Making the Union Work: Scotland, 1651-1763 1000051706, 9781000051704

Making the Union Work: Scotland, 1651-1763, explores and analyses existing narratives of Jacobitism and Unionism in late

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Making the Union Work: Scotland, 1651-1763
 1000051706, 9781000051704

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Table of Contents
List of Abbreviations
Preface
Introduction: Making the union work: Scotland 1651–1763
1. Scotland 1651–1660: Conquest and union with England and Ireland
2. Charles II as King of Scotland 1660–1685
3. A second Revolution? Scotland 1685–1702
4. Union 1702–1715
5. Post-union struggles 1715–1727
6. The transformation of Jacobitism, 1727–1745
7. The Scottish economy and Scottish society, 1688/9 to c.1763
8. The limits of the union? Scotland and the United Kingdom 1745–1763
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Making the Union Work

Making the Union Work: Scotland, 1651–1763, explores and analyses existing narratives of Jacobitism and Unionism in late seventeenth to mid-eighteenth century Scotland. Using in-depth archival research, the book questions the extent to which the currency of kinship patronage politics persisted in Scotland as the competing ideologies of Scottish Jacobitism and British Whiggism grew. It discusses the connection between the manifest corruption of patronage politics and the efflor­ escence of the Scottish Enlightenment. It also examines the stance taken by David Hume and Adam Smith in defining themselves as philosophers first, Whigs second, but Scots above all else, and analyses whether they achieved international success because of or despite the parliamentary union with England in 1707. Organised chronologically and concluding with an assessment of the newly formed United Kingdom in the decades following the 1707 union, Making the Union Work: Scotland, 1651–1763 will be of great interest to researchers and scholars of early modern Scotland. Alexander Murdoch is a graduate of the George Washington University in Washington D.C. and received his doctorate in History from the University of Edinburgh in 1978. He was Co-Director of the Scottish Records Programme of the North Carolina State Archives from 1988 to 1990, taught History and American Studies at what is now the University of Northampton in England from 1991 to 1995 and lectured in Scottish History at the University of Edinburgh from 1995 until his retirement in 2014. He is currently an Honorary Fellow in History at the University of Edinburgh.

Routledge Research in Early Modern History

Edwin Sandys and the Reform of English Religion Sarah L. Bastow Murder, Justice, and Harmony in an Eighteenth-Century French Village Nancy Locklin The Dirty Secret of Early Modern Capitalism The Global Reach of the Dutch Arms Trade, Warfare and Mercenaries in the Seventeenth Century Kees Boterbloem Languages of Reform in the Eighteenth Century When Europe Lost Its Fear of Change Edited by Susan Richter, Thomas Maissen, and Manuela Albertone Religious Tolerance from Renaissance to Enlightenment Atheist’s Progress Eric MacPhail Protestant Resistance in Counterreformation Austria Peter Thaler Prosecuting Homicide in Eighteenth-Century Law and Practice “And Must They All Be Hanged?” Drew D. Gray Making the Union Work Scotland, 1651–1763 Alexander Murdoch For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com/ Routledge-Research-in-Early-Modern-History/book-series/RREMH

Making the Union Work Scotland, 1651–1763

Alexander Murdoch

First published 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 Alexander Murdoch The right of Alexander Murdoch to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Murdoch, Alexander, author.

Title: Making the union work : Scotland, 1651-1763 / Alexander Murdoch.

Other titles: Scotland, 1651-1763

Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York : Routledge, 2020. |

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2019058838 (print) | LCCN 2019058839 (ebook) |

ISBN 9781138848559 (hardback) | ISBN 9781003031710 (ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: Scotland--History--17th century. | Scotland--History--18th

century. | Scotland--History--Union, 1707. | Jacobites.

Classification: LCC DA809 .M87 2020 (print) |

LCC DA809 (ebook) | DDC 941.107--dc23

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019058838

LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019058839

ISBN: 978-1-138-84855-9 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-003-03171-0 (ebk)

Typeset in Galliard

by Taylor & Francis Books

In memory of Rosalind Mitchison and Jenny Wormald, who transformed our understanding of Early Modern Scotland

Contents

List of Abbreviations Preface Introduction: Making the union work: Scotland 1651–1763 1 Scotland 1651–1660: Conquest and union with England and Ireland

viii

ix

1

8

2 Charles II as King of Scotland 1660–1685

19

3 A second Revolution? Scotland 1685–1702

41

4 Union 1702–1715

61

5 Post-union struggles 1715–1727

82

6 The transformation of Jacobitism, 1727–1745

101

7 The Scottish economy and Scottish society, 1688/9 to c.1763

122

8 The limits of the union? Scotland and the United Kingdom

1745–1763

142

Conclusion Bibliography Index

161

167

186

List of Abbreviations

BL EHR EUL HMC NLS NRS ODNB OED SHR SHS

British Library English Historical Review Edinburgh University Library Historical Manuscripts Commission National Library of Scotland National Records of Scotland Oxford Dictionary of National Biography Oxford English Dictionary Scottish Historical Review Scottish History Society

Preface

After more than forty years as a student of history and a practising historian, there are so many people who have helped me with my studies that it seems unfair to mention only some of them. I must acknowledge my longstanding debt to N.T. Phillipson and R.B. Sher. Dr Phillipson was the lead supervisor for my doctoral studies at the University of Edinburgh and helped me achieve more with my research project than I thought possible. I met Professor Sher as a fellow research student, a member of the University of Edinburgh during the academic year 1973 to 1974 during the third year of his five-year University of Chicago doctoral stu­ dies, which formed the basis of the book he published as Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment (1985). As a friend and mentor he led by example, and encouraged me to be ambitious in my archival research. My early publications owed a great deal to the example he set and the encouragement he gave me. This book is an attempt to look back to that early research and to endeavour to set it in the broader context of Early Modern Scottish History. Its faults are my own, but if it finds a readership, that will owe much to the advice and friendship of Dr David J. Brown of the National Records of Scotland, whose best work as a historian is still to come. At the University of Edinburgh I am grateful to Pro­ fessors Stewart J. Brown, John Cairns and Hector MacQueen for the examples they set then and continue to set now. It was a privilege to work with Professors Michael Lynch and Ewen Cameron as Professor of Scottish History at the uni­ versity. In regard to this book I will always be grateful to William Ferguson and Owen Dudley Edwards for their encouragement, and Professor Julian Goodare and Dr Alasdair Raffe for their comments on the first draft of what became this book. Beyond Edinburgh I owe a particular debt to Dr Philipp Rössner of the University of Manchester and Dr Max Skjönsberg of the University of St Andrews for their incisive and helpful comments on the draft texts they permitted me to send to them. Of course, my greatest debt has always been to Catherine, Anna, Joss and Lydia for their love, patience and forgiveness.

Introduction Making the union work: Scotland 1651–1763

This book originated in an invitation to write a survey of the history of Scotland from 1603 to 1745, later altered at my request to the period 1625 to 1763. Once it proved impossible for me to meet the deadline set by the publisher, I was for­ tunate to receive an invitation from Laura Pilsworth, one of the History editors at Taylor & Francis, to submit a proposal for consideration. I decided to return to the research that had underpinned my first book on the government (such as it was) of Scotland in the middle of the eighteenth century. I hoped that by working back from the age of David Hume and the Scottish Enlightenment to a starting point of the English conquest and occupation of Scotland in the middle of the seventeenth century, and from there through to the union of the English and Scottish parliaments, it would be possible to open up some new perspectives on the development of the new, post-union, administrative and fiscal regime for Scotland. This occurred to me in part because I still had notes from my doctoral research of correspondence in which the Commander-in-Chief of the British army in Scotland in the 1750s, General Humphrey Bland, had advised the Lord Chan­ cellor that to his mind, Scotland would be best governed as it was by Cromwell: ‘I think Oliver Cromwell has set us an example of how to bring this country under the obedience of England, and which render’d the People happy, by appting Eng. Judges – … and if some more of his Rules were followed by the English Ministry, in what relates to this Country, it would produce the desired effect: …’1 This appears to have meant that Scotland should be governed by Englishmen. As Bland put it, ‘to think of bringing these People to a right way of thinking & acting, by putting the Power into the Hands of Scotchmen, it is almost impossible: …’2 Implicit in that outburst was impatience with having to govern in accordance with Scots law, as guaranteed by the Treaty of Union approved by both Scottish and English Parliaments in 1707. Even after fifty years of parliamentary union, Scot­ land was a different country. They did things differently there, despite a parlia­ mentary union within a single United Kingdom. Scots law, as it developed in the second half of the seventeenth century in the published work of the former Lord Advocate Sir George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh and James Dalrymple, Viscount Stair, was founded on the Roman civil law, but also customary law, ‘placed in the context of Grotian natural law’, including the law of nations. By 1700, Scots law was ‘a blend of Roman law and local usage.’3 It was not until 1762 that the

2 Introduction United Kingdom had its first Scottish Prime Minister, John Stuart, third Earl of Bute, who within a year had to resign his offices, such was the strength of public outrage in England that a Scot could serve as the government’s Prime Minister. Union with Scotland, for many in England, had placed the constitution of 1688 that had safeguarded the liberties enjoyed by all Englishmen, in mortal danger, by reviving the royal prerogative.4 In the introduction to my first book, I stated my interest in establishing how Scotland was governed in the eighteenth century in greater depth than was the case at that time. I wrote then, that even if the creation of the United Kingdom had by the middle of the eighteenth century opened up opportunities for some Scots, those in Scotland who could not emigrate to England or elsewhere ‘required government’. At the time I was not aware of the long tradition of dis­ content in Scotland after 1707 with the way that Scotland was governed within the evolving union settlement. The savants of the Scottish Enlightenment in the middle of the eighteenth century were critical of some aspects of incorporation into a British union, but with few exceptions, they believed that the country had benefited from ‘improvement’ during the decades after 1707.5 The terms of the Treaty of Paris of 1763, which confirmed British victory in its Seven Years War with France seemed to them to open up expanding opportunities throughout Britain and its now geographically expanded empire. All that remained to modern Britons was to take advantage of the expanding opportunities now available to them. David Hume’s famous letter extolling Scotland’s status as ‘the People most distinguish’d for Literature in Europe’, expressed the optimism and energy with which many Scots faced the future by the middle of the eighteenth century.6 When I wrote primly of the necessity of ‘government’ for Scotland in the eighteenth century I was writing in an American tradition of constitutional opti­ mism. Decades later, my friend Peter King directed me to the work of the anthropologist James C. Scott, who in his book The Art of Not Being Governed set out the case, drawn from his study of the history of Southeast Asia, for those communities which resisted governmental intervention. In the introduction to his book, Scott not only confessed his ‘astonishment’ at becoming ‘a kind of histor­ ian’ in pursuing his research, but he wrote of his awareness of ‘the occupational hazard of historians, namely that a historian preparing himself to write, say, about the eighteenth century ends up writing mostly about the seventeenth century because it comes to seem so fundamental to the question at issue.’7 Scott’s work did not relate, at least directly, to the administrators and politicians I sought to identify and analyse in my first book. These were criticised but not named as ‘the people above’ for their remote and negative influence on contemporary political discourse in Scotland by a pamphlet published anonymously in 1761, attributed variously to Adam Ferguson or David Hume.8 In my original proposal, I hoped to interrogate the history of Scotland in the second half of the seventeenth century from the perspective of those looking back to that history from their lives in the middle of the eighteenth century, as General Bland attempted to do. It seemed to me that at a more critical level, David Hume attempted to do that in his two volume History of Great Britain published in the

Introduction

3

1750s, about the same time as General Bland chose to share his thoughts with Lord Chancellor Hardwicke. In time these volumes were republished as the con­ cluding volumes of Hume’s best-selling History of England. 9 Hume’s initial volumes presented a view of Scottish History in the seventeenth century that reveals much about an eighteenth-century debate over the legacy of that history.10 That debate had a distinctive impact on the historical aspect of the social project of a ‘history of man’ that formed the dynamic underlining to what we call the Scottish Enlightenment. Scotland had traversed the history of the uplands of the seventeenth century as part of its social journey to the modernity, politeness and prosperity of the eighteenth century. The cultural desert of seventeenth-century Scotland had been transformed, according to this perspective, thanks to the establishment of the unwritten English constitution of the 1688 Revolution and its aftermath. In Hume’s history of Britain in the seventeenth century, however, it was the crucible of Irish and Scottish conflict with England in the second half of the seventeenth century that forged the modern triumphs of English, and even­ tually, British liberties, through the constitutional revolution in England, Ireland and Scotland from 1688 to 1690 and beyond to 1707. What Hume did not consider directly in his History but was implicit in it was a narrative of the negotiation that occurred during periods of military and political conflict in Britain about the status of the subject in a modern monarchy. He did not really address what James Scott has referred to as attempts to evade ‘state incorporation’ by individuals or communities that at the same time sought to access ‘the economic and cultural opportunities’ of proximity to areas (Scott refers to ‘the interstices of unstable state systems’) where law and taxation are current.11 From the perspective of those in eighteenth-century Britain who wanted to make ‘the union work,’ the rule of law and the collection of taxation were the basis of modern ‘British’ government in the eighteenth century. For Nicholas Canny, Making Ire­ land British was a project which originated in the arrival of English Protestant plantation in Ireland during the second half of the sixteenth century, and the establishment of the Scottish plantation in Ulster (enthusiastically promoted by King James VI and I, at the turn of the seventeenth century). James as king of Scotland in the late sixteenth century had promoted similar projects on the western seaboard of the Scottish Highlands before his succession to the English throne. By the middle of the seventeenth century, the Cromwellian conquest of Ireland threatened to impose ‘a British, or at least an English, superstructure upon Irish society’ with the ‘ultimate purpose of changing the religious, linguistic, and cultural allegiances of the vast bulk of the Irish population.’12 The Restoration of the Stuart monarchy in Ireland put an end to the Cromwellian project, as (in a very different manner) it did to the Cromwellian regime in Scotland. In Frank O’Gorman’s words, ‘local auton­ omy was the real beneficiary of the Restoration of 1660.’13 During the eighteenth century the Scottish and Irish parliamentary unions with what was the English parliament in 1707, and in 1800 was the parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain, topped and tailed British unionism in its first century. For Scotland, Scottish participation during the War of Spanish Succes­ sion, in armies which included English regiments commanded by the English

4 Introduction Duke of Marlborough (who in 1682 had been made a baron in the peerage of Scotland by James VII and II), encouraged the idea of parliamentary union in support of the war effort. Scottish officers in the English army such as the Duke of Argyll, the Earl of Orkney and the Earl of Stair contributed to efforts to promote the union of Scotland and England as a project.14 Parliamentary union was achieved, but initially the element of incorporation involved English domination. The incorporation of Scotland into the elaborate English taxation system meant that, as Alvin Jackson has put it: ‘for years after 1707 Westminster’s economic strategies and taxation policies recognized, not British, but rather English needs.’15 On the other hand, Julian Hoppit has concluded that ‘it is clear that the relationship between legislation and economic life differed markedly between England and Scotland, despite the fact that the Union created a single market and put both nations on an equal footing with regard to overseas and imperial trade.’16 Scotland remained divided on the issue of union until the British victories in the wars against France from 1742–1748 and 1756–1763 demonstrated some of the advantages of the union to those who could access better employment in England, increased markets for Scottish produce in England and overseas as well as the advantages of the British navy in defending Scotland’s coast and shipping from French attack.17 The economic downturn which followed the outbreak of peace, demonstrated that economic gains through union remained limited. There was also the debilitating effect of increased problems between Britain and the British colonies in North America, which would eventually lead to renewed war with France, Spain and the Netherlands. A conflict which almost monopolised the attentions of British ministries after the Stamp Act crisis of 1765. The Scottish Banking Act of 1765 would be the last important Scottish legislation to gain par­ liamentary approval at Westminster for some time. The incorporation of Scotland into the United Kingdom appeared to many to be in the process of completion by 1763. In many respects the process was never completed, but whereas in Ireland union with Great Britain was widely contested as its parliament gained greater autonomy from Westminster, in Scotland there was no support for the revival of legislative independence. Scotland may not have become fully integrated into the Kingdom of Great Britain, but increasing numbers of Scots lived lives affected by British integration and British imperialism. There were those who hailed Scot­ land’s former capital as the Athens of modern Britain, but the reference was on Athens as it was in the Roman Empire, and the classical references in Edinburgh’s architecture embodied an increasing belief that its aspirations were founded on establishing itself as a province of the new Rome.18

Notes 1 BL, Add. MS. 35448, ff210–11, Bland to Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, Edinburgh, 26 Nov. 1754; Alexander Murdoch, The People Above: Politics and Administration in MidEighteenth-Century Scotland (1980), p. 43. See J.A. Holding, ‘Bland, Humphrey (1685/6–1763), army officer and author’ in ODNB, online edn, accessed 8 April 2019. 2 Ibid. 3 Karen Baston, Charles Aerskine’s Library (2016), p. 119.

Introduction

5

4 John Brewer, Party Ideology and Popular Politics at the Accession of George III (1976), pp. 112–124; Frank O’Gorman, ‘The myth of Lord Bute’s secret influence,’ in Karl W. Schweizer, ed., Lord Bute: Essays in Re-interpretation (1988), pp. 57–63. 5 Colin Kidd, Union and Unionisms (2008), pp. 144–148. 6 R.B. Sher, The Enlightenment and the Book (2006), p. 43; David Hume to Gilbert Elliot of Minto, 2 July 1757, in J.Y.T. Greig, ed., Letters of David Hume (1932), Vol. I, p. 255. 7 James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (2009), pp. x–xi. We now have an additional study by Michael Szonyi, The Art of Being Governed: Everyday Politics in Late Imperial China (2018). For an aspect of Peter King’s research on eighteenth century Britain see Peter King, ‘Edward Thompson’s Contribution to Eighteenth-Century Studies,’ Social History, 21 (1996), pp. 215–228. James Scott’s most recent book is Against the Grain: A Deep History of the Earliest States (2018). 8 Alasdair Raffe, ‘John Bull, Sister Peg, and Anglo-Scottish Relations in the Eighteenth Century’ in Gerard Carruthers and Colin Kidd, eds., Literature and Union: Scottish Texts, British Contexts (2018), particularly note 56; David Raynor, ed., Sister Peg: A pamphlet hitherto unknown by David Hume (1982). 9 David Allan, Making British Culture (2008), pp. 33, 44, 46, 50–51, 59–60, 67, 74–78, 84–92, 98, 101, 104, 115–116, 122–125, 139, 165–168, 180–182, 206–216, 223– 224, 230–237; Mark R.M. Towsey, Reading the Scottish Enlightenment (2010), pp. 233–238, 243, 248, 253–254, 256, 261, 263–280, 301–303; Nicholas Phillipson, David Hume (first edn 1989, new edition 2011), pp. 70–99. 10 See Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth Century Commonwealthmen (1959, paperback edn 1968), pp. 177–220, but also see the index entry ‘Commonwealthmen, some ideas and projects of, see Agrarian; Balance; Constitutional renewal; Constitutional safe­ guards; Education; Equality; Game laws; History and historians; Law reform; Natural or inherent rights; Naturalization; Optimism; Parliamentary reform; Poor; Ranks of society; Religious liberty; Resistance rights; Separation of church and state.’ 11 Scott, Art of Not Being Governed, p. 329; Peter Sahlins, Boundaries (1989, prbk edn 1991), p. 128, citing James Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (1985). 12 Nicholas Canny, Making Ireland British (2001), p. 577.

13 Frank O’Gorman, The Long Eighteenth Century (new edition, 2016), p. 30.

14 Alvin Jackson, The Two Unions (2012), pp. 65–68.

15 Ibid., p. 124.

16 Julian Hoppit, Britain’s Political Economies (2017), p. 123.

17 Carolyn Anderson and Christopher Fleet, Scotland: Defending the Nation (2018), pp.

124–131; Andrew Mackillop, ‘More Fruitful than the Soil’ (2000), pp. 41–52; Matthew Dziennik, The Fatal Land: War, Empire and the Highland Soldier (2016), pp. 27–38. 18 Alexander Youngson, The Making of Classical Edinburgh (first published 1966, last reissued 2002) mostly discusses the city after 1763, but the discussion of the origins of its urban expansion are rooted in the 1750s and 1760s. Also see Iain Gordon Brown’s scholarship on the origins of the classical revival in Scotland: ‘Sir John Clerk of Penicuik (1676–1755): aspects of a virtuoso life’ (University of Cambridge PhD, 1980); Iain Gordon Brown, Bernard Frischer, Patricia R. Andrew, eds., Allan Ramsay and the Search for Horace’s Villa (first published 2001, reprinted 2017).

SCOTLAND 0

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KILOMETRES ORKNEY STROMA

CAITHNESS

LEWIS

SUTHERLAND

HARRIS NORTH

BERNERAY M.

UIST BENBECULA

SKYE NORTH

ROSS & CROMARTY

MORAY

BANFF

RAASAY

Inverness

UIST

ABERDEEN

CANNA BARRA SANDRAY PABBAY

Aberdeen

I N V E R N E S S

EIGG MUCK

BERNERAY

HIGHLANDS NORTH ARGYLL

COLL TIREE

L O R N

MULL

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Dundee

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IONA

COLONSAY

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FIFE

Stirling STIRLING I TH LO

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ARRAR

L OWL AND S

KIN

TYR

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KNAPDALE

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G

TE BU

ISLAY

MI

R -A

ROXBURGH DUMFRIES

WIGTOWN

Map 1 ‘Scotland by shires’

KIRKCUDBRIGHT

Map 2 ‘The Kingdome of Scotland, performed by John Speed.’ The English cartographer John Speed engraved his map of Scotland for his theatre of the empire of great britaine (1611), but at some point in the 1650s the engraving was altered to remove images of Stuart royalty (James VI, his Queen, and their two sons) in favour of images of ‘a Scottish man’, ‘a Scottish woman’, ‘a Highland man’ and ‘a Highland woman’ sold by Robert Rea of London c.1661. Reproduced with the permission of the National Library of Scotland.

1

Scotland 1651–1660 Conquest and union with England and Ireland

By the time the English army under the command of Oliver Cromwell destroyed the Scottish army that Charles II had led into England at the Battle of Worcester on 3 September 1651, it had captured the executive committee of the Scottish Parliament and inflicted a defeat so complete that only the occupation of Scot­ land by the army led by Edward I of England in the Middle Ages could rival it.1 The Scottish diarist John Nicoll did not record his thoughts regarding the cap­ ture of the Committee of Estates of the Scottish Parliament, but he did reflect, at length, on the disaster at Worcester, noting that it occurred a year to the day after the catastrophic defeat of an earlier Scottish army by Cromwell at Dunbar on 3 September 1650, ‘quhairin wes manifestit the hot wraith and indignation of the Lord aganes this Kingdome of Scotland.’2 God’s ‘judgements justlie overtuk’ the kingdom, ‘for under hevin thair wes not greater falset, oppressioun, division, haitreit, pryde, malice, and invy.’3 David Stevenson has described Nicoll’s text as a ‘very useful, though rambling and scrappy, source of information, gossip and opinion on public affairs’, which were later altered in places after the restoration of the Scottish monarchy. This imparted a retrospective element to his account but also, Stevenson notes, an impression of a man ‘shocked by the violence of the time.’4 In 1651 Nicoll was clerk of the Society of Writers to the Signet in Edinburgh. His text thus to some extent reflects the perspective of the legal profession in Scotland rather than that of committed enthusiasts for the National Covenant of the Church of Scotland. The disruption in the Scottish alliance with the English Parliament was caused by the execution of King Charles I in 1649, the recognition of Charles II King of Scotland, England and Ireland in the same year and the inauguration of Charles II as King of Scotland at Scone in Perthshire on 1 January 1651.5 Although it has been claimed that ‘the outcome of the battle [of Worcester] has been solely viewed from the perspective of the English Commonwealth’, that judgement was tempered by the concession that ‘the defeat of Charles II at Wor­ cester had a deep effect on Presbyterianism in Scotland.’6 The Lord Chancellor of Scotland, the first Earl of Loudoun, recorded that once ‘the sad news of the defeat of the King’s armie at Worcester came … all men almost everie wher lossed both heart and hand.’7 In contrast, the Commonwealth of England declared a day of thanksgiving in celebration of their victory, to be held throughout the three

Scotland 1651–1660 8

9

kingdoms of England, Ireland and Scotland in October, but in Scotland the kirk refused to mark the occasion, ‘alledging that it was a day rather quhairin to fast and murne, than to rejoyce and geve thankis for their awin miserie and destruc­ tion,’ as John Nicoll expressed it. He claimed that ‘God in his richteous dis­ pensation did overturne all, and made strangeris to cum in, and to command and subdue the hail Kingdome.’9 Yet in defeat Nicoll wrote that the Scottish Cove­ nanting movement had not been destroyed, writing that ‘the Lord, out of his great mercy, did not remove his candelstik, but was pleasit to continue the light of his glorious gospel among us [the Scots], and did lat us find favour in the eyis of the enemies, …’ This did not mean that he was a supporter of the clergy of the Church of Scotland: ‘much wes taught aganes the King and the subjectis … bot lytill aganes the ministrie and their faltis.’10 ‘The ministrie’ continued to be divided, as they had been since the beginning of the Scottish conflict with the English Commonwealth. So-called ‘Protesters’, those who had opposed the idea of encouraging Charles II to come to Scotland, were aghast at his subsequent coronation, and of the General Assembly co­ operating with parliamentary encouragement of ‘malignant’ Royalists. Although Charles had accepted the Covenant, many Covenanters feared that he had not been sincere in doing so, and that as a result Scotland no longer enjoyed the favour of the Deity. As Nicoll’s comments in his diary indicated, echoed by those of his fellow lawyer Johnston of Wariston,11 at least some Scots were convinced that they, as a Covenanted people, had lost sight of divine purpose in crowning Charles as king. Equally there were those, such as Nicoll and Johnston, who hoped that the Scots could regain their place as a chosen people. When Johnston of Wariston heard the news of the catastrophe at Worcester, he recorded in his diary that this ‘maid me cry to the Lord, O how true is the Lord in His threa­ tenings and terrible in His jugments … How often hes this ruyne been fortold by His servants, that durst not runne on in the sam course of defection.’ He blamed Charles II for ‘his dissembled incoming to the Covenant’ but, he con­ tinued, ‘straunge hes been and is the idolatrye of this land and people, with him and the house of the King, which provoks the Lord the mor both to plaigue and remove him …’12 Yet the majority of the kirk’s clergy continued to refuse to renounce Charles II, not just as King of Scotland, but as king of ‘Great Britain and Ireland’. This meant that no matter how forcefully the English army in Scotland and the Commonwealth government in London asserted that their victories had demonstrated that they, not the Scots, were the agents of God’s ultimate purpose for the world, the Scots viewed their conquerors as having betrayed the Solemn League and Covenant, and thus the ultimate purpose of God’s works.13 Despite the sack of the city of Dundee by an English army led by General George Monck just before the defeat of the Scottish army at Worcester, the English, or at least Cromwell, had come to Scotland to incorporate the Scots, rather than for conquest. Yet from the Scottish perspective God’s plan was to join Scotland and England into a covenanted British monarchy in which the Civil and Godly magistrates would be one.14 Many Scots thought and hoped that divine

10 Scotland 1651–1660 agency had not been revealed at Dunbar and Worcester and that in time this would become apparent. The fact remains, however, that to the victorious Eng­ lish, the majority of the Scottish clergy were misguided, and it was they who would have to accept that they had mistaken the nature of divine agency in Eng­ land, Ireland, Scotland, and in due course, the wider world. The English army seized as many of the national records of Scotland as they could when the castle at Stirling surrendered to them in September 1651. Although some records had been smuggled out of the castle by the clerks responsible for them before the final surrender (later to be returned to the Lord Clerk Register after the Restoration), a large number of Scottish records were sent to the Tower of London for storage in December 1651. Many of the records of the Church of Scotland were also sent there after the surrender of the Bass Rock (where they had been sent to keep them out of English hands) in the spring of 1652. The ruling council of the Common­ wealth and former kingdom of England, in other words, had decided to incorpo­ rate Scotland into the Commonwealth, starting with its historical records.15 Similarly, the units of the English army besieging Dunottar Castle in northeast Scotland partly had been deployed there because the regalia of Scotland (including the royal crown and sceptre) had been taken there for safekeeping when Charles II led his army into England. Although the castle did surrender to the English in May 1652, by that time the Governor had arranged for the regalia to be smuggled out of it and concealed beneath the floor of the kirk at nearby Kinneff, where they remained hidden until the Restoration.16 The Commonwealth Parliament in September 1651 lost no time after receiving news of their great victory at Worcester in planning the extension of its authority to Scotland. It referred the task of bringing in a bill ‘for asserting the Right of the Commonwealth to so much of Scotland as is now under the Power of the Forces of the Commonwealth’ on 9 September and on 26 September the Council of State was instructed to nominate Commissioners for the government of Scotland. On 30 September the matter was submitted to the Scottish and Irish committee of the Commonwealth’s Council of State.17 John Lambert and Richard Deane, generals with the army in Scotland, were nominated by the end of October, along with two other military men, an Alderman of the City of London, and two leading members of the Commonwealth regime (Oliver St John and Sir Harry Vane junior). The Council of State also prepared a draft ‘Declaration of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of England, concerning the Settlement of Scotland.’ This included a pledge to ‘promote the Preaching of the Gospel’ in Scotland, a com­ mitment to incorporate Scotland into the Commonwealth ‘as now settled, with­ out King or House of Lords’, a declaration that reparations would be extracted as compensation for the damage done by the Scottish invasions of England in 1648 and 1651, and a pledge that those Scots who had ‘kept themselves free from the guilt of those things which have compelled this war’ would ‘be taken into the protection of the Parliament, and enjoy the Liberties and Estates, as other the free people [sic] of the Common-wealth of England.’18 The Declaration concluded by stating that ‘the Parliament are satisfied, That many of the people of Scotland who were Vassals, or Tenants to, and had

Scotland 1651–1660

11

dependency upon the Noble-men and Gentry (the chief actors in these invasions and wars against England), were by their influence drawn into, and have been involved with them in the same Evils.’ Those ‘Vassals, or Tenants to,’ who were willing to put themselves under the protection of Parliament and conform ‘themselves to their Government and regulation, shall not only be pardoned for all Acts past, but be set free from their former dependencies and bondage-ser­ vices.’ They would ‘be admitted as Tenants, Freeholders, and Heritors, to farm, hold, inherite, and enjoy from and under this Common-wealth, proportions of the said confiscated and forfeited lands under such easie Rents’ that would bring about ‘a more comfortable subsistence than formerly’ for ‘a free People, deliv­ ered (through Gods goodnesse) from their former slaveries, vassalage, and oppressions.’19 Those nominated Commissioners for Scotland who were not already resident in Scotland set off from London on Christmas Day 1651 and arrived in Scotland on 15 January 1651/2, where they set up their headquarters at Dalkeith outside Edinburgh. The Declaration of Parliament was formally published at the Mercat Cross at Edinburgh on 12 February 1652 as a ‘Tender of Union’. At the same time, the text of the declaration was sent out to all the shires and royal burghs of Scotland with the instruction (rather than the request) that representatives with ‘good affection to the welfare and peace of this Island’ were to appear at Dalkeith before the end of the month ‘to assent to’, rather than deliberate upon, the Commonwealth’s offer of parliamentary union with England (and Ireland).20 Some of the responses to the Tender of Union sub­ mitted to the Commissioners made clear that the offer of union was not subject ‘to the full and free deliberation of the people in their collected body’, ie to the judgement of a full Scottish Parliament. The English Commissioners for Scot­ land may have assumed that, having conquered Scotland, there was no role for a Scottish Parliament, given that Scotland was to be incorporated into the English Commonwealth. Other responses pointed out that they had been ordered ‘to approve we know not what, … whereby we have no access to desire either the privileges which may be supposed to come by this tender, or to have any hand in framing the mould thereof ….’ There were also objections to the ‘vast and boundless toleration of all sorts of error and heresies,’ which were going to be introduced in religion, and to the fact that the Covenants had been broken, especially the Solemn League and Covenant agreed by the English and Scottish Parliaments in 1643, and also by the ending of the monarchy through the execution of Charles I and the pursuit of Charles II by the regime.21 As David Stevenson has expressed it, ‘the English sincerely saw themselves as acting generously: they were pressing on the Scots the inestimable gift of being treated as Englishmen’, oblivious to the fact ‘that [most] Scots remained stub­ bornly suspicious of Englishmen bearing gifts …’22 From this perspective, it is possible to claim that the English ‘could defeat the Scots in war, but not in debate.’23 Such was the basis of the short and unhappy (for both parties) his­ tory of the parliamentary union of Scotland with the English Commonwealth and the Protectorate that succeeded it. Yet much of what was introduced in Scotland during the 1650s would provide a precedent for the English response

12 Scotland 1651–1660 to parliamentary union with the Scots 55 years later. High taxes and military garrisons would characterise the first half century of the Anglo-Scottish union in the eighteenth century just as they did in the short-lived union of the 1650s. In both cases an English government decided that the Scottish nobility could not be trusted and that the Scottish system of law was a nuisance. What had changed by the time of the eighteenth century union, however, was that mon­ archy had not only been restored, it had been forced to concede a degree of accountability to Parliament in London that neither Charles I and his sons or Oliver Cromwell would ever have tolerated from their parliaments. Cromwell ended up delegating authority to govern in Scotland first to the Englishman George Monck and then to the Irishman Roger Boyle, Lord Broghill, who both struggled with the power and influence of the Marquess of Argyll.24 In the eighteenth century, government in London increasingly delegated power and influence in Scotland to the great grandsons of the Marquess of Argyll, who became second and third dukes of Argyll during the first fifty years of post­ 1707 parliamentary union. They were both very aware of the legacy they had inherited through the execution of the Marquess at the express command of the restored Charles II, and of the execution of their grandfather for daring to rebel against the authority of Charles’s brother and successor in 1685. They both had witnessed their grandfather’s execution. Some Scots in the 1650s may have been confident that in debate the English could not defeat them as they had in war, and over the short history of the English occupation of Scotland there certainly was evidence that the confidence displayed by the English army as it expanded its garrisons in Scotland in 1652, like the Commonwealth Commissioners intent on bringing Scotland into an incorporating union, ebbed away over the years before both commissioners and garrison decamped back to England. Certainly there was much Presbyterian resistance to the Tender of Incorporation presented to the Scots by the Com­ missioners who had come to Scotland to rule them in 1652. Clergy associated with the ‘Protester’ party in the kirk sent ‘A Letter from The Protesters to L. General Cromwell’ in January 1652,25 which stated that the English attack on Scotland had been unjust, and that they retained their belief in a covenanted British nation for the kingdoms of England, Ireland and Scotland as outlined in the Solemn League and Covenant. Scotland as a covenanted nation had helped defend the liberties of the English Parliament that now had been erected into a Commonwealth solely focused on that Parliament and its ruling council. The English invasion had violated England’s status as a covenanted nation. Its defeat of the Scots ‘cannot but provock the Lord and be prejudiciall to Religion.’26 Far from demonstrating God’s will through their military victory over Scotland, the Commonwealth had betrayed God’s divine will as manifested by the Solemn League and Covenant. While ‘Protesters’ took on the victorious English regime by arguing with it, carrying on the published exchanges that had preceded and accompanied the arrival of the English army in Scotland, Dr Kirsteen Mackenzie has argued that the majority of the clergy of the Church of Scotland ‘decided to “ignore” the existence of the Republic by continuing to pray publicly for King

Scotland 1651–1660

13

Charles II.’ The refusal of the clergy of the Church of Scotland to accept that the military victory of the Commonwealth of England over Scotland required them to accept its authority thus had a major impact on the reception of the ‘Tender of Incorporation’ published by the Commonwealth’s Commissioners for Scotland in February 1652. Robert Baillie denounced the Tender as an attempt to ‘lay aside the King, and to make the third article of our Covenant stand well enough with a freedome to change Monarchie with a Scotish Republick, this to me is a high-enough crime.’28 Or rather, the incorporation of the former king­ dom of Scotland into an expanded British republic was criminal in its violation of the covenant. It was the clergy of the Church of Scotland who led the resistance to accept­ ing the ‘Tender’. As late as March 1653 ‘Protester’ clergy in their ‘Declaration as to English Actings’ argued that the English Commissioners were breaking the Solemn League and Covenant, which they had sworn to adopt in 1643. A decade later, in 1652 and 1653, they were defying the Deity, who would punish the Commonwealth as he had Israel when it had broken its divine covenant.29 Those Scots who defined their existence as predicated on the covenants argued that military defeat and subsequent occupation by an English army had not extinguished the legitimacy of a divinely sanctioned covenant. There was accep­ tance among the Scottish clergy that God so loved Scotland that he had rained down defeat and misfortune upon it, but that defeat did not entail that the Scots should break the Solemn League and Covenant just because the English Com­ monwealth had done so in 1649 by executing their king. As Dr Mackenzie has argued, essentially this meant that in the eyes of the ministry of the Church of Scotland, ‘the English were usurpers and their conquest was nothing but violent oppression.’30 This was not the case for all Covenanters, such as Sir James Hope, who embraced parliamentary union with England. The Marquess of Argyll, who accepted the Cromwellian settlement with reservations, would lose his life at the Restoration for his negotiations with the parliamentary regime, in which his submission to the Commonwealth and Protectorate came with conditions. Charles II had sworn in 1651 that he would hang Hope and his brother John ‘from the other end of the same rope by which he would hang Oliver Crom­ well’,31 but Hope’s death in 1661 cheated the restored King of that pleasure. The Marquess of Argyll, like Johnston of Wariston, did not escape the king’s vengeance. The English commissioners dispatched the ‘Tender’ to 32 shires and 57 burghs in Scotland. Bulstrode Whitlocke, in London, recorded that two separate texts of the ‘Tender’ were distributed to the Scottish burghs, ‘one signed to appease ministers, that nothing would be done which would be prejudicial to the Cove­ nant; the other, full and ample, to do all things conductible for the settling of the nation.’32 Twenty-nine shires and forty-four burghs accepted the Tender, but only eighteen shires and twenty-four burghs sent representatives, or deputies as the English termed them, to meet with the English Commissioners at Dalkeith. There was little time for discussion available for those who did go to Dalkeith. Penalties for failing to accept the Tender were not published by the regime, but the English 27

14 Scotland 1651–1660 army continued to expand its network of garrisons in Scotland throughout 1652. Scotland had not just been defeated, it was to be subjected to systematic military occupation by the English army.33 Yet for many Scots ‘religious toleration was contrary to the Covenant which aimed to establish Presbyterianism throughout the three kingdoms.’34 Thus, while accepting rather than rejecting the authority of the English Commonwealth and its army, many Scottish constituencies submitted responses to the ‘Tender’ that stated their desire to return to the dialogues between English and Scottish churches and parliaments that eventually manifested itself in the ‘British’ Solemn League and Covenant of 1643. They wished to con­ tinue to debate whether the Commonwealth’s execution of Charles I could ever be justified and whether the Commonwealth’s justification of religious toleration for (most) forms of Protestant worship across the three former kingdoms subject to its authority, broke previous commitments by the English Parliament to the Solemn League and Covenant. The alternative was to accept that the English conquest had been intended to kill that issue as comprehensively as the King’s English executioner had ended his life in 1649. When the English army under General Monck stormed Dundee on 1 September 1651 their battle cry was ‘God with us!’35 Other answers to the Tender dealt with constitutional rather than religious issues. Many of the shires, in particular, specified retention of the Scottish legal system in their ‘answers’. Royal Burghs were concerned about their traditional privileges. It has also been pointed out that there were constituencies who just did not respond to the tender. Others ‘answered’ but recorded ‘no desire to offer advice to the English about the union.’ Glasgow and some other burghs recorded their refusal to accept the imposition of the union, appealing to the Solemn League and Covenant, as were so many of the Scots.36 Part of the appeal to the covenant, at least in Scotland, was an insistence that Presbyterianism should be the established religion of the Commonwealth across all three former British and Irish kingdoms. Toleration for other Protestant sects thus broke the Covenant and would incur divine retribution, most Scottish Presbyterians believed. In time, many Scottish Presbyterians would have perceived the end of the Commonwealth in 1653 as part of that retribution. Cromwell’s death on 3 September 1658, the anniversary of both his victories over the Scots and their King at Dunbar and Worcester in 1650 and 1651 would be viewed similarly. Nevertheless, in April 1652 the Tender of Union was proclaimed as accepted in Scotland, and thus the basis for ‘the settling of the nation’, as Whitelocke put it, but in less than a year this union would be under a ‘Protectorate’ rather than a ‘Commonwealth’.37 James Fraser, the minister of the parish of Wardlaw (later Kirkhill) near Inver­ ness, recorded his impressions of the arrival of the English garrison at Inverness in 1651 in a manuscript, which eventually found its way into the Advocates Library at Edinburgh as a ‘Genealogy’ of the Frasers. It had also become something of a chronicle, although like Nicoll, Fraser revised his text in the light of the Restora­ tion. Thus Fraser recorded (we do not know when) that at the end of the year 1651 (taking January as the beginning of 1652) that:

Scotland 1651–1660

15

the English Commonwealth, being now settled, resolves to fix garrisons in Scotland… Collonel Thomas Fitch and his regiment came down to Scotland, marched through Aberdeen in December, a rude rageing rable of a Sectarian new regiment, running down men in the Streets, I being myself there at the time, witness to their Extravagances. Thence they marched north to Inverness, where they were garrisoned till the Revolution [ie, the Restoration].38 ‘In January 1652,’ Fraser continued, ‘the Declaration called the Tender of Union came down to Scotland as their New Yeares gift, smoothed with that time serving complement of Olivers,’ and promised preservation of the rights of Scots, ‘civil and spirituall. This gratified the Kirk into a compliance, through an act of union run in settling of a Commonwalth, abolishing monarchical government …’ Bul­ strode Whitelock in London recorded, on the other hand, that by March 1651 letters were received in London ‘that the meetings with the English commis­ sioners at Dalkeith, by the deputies of the shires were at an end.’ Whitelocke also recorded that ‘several of the great ones’ [presumably of the nobility of Scotland] had given signs of ‘perplexity what to do’ in response to the imposition of incor­ poration. In contrast he declared that ‘whereas the deputies of shires and boroughs [in Scotland] have consented to the proposals made to them from the parliament of England’, they were to be taken into ‘the special protection of the parliament of England; and all officers and soldiers and others are commanded not to injure them.’39 Whitelocke’s record of the Commonwealth’s Commissioners for Scotland, the ‘time serving complement of Olivers’, as James Fraser of Wardlaw referred to them, declaring that the English army in Scotland was not ‘to injure’ the shires and ‘boroughs’ of Scotland once they had accepted the Tender of Union. It conveyed the mailed fist approach the victorious English regime and its army had adopted in seeking to consolidate their authority in Scotland. Does it follow that Whitelocke’s reference to ‘the great ones’ of Scotland had been marked out for special treatment by the regime and assumed to be feudal tyrants who oppressed the people who lived on their estates? That certainly was the original intention.40 Whitelocke’s notes record that the English commissioners in Scotland were dis­ pleased that ‘the sheriffs in Scotland sent their deputies to the English commis­ sioners very slowly’, as a sign of reluctance to accept the authority of the new regime. They also had summoned the Marquess of Argyll ‘to come to them’ to ensure his submission to the Tender of Union, which did not really happen.41 The Marquess proved elusive. Nevertheless, having completed the union, all the English civil servants and army in Scotland and their masters in London had to do subsequently was to make the new union work. That would prove to be no easy task. The Welsh writer and royalist James Howell, has been described as expressing a ‘dislike of the Scots as quixotic trouble-makers’, recurrently in his work.42 Howell wrote and published a number of tracts anonymously in 1648 and 1649. This was

16 Scotland 1651–1660 when Scotland became involved in the ‘Engagement’ with Charles I that led to a Scottish army invading England under the leadership of the Duke of Hamilton, only to suffer disastrous defeat by the English parliamentarian army at Preston in Lancashire. A defeat that led to the execution of the king by the English Com­ monwealth in January 1649. In the anonymous tract attributed to Howell, Bella Scot-Anglica: A Brief of all the Battels and partial Encounters which have happened ‘twixt England and Scotland published in 1648, Howell wrote that an unnamed ‘Italian was well versed in the Scotishmens humours, who understanding of the late union [the Solemn League and Covenant] between the two Kingdoms, said that England had got no great catch by the addition of Scotland, she had onely got a Wolfe by the ears, who must be held very fast, else he will run away to France.’43 The Scots did not run away to France, but in the century after the English Commonwealth’s efforts to absorb Scotland and the Scots many English men and women would come to agree with Howell’s concluding words in Bella Scot-Anglica: ‘O England, Thine own People thee betray, And Scotland makes of thee a prey.’44

Notes 1 F.D. Dow, Cromwellian Scotland (1979), p. 14; C.S. Terry, ed., The Cromwellian Union: Papers relating to the Negotiations for an Incorporating Union Between England and Scotland 1651–1652 (Edinburgh: SHS First Series Vol. XL, 1902), p. xv. 2 John Nicoll, A Diary of Public Transactions and other occurences chiefly in Scotland, from January 1650 to June 1667. Ed. D. Laing (Edinburgh: Bannatyne Club Vol. 52, 1836), p. 59. 3 Ibid. 4 David Stevenson, ‘Nicoll, John (c.1590–1668)’, in ODNB, online edition, accessed 28 February 2018. 5 My thanks to Dr Alasdair Raffe for his guidance on this point. 6 Kirsteen MacKenzie, ‘Presbyterian Church Government and the “Covenanted Interest” in the Three Kingdoms 1649–1660’ (University of Aberdeen PhD., 2008), p. 52, also see Kirsteen MacKenzie, The Solemn League and Covenant of the Three Kingdoms and the Cromwellian Union, 1643–1663 (Abingdon, Oxon., 2018), pp. 104, 128–136. 7 C.H. Firth, ed., Scotland and the Commonwealth … From August 1651 to December 1653 (Edinburgh, SHS, First Series, Vol. XVIII, 1895), p. 25. 8 Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Interregnum, 1651. Ed. Mary Anne Everett Green (1877), Vol. 16, p. 456. British History Online: www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state­ papers/domestic/interregnum/1651, accessed 30 April 2019. 9 Nicoll, Diary, pp. 60–61. 10 Ibid. See Professor Laura Stewart’s comments on Nicoll’s text in ‘Cromwell and the Scots,’, in Jane A. Mills, ed., Cromwell’s Legacy (2012), p. 174. 11 David Hay Fleming, ed., Diary of Sir Archibald Johnston of Wariston, Vol. II (Edin­ burgh, SHS Second Series, Vol. XVIII, 1919) p. 131. 12 Ibid., pp. 131–133. 13 Kyle David Holfelder, ‘Factionalism in the Kirk during the Cromwellian Invaision and Occupation of Scotland, 1650 to 1660: The Protester-Resolutioner Controversy’ (University of Edinburgh PhD, 1998), provides a narrative of the divisions in what had been the covenanted Church of Scotland after the English conquest and union with the English Commonwealth and later Protectorate in 1652 and 1653. Also see R. Scott Spurlock, Cromwell and Scotland: Conquest and Religion 1650–1660 (2007), Chapters 1 & 2, pp. 7–71.

Scotland 1651–1660

17

14 MacKenzie, ‘Presbyterian Church Government’, pp. 55–57; MacKenzie, Solemn League and Covenant, pp. 104–107. 15 David Stevenson, ‘The English and the Public Records of Scotland 1650–1660’, in Stair Society Miscellany One by Various Authors (Edinburgh: Stair Society, 1971), pp. 15; Hay Fleming, ed., Diary of Sir Archibald Johnston of Wariston, pp. 9–161. 16 MacKenzie, ‘Presbyterian Church Government’, pp. 61–62; MacKenzie, Solemn League and Covenant, p. 104. 17 David Horspool, Cromwell the Protector (2017), p. 99. 18 Terry, ed., Cromwellian Union, pp. xvii–xxiii. 19 Ibid., p. xxiii. 20 Ibid., p. xxv. Also see Stewart, ‘Cromwell and the Scots’, pp. 178–179. 21 Terry, ed., Cromwellian Union, pp. xxviii–xxix. Also see MacKenzie, ‘Presbyterian Church Government’, Appendix C: ‘Responses to the Tender of Union by the Burghs and Shires of Scotland’. 22 David Stevenson, ‘Cromwell, Scotland and Ireland’, in John Morrill, ed., Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution (London: Longman, 1990), p. 165. 23 Ibid., p. 173. 24 Patrick Little, Lord Broghill and the Cromwellian Union with Ireland and Scotland (Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK: Boydell Press, 2004), pp. 115–121, 237. 25 MacKenzie, ‘Presbyterian Church Government’, p. 60. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid., p. 61. 28 David Laing, ed., Letters of Robert Baillie, A.M. Principal of the University of Glasgow. MDCXXXVII– MDCLXII… (Edinburgh, 1841), Vol. III, pp. 175–6. 29 MacKenzie, Solemn League and Covenant, p. 104. 30 MacKenzie, ‘Presbyterian Church Government’, p. 69; MacKenzie, Solemn League and Covenant, p. 105. 31 A.H. Williamson, ‘Hope, Sir James, of Hopetoun, appointed Lord Hopetoun under the protectorate (1614–1661)’ ODNB, online edition, accessed 10 Jan. 2019; A.H. Williamson, ‘Union with England Traditional, Union with England Radical: Sir James Hope and the Mid-Seventeenth Century British State’, EHR, Vol. 110 (1995). 32 Quoted in MacKenzie, ‘Presbyterian Church Government’, p. 70; MacKenzie, Solemn League and Covenant, p. 105. 33 Dow, Cromwellian Scotland, pp. 37, 39; John R. Young, The Scottish Parliament, 1631–1661 (1996), p. 297; MacKenzie, Solemn League and Covenant, pp. 106–107. 34 MacKenzie, ‘Presbyterian Church Government’, p. 73; MacKenzie, Solemn League and Covenant, p. 106. 35 Spurlock, Cromwell and Scotland, p. 34. 36 MacKenzie, Presbyterian Church Government’, pp. 73–74. 37 Bulstrode Whitelocke, Memorials of the English Affairs from the beginning of the Reign of Charles the First to the Happy Restoration of King Charles the Second (Oxford: Uni­ versity Press, new edition, 1853), Vol. III, p. 397. 38 James Fraser, Chronicles of the Frasers: The Wardlaw Manuscript Entitled … The True Genealogy of the Frasers 916–1674, ed. William Mackay (Edinburgh, SHS First series, Vol. XLVII, 1905), pp. 396–397. 39 Whitelocke, Memorials, pp. 396–397. 40 David Menarry, ‘The Irish and Scottish landed elites from Regicide to Restoration’ (University of Aberdeen PhD, 2001), pp. 55–57, 65–70, 79, 112–120. 41 Whitlocke, Memorials, p. 396. 42 D.R. Woolf, ‘Howell, James (1594?–1666), historian and political writer’, in ODNB, online edition, accessed 8 January 2019. 43 Two texts of Bella Scot-Anglica are available in the electronic resource Early English Books Online, Wing 715:8g and Thomason 168: E.435[25], the latter of which includes two additional pages of text which duplicate pagination of 18 and 19 for what should

18 Scotland 1651–1660 be pages 20–21. The quotation appears on the initial page 19 rather than what should be page 21. Although the phrase ‘a wolf by the ears’ later became associated with the American Thomas Jefferson, it appears in Suetonius’s Lives of the Caesars on p. 335 of the Loeb 1913 edition. See Carl J. Richard, The Founders and the Classics (1994), p. 264 reference 6. Brian P. Levack, The Formation of the British State (1987), pp. 217– 218 includes this phrase in a quotation from Bella Scot-Anglica. 44 Bella Scot-Anglica, Thomason 168: E.435[25], p. 19 (duplicate page number for what should be p. 21).

2

Charles II as King of Scotland 1660–1685

The ‘Restoration’ of the Stuart monarchy in 1660 originated in Scotland. Charles II ‘returned’ to London at the end of May in 1660, and the ‘Restora­ tion’ was celebrated with his coronation at Westminster Abbey on 23 April 1661. These events took place, however, because of the English army in Scot­ land and its commander, General George Monck. At the time of the Restoration in Aberdeen, the clergyman John Paterson preached a thanksgiving sermon, which proclaimed how unexpectedly ‘an English GENERAL, an English Army, an English Parliament, should have been the Instruments of SCOTLAND’s Deliverance.’1 Of course Charles had already been crowned at Scone in Scotland in 1651 as king of Scotland, having been previously recognised as monarch of Scotland, England and Ireland by both the Parliament and the Church of Scot­ land.2 He subscribed to the Solemn League and Covenant agreed by the parlia­ ments of England and Scotland in 1643 (which of course included provision for the Stuart kingdom of Ireland). Yet once he marched at the head of a Scottish army into England in the summer of 1651 Charles never returned to Scotland, although he was again proclaimed there as king in May 1660 after he and his brothers had arrived in London.3 ‘So soon as the news came to Scotland [of the proclamation of Charles II as King of England, Scotland and Ireland on 8 May 1660] there were great solemnities by bonfires, ringing of bells, &c’, wrote the Scottish clergyman William Row, who added that the commander of the remaining English garrisons in Scotland at that time, General Morgan, ‘hindered the solemnities in Edinburgh, pretending that there were no orders come for the same, until May 14. Then he countenanced the solemnity.’4 Although Charles never returned to Scotland, he did restore it as an ancient and separate kingdom, the Cromwellian union of Scotland with England and Ireland having ended with the overthrow of the Protectorate regime in 1659. Thus the end of the Protectorate regime was the end of the beginning of the project of a political union of Britain and Ireland, to be revived in very different circumstances in the eighteenth century. The principal agent in bringing about the Restoration of the monarchy in England, General Monck, had commanded the English army in Scotland from April 1654 until his departure to England with most of that army in January 1660. He was an English professional soldier of considerable experience who had won the confidence of Cromwell during the

20 Charles II as King of Scotland 1660–1685 invasion of Scotland in 1650, and had been entrusted with the task of completing the English conquest in 1651. He did this with a degree of ruthlessness, the sack of the burgh of Dundee by the English army adding insult to injury just two days before Cromwell’s victory over the Scottish army in England at Worcester. By the end of 1651 the Inverness minister James Fraser recorded that ‘General G. Monck lives at Dalkeith [outside Edinburgh] in great state, being now Governour of all the Kingdom, and well deserves his promotion, a very good kindly Scotchman, and beloved of all.’5 Just why he was ‘a very good kindly Scotchman’, Fraser did not state, but the contrast Fraser drew of Monck and the Cromwellian comman­ der in Ireland at the time, General Ludlow, in ‘temper’, indicates that Fraser thought that Monck perceived that his duty as ‘Governour’ was the maintenance of law and order. Ludlow in Ireland (where he commanded the English army from November 1651 to October 1652) could be said to be associated with the imposition of a new order that aspired to bring about revolutionary change rather than act as custodian of the public peace.6 After the conquest of Scotland Monck had left the country to serve Cromwell in the first war between England and the Netherlands, but Cromwell turned to him again in 1654 to consolidate the Eng­ lish victory over the Scots after the outbreak of a Royalist rebellion, centred in the Highlands, which had threatened the security of the English. Cromwell as Lord Protector would later reduce Monck’s power by setting up a separate Council of State there in September 1655 headed by the Protestant Irish nobleman Roger Boyle, Lord Broghill, but Monck continued to command the army and take responsibility for security and stability. After Broghill went south to attend the second of the Protector’s parliaments in London, he never returned, leaving Monck unchallenged in governing the country. After Cromwell’s death in September 1658 Monck supported the Protecto­ rate. The dissolution of Richard Cromwell’s Parliament by the army in England and the recall of the Rump Parliament appear to have caused him deep misgiv­ ings. When English officers in London then went on to dismiss the Rump Par­ liament at the end of the summer of 1659 ‘it became clear,’ in the words of Frances Dow, ‘that Monck would not only declare his allegiance to Parliament but would take positive steps to uphold its authority.’7 While there was also unease over the intentions of the army in England among the English garrisons in Ireland, Monck’s position as Commander of the largest English army outside England meant that his disapproval of the actions of General Fleetwood, General Lambert and their confederates, made manifest the possibility of renewed civil war. This was because Monck’s continuous tenure in Scotland after 1654 had enabled him to mould the nature of the English army there. He was not sym­ pathetic to Baptists, Independents and other Protestant dissenters who had made up a significant part of the English army that had first marched into Scotland in the summer of 1650. By 1659, that army bore fewer traces of missionary zeal among its rank and file. Many officers in its units were absent in England rather than serving with their regiments, and Monck had resisted attempts in London to impose new appoint­ ments to replace them. Once Monck decided to oppose the army in England, he

Charles II as King of Scotland 1660–1685

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first worked to ensure that the English units in or near Edinburgh and Leith were officered by men who supported the authority of the Parliament. Later in the autumn Monck sent trusted officers to inspect units in other garrisons across Scotland to ensure their loyalty to him as their commanding officer. He had been associated with the policy after 1654 of extending the network of English garri­ sons into the Highlands, of which the garrison at Inverlochy in the great glen was the most substantial. He had argued that some of the regiments in Scotland (such as that which garrisoned Inverness) should be settled in Scotland ‘for the public service, by engaging the officers to bring theire families hether, and soe not to go soe often for England.’8 By the autumn of 1659, the need for more men in the foot regiments was partly met by recruiting Scots. Robert Baillie wrote to his cousin in January 1661 that Monck had not only purged many Anabaptists from his regiments, but filled their places with a number of Scottish ‘old sojers’.9 By December, more than a hundred officers and non-commissioned officers had either deserted or been dismissed, some of them kept in custody at Tantallon Castle in East Lothian. To replace them, Monck asked his brother-in-law and London agent, Thomas Clarges, to recruit officers in London and arrange for them to be brought to Scotland by sea.10 What Monck could also draw on in retaining the loyalty of his army was his ability to pay them. He cared, or had learned to care, for the welfare of the rank and file of his troops. His financial resources were based on a payment from London of £20,000 sterling to meet the expenses of governing Scotland for the coming year, which included collecting taxes. In addition, in June, Parliament had approved ‘an assessment of £6000 per month on Scotland for the next twelve months to be paid by the shires and burghs.’11 Customs and excise duties also continued to be collected, and Monck ensured that the revenues they raised were retained in Scotland to support his army. Unlike Generals Fleetwood and Lam­ bert, Monck had money to pay his troops, and in time this contributed to the lack of armed resistance to Monck’s army as it marched into England. Robert Baillie claimed that to meet Monck’s request that the Commissioners of Supply advance six months cess, required sacrifices among the Scottish burghs and counties, ‘yet on good hopes, it was cheerfully and quickly done’ and that this ‘helped him [Monck] to give good satisfaction to his sojers, while the army in England was put to live on free quarter, all the shyres refuseing to pay any more money till a free Parliament did command it.’ Monck assured the Commissioners of the Army in Scotland (who were in London) that the commissioners for the Scottish shires and burghs had assured him of their ‘engagement against Charles Stewart’ as part of their agreement with him ‘to keepe the country in peace.’12 Once Monck’s army departed, there was no Royalist rebellion in Scotland to challenge the authority of the remaining (and much reduced) English military garrison there. As Monck prepared for departure, he balanced the force available through a continued Eng­ lish military presence in Edinburgh, Perth, Inverness and Inverlochy with scrupu­ lous consultation and co-operation with the traditional Scottish political elites (chiefly the nobility and landowners of lower rank) to ensure continued law and order, particularly in the shires. Shire commissioners in most localities were

22 Charles II as King of Scotland 1660–1685 collecting cess as demanded by the English Parliament in the summer. Now Monck persuaded them to take responsibility for maintaining law and order in his absence as well. There had been uncertainty over the exercise of executive and judicial authority in Scotland as soon as the Protectorate was put to an end on 6 May 1659 and officers in the army proclaimed that the republican Commonwealth and its Par­ liament and Council of State would succeed the previous regime.13 Discussions over new arrangements for the government of Scotland over the summer were rendered irrelevant by the decision ‘by a faction of the army’, led by Generals Fleetwood and Lambert, to do away with Parliament and centralise power in the Council of State and the army on 13 October (there are no entries in the Journals of the House of Commons after 13 October until 26 December 1659), thus initi­ ating their conflict with Monck.14 Monck ‘did not recognise the authority of the army and council’ to govern Scotland in the absence of a Parliament.15 Acutely aware that legal administration in Scotland had collapsed, Monck ordered that the burghs and shires of Scotland be invited ‘to send representatives to Edinburgh for a conference’.16 Members of the Scottish nobility were chosen disproportionately in the localities to attend the Edinburgh conference. Those commissioners who represented the burghs pressed for the restoration of an efficient legal system with judges knowledgeable in Scots law. In contrast, the shire representatives, aware of the high level of debt carried by most landowners to meet the taxes demanded by the English regime, urged caution rather than haste in bringing the courts in Scotland back into session.17 Related to this was Monck’s consultation with one of the Scottish lawyers he had persuaded the authorities in England to appoint to their central Scottish civil court in Edinburgh; James Dalrymple, later Viscount Stair. Before marching into England, Monck sought Dalrymple’s advice regarding ‘what was best done for settling the Three Nations.’18 As Professor Ford has dis­ cussed it, Dalrymple’s advice to Monck to restore the central courts in Scotland as soon as possible was offered on ‘the assumption [the future Viscount] Stair made that steps would need to be taken in London to revive the administration of jus­ tice in Scotland’, although at the time both men perhaps assumed that the political union of ‘the three nations’ would continue. Monck’s attempts to ensure that Scottish courts had judges appointed to them once he reached London were fru­ strated by the instability of the constitutional system there and the limited nature of Charles II’s interest in Scottish administration. The Scottish representatives at Edinburgh who met with Monck on 15 November 1659 heard an address to the commissioners that he (Monck) had received ‘a call from God and his people to march into England’. Did this imply that God’s people were English, or that Monck’s people (the English) had joined God in calling him away from Scotland? A historian might wonder if any of the commissioners, not least the Earl of Glencairn (leader of the royalist rebellion that had brought Monck back to Scotland), chosen president of the commissioners for the shires, and Sir James Stewart of Kirkfield and Coltness, Lord Provost of Edinburgh (and a Covenanter), had found Monck’s sense of mission rather ironic given the Scottish invasions of England to serve God, Covenant and King in 1649

Charles II as King of Scotland 1660–1685

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and 1651. The Scots were not being called to join Monck’s march into England, although Monck had required them to provide his forces with horses and packmen to expedite the anticipated march south (which was met with less than full compliance). He also commanded them to pay their cess to the government in Scotland as Parliament in London had decided before it was dispersed by the army. In addition, in Monck’s words, ‘you the nobility, gentlemen, sherriffe, and rest of the justices of the peace,’ were to support the reduced English garrisons in Scotland, after Monck’s departure, in maintaining stability.19 In return, Monck promised that once in England he would seek a reduction in future tax assess­ ments set by Parliament for Scotland. The text of Monck’s speech was printed in the expectation that commissioners would take copies back to their constituents as part of preparations for a further meeting by shire and burgh commissioners with Monck at Berwick-on-Tweed on 12 December prior to the departure of his army into England. Monck had declared that responses by Scottish burghs to his printed speech sent after the November meeting should be sent to the magistrates of Edinburgh in order that they could be considered later at the meeting of shire and burgh representatives that Monck had summoned to meet with him at Berwick. Some other burgh magistrates from smaller burghs in the Lothians (Haddington and Linlithgow) were added to those of Edinburgh in considering the burghs’ responsibilities for the maintenance of law and order in Scotland after the departure of the army. The commissioners from Scottish shires who responded to Monck’s commands chose five of their number to confer with the General (all members of the nobility: Glencairn, the Earl of Eglinton, the Earl of Rothes, the Earl of Wemyss, and Alexander Bruce, brother to the Earl of Kincardine and his successor as second Earl after his brother’s death in 1662).20 Their proposals for implementing Monck’s command that they take responsibility for maintaining order in the localities in the absence of his army were that the nobility be permitted to arm themselves to do that. This was met with a cautious response. The shires were instructed to act in concert with the nearest English garrison commander, and as part of this those lowland shires adjacent to the highlands would be permitted to raise an armed force to protect private property. The Earl of Glencairn replied that these measures were not sufficient, but Monck was adamant regarding his reluctance to permit members of the Scottish nobility to raise substantial forces of armed men. He did, however, state in his response to Glencairn ‘that hee doth allow to the counties next adjacent to the Highlands, vizt. To the counties of Dumbarton and Stirling … Pearth … Forfar and Kincardine … and to the county of Aberdeen forty men in armes, which are to be a guard for the security of the said countyes against thieves and robbers, and for the rest his Lordship will take care, if hee shall have occasion to remove further out of Scotland.’ The heritors in each of the named shires were ‘to make choice of a fit person to comand the said guard, they giving security to the governour of the next adjacent guarrison for his fidelity and good behaviour in six hundred pounds sterling.’21 In October 1654, at the end of Glencairn’s rebellion, Monck had proposed summary execution of rebels. Any man who had submitted to the authority of the Protectorate, or had been kept prisoner and later released on promise of good

