note: 31 December 2010. Retrieved 7 November 2015 from: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/yir2010.pdf United Nations (2012, August 3). General Assembly Resolution A/67/224. Retrieved 8 March 2013 from: https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/67/224 United Nations (2011). United Nations Peace Operations: Year in Review – 2010. Retrieved 11 November 2015 from: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/yir2010.pdf United Nations. (n.d.). “How We Are Funded”. Retrieved 11 March 2013 from: https://peacekeep ing.un.org/en/how-we-are-funded. See also: https://www.globalpolicy.org/un-finance/peacekeep ing-finance-5-12.html United Nations. (2011). UN Mission’s Summary detailed by Country Month of Report: 31-Jul-11. Retrieved 12 June 2013 from https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/jul11_3.pdf United Nations. (2014). Background Note: United Nations Peacekeeping [PDF]. Retrieved 15 January 2015 from: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/backgroundnote.pdf United Nations. (n.d.). United Nations Charter. Retrieved 11 March 2013 from https://www.un.org/ en/sections/un-charter/chapter-iv/index.html United Nations. (n.d.). Department of Field Support (Department of Operational Support). Retrieved 15 January 2015 from https://operationalsupport.un.org/en/about-un-field-support United Nations (n.d.). Peacekeeping Fact Sheet Archive: Archives 2004-2010. Retrieved 7 November 2015 from: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data. See also: https://ourworldindata.org/ peacekeeping

Chapter 4

Systemic-External Pressures and Malaysia’s UNPKO

Abstract This chapter provides deliberation on the causal role of systemic-external factors vis-à-vis UNPKO that are central to determining the level of systemic-external pressure that influenced UNPKO. By analysing the role and impacts of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and related articles of the UN Charter vis-à-vis UNPKO, this chapter highlights the importance of the geostrategic milieu of UNPKO. After that, this chapter assesses the dynamics of powerplays within the UNSC prior to and following the authorization of UNPKO by offering a general observation on the systemic-external impact on UNPKO. Essentially, the Cold War marks a specific era of the international system in which a recurrence of proxy wars, armed conflicts, the arms race and polarized security took place throughout the world. In order to evade the possibility of another world war, UNPKO is always regarded as one of the ‘middleground’ international responses meant to prevent or defuse such a possibility, even in the aftermath of the Soviet Union collapsing in 1991. The UNSC has also been one of the avenues of systemic power struggles and influence. This is frequently reflected either in the vetoing of a UNPKO-bound resolution or in the UNPKO mandate itself. On the whole, such a dynamic demonstrates significant parallels between the prevailing international security environment and UNPKO. Obviously, UNPKO consistently exhibit the dominant influence of the systemic-external imperatives that shape and determine states’ participation, systemic self-preservation and the balance of power politics. Keywords United Nations · Peacekeeping · Geostrategic · United Nations security council · Conflict-resolution · International system · International security · Power politics · Malaysia’s foreign policy

4.1 Introduction This chapter deliberates on the causal role of systemic-external factors (as identified in the analytical framework) vis-à-vis United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), via a neoclassical realist perspective. It seeks to elucidate whether the level of systemic-external pressure necessarily shapes UNPKO by analysing the role and impacts of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and related articles of © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Salleh and A. Idris, Malaysia’s United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1960–2010), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4137-1_4

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the UN Charter vis-à-vis UNPKO. It also includes a discussion on the geostrategic milieu of UNPKO. These points are important because they help to explain the dynamics of powerplays within the UNSC prior to and following the authorization of UNPKO. In the process, it sheds light on how and when such powerplay influences a UN member state’s behaviour with regard to UNPKO and the subsequent end-result of the UNPKO itself. It concludes with a general observation of the systemic-external impact on UNPKO. This study takes the year 1991 as the cut-off point separating the Cold War era from the post-Cold War as it was the year when the official document dissolving the Soviet Union – as a state and one of the two superpowers alongside the United States (US) – was made official, effectively ending a bipolar world order and heralding the start of the new, unipolar one (Bulletin of the Congress of People’s Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Vedomosti Declaration No. 142-H of the Soviet of the Republics, 23 January 2011). Thus, this study defines the years from 1945 to 1991, following the emergence of the Soviet-bloc and the US-bloc as the two rival hegemonic powers, as the Cold War era. The Cold War marks a specific era of the international security environment at a given time which saw proxy wars, armed conflicts, an arms race and even polarized security, outward defence and exclusive economic blocs of the Soviet-Communist bloc and the US-democratic bloc. In the face of the tense possibility of another worldwide armed conflict the size of the World War II, UNPKO, therefore, has been one of the ‘middle-ground’ international responses meant to prevent or defuse such a possibility. UNPKO is therefore vital to preserve the structure of the international system, among other things. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, leaving the US-bloc as the sole dominant superpower, the post-Cold War era has brought about a different configuration of the structural distribution of material power. Yet, UNPKO remains and has even become more prominent in the post-Cold War era than during the Cold War. Hence, an analysis of this is in order.

4.2 Power Rivalry Vis-à-Vis UNPKO The UNSC is the UN body with the prerogative power over UNPKO. Inevitably, key insights of the powerplays among and between the major powers and the resultant UNPKO take place within UNSC. As well, it is within the UNSC that the dynamics of great power relations and the balancing of systemic power politics vis-à-vis UNPKO are particularly visible. Before delving further into the workings of UNPKO within the UNSC, it is imperative for this discussion to first cover a few related important articles of the UN Charter frequently referred to and associated with UNPKO, which to some extent also form the basis of the UNSC’s power. i. Article 25, Chapter V of the UN Charter The above article states that “Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of UNSC in accordance with the present Charter”. A new UNPKO is established via the adoption of a resolution by the UNSC. Accordingly,

4.2 Power Rivalry Vis-à-Vis UNPKO

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in the event of an armed conflict, the UNSC may, among other things, send military observers or a peacekeeping force, i.e. UNPKO, to help separate belligerent parties to allow a peace settlement to take place (United Nations n.d.). As opposed to all other organs of the UN, which can only make recommendations to other states, the UNSC has the power to make decisions that all members of the UN should agree to accept and carry out (United Nations n.d.). Nevertheless, the practice of invoking Article 25 and member states’ compliance with the pursuant UNSC resolutions has been inconsistent, as indicated by the “Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council”, which contains the discussion of UNSC resolutions, decisions and communications from 1948 until 2011. For example, for the period of 1989–1992, the UNSC adopted only a few resolutions that explicitly invoked Article 25 of the UN Charter. Those resolutions, among other things, emphasized Iraq’s obligation to comply with UNSC resolutions (Resolution 667 [1990]), called upon all states to carry out their obligations to implement sanctions against Iraq (Resolution 670 [1990]) and implemented the UN peacekeeping plan for Yugoslavia (Resolution 743 [1992]) (“Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council” n.d.). However, for the period of 1996–1999, the UNSC did not adopt any decisions that explicitly invoked Article 25 of the UN Charter. Yet, the article was referred to, implicitly, through a number of other resolutions and presidential statements (of the UNSC) made with reference to specific situations of conflict in Afghanistan, Cambodia and Iraq/Kuwait. In all these circumstances, the UNSC reminded all parties of “the obligation to abide strictly by the decisions of the Council” (“Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council” n.d.). Likewise, from 2010 to 2011, the UNSC did not adopt any decisions which referred to Article 25, either explicitly or implicitly (“Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council” n.d.). Nonetheless, resolutions on arms and economic embargoes, such as UNSC Resolution 661 (1990) on Iraq and Resolution 1160 (1998) on Yugoslavia, managed to bring about member states’ compliance en masse, as required by Article 25 (United Nations, 2000). The ‘Repertoire’, however, includes neither the discussion on member states’ compliance with Article 25-backed UNSC resolutions nor the discussion on the repercussions that states could have faced in the event of non-compliance. This, among other things, suggests that ensuring member states’ obligation to comply with Article 25 is rather contentious. As an instance, in Resolution 740 (1992), the UNSC expressed its concern over the non-compliance of member states with sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia. This somehow shows that ensuring total compliance of member states as per Chap. V, Article 25 is a non-guarantee. It also suggests that the UNSC appears to have been unable, to a certain extent, to immediately punish non-compliance. Nevertheless, in provisions directed at one or more member states, UNSC resolutions did send noticeably strong messages to member states by, among other things, demanding that member states comply with its resolutions, reminding a member state of its obligations under UNSC resolutions, expressing concern at a member state’s rejection of, or refusal or failure to comply with UNSC resolutions, and even condemning a member state’s failure to comply with UNSC resolutions as constituting a material breach of its resolutions. Often, the bulk of the responsibility for putting into action these strong messages of the UNSC lies with the major powers.

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Besides, by virtue of their votes in the UNSC, the resolutions in general reflected the wishes and demands of the major powers. Chapter II (Membership), Article 6 states that ‘a member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council (United Nations n.d.).’ Thus, a non-compliant member state may tentatively face the possibility of having its UN membership suspended or stripped. The recommendation of the UNSC, in this regard, underscores the extent of the sphere of influence which the major powers have upon UN membership. True to form, without the support of the major powers, Article 25 would probably serve more as a recommendation than an obligation. ii. Chapter I and Chapter VIII, Article 2 (5) As far as UNPKO is concerned, the related UNSC resolutions appear to have also referred more to, among others, Chapter I (Purposes and Principles, Article 2 (5)) and Chapter VIII (Regional Arrangement) of the UN Charter. In particular, Article 2 (5) calls for states to provide any kind of assistance they could possibly offer a UN initiative as permitted within the UN Charter, and to avoid colluding with states against which the UN is taking action (United Nations n.d.). Based on the repertoire docket of 1996–1999, there were several resolutions and presidential statements which might be considered to have implicitly invoked Article 2 (5). The resolutions called for assistance relating to peacekeeping operations, other subsidiary bodies, mandatory measures within the framework of Article 41 of the Charter, multinational forces and other matters. In general, member states were called upon – but not obligated – to provide assistance to peacekeeping missions, including the provision of troops and material support for UNSMIH and UNTMIH (Haiti), UNPREDEP (Macedonia) and MINURCA (Central African Republic) (“Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council” n.d.). Subsequently, in 1989–1992’s repertoire docket, the UNSC adopted three resolutions containing provisions related to the principle of Article 2 (5). For example, again by virtue of Resolution 661 (1990), the UNSC called upon all states (a) to take appropriate measures to protect assets of the legitimate Government of Kuwait and its agencies; and (b) not to recognize any regime set up by the occupying power (Iraq). On another occasion, the UNSC also called on the international community to provide all means of assistance and support, materially and militarily, to enable Bosnia and Herzegovina to exercise its right of self-defence. They were even encouraged to hasten the support (“Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council” n.d.). Next, in 2004–2007’s repertoire docket, there were implicit references to Article 2 (5) in the UNSC decisions about UNPKO. For instance, through resolution 1584 (2005) regarding the situation in Ivory Coast, the UNSC urged all states to provide assistance to its UNPKO, including troops and material support. Likewise, with the situation in Chad, the Central African Republic and the subregion, through resolution 1778 (2007) of 25 September 2007 the UNSC urged all member states to facilitate the delivery to Chad and the Central African Republic freely, without obstacles or delay, of all personnel, equipment, provisions, supplies

4.2 Power Rivalry Vis-à-Vis UNPKO

69

and other goods intended for the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad. Moreover, by resolution 1546 (2004) (Iraq), the UNSC requested member states to contribute assistance to the multinational force, including military forces, as agreed with the Government of Iraq, to help meet the needs of the Iraqi people for security and stability, humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, and to support the efforts of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (“Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council” n.d.). Furthermore, as far as UN member states’ obligation to UNPKO is concerned, the UNSC generally uses terms that can be commonly associated with volunteerism, such as ‘urge’, ‘call’ and ‘request’. These terms do not necessarily imply an obligation. They, on the contrary, suggest that the related UNSC resolutions, deliberations and communications do not make it compulsory for all member states to contribute and participate in UNPKO, hence the irrelevance of Article 25 (obligation to comply). This appears to resonate well with the basic principle of UNPKO, which is voluntary participation, hence the relevance of Article 2 (5) – voluntary assistance to UN initiatives. Apparently, there has been no UNSC resolution condemning states for failing to provide assistance to UNPKO, as opposed to its condemnation of member states which fail to comply with UN resolutions on economic and arms embargoes on certain countries. So far, UNPKO remains a UN initiative which seems to allow member states to enjoy a certain degree of freedom of action. In other words, despite the obligation of UN member states to comply with UNSC resolutions, exemption seems to have been made in terms of UNPKO, with member states able to opt out of contributing to or participating in UNPKO if they wish. The participation and contribution of member states notwithstanding, UNPKO remains one of the key conflict resolution-mechanisms which the UNSC has at its disposal. iii. Veto Vote and Pocket Veto Veto means the ‘right to say no’, known otherwise as the rule of the ‘Great Power Unanimity’ (“Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council” n.d.). Essentially, this voting method denotes international recognition of the fact that international peace could only be maintained with the unanimous support and cooperation of all five permanent members of the UNSC (P-5) (“Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council” n.d.). Chapter V (The Security Council) of the UN Charter outlines the structure of the UNSC’s two-tier membership: (i) five permanent members (P-5); and (ii) ten non-permanent members. The permanent members are the United States of America (US), the United Kingdom (Britain), Russia (formerly the Soviet Union), China and France. For one thing, the veto vote clearly illustrates how international power axes compete against each other for unilateral freedom of action in order to resolve their incompatible interests and preferences. In order to authorize a UNPKO, the UNSC needs to pass a resolution which requires a minimum of nine votes out of the fifteen UNSC members, including the concurring votes of all P-5 (Patil 1992, p. 7). Permanent membership is automatic, leaving the election of the non-permanent members to be handled by the UN General Assembly (UNGA). The election of the

70

4 Systemic-External Pressures and Malaysia’s UNPKO

ten non-permanent members is based on two major aspects: (i) equitable geographical divisions; and (ii) the contribution of members of the UN to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization (Chapter V: The Security Council, Article 23 (1) (United Nations n.d.). The ten nonpermanent members serve a two-year stint in the UNSC. However, in decisions over Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) and Chapter VIII (Regional Arrangements – Article 52), a party to a dispute must abstain from voting. In other words, if any of the non-permanent members becomes directly involved in a dispute, it must abstain from voting within the UNSC, should there be a vote. In addition to that, it is important that the decision to deploy a UNPKO must not be vetoed by any of the P-5. As aforementioned, since UNPKO authorization needs a minimum of nine votes which must include all the five votes of the P-5 in the UNSC, the remaining four votes have to come from any of the ten non-permanent members. However, the most important thing about the vote is that none of the P-5 vetoes the vote. As such, even if a UNPKO manages to secure fourteen votes out of the maximum fifteen, it will be rendered void if a member of the P-5 decides to exercise its veto power (Patil 1992). Therefore, even if all ten of the non-permanent members vote unanimously in favour of a UNPKO their views ultimately count for nothing if one of the P-5 vetoes the resolution. Likewise, a unanimous vote by only four of the P-5 will suffer the same consequence. Each of the P-5 of the UNSC has an equal right to veto a UNPKO. This underlines the fact that UNPKO, through the UNSC, are in essence subject to the discretion of the P-5. Such discretion can invariably take place at the expense of lesser powers and the international community as a whole. In the same way, the veto power also underlines the fact that only the P-5 can guarantee (or disrupt) international peace and security. The following figure specifically illustrates how the veto vote is and can be utilized by the major powers in the UNSC to influence UNPKO and hence how it has influenced the number of UNPKO that have taken place so far. Figure 4.1 shows how scenarios of veto application concerning UNPKO take place in the UNSC. The first situation (#1: No Veto) indicates two major phases of UNPKO. The first phase refers to the absence of any veto on any issues brought to the UNSC after they have become substantive. The fact is that only issues that have not been vetoed via the use of the ‘pocket veto’ will make it to the meeting agendas of UNSC members and the next stage of the process. Pending the fulfilment of the required number of votes and, once again, the absence of veto votes, then a particular issue which necessitates the authorization of a UNPKO will be adopted as a UNSC resolution. Afterwards, only states which are not blocked by the major powers from joining a UNPKO can participate or contribute troops. In other words, if a major power decides against a particular state’s participation in a UNPKO, as in the case of Russia against Turkey in UNPROFOR (Bosnia), then that state cannot participate in that particular UNPKO. This scenario suggests that although the explicit practice dictates voluntary participation in UNPKO, in reality this is only open to those states which the major powers have not blocked from participating in a particular UNPKO. The second situation (#2: Veto and #2.1: Pocket Veto) is basically the opposite of the first situation. It indicates a situation in which one or more of the P-5 vetoes a

4.2 Power Rivalry Vis-à-Vis UNPKO

71

Fig. 4.1 Veto vis-à-vis UNPKO. Source Patil (1992)

UNPKO-bound substantive issue from being adopted as a resolution. In fact, many issues brought to the UNSC have the potential to lead to the formation of a UNPKO. However, rather than having to veto a resolution, P-5 seem to prefer to veto an issue or issues early on, i.e. before an issue gets to be substantive. Such censorship or threatened use of veto is also known as ‘pocket veto’. It refers to the P-5’s threat to use the veto power to prevent a resolution from being adopted by the UNSC. Prior to finalizing a resolution draft, UNSC members will go through rounds of informal and formal meetings. These meetings cannot take place without the consent of the P-5. For some issues to gain ground, the UNSC members have to arrive at a consensus. Hence, instead of vetoing a resolution, P-5 applies ‘pocket veto’ to censor some of those issues early on. It is why some ‘never saw the light of the day’ (Razali Ismail 2014, p. 4). It is the censored issues that, among others, prompted the ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution issued by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). In November 1950, in order to prevent the Soviet Union vetoing the UNSC resolution on the on-going war in Korea, the US brought the matter to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Subsequently, the UNGA passed the ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution, allowing the assembly to take over from the UNSC some circumstantial international security matters (MacQueen 2006). Also known as the General Assembly Resolution 377 (V) of 3 November 1950, this resolution states that if the UNSC cannot reach a decision on issues related to the maintenance of international peace and security, the UNGA can take appropriate actions deemed necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security (Langholtz 2010, p. 5). The move, described as “an attempt to transfer collective security power away from the UNSC”, was primarily meant to enable the UNGA to pass the resolution required by the Unified Command Forces (of which UN troops were part) to advance north beyond the 38th parallel (currently the de facto international frontier separating the

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4 Systemic-External Pressures and Malaysia’s UNPKO

South from the North of the Korean peninsula) (MacQueen 2006, p. 59). Similarly, due to an impasse in the UNSC caused by the threat of veto by UK and France on UNPKO in Egypt, the UNGA passed Resolution 1000 (ES-1) of 5 November 1956 authorizing the deployment of the First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) to Egypt (Langholtz 2010). However, a resolution issued by UNGA does not carry any binding obligation on the part of the member states, as opposed to UNSC resolutions. In other words, member states may opt to recuse themselves from being bound to act accordingly. Yet, an UNGA resolution can “press supportive countries to take action” (Okhovat 2011). From a different perspective, the ‘Unifying for Peace’ resolution, in more ways than one, also bears testament of the major powers’ far-reaching level of influence that could enable them to evade the use or the threat of veto power by the other major powers in the UNSC. In addition, although it can also be a way to bypass the UNSC and to overrule the veto power of the UNSC P-5 members, obviously, one cannot but note the role of the superpowers in enabling it to be passed in the first place. The UNGA resolution ultimately still serves the interests of the major powers. Yet, to some extent, the use of pocket veto appears to be significant in inducing a situation like the ‘Uniting for Peace Resolution 1950’ that led to the formation of a UNPKO to Korea, where, instead of being the third party put in charge of effecting a ceasefire, UNPKO itself became a party to the conflict. This, essentially, is a clear deviation from the original purpose of UNPKO. Apparently, the authorization and formation of a UNPKO depends heavily to the individual or collective preference of the P-5. Therefore, should any one of the P-5 veto a UNPKO-bound resolution, it follows that there will be no states participating in that particular UNPKO. In sum, however one sees it, UNPKO is heavily controlled by the P-5, with the UNSC playing its role as a conductor or a means to help realize the interests of the P-5, either individually or collectively. iv. Abstention Still, should any of the P-5 have a strong inclination to oppose a resolution on UNPKO which does not, however, quite amount to the determination to veto it, it could opt for abstention. For one thing, abstention can be taken as saying no to a UNPKO authorization. It represents a visible form of powerplay that is, at the very least, capable of sending out certain messages to the other powers within the UNSC and to the rest of the world. Alternatively, it may also be representative of the neutral stance the major powers are taking in relation to a UNPKO. That can also be taken as a diplomatic gesture which serves to appease a rival or ally powers, among other things. An example of this is China, which was either absent or abstained from the UNSC’s voting process for UNPKO in the 1970s, arguing that UNPKO lacked legitimacy in interfering with a state’s domestic matters. Nonetheless, China changed its stance in 1981 when, for the first time, it voted in favour of extending the UNPKO mission in Cyprus (Zhongying 2005).

4.3 Voting Pattern of Permanent Members of UNSC Vis-à-Vis UNPKO

73

4.3 Voting Pattern of Permanent Members of UNSC Vis-à-Vis UNPKO A general observation reveals that P-5 used the veto sparingly, and for specific objectives. The following table sums up the voting pattern of the P-5 during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras (until the material time). Looking at Table 4.1, between 1946 and 2010, Russia/the Soviet Union used its veto the most i.e. 125 times, followed by the US at 82, Britain at 32, France at 18 and China at 7, making the total number of veto votes 264. During this period about 92% (241) of the veto votes were used during the Cold War, with the remaining 8% (22) being used in the post-Cold War era. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was the highest user, i.e. 119 times. Russia, as the successor of the Soviet Union, has only used its veto six times since 1992. Meanwhile between 1996 and 2010, France and Britain never used their veto votes. Interestingly, the years of 1996, 1998, 2000, 2005 and 2010 saw no veto vote exercised by any of the P-5. Meanwhile, in relation to UNPKO – though not apparent from the above table – in total, there Table 4.1 Summary of the use of veto in UNSC (1946–2010). Source Global Policy Forum (n.d.) Period

China

France

Britain

US

USSR/Russia

Total

Total

7

18

32

82

125

264

2010

–

–

–

–

–

–

2009

–

–

–

–

1

1

2008

1

–

–

–

1

2

2007

1

–

–

–

1

2

2006

–

–

–

2

–

2

2005

–

–

–

–

–

–

2004

–

–

–

2

1

3

2003

–

–

–

2

–

2

2002

–

–

–

2

–

2

2001

–

–

–

2

–

2

2000

–

–

–

–

–

–

1999

1

–

–

–

–

1

1998

–

–

–

–

–

–

1997

1

–

–

2

–

3

1996

–

–

–

–

–

–

1986–95

–

3

8

24

2

37

1976–85

–

9

11

34

6

60

1966–75

2

2

10

12

7

33

1956–65

–

2

3

–

26

31

1946–55

*1

2

–

–

80

83

74

4 Systemic-External Pressures and Malaysia’s UNPKO

were only nine UNPKO-related resolutions vetoed by the P-5. Since the P-5 had ‘pocket-vetoed’ many issues brought to the UNSC before they were accepted as substantive, it follows that there could have been more UNPKO-bound resolutions which did not make it to the voting level. Mostly, during the Cold War, the P-5 vetoed applications for UN membership. More specifically, the Soviet Union vetoed the application for membership put forth by the US in retaliation for the latter vetoing the former putting forth a similar application for its Eastern European allies. All in all, the P-5 collectively vetoed 59 applications for UN membership and there were 43 veto votes to strike down or block nominations for the UN Secretary-General post. Other than UNPKO, subjects of the veto vote include the condemnation of acts by certain countries, the situation in certain countries or provinces, and complaints against one country by another. Seen from another perspective, many of these issues had the potential to lead to the formation of a UNPKO. However, since the ‘pocketveto’ is always used to prevent an issue from being considered substantive, in part, it helps to explain the much lower numbers of UNPKO during the Cold War as opposed to during the post-Cold War. To a great extent, the P-5 used the ‘pocketveto’ to prevent the possibility of an international intervention dominated by the rival power bloc in a certain conflict. This could reasonably explain the ten-year hiatus in UNPKO from 1978 to 1988 (MacQueen 2006, p. 129). Subsequently, veto votes used against certain UNPKO in the post-Cold War were precipitated by different sets of objectives. Inevitably, the use of veto reflects certain structural power configurations of the post-Cold War era. Russia’s veto against the extension of UNOMIG in Georgia and China’s against UNPREDEP in Macedonia would attest to this assumption. In other words, upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia as the heir had to set its focus more on securing its own interests and those of its allies along its immediate national border. In order to present a more focused observation, the following sections discuss the P-5’s use of veto in relation to UNPKO.

4.3.1 The Soviet Union and Russia With respect to UNPKO, Russia vetoed four resolutions, namely UNFICYP in Cyprus (1993 – on financing), UNPROFOR in Bosnia (1994 – on goods transportation), UNFICYP in Cyprus (2004 – on termination of UNFICYP and replacing it with the UN Settlement Implementation Mission in Cyprus) and UNOMIG in Georgia (2009 – on extending it) (Okhovat 2011). Accordingly, Russia was responsible for blocking the UNSC resolution to terminate UNFICYP which began its operation in 1964. As a result, UNFICYP remains in force up to the present time, making it one of the longest-running UNPKOs in UN peacekeeping history. Other UNPKO still running are UNTSO (since 1948), UNMOGIP (since 1949), UNDOF (since 1974) and UNIFIL (since 1978). The Soviet Union did participate in UNPKO. However, its participation was limited to sending a few military observers, for example, in UNTSO (1973 – Egypt). However, largely confined to observer-level, the Soviet observers represented none

4.3 Voting Pattern of Permanent Members of UNSC Vis-à-Vis UNPKO

75

of the Soviet Union military doctrine whatsoever, although one cannot rule out the fact that the presence also carried the Soviet Union’s strategic interests in the region (Findlay 1996). After the fall of the Soviet Union, its heir, Russia, for the first time sent its ground troops to join UNPROFOR (1992-Bosnia). This was, however, preceded by its virtually active participation in UNPKO, i.e. as observers on the Iraq-Kuwait border, in Western Sahara, Cambodia and Mozambique. Furthermore, the termination of UNOMIG in Georgia was important for Russia to make way for another parallel regional peacekeeping operation called Collective Peacekeeping Forces (CPKF) in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia (Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights n.d.). Russian-led CPKF was mounted by the Commonwealth of Independent Countries (CIS). Formed in 1991, CIS is a regional group of former Soviet Union states consisting of nine member-states. They are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Most important of all, the termination of UNOMIG helped consolidate Russian regional interests and keep the Western powers out of the Russian sphere of control in the region.

4.3.2 The United States of America (US) The US was the second most frequent user of the veto vote. Out of its 82 veto votes, 12 were used in the post-Cold War era and 70 in the Cold War era (Okhovat 2011, p. 13). As far as UNPKO is concerned, in the post-Cold War era, the US used its veto twice in both 2001 and 2002. On 27 March 2001, the US vetoed the UNSC resolution to establish a UN Military Observer Mission in Palestine (Okhovat 2011, p. 59), and in 2004 and 2006 the US vetoed resolutions demanding the cessation of violence in the Gaza strip (Security Council – Veto list n.d.). These were just three of the post-Cold War veto votes that the US used in order to protect the interests of Israel, one of its allies in the Middle East. In fact, all but one of its 12 post-Cold War veto votes were used in favour of Israel’s interests. These votes prevented the UNSC from adopting resolutions condemning Israeli settlement activities in East Jerusalem, demanding the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and illegalizing the construction of a security wall in the West Bank (Okhovat 2011). In 2002, the US used its veto to block the extension of UNPROFOR in Bosnia (Okhovat 2011). The veto was conditional on the UNSC members agreeing to grant the US troops serving in UNPKO immunity from the International Court of Crimes’ (ICC) jurisdiction. The treaty creating the ICC with the power to prosecute alleged war criminals entered into force on 1 July 2002 (Serafino 2003). Left without much of an option, the UNSC agreed to invoke Article 16 of the ICC Treaty and Chapter VII of the UN Charter by putting in a request to the ICC to withhold any war crimes prosecution against the US Army personnel for one year, upon the submission of the former’s request to the latter. Article 16 of the ICC treaty provides that “no investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with” should the UNSC so request under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

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4.3.3 China The People’s Republic of China (China) took over the permanent seat on the UNSC from the Republic of China (Taiwan) in 1971. Taiwan never vetoed any UNPKO resolution. Taiwan, for its part, used its veto only once to block Mongolia’s application for UN membership in 1955 (Global Policy Forum 2005). Since taking over, China has vetoed two resolutions related to UNPKO: the first in 1997 and the second in 1999. In 1997, China vetoed the UNSC resolution to authorize a deployment of 155 UN Military Observers to monitor the peace agreement between the Guatemalan government and the rebels (Haq 1997). However, China eventually dropped its veto, allowing the UNSC to acquire the votes needed, paving the way for the deployment of MINUGUA (Guatemala) to begin in the same year. China made it clear that the exercise of its veto was prompted solely by the Taiwan issue, not by the Guatemalan peace process itself (Haq 1997). In other words, the Chinese veto served to punish Guatemala for consistently bringing the issue of Taiwan’s representation as an independent state to the UNGA. China maintained that Taiwan had always been part of its territory. Specifically, China interpreted Guatemalan support for Taiwan’s membership of the UN as disrespect for China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Afterwards, in 1999, China also vetoed the resolution to extend UNPKO in Macedonia (UNPREDEP) (Okhovat 2011). Similarly, the veto served as a punishment for Macedonia’s political ties with Taiwan. As a result of the Chinese vote, UNPREDEP was terminated in 1999, four years after it began in 1995.

4.3.4 United Kingdom (Great Britain) Britain has never vetoed any resolution related to UNPKO in either the Cold War or the Post-Cold War (Nahory et al. 2002). In accounting for this, one needs to see the role of Britain with respect to UNPKO, particularly in the early years. Only three of the first fourteen UNPKO of the first forty years of the Cold War era, i.e. 1948–1988, were deployed in countries which were not part of Britain’s former colonies, i.e. ONUC (Congo, 1960–1964), UNSF (West New Guinea, 1962– 1963) and DOMREP (Dominican Republic, 1965–1966). In other words, eleven of those fourteen UNPKO took place in Britain’s former colonies: (1) UNTSO in the Middle East (Palestine, Golan Heights, Suez Canal and Lebanon, 1948-present); (2) UNMOGIP in India/Pakistan (1949-present); (3) UNEF I in Egypt (1956–1967); (4) UNOGIL in Lebanon (1958); (5) UNYOM in Yemen (1963–1964); (6) UNFICYP in Cyprus (1964-present); (7) UNIPOM in India/Pakistan (1965–1966); (8) UNEF II in Egypt (1973–1979); (9) UNDOF in Syria (1974- present); (10) UNIFIL in Lebanon (1978-present); (11) UNGOMAP in Afghanistan/Pakistan (1988–1990). Palestine, Syria, Egypt, Cyprus, Lebanon, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan were all former British colonies. Apparently, UNPKO were pushed to step into mitigate the conflicts

4.3 Voting Pattern of Permanent Members of UNSC Vis-à-Vis UNPKO

77

in all these former British colonies. This therefore provides a strong incentive for Britain’s absence of veto against any of these UNPKO.

4.3.5 France Like Britain, France has never vetoed any UNSC resolutions on UNPKO in either the Cold War or the post-Cold War eras (Nahory et al. 2002). But, unlike Britain, in the early years of UNPKO, France held a much less positive view of UNPKO. In the 1960s, France, along with the Soviet Union, challenged the constitutionality of UNPKO, particularly UNEF I to Egypt in 1956 and ONUC to the Congo in 1960. Both France and the Soviet Union questioned the constitutionality of the two, in part due to the absence of any explicit mention of ‘peacekeeping’ in the UN Charter, as well as the expense. France and the Soviet Union argued that these operations violated several articles of the UN Charter, notably Article 24 (Responsibility of the Security Council in matters of international peace and security) and Article 17 (2) (Expenses of the UN) of the UN Charter. Nonetheless, the opposition by the duo was judicially settled by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its Advisory Opinion 1962 (ICJ, Certain Expenses of the United Nations Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter, 2017–2020). The settlement consequently cleared the legal issue, which paved the way for all the subsequent UNPKO. In later years, however, France began to view UNPKO in a more positive light. France’s favourable perception of UNPKO is attributable to its aspirations to protect its strategic/geographic interests, especially its European frontier and its power interests as an internationally responsible permanent member of the UNSC (Wood 2005). As an instance, France’s leadership on UNIFIL (Lebanon) helped to (a) advance France’s triangulation of vital regional and global interests; (b) bolster its profile in the Middle East; (c) satisfy domestic demands; and (d) reaffirm its status in the international system (Coleman 2007, p. 320). Likewise, France’s growing activism in UNPKO was also driven by its desire to support pro-France regimes, as well as its own interests in its former colonies, in and around the countries of conflict. Accordingly, France played a major role in UNPKO deployed to Central Africa, the Ivory Coast and Rwanda (MacQueen 2006, p. 59). The Ivory Coast, as an instance, was formerly a French colony.

4.4 The Geostrategic Milieu of UNPKO Geostrategy is a subfield of geopolitics which sees international relations and international power politics through geographical variables. Geopolitics can be understood as the political meaning of geography (Fint 2006, p. 282), the effects of geography (human and physical) on international politics (Devetak 2007, p. 388), practices and

78

4 Systemic-External Pressures and Malaysia’s UNPKO

representations of territorial strategies (Staeheli et al. 2004, p. 113), and power relationships within geopolitical statements (Fint 2006, p. 16). Geostrategy, on the other hand, refers to the geographic direction of a state’s foreign policy (Meena 2005). It follows that since states possess limited resources and lack the capacity to pursue an all-out foreign policy, geostrategy shapes each state’s optimization of efforts to focus and direct its military power projection and diplomatic overtures to specific areas of the world (Meena 2005). A state’s foreign policy, then, is commonly driven by, among other things, its national interests, which include, but are not limited to, economic benefits, military power projection and even international prestige (Janardhan 2016, p. 22). The political world therefore makes up the basis of a state’s national interest. A region or state, no matter how remote or close, might be strategically more important to a particular state than certain other places, although it might prove to be less important to other states. It depends on how a state defines its national interests in a specific area or region and how it can achieve them through its foreign policy. It is about matching a state’s means (foreign policy, economic power, military might, ideological thrust) with its desired ends (trade, prestige, power and influence). A state may want to amplify its military power in a region due to its ideology, ethnicity, religion, nationalism or simply because of the leader’s personal wishes (Meena 2005). On the whole, geostrategy can be understood as a state’s foreign policy guided by geopolitical factors such as geography, economics, and demography. Looking at these factors helps us to understand the inherent relationship between states’ interests and UNPKO in different regions of the world. So far, peacekeeping operations have taken place across five regions/continents of the world, i.e. Europe, the Americas, Africa, Asia Pacific and the Middle East. For a start, there have been ten UNPKO in Europe, with only one taking place during the Cold War and the others during the post-Cold War era. All have taken place in Eastern Europe and none in Western Europe. Next, there have been nine UNPKO in the Americas, with three taking place during the Cold War. This means six of those UNPKO in the Americas took place during the post-Cold War era. As in Western Europe, there have been no UNPKO in North America, meaning that all the American UNPKO have taken place in South America. The Middle East, on the other hand, has had nine UNPKO. Despite having the lowest combined number of UNPKO, the Middle East is the region with most UNPKO during the Cold War. As a matter of fact, all nine of these UNPKO in the Middle East began during the Cold War. More importantly, three of the UNPKO are still running, i.e. UNTSO (Egypt, since 1948), UNDOF (Syria, since 1974) and UNIFIL (Lebanon, since 1978) (UN, List of Peacekeeping Operation 1948–2012). The Asia Pacific region had nine UNPKO, with four of them beginning during the Cold War era. That means five of the UNPKO have taken place in the postCold War era. Like some ongoing UNPKO in the Middle East, the Asia Pacific region still has one UNPKO running i.e. UNMOGIP (India/Pakistan, since 1949). Accordingly, the remaining eight UNPKO in the region have ended. In hindsight, three of the four UNPKO in Asia Pacific during the Cold War revolved around two of the regional powers, i.e. India and Pakistan. Pakistan was involved in three of the

4.4 The Geostrategic Milieu of UNPKO

79

Table 4.2 UNPKO’s regions of operation. Source United Nations: List of Peacekeeping Operations 1948–2012 (2013) Region

No. of UNPKO

Cold war

Post-cold war

Notes

Europe

10 9

1

9

All in Eastern Europe

3

6

All in South America

27

6

21

Middle East

9

9

–

All during Cold War while 3 UNPKO are still running.

Asia Pacific

9

4

5

1 UNPKO is still running, i.e. UNMOGIP (1949 onwards)

Americas Africa

UNPKO. Afghanistan (with Pakistan) and Cambodia were each involved in one of the UNPKO, i.e. UNGOMAP (1988–1990) and UNAMIC (1991–1992) respectively. Finally, Africa holds, by some margin, the record as the continent with the highest number of UNPKO, i.e. twenty-seven. However, only six of them took place during the Cold War, meaning the remaining twenty-one of the UNPKO have taken place during the post-Cold War era. The following table summarizes the figures (Table 4.2). As far as the UNPKO locations are concerned, the above table suggests a number of propositions. During the Cold War, the superpower rivalry within the UNSC limited the creation and deployment of UNPKO in the superpowers’ respective Cold War geostrategic interests. This attests to the existence of areas which the superpowers regarded as their sphere of influence. Accordingly, the end of the Cold War has, to some extent, apparently redrawn the sphere of the superpowers’ areas of influence, which has inadvertently resulted in increased numbers of UNPKO in areas that once may have been considered off-limits to UNPKO (MacQueen 2006). In Eastern Europe, for example, there was only one UNPKO established during the Cold War. However, it saw a 900% increase of UNPKO in the post-Cold War, i.e. from one to nine. This can be taken, among other things, as indicative of the presumption that UNPKO have been, since their inception, dominated more by the US Bloc, explaining in part their fast expansion into the Eastern Europe region in the post-Cold War era. Eastern Europe states such as Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia were obviously once dominated by the Soviet Bloc during the Cold War. Likewise, in South America, the number of UNPKO has doubled from three to six. Africa, similarly, saw almost a threefold increase, i.e. from six during the Cold War to 21 in the post-Cold War. Obviously, the end of the Cold War opened up new international frontiers for UNPKO, which, for most of the time, were representative of the expansion of the US Bloc, as the remaining superpower after the Cold War, into new strategic areas it formerly could not literally claim as part of its strategic interests. Asia Pacific and the Middle East, on the other hand, suggest a somewhat different trend. For Asia Pacific, it can be seen that the configuration of the superpowers’ geostrategic interests (or those of the heirs) has remained more or less the same, i.e. four during the Cold War and five after the Cold War. Essentially, the Cold War

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structural and material configurations persist, in the sense that the security interests of the superpowers during and after the Cold War appear to have not undergone drastic shifts in this region. This suggests that UNPKO can still very much be regarded as key regulators of the prevailing international system that best serve the interests of the major powers (MacQueen 2006, p. 11). That is why the powerplays within the UNSC, as far as UNPKO are concerned, remain the same, as the trend of UNPKO deployment to this region shows. In addition to this, taking into account the rapid process of decolonization in these regions during and after the Cold War, UNPKO remain important as a means “to immunize peripheral conflicts against the larger infection of the Cold War” (MacQueen 2006, p. 13). On the need to immunize peripheral conflicts, Southeast Asia nonetheless presents an interesting scenario. During the Cold War, the region was rife with inter and intra-states conflicts, such as the Vietnam War (1954–1975), Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978, China’s invasion of Vietnam in 1979, Indonesia’s military confrontation against Malaysia (1963–1966), and Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor (1975–1978) (HISTORY, Indonesia Invades East Timor, 2010). But, none of these conflicts brought UNPKO. Reasons vary. Primarily it was due to direct and high-level involvement of the superpowers in all of those conflicts. As an instance, during the Vietnam War, the Soviet Union was actively supporting North Vietnam while the US was supporting South Vietnam (Mohd Noor 2017). Likewise, Indonesia’s confrontation against Malaysia was supported by the Soviet Union and China (Dahana 2002), while Malaysia, on the other hand, was supported by the US, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Mohd Noor 2017). Therefore, during the Vietnam War, as an instance, since a party to a conflict cannot vote in a UNSC resolution for a UNPKO (and since such a resolution must also be supported by the concurring votes of all P-5 members), authorizing a UNPKO to Vietnam, or to Malaysia for that matter, was not feasible, if not impossible. However, a related development in Cambodia in 1989 presents an interesting case of UNPKO. Following Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia in 1989, and the subsequent signing of the Paris Treaty in 1991, the UNSC authorized a UNPKO to Cambodia in 1991 (UNTAC) (Mohd Noor 2017, p. 103). By 1991, the Soviet Union had already collapsed. The absence of the Soviet Union on the scene, leaving the US as the sole superpower, then considerably facilitated UNTAC. Obviously, there is an exemption to the need to immunize peripheral conflicts through UNPKO, particularly when the major powers themselves are part of the conflict, and vice versa. On another note, the Middle East presents another notable proposition. No new UNPKO has been deployed there since the Cold War. No new UNPKO notwithstanding, there are three UNPKO still running to the present day. These UNPKO more or less underline the perpetual strategic importance this region has over the major powers through and beyond the Cold War era. Yet the absence of new UNPKO in the Middle East does not necessarily suggest that the end of the bipolar era has led to former Soviet Bloc powers, especially Russia, substantially reducing their commitment to managing and maintaining security in the region (Mohd Noor 2017, pp. 129–130). It probably marks a changed, but not necessarily weakened, Soviet Bloc (and then Russian) sphere of influence in this

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particular region. Therefore, as far as the Middle East is concerned, the absence of new UNPKO can also be taken to indicate a newer form of security détente between the major powers in the region. Additionally, the Middle East’s huge energy resources, which account for 60.4% of the world’s oil reserves (combined with North Africa), could conceivably vindicate the major powers’ fixation with the region throughout both eras (Ruhanas Harun 2009, p. 27). In light of the preceding discussion, the absence of new UNPKO in the post-Cold War era, and the continuation of still-active UNPKO (from the era of the Cold War into the post-Cold War) denote that the current configuration of structural power in the Middle East is still serving the major powers’ interests and objectives. Alternatively, the major powers could be taken to have also inherited, and therefore be desirous of preserving, a sort of conceivable and acceptable security détente in the region. Conversely, Africa can serve as the most extreme instance of a region which is able to demonstrate the effects of the major powers’ significant reduction in security commitments, i.e. diminished major powers-client regime relations and, therefore, the accelerated attempts by the US Bloc to fill the resultant power vacuum in the region. In part, this can also help to explain the threefold increase of UNPKO in the African region, aside from the continuing process of decolonization. Plus, it also accentuates the imperativeness of the effort by the major powers to preserve and protect the international system by preventing the security threats in the region from getting protracted through UNPKO.