24 Charles II as King of Scotland 1660–1685 behaviour, should ‘die without mercy’ if ‘taken in armes’, and so should any taken prisoner after burning ‘the howses of any that are wellaffected to us.’22 On 25 January 1655, Monck sent General Lambert in London a letter that ‘those lately taken in armes, to wit Kinoule [William Hay, 4th Earl of Kinnoull], Dudopp [John Scrymgeour, Lord Dudhope, 3rd Viscount]. Sir Mungo Murray, and Lieu­ tenant Colonel Mercer, or any more pillaging rascals who staide oute after many Oppertunities of coming in, be executed for terror’, or, if that was deemed too extreme, those concerned should be transported to Barbados.23 His fears of a royalist ‘coup’ in Scotland once most of his army had withdrawn to England remained very real in 1659. Thus Monck had moved from the threat of the execution of persistent rebels in 1654 to a complicit alliance with the royalist monarchists of Scotland in 1659. He didn’t arm them, but without stating it openly, he held out the prospect of possible restoration of the Stuart king in England. Monck’s presentation of himself as an emissary who would ensure that Scottish interests would be represented in London was calculated to encourage the nobility and landed gentry, in particular, to wait and see rather than rebel once he departed. In the event, opposition to Monck’s army in England collapsed due to the weak finances of the revived Commonwealth army in England. As a result, Monck was able to send troops back to Scotland to bolster the garrison there. The ‘Restoration’ itself was confirmed by May, in London, and for many Scots that precluded any Scottish initiatives before the will of the restored king was made known to his subjects.24 The end of the Scottish aspect of the Restoration, the end of Scotland’s role in its genesis, was Monck’s arrival at York on 11 January 1660. General Lambert’s army opposing him had retreated south from Newcastle at the new year in a bid to retrieve the deteriorating political situation for the army in London. By the time Lambert reached York much of his army, lacking pay for a lengthy period of time, already had begun to vote with their feet and had left their units. The old Parlia­ mentarian General Fairfax, living in retirement in Yorkshire, had been in contact with Monck, and led a rising to support the arrival of his army there.25 At that point General Thomas Morgan’s two regiments with Monck’s army were ordered to return to Scotland to reinforce the Edinburgh garrison, although they were recalled to London to help Monck’s army maintain order as tensions between the restored ‘Rump’ Parliament and those in London demanding the recall of the full ‘Long Parliament’ (as it was before it was purged of those members not deemed sufficiently sympathetic to the Republican Commonwealth). Morgan returned to Scotland later in February to take command there.26 Around the same time com­ missioners from the Scottish shires and burghs had again assembled in Edinburgh, having been summoned there by letters from Monck, who had sent passes to sheriffs and magistrates in each shire authorising a landowner from each shire (and a burgess from each burgh) to meet with officers representing the English garrison in Edinburgh to discuss their grievances and recommendations relating to the maintenance of law and order. The meeting was not a great success. Monck’s message to the commissioners was that the shires and burghs had to complete the payment of the cess due to the

Charles II as King of Scotland 1660–1685

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English regime for 1659 to 1660, offering in return his interest in asking the English Parliament to mitigate its financial demands in future. The problem was that ‘only about half the shires and burghs sent representatives to Edinburgh.’27 Those who did appear made up for their lack of numbers by their disputatious­ ness, and as a result no agreement could be reached on the nation’s advice to Monck in London regarding Scottish interests. There was agreement that Scottish representatives should be sent to London to advise Monck on the need to con­ vince the Parliament of the necessity of setting Scottish taxes ‘proportionate to that of England,’28 but the shire representatives were opposed to proposals by the burgh representatives to give priority to reconvening the Scottish courts, and thus the enforcement of Scots law relating to collection of debts. Those who had bor­ rowed heavily against the value of their estates to pay the cess, not surprisingly, opposed this. There also was strong opposition from the shires to the burghs’ desire to secure a continuation of the existing parliamentary union of England with Scotland, a harbinger of the Royalist Revolution to come. In the end, the burghs chose William Thomson, town clerk of Edinburgh, to directly represent their interests in London, while the shires delegated Sir Mungo Murray of Garth (brother of the second Earl of Atholl).29 By the time Thomson and Murray reached London in March, the Restoration of the Stuarts had become inevitable, which, given that Murray and those addi­ tional representatives nominated to join him (who included the Earl of Glencairn) were Royalists, must have been regarded as good news. Unlike the Covenanting Bishops Wars, London and the English Parliament were now at the centre of events. For Scots such as the recently liberated former prisoner of the Cromwellian regime, the Earl of Lauderdale, this was as it should be, writing that ‘God forbid the stiring of Scotland should be a pretence for hindering the peaceable doing of what Scotland is most concerned in.’ This quotation is from a letter signed by the Earl of Crawford and Lord Sinclair as well as Lauderdale, which also stated that ‘the Generall’ [ie General Monck] professes fair to you [ie, the representatives from the Scottish shires and burghs summoned by Monck to meet in Edinburgh to discuss their grievances with the leading English officers in Scotland in February 1660] and is not to be disobliged; and yow are to consider if the publick heir of any from Scotland may not give jealousie then advance what we most desire.’30 Monck, no doubt thinking of the interests of the remaining English garrisons in Scotland, lobbied in London for action to ensure some degree of executive gov­ ernment there. The Council of State in London responded by appointing officers of the English garrison in Scotland as commissioners for managing its affairs: Major General Thomas Morgan, Colonel Philip Twistleton, Colonel William Daniel, and Colonel Molyneux Disney (who later commanded a regiment of English soldiers in the Dutch army after 1674).31 Scots in London such as Lau­ derdale and the clergyman James Sharp opposed this initiative. They also opposed the efforts of the commissioners once quorate in Scotland to ensure that the cen­ tral legal courts in Scotland were called back into session. When Charles II arrived in London he extended the commissioners’ authority until August 1660, but the courts did not meet, despite the presence of Morgan and his colleagues.32 Sharp

26 Charles II as King of Scotland 1660–1685 resented continued English involvement in Scottish public affairs, writing that the English ‘incline to keep Scotland under, and either incorporate, or make us dis­ tinct, as they shall find most serviceable to their interest.’33 Would the king accept Scottish advice rather than English counsel? Scots lobbying for influence in London such as Lauderdale and Sharp were anxious that Scottish MPs would be elected to the Convention Parliament, but Monck rejected their recommendations. There is no direct evidence why he adopted this position. Monck would have been concerned about the remaining English garrisons in Scotland. It was they, after all, who would have had to deal with any public unrest generated by parliamentary elections there, particularly as the Scottish nobility were becoming more assertive in pursuit of what they regar­ ded as their right to govern in the name of the king. At the end of March, Monck wrote to Sharp that ‘as for sending commissioners from Scotland to the parlia­ ment, it was neither for our reputation or advantage; and that, if we be quiet, our business would be done to our mind.’ This appeared to be because ‘the English are willing Scotland to be as free a nation as they are.’34 The Restoration Parlia­ ment, or the Convention Parliament that made the Restoration possible, included no Scottish representation. This set a precedent for the future. In early April, a group of thirteen members of the Scottish nobility and ten landed gentry under the chairmanship of the Earl of Rothes met in Edinburgh to choose representatives to go to London to lobby the government on its Scottish policies. Given Rothes’s later role in the government of the restored Kingdom of Scotland and his association with the Earl of Lauderdale as Secretary for Scotland, the meeting could have been arranged after correspondence with Lauderdale, who had borrowed money from Rothes to travel to the exiled Stuart court in the Netherlands after his release from imprisonment in March.35 Those attending the meeting conferred with two representatives of the burghs, both from Edinburgh, and then chose the Earl of Glencairn, the Earl of Home, and two members of the gentry (Sir Alexander Gibson of Durie and Archibald, later Sir Archibald, Stirling of Garden) to journey to London bearing a letter to Charles II asking that he send his commands to Scotland for the nobility and landed gentry there, and by impli­ cation the royal burghs.36 By the time they reached London in late April, how­ ever, the elections to the English Convention Parliament had begun, and on 1 May the new Parliament (without Scottish representation) had accepted Charles II’s Declaration of Breda and the recall of the King to England, with the tacit assumption that Charles would decide the future of the kingdoms of Ireland and Scotland.37 The anxiety among at least some members of the Scottish nobility and gentry regarding the return of the king (if not to Scotland then to England) reflects the complex relationship between Charles II and those who had supported the Scottish covenanting regime, along with Charles II’s own history as a cove­ nanted king in Scotland in 1650 and 1651. There also, of course, was the back story of the record of Scottish opposition to the policies of Charles’s father in the 1640s and the role of the covenanting regime in the downfall of Charles I and his execution at London in 1649. The ‘Restoration’, as it unfolded in Scotland, would be anything but straightforward, and it would confirm Scotland as a satellite

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kingdom, like Ireland, to be used by the king when convenient to bolster the power of the monarchy in England if it so suited him.38 The Earl of Clarendon’s analysis of the basis of the ‘Restoration’ in Scotland was that the restored king refused to ‘build according to Cromwell’s models’ because he ‘had many Reasons to continue Scotland within its own Limits and Bounds, and sole Dependence upon himself, rather than unite it to England.’39 The ‘resettling’ of Scotland, Clarendon argued, ‘was to be done with much less Difficulty, than the other of Ireland’ because ‘a Committee for that Kingdom [Scotland]’ was appoin­ ted to advise the king on Scottish affairs, who ‘were united between themselves, and did or did pretend to desire the same Things.’ Monck had the most influence in determining its composition ‘and their Dependence’, according to Clarendon, ‘was the more upon him, because He still commanded those Garrisons and Forces in Scotland, which kept them [the Scots, presumably] in their Obedience.’ However, Clarendon also believed that Monck ‘was the more willing to give them a Testi­ mony of their Affection to the King,’ because ‘without their Help He could not have been able to have marched into England against Lambert.’40 Glencairn, Rothes and others who had dealt with Monck as he prepared to march into Eng­ land claimed that they had done so because they knew that Monck would restore the king. Clarendon was not impressed, at least in retrospect, writing that ‘They did indeed give him only what They could not keep from him, nor did They know any of his Intensions, or himself at that Time intend any Thing for the King.’41 He did concede that ‘They were all either Men who had merited best from the King, or had suffered most for him, or at least had acted least against him,’ united as they were by ‘implacable’ hostility to the Marquess of Argyll, ‘which was the Shibboleth by which the Affections of that whole nation were best distinguished.’ Monck shared their hostility to Argyll, and it was Monck who ensured that Argyll would be condemned to death by the Scottish Parliament for collaboration with the Crom­ wellian regime so soon after the Restoration.42 So General Monck completed his involvement with the government of Scotland by convincing the restored king to trust those who opposed the Marquess of Argyll and wanted to remove his influence from Scottish public life, which his execution most assuredly accomplished. Monck also must have been involved to some degree with advising the new government on the final withdrawal of the last of the English garrisons in Scotland, completed in 1662, opposed though it was by Clarendon as the king’s principal minister. James Fraser near Inverness recor­ ded that the garrison there withdrew in April, some ‘in arms, rank and file, with wives and children, for Lieth’, while others marched out from their citadel with their arms, commanders and colloures, to the great grief of all the English souldery; never people left a place with such reluctancy. It was even sad to see and heare sighs and teares, pale faces and embraces, at their parting farewell from that town [Inverness]. And no wonder; they had peace and plenty for 10 yeares in it. They made that place happy, and it made them so. The citadel was slighted, all the country in course called in to rase it. I saw it founded, I saw it flourish, I saw it in its glory, grandeur and renoun, and now in its ruins.43

28 Charles II as King of Scotland 1660–1685 The presence of the English garrison in Inverness had represented Scottish sub­ jugation to England, but the garrison’s wages oiled the wheels of commerce in what had been a comparatively impoverished community, and the regiment itself ensured that the nobility obeyed the law as enforced by the Commonwealth and the Protectorate. By the end of May the rest of the English garrison had left both Inverness and its outpost at Inverlochy, the latter of which remained garrisoned; ‘the souldiers there were all Scotch men who remaind behind, and one Captyain Hammiltoun sent governour to that fort.’44 The English had not made a desert and called it peace, but despite their former power they had to depart, and their fortifications were cast down. Yet the King had not returned to Scotland but to England. Just what did that imply? It implied, even before the withdrawal of the English garrisons, the return of Scottish administration of legal jurisdiction (if not justice) and the election of the first Scottish Parliament since 1651. It very soon became apparent just what that would mean in turn, and the judicial murders of the Marquess of Argyll, James Guthrie and Johnston of Wariston, did not just embody the counter revolution in the now restored national church, but also a counter revolution in public life and civil society. In some ways, the execution of Argyll represented Charles II’s determination to revenge the death of the Marquess of Montrose.45 Argyll had travelled to London to present himself at court but rather than receive an audience with the king he was arrested and imprisoned in the Tower of London. As he did not hold an English peerage he could only be tried before the recalled Scottish Parliament convened in January 1661 with the Earl of Middleton as Royal Com­ missioner. Sent back to Edinburgh from London by sea and under guard, he was kept in custody in Edinburgh Castle while the Lord Advocate of Scotland pre­ pared charges against him.46 Defended by the Royalist George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh, Argyll proclaimed his loyalty to the Crown, but was damaged by those charges which accused him of collaboration with the Cromwellian regime after 1652. Argyll had denied this, only to have Monck, now the Duke of Albe­ marle, send to Edinburgh some of Argyll’s correspondence with him as Crom­ wellian commander in Scotland during the suppression of the Earl of Glencairn’s Royalist rising. Monck saw Argyll as double-dealing and treacherous, and so did Middleton as Royal Commissioner. His evidence was enough to convince a majority of the Scottish Parliament to vote for his conviction on 24 May and he was executed, professing his innocence, in Edinburgh on 27 May.47 Ironically, the King’s Secretary of State for Scotland resident in London, the Earl of Lauderdale, tried to intercede with the king on behalf of Argyll’s son and heir, Lord Lorne, who was seen by Lauderdale as a valuable political ally for the future, not least because of the importance of the Argyll estate in the western Highlands.48 Although the Marquess of Argyll’s property was forfeit to the Crown, Lauderdale was able to persuade the king to restore Lorne, now ninth Earl of Argyll, as heir to the Argyll estates on the basis that he was heir of his grandfather (the seventh Earl of Argyll), rather than his father. In 1664 Lauderdale was able to do better, and persuaded Charles II to restore the former Lord Lorne as the heir to his father as well, but not to the title of

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Marquess. Unfortunately, this included inheriting liability for huge debts that had been incurred during the Cromwellian occupation by raising loans on the security of the estate.49 In time, the ninth Earl of Argyll would become asso­ ciated with his father as defenders of the Solemn League and Covenant. While in the orbit of Lauderdale before 1681, however, he became a leading suppor­ ter of the Royalist regime in Restoration Scotland and profited from that asso­ ciation.50 Nevertheless, Lauderdale’s wish to use Argyll as an agent of royal authority in the west Highlands had its drawbacks, as the ninth earl’s use of his influence in the Privy Council in his own interests undermined any chance of achieving some degree of political stability there. His private assault on the Macleans of Mull as part of the expansion of his estate demonstrated this. As Allan Kennedy has written, ‘reliance on the House of Argyll to maintain order was unstable in practice. Binding policy to the interests of this one noble family rendered control both highly volatile and extremely partial.’51 In time Argyll’s eldest son and his grandsons would become important architects of parliamen­ tary union with England in the eighteenth century. His example, along with that of his father’s political career, would shape his grandsons’ future lives as soldiers and politicians with almost vice regal status in Scottish public life during the first half century of the history of the kingdom of Great Britain. There certainly were many people in Scotland and at Westminster after 1707 who argued that to delegate too much governmental authority to ‘one noble family rendered control both highly volatile and extremely partial’ during the lifetimes of the second and third dukes of Argyll.52 By the time the Marquess of Argyll had been executed, the Scottish Parliament that had convicted him had already voted, as Dr MacIntosh has written, ‘to abol­ ish the very legislation that guaranteed not only the legal basis of the Presbyterian church system in Scotland, but also that which determined its own standing in the constitution.’53 Literally, the Scottish Parliament had become the crucible of a Scottish counter revolution. Argyll’s execution, along with those of Guthrie and Johnston of Wariston, underlined just how comprehensive the leaders of the counter revolution intended it to be. As Dr Ronald Lee has pointed out, ‘the execution of Argyll symbolically marked the end of Scotland’s covenanting experiment.’54 Episcopacy was to be restored, despite substantial opposition in the Parliament, but Argyll’s fate silenced those who doubted and opposed the Act Rescissory that the Earl of Middleton as king’s commissioner had forced through Parliament. With no Act for an indemnity for past opposition to the Crown to be introduced until the next session of Parliament, covenanters who were Royalists could yet suffer the fate of those, like Argyll, who claimed unwavering loyalty to the Crown but had learned to live with the Commonwealth and the Protectorate in the 1650s. Middleton, as General of the Forces in Scotland, appeared in many ways to be modelling himself on Monck’s behaviour as the Protectorate’s Commander-inChief in Scotland, although Monck never had to deal with a Scottish Parliament. As Duke of Albemarle in England, however, he was now a member of the com­ mittee of the English Privy Council that dealt with Scottish issues, as was the

30 Charles II as King of Scotland 1660–1685 king’s Secretary of State for Scotland the Earl of Lauderdale. It was the Scottish Privy Council, which in addition to Middleton included the Earl of Rothes as President and the Earl of Glencairn as Lord Chancellor, as well as 33 other members of the nobility, 14 shire commissioners and only one burgh commis­ sioner, that exerted the same kind of control in Scotland over the selection of shire and burgh commissioners that Monck and his officers exercised in identifying and electing Scottish Members of Parliament for Cromwellian parliaments sitting in London. With the unicameral Scottish Parliament dominated by the nobility far easier to manipulate than the bicameral parliaments of England and Ireland, Middleton was in a much stronger position in Scotland than the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland was in that country. It led him to overreach himself in a manner that Monck never had as Cromwell’s man in Scotland. The result was that the King preferred Lauderdale in London to Middleton in Scotland as his principal advisor in Scottish affairs. By 1663 Middleton had retired into England after the last ses­ sion of the 1661–1663 Scottish Parliament. He was replaced as King’s Commis­ sioner presiding over the last session of this Parliament by Rothes as President of the Privy Council, now joined by the recently appointed episcopal bench of the Church of Scotland. In time the issue of church government would almost destroy this reconstituted church, and in some ways it did.55 Parliament in Scotland was not to meet again until 1669. In the meantime, the Earl of Lauderdale continued to enjoy the favour of the king by virtue of the influence he exerted at court by his almost constant attendance. This gave him a degree of power, but it was power delegated by the king and in turn that power could only be exercised through Rothes and the Privy Council in Scotland, the Scottish central courts, the Scottish Treasury and the small but increasingly active garrison of Scottish troops who would, by the time of the Pentland rising in 1666, enforce the law, albeit only to the limits of their capabilities.56 Recent, or relatively recent, studies of Restoration Scotland have transformed our understanding of a period that previously was defined by the religious issue in Scotland and the Royalist project of completing a counter revolution through the national church. We know far more now regarding the government of the High­ lands during the reign of Charles II and the development of a more professional, if still deeply conservative, legal system. There is much more interest now in chal­ lenging the image of late seventeenth century Scotland as corrupt politically and legally, fanatical and deeply divided in its religious culture, and impoverished eco­ nomically every bit as much as it was culturally. In terms of politics, Dr Gillian MacIntosh has made the case for a Scottish Parliament that despite its domination by the nobility began to become more of a representative forum as government became interested in passing legislation that would increase trade and encourage agrarian improvement. The legal profession developed in a manner that reflected the increase of students completing a legal education as an Advocate (the equivalent of an English Barrister) with systematic study at universities in the Netherlands. This reflected the nobility’s increased interest in putting their sons to the law, given the growth of litigation before the central courts at Edinburgh. While many of the royal burghs remained poverty

Charles II as King of Scotland 1660–1685

31

stricken and often unable to afford to send commissioners to Parliament, the larger burghs experienced an increase in financial services (if not banking), textile manufacturing and an expansion of foreign trade, particularly from Aberdeen, Edinburgh and Glasgow, as well as a modest increase in population.57 Charles was an absentee monarch of Scotland, and experimented with employ­ ing a Scottish Secretary in London to correspond with the Scottish officers of state, particularly the Earl of Middleton and the Earl and later Duke of Rothes as Royal Commissioners presiding over the Scottish Parliament and the Privy Coun­ cil. He later moved toward relying on the Earl and later Duke of Lauderdale to preside over Parliament and the uniquely Scottish institution of a ‘Convention’ that was restricted to issues specified in the royal summons, usually increases in taxation.58 Lauderdale succeeded Rothes as commissioner to Parliament after Rothes became something of a scapegoat for the Presbyterian rebellion of 1666. This was despite the fact that Rothes had presided over the establishment of a relatively small but effective Scottish army. Lauderdale, as Royal Commissioner, chaired every Parliament and Convention from 1667 to 1678 (1667, 1669, 1672, 1673–74 and 1678).59 His correspondence with the king, and presumably his discussions with the king while attending court in London, emphasised the lack of opposition to the king’s policies in the Parliaments and Conventions that he dominated. Yet now that we know much more about what transpired when the Scottish legislature met, it is clear that Lauderdale’s management of Scottish gov­ ernment was not as successful as the King apparently believed, although of course the systematic political opposition that developed in the legislature under the lea­ dership of the third duke of Hamilton had little in common with those religious dissenters who actively and militantly resisted the policies of the established church and the government policies that supported it.60 It would be the outbreak of another rebellion rather than parliamentary opposition that would end Lauder­ dale’s management of Scottish government in 1679. He did retreat after the Par­ liament of 1674 when the Duke of Hamilton began to attract support not only from other members of the nobility but also from burgh and shire commissioners. His earlier attempts at financial reform were undermined by increasing evidence of financial corruption in Scottish government and Lauderdale’s lack of interest both in doing anything about it or allowing anyone else to do so. Attendance at Par­ liament or Convention, neither of which met annually, increased over time during Lauderdale’s tenure, reflecting the rise of legislative opposition to his policies and the increased expense of Scotland’s involvement in the Dutch wars with England. The army in Scotland was small, but so was the Scottish tax revenue. Lauderdale advised the king to call Conventions rather than parliaments in Scotland to approve increases in taxation out of fear of losing control of a Parliament to the opposition led by the Duke of Hamilton. Lauderdale also was encouraged by the king in the idea of meeting some of the unrest generated by the second (but first for the restored monarchy) Dutch war by exploring the possibility of negotiating a parliamentary union between the English and Scottish Parliaments. Such a union would work towards reducing Scottish trade and cultural links with the Netherlands, who Charles and his ministers

32 Charles II as King of Scotland 1660–1685 regarded as an enemy despite the outbreak of peace between the Stuart kingdoms and the United Provinces. One reason Charles and his closest advisers regarded the Netherlands as a potential enemy was that he was in negotiations with the French monarchy over a secret treaty (and subsidy to Charles as king of the British and Irish kingdoms) that was directed against the Dutch.61 Rather than the Cromwellian union, the model was clearly the initial policies of James VI and I after 1603 for the Stuart British monarchies. The King wanted nothing to do with ‘Cromwell’s models’! From his first presiding over the Scottish Parliament as Royal Commissioner, Lauderdale had adopted the issue of Scottish access to English markets to promote economic development in Scotland. Tax income in Scotland remained small.62 Yet there was little incentive for the English parlia­ mentary commissioners the king had appointed to negotiate with the Scottish Parliament on trade with England to agree to access to English markets when there was no evidence that the Scots could offer any economic concessions that would tempt the English. Their traditional exports to England had been indigent Scottish nobility and ordinary soldiers who seemed to contribute more to political and social problems than to the expansion of the English economy. Indeed, Scottish migrants had already contributed much to the economic and social expansion of the English colonial plantations, but this was never recognised as a factor by English negotiators, who met with Scottish parliamentary negotiators in the autumn of 1670.63 The English negotiators were interested in absorbing Scottish representatives into a united Parliament sitting in London, but not at all drawn to Scottish proposals for a more federal union that would preserve an ele­ ment of political and constitutional agency for the Scottish political elite and (at least in theory) the people they represented. The Navigation Acts were about excluding economic competition for English merchants and their manufactures, particularly from the Dutch of course, but there was no interest in giving the Scots preferential treatment over the Dutch (or French) just because of the English monarchy’s connections with the kingdom of Scotland and its Parliament.64 In English eyes, Scotland and the Scots remained a foreign country. In the eight­ eenth century, after union with England, it would be the same with the Hano­ verian monarchs George I and George II. Although it is clear now that the Scottish Parliaments and Conventions under Charles II’s reign acted as a genuine national forum, Royalists such as the earl of Rothes (royal commissioner to the Scottish parliament in 1663) referred to ‘the good old forme of government’ in Scotland through the Scottish Privy Council and Court of Session as the supreme councils of the kingdom.65 We have no systematic study of the Scottish Privy Council during the reign of Charles II, although the minutes of the Privy Council have been an important source for historians who have written about the Restoration regime.66 The case has been made that ‘the Sover­ eignty of the [Court of] Session’ was greater than many historians have assumed in the past.67 It made law as well as pronouncing on the application of existing law to the cases that came before it. The cases that Lord Stair recorded in his Decisions of the Court of Session published in two volumes in 1683 and 1687, near the end of the government of Scotland under the Stuart restoration of the ancient and

Charles II as King of Scotland 1660–1685

33

independent kingdom, provide some evidence of this. The Session’s decision on a case relating to salmon fishing rights on the River Don in Aberdeenshire ruled that an Act of the Scottish Parliament that gave advantages to landowners with access to the river further up its course did not fully adhere to legal precedent in Scotland and sought advice and evidence as to ‘whether the same would be beneficial, or hurtful to the Salmond Fishing of the Kingdom’ in general.68 The decisions recorded by Stair, Professor Ford has argued, ‘shows that the lords of session were still willing to decide that statutory provisions had been deprived of effect by popular usage,’ and that by doing so ‘the lords of session were willing to regulate practices in the way that parliament ought have done, by receiving expert evidence on what would be in the public interest and by laying down – the term used was ordaining – clear rules to be observed by all those engaged in the activity.’69 As such they were willing ‘to regulate’ the effect of legislation ‘where parliament had failed to do so’ when approving legislation. Another case that had been recorded in Stair’s Decisions related to the same point. It concerned the Session’s judgement in litigation brought by the Archbishop of Glasgow concerning the use of substitute judges in the Commissary Court of Glasgow. Former commissaries had then advised the court as to how ‘the practice of the commissary courts’ could be better regulated by their recording the resi­ dence requirement for commissaries in their books of sederunt in the absence of relevant parliamentary legislation.70 These cases and others appear to have deployed (in Professor Ford’s words) ‘language that does not appear to have been used before the Interregnum,’ in ren­ dering the court’s view ‘that interpretation should be ever followed, which is according to Equity, and whereby the Statute may stand, and not be eluded.’71 The Restoration Court of Session thus did act as a supreme court for a sovereign king­ dom, acting in relation to the Privy Council and Parliament (but not the Kirk). It was also the case that ‘the theory that law could arise from the tacit consent of the people’ continued to influence the decisions of the session. There is some evidence that as far as the College of Justice was concerned, ‘no act of parliament or royal decree would have been given effect until it had been drawn to the attention of the people, and even then it would have been deprived of effect if it had been rejected by the people.’72 It certainly is the case that ‘to understand the statutory law of Scotland it was necessary to explore the records and reports of the session, for it was in the decisions of the court that acts of parliament were effectively registered as being in force in the books of the court,’ and this was the approach adopted by Stair in his research for his Decisions.73 It was the Court of Session that interpreted leg­ islation in relation to practice, precedent and tradition in law. Parliament and people both had a role in the evolution of the law, but so did the courts. If there was no evidence that an Act of Parliament had been enforced, there is evidence that judges ‘gave effect to the custom in the case before them while declaring that they would not do so in future cases’, often some kind of consultation relating to past practice and considerations of public interest. Professor Ford argues that when this proce­ dure was followed, the judges of the ‘Inner House’ seemed ‘to have assumed that they had legislative authority of their own.’74

34 Charles II as King of Scotland 1660–1685 While the Court of Session began, slowly, to develop as a Scottish constitutional institution independent of Parliament and Privy Council during the Restoration years, broader cultural and social changes had an impact on the work of the Ses­ sion as the legal profession began to attract more sons of the gentry and nobility. This was at least in part because landed families sought to recover from the dis­ ruption of long years of war followed by an English occupation, both of which entailed decades of high taxation. This did mean that family interest was often at play in contemporary litigation. Lord President Gilmour had, after the Restora­ tion, apparently dismissed the Cromwellian English judges appointed in the 1650s as unfit for their office because ‘they had neither kith nor kin,’ and the Earl (later Duke) of Lauderdale had proclaimed that in the Court of Session, ‘show me the man, and I’ll show you the law.’ Nevertheless, by 1674 the Court of Session reserved the right to exclude crown nominees who the court felt were unqualified for its work, as it would do so half a century later in the early eighteenth cen­ tury.75 Dr Jackson has argued that, ‘unprecedented appointments of members with no legal training or experience to serve as judges hearing civil cases in the College of Justice’ after the Restoration led to serious opposition to crown policy among the legal community in Scotland, particularly over the promotion of the Earl of Lauderdale’s brother as an ‘Extraordinary’ Lord of Session.76 The Faculty of Advocates in Edinburgh during the years of the Restoration regime demon­ strated ‘increasing corporate confidence’ in opposing Lauderdale’s attempts to pack the bench with his own nominees. In both 1669 and 1674 many Advocates refused to practice before the Courts, much to the fury of Lauderdale.77 By 1677 Lauderdale had convinced the king to authorise amending the conditions of appointments for all other judges of the Court of Session to be at royal pleasure rather than for life.78 Despite this, the College of Justice and the Faculty of Advocates raised the status of the legal profession in Edinburgh and Scotland. The lawyers were not the only professional group to improve their standing in the slowly expanding urban culture of Restoration Scotland, although the medical profession had to wait until the 1680s and the incorporation of the Royal College of Physicians in Edinburgh in 1681 to substantiate their claims to professional status.79 Urban society in Scotland, hierarchical as it was, began to develop a dynamic that made for a more pluralistic society. Charles II’s reign as restored king of Scots faced its greatest crisis when Lau­ derdale’s policy of using the army to enforce the monarchy’s authority reached its limits in 1679. This took the form of an outbreak of sustained civil disobedience over much of the country, but was particularly strong in the southwest. Excesses by the military and the government’s increased efforts both to extract tax through the use of military quartering and related efforts to enforce widespread compliance with public worship through the now Episcopalian Church of Scotland fuelled widespread opposition. Lauderdale can be said to have stood for the belief that as the Restoration monarchy had rescued the kingdom of Scotland ‘from slavish subservience to English military occupation’, the least its subjects in Scotland could do was obey their monarch’s wishes for public worship through the recon­ stituted Church of Scotland.80 Instead, government troops were confronted with

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35

armed (and effective) resistance at Drumclog on the border of Ayrshire and Lanarkshire in June 1679 following the assassination of the Archbishop of St Andrews, James Sharp, on the public highway in Fife in early May. Armed men began to assemble in the west of Scotland for the purpose of confronting gov­ ernment forces directly in Glasgow or Edinburgh.81 This led to the Scottish gov­ ernment accepting reinforcements in the form of English troops sent north under the command of the king’s bastard son the Duke of Monmouth, who defeated rebel forces at the Battle of Bothwell Brig in the west of Scotland in late June. By October 1679 Monmouth had returned to England, but the king’s brother, the Duke of York (Duke of Albany in Scotland) formally replaced Lauderdale as royal commissioner in Scotland, taking up residence at Holyrood Palace in Edinburgh.82 After the Duke of Albany’s return to England, the Earl of Rothes was elevated to a dukedom, and put in charge of the Scottish Privy Council again. Rothes’s health, however, after years of excessive drinking, collapsed in the spring of 1681, necessi­ tating a return to Scotland by the Duke of York and Albany to act as royal com­ missioner to the Scottish Parliament summoned to meet in Edinburgh in July 1681.83 Of course the new commissioner, as the king’s brother, could literally represent the monarchy in Scotland, in a way that Lauderdale could not, despite being dismissed by one contemporary in the Parliament as lacking ‘great conduct nor a deep reach in affairs, but was a silly man.’84 Although James Duke of Albany and York would never return to Scotland after 1681, both as heir to the thrones of England, Ireland and Scotland and from 1685 as monarch of the three kingdoms, the man who became James VII and II brought the issue of monarchy and the state churches (as they were in England, Ireland and Scotland) to the centre of events in the British kingdoms and Ireland. In the process, he contributed to the establish­ ment of a narrative of Scottish history that remains influential to this day.85 Yet the contest over church and state unfolded at a time of unprecedented change in European religious culture that in time would render the denominational clashes of the 1680s and beyond redundant. Changes in Scottish religious culture more generally had been incremental, however, even as political change became frantic and rapid after 1685. Alexander Shields, in expressing his opposition to the state church in Scotland in his book A Hind Let Loose, warned that accepting reli­ gious toleration at the hands of an absolutist monarch was to accept the ‘Principle of Atheistical Hobbes’.86 Episcopalians interested in natural and rational religion in times of violent religious conflict became drawn to the movement to recognise the importance of what was termed natural and universal law in much of Europe. Gil­ bert Burnet, Restoration clergyman and academic in Scotland and post 1688 Bishop of Salisbury in the Church of England, wrote of his debt to his youthful studies in civil and feudal law in France for the ‘just notions of human society and of govern­ ment,’ which he had learned there, although given his later career, he was some­ thing of a special case.87 In general, as Dr Jackson has argued, there is substantial evidence that by ‘seeking to reinforce and conserve the religious consciousness of the age, Restoration Scots thus increasingly espoused an essentially non-doctrinal religiosity to escape the constraints of creedal warfare.’88

36 Charles II as King of Scotland 1660–1685 Although the peculiar form of monarchy in Scotland instituted by the restored Charles II led to what increasingly became a divisive public culture presided over by the Earl (and later Duke) of Lauderdale and his allies and cronies, David Allan has argued that there were those responsible for that public culture with a sincere desire to apply philosophically derived principles to ‘efforts to make that culture more inclusive.’89 Robert Leighton, Bishop of Dunblane and later Archbishop of Glasgow in the Restoration Church of Scotland, had a particular interest in the philosophy of the Stoics ‘in both its classical and Renaissance manifestations.’90 After he retired as Archbishop in 1674, first to Edinburgh and then to his sister’s home in Surrey,91 he left his extensive library to his previous diocese of Dunblane, thinking that he might in death contribute to the spiritual and philosophical resources for the local community where he had in the past held responsibilities for its religious and social welfare. His close friend Burnet similarly left money in his will to endow a parish school in his first parish in East Lothian as a Restoration Church of Scotland clergyman.92 Burnet adopted the model put forward by James Ussher, Archbishop of Armagh in the Church of Ireland, who sought to modify traditional ideas of episcopacy by transforming bishops from princes of the church to ‘moderators of diocesan synods’ who would act ‘in conjunction with a Presby­ terian court structure’ to promote national churches that would prioritise ‘the essentials of faith’ rather than particular structures of church government that viewed prelacy and Presbyterianism as incompatible.93 Although a compelling case has been made to consider what has been termed ‘religious realignment’ in Scotland across the larger period from the restoration of the monarchy to introduction of a degree of religious toleration in Scotland through an act of 1712 passed by the post-Union Westminster Parliament, he does note that in contrast to Presbyterians, many Episcopalians ‘drifted away from the Westminster confession’s orthodox Calvinism after 1662.’94 Increasing poli­ tical tension in public life in Scotland during the 1670s developed further into a more confrontational approach by the government toward all opposition once the Duke of York and Albany became involved more directly in the government of Scotland. Yet within religious culture in Scotland, changes already were occurring, which in time would transform many aspects of Scottish society. Arminianism, involving ‘new interpretations of divine grace, free will and mortality’ in Christian life, and what later were labelled ‘Latitudinarian’ approaches to religion, empha­ sised the importance of human reason to religious beliefs. More problematically, Christianity itself became the subject of scepticism, including the published and manuscript works of Irish-born former University of Edinburgh student John Toland.95 There is less evidence of ‘free-thinking’ in Scotland than there is of the increasing concern expressed by ordained clergymen in Scotland regarding the challenge it posed to them. In Restoration Scotland the elusive links between religious controversy and political conflict became visible by the end of Charles II’s reign.96 What followed raised challenges that had been unimaginable to Middleton, Lauderdale and the King as they constructed their approach to gov­ erning the country after the counter revolution of 1660.

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Notes 1 John Paterson, Post nubila Phoebus, or A Sermon of Thanksgiving For the safe and happy Returne of our gracious SOVERAIGN to His Ancient DOMINIONS, AND Restaura­ tion to His just and Native Dignity, Royalties and Government. (‘Aberdene’, 1660), p. 15, English Books Online, accessed 1 May 2019. Quoted in Clare Jackson, Restoration Scotland 1660–1690: Royalist Politics, Religion and Ideas (2003), p. 47. 2 I am grateful to Dr Alasdair Raffe for his guidance on this point. 3 Ronald Hutton, Charles II (1989), Chapter 4, ‘The King of Scots, 1650–1651’, pp. 49–70, and Chapter 7, ‘The Year of Restoration, 1660–1661’, pp. 133–165. 4 William Row, Life of Robert Blair … with Supplement, ed. Thomas McCrie (Wodrow Society, 1848), p. 350. Row refers to Morgan by his former rank of Colonel. 5 Fraser, Chronicles of the Frasers, p. 396. 6 See C.H. Firth, revised by Blair Worden, ‘Ludlow [Ludlowe], Edmund’, under the section heading ‘The interregnum’, in ODNB, online edn, accessed 1 May 2019. 7 Dow, Cromwellian Scotland, p. 249. 8 C.H. Firth, ed., Scotland and the Protectorate … from January 1654 to June 1659 (Edinburgh, SHS, First Series, Vol. XXXI, 1899), p. 306, Monck to General Lambert, 4 Sept. 1655. 9 Dow, Cromwellian Scotland, p. 353; Laing, ed., Letters of Robert Baillie, Vol. III, p. 439, Baillie to Wm Sprang, 31 Jan. 1661. 10 Dow, Cromwellian Scotland, pp. 238, 253. 11 Ibid., p. 253; Laing, ed., Letters of Robert Baillie, Vol. III, p. 438. 12 Dow, Ibid., p. 253; C.H. Firth, ed., THE CLARKE PAPERS: Selections from the papers of William Clarke (Camden Society, New Series, Vol. 62, 1901), Vol. IV, pp. 139– 140, the Commissioners of the Army to General Monck, 26 Nov. 1659; pp. 142–143, General Monck to the Commission, n.d. I have been unable to consult F.M.S. Hen­ derson, ‘New Material from the Clarke manuscripts: political and official correspon­ dence and news sent and received by the army headquarters in Scotland, 1651–60’ (DPhil thesis, Oxford University, 1998). Also, see Frances Henderson, ‘Clarke, Sir William (1623/4–1666)’, in ODNB, online edn, accessed 5 May 2019. 13 J.D. Ford, Law and Opinion in Scotland during the Seventeenth Century (2007), p. 118; Nicoll, Diary, pp. 244, 248, 265–266, 329; Firth, ed., Scotland and the Protecto­ rate, pp. 385–392. 14 Journals of the House of Commons (1742), Vol. 7, p. 797. Accessed via Medieval and Early Modern Sources Online, Edinburgh University Library website, 24 May 2019. 15 Ford, Law and Opinion, p. 120. 16 Ibid., p. 120; Nicoll, Diary, pp. 257–258; Firth, ed., Clarke Papers, Vol. IV, pp. 139–143. 17 Ford, Ibid., p. 120; Hutton, Restoration, Chapters 3 & 4; Firth, ed., Clarke Papers, Vol. IV, pp. 88–89, General Monck to Johnston of Warriston, 3 November 1659. 18 Ford, Law and Opinion, p. 120; William Forbes, Journal of the Session … With a Pre­ face containing an Historical Account of the SESSION (1714), p. xxxii. 19 Dow, Cromwellian Scotland, pp. 254–255. 20 Ibid., p. 256; Sir James Balfour Paul, ed., The Scots Peerage (1906), Vol. III, p. 486. 21 Dow, Ibid., p. 256; Firth, ed., Clarke Papers, Vol. IV, p. 191, ‘The Lord Generall Monck’s answers to the proposals of the Commissioners of the shires of Scotland, pre­ sented to him December 13, 1659’; Nicoll, Diary, p. 260. 22 Firth, ed., Scotland and the Protectorate, p. 204, Monck to Cromwell, 31 October 1654. 23 Menarry, ‘The Irish and Scottish landed elites from Regicide to Restoration’, p. 189; C. H. Firth, ed., Scotland and the Protectorate, p. 244; Dow, Cromwellian Scotland, p. 135. 24 Dow, Cromwellian Scotland, p. 257. 25 See Ian Gentles, ‘Fairfax, Thomas, Lord Fairfax of Cameron (1612–1671), under the heading ‘The Restoration’, in ODNB, online edn, accessed 1 May 2019.

38 Charles II as King of Scotland 1660–1685 26 Dow, Cromwellian Scotland, p. 258; Nicoll, Diary, p. 274.

27 Dow, Ibid., pp. 258–259.

28 J.D. Marwick, ed., Records of the Convention of the Royal Burghs of Scotland 1615–1676,

(Scottish Burgh Records Society,1878), pp. 490–503; Nicoll, Diary, p. 272. 29 Dow, Cromwellian Scotland, p. 259; Scots Peerage, Vol. I, p. 473. 30 O. Airy, ed., Lauderdale Papers (Camden Society Vol. 34, 1884), Vol. I, p. 8, letter from ‘The Earls of Crawford and Lauderdale and Lord Sinclair’ to unknown, n.d. [1660]. 31 Basil Morgan, ‘Morgan, Sir Thomas, first baronet (1604–1679)’, in ODNB, accessed 28 March 2019; Dow, Cromwellian Scotland, pp. 85, 124, 145, 182, 275, 260, 268. 32 Dow, Ibid., pp. 260–261. 33 Robert Wodrow, The History of the Sufferings of the Church of Scotland, ed. Revd Robert Burns (1828, first published 1722), Vol. I, pp. 13–14, 18. 34 Wodrow, History of the Sufferings of the Church of Scotland, Vol. I, pp. 13, 14, 18. 35 Ronald Hutton, ‘Maitland, John, duke of Lauderdale (1616–1682),’ in ODNB, acces­ sed online 16 May 2018; also see Gillian H. MacIntosh, The Scottish Parliament under Charles II, 1660–1685 (2007), pp. 7, 9. 36 Dow, Cromwellian Scotland, p. 263; Margaret D. Young, ed., The Parliaments of Scot­ land: Burgh and Shire Commissioners, 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1993), Vol. I, p. 104, 273– 274; Vol. II, pp. 678–679. 37 Dow, Ibid., p. 263.

38 Ibid., p. 264.

39 The Life of Edward Earl of Clarendon … Written by Himself (Oxford, 1759), Vol. II, p. 49.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Allan Macinnes, The British Confederate: Archibald Campbell, Marquess of Argyll,

c.1607–1661 (Edinburgh, 2011), pp. 281, 301–302; Little, Lord Broghill and the Cromwellian Union with Ireland and Scotland, p. 120. 43 Fraser, Chronicles, p. 447. 44 Ibid., p. 449. 45 Allan D. Kennedy, Governing Gaeldom: The Scottish Highlands and the Restoration State (2014), pp. 171–172; David Stevenson, ‘Graham, James, first marquess of Mon­ trose (1612–1650)’, section under the heading ‘Execution’, in ODNB, online edn, accessed 1 May 2019. 46 Kennedy, Governing Gaeldom, pp. 166–174. 47 Macinnes, British Confederate, pp. 294–303. 48 See David Stevenson, ‘Campbell, Archibald, ninth earl of Argyll (1629–1685),’, under the heading ‘Forfeiture and recovery’, in ODNB, online edn, accessed 1 May 2019. 49 Macinnes, British Confederate, pp. 303–304. 50 Kennedy, Governing Gaeldom, pp. 198–201. 51 Ibid., pp. 202–203, 219–220. Also see Paul Hopkins, Glencoe and the End of the Highland War (1986), pp. 56–70. 52 Ibid., pp. 202–203; Eric Cregeen, ‘The Changing Role of the House of Argyll in the Scottish Highlands’ and J.M. Simpson, ‘Who Steered the Gravy Train?’, in N.T. Phil­ lipson and Rosalind Mitchison, eds., Scotland in the Age of Improvement (1970; paper­ back edn 1996), pp. 5–23, 47–72. 53 MacIntosh, Scottish Parliament under Charles II, 1660–1685, p. 23. 54 Ronald A. Lee, ‘Government and politics in Scotland, 1661–1681’ (University of Glasgow PhD, 1995), p. 24. 55 MacIntosh, Scottish Parliament, pp. 9–56. 56 Lee, ‘Government and politics’, Chapter 4, and p. 295. 57 Gains Murdoch, ‘The emergence of a credit system in Early Modern Scotland’, Scottish History Seminar, University of Edinburgh, 2 November 2017, based on aspects of his

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76

77 78 79 80 81 82

83 84

85 86

39

doctorate, ‘Scottish imperial scepticism and the prioritisation of the domestic economy, 1695–1815’ (University of Aberdeen PhD, 2016). MacIntosh, Scottish Parliament, p. 217. Ibid., pp. 156–171, 222–223. Ibid., p. 171. Ibid., p. 81. Ibid., pp. 80–81. Steve Murdoch and Esther Mijers, ‘Migrant Destinations, 1500–1750’, in T.M. Devine and Jenny Wormald, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Modern Scottish History (2012), pp. 320–337. MacIntosh, Scottish Parliament, pp. 113–114. Jackson, Restoration Scotland, p. 25. Lee, ‘Government and politics in Scotland, 1661–1681’, has explored this source thoroughly. Ford, Law and Opinion, pp. 312–342. Sir James Dalrymple of Stair, The Decisions of the Lords of Council & Session (1683), Vol. I, pp. 255–256, 305, Early English Books Online, accessed via the EUL online catalogue, 15 Nov. 2019; Ford, Law and Opinion, pp. 321–322. Ford, Law and Opinion, p. 322. Ibid., pp. 322–323. Ibid., p. 325. Ibid., p. 326. Ibid., pp. 326–327. Ibid., pp. 326–327. N.T. Phillipson, The Scottish Whigs and the Reform of the Court of Session 1785–1830 (Stair Society volume 37, 1990), pp. 6, 12; P.W.J. Riley, The English Ministers and Scotland, 1707–1727 (1964), p. 271; Clare Jackson and Patricia Glennie, ‘Restoration Politics and the Advocates’ Secession, 1674–1676’, SHR, Vol. XCI No. 1 (April 2012), p. 104; James Maidment, ed., The Court of Session Garland (Edinburgh, 1839), pp. 4, 9. Jackson, Restoration Scotland, pp. 83–84. ‘Extraordinary’ Lords of Session sat with the rest of the bench to hear appeals to the ‘Inner House’ on a case by case basis. See J. Irvine Smith, ‘The Transition to the Modern Law 1532–1660’ and G. Campbell H. Paton, ‘The Eighteenth Century and Later’ in An Introduction to Scottish Legal History (Stair Society, Volume 20, 1958), pp. 26, 54. Jackson and Glennie, ‘Restoration Politics and the Advocates’ Secession’, pp. 76–96. Jackson, Restoration Scotland, pp. 85–86. Helen Dingwall, Physicians, Surgeons and Apothecaries: Medicine in Seventeenth-Century Edinburgh (1995), pp. 37, 93, 112–113. Jackson, Restoration Scotland, p. 114. Mark Jardine, ‘The United Societies: Militancy, Martyrdom and the Presbyterian Movement in Late-Restoration Scotland’ (University of Edinburgh PhD, 2009). Alastair J. Mann, James VII: Duke and King of Scots, 1633–1701 (2014), pp. 133–146; Hugh Ouston, ‘York in Edinburgh: James VII and the Patronage of Learning in Scot­ land, 1679–1688’, in John Dwyer, Roger A. Mason and Alexander Murdoch, eds., New Perspectives on the Politics and Culture of Early Modern Scotland [1982], pp. 133– 155; Tim Harris, Restoration (2005), pp. 331–359. MacIntosh, Scottish Parliament, pp. 184–185. Ibid., p. 203 quoting the diarist Lauder of Fountainhall. See also the caption to the portrait illustration of the Dukes of Monmouth and York/Albany in Hutton, Charles II, Illustration 2, which remarks on ‘the same mixture of good looks and not very remarkable intelligence’ on display in each man’s image. Alastair Mann, James VII: Duke and King of Scots. Jackson, Restoration Scotland, p. 177.

40 Charles II as King of Scotland 1660–1685 87 Ibid, p. 180. I am grateful to Dr Alasdair Raffe for cautioning me against implying that Burnet might in any way be considered representative of the Scottish clergy in the Church of Scotland during the Restoration. 88 Jackson, Restoration Scotland, p. 190. 89 David Allan, Philosophy and Politics in Later Stuart Scotland (2000), p. 177; Jackson, Restoration Scotland, p. 182. 90 Allan, Ibid., pp. 179–180. 91 David Allan, ‘Reconciliation and Retirement in the Restoration Scottish Church: The Neo-Stoicism of Robert Leighton’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History, Vol. 50 (April 1999), pp. 251–278. 92 NLS, Saltoun Papers, MS. 16545, f62, ‘Copy of a Letter from Mr. Thomas Burnet to Mr. [James?] Johnston, dated at London 24 Feb. 1730/31; f63, Lord Milton to Symonds Inn, Chancery Lane London re Bishop Burnet’s legacy to Saltoun Parish School, enclosing a transcription of a letter from Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun to his brother Henry Fletcher, London, 13 Dec. 1713; NLS, Saltoun Papers, MS 16548, ff87–88, T. Burnett to ‘My Lord’ [Milton?], Temple, 27 May 1732; See Martin Greig, ‘Burnet, Gilbert (1643–1715)’, ODNB, online edn, under heading ‘Death’. Burnet left £2222/3sh./6d ‘to Marischal College, Aberdeen and the parish of Saltoun’; David Lemmings, ‘Burnet, Sir Thomas (1694–1753)’, ODNB, Online edn, both entries accessed 13 May 2019; Allan, Philosophy and Politics, pp. 185–190. 93 Colin Kidd, ‘Religious Realignment Between the Restoration and the Union’, in John Robertson, ed., A Union for Empire: Political Thought and the British Union of 1707 (1995), pp. 148–150. 94 Alasdair Raffe, The Culture of Controversy: Religious Arguments in Scotland, 1660–1714 (2012), p. 48. 95 Stephen H. Daniel, ‘Toland, John (1670–1722), in ODNB, online edn, accessed 12 May 2019; Jonathan Israel, Radical Enlightenment. Philosophy and the Making of the Modernity 1650–1750 (2001), pp. 609–614. 96 Raffe, Culture of Controversy, pp. 57–59.

3

A second Revolution? Scotland 1685–1702

There has been debate over whether the change of regime in the kingdoms of England (and Wales), Ireland and Scotland in the years 1685–1691 represented a ‘Revolution’ or not, ever since it (or they) occurred. From a Scottish perspective, this translated into discussion as to whether the ‘Revolution’ in Scotland had ele­ ments that were distinct and specific to it in comparison with England and Ireland. This question also relates to the issue of whether events of 1689 to 1691 brought together Britain by instigating a chain of events that led to the creation of a single polity encompassing the island of Britain, making possible the evolution of a modern state and the world empire that would in the next century achieve global influence. The Revolution certainly represents almost the single point of modern British history during which Scotland appears central to a ‘British’ national narra­ tive, linked as it is with the eventual union of the Scottish and English parliaments eighteen years later. With some justification it has been argued that this has obscured the essentially European context of what happened in Britain and Ire­ land from 1688 to 1691 and beyond. What happened occurred across the three kingdoms geographically specific to Britain and Ireland but essentially has to be considered in its wider European context to appreciate its importance.1 By the end of the seventeenth century greater Europe incorporated global colonial and mercantile contexts. These were transformative, but it was western Europe as a whole that was transformed, including Britain rather than specific to Britain/ England/London. There is a narrative regarding the Revolution in Scotland, which interprets the change of political regime there in 1689 as the beginning of that which has been referred to as ‘the road to Union’ between the Scottish and English parliaments in 1707.2 This has been conceptualised in the larger context of the period up to a decree including the first reign of the new British and Hanoverian dynasty that was initiated by a peaceful transition of power (and royal dynasty) from Queen Anne to George I, Elector of Hanover in 1714. For a Scottish History, that raises a number of questions, including those that provide a structure for the text of the rest of this chapter. Not everyone in Scotland agreed that events of 1688, and after, constituted a ‘Revolution’. For those who would for the next century be termed ‘Jacobites’, what happened after 1688 was nothing more than treason and usurpation. The ancient Scottish Stuart dynasty that had succeeded to the

42 A second Revolution? Scotland 1685–1702 monarchies of England and Ireland at the beginning of the seventeenth century had, by 1689 or 1691, lost all three British and Irish kingdoms for the second time in less than fifty years, leading the late Conrad Russell to quip, referencing The Importance of Being Earnest, that this was not so much misfortune as an indication of carelessness.3 Something was fundamentally wrong in Britain and Ireland. Was Scotland intrinsic or peripheral to this tragedy? There certainly are parallels to the Restoration of the monarchy in 1660, in which the Scottish political elite decamped to London to lobby the restored king. Those who had opposed the Stuart regime in 1688 included a substantial number who had chosen exile on the European mainland, usually in the Netherlands, and Holland in particular. Some had landed in Scotland as part of the ill-fated Earl of Argyll’s rising against James VII and II after he succeeded to the throne, only to return (those who were not executed) to exile.4 There was an influential con­ tingent of Scots who landed with the Prince of Orange’s invasion expedition in November 1688, including Scottish clergymen who had personal access to the Prince Stadholder, such as Gilbert Burnet, former minister of Saltoun parish in East Lothian, and William Carstares, future Principal of the College of Edin­ burgh.5 In Scotland, far to the north of fast-moving events in England, the King’s Privy Council in Edinburgh represented royal authority, but by Decem­ ber most of its members had either chosen not to attend council meetings as the political situation (for the regime) deteriorated, or had left Scotland to travel to Westminster to monitor and observe events there for themselves. As a result there was no government in Scotland, and the continued operation of an already weak system had come under threat. Some narratives of what had happened in Scotland in 1688 emphasised the selfishness of ambitious politicians, whether at Westminster or waiting out events on their estates in the country, but more recent work has emphasised that there was an ideological aspect to the political situation that cannot be explained by reference to ethnic, kinship or religious identity politics. We still have much to learn about how much this perspective can offer us in terms of historical analysis, because we have not yet disentangled the obvious presence of a distinctive Pres­ byterian and Calvinist religious ideology that was part of the lives of a substantial number of people in Scotland, and the developing Whig political ideology that by 1688 had become an influential element in bringing about the collapse of the Stuart regime. How far had the forces of religious dissent in Stuart Restoration Scotland fostered critical thinking about, and rejection of, the political precepts of the restored Stuart monarchy? Charles II had been crowned by the Scots once upon a time, and his younger brother had represented Charles as King’s commis­ sioner on two occasions between 1678 and 1682, but the fact remains that the Restoration Stuart monarchs were as little interested in Scotland and Scottish affairs as their father had been. Carelessness indeed. Politics and religion in Scotland before and after 1688 were not separate spheres but different aspects of a distinctly Scottish public culture that was developing in the latter half of the seventeenth century. Scotland was a poor kingdom, but it was a separate kingdom from England and Ireland in a manner

A second Revolution? Scotland 1685–1702

43

that distinguished it, even within the context of a multiple monarchical regime.6 It also meant that Scotland developed informal political and public connections with Europe, particularly the Absolutist monarchy of France and the quasirepublican polity that was the United Provinces of the Netherlands. The repub­ lican United Provinces was different from Scotland’s sister Stuart kingdoms, and had become increasingly influential in the development of Scotland’s economy and its professional social classes.7 What this meant in late 1688 and early 1689 (as the New Year was taken as beginning on 1 January in Scotland rather than Lady Day, as it was in England), was that those who were eventually to be defined as Jacobites in Scotland had to operate in both political and religious spheres without a functioning royal privy council and without a royal military force deployed in the country following the decision by James to order all royal troops (or almost all) south to join the principal royal army in England. At the same time, in southern and western Scotland, many parish ministers of the Royalist Episcopalian Church of Scotland were ‘rabbled’, ejected by crowds (or were they mobs?) of people who forced them from the parish kirk, sometimes also from their manse, and sometimes even from the borders of their parish.8 These were confrontations that clearly had a political as well as a religious context. How far were local elites involved in popular action and protest? What we do know is that William of Orange met with a group of the Scottish nobility in London once his army had arrived there in December 1688, and as a result he agreed to call a Convention of Estates representing the royal burghs and county freeholders to join the bishops and the nobility in coming together (in Edinburgh) to debate and discuss the future of the kingdom of Scotland. We now know much more about the process of election of representatives by burgh councils and meetings of county freeholders, summoned by each shire’s Sheriff, than was the case previously.9 It is clear that Jacobite supporters across the differ­ ent estates attended the Convention initially. It is also clear that a new generation of electors had worked to return commissioners to the convention with memories of the Scottish church and parliamentary revolutions of 1638 and 1641 (not to mention the decades of defeat and counter revolution from 1651 to 1688) influ­ encing them in addressing the challenges posed by the collapse of government and the descent into disorder of late 1688 and 1689. Both James and William sent addresses to be read to the assembled convention, which voted to accept William’s call to establish the basis of future government. There were rumours that the Jacobite members who left the convention after this initial vote would assemble as a rival Jacobite convention at Stirling. Nothing came of this. Instead, while the garrison at Edinburgh Castle remained loyal to the Jacobite cause, James Graham, Viscount Dundee, went to the Perthshire Highlands to raise the standard for those willing to fight to re-establish the authority of James VII and II.10 Once ‘Williamite’ control of the Convention of Estates was established, there is a traditional narrative of the offer of the Scottish Crown jointly to William and Mary by the convention once it had passed a ‘Claim of Right’ that followed but did not duplicate the example of the ‘Declaration of Right’ passed by the

44 A second Revolution? Scotland 1685–1702 Westminster Parliament. The belief that the Scottish Claim of Right was distinct rather than imitative has been central to the argument that there was a Scottish Revolution that maintained the sovereignty of the ancient Scottish kingdom, even if neither claimant to the disputed Scottish throne ever appeared in Scotland.11 When James did return to one of his kingdoms to fight for it, he chose Ireland. When representatives of the Scottish convention (there were three, each individu­ ally representing the nobility, the gentry and the burghs) travelled to St James’s Palace to offer the Scottish throne jointly to William and Mary, they presented the text of the Scottish Declaration of Right to the new monarchs, but they did not insist that the offer of the throne was conditional on acceptance of the Claim/ Declaration.12 Thus, William and Mary were crowned as joint monarchs of Scot­ land in London, not Scotland. The member of the Scottish nobility who carried the offer of the Crown to England, however, was the tenth Earl of Argyll (raised in 1701 to a Dukedom), grandson of the Marquess of Argyll, who had crowned Charles II as king of Scotland and Great Britain in Scotland in 1651. There was a degree of continuity implied in his presence in London when William and Mary accepted the crown of Scotland. He continued to reside in London for most of the year. His colleague Sir John Dalrymple had links with the Restoration regime as a former Lord Advocate, and in time would serve King William and Queen Mary as a secretary of state. The third, Sir James Montgomery of Skelmorlie in Ayrshire, would later be linked to opposition to the new monarchs. Montgomery had connections to the ninth earl of Argyll, who he attended as a friend when Argyll was executed in 1685 after his unsuccessful rebellion against James VII. He also organised the departure of his cousin, the future tenth earl of Argyll, who would act as his colleague in offering the crown of Scotland to William and Mary jointly in 1688, to join William of Orange in the Netherlands before the latter set sail for England. In opposition he would turn to Jacobite plotting, and died of tuberculosis while in exile in France in 1694.13 In the meantime, in Scotland, as the ejection of incumbent Church of Scotland ministers from their parishes continued, those still alive who had been members of the last General Assembly of the Church of Scotland met in Edinburgh to claim that the Presbyterian kirk of the Covenanting regime had been re-established.14 It took a while for the erstwhile Scottish Convention, raised to the dignity of a Par­ liament once William and Mary had accepted its offer of the Crown of Scotland, to acknowledge this claim. The Royal Commissioner (George Leslie, Lord Mel­ ville, from April 1690 first Earl of Melville) representing the monarchs while the Parliament was in session, had to accept the Presbyterian demand that episcopacy be abolished in the Church of Scotland in order to obtain parliamentary approval to collect taxation revenue sorely needed to secure the fragile Williamite regime.15 There was a threat of Jacobite attack on Lowland Scotland, either from Ireland or from the Jacobite military force still at large in the Scottish Highlands. Scottish regiments in the army of the Netherlands had been sent to Scotland by William to defend what had been the Convention. The Presbyterians already had raised a military force that helped halt a Jacobite advance towards the Lowlands at Dun­ keld in Perthshire, but soldiers had to be paid, and the Williamite Privy Council

A second Revolution? Scotland 1685–1702

45

responsible for Scottish government required money in its exchequer to maintain the forces defending it.16 Given the Jacobite threat in Ireland, Scotland was more or less left to those in the country who had dissented or opposed the policies pursued by James VII and II, as Royal Commissioner for his brother in 1679–1680 and 1681, and as an absent King of Scotland after 1685. Some exiles, such as Argyll and Lord Melville, returned to take places on the Privy Council, but much Scottish policy was discussed at Court in London or even in the field in the Low Countries (where William countersigned orders prepared by the Master of Stair as one of his secretaries of state authorising the attack on the Macdonalds of Glencoe in 1691/2).17 William’s officials in Scotland were left to their own devices while he pursued his many interests elsewhere, but they were not left to develop their own initiatives on policy. As neither James nor William was Scottish, it was the Presbyterians who provided the most obviously distinctive element in Scotland, and it would prove impossible for William to secure full integration of Episco­ palians as well as Presbyterians in the Church of Scotland during his reign.18 The General Assembly and its executive committee became dominated by Presbyter­ ian clergymen and laymen who tried to manage the General Assembly in Wil­ liam’s interest. Parishes in the north of Scotland, whether it be the Lowland Northeast or the Highland Northwest, often continued to be held by Episcopa­ lians or were vacant. There was the Whig opposition in the Scottish Parliament, at least initially, which some referred to as ‘The Club’, who pursued limitations on executive authority in Scotland with a certain degree of success.19 Here, despite the problems of organising a coherent opposition to the Court, were the origins of a political system that might at times have accommodated Jacobitism but came to accept the Hanoverian succession as the only means of safeguarding the gains of the Scottish Revolution of 1689 and preventing some kind of Jaco­ bite restoration. Events in Scotland certainly had been profoundly influenced by the knowledge of the contemporary unravelling of James’s government in Eng­ land, and later his arrival in Ireland to pursue the cause of his restoration. More recently, there has been significant scholarly interest in the crucial events unfolding elsewhere in Europe at the time, demonstrated by the appearance in Ireland not only of troops from the Netherlands and France in Britain and Ire­ land, but also troops from Denmark and several of the German principalities aligned with the alliance opposed to those of France and Louis XIV. The political settlement in a British context after 1688 did not change radically from the Restoration settlement of the Stuarts in 1660. There were still separate parliaments in England, Ireland and Scotland, although soon after 1688 the regime sought to diminish the increasing independence of the Scottish Parliament. The relationship of the Irish Parliament with Westminster was its model. Mary and William were both in the Stuart line, Mary through her father and William through his mother, so dynastic discontinuity could be downplayed by black pro­ paganda questioning the legitimacy of the son of James II and VII and Mary of Modena born in 1688. The Jacobite cause came into existence with this birth, generally accepted as legitimate by many historians.20 It became less the cause of

46 A second Revolution? Scotland 1685–1702 James II and VII as that of the putative James III and VIII, the innocent barred from his rightful place in the succession by lies and ruthless politicians. At least the Birth of Britain narrative has meant that Ireland and Scotland were factored in as a part of the beginning. It is no mistake that Macaulay, son of a Scot and grandson of a Church of Scotland minister, is the historian most responsible for that, although another, David Hume, wrote about it as the conclusion of what had begun as a projected three volume history of Britain, later to become the final two volumes of ‘A History of England’. Hume refused to extend his history into the eighteenth century (a third volume of the History of Britain for the period 1688 to 1714 had been projected by Hume). Macaulay never completed his History.21 Smollett, another Scot, grasped the commercial opportunity to continue Hume’s History into the eighteenth century, churning out a commercial narrative weak on analysis and argument but still ‘a serious foray into contemporary history’ that interrogated the covenanting narrative Smollett had inherited by birth in the Presbyterian Whig west of Scotland.22 What Hume, Smollett and Macaulay all neglected in their histories was the wider European context, instead identifying France as the enemy against which Britain could be defined, indeed, as the dragon slain by Britain in defence of its unique (and libertarian) unwritten constitution. This was a nation with an unwritten constitution that nevertheless included a number of texts such as the Declaration of Right (and the rather different Claim of Right adopted by the Scottish Parliament) and later the Toleration Act passed by the English Parliament at Westminster. In time there would be a Treaty of Union with Scotland. There was the end of censorship legislation at Westminster and the creation of a Bank of England (and the rather different charters approved by the Scottish Parliament creating the Bank of Scotland and the Company of Scotland). The Act of Settle­ ment established Westminster’s plans for the succession to the monarchy in future and confirmed that the succession would be to a single monarchy encompassing the whole of the island of Britain. Jacobites of course rejected this. As late as 1745 Charles Edward Stuart in Edinburgh proclaimed the re-establishment of a separate kingdom of Scotland and the repeal of the Act/Treaty of Union. So clearly the three kingdom context of British politics and economics established in the middle of the seventeenth century set the parameters for the dynamic of what began to unfold in 1688. The Irish Parliament expressed interest in union with Britain in 1703 but its overtures were brushed off by an English government secure in its confidence of Dublin’s subordinate status to Westminster.23 This was secured by the fact that the Irish Parliament represented Irishmen whose identity was foun­ ded on their colonial ties to England and who thought of themselves as English, or more precisely, ‘The Protestant Irish Nation.’24 A century later that would change, but after 1688 (and after the Treaty of Limerick in 1691) it was the Scottish Parliament that embraced its sovereign status after elections in 1703. Yet by 1707 it was persuaded to use its sovereignty to vote itself out of existence to banish the possibility of Jacobite restoration in Scotland, and through union with England and Wales, the entire island of Britain.

A second Revolution? Scotland 1685–1702

47

The Scottish Parliament embraced its sovereignty but William as the king of Scotland (as he was in his own right after Mary’s death in 1694) viewed it in the same light as the Irish Parliament.25 William as Stadholder of the United Provinces of the Netherlands was not a stranger to the concept of unionism and, having campaigned in Ireland, he recognised the different basis of his authority there, which indeed influenced his input to the land settlement in Ireland after 1691. The kingdom of Ireland would destabilise a union with England, but a union with Scotland would expand the recruitment base for his armies (as he knew from the Scottish and English regiments in the Dutch army) as well as, he thought, neu­ tralise the Jacobite threat by ensuring that the sovereign legislature of the United Kingdom would be beyond its reach. Nevertheless, his Privy Council in Scotland struggled to impose his authority there during his lifetime. Ironically, it was Wil­ liam’s sister-in-law Anne who would wield her monarchical authority over Scottish government more effectively (perhaps remembering her father’s experience in Scotland) and bring about co-operation between her English and Scottish privy councils in promotion of British parliamentary union. The Revolution of 1688 has only recently received attention that implied that it, rather than ‘the English Civil War’ (re-christened the ‘War of the Three King­ doms’ by a historian of Ireland) marked a turning point in British History.26 The ‘English’ civil war ended with English armies conquering and occupying Ireland and Scotland as well as royalist Wales, but 1688 can be read as setting in motion events that created a single British kingdom united in colonial domination of Ire­ land. This triumphant reading of a moment in the narrative that made a reality out of early modern British projects of unification leaves out the many people in England, Scotland and Wales who had no part in ‘the Revolution,’ ‘the Union,’ and the Hanoverian succession that followed in its wake. There had been little attention until recently to the subject of how Scotland was governed between 1689 and 1707, or indeed how it was governed after 1707.27 If the Stewarts/ Stuarts had been absentee kings before 1688, those who came after them never set foot in Scotland and relied on others to interact with the Parliament, the legal system and the national church. Society in the localities was dominated by kinship networks focused on the nobility and other landowners and their agents, which usually included the clergy. The gravitational pull of accelerating English eco­ nomic growth increasingly drew in landowners in the Scottish Lowlands. This in turn influenced the slow expansion of commercial activity most noticeable in areas adjacent to the Lowlands in Argyll, Perthshire and Aberdeenshire. So political changes driven from above appeared profound and successful, but economic and social processes were little affected. Parliamentary legislation, how­ ever, may not have had the impact that legislators intended, but it did demon­ strate ambition for change on the part of the elite, which predated 1688. There is little evidence that political change affected wider elements in society, but because political change was not specific to Scotland it did break down, incrementally, the factors isolating Scotland from change over time in cultural communication and economic activity. The political achievement of a British state inherently involved a degree of subordination not so much to England as to London. In the short term,

48 A second Revolution? Scotland 1685–1702 however, it exacerbated political and social divisions and weakened those Scottish institutions that had some impact, no matter how modest, on what had been the kingdom of Scotland. The Revolution of 1688 and after did not bring progress and prosperity to the Gaelic-speaking peoples of Ireland and Scotland. On the contrary, it divided the population of both ancient kingdoms in a manner that marked their history in the eighteenth century and reinforced their subordination to the British govern­ ment at Westminster. If the expulsion of the Huguenots by the government of Louis XIV was the epitome of intolerance, British rule in Ireland, personified by the Lord Lieutenants representing the Crown there, amounted to colonial dom­ ination of a conquered people, which entrenched the power and the privileges of the (mostly) anglicised elite. There was no religious toleration for the majority of the Irish population who remained loyal to their Roman Catholic faith. In the eighteenth century, increasing numbers of the Protestant dissenting minority in Ireland emigrated to the western hemisphere, particularly the British colonies of settlement in North America. Gaelic-speaking Ireland may not have represented quite as much of a hidden history as Irish nationalist historians claimed in the past, but there can be no doubt regarding the crushing poverty endured by the majority of the population, pushed to the periphery of Irish public life.28 In Scotland during the reign of the absent William II, the ‘Highland war’ to contain armed Jacobite forces in the Highlands essentially bankrupted the Scottish state at a time when it could attract few resources from the king’s other dominions as war in Ireland was followed by William’s wars in the European Low Coun­ tries.29 The Privy Council was weak and prone to faction, and the King’s search for reliable ministers to whom he could delegate the problems of governing Scotland was never resolved satisfactorily. Although the ‘massacre’ at Glencoe appeared to demonstrate the government’s inability to control its agents (or the Campbells as a clan) in the Highlands, it did mark the end of the Highland War following the Williamite victory in Ireland. With resources exhausted but secure to some extent from any further Jacobite threat, the government turned its attentions from the Highlands to attempting to resolve its problems with the Kirk of Scot­ land. The kirk in the Highlands remained Episcopalian in many areas, not through the authority of bishops, but the lack of Presbyterian ministers and support for Presbyterianism in many parishes, where serving ministers remained partly because there were no replacements and partly because they were willing to support the Williamite regime.30 The tenth earl of Argyll inherited the legacy left by his grandfather of being, at least to some, the most important member of the nobility in Scotland, at least in reference to the Scottish covenanting cause, cast down in the middle of the seventeenth century but now risen again. He was one of the group of Scottish nobles and gentry in London who persuaded William to call a Convention of Estates in Scotland, and subsequently became a Privy Councillor and a Lord of Treasury in Scotland.31 Restored to the Argyll estates, by 1701 the tenth earl was able to push himself forward in Scottish politics, benefiting from his family’s his­ tory of opposition to the Stewart/Stuart monarchy in the seventeenth century.

A second Revolution? Scotland 1685–1702

49

His father and grandfather had expanded and extended the Argyll estate in the southwest Highlands and Islands through ruthless foreclosing of debt and acqui­ sition of feudal superiorities over the lands of other clans in the region. Although Argyll was raised to a dukedom in the peerage of Scotland as a result of his involvement in government, his success as a politician was limited.32 The impor­ tance of his wife in this process should not be underestimated. She was the step­ daughter of Charles II’s Scottish minister the Duke of Lauderdale, and her mother was able to support her son-in-law by, among other things, allowing her daugh­ ter’s family to use her London mansion at Ham House as their London resi­ dence.33 The Campbells were Presbyterians and Whigs (mostly), but following the execution of his grandfather, leading members of the family had sought to extend the family’s network of political and social connections to include access to the patronage of the Duke of Lauderdale.34 Thus the tenth earl was well placed to attend the new monarch of England, Scotland and Ireland at court, which clearly made some kind of impression on William. Whatever else the Campbells might be, they were not associated with the Jacobites. Later there would be efforts to portray the family’s ‘pride, greed and avarice’ as extending to the willingness to indulge in intrigue with the exiled Jacobite court, but given the strength of the family’s identification with the covenanting movement, it was difficult to make these accusations stick. Archi­ bald Campbell, Earl of ‘Ilay’ [Islay], wrote from London to his Edinburgh cor­ respondent Andrew Fletcher, Lord Milton in July 1742 regarding a Jacobite attempt to persuade the second Duke of Argyll to support their cause. ‘The King is very well pleased with the dukes behaviour as to the late treasonable attempt made upon him,’ Ilay reported, ‘& the duke is pleased that the measures he took upon it were so much commended by the King.’35 The Campbells were not the only Scottish aristocratic family to achieve advancement to a dukedom in the rapidly changing British political environment from 1689 to the formal parlia­ mentary union of Scotland and England by 1707, but they were most successful. Argyll’s sons were sent to Eton to master the English language. The decision indicated a desire on the part of their father to remain in London, near William’s court. The elder son (John, the future second duke) was, at quite an early age, sent to join the Campbell regiment, raised to fight with William’s armies in the Low Countries, with a view to his becoming a soldier. The boy received a com­ mission from William’s government to act as colonel. The second son (Archi­ bald) would leave Eton to study at the college of Glasgow before going to Leiden to study Civil Law. Both boys would be taken on a tour of Europe with the noted scholar and book dealer Alexander Cunningham as their tutor.36 They would remain proud of their Scottish patrimony all their life, but aside from their birth, their early lives ensured that they would be Williamites first and Whigs second. They were taught to prioritise the importance of the Protestant succes­ sion to the thrones of England and Scotland rather than, it seems, any broader ideology. They were Whigs, but they were government Whigs, and as young men in particular were willing to act in alliance with Tories, if not with out-and­ out Jacobites, in order to advance their careers.37

50 A second Revolution? Scotland 1685–1702 The first Duke of Argyll was not directly linked to the violence unleashed against the Macdonalds of Glencoe, but his family and the Campbell regiment were involved.38 To this day Glencoe 1692 is associated with clan violence in the Highlands rather than violence directed by the state against those it per­ ceived as its enemies. Of course, it is stretching the argument to assert that there was a ‘Scottish state’ in 1692. There was a Parliament and a Privy Council that acted on the authority of monarchs resident in London. There were courts dispensing royal justice (of a sort) in Edinburgh, and sheriffs or their substitutes in each of the shires working with local elites (sometimes including members of the clergy) to raise tax, not always very successfully, and to enforce the laws as they understood them. After 1692, famine stalked the land, every bit as dread­ ful as that which occurred in many parts of France but utterly unlike the relative prosperity enjoyed by many localities in England and the more fortunate towns and regions of northern Europe. Political instability had weakened a Scottish economy that remained rudimentary in comparison to the increasing commer­ cial wealth of England, Holland and France. While peasants starved, nascent Scottish political economists began to dream of increasing commercial wealth as ‘the key to the universe’.39 State violence, or at least violence condoned by the Scottish Privy Council against seemingly ‘savage’ subjects, and state failure to support local elites in the parishes and shires struggling to deal with widespread and almost unprecedented famine, created a sense of crisis in the Scottish Parliament. Members of Parlia­ ment, or some of them, were interested in striking out in a new and positive direction in the government of the ancient kingdom. Again, events at Westminster echoed through Parliament House at Edinburgh. Parliamentary charters for trad­ ing companies were not new at Westminster, but represented new initiatives under the different style and substance of William’s kingship and the Dutch influence, which came with it. As noted above, the establishment of the Bank of England was echoed in Scotland by a charter for a very different Bank of Scotland in Edinburgh. Of more immediate importance was the indirect challenge to the long-established East India Company and Royal African Company in England by the Scottish Parliament legislating for the establishment of a ‘Company of Scot­ land.’ Could Scotland, sharing as it did a monarch with England and Ireland, who also held semi-regal status as Stadholder in the Netherlands, engage in overseas trade as the Danish, Swedes and Portuguese had done in competition with the Dutch, the English, the French and the Spanish?40 The answer, in short, was no, but to a remarkable degree the Company of Scotland project captured the imagination of a wide variety of Scots. The Financial Revolution was far from glorious, nor was it particularly bloody, but it drew Scotland into the revolutionary financial networks of bankers and mer­ chants who were transforming the economies of Europe even as war transformed its politics.41 The shareholders of the Company of Scotland were largely drawn from the nobility and gentry although merchants in the burghs were involved to a degree as well. We just do not know if Dutch and English money was bor­ rowed by subscribers to meet the calls for working capital from the Directors of

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51

the Company. In September 1700, ‘J. Stewart’, possibly the Lord Advocate, James Stewart of Goodtrees,43 wrote to William Carstares regarding ‘the hearts of all good countrymen bent upon an union with England’, and claiming ‘that three parts of the members of parliament (I mean the burrows and burgesses), are honest men, and presbyterians; and that they were angry enough about Caledonia [ie New Caledonia on the Isthmus of Panama], yet these (besides what we may count upon amongst the nobility), will never consent to a change in government, ….’ Steuart also wrote that these ‘three parts of the members of parliament’ had ‘projectors now at work making plans and scheming trade: … The design is a national trade; so that by it all Scotland will become one entire company of merchants.’ The influence of John Law and William Paterson was manifest despite the failure of the Darien expeditions, and in 1700 the Company of Scotland was still in existence. Steuart wrote to Carstares of ambitions to establish ‘a fund of credit’, ‘to pay back to any of the subscribers to the African stock his money if demanded;’ but also of plans to establish ‘manufacturies’ and ‘to pursue their fishing to greater profit in all the markets of Europe than any other fishing company in Christendom can do’. By these means ‘all the poor in the nation’ would be employed and that ‘in two years time, there shall not be one beggar seen in all the kingdom, and that without any act of slavery.’44 In effect, subscription to the cause of the company supplanted what had been represented by subscription to the ‘National’ Covenant of 1638. When the Treaty of Union was signed, more time had elapsed since the Company of Scotland’s parliamentary charter was granted than was the case in the period between the Scottish ‘National Covenant’ approved by the Church of Scotland General Assembly in 1638, and the British union envisaged in the Solemn League and Covenant agreed at Westminster in 1643. Each revolutionary Scot­ tish document, however, led to a British treaty meant to establish Scottish union with England and Wales. On each occasion the initiative came from Scotland and the resolution (although hardly satisfactory to the Scots) came from English initiatives to resolve political stalemate in England, and in both cases this led to military intervention by English armies in Scotland to establish Scotland’s poli­ tical subordination within a broader settlement that many Scots concluded was to the economic advantage of most of the population of the ancient kingdom. Political union did not inevitably lead to economic ‘improvement’, but it did make an expansion of the economy possible for Scotland in a way that isolation and withdrawal would not.45 The wars of the Covenant had made it impossible for the English to ignore Scotland, but it also made it apparent to an increasing number of Scots that some degree of integration with England could achieve political stability and increasing economic opportunity. The Scottish Convention of 1689 had become a Parliament by 1690. A parlia­ ment without Jacobite representation. Scottish Presbyterians seized the moment but were themselves divided over their legacy from the Scottish covenants of the seventeenth century, ranging from the United Societies, who viewed them literally as Scotland’s contract with the Deity, to Williamite supporters such as William’s former chaplain William Carstares, deeply influenced by his experiences in the 42

52 A second Revolution? Scotland 1685–1702 Netherlands, who represented the beginning of a growing influence of a more pluralistic northern European Protestantism on Scottish public and religious cul­ ture that would characterise its civil society during the eighteenth century.46 On Queen Anne’s accession to the British throne, Carstares was made Principal of the University of Edinburgh. As the contest over reconstituting the Church of Scot­ land’s General Assembly began after the general structure of William’s Scottish Parliament took shape, Parliament emerged as the central institution in public life with the failure of William’s agents in Scotland to retain the parliamentary Lords of the Articles dominated by members of the Scottish Privy Council as part of the legislative process.47 The Lords of the Articles had been able to determine the agenda of each of the parliaments in Scotland, which had met under the authority of the restored Stewart/Stuart monarchy after 1660, but this was no longer was the case after 1689. This in turn led to the formation of a party within the Convention Parliament who debated political issues facing it independently of the agents of the Crown and the Privy Council, effectively pursuing the issue of the sovereign power of the Scottish Parliament. At the same time, William and Mary and their advisers were having to concede issues of sovereignty and the royal prerogative to the English Parliament at Westminster. William was not amused, eventually declar­ ing at one point that he ‘had been ill-served in Scotland.’48 He wished to retain as much power for the monarchy in Scotland as possible, just as he did in Eng­ land. Over time, those who welcomed William as a positive improvement (or at least as a change) from his predecessor James became increasingly divided between those who supported his absentee kingship as the status quo because it prevented a return to a Jacobite regime dependent on France, and those, such as Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun, who publicly criticised his government in Scotland. Fletcher came to fear William’s ambitions to wield the power of universal mon­ archy in Europe himself, to the detriment of smaller states such as Scotland or the Netherlands whose nominal independence was threatened by his European alliances in support of his wars against France. His efforts to promote a com­ prehensive and tolerant settlement as the new basis for the Church of Scotland could also be seen as an Erastian ambition. The Latitudinarianism of his policies towards the Church of England and the Church of Ireland (even if they backed Episcopacy) and the Dutch Reformed Church (which did not), could be seen as subverting the independence of the established church in each of his kingdoms and in the United Provinces.49 The vehicle for asserting the sovereignty of the Parliament of Scotland became the Company of Scotland rather than the Church of Scotland, marking a change in Scottish priorities in public life that predated the union by more than a decade. The Company’s manifesto for global foreign trade did not attract universal sup­ port, but it did certainly reflect a change in direction for Parliament although not, significantly, for all the members of the Privy Council. By 1700 this had led to widespread opposition to the Scottish government, as economic difficulties at home after years of domestic famine were followed by economic failure overseas and rampant Anglophobia. The adoption of the Act of Succession by the English

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Parliament at Westminster without any attempt at consultation with the Scottish Parliament underlined the marginal significance of Scotland and its parliament under the British and Irish tri-monarchy. On the other hand, neither were Eng­ land’s allies in Europe. In 1702 William called on his English Parliament to enter into negotiations for a parliamentary union with Scotland as he sought to muster support in both kingdoms as well as Ireland in support of his leadership of a renewed European coalition against the expanding power of the Bourbon mon­ archy.50 Louis XIV’s grandson was set to succeed to the Crown of Spain and its colonies, almost guaranteeing French pre-eminence in European affairs. Then William died. William’s sister-in-law and successor Anne marked her succession to the thrones of England and Scotland (without ever going to Scotland for a separate corona­ tion) by following William’s wishes and requiring both her kingdoms to identify commissioners to meet in London to negotiate for a union of the parliaments. This marked the beginning of the tortuous process through which the united kingdom of Great Britain was created. Anne did not require the Convocation of the Church of England and the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland to appoint commissioners to meet in London to discuss the union of the Convoca­ tion and the General Assembly as the foundation of a United Church of Great Britain. She did require her parliaments of England and Scotland (but not Ireland) to discuss parliamentary union. It is not difficult to understand why. Beset by the Latitudinarianism unleashed by the arrival of William, his Dutch courtiers and both English and Scottish exiles with personal experience of living in the tolerant Netherlands, the last thing leaders of the Church of England desired was an even broader national church.51 Nor, indeed, were influential members of the church sanguine about the arrival of more dissenters in an expanded British Parliament. The Church of Scotland was predicated on opposition to Erastian influences and during the years of Restoration episcopacy had struggled, ultimately unsuccess­ fully, to square the circle of adapting an Episcopalian church to a country in which substantial numbers of the population resisted conformity to the state church.52 The physical absence of the monarch, as in Ireland, weakened the authority of the church, and the Scottish nobility and gentry in much of the country were not committed to supporting the church as established by the Scottish Parliament to mark the return of the Restoration monarchy.53 Many Scottish Episcopalians were willing to accept William and Mary as mon­ archs, but were not willing to conform to a Church of Scotland organised into presbyteries and ideologically committed to the covenanting tradition. The Pres­ byterians were able to obtain a settlement to their liking in the early days of the regime before the ecclesiastical priorities William and Mary wished to pursue became clear. Subsequently there was a long struggle within the General Assem­ bly, Synods and Presbyteries over just what kind of national church the Church of Scotland would be after 1690.54 A visitation of the colleges to assess the curricu­ lum and the teaching staff marked the beginning of that process. There then ensued a long campaign waged through pamphlets and formal addresses to the Privy Council and the Crown over the issue of the status of Episcopalians and

54 A second Revolution? Scotland 1685–1702 their meeting houses if they were willing to take the oath of loyalty to the regime. The Privy Council was unable to achieve the acceptance of Episcopalians within the Kirk on a formal basis, but in practice many parishes in the north and west in particular, where there had been few ‘rabblings’ of unpopular ministers, continued to receive ministry from Episcopalian clergy who remained because there were no Presbyterian clergy available to take their places.55 It took many decades and a change of generation before the Church of Scotland in northern Scotland became integrated, at least partially, with the kirk in the rest of the country in any mean­ ingful way.56 The effect of this on public life was divisive. Before the union there was a strong party in the kirk that recognised that parliamentary union was a betrayal of the national covenant that was at the heart of the Scottish covenanting revo­ lution of 1641 and thus of Scotland’s chosen status as the new Israel. After the union, particularly after the Tory electoral triumph in 1710, those who led the kirk in Scotland faced grave challenges, which, for better or worse, transformed the church by the mid-eighteenth century. By the time William died, war was again upon his dominions. Although the union can be seen as the beginning of the achievement of ecclesiastical and political stability in eighteenth-century Scotland, by the middle of the nineteenth century the ‘Revolution’ was the foundation of modern Scottish national identity for the majority of the popula­ tion. James Coleman has argued that ‘it is important not to overstate the importance of 1707 as one of the principal milestones in the narrative of Scottish nationality.’57 The Scots sought the preservation of the Union as a fundamental component of their own nationality, yet it was ‘the Revolution’ that was per­ ceived as having brought the modern nation into existence. As Coleman has argued, ‘the Revolution represented the consummation of all that the patriotic covenanters had fought for. In comparison, 1707 was merely a contract between equals, the legal seal stamped upon the achievement of Great Britishness at the Revolution.’58 ‘Revolution Values’ would continue to occupy, at least rhetori­ cally, a central place in the politics of Hanoverian Britain until the last quarter of the eighteenth century. In January 1747/8, almost sixty years after the ‘Revo­ lution’, the third Earl of Marchmont, was approached by the third Duke of Argyll when they found themselves in the same London bookshop. Marchmont’s family had been associated with opposition to the Duke of Argyll’s political influence in Scotland during the 1747 general election. The two men agreed that despite past disagreements, they were united as ‘Revolution’ Whigs, although Argyll expressed it, by saying that ‘both our families were forfeited families and in the same situation’, to which the Earl of Marchmont replied that his family (descendants of Patrick Hume of Polwarth) ‘had along with his Grace’s ventured their lives in the same cause …’59 The Jacobite rebellion of 1745–1746 and its aftermath had revived memories of the Whig constitution and the contested legacy of 1688/9. It is no mistake that Hume ended his ‘History of Britain’ (as the two volumes dealing with the history of the seventeenth century were originally titled) with an account of William of Orange’s arrival in England with a Dutch army that

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included English and Scottish regiments in Dutch service, and the eventual offer of the crowns of England and Scotland to William and his wife, the eldest daughter of James II and VII. Events in Scotland were briefly narrated as a kind of footnote to the central account of William’s entry into London and acceptance of the crown of England. Hume emphasises William’s meeting with the assembly ‘of thirty [Scottish] noblemen and about fourscore gentlemen’ he summoned to meet with him.60 Those summoned chose the third Duke of Hamilton as their ‘president’ at the meeting, whom Hume describes as ‘a temporizing character’, ‘determined to pay court to the present authority’ whose eldest son, the Earl of Arran, ‘proposed to invite back the king upon conditions’.61 Hume describes ‘Sir Patric Hume’ [no relation, although obviously sharing Hume’s surname] as being vehemently opposed’.62 Hume concluded his brief narrative with an account of the meeting of a Scottish convention called by William on the basis of his having accepted the ‘present administration’ of Scotland by vote of the Scottish assembly that had met with him in London. The parallel with Monck’s meeting with representatives of the Scottish nobility and gentry before marching his army into England in 1660 is striking, although ignored by Hume. Arran, later to be leader of the opposition to a treaty of union with England in the last Scottish Parliament as the fourth duke of Hamilton, could not even get someone to second his motion to invite James VII to return to Scotland and England ‘upon conditions’, which Hume describes as ‘a usual policy in Scotland, where the father and son during civil commotions, were often observed to take opposite sides; in order to secure in all events the family from attainder.’ It was not an observation that was meant to reflect positively on the nobility of Scotland. Hume declared in his account that at the convention, ‘it was soon visible, that the interest of the malcontents [as Hume referred to them] would entirely pre­ vail.’63 He went on to emphasise that ‘the revolution was not, in Scotland, as in England, effected by a coalition of whig and tory: The former party alone had overpowered the government, and were too much enraged by the past injuries, which they had suffered, to admit of any composition with their former masters.’ In Hume’s account, the purpose of the convention was to exclude the ‘tories’, who Hume refrained from referring to as ‘Jacobites’, writing as he was in the period after the end of the last Jacobite rebellion in Scotland in 1746. He con­ cluded his account by noting that ‘the more zealous royalists had regarded the ‘assembly as illegal’ and ‘had forborn to appear at elections’. Their leaders, the Earl of Balcarres and Viscount Dundee, had withdrawn from what Hume termed ‘the convention’, which then ‘passed a bold and decisive vote, that king James, by his mal-administration, and his abuse of power, had forfeited all title to the crown,’ and ‘made a tender of the royal dignity to the prince and princess of Orange.’64 With that, Hume’s narrative returns to London, ending with a declaration that the events of 1688 and 1689 formed ‘a new epoch in the constitution’ because ‘by deciding many important questions in favour of liberty, and still more, by that great precedent of deposing one king, and establishing a new family, it gave such an ascendant to popular principles, as has put the nature of the English constitu­ tion beyond all controversy.’

56 A second Revolution? Scotland 1685–1702 Although Hume wrote of the ‘English constitution’, he did mention William’s Scottish Convention in Edinburgh having ‘passed a bold and decisive vote, that king James … had forfeited all title to the crown’, without naming the legislation that established a ‘Claim of Right’ by authority of the sovereign parliament of the kingdom of Scotland that formed the basis of an offer, or as Hume had it, ‘made a tender of the royal dignity to the prince and princess of Orange.’ How far the Claim of Right became enshrined in Scots law was not clear after the parliamentary union of Scotland with England in 1707, but the Earl of Ilay (the future third Duke of Argyll) in 1735 cited it in his discussions with Sir Robert Walpole, King George II and other members if the British Privy Council in 1735 over the appointment of a new Lord Justice Clerk in Scotland. Adam Cockburn of Ormiston, who had held the office (with some interruptions) since 1692, had been given the office for life by royal warrant in 1722. The Lord Justice Clerk presided over the Court of Justiciary in the absence of the Lord Justice General, and corresponded with the Secretary of State in London responsible for Scottish government. One of the grievances listed in the Claim of Right was the failure of James VII to appoint judges for life, rather than at the King’s pleasure. Cockburn had not attended the courts of Session and Justiciary after the furore over raising the Malt Tax in Scotland in 1725, but continued to hold office.65 When he died in 1735, George II agreed to appoint Andrew Fletcher, Lord Milton, as his replacement, but refused, at least initially, to make the appointment for life, given the precedent Ormiston had established of continuing to hold office without fulfilling its duties. Ilay argued that this violated the Claim of Right of 1689: ‘I am endeavouring to support the Claim of Right as well as I can, & I am not without hopes.’66 In fact Lord Milton effectively had superceded Ormiston after 1725, at least in terms of correspondence with London (see Chapter 5). Eventually Walpole and Ilay were successful in having Lord Milton appointed for life, although he would resign in 1748 as part of an arrangement to redistribute the major legal offices in Scotland following the defeat of the Jacobite rebellion of 1745–1746.67 Clearly, however, Hume did not see the revolution as ‘the consummation of all that the patriotic covenanters had fought for’, as Dr Coleman has expressed it.68 Hume viewed the covenanting revolution, or the Presbyterian claims in 1688 and after, that the Revolution in Scotland had restored the covenants to church and nation, as the product of untrammelled religious enthusiasm that had created an apocalyptic crisis of politics and society across Britain and Ireland in the seven­ teenth century. ‘To decry with such violence,’ he wrote, ‘as is affected by some, the whole line of Stuart; to maintain, that their administration was one of con­ tinued encroachment on the incontestable rights of the people; is not giving due honour to that great event, which not only put a period to their hereditary suc­ cession, but made a new settlement of the whole constitution.’69 Writing in the middle of the eighteenth century, in the aftermath of the last Jacobite rebellion in Britain, Hume counted the great leader of the cause to change the defining mis­ sion of the Church of Scotland, William Robertson, as a friend as well as a fellow historian.70 By the middle of the eighteenth century, Robertson led the Church

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away from an atavistic obsession with the seventeenth century covenants in favour of an attempt to provide civil and moral leadership for the Scottish nation and all of its people. Under the patronage, after 1760, of a young king who as George III ‘gloried in the name of Britain’, Robertson led both the University of Edinburgh and the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland at the same time Hume’s History was attracting international attention, although much of that attention was critical, with many readers sceptical about Hume’s intellectual project.71 By deciding to continue his History of Britain to a third volume on the reigns of William of Orange and Queen Anne, which would have afforded him the oppor­ tunity to analyse the profound constitutional changes that occurred in Britain between 1688 and the death of Queen Anne in 1714, not least, the parliamentary union of Scotland and England in 1707, Hume would have written ‘more than a pre-history of modern British society’, instead, ‘it would have constituted a true ‘History of Great Britain’ by ‘taking the story up to and beyond the Act of Union in 1707’.72

Notes 1 Tony Claydon, Europe and the Making of England 1660–1760 (2007). 2 T.C. Smout, ‘The Road to Union’, in Geoffrey Holmes, ed., Britain after the Glorious Revolution, 1689–1714 (1969), pp. 176–196. 3 Conrad Russell, ‘The British Problem and the English Civil War’, History, Vol. 72 (1987), p. 397. 4 Allan Kennedy, ‘Rebellion, Government and the Scottish Response to Argyll’s Rising of 1685’, Journal of Scottish Historical Studies, Vol. 16, Issue 1 (May 2016), pp. 40–59. 5 Jackson, Restoration, Chapter 8. 6 Alasdair Raffe, The Culture of Controversy, Chapter 2. 7 Ginny Gardner, The Scottish Exile Community in the Netherlands, 1660–1690 (East Linton, 2004), particularly Chapter 7. 8 Alasdair Raffe, Scotland in Revolution, 1685–1690 (2018), pp. 109, 116–117. 9 Raffe, Ibid., chapters 4–6; Alasdair Raffe, ‘James VII’s multiconfessional experiment and the Scottish revolution of 1688–1690’, History, Vol. 100 (2015), pp. 354–73. 10 Raffe, Ibid., pp. 133, 153. 11 Ibid., pp. 134–138. 12 Ibid., pp. 144. Also see Raffe, ‘Scottish state oaths and the revolution of 1688–1689’, in Julian Goodare and Sharon Adams, eds., Scotland in the Age of Two Revolutions (2014), pp. 173–191. 13 Paul Hopkins, ‘Montgomery, Sir James, of Skelmorlie, fourth baronet (c1654–1694)’, in ODNB, online edn, accessed 28 May 2019. 14 Raffe, Scotland in Revolution, pp. 51, 141–142. 15 Ibid., pp. 141, 145. 16 Ibid., pp. 145, 153–154. 17 J. Gordon, ed., Highland Papers: Papers Illustrative of the Political Conditions of the Highlands of Scotland 1689–1696 (Glasgow: Maitland Club, 1845), pp. 63–64, ‘Letter from the King anent the Highland Rebells’, 11 Jan. 1692. Also see Paul Hopkins, Glencoe and the End of the Highland War (Revised Edition, Edinburgh, 1998), Chap­ ters 10 and 12. 18 Raffe, Scotland in Revolution, pp. 142, 143. 19 Ibid., pp. 145–146.

58 A second Revolution? Scotland 1685–1702 20 Tim Harris, Revolution: the great crisis of the British monarchy, 1685–1720 (2006), pp. 239, 258, 270–271; Alastair Mann, James VII, pp. 213–218. 21 William Thomas, ‘Macaulay, Thomas Babbington, Baron Macaulay (1800–1859)’, in ODNB, online edn, revised text of 2015, accessed 16 Jan. 2018. 22 Lewis M. Knapp, ed., The Letters of Tobias Smollett (Oxford, 1970), Letter 48 to John Moore, 2 Jan. 1758: ‘I was agreeably surprised to hear that my work met with any approbation at Glasgow, for it was not at all calculated for that meridian.’ See Nicholas Phillipson, ‘Smollett, Tobias (1721–74)’, in Robert Crowcroft and John Cannon, eds., The Oxford Companion to British History (Second Edition, 2015), online edition accessed 25 July 2017. 23 Allan I. Macinnes, ‘Union for Ireland failed (1703), Union for Scotland accomplished (1706–7)’, in K. Whelan and D. Keogh, eds., Acts of Union: The Causes, Contexts, and Consequences of the Acts of Union (Dublin, 2001), pp. 67–94. 24 Colin Kidd, British identities before nationalism (1999), quotation on p. 146. Also see pp. 150, 154, 162–170; Jim Smyth, ‘“Like Amphibious Animals”: Irish Protestants, Ancient Britons, 1691–1707’, Historical Journal, Vol. 36 No. 4 (Dec. 1993), pp. 785–797. 25 David Onnekink, ‘The Earl of Portland and Scotland (1689–1699): a re-evaluation of Williamite policy’, SHR, Vol. LXXXV, No. 2 (Oct. 2006), pp. 231–249. 26 J.C. Beckett, The Making of Modern Ireland 1603–1923 (London, 1966), Chapter 4, ‘The War of the Three Kingdoms’. 27 P.W.J. Riley published a trilogy of books on the subject, writing his history, like David Hume’s History of England, backwards: King William and the Scottish Politicians (1979), The Union of England and Scotland (1978), having followed The English Ministers and Scotland, 1707–1727 (1964), but in the present century Derek John Patrick, ‘People and Parliament in Scotland, 1689–1702’ (University of St Andrews PhD, 2002), and Derek Patrick, ‘Unconventional Procedure: Scottish Electoral Politics after the Revolution’, in Keith M. Brown and Alastair J. Mann, eds. Parliament and Politics in Scotland, 1567–1707 (2005) brought a different perspective to bear. Most recently, Alasdair Raffe’s Scotland in Revolution, 1685–1690, has focused on the years of revolutionary change and conflict rather than the reign of William of Orange as King of Scotland over the entire period 1689–1702. Compare Alexander J. Murdoch, ‘The Legacy of the Revolution in Scotland’, in Alexander Murdoch, ed., The Scottish Nation: Identity and History (2007), pp. 39–55. Also see Alasdair Raffe, ‘The Restoration, the Revolution and the Failure of Episcopacy in Scotland’, in Tim Harris and Stephen Taylor, eds., The Final Crisis of the Stuart Monarchy (2013), pp. 87–108. 28 Maureen Wall, ‘The Penal Laws 1691–1760’, in Gerard O’Brien, ed., Catholic Ireland in the Eighteenth Century: Collected Essays of Maureen Wall (Dublin, 1989), pp. 1–60.; E. Le Roy Ladurie, ‘Afterward: Glorious Revolution, shameful revocation’, in Bernard Cottret, The Huguenots in England: Immigration and Settlement c.1550–1700, trans­ lated by Peregrine and Adriana Stevenson (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 300–304. 29 Athol L. Murray, ‘Administration and Law’, in T.I. Rae, ed., The Union of 1707: Its Impact on Scotland (Glasgow, 1974), pp. 33–34. 30 Raffe, Scotland in Revolution, pp. 140–143. 31 John S. Shaw, ‘Campbell, Archibald, first Duke of Argyll’ in ODNB, online edn, accessed 1 Oct. 2018. 32 Riley, King William and the Scottish Politicians, pp. 110, 144, 147–148, 154. 33 Rosalind Marshall, ‘Murray [married names Tollemarche, Maitland], Elizabeth, duchess of Lauderdale and suo jure countess of Dysart (bap. 1626, d.1698), noblewoman’ in ODNB, accessed 3 Oct. 2018; Roger L. Emerson, An Enlightened Duke (2013), pp. 16–19. 34 MacIntosh, Scottish Parliament under Charles II, p. 151; Maurice Lee, Jr., ‘Dearest Brother’: Lauderdale, Tweeddale and Scottish politics, 1660–1674 (2010), pp. 18–21, 85–87; David Stevenson, ‘Campbell, Archibald, ninth earl of Argyll (1629–1685) poli­ tician and clan leader’, in ODNB accessed 4 Oct. 2018.

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35 Emerson, An Enlightened Duke, pp. 271, 275, 276.; NLS, MS. 16587, f85, Lord Ilay to Lord Milton, 8 July 1742, ff 87–88, 21 July 1742 and ff91–92, 24 July 1742. Quotation from the letter of 21 July. The accusation of ‘pride, greed and avarice’ is in W. Ferguson, Scotland: 1689 to the Present (1968, paperback edn, 1978), p. 143. 36 John Cairns, ‘Alexander Cunningham, Book Dealer: Scholarship, Patronage and Poli­ tics’, The Journal of the Edinburgh Bibliographical Society, Number Five (2010). 37 Emerson, An Enlightened Duke, pp. 31–45, 49–50, 51–55, 61–66; Riley, Union, pp. 126–143, 177, 256; Riley, English Ministers and Scotland, pp. 146–147, 151. 38 Hopkins, Glencoe and the Highland War, pp. 320–335. 39 David Armitage, ‘The Scottish vision of empire: intellectual origins of the Darien ven­ ture’, in John Robertson, ed., A Union for Empire: Political Thought and the British Union of 1707 (Cambridge, 1995), p. 104. 40 Macinnes, Union and Empire (2007), pp. 173–189 and Chapter 8: ‘Going Dutch?’; Douglas Watt, The Price of Scotland: Darien, Union and the Wealth of Nations (2006). 41 John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State 1688–1783 (1989), pp. 78, 84, 94–95, 114–120, 122, 143–144, 160. 42 W. Douglas Jones, ‘“The Bold Adventurers”: A Quantitative Analysis of the Darien Subscription List (1696)’, Journal of Scottish Historical Studies, Vol. 21 Issue 1 (May 2001), pp. 22–42; Patrick Walsh, ‘The Bubble on the Periphery: Scotland and the South Sea Bubble’. SHR, Vol. XCI No. 1 (April 2012), pp. 111–112. 43 E. Calvin Beisner, ‘Stewart [Steuart], Sir James, of Goodtrees (1635–1713)’, in ODNB, online edn, accessed 5 June 2019. 44 ‘J. Stewart’ to William Carstares, Edinburgh Sept 3, 1700’, in J. McCormick, ed., Statepapers and Letters Addressed to William Carstares, confidential Secretary to K. William during the whole of his reign … (1774), pp. 634–635. Also see J. Stewart to Carstares, Edinburgh Sept. 14, 1700, pp. 645–647 and J. Stewart to Carstares, Edinburgh Sept. 21, 1700, pp. 655–657. 45 Karin Bowie, Scottish Public Opinion and the Anglo-Scottish Union (2007), pp. 79–84, 87, 91, 97, 161–166. 46 Mark Jardine, ‘The United Societies’, Chapters 5 & 6; McCormick, ed., State-papers and Letters, addressed to William Carstares, pp. 3–91; Tristram Clarke, ‘Carstares [Carstairs], William (1649–1715), ODNB, online edition, accessed 22 January 2019; Thomas Ahnert, The Moral Culture of the Scottish Enlightenment 1690–1805 (2014), Chapter 1, Presbyterianism in Scotland After 1690. 47 Raffe, Scotland in Revolution, pp. 144–145.

48 Riley, King William and the Scottish Politicians, pp. 98–99.

49 Raffe, Culture, p. 46; Claydon, England and Europe, pp. 287, 314–317, 330.

50 Riley, Union of England and Scotland, pp. 177–182.

51 Tony Claydon, William III and the Godly Revolution (1996), p. 151; Claydon, Wil­ liam III (2002), pp. 101–105, 180–181; Gabriel Glickman, ‘Political Conflict and the Memory of the Revolution in England 1689–c.1750’ in Harris and Taylor, eds., Final Crisis of the Stuart Monarchy, p. 249. 52 Alexander Murdoch, ‘The Legacy of Unionism in Eighteenth-Century Scotland’, in T. M. Devine, ed., Scotland and the Union (2008), pp. 77–90; Julian Hoppit, A Land of Liberty? (2000), pp. 214–216, 255. 53 Harris, Revolution, pp. 364–421; Jardine, ‘The United Societies’, Chapters 5 and 6. 54 Kidd, ‘Religious Realignment between the Restoration and the Union’, in Robertson, ed., A Union for Empire?; Raffe, Culture of Controversy, pp. 92–119, 164–165; Riley, King William, pp. 61–65, 82–84, 95–96, 118–119. 55 Raffe, Culture of Controversy, pp. 217–232. 56 See the forthcoming University of Edinburgh PhD in History by Ben Rogers, ‘Reli­ gious Comprehension in Post-Revolutionary Scotland, 1689–1712’. 57 James Coleman, Remembering the Past in Nineteenth-Century Scotland (Edinburgh, 2014), p. 35.

60 A second Revolution? Scotland 1685–1702 58 Ibid. 59 Memorandum by Hugh, third Earl of Marchmont, 26 Jan. 1747/8, in Henry Paton, ed., Report on the manuscripts of Lord Polwarth, Vol. 5 (HMC, 1961), pp. 267–268, Medieval and Early Modern Sources Online, EUL catalogue, accessed 6 June 2019. See Emerson, An Enlightened Duke, p. 308. See John R. Young, ‘Hume, Patrick, first earl of Marchmont (1641–1724)’ ODNB, online edition, accessed 6 June 2019. 60 David Hume, History of England, ed. W.B. Todd (Indianapolis, 1983, facsimile edition of the edition of 1778), Vol. VI, p. 522. Volumes V and VI of what became the History of England were published in Edinburgh as the History of Great Britain [from 1603– 1688] in 1754 and 1756. 61 Raffe, Revolution in Scotland, p. 2. 62 See Young, ‘Hume, Patrick, first earl of Marchmont (1641–1724),’ in ODNB, online edn. 63 Hume, History of England, Vol. VI, p. 523. 64 Ibid. Also see Phillipson, Hume, p. 98. 65 Richard Scott, ‘The Politics and Administration of Scotland 1725–1748’ (University of Edinburgh PhD, 1982), p. 240. 66 NLS MS. 16559, ff112–113, Ilay to Milton, 1 May 1735; f121, Ilay to Milton 24 May 1735. 67 NLS MS. 16562, f90, Alexander Macmillan to Lord Milton, 3 May 1735; MS 16559, f132, Ilay to Milton, 31 July 1735; Margaret S. Bricke, ‘The Pelhams vs. Argyll: A Struggle for the Mastery of Scotland, 1747–1748’ SHR, Vol. LXII (Oct. 1982), pp. 157–165. 68 Coleman, Remembering the Past in Nineteenth-Century Scotland, p. 35. 69 Hume, History, Vol. VI. p. 531. 70 Sher, Church and University; John R. McIntosh, Church and Theology in Enlight­ enment Scotland: the Popular Party, 1740–1800 (1998); Laurence A. B. Whitley, A Great Grievance: Ecclesiastical Patronage in Scotland until 1750 (2013). 71 Mark Towsey, Reading the Scottish Enlightenment, Chapter 8 and p. 301 in the con­ clusion; David Allan, Making British Culture, Chapter 10. 72 See Moritz Baumstark, ‘David Hume: The Making of a Philosophical Historian’ (Uni­ versity of Edinburgh PhD, 2007), pp. 138–142.

4

Union 1702–1715

At the advent of a new reign, Queen Anne accepted her predecessor’s project for an Anglo-Scottish Britannic union and devoted considerable time and energy in seeking to complete it. It can be concluded with some certainty that it was her determination to bring about the parliamentary union of England and Scotland that made it happen.1 She was advised against dissolving the Scottish Parliament elected under William and Mary’s authority to mark the beginning of her reign in 1702 and thus calling for the election of a new parliament. There were those in Scotland who then argued that the 1702 session of the Scottish Parliament was illegal.2 Despite this, Queen Anne was successful in getting her English and Scot­ tish ministers to obtain the approval of both the English and Scottish parliaments for the appointment of English and Scottish commissioners to enter into negotia­ tions for a parliamentary union before the end of 1702. Significantly, negotiations were to be held in London, where the Queen could monitor problems and pro­ gress. As with all Crown-initiated Anglo-Scottish union negotiations in the seventeenth century, essentially the agenda was to incorporate and neutralise the Scottish Parliament within the English Parliament in such a way as to ensure that British sovereignty would be dominated by English interests. Anne became the last English and Scottish monarch and the first British monarch. It would be over a century before another British monarch would have any direct contact with Scot­ land, which ensured that the British parliamentary union remained problematic for most of the eighteenth century. Of course, Anne did not visit Scotland at any point in her reign, but she did have memories of residing at Holyrood Palace in Edinburgh with her father when James (as Duke of Albany in the peerage of Scotland) acted as Royal Commissioner to the Scottish Parliament in service to his elder brother the king. Anne would have attended the opening of the Parliament in which James presided as Royal Commissioner. The ladies of the court at Holyrood followed a precedent by the Countess of Dysart as wife of the Duke of Lauderdale when he had presided as Royal Commissioner over the Scottish Par­ liament by joining the Parliament as observers.3 Whether she understood at that young age why her father had taken his family to Scotland to represent its king is unknown. Charles II had decided to send James to Scotland partly because the authority of the Duke of Lauderdale was waning, but it is also the case that James’s conversion to Roman Catholicism had led to substantial opposition in the

62 Union 1702–1715 English Parliament to James’s status as heir to the throne.4 Encouraging him to leave England and reside in Scotland took James out of the line of fire from the English parliamentary opposition, at least for a time. Did Anne, once the Hanoverian succession had been established, see her des­ tiny as completing a union her great-grandfather had projected when he first suc­ ceeded to the throne of England in 1603? Did she see her reign as the completion of the history of the Stuart dynasty, or as dedicated to preserving the Protestant Succession in an expanded United Kingdom? Her letter to the Parliament of Scotland in 1706, when it met to begin to debate of the Treaty of Union agreed by the English and Scottish negotiators, expressed unconditional support, although how far it expresses the Queen’s own views as opposed to those of her ministers remains uncertain. The text is certainly unreservedly pro-union, pro­ claiming as it did that ‘The union has been long desired by both nations, and we shall esteem it as the greatest glory of our Reign, to have it now perfected, being fully persuaded that it must prove the greatest happiness of our People.’5 The union, her letter to the Scottish Parliament continued, should be ‘entire and per­ fect’ because it would thus ‘secure your Religion, Liberty and Property.’ The claim that union ‘would remove the animosities amongst yourselves and the jealousies and differences betwixt Our two ‘kingdoms’ although couched in the language of royal prerogative, was not that far removed from the language of the ‘Tender of Union’ of 1652. Union would guarantee ‘Strength, Riches and Trade.’ Britain, ‘the whole Island being joined in affection’, would be able ‘to resist all its Enemies’, which would ‘support the Protestant interest everywhere and maintain the Liberties of Europe.’ A united British kingdom would secure the liberty of Europe and unite it, but the war, then well underway between France and its enemies, was not mentioned. The year before, in a letter to the Duke of Marl­ borough, the Queen was much more pessimistic. In 1705 she wrote of ‘disagree­ able things that happen every day in Scotland’ and complained ‘of my misfortune to be obliged, by the circumstances of the times we live in, to do all the unjust, unreasonable things these strange people desire, which gives me more uneasiness than you can imagine.’6 Yet in November 1706 the Duke of Roxburghe would respond to Lord Belhaven’s famous speech about the abandonment of Caledonia by echoing the language of the Queen’s earlier letter to the Scottish Parliament: ‘all these grievances would be redressed, and all these distempers remedied; all our differences and animosities cemented; our trade set upon a right foot; our liberties and privileges, which are now so precarious, secured, and our wealth and strength increased.’7 Nevertheless, safeguarding the Hanoverian succession was a powerful motive for many English and Scottish unionists after the English Parliament had passed its Act establishing the succession in 1701. Anne’s failure to summon a new Scottish Parliament in 1702 probably reflected advice from her English and Scottish ministers that another session of William’s Scottish Convention Parlia­ ment would ensure the passage of legislation committing Scotland to the Hanoverian succession.8 The failure of the union negotiations in 1702 in effect made this impossible. English commissioners wanted an incorporating union

Union 1702–1715

63

absorbing Scottish sovereignty into the existing English Parliament. Scottish commissioners wanted legal access to trade with the English colonies as well as trade with merchants in England itself. The Restoration regime in England retained enough Commonwealth and Cromwellian fiscal innovations that when it (in imitation of its Dutch rivals and French paymasters) began to achieve some success in expanding English colonial trade and thus improved customs and excise revenues, it achieved an increase of revenue that had led it to seriously consider the project of introducing a more Absolutist political system. After 1688, William and Mary’s English ministers were able to access this increased Crown income to help meet the costs of William’s wars.9 Of course the estab­ lishment of the national debt with the foundation of the Bank of England played an even larger role in financing the war effort, but increased income from cus­ toms and excise helped service the national debt as much as or even more than (given Tory landowners’ reluctance to pay) the Land Tax. As John Brewer has observed, it was the customs, excise and land taxes that ‘were to provide approximately 90 per cent of the state’s revenue after the Glorious Revolution.’10 Finance and the financial revolution driven by the fiscal policies of the Dutch and French as well as the English thus became enmeshed in the political pro­ ject of English parliamentary union with Scotland. What has in the past been characterised as corrupt management of Scottish politics by Scottish politicians in English pay was in fact driven by Scottish determination to avoid surren­ dering Scotland’s political sovereignty for anything less than something like equal access for Scots to the expanding resources of the English commercial empire.11 This would not only benefit merchants and investors, but also open up the English colonies and plantations to sustained Scottish migration, although this was not widely discussed at the time, either in Parliament or in print.12 Queen Anne was able to appoint English and Scottish commissioners to negotiate the parliamentary union projects that William favoured in 1702 following approval by the English and Scottish parliaments, although Scottish approval was obtained from a parliament that met under the late King Wil­ liam’s authority. The difference was that there had been two elections for the English House of Commons in 1701 before a third election in summer 1702, whereas William’s Scottish Convention Parliament of 1689, summoned yet again to Edinburgh in 1702, had questionable authority to approve the legislation that it passed. Many questioned its legitimacy in approving the proposal that the Queen appoint Scottish commissioners to negotiate with English commissioners in London in late 1702.13 The Scottish parliamentary session of 1702 was adjourned in June and pro­ rogued in August 1702, whereas the English Parliament of 1702 met at West­ minster in the autumn. Negotiations between the union commissioners Queen Anne had appointed began in London in November, with each set of commis­ sioners meeting separately, exchanging statements, responses and questions between their separate meetings. This meant that while the Scots were meeting after their Parliament had been first adjourned and then prorogued, the English commissioners met with the Scots while their Parliament was in session.14

64 Union 1702–1715 Queensberry as Queen’s Commissioner to the previous session of the Scottish Parliament presided over the meetings of the Scottish commissioners.15 He had already decided that access to trade both within the island of Britain and overseas was a prerequisite for serious negotiations. Sir James Murray of Philliphaugh, another of the Scottish commissioners, had written to Queensberry in 1701 that ‘I hope you continue of the same opinion I have heard your grace declare, to wit, that this nation should not make one step that way [ie, toward union], before the case existed, unless England gave us good conditions as to our liberty of trad­ ing.’16 That was before the death of William. The issue of Scottish access to English markets both in Britain and overseas continued to be a key issue in the reign of Anne. The English Parliament that met in November included increased Tory repre­ sentation in the House of Commons.17 There were deep concerns among Tory MPs over the possibility of a parliamentary union between England and the par­ liament of a kingdom in which the established church was Presbyterian rather than Episcopalian.18 The Scottish commissioners attended hoping to obtain Scottish access to the English economy including its overseas plantations and trading posts. The English commissioners knew that they could secure (probably) support in their parliament to admit Scottish representation in the event of the Scottish Par­ liament voting itself out of existence. However, concessions were limited, whether on taxation levels on trade, in excise taxes or through Scots access to the fruits of English overseas trading networks. ‘The plantations are the property of English­ men,’ the English commissioners stated, adding that ‘this trade is of so great consequence and beneficial as not to be communicated as is proposed till all other particulars which shall be thought necessary to this union be adjusted.’19 The Scottish commissioners, in response, as Dr Riley summarised the account to which he had access, ‘resolved to put the direct question: whether the English proposed to accept union in return for freedom of trade with the colonies or whether they did not?20 As negotiations remained deadlocked early in 1703, English commis­ sioners were surprised to receive a statement from their Scottish colleagues that ‘the privileges of the companies and manufactures of both kingdoms’ would have to be safeguarded under the terms of parliamentary union.21 For the Scots, this meant the Company of Scotland and the Scottish linen and wool textile trades in particular. Some of the Scottish commissioners, including at least three who would later serve again as Scottish union commissioners in 1706 (Sir David Dalrymple of Hailes, Sir James Falconer of Phesdo and the Earl of Rosebery), left London in disgust at the lack of progress before negotiations were formally brought to a close on 3 February 1702/3.22 Queensberry, appointed royal commissioner again in 1703, tried to persuade Queen Anne to attend the first session of the new parlia­ ment in Scotland. Just as she had met with the English and Scottish union com­ missioners in London in the autumn, the Queen’s attendance at the Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh in the spring would demonstrate Anne’s commitment to bringing about a parliamentary union of her British kingdoms. Queensberry failed to convince the Queen that only her attendance would bring success to her union project, and as a result it was he who opened the first meeting of what was to be

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the last Scottish Parliament on Thursday, 6 May, in 1703. By September, ‘par­ liament terminated the commission appointed in the previous year to negotiate terms for the union.’24 After three years of intense debate, and opposition to the policies pursued by the Scottish Privy Council in the Scottish Parliament, despite efforts to broaden the base of the government to increase parliamentary support, advancing the pro­ ject of negotiated parliamentary union with the English Parliament was still pro­ blematic. It was only in 1705, under the leadership of the young second Duke of Argyll as Royal Commissioner, that Parliament could finally be persuaded (or intimidated) into appointing commissioners to meet again with the English to discuss parliamentary union. Argyll was reputed to have promised the fourth Duke of Hamilton, chief leader of opposition to Court and Privy Council policies relat­ ing to union and the Hanoverian succession in the Scottish Parliament, that he would be appointed one of the Scottish commissioners.25 Lockhart of Carnwath claimed that it was the then pro-union Earl of Mar who encouraged the Duke of Hamilton to unexpectedly move in Parliament that Queen Anne appoint the Scottish commissioners rather than the Parliament by vote of its members.26 Hamilton, with lands through marriage in England (in Lancashire and Stafford­ shire) as well as Scotland, was later raised to an additional dukedom in the peerage of Great Britain (as Duke of Brandon), only to be denied admission to the House of Lords. The grounds for this were that Scots holding post-1707 ‘British’ peera­ ges could only sit in the Lords as one of the sixteen post union Scottish Repre­ sentative Peers. Given that Hamilton had been leader of the opposition to the union project in the Scottish Parliament that may not have been surprising, but the ‘Hamilton Affair’ helped set the scene for outright rebellion in Scotland against the union in 1715.27 Argyll also was not appointed as a commissioner. Instead he joined Marlbor­ ough’s army as a General in the ‘Low Countries’ for the 1706 campaign, but his younger brother Lord Archibald Campbell (later in life third Duke of Argyll) represented the Campbell interest, joined by the Earl of Loudoun as one of the Queen’s secretaries of state for Scotland.28 George Lockhart of Carnwath, a Jacobite, was made a commissioner, supposedly on the basis of his being a nephew of the prominent English Whig Lord Wharton, 5th Baron Wharton. Wharton had arranged that as a youth Lockhart was educated in the same household as the future second and third Dukes of Argyll, presumably out of the hope that Lock­ hart would grow to support the Whig interest in Scotland.29 Instead, Lockhart used his access to union negotiations (which were largely unminuted) to under­ mine confidence in the integrity of the Treaty of Union from 1706 to the end of his life in 1731.30 After union negotiations were complete, Wharton criticised the Scots lords for parting with their birthright by accepting that only a minority of the Scottish nobility could sit in the House of Lords after the union as ‘Repre­ sentative Peers’. James Johnston, the former Scottish Lord Clerk Register, replied that ‘such are the times we live in, that I can scarcely persuade anybody that some have done it out of love of country.’ From an English perspective, Scots parlia­ mentarians were perceived as venal.31 While it is often asserted that it was 23

66 Union 1702–1715 Wharton who ensured his appointment as commissioner, it is possible that the connection with the second Duke of Argyll and his brother may have led to Lockhart’s appointment. The Campbell brothers were not Jacobites, but their childhood education at Eton did not teach them to love the English, although they did learn to express themselves in that language as members of the House of Lords after the union.32 With Argyll and Hamilton absent, the second Duke of Queensberry once more took the lead among the Scottish commissioners. The Westminster Parlia­ ment had repealed its anti-Scots Alien Act of 1705 as a prelude to negotiations, which indicated that the English ministry and the Whig ‘Junto’ that had lost ground to the Tory Party by 1705 were willing to be as generous as possible in negotiations. They also benefited from the Queen’s backing. Union would secure the Hanoverian succession for all of Britain, and secure Scotland in sup­ port of the ministry’s European war.33 The key English concession was Scottish access to what had previously been considered an ‘English’ empire, but during the Restoration monarchy regime ‘English’ plantations had become more eth­ nically diverse, including the substantial slave population in the Caribbean pur­ chased to meet demand for cheap labour, or sometimes any labour, required to expand production of colonial goods such as sugar and tobacco.34 Scots had become significant in this labour market as indentured servants, although they were by no means the only source of European labour for ‘English’ plantations. It appears that many Scots who travelled to the Caribbean became overseers of slaves in the plantations.35 The prospect of colonial trade in addition to com­ pensation for winding up the Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies were dismissed by some as ‘the price of Scotland’, but the price was right.36 The problem in the future would be the uneven distribution of the increase in wealth that became available to certain Scots in certain areas of the country following the union. Fifty years and a bit after the union some economic progress had occurred in some Scottish burghs and regions, but it was far from evident across all regions of Scotland. Although some historians have noted evi­ dence of economic development increasing ‘from the later 1730s,’ others have concluded that there was ‘a firm ceiling on growth rates’ in Scotland, and indeed European economies in general, over the entire period 1700–1760.37 Economic expansion, such as it was, more often than not was driven by Scottish participa­ tion in British wars of imperial expansion from 1739.38 The cost of access to the dynamic expansion of English domestic and overseas markets was to be the end of the Scottish Parliament, despite a substantial peti­ tioning campaign against this. The Duke of Hamilton supported the petitioning campaign, but it was the product of much more than the patronage of one of the leading members of the Scottish nobility. Petitions were submitted by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, the Convention of Royal Burghs of Scotland, the Company of Scotland (despite the financial compensation promised in the treaty), just under half the shires, very many burghs including those many repre­ sented in the Convention of Royal Burghs, and some parishes, particularly in the west of Scotland.39 The Earl of Mar had commented earlier that ‘they [the