4.5 The Impact of UNPKO on the International System The preceding discussion points out, among other things, the prevalence of the P5 interests in UNPKO across regions of the world. Balancing and adjusting their specific interests with those of the others, within the UNSC and through UNPKO, eventually leads to what can be described as mutually constitutive efforts by P-5 to preserve and regulate the international system.

4.5.1 Systemic Self-Preservation Between 1948 and 2010, the UN authorized more than 60 UNPKOs, lost 2850 personnel and spent an estimated USD 69 billion (United Nations 2010). In retrospect, the UN authorized 23 operations during the Cold War, i.e. 1948–1991 (43 years). That is the equivalent of roughly one UNPKO every two years. More than 40 UNPKOs, have subsequently taken place during the post-Cold War era, i.e. 1992– 2010 (18 years). The 1990s were the busiest years for UNPKO; in 1995 alone, there were 35 intra-state wars in 25 locations around the world (Sollenberg/Wallensteen 1996).

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One of the reasons attributed to such an obvious difference in the number of UNPKO is the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the post-Cold War era. In fact, during the first seven years of the post-Cold War era the combined number of UNPKO deployed surpassed the entire preceding 43 years of the Cold War by seven operations. In hindsight, there were 30 UNPKO from 1992 to 1999, which is the equivalent of about four operations each year from 1992 to 1999 (United Nations n.d.). The following decade, however, saw the number of UNPKOs fall to only about eleven (2000–2010), the equivalent of more or less one operation for each year. This plummet, nonetheless, refers only to newly authorized UNPKO in the respective period. It does not take into account UNPKOs which are still active past the year 2000 until the recent time. Reasons for the sudden surge and diminished number of UNPKOs vary. The “mutual acceptance of stalemate” between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War leading to a “new mini-détente ratifying the status quo circa 1970” and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 may be one of the major reasons for the stark difference in the corresponding number of crises around the world during and after the Cold War (Wohlforth 2008, p. 182). Putting this matter into perspective, the end of the Cold War has also given rise to a new kind of global instability or new world disorder of state failure and civil wars, which UNPKO in the early 1990s sought to address (Coleman 2007, p. 5). In other words, the mini-détente era saw a low number of crises, while the end of it saw just the opposite. In relation to the receding number of crises at the turn of the twenty-first century, to a certain extent, the US was beginning to pursue more active involvement in the world to meet its strategic and moral criteria in order to address the uncertainties of the post-Cold War world (Sorenson 2005, p. 120). However, the plummet also shows that the structural and material distribution of the temporal international system of the post-Cold War era was virtually stable during the two decades following the fall of the Soviet Union. Besides, many UNPKOs had either completed their mandates or missions. At the very least, UNPKO might have enforced acceptable terms of peaceful coexistence (ceasefire), to which the ongoing UNPKO, primarily in the Middle East, can attest. UNPKO demonstrate an almost equal and balanced representation of both major powers’ interests – i.e. US Bloc and Soviet Bloc (Russia) – during the Cold War. But the end of the Cold War progressively shows that the former was gaining supremacy over the latter. This, among other things, helped to discourage the latter from utilizing its veto at will against a UNPKO-bound resolution. The frequency of the use of veto power vis-à-vis UNPKO or a UNPKO-bound conflict by the major powers also testifies to the attempts by the major power to preserve the international system. The use of the veto power and the resultant UNPKO is to a large extent about ‘systemic self-preservation’ – a sort of security impasse that during the Cold War helped keep both of the superpowers from getting directly involved in a certain conflict in a certain region. This also prevented a conflict in which UNPKO served as the regulator from spiralling out of control (MacQueen 2006, p. 11). By and large, UNPKO interpositioned itself between the superpowers to enable them to keep and protect their perceived non-negotiable security interests. More often than not, UNPKO therefore

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helped the major powers to preserve the international system for their mutually assured interests. Additionally, during the Cold War, UNPKO was put into a sort of effective state of check and balance by the superpowers’ rivalry, resulting in the low number of UNPKO. However, with the end of the Cold War, it was only natural that the UNPKO would appear to be more aligned with serving the interests of the US Bloc, hence the flourishing numbers of UNPKO. With the apparent support of the US Bloc for UNPKO, especially in the post-Cold War era, it can be argued that UNPKO was all along more the US Bloc’s initiative than the Soviet’s. This made US Bloc allies, such as Malaysia, and the other traditional UNPKO contributors like Canada and Australia, more active in UNPKO. Inevitably, this serves as part of their endorsement of the USled international intervention initiatives (UNPKO) under the UN, especially with the Soviet Bloc’s influence substantially weakened in the UNSC following the break-up of the Soviet Union itself in 1991. Moreover, the remarkable difference in the number of UNPKO between the two eras suggests a number of possibilities. Among others, the Cold War and the pursuant low numbers of UNPKO bear testimony to the equally reinstituting effects of geostrategic balancing overtures by the superpowers. The post-Cold War, on the other hand, suggests the proliferation of uneven geostrategic advances by what was characteristically seen as an increasingly unipolar international system, especially in the years immediately following the break-up of the Soviet Union (Abdullah Ahmad 2007, p. 156). Keeping this in view, Russia, as the heir of the Soviet Union, inherited much reduced structural and material capabilities and consequently reduced areas of security and other interests. Technically, through its veto power in the UNSC, Russia should have the capacity and capability to neutralize the US geostrategic advances. However, owing to its much-diminished structural capabilities, Russia seems to be more comfortable having a much clearly defined delineation of its sphere of interests, especially those along its immediate border with CIS. Certainly, it is always possible that China could do the same as well. However, at the time of writing, the US literally remains the sole superpower. In general, however, UNPKO is geared to further, advance and preserve the strategic interests of certain major powers, with the interests of the other powers playing second fiddle to the major powers. Invariably, UNPKO is more about international politics than international military intervention (MacQueen 2006, p. vi). It is more about preserving the specific interests of specific powers than about achieving the greatest good for the greatest number of people across the world. Through the UN, UNPKO is there because the powers that be want it to be there. Whether or not the rest of the world community would agree to it, participate, contribute or decide to stand idly by is almost always a completely different matter altogether.

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4.5.2 Power Politics Balancing UNPKO has inevitably served as a theatre for rival spheres of power pursuing their own distinct interests. In no other avenue has such a major power centricity been more pronounced than in the UNSC itself, which, among other things, transmits the UNPKO mandate to a host of different regions. UN peacekeepers discharge their designated duties based on the mandate entrusted upon them by the UNSC. The mandate is prepared by the UNSC, in which the P-5 play an active role. Often, the mandates come about as a result of the dynamics of power politics on the part of the major powers (Belloni 2007, p. 5). Apparently, if the mandate is assumed to have weakened UNPKO structurally and procedurally, the systemic powerplays within UNSC could in many ways be held responsible. That is also one of the reasons why it is common to see a UNPKO beleaguered by contradictory objectives which focus on the wrong things, i.e. stability over change and prioritizing short-term policies over long-term ones. In the event of a working UNPKO, which does not necessarily mean one which amounts to being successful, this primarily stems from major powers’ own interests that might or might not run contrary to the reality on the ground (Belloni 2007, p. 20). Apparently, the major powers are willing to pay more heed to the furtherance of their peculiar interests within a UNPKO than to the real condition and situation in the countries of conflict. A number of studies have supported this contention. As highlighted in Chapter One, by assessing nineteen UNPKO from 1948 to 2005 in the Middle East, Africa and Europe, Sitkowski is convinced that UNPKO have been a weak conflict resolution mechanism because of the major powers’ respective policies and actions – in this case the US in particular – Cold War and post-Cold War notwithstanding (Belloni 2007). Another case in point is those eight UNPKO in the Middle East which have repeatedly been unable to fulfil their mandates, resulting in the recurrence of wars between the belligerent parties (Dombroski 2007, p.xiv). As a matter of fact, three of those UNPKO, as aforementioned, are yet to be concluded, and thus remain active to this day. Another study done on UNTAG in Namibia, ONUSAL in El Salvador, UNTAC in Cambodia, ONUMOZ in Mozambique, UNTAES in Eastern Slavonia and Croatia and UNTAET in East Timor attributes the failure of UNPKO to inconsistent operational directives rooted in the conflicting interests of the permanent members of the UNSC (Howard 2008). Another study by Ramesh concludes that the failure of peacekeeping operations can be traced to the powerplays of the major powers (Thakur 1994, p. 2). These assumptions are hardly surprising. Since UNPKO is the prerogative of the major powers exercised via the UNSC, holding them responsible for faulty assessments of the situations on the ground is inevitable. Almost always, it is because of the ambiguous and weak mandates resulting from the UNSC’s own permanent members’ conflicting interests, which almost single-handedly doom a UNPKO to a certain failure (Jett 1999). A case in point was UNAMIR (Rwanda), during which the troops had no authority to enforce anything, other than making their presence known in areas of conflict (Razali Ismail 2014, p. 284). Such a loose

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mandate also contributed to the UN’s difficulties in convincing member states to send troops to join a particular UNPKO (Razali Ismail 2014). These and many other aforementioned studies indicate that the self-defined interests and resultant powerplays which resulted in UNPKO appearing to be hijacked and held hostage by the P-5 could probably be regarded as the most common reason for the failure of a UNPKO. For a large part of UNPKO history, as long as the major powers, especially the US as the hegemonic power in the post-Cold War era, refuse to expand the peacekeeping regime beyond its current state and conditions, circumstances will not change much (Dombroski 2007, p. 136). Obviously, such reluctance can be closely tied to the intricate powerplay of states with interests in a particular region and beyond. However, in the case of successful UNPKO, for example in UNAVEM I (Jan 1989–June 1991; Angola), there is no reason to deny some credit to the major powers, too, for having been able to come up with a well-defined mandate which consequently led to the completion of the mandate, well-facilitated conflict resolution and a limited number of casualties (Jett 1999, p. 64). It can also be argued that the major powers’ shared common interests, or the absence thereof, in Angola greatly contributed to the perceived success. Despite the success, UNPKO continues to be beleaguered by a slew of problems. Some might as well be intentional while some others are almost always unavoidable. The familiar problems that have been frustrating UNPKO are financial constraints, flawed mandates and unrealistic goals. Yet one of the major inherent causes of the problems appears to be the paradoxical interests of the P-5. Collectively, all P-5 commanded 85% of global arms exports during the period under study, and this inevitably put them in a delicate situation in relation to their responsibility to keep international peace and security (Murphy 2007). There are definitely other compelling reasons for the success or failure of UNPKO. The lack of financial support from member states, especially from the major powers themselves, is certainly one of those. For example, in 2006 the US was the largest debtor, owing more than $1 billion to the UN Regular, Peacekeeping and International Tribunals budgets (Global Policy Forum 2006). Combined, the debt of all member states to the UN budgets totalled USD 3.3 billion on 31 December 2005 (Global Policy Forum 2006). Out of over 190 UN members, only forty – representing less than a quarter of the total regular budget – paid their full dues on time in 2006 (Global Policy Forum 2006). Another reason for failure is the lack of accountability and measurable performance of UNPKO that makes an operation unable to meet the complexity of the crisis (Jett 1999). Examination of conflict resolution mechanisms in Africa finds that similar problems beleaguer UNPKO across the continent: poor logistics, ill-defined mandates and delays in intervention (Onumajuru 2005). Again, the role of the major powers cannot be dismissed in contributing to this. Furthermore, the legitimacy aspect, or at least the perception thereof, of a UNPKO cannot be discounted as one of the key factors that eventually leads to the success or failure of a UNPKO. It is partly this perception of legitimacy that empowers the UNPKO with the necessary authority to achieve the goals specified in the mandate (Smith/Dee 2003, p. 98). The findings of numerous studies point in that direction.

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Comparing peacekeeping operations mounted by four different international organizations revealed that legitimacy did play a significant role in motivating states to participate in those peacekeeping operations (Coleman 2007). In other words, states do place a premium on the legitimacy aspect of a peacekeeping operation, and this influences their actions (Coleman 2007). However, legitimacy could invariably be sourced from the major powers’ allies. Another case of a successful UNPKO, attributed mostly to the question over legitimacy, was the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET; October 1999–May 2002). It was the perceived international legitimacy of the UNSC authorization and agreements by all belligerent parties that in the end proved to be the key to the success of UNTAET (Smith/Dee 2003). Drawing from the success of UNPKO in East Timor, Ballard argues that the favourable and strong support from permanent members of the UNSC, i.e. Britain and the US, proved to be the key reasons for the success of UNPKO in East Timor (Ballard 2008, p.132). These examples provide evidence of the extent to which the major powers could play their role in a much more constructive and efficient way to ensure the success of a UNPKO. The fact is, the UNSC resolutions on UNPKO were bound to incur substantial concessions before they could gain the necessary support from the P-5. In some cases, the P-5 has even prevented some states from participating in a UNPKO. A case in point was Russia blocking Turkey and Iran from joining UNPROFOR in Bosnia (Razali 2014, p. 300). In another case, Russia also threatened to bar any resolution supporting UN membership of Kosovo, a breakaway province of Serbia currently being administered by the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) (Deen 2007). Serbia, it should be noted, is Russia’s ally. Russia’s threat purposely pre-determined the future of UNMIK and that of Kosovo, in its own favour as well as that of Serbia. Obviously, major powers’ state-centricity in UNPKO represents a self-interested response by the major powers to redirect the effects of conflicts to their interests. In a way, this works by minimizing the presence of foreign powers hostile to the interests of the major powers or those of their allies in areas of conflict. This is deemed crucial to prevent the effects of the conflict spiralling out of control and consequently causing irreversible damage to the prevailing structures of the international system as a whole. For example, UNPKO played a significant role in containing conflicts in the Southern Africa region following conflicts in Angola and Mozambique, in the West Africa region following conflict in Sierra Leone, in the Central Africa region following conflict in the Congo, in Southeast Asia following conflict in Cambodia, and in Europe following conflict in Bosnia (MacQueen 2006). Therefore, UNPKO continue to be highly regarded by many states mainly because their absence could lead to a hostile clash of national interests and disintegrating structures of governance in the states in conflict (MacQueen 2006, p. x). In this sense, the major powers appear to have successfully intertwined their interests with those of the majority of the international community. This, among other things, suggests one fundamental fact: that the UNSC permanent members remain committed to pursuing their own particular interests through UNPKO, the Cold War and the post-Cold War notwithstanding. For this reason, the quest for global values and norms like international

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peace through multilateral conflict resolution mechanisms like UNPKO has often been subordinated by the major powers’ individual interests. This is one way of saying that their interests take precedence over international norms and values. As such, it is obvious that major powers’ interests – moulded, shaped and influenced by systemic and domestic imperatives – almost always overrule every other imperative that many would have otherwise believed to be the priority. UNPKO can therefore be viewed as a means to further and realize the major powers’ interests in relation to other states. Both are a means to an end. Not the other way around. All in all, the preceding discussion reveals one overriding central theme: that major powers are primarily concerned with the exertion, maintenance and expansion of their geostrategic interests, with UNPKO serving as one of the means. The end of the Cold War precipitated a new kind of global instability or new world disorder of state failure and civil wars, which UNPKO aimed to neutralize (Coleman 2007, p. 5). Yet, despite the availability of UNPKO as an internationally recognized and accepted mechanism for preserving international security and peace, it still fails to prevent the unlawful use of armed force. Both the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 and later of Iraq in March 2003 were devoid of the UNSC’s unanimous mandate. Unfortunately, the invasions suggest that systemic imperatives consistently supersede the whole structure of UNPKO. Additionally this state of affairs shows that, within the prevailing international system, a selective unilateral, military intervention by the major powers, i.e. the US, remains one of viable conflict resolution means, other than UNPKO. It also affirms the prevalence of the emergent changed structural material capability among the major powers and, to a certain extent, among the international community. It additionally highlights the primacy of the superpowers’ national interests (power politics), which invariably take precedence over humanitarian norms (Lupel 2013). Also, it serves to reinforce the legal-conceptual manifestation of a certain geopolitical (and regional) balance in the international system (Tanca 1993, p. 147). This is another attestation of the expendability of UNPKO at the hands of the major powers. Yet, in no absolute terms can the number of UNPKO represent the sole, definitive role of a characteristically geopolitical balancing powerplay in international intervention. The fact remains that, on the one hand, the Cold War bolstered the geopolitical balance which resulted in, among other things, a low number of UNPKO. The end of the Cold War, on the other, considerably weakened geopolitical rivalry between the superpowers, hence the inherent link, even to the least relative degree, to the huge number of UNPKO in the post-Cold War era. Much in the same vein, the role and conduct of the UN (and contributing states) vis-à-vis UNPKO is constrained and facilitated by the international community’s interpretation of the UN Charter, particularly the role of the major powers within a given power configuration, i.e. structural material capabilities (Aksu 2003, p. 210). In all likelihood, UNPKO chiefly owe their existence to “the careful calculation by key states of how they perceive their interests in particular crises” (Briscoe 2003, p. 226). Britain’s role in the formation of UNPKO in the first forty years, i.e. the nine UNPKO in the Middle East, provides testable proof of that contention. Despite the noble cause associated with UNPKO, it is essentially designed in such a way that it

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has become an important instrument which the major powers are able to utilize to keep intact and dominate the dynamics and mechanics of the power relations of the prevailing international system. The geopolitical balance is reinforced further by the very mechanism and structure of the UNSC, vis-à-vis UNPKO. The reluctance to contribute and the absence of support of some member countries notwithstanding, UNPKO troops inevitably serve the geostrategic power calculus of the major powers, exercised via the veto power of the P-5 within the UNSC. In the last five decades or so, small and developing countries have been the biggest contributors of troops for UNPKO. The major powers, meanwhile, have been the biggest financiers. Specifically, the major powers have provided 80% of the operation costs, while Asian and African nations have contributed 70% of UNPKO troops, 75% of which served in Asian and African regions (Bosco 2011). Hence, despite small and developing countries playing a less significant role in the authorization of UNPKO, their size of troop contribution is relatively important in helping to run a UNPKO.

4.6 Conclusion UNPKO protect and preserve the interests of the major powers just as much as they represent the systemic preservation of the international system. This has consequently become one of the reasons for the irregularity and anomaly in states’ participation. Additionally, UNPKO authorization notwithstanding, the UNSC has been one of the avenues used in systemic power struggles to increase a state’s influence. This is reflected either in the vetoing (especially through pocket-veto) of a UNPKO-bound resolution or in the UNPKO mandate itself, should one be passed. The mandate has consequently been identified in the data as one of the factors leading to the success or failure of a UNPKO. This also demonstrates the significant and parallel effects of the prevailing international security environment. While the Cold War saw a sort of security détente among the superpowers that led to low numbers of UNPKO, the post-Cold War, on the other hand, saw almost a two-fold increase. Such a changed structural material configuration also opened new frontiers for UNPKO dominated by the US Bloc. As some regions (and conflicts) were off limits to UNPKO during the Cold War, the postCold War then redrew the geostrategic interests of regions across the globe, resulting in more options for UNPKO-contributing states to choose from. UNPKO consistently show the dominant influence of systemic-external imperatives that shape and determine states’ participation, systemic self-preservation and the balance of power politics.

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MacQueen, N. Peacekeeping and the International System. New York, NY: Routledge. Meena, K. (2005). Difference Between Geo-Politics and Geo-Strategy. Retrieved 1 April 2016 from: http://www.idsa.in/askanexpert/geopoliticsandgeostrategy. Mohd Noor, M.Y. (2017). Asia Pasifik Sejak 1945: Perubahan Struktur Antarabangsa Dan Percaturan Politik Serantau. Kuala Lumpur: Institut Terjemahan & Buku Malaysia Berhad. Mohd Noor, M.Y. (2013). “Malaysia-Indonesia Relations Before and After 1965: Impact on Bilateral and Regional Stability”. Paper presented at the Symposium on Cultural Diplomacy in the Asia Pacific, Berlin, 7–9 June 2013, 4. Murphy, R. (2007). UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo; Operational and Legal Issues in Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nahory, C., Gya, G., & Watanabe, M. (2002). Subjects of UN Security Council Votes. Global Policy Forum. Retrieved 19 November 2015 from https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/art icle/102-tables-andcharts/40069subjects-of-un-security-council-vetoes.html. Okhovat, S. (2011). The United Nations Security Council: Its Veto Power and Its Reform. Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (CPACS): Working Paper No. 15/1 [PDF]. Retrieved 20 January 2015 from https://sydney.edu.au/arts/peace_conflict/docs/working_papers/UNSC_paper.pdf. Onumajuru, E.V. (2005). United Nations Peacekeeping Operation and Conflict Resolution in Africa. United Nations Institute for Training and Research Programme of Correspondence Instruction. Patil, A.V. (1992). The UN Veto in World Affairs 1946–1990: A Complete Record and Case Histories of the Security Council’s Veto. London: Mansell Publishing Limited. Razali Ismail. (2014). A UN Chronicle: 1988–1998. Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations. Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council. (n.d.). Article 24 – Responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security 1989–1992. Retrieved 16 March 2016 from http:// www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/functions_and_powers.shtml. Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council. (n.d.). 17th Supplement. Retrieved 16 March 2016 from: http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/2010-2011/Part%20V/2010-2011_Part% 20V.pdf#page=3. Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council. (n.d.). Article 24 – Responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security 1996–1999. Retrieved 16 March 2016 from: http:// www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/functions_and_powers.shtml. Ruhanas, Harun (2009). In Pursuit of National Interest: Change and Continuity in Malaysia’s Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East. International Journal of West Asian Studies, 1, 27. Security Council - Veto List. (n.d.). Retrieved 17 November 2015 from: https://www.un.org/ depts/dhl/resguide/scact_veto_table_en.htm. See also: https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.5051, https:// undocs.org/en/S/PV.5565, https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.5488 Serafino, N.M. (2003, August 6). Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement [PDF]. Retrieved 6 May 2016 from: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a477217.pdf. Smith, M.G., & Dee, M. (2003). Peacekeeping in East Timor: Path to Independence. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Sollenberg, M., & Wallensteen, P. (1996). Major Armed Conflicts. SIPRI Yearbook 1996. Retrieved 7 February 2015 from https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/1996/01. Sorenson, D.S. (2005). The United States. In D.S. Sorenson & P.C. Wood (Eds.), The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era (pp. 9–28). London: Frank Cass. Staeheli, L.A., Kofman, E., & Peake, L.J. (Eds.). (2004). Mapping Women, Making Politics. New York, NY: Routledge. Tanca, A. (1993). Foreign Armed Intervention in Internal Conflict. Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff. Thakur, R. (1994). Peacekeeping In Vietnam: Canada, India, Poland, and the International Commission. Canada: The University of Alberta Press. United Nations. (n.d.). Chapter VII. Retrieved 15 September 2014 from: http://www.un.org/en/sec tions/un-charter/chapter-vii. United Nations. (n.d.). Chapter II: Membership – Article 6. Retrieved 16 March 2016 from: http:// www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-ii/index.html.

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United Nations. (n.d.). Chapter I: Purposes and Principles. Retrieved 16 March 2016 from: https:// www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html. United Nations. (n.d.). UN Charter – Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements. Retrieved 5 August 2015 from: http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-viii/index.html. United Nations. (n.d.). UN Charter – Chapter V: Security Council. Retrieved 1 July 2015 from http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-v. United Nations. (n.d.). List of Peacekeeping Operation 1948–2012. Retrieved 4 March 2013 from: https://read.un-ilibrary.org/peacekeeping-and-security/year-in-review-united-nations-peace-ope rations-2012_ed2a58d7-en#page1. United Nations Peacekeeping. (n.d.). Fact Sheet: 31 December 2010. UN Peacekeeping Operations. (n.d.). Fact Sheet: 31 January 2013. United Nations Peacekeeping. (n.d.). Fact Sheet: 28 February 2013. United Nations. (2000). Report of the Security Council: 16 June 1999–15 June 2000. New York, NY: United Nations. Wohlforth, W.C. (2008). Realism. In C. Reus-Smit & D. Snidal (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Wood, C.P. (2005). France. In D.S. Sorenson & P.C. Wood. (Eds.), The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era (pp. 68–94). London: Frank Cass. Zhongying, P. (2005). China’s Changing Attitude to UN Peacekeeping. In M. Caballero-Anthony, & A. Acharya (Eds.), UN Peace Operations and Asian Security (pp. 73–77). New York, NY: Routledge.

Chapter 5

Domestic-Internal Pressures and Malaysia’s UNPKO

Abstract A state’s relative power position does not necessarily pre-condition its international action and reaction to systemic imperatives. This chapter explores the reasons why states with similar structures and relative power behave differently when it comes to UNPKO. As in the case of Malaysia, the leaders’ perceptions of power can be suggestively more important than the actual power of a state. By deliberating on the Prime Ministers’ perception and national power and their level of dominance over state institutions and other domestic political apparatus, it accordingly finds that the Prime Ministers of Malaysia held dominant control, structurally and practically, over state institutions and subsequently Malaysia’s UNPKO. Additionally, the changing international security environment also motivated the Prime Ministers to seize available opportunities to exert and amplify Malaysia’s visibility and influence among the international community. This chapter concludes that Malaysia needed to make up the lack of its hard power with soft power and international prestige through UNPKO. Additionally, since the Prime Ministers could overrule politicomilitary decisions, and those of civil society, they reduced these institutions merely to the executive level as well as supplementing and augmenting their perceptions of co-religionist and humanitarian causes. Collectively, both wielded weak influence on the Prime Ministers’ decisions over Malaysia’s UNPKO. Keywords Peacekeeping · United Nations · International relations · International security · Politico-military institutions · Co-religionist · Humanitarian · Hard power · Soft power · Malaysian Prime Ministers

5.1 Introduction By all accounts, a state’s relative power position, i.e. the material capability of a state, does not necessarily pre-condition its international action and reaction to systemic imperatives. This could explain why states with similar structures and relative power behave differently. In view of this, by playing a mediating role in utilizing a state’s relative power, the Prime Ministers’ perceptions of power can potentially be more important than the actual power of a state. State power, on the other hand, can be taken

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Salleh and A. Idris, Malaysia’s United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1960–2010), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4137-1_5

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to be a state’s ability to extract or mobilize resources as determined by its institutions as well as nationalism and ideology, among other things (Taliaferro 2009). For the purposes of this study, the impact of the Prime Ministers’ perceptions or ideology refers to the way they interact with the politico-military institutions and how these eventually influence the nature of Malaysia’s UNPKO. This is important because a power analysis has to rely on the strength and structure of states relative to their societies, which in turn determines how much or how little of the national resources the prime ministers can appropriate and allocate to a particular policy of their choice (Taliaferro 2009). The extraction also depends on the level of the Prime Minister’s national power, i.e. “the ability of state leaders to mobilize their nation’s human and material resources behind security initiatives” (Taliaferro 2009). Obviously, it is important for them to generate and sustain public support for their particular national policy or strategy of choice (Taliaferro 2009: 217). Building on this, with UNPKO serving as the background, via a neoclassical realist perspective, the following sections will deliberate on the Prime Ministers’ perceptions and national power and their level of dominance over state institutions and other domestic political apparatus. This chapter undertakes to shed light on whether the level of the domestic-internal pressures have mitigated, magnified or at times exerted the most dominant influence over Malaysia’s UNPKO. The concluding part will highlight key insights drawn from the preceding analysis.

5.2 Malaysian Prime Ministers and Peacekeeping The Prime Ministers, and therefore their perceptions (and values), are considered to have exerted the most significant impact upon Malaysian policy, domestic and external, as opposed to other factors that include, among other things, historical influences, resource environment and human environment (Ahmad Kamil 2013; Jeshurun 2008; Dhillon 2009; Fauziah Mohamad 2006; Ott 1971; Rajmah 2009; Saravanamuttu 2010). For some, they are so important that “the values and perceptions of these individuals have been the most single determinant of policy” (Ott 1971). The dictum of international relations states that a state’s foreign policy is always the extension of its domestic policy. Consequently, the objective of the foreign policy of any state, just as it is with Malaysia’s, is more or less premised on the necessity to safeguard and promote its national interests that without doubt draw a salient parallel with public interests (Ahmad Kamil 2013: 228). Being a small, multi-racial, multi-religious country that is easily vulnerable to racial flare-up, Malaysia takes communal unity seriously. It feeds on stability and progress by adopting policies based on the principles of moderation and compromise that can contribute towards mediation efforts and the prevention of conflicts, a strategy which is instrumental in the pursuit of international peace, security and prosperity (Mohd Najib 2015). Accordingly, Malaysian public interests (unity) have to be founded on strong communitarian and normative values (Ahmad Kamil 2013: 228). Being communitarian, Ahmad Kamil notes, is being “sensitive to moral obligations expected of the members of the international

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community” (Ahmad Kamil 2013: 228). As such, for Ahmad Kamil, the upholding and therefore the extension of Malaysian communitarian values greatly helps to explain Malaysia’s notable participation in international humanitarian disaster relief and, more specifically, UNPKO across the world. By extension, this relates closely to the concept of middlepowermanship that some consider to be unique to Malaysia (Saravanamuttu 2010).

5.2.1 Middlepowermanship UNPKO alone, both in conceptual and practical terms, cannot constitute a country’s middlepowermanship. However, middlepowermanship certainly requires a state to be active in UNPKO international peacekeeping operations, as in the case of Canada and Australia. In more ways than one, Malaysia’s activism in UNPKO bodes well for Malaysia’s aspirations to middlepowermanship, since it is a small state with a seemingly middle power capability to consistently contribute, materially and morally, to UNPKO (Saravanamuttu 2010: 195). Between 1960 and 2010, Malaysia recorded 57% UNPKO participation (33 operations out of 65). As a comparison, for the same period and number of UNPKO, both Canada and Australia recorded roughly 58% (35 out of 60) and 52% (31 out of 60) respectively (CSC-Canadian soldiers 1999). These two countries, which are generally regarded as middle powers, are much more renowned for their political influence than their military and economic might. One of the reasons for this, as Nye Jr. puts it, is the inclusion of attractive causes like economic aid and peacekeeping, among others, in these countries’ definitions of national interests’ representative of their national values (Nye Jr. 2002: 10). Indeed, the pursuit of universal values such as international peacekeeping and humanitarianism are vital for a state aspiring to middlepowermanship. As such, Malaysia’s five decades of UNPKO have demonstrated the characteristics, vision, missions, and statecraft befitting those of middle powers such as Canada (Saravanamuttu 2010). For that reason, peacekeeping and the ensuing middlepowermanship have brought into prominence and consolidated two important upshots of Malaysia’s middlepowermanship, which include (a) soft power and (b) international prestige.

5.2.1.1

Soft Power

Soft power is not a monopoly of middlepowermanship. Yet, central to middlepowermanship is the use of soft power. In the 2010 ‘Soft Power Index Results’, developed by the British Institute of Government, the top four rankings were occupied by France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Germany, with traditional peacekeepers like Australia positioned 8th, Canada 13th and Norway 14th (McClory 2010: 5). In 2012, the same major powers remained in the top four. However, middle powers like Canada and Norway respectively moved up to 10th and 12th place, and Australia down to 9th, while Malaysia was in 37th place, Singapore in 26th and

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Indonesia in 40th (McClory 2010: 11). Inherently, soft power is a relative and intangible concept that depends on the “ability to get others to want what you want” (Nye Jr. 2002: 9). It is a circumstance in which one affects the behaviour of others so much that all end up wanting the same thing, voluntarily. On the one hand, hard power, by forceful means, induces or threatens others. Soft power, on the other hand, uses one’s own preferences to be willingly joined by others (Nye Jr. 2002: 9). It attracts, not coerces. It is a form of power that is essentially co-optive, not commanding (Nye Jr. 1990). Nye Jr. asserts that it is the “ability to entice and attract. And attraction often leads to acquiescence or imitation” (Nye Jr. 2002: 9). It consequently makes the country’s foreign policy appear to be legitimate and therefore justifiable in the eyes of the international community. On the whole, soft power can be summed up as “the national resources that can lead to a country’s ability to affect others through the cooptive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes” (Nye Jr. 2011). By and large, a state with middlepowermanship criteria, in this case Malaysia, is known for commanding a certain degree of soft power with the ensuing capacity to provide a form of international leadership by its election on to the UNSC. Furthermore, as far as Malaysia’s membership of the UNSC is concerned, Malaysia’s election in 2014 – for the fourth time – in many ways validated Malaysia’s soft power. Malaysia’s three previous terms on the UNSC were in 1965 (shared splitterm with Czechoslovakia), 1989–1990 and 1999–2000 (Nye Jr. 2011). In addition, for the fourth election, Malaysia spent thirteen years lobbying for support, i.e. 2001– 2014 (Malaysian Digest 2014). Additionally, Malaysia was the sole candidate from the Asia Pacific Group, as opposed to the Western European and Others Group which could not decide between New Zealand, Spain and Turkey for the two seats designated for the group. For the record, Angola was the sole candidate for the Africa Group, as was Venezuela for South America. Being the sole candidate can principally be taken to suggest the extent of the Malaysia’s soft power – at least in its group – for the UNSC seat. Besides, Malaysia’s candidacy also won the unanimous endorsement of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Middle Eastern grouping of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). To put that into perspective, ASEAN has ten member-countries while the GCC has six major gulf oil-producing countries of the Middle East. The support more or less suggests that Malaysia had essentially earned the reputation of being an important member of international organizations such as ASEAN. In addition, its mediatory role was well-known on the international stage. For example, in 1980, as a member of the International Islamic Peace Committee (IPC), Malaysia’s expertise was sought to deal with the Iran-Iraq war; in 1986 to facilitate the readmission of Egypt into the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) following its expulsion after signing David Camp Accords with Israel in 1978; and in 1987 to find an amicable resolution for Pakistan-India conflict (Shanti 1997). Although not all of these appointments resulted in the desired outcomes, the fact remains that Malaysia’s expertise and influence were sought and called upon by the international community. Consequently, they should as well be representative of Malaysia’s global standing in international politics. Still, notwithstanding

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the outcome, Malaysia’s four-time membership of UNSC and the correlated global endorsements and appointments can, to a considerable extent, be regarded as positive indications of the significant level of Malaysia’s soft power.

5.2.1.2

International Prestige

Table 5.1 also suggests a number of propositions. This study argues that Malaysia’s first membership in the UNSC in 1965 can, in a way, be linked to its maiden UNPKO in 1960. Malaysia (then known as Malaya) had just achieved independence in 1957. In the early years of its independence, Malaysia depended heavily on Britain with regard to its financial, economic and military aspects in order to sustain its pro-West stance and its on-going fight against the local insurgent Communist party (Mohd Noor 2017: 42). Keeping in view Malaysia’s own dependence on Britain for its security, and its weak military strength, its intriguing decision to send about 3000 troops to join ONUC in the Congo (1960–1963) was proof of its alliance and backing of the US-Bloc-led initiative in the African region (Mahathir Mohamad, 2014, personal communication). Congo was a former colony of Belgium, which, in turn, was one of the Western European countries of the US Bloc during the Cold War. It is also necessary to consider Indonesia’s armed confrontation (Konfrontasi) against the formation of Malaysia that began in 1963. In the same year, ONUC ended and Malaysia was elected on to the UNSC. Malaysia’s ONUC participation to some extent opened the way for its UNSC membership. Additionally, Malaysia joining the UNSC could have indicated the US-Bloc reciprocal support for the formation of Malaysia, which, among other things, was meant to counter Indonesian Konfrontasi and prevent the spread of Communism in Southeast Asia. With Malaysian leaders seeing Indonesia’s Konfrontasi as part of a grand plan for Communist expansion in the region (Shanti 1997: 89), Malaysia used its UNSC membership to great effect. In order to gain support from the international community, Malaysia brought to some of the UNSC meetings maps and weapons seized from Indonesia’s commandos who were infiltrating the country. This helped Malaysia to build its case against Indonesia Table 5.1 Malaysia as a non-permanent member of the UNSC. Source United Nations Security Council, ‘Membership: Malaysia’ (2016); United Nations: List of Peacekeeping Operations 1948– 2012 (2013); Malaysia’s National Defence Policy, Map 2: Locations of ATM Deployment under UN Peacekeeping Operations (2010) UNSC non-permanent membership

Total

Year terms

Number of Malaysia’s UNPKO

1965 (split with Czechoslovakia)

1 in 1960

1989–1990

2 in 1988 and 1989

2000–2001

19

2015–2016

11

4 times

33 UNPKO

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and win the support of some of the major powers and a sizeable number of UN member states (Razali 2014: 18). Such support in part helped to weaken Indonesia’s Konfrontasi. In 1966, Indonesia ended its military campaign against Malaysia. By this time, Malaysia had experienced how effective and useful being a member of the UNSC was. Being a small power, Malaysia put to great use its membership of the UNSC to pursue its national interests and protect its territorial integrity, apart from other defence and security treaties and arrangement. Generally, a small power can appear to be relatively influential and reliable in the international sphere via its membership of the UNSC, which is the most important body of the UN. Also, election to membership could be regarded as recognition by UN member states (and therefore as endorsement by the major powers) of: Malaysia’s participation in ONUC, which in part underpinned the grand scheme to prevent the spread of Communism; Malaysia’s support for Commonwealth countries; and Malaysia’s wish to align itself closer with the Western ideals and ideologies (Saravanamuttu 2010). In a way, the fact that Malaysia was beginning to be active in other international and regional commitments was proof of its quest to build and enhance its prestige and thus, to some considerable extent, proof of its middlepowermanship aspiration. Malaysia’s record of UNPKO did help it to be elected to the UNSC for the second time for the term of 1989–1990. Unarguably, in the post-Cold War, Malaysia’s UNPKO reached its peak. Malaysia’s third membership of the UNSC for the 2000– 2001 term came on the back of Malaysia’s nineteen UNPKO in a ten-year period (1990–2000) – the highest in Malaysia’s UNPKO history so far. Its fourth membership came after eleven of Malaysia’s UNPKO. Clearly, involvement in UNPKO proved to be vital when Malaysia offered itself for election to a non-permanent seat on the UNSC for the 2015–2016 term. Its fourth win spoke volumes for both Malaysia’s international prestige as a “key variable in the international calculus of power politics” (Paridah 2008) and its continuing good standing in the area of global peace and security (Singh 2014). Indeed, UNPKO has always been recognized as one of the most important pillars of global governance. Hence, a country’s activism in this regard will usually prove to be instrumental in its election to the UNSC (Razali 2014). As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the UNSC is basically the most important organ of the UN. Apart from making key decisions on crucial matters such as international sanctions, war and peace, it also holds the prerogative power over UNPKO. Thus, a seat on the UNSC is considered to be a significant diplomatic accomplishment because, first and foremost, it enables the members to get the attention of the major powers more effectively, which could have a beneficial impact on various special interests and international issues, especially those which concern the member the most (Razali 2014: 127). In essence, it is about a member, no matter how small, having the opportunity and space to project a much more credible, effective voice on the world stage (Malaysia Digest 2014). More often than not, a member may either advance or frustrate a resolution on particular matters. As an instance, during Malaysia’s second membership of the UNSC from 1989 to 1990, Malaysia aggressively advanced the Bosnian cause, apart from that of the Middle East and Palestine (Razali 2014).