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English] think all notions about federal unions and forms a mere jest and chi­ mera.’40 In the end the Scottish Parliament was to be incorporated into what had hitherto been the Parliament of England (and Wales) at Westminster. The Queen and her ministers, concerned with the war with France, were forced to increase concessions to opponents of the treaty in the final text of the treaty to secure agreement on the integration of Scottish parliamentary representation with the existing English parliament. The Scottish legal system was recognised as separate and distinct from English Law (at least to a degree) by the Treaty under Articles XVIII, XIX and XX, with the proviso that the post 1707 House of Lords act as the final court of appeal for civil litigation, just as the Crown retained its privileges of Royal Pardon in criminal cases.41 The Scottish Court of Admiralty was also to be subject to the authority of the English Lord High Admiral, and the extension of the English tax system to Scotland, albeit with a plethora of concessions and exceptions, was to be marked by the creation of a new court, the Court of Exchequer, consisting of English as well as Scottish judges, which would adjudi­ cate on the introduction of English tax law into Scotland. They would be gov­ erned in their decisions by English Revenue Law as it had developed in the second half of the seventeenth century.42 This was a clear adoption of aspects of the Cromwellian tax regime in Britain (including Scotland from 1652 to 1659) as well as the Restoration monarchy’s interest in expanding English colonial trade as an addition to the tax base that supported the monarchy in England. One of the newly appointed judges in the court was John Scrope, grandson of a regicide who briefly served on the Cromwellian Council of Scotland.43 English and Scottish commissioners together assumed that the Scottish Privy Council, with its members appointed by the monarch of what was to become Britain, would continue to be responsible for enforcing the law (including revenue law) in Scotland. The aboli­ tion of the Scottish Privy Council in the first session of what had become the Parliament of Great Britain at Westminster, increased the difficulties faced by those Scots and Englishmen whose responsibility it was to introduce English rev­ enue law into Scotland after 1707. In truth, it is difficult to argue that the Privy Council in Scotland, certainly after 1660, had ever been effective as an agency of executive government in Scotland, but from 1660 to 1707 it had represented executive government in Scotland. The retention of a Secretary of State for Scot­ land based in London after 1707 proved inadequate, and so was Robert Harley’s creation of a ‘Commission of Chamberlainry and Trade’ in 1711 in the hope that it might deal with some of the issues that had come before the Privy Council until its abolition.44 The issue of any change to the 1689 ecclesiastical settlement in each country was elided by the commissioners for both kingdoms as they were acutely aware of strong opposition to the union in each kingdom on this issue. The high Tories in the Church of England were concerned to preserve its central place in English life, just as the Presbyterians who defined themselves and the post 1689 Church of Scotland as custodian of the ecclesiastical and political covenants of the midseventeenth century. Both feared for their place at the centre of national life. Each Parliament was to be left to pass legislation relating to their respective national

68 Union 1702–1715 churches independently of the treaty the commissioners were to negotiate. In the case of the Scottish Parliament this was to be almost its last act.45 The place of the Church of Scotland in Scottish public life was to dominate Scottish civil society for centuries after the union with England, as a national Presbyterian Church in part of a United Kingdom in which the state supported the Episcopalian and Anglican Church of England everywhere but in the former kingdom of Scotland. Episco­ palianism became increasingly identified with Erastianism in the eighteenth cen­ tury while in Scotland the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland provided a platform for those who opposed the place of the monarchy in its constitution as furthering crypto-Episcopacy if not Erastianism.46 In 1711 the House of Lords intervened to overrule the Scottish Court of Session regarding the legality of public worship by Episcopalian ministers in Scotland. This was the prelude to legislation at Westminster in 1712, which established a degree of religious tolera­ tion in Scotland for the first time since the days of the Cromwellian union.47 The Earl of Ilay, as Lord Justice General for Scotland, wrote to William Carstares at the time that the appeal on behalf of the Episcopalian minister James Greenshields ‘always was certain …, in whatever shape it first appeared’, to be ‘irresistible’.48 Ilay reported that in the House of Lords when the case was discussed ‘all their bishops left us, and the rest declared that it was none of their business; and when I moved a delay … they all left my brother and me to debate against the whole house.’49 He was ‘sorry it is my fate to differ with so many of my church’, and that it was ‘indeed unfortunate, that the only family which can now, (pardon the vanity of the expression), as it were stand in the gape, should have so little credit with them, as to be distrusted, in some measure, till the blow is given.’50 It was the beginning of Ilay’s long career as a London-based ‘manager’ of the business of the Church of Scotland. It has been stated that, post-union, ‘Scottish Parliamentary life as reflected in the careers of Scottish members at Westminster became for a long time so mor­ ibund as to be scarcely relevant any longer to a general history of Scottish society.’51 It certainly is true that the Scots accepted a relatively low number of Scottish representatives in both the House of Commons (45 out of 600) and the House of Lords (16 out of approximately 160), based on the disparity of wealth between the two kingdoms. Representation based on comparative population would have justified greater representation for Scotland, and illustrated just how far the Treaty of Union came to represent an exercise in political economy rather than shared sovereignty.52 This does not take into account the fact that the Church of England continued to be represented by the bishops of the church in the House of Lords, whereas the Church of Scotland was not represented there at all, hence Ilay’s claim to represent it. Nevertheless, at the time of the Scottish parliamentary debate on the Treaty of Union, although the Duke of Roxburghe claimed in his personal correspondence that the union would be approved because of ‘a general aversion at civil discords, intolerable poverty, and the constant oppression of a bad ministry, from generation to generation, without the least regard to the good of the country’, there was the possibility that in a deeply divi­ ded English Parliament, Scottish MPs and Representative Peers ‘may probably get

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the balance in their hands.’ It would be enough of an influence to attract minis­ terial interest in influencing Scottish elections for the rest of the eighteenth cen­ tury and beyond.53 There were of course some English lords who had connections to Scotland, most obviously the Duke of Argyll as Earl of Greenwich from 1705 and Duke of Greenwich from 1719, whereas we have already considered the socalled ‘Hamilton Affair’ in which an important member of the Scottish nobility was granted an additional title as Duke of Brandon in the post 1707 peerage of Great Britain but was refused admission to the House of Lords, setting a pre­ cedent that would persist for most of the eighteenth century.54 It is clear that the dramatic change in the political climate that affected Eng­ land, and particularly London, after events there in 1688/89 deeply influenced expectations as to what the Scottish Parliament could be in terms of radical reform of the government of Scotland.55 The first halting steps under William’s regime opened up parliamentary politics and that in turn led to more politicians becoming involved in opposition to the policies the Scottish Privy Council sought to implement on behalf of the monarch. The opposition did this by appealing to political opinion in Scotland beyond Parliament. This in turn meant ‘restoration’, to some extent, of Scottish political culture of the 1630s and 1640s, but without war in or with England.56 It certainly became a political culture informed by the demands of war, first in regard to the Jacobite war in Ireland and in the Scottish Highlands, then wars on the continent as part of William’s coalition against Bourbon France. War continued into Anne’s reign right up to 1713. Opposition politicians sought to influence public opinion on their estates and in the regions where their estates were located to force changes in government policy, particularly that toward the Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies.57 These developments then became more pronounced when a new monarch, Anne, and the ministry who served her in London and Edinburgh became interested in winning parliamentary approval of the Hano­ verian succession to Anne via the claims of Sophia Electress of Hanover and her son, who were descendants of James VI and I through his daughter Elizabeth (wife of the Elector Palatine in Germany). This was achieved at Westminster but not in Edinburgh, and only came about as part of the parliamentary union of Scotland with England.58 Opposition, indeed, very strong opposition, in the Scottish Parliament elected to mark the beginning of the reign of Anne created an unprecedented adversarial environment in Scottish politics from its first session in 1703 to its final session of 1706–7.59 Part of this was driven by the stagnation of the Scottish economy after 1689, which was emphasised by the failure of the Company of Scotland’s colonial project at Darien. Was this the result of royal neglect and the lack of positive lea­ dership from the Scottish Privy Council? These matters were brought to a head by the unsavoury popular frenzy in Edinburgh and its environs in 1704 and 1705 when Company of Scotland officials brought the Captain and crew of an East India Company ship, put into the Firth of Forth with storm damage, to trial for piracy and murder before the Admiralty Court of Scotland. Such was the force of popular protest at any attempt to pardon members of the English crew, and the

70 Union 1702–1715 threat of severe mob violence, that the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Advocate, leading legal officials of the Crown in Scotland, were barracked in the streets of Edinburgh. A royal pardon for the sentence of death for the Captain and two of the crew of the vessel (the Worcester) was received by the Privy Council, but there was not a quorum of privy councillors available to prevent the executions. It was an incident that in a manner bookended the withdrawal (or flight) of Jacobite members of the Scottish Convention in Edinburgh in 1689 out of fear of the large numbers of armed men with Covenanting Presbyterian sympathies, who had arrived in Edinburgh for the meeting of the convention, with the popular unrest that became such a feature of the debate in Scotland over the union between 1705 and 1707.60 Although members of the ‘Squadrone’, a relatively small group of members of the last Scottish Parliament who had been sceptical about the Union issue, were largely absent from membership of the Scottish Privy Council as a result of their opposition; as the union debate developed they became convinced that union was necessary to make the Hanoverian succession secure and thus eliminate any pos­ sibility of a Jacobite restoration to the throne of Scotland. Their scepticism about the effectiveness of the Scottish Privy Council, administratively and politically, led them to engineer its post-union abolition by Westminster.61 Members of the former ‘Squadrone’ who were elected to the House of Commons, or as some of the sixteen Scottish Peers elected to join the House of Lords at Westminster were able to convince English Whigs led by the so-called ‘Junto’ that the revitalised Tory presence in the House of Commons might lead to a future ministry engi­ neering appointments to the Scottish Privy Council that could undermine rather than reinforce public order in Scotland. They claimed that effective introduction of the English Justice of the Peace system would fulfil the need to enforce the law (especially the new English taxation system introduced into Scotland by the Treaty of Union).62 This hearkened back to the days of the military occupation of Scot­ land by the armed forces of the Commonwealth and the Protectorate, when ambitions of securing law and order at local level through recruitment (sometimes not entirely voluntary) of local elites as JPs, stiffened by some officers from the local garrisons, was pursued as a means of finally bringing public order to most of Scotland. It did not really work in the 1650s and it did not really work after the union, at least during its first five decades. Treasury revenue officers in Scotland found the JPs and the British army regiments stationed in Scotland of limited effectiveness in supporting their efforts to collect tax there. In fact, as has been recognised by many historians, although the Treaty of Union was ‘incorporating’ in that it ensured the end of the Scottish Parliament in exchange for Scottish representation in the Westminster Parliament, the final Treaty as accepted by Westminster included a strong federal element in its recog­ nition of the integrity of the Scottish legal system, although it did not quite include its sovereignty.63 In fact, the Scottish Court of Session with its fifteen judges appointed for life (some of whom also constituted Scotland’s highest criminal court, the Court of Justiciary), came to carry out many of the functions of government that had been within the remit of the Scottish Privy Council before

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the union. Although the church settlement involving separate legislation by the last Scottish Parliament and the separate legislation passed by the last session of the Westminster Parliament before it became ‘British’ were separate from the Treaty of Union accepted by Scotland and England, it too introduced a federal element, if not recognised by many at the time or subsequently as such. The Church of Scotland in its General Assembly and the Commission that governed the church between its annual assemblies continued to assert the national status of the church in what had been the Kingdom of Scotland.65 Nevertheless, there was a weak and ad hoc quality to government in Scotland after the union, which from an elite perspective only began to improve with the increasing evidence that influential members of the Church of Scotland sought to work with the govern­ ment rather than confront it by the 1750s, just as leading Scottish politicians began to cooperate with the ministry in London in identifying credible candidates to serve as judges in the courts of Session and Justiciary, thereby raising (at least for a time) the quality of the personnel of the courts from the more problematic quality of the bench immediately after the union.66 For the great majority of the Scottish people, beyond the elite represented in government, union became asso­ ciated with the introduction of increased numbers of tax collectors and the pre­ sence of the British army, which of course included the deployment of English regiments in Scotland.67 By 1717 the first fortified barracks in Britain were con­ structed in Scotland under the authority of the Board of Ordnance in London, which represented a departure from previous practice in England and Ireland, where barracks had become ‘enclosed military communities’ such as those at Woolwich, rather than garrisoned outposts.68 The absence of a Scottish Parliament and Privy Council transformed Scottish politics by removing its focus. In time some Scots would come to believe that this was a positive development, allowing local elites in Scotland to pursue increased wealth through economic development rather than the politics of power and lordship.69 The General Assembly of the Church of Scotland and the Court of Session each, to a certain extent, took on the characteristics of these absent insti­ tutions and thus preserved an element of the sovereignty of the ancient kingdom now incorporated into the United Kingdom of Great Britain.70 They each were, however, acting in something of a vacuum created by the physical absence of the monarch and the abolition of the Scottish Privy Council (although Scottish offi­ cers of state sat on the Privy Council, as many of them had before 1707, which continued to meet in London) as well as the Parliament. The Convention of Royal Burghs continued to meet annually in Edinburgh, sending petitions and some­ times representatives to London to try to attract the attention of the monarch and her/his ministers and/or the Westminster Parliament with its 45 Scottish MPs and sixteen Scottish Representative Peers (plus some pre-union members of the peerage of England with Scottish connections) in the House of Lords.71 This meant that the Royal Burghs of Scotland, although disparate in population and wealth, like the General Assembly of the kirk, continued to make representations to what was now the legislature of the United Kingdom in the same manner that they did to the former Parliament of Scotland.72

72 Union 1702–1715 In the localities, the Royal Burghs had the clearest political structure with their Provosts and Burgh Councils. After the union, however, each ceased to have direct parliamentary representation, with the exception of Edinburgh, which sent its own MP to Westminster. The remaining burghs were divided, for parliamen­ tary constituencies, into groups based roughly on proximity, with each burgh casting a vote for an MP to represent the district/group. Some MPs represented five burghs. In those groups with four burghs, if there was an equal division of votes the burgh whose turn it was to host the election of the MP could determine the result. Scottish burgh councils were not elected openly by vote of those who were burgesses. Instead, a complex process of outgoing members of council selecting their successors had evolved since the medieval period, and was perpe­ tuated by legal officials after the union, who influenced the Court of Session liti­ gation over the ‘Sets’ [constitutions] of Royal Burghs in the first half of the eighteenth century. As a result, bribery and patronage exercised a powerful influ­ ence on elections, sometimes contributing to the outbreak of mob violence. If burgh politics had been problematic before the union, due to interference and intimidation by neighbouring landowners, the new system was more remote, less open, and prone not only to bribery but to conflict between the constituent burghs of each parliamentary district.73 The shire elections varied dramatically according to the size of the constituency. Larger counties such as Aberdeenshire and Stirlingshire included more non-noble landowners who paid the level of land tax sufficient to qualify for a vote in parlia­ mentary elections. The Scottish Parliament passed a number of laws in the seven­ teenth century that governed electoral law, so although post-union shire elections involved fewer MPs, the law remained the same (and separate and distinct from that of England and Wales).74 Some shires with large land areas had few voters. The most extreme example was Sutherland, where the Earl of Sutherland owned so much of the land area of the shire that in 1708 only 15 men were identified as voters.75 The six smallest counties (Bute, Caithness, Cromarty, Clackmannan, Kin­ ross and Nairn) were paired and took it in turns to be represented at Westminster in alternating parliaments.76 The physical distance of Westminster and London from Scotland made politics more remote for most Scots. There were still politics at play, which led to the emergence of political managers operating in Scotland, who focused on attempting to ensure that as many Scottish MPs and Representative Peers as possible supported the UK government of the day. This drew them into the orbit of the English parliamentary parties, although as the ‘Country’ and ‘Tory’ interests (for the latter of which in Scotland read Jacobite) they had little chance of participating in government, particularly after 1715. Even in opposition, Scottish politicians sought to identify agents at burgh and shire level to manage land tax valuation through the county commissioners of supply, the right to vote through the annual Freeholders Head Court chaired by the sheriff of the county or his sub­ stitute, the composition of burgh councils, the selection of Church of Scotland ministers at parish level, the appointment of Justices of the Peace (more significant in some areas than others), and the operation of the sheriff courts held in each of the shires, or the burgh courts, which to a degree were their urban equivalent.

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As discussed above, there were also new points of political pressure in Scotland after the union arising out of the wholesale adoption of the much more complex and demanding English (and Welsh) system of taxation that had developed over the course of the seventeenth century.77 The excise tax, in particular, became increasingly important in English and British public finances, rising from 26.1 per cent of tax revenue from 1696 to 1700 to 50.6 per cent from 1751 to 1755.78 In Scotland, collection of excise tax was still problematic in the middle of the eight­ eenth century.79 This was a taxation system introduced into Scotland with only a modicum of forethought by the commissioners who had agreed the union. Initi­ ally, the English Treasury after 1707 had to accept some Scottish influences in the appointment of customs and excise officials for what was a new and much more extensive system of taxation. Particularly in the largest port, Glasgow, pro-union politicians were allowed to influence the appointment of customs officers.80 The scale of taxation in Scotland appears to have increased after the union, which, however, created a relatively large number of posts that were highly paid in com­ parison to other employment available in the country.81 Unsurprisingly, popular distrust of the new English taxation system was widespread, and remained so for decades, although higher taxes had been introduced by the Covenanting regime of the 1630s and 1640s. The Scottish Board of Exchequer post union became a court devoted to enforcing the collection of taxes under the new taxation law imported from England. Instead of Lords of the Treasury (who included the first Duke of Argyll and his younger son) what became known as the Scottish Court of Exchequer, consisted of five ‘Barons’, which the Treasury in London at first intended to always be three Englishmen and two Scots. Two of the longest ser­ ving of these after 1707 wrote a manuscript account entitled an ‘Historical View of the Forms and Powers of the Court of Exchequer in Scotland’, intended for the use of those who held posts in the court. The authors declared that ‘the Barons of the present [post union] Court of Exchequer have not only all the authority communicated to them which the Lords of Exchequer enjoyed before the Union of the two Kingdoms, but likewise the greatest part of these powers which the Lords of Treasury, in Scotland formerly had; …’82 The Court formally came into existence on 1 May 1708, under the terms of the Exchequer Court (Scotland) Act passed at Westminster. The Scottish Privy Council ceased to exist on the same day, ‘leaving the Exchequer as the only government department operating in Scotland, apart from two new boards of customs and excise.’83 The Scottish Mint was the key instrument of recoinage in Scotland under the direction of David Gregory of the University of Oxford (an Aberdonian) and was considered by Sir Isaac Newton, Warden of the Royal Mint in London, to be a success.84 When the recoinage was almost completed the then Master of the Mint in Edinburgh, George Allardyce, was consulted on the financial provision that was to be made for it in the Coinage Act of 1708, which carried out the terms of Article 16 of the Treaty of Union, guaranteeing the continuation of the mint in Edinburgh. Allar­ dyce ‘stipulated what was necessary to cover salaries, repairs to the buildings and provision of tools, but had not allowed for the actual costs of coining money’ before his death in 1709. With Allardyce’s death, coinage at the Edinburgh mint

74 Union 1702–1715 ceased, but under the terms of the Coinage Act, the full number of staff at the mint, including Allardyce’s successors, was maintained until 1814.85 The eco­ nomic miracle the Scots had hoped for after the union did not materialise, and would not materialise until the wartime economy of the middle and late eight­ eenth century. Post 1754 Scotland received higher levels of investment, much of it from the UK government and members of the Scottish nobility who could draw on income from English assets received from favourable marriages to English heiresses or inheritances received after some Scots married into wealthier English families. Eventually greater access to capital investment integrated most of Scot­ land into the textile-led manufacturing boom that generated significant levels of wealth from both industrial production and foreign trade in parts of Scotland as well as England.86 One reason Jacobitism acquired such resonance in Scotland after the union was that post union increases of taxation became an issue in popular culture.87 Scotland as a country became characterised by systematic tax evasion that had, by the end of the War of Spanish Succession in 1713, led to confrontation at Westminster between Scottish members of parliament and the government. Many members of the Scottish elite in and out of Parliament argued that the union had become a takeover rather than a partnership. Famously, Scottish MPs and Representative Peers, led by the second Duke of Argyll sitting in the Lords as the English Earl of Greenwich, responded to ministerial plans to introduce the English tax on malt into Scotland, by attempting to repeal of the Treaty of Union. Although under the terms of the treaty the malt tax was not to be introduced in Scotland until the end of the war with France and Spain, most Scottish members of parliament (including the nobility in the House of Lords) were adamant that as the anticipated economic gains for Scotland had not materialised, the Act of Union should be repealed and the union dissolved rather than collection of the Malt Tax introduced. Argyll led a delegation to wait upon the Queen before the vote to ask for her support in dis­ solving the union.88 In the Lords, Argyll ‘conceded that “it was true he had a great hand in making the Union: that the chief reason that moved him to it was securing the Protestant succession; but he was satisfied that it might be done as well now, if the Union were dissolved; and if it were not, he did not expect long to have either property left in Scotland, or liberty in England.”’89 The matter never reached the Commons because it failed narrowly to gain approval in the Lords. If the House of Lords had approved the bill, no doubt the ensuing debate in the Commons would have told us much about the state of the union in 1713. As it was, Argyll continued to oppose the Malt Tax bill, claiming that the tax could only be collected in Scot­ land by military force. He also supported the protest that denounced the tax ‘as a violition of the Union and an unfair burden on Scotland.’ Later in the Parliament, during the debate on peace negotiations with Spain, Argyll praised the Catalans, as ‘a people possessed of as great privileges, as any in the world, and not less than ours.’ He then proclaimed that oppression ‘was an infectious weed, and spreads. Scarce any nation have their liberties left but our own, and certainly it is our interest to establish, or restore liberty wherever we can.’90 The following year Queen Anne died, and the Hanoverian succession became a reality despite Jacobite hopes and

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plots to the contrary. The United Kingdom now had a German-speaking Lutheran king who conducted much of his public business in French. A man who by accepting the British throne brought something not dissimilar to the Williamite regime back into existence with the Electorate of Hanover taking the place of the United Provinces of the Netherlands. Enthusiasm for the new reign was muted in Scotland. The union had of course brought higher taxation, certainly for tradesmen in the burghs, and for the Pres­ byterians there were more problems with the security and status of the kirk. As the new monarch was keen to punish the Tory ministry in London for its flirtations with the Jacobite cause, the ambitious Earl of Mar was dismissed as Secretary of State for Scotland. Early manifestations of the authority of the new king and his ministers reinforced a culture of popular resistance to civil authority in Scotland that drew deeply on the covenanting culture of seventeenth century Scotland and its resistance to the authority of the monarchy, most often expressed through resistance to the collection of tax. The Jacobite Rebellion, which the Earl of Mar launched in Scotland in August 1715 not only confirmed the new British king in his doubts about the Tories, but also in his doubts about Scotland. The social history of popular conceptions of right and wrong in both eco­ nomic and religious spheres were not insulated from each other. If it was reli­ gious dissent that particularly inflamed public discourse in Scotland during the Restoration, after the Revolution, debate on the future of the Church of Scot­ land continued to be divisive in Scottish society.91 Resistance to civil authority on grounds of religious conscience could of course map over to resistance to unjust taxation by an unjust government.92 The Commonwealth and Protecto­ rate of Britain in the 1650s failed for just that reason. After 1707, high taxation rates were introduced from England and became a national grievance in Scottish popular culture as they affected almost every level of economic activity in the country.93 Ecclesiastical grievances over English pressure for toleration for Epis­ copalians who supported the Hanoverian succession in Scotland and the princi­ ple of lay patronage (which included the right of the monarch, whether Queen Anne or King George, to appoint ministers to about a third of all Church of Scotland parishes) became a national grievance as oppressive to the Presbyterian national kirk of Scotland. Tax officials (such as Adam Smith’s father, who was Comptroller of Customs at Kirkcaldy in Fife) and Erastian clergy both came to personify Scottish subordination to English authority in Scottish popular culture post union.94 A high tax regime also stirred up memories of English military occupation, not only in the 1650s, but with what amounted to military occupa­ tion (also extracting high taxes) by troops raised in Scotland in support of a Stuart Restoration regime dominated by the resident Scottish nobility. The Hanoverian succession was completed successfully after the death of the Queen in 1714 without much reference to Scotland. This changed when the Earl of Mar left London, having attended the brief parliamentary session held after the Queen’s death, travelled to Scotland in August of 1715, and raised the standard of rebellion calling for the half-brother of the late Queen to be crowned as the rightful monarch of Scotland and England.95

76 Union 1702–1715

Notes 1 2 3 4

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

13 14 15 16 17 18

19

20 21 22 23

Christopher Whatley, The Scots and the Union (2006), pp. 4–6, 53, 215–216, 262.

Bowie, Scottish Public Opinion, pp. 9, 27, 35–36, 59, 73, 82–83, 161.

MacIntosh, Scottish Parliament under Charles II, pp. 117, 188.

Harris, Restoration, pp. 7, 11, 15, 83–84, 86, 182–186, 189–190, 192, 199–205, 211,

408, 411. Alastair Mann, James VII, pp. 133–150; Tim Harris, ‘Scotland under Charles II and James VII and II: In Search of the British Causes of the Glorious Revolution’, in Harris and Taylor, eds., Last Crisis of the Stuart Monarchy, pp. 119, 121–123. Beatrice Curtis Brown, ed., The Letters and Diplomatic Instructions of Queen Anne (London, 1935), p. 191. Ibid., p. 171. Graham Townend and David Hayton, ‘KER, John (c.1680–1741)’ [first Duke of Roxburghe 1707–1741], in Ruth Paley, ed., The History of Parliament: House of Lords 1660–1715 (2016), Vol. V, p. 721. Riley, Union of England and Scotland, pp. 36–39. Brewer, Sinews of Power, pp. 78, 84, 94–95, 114, 116, 119–122, 143–145, 160. Also see Stephen Taylor, ‘Afterward’, in Harris and Taylor, eds., Final Crisis of the Stuart Monarchy, p. 283. Brewer, Sinews of Power, pp. 69, 94–95, 120–125, 133, 153–154, 161, 207. Bowie, Scottish Public Opinion, pp. 58–59, 67, 70, 72, 137, 160. Steve Murdoch and Esther Mijers, ‘Migrant Destinations, 1500–1750’, in T.M. Devine and Jenny Wormald, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Modern Scottish History, pp. 324– 325, 331, 333, 335; Alex[ander] Murdoch, ‘Emigration from the Scottish Highlands to America in the Eighteenth Century’ British Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies, Vol. 21 No. 2 (Autumn 1998), pp. 161–174; Alexander Murdoch, Scotland and America, c.1600-c.1800 (2010), Chapter 2: Emigration in the Eighteenth Century’. Bowie, Scottish Public Opinion, pp. 35, 82–83, 161. Riley, Union of England and Scotland, pp. 40, 177–182. Graham Townend, David Hayton, and Stuart Handley, ‘DOUGLAS, James (1662– 1711)’ [2nd duke of Queensberry 1695–1711], in Paley, ed., House of Lords 1660– 1715, Vol. II, p. 862. Riley, Union of England and Scotland, p. 37, citing Buccleuch MSS at Drumlanrig Castle, Dumfries-shire, ‘Seven Letters’, 5 Aug. 1701. Also see A.J. Mann, ‘Murray, Sir James, Lord Philiphaugh (1655–1708)’, in ODNB, online edn, accessed 4 Feb. 2019. D.W. Hayton, History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1690–1715 (2002), Vol. I, pp. 197, 224–225. Riley, Union of England and Scotland, pp. 302–305; James Mackinnon, The Union of England and Scotland (1896), pp. 68–76; Murdoch, ‘The Legacy of Unionism in Eighteenth-Century Scotland’, in Devine, ed., Scotland and the Union 1707–2007, pp. 79–80. Riley, Union of England and Scotland, p. 181. The quotation appears to be from a manuscript ‘Journal of what passed in the Treatie of Union which commenced at Westminster the 27 October 1702 Containing what was transacted either in the Gen­ eral Meeting of both Kingdoms or in the Private Meetings of the Lords Commissioners for Scotland’, 27 Oct. 1702–3 Feb. 1703, now British Library MS 61627. See British Library, Department of Manuscripts, The Blenheim Papers from the British Library London: the papers if the 1st Duke of Marlborough, Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough, and the 3rd Earl of Sunderland (1985), Part I, pp. 123–124. Riley, Union of England and Scotland, p. 181. Ibid., pp. 181–182. Whatley, Scots and the Union, pp. 215, 238. Curtis Brown, ed., Letters … of Queen Anne, pp. 83–84, 88–91, Queen Anne to the Scottish Privy Council March 19, 1702; Queen Anne to the Parliament of Scotland

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24 25

26 27

28 29

30 31 32 33 34

35

36 37

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May 10, 1702; Queen Anne to the Duke of Queensberry June 3, 1702; Queen Anne to the Parliament of Scotland June 27, 1702. Ibid, p. 215; K.M. Brown ‘Party Politics and Parliament: Scotland’s Last Election and its Aftermath, 1702–3’, in K.M. Brown and A.J. Mann, eds., Parliament and Politics in Scotland, 1567–1707 (2005), pp. 283–285. Dr Bowie’s research has uncovered just how important Hamilton’s support had been to opposition to the Act of Union in the Scottish Parliament. See Bowie, Scottish Public Opinion, pp. 14, 16, 31, 34–36, 46–47, 50, 59, 68–69, 78, 81, 83, 94–95, 118–119, 121–122, 124, 129–132, 139–140, 141–149, 156, 160, 163–164. Townend and Hayton, ‘ERSKINE, John (1675–1732)’ [22nd Earl of Mar 1689– 1732], in Paley, ed., House of Lords 1660–1715, Vol. V, p. 670. See Anthony Aufrere, ed., Lockhart Papers (1817), I, p. 134. Geoffrey Holmes, ‘The Hamilton Affair of 1711–12: A Crisis in Anglo-Scottish Rela­ tions’, EHR, Vol. 77 (1962), pp. 257–282; Rosalind K. Marshall, ‘Hamilton, James, fourth duke of Hamilton and first duke of Brandon (1658–1712), ODNB, online edn, accessed 17 June 2019; Townend and Hayton, ‘HAMILTON, James (1658–1712) [fourth duke of Hamilton 1698–1712] in Paley, ed., House of Lords 1660–1715, Vol. V, pp. 689–698. Townend and Hayton, ‘CAMPBELL, Hugh (c.1673–1731)’ [third earl of Loudoun 1684–1731], in Paley, ed., House of Lords 1660–1715, Vol. V, pp. 639–640. Daniel Szechi, George Lockhart of Carnwath 1681–1731: A Study in Jacobitism (East Linton, 2002), pp. 17–18. The cover of the paperback edition give the dates in the title as 1689–1727; Townend and Hayton, ‘CAMPBELL, John (1680–1743) [2nd duke of Argyll 1703–1743, Earl and later Duke of Greenwich, 1705–1743] and CAMPBELL, Archibald (1682–1761) [Earl of Ilay], in Paley, ed., House of Commons 1660–1715, Vol. II, pp. 428–436, and Vol. V, pp. 633–639; J. Kent Clark, ‘Wharton, Thomas, first marquess of Wharton, first marquess of Malmesbury, and first marquess of Catherlough (1648–1715)’, in H.G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, eds., ODNB (2004), Vol. 58, p. 382; Robin Eagles, ‘WHARTON, Thomas (c.1648–1715)’, in Paley, ed., House of Lords 1660–1715, Vol. IV, pp. 894–915. Szechi, Lockhart of Carnwath, pp. 4–6, 112–113, 121, 152, 157–158, 162, 164, 170, 178, 187, 205. Paley, ed., House of Lords 1660–1715, Vol. I, p. 155. Alexander Murdoch, ‘Campbell, John, second duke of Argyll and duke of Greenwich (1680–1743)’ and ‘Campbell, Archibald, third duke of Argyll (1682–1761)’, both in ODNB, online edn, accessed 17 June 2019. Alexander Murdoch (edited by Philip Carter), ‘England, Scotland, and the Acts of Union (1707)’, ODNB, online edn, accessed 6 Feb. 2019 (first published in the online edn Jan 2007, published in print March 2009). See, for example, Hilary McD. Beckles, ‘The “Hub of Empire”: the Caribbean and Britain in the Seventeenth Century’, in Nicholas Canny, ed., The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume I, The Origins of Empire (1998), pp. 221, 230; James Horn, ‘British Diaspora: Emigration from Britain, 1680–1815’, in P.J. Marshall, ed., The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. II, The Eighteenth Century (1998), pp. 31–32, 40–45. Jardine, ‘The United Societies’, pp. 221–228: ‘The Societies and Barbados, Jamaica and the English North American Colonies, 1684–1688’; Wodrow, History of the Sufferings of the Church of Scotland, ed. Robert Burns (Glasgow, 1828–1830), Vol. IV, pp. 185– 7; Murdoch, Scotland and America, pp. 110, 128–130. Watt, The Price of Scotland, Chapter Seventeen: ‘Bail-out’. Bob Harris, ‘The Scots, the Westminster Parliament and the British state in the eight­ eenth century’, in Julian Hoppit, ed., Parliaments, nations and identities in Britain and Ireland, 1660–1850 (2003), p. 124; Philipp Robinson Rössner, Scottish Trade in the Wake of Union (1700–1760) (2008), p. 226.

78 Union 1702–1715 38 T.M. Devine and Philipp R. Rössner, ‘Scots in the Atlantic Economy, 1600–1800’, in John M. Mackenzie and T.M. Devine, eds., Scotland and the British Empire (2011), pp. 30–53. 39 Karin Bowie, ed., Addresses Against Incorporating Union 1706–07 (SHS, Sixth Series, Vol. 13, 2018), pp. 18, 24, 28, 30–31, 43, 79–80, 111, 115, 169–171, 255, 268–269, 278–280, 288–294. 40 Earl of Mar to William Carstares, March 9, 1705/6, in J. McCormick, ed., State Papers and Letters Addressed to William Carstares, pp. 743–744. 41 Whatley, Scots and the Union, pp. 328–329; A. Cooke, et al., eds, Modern Scottish History: 1707 to the Present, Vol. 5, (1998), pp. 10–12 with text of Articles XVIII, XIX and XX of the Treaty of Union; Bowie, Scottish Public Opinion, pp. 106–107, 110–112, 114, 136–137, 157, 164; also see J.D. Ford, ‘Protestations to Parliament for Remeid of Law’, SHR, Vol. 88 No. 1 (April 2009), pp. 99–107. 42 Sir John Clerk and John Scrope, Historical view of the forms and powers of the Court of Exchequer in Scotland (Edinburgh, 1820). Also see Atholl L. Murray, ‘The PostUnion Court of Exchequer’, in Miscellany Five (Stair Society, Volume 52, 2006), pp. 103–131. 43 A.A. Hanham, ‘Scrope, John (c1662–1752), judge and politician’ in ODNB, Vol. 49, ff559–560; C.H. Firth, ‘Scrope or Scroope, Adrian (1601–1660), regicide’ in The Dic­ tionary of National Biography, Vol. XVII, pp. 1070–1071, which records that Adrian Scrope’s eldest son, Edmund, and thus John Scrope’s uncle, had accompanied his father when he became a member of the Scottish Council Cromwell had established under Lord Broghill in May 1655. Edmund Scrope was Keeper of the Scottish Privy Seal during at least part of his father’s term on the council, which came to an end with Cromwell’s death in 1658. 44 Harris, ‘The Scots, the Westminster Parliament, and the British state’, p.125; Atholl L. Murray, ‘Administration and Law’, in T.I. Rae, ed., The Union of 1707, p. 32; Riley, English Ministers and Scotland, pp. 174–187. 45 Bowie, Scottish Public Opinion (2007), pp. 157, 164, 166. My thanks to Alasdair Raffe for pointing out to me that the Scottish Parliament continued to sit until 25 March, passing a number of acts after it had passed the act of security for the Church of Scot­ land in January. 46 Bowie, Scottish Public Opinion, pp. 86–87, 119, 126, and Jeffrey Stephen, Scottish Presbyterians and the Act of Union (2007). This continued to be an issue during the rest of the eighteenth century and beyond. For one of the initial disputes that illustrate what the late N.T. Phillipson once described as ‘the debate on what the Church of Scotland would become’, see Anne Skoczylas, Mr. Simson’s knotty case: divinity, politics, and due process in early eighteenth-century Scotland (Montreal, 2001). Also see Thomas Ahnert, The Moral Culture of the Scottish Enlightenment, Chapter One. 47 Raffe, Culture of Controversy, pp. 51, 55; Alasdair Raffe, ‘Scotland restored and reshaped: Politics and Religion, c.1660–1712’, in T.M. Devine and Jenny Wormald, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Modern Scottish History (2012), pp. 265–266. 48 Ilay to Carstares, London, March 20, 1711, in J. McCormick, ed., Carstares Papers, p. 791. Also see Tristram Clarke, ‘Greenshields, James (b. 1668/9, d. in or before 1741)’ in ODNB, online edition, accessed 13 Feb. 2019. 49 Ilay to Carstares, March 20, 1711, in J. McCormick, ed., Carstares Papers, pp. 791–792. 50 Ibid. There is an echo in Ilay’s letter of one of his father’s letters to Carstares in 1698: ‘What family in Scotland can claim so much of the church of Scotland, as now estab­ lished, then I?’ Earl of Argyll to Carstares, London, Feb. 26, 1698, J. McCormick, ed., Carstares Papers, p. 371. 51 T.C. Smout, History of the Scottish People, (London, 1969), pp. 217–218. 52 Whatley, Scots and the Union, pp. 187–202; Bowie, Scottish Public Opinion, pp. 68, 72– 73, 75, 78–79, 81, 83–84, 90–92, 94, 103–110, 161–163.

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53 Townend and Hayton, ‘KER, John (c.1680–1741)’ [first duke of Roxburghe 1707– 1741], in Paley, ed., House of Lords 1660–1715, Vol. V, p. 720. 54 Clyve Jones, ‘“Venice Preserv’d; or A Plot Discovered”: The Political and Social Con­ text of the Peerage Bill of 1719’, in C. Jones, ed., A Pillar of the Constitution: The House of Lords in British Politics, 1640–1784 (1989), pp. 95, 97, 103, 104. 55 Bowie, Scottish Public Opinion, pp. 53–54; Raffe, Culture of Controversy, pp. 217–224, 226–228, 230–233; Raffe, Scotland in Revolution, Chapter Six. 56 Bowie, Ibid., pp. 31, 69, 82; Ferguson, Scotland’s Relations with England, p. 172; Ferguson, Scotland: 1689 to the Present, pp. 7–8. 57 Bowie, Ibid., pp. 30–32, 35, 53, 70, 160. 58 Whatley, Scots and the Union, pp. 48, 218, 249; Bob Harris, ‘The Anglo-Scottish Treaty of Union, 1707 in 2007: Defending the Revolution, Defeating the Jacobites’, Journal of British Studies, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Jan., 2010), pp. 32–35. 59 Bowie, Scottish Public Opinion, pp. 54–55, 57, 64, 131, 137, 160, 166–167. 60 Watt, The Price of Scotland, pp. 217–218; Whatley, Scots and the Union, pp. 200–201, 217; Bowie, Scottish Public Opinion, pp. 27, 41–43, 52, 54, 62–64, 76, 79–80, 90, 162. I am grateful to Alasdair Raffe his advice on the Worcester case. 61 Riley, English Ministers and Scotland, pp. 90, 92. 62 Graeme Townend, ‘“Rendering the Union More Complete”: The Squadrone Volante and the Abolition of the Scottish Privy Council’, Parliamentary History, Vol. 28 No. 1 (Feb. 2009), pp. 88–99; Derek J. Patrick and Christopher A. Whatley, ‘Persistence, Principle and Patriotism in the Making of the Union of 1707; The Revolution, Scottish Parliament and the Squadrone Volante’, History (the journal of the UK Historical Association), Vol. 62 No. 2 (April, 2007), pp. 162–186; Alexander Murdoch, ‘Squadrone, [Squadrone Volante] (act. c.1704–c.1755), ODNB, online edn, accessed 6 Feb. 2019 (first published in the online edn September 2005). 63 Anthony Cooke, et al, eds., Modern Scottish History 1707 to the Present Volume 5: Major Documents, pp. 10–12, Document 1, ‘The Articles of the Treaty of Union of 1707, with the amendments inserted by the Scottish Estates during the “Explanations”’. See Articles XVIII, XIX, and XX. Also see Philip Loft, ‘Litigation, the Anglo-Scottish Union, and the House of Lords as a High Court, 1660–1875’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Dec. 2018), pp. 944–945, 949, 952–953, 958–965. 64 Harris, ‘The Scots, the Westminster Parliament and the British state’, pp. 137–138. 65 Lawrence Whitley, A Great Grievance: Ecclesiastical Patronage in Scotland, until 1750; Alistair Mutch, Religion and National Identity: Governing Scottish Presbyterianism in the Eighteenth Century (2015); James Coleman, Remembering the Past in Nineteenth Century Scotland, Chapter 5. 66 Harris, Politics and the Nation (2002), pp. 29–33; Murdoch, People Above, pp. 53–62. 67 Andrew MacKillop, ‘Confrontation, Negotiation and Accommodation: Garrisoning the Burghs in Post-Union Scotland’, Journal of Early Modern History, Vol. 15 (Jan. 2011), pp. 159–160, 162, 171. 68 Victoria Henshaw, Scotland and the British Army, 1700–1750 (2014), p. 153. 69 Nicholas Phillipson, ‘Culture and Society in the 18th Century Province’, in Lawrence Stone, ed., The University in Society (Princeton, 1974), Vol. II, pp. 409, 411–412, 418–419; and Alexander Murdoch, ‘The Legacy of Unionism in Eighteenth Century Scotland’, p. 85; Nicholas Phillipson, Hume (1989, reissued 2011), p. 28. 70 Alexander Murdoch, ‘Scottish sovereignty in the eighteenth century’, in H.T. Dick­ inson and Michael Lynch, eds., The Challenge to Westminster (2000), pp. 42–49; Stewart J. Brown, ‘Religion in Scotland’ and Alexander Murdoch, ‘Scotland and the Union’, in H.T. Dickinson, ed., A Companion to Eighteenth-Century Britain (2002), pp. 260–270, 381–391. 71 Harris, ‘The Scots, the Westminster Parliament and the British state’, pp. 127–131, 134–136.

80 Union 1702–1715 72 Bob Harris and Charles McKean, The Scottish Town in the Age of Enlightenment 1740– 1820 (2014), pp. 4, 18–20, 65, 67, 82, 86, 121, 457. 73 Ronald Sunter, Patronage and Politics in Scotland, 1707–1832 (1986), pp. 164–169, 199–210. 74 William Ferguson, ‘Electoral Law and Procedure in Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Century Scotland’ (University of Glasgow PhD, 1957), Chapter One, ‘County Repre­ sentation Before 1707’; Ronald M. Sunter, ‘Stirlingshire Politics, 1707–1832’ (Uni­ versity of Edinburgh PhD, 1972), Chapters 1–4. 75 David Hayton, ‘Sutherland’ in Eveline Cruickshanks, Stuart Handley and D.W. Hayton, eds., The History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1690–1715, Vol. II, p. 894. 76 D.W. Hayton, The History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1690–1715, Volume I, pp. 141, 153, 231, 234. 77 C.D. Chandaman, English Public Revenue 1660–88 (Oxford, 1975). Also see Whatley, Scots and the Union, pp. 127 and 141; Brewer, Sinews of Power, p. 133; Jonathan Scott, England’s Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in European context (2000), pp. 312–313, 401–403, 414–416, 485–487; Hoppit, British Political Econo­ mies, pp. 296–301. 78 M.J. Daunton, Progress and Poverty: An Economic and Social History of Britain 1700– 1850 (Oxford, 1995), p. 509. 79 T.C. Smout, ‘Where had the Scottish economy got to by 1776?’, in Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff, eds., Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge UP, 1983), p. 61 includes a table on the yield of the malt tax and excise tax based on data from Henry Hamilton, Economic History of Scotland in the Eighteenth Century, p. 105. 80 Riley, English Ministers and Scotland, pp. 125–139; Sunter, Patronage and Politics, pp. 199–210. 81 Murray, ‘Administration and Law’, pp. 33–35. 82 Clerk and Scrope’, Historical View of the Forms and Powers of the Court of Exchequer, p. 143. See Rosalind Mitchison, ‘Clerk, Sir John, of Penicuik, second baronet (1676– 1755) in ODNB, online edn, accessed 15 Feb. 2019; and A.A. Hanham, ‘Scrope, John (c.1661–1752) in ODNB, online edn, accessed 15 Feb. 2019. Also see Murray, ‘The Post-Union Court of Exchequer’, in Stair Society Volume 52, Miscellany Five pp. 103–131. 83 Murray, ‘The Post-Union Court of Exchequer’, p. 104. 84 See Anita Guerrini, ‘Gregory, David (1659–1708)’, ODNB, online edn, accessed 19 June 2019. 85 Athol L. Murray, ‘Sir Isaac Newton and the Scottish recoinage, 1707–10’, Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland, Vol. 127 (1997), pp. 921–944; Atholl L. Murray, ‘The Scottish Mint after the recoinage, 1709–1836’, Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland, Vol. 129 (1999), pp. 861–2. 86 T.M. Devine, C.H. Lee, and G.F. Peden, eds., The Transformation of Scotland: The Economy Since 1700 (2005), pp. 34, 38–39, 43–44, 46–48, 52–54. 87 Riley, English Ministers and Scotland, pp. 63–66, 69–70, 73–74, 206–207, 219–221, 226–228; Harris, ‘The Anglo-Scottish Treaty of Union, 1707 in 2007’, p. 44; Whatley, Scottish Society, 1707–1830 (2000), pp. 37, 54, 56–57, 73–74; Whatley, Scots and the Union, pp. 253–254. 88 http://thehistoryofparliament.wordpress.com: ‘There has all along been something odd in this affair: The Malt Tax and the 1713 attempt to repeal the Union’ posted 31 May 2013, accessed 27 July 2018; Riley, English Ministers and Scotland, p. 243; Whatley, Scots and the Union, pp. 325–326, 338–339. 89 Townend and Hayton, ‘CAMPBELL, John (1680–1743)’, in Paley, ed., House of Lords 1660–1715, Vol. II, p. 434. 90 Ibid.

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91 Raffe, Culture of Controversy, pp. 51, 55, 56, 85, 114, 134, 143, 163, 205. 92 Colin Kidd, ‘Conditional Britons: The Scots Covenanting Tradition and the Eight­ eenth-century British State’, EHR, Vol. 117 (Nov. 2002), pp. 1162–1163. 93 Christopher A. Whatley, Scottish Society 1707–1830 (Manchester, 2000), pp. 55–57.; Whatley, Scots and the Union, pp. 285, 309–310. Harris, ‘The Scots, the Westminster Parliament and the British State’, pp. 127, 129–131. 94 Ian Simpson Ross, The Life of Adam Smith (1995), pp. 5–8; N.T. Phillipson, Adam Smith (2010), pp. 9–10; William Ferguson, Scotland: 1689 to the Present, pp. 53, 58, 60–61, 141–142, 211–213. 95 Townend and Hayton, ‘ERSKINE, John (1675–1732)’ [22nd Earl of Mar 1689– 1732], in Paley, ed., House of Lords 1660–1715, Vol. V, p. 675.

5

Post-union struggles 1715–1727

The failure of the Jacobite rebellion of 1715 in Scotland demonstrated the unsatisfactory nature of the union settlement of Britain achieved in 1707. It had not met the economic, political and social needs of Scotland. Although Jacobit­ ism was associated in many minds with the Roman Catholicism of the Stuart dynasty and the European monarchies who supported their claims, the grie­ vances identified by Robert Freebairn, in the pamphlets he printed while the principal Jacobite army occupied Perth in the autumn of 1715, were economic and political.1 Episcopalians were convinced that a restored Stuart monarchy would uphold a measure of toleration while opposing what they perceived as ‘phanaticism’ in what had become the Church of Scotland after 1690. The principal issue, however, was the greatly increased tax burden (at least in theory) that had been introduced into Scotland by the union. Julian Goodare has calcu­ lated that in 1659, the last year that the English garrison in Scotland com­ manded by General George Monck was operational, the ration of taxes raised between Scotland and England and Wales had been about 1:10.5, but by 1707 was 1:36.2 Professor Hoppit has investigated the post-union situation, and responded to estimates that taxes, particularly customs and excise taxes, rose fivefold after the Union by noting that ‘rates of duties is not the same as duties collected, a distinction often subsequently lost.’3 As a result, after the Union ‘there was no rise at all and [there] may even have been a fall.’4 He does, how­ ever, concede ‘that this is not to say that after 1707 the tax regime was not in some respects novel, disruptive, unwelcome and challenging.’5 A complex and elaborate set of taxation regulations, which had been created in England from 1643 to 1707, was imposed on a kingdom with an economy that generated far less wealth than that in England, and after 1707 had lost tax income from imports from its principal trading partner (England). Hoppit points out that the English system of customs and excise drawbacks exaggerated the tax burden, as what might be termed ‘notional tax’ on customs in particular was never collected because of drawbacks on goods (particularly tobacco) that were re-exported to European ports and beyond.6 Related to this grievance was widespread dis­ appointment in Scotland that the economic benefits promised by the union had not materialised during the reign of Queen Anne. English markets for Scottish woollens and linen were difficult to access due to the influence English textile

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merchants wielded at Westminster. The ‘Equivalent’ promised under the terms of the Treaty of Union had not been paid in full, and the reinvestment of higher tax revenues after parliamentary union in the Scottish economy through the ‘rising’ Equivalent just had not happened. The rebellion was predicated on the idea that it was time to end an ill-conceived union. William Scott of Ancrum wrote to his elder brother in December 1715 that ‘the Union has begun our nation’s ruine and will, in all probability, in a short time compleat it.’7 When James VIII was proclaimed at the mercat cross in Dundee in September 1715, a principal justification given in that proclamation was that ‘this his Majestie’s ancient kingdom was reduced to a very miserable and deplorable condition by many heavy and unsupportable grievances and burdens, particularly by the late unhappy Union.’8 This ‘ruine’, ie high taxes, had of course been a grievance for many in Scotland under the Cromwellian occupation of the 1650s and the Restoration Stuart regime in Scotland fronted by Lauderdale that succeeded it (although taxes fell after 1660 and by the end of the century war and famine had diminished the economy).9 Before 1707 the actual collection of tax including customs and excise had been difficult and was constantly in arrears. After 1707 there were significant difficulties in introducing the English revenue system, and this had involved direct intervention in Scottish government. In Robert Freebairn’s published grievances in 1715, bad government was identified as interference by the House of Lords at Westminster in Scots Law and the refusal by the English to concede that all of the Scottish nobility could take their places in the second chamber of the Westminster Parliament, as opposed to the sixteen Scottish Representative Peers who could.10 These grievances had arisen out of unfair and secretive interference by the English ministry in London in the deliberations of the Scottish Parliament during the union negotiations of 1705 to 1707. This unwelcome intervention had been fol­ lowed by the post union abolition of the Scottish Privy Council by vote of the Westminster Parliament.11 The Court at London had corrupted Scottish legal and political institutions after the union, it was argued, and now continued to do so under another usurper in the person of King George. James VIII should be restored as Scotland’s rightful king, the union should be repealed and Stuart authority under James III and VIII should be restored at Westminster. These grievances may have reflected the views of the Earl of Mar, who embarrassingly had held office and supported the Treaty of Union both before and after 1707, but he could not have been as successful as he was initially in Scotland if his views did not reflect substantial political opinion among the gentry and nobility in Scotland and their supporters.12 It was partly on the basis of acknowledging Scottish grievances that the second Duke of Argyll, as Commander of the Forces in Scotland, forwarded Jacobite approaches for peace terms following the inconclusive Battle of Sheriffmuir near Stirling in November 1715 to London in the hope that the rebellion could be brought to an end quickly. The response by Secretary of State Townshend was that the new king, George I, was convinced that ‘in the present situation and cir­ cumstances of affairs’ for ‘the honour of his government’ and ‘the future peace

84 Post-union struggles 1715–1727 and quiet of his good subjects’ that ‘the rebells’ should not be offered ‘any terms but those of surrendering their person and entirely submitting to his Majesty’s pleasure.’13 The historian of the Jacobite revolt of 1715 has argued that the revolt ‘only ground on’ into 1716 ‘because of Westminster’s search for revenge’ and indeed that General Cadogan, having replaced the second Duke of Argyll as Commander of the Forces in Scotland, waged a ‘needless’ campaign against the retreating and ever decreasing Jacobite army in the north of Scotland in the winter and spring of 1716.14 The Dutch and Hessian troops sent to reinforce what was now Cadogan’s army in Scotland were not popular. As late as 1756 there were references to Scottish grievances over the conduct of the Dutch and Hessian troops in Scotland in 1716, ‘Militiae et domi’ [on campaign rather than in peace].15 In March 1716 rioters in Edinburgh attacked Dutch soldiers after one of them had displayed a highland targe plated with silver, a broad sword and ‘a blew Bonnet’ while boasting that they were ‘the spoils of a Highlander whom he had killed with his own hand and cut the head of[f].’16 The Edinburgh magistrates, while acknowledging the theft of baggage carts belonging to the Dutch soldiers and their officers, nevertheless remarked in their evidence before one of the Lord Advocate’s deputies (Duncan Forbes of Culloden) in early April that ‘knowing the warm Reports that were flyeing every where that severals of the Dutch Regements had plundered in the north without measure or distinction’, boasting on the High Street of Edinburgh about beheading Highlanders and plundering their property was a provocative act. While Sir Robert Walpole was out of office and in opposi­ tion in 1717 he criticised General Cadogan’s conduct as Commander in Chief of the Forces in Scotland in 1716, alleging that financial corruption was involved in arrangements for UK Treasury payments for the transportation of Dutch troops to Scotland in 1716 at the end of the Jacobite rebellion. Walpole’s then ally William Pulteney made the accusation in the House of Commons that funds allocated to bring Dutch troops to Scotland in 1716 had been embezzled. ‘Mr Robert Wal­ pole’, it was reported, ‘supported Mr. Pulteney’s Charge with much vehemence, and at two different Times, spoke near the space of two Hours, and strained his voice to that Degree, that he was taken with a violent Bleeding at the Nose’, but persevered by declaring ‘that by the Papers that had been read, there was an apparent Fraud, tho’ he could not say … but that the Lord Cadogan might pro­ duce other Evidence to prove his Innocence.’17 George I had succeeded Queen Anne as monarch of Great Britain in 1714, and less than a year later found himself the subject of a rebellion against his rule in Scotland and the north of England. He was not impressed by the second Duke of Argyll’s defeat of the rebels in Scotland, or perhaps he saw Argyll’s efforts as more avoidance of defeat than securing a victory. He much preferred General Cadogan, a veteran of the battles of the Boyne and Aughrim in Ireland in the late seven­ teenth century, who was the architect of securing Dutch intervention in defeating the Jacobite rebels, and was no admirer of the Duke of Argyll’s military cap­ abilities.18 Argyll had offended the Secretary of State for Scotland in 1715, the Duke of Montrose, by sidelining his influence, leading Montrose to resign as Secretary during the rebellion. It was only well after the end of the rebellion, in

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December 1716, that King George appointed a new Secretary of State for Scot­ land, Montrose’s political ally the Duke of Roxburghe. Roxburghe, like Montrose, was a devout Whig but no admirer of Argyll. Both men were not averse to encouraging speculation that Argyll’s lack of zeal in the pursuit of Jacobite rebels was the result of Jacobite sympathies.19 The Duke of Montrose succeeded Rox­ burghe as Keeper of the Great Seal of Scotland, and Scottish MPs who supported Roxburghe and Montrose became commissioners of the Treasury (George Baillie of Jerviswood) and the Admiralty (John Cockburn of Ormiston).20 The Earls of Stanhope and Sunderland were the leading ministers at Westmin­ ster after the end of the rebellion. Both supported Roxburghe, who was one of the Scottish Representative Peers in the House of Lords and thus based in London. By 1718 Roxburghe supported the ministry’s Peerage Bill, which would have done away with the Scottish Representative Peers by creating twenty-five Scottish ‘Lords of Parliament’, presumably including Roxburghe, who would thus be one of those to sit for life in the House of Lords to the exclusion of the rest of the Scottish peerage. This would have put an end to the practice of the government of the day nominating Scottish peers through the so-called ‘King’s List’ circulated to the Scottish nobility at each general election, a procedure Roxburghe and many other Scottish peers thought inflated the power of the executive.21 Sir Robert Walpole, in opposition to the government by 1718, led opposition to the Peerage Bill in the House of Commons and succeeded in preventing its passage. For all his many failings, Walpole was a House of Commons man whose capacity for the hard work of scrutinising financial legislation made him almost unique in that part of the legislature where it was essential. The king recognised his indispensability, and in 1718 Walpole returned to ministerial office at the Treasury as Paymaster Gen­ eral, the office he had held previously from 1715 to 1717, and which, apparently, was a ‘notoriously lucrative’ office for those who were appointed.22 By 1721 Walpole, having benefited from being Paymaster General, would become First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer, offices he would retain as prime minister in the UK government for the next twenty years. In the words of E.P. Thompson, Walpole became ‘England’s [sic] first and least lovely prime minister’. The same year the Earl of Ilay was given the valuable place of Keeper of the Privy Seal in Scotland with a salary of £2,000 a year in addition to his legal post as Lord Justice General (salary £1,000 a year), presumably with the general election of 1722 in mind and the need to increase government influence in Scot­ tish constituencies. In the meantime, the Duke of Roxburghe as Secretary of State for Scotland had found an ally in his colleague Lord Carteret, Secretary of State for the so-called ‘Northern Department’, fluent in German, and a favourite of the king. This strengthened Roxburghe’s position in the ministry and increased his power over government administration in Scotland. By 1720 he was strong enough to remove the Lord Advocate (who had held office since the Hanoverian succession) Sir David Dalrymple. The fact that Dalrymple had opposed government policy since the Jacobite rebellion in 1715 provides some evidence of Roxburghe’s policies as Secretary of State. Dalrymple opposed the punitive nature of much government

86 Post-union struggles 1715–1727 policy in Scotland after the rebellion, particularly in the confiscation of the estates of the nobility and landed gentry who had supported it. He also questioned the establishment of a Forfeited Estates Commission in Scotland to superintend the sale of these estates.23 Some successful purchasers were English, such as the York Buildings Company of London.24 Dalrymple was replaced by a leading member of the Faculty of Advocates in Scotland, Robert Dundas of Arniston in Midlothian, who shared Roxburghe’s distrust of the Duke of Argyll and his party in Scotland, and was now returned to Parliament to act as government spokesman for Scottish affairs in the House of Commons.25 Although some historians have perceived Roxburghe and his followers in the so-called ‘Squadrone’ party, who were beginning to refer to themselves as ‘Patri­ ots’, as a regionally specific political interest group in the south of Scotland, the Earl of Sutherland, with his vast estate in the north of Scotland, was a strong supporter.26 Already the Lord Lieutenant of Ross, Cromarty, Moray, Nairn, Caithness and Sutherland, in 1717 Roxburghe arranged further appointments to Sutherland as Lord Lieutenant of Orkney, Shetland and Inverness, thereby boosting his authority, and consequently his electoral influence, in the north of Scotland.27 Roxburghe also was trying to exert his influence over the courts in Edinburgh, where the Earl of Ilay’s position was still strong as his legal office of Lord Justice General was for life and gave him influence over the Court of Session and in particular, the Court of Justiciary. Roxburghe attempted to make the advocate Patrick Haldane of Gleneagles a judge in the Court of Session in 1721, but Haldane had taken a leading role in the Forfeited Estates Commission and made enemies in the Scottish legal profession as a result. The judges of the Court of Session then voted that Haldane was unqualified to take his place with them. Rather than confront the Court of Session’s decision and turn it into a test of strength, Roxburghe opted to ensure that the government obtained legislation in London that prevented the court in future from rejecting crown appointments.28 Haldane received the consolation of being appointed a commissioner of the Board of Excise in London in 1724, but after Roxburghe was dismissed as Secretary of State Haldane lost his place.29 During the general election of 1722 in Scotland the ministry in London, divi­ ded as it was, ordered Argyll and Ilay on the one hand, and Roxburghe and Montrose on the other, to co-operate to ensure that Jacobites and/or Tories would be prevented from election in any Scottish constituency, although Argyll and Ilay seem to have been more open to negotiation with Jacobite voters than was the case with the Squadrone.30 The balance of the ministry changed after the election. Walpole was able to convince the king to send Carteret to Ireland as Lord Lieutenant while replacing him as Secretary of State with the Duke of Newcastle. Cadogan’s position weakened as well, leaving Roxburghe isolated. Walpole became convinced that the ministry should cease to favour the Squadrone in Scotland, possibly because it was becoming apparent to him that good Hano­ verians as Roxburghe and his followers were, they had no interest in promoting the efficient collection of taxation in Scotland, despite their enjoyment of lucrative public offices relating to Scotland whose salaries were paid by the Treasury. In the

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House of Commons after the election of 1722 Walpole supported candidates associated with Argyll and Ilay in the Scottish elections in all disputed elections that had to be adjudicated by the House of Commons. He made no such efforts for candidates who supported Roxburghe.31 This did not mean that Walpole wanted to make Ilay Secretary of State for Scotland, but he was willing to favour Argyll’s influence in Scotland, despite the King’s mistrust of him. If the Treasury could get a grip on Scottish tax revenue, or rather the issue of why the return to the Treasury on tax in Scotland was so poor, pandering to the Duke of Argyll was worth it. Baron John Scrope of the Scottish Court of Exchequer had been an English member of that court since its creation in the aftermath of the Treaty of Union in 1707. Walpole knew that Scrope had advised Sidney Godolphin, Earl of Godolphin, and Robert Harley, Earl of Oxford after the union on the issues affecting Scottish revenue, including the integration of the Scottish Treasury into the much larger and more elaborate UK Treasury in London. The number of customs and excise officials in Scotland increased substantially but, as Scrope was well aware, this had not increased efficiency in the collection of what were now UK taxes in Scotland. While Paymaster General, Walpole must have met Scrope when the latter visited London from Edinburgh to brief the Treasury on Scottish revenue matters. The Secretary of the Treasury in London was William Lowndes, who had held the post for almost thirty years.32 On his death in 1724 Walpole chose Scrope to replace him. As Patrick Riley has commented, ‘since Scrope’s experience of revenue matters was large, and his opinion of the Scottish revenue commissioners low, it would be surprising indeed, if Walpole had not consulted him’ when he decided to launch a major Treasury enquiry into the state of cus­ toms and excise revenue collection in Scotland, particularly the customs.33 It did not escape Walpole’s attention that the largest customs establishments in Scot­ land were near Glasgow at Greenock and Port Glasgow, where the Squadrone, or Patriot, Duke of Montrose had recommended the majority of the men employed there.34 English merchants who traded in tobacco along the west coast of Britain from Whitehaven and Cockermouth to Liverpool and Bristol were petitioning the Treasury to complain of unfair competition from Scottish merchants who were undercutting them by evading duty through fraud in declaring cargoes.35 This led to increased scrutiny of the performance of those responsible for the collection of taxation in Scotland and the enforcement of the law. Walpole decided to put the Customs collection in England and Scotland under a single commission in London, and passed legislation in Parliament to bring the issue to public attention.36 In turn, the Treasury began to question the basis of the compromise cobbled together post 1713 and 1715 regarding the extension of the Malt Tax to Scotland and to the lack of economic growth in Scotland post union, which had a knock-on effect on Scottish tax revenue. There were also questions regarding the problems the army in Scotland had experienced in attempting to enforce the Disarming Act targeted at the Highland clans and other gentry and noble families associated with the Jacobite rebellion of 1715.

88 Post-union struggles 1715–1727 Yet another issue was the failure of authorities in Scotland to administer ade­ quately the sale of the estates confiscated from Jacobite rebels by the govern­ ment after the 1715 rebellion.37 Some estates remained unsold. Others, such as those purchased by the York Buildings Company, remained remote from the control of their new owners, which led to accusations of Scottish disloyalty, inefficiency and corruption. All these matters came to a head with the collapse of public order in Scotland in 1725 following the Walpole ministry’s efforts to reform the collection of the Malt Tax in Scotland. Walpole had concluded that he had to respond to growing criticism in England and in Parliament that Scottish tax revenue was not making an adequate contribution to British state finance. In the aftermath of the South Sea ‘Bubble’, Walpole had set up a ‘sinking fund’ to try to settle the financial markets, guaranteed by UK public taxation revenue, which was supposed to underwrite the South Sea Company debt assumed by the UK government.38 Edward Thompson, in his history of the ‘Black Acts’ passed by Parliament at this time, termed him the ‘Screen-Master General’, and quoted J.H. Plumb’s con­ clusion that at the time, Walpole was ‘the most execrated and despised man in public life, hated, indeed far more intensely than Sunderland or the South Sea Directors.’39 Special treatment for Scotland, or the perception in England that Scotland was receiving special treatment, would further weaken Walpole’s posi­ tion. Most Scottish MPs and Representative Peers argued that the Scottish economy could not bear higher taxation given that the expected improvement in economic performance in Scotland following the union had not materialised, but Walpole had to demonstrate that the Treasury was serious about tax collection.40 This brought him into conflict with the Duke of Roxburghe as Secretary of State for Scotland, who refused to countenance Walpole’s proposal for phased intro­ duction of an increase in the Malt Tax in Scotland from 1725. The leading crown prosecutor and law officer in Scotland, Lord Advocate Robert Dundas, supported and indeed led opposition to the payment of Malt Tax and was dis­ missed. Serious rioting broke out in Glasgow in the summer of 1725 involving armed confrontation with troops (who were English) sent there to support the burgh council in maintaining public order. The violence has been referred to as ‘the Malt Tax riots’, but at the time were also called ‘the Shawfield Riots’ after the sitting MP for the Glasgow district of burghs, the merchant Daniel Campbell of Shawfield, whose mansion house in Glasgow literally was demolished brick by brick by the mob in retribution for his vote in the House of Commons to sup­ port Treasury policy on the Malt Tax in Scotland.41 The Earl of Ilay had praised Campbell of Shawfield for his performance in the House of Commons in the debate that preceded the summer riots. He argued that Campbell had ‘said more for the service of his Country than those who aspirse [asperse] him only he omitted the gross unparliamentary impertinances which have been of no use but to serve as arguments to the English to enforce their projects on us …’ Dundas of Arniston, who spoke in broad Scots, had alie­ nated many of the English MPs in his vehement opposition whereas, at least in Ilay’s opinion, Campbell of Shawfield had sought to meet them halfway by

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acknowledging their concerns. Ilay tried to make the case to the ministry for rea­ listic Treasury targets for tax revenue in Scotland. Dundas of Arniston sought to defy its authority in defence of his country. No one was aware of it, but Scotland was on the road to the 1745 rebellion, by which time both Ilay (as third Duke of Argyll) and Dundas (as a judge in the Court of Session) would still be contesting this point.42 John Scrope, who was an MP as well as the newly appointed Secretary to the Treasury, threatened in the House of Commons to impose additional taxes on Scotland if the duty on malt was not collected there. Walpole then immediately proposed raising the excise on a barrel of beer in Scotland by sixpence, ‘and the removal of the bounty on drawbacks on the export of corn’ (calculated to hit Scottish landowners and the merchants who purchased their corn for export).43 In Scotland there were protests that these actions were in violation of the Treaty of Union and represented an English assault on Scotland. Scots MPs, including both Campbell of Shawfield and Dundas of Arniston, met with Walpole to negotiate, which resulted in an agreement that the Malt Tax levy in Scotland would be threepence rather than the English rate of sixpence. Part of the agreement was that if the Malt Tax income in Scotland fell below £20,000 in any given year the short fall would have to be made up from the following year’s collection.44 Bob Harris has pointed out that in the aftermath of this negotiation, ‘Walpole was to emerge in the mid–1720s as a powerful spokesman in the Commons for the notion of a British interest which transcended English national interest’.45 It was the germination of a project to establish a Board of Trustees for the Encourage­ ment of the Fisheries and Manufacturies of Scotland, with funding from the UK Treasury to invest in the economic improvement of the country. When English MPs protested, Walpole argued that it was necessary to raise the basis for increased tax income in Scotland in the future and that ‘there was no point in seeking more [tax] if that meant having to maintain 6,000 troops in Scotland [as the Crom­ wellian regime had done] to Maintain the peace’.46 Walpole, without a Secretary of State for Scotland to back him up, turned to the younger brother of the Duke of Argyll to preserve the authority of the UK government in Scotland in the midst of the crisis. Ilay had studied law at the University of Leiden after attending the College of Glasgow. His office of Lord Justice General of Scotland since 1710 was for life and gave him significant legal authority, particularly in criminal cases. He held high office through the now incorporated crown of Scotland in the United Kingdom of Great Britain, and by virtue of that had a place on the Privy Council at Whitehall, as well as sitting in the House of Lords as one of the Scottish Representative Peers. Another office held by Ilay was that of ‘Extraordinary Lord of the Court of Session’, one of four aristocrats appointed under the authority of the Crown of Scotland who held the privilege of sitting in the ‘Inner House’ of the court, when all the court’s judges (there were 15 ‘ordinary’ Lords) acted as a Court of Appeal against decisions by judges sitting individually in the court’s ‘Outer House’. Thus Ilay could join the Court of Appeal and contribute to its delib­ erations. He did play a role in bringing this system to an end as part of

90 Post-union struggles 1715–1727 Walpole’s reforms of Scottish government in the 1720s, but as his appointment had been for life, he continued to be able to act in his capacity as an ‘Extra­ ordinary’ Lord of Session until his death in 1761.47 Argyll and Greenwich was a military man. Field Marshall George Wade commanded the UK troops in Scotland in 1725 (he was a Protestant Irishman by birth, as was his predecessor the Earl of Cadogan), but the Duke of Argyll certainly had advice to offer the ministry on preserving public order in Scot­ land, and his brother had views on the legal position under Scots Law, in par­ ticular its authority to collect tax under the terms of the Treaty of Union.48 Argyll persuaded Walpole to approve the appointment of Duncan Forbes of Culloden in Inverness-shire in succession to Robert Dundas as Lord Advocate in 1725. With Argyll’s backing (less so from Ilay apparently), Forbes was able to draw on the support of the army to suppress revenue riots. He threatened to arrest the entire burgh council of Glasgow and charge them with treason for giving way to mob rule. When the bakers and brewers of Edinburgh threatened to cease their production of bread and beer in protest at the collection of the Malt Tax, Forbes responded with the same treatment meted out to the burgh council of Glasgow. Ilay, in London, had been in correspondence with a protégé whom he had recommended to the government as a judge in the Court of Session just the year before, Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun’s nephew (also Andrew Fletcher), who took the judicial title of Lord Milton after he was appointed. Ilay reported to Fletcher in Edinburgh at the time that Lord Townshend as Secretary of State had enquired ‘whether you were not of the same temper as your unkle, I bid him ask the D. of Roxburg at which he laughed and was very well pleased.’49 Milton reported on the discussions among his colleagues regarding events in Edinburgh and Glasgow, and indeed undertook a role that he would continue to fulfil for virtually the whole of his life, acting on Ilay’s behalf in seeking to identify those who would work to restore order in Edinburgh and support Forbes as Lord Advocate. Ilay wrote to Milton about his reaction to the conflict in terms of what had happened since the union and the difficulties in attempting to implement it: As for the dispopularity (to coin a new word) I heartily wish That it could hurt amoung us more than it can, I have within these 15 years both known & felt the contrary I desire only to be furnished with true & authentick accounts of the zeal that is showed on this occasion by those who never endeavoured to be popular before, who first underminded in publick & private the Articles of Union, & who now by down right lyes affect a superior love of their Country.50 In the aftermath of the riots in Glasgow and growing opposition in Edinburgh, Ilay was sent to Edinburgh in August to report on the situation. Walpole did not appoint Ilay as a Secretary of State to replace the Duke of Roxburghe, instead choosing to emphasise the incorporation of Scotland under the Treaty of Union by instructing Ilay to report to one of the two English Secretaries of

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State, the Duke of Newcastle, who would spend the rest of his life (up to and including the 1760s) involved to a greater or lesser extent with the problems of governing Scotland from Westminster. Newcastle would experience consider­ able political frustration as a servant of the crown in the process and died con­ vinced that Scottish legal and administrative autonomy represented a threat to the integrity of the English constitution and the Whig political ideology that safeguarded it. Dundas of Arniston had been dismissed as Lord Advocate in May. Roxburghe wrote to him a few weeks later that ‘the only reason that was ever given to me for your being dismissed, was the part you acted against Sir R. Walpole’s scheme proposed in lieu of the Malt Tax, particularly your writing the proposal or reso­ lution, at the meeting of the Scots members, with your own hand, but the easier the Malt Tax goes on, the more absurd will that scheme appear to have been …’51 Roxburghe and Montrose, with legal advice from Dundas, gambled that the Malt Tax issue in Scotland would help tip the ministerial balance in favour of Carteret (who at the time was in Hanover with the king) and lead to the dismissal of Walpole. This, however, allowed their political opponents to accuse them of favouring Jacobites, just as Argyll had been portrayed as unsound on opposition to Jacobitism in 1716. Once rioting broke out in Glasgow in June, General Wade wrote to the Duke of Newcastle in London that this was probably beginnings of a Rebellion, especially since I have been Informed that During the Riot at Glasgow one of the Cry’s was, Down with Walpole and up with Seaforth & farther to excite the Mob, it was said that they should not want a Support for the Mackenzies were up in the North, & would soon come to their assistance, This til now I took for trifling story’s, and the usuall way of the Jacobites who never fail to Mix themselves with all Mobbs, and to take All advantage of creating disturbance to ye Govermt.52 As a result the troops, already in Scotland under Wade’s command in prepara­ tion for enforcing the Disarming Act for Scotland passed by Parliament in 1725, were diverted to garrisoning burghs such as Glasgow, Edinburgh and Aberdeen where opposition to the collection of excise revenue was strongest and magistrates lacked confidence in their ability to maintain law and order. It was the arrival of two companies of soldiers commanded by Captain Bushell on 22 June that set off the rioting in Glasgow, which forced the military to retreat after opening fire on rioters with fatal results. The enraged mob pursued the soldiers for six miles as they retreated to Dumbarton Castle west of Glasgow.53 It was this that provoked Duncan Forbes to threaten that the Glasgow magis­ trates would be arrested for failing to do their duty and maintain the peace. Forbes’s reports to the Lords Justices (acting as regents in the absence of the king) in London led to orders from London to Wade to send a larger military force to garrison Glasgow after reinforcements for the army in Scotland were landed at Berwick on Tweed.

92 Post-union struggles 1715–1727 Ilay had arrived in Scotland to back Forbes as the Lord Advocate, only to have Forbes complain that he did not consult him.54 As noted above, Ilay had the right to sit as a judge with both the Court of Session and the Court of Justiciary. In the absence of a Lord Chancellor as head of the Scottish legal system (an office abol­ ished after the Treaty of Union) he used his legal offices to demonstrate that UK law, including that relating to the payment of taxes, had to be obeyed, even if regarded as unjust. He wrote a long account of his initial effort to preserve order to his secretary in London, William Steuart, as part of his efforts to keep the ministry (and his elder brother the Duke of Argyll) informed of his actions.55 This letter, first published in Reverend William Coxe’s Life of Sir Robert Walpole in 1798 and now lost, has been cited by many historians, particularly in regard to Ilay’s assertion at the very end of his letter that in Scotland ‘by a long series of noadministration the mere letter of the law has little or no weight with the people’.56 To a certain extent Ilay wanted to establish a narrative with the ministry in London that his actions were contributing successfully to an extension of central administrative control of Scottish government by Walpole’s ministry. It was a narrative that would be contested by Roxburghe, Dundas of Arniston and others (including eventually the second Duke of Argyll and his and Ilay’s nephew the third Earl of Bute) during the remaining years of the Walpole ministry, but there is no doubt that the basis of Scottish government changed after Walpole’s appoint­ ment to office as First Lord of the Treasury. Ilay’s statement to Steuart has never been quoted in its entirety. His conclusion to the sentence, which has been quoted only partially, stated that the law ‘must be supported, by the concurrent influence of every thing that any ways tend to the dignity, authority, respect, and reputation of those in office.’57 Ilay reported that the English commissioners of the Scottish Board of Excise in Edinburgh, appointed because of their previous experience as collectors of excise in England, were devoid of ‘dignity, authority, and reputation’, while willing to concede that they might have some expertise in the ‘lower parts of their business.’ They were unable, in Ilay’s words, ‘to conduct the management of the excise here, which requires authority, spirit, and a proper behaviour, suiting an office that ought to carrie respect with it in this country.’ In contrast, Ilay wrote that ‘the whole town knows that they are frightened out of their wits, that they lie in different places cording as the panic seizes them.’58 It was law enforcement, however, rather than tax collection, that Ilay had as his objective. From the perspective of those Scottish politicians who thought of themselves as ‘patriots’, Ilay was tampering with due process in the judi­ ciary. Unsurprisingly, he had a different view. He qualified as a Justice of the Peace in Edinburgh the day he arrived, and insisted that the JPs summon all the brewers of the city at six days’ notice to appear before them to answer for their refusal to pay excise on the beer they brewed or indeed to brew beer at all. He was unable to prevent the great majority of brewers in the town from ceasing to brew, he reported, because ‘the thing which united them most was, that they believed, and do so to this day, that I am acting against the secret wishes of the king only to support Sir Robert Walpole, that he is next sessions of parliament to fall, and that one Mr. Poultney would have all in his hands, in conjunction with Dundas and the duke of Roxburg.’59

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Ilay also wrote about his attempt to convene his fellow members of the Court of Session regarding a warrant Duncan Forbes had obtained from them, which gave him as Lord Advocate power to have any Edinburgh brewer who refused to pay excise or to brew beer arrested.60 He admitted that the warrant/Act of Sederunt of the court ‘had been carried not only by the authority, but indeed by the artifice of our friends, and I had notice that the rest had either been practiced upon or intimidated, so that they did not care to have those warrants executed.’61 He had difficulty making progress, reporting that ‘as I could not get my brethren that day together to advise the execution of the warrants [as Lord Justice General, Ilay would be the presiding judge at such a meeting], and having some reason to suspect one of them to have changed his way of thinking, besides the clamour of the church, if they had on Saturday night been deprived of the spiritual assistance from the pulpits on Sunday [ie, rather than force the court to break the Sabbath], I resolved to be quiet till Monday.’62 Thus Ilay convened a meeting of those members of the Courts of Session and Justiciary he could persuade to attend. The Lord President (Hugh Dalrymple of North Berwick), Lord Newhall (Sir Walter Pringle), Lord Royston (Sir James Mackenzie), and Lord Milton (Andrew Fletcher, nephew of Andrew Fletcher the commissioner for East Lothian in the last Scottish Parliament). ‘All the rest were out of town, but lord Cullen,’ Ilay commented, ‘who, when he should have come to us, was asleep, and his servants would not wake him.’63 Afterwards, Ilay recor­ ded what was in effect a long minute of the meeting.64 He stated that he had congratulated the judges on ‘their seasonable interposing their authority against the conspiracy of the brewers’ by the Lord President signing the warrants ‘in the name of the court of session.’ It made it possible for the authorities in Edinburgh to imprison brewers for contempt if they did not submit to paying the excise due to the revenue by 10 August. The warrants, however, had been delayed until the next session of the court in the autumn, although Ilay was not specific as to why this had occurred. He wrote that he had argued that ‘since the conspirators had actually began their attempt to starve this town’ the court had no choice but to lend their authority to the execution of the warrants or those present at the meeting ‘could no longer be answerable to the king, to the court of session, or to our country, if the leaders of this sedition were not immediately imprisoned.’65 There was more to treason than Jacobitism, he implied. Any defiance of the law should be treated as sedition. This reflected Walpole’s influence on the English legal system after 1721, in which the political and social elite turned to law to defend their privileges and property against the challenges they faced from a sub­ stantial proportion of the population.66 Lord Newhall opposed this course of action and argued that nothing could be done while the court was out of session, to which Ilay claimed to have replied, ‘that although the court of session was not now sitting, those warrants were signed in court, and that it was impossible they could be execute, but out of term time’ and ‘that as a member of the court of session, I could not justifie myself to the parliament, if I should be thought guilty of suppressing the orders of the court, made on so solemn an occasion for the publick good, …’67 Otherwise, Ilay

94 Post-union struggles 1715–1727 argued, the members of the court could do no more than plead guilty to an indictment that the former Lord Advocate Dundas had already drawn up for the brewers, which the Court of Session had ordered burned ‘by the hands of the common hangman.’ At this point the other judges, particularly the Lord Pre­ sident, ‘not sorry, I believe to see Newhall in the wrong box’, Ilay commented, agreed to ‘deliver out to the proper officer, warrants against those brewers whom I had named, and accordingly, I believe, they are now all in prison.’68 Later in his letter he related that one of the leaders of the recalcitrant brewers imprisoned in the Edinburgh Tolbooth ‘had the impudence to desire one to pro­ pose to me … that the justices of the peace should adjourn the consideration of the suit of the board of excise against them until parliament met.’69 Ilay refused, and joined about 20 other JPs to hear the pleas of the Edinburgh brewers sum­ moned to appear before them. He confessed (or boasted) that he had ‘connived at the absence of the magistrates of Edinburgh, who are in the commission, in regard to their approaching elections, though they offered to attend if I pleased.’70 Ilay presided over the meeting of the JPs and responded to a petition submitted by the brewers justifying their actions, ‘and there being present a vast number of people, I said every thing I could think of, not only for the sake of the brewers, but for the sake of the audience too.’ He wrote that he was surprised that the ‘spectators’, ‘behaved themselves very decently during the whole proceeding, nor could I observe the least murmur or impertinence.’71 Ilay was not prepared to excuse poverty as a justification for refusal to pay tax: ‘all the excuse the brewers made for not giving bond for the duty, was their poverty, and that they must pay their creditors, of whom they brought their corn,’ recording that the JPs allowed the brewers’ appeal to ‘the quarter sessions, as they are allowed by act of parliament’ but wrote to Stewart that when the quarter sessions met a week later, ‘these jud­ gements [against the brewers] will be made final.’72 Now that Wade had troops in Edinburgh, the Justices of the Peace wielded authority that they had not possessed earlier in the summer. So did Ilay. The unrest, however, did make it clear that there would always be problems collecting tax revenue in Scotland as long as the majority of the population remained impoverished. In further correspondence, Ilay discussed Walpole’s plan to not only do away with the Duke of Roxburghe as Secretary of State for Scotland, but to do away with the office of Secretary of State for Scotland entirely. This meant that the income from the Scottish Signet Seal that had gone to Roxburghe as Keeper of the Signet as well as Secretary of State would now be divided between the two remaining English Secretaries of State for the Northern and Southern ‘depart­ ments’. It was also necessary for a new deputy keeper of the Signet to be appointed in Edinburgh to replace Roxburghe’s deputy Thomas Pringle, ‘because it is out of that office that all summonds for law suits proceed.’73 Ilay nominated an Edinburgh Justice of the Peace named Campbell, assuring Wal­ pole that ‘you may depend upon it, I shall not in the sequel of Scotch affairs, be partial to that name, yet upon this occasion, I industriously do it, as a measure useful.’74 This was a promise that would not be kept fully in the future. After his victory over Dundas of Arniston and other ‘Patriots’ who had supported

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opposition to Walpole’s increase of indirect excise taxes, Ilay used his brother’s influence and prestige to work with Wade as Commander of the Forces in Scotland to increase the authority and power of the government in enforcing the law, including the Disarming Act of 1725. As part of his attempt to ensure that the Church of Scotland did not consider itself above the law, he organised a visitation of the universities in Scotland to begin to exert government control on the training of future ministers of the kirk. At Glasgow the faculty had become divided over political disputes. Ilay wrote to the Duke of Newcastle from Edinburgh in October 1726 that ‘the only disappointment that any have met with, is, that those whom the whole Country & themselves in their own consciences had condemned, have been advised to enjoy & execute their offices in peace with their brethren for the public service.’75 Ilay returned to London in the autumn able to report some success in his efforts to restore order and promote the interests of the government. He convinced Walpole that he would promote the interests of the government in Scotland as a means of increasing its authority there. Ilay, however, used his connection with Walpole to argue that the union settlement in Scotland was not working, and that if the law was to be obeyed in Scotland, and tax was to be collected there in support of the gov­ ernment, something would have to be done to demonstrate that Scotland would benefit by accepting the union and the authority of the Westminster Parliament. The Duke of Argyll had played a key role in bringing about the union and in saving it from Jacobite destruction in 1715. His younger brother was involved in the successful union negotiations in 1706 as a commissioner, and had led pro-union Campbell militia in 1715 against the Jacobite rebels before being wounded at the Battle of Sheriffmuir (and as a result walked with a limp for the rest of his life). Together they convinced Walpole that if the union was to endure, military repression in Scotland was not going to be enough, and would in addition cost the Treasury far more than uncollected customs and excise revenue. The Cromwellian precedent was not cited. Instead, good government and at least some economic investment was required to integrate the Scottish with the English economy, but to gain Walpole’s support, Ilay had to demonstrate that UK government policy would be imple­ mented in Scotland, or at least not openly defied. Of course, this did not mean that the Campbells ceased to pursue their own careers and interests, hence Walpole’s (and the King’s) refusal to make Ilay Secretary of State for Scotland. Nor did Walpole allow Ilay and his elder brother to fulfil their ambitions of creating a Scottish bank that could trade across all the UK, purportedly in the interests of the Hanoverian monarchy and its government. He did, however, support their efforts to obtain a Westminster parliamentary charter to establish a Royal Bank of Scotland, capitalising it by employing the Equivalent debentures that had been issued by the Treasury after the union as part of the compensation for shareholders in the Company of Scotland that was so intrinsic to the Treaty of Union.76 With the charter of the Royal Bank of Scotland in 1727, at the end of the reign of George I of Hanover and the beginning of the reign of his son, in effect the Company of Scotland was re-established as a bank,

96 Post-union struggles 1715–1727 with Ilay as its first Governor and Andrew Fletcher, Lord Milton, among his sup­ porters on the board. In the same year Walpole’s ministry passed legislation for the establishment of the ‘Board of Trustees for the Encouragement of Fisheries and Manufactures in Scotland’, finally fulfilling a longstanding commitment in the Treaty of Union that Scottish tax revenue would be used to reinvest in establish­ ing economic development in fisheries and manufactures. The Earl of Ilay argued in a letter to the Duke of Newcastle when the latter was Secretary of State responsible for Scotland in 1726 that establishing a Board of Trustees for the Encouragement of Fisheries and Manufacturies in Scotland by Act of Parliament to reinvest some tax revenue in economic development would help stabilise Scot­ tish politics. He wrote that I am of opinion that the interest of Goverment will be very much strength­ ened by the schemes that are preparing, All sorts of people & parties are giving their attention to this matter, it is growing popular, & A great humour is rising of satisfaction in the views they have of improving their trade, which is likely to put an end to their mutinous discourse about the malt tax, I think its very happy that this new scent is so strong as to carrie many discontented whigs and even Jacobites into the pursuits of these matters, in all respects innocent, & in many, highly usefull.77 Trustees appointed by the Crown included Duncan Forbes, Lord Milton, and others who had contributed to re-establishing the authority of the government in 1725, although both in Scotland and England they would not lack critics of their actions in the years ahead.78 How far were the Trustees the creatures of Ilay and Walpole? Was the money they received being invested properly, or was it merely being used to support the cash flow of the Royal Bank of Scotland? Ilay and Milton and their supporters certainly worked to protect the interests of Walpole’s ministry in the 1727 elections. As in England, there was growing opposition to Walpole’s influence as First Lord of the Treasury and disappoint­ ment that there was no sign that the new king was going to dismiss him. Cer­ tainly there was plenty of evidence of judicial involvement in politics, which Ilay countenanced and supported. He himself took a leading role in attempting to ensure that the election of Scottish Representative Peers favoured the govern­ ment. Although only two years had passed since the collapse of governmental authority in Scotland in 1725, elected Scottish representatives in general sup­ ported the government. Of course there were many in Scotland who were aghast at government for in effect turning Scotland over to the Campbells, from proEnglish Whigs of what was still referred to by many as the ‘Squadrone’, or sometimes as ‘Patriots’, to the continuing element of Jacobite support for an alternative dynasty with a long-standing association with Scotland.79 Given that to openly espouse Jacobitism was held to be treason, it is difficult to measure it as part of public life in Scotland. Jacobitism was there, yet not always apparent. In contrast, the regime that had developed in Scotland after the failure of the rebellion of 1715 (and the use of Dutch, English and German troops in northern

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Scotland in its aftermath) could be seen to increasingly resemble the colonialism of British viceregal government in Ireland, without the political autonomy represented by a separate parliament. It was by no means certain that the union would endure by 1727. There were pronounced divisions in what was still a desperately poor country. During the reign of George II, those divisions would increase rather than decrease, and the second and third Dukes of Argyll (the former Ilay succeeding his brother on his death in 1742) would still be centrally involved in how Britain governed the ancient kingdom of Scotland. There would also be another Jacobite rebellion in Scotland that would lead to a second, more threatening, invasion of England by what was in effect a private army from Scotland intent on the destruction of the Hanoverian monarchy and the restoration of the Stuart dynasty in the UK.

Notes 1 Robert Freebairn, To All True-Hearted Scotsmen, Whether Soldiers or Others (Perth, 1715), reprinted in Anthony Cooke, et al., eds., Modern Scottish History 1707 to the Present, Vol. 5, pp. 33–34. The NLS has two copies printed in 1715 and 1716 with the place of publication given as Perth. Also see Hoppit, Britain’s Political Economies, p. 299. 2 Julian Hoppit, ‘Scotland and the Taxing Union, 1707–1815’, SHR, Vol. 98 No. 246 (April 2019), p. 50; Julian Goodare, State and Society in Early Modern Scotland (1999), pp. 319, 321. 3 Hoppit, ‘Scotland and the Taxing Union’, p. 47, quotation from note 7.

4 Ibid., p. 50.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., pp. 50–51; also see Philipp Rössner, Scottish Trade in the Wake of Union, pp. 37–

84, 133–175. 7 Daniel Szechi, 1715: The Great Jacobite Rebellion (2006), p. 72, quoting from NRS, GD 259/4/2/31, William to [Patrick] Scott of Ancrum, 27 Dec. 1715. Scott repeats this justification in another of the letters he wrote from Marshallsea prison after his capture at the Jacobite defeat at Preston in NRS, RH2/4/309/ letter stamped ‘287’, William Scott to [his brother Patrick], 11 Feb. 1716. This is a photocopy of a docu­ ment in SP 54/11 at The National Archives, Kew. 8 Szechi, 1715, pp. 112–113 quoting SP54/8/29, and SP54/8/77 Lord Justice Clerk Cockburn [of Ormiston] to Under Secretary Pringle [Szechi’s attribution], 20 Sept. 1715. Pringle was Deputy Keeper of the Signet Seal in Scotland. The Secretary of State received an additional salary as Keeper of the Signet Seal. After 1725 the salary was divided equally between the two English Secretaries of State in the absence of a third Secretary of State for Scotland, and a new Deputy Keeper of the Signet was appointed. 9 Goodare, State and Society, pp. 19–20; Hoppit, ‘Scotland and the Taxing Union’, p. 50 10 Clyve Jones, ed., A Pillar of the Constitution: The House of Lords in British Politics, 1640–1784 (1989), pp. 12–17. 11 Graeme Townend, ‘“Rendering the Union more Complete”’; Derek J. Patrick and Christopher A. Whatley, ‘Persistence, Principle and Patriotism in the Making of the Union of 1707’. 12 Riley, English Ministers and Scotland, pp. 63–4, 242, 262–3, 283; Szechi, 1715, pp. 14–16, 51–52, 56, 67–73; Whatley, Scots and the Union, pp. 339–343; Townend and Hayton, ‘ERSKINE, John (1675–1732)’, in Paley, ed., House of Lords 1660–1715, Vol. V, p. 675.

98 Post-union struggles 1715–1727 13 Szechi, 1715. pp. 161–162. Ragnhild Hatton, George I Elector and King (1978), pp. 176–177 argues that it was Walpole and Townshend who were bent on harsh punish­ ment for rebels rather than George I. 14 Szechi, 1715, pp. 196–197. 15 Andrew Fletcher, MP to his father Andrew Fletcher SCJ, NLS, MS. 16518, f32, 24 Feb. 1756. My thanks to my colleague Dr Dominic Berry, Senior Lecturer in Classics, Uni­ versity of Edinburgh, for the translation. Part of the text of this letter uses a numerical cipher in which 76 is for ‘Hanoverians’, 77 for ‘Hessians’ and 133 for ‘Dutch’. See NLS, MS. 17605 f26r & v for the relevant cipher. There is a reference to these troops in Bruce Lenman, Jacobite Risings in Britain 1689–1746 (1980; reprint, Aberdeen, 1995), p. 153. 16 Szechi, 1715, p. 231; NRS, RH2/4/310/217, Lord Justice Clerk Cockburn to Deputy Keeper of the Signet Pringle, Ormiston, 7 April 1716 (photocopies). The 217 number refers to Lord Justice Clerk Cockburn’s letter and enclosures, some of which are also numbered 217 in manuscript and others 195. See List & Index Society Volume 262, Descriptive List of Secretaries of State: State Papers of Scotland, Series Two (1688– 1782) Part One (London, 1996), pp. 122–126 listing The National Archives Kew, S.P. 54/11/195, 217, 218. My thanks to Dr David J. Brown of the National Records of Scotland for his assistance. The quotation is from one of the enclosures with Cock­ burn’s letter RH2/4/310/217 relating to RH2/4/310/195 concerning the Edin­ burgh Baillie and Sheriff Court case arising from the riot and thefts. 17 Riley, pp. 267–268; The History of the House of Commons from the Restoration to the Present Time (1742), Vol. 6, pp. 129–138 (quotation from p. 138). Accessed through Eighteenth Century Collections Online, EUL, 18 July 2019. 18 See James Falkner, ‘Cadogan, William, Earl Cadogan (1671/2–1726)’ ODNB, online edn accessed 28 November 2018. 19 Szechi, 1715, p. 248; P.W.J. Riley, English Ministers and Scotland, pp. 262–264. 20 David Wilkinson, ‘BAILLIE, George (1664–1738)’, in E, Cruickshanks et al, eds., The History of Parliament: House of Commons 1690–1715, Vol. III, pp. 106–120; John M. Simpson, ‘BAILLIE, George (1664–1738)’ in R. Sedgwick, ed., The History of Parlia­ ment: The House of Commons 1715-1754 (1970), Vol. I, p. 562; R.H. Campbell, ‘Cockburn, John, of Ormiston (1679–1758)’, ODNB, online edn accessed July 2018. 21 Riley, English Ministers and Scotland, pp. 268–269; Jones, ‘Venice Preserv’d, or A Plot Discovered: The Political and Social Context of the peerage Bill of 1719’, in Jones, ed., A Pillar of the Constitution, pp. 79–112. 22 Riley, English and Scotland, pp. 256–257, 269; E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters (1975), pp. 178, 197–198. 23 Janet Sorenson, ‘Dalrymple, Sir David, first baronet (c.1665–1721)’, ODNB, online edn, accessed 2 April 2019; Riley, English Ministers and Scotland, p. 270. 24 David Murray, The York Buildings Company (1883). 25 Richard Scott, ‘Dundas, Robert, Lord Arniston (1685–1753), politician and advocate’ and Alexander Murdoch, ‘Squadrone [squadrone volante] (act. 1704-c.1755)’, both in ODNB, online edn, accessed 30 July 2018. 26 Ferguson, Scotland: 1689 to the Present, p. 137: ‘by 1715 it was little more than a ter­ ritorial interest, located mainly in the south-eastern counties.’ Townend and Hayton, ‘GORDON (afterwards Sutherland), John (1661–1733)’, in Paley, ed., House of Lords 1660–1715, Vol. V, pp. 676–679. 27 Riley, English and Scotland, pp. 263, 267, 286. 28 Ibid., p. 271. 29 Andrew Lang, ‘Haldane, Patrick (1683/4–1769)’, ODNB, Vol. 24, p. 513. Haldane lost his excise post after the death of George I in 1727. 30 Riley, English Ministers and Scotland, p. 272; Riley cites Duncan Warrand, ed., More Culloden Papers (Inverness, 1925), Vol. II, p. 207, Duncan Forbes of Culloden to the 2nd Duke of Argyll, Edinburgh, 3 Feb. 1722, which is about the fortunes of the Jaco­ bite associated Maule of Panmure family, and the estates in Angus they lost after the

Post-union struggles 1715–1727

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

49 50 51 52

53 54 55

56 57

99

1715 rebellion. Also see Szechi, 1715, p. 248; and Margaret Sankey and Daniel Szechi, ‘Elite Culture and the Decline of Scottish Jacobitism 1716–1745’, Past & Present, No. 173 (Nov. 2001), pp. 106–112, 123–124. Riley, English Ministers and Scotland, p. 273.; R. Sedgwick, ed., History of Parliament: The Commons 1715–1754 (1970), Vol. I, p. 34. Andrew Hanham, ‘Lowndes, William (1652–1724)’ in ODNB, online edn, accessed 8 July 2019; Andrew Hanham, ‘LOWNDES, William (1652–1724)’, in E. Cruickshanks et al, eds., History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1690–1715, Vol. IV, pp. 674–682. Riley, English and Scotland, pp. 276, 280–282. Ibid, p. 279; also J.M. Price, ‘Glasgow, The Tobacco Trade, and the Scottish Customs, 1707–1730’, SHR, Vol. 63 No 175 (April, 1984), pp. 1–36. Price, Ibid, pp. 14–27; Riley, English Ministers and Scotland, p. 276. Riley, Ibid., p. 279. Margaret Shaw Bricke, ‘The Management and Administration of Scotland, 1707–1765’ (University of Kansas PhD, 1972), p. 18. Julian Hoppit, A Land of Liberty? pp. 334–338, 403–408; William Goetzmann et al, eds., The Great mirror of folly: finance, culture, and the crash of 1720 (Yale UP, 2013). Thompson, Whigs and Hunters, p. 199; J.H. Plumb, Sir Robert Walpole: The Making of a Statesman (1956), pp. 379–380. Hoppit, ‘Scotland and the Taxing Union’, pp. 57, 60, 64–65. Richard Scott, ‘The Politics and Administration of Scotland 1725–1748’, pp. 331–343. NLS MS. 16531, ff8–9, Ilay to Milton, 7 Jan.1725. Harris, ‘The Scots, the Westminster parliament, and the British state’, pp. 129–130. Ibid., p. 130. Ibid., p. 131. Ibid. Emerson, An Enlightened Duke, pp. 193–194. Gordon Pentland, ‘“We Speak for the Ready”: Images of Scots in Political Prints, 1707– 1832’, SHR, Vol. 90 No. 1 (April 2011), p. 71, refers to the prominence of images of ‘Archibald Campbell second duke of Argyll’ in London published cartoons and caricatures of Scots before 1745, but clearly is referring to John Campbell, second Duke of Argyll, whose younger brother and eventual successor as duke was named Archibald. NLS, MS. 16529, f40, Ilay to Andrew Fletcher [Lord Milton], 13 April 1724. Ibid. G.W.T. Omond, ed., Arniston Memoirs (Edinburgh, 1887), p. 69, Duke of Roxburghe to Robert Dundas of Arniston, 4 June 1725; Scott, ‘Politics and Administration of Scotland 1725–1748’, p. 329. NRS, RH2/4/317/No. 158, General George Wade to ‘My Lord’ [the Duke of Newcastle as Secretary of State in London], Edinburgh, 1 July 1725. For Seaforth, see David Horsburgh, ‘William Mackenzie, fifth earl of Seaforth (d. 1740)’, ODNB, online edn accessed July 2018. Scott, ‘Politics and Administration of Scotland 1725–1748’, p. 334. Ibid., p. 343. Roger L. Emerson, An Enlightened Duke, pp. 51, 222; also see J.M. Simpson, ‘STEUART, William (1686–1768) of Weyland and Seatter, Orkney’, in Sedgwick, ed., The History of Parliament: The Commons 1715–1754, Vol. II, pp. 446–447; and David Wilkinson, ‘STEUART (Stewart), William (1686–1768) of Weyland and Seatter, Orkney’, in Cruickshanks, et al., eds., The History of Parliament: The Commons 1690– 1715, Vol. V, pp. 567–568. Ferguson, Scotland:1689 to the Present, p. 143; Scott, ‘Politics and Administration of Scotland 1725–1748’, p. 328; John Stuart Shaw, The Management of Scottish Society (1983), p. 86; T.M. Devine, Independence or Union (2016), p. 37. William Coxe, Memoirs of the Life and administration of Sir Robert Walpole Earl of Orford (London, 1798), Vol. II, p. 462, ‘The Earl of Ilay to Mr. Steuart Edinburg 24

100 Post-union struggles 1715–1727

58 59

60 61 62 63 64

65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75

76

77 78 79

Aug [to 27 August 1725], in the possession of Archibald Campbell, Esquire, the papers of his grandfather, Archibald earl of Ilay, and duke of Argyle.’ The Malt Tax riots have been discussed in Amy Watson, ‘Patriotism and Partisanship in Post-Union Scotland, 1724–37’, SHR, Vol. 97 No. 1 (April 2018), pp. 62–68. The best account remains Richard Scott, ‘The Politics and Administration of Scotland 1725–1748’, Chapter Nine: ‘The Malt Tax Crisis’, pp. 327–365, which is accessible without restriction through the University of Edinburgh Library online catalogue. Coxe, Walpole, Vol. II, p. 461. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 457. See Stuart Handley, M.J. Rowe and W.H. McBryde, ‘Pulteney, William, earl of Bath (1684–1764)’ in ODNB, accessed 29 November 2018; and Romney Sedgwick, ‘PULTENEY, William (1684–1764)’, in R. Sedgwick, ed., The History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1715–1754, Vol. II, p. 375, and Vol. I, p. 35, on Pulteney’s opposition in 1725. Bricke, ‘The Management and Administration of Scotland, 1707–1765’, pp. 146–147. Coxe, Walpole, Vol. II, p. 456. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 458. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 458. Lord Cullen died in March 1726. See Colin Kidd and Clare Jackson, ‘Grant, Sir Francis, first baronet, Lord Cullen (1658x63–1726)’, ODNB, online edition, accessed 30 July 2018. In November 1715, the second Duke of Argyll had sent a long account of his actions in Scotland against the Jacobite rebellion to Steuart, which is reproduced in Charles Dalton, George the First’s Army 1714–1727 (London, 1910), pp. 10–16. On p. 16 the conclusion of Argyll’s letter states that ‘Stuart’ could ‘read it to those who you believe my friends …’. Coxe, Walpole, Vol. II, p. 458. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters, Chapters 9 and 10. For the Scottish context, see Christopher A. Whatley, ‘The Union of 1707, Integration and the Scottish Burghs: The Case of the 1720 Food Riots’, SHR, Vol. 78 No. 2 (Oct 1999), pp. 192–218. Coxe, Walpole, Vol. II, pp. 458–459. Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 459. See A.H. Millar, revised by Anita McConnell, ‘Pringle, Sir Walter, Lord Newhall (1664?–1736)’, ODNB, online edn accessed 30 July 2018. Newhall’s opposition to the introduction of the Malt Tax in Scotland in 1725 is noted. Coxe, Walpole, Vol. II, pp. 460–461 Ibid., Vol. II, p. 461. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 463–464. Ibid. Eric G. Wehrli, Jr., ‘Scottish Politics in the Age of Walpole’ (University of Chicago Ph. D, 1983), pp. 282, 308–309; NRS, RH2/4/324/No. 271, Earl of Ilay to the Duke of Newcastle, ‘Edenburg’ Octob. 8, 1726. My thanks to Dr Alasdair Raffe for sharing his views on the visitation of 1726 at Glasgow with me. S.G. Checkland, Scottish Banking: A History, 1695–1973 (Glasgow & London, 1975), pp. 57–59; Richard Saville, Bank of Scotland: A History 1695–1995 (Edinburgh, 1996), pp. 91, 93–96; Whatley, Scottish Society, p. 61; John S. Shaw, ‘Civic Leadership and the Edinburgh Lawyers in Eighteenth Century Scotland: with Special Reference to the Case of Andrew Fletcher, Lord Milton’ (University of Stirling PhD, 1979), pp. 220– 221; John S. Shaw, Management of Scottish Society 1707–1764, pp. 119–124. NRS, RH2/4/324/No. 271, Ilay to Newcastle, ‘Edenburg’ Octob. 8, 1726. John S. Shaw, Management of Scottish Society, pp. 133–143; Shaw, ‘Civic Leadership’, pp. 167–169. Scott, ‘Politics and Administration of Scotland 1725–1748’, pp. 371–376; Wehrli, ‘Scottish Politics in the Age of Walpole’, p. 307.

6

The transformation of Jacobitism, 1727–1745

The Treaty of Union as the foundation text of a united British kingdom defined the development (or was it the mutation?) of Scottish Jacobitism after 1707. Jacobitism in Scotland might be described as having mutated as it became asso­ ciated with opposition to the union. Jacobitism appealed to Scots who valued the history and sovereignty of the ancient kingdom as well as those who opposed and resented the imposition of substantially higher rates of taxation, or alternatively, what could be perceived as an expansion of the resources devoted to tax collection after the union. In that sense, the post-union regime bore some resemblance to the English occupation of the 1650s, which included incorporation in the Crom­ wellian Protectorate/Republic.1 By 1727 the UK government had significantly increased its presence in Scotland. The military garrison had been expanded and consisted of both English and Scottish units.2 ‘English’ regiments did recruit Scots while in Scotland, just as there were soldiers who were not Scots in Scottish units. The Crown legal officers had become more assertive in prosecuting what were perceived to be breaches of the Treaty of Union. They were more closely super­ vised by the second Duke of Argyll’s younger brother the Earl of Ilay, who tra­ velled to Scotland from London during the summer months almost annually. Ilay identified lawyers and Church of Scotland ministers who were, in his opinion, talented, energetic and loyal to the Hanoverian succession as well as the British United Kingdom project. This meant that the Scottish legal system (including the post-union Court of Exchequer) became more closely subject to scrutiny from London as was the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. The five Scottish colleges (it would be an exaggeration to refer to them as universities at that point in their history) also became subject to what some termed management and others saw as Erastian intrusion.3 Nor was this all. Ilay and his protégés sought to influ­ ence burgh council government in the Royal Burghs of Scotland as well as the annual Convention of the Royal Burghs of Scotland at Edinburgh. This meant that the UK ministry identified merchants but also government office-holders who could both provide information to the government and endeavour to influence their burgh councils in favour of government policy. Landowners, particularly those who could qualify to vote in county parliamentary elections, were also sub­ ject to what some called ‘influence’ by agents of the government.4

102 The transformation of Jacobitism, 1727–1745 As a result of these developments, opposition to UK government policy in Scotland increased, particularly because the nature of that government appeared so shadowy. It was clear that the new king in 1727, George II, had decided that executive government serving the king would continue to be led by Sir Robert Walpole as First Lord of the Treasury, sitting in the House of Commons. There was, however, no Secretary of State for Scotland, as the British ministry wished to emphasise that Scotland was governed under its authority and its authority alone.5 The Earl of Ilay was appointed as Keeper of the Privy Seal of Scotland in 1721, and he had been (for most of the time) a member of the UK Privy Council since 1711. Since 1707 there had been no Lord Chancellor serving as head of the Scottish legal system. Instead, the Lord Chancellor of England, who presided over the House of Lords at Westminster with its sixteen Scottish Representative Peers, included as part of his duties presiding over appeals against decisions by the high­ est Scottish civil court, the Court of Session, brought before the House of Lords in London. The leading legal officers of the British monarch in Scotland, the Lord Advocate and the Solicitor General, in theory were subject to the authority of the UK Lord Chancellor, yet they operated under a system of law that did not recognise English Common Law (at least, not yet). By 1733 Ilay received the office of Keeper of the Great Seal of Scotland for life (an office associated with the post of Lord Chancellor of Scotland before the union), but which had been held by the Duke of Montrose from December 1716.6 There was a Commander in Chief of the British Army in Scotland, as there had been since the union, who by 1727 was the Irish Protestant General George Wade. The British army in Scot­ land, however, were subject to the legal authority of the Scottish courts, including the burgh courts in the towns as well as the sheriff courts in the Scottish counties.7 By 1727 it was clear that there was still much to be worked out in Scotland regarding the relationship of military authority and the Scottish legal system, as the crisis over the extension of the UK Malt Tax to Scotland and the riots asso­ ciated with that issue had demonstrated.8 After the riots opposition Whigs in Scotland, chiefly the former Lord Advocate Robert Dundas, called for the officers who had commanded soldiers who had fired on the rioters in Glasgow to be charged with murder. The officers, Captain Bushell and Lieutenant Thurloe, were defended in Parliament by Walpole himself, to declared ‘that Bushell deserved rather an address of Parliament to [the] King to reward him, than any punish­ ment.’9 Walpole then declared ‘that it had been Resolved to Draw a veil over the Late Disturbances in Scotland’ to avoid being ‘under some necessity of using severity towards wellmeaning people whose weakness was abused by the per­ verseness of those who find their account in publick Disturbances.’ He replied to Dundas (who was still MP for Midlothian) that if a majority in the House of Commons had voted to prosecute Bushell and Thurloe, ‘he called upon him and every one Else to witness that the Gentleman [Dundas] and not he were accoun­ table to the people below for what might happen.’10 The accession of a new king meant that there was a UK parliamentary House of Commons to elect, and in Scotland, a new election of sixteen Scottish peers who would be admitted to the House of Lords. It was the Earl of Ilay’s attempts to

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influence the election of the 16 Scottish Representative Peers in 1734 that aroused the most opposition as, understandably, there were members of the peerage who resented government efforts, or rather the effort of one of their number, the Earl of Ilay, to circulate a ‘King’s List’ of preferred candidates.11 Scottish peers who had been associated with opposition to or rivalry with the Campbell of Argyll aristocratic interest such as former Scottish Secretaries of State the Duke of Mon­ trose and the Duke of Roxburghe, were excluded from the ‘King’s List’ on the grounds that they were not supporting the King’s leading minister, Sir Robert Walpole. The fact that Ilay’s elder brother the second duke of Argyll had received a promotion in the English peerage from the king (the Earldom of Greenwich he received in 1705 being raised to a dukedom by George I) did not help, given that Scottish peers receiving post-union ‘British’ peerages were not admitted to the House of Lords. In contrast, since his English peerage in 1705 Argyll had sat in the House of Lords as an English peer.12 It was Sir Robert Walpole’s excise scheme which gave added impetus to political opposition in Scotland, driven by the possibility that Walpole finally had misread popular opinion by using the excise as a means of keeping the land tax at a minimal rate, and thus undermine Tory opposition and Jacobitism. The Scottish opposition Whigs styled themselves as ‘Patriots’, unwilling to submit to Walpolean political manipulation.13 They were keen to reduce expenditure on placemen, especially those in the excise, and reduce the tax burden on Scotland at a time when there was little evidence that union with England was providing the economic stimulus that the Scottish pro-union elite had anticipated in 1707. Of course the Campbells perceived themselves as patriots as well, but the second Duke of Argyll was beginning to doubt the price he and his followers were having to pay for power and privilege, particularly being cast as defenders of the post-union revenue system in Scotland, and thus in opposition to widespread resistance to it.14 By 1740, with another parliamentary general election featuring pronounced opposition to Walpole and his government imminent, the second Duke of Argyll was writing to his nephew James Stuart Mackenzie that ‘I have reason to fear My Brother Ilays advice to you will be to make your Self a Slave of Walpols My advice and your Brother Buts [John Stuart, third earl of Bute] will be to keep your Self an Independent man & that you should scorn any dependence upon any Minister whatsoever’. In another letter to Stuart Mackenzie, Argyll elaborated on his rea­ sons for opposing Walpole’s ministry: My Brother Ilay, wants to make all his friends Tools to Walpole & all other Ministers Whatsoever, My Brother Ilay prefers his Places to all other Con­ siderations, friendship Honour Relation gratitude & Service to his Country Seem at present to have no weight with him, your Brother Bute & I think it Our Honour that those considerations should weigh with us.15 As John M. Simpson commented in a seminal essay on Scottish government in the eighteenth century published in 1970, ‘it is hard not to sympathize with a man so evidently designed for a brilliant part, yet eternally at odds with the script, with his

104 The transformation of Jacobitism, 1727–1745 fellow players, and with himself.’16 Argyll’s younger brother, Ilay, and his sup­ porters appear to have viewed the Whig opposition as hypocrites anxious only for their own self-aggrandisement, and in the process wittingly or unwittingly encouraging Jacobite intrigue. The Walpolean regime was not slow to perceive Jacobite intrigue in any opposition to its policies, as illustrated by its campaign against the former Viscount Bolingbroke, who had been pardoned for his Jaco­ bitism and allowed to return to England from exile in France, only to place him­ self promptly at the centre of the growing opposition to Walpole as First Lord of the Treasury.17 Bolingbroke supported several prominent Scottish aristocratic politicians who became involved in organised opposition to the alliance Walpole had entered with the Duke of Argyll’s political supporters in Scotland to establish a stable UK government interest there. A leading role in this development was taken by the second Earl of Stair, whose family had been so important politically in Scotland following the arrival of William of Orange in England in 1688. At that time they were particularly prominent in the Scottish legal system. The first Earl of Stair had, as Sir John Dalrymple, Master of Stair (an estate in Ayrshire) held office as Lord Advocate of Scotland under both James VII and II and William and Mary. Dalrymple had, with the then tenth Earl of Argyll and Sir James Montgomery of Skelmorlie, carried the offer of the Scottish crown to London in 1689, and after William of Orange and his queen agreed to accept was appointed to be one of the Scottish Secretaries of State and thus central to Williamite government there. The second Earl of Stair was, in contrast, trained as a soldier, and had this in common with the second Duke of Argyll.18 Both Stair and Argyll eventually were promoted to the rank of Field Marshall in the British army. In contrast, whereas Argyll’s diplomatic career was brief, Stair held several important diplomatic posts, although he was as well known for speaking his mind as his compatriot Argyll. Perhaps his most important diplomatic posting was as UK envoy to the court of France after the successful completion of the Hanoverian succession in 1715. Stair made great efforts to convince the French ministry that it should refuse to jeo­ pardise the recent peace achieved between Britain and France through support of the Jacobite rebellion that broke out in Scotland and northern England later in 1715. By that time the principal architect of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, Bolingbroke, had fled London and joined the Jacobite court in France, becoming Secretary of State for the Jacobite claimant to the British throne, James, whose father James VII and II had died while in exile in France in 1702. Bolingbroke was soon disillusioned with the man who would be king and even more disillu­ sioned with the Jacobite court in exile, whose status in France was considerably reduced from 1713, after the end of the War of Spanish Succession and the Treaty of Utrecht.19 Once Stair became aware of Bolingbroke’s dissatisfaction with the Jacobite court in exile, he became a strong advocate of obtaining a royal pardon for Bolingbroke that would allow him to return to London.20 He was able to convince George I that this would be a positive development for the

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Hanoverian monarchy, although Bolingbroke returned to England without the restoration of his previous title as a Viscount, which prevented his resumption of membership of the House of Lords and thus the right to sit in Parliament.21 Bolingbroke became involved in the growing opposition to the Whig ministry dominated by the Norfolk landowners Walpole and Townshend, who had established themselves as leading ministers in the government by the early 1720s. The Scottish dimension of this was not only continued contact between Bolingbroke and Stair, both while Stair was British ambassador to France, and after his return to the UK, but through close links that developed between Bolingbroke and the second Earl of Marchmont in Scotland, as well as his sons Lord Polwarth and Alexander Hume Campbell 22. With far stronger links to the Presbyterian Covenanting Whig opposition to the Stuart monarchy in Scotland before 1688 than the Dalrymples of Stair, Marchmont and his sons represented the kind of country Whig ‘patriot’ political interest that would transcend older labels as Whigs or Tories.23 Implicit in their alliance with Bolingbroke was the idea that their political project would render Jacobitism meaningless by accepting the Hanoverian succession while opposing Walpole’s increasing domination of government and policy.24 This coincided with Walpole’s decision to address the problems of widespread public dissatisfaction with high taxation in Scotland following the failure of the 1715 Jacobite rising, which had culminated in the Malt Tax riots of 1725. The Wood’s halfpence scandal in Ireland had raised similar issues, although the latter was a subordinate kingdom rather than part of the UK. Yet Walpole’s ministry and its determination to ensure that its writ ran in Scotland raised serious questions regarding Scotland’s status in the UK, as it appeared to be a subordinate kingdom that lacked even its own parliament rather than a fully integrated part of the United Kingdom.25 Walpole’s project to improve the efficiency and productivity of tax collection in Scotland also coincided with his unexpected retention as First Lord of the Treasury after the succession of George II. As has been discussed above, a growing opposition based on deep-rooted hostility to the expanding fiscal regime at the heart of the Hanoverian monarchy marked the first years of George II’s reign.26 Walpole’s foreign policy of avoiding involvement in European wars was part of his project to lower the land tax by increasing income for the Treasury from customs and excise. Lowering the land tax would undermine Tory and Jacobite opposition to the Whig ministry by reducing financial pressures on landed estates, but it also led to opposition accusations that increases in customs and excise revenue had led to the growth of bribery and corruption in government. For what seem almost certainly political reasons, in Article IX of the Treaty of Union, the land tax in Scotland after 1707 ‘was pegged at a very low ratio relative to that in England and Wales’, which meant that ‘Scotland contributed 2% of the British total, against its 35% share of Britain’s land mass and about 17% of its population in 1707.’27 Thus the parliamentary election necessitated by the death of George I marked the beginning of significant political opposition in Scotland to the policies of the UK government. From the perspective of the ministry, this opened the way for Jacobite agitation, but increasing numbers of Scots argued

106 The transformation of Jacobitism, 1727–1745 that the sins of Jacobitism past should not be used as a screen to hide the growth of bribery and corruption in the Hanoverian state. In Scotland, Walpole’s alliance with the second Duke of Argyll and his followers essentially mirrored his con­ temporary approach to the ‘undertakers’ he employed or supported in the con­ tinuing Irish Parliament.28 The Earl of Ilay and his followers did not have a Scottish Parliament to manage, but they did expend a great deal of effort to influence the proceedings of the Convention of Royal Burghs of Scotland and the annual General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in Edinburgh, as well as influence the elections of Scottish MPs and Representative Peers to Westminster in the interest of the Walpole ministry. In Ireland, the ‘Wood’s halfpence’ scandal set something of a precedent for what occurred in Scotland at the time of the Malt Tax riots in Glasgow in 1725.29 Together, these disputes forced Walpole to focus on the issue of the relationship of Ireland and Scotland to the government in London. Of course, Scotland was part of the UK and Ireland was not, which was part of the reason that Ireland had ended up with ‘undertakers’ who managed the Irish Parliament. After 1713, the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland representing the absent monarch was always English.30 In addition to the ‘Lord Lieutenant’, who in the first half of the eighteenth cen­ tury only resided in Ireland when Parliament was in session, there was an Irish Privy Council as well as ‘the lords justices, usually three in number’ whose ‘influ­ ence increased somewhat after the Wood’s halfpence dispute.’31 After 1725 and the crisis over ‘Wood’s halfpence’ the Irish Lords Justices were the primate of the Church of Ireland, the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, and the speaker of the Irish House of Commons. Walpole established the convention that the offices of Pri­ mate of the Church of Ireland and Lord Chancellor would always be held by Englishmen. This left the role of the speaker of the Irish House of Commons to act as the only Irish ‘undertaker’, who in exchange for government favour and the rewards that went with it, accepted the task of overcoming any opposition gov­ ernment measures might meet with in the Parliament. One aspect of this was the Irish legislation that by 1728 established that ‘the effective removal of the Catho­ lics’ right to vote was made explicit’.32 In Scotland, the lack of both a Parliament and a Privy Council from 1707 and 1708 respectively, meant that Walpole had a very different constitutional and administrative situation to address in 1725. This in effect was why the Malt Tax riots in Glasgow and continued resistance to tax collection elsewhere in Scotland convinced the UK government that something had to be done about Scottish government as it had developed, or rather failed to develop, after 1707. In many ways, what Walpole set up and then established as a system from the beginning of the new reign under George II was the informal creation of what amounted to an unofficial Lord Lieutenant of Scotland. Nevertheless, despite holding the office of Lord Justice General, as well as that of Keeper of the Scottish Privy Seal, Ilay was not identified specifically by Walpole’s ministry as having executive responsibility for Scottish affairs. In 1725 Walpole had written to the third Duke of Devonshire (a future Lord Lieutenant of Ireland from 1737–1744) that the Duke of Rox­ burghe had been dismissed as Secretary of State for Scotland (with a pension of

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£3,000 a year) because he had been able to present himself publicly in Scotland as in charge of Scottish government and had refused to support policies the ministry, with the King’s approval, wished to implement.33 As Walpole put it to Devon­ shire: ‘your Grace must be sensible how impossible it was for us to carry on the common business of Scotland, much lesse to struggle with the present difficulties when we dare not trust the Secretary of State of the Province [sic] with any one thought or resolution that was to be executed.’ In 1733, Ilay was given the place of Keeper of the Great Seal of Scotland (previously held by the Duke of Montrose from 1716 to 1733) while being succeeded as Keeper of the Privy Seal by the Duke of Atholl, in preparation for the General Election of 1734.34 Walpole wished to punish Montrose for refusing to support his taxation policies while strengthening Ilay’s position as his unofficial manager for Scotland. His supporter Lord Milton, judge and political agent, at the time expressed his reservations with Walpole’s policy on Scottish government to Ilay: I am very glad your Lop by this Exchange gets a little more money and mortifys the Ennemy [the Patriot Whigs]. But still I coud have wished some­ thing better. I know youle thinke me wrong but to me it dayly becomes more & more Apparent that without being S. of S. [Secretary of State for Scotland] you may govern [crossed out] hurt your Enemys but never Govern & unite your Friends nor get your affairs managed with tolerable ease to yrself35 Ilay set up an informal committee something like the Irish ‘Lords Justices’. Those he recruited in Scotland were legal officers, judges, MPs, clergymen and Repre­ sentative Peers who worked to increase the power and influence of the govern­ ment. He did not, however, have to manage a Scottish Parliament. It is no mistake that Andrew Fletcher, nephew of the great Scottish patriot of the Union Parliament, Fletcher of Saltoun, was identified by Ilay as his principal Scottish correspondent in 1724. Fletcher’s appointment as a judge on the Scottish Court of Session, where he adopted the judicial title of Lord Milton, strengthened Ilay’s influence over the Scottish central courts, whose importance in the absence of a Scottish Privy Council had increased after 1708. By 1733 its presiding judge, Lord President Sir Hew Dalrymple, wrote to Milton that the courts in Edinburgh were ‘all that remains of the Government of the antient Kingdom’.36 As an Extra­ ordinary Lord of Session, Ilay had the right to sit as one of the judges of the Court of Session on any case when he was in Scotland, but he was, and intended to continue to be, normally resident in London and its environs for most of the year, where he was frequently in attendance at UK Privy Council meetings with other ministers and in the House of Lords. Thus his role was more like a Lord Lieute­ nant of Ireland than a Speaker of the Irish Parliament’s House of Commons acting as an ‘undertaker’, without delegated authority from the ministry. One example of how this unusual arrangement worked is reflected in correspondence between Ilay and Milton in early 1727 regarding stamp duties and excise officials in Scotland. This involved the Lord Justice Clerk (Adam Cockburn of Ormiston) and an

108 The transformation of Jacobitism, 1727–1745 English commissioner of the Scottish Board of Excise. Ilay assured Milton that ‘I will go down to the Treasury & look into it, the part of that dispute that lay in my province, (as far as I have any at all) was the right of nomination, & in that I gave my opinion in favour of My Lord Justice Clerk, the other part as its said here arose upon a conversation between the deputy & the Chief Baron [of the Exchequer court in Scotland].’37 As for Ilay’s informal network of correspondents to keep the relevant Secretary of State (the Duke of Newcastle) informed of Scottish business, he initially arranged in 1725 for the new Deputy Keeper of the Signet Seal in Scotland, Ranald Campbell, to act in that capacity. After Campbell’s death in 1726, Ilay’s deputy as Keeper of the Privy Seal, Alexander McMillan, was appointed as Deputy Keeper of the Signet as well.38 In addition, the Lord Advocate and Solicitor General (Duncan Forbes and Charles Areskine), two judges of the Court of Session (Lord Grange and Lord Milton) and George Drummond, one of the Scottish revenue commissioners in Edinburgh, also corresponded with Newcastle. By the 1730s Newcastle had fewer correspondents, partly because there was a limit to Newcastle’s interest in Scottish affairs. In Richard Scott’s analysis, ‘the really important channel of communication was not the formal one between government servants in Edinburgh and the Ministers in London but the informal ones between Milton and Ilay, and Ilay and Walpole.39 It should be noted that the judges Milton and Grange in effect acted in place of Lord Justice Clerk Adam Cockburn of Ormiston, who held his post for life despite the hos­ tility of Ilay and Walpole after 1725. Milton succeeded Ormiston as Lord Justice Clerk after his death in 1735, to formalise what he had been doing for the gov­ ernment since his first appointment as a judge. While Grange had acted Lord Justice Clerk from 1710 to 1715 before Ormiston took his place, Grange had continued as a Lord of Session after 1715 until he resigned his gown as part of his joining the Patriot Whig opposition to Ilay and Walpole in 1733 and becoming a Member of Parliament in 1734/5.40 The nature of Jacobitism in Scotland changed under the Hanoverian dynasty. It became less of an ideological cause linked to the rights of the ancient royal dynasty of Scotland, and more an umbrella movement for those who were dis­ satisfied with what the union had become since 1707. This included the belief that Scotland did not need what George II latterly (after the ’45 Jacobite rebel­ lion) called ‘a Vice Roy’, who ran Scotland as a glorified fiefdom.41 The analogy with government in the still separate kingdom of Ireland under the Hanoverians would not be considered a flattering one. Were the Campbells taking power in Scotland for their own aggrandisement? After 1727, a substantial number of the Scottish nobility, of burgh councillors, of lawyers and government officials, and of members of the Church of Scotland increasingly came to think so. The Campbells were not defending the Scottish union with England, their opponents believed. They were corrupting it to their own purposes. Ultimately, the response of the second Duke of Argyll and his nephew the third Earl of Bute was to go over to the ‘Patriot’ opposition, which briefly gained some influence in government after the fall of Walpole.