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At the height of the Bosnian conflict, Malaysia’s Permanent Mission office in the UN, New York became the main venue for the Bosnians to pursue their cause in the UN. Most UN resolutions on Bosnia were then drafted and prepared in the Malaysian office (Razali 2014). When the UN eventually authorized a peacekeeping operation (UNPROFOR: 1993–1995) to Bosnia, Malaysia sent the biggest contingent (Mahathir 2011: 438). However, being a member of the UNSC and therefore party to its decisions – notwithstanding the member’s weight of role and vote – can also lead to a state being seen as partly responsible for the UNSC’s decision as a whole. That is why and how being a member of the UNSC may also cause attrition in a state’s foreign relations with other states (Patil 1992: 7). In 1965, Pakistan terminated its diplomatic relations with Malaysia as a measure of protest over what it considered to be Malaysia’s doubtful impartiality in Pakistan’s conflict against India over Kashmir (Razali 2014: 19). Diplomatic relations were, however, restored a year later. On a different tack, Malaysia’s international activism vis-à-vis Bosnia through its membership of the UNSC shows how a UNSC member can make use of its role in international matters to achieve certain specific goals. Often, it acts as a measurement of the extent to which a state’s soft power and international prestige as a UNSC member is regarded as functional and beneficial by the international community. By joining UNPKO in war-torn conflict countries, Malaysia has been implicitly exporting one invisible product, which is security (Chang/Mejoh 1995: 55). Therefore, equating Malaysia with security is vital. Being a regular contributor to UNPKO bears a testimony to Malaysia’s “longstanding reputation as a responsible member of the international community, particularly in the context of international peace and security” (Chang/Mejoh 1995). By extension, according to Syed Hamid Albar, a former Malaysian foreign minister, Malaysia’s UNPKO also helps it to expand and bolster its international power projection abroad, which it deems crucial to help secure its own security, territorial integrity and national interests (Syed Hamid Albar, personal communication, 4 December 2013). Most importantly, Malaysia has experienced first-hand benefits from being a non-permanent member of the UNSC. Not only has its involvement helped to secure its political and territorial survival; it has also brought Malaysia closer, in a desirable way, to the centre of world power and thus the centre of international attention. This too could have encouraged Malaysia’s activism in UNPKO, which is so crucial to its middlepowermanship aspiration and its command of soft power and international prestige. To some extent, Malaysia’s international prestige is also raised by the general perception of it as a state which upholds and champions co-religionist and humanitarian causes vis-à-vis UNPKO, which the extant literature indicates as being the function of the Malaysian Prime Ministers vis-à-vis Malaysia’s foreign policy (Ahmad Kamil 2013; Jeshurun 2008; Saravanamuttu 2010). Accordingly, Malaysia’s UNPKO is always associated with having a preference that matches the Prime Ministers’ own priorities. Map 1 and Map 2 of Malaysia’s National Defence Policy 2010 (NDP-2010, pp. 14 and 32) show several interesting features. Firstly, out of Malaysia’s thirty-three UNPKO, twelve were in Muslim-majority countries while twenty-two were in non-Muslim majority ones (Malaysia Ministry of Defence 2010). Obviously, Malaysia’s UNPKO in predominantly non-Muslim countries outnumber

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Table 5.2 Malaysia’s UNPKO to Muslim and Non-Muslim Majority Countries. Source Malaysia’s National Defence Policy 2010 (NDP-2010), Map 1 and Map 2 UNPKO/SIZ-NSIZ/Muslim – non-Muslim majority countries

SIZ

NSIZ

Total

Muslim majority countries

6

6

12

Non-Muslim majority countries

9

12

21

15

18

33

Total

those in Muslim majority ones by nine. In terms of the size of Malaysia’s UNPKO, three contingents were sent to Muslim-majority countries, i.e. Bosnia, Somalia and Lebanon. Interestingly, Malaysia also sent three contingents to non-Muslim majority countries, i.e. the Congo, Namibia and Cambodia. Nevertheless, the pursuit of the co-religionist and humanitarian cause through Malaysia’s UNPKO also has no bearing on Malaysia’s Strategic Interests Zone (SIZ) and Non-Strategic Interests Zone, as shown in Map 1 and Map 2 of NDP-2010 (more of this aspect will be discussed in the following chapter). With regard to Malaysia’s SIZ, six of Malaysia’s UNPKO were in Muslim majority countries like Iraq, Lebanon and Iran, as opposed to nine in non-Muslim majority ones like Cambodia, East Timor and Nepal. As it is, as far as Malaysia’s SIZ are concerned, its UNPKO to non-Muslim majority countries exceed those in Muslim-majority ones by three. With regard to Malaysia’s NSIZ, it is similarly found that six were sent in Muslim majority countries, i.e. Somalia, Sudan and Afghanistan. Malaysia’s other twelve UNPKO were in non-Muslim majority countries like Burundi, Angola and Ethiopia. Once again, Malaysia’s UNPKO in non-Muslim majority countries surpasses those in Muslim-majority ones by six. Altogether, Malaysia’s UNPKO in non-Muslim majority countries exceeds those in the Muslim-majority ones. Table 5.2 sums up the preceding discussion. Based on Table 5.2, Malaysia’s UNPKO shows that both co-religionist and humanitarian causes are inherent, but not necessarily representative of the basis of Malaysia’s UNPKO. If religion is to be made the sole benchmark for Malaysia’s UNPKO, since Malaysia is a Muslim-majority country, the fact that Malaysia has been involved in more UNPKO in non-Muslim majority countries proves that coreligionist causes are not the main motive for its participation in UNPKO. Both coreligionist and humanitarian causes are therefore explicitly and virtually of different weights in terms of significance for the Prime Ministers’ stance on UNPKO. Thus, it is rather premature to accept only the co-religionist cause as significant. Likewise, it is inaccurate for humanitarian causes alone to be treated as enjoying primacy over co-religionist causes vis-à-vis the Prime Ministers’ stance on Malaysia’s UNPKO. Furthermore, as to why Malaysia has been involved in more UNPKO in non-Muslim majority countries than in Muslim-majority ones, this can be related to the fact that there just happened to be, at those points in time, more conflicts in non-Muslim majority countries than in Muslim majority ones. Africa, as an instance, occupies the first rank of the conflict-ridden region with 89% of Malaysia’s UNPKO, followed by Southeast Asia at 47%, the Middle East at 27%, Europe at 20%, Central Asia at

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11% and, lastly, South Asia at 6% (UN: List of Peacekeeping Operations 1948–2012, 2013; Malaysia’s National Defence Policy, Map 2: Locations of ATM Deployment under UN Peacekeeping Operations, 2010). This statistic also reflects Malaysia’s large UNPKO presence in African countries which happened to be non-Muslim majority ones. In addition, most of Malaysia’s UNPKO have taken place in relatively backward and poor countries. By chance, Malaysia’s drive for globalization began in earnest with the ascendancy of the fourth Prime Minister (1981–2003), who focused on building and developing relations with African and Asian countries through his ‘Concentric Circles of Interests’ policy. Malaysia’s activism in South-South Cooperation and Group 77 in the UN were some of the initiatives introduced by the fourth Prime Minister to boost Malaysia’s relations with South-South and G77 countries like Angola, Somalia, Sudan, Cambodia, Iraq and Iran. These countries, as an instance, were themselves also the host-countries for Malaysia’s UNPKO. On a final note, as a whole, the stance of Malaysian Prime Ministers encompasses both coreligionist and humanitarian causes vis-à-vis Malaysia’s UNPKO, albeit to varying degrees in different points of time and contexts. According to Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysia’s Prime Minister from 1981 to 2003, in the absence of such a preference for strategic interests or co-religionist causes, and in the context of UNPKO, Malaysia has only substantiated its international prestige as the voice of the small and developing countries in affairs and matters of their concern (Mahathir Mohamad, personal communication, January 13, 2014).

5.3 National Power In pursuing a strategy in foreign policy, and to sustain it, the Prime Ministers rely on their ability to extract and mobilize the necessary human and material resources. The following section will deliberate on this in order to analyse the level of national power the Malaysian Prime Ministers had vis-à-vis Malaysia’s UNPKO.

5.3.1 Malaysian Prime Ministers and the Legislature The Malaysian maiden peacekeeping operation in the Congo (ONUC: 1960–1963) was the only operation debated in the Malaysian Parliament. A parliamentary member, S.P. Seenivasagam, tabled the motion for a parliamentary debate on the Congo operation (Saravanamuttu 2010). So far, it remains the only occasion on which the Prime Minister himself sought to justify the operation to the legislative members. Thereafter, the government has never prepared any parliamentary paper on a single foreign policy initiative, including the peacekeeping operation (Saravanamuttu 2010). Apparently, the decision whether or not to join a peacekeeping

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operation does not require legislative approval. Instead, it only needs the executive decision, i.e. by the Prime Minister (Mahathir Mohamad, personal communication, 13 January 2014). However, despite the absence of any subsequent debate on subsequent Malaysian peacekeeping, occasionally members of the Cabinet do brief members of the legislature on the development of Malaysian peacekeeping operations overseas. Additionally, Tun Dr Mahathir insists that there is neither any legal obligation nor the need to debate Malaysian peacekeeping operations in the parliament (Mahathir Mohamad, personal communication, January 13, 2014). To put things into perspective, Tun Dr Mahathir was responsible for 76% of all Malaysian peacekeeping operations from 1960 to 2010. That is the equivalent of 25 out of the total 33 Malaysian peacekeeping operations. Meanwhile, Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first Prime Minister, was responsible for only one operation, i.e. the Congo (3%), while the fifth Prime Minister, Abdullah Badawi, overseeing seven operations (21%). Regardless of the statistics, the members of the legislature of both divides seem to be in accord over Malaysia’s UNPKO, even though one also needs to take into account the overriding effect of the ruling party’s majority in the Parliament. The Bosnian conflict, for example, proved to be one of the turning points that united both the ruling and opposition political parties. Without much altercation, both found common ground vis-à-vis the government’s stand over the genocide in Bosnia and the subsequent deployment of Malaysian troops to join the UNPKO in Bosnia. On 28 October 1993, Members of the Malaysian Parliament unanimously passed the resolution to condemn the invasion and all human rights violations on Muslims in Bosnia, to request the UNSC to take firm action and implement its related resolutions, to call for the withdrawal of the arms embargo imposed on Bosnia, to press France and Britain not to block this effort, and, finally, to present these resolutions to the Parliaments of all the relevant countries, especially Britain and France (Azlizan Mat 2010). Beyond this, the legislature (Members of Parliament) had not played a prominent role in the decision-making on Malaysia’s UNPKO, nor did it ever object to Malaysia’s participation. Other than the sole parliamentary motion for Congo, Malaysia’s other 32 UNPKO did not go through the same process. This might also suggest that Malaysian legislature members shared a common world-view when it came to the state’s pursuit of international prestige and soft power, which, among other things was the essence of Malaysia’s aspiration for middlepowermanship that underlines its UNPKO. Having discussed the dynamic relationship between the Prime Ministers and the legislature, this next section deliberates on the dynamics of the Prime Ministers’ relationships with the politico-military institutions vis-à-vis UNPKO.

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5.3.2 Malaysian Prime Ministers and Politico-Military Institutions Pursuant to Malaysia’s UNPKO decision-making process discussed in Chap. 3, it appears that Wisma Putra, MINDEF and the Treasury do not decide on Malaysia’s foreign policy vis-à-vis UNPKO. Instead they only assume the facilitator-role in the respective process. As such, Wisma Putra’s centrality in Malaysia’s foreign policy, in form and substance as a whole, as Azhari notes, “only comes in at the beginning and at the end of the foreign policy making decision-making process” (Azhari Karim 1990). Hence, it is common practice for Malaysian foreign policy to remain the prerogative of the Prime Ministers (Ott 1972: 225). However, in the early years, Wisma Putra did help the Prime Ministers to come up with critical and sound foreign policy decisions. Notwithstanding the early practice, Wisma Putra is “no more than a mouthpiece for the Prime Minister’s office” (Marvin Ott, personal communication, 17 May 2014). Things were not that much different for Wisma Putra in the later years, especially during the era of Tun Dr Mahathir. Invariably, it was a rarity to see Tun Dr Mahathir consulting Wisma Putra on key foreign affairs, let alone involving it in decisions about vital foreign policy issues (Saravanamuttu 2010: 346). As a matter of fact, Wisma Putra was hardly consulted on any important policies, and was thereby reduced to the task of rationalizing policy and damage control (Dhillon 2009: 54). In short, MINDEF, the Treasury and Wisma Putra collectively only play a supporting role in relation to the Prime Minister’s power vis-à-vis Malaysia’s UNPKO. According to General Datuk Baharom Hamzah, Chief of Staff, Malaysia’s Joint Force Headquarters, Ministry of Defence, Kuala Lumpur, should MINDEF decide against a certain peacekeeping involvement, it does not need to prepare the working paper (Cabinet Paper). It only needs to communicate its decision to the Prime Minister, who will, subsequently and usually in practice, endorse the Ministry’s decision (Baharom Hamzah, personal communication, 5 December 2013). However, if MINDEF decides in favour of participating in a peacekeeping operation, the Cabinet Paper will be prepared for the Prime Minister to make the final decision. This observation is supported by Colonel Badrul Hisham Muhammad, Commandant of Malaysia’s Peacekeeping Centre in Port Dickson, Negeri Sembilan (Badrul Hisham Muhammad, personal communication, 10 February 2015). Based on the interviews, it is evidently at this stage that the Prime Minister appears to hold the prerogative power as far as Malaysia’s UNPKO are concerned. In other words, the Prime Minister enjoys the power to overrule the MINDEF’s prior approval, if need be. Also, since the Cabinet Paper focuses more on the technical details, it follows that the executive power of the Prime Minister could allow him to override it. Yet, as it transpires, over the five decades focused on in this book, the Prime Minister has never turned down MINDEF’s Cabinet Paper on UNPKO, according to Malaysia’s fourth Prime Minister, Tun Dr Mahathir himself (Mahathir Mohamad, personal communication, 13 January 2014). There is one exception, though. A case in point is multinational non-UNPKO, e.g. the International Force for East Timor (INTERFRET), organized and led by Australia

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in East Timor from 1999 to 2000. This operation, mandated but not operated by UN, was therefore not listed in the United Nations’ ‘List of Peacekeeping Operations 1948–2012’ (United Nations 2013). INTERFRET was one of those peacekeeping operations in which the Malaysian Prime Minister applied his prerogative to overrule the MINDEF’s prior agreement to participate in INTERFRET. Despite the MINDEF giving its preliminary nod for Malaysia’s participation in INTERFRET, the Prime Minister overruled it, citing Malaysia’s lack of military equipment, among other things. However, it was later revealed that it was due to Tun Dr Mahathir wanting to prevent Australia from gaining more influence in the region through INTERFRET, among other things (Henke 2012: 179). Yet, to some extent, Tun Dr Mahathir’s action did just the reverse. By virtue of his rejection alone, which was designed to stifle the expansion of Australia’s regional influence and dominance, he in fact effectively sanctioned the well-established regional influence of Australia. In addition to that, Tun Dr Mahathir also accused Australia of hypocrisy over the crisis in East Timor, citing, among other things, his aversion to supporting Australia’s leadership in INTERFRET. In addition, the reluctance to participate in INTERFRET might have also indicated Tun Dr Mahathir’s displeasure at Australia’s continuous interference in Malaysia’s domestic affairs, especially those concerning the Malaysian authorities’ actions against political dissidents (Henke 2012). In any case, Malaysia’s initial reluctance to join INTERFRET can be construed to have resulted from the unfavourable state of the prevailing bilateral relations between the two countries. Malaysia’s Prime Minister’s action, to a certain extent, also brought into perspective a number of contentious but vital issues, such as regional power rivalry, domestic politics pressures, and leaders’ inter-personal relations, among other things. Returning to the INTERFRET issue, upon learning of Malaysia’s rejection, Thailand intervened. It sent its Foreign Minister, Surin Pitsuwan, to talk to Tun Dr Mahathir, who eventually agreed to participate in INTERFRET. But instead of contributing troops, Malaysia ended up sending only interpreters (Henke 2012: 179). On the whole, it has been shown so far that it is the Prime Minister who enjoys the unequivocal, prerogative power vis-à-vis UNPKO – notwithstanding inputs given by the politico-military institutions. However, since it is the military which forms the bulk of the contingent or the team of Malaysia’s UNPKO, it is necessary to examine some of the push and pull factors of a UNPKO from the military’s perspective, as follows.

5.3.2.1

Added Dimension to Malaysia’s Doctrine of Warfare

Malaysia does not have a specific doctrine for its peacekeeping, per se, nor is it in the process of developing one. However, UNPKO are instrumental in the evolution of Malaysia’s doctrine of warfare. Following Malaysia’s independence in 1957, Britain made provision for Malaysia’s external security through the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement (AMDA). On the background of AMDA, Malaysian armed forces were able to focus on insurgency warfare. This kind of warfare was designed exclusively to suppress the threat posed by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP:

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1957–1989). Insurgency warfare made the Malaysian army a doctrinal and tactical expert in jungle guerrilla warfare. When the Communist threat virtually ended in 1989, Malaysia turned its attention to conventional warfare, which was more or less about going to war (Badrul Hisham Muhammad, personal communication, 10 February 2015). Among other things, the conventional doctrine was designed to suppress secession as well as being about the possibility of simultaneously waging war on two fronts (Ministry of Defence 2010: vii). In relation to that, Malaysia set up the Mechanized Infantry Unit, which was also considered to be a new doctrine (Badrul Hisham Muhammad, personal communication, 10 February 2015). This unit was equipped with Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC) or Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV) for transport and combat. Hence, the added dimension of Malaysian armed forces’ doctrine of warfare. Peacekeeping, as opposed to conventional warfare, is about stopping war (Badrul Hisham Muhammad, personal communication, 10 February 2015). Following the end of the Cold War, Malaysian armed forces began to adopt the US concept of “Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)” (Kamarulnizam Abdullah 2014). It had four pivots: local-military activities, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and peacekeeping operations (Kamarulnizam Abdullah 2014). Looking closely at the pivots, MOOTW ran parallel with the characteristics of the UNPKO, and therefore added another dimension to the Malaysian doctrine of warfare. Accordingly, Malaysia began to procure and acquire peacekeeping-related assets and equipment. Clearly, peacekeeping brought the Malaysian military new and different sets of vital cross-cultural, sophisticated and advanced assets, skills and knowledge, both at personal and collective levels.

5.3.2.2

Troop Training

UNPKO serve as a crucial training ground for Malaysian troops on foreign soils under different climates. Among other things, they allow Malaysian armed forces to test and conduct the training of troops, non-commissioned officers, junior officers and senior officers in demanding and variable circumstances (Pawan 2011). Malaysian troops also get to test their skills and levels of capability, planning, logistics, transport, delivery systems, communications, and command and control systems (Roslan 2002: 25). Overall, UNPKO provide one of the means for Malaysian troops’ intensive training and familiarization with the latest equipment and procedures, and offer the opportunity to verify the effectiveness of discipline to ensure a high level of personal integrity and check troops’ acceptance of political authority (Malaysia Peacekeeping Training Centre n.d.). By now, Malaysian troops have acquired the techniques and tactics to operate in various weather conditions and climates, i.e. hot, cold and mild. These have been some of the well-deserved and positive impacts of the UNPKO on Malaysia’s army.

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Acquisition of Modern Assets and Equipment

Different regions and different mandates require different equipment and different weaponry and tactics. The pressing, urgent needs of Malaysian contingents for certain UNPKO across the globe has served to justify the modernization of Malaysian armed forces. Malaysia began the modernization of its armed forces in the late 1990s. The objective was to reduce dependence on men-operated assets and upgrade the capability of the state-of-the-art equipment. In doing so, Malaysia’s defence expenditure increased from an average of RM 2.6 billion in the 1980s to an average of RM 6 billion in the 1990s (Singh 2004: 15). In addition to that, between 2000 and 2008, Malaysia’s defence budget increased twofold, from about RM 8 billion in 2000 to RM 16 billion in 2008 (Ministry of Defence 2010: 53). Among other things, apart from disposing of obsolete equipment, the armed forces acquired a Multiple Launcher Rocket System (MLRS), a Main Battle Tank (MBT), 155 Towed Howitzers, AntiTank Guided Missiles (ATGM), Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC) and Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV) (Jayasankaran 2002). APC and IFV were some of the main assets of Malaysian peacekeeping contingents, for example in Somalia (UNOSOM II: 1993–1995) and Bosnia (UNPROFOR: 1993–1995). The existing Malaysian fleet of a Condor variant of APCs (wheeledtype), known as Gempita, played a central role in Malaysian UNOSOM II (Badrul Hisham Muhammad, personal communication, 10 February 2015). The APC fleet is also currently being used by the Malaysian contingent in Lebanon (UNIFIL: 2007– present). The German-made APC works well on the terrains in Somalia and Lebanon, which are similar to the terrains in Malaysia. At present, Malaysia has 4559 units of Condor-APC in service (Army Guide 2002). Malaysia used IFV for the first time in UNPROFOR in Bosnia. Built for reconnaissance, surveillance and observation duties, the armoured-wheel IFV was well-suited to the terrain and climate in Bosnia. It had enhanced infantry firepower, higher level steel armour protection and an advanced communication facility (Army Guide 2002). In 1993, in line with Malaysia’s armed forces modernization and its contingent’s urgent needs in UNPROFOR, Malaysia acquired 42 of the Korean-made IFVs, followed by another 22 in 1994, and another 47 in 1995 (Army Guide 2002). Currently, Malaysia has 111 IFV units in service (Army Guide 2002). The acquisition of new communication, surveillance, observation, intelligence and reconnaissance assets, such as laser range finders, radar and global positioning systems, are also important. Malaysian armed forces have adopted electronic command methods that digitalize its Command, Control, Communication, Computers and branches, i.e. air, land, sea and electro-magnetic spectrum (Ministry of Defence 2010: vi). Subsequently, these state-of-the-art electronic instruments have proved to be central in Malaysia’s UNPKO. Besides having to be well-trained in a new assets-maintenance regime, Malaysian troops have also learned of different type of coolants for vehicles used in different climates, i.e. cold and hot climates. They have also learned about equipment maintenance issues, such as incompatible parts and mismatched quality. The storage equipment for medicines is also different (Badrul

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Hisham Muhammad, personal communication, 10 February 2015). The same applies to food, clothing and personal equipment. The acquisition of new, modern equipment comes packaged with a training module. The transfer of technology also means the transfer of the necessary knowhow. It means the army has the opportunity to learn advanced methods to operate state-of-the-art assets and equipment. For example, the acquisition of IFV from Korea required two months’ training for 52 Malaysian army personnel in Korea (Ramli Abu Bakar 2004: 135). In due course, Malaysian troops gained the operational and training advantage because IFV, for example, needed to undergo some modifications and supplementation to suit Malaysia’s terrain. A case in point was Malaysia’s successful upgrade of its K200 IFV model to the enhanced K200A1 in 2000 (Army Guide 2002). The Royal Malaysian Army’s Workshop #91 dismantled the vehicle, carried out modifications to the hull, and fitted the new power pack. The upgrade improved the braking and the power-to-weight ratio of the vehicle, and increased its speed to 70 kilometres per hour (km/h) (Army Guide 2002).

5.3.2.4

Military Interoperability

Bosnia (UNPROFOR: 1993–1995) was Malaysia’s first UNPKO in Europe. Prior to that, Malaysian troops had to undergo a two-month acclimatization process in Turkey (Baharom Hamzah, personal communication, 5 December 2013). Coming from hot and humid weather, Malaysian peacekeepers had to get used to different gears, equipment, vehicles (left-hand drive) and winter clothing to suit the weather conditions. For example, they learned the proper way to store their medicines, toothpaste and drinks, which were always found to be frozen solid overnight (Baharom Hamzah, personal communication, 5 December 2013). Moreover, UNPKO also expose the Malaysian contingent to new aspects of international standards of human resource management, training and logistics which involve the delicate administration and coordination of and with their foreign counterparts. Mostly, Malaysian peacekeeping troops learn ways to overcome the issues and problems that come with those changes, which are almost always impeded by misapprehension of the procedures as well as the rules and regulations in place. However, overcoming these is considered fundamental, as it improves the interoperability of Malaysian troops. While UNPKO help Malaysian troops to gain invaluable insights into new leadership experiences and the organizational skills of foreign armies, they also allow Malaysia to project a competent image and demonstrate the capability of its armed forces to the world. Moreover, withdrawing Malaysia’s UNPKO from a foreign country requires different, sophisticated levels of interoperability between the different branches of the Malaysian armed forces and those of the foreign armies. On 24 November 1994, Malaysian armed forces headquarters launched Operation United Shield to withdraw the Malaysian contingent from Somalia (Ramli Abu Bakar 2004). Subsequently, the operation led to the formation of one special interoperability task known as Gugusan Tugas Nasional (National Task Cluster-GTN) on 1 December 1994 (Azlan Muhammad 2004). The task combined elements of the Malaysian Army, Navy and

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Air Force, which included the use of the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) multi-purpose logistic ships, i.e. KD Mahawangsa and KD Indera Sakti, RMN’s special unit force, Pasukan Khas Laut (PASKAL), and the army’s commando unit, GerupGerak Khas (GGK) (Azlan Muhammad 2004). Additionally, having a good command of the local language is the key to the acculturation of diverse customs, religions, tradition and ethnicity in peacekeeping. In any case, it is very useful and helpful in winning the hearts and minds of the locals. It could even save lives and prevent fatal misunderstandings. In fact, cross-cultural learning and adaptation are so vital that the UN has introduced a new training module for peacekeepers called Cultural Diversity in UN Peacekeeping (CDUNPKO) to be taught at peacekeeping training centres around the world (Badrul Hisham Muhammad, personal communication, 10 February 2015). As such, Malaysian troops generally have a good command of English as the lingua franca of the UNPKO, through which they are able to learn new communication skills or the common military terms used by European, Middle Eastern, African and Asian armies (Badrul Hisham Muhammad, personal communication, 10 February 2015). Malaysian troops’ mastery of Slav languages before their deployment to Bosnia, as well as Arabic in Lebanon, among other things, helped them to win the support of the locals.

5.3.2.5

Military Diplomacy and Professionalism

Malaysian peacekeepers are tasked with looking after the image and the name of the country throughout their missions. In more ways than one, they play the role of the country’s diplomat when serving abroad. Apart from proving Malaysian peacekeepers’ professionalism, this “defence diplomacy” also serves as the “second track” of the foreign relations effort of the government (Khairol 2002: 28). Among other things, it strives to find a balance between realizing national interests, such as international prestige and good international citizenry. In part, the existence of such a good reputation can be visibly proven through the UN’s or the locals’ requests for a mission extension and increased strength in terms of the number of personnel (UN News Centre 2008). In general, Malaysian troops are well known to have the reputation of being professional, neutral and impartial. An overview of such reputable professionalism of Malaysia’s UNPKO in four different regions follows. In Africa, one of the highest points of such a reputation came with the appointment of Malaysian General, Lt. Gen. Dato’ Aboo Samah Aboo Bakar on 20 January 1994 as the Commanding Officer of the 20,000-strong UNOSOM contingent in Somalia (News Straits Times 1994). The international media also credited Malaysian troops with having successfully mounted the rescue missions of seven Cable News Network (CNN) and Italian reporters and three UNOSOM II legal officers (Azlan Muhammad 2004: 47). These unplanned night-time rescue missions demonstrated the skill of the highly disciplined and capable Malaysian Quick Action Force (MQAF-Pasukan Atur Cepat), which executed them even without the aid of night-vision equipment (Azlan Muhammad 2004). In fact, the MQAF was assigned to provide special protection

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for the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) to UNOSOM II on his visit to Mogadishu (Azlan Muhammad 2004). Major General Thomas M. Montgomery, the UN Deputy Force Commander for Somalia, was himself impressed by Malaysian troops’ professionalism and dependability (Hamid Mohd. Amin 2002). The Bakaara Market rescue operation in Mogadishu, Somalia on 3 and 4 October 1993 was yet another demonstration of Malaysia’s army professionalism. During the mission, 114 Malaysian troops played the pivotal role in extracting 75 US elite army troops and their rescue team who were trapped in the market as a result of a botched mission to capture certain Somali targets. Malaysia suffered one casualty, had nine others wounded, and lost four of its Condor APC (The Star 2002). Following the success of this mission in particular, and the Malaysian army’s professionalism during UNOSOM II in general, both the US army and the UNOSOM II Headquarters issued a Certificate of Achievement and letters of appreciation commending the Malaysian contingent’s remarkable valour and reliability. The Certificate of Achievement, issued by the US 10th Aviation Brigade (Falcon Brigade), was signed by Colonel Lawrence E. Casper, AV Commanding Officer, and dated 5 January 1994 (Taotauajer 2014). In addition to that, the US Army also issued letters of appreciation to Malaysia’s contingent dated 5 October 1993 and 9 October 1993 (Taotauajer 2014). The UN’s letter was dated 4 October 1993. In more ways than one, these significantly highlighted the Malaysian army’s distinction on the international stage. Often, Malaysia’s commendable reputation precedes the contingent’s arrival in areas of conflict. In Cambodia (UNTAC: 1991–1993), Malaysian peacekeepers were mandated to, among other things, disarm and gather the weapons from the parties in conflict. Despite the risk, Malaysia received full cooperation from the parties involved. In fact, other than one death due to illness, Malaysia suffered no casualties. However, contingents from China, Japan and Bulgaria suffered a few casualties while carrying out the same mandate (Ramli Abu Bakar 2004). The cooperation extended by the belligerent parties was, to an extent, testament to Malaysian troops’ reputation, and hence contributed to the ease with which they carried out their assigned task. Following the full cooperation extended by Cambodian belligerent parties, Malaysia was able to move on to its other mandate: clearing landmines. Malaysian peacekeepers managed to clear 35,000 square miles and in due course disabled 10,042 landmines and entrapments (Ramli Abu Bakar 2004). In total, UNTAC peacekeepers cleared 2,110,000 square miles and deactivated 82,098 land mines (Ramli Abu Bakar 2004). In the Middle East, in Lebanon, the UN initially did not put Malaysia in charge of any area and was instead subordinated under India’s command (Mat Khalid Hamzah 2011: 47). Only in the later stages was Malaysia allocated its own areas of command, i.e. East Sector – 14 square kilometres (km2 ) (increased from 8 km2 ) and West Sector – 140 km2 (increased from 41 km2 ) (Mat Khalid Hamzah 2011). Another high point of Malaysia’s UNPKO in Lebanon came on 25 October 2010 when the UNIFIL Force Commander, Major Jess Alberto Asarta Cuevas, acknowledged that, as opposed to other countries’ contingents, Malaysia’s was the least threatened by Vehicle Bomb Explosive Improvised Devices (VBEID), or any other threats, when on patrol duty

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(Mat Khalid Hamzah 2011: 50). All these factors considerably helped to signify the good reputation of Malaysian troops. When Malaysia first accepted the UN invitation for UNIFIL, Malaysia did offer 1000 troops (Mat Khalid Hamzah 2011: 30). The offer was revised, as the UN needed only 360 troops from Malaysia. Over the years, the UN has requested increased numbers of Malaysian troops. For example, in August 2008, the UN requested an additional 230 Malaysian troops, followed by another additional 150 in 2009. At the time of writing, Malaysia has 863 troops serving for UNIFIL (Malaysia Peacekeeping Training Centre n.d.). In 2010, as a sign of the locals’ recognition of Malaysian troops’ professionalism in Lebanon, they strongly objected the UN’s plan to move the Malaysian contingent (MALCON East Contingent) out of the East Sector (Kawkaba Camp) and combine it with the Malaysian battalion in the West Sector (Mat Khalid Hamzah 2011: 62). The UN abandoned the plan accordingly, and MALCON East Contingent stayed (Mat Khalid Hamzah 2011: 62). In Europe, in Bosnia, only two contingents from Muslim countries were given their own area of command: Malaysia and Turkey (Ramli Abu Bakar 2004: 144). Malaysia was put in charge of Jablanica, Konjic, Pazaric, Visoko and a few areas under Serb control (Ramli Abu Bakar 2004). The other Muslim countries’ contingents were segregated and put under the command of European contingents and were given menial tasks such as drivers, guards and even delivery (Ramli Abu Bakar 2004). Another illustration is the ‘Post Mike’ incident. Prior to the arrival of Malaysian troops to take over ‘Post Mike’ at Konjic, Bosnian Muslims, the Croats and Serbs were fiercely involved in exchanges of fire (Ramli Abu Bakar 2004: 145). When Malaysian troops arrived, the firing immediately stopped. The Malaysian contingent managed to host a function which was well-attended by the belligerent parties, who ended up playing sepak raga together.1 This was not what Croat leaders at Konjic and Jablanica initially had in mind when registering their objections to the Malaysian assignment to Konjic earlier. Having seen and experienced Malaysian professionalism themselves, the Croats asked for the extension of Malaysian deployment in certain areas of conflict where the Croats were involved (Ramli Abu Bakar 2004: 148). As it turned out, areas overseen by the Malaysian contingent were among the earliest to be stabilized compared with others. This, to a certain degree, can be assumed to have been motivated by the locals’ trust and belief in the Malaysian contingent’s professionalism as neutral and impartial peacekeepers. In fact, there were no breaches of treaty by the belligerent parties in the areas overseen by Malaysian troops (Ramli Abu Bakar 2004: 149). Malaysia was also tasked with handling the prisoners exchange process involving Croat soldiers who had been pinned down and besieged in Konjic Poket by the Bosnian Muslims for two years, i.e. since the beginning of the conflict in 1992 (Ramli Abu Bakar 2004: 150). Malaysian troops handled the exchange successfully. The Croats returned the favour by letting Malaysia open the route for aid delivery in Varde Line (Ramli Abu 1 Sepak

raga is a traditional sport from Malaysia and resembles sepak takraw (kick volleyball). Players stand in a circle in which the players, usually in a group of 5–7, keep a spherical rattan ball afloat in the air by momentary touches of the feet.

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Bakar 2004). Previously, Spanish troops had been trying to open the route but were consistently frustrated by incessant ambushes by the Croats. Malaysia, however, faced no major problems in Varde Line. Bosnian Muslims in Konjic were also highly impressed with Malaysian troops’ professionalism. One of the locals, Mujenira Turcimovic, whose late husband used to work as a cook for the Malaysian contingent, described the Malaysians as civilized, polite, all-smiling and child-loving people who would never harm others. Living in Konjic during the war but having since moved to Pazaric, Mujenira chose to call them the “best people under the sky”. The Malaysian troops, despite being of different faiths, behaved more like family members than UN Peacekeepers. They fixed the locals’ houses and cars, maintained basic amenities, held religious and education classes, celebrated the locals’ festivals, and provided free medical and dental services, among other things. On the whole, Malaysian troops assimilated very well with the locals. Mujenira recounted that Malaysian troops would even use the route frequented by the locals to go to Sarajevo city and consequently had to endure hostile fire themselves for being mistaken as the locals. No untoward incidents occurred, however. Always at the ready for the locals, Mujenira concluded that the Malaysian troops were a gift from God for the Bosnians, and it was impossible to forget them (Turcimovic, M., personal communication, 19 May 2016). Mujenira’s experience was also backed up by a few other locals’ accounts, such as those of Fuad Botonic, Assistant Professor Dr Mirsad Karic, and Senad Biber. Botonic was a former employee of Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM) – an NGO from Malaysia – based in Split, Croatia, and is now working for the Malaysia Embassy in Sarajevo. Assistant Prof Dr Mirsad was in Tuzla during the war. After the war, he did his MA and PhD in Malaysia and is now the Vice Rector of the International University of Sarajevo. Senad, on the other hand, was studying in Malaysia throughout the war but shared virtually similar stories which his villagers related to him. Senad is now a teacher and a court translator and lives in Sarajevo. According to Dr Mirsad, some of the Bosnian Muslims, especially the orphans who were under the protection of Malaysian troops during the war, can still speak Malay to this day. A number of the Malaysian troops still maintain close contact with the Bosnian locals by visiting them every now and then (Botonic, personal communication, 18 May 2016; Karic, personal communication, 20 May 2016). When UNPROFOR ended, NATO took over from the UN and continued the peacekeeping operations. Impressed by Malaysia’s record and high level of professionalism and commitment during UNPROFOR, Malaysia was the only non-NATO country invited to stay and extend its assignment in Bosnia to assist the mandates of the NATO-led International Force (IFOR: 1995–1997) and later the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR: 1997–1998) (Ramli Abu Bakar 2004: 149). Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad, the Malaysian Prime Minister at that time, decided to accept the invitation and even paid the contingent’s expenses (Mahathir Mohamad, personal communication, 13 January 2014).

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Troop Added Salary/Allowance

Currently, the UN pays $1028 monthly for each uniformed peacekeeper, while the amount for Police and other civilian personnel may vary since their salaries are determined by the budgets established for each operation (United Nations n.d.). On average, every Malaysian troop earns about RM 30,000 for a six-month assignment, with the average number of personnel for each contingent being 1500 men and women (Ramli Abu Bakar 2004: 154). That means each of the troops earns about RM 5000 a month or RM 166 a day, which is equal to about RM 450 million for all 1500 personnel in a single six-month assignment. In a way, this is useful for the country’s foreign exchange. At the very least, it helps to increase domestic consumption and in due process stimulate the domestic market. Yet these figures were nowhere near what Bangladesh troops, for instance, gained from UNPKO. From 1988 to 2004, 40,793 Bangladeshi troops earned USD 766 million (Rahman 2004). Converted into RM, going by the conventional foreign exchange rate of USD 1 to RM 3.30, for instance, Bangladeshi troops would have spent RM 2.5 billion in their domestic market. Meanwhile, a Uruguayan Army Lieutenant Colonel with a monthly salary of USD 700 would earn ten times as much when serving in a UNPKO (plus allowances) (Sotomayor 2007: 178). Overall, the experience and knowledge gained from peacekeeping provide a valuable contribution to the overall professionalism of Malaysian armed forces. Taken as a whole, the UN’s request for Malaysian participation, in itself, bears testimony to Malaysian armed forces’ capability, competency and professionalism. As such, not only do UNPKO work in favour of Malaysia’s military diplomacy; they also testify to Malaysia’s commitment to global security and peace (Malaysia Peacekeeping Training Centre n.d.: 47). Obviously, Malaysia’s military power projection as a function of its participation in UNPKO is one of the integral parts of Malaysia’s UNPKO.

5.3.3 Malaysian Prime Ministers and the Civil Society Since independence, Malaysian civil society activism has been shifting in degree and focus from anti-colonialism, ethnic nationalism, social justice, democratic reforms and even religious sentiment (Case 2015). Particularly, Malaysians have strived for human rights, women’s rights, and workers’ rights, and participated in student movements within respective civil societies (Chong 2011). Some examples of the NGOs include the Human Rights Organization of Malaysia (SUARAM), Aliran Kesedaran Negara (ALIRAN) or the National Consciousness Movement, the Penang Consumers’ Society (CAP), the Women’s Aid Organization (WAO), and the Environment Protection Society (Khoo 2013). On the whole, the advocacy of these groups has centred more on domestic issues than foreign ones. Following the 1969 racial clash on 13 May 1969, the government introduced a succession of laws, including the

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Emergency Ordinance 1969 (EO), the now-defunct Internal Security Act (ISA), the Universities and University Colleges Act 1971, the Official Secrets Act 1972 (OSA), the Societies (Amendment) Act 1981, and the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 (PPPA). Most of the laws are still in effect to the present day. Legally, these laws contribute towards putting civil society activism in check. They may be one of the reasons why certain quarters saw Malaysia’s civil society as generally weak (Balakrishnan 2006). Furthermore, the laws might also have contributed to moderate the civil society role in the state’s foreign policy as well. Pursuant to that, the question of whether a weak civil society was what Malaysia’s government had purposely intended along – through the laws – is difficult to ascertain. The laws notwithstanding, sources of political dissent among interest groups, the mass media and the public at large were generally insubstantial even before the introduction of the laws (Ott 1971). Yet, in the 1960s, anti-colonialism sentiment was especially high among the public, resulting in a series of violent public rallies. These include the small-scale and limited attacks on some major power interests in the country. The damage suffered by the US Information Service Library brought about by the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee’s anti-US rally in 1964 was one of those (Saravanamuttu 2010: 334). Visiting US officials met with hostile receptions from the public, too. Those affected included US President Johnson himself, who came to visit Malaysia in October 1966. Prior to that, in March the same year, some 200 demonstrators chanting the “anti-US-imperialism” slogan greeted William Bundy (Saravanamuttu 2010). Bundy was the US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. The public was less than enthused, too, when Malaysia helped train about 3000 Vietnamese officers in anti-guerrilla operations – in support of the South Vietnamese forces backed-up by the US – during the Vietnam War (1955– 1975) (Sodhy 2007: 264). Likewise, some groups made their displeasure known when the government allowed the US army to enter Malaysia for a recreational visit (Sodhy 2007). Mostly, civil society and the government have endured an essentially acrimonious co-existence, especially since the preventive laws were put in force. Largely in conflict, with both preferring to stay within their own confines, they remain consistently suspicious of each other (Khoo 2013: 82). Apparently, this deep distrust meant that even some of the NGOs were considered a threat to the country’s national interests (Khoo 2013: 77). In fact, in 1981, the amendment to the Societies Act of 1966 classified NGOs into two categories: ‘political’ and ‘friendly’. Likewise, OSA amendments in 1986 imposed certain restrictions on the human rights movements in Malaysia. Such an acrimonious relationship also partly stems from the NGO’s alleged association with some international movements who were hostile to the government, especially human rights ones, coupled with their strategic partnership with the opposition political parties. Bersih, a coalition calling for election reforms, or BERSIH, for example, was more commonly seen to be closer in methods, strategies and objectives to the opposition alliance (Pakatan Rakyat) than the ruling coalition (Barisan Nasional).

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Nevertheless, a number of prominent local NGOs are active on international fronts. Founded in 1971, Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM) seeks to promote international volunteerism and global humanitarian aid, along with its domestic focus on social justice and Muslim-Malay agendas (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia 2014). The International Movement for a Just World (JUST), established in 1992, seeks to raise global awareness of the injustices in the current world. Subsequently, the Malaysian Medical Relief Society (Mercy Malaysia), founded in 1999, aims to provide a platform for Malaysians to unite and take their role in the international humanitarian arena (Mercy Malaysia n.d.). Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM – People’s Voice Malaysia), created in 1989, on the other hand, has also been active internationally to raise global awareness of human rights issues in Malaysia (Balakrishnan 2006: 40). However, SUARAM is not to be confused with Suara Hak Asasi Malaysia (SUHAKAM – Human Rights Commission of Malaysia). SUHAKAM is an independent body set up by the government in 1999 to promote human rights education, offer advice on legislation and policy, and conduct investigations into human rights breaches in Malaysia. Hitherto, as far as Malaysia’s foreign policy is concerned, the civil society activism vis-à-vis the state’s foreign policy is not as rigorous as the domestic issues-orientated NGOs. Syed Hamid Albar, the former Foreign Minister of Malaysia from 1999 to 2008, affirms that the role of Malaysian civil society vis-à-vis the foreign policy of the country can generally be regarded as not strong (Syed Hamid Albar, personal communication, 4 December 4, 2013). Not strong in the sense that it did not exert much of an influence on Malaysia’s international overtures. In fact, as far as Malaysia’s foreign policy was concerned, the government had “very little engagement, if no engagement at all, with the civil society” (Saravanamuttu 2010: 346). Some relate such a condition to, among other things, the fact that it is still maturing, i.e. at the developing stage (Balakrishnan 2006: 40). Yet one also needs to take into account the impact of the preventive laws in shaping or influencing the activism of civil society on the international front. This, in turn, could in part explain civil society’s relatively non-violent response to Malaysia’s vote in favour of UN Resolution 678, which allowed for all means necessary to repel Iraq’s invading forces in Kuwait. The calls by some radical pro-Iraq and anti-US sections of the Malaysian public to draft volunteers to fight alongside the invading Iraqi forces can, to some extent, be seen as a sign of disapproval of Malaysia’s stance (Jeshurun 2008: 222). In contrast, the local mainstream media, partly because of international media approval for the resolution, and also because of their close link with the government, more or less behaved alike (Jeshurun 2008). However, some members of the public were convinced that the vote was a mistake or a faux pas, arguing that with Malaysia being in the middle of its two-year term as a non-permanent member of the UNSC (1989–1990), abstention during the vote was therefore the more logical course of action (Saravanamuttu 2010: 196). In defence of the vote, Razali Ismail (Malaysia’s former permanent representative to the UN) asserts that, in return for the vote, the US Secretary James Baker promised Malaysia it would adopt a similar level of the decisiveness and fairness it applied over the Iraqi issue in its dealings with the Palestinians (Razali Ismail 2014). In essence, the

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US promised to “deliver Palestine”, i.e. to bring about a solution to the Palestinian issue, so long as Malaysia, as an important Muslim country, would not vote against or abstain from Resolution 678. In addition to this, Ahmad Kamil, the former Secretary General of the Malaysian Foreign Ministry, also rejects such a faux pas assumption (Ahmad Kamil 2013: 223). Ahmad writes that for such a fellow Muslim country’s aggression against another, it was only understandable that the Malaysian government did not have much of a choice (Ahmad Kamil 2013). Accordingly, it is highly probable that such a government stance might have drawn close parallels with that of civil society, thus the relative absence of an antagonistic response from civil society in general. However, the fact that civil society has a role to play in shaping a state’s preference for peacekeeping is not new. It is commonly seen in advanced countries. As an instance, the domestic mass movement called ‘Save Darfur Coalition’ in the US more or less influenced the US government to take immediate measures to resolve the crisis in Darfur, Sudan (Henke 2012: 217). Likewise, the governments of the UK and Norway also faced similar pressure from their civil society’s humanitarian chapter to take an interest in resolving the Darfur crisis. Such pressure, as far as the US is concerned, eventually resulted in the US taking on the status of being the lead nation for UNPKO in Darfur (UNAMID) (Henke 2012). However, in the case of Malaysia, on account of the domestic laws and range of focus of international advocacy, civil society has played a less significant role in shaping the country’s UNPKO. On the contrary, the role of civil society vis-à-vis Malaysia’s UNPKO is mostly geared more towards substantiating the government’s well-defined stand on certain international conflicts. The humanitarian and relief work of the Malaysian Red Cross, the Malaysian Crescent, and Mercy Malaysia are among the initiatives that fall into this category. Most importantly, this type of international advocacy in general serves to complement the state’s international posture, as Malaysia’s UNPKO between 1960 and 2010 can attest. Evidently, supplementing the state’s goals, like humanitarian causes, for example, seems to be doing the NGOs a notable favour for themselves too, especially in promoting their advocacy in the international arena. In particular, this might help to explain civil society’s readiness to cooperate and collaborate with the government’s peacekeeping commitments in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) and Somalia (UNOSOM II) – predominantly Muslim countries ravaged by armed conflicts and humanitarian disasters. Plus, the NGOs’ co-religionist advocacy, especially in Muslim-majority countries, can also be related to the Malaysian public’s own sensitivity and concern, as a Muslim-majority state itself, over fellow Muslims in need in other parts of the world. This, to a qualified extent, nicely complements Malaysia’s reasons for participating in UNPKO.

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International Advocacy of the Malaysian Civil Movement vis-à-vis UNPKO

As far as Malaysia’s UNPKO are concerned, the relevant NGOs tend to expand their goals and serve their audience by turning to co-religionist and humanitarian causes as one of their core areas of advocacy. Additionally, this demonstrates the alignment between the Prime Ministers’ stance and that of the civil society. At times, the NGOs created, amplified and represented the co-religionist and humanitarian cause noticeably more than the Prime Ministers did, although the latter might have advanced it earlier. However, building on the positive response of civil society, the Prime Ministers translated and expanded it into appropriate action (policy). Thus, it was common to see civil society extending its support to initiatives launched by the government to address global humanitarian disasters. The opposite is true as well. It seems that the NGOs did extremely well to appease the public by constantly echoing Muslim solidarity and humanitarian appeals among and to the public. Consequently, the Prime Ministers’ and the ruling party’s political advantage was greatly enhanced several times over. As far as the Bosnian conflict is concerned, for example, the fact that Malaysia was among the only three Muslim countries that participated in UNPKO in Bosnia helped to magnify and validate the co-religionist cause that relevant NGOs like ABIM seemed to be propagating (Jeshurun 2008: 25; Shanti 1997: 254). So far, Malaysia’s UNPKO in Bosnia remains the only time that Malaysia hassent a peacekeeping contingent to Europe. For another UNPKO in Kosovo, Malaysia sent only a small team of personnel. Up until 2010, Bosnia and Kosovo were the only conflicts in Europe to which Malaysia sent its troops. Furthermore, as a Muslimmajority country, Malaysia could have chosen to participate only in exclusively Muslim-orientated UNPKO. However, this is insufficient to suggest that Islam, as the religion of the majority of Malaysia’s population, has had a paramount impact on Malaysia’s decisions regarding UNPKO. Nevertheless, taking into consideration Malaysia’s Muslim majority, it is only natural to see that the state’s policy is laden with Islamic values on both the domestic and the international fronts. Accordingly, the Prime Ministers have put this affiliation to great use (and disregard it at its convenience when need be) to garner and strengthen support for the ruling party. On the one hand, conflicts in Bosnia and Somalia, for example, represent a magnified call for ‘Muslim Brotherhood’. The Congo and Cambodia, on the other hand, augmented the call for the universal cause of humanitarian aid. Up to 1995, Malaysian peacekeeping in Bosnia (UNPROFOR, 1993–1995) was both the biggest and the most expensive operation. In contrast, the operation in the Congo (ONUC, 1960–1963), a predominantly Christian country, was the first and deadliest of all Malaysia’s thirty-three peacekeeping operations from 1960 to 2010. These conflicts and Malaysia’s subsequent UNPKO seem to suggest that the government has applied an ‘even-handed approach’ to dealing with international conflicts, specifically those where it sent its peacekeepers. Pursuant to this, one fact remains outstanding: that religious affiliation did not singly determine Malaysia’s

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UNPKO, as its operations in Bosnia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Congo have shown. Yet some people argue that Islam did account for Malaysia’s national interests (Shanti 1997: 82). Some imply that the religious appeal of the state policy had to appease the local population more than the international audience. In other words, the state policy needed to appear to be a legitimate and genuine reflection, in the best possible means and manners, of the religious and universal perspectives of the majority. By some token, as Nair puts it, the Islamic element in Malaysian foreign policy is much more suited or rationalized as an element to underscore the goal of nation-building, among other things (Shanti 1997). Therefore, as far as civil society international activism is concerned, such a proposition is not far-fetched. Often, Malaysia’s UNPKO in Muslim countries seem to have resonated better with the domestic opinion than those in non-Muslim ones. Malaysian civil society’s response to the Bosnian conflict as opposed to the Cambodian events, for example, certainly suggest this to be the case. With the Prime Ministers depending on expedient Islam, for example, as one of the means to protect the regime’s survival, striking a chord with civil society wherever possible is paramount. In achieving this, the rather vaguely worded yet indispensable role of Islam in the state’s federal constitution comes to the fore (Ahmad Fauzi/Che Hamdan 2015; Ahmad Kamil 2013). Fauzi and Hamdan contend that by design, Islam does not carry the constitutional weight to play an extensive role in administering the country (Ahmad Fauzi/Che Hamdan 2015). Neither does Islam serve as the sole essence of the constitution, nor as the single focal point of the administrative system. Rather, the constitution treats Islam only as the official religion of the state with no other clauses delineating its role. Thus, it is from such vagueness that the political leaders were thought to have assumed the “free rein to employ, or not, Islam as a political tool” (Ahmad Fauzi/Che Hamdan 2015: 305). Evidently, on the grounds of political expedience, and to some extent Malaysia’s UNPKO, the Prime Ministers conveniently glorify Islam and vice versa in state matters, with some others insisting that Islam has always been subservient to other foreign policy goals (Mohamed Abu Bakar 1990). Hence, the pronouncement of co-religionist and humanitarian causes in Malaysian foreign policy during the five decades covered in this study appears to be rather circumstantial, conditional and issue-orientated. Thus far, Malaysian civil society appears to engage with the government more on domestic issues than foreign ones. In other words, civil society has much in common with the government when it comes to the state’s foreign policy goals. Besides, in view of the relatively weak activism of Malaysian civil society, it is not surprising that in general the government has enjoyed almost total control over Malaysia’s foreign affairs. The fact that the same ruling party has been in power since independence in 1957 ensures the consistency of the policy-making mechanism and stance as well as the familiar breed of Prime Ministers. Therefore, by going along with the government’s almost absolute control of foreign policy, to some extent, civil society does appear to have elements of its international advocacy indirectly represented by the government and vice versa. As an instance, Malaysia’s co-religionist and humanitarian causes appear to largely coincide with and fall within the advocacy framework of Malaysia’s related civil society.

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Pursuant to that, Malaysia’s UNPKO are certainly among those international stances that both the government and civil society generally share and where their responses complement each other rather well. As such, it is only proper that this study examines the role played by civil society in mitigating or magnifying Malaysia’s UNPKO, as the following discussion will highlight.

5.3.3.2

Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)

In dealing with international conflict, NGOs often turn to fundraising to provide humanitarian assistance to Malaysia’s UNPKO host countries as part of their activities. Regardless of whether it makes up the background or the foreground of their very own set-up, they mostly attune to the national stance. As an example, at the height of Bosnian conflict, several loose non-governmental organizations sprung into existence. As far as Bosnian conflict is concerned, Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM – Malaysian Muslim Youth Association) and Barisan Bertindak Bosnia (BBB – Bosnian Action Front) were among those NGOs that made the most national headlines. While ABIM has been a more established NGO, BBB was not. It was especially set up and later disbanded for the Bosnian plight, which accordingly ran parallel with Malaysia’s UNPKO in Bosnia. Through various fundraising activities, ABIM played an instrumental role in providing for the needs of the war victims in Bosnia. On 9 June 1992, ABIM, together with Berita Harian and Utusan Malaysia (two major mainstream print media), launched ‘Bosnia Fund-ABIM’ (News Straits Times, 10 June 1992). The fund helped to buy food, flour, sugar, boots, medical and winter clothing supplies for victims of the Bosnian conflict. In addition to the 300 Bosnian refugees brought in by the government, ABIM launched a major initiative when it announced in October 1992 that it would bring in another 60 Bosnian refugees (News Straits Times, 29 October 1992). ABIM also had its own relief centre in Sarajevo, Bosnia (News Straits Times, 28 April 1996). Besides that, according to Fuad Botonic who was part of the local workforce working at the ABIM office in Zagreb for three years (1993–1996), ABIM also delivered supplies to orphanages and villages in Bosnia as far as Jablanica and Konjic. Financially, ABIM also adopted a number of Bosnian orphans and supported more than 120 families across Bosnia for more than three years. Despite its financial constraints and being relatively unknown to the Bosnians as opposed to big NGOs from the rest of the world, ABIM’s work was described by Fuad as highly effective and successful (Botonic, personal communication, May 18, 2016). ABIM intensified and expanded its cause when it formed a loose grouping of NGOs and newspapers editors dedicated to the plight of the Bosnians. On 21 April 1994, ABIM, along with Majlis Belia Malaysia (Malaysian Youth Council), Persatuan Kebangsaan Pelajar Islam Malaysia (Malaysian National Muslim Students – PKPIM) and groups of editors of major newspapers, formed Barisan Bertindak Bosnia (Bosnian Action Front – BBB) (Berita Harian, 10 June 1992). Eight days later, on 29 April 1994, BBB launched its own fund called Tabung

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Barisan Bertindak Bosnia, which managed to collect about RM 5 million in donations (Utusan Malaysia, 6 April 1999). In May 1994, in order to raise nationwide awareness of the conflict in Bosnia (and indirectly of Malaysia’s UNPKO there), BBB organized a huge public rally at the Merdeka Stadium in Kuala Lumpur to register the Malaysian public protest against the Balkan War (News Straits Times, 28 April 1996). Later, BBB held Malaysia’s biggest ever fundraising concert, called Malam Karyawan Malaysia, at Shah Alam to raise even more funds for the Bosnians and Somalis (News Straits Times, 6 September 1992). For the record, Malaysia also sent a contingent to join a UNPKO in Somalia at almost the same time as the UNPKO in Bosnia. In the meantime, BBB was also instrumental in drumming up public support to ensure the success of the government-backed ‘RM1 Fundraising’ campaign for the Bosnians. Other fundraising drives followed. Among others, they included the Bosnia Medical Fund, launched in 1992 by the Malaysia Islamic Medical Association (News Straits Times, 20 August 1992); a donation drive launched by Etika Emas Farmasi (a pharmacy company) in collaboration with the Lions Club and the Malaysian Silambam Society (News Straits Times, 3 October 1994); and a fund organized by the Malaysian Scrabble Association (News Straits Times, 3 June 1994). Malaysian NGOs also launched funds for other conflicts, such as those in Kosovo and Somalia. As an instance, a loose association of NGOs called Barisan Bertindak Kosovo launched a Kosovar fund named ‘Tabung Barisan Bertindak Kosovo’. BBK consisted of Majlis Belia Malaysia (Malaysia Youth Council) and editors from mainstream media, such as Utusan Malaysia, News Straits Times and a private television company, TV3 (Utusan Malaysia, 6 April 1999). Among the donation drives launched for Somali victims were those of the Malaysian Council For Child Welfare (MKKM) (News Straits Times, 17 November 1992) and BBB’s concert, Malam Karyawan Malaysia (News Straits Times, 6 September 1994). NGOs mostly focus on fundraising drives in order to show their solidarity with and support for the victims of conflicts. These intiatives, among others, also indicate the Malaysian NGOs’ approval of and support for Malaysia’s UNPKO in the respective host countries. Not only did this help to validate the government’s stance vis-à-vis the respective conflict, it also help to boost the morale of the Malaysian troops who delivered the NGOs’ donations to the victims. Additionally, this activism by NGOs on the one hand highlights the fact that they were mostly interested in peacekeeping operations in which the Malaysian contingent played a part, such as the ones in Bosnia and Somalia. Malaysia’s other UNPKO, on the other hand, especially those in which Malaysia sent only a small team of personnel, do not appear to have been able to generate either as much interest or as much support from the NGOs. Thus far, the internationally orientated NGOs have enjoyed a more harmonious relationship with the government than their domestically orientated counterparts. The chief reason for this is the compatibility of the state’s external agenda with those of the NGOs. In other words, both seemingly share common international concerns. Global issues like global warming, globalization, economic inequality, war, peace, bilateral and multilateral relations, humanitarian aid and peacekeeping operations have already been at the forefront of the state’s international overtures. As might be

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expected, these are the international concerns of the NGOs too. As such, since the government possesses the adequate and efficient machinery and expertise to pursue those international ends, the NGOs are in a better position to play an auxiliary role. This is presumably more effective because many NGOs in Malaysia do enjoy support from vast and far-reaching international networks and donors. Understandably, these international networks are advantageous when the NGOs supplement the government’s efforts instead of overtaking them. Apart from the question of representational legitimacy, international relations are as much about inter-state issues. For that reason, the government is the sole rightful and legal representative to pursue those. Going by the current practice, as far as Malaysia’s UNPKO are concerned, the NGOs appear to be content to play a supporting role to the government. The ruling government, for its part, also played a major part in encouraging such NGO involvement. For example, during the Bosnian conflict, the Prime Minister pledged to send Malaysia’s troops to Bosnia to engage in battle alongside Bosnia against Serbian forces in the event of the UN prematurely withdrawing its troops (Borneo Mail, 15 July 1993; News Straits Times, 16 August 1994). The pledge gained more credibility when the local Ulama (religious scholars) conferred the status of jihad (holy war) on Malaysian troops in Bosnia (Berita Harian, 16 July 1993). Such support rendered by national religious figures prompted even leaders of the major Malay-Muslim-based opposition party, Parti Islam Malaysia (PAS), to show their support for the cause (Borneo Post, 17 August 1992). Malaysia’s commitment to helping Bosnia culminated in a USD 10 million donation for Bosnian Army training and equipment (Jeshurun 2008: 262; Dhillon 2009: 231). Such seemingly strong support for Bosnia on the part of the Malaysian government, which the NGOs complemented, was unprecedented in the history of Malaysia’s UNPKO. In analysing this, some describe it as part of the attempt to tilt the domestic power struggle in favour of the ruling party, especially with some of the opposition parties accusing Malaysia of being equally responsible for the plight of the Bosnians, in part for joining the UN force whose action in Bosnia was seen to be rather lackadaisical and frustratingly lethargic (Shanti 1997: 255). The ruling party turned the accusations around by showing the public that it was not. To a considerable extent, Malaysia’s foreign policy, particularly over UNPKO, reinforces the legitimacy of the co-religionist and humanitarian cause of the NGOs and, in due process, has helped to strengthen and expand the ruling party’s domestic political base and support among civil society movements and vice versa.

5.3.3.3

The General Public

Rhetoric notwithstanding, Malaysia’s response to the Bosnian conflict also represents the public anxiety over its own fundamental societal integrity. Appalled by the UN’s apathetic response to ethnic cleansing and genocide in Bosnia as opposed to the former’s prompt response over the Iraq-Kuwait issue, Malaysians had every right to be concerned (Shanti 1997: 257). Such frustration also gave rise to reports suggesting that some 500–3000 Malaysians had already reached Bosnian battlegrounds in Bihac,

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Mostar and Sarajevo and were fighting alongside Bosnians against the Serbian forces (Shanti 1997). Malaysian solidarity with the Bosnians also came in the form of nationwide fundraising campaigns by non-NGO entities that included, among others, donations by public schools, universities and even state governments (News Straits Times, 19 August 1992). A state-fund launched by the State Government of Melaka managed to raise RM 1 million (News Straits Times, 17 April 1996), while the staff and students of Universiti Sains Malaysia managed to donate RM 16,227 to the Bosnian Medical Fund (News Straits Times, 29 October 1992). Furthermore, with Malaysia having a similar multi-ethnic, multi-religion societal make-up as Bosnia, there were strong grounds for Malaysia’s concern. Almost 44% of the Bosnian population was Muslim, and 32% were Orthodox Christian and17% were Catholic Christians (Azlizan Mat 2010: 317). In comparison, Malaysia had a Muslim majority of more than 60%, with 19% Buddhist, 9% Christian, 6% Hindu and 1.3% other (United States Department of State 2011). Malaysian commitment in Bosnia was therefore chiefly about its own fears, its denunciation of genocide and its frustration with the UN’s slow response (Dhillon 2009: 230; Mahathir Mohammad, personal communication, 13 January 2014; Sabah Times, 21 December 1993). Abdullah Badawi, in his capacity as Malaysian Foreign Minister, summed up Malaysia’s concern by criticizing the double standard of certain parties with regard to Bosnia (Malaysia Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993). Nevertheless, the Malaysian public in general professes different attitudes to different conflicts. The public displayed more enthusiasm for Malaysian intervention in the conflicts in, for example, Bosnia, Somalia and Lebanon than for the conflicts in Liberia, the Congo, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Mozambique, Western Sahara and Namibia. Even for conflicts closer to home, for example, in East Timor, the public response was no match for the support it showed with regard to Bosnia. Touching on the conflict in East Timor, as previously mentioned, one could not but note Malaysia’s initial reluctance to join the Australia-led international coalition of peacekeeping in East Timor (International Force for East Timor – INTERFRET, 1999–2000). Malaysia’s reluctance was due, among other things, to Malaysia’s perceivably close relations with Indonesia, its own fractious relationship with Australia, and East Timor leaders’ initial distrust of Malaysia’s possible participation. Although Malaysia did join INTERFRET eventually, after much persuasion by Thailand, Malaysia’s participation was limited to sending only a number of interpreters. In the subsequent UNPKO, i.e. UNMISET (2002–2005) and UNMIT (2005–2012), instead of sending a contingent, Malaysia deployed only a small number of personnel. Although in later years Malaysia’s support for the now independent East Timor steadily grew, the corresponding public response could not replicate the keenness vis-à-vis the Bosnian conflict. On another note, the conflict in Cambodia (1992) and Malaysia’s subsequent participation in the UNPKO there does present a different scenario. In this particular conflict, Malaysia sent a contingent to join the UNPKO in Phnom Penh (UNTAC, 1992–1993). Certainly, the dynamics and characteristics of the Cambodian conflict were different from those of Bosnia. Apart from the geographical proximity of the Cambodian conflict, Malaysia’s concern over the regional balance of power forced its

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hand primarily through the ASEAN grouping to help bring about an amicable end to the conflict (Rajmah 2009). Ironically, as opposed to the Bosnian conflict, the threat of the Cambodian conflict, in terms of a humanitarian disaster, was more pressing and physically closer to Malaysia because Malaysia was one of the favourite destinations of Cambodian refugees, especially the Muslim Cham or Champa community. In contrast to the Bosnian refugees who stayed in Malaysia for only ten years, Malaysia granted the Cambodians citizenship (Ahmad Kamil 2013: 68). Nevertheless, the public response to the Cambodian conflict paled in comparison to that of Bosnia. As previously mentioned, this may be due to the dynamics and characteristics of the Bosnian conflict having strong similarities with the social structure of Malaysia. Among other things, religionwise, the predominantly Muslim Malaysians probably saw themselves as having more in common with the Bosnians than the Cambodians. Understandably, the public response was almost self-explanatory. It is more or less about the public sharing the common fear of the possible total breakdown of the structure of society and the likely repeat of the 1969 race riot. However, in the post1969 riot, Malaysia was able to evade such devastating inter-ethnic armed conflicts that had inadvertently drawn the interference of foreign powers, which subsequently changed the map of Bosnia. Unlike Bosnia, Malaysia came out intact, better and vastly improved from its worst racial strife. It managed to contain the riot, restored the state integrity as a nation and was able to carry out its massive societal engineering programmes, commonly referred to as the New Economic Policy (Dasar Ekonomi Baru). The experience also helped to forge stronger bonds and ties between its multiethnics society, which proved to be crucial to advancing its economic and political standing. In contrast to other conflicts, Bosnia and everything that it stands for and for what it used to be, mostly as a predominantly fragile multi-ethnic and Muslim country, provided an invaluable lesson for Malaysia, hence the greater public interest in the Bosnian conflict than in any other conflict.

5.3.3.4

The Mass Media

Malaysia’s mainstream media was mostly government-controlled, or at least linked with components of the ruling coalition. Print media such as Utusan Malaysia, Berita Harian and News Straits Times are linked to the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), which is the backbone of the ruling coalition of Barisan Nasional (BN). The Star, on the other hand, is linked to the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), a key political party component of BN. Likewise, television stations like TV1, TV2 and TV3, for example, are also linked to UMNO. Having mentioned that, the media coverage of Malaysia’s UNPKO has generally been positive and extensive, from the imminent deployment and the send-off to the arrival, the return, the recognition, the appreciation and commemorative issues of the operations. Apart from featuring those, the media has played a minimal role in the deliberation process involving the deployment of Malaysia’s UNPKO. However, in addition to keeping the public informed of the current developments of Malaysia’s UNPKO, the media coverage has also helped to instil national pride and patriotism among the public.

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Analysis of the media coverage of Malaysian peacekeeping includes issues of Utusan Malaysia, Berita Harian, The Star, News Straits Times, Borneo Mail, Sabah Times, Borneo Post and Berita Minggu. The data collected show that the news coverage by the local media peaked from 1990 to 1995 before it began to diminish in frequency afterwards (up to 2010). Among the chief reasons for such intense coverage was that from 1992 to 1995, Malaysia had three peacekeeping operations running almost concurrently. They were Cambodia (UNTAC, 1992–1993), Somalia (UNOSOM II, 1993–1995) and Bosnia (UNPROFOR, 1993–1995). For these three operations, Malaysia deployed a contingent of troops, which included an army battalion consisting of personnel from the three major divisions of the military, i.e. Army, Navy and Air Force. Other peacekeeping operations to which Malaysia sent a contingent were the Congo (ONUC, 1960–1963), Namibia (UNTAG, 1989– 1990) and Lebanon (2007–present). These operations were the most covered of all Malaysian peacekeeping operations thus far, as opposed to Malaysia’s small-scale involvement in other peacekeeping operations such as those in Liberia (UNOMIL, 1993–1999), Chad/Libya (UNASOG, 1994) and Tajikistan (UNMOT, 1998–1999). Often, the media appears to play more of an auxiliary role in Malaysia’s UNPKO. There are a number of possible explanations. Firstly, the military nature of peacekeeping might serve to isolate it from media reach. Since peacekeeping operations are almost exclusively a military affair, it is only proper that the media assumes a minimal role in the ways that the military manages and operates the peacekeeping operation. Security-wise, in order to get real-time coverage of the operation, the media would need to embed itself into the Malaysian troops in the conflict area. Consequently, the media personnel would have to rely on the troops for their safety. Unfortunately, embedding the media might put the mission at risk, as non-combatants with no prior military training could prove to be a liability to the UN personnel and the operation itself. The Malaysia Joint Force Headquarters even turned down the researcher’s request to visit Malaysia’s UNPKO in Lebanon on 4 February 2015 due to the prevailing bad security situation (Letter Ref: MKAB/J3/3304/10-(4), Date: 4 February 2015). Secondly, the financing of Malaysian peacekeeping is borne by the UN. This helps to quash the media or the general’s public concern over the use of public funds to run such an expensive international operation, hence the absence of public debate on Malaysia’s UNPKO financing in the media. Thirdly, the decision-making process over Malaysian peacekeeping is almost exclusively the domain of the Prime Ministers. Since the general public sentiment appeared to parallel that of the Prime Ministers, it follows that the media played a minimal part in the deliberation process over Malaysian peacekeeping operations. In fact, the media’s role came to the fore only after the decision had been made, which invariably did not offer much of an opportunity for a second opinion on Malaysia’s UNPKO. Finally, with the public understandably not being privy to certain security-related information, collating public opinion or conducting polls on Malaysian peacekeeping was therefore a rarity, if non-existent. As opposed to the international media that had more in-depth reporting of UNPKO, the role of the local media was limited to picking up secondary news feeds (Berita Harian, 10 January 2002). This serves mostly to keep the public abreast of

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the developments of the past and on-going operations. With not much to offer beyond that, Jeshurun holds that the media were responsible for failing to generate enthusiastic public interest in Malaysia’s UNPKO (Jeshurun 2008: 251). Additionally, the lack of information in part also caused the public to be unable to grasp fully the complexity of the grave situations Malaysian troops were facing in their everyday routine. Moreover, since participation in peacekeeping is voluntary, Malaysia still has a choice over whether or not to participate. In other words, as long as it does not put a great strain on national resources, Malaysia’s participation is as good as guaranteed (Mahathir Mohammad, personal communication, 4 December 2013). Besides, the fact that Malaysia could always decline the invitation to participate in any UNPKO or withdraw from one at any time may have helped to address public concern over the Malaysian troops’ security and safety, hence the seeming lack of public interest in Malaysia’s UNPKO.

5.4 Conclusion With such a preponderance of power, as discussed in the preceding sections, both structurally and practically the Prime Ministers hold dominant control over state institutions. This provides the leverage with which the Prime Ministers’ perceptionstances on peacekeeping and national power come into play and subsequently influence Malaysia’s UNPKO. However, as a small power that consistently and inevitably exposes itself to systemic influences, the Prime Ministers’ perception of those influences plays a crucial role in ensuring that Malaysia reacts appropriately, not necessarily correctly, to the international security environment. Besides, as a small power aspiring to middlepowermanship, it follows that the Prime Ministers should judge the level of national power at their disposal as accurately as possible in order to formulate the state’s foreign policy vis-à-vis UNPKO. Moreover, the changing international security environment also motivates the Prime Ministers to seize on every available opportunity to exert and amplify Malaysia’s visibility and influence within the international community. This drive, in turn, governs Malaysia’s need to compensate for its lack of hard power with soft power and international prestige, through UNPKO. As far as the politico-military institutions are concerned, they mostly come into the equation during the policy deliberation processes. And, as previously stated, when it comes to decision-making, it is the Prime Ministers who wield the most power. Since the Prime Ministers can almost always overrule politico-military decisions, in a way this had reduced these institutions merely to the execution level. Likewise, the role of Malaysia’s civil society is also reduced to basically supplementing and augmenting the Prime Ministers’ stance on co-religionist and humanitarian causes. Its influence on the Prime Ministers’ decisions over UNPKO is inherently weak. Collectively these internal-domestic imperatives serve to indicate the Prime Ministers’ high level of national power, particularly in mobilizing and extracting the resources which the Prime Ministers consider necessary for Malaysia’s UNPKO.

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This, in turn, has further elevated the Prime Ministers’ dominance over state institutions, which is particularly useful when the Prime Ministers decide to join multiple UNPKO, of virtually similar size and nature, almost concurrently in different regions of the world, as indicated by the fourth Prime Minister. The same can also be said of the first Prime Minister, who authorized Malaysia’s UNPKO to the Congo, which involved 3000 troops, when such a number of troops could have been better utilized to add more strength to its on-going fight to suppress the local communist insurgency threat. All told, domestic determinants play a less significant role vis-à-vis the Prime Ministers’ decisions on UNPKO. This, apart from the way the military has seen how UNPKO could contribute towards improving and upgrading its interoperability and assets, also speaks volumes for the way civil society has responded, in general, to the Prime Ministers’ actions and inaction vis-à-vis UNPKO. The manners and the extent to which the Prime Ministers have made their decisions regarding Malaysia’s UNPKO have served to validate the Prime Ministers’ stance and national power on the domestic front.

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Chapter 6

Malaysia’s UNPKO in the Cold War and Post-Cold War Eras

Abstract This chapter compares Malaysia’s UNPKO during and after the Cold War – as the case study – in order to allow a focused analysis of the prevailing systemic-external and domestic-internal determinants of Malaysia’s UNPKO. In the process, this chapter provides a succinct deliberation on Malaysia’s strategic and non-strategic interests zones (SIZ and NSIZ), which serve as one of the important backgrounds to Malaysia’s UNPKO. By highlighting key insights drawn from the analysis, Malaysia’s UNPKO demonstrate a strong link with the systemic pressure, i.e. the Cold War and the post-Cold War. Malaysia’s relatively low number of UNPKO during the Cold War was overwhelmed by its substantial increase in participation in the post-Cold War era. The change in structural power from bipolarity to unipolarity has substantially affected Malaysia’s UNPKO. Domestic factors like trade, distance, health risk and facility can be relegated to an intervening role at best. Thus, as long as the conduct, system and mechanism of UNPKO continue to be conditioned by the prevailing systemic pressure and regulated exclusively by the UNSC, peacekeeping operations will remain firmly under the control of the major powers and the current international system, with small powers like Malaysia mostly reduced to an auxiliary role. Keywords Peacekeeping · United Nations · Strategic Interests Zone · International system · Cold War · Post-Cold War · Structural power · Bipolar · Unipolar · United Nations Security Council

6.1 Introduction This chapter compares Malaysia’s UNPKO during and after the Cold War – as the case study – in order to facilitate a focused analysis of the prevailing systemicexternal and domestic-internal determinants of Malaysia’s UNPKO. In the process, this chapter provides a succinct deliberation on Malaysia’s strategic and non-strategic interests zones (SIZ and NSIZ), which serve as a useful background for analysing Malaysia’s UNPKO. Due to the large size of the case study, i.e. Malaysia’s thirtythree UNPKO, the subsequent discussion revolves around Malaysia’s UNPKO as a whole. The size of Malaysia’s UNPKO is also touched upon. Malaysia served in © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Salleh and A. Idris, Malaysia’s United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1960–2010), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4137-1_6

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six UNPKO at contingent-level as opposed to twenty-seven at observer-level. The concluding section highlights key insights drawn from the analysis.

6.2 Malaysia’s UNPKO During the Cold War and Post-Cold War Era As mentioned before, between 1960 and 1991, during the Cold War, Malaysia participated in eight UNPKO, and then it participated in twenty-five UNPKO in the postCold War era. In total, between 1960 and 2010 Malaysia participated in thirty-three out of sixty-five UNPKO, which is the equivalent of 51% participation. As a comparison, this is similar to the level of participation by other regular UNPKO participants like Canada and Australia, which participated in thirty-five and thirty-one UNPKO respectively during the same period. However, this does not take into account the size and nature of the two countries’ UNPKO. Pursuant to that, during the Cold War, out of Malaysia’s eight UNPKO, two were at contingent-level and the remaining six at observer-level. In the post-Cold War era, out of Malaysia’s twenty-five UNPKO, four were at contingent-level and the remaining twenty-one were at observer-level. Among Malaysia’s notable UNPKO during the Cold War were ONUC in the Congo, 1960– 1963 (Contingent); UNIIMOG in Iran/Iraq, 1988–1991; UNTAG in Namibia, 1989– 1990 (Contingent); UNSOGI in Iraq, 1990–1991; UNIKOM in Iraq/Kuwait, 1991– 2003; MINURSO in Western Sahara, 1991–present; UNAVEM II in Angola, 1991– 1995; and UNAMIC in Cambodia, 1991–1992. Among those in the post-Cold War were UNPROFOR in Bosnia, 1992–1995 (Contingent); UNTAC in Cambodia, 1992– 1993 (Contingent); ONUMOZ in Mozambique, 1992–1994; UNMLT in Cambodia 1993–1994; UNOSOM II in Somalia, 1993–1995 (Contingent); UNOMIL in Liberia, 1993–1997; UNASOG in Libya/Chad 1994; UNMOT in Tajikistan 1994–2000; UNMIBH in Bosnia 1995–2002; and MONUA in Angola 1997–1999. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 list all of Malaysia’s UNPKO during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, along with those which Malaysia did not join. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 provide a range of important information. To begin with, Malaysia’s UNPKO in the post-Cold War era, i.e. twenty-five, outnumber those during the Cold War, i.e. eight. The increase from eight to twenty-five UNPKO shows a surge of about 312%. This indicates that Malaysia was more active in UNPKO in the post-Cold War era than during the Cold War era. Next, a closer look indicates that Malaysia’s UNPKO peaked during the closing years of the Cold War and the first ten years of the post-Cold War era. The eleven years between 1988 and 1999 were what this study considers to be the ‘golden years’ in the history of Malaysia’s UNPKO. They were crucial, as they mark the transitional phase between the Cold War era (bipolar world) and the post-Cold War era (unipolar world). Among important events with widespread international repercussions during this transitional phase was the collapse of Berlin Wall in Germany. The collapse affirms the much-weakened

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Table 6.1 Malaysia’s UNPKO during the Cold War. Source United Nations (2013); Malaysia’s National Defence Policy, Map 2 (2010) Cold War (18 UNPKO: 1960–1991) Joined (8)

Did not join (10)

1. ONUC: Congo, 1960–1963 (Contingent) 2. UNIIMOG: Iran/Iraq, 1988–1991 3. UNTAG: Namibia, 1989–1990 (Contingent) 4. UNSOGI: Iraq, 1990–1991 5. UNIKOM: Iraq/Kuwait, 1991–2003 6. MINURSO: Western Sahara, 1991–present 7. UNAVEM II: Angola, 1991–1995 8. UNAMIC: Cambodia, 1991–1992

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

DOMREP: West New Guinea, 1962–1963 UNYOM: Yemen, 1963–1964 UNFICYP: Cyprus, 1964–present UNIPOM: India-Pakistan, 1965–1966 Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic, 1965–1966 6. UNEF II: Israel/Egypt/Suez Canal, 1973–1979 7. UNDOF: Israel/Syria/Golan, 1974–present 8. UNGOMAP: Afghanistan and Pakistan, 1988–1990 9. ONUCA: Central America, 1989–1991 10. UNAVEM I: Angola, 1989–1992

sphere of influence of the Soviet Bloc in Western Europe proper that eventually led to the reunification of Germany. Another important event that generated a worldwide effect was the official dissolution of the Soviet Union as a state itself in 1991, which inevitably left the US as the sole hegemonic superpower. Furthermore, this transitional phase also created a global power vacuum that resulted in a number of intra-state and inter-state armed conflicts. In order to deal with them, the international community turned to the UN, and therefore UNPKO, as one of the immediate conflict resolution mechanisms. The emergence of the transitional phase combined with the rising need for UNPKO, as far as international peace was concerned, afforded Malaysia the leverage for more expansive foreign policy initiatives. Subsequently, 67% of Malaysia’s UNPKO, i.e. twenty-two out of thirty-three, were deployed within the transitional phase, with four of those at contingent-level. They were UNOSOM II (Somalia, 1993–1995), UNPROFOR (Bosnia, 1992–1995), UNTAC (Cambodia, 1992–1993) and UNTAG (Namibia, 1989–1990). The other two of Malaysia’s UNPKO contingents were sent to ONUC in the Congo in 1960 and UNIFIL in Lebanon in 2006. Overall, two contingents were sent during the Cold War era and four in the post-Cold War era. The other twenty-seven of Malaysia’s UNPKO were at observer-level. Six of them took place during the Cold War era and the remaining twenty-one during the post-Cold War era. Moreover, based on the above figures, in particular the 312% surge of Malaysia’s UNPKO from the Cold War era to the post-Cold War era, the systemic-external factors were of significant consequence to Malaysia. The years prior to and immediately after the breakdown of the bipolar world and the subsequent emergence of the unipolar one, in more ways than one, were just as beneficial to some states as they proved costly to states under the sphere of influence of either side of the structural power blocs.