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Some suspected the Campbells of pandering to Jacobites in Scotland to entrench their power and influence there. Many dismissed reduction of direct taxation and government investment in the economy as Campbell ruses to increase their own power and wealth through persuading the English to agree to special treatment for their junior partner in parliamentary union. This enhanced the shadowy and insubstantial nature of what some historians have analysed as the social history of Jacobitism. Jacobites who armed themselves and defied the British state were traitors, but those who wished well to the ancient national dynasty of Scotland were adhering to loyalties that were admirable in their patriotism, but irrelevant, it would seem, to the future of modern Scotland.42 If Scotland was the historical nation, as Hume would express it in 1770, Jacobitism was stuck in the past.43 Hence when Robert Stirling in Kingston Jamaica wrote to his brother Archibald in Scotland in 1753, where the Stirling of Keir family were well known for their Jacobite sympathies, he declared that he and his friends in Jamaica did not ‘trouble ourselves about Kings or anything else but how to make as much Sugar & Rum as we can’.44 The Stirlings of Keir were Jacobite sympathisers in Scotland, but trading links with the Caribbean to a certain extent provided com­ pensation for political disappointments at home. ‘The chief use of money’, Stirling wrote to his brother, ‘is to support our friends and relations which gives a man more real pleasure than any other use he can put it to …’45 He made money from the high returns on the sugar and rum he shipped for sale in Britain and beyond. Kinship was a greater tie than political allegiance. In some ways it was the same thing. Of course, it is clear that not everyone at the time had the choice, as was the case with the nameless (in the historical record) ‘black servant’ of ‘Colin M’Naughton of Jamaica’ incarcerated as a Jacobite prisoner in Edinburgh Castle from 15 January, and eventually ‘Discharged sick’ in March 1746 from the Edin­ burgh Tolbooth.46 Similarly, in 1747 one of the principal clerks of the Court of Session wrote to the Lord Advocate seeking charity for three men from the Scot­ tish Highlands held in the tollbooth of Musselburgh just east of Edinburgh by the magistrates there, their transgression apparently being ‘Poverty & Tartan, which too often appear coupled.’47 Equally, the patronage-driven project to ensure that Scottish representatives at Westminster supported the ministry seemed to many to represent the unsatisfactory nature of the union of Scotland and England under the Hanoverian succession. That did not make all who opposed the ministry Jacobites, as those who were pro-ministry often implied. Rather it often appeared to include the idea that former Jacobites in Scotland could be converted into members of a coalition dedicated to limiting the power of a government seemingly devoted to financial expansion, higher taxation, and a dangerous propensity to encourage the pro-European proclivities of a Hanoverian king bent on ensuring that French power to dominate affairs of state in central Europe would always be held in check. Of course, the outbreak of the 1745 Jacobite rebellion demonstrated that the idea of repealing the Treaty of Union and reinstating the ancient kingdom of Scotland had not died as an aspect of Scottish Jacobitism, although clearly Charles Stuart (the so-called young pretender, as the Whigs would have it) wished his

110 The transformation of Jacobitism, 1727–1745 father to be restored as monarch of the kingdoms of England and Ireland as well as Scotland. Equally both opposition Scottish Whigs and the pro-ministerial Scot­ tish Whigs led by the Duke of Argyll (the former Ilay) after his elder brother’s death in 1743 aimed to transform and reinvent the union rather than repeal it. Of course Hanoverian politics was about ambition and profit through public office as well as ideology, but the continuing possibility of Jacobite treason reinforced the determination of Scottish Whigs that the union with England should demon­ strate a positive and transformative effect on Scotland. It is also true that the Walpole years appeared to demonstrate that the post-union high tax regime may have offered placemen profit in the revenue, the church, the legal system and in political office, but it did not seem to lead to an expanding system of credit in Scotland that would finance economic growth of any substance. Clearly this had something to do with the political instability that made the last Jacobite rising possible in Scotland after the fall of Walpole and the outbreak of war first with Spain in 1739, and then with France from 1742. The first ten years of the reign of George II appeared to demonstrate the failure of any opposition to Walpole’s ministry. Thereafter, however, the failure to deliver substantial economic growth for Scotland while taxes remained (or were perceived to be) high would contribute to Walpole’s eventual loss of office, although it would take time for the monarch and his closest advisers to re­ establish some form of stability in government. In the decade before his death in 1743, the second Duke of Argyll became increasingly uneasy with the Walpole ministry’s approach to Scotland, particularly after the parliamentary general election of 1734. There were some other English peers with Scottish connec­ tions, such as the Earl of Portmore, but the second Duke of Argyll, despite his English wife and his English estates at Adderbury in Oxfordshire and Sudbrook in Surrey, regarded himself as a Scotsman, and perhaps even, it seemed, as the leading Scotsman of the United Kingdom. The monument over his tomb at Westminster Abbey appeared to demonstrate that. Of course his father had played an important role in the success of the Revolution of 1688 and the offer of the Scottish crown to William and Mary as part of that. Argyll himself, how­ ever, had exceeded his father’s importance both as a particularly effective Royal Commissioner of the Scottish Parliament in 1705 and as the saviour of the union during the Jacobite rebellion on 1715, when he acted as Commander of the royal army in Scotland and prevented a major incursion by rebel forces into the Scottish Lowlands. He also was a General in Marlborough’s European army and played a role in its success against the French during the war of Spanish Succes­ sion. He not only spoke regularly in the House of Lords at Westminster on Scottish issues, but appears to have attended many of the debates in the Lords on issues relating to Scotland. Although Walpole’s majority in the House of Lords was secure, Argyll’s younger brother the Earl of Ilay had gone to extra­ ordinary lengths to ensure that all sixteen of the Scottish Representative Peers elected in 1734 by members of the Scottish peerage were supporters of the ministry, who like the bishops of the Church of England could be relied on to vote for the Walpole ministry’s measures in the House of Lords on a regular

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basis. The Earl of Stair, writing to the Duchess of Marlborough at the time of the 1741 general election, declared that he and other peers intended to go to Holyrood Palace for the election of the Scottish Representative Peers to prevent the Earl of Ilay and his supporters from treating it as a ‘congé d’élire’,49 a ritual ceremony signifying submission rather than liberty and independence. The second Duke of Argyll took this to be an attack on the political integrity of Scotland, of its place in Britain as a subordinate province like Ireland rather than as an equal partner, and began to demonstrate sympathy towards ‘Patriot’ opposition measures in the Lords. This sympathy became outright opposition in 1737, when government authorities in Scotland both civil and military lost control of public order in Edinburgh over what became known as the ‘Porteous Riot’. The riot occurred after the execution of a notorious smuggler who had won some popular sympathy for helping an accomplice escape custody while imprisoned in the Edinburgh tolbooth. There had been an attempt to seize the smuggler’s body, after execution by hanging in the Grassmarket, followed by an attack on the town guard as they marched back toward the centre of the burgh. This led their Cap­ tain, John Porteous, to give the order to fire, resulting in death and injury to a number of individuals in the crowd that had assembled for the execution. As a result Porteous was prosecuted for murder, convicted by the Scottish courts and sentenced to hang, a verdict received with approval by many in Edinburgh.50 Others, however, were concerned by the implicit sympathy the ruling appeared to represent for smuggling rather than support for the rule of law. They organised a royal pardon for Porteous, which duly arrived in Edinburgh from London before the date set for his execution. Before Porteous could be released, a highly orga­ nised mob assembled in the centre of Edinburgh that broke into the Edinburgh Tolbooth to seize him.51 He was taken to the Grassmarket and murdered in a botched attempt to hang him. There were military units present in Edinburgh at the Castle and in the Canongate, but the officer commanding, General Moyle, refused to authorise the entry of troops into the royal burgh without a warrant from the Magistrates, despite a verbal request conveyed to him by the Member of Parliament for Edinburgh, Patrick Lindsay, a former magistrate who went to Moyle’s headquarters to request assistance on behalf of the burgh council. Troops were drawn up at Holyrood Palace in the Canongate, outside the boundaries of the royal burgh, but were not authorised to enter the city itself until after Porteous had died.52 The impact of what was taken to be an outrage in London resulted in govern­ ment action to assert the power of the monarchy in the face of such a bold affront to its authority. Walpole himself was involved. The magistrates of Edinburgh and their MP were called to London to undergo examination relating to their part in the outrage. Parliament passed an act stipulating that ministers in every kirk in Edinburgh read out a demand that the perpetrators of the outrage be identified and brought to justice. This aroused great opposition in a Church of Scotland, whose very identity was founded on fear of Erastian influence on or in the kirk. The second Duke of Argyll was no pillar of the Church of Scotland, although his writ still ran in parts of it due to his lineage as great grandson of the famous

112 The transformation of Jacobitism, 1727–1745 covenanting Marquess of Argyll. He did, however, instinctively oppose Westmin­ ster parliamentary interference in the Scottish legal system and the Church of Scotland, and broke with the ministry on this issue, losing his public and military offices as a result. Although his brother remained loyal to the ministry right up until Walpole’s resignation as First Lord of the Treasury, he was unable to prevent the damage to the ministry’s influence in Scotland caused by his elder brother’s open opposition to it. Bolingbroke was no longer central to the political opposition to Walpole’s regime, but the idea of a broad coalition of politically active members of parlia­ ment and peers leading to a reform of a bureaucratic and ‘grubby’53 administra­ tion offered Argyll a way to demonstrate his own patriotism as a Scot as well as a Briton. The union he helped bring about should, he believed, genuinely allow all Scots to have equal access to British liberties rather than subject them to the whims of a political toady such as Walpole, his creatures, and the financial interests they represented. Just as Bolingbroke was a former Jacobite who could be said to have grown and learned through his access to Enlightenment culture in France once he was no longer a Jacobite, so a number of historians have commented recently on links between Jacobitism and the Enlightenment in Scotland. Did not David Hume, seeking intellectual shelter and solace in France, turn to his friend and relation the Jacobite and Jesuit ‘the Chevalier Ramsay’ in the 1730s? Appar­ ently Ramsay’s Jacobitism was incidental, as Hume’s contact came through a letter of introduction from the Scottish physician George Cheyne, who had treated Hume for what we would now term depression before he left Britain for France. After spending some time with Ramsay in Paris, Hume settled at La Fleche in the Loire valley with its Jesuit college, while he tried to write the book that would become The Treatise on Human Nature. 54 Jacobitism and Roman Catholicism may not have been part of Hume’s philosophy and politics, but they certainly were not absent from his social life. Although direct links between Jacobitism and enlightenment culture in Scotland are implied rather than explicit in recent scho­ larship; it is fair to observe that those who were zealous Jacobites, Tories or Whigs had less to do with Enlightenment culture than those Jacobites, former Jacobites, ‘court’ or ‘sceptical’ Whigs who were interested in what they perceived as cultural, economic and social progress rather than constitutional power. David Hume as an essayist praised aspects of the modern British constitution, but he did not con­ demn the Absolutist monarchical constitution of France. The spirit of ‘improve­ ment’ and Enlightenment were not nationally or politically specific, although without question economic development and Enlightenment social values were increasingly influential in France.55 Family kinship networks were important to Scottish Jacobitism. They incorpo­ rated members who had been or were to be involved with the Jacobite risings against the Hanoverians, but later accepted pardons that often were obtained through the good offices of relations who were Whigs, or at least important enough and wealthy enough to wield influence with the Walpolean regime. Many of these kinship networks not only included Jacobite sympathisers but also men who participated early in European colonial/overseas trade, sometimes with great

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success and sometimes not. One recent collection of essays on the ‘Enlight­ enment in Scotland’ included contributions by Scottish historians who were less interested in ‘the Scottish Enlightenment’ and more concerned with the intellec­ tual marginalisation of both Covenanting Presbyterian and Jacobite (often Epis­ copalian) political and religious traditions that were so central to Scottish civil and social culture during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In contrast, those Scots who adopted ‘Enlightenment’ cultural values were more concerned with the improvement and modernisation of an underdeveloped economy. These included clergymen who critics called ‘moderates’. They sought to balance religious Chris­ tian commitment and culture in a national church, which had struggled to accommodate strong Calvinist and Erastian legacies of a Protestant Christian cul­ ture in different regions of Scotland. This was a contradiction that, Enlightenment or no Enlightenment, was never fully resolved in modern Scottish culture.57 Hume claimed that Scotland had become a ‘historical nation’ because he believed that it had transcended its past and was facing a more positive future. He lived to doubt his optimism. It was about the time that the second Duke of Argyll entered into opposition to the Walpolean regime that Hume, who turned 30 in 1741, extended his intellectual interests from philosophy to politics and history. His Treatise of Human Nature, Books 1 & 2, appeared in early 1739, followed by Book 3 in late 1740. Hume famously described his principal work of philosophy as having been published ‘dead-born from the press’, but it was immediately followed by volumes of essays published in Edinburgh in 1741 and 1742, the second volume of which included an essay on the character of Walpole. Embarrassed by its public appearance after Walpole had been forced from office, in subsequent edi­ tions of the essays Hume ‘reduced the essay to a footnote to that on politics as a science, and eventually omitted it altogether’.58 At the time, however, Hume’s essay on Walpole was published (anonymously) in many British newspapers. The Newcastle Journal published it along with a review of its contents, prompting Hume to reply (anonymously) in the March 1742 issue of The Scots Magazine, in terms by no means uncritical of Walpole. He conceded that Britain undoubtedly had been able to expand its trade and thus its natural wealth while Walpole was in power.59 Hume’s essays, it has been argued, ‘staked out a framework for understanding contemporary British politics which was considerably more sophisticated than that which had hitherto dominated public debate, by Viscount Bolingbroke’.60 It took time, but indications are that, as editions of the essays continued to be published in a revised form, Hume found a significant readership.61 As opposed to following the Bolingbroke opposition line, drawing on traditions of classical republicanism, Hume (although an accomplished classicist) emphasised the importance of stable political institutions and the rule of law. He rejected the sense of divine exceptionalism that was part and parcel of the British Whig tra­ dition post 1688.62 He was himself, as the historian Duncan Forbes put it, ‘a sceptical Whig’, suspicious of party, ‘especially when principle was reinforced with religious enthusiasm’.63 His essays could be read as supporting post 56

114 The transformation of Jacobitism, 1727–1745 Walpolean ‘Court Whigs’ in government,64 namely Henry Pelham and his brother the Duke of Newcastle, but also the third Duke of Argyll, transfigured after his elder brother’s death from Lord Ilay the Walpolean henchman into an elder statesman whose nephew the third Earl of Bute was to become tutor to George II’s grandson the Prince of Wales.65 Indeed, Hume’s candidacy for the professorship of moral philosophy at the College of Edinburgh was supported by the Lord Provost of Edinburgh, who was presumed, certainly by Hume, to have the support of the third Duke of Argyll. Argyll still held some legal appointments for life (Lord Justice General and Keeper of the Great Seal), but his political influence was reduced by Wal­ pole’s loss of office and the changes new ministers had made in their approach to managing public appointments in Scotland, such as those to professorships in Scottish colleges.66 The burgh council of Edinburgh appointed a Church of Scotland minister, rather than Hume, to be Edinburgh’s Professor of Moral Philosophy. Hume then became caught up in the fallout from the Jacobite rising of 1745 to 1746. He published a defence of the actions of the Lord Provost of Edinburgh during the Jacobite occupation of Edinburgh in autumn 1745 when he was tried before the Scottish Court of Justiciary in 1747.67 Also in 1747, when Hume worked on a new edition of his Essays, Moral and Political, an essay he had planned on the protestant succession was not included after he had asked Charles Aerskine, a Court of Session judge and former Lord Advocate, to advise as to whether it should be published. It was replaced by an essay on national characteristics.68 Although Adam Smith was not yet publishing by 1740 (he was twelve years younger than Hume) he had also begun to engage with Scottish politics and government. Although Smith’s Snell exhibition fellowship from the College of Glasgow led him furth of Scotland to study at Oxford in 1740, while at Oxford he was in contact with his cousin William Smith, the second Duke of Argyll’s steward at Adderbury, Argyll’s Oxfordshire estate. Smith the student got access to the library at Adderbury through his cousin’s influence. After the second duke’s death in 1743, Adderbury passed to his eldest daughter, but Smith by the age of twenty must have had an idea of Argyll’s opposition to Walpole’s government. He would later take the second duke’s grandsons on their European grand tour after the Peace of Paris in 1763.69 Like Hume, Smith was in England at the time of the last Jacobite rising in 1745, returning from Oxford to live with his mother in Fife in 1746. Although there were by reputation many Jacobite sympathisers at Oxford, Smith’s experience was similar to that of Hume’s during the Jacobite rebellion. Both observed English reactions to what was widely regarded as a Scottish inva­ sion of England at a time when England (or more properly Great Britain) was at war with France. As Hume and Smith are so associated with what we now have been taught to regard as ‘the Scottish Enlightenment’, it is worth noting that the enormous litera­ ture on the lives and careers of both of them includes little discussion of their poli­ tics, although both became part of the Argathelian project to construct a strong, or at least stronger, Scottish economy through the union.70 That included the

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ambition to strengthen the fabric of a stronger Scottish society that would profit from the growing cultural and intellectual development arising from the expanding public life and civil society, which economic expansion would make possible. Hume and Smith were not associated with Jacobitism. They were associated with the Scottish Argathelian Whig project that could be said to have grown out of the continuing presence, cultural as well as political, of Jacobitism in Scotland after the union, and to a certain extent beyond 1745. Jacobitism would be gone by the last decade of the eighteenth century, but its legacy was the literary phenomenon of sentimental Jacobitism, which came to mark indelibly the identity of Scotland post Enlightenment. The careers of Hume and Smith developed in the manner that they did because of Scottish access to the expanding literary and print culture in Hano­ verian Britain. It is an exaggeration to claim that there was a Jacobite Enlight­ enment, just as it is something of an exaggeration to claim that there was a ‘Scottish’ Enlightenment rather than an expanding presence in Scotland of Eur­ opean Enlightenment culture. Margaret Sankey’s and Daniel Szechi’s insight into the place of Jacobitism in eighteenth century Scotland was that it was a cultural and social phenomenon as much as it was military and political, but then so was the Whig manifestation of politics in post-union Hanoverian Scotland.71 The great accusation against William Robertson by his opponents was that he was a cryptoEpiscopalian subverting the Kirk of Scotland by subordinating its independence through expanding the secular role of the kirk in Scottish society.72 It is only recently that the idea that the ‘Enlightenment’ could be analysed in a national context within Britain has been extended beyond Scotland to England, Ire­ land and Wales. Roy Porter argued that England was central to the Enlightenment in Britain, because the permanent importance of the discoveries and ideas of Locke and Newton formed the later basis of whatever Hume and Smith were able to achieve.73 Attempts to discuss Enlightenment culture in Ireland have been more contentious, as Ireland in the eighteenth-century has been defined by so many historians in terms of the culture and society of the Protestant Ascendancy.74 Yet there is no doubt that the same kind of marriage of philosophy and political economy was not only present in the work of Bishop Berkeley and Viscount Molesworth, but also in the teaching in the Scottish colleges through their professors’ engagement with the ideas of Grotius and Puffendorf and the scholarship that flourished in the Netherlands and the German-speaking universities. There is also the point to make that a society such as that in Ireland, presented in so many works as divided between Catholic and Protes­ tant, was bridged in manifold ways through the interaction of the complex, multilayered society of eighteenth-century Ireland. The term ‘Protestant Ascendancy’ does not fully express this.75 The career of John Toland, from one perspective, illustrates the cosmopolitan nature of the European Enlightenment, but from another per­ spective, the complexities of an Irish society in which a boy born out of wedlock in an Irish-Gaelic speaking family could receive financial support from an Irish Presbyterian community in Donegal to study Divinity at Glasgow before moving on to Edin­ burgh, the Netherlands, German-speaking Europe and London.76 It is also clear that eighteenth-century Ireland was no place for religious toleration for Roman Catholics, despite contemporary claims regarding ‘British’ liberties.77

116 The transformation of Jacobitism, 1727–1745 There have been claims that a ‘Scottish Enlightenment’ was no more than the adaption of the ideas of Locke and Newton in Scottish public culture. Equally, discussion of what might be considered a ‘Welsh Enlightenment’ have explored the relationship of Welsh culture in the eighteenth century to what might be considered ‘Enlightenment culture’.78 Certainly there were Welshmen who made a contribution to European Enlightenment culture, such as Richard Price in England, or Sir William Jones in India, but while their origins were Welsh, their links to Enlightenment culture were Anglophone. The Morris brothers, sons of a cooper on Anglesey who read widely (which does not quite seem to fully explain his effect on the achievements of his sons), became interested in the language and history of Wales once they had established themselves as minor officials in the Customs service and in the Navy Office in London. They were instrumental in the establishment in London of the ‘Cymmrodorian’ (‘ancient inhabitants’) society as a means of celebrating Welsh language and culture in a manner that Evans argues ‘accelerated Wales’s semi-autonomous cultural development as compensation for, and justification of, its lack of separate political clout.’79 Sir William Jones was a member of the Cymmrodorian and served on the Welsh legal circuit, but he was also ‘Harrow-educated, London-based and an Orientalist’, illustrating that, in Evans’ opinion, ‘the ground area between activities not really Welsh on one side, and those not really enlightened, on the other, was always narrow’.80 Certainly the Morris brothers and the Cymmrodorian illustrate the literary networking and associational culture characteristic of much of the social transactions we consider part of Enlightenment culture. Franco Venturi emphasised an Enlightenment he saw as cosmopolitan and international: ‘Enlightenment was born and organised in those places where the contact between a backward world and a modern one was chronologically closer’.81 As others have noted, this was not unlike the relation­ ship of Anglophone/Scots and Gaelic cultures in Scotland throughout the seven­ teenth and eighteenth centuries. John Robertson has argued that Venturi defined the Enlightenment as ‘a movement in which cosmopolitanism and patriotism combined to give … unprecedented intellectual openness, as its adherents every­ where sought in the experience of other societies models for the betterment of their own’.82 Thus Enlightenment culture was a project of the provincial rather than the metropolitan, of Edinburgh, Dublin and other university towns and legal centres across Europe rather than London and Paris.83 Of course, such provinces were in a symbiotic relationship with the metropoli of eighteenth century Europe, but the dynamic of the relationship was not all one way. Seen from such a per­ spective, Scottish intellectuals and their friends and family could define themselves as part of an effort to counter the metropolitan decline that overtook the Romans and the Athenian empire in the past and seemed to be threatening London in the age of Walpole by promoting the civilising powers of commerce and education in the patriotic enterprise of improving their country. What Scotland shared with Ireland and Wales, and still to an extent with parts of England as late as the middle of the eighteenth century, was an uneasy juxta­ position of a number of local and regional cultures, which included considerable linguistic diversity. This had a significant effect on how the UK project played out

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until the end of the ‘Seven Years War’ in 1763, at which time responsibility for what had become an international empire prompted greater interest in centralisa­ tion.84 What some Scots referred to as ‘completing the union’ became part of how the Scottish Enlightenment defined itself, and that included individuals and families who were or had been associated with Jacobitism to a significant degree. Indeed, the leading lights of the Enlightenment bore considerable responsibility for that, as the distinctive and central role of a continued Jacobite presence in Scottish society and culture to the middle of the eighteenth century and beyond became the central plank of an effort to present Scotland’s historical experience as central to the success of the British unionist project. Scottish Enlightenment intellectuals thus could and did present their place as British provincials as a beginning rather than an end to the British union and its future.

Notes 1 Julian Goodare, State and Society in Early Modern Scotland, pp. 319–321. 2 Victoria Henshaw, Scotland and the British Army, 1700–1750, see the index entries under ‘barracks’ and Chapter 5, ‘Scotland’s Military Installations’. There is little dis­ cussion in the text of the service and experience of the ‘English’ regiments who served in Scotland while General Wade was Commander of the Forces there. Also see Mack­ illop, ‘Confrontation, Negotiation and Accommodation: Garrisoning the Burghs in Post-Union Scotland’, pp. 159–183. 3 John Stuart Shaw, Management of Scottish Society, pp. 32–33, 98–106. 4 See, for example, NLS, Saltoun Papers, MS. 16536, ff114–117, Duncan Forbes of Culloden to the Earl of Ilay, Aberdeen, 26 August 1727; MS. 16536 ff120–1, Duncan Forbes to ‘My Lord’, Culloden, 1st September 1727; MS. 16536 f122, Duncan Forbes to ‘My Lord’, Culloden, 8th September 1727; MS. 16555, ff44–5, Alexander Brodie of Brodie to Lord Milton, Brodie house, May 25th docketed [23] May 1734; MS. 16555 f62, Lord Ilay to Lord Milton, ‘Janry 8th 1734’; MS. 16555 f64, Lord Milton to Lord Ilay (copy), Jan. 1734; MS. 16555, f112, Charles Campbell to Lord Milton, Stirling March 20th docketer ‘Capt Charles Campbell 20 March 1734’; MS. 16557 f45, Earl of Home to Lord Milton, 26 May 1734; MS. 16558 ff7–8, Countess of Eglinton to Lord Milton, 20 & 28 April 1734. 5 J.H. Plumb, Sir Robert Walpole: The King’s Minister (1960), pp. 104–105. 6 Riley, English Ministers and Scotland, p. 265; Ronald Sunter, ‘Graham, James, first duke of Montrose (1682–1742)’, in ODNB, online edn, accessed 30 July 2019. 7 Henshaw, Scotland and the British Army, index entries for General Wade and ‘smuggling’. 8 Mackillop, ‘Confrontation, Negotiation and Accommodation’, pp. 159–183. 9 Quotation from NLS, MS. 16533, f56, Ilay to Lord Milton, 5 March 1726. Also see MS. 16532 f146, ‘Copy Letter [from Lord Milton?] to Mr [William] Steuart, Octr 1725’; MS. 16532 ff96 & 97, ‘Letter to R.C. [Deputy Keeper of the Signet Seal Ranald Campbell] to ‘Mr [Charles] Delafaye’. 27 Nov. 1725. 10 NLS MS. 16534 f30, Duncan Forbes to Lord Milton, ‘March 10th 1726’. 11 R. Scott, ‘Politics and Administration of Scotland 1725–1748’, pp. 382–406. 12 Richard Harding, ‘Lord Cathcart, the Earl of Stair and the Scottish Opposition to Sir Robert Walpole, 1732–1735’, Parliamentary History, Vol. 11 Pt 2 (1992), pp. 192–217. 13 NLS, MS.16555 f89, Ilay to Milton, ‘Sept. 1734’; MS. 16559 ff92–3, Ilay to Milton, Jan 30 [1735]; MS. 16559 f96, Ilay to Milton, ‘March 13’, docketed ‘13 March 1735’; MS. 16559 ff98–99, Ilay to Milton, 15 March 1735; MS.16559 ff100–101, copy of letter from Lord Milton to Earl of Ilay, n.d., but clearly a reply to Ilay’s letter of 15 March 1735.

118 The transformation of Jacobitism, 1727–1745 14 Emerson, An Enlightened Duke, pp. 266, 268–270, 277–278. 15 Mackenzie manuscripts in the Bute Archive at Mount Stuart, Isle of Bute, Scotland, second Duke of Argyll to ‘My Dear Stuart’, ‘London, Oct ye 23 1740’; and Argyll to Stuart Mackenzie, ‘London Jan: ye 9 1741’; See Emerson, An Enlightened Duke, p. 268. 16 Simpson, ‘Who Steered the Gravy Train, 1707–1766?’, p. 58. 17 H.T. Dickinson, Bolingbroke (1970), pp. 173–246. 18 H.M. Stephens, revised by William C. Lowe, ‘Dalrymple, John, second earl of Stair (1673–1747)’, in ODNB, online edn, accessed 31 July 2019; Graeme Townend and David Hayton, ‘DALRYMPLE, John (1673–1747)’, in R. Paley, ed., The History of Parliament: House of Lords, 1660–1715, Vol. V, pp. 657–660. 19 H.T. Dickinson, ‘St John, Henry, styled first Viscount Bolingbroke (1678–1751)’, in ODNB, online edn, accessed 31 July 2019, particularly the sections headed ‘The Jaco­ bite Cause’, ‘Opposition to Walpole’ and ‘Patriotism’. 20 I. Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 1968), pp. 14–15; but especially Dickinson, Bolingbroke, pp. 142–3, 147, 150–11, 154. 21 Dickinson, Ibid., p. 174. 22 Marianna Birkeland, ‘Campbell, Alexander Hume, second earl of Marchmont (1675– 1740)’ in ODNB, online edn, accessed 31 July 2019; Romney Sedgwick, ‘HUME CAMPBELL, Hon. Alexander (1708–60)’ and HUME CAMPBELL, Hugh, Lord Polwarth (1708–94) in R. Sedgwick, ed., History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1715–1754, Vol. II, pp. 159–160. 23 Gabriel Glickman, ‘Political Conflict and the Memory of the Revolution in England 1689–c.1750’ in Harris and Taylor, eds., The Final Crisis of the Stuart Monarchy, p. 244. 24 Dickinson, Bolingbroke, pp. 219–221, 237, 248, 268, 270, 275–6. 25 See Daniel Szechi and David Hayton, ‘John Bull’s Other Kingdoms: The English Government of Scotland and Ireland’ in Clyve Jones, ed., Britain in the First Age of Party, 1680–1750 (London, 1987), pp. 241–280. 26 Andrew Mackillop, ‘Subsidy state or drawback province? Eighteenth-century Scotland and the British fiscal-military complex’ in Aaron Graham and Patrick Walsh, eds., The British Fiscal-Military States, 1660–c.1783 (2016), accessed electronically in the Reading Room of the NLS, 24 July 2019; Michael Jubb, ‘Economic Policy and Economic Development’ in Jeremy Black, ed., Britain in the Age of Walpole (1984), 121–144; Michael Jubb, ‘Fiscal Policy in England in the 1720s and 1730s’ (University of Cam­ bridge PhD, 1978), pp. 339–405. 27 Julian Hoppit, ‘Scotland and the Taxing Union’, p. 46 and note 5 on p. 46; Christo­ pher A. Whatley, Bought and Sold for English Gold? (Second Edition 2001), Appendix 6, The Articles of the Treaty of Union of 1707, Article IX, p. 106. Hoppit, ‘Scotland and the Taxing Union’ and Article IX of the Treaty of Union record £48,000 per annum as maximum annual payment from Scotland of the Land Tax after 1707. Macinnes, Union and Empire, p. 282, states £480,000, which appears to be a misprint. 28 Szechi and Hayton, ‘John Bull’s Other Kingdoms’, pp. 273–275. 29 Patrick McNally, ‘Wood’s halfpence, Carteret and the government of Ireland, 1723– 26’, Irish Historical Studies, Vol. 30 Issue 119 (May 1997), pp. 354–376. 30 Patrick McNally, Parties, Patriots and Undertakers: Parliamentary Politics in Early Hanoverian Ireland (Dublin, 1997), pp. 24, 46–47. 31 Ibid., pp. 46–52. 32 Ibid., p. 46; J.G. Simms, ‘Irish Catholics and the parliamentary franchise, 1692–1728’, Irish Historical Studies, Vol. 12, No. 45 (March 1960), pp. 28–37. 33 Plumb, Sir Robert Walpole: The King’s Minister, pp. 105–106 34 Marianna Birkeland, ‘Murray, James, second duke of Atholl (1690–1764)’, in ODNB, online edn, accessed 7 August 2019. 35 NLS, MS. 16552 f98, docketed by Lord Milton ‘Ld. Ilay Copy 20 June 1733’.

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36 NLS, MS. 16553, f5, Sir Hew Dalrymple, Lord President of the Court of Session, to Andrew Fletcher, SCJ, 7 March 1732 [dated old style for 1732/3, apparently, as the letter has been placed with correspondence for 1733]. 37 NLS, MS. 16535 f63, Ilay to Milton, docketed ‘14 Jan 1726/7’. 38 See The History of the Society of Writers to the Signet (1890), pp. 389–394; John Shaw, Management of Scottish Society, p. 137. 39 Scott, ‘Politics and Administration of Scotland 1725–1748’, p. 365. 40 Richard Scott, ‘Erskine, James, Lord Grange (bap. 1679, d. 1754)’, in ODNB, online edn, accessed 8 August 2019. 41 See Appendix 9: ‘Scotland’, in Sedgwick, ed., History of Parliament: The Commons, 1715–1754, Vol. I, pp. 159–160. 42 Sankey and Szechi, ‘Elite Culture and the Decline of Scottish Jacobitism 1716–1745’, pp. 90–128. 43 Hume to William Strachan [Aug. 1770], in J.Y.T. Greig, ed., Letters of David Hume, Vol. II, pp. 230–231. 44 Allan I. Macinnes, Marjory-Ann Harper and Linda G. Fryer, eds., Scotland and the Americas, c.1650–c.1939: A Documentary Source Book (SHS, Fifth Series, volume for the year 2000, published 2002), p. 76. 45 Ibid. 46 Sir Bruce Gordon Seton and Jean Gordon Arnot, eds., The Prisoners of the ’45, Volume 3 (SHS, Third Series, Vol. 13, 1929), p. 414, Entry 3470. 47 John Finlay, Legal Practice in Eighteenth-century Scotland (Leiden, 2015), p. 222. 48 See the pamphlet which used an aspect of Scottish medieval history as a means of attacking certainly Walpole, and by implication Ilay in 1734: The Life of Sir Roby. Cochran, Prime Minister to King James III of Scotland (London, 1734), pp. 5–7, denouncing the activities ‘of a Corrupt, Ambitious, an Ignorant, or a Desperate Minis­ ter’. Norman MacDougall, James III: A Political History (Edinburgh, 1982), pp. 289– 291, discusses this pamphlet and two further pamphlets on the same subject published in London in 1735. 49 J.M., Graham, ed., Annals and Correspondence of the Viscount and first and second earls of Stair (1875), Volume II, p. 274. See OED entry for ‘congee|congé’, ‘6. Congé d’élire: royal permission to a monastic body or cathedral chapter, to fill up a vacant see or abbacy by election.’ Accessed electronically 7 July 2017. 50 See H.T. Dickinson and Kenneth Logue, ‘The Porteous Riot, 1736: Events in a Scot­ tish protest against the Act of Union with England’, History Today, Vol. 23 (1972), pp. 272–281; H.T. Dickinson and Kenneth Logue, ‘The Porteous Riot: A Study of the Breakdown of Law and Order in Edinburgh, 1736–1737’, Journal of the Scottish Labour History Society, No. 10 (June 1976), pp. 21–40; Kenneth J. Logue, ‘The Life and Death of the Notorious John Porteous’, in Murdoch, ed., The Scottish Nation Identity and History, pp. 56–70. 51 Hoppit, ‘Scotland and the Taxing Union’, p. 47. 52 Cambridge University Library, Cholmondeley (Houghton) MSS, Ch(H) Papers 71/ 5, ‘Examinations of individuals concerned in the Porteous Riot’, March 1736, parti­ cularly the testimonies of ‘Mr [Patrick] Lindsay’, ‘General Moyle’, ‘the Lord Provost of Edinburgh’ and ‘General Wade’; Romney Sedgwick, ‘LINDSAY, Patrick (1686– 1753)’, in Sedgwick, ed., The History of Parliament: House of Commons 1715–1754, Vol. II, p. 218. 53 Phillipson, David Hume, p. 55; Bruce Lenman, ‘A Client Society: Scotland between the ’15 and the ‘45’, in Black, ed., Britain in the Age of Walpole, p. 84. 54 James A. Harris, Hume: An Intellectual Biography (2015), pp. 78–81. 55 Emma Rothschild, ‘Isolation and Economic Life in Eighteenth-Century France’, American Historical Review, Vol. 119 No. 4 (Oct. 2014), pp. 1055–1082, particularly p. 1057, note 14.

120 The transformation of Jacobitism, 1727–1745 56 George McGilvary, ‘John Drummond of Quarrel’, pp. 147–148, and Allan Macinnes, ‘Union, Empire and Global Adventuring with a Jacobite Twist, 1707–53’, p. 136, in Douglas Hamilton and Allan Macinnes, eds., Jacobitism, Enlightenment and Empire (London, 2014). 57 Nicholas Phillipson, ‘Foreword’ to Jean-François Dunyach and Ann Thomson, eds., The Enlightenment in Scotland: national and international perspectives, Oxford Uni­ versity Studies in the Enlightenment (2015), and the essays by Colin Kidd, ‘Enlight­ enment and anti-Enlightenment in eighteenth-century Scotland: An AyrshireRenfrewshire microclimate’ and Allan I. Macinnes, ‘Applied Enlightenment: its Scottish limitations in the eighteenth century’. Also see Colin Kidd, ‘Subscription, the Scottish Enlightenment and the Moderate Interpretation of History’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History, Vol. 55, No. 3 (July 2004). 58 John Robertson, ‘Hume, David (1711–1776)’, in ODNB, online edition accessed May 2017. For an extensive discussion of Hume’s project to compose a treatise and how this led him to seek to present his ideas ‘in an entirely new way’, see Harris, Hume: An Intellectual Biography, Chapter 2. The quotation is from Harris, Hume, p. 141. Harris also argues (p.140) that ‘we cannot be certain why’ Hume gave up on the Treatise. Also see pp. 145– 154 in Chapter 3, under the subheading ‘Preparation for the Study of Politics’. 59 Harris, Hume, pp. 185, 196–197, 201, 245; Scots Magazine, Vol. IV (1742), pp. 38–39, 119; Robert C. Elliott, ‘Hume’s “Character of Sir Robert Walpole”: Some Unnoticed Additions’, Journal of English and Germanic Philology, Vol. 48 (1949), pp. 367–370. 60 Robertson, ‘Hume, David’, in ODNB; Dickinson, Bolingbroke; Kramnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle; Duncan Forbes, Hume’s Philosophical Politics (Cambridge, 1975), pp. 193–194. 61 Harris, Hume, pp. 196–197. 62 Forbes, Hume’s Philosophical Politics, pp. 91, 94,193–194; Harris, Hume, pp. 166–174; Nicholas Phillipson, David Hume (2011), pp. 68–69. 63 Robertson, ‘Hume, David’ in ODNB. 64 See Reed Browning, Political and Constitutional Ideas of the Court Whigs (Baton Rouge and London, 1982), pp. 17–18, 151, 169, 192, 226–227. 65 Emerson, An Enlightened Duke, pp. 331–335; Murdoch, People Above, pp. 85–103. 66 Harris, Hume, pp. 207–209. Roger Emerson, ‘The “Affair” at Edinburgh and the “Project” at Glasgow: The Politics of Hume’s Attempts to become a Professor’, in M. A. Stewart and J.P. Wright, eds., Hume and Hume’s Connexions (1995). 67 See A True Account of the Behaviour and Conduct of Archibald Stewart, Esq. (Edin­ burgh, 1747), and Harris, Hume, pp. 234–235. 68 Harris, Hume, pp. 239–242. The essay was published later, in 1752. 69 See Brian Bonnyman, The Third Duke of Buccleuch and Adam Smith (2014), pp. 40– 52. 70 Forbes, Hume’s Philosophical Politics, pp. 86–89; Donald Winch, Adam Smith’s Politics (Cambridge, 1978), pp. 165–169, 183–186. 71 Sankey and Szechi, ‘Elite Culture and the Decline of Scottish Jacobitism’, pp. 126–128. 72 Colin Kidd, ‘The ideological significance of Robertson’s History of Scotland’, in Stewart J. Brown, ed., William Robertson and the Expansion of Empire (Cambridge, 1997), p. 136. 73 Roy Porter, Enlightenment: Britain and the Creation of the Modern World (London, 2000), pp. 242–257, especially 242–244. See the review by Richard B. Sher in SHR, Vol. 82 No. 2 (October 2002), pp. 279–283. 74 Patrick McNally, Parties, Patriots and Undertakers (1997) pp. 15–16; Sean Connolly, Religion, Law and Power: The Making of Protestant Ireland 1660–1760 (Oxford, 1992), pp. 198–317. 75 McNally, Parties, Patriots and Undertakers, pp. 15–16; Ian McBride, ‘The Edge of Enlightenment: Ireland and Scotland in the Eighteenth Century’, Modern Intellectual History, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2013), pp. 135–151, esp. pp. 148–149.

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76 Stephen H. Daniel, ‘Toland, John (1670–1722)’, in ODNB, online edn, accessed 7 August 2019; Justin Champion, John Toland and the crisis of Christian Culture, 1696– 1722 (Manchester, 2003), pp. 2–8, 46–47, 51–55, 60–65, 73–77, 116–119, 129–131, 150–159, 214–218, 222–228, 246–250. 77 Le Roy Ladurie, ‘Afterward: Glorious Revolution, shameful revocation’, in B. Cottret, The Huguenots in England: Immigration and Settlement c1550–1700, translated by Peregrine and Adriana Stevenson (1991), pp. 300–304. 78 R.J.W. Evans, ‘Was there a Welsh Enlightenment?’, in R.R. Davies and Geraint H. Jenkins, eds., From Medieval to Modern Wales (Cardiff, 2004), pp. 142–159. 79 Ibid., p. 158. 80 Ibid., p. 151. 81 Ibid., p. 159; Franco Venturi, Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment (London,1971), p. 133: ‘It is tempting to observe that the Enlightenment was born and organized in those places where the contact between a backward world and a modern one was chronologically more abrupt, ad geographically closer. It was the dif­ ference between traditional Scotland and the Glasgow and Edinburgh of the eighteenth century which created groups and societies similar to the patriotic ones of the con­ tinent, which concentrated attention on the economy and society and which posed once again all the problems of the relations between utilitarian philosophy and new policies.’ 82 John Robertson, ‘Review Article: Franco Venturi’s Enlightenment’, Past and Present, No. 137 (Nov. 1992), pp. 183–206. 83 Phillipson, ‘Culture and Society in the Eighteenth Century Province: The Case of Edinburgh and the Scottish Enlightenment’, in Stone, ed., The University in Society, Vol. II, pp. 407–448; Phillipson, Adam Smith: An Enlightened Life, Chapter 4, ‘Edin­ burgh’s Early Enlightenment’. 84 C.A. Bayly, Imperial Meridian (1989), pp. 77–86; Stephen Conway, War, State and Society in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Britain and Ireland, 1740–1800 (2006), pp. 18–19, 71, 87, 90–93, 96–97, 113, 115, 136–139, 155–156, 159, 181–182, 192, 194–210, 260–267.

7

The Scottish economy and Scottish society, 1688/9 to c.1763

It has been argued that European mercantilism and the expansion of European trading overseas opened up avenues of optimism in Scottish government and society, which coincided with the demise of the Lauderdale regime in 1679. Government in Scotland, stimulated by the presence of the Duke of Albany (the Scottish title of the Duke of York) during the two short but influential periods he resided in Edinburgh, began to discuss economic development in the Privy Council, and to a certain extent adopted English policy as its paradigm.1 Of course the experience of English conquest and military occupation in the 1650s had been a blow to the Scottish economy, occurring as it did after almost fifteen years of constant warfare by a Scottish covenanting government that made Scot­ land virtually a kingdom independent of its king. It went to war and fully func­ tioned without the presence, or indeed without the approval of its absentee king, and met its nemesis in Oliver Cromwell in 1650 and 1651. Despite the resurgence of the Scottish nobility at the Restoration, with the revival of the monarchy and the ancient kingdom of Scotland, the Scottish Restoration government from 1660 was not as successful as its Covenanting predecessors, or even, arguably, the English garrison of the 1650s, in ensuring that its writ ran throughout the coun­ try. There were, however, efforts by the Privy Council (and the Parliament when it was in session) to encourage economic recovery and indeed development. Privy Council interest in economic development after 1679 came after the suppression of a major rebellion in the Presbyterian heartlands of the west of Scotland against the authority of the Scottish government. It was this that prompted the dispatch of Charles II’s brother and heir James to act as Royal Commissioner in Scotland, where he presided over the Scottish Privy Council for most of the period from October 1679 to 1681.2 James had experience of English Privy Council discussions of the importance of foreign trade and colonies for generating national (and royal) wealth through mercantilist trading monopolies, including personal involvement in the development of former Dutch colonies in New York and New Jersey in North America. He previously had sat as a member of the Scots section of the English Privy Council.3 It was the Cromwellian Protectorate which first legislated a parliamentary ‘Navigation Act’, but the Restoration monarchy under Charles II had retained and expanded mercantilist policies hostile to dominant Dutch (and

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French) interests after 1660. This English legislation did Scotland no favours. Equally, however, the Scottish Privy Council (and Parliament and legal system) had no interest in enforcing English law in Scotland. That had not changed in 1681, nor did it after James Stuart became James II of England and Ireland and James VII of Scotland in 1685. After 1688/9, as warfare broke out across England, Ireland and Scotland, it may have been short and sweet to the victors in England in 1688, but was far more destructive and disruptive in Ireland and Scotland than anything either kingdom had suffered since 1650 and 1651. The Williamite regime in Scotland was also more unstable if less repressive than its predecessor.5 The pressures of the Williamite war effort, not so much in Scot­ land itself after 1692 but in terms of the demands of securing resources from Scotland to support the war against France, meant that economic development was minimal. As Rosalind Mitchison observed, the effect of William’s (and France’s) wars ‘was to turn a world heading towards [mercantilist trading] protection for reasons of intellectual preference into one urgently needing to use high duties for revenue’.6 The consequences led to an expansion of state finance but did not necessarily expand the British economy as a whole.7 This would define the British economy of the eighteenth century and Scotland’s uneasy place within it. Restoration Scotland was an ancient kingdom restored after decades of war and foreign occupation, but its economy reflected the efforts by both Scottish and English governments to raise tax revenue for armed struggle and the main­ tenance of garrisons. Scotland in the 1690s was in economic as well as political crisis, but over the course of the seventeenth century, including the years of the Restoration of the ancient Scottish monarchy, ‘Scotland had achieved a great deal.’8 Although the price of grain was static in markets across northern Europe, Scottish landowners diversified into raising and selling black cattle and sheep, and developing salmon fishing on the rivers that flowed through their estates along the east coast. They also followed Dutch example by encouraging the fishing of herring shoals off the coast where their lands were bounded by the sea. From 1665 Scottish salt works secured almost a monopoly of their home market, and a number of estates made substantial investments in expanding the coal works in Fife and the Lothians. Estates across central Scotland (and sometimes beyond) promoted part-time textile production of linen in particular, which brought increasing numbers of working women into the commercial economy, albeit at the margins.9 In the years after 1660 as many as 60,000 head of cattle were being sent to England in good years, herded across Scotland to markets such as those held at Crieff and Falkirk.10 As early as 1663 the Scottish Parliament passed legislation to encourage the export of grain to continental markets. Hundreds of new market centres were established after 1660 through parliamentary legislation. Burghs of barony were approved by parliament to encourage trade, getting access to trading privileges, which before 1672 were restricted to Royal Burghs chartered by the monarchy.11 There was urban expansion, but it was patchy. Edinburgh was a small city, with a growing professional sector, which attracted increasing numbers of the

124 The Scottish economy, 1688/9 to c.1763 younger sons of the nobility and gentry. Glasgow was not as large, but clearly benefited from increasing access to expanding Atlantic trade networks.12 Although the English navigation acts were restrictive, Scots merchants were not affected during the English wars with the Dutch in the 1660s and 1670s. Indeed, the size of the Scottish merchant marine doubled through the capture of Dutch vessels during the war with the Dutch in the 1670s.13 This may have contributed to the increasing confidence that led to the establishment of a committee on trade by the Scottish Privy Council.14 The committee brought forward a mercantilist-influ­ enced system that was approved by Parliament, banning imports into Scotland of products such as linen that the Scots intended to export themselves, and prohi­ biting the export of Scottish raw materials that could contribute to the expansion of manufacturing.15 So far, so positive, but although on many estates in Scotland there were attempts to improve the cultivation of crops, there were limitations on what could be achieved. Margaret Young’s doctoral research on agrarian improvement in the carse of Gowrie in Angus and Perthshire demonstrates that crop yields rose in the 1670s and 1680s, but that there were fluctuations between harvests, which in some years were severe.16 Christopher Whatley has argued that even in areas where there had been substantial advances in improving agricultural production, ‘few tenant farmers had accumulated sufficient reserves of capital to enable them to survive more than a single bad year without becoming heavily indebted.’17 This did not mean that many tenants were bad farmers, but it did mean that there was not yet a fully developed market for the distribution and sale of grain across all of Scotland. By the 1670s agricultural wages in Scotland began to stagnate whereas they rose in England.18 Credit was not always available, and domestic consump­ tion, even by the families of tenant farmers, was limited. Conditions had deterio­ rated further in the last decade of the seventeenth century.19 The war ended in 1697, but the ambitions of the Scottish Parliament and Privy Council to identify the means for economic recovery were frustrated less by war­ time disruption than by the Scottish experience of severe famine in the 1690s. As Karen Cullen has commented, ‘the famine highlighted real weaknesses in the Scottish economy and a mistaken over-confidence in the country’s agricultural sector.’20 After the Cromwellian occupation had ended, an increasing number of landowners in Scotland endeavoured to recover from their setbacks under the high tax regimes of the Covenanting wartime government and the Cromwellian union with England by experimenting with agricultural improvement. Their hope was that increasing grain yields and raising the quality of the livestock on their estates would enable them to realise higher rents.21 This was moderately successful, but by the 1680s, with the political and religious temperature rising again in Scotland, those landowners who had increased yields were having difficulty finding a market for their grain both internally in Scotland or through export to continental Europe or to England.22 In a well-known memorandum to the Committee of Trade of the Scottish Privy Council in 1681, it was noted that ‘wee have seen by experience in this country oftener than once, particularly in anno 1667, 1672, 1673 and 1674, wher the strength of the habituall disease in the body of trade in this

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kingdome was found almost in conquerable by aney laws or acts made for reg­ ulating and redressing the same.’23 When out-and-out famine conditions arose through the hostile weather that afflicted all of Europe in that decade, Scottish grain markets failed. Larger estates did in some cases continue to export grain to Europe, but only because it was difficult to find buyers in Scotland who could afford to purchase grain on the open domestic market.24 Although in some areas agriculture had begun to adopt best practice from the more innovative commercial farms of England and the Netherlands, Whyte has suggested that ‘one effect of the famines of the late 1690s may have been to convince the more forward-looking agriculturalists of the urgent necessity of spreading improved techniques more widely throughout Scotland.’ There cer­ tainly were estates where progressive agriculture on Dutch and English models were introduced, but while landowners wished to innovate, their ability to con­ vince their tenants to follow the examples their factors wished to set was much more limited.25 This may be behind the legislation relating to agrarian improvement legislation passed by the Scottish Parliament in 1695, which established the basis of the ‘improvement’ that would become more widespread and influential by the early eighteenth century. The objective appeared to be consolidation and enclosure of farmland, which became the basis for many of the initiatives embarked upon in the eighteenth century by landowners anxious to raise the value of their estates. When this programme for future improvement was passed by Parliament in 1695, the full scale of the acute economic crisis that overtook Scotland in the second half of the 1690s had not become fully appar­ ent. Theory had yet to be translated into practice.26 The preamble of the ‘Act Anent Lands Lying Run-rig’ stated that runrig and the multiple tenancies of farms, which it supported as an agricultural system, was ‘highly prejudicial to the … improvement of the nation by planting and enclosing conform to the several acts and laws of Parliament made thereanent.’ It made it possible for just one proprietor with lands let in runrig in a particular area to apply to a sheriff, or the Justices of the Peace, or the Lord of a Regality (land subject to the legal jurisdiction of a powerful subject by grant of the Scottish crown) for the division and consolidation of lands under their jurisdiction. This made it possible for larger and wealthier landowners to force through divisions that would allow them to sell, exchange, and buy lands allocated to them under such a division and thus consolidate their landholdings into enclosed fields and farms. This aspiration did not map on to what was happening on the ground under the complex system of feudal land law in Scotland. Each farmtoun across the country was still to a certain extent a law unto itself. Another important bill relating to agriculture passed by the Scottish Parliament in 1695 was an Act for the division of ‘com­ monties’. The rationale, if it can be termed that, in the text of the Act referred to ‘the discords’, which arose over land held in common. The language deployed by those responsible for the text of the Act can be read from a variety of perspectives. Under the terms of the Act, those with rights to a commonty who wanted to divide it could raise a summons in the Court of Session. If the court approved a summons, it appointed an agent with knowledge of the locality (a sheriff, Justice

126 The Scottish economy, 1688/9 to c.1763 of the Peace, or baillie of regality) to devise a division of the common that would be accepted by those with rights to it, which meant that all land suitable for crops or grazing would be transferred to private ownership. The only common rights which would be protected would be access to peat mosses (if present) ‘so that everyone received a share with access for each party reserved.’27 Otherwise, ‘commonties’ were to be divided in proportion to the size of the contiguous estates of those landowners who could prove their rights ‘to the individual appointed by the Court of Session to carry out the division’. Again, this act pro­ vided that any individual with rights of access to the common could force through a division if they had the money to employ the lawyers who acted for them. Access to peat was recognised implicitly as a common right, but also implicit was the assumption that farming was best left to those with the resources to enclose. The passage of both this Act and the Act of Runrig by the Scottish Parliament acquired a tragic irony in retrospect given the outbreak of severe famine in Scotland by the autumn of 1695.28 The historian of that famine has written that it ‘triggered five years of grain scarcity, high prices, dearth and ultimately, famine.’ It caused a crisis in food supply for the general population that lasted until autumn 1700.29 Why? Harvests failed over most of northern Europe in the late 1690s due to exceptionally harsh weather. Was the operation of the grain market in Scotland responsible for the disaster which overtook many areas of the country in the 1690s? Or was it the primitive state of the feudalistic farming systems employed across most of the country which caused the crisis? It appears that the famine was a result of the war with France, the disruption of trade for Scottish merchants that resulted from this, and relatively high levels of taxation levied on a poor country to contribute to the costs of the war. The failure of the harvest in 1695 made these difficult challenges for the Scottish economy, and proved fatal for the provision of an adequate food supply in many regions of the country. Government, such as it was in Scotland, was unable to meet this challenge, although Dr Cullen concedes that harvest fail­ ures elsewhere in northern Europe, and the high cost of importing grain ‘was a serious problem to the government.’30 If the 1690s famine was unique to Scot­ land the government would have been better placed to import grain to avoid famine. Disaster it was, however, despite the efforts of some parish heritors and burghs to provide support for the poor. The demographic impact of the famine has still not been fully researched, but increased mortality, a fall in the birth rate, and loss of population through increased migration ‘meant that Scotland had only just regained its pre-famine level more than half a century after the end of the famine.’31 Nevertheless, the end of the famine in 1700 made it possible for landowners interested in raising crop yields and the quality of livestock on their estates to try to put their ideas into practice. Some commonties were divided by private agreement, just as it would be possible for some estates to begin investing in enclosure. The common of Halls in Midlothian was divided among landowners and feuars in 1695, for example, who included the Clerk of Penicuik family, after the Act anent Commonties was first passed by Parliament.32 The common of Lillieslief in Roxburghshire was divided

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in 1702, which involved the Buccleuch estate. Pasture amounting to 891 acres was divided among eleven neighbouring estates and ‘a number of small feuars’, with the peat moss on the common remaining undivided as per the terms set out in the text of the act.33 Estate by estate, farm by farm, perhaps even field by field, agriculture was changing and developing in Scotland, although beneath the generalities there was considerable variation, from the continuity represented by the persistence of tra­ ditional agriculture in much of the Highlands, the north-east of Scotland, and the upland Border country with England to significant development of more com­ mercialised agriculture in the central Lowlands of Scotland, which raised pro­ ductivity in what had become the most prosperous part of the country. Commercialised agriculture often involved getting rid of people on an estate, somewhat more neutrally referred to recently as a process of ‘tenant reduction’.34 Tenant reduction in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries did not always ‘get rid of people’, although the migration rate both within Scotland and beyond it was substantial. In other cases those families who lost their share of multiple tenancies became cottars whose labour remained a resource valued by many estate managers.35 The pace of change was evolutional rather than revolu­ tionary, with little contemporary comment on the process. This could be a result of the confident belief of many landowners and their agents that ‘improvement’ enabled peasant families to raise their status and become more productive. Hence the then Lord Advocate, William Grant, later the Court of Session and Justiciary judge Lord Prestongrange, writing about 1750, of the need for careful govern­ ment management of the estates confiscated by the UK government after the Jacobite rebellion and retained under government management rather than sold to the highest bidder. Grant and the third Duke of Argyll were advocates of parliamentary establish­ ment of a commission for ‘annexed’, as opposed to all forfeited (confiscated) Jacobite estates, which was established by Act of Parliament in 1752. By 1754 the Duke of Newcastle, who had succeeded his brother Henry Pelham as First Lord of the Treasury at Westminster, followed this up by demanding a report from the Scottish Court of Exchequer on the administration of the estates of Scottish Jacobites forfeited to the Treasury after the end of the Jacobite rebellion in Scot­ land in 1746. Grant, the former Lord Advocate, on his appointment to a so-called ‘double gown’ in both the Court of Session and the Court of Justiciary, wrote to the UK Lord Chancellor (Hardwicke) that he ‘had seen with Lord Deskford [a member of the Commission for Annexed Estates and heir to the Findlater estate in Northeast Scotland] in the low country in his various schools for knitting and spinning, and when afterwards I saw little flocks of idle children in the highlands my heart burned with desire that they might be usefully employed …’36 Lord Dupplin, MP for Cambridge and a member of the UK Treasury Board under Newcastle (but also a son of the Earl of Kinnoull, whose estates were in Perthshire) wrote to Lord Deskford that the task for the Commission of Annexed Estates would be the ‘settling and civilising’ of the highlands and that ‘if there should be any attempt to make that commission subservient to highland power

128 The Scottish economy, 1688/9 to c.1763 and highland views, every step taken for that purpose must be directly opposite to the intention of the Legislature.’37 The suspicion remained that the influence of the third Duke of Argyll would delay meaningful reform. In 1760, when the commission was renewed after the death of George II, the Sheriff Depute of Perthshire, John Swinton (from Berwickshire) wrote to Gilbert Elliot at the Board of Treasury in London requesting appointment to the commission, arguing that the highlands ‘have not turned to a great account to the public or that much has been done for the inhabitants. I except those [people from the Scottish highlands] who have gone to Canada. I mean there is really a Canada at home si sua bona NORUNT.’38 T.C. Smout has argued that for the improving elite in Scotland, ‘the improvement of the people … would go alongside the improvement of the economy.’39 Smout has also observed that ‘the trouble with improvement in the first half of the eighteenth century was that it was trying to replace a low input, low output agricultural system with a high input, high output system in an eco­ nomic climate where demand was sluggish and prices flat.’40 That began to change in the 1740s under the stimulation of renewed war with France and Spain after over twenty years of peace. War would bring the higher demand and higher prices needed to make Scottish agriculture pay. For many contemporaries, such as David Hume and Adam Smith, it would seem a triumph, although they were not to know that it would be a temporary one.41 Smith argued that ‘only by moving to the higher-wage regions in corn lands or towns’ could the rural poor benefit from agricultural improvement.42 If agrarian improvement was, to a significant number of those who were members of the Scottish elite, one means of improving the nation, so was over­ seas trade. Nevertheless, European mercantilism did not make it easy for those who wished to grow Scotland’s economy and raise general standards of living. The demise of the Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies demonstrated that. Despite its failure, the Act of the Scottish Parliament char­ tering the Company of Scotland indicated an increasing awareness among the Scottish elite of just how much economic growth had been achieved in southern England, the Netherlands and northwest France through colonial trade by the end of the seventeenth century.43 The 1695 Scottish legislation to encourage the consolidation of land suitable for farming reflected awareness of English suc­ cesses in agrarian innovation, which meant that more landowners would look to raise productivity on their land as additional markets opened up for their pro­ duce, not just livestock but grain as well.44 It was out of this awareness that the project of parliamentary union was revived in the years after the death of William III (William II in Scotland). William had argued for it both in 1689 and just before his unexpected death in 1702.45 His successor as monarch, Queen Anne, supported the project.46 Although negotiations in 1702 again proved abortive, from the beginning of her reign the union question dominated Scottish public life, and a very significant element in the extensive printed literature the issue generated discussed the possibility for economic renewal and expansion for Scotland through unhindered access both to English markets but also to the overseas plantation colonies whose products, particularly sugar, had proved to be

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so successful in European markets. The issue attracted less attention in England, but as the Scottish Parliament continued to legislate in a manner not entirely aligned with English interests, so debate over England’s relations with Scotland increased in London as well as Edinburgh. Much of the treaty eventually accep­ ted by both Parliaments in 1706 and 1707 was focused on the economic issue of Scottish poverty and how an elaborate and expensive English taxation system could be extended to Scotland, an issue which for the English was non­ negotiable. English support for parliamentary union with Scotland was certainly not rooted in concern over the Scottish economy, but there was a recognition that only so much tax income could be extracted from Scotland, certainly before the end of the war, which had broken out again between England (and Scotland) and France after the death of William III in 1702. Even with the concessions offered by the treaty as finally agreed and the sensitive nature of the de facto religious settlement after the union that appeared to offer some security for a Presbyterian Church of Scotland, the introduction of the full administrative apparatus of the English rev­ enue system would prove to be an enormous shock to the entire population of Scotland after the Union.47 In contrast to the barely functional Scottish Exche­ quer and Treasury pre-union, after May 1707 an expanded (and expensive) roster of customs and excise officials were deployed in Scotland, although receipts were low.48 It would take the outbreak of yet another war with Spain and France in 1742 and the defeat of another Jacobite rebellion in 1746 before what by then was a much larger and more powerful British state poured resources into the country to ensure that the law, including revenue law, was enforced. The contrast between sporadic attempts to extend British Westminster government control and contrasting efforts to win investment from the UK Treasury into expanding the Scottish economy is the dominant thread of Scottish history in the first fifty years after the 1707 treaty establishing the United Kingdom.49 Relatively recent research has explored the economic impact of the consider­ able changes to the operation of the formerly English and now UK tax system extended to Scotland after 1707, and in particular the impact of customs and excise taxes on Scottish trade out with what had become the UK after May 1707. The Scottish excise service was expanded, to the outrage of much of the population. Professor Whatley cites fears of ‘shoals’ of excise officers from Eng­ land, quoting James Erskine (using his judicial title of Lord Grange) writing to his brother the Earl of Mar in August 1707 that the excise and general hostility to the union on the part of ‘the Commonality’ had ‘set them all mad’, although the total number of Englishmen among the new excise officers was less than a hundred.50 Bob Harris refers to ‘the intense and long-lasting antipathy toward the hoards of new tax officials who came north after 1707.’51 Julian Hoppit, in contrast, while citing the Jacobite printer/publisher Robert Freebairn in 1716 on the ‘rigourously exacted’ taxes collected ‘by a Parcel of Strangers send down upon us by England’, dismisses this perspective as ‘mythic’ given that actual tax raised by the newly introduced revenue system after 1707 did not ‘rise at all’ and that there ‘may even have been a fall.’52 Some concessions had been made by the

130 The Scottish economy, 1688/9 to c.1763 English commissioners for the Treaty of Union on some commodities taxed under the English excise, on the general principle advanced by the English negotiators that tax collection and tax law had to be uniform in both Scotland and England. The immediate result was large scale fraud on the part of mer­ chants and tradesmen in Scotland, sometimes involving violence towards cus­ toms and excise officers, which peaked in the political crisis of 1723–1725.53 Problems relating to the collection of excise taxes would continue throughout the eighteenth century. There were also problems with the collection of the customs duties, but there were some benefits. The Restoration Stuart monarchy in England had developed an extremely complex customs regulatory system whose technicalities included elaborate rules for the taxation of imports from the English plantations in the Caribbean and North America. They also led to increased overseas trade and continued growth in income from the customs, all of which went directly to the Crown. These regulations ‘favoured the transit trades, and encouraged re-exports of colonial non-essentials, such as tobacco, somewhat at the expense of domestic exports.’54 There were three aspects of what became known as the ‘re-export’ trade in the UK, in which Scottish merchants, the great majority trading out of ports in the west of Scotland, particularly Glasgow, increasingly specialised in tobacco rather than cotton, sugar or other colonial crops.55 Firstly, the UK Treasury by 1707 did not tax imports of colonial goods if they were ‘re-exported’ from mainland UK ports to Europe, or indeed beyond Europe. Secondly, the excise tax on the sale of tobacco that was re-exported within three years of its importation into the UK and storage in a government warehouse, was by 1723 entitled to a ‘draw-back’ (tax rebate) of 100 per cent. Finally, this meant that if imported colonial goods were intended for ‘re-export’, merchants were not required to pay cash for the customs duties on importation, but only if goods were sold on into the UK economy rather than exported abroad. Instead, customs officers would accept a bond com­ mitting the merchant to pay duty unless the goods concerned were re-exported out of the UK within three years. The effect was to encourage many merchants to enter the re-export or transit trade, thus providing British merchants with an advantage in trading colonial goods to European countries, who had less access to them. The UK government encouraged its own merchants by promoting their trade with European ports rather than import goods for the domestic market.56 In Scotland, particularly, smuggling of colonial goods became a major activity, just as it had been before the union, but as the transit trade was legal, and an increase in the presence of the British army and navy took effect, a substantial number of Scottish merchants entered the legal re-export trade rather than risk engaging in illegal trade. Ironically, this involved re-establishing traditional Scottish trade links with France, the ‘Low Countries’ and the Baltic. Although war intervened in 1739 to 1748 and again from 1756 to 1763, Scottish merchants preserved their trade with French correspondents through the elaborate credit networks they had con­ structed from the 1720s to the 1750s.57 Low levels of consumption in Scotland for colonial goods, and the increasing difficulty of transporting smuggled goods into England, also encouraged