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Table 6.2 Malaysia’s UNPKO in the post-Cold War era. Source United Nations (2013); Malaysia’s National Defence Policy (2010), Map 2 Post-Cold War (47 UNPKO: 1992–2010) Joined (25)

Did not join (22)

1. UNPROFOR: Bosnia, 1992–1995 (Contingent) 2. UNTAC: Cambodia, 1992–1993 (Contingent) 3. ONUMOZ: Mozambique, 1992–1994 4. UNMLT: Cambodia 1993–1994 5. UNOSOM II: Somalia, 1993–1995 (Contingent) 6. UNOMIL: Liberia, 1993–1997 7. UNASOG: Libya/Chad 1994 8. UNMOT: Tajikistan 1994–2000 9. UNMIBH: Bosnia 1995–2002 10. MONUA: Angola 1997–1999 11. UNAMA: Afghanistan 1998–1999 12. UNMIK: Kosovo 1999–present 13. UNAMSIL: Sierra Leone 1999–2005 14. UNTAET: East Timor 1999–2003 15. MONUC: The Congo 1999–2000 16. UNMEE: Ethiopia and Eritrea 2000–2008 17. UNMISET: East Timor 2002–2005 18. UNMIL: Liberia 2003–present 19. UNSGRC: Cambodia 1994–1995 20. UNMIN: Nepal 2007–present 21. UNMIT: Timor Leste 2005–2012 22. UNOB: Burundi 2004–2006 23. UNIFIL: Lebanon 2006–present (Contingent) 24. UNMIS: Sudan 2009–2011 25. UNAMID: Sudan/Darfur 2009–present

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

ONUSAL: El Salvador, 1991–1995 UNOSOM I: Somalia, 1992–1993 UNOMIG: Georgia, 1993–2009 UNOMUR: Uganda-Rwanda, 1993–1994 UNMIH: Haiti, 1993–1996 UNAMIR: Rwanda, 1993–1996 UNAVEM III: Angola, 1995–1997 UNCRO: Croatia, 1995–1996 UNPREDEP: Macedonia/Europe, 1995–1999 10. UNTAES: Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, 1996–1998 11. UNMOP: Prevlaka, 1996–2002 12. UNSMIH: Haiti, Aug–Dec 1997 13. MINUGUA: Guatemala, Jan–May 1997 14. UNTMIH: Haiti, Aug–Dec 1997 15. MIPONUH: Haiti, 1997–2000 16. UNCPSG: Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, Jan–Oct 1998 17. MINURCA: Central African Republic, 1998–2000 18. UNAMSIL: Sierra Leone, 1999–2005 19. UNOCI: Côte d’Ivoire, 2004–present 20. MINUSTAH: in Haiti, 2004–present 21. MINURCAT: Central African Republic and Chad, 2007–2010 22. MONUSCO: Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2010–present

With UNPKO in general being initiated more by the US Bloc, it was only logical that Malaysia’s reactions and responses to UNPKO, which were generally representative of its international stance, would reflect the systemic change. The US, by now the sole superpower, had gone to great lengths to ensure that states responded appropriately to its UNPKO-led initiatives. There were some instances where the US did play a part in inducing states to participate in particular UNPKO. For example, when the UN was facing a major shortage of troops for UNAMIS in Sudan, the US intervened by consulting states individually, which resulted in most of them agreeing to participate in UNAMIS (Henke 2012: 220). In another UNPKO, i.e. UNAMID, the US Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, even came to meet the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, personally in order to ensure that contributing states would honour their pledges to contribute troops, and he individually requested states to shore up specific strategic shortages faced by UNAMID (Henke 2012). Bolton even offered assistance to help UNPKO with the

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respective operational planning (Henke 2012). However, these direct interventions by the US to make a UNPKO work do not necessarily indicate that UNPKO, before and after the Cold War, were all along and exclusively dominated by the US Bloc alone. The fact that the Soviet Union did not veto some of the UNPKO during the Cold War was representative of its approval of and acceptance of UNPKO. The absence of the veto might mean that the Soviet Union did not consider those UNPKO to pose substantial threats to its interests inasmuch as it also stood to be one of the beneficiaries as well. For example, the authorization of UNEF II (Israel/Egypt/Suez Canal) in 1973 and UNDOF (Israel/Syria/Golan) in 1974 were instrumental in preventing an all-out armed conflict between Israel’s allies, i.e. the US, and Syria’s, i.e. the Soviet Union. The presence of these UNPKO, to some measure, acted like a physical barrier, separating the two superpowers from directly engaging each other. On another note, Malaysia did not join those two UNPKO. It goes without saying that systemic imperatives broadly condition Malaysia’s policy options, as a small power, in the international arena, as its UNPKO during the Cold War and the post-Cold War eras have shown. In truth, the changed configuration of the structural material capabilities of both the bipolar and the unipolar world orders provided Malaysia with a certain degree of political and strategic leverage that restricted and expanded its UNPKO. In other words, the single hegemonic international system, i.e. the US Bloc, has paved the way, directly or indirectly, for Malaysia to play a more active role in UNPKO in the post-Cold War era than during the Cold War. This is understandable, given the importance of avoiding a confrontation with or a backlash from the other major powers. The markedly changed orientation of Malaysia’s foreign policy, i.e. from the first Malaysian Prime Minister’s overt support for the Western bloc initiative and his anti-Communist stance to the second Prime Minister’s ‘Equidistant Policy’ – i.e. being friendly towards all states irrespective of their political ideologies – in part ensured that Malaysia’s UNPKO were appropriately and sufficiently subservient to its current foreign policy orientation. In other words, Malaysia’s UNPKO reflect Malaysia’s movement away from its previous overtly pro-Western policy and staunch anti-Communist stance in order to enable it to reflect the prevailing systemic pressures. Obviously, Malaysia could not afford, much less possess, the capability, to affect systemic changes to its liking. However, Malaysia’s UNPKO, especially during the transitional phase, have again demonstrated Malaysia’s long-standing alliance with the US Bloc, despite its seemingly consistent emphasis on an equidistant policy. It is feasible to argue that Malaysia used UNPKO to prove that it was and still is a reliable ally of the US Bloc. This is hardly surprising. Argentina and Uruguay, for example, have consistently portrayed themselves as UNPKO traditional peacekeepers from South America in order to be seen as reliable allies of the US (Sotomayor 2007). The same can also be said of Canada and Australia (Spooner 2009). Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, during the Cold War era, Malaysia was elected twice as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), i.e. in 1965 and 1989, and once in the post-cold War era, i.e. in 1999. The most recent election of Malaysia to the UNSC was in 2015.

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As far as Malaysia’s membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is concerned, keeping in view the UNSC’s role in authorizing UNPKO, such an election shows that, despite the combined strength of the five permanent members (P-5) of the UNSC, Malaysia commands a considerable level of international influence, which has enabled it to play a role in affecting UNPKO and, consequently, has increased its active engagement in the maintenance of international peace and security, and its involvement with the other purposes of the Organization (Chapter V: The Security Council, Article 23 (1)). Being on the UNSC has also allowed Malaysia to play a constructive role vis-à-vis the P-5, i.e. providing inputs on matters of mutual interest more directly and, in some cases, more effectively. Specifically, the voting process of UNPKO provides Malaysia, as one of the members of the UNSC, with the opportunity to demonstrate its alliance. Therefore, UNPKO have been manipulated as an effective tool to serve not just the major powers’ interests, but also those of Malaysia. Thus, in order to provide a comprehensive picture of Malaysia’s UNPKO, it is necessary for the following discussion to cover Malaysia’s strategic and non-strategic interests zones (SIZ and NSIZ).

6.2.1 Malaysia’s UNPKO in Its Strategic Interests Zone (SIZ) and Non-strategic Interests Zone (NSIZ) As previously stated, through its National Defence Policy (NDP-2010), Malaysia has classified the political world into two main zones: SIZ and NSIZ, as shown on Map 1 of NDP-2010, p. 14 (see Appendix 1 at the end of this chapter). On the one hand, Malaysia’s SIZ includes North America, Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, East Asia, Southeast Asia and Oceania. On the other, Malaysia’s NSIZ covers Africa, Central Asia and South America. Generally, SIZ refer to those states which are strategically important in terms of Malaysia’s politics, economy and security while NSIZ point to the opposite. Map 2 of NDP-2010, p. 32, on the other hand, shows all of Malaysia’s UNPKO in both its SIZ and NSIZ (see Appendix 2, Ministry of Defence 2010: 4). So far, Malaysia’s UNPKO have taken place across regions of Africa, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Europe and others. Table 6.3 sums up Malaysia’s UNPKO and its size or level in its SIZ and NSIZ during the Cold War and in the post-Cold War eras. As shown by Table 6.3, from 1960 to 2010, fifteen of Malaysia’s UNPKO were sent to its SIZ and eighteen to its NSIZ. All in all, there were only four Malaysian UNPKO in its SIZ during the Cold War as opposed to eleven in the post-Cold War era, which is an increase of 275%. In its NSIZ, Malaysia also joined five UNPKO during the Cold War as opposed to thirteen in the post-Cold War era, which is an increase of about 260%. On the whole, both zones show almost a threefold increase in Malaysia’s UNPKO. Specifically, during the Cold War, there were four Malaysian UNPKO in its SIZ, with all of them at observer-level. During the same period, there were also five Malaysian UNPKO in its NSIZ, two of which were contingent-level and three observer-level.

Cold War

4 (all observers)

5 (2 contingents/3 observers)

9 (2 contingents/7 observers)

Zone/UNPKO

Strategic Interests Zone

Non-Strategic Interests Zone

Total

24 (4 contingents/20 observers)

13 (1 contingent/12 observers)

11 (3 contingents/8 observers)

Post-Cold War

33 (6 contingents/27 observers)

18 (3 contingents/15 observers)

15 (3 contingents/12 observers)

Sub-total

Table 6.3 Malaysia’s UNPKO in Cold War and post-Cold War eras according to its SIZ and NSIZ. Source Malaysia’s National Defence Policy, Maps 1 and 2 (2010)

6.2 Malaysia’s UNPKO During the Cold War and Post-Cold War Era 135

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6 Malaysia’s UNPKO in the Cold War and Post-Cold War Eras

Next, in the post-Cold War era, out of Malaysia’s eleven UNPKO in its SIZ, there were three contingent-level and eight observer-level. During the same period, there were thirteen Malaysian UNPKO in its NSIZ, one of which was contingent-level and the remaining twelve observer-level. Along with the increase in Malaysia’s UNPKO in both zones in the post-Cold War era, Malaysia’s UNPKO in its NSIZ surpasses those in its SIZ by three operations. However, as far as Malaysia’s six contingent-level UNPKOs are concerned, Malaysia sent three to each zone. During the Cold War, the contingents to Malaysia’s NSIZ were ONUC in the Congo (1960–1963) and UNTAG in Namibia (1989–1990). As previously stated, in the same period, no contingents were sent to Malaysia’s UNPKO in its SIZ. Later, in the post-Cold War era, only one contingent was sent to Malaysia’s NSIZ, i.e. UNOSOM II in Somalia (1993–1995). Conversely, the three contingents to Malaysia’s SIZ were sent to UNPROFOR in Bosnia (1992–1995); UNTAC in Cambodia (1992–1993); and UNIFIL in Lebanon (2006–present). All three were sent in the post-Cold War era.

6.2.1.1

Malaysia’s UNPKO in Its SIZ Region

Seven or 47% of Malaysia’s UNPKO took place in Southeast Asia, four or 27% in the Middle East, three or 20% in Europe and one or 6% in South Asia. The fact that the majority of Malaysia’s UNPKO to its SIZ were concentrated in Southeast Asia is not a coincidence. Apart from the available UNPKO-necessitating conflicts in the region, this complemented Malaysia’s fourth Prime Minister’s ‘Concentric Circles of Interests’, in which Southeast Asia (ASEAN) was at the top of his foreign policy priority compared with other regions. In addition to that, four or 36% of those took place during the Cold War. This means that the remaining eleven or 74% were sent in the post-Cold War era. Table 6.4 outlines the complete list of all Malaysia’s UNPKO in its SIZ. Table 6.4 Malaysia’s UNPKO in its SIZ. Source United Nations (2013); Malaysia’s National Defence Policy, Map 2 (2010) Malaysia’s Strategic Interests Zone

Malaysia-UNPKO (15)

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

1. Iran/Iraq: UNIIMOG, 1988–1991; Middle East 2. Iraq: UNSOGI, 1990–1991; Middle East 3. Iraq/Kuwait: UNIKOM, 1991–2003; Middle East 4. Cambodia: UNAMIC, 1991–1994; Southeast Asia 5. Cambodia: UNTAC, 1992–1993; Southeast Asia 6. Cambodia: UNMLT, 1993–1994; Southeast Asia 7. Bosnia: UNPROFOR, 1993–1995; Europe 8. Cambodia: UNSGRC, 1994–1995; Southeast Asia 9. Bosnia-Herzegovina: UNMIBH, 1995; Europe 10. Kosovo: UNMIK, 1999; Europe 11. Lebanon: UNIFIL, 2006–present; Middle East 12. East Timor: UNTAET, 2000–2005; Southeast Asia 13. East Timor: UNMISET, 2002–2005; Southeast Asia 14. East Timor: UNMIT, 2005–2012; Southeast Asia 15. Nepal: UNMIN, 2007–present; South Asia

North America Europe Middle East South Asia East Asia Southeast Asia Oceania

6.2 Malaysia’s UNPKO During the Cold War and Post-Cold War Era

6.2.1.2

137

Malaysia’s UNPKO in Its NSIZ Region

There were eighteen Malaysian UNPKO in its NSIZ, sixteen or 89% of which took place in Africa and two or 11% in Central Asia. Observably, Africa turns out to be where most of Malaysia’s UNPKO to its NSIZ were concentrated. Africa occupies the third rung of Malaysia’s ‘Concentric Circles of Interests’, after Southeast Asia and the Pacific. This places Africa among the focal points of Malaysia’s foreign policy, especially during the administration of the fourth Prime Minister, hence the large numbers of Malaysian UNPKO in Africa. Similar to Malaysia’s UNPKO in its SIZ, only five or 28% took place during the Cold War, with most, i.e. thirteen or 72%, taking place in the post-Cold War era. Table 6.5 lists all eighteen of Malaysia’s UNPKO in its NSIZ. Taken together, Tables 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 indicate that during the Cold War and in the post-Cold War eras, Malaysia’s UNPKO in its NSIZ exceeded those in its SIZ by three. This suggests that Malaysia’s UNPKO does not take into account the strategic importance of a region as outlined in its National Defence Policy (NDP-2010). Hence, a succinct look into the backgrounds of both zones is helpful in generating an even more balanced and comprehensive understanding of Malaysia’s UNPKO. Regardless of the strategic zoning classifications vis-à-vis Malaysia’s UNPKO, both are central to Malaysian national defence policy for a number of reasons. Firstly, many countries grouped under Malaysia’s SIZ lie along the critical Strait of Malacca shipping lane, hence their considerable dependence on it. Additionally, it also underscores the Table 6.5 Malaysia’s UNPKO in its NSIZ. Source United Nations (2013); Malaysia’s National Defence Policy, Map 2 (2010) Malaysia’s Non-Strategic Interests Zones

Malaysia-UNPKO (18)

1. Africa 2. Central Asia 3. South America

1. Congo: ONUC, 1960–1963; Africa 2. Namibia: UNTAG, 1989–1990; Africa 3. Angola: UNAVEM II, 1991–1997; Africa 4. West Sahara: MINURSO, 1991–present; Africa 5. Angola: MONUA, 1991–1999; Africa 6. Mozambique: ONUMOZ, 1993–1995; Africa 7. Somalia: UNOSOM II, 1993–1995; Africa 8. Liberia: UNOMIL, 1993–1999; Africa 9. Chad/Libya: UNASOG, 1994; Africa 10. Tajikistan: UNMOT, 1998–1999: Central Asia 11. Afghanistan: UNAMA, 1998–1999: Central Asia 12. Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL, 1999–2005; Africa 13. DR Congo: MONUC, 2000; Africa 14. Ethiopia-Eritrea: UNIMEE, 2000–2008; Africa 15. Liberia: UNMIL, 2003–present; Africa 16. Burundi: UNOB, 2004–2006; Africa 17. Sudan: UNMIS, 2009–2011; Africa 18. Sudan/Darfur: UNAMID, 2009–present; Africa

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6 Malaysia’s UNPKO in the Cold War and Post-Cold War Eras

countries’ immediate and strategically vital security and economic interests vis-àvis Malaysia. As a result, North America, East Asia, Oceania, Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and Europe fall within Malaysia’s SIZ. It is no coincidence, either, that many countries of this SIZ are major economic powerhouses whose trades like oil shipping rely heavily on a stable and secure Strait of Malacca. Generally, ships carrying oil supplies from the Middle Eastern countries pass through the Strait of Malacca before reaching their destinations in East Asian countries and vice versa. Without doubt, as far as the NDP-2010 is concerned, trade activity, the security and the economic fundamentals of those countries are intricately intertwined with Malaysia. Conversely, as per NDP-2010, those regions (countries) that do not depend heavily on the Strait of Malacca, such as Africa and South America, consequently fall within Malaysia’s NSIZ. However, despite the NSIZ appearing to be of less immediate economic and security significance to Malaysia, it remains part and parcel of Malaysia’s defence and foreign policies. Mostly, this is because Malaysia’s global peace principle, neutrality and globalization policy underpin Malaysia’s international activism, i.e. UNPKO, especially in and among the developing countries of the two continents. Moreover, as a primarily trading nation, often, many countries in Malaysia’s NSIZ are important to Malaysia’s ‘Entrepreneurial Policy’, which denotes its propensity for giving first priority to the economic grounds of its diplomacy (Paridah 1998). Other factors, such as political ideology, accordingly follow suit. Paridah asserts that ‘Entrepreneurial Policy’ is similar in substance and form to Malaysia’s ‘Equidistant Policy’, which serves and complements Malaysia’s neutrality and non-alignment stance (Paridah 1998: 156). Above and beyond, it allows Malaysia to be friendly with all nations of the world irrespective of political ideology. Besides, the bottom line of Malaysia’s international relations, as with other countries, is reciprocity and mutual benefits. This affirms Malaysia’s belief that all countries should enjoy an equal right to a more equitable share of the world’s economic opportunities (Paridah 1998). However, Malaysia’s entrepreneurial diplomacy bears very little similarity, if any, to Japan’s incessantly rigorous economic drive. Cynically dubbed ‘economic animal’, Japan’s diplomacy with other states, such as those of Southeast Asia, has been rooted mostly in “money and goods, not friendships or mutual benefits” (Mendl 2001). Japan, nevertheless, has been hard at work to disassociate itself from such an adverse image (Mendl 2001). Putting Japan’s image of ‘animal economic diplomacy’ aside, with Malaysia’s entrepreneurial diplomacy now in the equation, Malaysia’s SIZ and NSIZ should accordingly be less than a significant causal factor of Malaysia’s UNPKO, as indicated by Tables 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5. Conversely, Malaysia being oblivious to its own strategic interests zoning schematic vis-à-vis UNPKO allows it to substantiate its growing encouraging international prestige i.e. UNSC membership. In other words, Malaysia’s UNPKO places financial, economic or monetary gains as secondary objectives to international peace.

6.2 Malaysia’s UNPKO During the Cold War and Post-Cold War Era

6.2.1.3

139

Fatalities in Malaysia’s UNPKO According to Its SIZ and NSIZ

So far, Malaysia has lost an equal number of troops in both zones. The causes of death vary. They range from malicious acts and combat to illness, accidents and others (lists of Malaysia’s UNPKO fatalities in its SIZ and NSIZ are provided in Appendices 3 and 4). Although the fatality rate might not have demonstrated anything significant in terms of Malaysia’s UNPKO in either zone, it logically follows that if a country is to risk losing its army personnel in military missions abroad, it might as well limit that risk to the conflicts it most considers to be critically important to its national interests. However, as it stands, Malaysia has coped well with an equal number of fatalities and apparent level of risk in both zones. With all else being almost equal, Tables 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 share one concurrently running theme: that Malaysia’s UNPKO are flexible when it comes to strategic zoning, although the same cannot apply to the Cold War and the post-Cold War. Such flexibility shows that SIZ and NSIZ have played a less significant role in Malaysia’s UNPKO than systemic factors. Additionally, such flexibility, either by design or default, allows Malaysia’s foreign policy to bear a close resemblance to that of middle powers – which happen to be traditional UNPKO contributors like Australia – or perhaps, at the very least, to the Malaysian Prime Ministers’ aspiration to achieve middlepowermanship. Certainly, completely dismissing the link between SIZ, NSIZ and Malaysia’s UNPKO is not realistic. Under certain circumstances, the zones can be relatively important. In a sense, the degree of significance they have to a UNPKO does matter, albeit to a muchreduced degree. As such, the zones’ respective economic and security importance (or otherwise) indirectly remains a relevant aspect of Malaysia’s international overtures. Ultimately, systemic imperatives notwithstanding, other secondary ones like fiscal constraints and the availability of assets also have the potential to mitigate or magnify the zoning importance in relation to Malaysia’s UNPKO, which is addressed in the next section.

6.3 Other Considerations Influencing Malaysia’s UNPKO Any deliberation on Malaysia’s participation in UNPKO requires the assessment of a host of other considerations. Accordingly, Malaysia’s non-participation in UNPKO in its SIZ and NSIZ might be able to shed more light on these aspects (Appendices 5 and 6). As previously mentioned, apart from external-systemic pressure, Malaysia’s own evaluation of the prevailing threat in and for the conflict-area, financial standing, health risk, distance, mandate clarity, troop availability and suitability or operability of military assets like personnel carriers constitute some of the considerations which determine Malaysia’s stance vis-à-vis UNPKO in a particular area (Nazari Abdul Hadi, personal communication, 22 October 2013). Based on interviews and a review of the extant literature, this study highlights four of these factors.

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6 Malaysia’s UNPKO in the Cold War and Post-Cold War Eras

6.3.1 Malaysia’s Commitment to UNSAS Following the signing of the UN Standby Arrangements System 1996 (UNSAS), Malaysia is required to have one army battalion ready for UNPKO. Committing a battalion to UNPKO in fact requires the army to commit three battalions to UNPKO simultaneously: one battalion serving, one on standby and another undergoing training. All in all, Malaysia would have to put aside more or less 2550 of its infantries plus the related assets and equipment (Badrul Hisham Muhammad, personal communication, 10 February 2015). To an extent, this may affect, an as instance, Malaysia’s readiness for a conventional war in the immediate future, and thus the need to reassess its peacekeeping commitment. Besides, Malaysia is also involved in a number of non-UNPKO regional-level peacekeeping operations, such as the International Monitoring Team in Mindanao, Philippines. The availability of the battalion, therefore, is not something the Malaysian military can guarantee at all times (Badrul Hisham Muhammad, personal communication, 10 February 2015). In addition to this, Malaysia is in the Wet-Lease category of UNSAS. Basically, the Wet-Lease category requires contributing countries to arrive with their own major equipment and self-sustainment (United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System Military Handbook, 2003). In other words, Malaysia needs to provide for its own expenses, assets and for the mobilization of its troops/team of personnel to the conflict-area. This includes the logistics, placement, accommodation and acquisition/maintenance of assets and troops. Cost-wise, the UN will reimburse the expenses quarterly, usually in the range of 60–100%, depending on the pre-agreed category of the items and claims (Kamarulnizam 2014). For example, Malaysia spent RM 21 million on its operation in Cambodia (UNTAC: 1992–1993), RM 87.5 million in Somalia (UNOSOM II: 1993–1995), RM 224.6 million in Lebanon (UNIFIL: 2007– 2009) (Ministry of Defence 2009) and RM 205.9 million in Bosnia (UNPROFOR: 1993–1995) (Ramli Abu Bakar 2004: 27). All sums were fully reimbursed by the UN. However, for certain countries, it is this financial aspect of peacekeeping which could prove to be burdensome, despite the quarterly reimbursement. In the case of Malaysia, initially diverting the development funds for the Malaysian military to UNPKO could impede the former’s readiness for conventional war. In fact, the financial aspect can turn out to be one of the single most important factors in Malaysian participation in a UNPKO (Syed Hamid Albar, personal communication, 4 December 2013). On a different note, Malaysia does not belong to the Dry-Lease of UNSAS, which requires contributing countries to contribute only troops. Equipment and expenses will be provided and paid for by the UN. However, there are some countries which, despite their wealth, lack the military capability to participate in a UNPKO. Brunei’s cooperation with Malaysia’s UNPKO in UNIFIL provides an illustration of such a country.

6.3 Other Considerations Influencing Malaysia’s UNPKO

141

6.3.2 Trade Opportunities Inevitably, economic benefits can be seen as one of the contributing factors of Malaysia’s UNPKO. According to Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysia’s fourth Prime Minister, economic benefits can be treated more as upshots because they, in a sense, form neither the foreground nor the background of Malaysia’s UNPKO (Mahathir Mohamad, personal communication, January 13, 2014). They are more by way of being complementary – i.e. they may not necessarily be the exclusive motivation for Malaysia’s UNPKO (Mahathir Mohamad, personal communication, 13 January 2014). In other words, Malaysia will take them into account, if available, and vice versa. It is also necessary to consider Malaysia’s aggressive foreign and trade policies in promoting, for example, South-South cooperation since the 1980s that might have mitigated or magnified Malaysia’s UNPKO. So far, although economic benefits appear to represent a less salient factor in Malaysia’s UNPKO, dismissing them altogether is untenable. As a case in point, up to 2003, Malaysia had deployed five contingents. From these five contingents, plus all the other operations up to 2003, Malaysia generated close to RM 4 million (RM 392,789,862.29) worth of equipment, allowances and reimbursements (Ramli Abu Bakar 2004: 154). The payment for some military equipment which Malaysia procured from Russia came in the form of a palm oil supply that to some extent also boosted the local palm oil industry (Donaldson/Nogee 2009: 331). The UNPKO in Lebanon (UNIFIL: 2007–present) has been one of the longest that a Malaysian contingent has ever served in. Over the years, Malaysia has seen its number of troops gradually increased, as per the UN request. In 2009, having passed the weapons appropriateness test by the Lebanese Army, Malaysia officially became a supplier of non-offensive weaponry and equipment for Lebanon’s military modernization programme for 2010 (Global Security n.d.). It is difficult to ascertain whether the Lebanese government’s decision could be related solely to Malaysia’s peacekeeping commitment to UNIFIL. Nonetheless, one thing is clear: that the Lebanese army became familiar with Malaysian army weapons via UNIFIL. As Table 6.6 indicates, from 1999 to 2002/2003, the value of Malaysia’s imports from some of the host countries (of UN peacekeeping), especially those to which Malaysia sent its contingents, show an upward trend. However, the trade statistics cover only a few selected Malaysian peacekeeping contingents, such as: (i) Namibia Table 6.6 The value of Malaysia’s imports from selected UNPKO host countries (1999–2003). Source Malaysia’s Statistic Department, 2004 (adapted from Ramli Abu Bakar 2004) Country/year (imports in RM)

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

The Congo

2,009,384

3,845,127

7,602,283

2,703,064

Namibia

1,172,133

932,343

2,598,101

1,661,394

8,388,727

40,547,262

64,007,521

68,252,900

73,577,468

31,065,357

1636

593,384

23,620

6,843,987

2,855,999

Cambodia Bosnia

3,839,687

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6 Malaysia’s UNPKO in the Cold War and Post-Cold War Eras

(UNTAG: 1989–1990); (ii) Bosnia (UNPROFOR: 1993–1995); (iii) The Congo (ONUC: 1960–1963); and (iv) Cambodia (UNTAC: 1992–1993). Total Malaysian imports from the Congo increased by 91% from RM 2 million in 1999 to RM 3.8 million in 2003. Namibia, likewise, recorded an import growth of 615.7% from RM 1.1 million in 1999 to RM 8.4 million in 2003. Furthermore, imports from Cambodia recorded an increase of 81.5% i.e. RM 40 million in 1999 to RM 73 million in 2002. Malaysia’s imports from Bosnia showed an exponential rise of 418,236%, i.e. from a meagre RM 1636 in 1999 to RM 6.8 million in 2003. Malaysia’s imports from Bosnia and Herzegovina comprised mainly furniture and aluminium (Prime Minister’s Office 2007). Table 6.7 shows the value of Malaysian exports to the above countries during the same time period. Malaysian exports to the Congo increased by 231%, i.e. from RM 3.3 million in 1999 to RM 10.9 million in 2003. This resulted in a growth of RM 7 million in favour of Malaysia. Similarly, Namibia recorded an increase of 396% in imports from Malaysia, i.e. from RM 11.1 million in 1999 to RM 55.1 million in 2003. This resulted in RM 44 million extra for Malaysia. This trend continues with Malaysian exports to Cambodia. In 1999, the value of Malaysia’s exports to Cambodia was RM 144.3 million. In 2003, it grew to RM 246 million, an increase of 44%, which resulted in almost RM 102 million extra for Malaysia. In 1999, Malaysia’s exports to Bosnia were worth RM 527,857 before rising to RM 3.2 million in 2002, which was an increase of about 510%. Among Malaysia’s exports to Bosnia and Herzegovina were electronics and electrical products. These figures reveal that there was an overall increasing trend in both imports and exports between Malaysia and the other countries. In terms of profit, Malaysia has been the bigger beneficiary. Pursuant to that, it can be established that Malaysia’s UNPKO might have encouraged trade between Malaysia and the Congo, Namibia and Cambodia. However, it is difficult to ascertain if the growth could single-handedly correlate to Malaysia’s UNPKO. Additionally, there were also a number of former host countries which eventually commenced economic ventures with countries other than Malaysia. A case in point is East Timor. In the immediate years following the end of the UNPKO in the country, East Timor signed a petroleum exploration joint venture with Australia (Syed Hamid Albar, personal communication, 4 December 2013), not with Malaysia. For the record, Malaysia joined all three UNPKO in East Timor (UNTAET, UNMISET Table 6.7 Value of Malaysia’s exports to selected UNPKO host countries (1999–2003). Source Malaysia’s Statistic Department, 2004 (adapted from Ramli Abu Bakar 2004) Country/year (exports in RM) The Congo Namibia Cambodia Bosnia

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

3,289,150

6,367,175

4,686,939

10,615,222

11,103,954

572,373

52,840,995

47,082,051

10,899,638 55,126,772

144,319,291

271,064,731

228,900,670

209,062,510

246,123,048

527,857

418,401

791,889

3,219,431

2,500,716

6.3 Other Considerations Influencing Malaysia’s UNPKO

143

and UNMIT). Malaysian participation, however, only came in the form of a small team of personnel, not a contingent. Australia, on the other hand, as opposed to Malaysia’s small team of peacekeepers, played a major part in INTERFRET, a regional peacekeeping operation authorized by the UN but operated by a coalition of willing countries led by Australia. Obviously, just because Malaysia joined a UNPKO in certain countries, it does not necessarily mean that Malaysia automatically became the recipient of the resulting economic advantage. Unarguably, the trade, in some ways, suggests that economic benefits are indeed some of the indirect impacts of Malaysian peacekeeping. But the opposite is just as true as well. East Timor, for example, could serve as a rebuttal. As a result, the Malaysian peacekeeping pattern suggests that it does not solely factor economic profit considerations into the equation when deciding on its deployment’s choice of conflict area, or any other areas of conflict for that matter. Thus far, it cannot be denied that economic benefits do appear to be the indirect causes and impacts of Malaysia’s UNPKO. Yet, keeping in view Malaysia’s UNPKO in its SIZ and NSIZ, the economic factor seems to be unable to significantly equal or match the significance of the other much more pronounced factors, like systemic imperatives or the perceptions of the elite, for that matter. As far as UNPKO are concerned, and prevailing international security notwithstanding, Malaysia has treated both zones equally. Apparently, neither trade nor strategic interests prove to be a salient factor for Malaysia’s UNPKO. One thing is clear, though: Malaysian activism of UNPKO in both zones has been useful in persuading states to vote in its favour regarding UNSC membership, among other things. This highlights the fact that UNPKO, for Malaysia, are more important for its own objective of securing UNSC membership (and international prestige) than for other reasons. Besides, one cannot rule out the global impact of the end of the Cold War in 1991 on the international system. Obviously, following the break-up of many clientregimes around the world, with the superpowers’ patronage withdrawn, many states began to disintegrate into political chaos and became failed states. If left unresolved, these conflicts could literally get bigger, necessitating foreign intervention with farreaching repercussions, particularly for the countries in conflict, the region and even the world in general. Arms smuggling, refugees, crimes, diseases, terrorism, genocide, humanitarian disasters and a host of many other consequential issues might eventually develop into forces with the potency to disrupt the emergent international system. All this makes UNPKO, due to their conflict-prevention objective, even more important and appealing to Malaysia. Thus, the growing number of Malaysia’s UNPKO in the post-Cold War era and the resultant UNSC votes might not have any correlation with the significance of Malaysia’s SIZ and NSIZ. In any case, region-wise, most of these post-Cold War conflicts, especially in the 1990s, took place in poor and developing countries in Africa and Asia. Interestingly, the emergence of these conflicts coincided with the beginning of Malaysia reorientating the focus of its foreign relations from the Global North (advanced states) to the Global South (poor and developing states), particularly under the fourth Prime Minister, who oversaw 76% of Malaysia’s UNPKO. In many ways, such a shift in attention underscores one of the major running themes

144

6 Malaysia’s UNPKO in the Cold War and Post-Cold War Eras

of Malaysia’s foreign relations in the 1990s, i.e. globalization (Saravanamuttu 2010: 329). Against the background of globalization, a substantial number of Malaysia’s UNPKO, especially in the post-Cold War era, were driven primarily by the Malaysian desire to play a more proactive and central role in developing countries (Kamarulnizam 2014: 163). Accordingly, UNPKO were one of the ideal means for Malaysia to assert itself in a much more direct, immediate and noticeable manner in the developing countries which inadvertently make up part of either its SIZ or NSIZ. Often, this has proved useful in building and shaping the countries’ favourable perception and image of Malaysia in the international sphere, and consequently in securing votes for a seat on the UNSC, among other things.

6.3.3 Distance and Logistics Admittedly, the geographical location of the conflict areas in relation to Malaysia also matters. UNPKO in the Americas, such as UNTMIH (Haiti), MINUGUA (Guatemala), and UNSMIH (Haiti), are some of the examples. To illustrate this, it takes more than forty hours to fly from Malaysia in Southeast Asia to Ecuador in South America. On top of the operations’ short period of time, i.e. five to six months, Malaysia does not consider it cost-effective to contribute troops to South America (Badrul Hisham Muhammad, personal communication, 10 February 2015). On the other hand, the UN also encourages the set-up of regional arrangements to “deal with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security”, provided they do not run counter to the purposes and principles of the UN (UN Charter – Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements). IFOR and SFOR by NATO during the Bosnian conflict are two examples of such regional arrangements. Accordingly, the UN would prioritize such a regional arrangement and participation thereafter from neighbouring countries above those from other continents. Nevertheless, there are cases where countries from afar have participated. As an instance, Japan was one of the Asian countries participating in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2004 (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Contribution to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations as at March 2014, 9 July 2019). But, as in the case of Malaysia, distance-wise, joining MINUSTAH is a remote possibility (Badrul Hisham Muhammad, personal communication, 10 February 2015). Another case in point is UNAMID (2009–Present, Sudan/Darfur). According to General Datuk Baharom Hamzah, Chief of Staff, Malaysia’s Joint Force Headquarters, Malaysia Ministry of Defence, the UN initially asked Malaysia to send a contingent to UNAMID Darfur (Baharom Hamzah, personal communication, 5 December 2013). In assessing the request, if Malaysia were to send a contingent to Darfur, its equipment such as the Army Personnel Carriers (APC) would have to be unloaded at Khartoum’s port. From Khartoum, the APC would have to travel 4000 km to Darfur (Baharom Hamzah, personal communication, 5 December 2013). As a simple comparison, the distance from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia to Beijing, China is 4348 km. On top of the security threat along the route, Malaysia would also have to carry its

6.3 Other Considerations Influencing Malaysia’s UNPKO

145

own fuel supply. Faced with such circumstances, the army was concerned that the Malaysian contingent would end up grappling more with its own logistic and security issues and problems than carrying out the mandate of UNAMID. Thus, a contingent would be a non-feasible alternative. In the end, Malaysia ended up sending only a small team of personnel (Baharom Hamzah, personal communication, 5 December 2013).

6.3.4 Health Risks and Facilities The threat of endemic diseases or plague also needs to be studied carefully vis-à-vis Malaysia’s UNPKO. Malaysia may not possess the relevant and necessary equipment and assets to counteract some health risks, especially with regard to controlling infectious diseases, prevention through inoculation and nurses’ training (Roslan Zahari 2002: 48). The possibility of Malaysian troops themselves contracting a disease or becoming carriers of viruses cannot be discounted either. Not only does an endemicravaged conflict area pose a great risk to Malaysian personnel, it may also compromise the integrity of the UNPKO itself. However, Malaysia may still join the respective UNPKO, albeit with a limited number of personnel. The UNPKO in Liberia (UNMIL, 2003–present), for example, was threatened by the Ebola epidemic which claimed more than 1200 lives (UN News Centre, September 11, 2014). This was one of the reasons why Malaysia sent only a small team to Liberia (UNMIL), i.e. six personnel (Malaysia Peacekeeping Training Centre n.d.: 12). Finally, facilities and amenities in some of the conflict-areas are poorly maintained. Some do not have proper roads, let alone proper logistics. As a rule of thumb, Malaysia’s assets and equipment are designed and acquired to suit Malaysia’s geographical terrain and weather. Consequently, the topography in some of the conflict-areas is neither passable nor accessible with Malaysia’s equipment. Joining a peacekeeping operation in such an area would require Malaysia to procure the relevant equipment beforehand. Such procurement, then, plus the training and familiarization process, may take a considerable time and require considerable resources. In such cases, Malaysia’s capacity to assist would be reduced. Hence Malaysia would be tempted not to join the operation. However, as a matter of fact, Malaysia has never turned down a UN peacekeeping request outright. Instead, Malaysia highlights the characteristics of the conflict and outlines its own current capacity, which effectively exempts it from participation in the respective peacekeeping (Baharom Hamzah, personal communication, 5 December 2013). Malaysian peacekeeping operations in the Congo (MINUSTAH) and Sudan (UNAMID) illustrate such problems. In the Congo (MINUSTAH), Malaysian Military Observers (MILOB) were assigned to a remote area, i.e. Masamannimba District (Malaysian Ministry of Defence n.d.). They were faced with poorly maintained and unfamiliar patrol vehicles, poor medical facilities, poor amenities, poor roads, no intranet access, no land telephone access, limited and unreliable access to satellite communication, and even widespread, contagious diseases like malaria, typhoid,

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diarrhoea and HIV (Malaysian Ministry of Defence n.d.). In the case of a vehicle breakdown, the spare parts requested could take up to fifteen hours of delivery time, while at the same time Malaysia’s MILOB also had to deal with negligent foreign MILOB and threats posed by local bandits and criminals (Malaysian Ministry of Defense n.d.). Likewise, Malaysian personnel in Sudan (UNAMID) faced similar, if not worse, circumstances. Apart from the poor roads and amenities, almost all aspects of the operation were in poor condition: fuel and water supplies, accommodation, power supply, sanitation, clothing, the serviceability of vehicles and armoured personnel vehicles, and even basic materials and stores (Malaysian Ministry of Defence n.d.). In some cases, the Malaysian team did not have enough personal protection gear, such as blue helmets and flak jackets. In addition, they also had to contend with tyres supplied without an inner tube, consistently malfunctioning water pumps, and even unserviceable faulty sewerage water treatment (Malaysian Ministry of Defence n.d.). Generally, Malaysia would have to do more with less. Yet, it is pertinent to stress the overriding fact that, as a country with limited resources, Malaysia almost always finds itself at a crossroad when it comes to choosing which UNPKO to join or the size of its participation. Although Malaysia has considered some of the problems and threats to be acceptable and manageable, at present, no objective or quantitative benchmark to specify the levels of acceptability or manageability of the problems and threats is available (Nazari Abdul Hadi, personal communication, 22 October 2013).

6.4 Conclusion Malaysia’s UNPKO demonstrate a strong link with systemic pressures, i.e. the Cold War and post-Cold War. Malaysia’s relatively low UNPKO participation during the Cold War was overshadowed by the substantial increase in its participation in the post-Cold War era. Of course, what holds true for Malaysia’s UNPKO may not necessarily be true of other states. Yet, seen from the change in the structure of power from bipolarity to unipolarity, it is apparent that the US Bloc now has the upper hand, especially on the UNSC, which has affected the way Malaysia approaches UNPKO. Other domestic factors like trade, distance, health risks and facilities can be relegated to subordinate roles. Mostly, they affect the size and nature of Malaysia’s UNPKO after the Prime Minister has made the decision to join one. After all, Malaysia has a limited number of options at its disposal when it comes to its participation or involvement in an international peacekeeping effort. Still, if the conduct, system and mechanism of UNPKO continue to be conditioned by the prevailing systemic pressure and regulated exclusively by the UNSC, they will remain firmly under the control of the major powers and the current international system, with small powers like Malaysia mostly reduced to an auxiliary role.

Source Malaysia’s National Defence Policy (2010: 14)

Appendix 1: MAP 1: Malaysia’s Strategic Interests Zone and Non-strategic Interests Zone

Appendix 1: MAP 1: Malaysia’s Strategic Interests Zone and Non-strategic Interests Zone 147

Source Adapted from Malaysia’s National Defence Policy (2010: 32)

Appendix 2: Map 2: Locations of Malaysia’s UNPKO (1960–2010)

148 6 Malaysia’s UNPKO in the Cold War and Post-Cold War Eras

Appendix 3: Malaysia’s UNPKO Fatalities in Its Strategic …

149

Appendix 3: Malaysia’s UNPKO Fatalities in Its Strategic Interests Zones Strategic Interest Zone No.

UNPKO/year/country

1

UNTAC/1992–1993/Cambodia, Southeast Asia

1

2

UNPROFOR/1993–1995/Bosnia, Europe

3

3

UNMIBH/1995/Bosnia, Europe

3

4

UNTAET/2000–2005/East Timor, Southeast Asia

2

5

UNIFIL/2007–present/Lebanon, Middle East

2

6

UNMISET/2002–2005/East Timor, Southeast Asia

1

7

UNMIT/2005–2012/East Timor, Southeast Asia

1

8

UNMIK/1999/Kosovo: Europe Total

Loss

1 14

Source United Nations: Peacekeeping: Fatalities by Nation up to 31 January (2013)

Appendix 4: Malaysia’s UNPKO Fatalities in Its Non-strategic Interests Zones

Non-Strategic Interest Zone No.