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merchants to enter the re-export trade, although we need to know more about the trading links between Scottish merchants and the Isle of Man.58 Recent research on the importation of tea into Scotland in the eighteenth century, while unable to quantify any smuggling that was taking place, has concluded that Scottish merchants paid no attention to the legal monopoly on the sale of tea in the United Kingdom held by the East India Company.59 Initially most tea sold in Scotland was sourced from the Dutch East India Company and the Nether­ lands. After 1731, with the establishment of the Swedish East India Company (which included merchants of Scottish birth), tea for the Scottish market, little as it was, mostly was smuggled from Gothenburg in Sweden. By the 1740s some Scottish merchants could find a market in London for tea imported into Scot­ land from Sweden. Thus smuggling and ‘free trading’ illustrated the undeve­ loped nature of Scotland’s economy even as late as the 1750s, unable ‘to catch up with the consumption, trading patterns and terms of taxation of her English partner in the United Kingdom.’60 Within the post-union free market, until markets and means of production were more thoroughly integrated (this also applied, of course, to Wales and the English regions as well as Scotland), Scotland remained an ‘economy of limited markets and opportunities’.61 In that sense the Scottish economy was very like those of the Baltic countries as long as in economic terms it remained peripheral to the com­ mercialised agriculture and dynamic consumer markets of the South of England and London. It has been argued that ‘the Union of 1707 did not create the fra­ mework for the Scottish colonial trades but merely increased the institutional safety of an already existing trading pattern.’ Thus trade with England and parti­ cularly London became easier for Scottish merchants just as trade with English plantation colonies in the Caribbean no longer involved the risks of defying the English Navigation Acts. Trade grew as a result, although in the early eighteenth century much of the trading of Scottish merchants was based on systematic underrecording of the volume of tobacco imported for re-export. This was due to the willingness of many of the Scottish customs officials who were appointed when the English customs establishment was introduced into Scotland to accept bribery or less obvious incentives to collude with merchants.62 UK government intervention in Scottish affairs in the 1720s, although it inclu­ ded increasing the number of English officers on the Scottish customs establish­ ment, still resulted in only modest increases in Scottish tax revenue. That changed with an ambitious Treasury enquiry into the Scottish revenue system in 1732 as part of what would lead to the so-called ‘Excise Crisis’, as the Walpole ministry continued to try to reduce the revenue’s dependence throughout the UK on the land tax. By the 1720s smuggling of tobacco into the UK could have been as much as 50 per cent of the value of customs duties that were actually collected.63 The 1732 Treasury review of Scottish customs records from 1727 to 1732 found that ‘little above 300 hhds of Tobacco pay duty each Year, tho the real quantity consum’d in Scotland is probably ten times as much.’64 Smuggling tobacco into Scotland and the north of England was big business for Scottish merchants in the west of Scotland during the first third of the eighteenth century as tobacco was

132 The Scottish economy, 1688/9 to c.1763 declared for re-export and thus exempted from paying duty, only to be landed illegally along remote coastal areas of England and Scotland rather than exported to France or northern European ports. The domestic Scottish economy (as opposed to the re-export trade in colonial goods) produced two commodities for which there was foreign demand: cattle and linen.65 The first of these was exported exclusively to England, initially through English cattle drovers who fattened cattle on north of England pastures before herding them on to the London market, where the roast beef of old Eng­ land beloved of ‘John Bull’ was in many cases from Scotland.66 Over the course of the first half of the eighteenth century Scottish linen began to find markets in the British Caribbean and North American colonies, but its original export market in the late seventeenth century was in England, because its low quality was matched by its low price.67 Dr Rössner is right to argue that ‘cattle and linen production either retained or even increased their economic significance in a slowly expanding but structurally unchanged Scottish economy after 1707’.68 Free trade with Eng­ land definitely led to an increase of Scottish trade with England and union gave Scotland access to English capital resources for investment, although again, in the first half of the eighteenth century, English investors in Scotland seldom reaped large profits from their investments.69 As Scottish banking developed in the eighteenth century, it increasingly was able to draw on capital markets in London, although it is difficult to quantify the connection.70 The origins of the so-called ‘Ayr Bank’ collapse, however, go back to the private banking system that devel­ oped in Scotland after the union and its growing reliance on borrowing and credit from London. There is much to the argument that ‘it was the English and not the American connection which stimulated Scotland’s economic development, 1700– 1760’, but was it the English colonial trades and the financial surpluses it generated that provided the capital for increasing English investment in Scottish enterprises and Scottish goods?71 Thus Scotland was achieving some economic growth in the eighteenth century, but the majority of the population, in common with most of northern Europe, did not experience a rise in living standards.72 It would be the British imperial wars after 1754 (when clashes between the British and French in North America pre­ dated the declarations of war in 1756) that would bring the expansion of domestic markets in the UK that would enable Scottish agriculture, by far the most domi­ nant element in the economy, to expand. Nevertheless, ‘it appears as though between 1708 and 1760, domestic output did not trend up significantly’ and that from the 1750s until after the conclusion of the Seven Years War in 1763 Scotland did not export a surplus of grain, but instead was reliant on imported grain to feed its slowly expanding population.73 Initially, then, making the union work involved progressive integration of Scottish government and politics into English economic and political institutions. It was an exercise in political economy. The Scottish economic take-off, if it ever really occurred, was the result of Scottish access to English markets in Britain and beyond that in the empire, particularly after 1763. This generated wealth that was unequally distributed as the population expanded, while population was reduced on rural estates and urbanisation increased, as did

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migration to England and overseas. Thus the Glasgow success story in the tobacco trade, although visible by 1763 (the year before Adam Smith resigned his pro­ fessorship at the University of Glasgow), remained something of an isolated phe­ nomenon in Scotland nationally.74 By 1763 David Hume had published a number of essays on political economy. Hume’s most recent biographer, James Harris, has argued that manuscripts in Hume’s handwriting bequeathed to the Royal Society of Edinburgh (apparently dating from the early 1740s), around the time of the first, anonymous, edition of Essays, Moral and Political) demonstrate that ‘the books that Hume had been reading seem to have been, in large part, descriptions and analyses of trade, parti­ cularly trade between England, France and Holland, along with general compara­ tive accounts of the economic situations of these countries’,75 and that ‘the reading that Hume had been doing would have led him fairly directly from mat­ ters of political arithmetic and political economy to the party divisions that were the most notable feature of the British parliamentary politics of the time.’76 Hume’s foray into political economy was not specific to Scotland, but in many ways, it was all about Scotland. Part of his interest related to the debate over Sir Robert Walpole’s policies as First Lord of the UK Treasury. One of Hume’s notes states that ‘S.R.W. [Sir Robert Walpole] was more considerable before he was Prime Minister than any private Man since his Change in one Night about the Mutiny Bill in 1717 augmented the … Majority by 80.’77 This refers to Walpole’s resignation in 1717 and his moving to lead the opposition to the ministry, which had forced him to resign from the Treasury. According to J.H. Plumb, ‘the main weight of Walpole’s attack was aimed at the supply for the army which was about the only measure which allowed of controversy.’78 From the beginning of December into January Walpole opposed the ministry’s demands for supply of the army and forced them to be reduced. In the debate on the Mutiny Bill, ‘he spoke strongly against permitting courts martial to inflict the death penalty but took himself and his supporters into the government lobby for the bill as a whole.’79 The increase of wealth for a privileged minority with access to the benefits of financial speculation including paper credit, and a catastrophic rise in the public burden of Britain’s growing national debt led ‘Patriot’ Whigs to accuse members of the government of putting their own financial interests over those of the nation. The source of Walpole’s own wealth is described by Professor Stephen Taylor in his entry on Walpole in the Oxford DNB as ‘a mystery’, stating ‘that he did sud­ denly become very rich.’80 Britain’s national debt rose from less than £5 million to more than £50 million between the Revolution of 1688 and the end of Walpole’s ministry.81 Hume may have considered himself a philosopher rather than a ‘Patriot’ Whig, but he denounced increasing the national debt to the end of his life. Hume continued to consider the relationship between economics and politics in his Political Discourses.82 By 1750 he was sending drafts of his essays on the Balance of Trade and the ‘Populousness of Antient Nations’ to the Scottish M.P. James Oswald and the Edinburgh-based Church of Scotland clergyman Robert Wallace.83 Most of what was published as Political Discourses in 1751 are now considered as essays on economics in the eighteenth century, yet the focus of

134 The Scottish economy, 1688/9 to c.1763 many of the essays on commerce, credit and currency were certainly perceived in eighteenth-century Britain and Scotland (and elsewhere in Europe) as contribut­ ing to contemporary debate on political and public issues.84 Walpole had died, the war with France (and Spain) had been concluded in 1748 and there was wide­ spread public concern over public finances in Britain, but also elsewhere in Europe, particularly in France. Hume, James Harris has argued, emphasised ‘the distinctly political advantages of encouraging and promoting flourishing industry and commerce’, presenting increasing commercial activity as strengthening liberty and ‘the refinement of manners’.85 It was not money itself, ‘but rather the amount of industry and trade, and the speed at which money circulated as a result of industry and growth’, that prompted national prosperity.86 If a country was poor, this was because not enough money was in circulation in the economy. Industry and enterprise were what were essential for the prosperity of a nation, not wealth itself.87 Hume may have been a Scot, but he was no John Law, a Scot who advocated and suffered the consequences of paper credit replacing gold and silver as money. Paper bills, bonds and currency had no international value, rather they brought ‘all the ill effects of … a great abundance of money, without reaping any of the advan­ tages.’88 This was not strictly true, as Dr Rössner has demonstrated in his study of Scottish trade with German ports in the middle of the eighteenth century,89 but by 1761 Hume’s remarks appear prescient in the light of the difficulties Scottish private banks encountered so destructively in 1762.90 In his essays relating to political economy published in Political Discourses, Hume demonstrated his extensive knowledge of the substantial literature published in France in the aftermath of John Law’s experiment with the Compagnie des Indes and related enterprises in 1719 to 1720.91 Hume did not focus on the political economy of Scotland specifically, as Law had done when he published his pamphlets as part of the union debate in 1705, in an attempt to influence the Scottish Parlia­ ment on economic policy, or as Bishop Berkeley had written when, as a bishop of the Church of Ireland resident in Ireland, he had turned his attention to attempting to discover the basis of the country’s economic poverty.92 As has been pointed out recently, however, the background to Hume’s interest in political economy was related to the post-union position in which Scotland found itself in the 1740s, during a period of political instability at Westminster and outright Jacobite rebellion from August 1745 to April 1746. The integration of the Scottish Highlands into the United Kingdom after the end of the rebellion raised issues which were reflected in Hume’s interest in political economy. This affected not only the government of the UK, but civil society in Lowland Scotland. There were accusations from a number of sources in England that Lowland Scotland had at best been reluctant to resist the Jacobite rebellion and at worst had somehow colluded in its initial success and the subsequent invasion of England, evocative as it was of the Scottish military invasions of England in 1649 and 1651.93 Hume, as discussed in Chapter 4, was in England when the Jacobite rebellion in Scotland broke out in 1745. The rebellion made Hume aware of the repercussions a second substantial Jacobite rebellion had unleashed in terms of what it was to be a Scot in the United Kingdom.

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James Steuart embraced the study of political economy from a different start­ ing point. Like Hume his work was not specific to Scotland, yet bound up in his own life as a Scot whose intellect became shaped by his life and work in Europe. Steuart was the grandson of a former Lord Advocate of Scotland who had been identified with covenanting sympathies and support for the post revolution Presbyterian Church of Scotland. His father was for some time Solicitor General for Scotland.94Yet after meeting Charles Edward Stewart at Holyrood Palace after the Jacobite victory at Prestonpans in September 1745, he agreed to travel to Paris to represent Jacobite interests, arriving in Paris to seek an audience at Court after the invasion of England by the rebel army. His youthful romanticism carried with it a heavy cost, as he was exempted from the UK Parliament’s Act of Indemnity passed after the defeat of the rebellion. This was because he had continued in the service of the rebels ‘beyond the seas at any time between the 20th July 1745 and the 15th June 1747.’95 While he was still in France, a Court of Oyer and Terminer was convened in Edinburgh in 1748 by Scottish legal officials under pressure from the Lord Chancellor in London to demonstrate their zeal in defence of the Hanoverian monarchy, and he was attainted for treason.96 Steuart was not finally pardoned until December 1771, although he was permitted to take up residence on his family’s estate of Coltness in Lanark­ shire, which had been transferred to his wife’s ownership before his departure for France. The UK Secretary of War, Lord Barrington, an old acquaintance and friend from Steuart’s years of continental exile, took up Steuart’s case with the government. Steuart had left France when Britain went to war with it again in 1756, residing first at Brussels and then in the university town of Tübingen in Baden-Württemberg. His return to the UK coincided with the Treaty of Paris in 1763 concluding the Seven Years War.97 During his many years of continental exile, Steuart had become familiar with the public affairs of France through his involvement with the exiled Jacobite community there. He broadened his experience of political economy in Europe through his travels in the Low Countries, the Rhineland and northern Italy, and by 1759, while resident in Tübingen, he had written the first two books of what would be published in London in 1767 as An Inquiry into the Principles of Poli­ tical Oeconomy. As with Hume’s essays in Political Discourses, or Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, Stewart’s book was not a study of Scottish political economy, and its publication in London reflected that. Again, like Hume, he had learned his political economy from the French, but in contrast to Hume, he learned to read German, which led to his interest in ‘cameralism’, which Philipp Rössner has defined as ‘production-orientated, as distinct with mercantilist interest in trade.’98 His travels in Europe had encouraged him to think of French political economy in relation to the rest of Europe, including Britain. His work was not a response to Hume’s forays into political economy, but he was aware of it. Steuart opposed free trade. He did, however, think that an expanding but well-administered banking system could encourage an expansion of the domestic economy and an increase of opportunities in foreign trade. This reflected Scottish experience, including the difficulties the Scottish banking system had encountered by the time he was able

136 The Scottish economy, 1688/9 to c.1763 to take up residence on his Lanarkshire estate.99 John Law’s arguments for an expansion in the supply of credit through paper money, bonds, bills and stock both in his native Scotland and later as a financier in France had not been a panacea, but Steuart believed that it could be a force for economic good if wellregulated. Hume did not. Steuart, according to Istvan Hont, considered that the low wages current in the under-developed economy of a poor country could make it possible to pro­ vide products for export that could undercut those of competitors in price if not in quality.100 He also advocated the use of tariffs on imports to protect the home market for such products. It is clear that by 1759, at the time Steuart embarked on the composition of what became the Inquiry, his opinion was that such pro­ ducts could very well be Scottish products protected by British tariffs, as in fact they had benefited the Scottish cattle trade and linen production post-union. Free trade could only come about in Europe with the establishment of the (French) universal monarchy Britain had been created to prevent, but Scotland had after 1707 achieved access to the English market and, as increasing demand for Scottish linen in the English Caribbean demonstrated, access to what had been exclusively English colonial markets. Although there was no mention of Steuart’s work in The Wealth of Nations when it was published in 1776, it has since been argued that Smith was indebted to Steuart in ‘the theory of Money’ and that he also seems also ‘to have been inspired in his historical interests’ by Steuart.101 Istvan Hont has observed that ‘for Smith, profit did not mean the income or “wages” of the artisan, as it had for James Steuart. Instead, it meant the merchants and “master-manufacturers” share in the price of the product.’102 Whereas for Steuart the increase in emigration from Scotland to North America in the aftermath of the Seven Years War would have been alarming because it threatened to lead to an increase of the price of labour in Scotland, which was not a concern for Smith.103 Our most authoritative analysis of the state of the Scottish economy between 1750 and 1775 concluded that in that period it was improving but it could have done better.104 Tellingly, it also concluded that the benefits of a comparatively modest increase in Scottish GNP per capita ‘probably accrued much more to the landowners and the bourgeoisie than to the common people, for whom there is little evidence of gain except from employment in domestic industry.’105 There was, however, a fifteenfold increase in the supply of paper money between 1744 and 1772 (the year of the major banking crisis in Scotland following the collapse of the ‘Ayr Bank’).106 This reflected a longstanding interest in Scotland in the idea that increasing the money supply and credit in the Scottish economy would encourage economic growth. It went back to the days of the Company of Scot­ land and John Law’s lobbying once union negotiations with England began in earnest in 1705 to obtain Scottish legislation to facilitate economic expansion before the Scottish Parliament voted itself out of existence. It continued after union in 1707 through activity in London markets up to and beyond the ‘South Sea Bubble’ of 1720.107 The Scottish Bank Act passed by the UK Parliament in 1765 marked the culmination of efforts by Scots in the Westminster Parliament

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since 1727 to place the Scottish banking system on a well-regulated basis within the overall financial structures of the United Kingdom and its financial centre in London. The crisis of 1772, however, would demonstrate its limitations, although the expanding British wartime economy after 1776 prevented complete collapse of the Scottish banking system. Nevertheless, Professor Smout in 1983 considered that by the mid-eighteenth century the Scottish economy ‘resembled a number of late-eighteenth century European countries (Denmark, for example, and some of the German states)’, in contrast to the much larger economy of England.108 Rössner, twenty-five years later, has written in similar terms that by 1763, ‘Scotland, in terms of real wages, per capita and disposable incomes, and her economic structure, was closer to the continental standard (Germany, Scandinavia, Russia) than to its immediate south­ ern neighbour’.109 He has since argued that 1763 (marked by Britain’s victory over France in the Seven Years War) ‘came across clearly as a turning point in the discursive as well as economic history of many other European countries.’110 This meant that because there were what Rössner has referred to as ‘two decidedly different economic regimes’ within Britain, Scotland effectively was treated by the UK Treasury as a separate and subordinate economy.111 This was a legacy of the separate administration of Scotland by the Protectorate, Restoration and postRevolution regimes. Fictive union under the Protectorate as well as fictive admin­ istrative independence during the Restoration and in the 1690s institutionalised the separate nature of the pre-industrial Scottish economy from the expanding English economy. The Treaty of Union passed by the English and Scottish par­ liaments in 1706 and 1707 did not change that, although after the Jacobite rebellion of 1745 to 1746 tax collection became more efficient in Scotland ‘against a back drop of an expanding economy’ that by the 1780s was showing signs of supporting a higher standard of living for an increasing amount of the Scottish population.112

Notes 1 Rosalind Mitchison, Lordship to Patronage (1983), p. 107. 2 Hugh Ouston, ‘York in Edinburgh’, in J. Dwyer, R.A. Mason, and A. Murdoch, eds., New Perspectives on the Politics and Culture of Early Modern Scotland (1982), pp. 133–134; Macinnes, Union and Empire, pp. 164–165, 169–170. 3 G. MacIntosh, Scottish Parliament under Charles II, p. 184. 4 Jonathan Scott, ‘“Good Night Amsterdam”. Sir George Downing and Anglo-Dutch Statebuilding’, EHR, Vol. CXVIII (April 2003), pp. 334–356; J. Scott, ‘Downing, Sir George, first baronet (1623–1684)’, in ODNB, online edition, accessed 7 March 2019. 5 Whatley, Scots and the Union, pp. 148–149. 6 Mitchison, Lordship to Patronage, p. 107. 7 Nuala Zahedieh, ‘Regulation, rent-seeking, and the Glorious Revolution in the Eng­ lish Atlantic economy’, Economic History Review, Vol. 63 No. 4 (2010), especially pp. 865–866, 873, 876, 881–885. 8 Whatley, Scots and the Union, p. 117. 9 Ibid., p. 109.

138 The Scottish economy, 1688/9 to c.1763 10 A.J. Koufopolous, ‘The cattle trades of Scotland, 1603–1745’ (University of Edin­ burgh PhD, 2005), pp. 55–56, 64–65, 76–77, 176–180. 11 Whatley, Scots and the Union, pp. 110–111. 12 A. Murdoch. Scotland and America, pp. 64–67, 71–78, 81–84; Gordon Jackson, ‘Glasgow in Transition’, in T.M. Devine and Gordon Jackson, eds., History of Glas­ gow Vol. I (1995), pp. 72–76; Eric Graham, Maritime History of Scotland (2002), pp. 60, 114, 123. 13 Whatley, Scots and the Union, pp. 113, 124; Graham, Maritime History, pp. 21–25, 55, 143–144; Steve Murdoch, Network North (2006), pp. 149, 164–168, 182–183, 199, 226–227. 14 Smout, Scottish Trade, pp. 240–244; Whatley, Scots and the Union, pp. 116, 124.

15 Macinnes, Union and Empire, pp. 206–210.

16 Mary Young, ‘Rural society in Scotland from the Restoration to the union’ (Uni­ versity of Dundee PhD, 2004), pp. 214–216. Accessed 19 Aug 2019: www.discovery. dundee.ac.uk/ws/portafiles/portal/1299613/Young_phd_2004.pdf. 17 Whatley, Scots and the Union, p. 118. 18 A.J.S. Gibson and T.C. Smout, Prices, Food and Wages in Scotland, 1550–1780 (1995), pp. 275–276. 19 I.D. Whyte and K.A. Whyte, ‘Continuity and Change in a Seventeenth-century Farming Community’, The Agricultural History Review, Vol. 32, No. 2 (1984), pp. 159–169; I.D. Whyte and K.A. Whyte, ‘Debt and Credit, Poverty and Prosperity in a Seventeenth-century Scottish Rural Community’, in R. Mitchison and P. Roebuck, eds., Economy and Society in Scotland and Ireland 1500–1939 (1988), pp. 70–80; Bill Inglis, ‘Scottish testaments inventories: a neglected source for the study of Scottish agriculture – illustrated by the case of Dunblane, 1660–1740’, Scottish Archives, Vol. 10 (2004), pp. 58–63. 20 Karen J. Cullen, Famine in Scotland: The ‘Ill Years’ of the 1690s (2010), p. 189.

21 Whatley, Scots and the Union, pp. 119–121.

22 P. Hume Brown, ed., Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, Third Series, Vol. 7

(1915), pp. 665–672: ‘Miscellaneous Privy Council Papers 1681, 1682’, No. 14, ‘Memorial to be exhibite to the honourable Committee of Trade in Scotland’ [1681]. 23 Ibid., p. 666. 24 Whatley, Scots and the Union, pp. 146, 148–149; Gibson and Smout, Prices, Food and Wages, p. 170; Cullen, Famine in Scotland, p. 69. 25 Ian D. Whyte, Agriculture and Society in Seventeenth-Century Scotland (1979), p. 255. 26 Ibid., p. 106. 27 Ibid. 28 Cullen, Famine in Scotland: the ‘Ill Years’ of the 1690s, p. 31. 29 Ibid., pp. 31, 40. 30 Ibid., pp. 91–92. 31 Ibid., p. 191. 32 Whyte, Agriculture and Society, pp. 106–107. 33 Ibid. 34 Robert Dodgshon, ‘The Clearances and the Transformation of the Scottish Coun­ tryside’, in T.M. Devine and Jenny Wormald, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Modern Scottish History (2012), pp. 131, 134, 138–139, 141, 144, 158. 35 Dodgshon, ‘Clearances’, pp. 139–141. 36 Quoted in Murdoch, People Above, p. 74. 37 Quoted in Ibid., pp. 74–75, p. 167 reference 102. 38 Quoted in Ibid., p. 102. Also see Fredrik Albritton Jonsson, Enlightenment’s Frontier: The Scottish Highlands and the Origins of Environmentalism (Yale, 2013), p. 29, which identifies the Latin quotation as from Virgil’s Georgics, and points out that in 1755 Gilbert Elliot had written that the intention of the commission was ‘that under our protection a loyal well policed colony will soon flourish’. See NLS MS. 11009

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39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49

50 51 52 53

54 55 56 57

58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

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f30, Gilbert Elliot to Dr. John Clephane, Edin. 28 June 1755: ‘We have opened the commission for the forfeited Estates and flatter ourselves that under our protection a Loyal and well policed Colony will soon flourish in the heart of those barbarous countries.’ For Clephane see Helen Brock, ‘Clephane, John (1701/2–1758), physi­ cian’ in ODNB (2004), Vol. XII, pp. 39–40. T.C. Smout, ‘A New Look at the Scottish Improvers’, SHR, Vol. 91 (April 2012), p. 132. Ibid. Also see Philipp Robinson Rössner, ‘The 1738–1741 Harvest Crisis in Scot­ land’, Scottish Historical Review, Vol. 90 (April 2011), pp. 27–63. Devine, et al, eds, Transformation of Scotland, pp. 55–56, 73–79. Albritton Jonsson, Enlightenment’s Frontier, pp. 143–144. Whatley, Scots and the Union, pp. 126–127, 166–175. Gibson and Smout, Prices, Food and Wages, pp. 172–173. Whatley, Scots and the Union, pp. 185–187. Ibid., pp. 4, 6, 53, 215–216. Hoppit, ‘Scotland and the Taxing Union’, pp. 46–50, 57, 64–66. Rössner, Scottish Trade in the Wake of Union (1700–1760), pp. 42–54, 216–217 note 40. Hoppit, Britain’s Political Economies, pp. 118–123; Brian Bonnyman, ‘Agrarian patriotism and the landed interest: the Scottish “Society of Improvers in the Knowl­ edge of Agriculture”, 1723–1746’, in Koen Stapelbroek and Jani Marjanen, eds., The rise of economic societies in the eighteenth century (2012), pp. 26–51. Whatley, Scots and the Union, pp. 331–339, quotation from p. 331. Harris, ‘The Anglo-Scottish Treaty of Union, 1707 in 2007’, p. 44. Hoppit, ‘Scotland and the Taxing Union’, pp. 49–50. See Cambridge University Library, Cholmondelay Mss (H), Ch (H) Paper 40/9, Isaac Hide to the Commissioners of Excise in Scotland, Edinburgh, October 7, 1723; Ch (H) Paper 40/10, Commissioners of Excise in Scotland [‘Al: Wedderburn, David Ross, J. Bennet, Gi: Brunet, Chas. Cokburne’] to [the Lords of Treasury], ‘Edinr 12 Novr 1723; Ch(H) Paper 40/11/2, ‘An Abstract of the several Memorials of Mr. Isaac Hide, Mr. Henry Robinson and Mr Wm. Pinney appointed by the Right Hon­ ourable the Lords Commissioners of His Maties Treasury…’, docketed ‘12 Dec. 1723’, 15pp. Devine and Rössner, ‘Scots in the Atlantic Economy 1600–1800’, p. 41. Jacob M. Price, ‘The Rise of Glasgow in the Chesapeake Tobacco Trade, 1707–1775’, William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 11 No. 2 (Apr. 1954), pp. 179–199; T.M. Devine and Gordon Jackson, eds., History of Glasgow, Vol. I (1995) pp. 72–75, 139–141. Rössner, Scottish Trade, pp. 227, 230; Hoppit, Britain’s Political Economies, pp. 120– 121; Hoppit, ‘Scotland and the Taxing Union’, pp. 50–51, 53. Price, ‘Glasgow, the tobacco trade, and the Scottish customs, 1707–1730’, pp. 32, 36; Gentao Seki, ‘Policy Debate on Economic Development in Scotland: the 1720s to the 1730s’, in Tatsya Sakamoto and Hideo Tanaka, The Rise of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment (2003), pp. 22–38. Hoppit, ‘Scotland and the Taxing Union’, pp. 63–64; Romney Sedgwick, ‘LIND­ SAY, Patrick’, in R. Sedgwick, ed., History of Parliament: House of Commons 1715– 1790, Vol. II, p. 218. Philipp Rössner, Scottish Trade, pp. 175–185. Ibid., pp. 183–185. Devine and Rössner, ‘Scots in the Atlantic Economy, 1600–1800’, p. 47. Rössner, Scottish Trade, p. 150; Hoppit, ‘Scotland and the Taxing Union’, pp. 50–55. R.C. Nash, ‘The English and Scottish Tobacco Trades in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: Legal and Illegal Trade’, Economic History Review, Second Series, XXXV (1982), pp. 354–372. Rössner, Scottish Trade, p. 151. Ibid., pp. 172–173.

140 The Scottish economy, 1688/9 to c.1763 66 Gibson and Smout, Prices, Food and Wages, p. 196, although prices did not rise ‘until sometime after 1740’. See David Bindman, ‘Hogarth, William (1697–1764)’, under the subheading ‘The state of the nation’, ODNB, accessed 11 March 2019; and Miles Taylor, ‘John Bull and the Iconography of Public Opinion in England, c. 1712– 1929’, Past and Present, Vol. 134, Issue 1 (Feb. 1992), pp. 100–101; Pentland, ‘“We Speak for the Ready”’, p. 80. 67 Alastair J. Durie, ‘The markets for Scottish linen, 1730–1775’, SHR, Vol. 52, Part 1 (Apr. 1973), pp. 30–49. 68 Rössner, Scottish Trade, pp. 172–173. 69 T.M. Devine, et al., eds., Transformation of Scotland, pp. 48–49; R.H. Campbell, Scotland Since 1707 (1965, new edition 1985), pp. 54–57. 70 Saville, Bank of Scotland, pp. 93–148; Emerson, An Enlightened Duke, pp. 236–239; Checkland, Scottish Banking: A History, 1695–1973, pp. 6–8, 14–17, 24–26, 29–30, 35, 94–95, 108–111. 71 Rössner, Scottish Trade, p. 213; Zahedieh, The Capital and the Colonies, pp. 127– 136. 72 Rössner, Scottish Trade, pp. 218–219. 73 Ibid, p. 217, citing a paper given by Catherine Douglas to the Economic History Society’s Annual Conference in 2004. I have not yet been able to consult Catherine Douglas, ‘Enclosure and Agricultural Development in Scotland’ (University of Oxford PhD, 2010). 74 Campbell, Scotland Since 1707, pp. 39–43; T.M. Devine et al., eds., Transformation of Scotland, pp. 13–25. 75 Harris, Hume, p. 147. 76 Ibid., p. 154. 77 Ernest C. Mossner, ed., ‘Hume’s Early Memoranda: The Complete Text’, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 9 No. 4 (Oct 1948), p. 504. My thanks to Dr Max Skjöns­ burg of the University of St. Andrews for directing me to this publication. 78 J.H. Plumb, Sir Robert Walpole: The Making of a Statesman, p. 261. Also see Marc Hanvelt and Mark G. Spencer, ‘David Hume’s “A Character of Sir Robert Walpole”’, SHR, Vol. 118, Supplement: No. 248 (October 2019), p. 371. 79 Ibid., p. 264 (quotation), also see pp. 262–263. 80 Stephen Taylor, ‘Walpole, Robert, first earl of Orford (1676–1745)’, in ODNB, online edition, accessed 14 March 2019. The reference for the quotation in the print edition is Vol. 57, p. 71. 81 Harris, Hume, p. 183 citing Brewer, Sinews of Power, p. 115.

82 Ibid, p. 249.

83 See Edith Haden-Guest and Eveline Crickshanks, ‘OSWALD, James (1715–69)’, of

Dunniker, Fife, in R. Sedgwick, ed., History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1715–1754, Vol. II, pp. 314–315. B. Barnet Cochran, ‘Wallace, Robert (1697– 1771)’, in ODNB, accessed 1 March 2019. 84 Harris, Hume, p. 266. See the forthcoming book by Margaret Schabas and Carl Wennerlind, A Philosopher’s Economist: Hume and the Rise of Capitalism (University of Chicago Press). 85 Harris, Ibid., p. 272.

86 Ibid.

87 Ibid., pp. 273, 276. Also see Istvan Hont, ‘The “Rich Country-Poor Country”

Debate Revisited’, in C. Wennerlind and M. Schabas, eds., David Hume’s Political Economy (2008), pp. 243–246. 88 Harris, Ibid., p. 277 quoting Political Discourses, first edn of 1752, p. 90. Also see Hont, ‘The “Rich Country-Poor Country” Debate Revisited’, pp. 259–260. 89 Rössner, Scottish Trade, pp. 233–266; Philipp Rössner, Scottish Trade with German Ports 1700–1770 (2008).

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90 Henry Hamilton, ‘Scotland’s Balance of Payments Problem in 1762’, Economic His­ tory Review, Second Series, Vol. IV (1952–53), pp. 344–357; Saville, Bank of Scot­ land, pp. 139–148; Checkland, Scottish Banking, pp. 108–111. 91 See Roger L. Emerson, ‘The Scottish Contexts for David Hume’s Political-Economic Thinking’, in C. Wennerlind and M. Schabas, eds., David Hume’s Political Economy, p. 29 note 3: ‘I thank Istvan Hont for pointing out to me that the French economists cited by Hume all had some relation to John Law.’ 92 Harris, Hume, p. 278. See Richard Bonney, ‘Law, John (bap. 1671, d. 1729) and the section subheaded ‘Bishop of Cloyne’, in M.A. Stewart, ‘Berkeley, George (1685– 1753), Church of Ireland bishop of Cloyne and philosopher’, both in ODNB, acces­ sed 1 March 2019. Also see Hont, ‘The “Rich Country-Poor Country” Debate Revisited’, pp. 246–247, 250–253, 259–261. 93 Harris, Hume, p. 530 reference 116. 94 E. Calvin Beisner, ‘Stewart [Steuart], Sir James, of Goodtrees (1635–1713)’, in ODNB, online edn, accessed 15 August 2019. 95 Andrew S. Skinner, ‘Introduction’, in Sir James Stewart, An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy, edited Andrew S. Skinner, et al (London, 1998), Vol. I, p. xxxiii. 96 Ibid. 97 Andrew S. Skinner, ‘Steuart [later Steuart Denham], Sir James, of Coltness and Westshield’, in ODNB accessed 6 October 2017; Also see Dylan E. Jones, ‘Barring­ ton, William Wildman, second Viscount Barrington (1717–1793), in ODNB, online edn, accessed 1 November 2019. 98 Philipp Rössner, ‘Heckscher Reloaded? Mercantilism, the State, and Europe’s Tran­ sition to Industrialisation, 1600–1900’, Historical Journal, Vol. 58 No. 2 (2015), p. 668; Keith Tribe, Strategies of Economic Order (1995), pp. 4, 8–31. 99 Istvan Hont, ‘The “rich country-poor country” debate in Scottish classical political economy’, in Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff, eds., Wealth and Virtue: The Shap­ ing of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment (CUP, 1983), pp. 296–297. 100 Ibid., pp. 296–298. 101 Eric Roll, History of Economic Thought (1938; revised edn 1961), p. 145. 102 Hont, ‘rich country-poor country’, pp. 300–301. 103 See Smith’s letters on free trade with Ireland published in Ernest Campbell Mossner and Ian Simpson Ross, eds., The Correspondence of Adam Smith (OUP, 1977), pp. 240–244. 104 T.C. Smout, ‘Where had the Scottish economy got to by the third quarter of the eighteenth century?’, in Hont and Ignatieff, eds., Wealth and Virtue, pp. 45–72. 105 Ibid., p. 71. 106 Ibid., p. 70. 107 Walsh, ‘The Bubble on the Periphery’, pp. 112–113, 115–222. 108 Smout, ‘Where had the Scottish economy got to’, p. 71. 109 Rössner, Scottish Trade, p. 223. 110 Rössner, ‘Heckscher Reloaded?’, p. 675. 111 Rössner, Scottish Trade, p. 224. 112 Hoppit, ‘Scotland and the Taxing Union’, pp. 61, 63; Gibson and Smout, Prices, Food, and Wages, p. 299.

8

The limits of the union? Scotland and

the United Kingdom 1745–1763

When was the union of Scotland with England and Wales completed? The Scottish clergyman Alexander Carlyle wrote to Charles Townshend, MP, step­ father of the young third Duke of Buccleuch, in 1759 to encourage him to accept the advice of those in Edinburgh who wanted Townshend to stand as a candidate for Member of Parliament for Edinburgh at the General Election due in 1761: ‘we have hitherto, as a country, made a sneaking figure, because our leaders have almost always been vile tools & Slaves. Come & compleat the Union, & teach us to act like freemen & Britons.’1 The political issue that had particularly aroused Carlyle’s interest in this subject concerned UK parliamentary legislation governing the raising of militia units during the war between Britain and France that had formally begun in 1756. After 1759 there were a series of raids by French privateers on Ireland and Scotland, as well as rumours of another Jacobite uprising in Ireland or Britain or on both islands.2 In other words, one perspective on the idea of a successful completion to the political project of creating the United Kingdom approved by both the English (and Welsh) Par­ liament and the Scottish Parliament in 1707 was the idea that the union was completed when there were no longer Jacobite rebellions in mainland Britain. There was not another rebellion, although in 1759 one seemed possible. What became known to some as ‘The Seven Years War’ concluded by the Treaty of Paris in 1763 might be seen as the end of any possibility of a Jacobite restora­ tion. Yet plans to include Scotland in legislation for a UK militia to guarantee the defence of the realm during the war were rejected by the UK Parliament. Why? It was widely believed in England that anti-union Jacobitism was wide­ spread in Scotland, which meant that military units raised in Scotland would be by definition suspect in their loyalty to the British Hanoverian monarchy.3 In 1757 the British ministry had approved plans to raise regiments of the line through the office of the Secretary for War, which would be recruited in the Scottish Highlands. Officers who obtained commissions received them on the basis that they could raise their complement of men. To assist in recruiting, enlisted men would wear uniforms incorporating the Highland dress that had been made illegal in Scotland after the last Jacobite rebellion.4 One of the bat­ talions raised was an additional battalion of the 42nd Regiment or Black Watch, which had suffered horrific losses at the unsuccessful British attack on the French

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Fort Ticonderoga in 1758. The French officer who brought the news of the victory to Paris had provided an account of the tragic bravery of the Highland soldiers who led the British attack on the fort. He recommended that the French themselves should recruit a unit of Scottish Highlanders, even if it was not a large one, for service in the defence of French Canada. He argued that the highlanders understood ‘very well they are sent to America in great numbers by the British in order to depopulate their lands and even in hopes of seeing some of them killed.’ Captured highland soldiers from British units apparently had ‘told us a hundred times and over that if they saw in our army a troop of their own compatriots and a chief known by them a great number of them would come over to our flag …’5 Although the Seven Years War ended in what many regarded as a triumph in mainland North America after the Treaty of Paris of 1763, given that the French ceded Quebec and almost all that remained of French Canada to Britain. The fact that this treaty had been negotiated by a British political ministry headed by a Scottish nobleman, the Earl of Bute, provoked opposition in England.6 This opposition was so strong that by 1763 the third Earl of Bute (John Stuart, nephew of the second and third Dukes of Argyll) was forced to resign due to the vilification he was subjected to, in London in particular, as a crypto-Jacobite intent on undermining the authority of Parliament in favour of expanding the power of the monarchy.7 Even after Bute’s resignation as First Lord of the Treasury and Prime Minister in 1763, Bute and Scots in general were viewed as representatives of a foreign influence bent on monopolising power and privilege in victorious Britain due to their influence over the king.8 The perceived short­ comings of the Treaty of Paris, which brought the Seven Years War to an end, were blamed on Bute. Scotophobia may have become the order of the day in London, but it was the case that by 1763 there was evidence that at least some areas of the Scottish economy were beginning to benefit from economic growth, partly driven by increased British wartime spending and expanding markets for Scottish goods in England and, to a certain extent, the British colonial empire that was so greatly extended by the Treaty of Paris.9 Britain had become a larger construct than the island itself, and a successful treaty that was widely regarded as a defeat for France could also be seen by many Scots and Welsh, as well as English Jacobites, as a defeat for Jacobitism. In 1745 Charles Edward Stewart (or Steuart, or Stuart) arrived in Scotland and Britain as a charismatic symbol of Jacobite hopes in Britain, daring to claim his birthright as the eldest grandchild of the king deposed by the Revolution of 1688. Was it just that he be visited with the guilt of his grandfather? More than half a century later, was he not a legitimate can­ didate to the throne of the United Kingdom, particularly if he guaranteed the integrity of the established churches of England and Scotland? By 1763, he was no longer young and, the French concluded, no longer of any use to them.10 His father, the ‘Old Pretender’, died in 1766. Twelve years later, in 1778, Charles still was alive, but when the French declared war on Britain in that year they looked to English-speaking North American rebels against British authority

144 The limits of the union? Scotland 1745–1763 there rather than Scottish Jacobites as their clients in renewed warfare. World trade rather than the balance of power in Europe was now the contested arena for a war, which set the scene for an even larger conflict involving Britain and France by the end of the century. What had changed between 1746 and 1763? In 1746 many members of the British government viewed the defeat of a Jacobite rebellion in Scotland as the conquest of a rebellious province. By 1763 the First Lord of the Treasury at West­ minster was a Scot; a different young Prince had become King of Great Britain in the person of George III, and he had already declared at his coronation that he gloried in the name of Britain. Rhis King, however, as the successor of his grand­ father, was not only King of Great Britain, but Elector of Hanover in the Germanspeaking Holy Roman Empire. Just as the third Duke of Argyll, at that time the Earl of Ilay, had persuaded Sir Robert Walpole to release UK Treasury funds to try to expand the Scottish economy in the 1720s, so, eventually, he was able to con­ vince Henry Pelham and his brother the Duke of Newcastle as successive First Lords of the Treasury after the final defeat of the Jacobites in 1746 to release Treasury funds to compensate Scottish landowners for abolition of their heritable legal jurisdictions. Eventually the Treasury would pay outstanding debts on Jacobite estates that had been ‘annexed’, ie confiscated, after 1746. In contrast, the Lord Chancellor, the Earl of Hardwicke, was so suspicious of the ‘Highland Power’, which he thought Argyll represented after the rebellion was defeated, that he was determined to absorb as much of the Scottish judicial system into alignment with that of the rest of the UK as possible.11 He saw the abolition of heritable jurisdic­ tions as part of that process, citing the policy of the Cromwellian Commonwealth and Protectorate as a precedent: ‘that usurper abolished all the great heritable jur­ isdictions at once without giving any compensation for them.’12 The Treasury at Westminster after 1747, however, had to find the money to buy out Scottish land­ owners who claimed compensation for their heritable jurisdictions, although there was political embarrassment that the Duke of Argyll was awarded almost the entirety of his claim for compensation by the Court of Session, in contrast to the experience of most of the other claimants.13 Argyll, for all that Hardwicke, the Duke of Cumberland and the Duke of Newcastle viewed him as too soft on Jaco­ bitism, due to his vast Highland estate, recovered political influence after the aboli­ tion of heritable jurisdictions in Scotland. In time he was able to persuade the government to renew UK tax subsidies to encourage the expansion of the manu­ facture of linen cloth in Scotland and to protect Glasgow mercantile investment in British overseas colonial trade through a drawback of customs duties on re-exported colonial commodities. In addition, the Treasury paid almost £70,000 sterling to settle the debts on the annexed Perth estate in 1759.14 By 1754 the Duke of Argyll, old as he was, became useful to the government again as a general election loomed. In June, Newcastle sent an ‘ostensible’ letter to Argyll intended to be circulated among the freeholders who had voted in the election in the Scottish constituencies, expressing thanks for ‘the great success in the Scotch Elections, that, as I believe, was never before known’, and ‘that there is a more certain prospect of Quiet, than has been since the Union, and as a proof of

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it That the Minds of the people in Scotland, are set upon Trades & Manu­ factures.’15 As proof of his intentions, Newcastle asked that Argyll should ‘answer for me [in Scotland that] Nobody can be of more opinion than I am, That Scot­ land ought to be treated as part of the United Kingdom, under the same con­ stitution, & govern’d by the same Laws, in most material points’. If the constitution and the laws of the UK received ‘due obedience in Scotland’, New­ castle continued, ‘So it is but Justice, That all Such, who do pay that obedience, shoud have the full enjoyment, & the benefit, & advantage of them, and I must heartily wish, that both parts of the United Kingdom, would act towards each other, & in support of the Government in such manner, as in time to destroy all National prejudices, & Distractions.’ Newcastle’s letter, in fact, was not that dif­ ferent from the ideas Argyll (then the Earl of Ilay/Islay) proposed to Newcastle in October 1726 to convince the then Walpole ministry to invest in public expendi­ ture in Scotland to expand trade and grow the economy, ‘which is likely to put an end to the late mutinouse discourses [of 1725]’ and ‘carrie many discontented whigs & even Jacobites into the pursuit of these matters’ [efforts to investing in increasing trade and manufactures].16 Argyll had thus come some way from the ambitious young courtier and politician who had assisted his elder brother in bringing about the successful completion of the parliamentary union of the Scottish and English parliaments. In middle age, he found his niche (and his fortune) politically by supporting the ministry of Sir Robert Walpole, which gave him access to considerable wealth and status. This had come at a cost. By the time he succeeded his elder brother as third Duke of Argyll in 1743, he wrote to his friend and agent Lord Milton in Edinburgh that he was ‘too old’ and had ‘too great a stake to wish to set myself up as a Cock to be thrown at.’ He declared that health and his ‘private affairs’ would limit his ability ‘to enter into any political scheme that required application, attendance or bustling, and every year at my age [he was 61] I must expect to be less capable of it.’17 Instead, he found himself caught up in affairs of state once more when the brief but spectacular impact of the last Jacobite rebellion in Scotland in 1745 threatened everything that he and his elder brother had promoted as the economic and social benefits for Scotland of union with England. His political opponents attributed the discontent and instabil­ ity that had led to the outbreak of the rebellion to his shortcomings. He had remained the most influential Scottish politician in London, much to the embarrassment of those Scottish politicians who opposed him, as the rebellion occurred while one of their number held the revived office of Secretary of State for Scotland in the person of John Hay, fourth Marquess of Tweeddale. The new Secretary had taken office in the aftermath of the fall of Walpole’s ministry on the basis that both the second and third Dukes of Argyll were too beholden to High­ land and Jacobite families and influences. The Secretary of State for Scotland dis­ missed by Walpole in 1725, the Duke of Roxburghe, had continued to receive a pension equivalent to the Secretary’s salary until his death in 1741. This made it possible to revive the office for Tweeddale when Lord Carteret had increased his influence with the King as one of the English Secretaries of State (the Marquess would marry one of Carteret’s daughters in 1748).

146 The limits of the union? Scotland 1745–1763 Tweeddale, in contrast to the Duke of Argyll, would represent the Scottish ‘Lowland’ interest: Whig, improving, polite and Anglophilic. More than a year after the end of the Jacobite rebellion, after Tweeddale had resigned from his office as Secretary of State, the third Duke of Argyll reported to his Scottish cor­ respondent Lord Milton that: Ld Stair had for some time talked of a wild Scheme of forming a Lowland Party against what he called the Highland party, by which I knew he meant me, Ld Cobham also told me that his friends wanted to make the D. of Queensberry Secretary of State in order to be between me & the King, I answered that I agreed to it, & would tell the D of Newcastle so (which I did to his Grace’s amazement) but I was very apprehensive that though they might weaken one, they could not set up the other; & so it proved.18 As always with the correspondence between the third Duke of Argyll and Lord Milton, from long before his accession to the dukedom, the commentary was terse, but it does seem to be clear that Argyll was discussing opposition attempts to replace him in the government of Scotland from the excise tax crisis of 1733 to the post Jacobite rebellion period in 1747, by which time the British ministry was suspicious of all things Scottish, Whig as well as Jacobite. The Earl of Stair had died on 9 May 1747, a little more than a month before Argyll had written from London to Milton about him, so Argyll was thinking back to the origins of ‘Patriot’ Whig opposition to the Walpole regime’s government of Scotland. Stair had died at Queensberry House, Edinburgh, but the Duke of Queensberry Argyll was discussing in 1747 was the third Duke of Queensberry and second Duke of Dover, who had supported Stair’s opposition to the Wal­ pole government in the 1730s. Unable to sit in the House of Lords because of his British peerage as Duke of Dover, Queensberry spent most of his life in England. So did Tweeddale.19 Argyll’s comment on the Duke of Newcastle’s ‘amazement’ at Lord Cobham’s suggestion that Queensberry become Secretary of State for Scotland in succession to Tweeddale gives some indication of the reasons why this project never came to pass, as does Argyll’s laconic remark that ‘I was very apprehensive that though they might weaken one, they could not set up the other.’ The defeat of the Jacobite rebellion of 1745 to 1746 threatened to, in effect, do away with the Treaty of Union in favour of the Cromwellian precedent of British union as military occupation of Scotland. The Marquess of Tweeddale, appointed to ensure that the nobility of Scotland would be provided with a direct channel to the British cabinet to ensure that their interests were acknowl­ edged in the government of the country, resigned his office before the end of the rebellion, partly due to political infighting within the British cabinet that saw his father-in-law and political patron the Earl of Granville (previously Lord Carteret) lose office and power, but also in recognition that he had been unable to prevent

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the outbreak of the rebellion. Even before 1745, there had been complaints about Tweeddale’s approach to the government of the country. Lord Arniston, former Lord Advocate under the Duke of Roxburghe and by 1744 a judge in the Court of Session, and thus no friend to the Duke of Argyll, wrote to Tweeddale in November 1744 to complain that none of Tweeddale’s corre­ spondents in Scotland were aware [‘kept quite in the dark’] that Charles Are­ skine, former Lord Advocate during the Walpole ministry, had been appointed to a ‘double gown’ as a judge in the court of justiciary as well as the court of session. ‘I may speak in this way from experience,’ Dundas wrote, ‘when I served under the D Roxburgh [sic] the other side were minutely informed of every­ thing, I was then pretty well informed likeways’, however, since becoming a Lord of Session, he had learned that he had not been informed ‘so well as they, the president since [Duncan Forbes of Culloden], hath told me that they found out this and from it drew advantages.’ Dundas’s conclusion was that Tweeddale had not realised that ‘to govern Scotland to do it with any success’ he had to identify ‘somebody he woud take the trouble to inform and to trust for his man.’ It was up to Tweeddale to choose the man, ‘but if he can trust nobody he nei­ ther can serve nor govern with any success far less with endurance.’20 At the time, Dundas realised that Tweeddale’s ally in the UK ministry, the earl of Car­ teret, was going to withdraw as one of the English Secretaries of State, leaving Tweeddale isolated in the government.21 When the king attempted to reinstate Carteret in 1746 (by that time Earl of Granville) opposition from Henry Pelham and the Duke of Newcastle prevented it. Once the Jacobite rebellion had occurred in Scotland, Tweeddale was hope­ lessly exposed as being unable to govern the country. The Earl of Marchmont, associated with the former ‘Patriot’ opposition to Walpole, criticised the govern­ ment after the outbreak of the rebellion and blamed it for the outbreak of the rebellion. In October 1745 he wrote that ‘I only wished the English would have before this time thought a little more of Scotland, for that we had all forseen the danger of our country,’ but that at Whitehall the restoration of the office of Secretary of State ‘had been thought of here [London] only as a present to be made to some great man …’22 In Marchmont’s opinion, the catastrophe of the ’45 rebellion had occurred because the ministry had only consulted Tweeddale and the Duke of Argyll, and ‘considered only which of these two men should [govern as] viceroy of it … and thus the King had lost his Crown.’ Tweeddale, Marchmont told the ministry, ‘had neglected the common and necessary precau­ tions to defend the kingdom.’23 By January 1746, General Joseph Wightman was writing to Duncan Forbes that all was to be as it was under Walpole: ‘the Marquis [sic] having demitted, the Duke comes into the same Situation he was in before the Patriots prevailed against Sr R. W——le; and consequently the J——ce [the Lord Justice Clerk, Lord Milton] is once more depute Vice Roy.’24 Whispers that the Duke of Argyll and his political agents were too sympathetic to Jacobites had already circulated in the aftermath of the rebellion. Horatio Walpole, the late Sir Robert Walpole’s brother, wrote a long letter to Henry Pelham in August 1746, which

148 The limits of the union? Scotland 1745–1763 agreed with Marchmont’s claim that, as Lord Ilay, the new Duke of Argyll had been guilty of seeking the support of Jacobite families to strengthen the influ­ ence of the Argyll family in Scottish parliamentary elections. Although Walpole conceded that the ministry would have to seek Argyll’s support, due care would have to be taken to ensure that Jacobite families should not have access to posi­ tions of power, as in the past this had contributed, it seemed to him, to the conditions that had made the outbreak of the 1745 rebellion possible.25 Thus Henry Pelham, now First Lord of the Treasury, having committed the ministry to supporting a bill to abolish the heritable legal jurisdictions held by a significant number of Scottish noblemen and landowners, despite the fact that their continued existence was guaranteed under the Treaty of Union, decided to seek support for the bill from Scottish MPs, many of whom who had been elec­ ted as opposition Whigs in the preceding general election in 1741. These inclu­ ded the Earl of Marchmont’s brother Alexander Hume Campbell, MP for Berwickshire, who was but one of approximately (estimates vary) 21 opposition Whigs (and five Tories, also in opposition) returned for Scottish constituencies in 1741.26 Pelham and his brother the Duke of Newcastle as the senior Secretary of State in the UK government, agreed that they needed maximum support to implement their Scottish policy through parliamentary legislation, and that securing the support of Hume Campbell as a leading Scottish MP would help them achieve that by becoming a government spokesman on Scottish affairs for the government in the House of Commons.27 Pelham also knew that the approximately 19 Scottish Members of Parliament for Scottish constituencies that were associated with the political interest of the Duke of Argyll could not be counted upon to support his ministry’s Scottish legislation, including the Act abolishing heritable jurisdictions. Indeed, after the 1747 general election, Pelham had declared to a colleague in the ministry that he ‘was at a loss to know’ who was ‘the Scottish minister at present.’28 Argyll was not hell bent on retaining heritable jurisdictions in the Scottish legal system. The Act was put forward by the ministry, however, at a time when the scale of the British military incursion into Scotland and the army’s conduct in the Highlands after the defeat of the Jacobite army at Culloden, meant that for many Scots, loyal Hanoverians or those who had no intention of supporting any further Jacobite rebellion, this legislation appeared to be ‘a vindictive measure to punish them.’29 Not only did many Scots of the political class in a General Election year view the proposed bill as an attack on private property in Scotland by the UK government, but its provision for the appointment of all judges in the sheriff courts across all of Scotland by Westminster aroused fears of more systematic government interference in the Scottish legal system at local level. For Argyll and his supporters in the House of Commons and among the Scottish Representative Peers in the House of Lords, open support for the bill was not something that they expected would find favour with their constituents. Rather, it would damage their attempts to present themselves as defenders of Scotland’s national interests in Parliament.30 As William Maule, at that time MP for the Aberdeen district of burghs (whose father the former Earl of Panmure had been a leading supporter of

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the Jacobite rebellion in 1715) wrote to Lord Milton from London that though many Scottish MPs: ‘had been really for the bill in our hearts, that it was so dis­ agreeable to the bulk of our constituents that there was an absolute necessity of opposing it, if ever we have a mind to come back here [the House of Commons] again.’ He thought that those who voted for the abolition of heritable jurisdictions in Scotland ‘feel the weight of this at their next elections’, which would be held later in 1747.31 The Abolition of Heritable Jurisdictions in Scotland Bill only passed its first reading by a majority of 96 to 75, which did not improve Argyll’s standing with the ministry.32 Hume Campbell spoke in favour of the bill’s passage, having held out for some mark of political favour from King and government for his elder brother such as support for his election as a Representative Peer for Scotland in the general election due in the autumn of 1747, or appointment to one of the other post-union Scottish offices of State. Indeed, Hume Campbell hoped that his brother might in time succeed the Duke of Argyll after his death as the chief government minister for Scotland.33 Although Pelham could not immediately secure the appointment of the Earl of Marchmont to a high Scot­ tish office, a relatively desirable sinecure with an enhanced salary was found for him as First Commissioner of the Board of Police for Scotland, relic of previous Westminster attempts to devise a means of replacing the abolition of the Scot­ tish Privy Council approved by Parliament in 1708.34 Pelham also made it clear to Argyll that the government supported Hume Campbell’s re-election as MP for Berwickshire in the forthcoming 1747 general election.35 Hume Campbell would be re-elected by a majority of only one vote in July 1747, but did not have to face a petition to the House of Commons against that result after the election as Argyll’s agents prevented this. There were a substantial number of voters in Berwickshire whose families had Jacobite connections either in the recent past or even in the 1745 rebellion. Argyll knew that this was not a time to oppose the ministry. In the Lords, Argyll had spoken in favour of the Abolition of Heritable Jur­ isdictions in Scotland bill. However, Andrew Mitchell, who Pelham had insisted should receive government support as the ministerial candidate for the Aberdeenshire constituency in Scotland, reported that Argyll’s speech in the House of Lords was ‘exotic’, writing to Lord President Culloden (Duncan Forbes) in Invernessshire that ‘had I not been informed before that he was to speak for the bill I should have thought from his facts and reasonings that he intended to vote ag’t it.’36 Perhaps this was because Argyll in his speech did not support the view of one contemporary pamphleteer that the Scottish private jurisdictions were a manifes­ tation of ‘Egyptian slavery’, and were a ‘disgrace to our constitution.’37 Argyll concluded his speech to the House of Lords by proclaiming that ‘before the Union, the jurisdictions were a source of protection from central government, This was no longer needed. It was time Scotland rested its liberties on the same basis as the English.’38 Although the Duke of Argyll’s lukewarm support for the heritable jurisdictions bill had weakened his relationship with the ministry by giving his opponents the

150 The limits of the union? Scotland 1745–1763 opportunity to insinuate that he and his late elder brother had been too ready to collaborate with Jacobites; as Richard Scott has argued, ‘what saved him was the 1747 general election, because Pelham, as the principal electoral manager, needed Ilay’s [Argyll’s] assistance in Scotland.’39 The King had been convinced by Cum­ berland that Argyll acted as a Vice Roy in Scotland without due deference to the monarch, but Pelham defended Argyll to the King as a willing supporter of the ministry in its preparations for the General Election.40 Nevertheless, Pelham insisted that a number of Patriot Whig candidates also be supported, including Mitchell (a former protégé of Tweeddale’s) as well as Hume Campbell. Cumber­ land’s Scottish favourite Sir Laurence Dundas won the Linlithgow district of burghs seat by use of wholesale bribery, but with Pelham’s support, Dundas’s election was reversed on petition to the House of Commons in favour of the candidate Pelham and Argyll had agreed to support, James Carmichael.41 In June Argyll had written to Lord Milton about Sir Laurence Dundas that: ‘I take him to be manifestly an Enemy of mine, & I will have nothing to do with him.’42 He also wrote that he would ‘come down’ to Scotland later than he had in previous years: in the Shape things stand, I should only draw crowds of people about me, & make a most wretched figure, by being neither able to reward, punish nor in some cases to protect my friends, all which would appear in a more glaring light if I was now at Edinburgh than here at London, … Mr Pelham is the only one of the Ministers who seems to know what they are doing.43 In a long letter to Milton about his dissatisfaction with the activities of Sir Laurence Dundas in the Linlithgow burghs constituency, Argyll confided that: ‘Old Areskine [James Erskine, formerly the Court of Session judge Lord Grange] supported by Ld. Chesterfield has teased me about it being nae bleat [no importance] as the Scotch say but I told him it was a thing I could not undertake to meddle in.’44 In the election of the Scottish Representative Peers sitting in the House of Lords, Argyll had to accept the inclusion of some members of the Scottish nobility recommended by Cumberland.45 In July, Argyll reiterated that he regarded Sir Laurence Dundas as ‘a mortal Enemy & that he was the spring & author of all or most of the mischief against our friends when he attended the army.’46 He informed Milton that ‘I had no hand at all’ in the compilation of the list of min­ isterial candidates for election as Scottish Representative Peers in the House of Lords sent to Scotland by the Duke of Newcastle, ‘the new ones being such as have been recommended by the D. of C.’ [Duke of Cumberland].47 In a later letter he commented that ‘the list of Peers you see is filled with those who whis­ pered themselves into favour with the Duke of C. Sir Everard [Fawkener] or the Aid de Camps, all which I cannot help, & there is no remedy for it, I might easily have made matters much worse, but not better, & one can play no other cards than such are in ones hand.’48

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After the passage of the heritable jurisdictions Act and the general election which followed later in the year, the Lord President of the Court of Session, Duncan Forbes, who had taken an active role in organising opposition to the Jacobite Rebellion in the Highlands, died in December 1747. Argyll supported Charles Aerskine as his successor. Aerskine was a former MP and Lord Advo­ cate who had been only recently appointed as a judge in both the Court of Session and the Court of Justiciary after the fall of the Walpole ministry, taking the judicial title of Lord Tinwald. Former Patriot Whigs with Scottish con­ nections, such as the Earl of Marchmont and his brother Alexander Hume Campbell, however, seized on Areskine’s links with Argyll, who had played a part in his entry into Parliament as an MP following his appointment as Lord Advocate. In London, Marchmont declared ‘that it was a mortal blow to the King’s interest for Areskine had been a notorious Jacobite’ and accused Are­ skine (now a Court of Session and Court of Justiciary judge as Lord Tinwald) as ‘a known Jacobite in 1715’, that he had no faith in Scots Jacobites conver­ sions and ‘they might as well take the Crown of Scotland off the King’s head and put it on the Duke of Argyle’s’ if the appointment went ahead.49 Instead, another former Lord Advocate who was a judge in both the Court of Session and the Court of Justiciary, Robert Dundas Lord Arniston, was appointed Lord President by the Crown. Arniston had been Lord Advocate at the time of the Glasgow ‘Shawfield’ riots of 1725 and had led resistance to the extension of the UK Malt Tax to Scotland at its full rate.50 He had been alarmed by Areskine’s appointment to the Courts of Justiciary and Session in 1744. His appointment was meant to be a public demonstration of the limits of the duke of Argyll’s influence in Scottish government. George II had opposed Aerskine’s appointment by declaring that as he was Argyll’s candidate, ‘he would not make him [Argyll] King of Scotland’.51 This led Pelham to seek a compromise with Argyll that acknowledged Argyll’s importance to the government and the legal system in Scotland, while seeking to clarify the ministry’s wish to work with all Whigs in Scotland in organising the government of the country.52 Pelham wrote to Arniston after his appointment in May 1748 that ‘I have always wish’d to see those distinguish’d who are the true friends to both [Crown and Ministry] but personal altercations and party Divisions have too often prevented the execution of ye best Intentions.’ He sought to persuade Dundas that he must not ‘let Politicks create you Enemies whom Justice would make your Friends. Unite cordially with those whom the King thinks proper to employ in the great stations of your Country.’ Pelham claimed that a great deal is to be done to bring the Factions and disaffected in Scotland to a proper sense of their Duty; which cannot effectively be brought about but by a thorough Union amongst those who are the friends to the Government53 Charles Aerskine was appointed in place of Lord Milton as Lord Justice Clerk in 1748. This meant that Milton demitted as the presiding judge in the Scottish Court of Justiciary, significantly reducing his workload, not least by moving the