UNPKO/year/country

1

ONUC/1960–1963/The Congo, Africa

6

2

MINURSO/1991–present/Western Sahara, Africa

1

3

UNOSOM/1993–1995/Somalia, Africa

5

4

UNAMID/2009–present/Sudan – Darfur, Africa

1

5

MONUC/2000/Democratic Republic of the Congo, Africa

1

Total

Loss

14

Source United Nations: Peacekeeping: Fatalities by Nation up to 31 January (2013)

150

6 Malaysia’s UNPKO in the Cold War and Post-Cold War Eras

Appendix 5: Malaysia’s Non-participation in UNPKO According to Its Strategic Interests Zones

No.

Mission

Mission name and region/continent

Year

1

UNSF

United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea, Southeast Asia

1962–1963

2

UNYOM

United Nations Yemen Observation Mission, Middle East

1963–1964

3

UNFICYP

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, Europe

1964–present

4

UNIPOM

United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission, South Asia

1965–1966

5

UNEF II

Second United Nations Emergency Force, Israel/Egypt/Suez Canal, Middle East

1973–1979

6

UNDOF

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, Israel/Syria/Golan, Middle East

1974–present

7

UNGOMAP

United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan, South Asia

1988–1990

8

UNOMIG

United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, Europe

1993–2009

9

UNCRO

United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, Europe

1995–1996

10

UNPREDEP

United Nations Preventive Deployment Force, Macedonia, Europe

1995–1999

11

UNTAES

United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, Europe

1996–1998

12

UNMOP

United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka, Europe

1996–2002

13

UNCPSG

UN Civilian Police Support Group; Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, Europe

Jan–Oct 1998

Source United Nations (2013)

Appendix 6: Malaysia’s Non-participation in UNPKO in Its Non-strategic Interests Zones

No.

Mission

Mission name and region/continent

Year

1

DOMREP

Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in 1965–1966 the Dominican Republic, North America

2

UNAVEM I

United Nations Angola Verification Mission I, Africa

1989–1992 (continued)

Appendix 6: Malaysia’s Non-participation in UNPKO …

151

(continued) No.

Mission

Mission name and region/continent

Year

3

ONUCA

United Nations Observer Group in Central America, North America

1989–1991

4

ONUSAL

United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador, North America

1991–1995

5

UNOMUR

United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda, Africa

1993–1994

6

UNMIH

United Nations Mission in Haiti, North America

1993–1996

7

UNAMIR

United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, Africa

1993–1996

8

UNAVEM III

United Nations Angola Verification Mission III, Africa

1995–1997

9

UNSMIH

United Nations Support Mission in Haiti, North America

1997

10

MINUGUA

United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala, North 1997 America

11

UNTMIH

United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti, North America

1997

12

MIPONUH

United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti, North America

1997–2000

13

MINURCA

United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic, Africa

1998–2000

14

UNAMSIL

United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, Africa

1999–2005

15

UNOCI

United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, Africa

2004–present

16

MINUSTAH

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, North America

2004–present

17

MINURCAT

United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, Africa

2007–2010

18

MONUSCO

United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Africa

2010–present

19

UNOSOM I

United Nations Operation in Somalia I, Africa

1992–1993

Source United Nations (2013)

References Donaldson, R.H., & Nogee, J.L. (Eds.). (2009). The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems Enduring Interests. New York, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Distance Calculator. (n.d.). Retrieved 18 July from http://www.entfernungsrechner.net. Global Security. (n.d.). Malaysian Armed Forces. Retrieved 24 January 2015 from www.globalsec urity.org/military/world/malaysia/maf.htm. Henke, M.E. (2012). The International Security Cooperation Market: Coalition Building in Pursuit of Peace. PhD thesis, Princeton University, New Jersey, USA. Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (n.d.). Japan’s Contribution to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations as of March 2014. Retrieved 1 July 2015 from http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/ pdfs/contribution.pdf.

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Kamarulnizam, A. (2014). Malaysia’s Peacekeeping Operation Contributions. In C. Aoi & Y.K. Heng (Eds.), Asia Pacific Nations in International Peace Support and Stability Operations (pp. 158–161). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Malaysia Ministry of Defence. (2010). National Defence Policy. Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Haji Jantan. Malaysia Peacekeeping Training Centre. (n.d.). Malaysian Experience in Lebanon: Issues and Challenges [PDF]. Retrieved 29 January 2015 from http://www.12_UNIFIL_for_TE25_BY_MPC_ COMNDT.pdf. Malaysian Ministry of Defence. (2009, May 18). MATM/J3/3094, Jilid 18141. Malaysian Ministry of Defence. (n.d.). Royal Malaysian Navy, End of Mission Report (Limited): United Nations – African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID: 18 May 2008–31 May 2009). Mendl, W. (Ed.). (2001). Japan and Southeast Asia. New York, NY: Routledge. Paridah, Samad. (1998). Tun Abdul Razak: A Phenomenon in Malaysian Politics – A Political Biography. Kuala Lumpur: Partisan Publication. Prime Minister’s Office. (2007, June 21). Koleksi Arkib Ucapan Ketua Eksekutif: Abdullah Badawi. Retrieved 29 March 2016 from http://www.pmo.gov.my/ucapan/?m=p&p=paklah&id=3110. Ramli Abu Bakar. (2004). Peranan Malaysia Dalam Pasukan Pengaman Perubuhan Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu (PBB). MA thesis, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Roslan Zahari. (2002). Malaysia Dalam Operasi Pengaman Pertubuhan Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu (PBB): Satu Analisis. Undergraduate thesis, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Sotomayor, A.C. (2007). Unintended Consequences of Peace Operations for Troop-Contributing Countries in South America: The Cases of Argentina and Uruguay. In C. Aoi, C. de Coning, & R. Tahakur (Eds.). Unintended Consequences of UN Peacekeeping Operations. Hong Kong: UN University Press. United Nations. (n.d.). Background Note: The UN Peacekeeping [PDF]. Retrieved 1 July 2015 from https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/backgroundnote.pdf. United Nations. (n.d.). UN Charter – Chapter V: Security Council. Retrieved 1 July 2015 from http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-v. United Nations. (n.d.). UN Charter – Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements. Retrieved 1 July 2015 from https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-viii/index.html. United Nations. (2003). United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System Military Handbook [PDF]. Retrieved 4 March 2013 from: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/peacekeeping-han dbook_un_dec2003_0.pdf. United Nations. (2013). List of Peacekeeping Operations 1948–2012. Retrieved 4 March 2013 from https://read.un-ilibrary.org/peacekeeping-and-security/year-in-review-united-nationspeace-operations-2012_ed2a58d7-en#page1. United Nations News Centre. (2014, September 11). Ebola: UN Will ‘Stay the Course’ in Liberia, Peacekeeping Chief Says. Retrieved 5 July 2015 from http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp? NewsID=48693.

Chapter 7

The Interplay of Systemic-Domestic Determinants of Malaysia’s UNPKO

Abstract This chapter groups Malaysia’s UNPKO according to specific Prime Ministers before analysing the interactions between the prevailing systemic-external and domestic-internal conditions to determine the conditions under which, how and when, they influenced Malaysia’s UNPKO. Mostly, despite the Prime Ministers’ dominance over state institutions, systemic pressures still set the parameters for their decisions vis-à-vis UNPKO. This chapter observes that Tunku Abdul Rahman perceived mixed systemic pressure and high state power, making Malaysia’s participation in UNPKO likely. Tun Razak and Tun Hussein, on the other hand, perceived both systemic pressure and state power as high, making Malaysia’s UNPKO unlikely. Subsequently, both Tun Mahathir and Tun Abdullah perceived a mixture of low systemic pressure and high state power, making Malaysia’s UNPKO likely. This chapter concludes that the Prime Ministers’ perceived level of systemic pressure mostly overruled their perceived level of state power. However, at times, the Prime Ministers’ mixed or indeterminate perception of systemic pressure might cause that perception to assume the independent causal function. Keywords United Nations · Peacekeeping · International relations · International security · Malaysia’s Prime Minister · Systemic-external pressure · Domestic-internal pressure · Mahathir Mohamad · State power · Perception

7.1 Introduction With regard to Malaysia’s UNPKO, the elites, i.e. Prime Ministers, had different ways of perceiving, processing and evaluating pressures arising from the international security environment, as well as domestic pressesure, which then culminated in Malaysia’s variable response and commitment to UNPKO. Although all of them shared a similar power base that has prevailed in Malaysia since 1957, the level of state power each possessed or rather that each believed to be at their disposal is quantitatively and qualitatively different. In order to examine the impact of this, apart from data acquired from the preceding discussions, this chapter groups Malaysia’s UNPKO according to specific Prime Ministers before analysing the interactions between the

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Salleh and A. Idris, Malaysia’s United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1960–2010), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4137-1_7

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prevailing systemic-external conditions and the domestic-internal conditions to determine the conditions under which, how and when, they influenced Malaysia’s UNPKO within the six sections of the neoclassical realism table of hypotheses (H1–H6).1 The concluding section will sum up the highlights.

7.2 Malaysian Prime Ministers and UNPKO Each of the Malaysian Prime Ministers faced a multitude of different externaldomestic pressures. The degree and the extent to which the different contextual surroundings affect the Prime Ministers’ stance and decisions on UNPKO will be examined further in the succeeding sections.

7.2.1 Tunku Abdul Rahman Malaysia achieved its independence from Britain in 1957. During Tunku Abdul Rahman’s era (Tunku, 1957–1970), there were six new UNPKO. ONUC (contingent) was the only UNPKO that Malaysia joined in Tunku’s time. Statistically, it represents only 3% or one of Malaysia’s thirty-three UNPKO. Although ONUC was the first and did pave the way for Malaysia’s subsequent activism in UNPKO which has been so instrumental in maintaining the country’s status, prestige, visibility and international awareness in later years (Kamarulnizam 2014), one question remains outstanding: Why only ONUC? In Tunku’s era, besides ONUC, there were other UNPKOs. They were UNSF (West New Guinea, 1962–1963), UNYOM (Yemen, 1963–1964), UNFICYP (Cyprus, 1964–present), DOMREP (Dominican Republic, 1965–1966) and UNIPOM (India-Pakistan, 1965–1966). By region, UNSF took place in Southeast Asia, UNFICYP in Europe, UNYOM in the Middle East, DOMREP in South America and, finally, UNIPOM in South Asia. Inevitably, this warrants an analysis of the external-domestic factors that shaped Tunku’s perception vis-à-vis Malaysia’s UNPKO. Firstly, on domestic grounds, Malaysia (then Malaya) was in the midst of the British-imposed Emergency Period (1948–1960), the main objective of which was to suppress the local communist movement led by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). The MCP was attempting to seize control of Malaya from Britain following Japan’s withdrawal at the end of World War II in 1945. Before World War II, Malaya had been a colony of Britain. When Malaya gained its independence in 1957, granted by Britain, it was already into the ninth year of the Emergency Period. Three years later, i.e. 1960, the period ended. This was also the year that Malaysia’s participation in ONUC began. With regard to the local communist threat, the involvement of Britain and China (which supported the MCP) underlines the active role the major powers took in influencing 1 Appendix.

7.2 Malaysian Prime Ministers and UNPKO

155

political developments in Asia in general and in Southeast Asia in particular. Other conflicts in the region which saw such an involvement were the Chinese Civil War of 1945–1949, the first Vietnam War of 1946–1954, and the Korean War of 1950–1953 (Mohd Noor 2017). The Chinese Civil War resulted in the break-up of China into two major camps with different ideologies and respective territories. While the proCommunist camp controlled Beijing, the pro-Democracy camp took over Taipei. Likewise, the Vietnam War divided the country into two: pro-Communist to the North and pro-Democracy to the South. Similarly, the Korean War did the same to the Korean peninsula: pro-Communist to the north and pro-Democracy to the South. Again, regarding the Communist threat in Malaysia, in addition to the aforementioned Emergency Period imposed by Britain since 1948 and Britain’s AngloMalayan Defence Pact (AMDA) of 1957, the US set up a defence pact called SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) in 1954. Members include the Philippines, Thailand, France, Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the US itself (Mohd Noor 2017). In the wake of the wars in Vietnam and Korea, these two defence pacts provided Malaysia with a security patronage against invasion by a hostile foreign power, especially Communist powers. In another effort to continue suppressing Communism in Malaya and Borneo, Tunku proposed an enlargement of Malaya to include Sabah, Brunei and Sarawak on the island of Borneo and Singapore (all British colonies at the time), to be known as the Federation of Malaysia, scheduled to take place in 1963 (Mohd Noor 2017). As to be expected, the proposal received mixed reactions. While the US Bloc, via Britain, pushed for it, Indonesia strongly objected to it. Indonesia’s objection received backing from the Soviet Union. This inevitably led to Indonesia being perceived as pro-Soviet Bloc. The then Indonesian President Sukarno’s visits to Moscow in the Soviet Union and Beijing in China in 1956 substantiated such a perception (Mohd Noor 2017: 35). This perception grew stronger when Sukarno allied himself with Aidit, who was the then Chairman of the Indonesia Communist Party (CPI), which in turn had the third-largest membership of a Communist party after China and the Soviet Union (Mohd Noor 2017). With regard to the proposal of the new Federation of Malaysia, Sukarno had threatened to not let it happen, apart from his wish to make the whole of Borneo island (Sabah, Sarawak, Kalimantan and Brunei) part of Indonesia proper, by launching illicit armed confrontations or Konfrontasi against Malaysia in 1963. As part of its saboteur campaign, Indonesia sent its paramilitary elements and commandos all over Malaysia to carry out sabotage missions. Malaysia responded. As discussed in Chap. 5, in the same year, the UN elected Malaysia as one of the non-permanent members of the UNSC. In some of the UNSC meetings, Malaysia showed maps and weapons seized from Indonesian commandos to UNSC members in order to prove the existence of Indonesia’s illicit campaign of aggression against Malaysia. Faced with mounting pressure from UNSC members and those of the UN General Assembly (UNGA), Indonesia ended the campaign in 1966. The end of the campaign, by a great measure, was also the result of the overthrow of Sukarno himself by the then General Suharto on 30 September 1965 (Mohd Noor 2017: 57). The coup d’état was, in turn, facilitated by the intervention of the US, which, among other things, had blocked USD 400 million of military and economic aid to Indonesia in 1964

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(Mohd Noor 2017: 69). The US even provided Malaysia with military training and financial assistance to counter the Indonesian confrontation (Ott 1971: 69). Altogether, all these pro-Communism and anti-Communism efforts show that the major powers were interested in shaping the political developments in Southeast Asia. Up to an extent, such activity also highlighted Malaysia’s relatively weak power position, as far as the regional power structure was concerned. In many ways, AMDA and SEATO were able to help Malaysia strengthen its national security and protect its territorial integrity from direct foreign aggression. Receiving strong support from the major powers with regard to its domestic security prompted Malaysia under Tunku to return the favour and to prove its alliance with the pro-US Bloc by, among other things, contributing 3,000 troops to join ONUC. As previously stated, Tunku joined only one UNPKO, and did not join the other five. As a small power already engaged in ONUC (1960–1963), it was not technically or financially feasible for Malaysia to join UNSF in 1962 or UNYOM in 1963. The events of 1963 were other important factors vis-à-vis Malaysia’s UNPKO for at least four reasons. Firstly, it was the year Malaysia concluded its participation in ONUC, in which it suffered the loss of six troops. This number of casualties is the highest so far in Malaysia’s UNPKO history. Secondly, it was the year that the formation of the new, expanded Federation of Malaysia took place. Thirdly, it was the year that Indonesia’s confrontation began. Fourthly, it was the year that Malaysia, for the first time, joined the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a nonpermanent member for a two-year term, evenly shared with Czechoslovakia. The year of 1963 was obviously a tense and busy year for Tunku. With all this in mind, it was only logical that Malaysia did not join UNSF (1962–1963) or UNYOM (1963– 1964). Subsequently, from 1963 to 1966, Malaysia was occupied with the Indonesian confrontation. Having already sent 3000 of its troops to ONUC, Malaysia needed to focus on dealing with the Indonesian confrontation. Again, with such a focus, it was not technically or financially feasible for Malaysia to join UNFICYP, which began in 1964, or DOMREP and UNIPOM, which began in 1965. On the domestic front, being the first Prime Minister and the pioneer of Malaysia’s structure and orientation as a state, Tunku enjoyed considerable power as far as the state institutions and their interactions with the Prime Minister were concerned. Firstly, as the first Prime Minister, Tunku’s perceptions and value system invariably set the general substance and form of Malaysia’s foreign policy. In fact, the perceptions and values of Malaysian Prime Ministers were (and are) the most influential determinant of Malaysia’s foreign policy (Ott 1971). As such, it is not surprising that some of the ministries, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, acted more like a spokesperson for the Prime Minister (Ott 1971), all the more so since Tunku was usually also the first Minister of Foreign Affairs (then the Ministry of External Affairs). His only separate foreign minister, Tun Dr Ismail Rahman, served for only a year (1959–1960). As such, with Tunku mostly holding both posts, he enjoyed the freedom to determine the orientation and focus of Malaysia’s policy, both domestic and foreign. Yet, Tunku’s era also shows a degree of appreciation for the views of the legislative body. As an instance, Tunku allowed ONUC to be discussed in Parliament. Nevertheless, it was the only parliamentary debate on UNPKO that ever took

7.2 Malaysian Prime Ministers and UNPKO

157

place among Malaysia’s legislative body. The parliamentary debate ultimately did not stand in the way of Malaysia’s participation in ONUC anyway. True to form, Tunku enjoyed substantial power vis-à-vis the state institutions as far as UNPKO were concerned. Assessment of the civil society of the day vis-à-vis Malaysia’s UNPKO is a bit complicated, particularly as there was only one UNPKO that Malaysia joined during Tunku’s era. However, if the Malaysian civil society movement since independence is anything to go by, it might be able to offer some valuable insights into Tunku’s stance vis-à-vis UNPKO. In general, Malaysian civil society activism encompasses a range of issues, which include, but are not limited to, anti-colonialism, social justice and even religious sentiment (Case 2015). Anti-colonialism vandals or attacks, for example, have largely centred on US interests. However, these occurred mostly after ONUC ended in 1963. For example, the anti-US rally led by the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee vandalized the US Information Service Library in 1964 (Saravanamuttu 2010: 334). The civil society movement also staged hostile receptions against the US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and the US President himself, who visited Malaysia in 1965 and 1966 respectively (Saravanamuttu 2010). As far as ONUC was concerned, the extant literature shows that there was no opposition by civil society to the decision over ONUC, despite the fact that the Parliament did deliberate on it. Thus, since the state institutions and civil society did not pose significant objections to Malaysia’s participation in ONUC, Tunku found it relatively comfortable to decide in favour of ONUC. Based on the stipulated global and regional international security environments and th domestic scene, the external-internal nexus of Tunku’s era vis-à-vis UNPKO agrees with Hypothesis 3 (H3). Holding Tunku’s perception of state power as constant, i.e. high, Tunku had a mixed perception of pressure from the international security environment. The mixed perception has two stages. The first stage refers to the immediate years following Malaysia’s independence in 1957. The second stage refers to the immediate years following the formation of the new Federation of Malaysia in 1963. In the first stage, although China extended its support to MCP, the US and Britain moderated it by providing Malaysia with substantial financial assistance and security assistance, which proved to be instrumental in Malaysia’s survival and territorial integrity. On the one hand, Tunku had to deal with the Chinese threat. On the other, Tunku had assurance from Britain and the US of Malaysia’s security. With these serving as the prevailing international security backgrounds, Tunku was bound to have had a mixed perception of the systemic pressure. On the one hand, this indeterminate level of systemic pressure endowed Tunku with the power and authority to decide in favour of joining ONUC. On the other, UNPKO provided a platform for Tunku, as a pro-West supporter all along, to prove and justify Malaysia’s alliance with the US Bloc. During the second stage, in specific reference to the formation of Malaysia in 1963, Indonesia’s objection brought considerably more complex dynamics to the international security environment in the region. Primarily, the Indonesian confrontation precipitated the involvement of the Soviet Union. By now, Malaysia had an additional rival major power to contend with, apart from China. Unlike the first stage

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in which Malaysia had only China’s support for the local Communist insurgency to deal with, the second stage saw Malaysia needing to deal with the Soviet Union’s support for Indonesia’s objection. With both China and the Soviet Union entering the fray, Malaysia’s security concerns were abated and moderated by the security patronage provided by Britain and the US. In other words, the major powers of the US Bloc continued to provide a measured security support for Malaysia. The combination of these complicated systemic pressures probably generated mixed or indeterminate systemic pressure for Tunku once again. However, unlike the first stage in which Malaysia joined ONUC, Tunku did not find it feasible for Malaysia to join the other five UNPKO, especially since the Indonesian confrontation was at its peak. The indeterminate level of systemic pressures helps to highlight a neoclassical realism proposition that although the Prime Minister’s perception mostly assumes a mitigating function as far as a foreign policy strategy is concerned, the Prime Ministers can also assume the independent causal function, depending on the level and type of the enabling surrounding situations (Lai 2008: 63) – in Tunku’s case, the indeterminate level of systemic pressure. Having mentioned that, this situation also corresponds to the neoclassical realism perspective that the Prime Minister’s evaluation of the prevailing international security environment is not necessarily objective, but depends on different temporal and contextual considerations, resulting in Prime Ministers being able to behave accordingly, i.e. even to the extent of assuming an independent, causal role (Sterling-Folker 1997: 22).

7.2.2 Tun Abdul Razak and Tun Hussein Onn During the eras of Tun Razak and Tun Hussein, Malaysia did not join any UNPKO. During Tun Razak’s era, Malaysia did not join two UNPKOs, i.e. UNEF II (Second United Nations Emergency Force in Sinai, Middle East 1973–1979) and UNDOF (United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, Middle East 1974–present). In Tun Hussein’s era, Malaysia did not join one UNPKO, i.e. UNIFIL (Lebanon, 1978– present). On the international front, prior to 1969, a bipolar power structure between the US and the Soviet Union generally characterized the world’s international security environment. However, in the Asia Pacific region, an important development took place in 1969 when the US adopted the ‘Guam Doctrine’ that resulted in its more open foreign policy towards China (Mohd Noor 2017: 72). Consequently, the relations between the US and China began to get closer and the relations between the Soviet Union and China began to deteriorate, primarily from both competing for individual spheres of influence in the Indo-China region. Countries in the Indo-China region were generally either pro-Soviet or pro-China. For example, Vietnam was pro-Soviet while Cambodia was pro-China. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and China’s invasion of Vietnam in 1979 worsened the already fractious relations (Mohd Noor 2017: 97). The US took advantage of this friction and the already worsening situation between the Soviet Union and China, taking into consideration the US’s impending loss in the second Vietnam War, to

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support China’s admission to the UNSC in 1972. The visit of Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State, to China the year before, i.e. 1971, preceded the Chinese admission to the UNSC. Later, the US President, Richard Nixon, visited China in 1972. The Chinese President, Deng Xiaoping, reciprocated the US approach, which culminated in his maiden visit to the US in 1979. Correspondingly, Tun Razak took heed of the changing international security environment and made his first visit to China in 1974. As mentioned in Chap. 3, Tun Razak introduced a changed foreign policy orientation known as the ‘Policy of Equidistance’ to take advantage of the current state of US-China relations by getting Malaysia more involved in regional and international organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (Mohd Noor 2017: 150). Established in 1967, ASEAN had a number of objectives. Initially, through ASEAN, member countries sought to protect their common regional security interests, apart from efforts to spur the growth of technological, cultural and educational collaboration between them. Despite the explicit goals, ASEAN was more a collective strategy by the founding members to contain the spread of Communism (Mohd Noor 2017: 71). Later, ASEAN played an instrumental role in Malaysia’s foreign policy and the regional security environment. For example, in 1971, ASEAN endorsed the establishment of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) that complemented Tun Razak’s policy of neutrality. ZOPFAN represents the ASEAN wish to turn the region into a nuclear-free zone and, most important of all, keep it free from major wars between major powers. In the same year, Malaysia joined NAM. As a movement, NAM seeks, among other things, to avoid nuclear war and the polarization of states according to ideology blocs, i.e. pro-Communism or pro-Democracy. Many new Asian and African countries joined NAM in support of its neutralism. In addition to that, in 1976 ASEAN held its first summit in Bali, Indonesia. The summit led to the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which calls for peaceful resolution of conflict among member countries and non-ASEAN states. These organizations, movement, treaties and initiatives all point towards the goal of achieving neutrality and peaceful coexistence among states of different ideologies. While this reflects ASEAN and NAM’s fear of an all-out war between the major powers, it also forms the basis of Malaysia’s foreign policy under Tun Razak, which in turn testifies to the high systemic-external pressure Malaysia was facing during his time. On the domestic front, having addressed Malaysia’s international and regional security concerns, Tun Razak focused more on pressing domestic issues, such as developing Malaysia’s national economy, improving national education, intensifying the fight against local insurgency, and bolstering the people’s unity. These domestic concerns were badly damaged by Malaysia’s first racial clash on 13 May 1969, a year before Tunku resigned. Like Tunku, Tun Razak simultaneously held the posts of Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister, except in his final year, when he appointed Tengku Ahmad Rithaudeen as the Malaysian Foreign Minister in 1975. Tengku Ahmad continued to hold the post well into the entire five-year premiership era of Tun Hussein Onn, i.e. 1975–1981. Such a continuation of the state institutions structure, and the resultant state power, meant that Tun Razak inherited quite a

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considerable degree of power. In relation to this, the question arises as to why he did not join two newly authorized UNPKO during his time, i.e. UNEF II (Second United Nations Emergency Force in Sinai, 1973–1979) and UNDOF (United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, 1974–present). The primary objectives of both UNPKOs were to separate Egypt, Israel and Syria, which went to war in 1973 over control of the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights. While Syria was invariably one of the key Soviet allies in the region, Israel and Egypt were key allies of the US. Additionally, as mentioned in Chap. 4, the UN sent nine UNPKO to the Middle East during the Cold War, three of which are still running, i.e. UNTSO (Egypt, 1948– present), UNDOF (Syria, 1974–present) and UNIFIL (Lebanon, 1978–present) (UN, List of Peacekeeping Operations 1948–2012). Other than the nine UNPKO, no new UNPKO were sent to the Middle East. This underlines the strategic importance of the Middle East and the countries therein to the Soviet Union (later Russia) and the US. Non-participation in either UNPKO to some extent complemented and corroborated Malaysia’s neutrality or Equidistant Policy under Tun Razak. With national resources all optimized to rebuild the nation following the racial clash, and to suppress the local insurgency in order to secure its national interests on domestic fronts, it was only logical that Tun Razak did not prioritize UNPKO. Much the same can be said of Tun Hussein Onn, who came to power following Tun Razak’s death in 1976. Seen from the perspective of state power, like his two predecessors, with not much change in the way he administered the country, Tun Hussein exerted quite strong control over state institutions and civil society, hence his continuation with Tun Razak’s regional and domestic focus. During Tun Hussein’s time, as mentioned in Chap. 3, there was only one new UNPKO, i.e. UNIFIL in Lebanon, authorized in 1978. Since UNIFIL took place in the Middle East, it involved key interests of both the Soviet Union and the US. Thus, apart from his preference for continuing with Tun Razak’s foreign policy, his ailing health and preoccupation with regional and domestic issues also prompted him to not to prioritize UNPKO. Major powers like China took note of Malaysia’s stance under Tun Hussein. Four years after Tun Abdul Razak’s visit to China in 1974, China visited Kuala Lumpur in 1978. Tun Hussein then made a state visit to the Soviet Union from 20 to 25 September 1979 (Buszynski 2013: 230). In both visits, Tun Hussein Onn emphasized Malaysia’s desire for the major powers to be cognizant of Malaysia’s (and ASEAN’s) neutrality policy (Hishamuddin 2012). This neutrality policy, in many ways, is also indicative of the high level of systemic pressure that Malaysia was facing. It was only sensible that, as a small power, Malaysia did not want to get itself entangled in the major powers’ tussle for influence in the region. In other words, with the bipolar world at its peak, both Tun Razak and Tun Hussein believed that Malaysia simply could not replicate Tunku’s policy of an overtly pro-West stance, leaving neutrality as the most feasible and logical course of action for Malaysia, as far as its foreign policy was concerned. Putting Malaysia in the middle ground, having visited and expressed their stance to the Communist powers, Tun Razak and Tun Hussein definitely perceived a high level of systemic pressure. The preceding discussion of prevailing systemic-domestic environments facing both Tun Razak and Tun Hussein thus agrees with this study’s Hypothesis

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2 (H2). That is, while both held a high level of state power, they also perceived a high level of systemic pressure. With both state power and systemic pressure being high, it was unlikely that Malaysia would join a UNPKO. More than ever, this also represents the conditioning, causal factor and influence of the Cold War rivalry on a small power’s behaviour. This once again affirms Malaysia’s relatively weak power position in the international arena. Keeping in view the high systemic-external pressure, though both Tun Razak and Tun Hussein had inherited a high level of state power, they both chose to focus more on pursuing domestic goals, and consequently decided not to join any UNPKO.

7.2.3 Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad Tun Dr Mahathir’s era spanned twenty-two years, during which Malaysia joined twenty-five UNPKO and did not join sixteen. Such participation equals 76% of Malaysia’s thirty-three UNPKO that covered almost all regions of the world, including the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia and Europe. These numbers substantially contrast with those of Tun Dr Mahathir’s predecessors, and those of his successors. What motivated this? How and in what context did he make the decisions to join UNPKO? On the international front, Tun Dr Mahathir’s predecessors had laid firm foundations and defined a clear posture and orientation for Malaysia’s foreign policy. Invariably, the most fundamental aspect of it was (is) the neutrality approach that enabled Malaysia to focus firstly on its domestic needs, followed by regional affairs and then global issues. In order to address its domestic needs, the Prime Minister was well aware that regional and global needs should come hand in hand with those of the domestic sphere. Thus, ASEAN’s important initiatives like ZOPFAN and TAC jointly represent and address the region’s collective security concern. This concern, in turn, primarily stems from the changing dynamics of the prevailing international security environment. The following two phases of the international security environment make up the international security backgrounds vis-à-vis Malaysia’s UNPKO during the era of Tun Dr Mahathir, namely: (i) the closing years of the Cold War, i.e. 1981–1990, and (ii) the early post-Cold War years, i.e. 1991–2003. Both represent the transitional phases of a bipolar world ending and a unipolar world beginning.

7.2.3.1

First Phase

During this phase, Malaysia joined seven UNPKOs: UNIIMOG (Iran/Iraq), 1988– 1991; UNTAG (Namibia), 1989–1990 (Contingent); UNSOGI (Iraq), 1990–1991; UNIKOM (Iraq/Kuwait), 1991–2003; MINURSO (Western Sahara), 1991–present; UNAVEM II (Angola), 1991–1995; and UNAMIC (Cambodia), 1991–1992. These Malaysian UNPKOs took place between 1988 and 1991. This period was a critical phase of the Cold War in which the Soviet Union, and hence the bipolar world,

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was showing signs of a breakdown. Pursuant to that, many pro-Soviet states began to disintegrate, culminating in various intra-state conflicts and inter-state wars. The Bosnian conflict and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait were two of the most notable intra-state and inter-state conflicts during this first phase. For some, the disintegration relates to two key events. Firstly, in 1983–1984, the sudden plunge of petroleum prices and the massive drop in its crops badly affected the Soviet Union’s economic prowess (Hsiung 1993: 2). The twin fall brought about a chain of reactions across the Soviet Union’s economy that eventually caused its military and economic strength to deteriorate significantly. Secondly, the internal leadership crisis which culminated in Michael Gorbachev assuming leadership of the Soviet Union in March 1985 also played a role. Upon taking power, Gorbachev introduced a number of measures and reforms, i.e. glasnost (political openness) and perestroika (economic restructuring). However, both reforms failed, resulting in protracted shortages and the rationing of goods and food across the Soviet Union (History 2011).

7.2.3.2

Second Phase

During the second phase, Malaysia joined eighteen UNPKO, namely UNPROFOR (Bosnia), 1992–1995 (Contingent); UNTAC (Cambodia), 1992–1993 (Contingent); ONUMOZ (Mozambique), 1992–1994; UNOSOM II (Somalia II), 1993–1995 (Contingent); UNOMIL (Liberia), 1993–1997; UNMLT (Cambodia), 1993–1994; UNASOG (Libya/Chad), 1994; UNSGRC (Cambodia), 1994–1995; UNMOT (Tajikistan), 1994–2000; UNMIBH (Bosnia), 1995–2002; MONUA (Angola), 1997–1999; UNAMA (Afghanistan), 1998–1999; UNMIK (Kosovo), 1999–present; UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone), 1999–2005; UNTAET (East Timor), 1999–2003; MONUC (Congo), 1999–2000; UNMEE (Ethiopia and Eritrea), 2000–2008; and UNMISET (East Timor) 2002–2005. All of these Malaysian UNPKO began in 1992 – about a year after the official dissolution of the Soviet Union as a state, paving the way for the emergence of the US as the sole superpower, i.e. the unipolar world. While the dissolution of the Soviet Union gave rise to a number of new Eastern Europe states like Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Belarus and Moldova, the dissolution of one of its former client-states – Yugoslavia – resulted in the emergence of new states in the Balkans, like Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. Unlike former Soviet Union states, the emergence of these new Balkan states came with intra-state conflicts from 1992 to 1995. Following the conflict, the UN authorized UNPROFOR in Bosnia in 1992. In Africa, the pro-Soviet regime in Somalia was also facing internal conflicts which led to its fall, quickly plunging the country into civil war. In response to the civil war, the UN authorized UNOSOM I (1992) and UNOSOM II (1993). In Southeast Asia, the Soviet’s fading power also affected Vietnam. Following its Soviet-supported occupation of Cambodia in 1979, it began to withdraw and left the country in 1989. The vacuum of power in Cambodia led the country into chaos, leading to the signing of the Paris Treaty in 1991 that opened the way for the authorization of UNTAC in

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1992. In short, the Soviet Union’s political and economic crises in the 1980s and early 1990s substantially caused its own fall in 1991. The US, on the contrary, remained stable and strong. In short, the second transitional phase that saw the worldwide adverse effects of a disintegrated Soviet Union led to a substantial increase in conflicts, which subsequently necessitated the corresponding increase in UNPKO. On the domestic front, Tun Dr Mahathir did not also hold the post of Foreign Minister. In fact, Tun Dr Mahathir had five Foreign Ministers, including his would-be successor, Tun Abdullah Badawi. Malaysia’s foreign policy under Tun Dr Mahathir saw a number of significant developments. But, as in the case of his predecessors, the Foreign Ministry acted more like his spokesperson and the executive. Most of the time, the Foreign Ministry was more like an extension of the Prime Minister’s Office (Ahmad Kamil 2013: 219). As far as Malaysia’s foreign policy is concerned, as mentioned in Chap. 3, Tun Dr Mahathir introduced the ‘Concentric Circles of Interests’ (Shanti 1997), ‘Prosper Thy Neighbours’ and ‘Look East’ policies, among other things. Following the Prime Minister’s focus on these policies, developing countries, including those in Eastern Europe, became his subject of interest. Having reorientated Malaysia’s foreign policy posture, he maintained that there was a need for Malaysia to look after the developing countries’ needs and concerns. This was achieved through the subsequent Malaysian UNPKO in these countries that, among other things, helped to establish and consolidate diplomatic relations. UNPKO also allowed Malaysia to gather more information about the hostcountries’ political and economic conditions. Should an opportunity for trade arise, for example, Malaysia would study the feasibility of it. However, Malaysia treated the economic aspect of UNPKO as complementary (Mahathir Mohamad, personal communication, 13 January 2014). That is, should there be no such opportunity; Malaysia would still have sent its UNPKO, if the conditions permitted. For that reason, UNPKO became one of the ideal means for Malaysia to assert itself in a more direct, immediate and noticeable manner among the developing countries. This was obviously useful in building and shaping the countries’ favourable perception and image of Malaysia. In addition to that, the diplomatic relations paved the way for the leaders to get to know each other personally (Mahathir Mohamad, personal communication, 13 January 2014). These good personal relations later proved to be central to Malaysia’s UNPKO. Accordingly, Tun Dr Mahathir welcomed the UN’s requests for Malaysia’s UNPKO in those countries thereafter (Mahathir Mohamad, personal communication, 13 January 2014). For example, despite the considerable financial and logistical implications, Malaysia proceeded to join UNPKO in Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia and Africa, namely UNPROFOR in Bosnia, 1992–1995 (Contingent); UNTAC in Cambodia, 1992–1993 (Contingent); and UNOSOM II in Somalia, 1993–1995. Three began in 1992 while one began in 1993. In relation to the aforementioned good personal relations, Tun Dr Mahathir highlighted the fact that he personally received requests from Omar Bashir of Sudan and Rafiq Hariri of Lebanon for Malaysia to join UNPKO in their respective countries (Mahathir Mohamad, personal communication, 13 January 2014). Rival leaders of Somalia, i.e. General Mohamad Farrah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, also personally asked Tun Dr Mahathir to mediate

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in their conflict in Somalia (Ahmad Kamil 2013: 194). As a result, Malaysia joined the UNPKO in Lebanon, Sudan and Somalia. For the record, Malaysia did not join UNIFIL until 2006. However, the feasibility study was initiated by the fourth Prime Minister (1981–2003). In relation to UNPROFOR (Bosnia), in an interview Tun Dr Mahathir stated that he believes that the Serbians had been deliberately targeting the Bosnians. Calling it genocide, Tun Dr Mahathir argued that Malaysia had a responsibility to join UNPROFOR in order to help the Bosnians (Mahathir Mohamad, personal communication, 13 January 2014). Despite the UN initially not extending an invitation to Malaysia to be part of UNPROFOR, due in part to Serbia’s early reservations about Malaysia’s participation, Malaysia persistently asked to join it. Eventually, when the UN approved Malaysia’s request, due, among other reasons, to the growing international support for Malaysia’s participation (elaborated further in the following sections), it sent a contingent to join UNPROFOR. As far as Malaysia’s UNPKO are concerned, UNPROFOR was an exceptional case, primarily as Malaysia had to ask to participate in it. This contrasted with all of Malaysia’s other UNPKOs, which Malaysia was invited to join by the UN (Mahathir Mohamad, personal communication, 13 January 2014). Later, Malaysia even financed its participation in the subsequent NATO-led peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, i.e. IFOR (1995–1997) and SFOR (1997–1998), after UNPROFOR ended in 1995. Overall, Malaysian troops stayed in Bosnia forsix years. Apart from sending troops to join UNPROFOR, Malaysia also initiated Project Scarecrow in 1992. Essentially, this project had two objectives: (i) a diplomatic offensive in the West and (ii) gathering military assistance for Bosnia. Through this project, Malaysia wanted to attract as much interest as possible from the international community to pressurise the UN to address the Bosnian conflict effectively. In order to shape and correct perceptions of the said conflict, Malaysia hosted an international conference of World Members of Parliament on Bosnia in Kuala Lumpur from 22 to 23 January 1994 (Laith 1994). It attracted sixty representatives from thirty countries and culminated in a declaration for Bosnian Conflict Resolution (Laith 1994). This project also involved paid protests at the UN Headquarters in Geneva, the formation of the pro-Bosnia international donors-group, the organization of international conferences, forums and meetings, and even military assistance, including the supply of light weapons and anti-tank guns to Bosnia (Ahmad Kamil 2013). Malaysia, on its own, also provided financial aid and scholarships for Bosnian students and even single-handedly brought 300 Bosnian refugees into the country (Shanti 1997: 254). Malaysia also led the campaign to block the re-election of the current UN Secretary-General (UN-SG) for his appalling response to the Bosnian crisis (Razali 2014: 299). Acting on the orders of Tun Dr Mahathir himself, Razali Ismail, then Malaysian Permanent Representative to the UN, submitted a memo calling for the resignation of UN-SG, Boutros-Boutros Ghali to the UN Development Programme (UNDP) Regional Representative, Carl-Erik Wiberg (Salmi 2007: 37). Malaysian advocacy concerning the Bosnian conflict eventually exerted enough pressure for the UN to pass a resolution on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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Along a similar line of reasoning, Malaysia also joined UNOSOM II. For the record, Somalia proved to be one of the most dangerous UNPKOs for Malaysia. Malaysia lost five of its personnel, making it the second-most lethal operation in a single UNPKO after ONUC in 1960–1963. In fact, UNOSOM was the last operation to which Malaysia sent a contingent during Tun Dr Mahathir’s era. Nonetheless, Malaysia continued to support the Somalis’ cause even after the UN terminated UNOSOM II in 1995. In the same year, on a diplomatic level, Malaysia initiated Operation Morning Glory, which lasted for three years, i.e. 1995–1997. Through this operation – as requested by the rival leaders in Somalia themselves – Malaysia acted as an intermediary to bring them to the meeting table (Syed Hamid Albar, personal communication, 4 December 2013). Malaysia’s diplomat, Ahmad Kamil was the central figure in this operation. For two years, Ahmad travelled back and forth between Mogadishu and Kuala Lumpur in order to meet and persuade both parties to meet for a peace talk in Kuala Lumpur. Malaysia successfully brought the rival parties to Kuala Lumpur on 4 June 1997. Both then signed a broad framework on agreement in the Malaysian capital. However, upon their return to Somalia, both were immediately engaged in civil war again. Following the war, realizing that its effort had failed, Malaysia terminated Operation Morning Glory (Ahmad Kamil 2013). Despite the failure, the operation speaks volumes for the extent to which Malaysia would have gone to in order to help the Somalis’ cause. As far as the other UNPKOs that Malaysia did not join are concerned, Tun Dr Mahathir highlights the absence of invitations from the UN as one of the key factors (Mahathir Mohamad, personal communication, 13 January 2014). Those UNPKOs include, among others, UNMIL (Liberia), 1993–1999; UNASOG (Chad/Libya), 1994; UNOMSIL (Sierra Leone), 1999–2005; MONUC (Democratic Republic of the Congo), 2000; UNIMEE (Ethiopia-Eritrea), 2000–2008; and UNOB (Burundi), 2004–2006. However, UNAMIR (Rwanda, 1993–1996) was an exception. Malaysia made it clear that it did not wish to join UNAMIR due to the unclear mandate, i.e. the lack of authority to enforce the mandate (Razali 2014: 299). Tun Dr Mahathir also emphasized that even if Malaysia had been more willing to participate, it would have still had to refuse since it already had a few UNPKO running concurrently. Apart from logistical problems and the non-availability of troops due to other UNPKO, Malaysia had to consider its fiscal constraints. In fact, some of the UNPKO forced Malaysia to issue defence budget supplements that caused a deficit in its national budget. Besides, with participation in UNPKO being voluntary, Malaysia’s non-participation in some UNPKO might have helped it to avoid overstretching its capacity to the detriment of its own defence needs (Mahathir Mohamad, personal communication, 13 January 2014). Touching on the role of state institutions vis-àvis Malaysia’s UNPKO, Tun Dr Mahathir argues that, as opposed to the Parliamentary debate over ONUC during Tunku’s era, there was no legal requirement for the Prime Minister to consult Parliament. What Tunku did was, in fact, down to his own courtesy. Therefore, Tun Dr Mahathir never requested parliamentary approval for Malaysia’s UNPKO. With regard to the role of the ministries involved, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence, Tun Dr Mahathir relates that both

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ministries were instrumental in carrying out the feasibility study for a UNPKO. Yet, the final decision still had to come from the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) i.e. be made by the Prime Minister. That is why, should the Prime Minister decide in favour of a UNPKO, the two ministries would have to find a way to make it happen, and also why the Cabinet Paper mentioned in Chap. 5 needs to leave room for the Prime Minister’s prerogative to take effect. Nevertheless, Tun Dr Mahathir never overruled the ministries’ recommendations during his era. Based on the stipulated systemic-external and domestic-internal pressures, Malaysia’s UNPKO during Tun Dr Mahathir’s era agree with this study’s Hypothesis 1 (H1). In view of the transitional phases of the international security environment, Tun Dr Mahathir perceived a low level of systemic pressure vis-à-vis UNPKO. The decisions made by Tun Dr Mahathir also indicate Malaysia’s relatively weak power position at international level, as Malaysia’s UNPKO generally reflected its pro-US approach. Additionally, although the major powers neither interfered nor applied any kind of pressure on the Prime Minister’s decision-making over UNPKO (Mahathir Mohamad, personal communication, 13 January 2014), Malaysia’s visibly small capability forced it to consistently subordinate its participation to its military and economic standing. On another note, having emphasized his own personal conviction and the prerogative power of the PMO to decide over a UNPKO, Tun Dr Mahathir apparently perceived the level of his state power to be high. Consequently, the combination of a low level of systemic pressure and a high level of state power resulted in Malaysia’s active participation in numerous UNPKO during the era of Tun Dr Mahathir.

7.2.4 Tun Abdullah Badawi Just as Tun Razak, Tun Hussein and Tun Dr Mahathir benefited from their predecessors’ policies, so did Tun Abdullah Badawi. However, like his immediate predecessor, Tun Abdullah did not simultaneously hold the two posts of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. He had two foreign ministers, i.e. Syed Hamid Albar (1999–2008) and Rais Yatim (2008–2009). To an extent, Abdullah’s leadership resembled that of Tun Hussein Onn. Among other things, he sustained and expanded Malaysia’s nonaligned and ‘Concentric Circles of Interest’ approach (Paridah 2008: 94). Mostly, as a small power, Tun Abdullah’s premiership sought to sustain pragmatism in Malaysia’s foreign policy. As Malaysia was entering the second decade of the post-Cold War era (post2001), Tun Abdullah accelerated the pace of the country’s growing international prestige and, to some extent, its soft power, which remains crucial for Malaysia’s international leadership or middlepowermanship aspiration on the international stage (Paridah 2008: 95). This resulted, among other things, in Tun Abdullah’s continuing support for UNPKO (Paridah 2008). With regard to Malaysia’s UNPKO, Tun Abdullah authorized seven of Malaysia’s thirty-three UNPKO. This participation rate is equivalent to 21% participation. Meanwhile, as far as ten UNPKOs during his era are concerned, Tun Abdullah recorded 70% participation (seven out

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of ten). Tun Abdullah’s UNPKO were UNMIL (Liberia), 2003–present; UNIFIL (Lebanon), 2006–present (Contingent); UNMIN (Nepal), 2007–present; UNMIT (Timor Leste), 2005–2012; UNOB (Burundi), 2004–2006; UNMIS (Sudan), 2009– 2011; and UNAMID (Sudan/Darfur), 2009–present. Malaysia did not join three UNPKO, namely UNOCI (Côte d’Ivoire), 2004–present; MINUSTAH (Haiti), 2004– present; and MINURCAT (Central African Republic and Chad), 2007–2010. Obviously, the post-Cold War era afforded states, especially those of the pro-US Bloc, the opportunity to pursue their interests in areas or regions that used to be beyond their reach. As such, since the US Bloc has always dominated UNPKO, Malaysia benefited accordingly. Yet, in view of the prevailing condition of the international security environment, especially with Russia now taking the place of the Soviet Union on the UNSC, Malaysia was also careful not to disrupt the prevailing unipolar power operation. As an instance, with reference to UNPROFOR in Bosnia, Malaysia showed its attentiveness to Serbian concerns, as a party to the on-going conflict in Bosnia, in deference to the fact that Serbia was Russia’s ally in Europe. Upsetting Russian interests could, in many ways, harm Malaysia’s UNPKO because Russia, as one of the P-5 on the UNSC, has the capacity to block a state’s participation in UNPKO. For the record, Russia did initially block Turkey’s participation in UNPROFOR, although later it reversed this. In relation to Malaysia’s participation in UNIFIL in Lebanon, the initial concerns of Israel and Hezbollah (two of the belligerent parties in the Lebanese conflict) over Malaysia’s impartiality were mitigated by two factors. Firstly, Malaysia’s commitment to support US-led IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia convinced the US (and then Israel) of Malaysia’s professionalism in UNPKO. As a result, the UN eventually invited Malaysia to participate in UNIFIL in 2006. Secondly, as mentioned in the preceding section, the Lebanese Prime Minister personally asked Malaysia to join UNIFIL when Tun Abdullah’s predecessor was still in power. Such a request resonated well with the UN’s policy of prioritizing the host country’s consent over the wish of participating countries to join a UNPKO. However, Malaysia was only able to join UNIFIL three years after Tun Dr Mahathir stepped down. Likewise, as mentioned earlier, Malaysia’s UNPKO in Sudan – i.e. UNMIS (Sudan), 2009–2011, and UNAMID (Sudan/Darfur), 2009– present – resulted from a request by the Sudanese leader, Omar Bashir, for Malaysia to participate in the UNPKO in Sudan (Paridah 2008). In fact, Omar himself spent a few years as a student at Malaysia’s military college, which was pivotal in his request for Malaysia’s participation in the UNPKO (Paridah 2008). Similarly, despite Timor Leste’s initial concerns about Malaysia’s impartiality on account of its close relations with Indonesia as Timor’s former colonial power, Malaysia eventually joined UNMIT in Timor Leste in 2005. Again, this was essentially a continuation of Malaysia’s two UNPKO to the same country during the era of Tun Dr Mahathir, i.e. UNTAET (East Timor) in 1999–2003 and UNMISET (East Timor) in 2002–2005. Due to the impartiality shown by Malaysian troops during those two operations, the Timor Leste leaders’ fears concerning Malaysia’s possible bias receded. Consequently, Timor Leste invited Malaysia to participate in UNMIT in 2005. It even asked Malaysia to help train its police and army as part of its nation-rebuilding efforts, and Malaysia duly obliged (Paridah 2008).

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As for the three UNPKOs that Malaysia did not join during Tun Abdullah’s era, the same reasons highlighted by Tun Dr Mahathir remain. For example, Malaysia did not join MINUSTAH in Haiti due to the lack of invitation from the UN and Malaysia’s limited logistic capability and concern over the budget deficit, among other things. For similar reasons, Malaysia also did not join UNPKO in the Ivory Coast in 2004 or MINURCAT in the Central African Republic/Chad, 2007–2010. On another note, Malaysia’s UNPKO continue to be one of its trump cards when it comes to its election as a non-permanent member of the UNSC. For the record, Malaysia joined the UNSC for the fourth time in 2015 during the administration of Najib Razak, Tun Abdullah’s immediate successor. Nevertheless, Malaysia had already been working on garnering votes for this since 2001. Tun Abdullah’s UNPKO and those of Tun Dr Mahathir played an instrumental role in Malaysia’s return to the UNSC. On the domestic front, the Prime Minister’s power vis-à-vis UNPKO remains unchanged. According to Sara Othman, Assistant Secretary, Multilateral Political Affairs Division, Malaysia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ministry is primarily responsible for gathering sufficient information by coordinating and connecting several other ministries and agencies relevant to UNPKO. Yet the ministry does not make the final decision (Sara Othman, personal communication, 15 January 2014). Colonel Nazari Abdul Hadi, Defence Adviser, Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the UN, confirms this role (Nazari Abdul Hadi, personal communication, 22 October 2013). Next, Major General Datuk Baharom Hamzah, Chief of Staff, Malaysia’s Joint Force Headquarters, who himself served during UNPROFOR, reveals that the practice of the Cabinet Paper continued well into the era of Tun Abdullah (Baharum Hamzah, personal communication, 5 December 2013). Accordingly, he attests to the PMO’s prerogative concerning Malaysia’s UNPKO. Colonel Badrul Hisham Muhammad, Commandant of Malaysia’s Peacekeeping Centre, supports the General’s affirmation, insisting that it is always the Prime Minister, via the PMO, who will ultimately make the decision over Malaysia’s UNPKO (Badrul Hisham Muhammad, personal communication, 10 February 2015). As far as civil society is concerned, Tan Sri Syed Hamid Albar, former Foreign Minister of Malaysia from 1999 to 2008, argues that civil society plays a less significant role in influencing the decision-making process of Malaysia’s UNPKO (Syed Hamid Albar, personal communication, 4 December 2013). Overall, since Tun Abdullah inherited the power structure of Tun Mahathir, the state institutions and their hierarchy hardly changed during his term in office. In the absence of significant opposition by civil society to Malaysia’s UNPKO, it can safely be argued that civil society continues to be accommodative, not necessarily supportive, of Malaysia’s UNPKO. There were no parliamentary debates on Malaysia’s UNPKO during Tun Abdullah’s era either, although occasionally the Members of Parliament received briefings on the related developments. Most importantly, the prerogative power with regard to Malaysia’s UNPKO remains with the PMO, while the ministries involved continue to have their roles reduced to mainly conducting feasibility studies and providing recommendations. Working on the preceding deliberation on both the systemic-external and the domestic-internal imperatives of Malaysia’s UNPKO, this study has found that the era of Tun Abdullah agrees with Hypothesis 1 (H1). By continuously being part

7.2 Malaysian Prime Ministers and UNPKO

169

of the pro-US Bloc during the post-Cold War era, and consistently being a regular participant in UNPKO, Tun Abdullah perceived the level of systemic pressure to be low. Inherited unchanged state institutions and hierarchy from his predecessor helped a lot too. Consequently, Tun Abdullah continued to enjoy a high level of state power. The combination of these factors led to a high level of participation in UNPKO during the era of Tun Abdullah, as in Tun Mahathir’s era, the level and nature of participation notwithstanding.

7.3 Conclusion Mostly, despite the Prime Ministers’ dominance over state institutions (thus, domestic imperatives), the systemic pressures formed the basis of their decisions regarding Malaysia’s UNPKO, as the eras of Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tun Razak, Tun Hussein, Tun Dr Mahathir and Tun Abdullah have indicated. Tunku perceived a mixed or indeterminate systemic pressure that led Malaysia to join ONUC despite the bipolar world order being at its peak, and. for similar reasons, not to join the other five UNPKO. Both Tun Razak and Tun Hussein faced the high systemic pressure of a peaking bipolar world, while the era of Tun Dr Mahathir went through transitional phases that underline the closing years of the bipolar world and the beginning of a unipolar world order. The era of Tun Abdullah then saw the unipolar world at its peak. With regard to the hypotheses of this study, as proposed in Chap. 2, this study has found that all five Prime Ministers perceived themselves as possessing a high level of state power. Accordingly, the findings dismiss H4, H5 and H5, whose premises rely on low state power. Next, the above deliberation has indicated that while Malaysia’s UNPKO during Tunku Abdul Rahman’s era agree with Hypothesis 3 (H3: mixed systemic pressure and high state power, making UNPKO both likely and unlikely), the eras of Tun Razak and Tun Hussein agree with Hypothesis 2 (H2: high systemic pressure and high state power; UNPKO unlikely). Subsequently, the eras of both Tun Dr Mahathir and Tun Abdullah agree with this study’s Hypothesis 1 (H1: low systemic pressure and high state power; UNPKO likely). Overall, the Prime Ministers’ perceptions of the level of systemic pressure mostly overruled their perceived level of state power. Yet, inasmuch as the level of systemic pressure played the primary causal function of Malaysia’s UNPKO, at times the Prime Ministers’ mixed or indeterminate perceptions of the level of system pressure may cause the Prime Minister’s perception to assume the independent causal function, as the era of Tunku Abdul Rahman had indicated.

1978–1981

3. Tun Hussein Onn

1970–1976

2. Tun Abdul Razak

–

3. UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, Europe, 1964–present

1. UNIFIL: Lebanon, 1978–present

1974–present

(continued)

1973–1979 2. UNDOF: United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, Israel/Syria/Golan, Middle East,

1. UNEF II: Second United Nations Emergency Force, Israel/Egypt/Suez Canal, Middle East,

America, 1965–1966

5. Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic, North

4. UNIPOM: United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission, South Asia, 1965–1966

2. UNYOM: United Nations Yemen Observation Mission, Middle East, 1963–1964

1. DOMREP: United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea, Southeast Asia, 1962–1963

Did not join

1957–1970

1. ONUC: The Congo, 1960–1963

Joined

Rahman

1. Tunku Abdul

Minister/Premiership

Prime

Appendix: List of Malaysia’s UNPKO According to the Prime Ministers’ Eras

170 7 The Interplay of Systemic-Domestic Determinants …

1981–2003

4. Tun Dr Mahathir

Minister/Premiership

Prime

(continued)

4. UNOMUR: United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda, Africa, 1993–1994 5. UNMIH: United Nations Mission in Haiti, North America, 1993–1996 6. UNAMIR: United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, Africa, 1993–1996 7. UNAVEM III: United Nations Angola Verification Mission III, Africa, 1995–1997 8. UNCRO: United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, Europe, 1995–1996 9. UNPREDEP: United Nations Preventive Deployment Force, Macedonia, Europe, 1995–1999 10. UNTAES: United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and

5. MINURSO: Western Sahara, 1991–present

6. UNAVEM II: Angola, 1991–1995

7. UNAMIC: Cambodia, 1991–1992

8. UNPROFOR: Bosnia, 1992–1995 (Contingent)

9. UNTAC: Cambodia, 1992–1993 (Contingent)

10. ONUMOZ: Mozambique, 1992–1994

13. MINUGUA: United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala, North America, Jan–May

14. UNOMIL: Liberia, 1993–1997

25. UNMISET: East Timor, 2002–2005

24. UNMEE: Ethiopia and Eritrea. 2000–2008

23. MONUC: Congo, 1999–2000

22. UNTAET: East Timor, 1999–2003

21. UNAMSIL: Sierra Leone, 1999–2005

20. UNMIK: Kosovo, 1999–present

19. UNAMA: Afghanistan, 1998–1999

18. MONUA: Angola, 1997–1999

17. UNMIBH: Bosnia, 1995–2002

16. UNMOT: Tajikistan, 1994–2000

21. UNAVEM I: United Nations Angola Verification Mission I, Africa, 1989–1992

1989–1991

(continued)

Asia, 1988–1990 20. ONUCA: United Nations Observer Group in Central America, North/South America,

19. UNGOMAP: United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan, South

18. UNAMSIL: United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, Africa, 1999–2005

17. MINURCA: United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic, Africa, 1998–2000

Sirmium, Europe, Jan–Oct 1998

16. UNCPSG: UN Civilian Police Support Group, Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western

15. MIPONUH: United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti, North America, 1997–2000

14. UNTMIH: United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti, North America, Aug–Dec 1997

1997

12. UNSMIH: United Nations Support Mission in Haiti, North America, Aug–Dec 1997

13. UNOSOM II: Somalia II, 1993–1995 (Contingent)

15. UNASOG: Libya/Chad, 1994

11. UNMOP: United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka, Europe, 1996–2002

12. UNSGRC: Cambodia, 1994–1995

Western Sirmium, Europe, 1996–1998

3. UNOMIG: United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, Europe, 1993–2009

4. UNIKOM: Iraq/Kuwait, 1991–2003

11. UNMLT: Cambodia, 1993–1994

2. UNOSOM I: United Nations Operation in Somalia I, 1992–1993

3. UNSOGI: Iraq, 1990–1991

1. ONUSAL: United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador, North America, 1991–1995

Did not join

2. UNTAG: Namibia, 1989–1990 (Contingent)

1. UNIIMOG: Iran/Iraq, 1988–1991

Joined

Appendix: List of Malaysia’s UNPKO According to the Prime Ministers’ Eras 171

7. UNAMID: Sudan/Darfur, 2009–present

6. UNMIS: Sudan, 2009–2011

5. UNOB: Burundi, 2004–2006

2007–2010

3. MINURCAT: United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, Africa,

4. UNMIT: Timor Leste, 2005–2012

2. MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, North America, 2004–present

3. UNMIN: Nepal, 2007–present

1. UNOCI: United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, Africa, 2004–present

Did not join

2. UNIFIL: Lebanon, 2006–present (Contingent)

1. UNMIL: Liberia, 2003–present

Joined

Source Malaysia’s Defence Policy (2010) and United Nations (2013)

2003–2009

5. Tun Abdullah

Minister/Premiership

Prime

(continued)

172 7 The Interplay of Systemic-Domestic Determinants …

References

173

References Ahmad Kamil, J. (2013). Growing Up with The Nation. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Editions. Buszynski, L. (2013). Soviet Foreign Policy and Southeast Asia. New York: Routledge. Case, W. (2015, October 20). Civil Society in Southeast Asia: Not All It’s Cracked Up to Be. Retrieved 4 April 2016 from: https://www.mei.edu/publications/civil-society-southeast-asia-notall-its-cracked-be. Hishamuddin, T.H. (2012). Speech at the Launch of The Tun Hussein Onn Chair in International Studies, Institute of Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved 29 May 2015 from https://www.isis.org.my/2012/03/28/the-launch-of-the-tun-hussein-onn-chair-in-int ernational-studies-28-march-2012-kuala-lumpur/. History. (2011). The Origins and Evolution of the Soviet State. Retrieved 5 May 2017 from http:// www.history.com/topics/cold-war/fall-of-soviet-union#section_2. Hsiung, J.C. (1993). Asia Pacific in the Post-Cold War Order. In James Hsiung (Ed.), Asia Pacific in the New World Politics. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienne Publishers. Kamarulnizam, A. (2014). Malaysia’s Peacekeeping Operation Contributions. In C. Aoi & YK. Heng (Eds.), Asia Pacific Nations in International Peace Support and Stability Operations (pp. 158–161). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Lai, Y.M. (2008). Nationalism & Power Politics in Japan’s Relations with China – A Neoclassical Realist Interpretation. PhD thesis, University of Warwick, Coventry, England. Laith, Shubeilat. (1994). Save Bosnia, Parliamentarians Told in Malaysia Conference. Executive Intelligence Review, 21(7). Retrieved 19 April 2016 from www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/ 1994/eirv21n07-19940211/eirv21n07-19940211_040-save_bosnia_parliamentarians_tol.pdf. Mohd Noor, M.Y. (2017). Asia Pasifik Sejak 1945: Perubahan Struktur Antarabangsa Dan Percaturan Politik Serantau. Kuala Lumpur: Institut Terjemahan & Buku Malaysia Berhad. Ott, M.C. (1971). The Sources and Content of Malaysia’s Foreign Policy Toward Indonesia and the Philippines 1957–1965. PhD thesis, John Hopkins University, Maryland, USA. Razali, I. (2014). A UN Chronicle: 1988–1998. Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations. Salmi, I.A. (2007). Keberkesanan Diplomasi Malaysia Di Dalam Menyelesaikan Konflik BosniaHerzegovina. Undergraduate thesis, University of Malaya. Saravanamuttu, J. (2010). Malaysia’s Foreign Policy, The First Fifty Years: Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism. Singapore: ISEAS. Shanti, Nair (1997). Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy. London: Routledge. Sterling-Folker, J. (1997). Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level Variables. International Studies Quarterly, 41(22). United Nations (2013). List of Peacekeeping Operations 1948–2012. Retrieved 4 March 2013 from https://read.un-ilibrary.org/peacekeeping-and-security/year-in-review-united-nationspeace-operations-2012_ed2a58d7-en#page1.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

Abstract This chapter provides the concluding analysis of the dynamics of Malaysia’s decision-making vis-à-vis its UNPKO during and after the Cold War by focusing on the related causal factors, external and domestic. It elucidates why, how, when, and the extent to which the nexus of systemic-external pressure and domestic-internal pressure affected the Malaysian Prime Ministers’ perceptions and assessment vis-à-vis UNPKO. This chapter highlights the primacy of systemic pressures, the changing nature of Malaysia’s Prime Ministers’ perceptions, and how both eventually made their way into Malaysia’s UNPKO from 1960 to 2010. It concludes that the UN, via UNPKO, remains a subject, tool and means for the major powers to achieve their interests, including as a way to preserve and sustain the fragile fabric of the international system, with small powers mostly playing a merely supplementary role in UNPKO. Keywords Peacekeeping · United Nations · Systemic-external pressure · Domestic-internal pressure · International relations · Cold War · Post-Cold War · Elites · Malaysian Prime Ministers · International system This study has attempted to analyse the dynamics of Malaysia’s decision-making vis-à-vis its UNPKO during and after the Cold War by focusing on the related causal factors, external and domestic. Pursuant to that, this study has sought to address important research questions that required an examination of Malaysia’s selective participation in UNPKO through the premierships of five Prime Ministers (1960–2010). By applying the neoclassical realism analytical framework, this study has attempted to elucidate why, how, when, and the extent to which the nexus of systemic-external pressure and domestic-internal pressure affected Malaysian Prime Ministers’ perceptions and assessment vis-à-vis UNPKO, i.e. participation and nonparticipation in it. Primarily, this study hypothesizes six different systemic-external pressures from different times and contexts that influenced the Prime Ministers’ perceptions, which, in turn, influenced Malaysia’s UNPKO. Consequently, besides the mitigating function of the domestic pressure, the Prime Ministers’ perceptions at times might assume an independently causal function.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Salleh and A. Idris, Malaysia’s United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1960–2010), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4137-1_8

175

176

8 Conclusion

This chapter firstly attempts to summarise the empirical findings from Malaysia’s UNPKO during the Cold War and in the post-Cold War era through the perspectives of the five Malaysian Prime Ministers by re-engaging the research questions and identifying the commonalities and differences between the two eras to establish the causality level of systemic-external and domestic-internal pressures vis-à-vis Malaysia’s UNPKO. Fundamentally, the aim of this study has been to demonstrate that states’ interests matter, as they provide an illuminating lens through which to view a state’s options in foreign policy. To this end, Malaysia’s UNPKO serve as an example of how states’ interests evolve through different external and internal settings. This was achieved by outlining in Chap. 2 the traditional international relations theories in order to settle upon a general pattern of interests that have influenced Malaysia’s UNPKO. Thus, this study has sought to comment not only on UNPKO in general, but also on Malaysia’s UNPKO during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. Chapter 3 highlights the background of UNPKO and that of Malaysia by a trajectory through which the following empirical chapters take place. Thus, Chaps. 4, 5, 6 and 7 empirically examined how, when and in what contexts systemic-domestic pressures have influenced Malaysia’s UNPKO. This conclusion will highlight the main findings of this study by commenting upon the changes that have occurred over the time frame with reference to Malaysia’s UNPKO. What follows will address the primacy of systemic pressures, the changing nature of Prime Ministers’ perceptions and how both eventually made their way into Malaysia’s UNPKO in the five decades under discussion. This is followed by an evaluation of the theoretical/analytical approach that focuses on the feasibility and relevance of the neoclassical realism analytical framework for addressing the research questions of this study. The concluding section describes this study’s implications for future related studies on similar subject matter.

8.1 Empirical Findings The analysis of Malaysia’s UNPKO reveals a number of insights with regard to the nexus of systemic-external and domestic-internal pressures vis-à-vis Malaysia’s UNPKO, guided by the central research question, namely the manner, conditions, and the extent to which the nexus affects Malaysian Prime Ministers’ perceptions and assessments vis-à-vis UNPKO. They are also framed around the correlated questions regarding the salience of the Prime Ministers’ perceptions vis-à-vis other determinants in causing or constraining Malaysia’s UNPKO, and whether other imperatives mitigate or magnify the policy-making process of Malaysia’s UNPKO.

8.1 Empirical Findings

177

8.1.1 The Salience and Limit of Systemic-External Pressures As mentioned in Chap. 6, Malaysia recorded about 44% participation in UNPKO during the Cold War, i.e. eight out of eighteen UNPKO, and about 53% participation during the post-Cold War era (1992–2010), i.e. twenty-five out forty-seven UNPKO. Building on these figures, this study has found varying conditions and dynamics in both eras which proved to be the primary determinant of Malaysia’s UNPKO. Malaysia’s UNPKO align with the power operations of largely bipolar (Cold War) and unipolar (post-Cold War) world orders and the variations in between. In general, the prevailing state and level of the international security environment, geostrategic interests and Malaysia’s relative power position appear to be the primary determinants of Malaysia’s UNPKO across different regions of the world during both eras. Region-wise, in Europe there was only one UNPKO during the Cold War as opposed to nine in the post-Cold War era. The level of the international security environment pressure was high because Europe had been the epicentre of World War II, the conflict which gave rise to the bipolar world. Malaysia did not join any UNPKO in this region during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War, when the level of the international security environment pressure was more or less low, keeping in view Malaysia’s pro-US Bloc stance, Malaysia joined three out of nine UNPKO in the region, namely UNPROFOR (Bosnia), UNMIBH (Bosnia) and UNMIK (Kosovo). Africa, on the other hand, saw an increase from six UNPKO during the Cold War to twenty-one in the post-Cold War. Malaysia joined only two UNPKO in this region during the Cold War as opposed to twelve in the post-Cold War era. For both regions, a pattern appears: that the frequency of Malaysia’s UNPKO was low during the Cold War but was high in the post-Cold War era. In total, the data show that Malaysia’s UNPKO in the post-Cold War era, i.e. twenty-five, outnumber those during the Cold War by eight operations. Such an increase indicates a surge of about 312%. Such an increase also affirms the inherently related and considerable impact of the prevailing international security environment on Malaysia’s UNPKO. Additionally, the premiership of the fourth Prime Minister shows the salience of the external-systemic pressures. With the Soviet Union hegemony on the decline from the 1980s to the 1990s (phase #1), and the US hegemony strengthening from the 1990s onwards (phase #2), Malaysia’s UNPKO behaved accordingly. As mentioned in Chap. 7, out of Malaysia’s thirty-three UNPKO, the fourth Prime Minister authorized seven UNPKO in phase #1 and subsequently eighteen in phase #2. This suggests that the prevailing international security environment led the fourth Prime Minister to perceive a low level of systemic pressure, which in turn led to him authorizing a total of twenty-five of Malaysia’s UNPKO (76% of all Malaysia’s thirty-three UNPKO). Subsequently, out of ten available UNPKO, the fifth Prime Minister authorized seven of Malaysia’s UNPKO (21% participation of all thirtythree of Malaysia’s UNPKO). Combined, these two Prime Ministers were responsible for 97% of Malaysia’s UNPKO (thirty-two out of thirty-three). By and large, this high percentage of Malaysia’s UNPKO reflected the fact that both Prime Ministers shared a similar perception of a low level of systemic pressure that consequently

178

8 Conclusion

allowed Malaysia’s UNPKO to increase progressively and substantially during their respective premierships. As the corresponding numbers of UNPKO during both eras suggest, UNPKO managed to isolate peripheral conflicts that, to a qualified extent, served the mutual interests of the hegemonic powers. In addition to that, the world order power operation plays so significant a role that it could single-handedly decide on the authorization and even the success or failure of UNPKO itself. This underscores the perpetual significance of the role of the hegemonic powers vis-à-vis international peace and conflict resolution. As far as UNPKO, pocket veto and veto are concerned, the UNSC is the venue where the actual power-play dynamics of the international system take place. Although the UNGA may still authorize a UNPKO, it lacks the obligatory character of the UNSC’s related resolution, as provided for in Article 25, Chapter V of the UN Charter. It is a fact that the veto power underlines the major powers’ dominance over UNPKO. Invariably, it characterizes the structural and material configuration of the prevailing international system, which considerably affects a UNPKO authorization and shapes its deployment. In principle, UNPKO foretells the consequential, working systemic powerplay, underpinned by an international structure of distinct, competing power centres and accordingly, the degree of autonomy that small powers enjoy vis-à-vis UNPKO. Among other things, such a degree of autonomy has translated into small powers making up the biggest state-contributors of troops for UNPKO. The dominance of major powers’ interests has resulted in them being the biggest financiers of UNPKO too. These roles regardless, the systemic-external pressures have moulded UNPKO into a means to protect and preserve the interests of the major powers. Inevitably, the veto power of the major powers represents their overriding will and their influence on world affairs. Still, the most important insight of all is that the international security environment and the pressures it generates have played the most important, independent, causal role vis-à-vis Malaysia’s UNPKO. Having highlighted that, this study argues that international peace and therefore UNPKO tend to appear more of a commodity than a norm or value. For the major powers, international peace (and UNPKO) matters only when there is a collusion of interests, as represented by the UNSC permanent members’ voting pattern within UNSC. For the rest, it matters when certain tangible and non-tangibles outcomes are more than likely to be present and vice versa, as represented by the voluntary nature of states’ participation in UNPKO. By and large, UNPKO remains a means to a state’s interests, not an end.

8.1.2 The Salience and Limit of Domestic-Internal Pressures In general, this study has found that the Prime Ministers possessed a dominant control over state institutions, as far as Malaysia’s UNPKO are concerned. However, such a control was consistently subjected to systemic influences. As a small power, the dynamics of the prevailing international security environment significantly informed the Prime Ministers’ decisions vis-à-vis UNPKO. As a result, Malaysia sent one

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179

UNPKO during the first Prime Minister’s term in office, none during the second and the third Prime Ministers’ terms, twenty-five during the fourth Prime Minister’s term, and seven during the fifth Prime Minister’s term. Accordingly, it was found that Malaysia’s UNPKO represent a consistent strategy, on the part of the Prime Ministers, to achieve Malaysia’s goal of middlepowermanship. Since Malaysia, as a small power, lacked the hard power that usually characterizes middle powers, it focused on enhancing its soft power and international prestige through its international activism (UNPKO) as part of the main underpinning of its middlepowermanship aspiration. As a case in point, Malaysia was elected to the UNSC for the third time (2000–2001) due to, among other things, its nineteen UNPKO in a ten-year period (1990–2000), which was the highest ever in its history. Region-wise, 90% of Malaysia’s UNPKO took place in Africa and Asia. Accordingly, Malaysia’s activism in these regions also helped it to secure the votes it needed for its election to the UNSC. On top of that, this study has found that Malaysia’s UNPKO between 1960 and 2010 were less dependent on its own strategic interests classification, i.e. SIZ and NSIZ, than on systemic pressures, even though both zones form part of Malaysia’s National Defence Policy (NDP-2010). In fact, Malaysia’s UNPKO in its NSIZ surpassed those in its SIZ by three operations, although its deployment of contingents to each zone was equal, with three sent to each. Next, this study has also been able to establish the mitigating role of its politico-military institutions, especially the Malaysia Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and the Malaysia Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Wisma Putra). Specifically, their roles vis-à-vis Malaysia’s UNPKO have been reduced to conducting feasibility studies that were helpful in determining the nature and level of Malaysia’s UNPKO. Similarly, the study has also found that the legislative assembly and civil society have been accommodative of Malaysia’s UNPKO. This was especially evident during the era of the fourth Prime Minister, i.e. Tun Dr Mahathir, who categorically maintains that the Prime Minister has no legal obligation to seek parliamentary approval as far as Malaysia’s UNPKO are concerned. As for the impact of civil society on Malaysia’s UNPKO, it was relatively weak, and was mostly confined to mitigating and magnifying Malaysia’s UNPKO. Similarly, this study has found that the Prime Ministers’ co-religionist and humanitarian perceptions remained a secondary factor in Malaysia’s UNPKO. Overall, on the domestic front, the Prime Minister has enjoyed, both technically and in practice, absolute power over Malaysia’s UNPKO. However, at times, despite the salience of the Prime Ministers’ perceptions, the international security environment has generated mixed – i.e. indeterminate – levels of systemic pressure. This, to an extent, has provided the Malaysian Prime Ministers with room to assume an independent role with regard to Malaysia’s UNPKO. This accounts for the anomalies in Malaysia’s UNPKO. Looking at the bigger picture, it also explains why states with similar structure and levels of influence react differently to certain UNPKO, and also why states of different structures and levels of influence have identical responses to certain UNPKO. By and large, it also helps to explain why Malaysia’s UNPKO have not had a predictable pattern.

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8 Conclusion

Hence, the salience of the international security environment as the independent variable of Malaysia’s UNPKO seems to have been affected. The premiership of Malaysia’s first Prime Minister constituted such an exception. During this time, despite the growing domestic threat, the US and Britain provided the corresponding security assurance, making the Prime Minister believe that Malaysia’s national interests were well-protected. This, among other things, led him to agree to contribute a large number of Malaysian troops to serve in ONUC. As previously mentioned, this UNPKO was the only one during the premiership of the first Prime Minister, and also one of the biggest in the history of Malaysia’s UNPKO. In relation to that, this study has also found such an anomalous condition to be rare, especially since one cannot totally rule out the possibility of the major powers inducing such a condition beforehand, implicitly or explicitly. Whether or not that really was the case, as a small power, Malaysia could not insulate itself totally from the impact and influence of the prevailing international security environment. In other words, international influence can be so significant that it can overrule the domestic influence on Malaysia’s UNPKO, especially since Malaysia’s UNPKO generally reflect the US’s interests as a hegemonic power. Essentially, the analysis of Malaysia’s UNPKO during the Cold War and in the post-Cold War era shows that despite the Prime Ministers commanding a high level of state power vis-à-vis Malaysia’s UNPKO, systemic pressures still form the basis of the Prime Minister’s decision, as the five premierships of Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tun Razak, Tun Hussein, Tun Dr Mahathir and Tun Abdullah have shown. At times, depending on certain conditions, the Prime Ministers might have assumed an independent function vis-à-vis Malaysia’s UNPKO. However, this remains rare. Rather, Malaysia’s UNPKO reflect the general posture of its foreign policy, dictated beforehand by the powerplays of the major powers of the prevailing world security order. At this juncture, this study has been able to find that: firstly, it is the systemic pressure as the independent variable that sets the broad perimeter of Malaysia’s UNPKO. Secondly, having established that the domestic determinants act mostly as the intervening variables, they still played a role in affecting the size, nature and level of Malaysia’s UNPKO, i.e. the feasibility study, especially when the Prime Ministers had decided to join one. Thirdly, despite the dominance of the external determinant, it does not necessarily translate into a Malaysian UNPKO, highlighting the fact that the Prime Ministers’ perceptions could occasionally take on the independent, causal role with regard to Malaysia’s UNPKO, depending on the level of pressure the prevailing security environment was exerting during a particular time. Table 8.1 sums up Malaysia’s UNPKO in numbers.

8.2 Theoretical Findings and Reflections on the Neoclassical …

181

Table 8.1 Malaysia’s UNPKO in numbers. Source United Nations: List of Peacekeeping Operations 1948–2012 (2013); Malaysia’s National Defence Policy, Map 1 and Map 2 (2010) Cold War and Post-Cold War

– 8 during the Cold War – 25 during the post-Cold War

Region of operations

– 47% in Southeast Asia (7), 27% in the Middle East (4), 20% in Europe (3), 6% in South Asia (1) – 89% in Africa (16), 11% in Central Asia (2) – Summary: – Most active region: Africa (16) – Most inactive region: South Asia (1)

Participation by SIZ and NSIZ

– 15 Malaysian UNPKO in SIZ, 18 Malaysian UNPKO in NSIZ – Over 600% increase in Malaysia’s UNPKO in SIZ (from 2 to 13) – About 800% increase in Malaysia’s UNPKO in NSIZ (from 2 to 16) – SIZ: 20% Contingent (3), 80% Observer (12) – NSIZ: 17% Contingent (3), 83% Observer (15) – Region-distribution of 6 contingents: 3 to Africa, 1 to Europe, 1 to Southeast Asia, 1 to the Middle East – Region-distribution of 25 observers: 13 to Africa, 6 to Southeast Asia, 3 to the Middle East, 2 to Central Asia, 1 to South Asia

Participation by co-religionist and humanitarian cause

– – – –

Total

– Total UNPKO: 33 – Total contingents: 6 – Total non-contingents: 27

12 to Muslim-majority countries 21 in non-Muslim majority countries 3 contingents to predominantly Muslim countries 3 contingents to predominantly non-Muslim countries

8.2 Theoretical Findings and Reflections on the Neoclassical Realism Analytical Framework This study has applied neoclassical realism as the analytical framework to consider both the domestic and systemic pressures which account for Malaysia’s UNPKO behaviour. In general, the neoclassical analytical framework has fared well in explicating the independent role of systemic pressures in setting the permissive broad parameter that conditions Malaysia’s UNPKO. It has also helped this study to uncover a peculiar circumstance in which the intervening domestic variables, i.e. Prime Ministers’ perceptions, have at times acquired the ability to become the causal independent function of Malaysia’s UNPKO. This atypical and rare circumstance is useful for explaining Malaysia’s variable responses to similar or dissimilar internal and external stimuli vis-à-vis UNPKO. As a result, the framework has expanded the neoclassical realism explanatory power by being able to account for, link and satisfy the objectives

182

8 Conclusion

of this study. By operationalizing the systemic-external and domestic-internal imperatives, it has been able to systematically assess the salience and limits of both. In any case, it substantially helps to improve the general understanding of the perpetual influence of systemic pressure on a state’s behaviour. Moreover, this study has also sought to contribute to the growing field of research in international relations theory by explaining the external-domestic factors that have informed Malaysia’s UNPKO. Additionally, it has attempted to deepen understanding of how the systemic pressures and, at times, the domestic ones which inform Malaysia’s foreign policy went through phases of change. Most importantly, it has also drawn attention to the influence of the international security environment, i.e. bipolar and unipolar world orders, which acted as the independent variables in influencing Malaysia’s UNPKO. This, of course, does not dismiss the role of the Prime Ministers in the decision-making process that, for most of the time, has served to act as the intervening variable function or, at times, as the independent causal function, depending on the prevailing external conditions. Finally, this study has shown that, as far as UNPKO are concerned, states’ interests, norms and values matter only when they agree with the interests of the major powers. In other words, they mostly must be subservient to the interests of the major powers. As such, the attempts to highlight and emphasize the independent, causal role of norms in states’ behaviour will most likely end up being inadequate to account for a state’s foreign policy, especially when it comes to anomalies in that state’s behaviour. Additionally, the ability to account for anomalies in states’ behaviour makes the neoclassical realism framework even more relevant and appropriate for studying a state’s foreign policy across a host of different types of states’ relative power positions. Ultimately, international peace as a norm or value is at best the endproduct of a state’s pursuit of power and security, enforceable by states, not the other way around, as UNPKO and states’ corresponding participation have demonstrated.

8.3 Implications for Future Research By and large, this study has managed to ascertain the sources of Malaysia’s action and reaction vis-à-vis UNPKO by concentrating on realism core concepts, such as security and power. Among other things, it has shown that international organizations like the UN remain a subject, tool and means for the major powers to achieve their interests, including to preserve and sustain the fragile fabric of the international system. Alternatively, this study has shown the relevance and reliability of realism in the analysis of Malaysia’s UNPKO during the Cold War era and in the postCold War era. It helps to improve the explanatory power of the realist framework for small powers facing and reacting to imperatives derived from and generated by emerging or well-defined structural power configurations. Although this study has benefited substantially from key-informant interviews, they were mostly confined to data acquired from the fourth Prime Minister, who happened to oversee twenty-five of Malaysia’s thirty-three UNPKO, and from politico-military bureaucrats serving

8.3 Implications for Future Research

183

under the fourth, fifth and sixth Prime Ministers. Unfortunately, this study did not enjoy the luxury of such data from the first, second and third Prime Ministers, who are deceased and had only one Malaysian UNPKO between them, which can be credited to the first Prime Minister only. Additionally, since this study set out to examine only a small power’s UNPKO, due to the limitation of its scope, a study of similar subject matter and depth would benefit from comparing the UNPKO of states with different relative power positions.

Appendix A

Malaysia’s UNPKO Decision-Making Process

UN

WISMA PUTRA

PMO

WISMA PUTRA

MINDEF

Source Nazari Abdul Hadi (2013). Malaysia’s Defence Adviser, United Nations

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Salleh and A. Idris, Malaysia’s United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1960–2010), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4137-1

185

Appendix B

Scope of Duty of Malaysia’s UNPKO

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Salleh and A. Idris, Malaysia’s United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1960–2010), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4137-1

187

Iran/Iraq: United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG): 1988–1991

Iraq: United Nations Office of Secretary General in Iraq (UNOSGI): 1991–1992

2

3

3 Military Observers

45 Military Observers 3 groups of 15 Military Observers each at a time

Congo-Zaire: United Nations Operation 3000 troops in the Congo (ONUC): 1960–1963 Malaysian contingent: • 2nd Battalion Royal Malay Regiment • 4th Battalion Royal Malay Regiment • 6th Battalion Royal Malay Regiment • 7th Battalion Royal Malay Regiment • 1st and 2nd Reconnaissance Regiments

Forms of involvement

1

No. UNPKO

• UN administrative group in Iraq following the end of UNIIMOG

• Monitor, confirm and supervise the ceasefire between Iraq and Iran as well as the withdrawal of all forces to the internationally recognized boundary pending a comprehensive settlement

• Assist the newly formed government and maintain law and order • Maintain the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo • Prevent the occurrence of civil war • Secure the removal from the Congo of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel not under UN Command • Secure the removal of all mercenaries

Missions

Remarks

(continued)

188 Appendix B: Scope of Duty of Malaysia’s UNPKO

Namibia: United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG): 1989–1990

Iraq: United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM): 1991

Angola: United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II): 1991–1995

Western Sahara: United Nations 25 Military and Police Observers Mission for the Referendum in Western Between 2 and 15 Observers at a time Sahara (MINURSO): 1991–ongoing (as of 2010)

4

5

6

7

37 Military and Police Observers Between 1 and 20 Observers at a time

28 Military Observers Between 6 and 8 at a time

Forms of involvement 891 troops • MALBATT, Military Observers , HQ Staff Malaysian contingent: • 3 groupings of a battalion group (851 officers and men of 17th and 21st Battalions Royal Malay Regiment) • UNTAG HQ Staff group (15 Officers) and Military Observers group (25 observers)

No. UNPKO

(continued) Missions

• Monitor the ceasefire , the confinement of troops of both sides to the agreed locations, custody of certain arms and ammunitions and the reduction of troops

• Verify the implementation of the ceasefire • Observe and verify the elections in accordance with the peace accord between parties in conflict

• Assist the return of Iraq/Kuwait war properties and the formulation of policies for the maintenance of law and order along the 200 km demilitarized zone

• Observe and check on the withdrawal of the South African Defence Force (SADF) • Observe the disbandment of the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF)

Remarks

(continued)

Appendix B: Scope of Duty of Malaysia’s UNPKO 189

Cambodia: United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC): 1991–1992

Cambodia: United Nations Transitional 2119 troops Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC): MALBATT, Military Observers , 1992–1993 Military Police, HQ Staff, Police, Technical Specialists Malaysian contingent: • Malaysian Battalion I (Royal Ranger Regiment, March 1992–July 1993), Malaysian Battalion II (Royal Malay Regiment, July 1993–November 1993) • UNTAC HQ Staff (7 Malaysian Officers and 3 other ranks, 29 Officers as Military Observers , 20 Military Police, 25 Air Force Officers and 52 of other ranks) • 226 police personnel

Cambodia: United Nations Military Liaison Team: 1993–1994

8

9

10

Military Observers

Forms of involvement 2 Military Observers

No. UNPKO

(continued) Missions

• Maintain close liaison with the Cambodian Government and report to the Secretary-General on matters affecting security in Cambodia • Assist Government in dealing with residual military matters related to the Paris Agreement

Observe Human Rights Conduct free and fair general elections Civil Administration Maintain law and order Repatriate and resettle Cambodian refugees and displaced persons • Rebuild essential Cambodian infrastructure during the transitional period

• • • • •

• Maintain ceasefire

(continued)

• Not listed in UN Peacekeeping Operations 2014, but listed in Malaysian Defence Policy 2010, Map 2, p. 32 • Number of MAF Personnel: 4

Remarks

190 Appendix B: Scope of Duty of Malaysia’s UNPKO

Military Observers and Police Peronnel • Monitor and verify ceasefire , Between 20 and 24 military observers at collection, storage and destruction of a time and 35 police officers in a single weapons • Monitor and verify complete tour assignment withdrawal of foreign troops • Monitor and verify disbanding of private and irregular armed groups • Coordinate and monitor humanitarian assistance operations • Provide technical assistance and monitor electoral process (continued)

Mozambique: United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ): 1993–1995

12

Remarks

Somalia : United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II): 1993–1995

11

Missions

Forms of involvement

3206 troops • Monitor ceasefire in Mogadishu • 6 January 1994: General Datuk Aboo UN Force Commander, MALBATT, HQ • Provide protection and security for UN Samah was appointed as the Force Staff, Technical Specialists and security personnel, equipment and supplies Commander • Escort and protect deliveries of • UNOSOM II consisted of 20,000 UN elements and Police humanitarian supplies to the force Malaysian contingent: distribution centres • MALBATT : 3 rifle companies (2 mechanized and 1 from 7th Battalion Royal Malay Regiment, 870 Military personnel from mechanized 19th Battalion Royal Malay regiment, combat support and service support elements • MALBATT II: 7th Battalion Royal Ranger Regiment • MALBAT III: 7th Battalion Royal Malay Regiment • UNOSOM HQ Staff: 8 military officers • 5 officers of Royal Malaysian Police

No. UNPKO

(continued)

Appendix B: Scope of Duty of Malaysia’s UNPKO 191

Bosnia -Herzegovina/ Croatia: United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR): 1993–1995

Liberia: United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL): 1993–1999

Cambodia: United Nations Secretary-General Representative to Cambodia (UNSGRC): 1994–1995

13

14

15

Military Observers

37 Military Observer

Forms of involvement 4639 troop Military Observers , HQ Staff, Military, Police Detachment, Police Malaysian contingent: • MALBATT I: 23rd Battalion Royal Malay Regiment and 3rd Armour Regiment • MALBATT II: 5th Battalion Royal Malay Regiment and 2nd Armour Regiment • 12th Battalion Royal Malay Regiment and 1st Armour Regiment • 4 Air Traffic Control Team of the Air Force • 25 Police Officers

No. UNPKO

(continued) Missions

Observer

Observer

• Monitor ceasefire • Provide protection and security for UN personnel, equipment and supplies • Escort and protect deliveries of humanitarian supplies to the distribution centres

(continued)

Not listed in UN Peacekeeping Operations 2014, but listed in Malaysian Defence Policy 2010, Map 2, p. 32

Remarks

192 Appendix B: Scope of Duty of Malaysia’s UNPKO

Chad: United Nations Aouzou Observer Group (UNASOG): 1994

United Nations Mission in Bosnia -Herzegovina (UNMIBH): 1995

United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA): 1997–1999

United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT): 1998–1999

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA): 1998–1999

United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK): 1999

United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL): 1999–2005

Democratic Republic of the Congo: 52 Military Observers United Nations Organization 143 Police Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 50 troops Republic of the Congo (MONUC/MONUSCO): 2000

United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and 9 Staff/Observers Eritrea (UNIMEE): 2000–2008

United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET): 2000–2005

United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET): 2002–2005

United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL): 2003–present

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

Missions Observer

Observer

Observer

Observer

Experts on Mission (numbers unspecified)

20 Military Observers

20 Military Observers 20 interpreters

Staff/Observer (numbers unspecified)

Contribute to the effectiveness of security activities

Observer

Observer

Observer

Observer

Observer

Military Observer (numbers unspecified) Observer 1 Liaison Officer

Staff/Observer (numbers unspecified)

Staff/Observer (numbers unspecified)

Staff/Observer (numbers unspecified)

Military Observer (numbers unspecified) Observer

Forms of involvement 2 Military Observers

No. UNPKO

(continued) Remarks

(continued)

Appendix B: Scope of Duty of Malaysia’s UNPKO 193

United Nations Operation in Burundi (UNOB): 2004–2006

United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNMIT): 2005–2012

United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN): 2007

African Union-United Nations Mission Individual Police in Darfur (UNAMID): 2009–present (numbers unspecified) Mission Experts (numbers unspecified) 13 troops

United Nations Missions in Sudan (UNMIS): 2009–2011

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL): 2007–present

28

29

30

31

32

33

Missions

• Contribute to the effectiveness of security activities • Develop situational awareness • Monitor and report violation of UNSC R 1701 • Escort convoys • Maintain a battalion mobile reserve • Establish a crowd and riot capability • Protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence • Maintain continuous liaison with local authorities • Conduct civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) activities

Observer

Contribute to the effectiveness of security activities

Observer

Contribute to the effectiveness of security activities

Observer

Remarks

Source United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2014); ASEAN Regional Forum (2015); Malaysia Peacekeeping Training Centre (n.d.); Malaysia Armed Forces Official Website, ‘UN Missions’ (2016); Chang/Mejoh (1995)

Experts on Mission Contingent Troops (numbers unspecified)

3 Military Observers 10 Adjutant Officers 1 SSO Air Ops

Staff/Observers (numbers unspecified)

Individual Police Mission Experts (numbers unspecified)

Forms of involvement 3 Military Observers

No. UNPKO

(continued)

194 Appendix B: Scope of Duty of Malaysia’s UNPKO

Appendix C

MAP 1: Malaysia’s Strategic Interests Zone and Non-strategic Interests Zone

Source Malaysia’s National Defence Policy (2010: 14)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Salleh and A. Idris, Malaysia’s United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1960–2010), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4137-1

195

Appendix D

Map 2: Locations of Malaysia’s UNPKO (1960–2010)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Salleh and A. Idris, Malaysia’s United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1960–2010), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4137-1

197

Source Adapted from Malaysia’s National Defence Policy (2010: 32)

198 Appendix D: Map 2: Locations of Malaysia’s UNPKO (1960–2010)

Appendix E

Malaysia’s UNPKO Fatalities in Its Strategic Interests Zones

Strategic Interest Zone No.

UNPKO /year/country

Loss

1

UNTAC/1992–1993/Cambodia, Southeast Asia

1

2

UNPROFOR/1993–1995/Bosnia , Europe

3

3

UNMIBH/1995/Bosnia , Europe

3

4

UNTAET/2000–2005/East Timor, Southeast Asia

2

5

UNIFIL/2007–present/Lebanon, Middle East

2

6

UNMISET/2002–2005/East Timor, Southeast Asia

1

7

UNMIT/2005–2012/East Timor, Southeast Asia

1

8

UNMIK/1999/Kosovo: Europe

1

Total

14

Source United Nations: Peacekeeping: Fatalities by Nation up to 31 January (2013)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Salleh and A. Idris, Malaysia’s United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1960–2010), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4137-1

199

Appendix F

Malaysia’s UNPKO Fatalities in Its Non-strategic Interests Zones

Non-Strategic Interest Zone No.

UNPKO /year /country

Loss

1

ONUC/1960–1963/The Congo, Africa

6

2

MINURSO/1991–present/Western Sahara, Africa

1

3

UNOSOM/1993–1995/Somalia , Africa

5

4

UNAMID/2009–present/Sudan – Darfur, Africa

1

5

MONUC/2000/Democratic Republic of the Congo, Africa

1

Total

14

Source United Nations: Peacekeeping: Fatalities by Nation up to 31 January (2013)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Salleh and A. Idris, Malaysia’s United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1960–2010), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4137-1

201

Appendix G

Malaysia’s Non-participation in UNPKO According to Its Strategic Interests Zones

No.

Mission

Mission name and region /continent

Year

1

UNSF

United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea, Southeast Asia

1962–1963

2

UNYOM

United Nations Yemen Observation Mission, Middle East

1963–1964

3

UNFICYP

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, Europe 1964–present

4

UNIPOM

United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission, South Asia

1965–1966

5

UNEF II

Second United Nations Emergency Force , Israel/Egypt/Suez Canal, Middle East

1973–1979

6

UNDOF

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force , Israel/Syria/Golan, Middle East

1974–present

7

UNGOMAP

United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan, South Asia

1988–1990

8

UNOMIG

United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, Europe

1993–2009

9

UNCRO

United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, Europe

1995–1996

10

UNPREDEP

United Nations Preventive Deployment Force , Macedonia, Europe

1995–1999

11

UNTAES

United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, Europe

1996–1998

12

UNMOP

United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka, Europe

1996–2002

13

UNCPSG

UN Civilian Police Support Group; Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, Europe

Jan–Oct 1998

Source United Nations (2013)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Salleh and A. Idris, Malaysia’s United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1960–2010), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4137-1

203

Appendix H

Malaysia’s Non-participation in UNPKO in Its Non-strategic Interests Zones

No. Mission

Mission name and region /continent

Year

1

DOMREP

Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in 1965–1966 the Dominican Republic, North America

2

UNAVEM I

United Nations Angola Verification Mission I, Africa

1989–1992

3

ONUCA

United Nations Observer Group in Central America , North America

1989–1991

4

ONUSAL

United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador, North America

1991–1995

5

UNOMUR

United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda, Africa

1993–1994

6

UNMIH

United Nations Mission in Haiti, North America

1993–1996

7

UNAMIR

United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, Africa

1993–1996

8

UNAVEM III United Nations Angola Verification Mission III, Africa

1995–1997

9

UNSMIH

United Nations Support Mission in Haiti, North America 1997

10

MINUGUA

United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala, North 1997 America

11

UNTMIH

United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti, North America

1997

12

MIPONUH

United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti, North America

1997–2000

13

MINURCA

United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic, Africa

1998–2000

14

UNAMSIL

United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, Africa

1999–2005

15

UNOCI

United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, Africa

2004–present

16

MINUSTAH

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, North America

2004–present (continued)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Salleh and A. Idris, Malaysia’s United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1960–2010), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4137-1

205

206

Appendix H: Malaysia’s Non-participation in UNPKO in Its Non-strategic Interests …

(continued) No. Mission

Mission name and region /continent

Year

17

MINURCAT

United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, Africa

2007–2010

18

MONUSCO

United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the 2010–present Democratic Republic of the Congo, Africa

19

UNOSOM I

United Nations Operation in Somalia I, Africa

Source United Nations (2013)

1992–1993

Appendix I

List of Malaysia’s UNPKO According to the Prime Ministers’ Eras

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Salleh and A. Idris, Malaysia’s United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1960–2010), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4137-1

207

1. ONUC: The Congo, 1960–1963

–

1. Tunku Abdul Rahman 1957–1970

2. Tun Abdul Razak 1970–1976

3. Tun Hussein Onn 1978–1981

Joined

Prime Minister /Premiership

1. UNIFIL: Lebanon, 1978–present (continued)

1. UNEF II: Second United Nations Emergency Force , Israel/Egypt/Suez Canal, Middle East, 1973–1979 2. UNDOF: United Nations Disengagement Observer Force , Israel/Syria/Golan, Middle East, 1974–present

1. DOMREP: United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea, Southeast Asia, 1962–1963 2. UNYOM: United Nations Yemen Observation Mission, Middle East, 1963–1964 3. UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, Europe, 1964–present 4. UNIPOM: United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission, South Asia, 1965–1966 5. Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic, North America , 1965–1966

Did not join

208 Appendix I: List of Malaysia’s UNPKO According to the Prime Ministers’ Eras

Joined

1. UNIIMOG: Iran/Iraq, 1988–1991 2. UNTAG: Namibia, 1989–1990 (Contingent) 3. UNSOGI: Iraq, 1990–1991 4. UNIKOM: Iraq/Kuwait, 1991–2003 5. MINURSO: Western Sahara, 1991–present 6. UNAVEM II: Angola, 1991–1995 7. UNAMIC: Cambodia, 1991–1992 8. UNPROFOR: Bosnia , 1992–1995 (Contingent) 9. UNTAC: Cambodia, 1992–1993 (Contingent) 10. ONUMOZ: Mozambique, 1992–1994 11. UNMLT: Cambodia, 1993–1994 12. UNSGRC: Cambodia, 1994–1995 13. UNOSOM II: Somalia II, 1993–1995 (Contingent) 14. UNOMIL: Liberia, 1993–1997 15. UNASOG: Libya/Chad, 1994 16. UNMOT: Tajiki stan, 1994–2000 17. UNMIBH: Bosnia , 1995–2002 18. MONUA: Angola, 1997–1999 19. UNAMA: Afghanistan, 1998–1999 20. UNMIK: Kosovo, 1999–present 21. UNAMSIL: Sierra Leone, 1999–2005 22. UNTAET: East Timor, 1999–2003 23. MONUC: Congo, 1999–2000 24. UNMEE: Ethiopia and Eritrea. 2000–2008 25. UNMISET: East Timor, 2002–2005

Prime Minister /Premiership

4. Tun Dr Mahathir 1981–2003

(continued)

(continued)

1. ONUSAL: United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador, North America , 1991–1995 2. UNOSOM I: United Nations Operation in Somalia I, 1992–1993 3. UNOMIG: United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, Europe, 1993–2009 4. UNOMUR: United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda, Africa, 1993–1994 5. UNMIH: United Nations Mission in Haiti, North America , 1993–1996 6. UNAMIR: United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, Africa, 1993–1996 7. UNAVEM III: United Nations Angola Verification Mission III, Africa, 1995–1997 8. UNCRO: United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, Europe, 1995–1996 9. UNPREDEP: United Nations Preventive Deployment Force , Macedonia, Europe, 1995–1999 10. UNTAES: United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, Europe, 1996–1998 11. UNMOP: United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka, Europe, 1996–2002 12. UNSMIH: United Nations Support Mission in Haiti, North America , Aug–Dec 1997 13. MINUGUA: United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala, North America , Jan–May 1997 14. UNTMIH: United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti, North America , Aug–Dec 1997 15. MIPONUH: United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti, North America, 1997–2000 16. UNCPSG: UN Civilian Police Support Group, Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, Europe, Jan–Oct 1998 17. MINURCA: United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic, Africa, 1998–2000 18. UNAMSIL: United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, Africa, 1999–2005 19. UNGOMAP: United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan, South Asia, 1988–1990 20. ONUCA: United Nations Observer Group in Central America , North/South America , 1989–1991 21. UNAVEM I: United Nations Angola Verification Mission I, Africa, 1989–1992

Did not join

Appendix I: List of Malaysia’s UNPKO According to the Prime Ministers’ Eras 209

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

5. Tun Abdullah 2003–2009

Source Malaysia’s Defence Policy (2010) and United Nations (2013)

UNMIL: Liberia, 2003–present UNIFIL: Lebanon, 2006–present (Contingent) UNMIN: Nepal, 2007–present UNMIT: Timor Leste, 2005–2012 UNOB: Burundi, 2004–2006 UNMIS: Sudan, 2009–2011 UNAMID: Sudan/Darfur, 2009–present

Joined

Prime Minister /Premiership

(continued)

1. UNOCI: United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, Africa, 2004–present 2. MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, North America , 2004–present 3. MINURCAT: United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, Africa, 2007–2010

Did not join

210 Appendix I: List of Malaysia’s UNPKO According to the Prime Ministers’ Eras

About the Authors

Dr Asri Salleh has been a senior lecturer at Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM) since 2008. He is currently attached to Sabah Branch, Kota Kinabalu Campus. Asri’s primary research interest is international relations. Specifically, Asri specializes in international and security studies, foreign policy, peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Asri was selected to participate in the United States’ International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP-2013), during which he visited Washington DC, Boston, Texas and Hawaii within a three-week period. Asri has authored and translated a number of books, journals and periodicals that include, among others: Dispute Resolution through “Third Party Mediation: Malaysia and Indonesia”, Journal of Intellectual Discourse, IIUM (2007); “Malaysia’s policy towards its 1963–2008 territorial disputes”, Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution (2009); Tun Abdul Razak – Fenomena Politik Malaysia (Partisan Publication, 2009, translation); Datuk Seri Najib; Waris Politik Terulung Pertama Malaysia – Biografi Politik (Partisan Publication, 2010, translation); Malaysia’s Territorial Disputes, 1963–2008 (UiTM Press, 2012); and “Constitutional Asymmetry in Malaysia: A Case Study of Sabah and Sarawak. A Country Study of Constitutional Asymmetry” Constitutional Asymmetry in Multinational Federalism Managing Multinationalism in Multi-tiered Systems (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019). Asri’s articles also appear regularly in national media such as News Straits Times, Utusan Malaysia and Berita Harian. Address: Dr Asri Salleh, Head of Studies Centre, Faculty of Administrative Science and Policy Studies, Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM) Sabah Branch, Kota Kinabalu Campus, Locked Bag 71, 88997 Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia. Email: [email protected]

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Salleh and A. Idris, Malaysia’s United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1960–2010), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4137-1

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About the Authors Dr Asmady Idris is Associate Professor and an International Relations scholar at the Universiti Malaysia Sabah (UMS). He earned his MA and Ph.D. in International Relations at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK. He has written numerous articles on Middle East-Asia Pacific relations, as well as on other international issues: “Malaysia’s Relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran: Juggling the Interests”, Contemporary Review of the Middle East, January, 5(1): 46–64; “Impact of Mutual Interaction between Civil Society and Conditionality by an External Actor on Democratization: Cases of Turkey and Malaysia”, International Journal of Social Sciences and Education Research, 2(2): 579–602; “Malaysia’s Contemporary Political and Economic Relations with Iran”, International Relations and Diplomacy, February, 3(2): 123–133; “A NonRegional Perspective on Bilateral Relations Between States from Different Regions: A Case Study of Malaysia-Saudi Arabia Relations”, Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research, 22(9): 1339–1352; “Kelangsungan Dominasi BN di Sabah: Analisis PRU13”, Kajian Malaysia 32 (Supp. 2): 171–206; “Malaysian Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Humanitarian Issues in Gaza, Palestine”, International Journal of West Asian Studies, 4(1): 49–78; “Malaysia’s Relations with Saudi Arabia in Small States’ Organizations: The Case of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)”, Asian Profile, 39(2): 151– 162; “Malaysia’s Economic Relations With Saudi Arabia”, Jurnal Jati, 12: 31–54; “Malaysia’s Relations With Saudi Arabia In Smaller States’ Organisations: The Case Of The OIC”, Sosiohumanika, 1(1): 193–218; with Mohd. Shauki Md. Radzi: “Malaysia’s Relations with Saudi Arabia under Tunku Abdul Rahman Era, 1957–1970”, Historia: Journal Of Historical Studies; “Early Development Of Malaysia’s Relations With Saudi Arabia”, in: The Islamic Quarterly Journal, 47(4): 273– 302. Address: Dr Asmady Idris, Associate Professor, Faculty of Humanities, Arts and Heritage, Universiti Malaysia Sabah, Jalan UMS, 88400, Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia. +6088-320000 ext. 1845. Email: [email protected]

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Index

A Abdul Rahman, 1, 48, 102, 153, 154, 169, 170, 180, 208 Abstain, 70, 115 Abstention, 72, 114 America, 69, 75, 78, 79, 95, 96, 131, 133, 134, 136–138, 144, 150, 151, 154, 170–172, 205, 208–210 Analytical framework, 1, 11, 12, 15, 17, 20, 21, 25, 26, 29, 30, 32, 33, 65, 175, 176, 181 Anarchy, 17, 18, 20–23, 27 Annual budget, 5 Arms, 6, 40, 46, 65–67, 69, 85, 102, 143, 189 Assessment, 5, 9, 27, 29, 41, 42, 45, 84, 139, 157, 175, 176 Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), 10, 16, 49–52, 96, 122, 136, 159–161, 194 Authorization, 4, 37, 65, 66, 70, 72, 86, 88, 133, 162, 178 Autonomy, 17, 21, 178

B Badawi, 1, 51, 102, 121, 163, 166 Balancing, 4, 66, 81, 83, 84, 87 Bilateralism, 104, 119 Bipolar, 26, 51, 66, 80, 130, 131, 133, 158, 160, 161, 169, 177, 182 Bosnia, 6, 8, 9, 11, 18, 52, 68, 70, 74, 75, 86, 99, 100, 102, 106–108, 110, 111, 115–123, 130–132, 136, 140– 142, 149, 162–164, 167, 171, 177, 192, 193, 199, 209

C Cabinet Paper, 45, 103, 166, 168 Causal factor, 1, 3, 22, 30, 32, 138, 161, 175 Ceasefire, 41, 47, 48, 72, 82, 188–192 Charter, 4, 42, 49, 65–69, 75, 77, 87, 144, 178 Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), 48, 194 Civil society, 3, 29, 93, 112–118, 120, 124, 125, 157, 160, 168, 179 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 26, 75, 83 Communism, 48, 97, 98, 155, 159 Conflict, 4–7, 9, 10, 19, 20, 22, 24, 38–41, 47, 48, 53, 65–67, 69, 72, 74, 76, 77, 80, 82, 84–88, 94, 96, 99, 100, 102, 109, 110, 113, 115–123, 131, 133, 136, 139, 140, 143–145, 155, 159, 162–164, 167, 177, 178, 189 Constructivism, 16, 18–22, 25, 32 Continental shelf, 44 Contingent conventional, 21 Co-religionist, 3, 93, 99–101, 115–117, 120, 124, 179, 181

D Decision-making, 1, 3, 10, 17, 28, 29, 32, 37, 45, 102, 103, 123, 124, 166, 168, 175, 182, 213 Department of Field Support (DFS), 39–41 Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), 39, 40 Deployment, 3, 39, 41, 72, 76, 79, 80, 97, 101, 102, 108, 110, 122, 143, 150, 171, 178, 179, 203, 209

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 A. Salleh and A. Idris, Malaysia’s United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1960–2010), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4137-1

227

228 Détente Doctrine, 81, 82, 88, 104 Diplomacy, 44, 53, 108, 112, 138 Domestic factors, 15, 19, 27, 33, 129, 146, 154, 182 Domestic interest groups, 29 Domestic pressure, 12, 15, 154, 175, 176

E Egoism, 22, 23 Elite, 3, 26–30, 109, 153 Entrepreneurial, 138 Equidistance, 49, 50, 159 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 44 External, 1, 3, 10, 11, 23, 26–33, 42, 44, 48, 49, 53, 65, 66, 88, 94, 104, 119, 129, 131, 139, 153, 154, 156, 157, 159, 161, 166, 168, 175–178, 180–182

F Failure, 5, 10, 18, 41, 67, 82, 84, 85, 87, 88, 165, 178 Fatality, 2, 139, 149, 201 Finance, 5, 39, 40, 43, 45 Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), 44 Force, 2, 4, 8, 9, 11, 17, 19, 20, 23, 27, 38, 39, 44–47, 50, 67–69, 71, 72, 74, 75, 87, 103–109, 111–114, 120, 121, 123, 143, 144, 150, 158, 160, 168, 170, 171, 188–192, 194, 203, 208, 209 Foreign policy, 3, 7, 9–11, 15, 19, 20, 23, 25– 27, 29, 30, 33, 37, 38, 43–45, 48–53, 78, 94, 96, 99, 101, 103, 113, 114, 117, 120, 124, 131, 133, 136–139, 156, 158–161, 163, 166, 176, 180, 182, 213 Framework, 1, 11, 12, 15, 17, 20, 21, 25, 26, 29, 30, 32, 33, 39–41, 65, 68, 117, 165, 175, 176, 181, 182

G Genocide, 102, 120, 121, 143, 164 Geopolitical, 4, 10, 78, 87, 88 Geopolitics, 77 Geo-strategic, 7, 30–32, 65, 66, 77, 79, 83, 87, 88, 177 Global, 5–7, 17, 24, 44, 45, 47, 49, 73, 76, 77, 82, 85, 87, 96–98, 106, 112, 114, 116, 119, 131, 138, 141, 143, 157, 161

Index Globalization, 3, 37, 44, 48, 51–53, 101, 119, 138, 144 Governance, 6, 17, 86, 98 H Hegemonic, 5, 8, 66, 85, 131, 133, 178, 180 Hegemony, 16, 23, 177 Hobbesian, 22, 26 Humanitarian, 3, 7, 24, 41, 45, 47, 48, 69, 75, 87, 93, 95, 99–101, 105, 114–120, 122, 124, 143, 179, 181, 191, 192 Hypothesis, 157, 160, 166, 168, 169 I Immunity, 8, 75 Impact, 3, 5, 10, 65, 66, 81, 94, 98, 105, 114, 116, 143, 153, 177, 179, 180 Impartial, 38, 108, 110 Imperative, 5, 9–11, 15, 23, 26–31, 33, 65, 66, 87, 88, 93, 124, 133, 139, 143, 168, 169, 176, 182 Independent, 6, 7, 15, 17–19, 24–26, 30, 32, 33, 49, 53, 75, 76, 114, 121, 153, 158, 169, 178–182 India, 2, 7, 42, 51, 76, 78, 96, 99, 109, 131, 150, 154, 170, 203, 208 Interests, 1, 2, 5–11, 15–20, 23–27, 29, 33, 38, 41, 44, 51, 53, 69, 72, 74, 75, 77– 88, 94, 95, 98–101, 108, 113, 115, 117, 119, 122, 124, 129, 133–139, 143, 149–151, 157, 159, 160, 163, 164, 166, 167, 175–180, 182, 199, 201, 203, 205, 206 Internal, 11, 26, 27, 29, 32, 44, 49, 94, 113, 124, 129, 153, 154, 157, 162, 166, 168, 175, 176, 181, 182 International, 3–11, 15–33, 37, 38, 41, 45, 49–53, 65, 66, 68–71, 74, 75, 77– 83, 85–88, 93–99, 101–103, 107– 109, 111, 113–121, 123, 124, 129– 134, 138–140, 143, 144, 146, 153, 154, 157–159, 161, 164, 166, 167, 175–180, 182 International community, 4, 5, 68, 70, 86, 87, 93, 95–97, 99, 124, 131, 164 Internationalism, 25 International law, 4 International organization, 4, 5, 8, 11, 16, 32, 50, 86, 96, 159, 182 International relations, 5, 9–11, 15, 16, 18– 22, 24, 25, 28, 33, 51, 77, 94, 120, 138, 176, 182

Index International security environment, 16, 26, 30–32, 65, 66, 88, 93, 124, 153, 157–159, 161, 166, 167, 177–180, 182 International society, 22 International status, 7, 16 Inter-state, 15, 18, 33, 120, 131, 162 Intervening, 15, 17, 23, 26–28, 30, 33, 129, 180–182 Intervention, 4–6, 10, 24, 29, 74, 83, 85, 87, 121, 133, 143, 155 Intra-State, 4, 80, 81, 131, 162

J Joint Force Headquarters (JFH), 45, 46 Joint military operation, 46

229 Materialism, 19, 22 Mechanized Infantry Battalion, 46 Middle power, 95, 139, 179 Middlepowermanship, 95, 96, 98, 99, 102, 124, 139, 166, 179 Milieu, 9, 30–32, 65, 66, 77 Military diplomacy, 108, 112 Military interoperability, 107 Military intervention, 29, 83, 87 Military Observer (MILOB), 46, 47, 67, 74–76, 145, 188–194 Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), 105 Minimum Deterrent Capability (MDC), 44 Ministry of Defence (MINDEF), 2, 44, 45, 47, 99, 103–106, 134, 140, 144–146, 165, 179 Multilateralism, 16 Muslim majority countries, 2, 100

K Konfrontasi, 97, 98, 155

L Leadership, 7–9, 24, 27, 28, 52, 77, 96, 104, 107, 162, 166, 211 Legitimacy, 4, 5, 8, 49, 72, 85, 86, 120 Liberalism, 16–19, 32 Logics of anarchy, 22

M Mahathir, 1, 51, 52, 97, 99, 101–104, 111, 121, 124, 141, 153, 161, 163–169, 171, 179, 180, 209 Major power, 7, 8, 10, 16, 24, 25, 50, 51, 53, 66, 68, 70, 72, 80–88, 95, 98, 113, 129, 133, 134, 146, 154, 156–160, 166, 175, 178, 180, 182 Malaysia, 1–3, 9–12, 15, 16, 26, 30–33, 37, 38, 43–54, 80, 83, 93–125, 129–151, 153–169, 175–182, 194, 195, 198, 199, 201, 203, 205, 206 Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF), 44, 45, 47, 104–107, 112, 190 Malaysian Battalion (MALBATT), 46, 110, 190–192 Malaysia Peacekeeping Training Centre, 47, 105, 108, 110, 112, 145, 194 Mandate, 4, 5, 38–41, 45–47, 65, 82, 84, 85, 87, 88, 106, 109, 111, 139, 145, 165 Map, 97, 99–101, 122, 131, 132, 134–137, 155, 181, 190, 192 Material capability, 4, 22, 30, 83, 87, 93, 133

N National Defence Policy (NDP), 2, 37, 44, 45, 97, 99–101, 131, 132, 134–138, 147, 148, 179, 181, 195, 198 National interests, 6, 7, 16, 20, 27, 33, 53, 78, 86, 87, 94, 95, 98, 99, 108, 113, 117, 139, 160, 180 Nationalism, 28, 29, 78, 94, 112 National policy, 30, 94 National power, 23, 30–32, 93, 94, 101, 124, 125 Neoclassical Realism (NCR), 1, 11, 12, 15, 23, 25–33, 38, 154, 158, 175, 176, 181, 182 Neutrality, 3, 37, 38, 48–53, 138, 159–161 Non-alignment, 44, 50, 52, 138 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), 23, 111–116, 118–120, 212 Non-Strategic Interest Zones (NSIZ), 1–3, 11, 100, 129, 134–139, 143, 144, 179, 181 Non-tangible, 3, 178 Non-use of force, 39 Norm, 4, 17–21, 24, 25, 87, 178, 182 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 4, 8, 9, 11, 17, 111, 144, 164 O Observer, 21, 32, 46, 47, 50, 67, 74–76, 130, 131, 134–136, 145, 150, 151, 158, 160, 170, 171, 181, 188–194, 203, 205, 208, 209

230 P Peace, 4–8, 10, 16–18, 20, 24, 38–44, 46– 48, 67, 69–72, 76, 77, 85, 87, 94, 96, 98, 99, 112, 119, 131, 134, 138, 144, 159, 165, 178, 182, 189 Peacebuilding, 38, 41, 46 Peace enforcement, 4, 5, 24, 40, 46, 47 Peacekeepers, 5, 6, 45–47, 84, 95, 107–112, 116, 133, 143 Peacekeeping, 1–4, 6, 8–11, 15, 16, 24–26, 29, 38–43, 45–47, 49, 65, 67, 68, 74, 75, 77–79, 84–86, 95, 97, 99, 101– 108, 110–112, 115, 116, 119, 121, 123, 124, 129, 140, 141, 143–146, 150, 160, 164, 168, 170, 181, 190, 192, 194, 203, 208, 213 Pocket Veto, 69–72, 178 Policy, 2, 3, 5–11, 15, 17, 19, 20, 23, 25–30, 33, 37, 38, 40, 41, 43–45, 48–53, 73, 78, 84, 85, 94, 96, 97, 99–101, 103, 113, 114, 116, 117, 120, 122, 124, 131–139, 141, 147, 148, 156, 158– 161, 163, 166, 167, 170–172, 176, 179–182, 189, 190, 192, 195, 198, 208–210 Politico-military institutions, 94, 102, 104, 124, 179 Positivism, 19, 21 Post-Cold War, 1–3, 9, 11, 16, 25, 37, 42, 53, 66, 73–79, 81–85, 87, 88, 98, 129– 137, 139, 143, 144, 146, 161, 166, 167, 169, 176, 177, 180–182 Power, 2, 4, 5, 7–10, 15–19, 21–32, 44, 49– 51, 53, 65–72, 74, 75, 77, 78, 80–88, 93–99, 101–104, 107, 112, 113, 117, 120–122, 124, 125, 129, 131, 133, 134, 139, 146, 153–162, 166–169, 175, 177–183 Prestige, 7–9, 49, 78, 93, 95, 97–99, 101, 102, 108, 124, 138, 143, 154, 166, 179 Prime Minister, 1, 11, 12, 30, 31, 45, 48– 53, 93, 94, 99–104, 111, 112, 116, 117, 120, 123–125, 133, 136, 137, 139, 141–143, 146, 153, 154, 156, 158, 159, 161, 163–172, 175–183, 208–210 Pro-West, 3, 37, 48, 49, 53, 97, 157, 160 Proxy war, 65, 66

Q Quick Reaction Force (QRF), 47

Index R Refugee, 47, 48, 118, 122, 143, 164, 190 Regional leadership, 7, 9 Resolution, 5, 38, 41, 53, 65, 67–72, 74–77, 80, 82, 84–88, 96, 98, 99, 102, 114, 115, 131, 159, 164, 178 S Security, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 15–18, 20, 22, 23, 26– 28, 30–32, 38–41, 44, 45, 48, 53, 65– 71, 75, 77, 80–83, 85, 87, 88, 93, 94, 97–99, 104, 112, 113, 123, 124, 133, 134, 138, 139, 141, 143–145, 150, 153, 155–159, 161, 166, 167, 170, 177–180, 182, 190–194, 203, 208 Self-defence, 39, 68 Self-determination, 6, 7 Self-preservation, 6, 65, 81, 82, 88 Small power, 2, 15, 30, 44, 98, 124, 129, 133, 146, 156, 160, 161, 166, 175, 178–180, 182, 183 Soft power, 9, 93, 95–97, 99, 102, 124, 166, 179 Somalia, 5, 9, 43, 46, 47, 52, 100, 101, 106–109, 115, 116, 119, 121, 123, 130–132, 136, 137, 140, 149, 151, 162–165, 171, 191, 201, 206, 209 South America, 78, 79, 96, 133, 134, 137, 138, 144, 154, 171, 209 Sovereignty, 17, 18, 44, 50, 76 States’ interests, 1, 6, 9–11, 16, 17, 19, 23, 78, 176, 182 Status quo, 16, 24, 82 Strategic, 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 11, 26, 27, 40, 41, 44, 75, 77, 79, 80, 82, 83, 100, 101, 113, 129, 132–139, 143, 149, 150, 160, 179, 199, 203 Strategic Interests Zone (SIZ), 1–3, 11, 100, 129, 134–139, 143, 144, 149–151, 179, 181, 201, 203, 205, 206 Structural, 1, 7, 17–19, 21, 22, 24, 26, 28, 38, 66, 74, 80–83, 87, 88, 129, 131, 133, 178, 182 Superpower, 4, 7, 10, 28, 66, 72, 79, 80, 82, 83, 87, 88, 131–133, 143, 162 Systemic, 1, 5, 6, 12, 15, 19, 22–33, 37, 53, 65, 66, 82, 84, 87, 88, 93, 124, 129, 131–133, 139, 143, 146, 153, 154, 157–161, 166, 168, 169, 175–182 T Tangible, 3, 178

Index Theory, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21–23, 25, 26, 29, 32, 176, 182 Troops, 2, 5, 7–9, 26, 40–43, 45–47, 49, 68, 70, 71, 75, 84, 85, 88, 97, 102, 104– 112, 116, 119, 120, 123–125, 132, 139–141, 144, 145, 156, 164, 165, 167, 178, 180, 188–194 Troops Contributing Countries (TCC), 2, 41

U Unilateralism, 18, 69, 87 Unipolar, 26, 66, 83, 130, 131, 133, 161, 162, 167, 169, 177, 182 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 69, 71, 72, 76, 155, 178 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), 1–12, 15–17, 25, 26, 30– 33, 37–54, 65–88, 93–95, 97–109, 112, 115–125, 129–146, 149–151, 153, 154, 156–158, 160–172, 175– 183, 188–194, 199, 201, 203, 205, 206, 208–210, 213 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 16, 25, 40–42, 52, 65– 77, 79–81, 83, 84, 86–88, 96–99, 102, 114, 129, 133, 134, 138, 143, 144, 146, 155, 156, 159, 167, 168, 178, 179, 194

231 United

Nations Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS), 43, 46, 47, 140 United Nations (UN), 1, 2, 4–6, 8, 11, 16, 38–51, 54, 65–72, 74–79, 81–87, 97– 99, 101, 104, 108–112, 114, 120, 121, 123, 131–134, 136, 137, 140, 141, 143–145, 149–151, 155, 156, 158, 160, 162–165, 167, 168, 170–172, 175, 178, 181, 182, 185, 188–194, 199, 201, 203, 205, 206, 208–210, 213 UN Secretary-General (UNSG), 40, 41, 74, 132, 164

V Variable, 1, 15, 17, 23–28, 30–33, 46, 77, 98, 105, 153, 180–182 Veto, 69–77, 82, 83, 88, 133, 178 Voluntary, 2, 43, 69, 70, 124, 165, 178

W Wisma Putra, 30, 45, 103, 179

Z Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), 159, 161