152 The limits of the union? Scotland 1745–1763 responsibility for corresponding with the relevant Secretary of State in London (the Duke of Newcastle) on Scottish affairs from Milton to Areskine, now Lord Tinwald. Milton continued as a Lord of Session, and received compensation for the loss of the income that the office of Lord Justice Clerk had brought to him by being appointed Keeper of the Signet in Scotland for life, an office whose income through legal fees and salary had been divided previously among the two Secretaries of State, or given to the Secretary of State for Scotland if one was in post. Milton’s son (also Andrew Fletcher) was already an MP, and received the reversion of the post of Auditor of the Scottish Exchequer for life, an office Milton had held before he was raised to the Scottish bench in the 1720s. These marks of favour were in recognition of Milton’s extraordinary service as chief representative of civil and legal authority in Scotland during the Jacobite rebel­ lion.54 Pelham felt that as a result of these appointments, there was now a basis for proceeding with the rest of the ministry’s legislative plans for Scotland, including the establishment of a commission for the administration of the Jaco­ bite estates annexed by the UK government with legislation finally passed in 1752.55 In the years between 1748, when what amounted to a governmental reshuffle in Scotland was completed, and his death in 1754, Pelham took the lead in attempting to integrate Scottish government into the overall govern­ mental policies for the UK as a whole.56 These were years of peace in the UK before rising tensions with the French presence on the border of British North America led to increasing conflict there. Pelham died in 1754, when Pelham’s brother the Duke of Newcastle succeeded him as First Lord of the Treasury and Prime Minister until outright war was declared between Britain and France in 1756, leading to William Pitt becoming one of the Secretaries of State in the ministry in 1757. The English backlash against all things Scottish in the after­ math of the last Jacobite rebellion, was well represented by the thoughts of the English Archbishop of York writing to Lord Chancellor Hardwicke in 1745 and 1746 that ‘England is terribly abused by that perfidious and bloody nation [Scotland]. I think we may feel the mischief now of being united to a kingdom which will not incorporate with us.’57 Pelham took a different view. In 1750 Henry Fox, no friend to Pelham but a rising Westminster politician in the House of Commons, wrote to Pelham that his was a ministry that could complete the union: ‘This [the UK] is a thriving and improving country; So much so, that it must necessarily (and even in our own time I believe) be thought of, and put upon a different foot than it has yet been.’ Genuinely uniting the two kingdoms, Fox argued, ‘would give you more fame than has ever fallen to the share of any minister yet, and it would give you great trouble too. But, difficult as it is, and it will be exceedingly so, yet, sooner or later, well or ill, within these 20 or 30 years, and probably within much less time, it must be done.’58 Pelham thus made the incorporation of Scotland into the UK a keystone of his ministerial policy, rather than supporting the military subjugation of the country. His determination to reduce the Land Tax through post war economies after the conclusion of peace with France in 1748 meant that the size of the British military garrison there had to be reduced. Comparisons of the

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number of English garrisons in Scotland during the Cromwellian Common­ wealth and Protectorate with the British military garrisons established after 1746 indicate a similar scale of commitment and expenditure.59 Thus Fort George, built near the site of the old Cromwellian citadel outside Inverness, was not completed as rapidly as the Duke of Cumberland and his military retinue had wished, although the King insisted that its construction be approved. Pelham was convinced that the abolition of heritable jurisdictions in Scotland was necessary even though it involved an increase of salaried sheriffs ‘depute’ on the Scottish Civil List. He took much more convincing to approve the annexation of the larger Jacobite estates forfeited to the government by their owners’ treason during the last Jacobite rebellion. This resulted in the decision not to pay the commissioners who were appointed by the Crown to supervise the administra­ tion of these estates in 1755. Lesser officials, such as the factors appointed to run each of the estates, still had to be paid, but they were cheaper than a substantial British military presence. Substantial sums were released by the Treasury to compensate those creditors who had advanced loans to the former owners of the ‘annexed’ estates, but those funds were not approved, far less released, while Pelham was at the Treasury. The same situation arose over the issue of govern­ ment compensation to those who had lost heritable legal jurisdictions in Scot­ land.60 The legal process of establishing claims and agreeing compensation through the Scottish Court of Session dominated the court’s business in 1747 and 1748. Its deliberations on the claims submitted to it for compensation were completed in its report of March 1748, which provoked some criticism. The fact that while only 48 per cent of claimants received compensation, the third Duke of Argyll was awarded £21,000 of an original claim of £25,000, which helped finance his transformation of the traditional residence of the chiefs of Clan Campbell into a Gothic palace. Although this was not completed by his death in 1761,61 it still represented a statement of a different future for the Highlands of Scotland from that George II and the Duke of Cumberland envisaged for the new Fort George that was to be constructed outside Inverness. Thus although Pelham and the Treasury sought economies in the cost of gov­ erning Scotland, this meant, ironically, that the government continued to work with the Duke of Argyll in managing general elections in Scotland and in devel­ oping policies for Scottish government. Retaining a significant element of the status quo was cheaper, and Argyll kept his health and thus much of his public influence in Scotland much longer than a younger generation of Scottish and English politicians had expected.62 This was of use to Pelham in particular because Argyll knew where the bodies were buried, as it were, in the development and growth of the post-union system of government in Scotland. The whole purpose of what the former Earl of Ilay came to be as a de facto Secretary of State was to ensure, after the Malt Tax riots of 1725 had demonstrated vividly to the govern­ ment its weakness, that tax revenue would be collected more effectively in Scot­ land. Indeed, by the time of the last Jacobite rebellion, while taxation may have seldom produced a surplus that could be remitted to the Treasury, for the most part the funds that were remitted met the costs of the salaries for the Scottish civil

154 The limits of the union? Scotland 1745–1763 list and the large establishment of customs and excise officers in Scotland.63 The establishment of the Board of Trustees for Fisheries and Manufactures and the Royal Bank of Scotland ‘reinforced a tendency for discussion of political economy in Scotland to develop within an explicitly national framework.’64 By 1746 the former Ilay, now third Duke of Argyll, working with Lord Milton and others connected with his patronage network from the Board of Trustees, established the British Linen Company, which would later become a fully established Scottish bank with a royal charter and a specific commitment to encouraging textile man­ ufactures.65 In other words, although the ‘British’ Linen Company in Scotland would be followed by a ‘Free British’ Fishery Society, which had a significant English membership, but also a substantial Scottish presence, it demonstrated, as Bob Harris has written, that ‘Scottish national economic development was usually envisaged at a remove from Westminster and the British context; it was something which Scots would do for themselves in Scotland.’66 When the Duke of Newcastle succeeded his brother at the Treasury, and to at least some degree tried to continue his policies towards Scotland (see Newcastle’s letter to Argyll of 1754 quoted on page 145), the outbreak of war with France in 1756, diverted Newcastle’s (and William Pitt’s) attentions away from Scottish affairs. Newcastle retreated from his plans to increase the number of English rev­ enue officers in Scotland as the war went badly, and the Duke of Argyll put pres­ sure on the ministry to make a greater acknowledgement of his continued importance in the government of Scotland. He was partly successful because his own nephew, John Stuart, Earl of Bute, had acquired significant political influence at court as tutor to the King’s grandson, the future George III. With the ministry weakened, not only Argyll but also William Murray (then English Attorney Gen­ eral, although Scottish by birth, and soon to be appointed as the Chief Justice of the Court of King’s Bench) were ‘courted’ to try to ensure that Bute’s previous support for ‘Patriot’ Whig opposition measures would be moderated to limit the now adult Prince’s possible support for opposition Whig policies.67 However, by Autumn 1756 Argyll reacted to the appointment of William Pitt the elder as Secretary of State and Leader of the House of Commons in succession to Henry Fox by writing to Fox that he had been ‘driven’ by ‘want of favour (to say no worse) in the Closet, and the low regard, if not contempt, I met with in other places, to an inclination to retire out of the kingdom.’68 Presumably he meant by this a wish to retire out of the kingdom of England to his estates and properties in Scotland, not just at Inveraray in the Highlands but to his suburban Edinburgh estate at Duddingston, his house at ‘The Whim’ in Peeblesshire, and the Argyll residence at Roseneath on the north side of the Clyde opposite Greenock.69 Whether he was sincere in his protestation to Fox is difficult to determine, but clearly his nephew the Earl of Bute’s new found prominence as Groom of the Stole to the Prince of Wales in London certainly appeared to indicate that the elderly Argyll’s long career as the most influential Scottish politician and statesman at Westminster was drawing to a close.70 Just as Argyll had contemplated retirement in 1747 only to have the West­ minster government conclude that without his involvement and his knowledge

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of the Scottish parliamentary constituencies, their chances of increasing the number of pro-ministerial MPs in the House of Commons was jeopardised, so after 1757 Argyll became more important to the ministry as it planned for the general election of 1761. Although Argyll’s nephew Bute was now the up-and­ coming Scottish politician of note at Westminster through his connections with the young Prince of Wales, Bute had taken his wife and children from his Scot­ tish estate on the Isle of Bute from Scotland to London after the outbreak of the Jacobite rebellion in Scotland in late summer 1745 and never returned. Although he had sat as one of the Scottish Representative Peers in the House of Lords, he had no interest in Scottish electoral politics, and had always dis­ approved of his uncle’s involvement in politics. Bute was important to the min­ istry because of his influence over the future king, but his uncle, even in his late seventies, was significant to the ministry because of his influence over political and public life in Scotland. Argyll’s influence increased because of the outbreak of the war with France. This became a kind of return match on the war of 1742 to 1748 with added theatres of conflict, which presented Argyll an opportunity to make himself indis­ pensable to the ministry, including Fox’s replacement as Secretary of State, Wil­ liam Pitt the elder. This took the form of increasing the recruitment of regiments in Scotland for the British army, with Argyll given the task of recommending Scottish officers who would be able to recruit the men required for the ranks. Almost 2,000 men were raised in 1757, mostly in the Highlands, with the sole objective of sending them as reinforcements to the British army in North America, where British colonial governments had increased their demands on the ministry for military protection against French and Indian attacks on the frontier.71 By the time the 1761 elections were underway, which had involved some tension between Argyll and his nephew over ministerial support for candidates in Scottish constituencies as well as over who the ministry would support in the elections for Scottish Representative Peers. Then Argyll died in London in April 1761. The death of George II in autumn 1760 and the succession of his grandson as George III had increased Bute’s political importance to the ministry exponentially. Nevertheless, there was an increase of political tension in Scotland over funeral arrangements for his uncle, which included lying-in-state at Holyrood Palace and a procession (‘with weepers’, presumably Gaelic speaking) through central Scotland to Glasgow and on to the ancestral burial place of the Earls of Argyll at Rose­ neath.72 There was to be no lavish memorial for the third Duke of Argyll at Westminster Abbey, as there had been for his elder brother, but in death if not in retirement the third Duke of Argyll returned to the lands of his ancestors (or at least some of them). He left his English properties to the English mother (Anne Williams) of his two English-born children.73 Before 1761 had ended, William Pitt resigned from the ministry and was replaced as one of the Secretaries of State by Bute. Scottish affairs at Westminster were delegated after the Duke of Argyll’s death to Gilbert Elliot, a Scottish MP who already held ministerial office as one of the Lords of Admiralty. By the time Bute had taken public office his younger brother, James Stuart Mackenzie, had

156 The limits of the union? Scotland 1745–1763 returned from a diplomatic posting at Turin to take up one of the Crown offices of the kingdom of Scotland as Lord Privy Seal, on the understanding that he would act as Argyll had as the principal London correspondent of Lord Milton, who Bute wished to continue to act for the ministry in Edinburgh. In the meantime, Bute dedicated his energies to advising the king on the negotiations for a treaty to end the war with France. Thus began the public furore centred on London that manifested itself in increasing (and increasingly violent) public and extra-parliamentary protests against Bute and the policies that he had advised the king to adopt.74 Opposition Whig protest went beyond resistance to what were perceived as Bute’s attempts to break constitutional convention and extend the power and privileges of the monarchy to focus on Bute’s nationality as a Scot and the implied threat that all Scots posed to English liberties.75 Such was the outcry in London against Bute, the shortcomings of the peace negotiations and the final Treaty of Paris of 1763, that once the peace was completed Bute insis­ ted that he resign his public offices and retire from politics, although popular protest against the ministry, which replaced his government and its successors, included regular allegations that ministers were secretly following advice and instructions from Bute as the ‘minister behind the curtain’ to the King.76 The Earl of Ilay and later third Duke of Argyll had held public offices relating to Scotland and its role as a founder kingdom of the United Kingdom of Great Britain almost continuously from the advent of the negotiations that led to the Treaty of Union in 1707 until his death at an advanced age (he was almost 80) in 1761. In many ways Scotland had become a different country but if it was another country, was that the UK or was Scotland the first to be subjected to the project that became the British global empire? Ireland was a subordinate king­ dom, but Scotland was a former kingdom consigned to peripheral status within the metropolitan United Kingdom dominated by London. If Wilkite ideology included more than a little Scotophobia, there was also increasing political opposition to the politics of interest and patronage in Scotland that was expres­ sed in rioting on at least one occasion, but also other expressions of dissatisfac­ tion with the status quo in political culture and practice.77 While by 1759 Scots, whether they be the third Earl of Bute or David Hume, were beginning to win their way to considerable success in England, particularly in London, in politics and publication. Although this led to considerable expressions of public pre­ judice against Scots in London and England, political conflict in Scotland in the run up to the general election of 1761 and its aftermath reflected the growing influence of ‘Pitt and Popularity’ on popular politics and public opinion in Scotland at the time.78 This illustrates what Gordon Pentland has termed ‘the contingent, uneven and non-linear nature of Britishness’ by 1761.79 One of Bute’s perceived shortcomings was the decision to return many British territorial gains against the French in the Caribbean, preferring instead to retain French Canada as part of an expanded North America continental empire that also included what had been Spanish Florida. Almost immediately after the peace, the Grenville ministry, which succeeded Bute’s government, ran into trouble over its retention of a military garrison in British North America and its

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efforts to raise tax revenue there to pay for it. Its problems became something like a greatly expanded Cromwellian conundrum over the Protectorate’s military occupation of Ireland and Scotland.80 There were both Scots and American colonists who advocated an expansion of parliamentary union to include the English-speaking American colonies, but this constitutional option remained a non-starter on both sides of the Atlantic.81 Large scale Scottish emigration to mainland North America increased to such an extent that within ten years of Bute’s resignation, it had led to Scottish efforts to obtain Westminster legislation to put a stop to it.82 When the American crisis burst the Westminster bubble over American policy, concern over the government of Scotland ceased to be a parliamentary issue to a government almost exclusively preoccupied with its American policy. There were Scots who supported or were sympathetic to American resistance to direct rule from Westminster, but for most members of the political classes in Scotland, retention of the North American colonies was a central element of the British project, and by the end of the American war, there were few Scots involved in Scottish public life who did not see an expanded Britain as a key element in resisting the continuing power of France. Scotland would become important in maintaining the dynamic of that expansion.83

Notes 1 NRS, RH4/98/2, microfilm of Townshend correspondence formerly in the Buccleuch Papers as GD 224/295/3, the Townshend Papers are now at the William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Alexander Carlyle to Charles Townshend, Edin. Nov. 1, 1759; R.B. Sher, Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment (1985), p. 223; Murdoch, People Above, p. 88. 2 John Robertson, The Scottish Enlightenment and the Militia Issue (1985), pp. 105–107, 109.

3 Ibid., pp. 106, 113.

4 Matthew Dziennik, The Fatal Land, pp. 157–169; Andrew Mackillop, ‘More Fruitful

than the soil’ (2000), pp. 47–52; Murdoch, People Above, pp. 49, 91; Alexander Mur­ doch, ‘More “reluctant heroes”. New light on military recruiting in North East Scot­ land, 1759–1760’, Northern Scotland, Vol. 6 No. 2 (1985), pp. 157–168. 5 Ronald Black, The Campbells of the Ark: Men of Argyll in 1745, Volume I: The Inner Circle (2017), p. 105, quoting the English translation of part of Bouganville’s report in Ian Macpherson McCulloch, Sons of the Mountains: The Highland Regiments in the French and Indian War, 1756–1767 (Fleischmanns, New York: Purple Mountain Press, and Toronto: Robin Braes Studio, 2006), Vol. 1, p. 103. French text published in Pierre-Georges Roy ed., ‘Memoir pour le Ministre de Marine sur 1. Le Pandres Ali­ mentaires; 2. Les Canons Portifs; 3. Une Trouped’Ecossais a envoyer au Canada, 17 janvier, 1759’, per M. Bougainville, Rapport de l’Archiviste dela Province de Quebec (1923–1924), p. 40. 6 K.W. Schweizer, ‘Lord Bute, William Pitt, and the peace negotiations with France, April–September 1761’, and ‘Lord Bute and the Press: The Origins of the Press War of 1762’ in Schweizer, ed., Lord Bute: Essays in Re-interpretation, pp. 4–55, 83–98; Brewer, Party Ideology and Popular Politics at the Accession of George III, Chapter 7. 7 Gordon Pentland, ‘“We Speak for the Ready”’, pp. 75–84. I have been unable to consult Geoff Parker, ‘Enlightenment and Scotophobia: Studies in Smollett and Scot­ tish Culture’ (unpublished DPhil. Thesis, University of Flensburg, Germany, 1999).

158 The limits of the union? Scotland 1745–1763 8 Frank O’Gorman, ‘The myth of Lord Bute’s secret influence’ in Schweizer, ed., Lord Bute, pp. 57–81. 9 Rössner, ‘Hechsher Reloaded?’ p. 675; John Robertson, The Case for Enlightenment (2005), pp. 373–376; Bob Harris, Politics and the Nation (2002), pp. 189–191. 10 Frank McLynn, Charles Edward Stuart (1989), pp. 449–461. 11 Julian Hoppit, ‘Compulsion, Compensation and Property Rights in Britain, 1688– 1833’, Past & Present, No. 210 (Feb. 2011), pp. 108–115. 12 Philip C. Yorke, ed., Life and Correspondence of Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain (1913), Vol. I, p. 608, Hardwicke to the Duke of Cumberland, April 16th, 1747. 13 Hoppit, ‘Compulsion’, p. 114. 14 Emerson, An Enlightened Duke, pp. 315–326; Murdoch, People Above, pp. 73–84; Annette M. Smith, Jacobite Estates of the Forty-Five (1982), pp. 45–46. 15 NLS, Saltoun Papers, MS. 16675, ff193–4, Newcastle to Argyll, 2 June 1754. 16 NRS, RH2/4/324/No. 271, Earl of Ilay to Duke of Newcastle, Oct. 8, 1726. 17 Murdoch, People Above, p. 34; citing NLS, MS. 16591, f104, Argyll to Milton, 26 [Nov 1743]. 18 NLS, Saltoun Papers, MS. 16641, f74, Argyll to Milton, 19 July 1747. See Matthew Kilburn, ‘Temple, Richard, first Viscount Cobham (1675–1749)’ and William C. Lowe, ‘Douglas, Charles, third duke of Queensberry and second duke of Dover (1698– 1778)’, in ODNB, online edn, accessed 30 August 2019. 19 Richard Scott, ‘Hay, John, fourth marquess of Tweeddale (1695–1762)’, in ODNB, online edn, accessed 4 October 2019. 20 NLS, Yester Papers, MS. 7064, f99, Dundas of Arniston to Tweeddale, 22 Nov. 1744. 21 Ibid. 22 Marchmont Papers, ed. G.H. Rose (1831), Vol. I, pp. 138–139, 13 Oct. 1745. Marchmont recorded in his diary his discussion at court with Lord Cobham regarding the various offers by members of the Scottish nobility to take up arms to resist the rebellion. 23 Marchmont Papers, ed. Rose, Vol. I, pp. 104–109, 27 Sept. 1745; pp. 121–133’, on the Scottish nobility at court in late September and early October 1745, and their claims that Argyll and Tweeddale sought to exclude Marchmont, the Duke of Mon­ trose, and the Earl of Stair from efforts to defeat the rebellion, which Marchmont repeated to Lord Chancellor Hardwicke. 24 General Wightman to Lord President Forbes, 22 Jan. 1746 in Culloden Papers, ed. H. Duff (1815), pp. 266–267. 25 Scott, ‘The Politics and Administration of Scotland 1725–1748’, pp. 519–522, citing Nottingham University Library, Newcastle (Clumber) Papers, NED 88, Horatio Wal­ pole to Henry Pelham, 13 August 1746. 26 Bricke, ‘The Pelhams vs. Argyll’, p. 158; Sedgwick, ed., History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1715–1754, Vol. I, p. 159. 27 Bricke, ‘The Pelhams vs. Argyll’, p. 158; Hume Campbell to Marchmont, 9 May 1747, HMC Polwarth, v, p. 243. 28 G.W.T. Omond, Lord Advocates of Scotland (1883), Vol. 2, p. 44 note 1, letter from Lord Dupplin to Robert Craigie, 9 June 1748. 29 Scott, ‘The Politics and Administration of Scotland 1725–1748’, pp. 527–528. 30 Ibid. 31 NLS, MS. 16650 ff 107 & 107v, Maule to Milton, 25 April 1747. 32 Scott, ‘The Politics and Administration of Scotland 1725–1748’, pp. 530–531. 33 HMC Polwarth, v, p. 205, Hume Campbell to Marchmont, 24 Feb. 1747. 34 HMC Polwarth, v, p. 252, Henry Pelham to Hume Campbell. 21 July 1747; Riley, English Ministers and Scotland, pp. 185–187. Eventually Marchmont was returned as one of the Scottish Representative Peers in the House of Lords at a bye-election in 1749.

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35 Bricke, ‘The Pelhams vs. Argyll’, p. 160 citing copy of Milton to Pelham, 30 June 1747, now NLS MS. 16652, ff59–61; copy of Milton to Argyll, 7 July [sic. for 3 July] 1747, now NLS MS. 16641, ff63–64; copy of Milton to Pelham, 21 July 1747, now NLS MS. 16652, ff70–71. 36 Murdoch, People Above, p. 35; H.M. Scott, ‘Mitchell, Sir Andrew (1708–1771)’, in ODNB, online edn, accessed 17 October 2019. 37 Harris, Politics and the Nation, p. 169 citing the preface of An Ample Disquisition into the Nature of Regalities and other Heretable Jurisdictions in that Part of Great Britain call’d Scotland (1747). 38 Quoted in Byron F. Jewell, ‘The Legislation Relating to Scotland After the Forty-Five’ (University of North Carolina PhD, 1975) p. 205. 39 Scott, ‘The Politics and Administration of Scotland, 1725–1748’, p. 532. 40 Sedgwick, ed., History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1715–1754, Vol. I, p. 160. 41 Scott, ‘The Politics and Administration of Scotland 1725–1748’, pp. 532–542; John B. Owen, The Rise of the Pelhams (1957), p. 314 42 NLS, Saltoun, MS. 16641, f58,n.d. but written June 1747. 43 Ibid, f 59, Argyll to Milton, 23 June 1747. 44 Ibid, f53, Argyll to Milton, 18 June 1747; Scott, ‘Erskine, James, Lord Grange’, in ODNB, online edn, accessed 8 August 2019; John Cannon, ‘Stanhope, Philip Dormer, fourth earl of Chesterfield (1694–1773), in ODNB, online edn, accessed 17 October 2019. 45 Scott, ‘The Politics and Administration of Scotland 1725–1748’, pp. 532–542. 46 NLS, Saltoun, MS 16641, f70 Argyll to Milton, 12 July 1747. 47 Ibid, f 53, Argyll to Milton, 18 June 1747. 48 Ibid, f 59, Argyll to Milton, 23 June 1747. See Haydn Mason, ‘Fawkener, Sir Everard (1694–1758)’, in ODNB, online edn, accessed 10 December 2018. 49 Scott, ‘The Politics and Administration of Scotland 1725–1748’, pp. 544–548; Mem­ oranda by the third Earl of Marchmont for 2 & 3 Dec 1747, recording discussion with the Earl of Chesterfield and the Duke of Newcastle, HMC Polwarth, v, pp. 258–260. 50 Richard Scott, ‘Dundas, Robert, of Arniston’, in ODNB, online edn, accessed 12 Dec. 2018. 51 Sedgwick, History of Parliament, I, p. 160. 52 NLS, MS. 16656 f22, Argyll to Milton, 9 Feb 1748. 53 Scott, ‘The Politics and Administration of Scotland 1725–1748’, p. 548 citing Pelham to Arniston, 12 May 1748, Newcastle Clumber Papers NEC 2017. We will learn much more about the British government and its army and their policy for the Highlands from 1745 to c1760 through Alastair Noble’s forthcoming University of Edinburgh PhD, ‘“That Barbarous Region”: Representations of the Highlands and the Construc­ tion of Scotland’. 54 Shaw, Management of Scottish Society, pp. 147–191. 55 Murdoch, People Above, pp. 38–39, 73–73; Harris, Politics and the Nation, pp. 163, 173–174. 56 Brewer, Sinews of Power, pp. 67, 86–87; Harris, Politics and the Nation, pp. 28, 98, 276, with the caveat (p. 276) ‘that major reforms threatened the conciliatory, albeit unexciting, political strategy Whig oligarchy had marked out as most likely to promote its continued political supremacy, as well as the stability and peace of the nation.’ 57 For the quotation see Jewell, ‘Legislation Relating to Scotland’, p. 60, citing BL Add. MS. 35598, ff143–142 [sic] Archbishop Herring to Hardwicke, 13 Dec. 1745; BL Add. MS 35889, f84, Archbishop Herring to Philip Yorke, 29 Jan. 1746. 58 Jewell, ‘Legislation Relating to Scotland’, p. 249, citing Newcastle Clumber Papers NEC 1213, Fox to Pelham, 28 May 1750. 59 See the map pf English garrisons in Spurlock, Cromwell and Scotland, p. xv and its equivalent in Harris, Politics and the Nation, p. 179. Also see Anderson and Fleet, Scotland: Defending the Nation, pp. 18, 84–87, 107, 114–116, 124. 60 Hoppit, ‘Compulsion’, pp. 108–115.

160 The limits of the union? Scotland 1745–1763 61 Ian G. Lindsay and Mary Cosh, Inveraray and the Dukes of Argyll (1973). 62 P.W.J. Riley, ‘The Structure of Scottish Politics and the Union of 1707’, in T.I. Rae, ed., The Union of 1707: Its Impact on Scotland (1974), pp. 28–29. 63 Hoppit, Britain’s Political Economies, pp. 280, 285–289, 291; Scott, ‘Politics and Administration’, appendices, pp. 562–569. 64 Bob Harris, ‘Towards a British Political Economy: An Eighteenth-Century Scottish Per­ spective’, in Perry Gauci, ed., Regulating the British Economy, 1660–1850 (2011), p. 90. 65 Emerson, An Enlightened Duke, pp. 310–311. 66 Harris, ‘Towards a British Political Economy’ p. 90. Also see Bob Harris, ‘Patriotic Commerce and National Revival: The Free British Fishery Society and British Politics, c.1749–58’, English Historical Review, Vol. 114 (April 1999), pp. 285–313; and Bob Harris, ‘Scotland’s Herring Fisheries and the Prosperity of the Nation, c.1660–1760’, SHR, Vol. LXXIX (April 2000), pp. 30–60. 67 Murdoch, People Above, p. 48. 68 Ibid., p. 49. 69 Emerson, An Enlightened Duke, pp. 158–162, 239–242, 275–281. 70 Murdoch, People Above, pp. 48–49. 71 The most recent contribution to the literature relating to the Scottish Highland Regi­ ments is Matthew Dziennik, The Fatal Land. 72 Emerson, An Enlightened Duke, pp. 3–5, 344 and Murdoch, People Above, pp. 101–102. 73 Emerson, Ibid., p. 5; for the monument to the second duke of Argyll at Westminster Abbey, see Malcolm Baker, ‘Roubiliac, Louis François (1702–1762) under the subhead­ ing ‘the major monuments’, in ODNB, online edn, accessed 7 October 2019. Also see www.westminster-abbey.org/abbey-commemorations/commemorations/john-campbell­ 2nd-duke-of-argyll accessed 7 October 2019. 74 John Brewer, ‘The Misfortunes of Lord Bute: A Case-Study in Eighteenth-Century Political Argument and Public Opinion’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 16 (March, 1973), pp. 3–43. 75 Brewer, ‘Misfortunes’, pp. 19–22, but also see Geoff Parker, ‘Enlightenment and Sco­ tophobia: Studies in Smollett and Scottish Culture’ (University of Flinsburg, Germany, PhD, 1999), which I have been unable to consult. 76 O’Gorman, ‘Myth of Lord Bute’s secret influence’ in Schweizer, Lord Bute, pp. 57–70. 77 Murdoch, ‘The Importance of being Edinburgh: Management and Opposition in Edinburgh Politics, 1746–1784’, SHR, Vol. 62 No. 1 (April 1983), pp. 3, 5, 7–11; Murdoch, ‘Politics and the People in the Burgh of Dumfries, 1758–1760’, SHR, Vol. 70 No. 2 (Oct. 1991), pp. 151–171; Richard B. Sher, ‘Moderates, Managers and Popular Politics in Mid-Eighteenth Century Edinburgh: The Drysdale “Bustle” of the 1760s’, in Dwyer, Mason and Murdoch, eds., New Perspectives on the Politics and Cul­ ture of Early Modern Scotland, pp. 179–209; Hisashi Kuboyama, ‘The politics of the people in Glasgow and the west of Scotland, 1707–c.1785’ (University of Edinburgh PhD, 2012), pp. 120–134. Somehow an error has occurred on p. 120 in Dr Kuboya­ ma’s thesis, where the younger brother of the third earl of Bute, James Stuart Mack­ enzie, is identified as his nephew. 78 Pentland, ‘“We Speak for the Ready”’, pp. 75–77; Marie Peters, Pitt and Popularity (1980), pp. 265–276; Sher, Church and University, pp. 67, 78, 89–92, 216–217, 228, 230; Robertson, Scottish Enlightenment and the Militia Issue, pp. 81–84, 89, 106, 110, 112; Hanvelt and Spencer, ‘David Hume’s “A Character of Sir Robert Walpole”’, pp. 383–385. 79 Pentland, ‘“We Speak for the Ready”’, p. 80. 80 Hoppit, ‘Scotland and the Taxing Union’, p. 50; Dow, Cromwellian Scotland, pp. 141–142. 81 Murdoch, Scotland and America, pp. 150–155. 82 B. Bailyn, Voyagers to the West (1986), pp. 46–48, 50–54, 57–66, 398. 83 L. Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation (1993), Chapter 3; Kidd, Subverting Scotland’s Past, pp. 205–209.

Conclusion

Britain signed the Peace of Paris in 1763, generally viewed by historians as a vic­ tory for Great Britain over the Kingdom of France and its ally Spain. The UK minister responsible for negotiating that peace was John Stuart, third Earl of Bute, elder nephew of the late third Duke of Argyll, who had died at the age of 79 in April 1761. Bute had attained high office before his uncle’s death. George II died in November 1760. The new king, the 21-year-old George III, had been tutored by Bute, and looked to his former tutor for support as he assumed the throne. He was just a few months older than Charles II had been when he was crowned king of Scotland at Scone in 1651. The Marquess of Argyll had presided at that cor­ onation in 1651; his great great grandson, the Earl of Bute, took a prominent place at the coronation of George III and his young Queen at Westminster Abbey in September 1761. Famously, in his accession speech, the new king proclaimed that he gloried ‘in the name of Britain’ as his birthright. The young king’s insistence that the Earl of Bute assume ministerial office brought both he and Bute into conflict with William Pitt, generally acknowl­ edged as the leading light of a ministry which was bringing the war with France to a successful conclusion. The issue was over the British alliance with Prussia, but by the time Pitt resigned as Secretary of State in October 1761 criticism of the new King’s reliance on Bute was widespread, particularly in London. John Brewer has argued that although Bute was a Scot, indeed, the first Scot to serve as a Secretary of State for British and foreign affairs and later as First Lord of the Treasury, it was not his nationality that was the fundamental reason for his unpopularity. The king’s reliance on an unelected minister, albeit one who sat in Parliament as a Scottish Representative Peer in the House of Lords, was viewed by many Whig politicians as unconstitutional. George III wanted to rule through his own choice of prime minister, not through consultation with either Whig leaders such as the Duke of Newcastle, or leading Members of Parliament in the House of Commons such as William Pitt. For those with a very Whig view of the unwritten British constitution as it had developed since 1688, with its limitations on the prerogative powers of the Crown, Bute was bad news, but opposition to Bute’s appointment to ministerial office also reflected what Brewer termed ‘militant chauvinism’ that affected ‘the nation at large’.1 One has also to wonder if the fear and resentment Bute generated in office was due to his Scottishness or

162 Conclusion his wife’s inheritance, in 1761, of a ‘personal fortune … estimated at £1 million’ as well as ‘the Wortley estates in West Yorkshire worth £17,000 per annum.’2 At the centre of political and social power in Great Britain at the end of a suc­ cessful war for imperial power contested with France, Bute was viewed as an out­ sider. His uncle the second Duke of Argyll had been associated with George III’s grandfather when the future George II was Prince of Wales, and represented the hopes of opposition politicians who were convinced that Sir Robert Walpole was misusing his power at the Treasury after the financial crisis of the ‘South Sea Bubble’.3 To a certain extent Bute had followed in his uncle’s footsteps, only with more success in winning the loyalty of the Prince of Wales. Brewer believed that Bute’s nationality was ‘one very partial explanation of Bute’s unpopularity in the nation at large’, and certainly Bute, as we have discussed on page 155, was far from a typical Scot. For Bruce Lenman, Bute was, like his uncles, Eton educated, and only resident in Scotland for a few years before the last Jacobite rebellion in 1745.4 This does not take into account Bute’s degree from the University of Leiden, where he studied the law of nations. Brewer noted perceptively that John Wilkes’s invective published in the North Briton ‘hammered away week after week at the interchangeable depravity of the Scots nation and the King’s favourite.’5 Bute was viewed as a threat because, unlike the Jewish community in London who would have benefited from what contemporaries had condemned as ‘the Jew Bill’ of 1754, Bute as a Scot had become the leading minister of the government of Great Britain. Bute’s ‘patronage of his fellow countrymen’, according to Brewer, ‘was linked by his opponents with Scottish immigration into England and soon elevated into a conspiratorial design to squeeze all worthy Englishmen from posts of power and replace them with needy Scots.’6 Wilkes may have come to symbo­ lise English liberties after 1760, but Bute became a kind of doppelgänger who long after he resigned from public office and lost all authority with the king, continued to represent English ‘hostility to Scots, and the prevailing view of the Scots used to belabour Bute.’7 David Hume, writing to his Scottish publisher in London, Andrew Millar, in 1763 declared that he had decided against continuing his History by adding a further volume or perhaps two volumes on the reigns of King William, Queen Anne and George I, because of ‘the general Rage against the Scots’ in England.8 Even before the succession of a new king representing a new generation and the death less than six months later of the third Duke of Argyll, there were indications that politics (and by implication society) were changing as memories of the last Jacobite rebellion and its aftermath began to fade. For example, whereas in 1745 to 1746 substantial numbers of able-bodied men were raised to serve in the Jacobite rebel army, after the outbreak of the Seven Years War with France in 1756, men of military age were subjected to a sustained cam­ paign by agents of the British army and the British state to raise men in Scot­ land for military service abroad. The majority were enlisted for service in North America, but some were sent to the war in Germany, if not voluntarily then under the terms of the Press Act passed by Parliament in London and enacted with particular severity in Scotland in 1757 and 1758. Lord George Beauclerk,

Conclusion

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Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in Scotland, working with the chief law officers of the Crown there (the Lord President of the Court of Session, the Lord Justice Clerk and the Lord Advocate), agreed quotas for impressing men through the authority of the sheriffs depute in all the Scottish counties, assisted by their sheriffs substitute. These in turn divided the Commissioners of Supply and Justices of the Peace in each county into districts responsible for meeting a quota of men towards the national target of 1800. This process was repeated in 1758, when the quota was reduced from 1800 to 1400 men. The men pressed were in addition to the so-called ‘Highland’ regiments whose enlistments attracted more attention in England than the men raised in addition to them through implementation of the Press Act. Lord George Beauclerk wrote to Lord Barrington, the Secretary for War, reporting that after consulting the Scottish law officers, ‘it was universally believed here that few or no men had been Levyed in England by the press act,’ and as a result ‘the people in General seemed Resolved to pursue no other Plan in the Execution of it in time coming than what the Law Directed; That they already began to find a scarcity of Labourers and that from the number sent to the army there were hardly [any] left who would fall within the usual Description of the press Act; …’9 There is additional evidence that the implementation of the Press Act in 1756 and 1757 had caused significant disruption. The Aberdeen Journal both in 1756 and 1757 published notices assuring ‘traders, chapmen, countrymen and farmers’ who came to sell goods in Aberdeen that they would not be impressed.10 Similarly, but in contrast to impressment, in the issue of the Aberdeen Journal for 1 February 1757, Captain Simon Fraser of Fraser’s Highlanders [the 78th Foot] promised ‘all Gentlemen Volunteers’ who would enlist not only ‘pre­ sent pay and free Quarters’ but that they would be immediately ‘put into antient Highland Dress, short Coat, Philabeg, Plaid and Kelt [sic], broad Sword and Pistol, and have all the Encouragement that a Scots Highlander could wish for.’ Previously, there has not been a great deal of attention given by historians of Scotland to the operation of the Press Act in Scotland from 1756 to 1758. It does appear clear that the public debate in Scotland over the Pitt ministry’s introduc­ tion of a bill to raise militia units in England made those involved in implementing the Press Act in Scotland aware of the contrast between national recruitment for the war effort in England and Scotland. Although we know more about the interest of leading intellectuals such as Adam Ferguson, David Hume and Adam Smith on the issue, a large proportion of the landed gentry in Scotland had been appointed as District Commissioners for the Press Act. Surviving minutes for the Thornhill District in Perthshire, for example, identify George Drummond of Blair, Nicol Grahame of Gartmore, James Graham of Bowhaple and James Fairfield of Breandom as commissioners. Similarly, the meeting of JPs and Commissioners of Supply for Haddingtonshire for putting the ‘act for the speedy and effectual recruiting of his majestys landforces and marines’ on 14 November 1757 was attended by Lord Belhaven, Mr Law of Elvingston, Mr Fall of Dunbarcastle, Mr Baird of Newbyth, Mr Kinloch of Gilmerton, Mr Carfrae in the parish of Had­ dington, Mr Hepburn of Humbie, Lord Coalston [George Brown of Coalston, a

164 Conclusion Court of Session judge], Mr. Buchan of Letham, Provost Dickson [presumably of Haddington], Sir Hew Dalrymple [of North Berwick] and Mr Hay of Hopes. A similar, but printed document for Aberdeenshire is preserved in the Grant of Monymusk Papers in the National Records of Scotland.11 Government recruit­ ment policy in Scotland contrasted with that in England. The Select Society of Edinburgh discussed issues of national defence from 1755, and in 1757 considered ‘the comparative advantages of a standing army and a militia’.12 By 1759, the ravages of the Press Act in Scotland had led Lord George Beauclerk to inform the Secretary for War that there were few men to be had in Scotland for military recruitment. Beauclerk wrote that ‘I have at present no sort of reason to Expect success from a press Act.’ He did, however, go on to argue ‘that if one [a Press Act] is to be passed for England, Scotland should cer­ tainly be included, as its being put in force here will no doubt contribute to the success of the usual method of Recruiting.’13 In 1759, when knowledge of a possible French attack on Scotland became known, as well as the fact that the English MPs Charles and George Townshend supported the idea of extending the English Militia law to Scotland, those who had been in favour of Scotland orga­ nising its own national defence organised public meetings in support of drafting a parliamentary bill for a militia for Scotland. A meeting of the freeholders of Mid­ lothian in Edinburgh was unable to agree an address supporting the plan to extend the English militia laws to Scotland, however, because the Duke of Argyll would not support it, preferring the raising of ‘fencible’ regiments by the Lord Lieutenants in selected regions of Scotland on the model of what he had organised with the government in 1746. The chairman of the Midlothian meeting, Sir Alexander Dick of Prestonfield, reported to Charles Townshend that although ‘we did all in our power’, the failure to win the support of the Duke of Argyll demonstrated that ‘aged pulses don’t beat high enough for the many things this country needs.’14 Although such a bill was introduced in the House of Commons by the Scottish MP Sir Gilbert Elliot, it was defeated by the influence of the Duke of Newcastle and the Earl of Hardwicke, who were against introducing an armed militia into the Scottish Highlands, citing the last Jacobite rebellion as a precedent against the bearing of arms in the Highlands. The Lord Advocate of Scotland, Robert Dundas of Arniston, spoke against the bill, and in reward was chosen by the government as Lord President of the Court of Session in Scotland before the end of the year.15 It is clear that by the latter stages of the Seven Years War politics had changed in Scotland. With most of the aristocracy resident in England, Scottish landowners more generally, and even more importantly an expanding urban population, were looking less to traditional political leadership from the Scottish aristocracy and more to the politics of economic development. Traditional approaches to postunion politics would persist, but the failure of the third Earl of Bute and his brother James Stuart Mackenzie to survive as government ministers in Scotland and the equal failure of their cousins Lord Lorne (the future fifth Duke of Argyll) and his brother Lord Frederick Campbell to in their turn succeed as men of influence in government, reflected an increasing belief amongst the middle class in

Conclusion

165

Scotland that political integration in Britain and economic expansion through accessing new markets furth of Scotland were necessary for the future of the country. This led to public preoccupation with the politics of British imperial markets and the retention of the American colonies rather than specifically Scottish political issues.16 As it was argued by the author of one anonymous pamphlet, The Public Catechism; or, a Few Cool Questions to the People, the true Scottish patriot should take as his (and increasingly, her) priority the nation’s manufacturers, and look for the preservation of Scottish military glory in the Highland battalions that by 1760 had established themselves as so important to the British army.17 Never­ theless, the popular fury in England which greeted the appointment of a Scottish prime minister, and the condemnation of the Treaty of Paris, which ended his tenure of high office, demonstrated clearly that if an increasing number of Scots accepted their union with England in a British state, there were still many short­ comings to the operation of that union. It would not be long before the short­ comings of the British union would become transatlantic rather than an insular issue. The union would endure, but it would not be static. The war which appeared to demonstrate the enduring nature of the British United Kingdom of Great Britain was but a prelude to future wars, which would transform the nature of that union in a more revolutionary context.18

Notes 1 John Brewer, ‘The Misfortunes of Lord Bute’, quotation at p. 22. Also see Colley, Britons, Chapter 3, especially p. 121. 2 Karl Wolfgang Schweizer, ‘Stuart, John, third earl of Bute (1713–1792)’, in ODNB, online edn, accessed 12 April 2019. 3 Gordon Pentland, “‘We Speak for the Ready”’, pp. 65, 75–84. For recent scholarship on Bolingbroke’s opposition to Walpole’s ministry see Max Skjönsberg ‘Lord Boling­ broke’s Theory of Party and Opposition’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 59 No. 4 (2016), ˝nsberg. ‘On the Character of a “Great pp. 947–973; and Joseph Hone and Max Skjo Patriot”: A New Essay Ascribed to Bolingbroke’, Journal of British Studies, Vol. 57 (July 2018), pp. 445–466. 4 Bruce Lenman, Integration, Enlightenment, and Industrialization: Scotland 1746–1832 (1981), p. 29; Lenman, Enlightenment and Change: Scotland 1746–1832 (new edition 2009), pp. 44–45. 5 Brewer, ‘Misfortunes’, p. 20.

6 Ibid, but also see Pentland, ‘“We Speak for the Ready”’, pp. 75, 80, 84.

7 Brewer, ‘Misfortunes’, p. 21.

8 Hume to Andrew Millar, Edin. 28 Mar. 1763, in J.Y.T. Greig, ed., Letters of David

Hume (1932), 2 Vols., Vol. 1, pp. 381–382; Hanveldt and Spencer, ‘David Hume’s “A Character of Sir Robert Walpole”’, pp. 383–385. See Hugh Amory, ‘Millar, Andrew (1705–1768)’, in ODNB, online edn accessed 25 April 2019, and Richard B. Sher, The Enlightenment & the Book (2006), pp. 54, 308–309. 9 NLS MS. 13497, Letterbook of Lord George Beauclerk, p. 168, Beauclerk to Lord Barrington, 25 Nov. 1758. 10 I am grateful to George Dixon, former Archivist for Stirling Council Archives, for sending me copies of his notes taken from the Aberdeen Journal issues of 23 March 1756, 18 Jan. 1757, and 1 February 1757.

166 Conclusion 11 See NRS, GD 35/309 (Thornhill District in Perthshire); NRS, JP2/2/1 (Hadding­ tonshire) and NRS GD 3435/787, pp. 1–21 (Aberdeenshire). 12 Robertson, Scottish Enlightenment, p. 86. 13 NLS, MS. 13497, Letterbook of Lord George Beauclerk, p. 160, Beauclerk to Lord Barrington, 26 Oct. 1758. 14 NRS, RH4/98/2, Sir Alexander Dick to Charles Townshend, M.P., 4 Oct. 1759. 15 Robertson, Scottish Enlightenment, pp. 108–113. Also see Richard B. Sher, Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment (new edn, 2015), pp. 215–234. 16 Harris, Politics and the Nation, pp. 335–337. 17 Robertson, Scottish Enlightenment, p. 114, citing pamphlet in the Signet Library col­ lection undated but attributed by Robertson to 1761. 18 Atle Wold, Scotland and the French Revolutionary War, 1792–1802 (2017); Gordon Pentland, ‘Patriotism, universalism and the Scottish conventions, 1792–1794’, History (the journal of the Historical Association), Vol. 89 no. 295 (July 2004), pp. 340–360.

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168 Bibliography MS. 16518 f32, Andrew Fletcher, M.P. to his father Andrew Fletcher S.C.J [Lord Milton], 24 Feb. 1756 MS. 16529 f40, Ilay to Milton, 13 April 1724 MS. 16531 ff8–9, Ilay to Milton, 7 Jan.1725 MS. 16532 ff96 & 97, ‘Letter to R.C. [Deputy Keeper of the Signet Seal Ranald Campbell] to ‘Mr [Charles] Delafaye’. 27 Nov. 1725 f146, ‘Copy Letter [from Lord Milton?] to Mr [William] Steuart, Octr 1725 MS. 16533 f56, Ilay to Lord Milton, 5 March 1726 MS. 16534 f30, Duncan Forbes to Lord Milton, ‘March 10th 1726 MS. 16536 ff114–117, Duncan Forbes of Culloden to the Earl of Ilay, Aberdeen, 26 August 1727 ff120–121, Duncan Forbes to ‘My Lord’, Culloden, 1st September 1727 f122, Duncan Forbes to ‘My Lord’, Culloden, 8th September 1727 MS. 16545 f62, ‘Copy of a Letter from Mr. Thomas Burnet to Mr. [James?] Johnston’, dated at London 24 Feb. 1730/31 f63, Lord Milton to Symonds Inn, Chancery Lane London re Bishop Burnet’s legacy to Saltoun Parish School, enclosing a transcription of a letter from Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun to his brother Henry Fletcher, London, 13 Dec. 1713 MS. 16548 ff87–88, T. Burnett to ‘My Lord’ [Milton?], Temple, 27 May 1732 MS. 16555 ff44–45, Alexander Brodie of Brodie to Lord Milton, Brodie house, May 25th [docketed 23 [ic] May 1734 f62 Lord Ilay to Lord Milton, ‘’Janry 8th 1734’ f64, Lord Milton to Lord Ilay (copy), Jan. 1734 f89, Ilay to Milton, ‘Sept. 1734’ f112, Charles Campbell to Lord Milton, Stirling March 20th docketed ‘Capt Charles Campbell 20 March 1734 MS. 16557 f45, Earl of Home to Lord Milton, 26 May 1734 MS. 16558 ff7–8, Countess of Eglinton to Lord Milton, 20 & 28 April 1734 MS. 16559 ff92–93, Ilay to Milton, Jan 30 [1735] f96, Ilay to Milton, ‘March 13’, docketed ’13 March 1735’ ff98–99, Ilay to Milton, 15 March 1735 ff100–101, copy of letter from Lord Milton to Earl of Ilay, n.d., but clearly a reply to Ilay’s letter of 15 March 1735 ff112–113, Ilay to Milton, 1 May 1735 f121, Ilay to Milton 24 May 1735 f132, Ilay to Milton, 31 July 1735 MS. 16562 f90 Alexander Macmillan to Lord Milton, 3 May 1735

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Index

Aberdeen 15, 19, 31, 163

Aberdeenshire 10, 33, 47, 72, 149;

Dunnottar Castle, 10

Absolutist monarchy 63, 112

Agricultural improvement 124–128; Clerk

of Penicuik estate, 126

Allan, Dr. David 35

Allardyce, George, Master of the Royal

Mint in Scotland 73

Angus 23, 124

Anne, Queen of England, Ireland and

Scotland, first monarch of the United

Kingdom of Great Britain 41, 47, 51,

53, 61, 64, 67, 74, 82, 128, 162; as

Princess Anne, resides in Edinburgh

1681–1682, 47, 61; 1706 letter to the

Parliament of Scotland 62

Arminianism 36

Army in Scotland 9, 21, 71, 89, 101, 142,

148, 152, 155, 165; 42nd Regiment,

‘Black Watch’ 142; 78th Regiment,

‘Fraser’s Highlanders’ 163;

Impressment, 1756–1758, 162–164

Athens 4, 116

‘Ayr Bank’ (Douglas, Heron and Co.)

132, 136

Baillie, George, of Jerviswood, Lanarkshire,

and Mellarstain, Berwickshire 85

Baillie, Revd Dr Robert 13, 21

Bank of England 50, 63

Bank of Scotland 46

Baptists 21

Barbados 46

Barrington, William Wildman, second

Viscount Barrington 135, 165

Beauclerk, Lord George, Commander of the Army in Scotland 1756–1758, 162–164

Berkeley, Bishop George, 115, 134

Berwick-on-Tweed, 23, 91

“Bishop’s Wars” 1639–1640, 25

Bland, General Humphrey 1–3 Boyle, Roger, Lord Broghill, first earl of

Orrery 12, 20

Brewer, Professor John 63, 161, 162

Bristol 87

British Linen Company 154

British North America 4, 142,

155–157, 165

Brown, George. Lord Coalston SCJ (Scottish College of Justice) 163

Bruce, Alexander, second earl of

Kincardine 23

Burgh and shire commissioners meet with

General Monck at Edinburgh, 1659 22

Burnet, Gilbert, clergyman and later Bishop

of Salisbury 35, 42

Bushell, Captain, of Deloraine’s Regiment,

1725 91, 102

Buteshire (Isle of Bute and Isle of Arran)

72, 155

Cadogan, General William, later Earl

Cadogan 84, 86, 90

Caithness 72, 86

Calvinism 42, 113

‘Cameralism’ 135

‘Campbell regiment’ 1689/90, 49–50 Campbell, Archibald, seventh earl of

Argyll 28

Campbell, Archibald, first marquess of

Argyll 12–15, 44, 161; trial of, 1661

27–29, 112

Campbell, Archibald, ninth earl of Argyll,

formerly Lord Lorne 28, 29, 42, 44

Campbell, Archibald, tenth earl and first

duke of Argyll 44, 45, 48–50

Index 187 Campbell, Archibald, third duke of Argyll

12, 29, 49, 54, 56, 65, 68, 85–89,

92–97, 101–107, 110, 114, 127, 128,

143–149, 153–155, 161–164; Life Part­ ner: Anne Williams, ‘Mrs. Williams’ 155

Campbell, Daniel, of Shawfield, Lanarkshire 88–89 Campbell, Elizabeth (previously Talmash or

Tollemache), wife of the first duke of

Argyll 49

Campbell, Lord Frederick, younger brother

of the fifth duke of Argyll 164

Campbell, Hugh, third earl of Loudoun 65

Campbell, John, first earl of Loudoun,

Lord Chancellor of Scotland 8

Campbell, John, second duke of Argyll 4,

12, 29, 49, 65–66, 69, 74, 83–87, 90,

92, 95, 103, 106, 110–111, 143, 145,

150, 161

Campbell, John, Lord Lorne (Later fifth

duke of Argyll) 164

Campbell, Ranald, deputy Keeper of the

Signet Seal 94, 108

Canada 128, 143, 156

Canny, Professor Nicholas 3

Caribbean 66, 109, 130–132, 136, 156

Carlyle, Rev’d Alexander 142

Carstares, William 42, 51–52, 68

Carteret, John, Lord Carteret, later second earl of Granville 85–86, 91, 145–147 Catalonia, Province of Spain 74

Cavendish, William, second duke of

Devonshire, 106

Charles I, 8, 11, 12, 14, 16

Charles II, 11–13, 21–22, 25–28, 30–35,

61, 122; coronations of 8, 9, 19, 42, 44,

49, 161; Declaration of Breda 26

Church of England 53, 67, 68, 110

Church of Scotland 8–15, 44–48, 53, 54,

68, 71, 75, 82, 108, 111, 114–115;

General Assembly of 9, 45, 52, 66, 71,

101; records of 10

Churchill, John, first Duke of Marlborough

4, 62, 65, 110

Churchill, Sarah, Duchess of

Marlborough 111

Clackmannanshire 72

Clarges, Thomas 21

Cockburn, Adam, Lord Ormiston SCJ, of

Ormiston, Midlothian 56, 107

Cockburn, John, M.P., of Ormiston,

Midothian 85

Cockermouth, Cumberland, England 87

Coleman, Dr. James 54, 56

Colyear, David, first earl of Portmore 110

Commissioners for the Government of Scotland 1651–1652 10–13 Commissioners of Supply in Scotland 21

Commissioners selected by Scottish shire commissioners to meet with Council of State in London 1660 21–23 Committee of the Estates of the Scottish Parliament Commonwealth of England: Council of

State 8, 10, 15, 21–22, 25; Parliament 8,

10–11, 21–22; Recall of the ‘Rump’

Parliament, 1659 20, 24

Company of Scotland Trading to Africa

and the Indies 46, 50–52, 66, 69, 95,

128, 136

Convention of the Royal Burghs of

Scotland 14, 66, 71, 101

Coxe, Revd William 92

Cromarty 77, 86

Cromwell, Oliver 1, 3, 8–9, 12, 20, 27,

122; death of 14, 20; English army in

Scotland, payment of 21; union with

England during Cromwell’s rule 1,

11–15; 19–22, 29, 33–34, 67, 70, 75,

83, 101, 122, 144, 146, 153

Cullen, Dr Karen 126

Culloden, Battle of, 1746 148

Cunningham, Alexander, tutor and book

dealer 49

Cunningham, William, ninth earl of Glencairn 25–27, 30; “Glencairn’s Rebellion” 1653–1654, 21–23 Dalkeith, Midlothian 11, 13, 15, 20

Dalrymple, Sir David, first baronet 64, 85

Dalrymple, Sir Hew, Lord North Berwick

93, 94, 107

Dalrymple, James, Viscount Stair, 1, 22; Decisions of the Court of Session, 33 Dalrymple, John, Master of Stair (later first

earl of Stair) 44–45, 104, 111

Dalrymple, John, second earl of Stair 4,

104, 146

Deane, General Richard 10

Declaration of the Parliament of England,

considering the settlement of Scotland,

1651 9, 10

Denmark 45, 50

Dick, Sir Alexander, of Prestonfield 164

Douglas, Charles, third duke of Queen­ sberry and second duke of Dover 146

Douglas, James, second duke of Queen­ sberry and first duke of Dover 64, 66

188 Index Dow, Dr. Frances D. 20 Dunbar, Battle of, 1650 8, 10, 14 Dunbartonshire 23; Dundas, Sir Lawrence, M.P. 150 Dundas, Robert, of Arniston, Midlothian, Lord Arniston, and Lord Presdient, SCJ 86, 88–91, 102, 147, 151 Dundas, Robert, the younger, second Lord Arniston and Lord President of the Court of Session, SCJ 164 Dundee 9, 14, 20, 83 Dunkeld, Perthshire 44 East India Company 50 Economic development 2, 43, 51, 52, 66, 95–96, 109, 137, 143 Economies of England and Scotland 4, 47, 50, 64, 128, 145, 152; paper currency 133–135 Edinburgh 11, 14, 19, 21–24, 28, 31, 35, 43, 64, 84, 87, 90, 94, 192; College of 36, 42, 52, 101, 114, 146, 150, 164; Holyrood Palace 35, 61, 111, 155; Parliament House 50; ‘Porteous Riot’, 1737 111; Select Society 164 Edward I of England 8 Elliot, Sir Gilbert, of Minto, third baronet 128, 155, 164 ‘Engagement’ between Scottish Parliament and Charles I, 1648 15 England, First Lord of the Treasury 143–144, 161; see also Godolphin, Sidney; Harley, Robert; Walpole, Sir Robert English garrisons in Scotland 12–15, 21, 27–28, 82 English Parliament: Act of Settlement, 1701 46, 53; Alien Act 1705 66; Parliamentary elections of 1701 and 1702 63; Toleration Act 1694 46 Episcopacy and Episcopalians 29, 30, 34, 35, 43, 48, 53 54, 68, 82 Erastianism 52, 53, 111, 113 Erskine (or Areskine), Charles, Lord Tinwald SCJ 108, 114, 147, 151 Erskine, James, Lord Grange SCJ 108, 129, 150 Erskine, John, sixth earl of Mar 65–66, 75, 83, 129 Eton School 50, 65 European religious culture, late seventeenth century 35, 46

Faculty of Advocates 14, 34, 86 Fairfax, Thomas, third Lord Fairfax of Cameron 24 Falconer, Sir James, of Phesdo, Kincardineshire 64 Famine 50, 52, 126 Fawkener, Sir Everard, secretary to the Duke of Cumberland from 1745 150 Feudalism 13, 15 Fife 35 ‘Financial Revolution’: and banking, 50, 88, 132, 135–137, 154 Fisheries 123, 154 Fitch, Colonel Thomas 15 Fleetwood, General Charles 20–21 Fletcher, Andrew, of Saltoun, Member of the Scottish Parliament, 1703–1707 52, 90, 107 Fletcher, Andrew, Lord Milton SCJ 49, 56, 90, 93, 96, 107, 145–152, 154, 156 Fletcher, Andrew, M.P., son of Lord Milton 152 Forbes, Duncan, of Culloden, Inverness-shire 84, 90–93, 96, 108, 147, 149, 151 Forbes, Duncan, historian 113 Ford, Professor John D. 22, 33 Foreign trade 62–64, 109, 130–131, 135, 143 Fox, Henry, M.P. 152, 154–155 France 4, 16, 43–46, 48, 50, 52, 69, 104, 112, 114, 128–130, 134–135, 142, 152, 157, 161; French report on British Highland troops in North America, 1759 143 Fraser, James, minister of the parish of Wardlaw (later Kirkhill), Inverness 14–15, 27 Fraser, Captain Simon, of Fraser’s Highlanders 163 Freebairn, Robert 82–83, 129 George I, King of the United Kingdom 1715–1727 32, 41, 74–75, 83–85, 95, 104, 162 George II, King of the United Kingdom, 1727–1760 32, 56, 97, 102, 106, 108, 128, 143, 151, 153, 155, 161–162 George III, King of the United Kingdom, 1760–1820 143, 154–156, 161; as Prince of Wales, 114; Gloried ‘in the name of Britain’ 56, 161 Gilmour, Sir John, Lord President of the Court of Session, 1661–1670 34

Index 189 Glasgow 14, 31, 35, 124, 130; Malt Tax,

or ‘Shawfield’ rioting 88–91, 102;

College of 49–50, 89, 95, 101, 115, 133

Glencoe, attack on the Macdonalds of

Glencoe 45, 48, 50

Godolphin, Sidney, first earl of

Godolphin 87

Goodare, Professor Julian 82

Graham, James, first marquess of

Montrose 28

Graham, John, first viscount Dundee

43, 55

Graham, James, first duke of Montrose 84,

86–87, 91, 102–103, 107

Grant, Sir Francis, Lord Cullen SCJ 93

Grant, William, Lord Prestongrange SCJ 127

Greenock, Renfrewshire 87

Greenshields, Rev’d James 68

Gregory, Professor David 73

Grotius, Hugo 115

Guthrie, Rev’d Dr James 28–29

Haddington, East Lothian 23, 163

Haldane, Patrick, of Gleneagles,

Perthshire 86

Hamilton, George, first earl of Orkney 4

Hamilton (previously Douglas), George,

third duke of Hamilton 31, 55

Hamilton, James, first duke of Hamilton 16

Hamilton, James, earl of Arran, later fourth

duke of Hamilton and first earl of

Brandon 55, 65–66, 69; ‘Hamilton

Affair’ 1711–1712 65

Hamilton, John, second Lord Belhaven and

Stenton 62

‘Hanoverian succession’ 62, 65–66, 74, 85,

97, 104, 144

Hardwicke, Philip, first Earl of Hardwicke

1, 3, 127, 152, 164

Harley, Robert, later first earl of Oxford 87

Harris, Professor James 133–134

Harris, Professor Bob 89, 129, 154

Hay, John, fourth marquess of Tweeddale

145–147, 150

Hay, William, fourth earl of Kinnoull 24

Hay, Thomas, ninth earl of Kinnoull,

previously Lord Dupplin 127

Hesse, Holy Roman Empire: troops in

Scotland, 1715 84, 96

‘Highland Dress’ 142–143

Highlands, Argyll estate 29, 47, 49

Hobbes, Thomas 35

Hont, Dr Istvan 136

Hope, Sir James 13

Hoppit, Professor Julian 4, 82, 129

Howell, James 15–16 Hume, David: Cheyne, George, physician

112; History of England 3; projected

third volume of the History of Great

Britain 46, 162; History of Great

Britain, Volume II (later volume VI of

Hume’s History of England) 54–56;

Ramsay, Andrew Michael, ‘the

Chevalier’ 112

Hume, Patrick, of Polwarth, Berwickshire, later first earl of Marchmont 54–55 Hume Campbell, Alexander, M.P. 148–151 Hume Campbell, Hugh, third earl of

Marchmont, 54 147–149, 151

Hyde, Edward, first earl of Clarendon 27

Inverlochy, Inverness-shire 21, 28

Inverness 86

English garrison, 1652–1660 14, 21, 27–28

Fort George, under construction from

1749 153

Ireland 3–4, 9–10, 19–20, 27, 35, 41,

44–45, 48, 53, 86, 97, 108, 111, 142;

Church of Ireland, 36, 52, 134; Irish

Parliament, 45–47; ‘Protestant Ascen­ dancy’ 46, 115; ‘undertakers’ in the Irish

Parliament 106; “Wood’s half pence’

scandal 105

Jackson, Professor Alvin 4

Jackson, Dr. Clare 34–35 Jacobitism 43–47, 49, 52, 55, 66,

70–75, 82–83, 86, 91, 96, 101, 104,

108–115, 117, 134–137, 142, 144, 148,

151–152, 162

James, VI of Scotland and I of England 3,

32, 69

James, VII of Scotland and II of England

4, 12, 36, 42–43, 45, 52, 55, 61, 104,

122, 143; Maria d’Esti, of Modena,

consort of James from 1673 45; resident

in Edinburgh 1678–1682 35, 61

James Francis Edward Stuart, son of James

VII and II 45, 83, 143

Johnston, Archibald (Sir), of Wariston 9, 13, 28–29 Johnston, James, ‘Secretary Johnston’ 65

Kennedy, Dr Allan 29

Ker, John, first duke of Roxburghe 62,

68–69, 85–88, 90–91, 94, 103,

107–107, 145, 147

190 Index

Lambert, General John 10, 20–21, 24, 27

Latitudinarian 36, 52

Law, John 51, 134, 136

Law and order 3, 21

Lee, Dr. Ronald 29

Leiden, University of 89

Leighton, Robert, Bishop of Dunblane and

later Archbishop of Glasgow 35

Leith 21

Lenman, Professor Bruce 162

Leslie, George, fourth Lord Melville, later

first earl of Melville 44–45 Leslie, John, seventh earl of Rothes, later

Duke of Rothes 23, 26–27; as Royal

Commissioner to the Scottish Parliament

30–31, 35

Lindsay, Colin, third earl of Balcarres, 55

Lindsay, John, seventeenth earl of

Crawford and first earl of Lindsay 25

Lindsay, Patrick, M.P. 111

Linlithgow 23, 150

Locke, John 115

Lockhart, George, of Carnwath,

Lanarkshire 65

London 10–11, 19, 20–21, 23–25, 44–45,

47, 49–50, 54–55, 64, 87, 107, 147

Lord Advocates of Scotland, 28, 51, 70,

84–85, 94, 102, 108–109, 127, 135,

151, 163–164

Lord Chancellors of Scotland 8, 30, 70, 135

Lord Chancellors of England and the UK

after 1707 67, 102, 144, 152

Lord Clerk Register 10, 65

Lord Justice Clerk of the Scottish Court

of Justiciary 56, 108, 145–147,

151–152, 163

Lord President of the Scottish Court of

Session 147, 149, 151, 163–164; see also

Dalrymple, Sir Hew

Louis XIV, King of France 45, 48, 53

Lowndes, William, M.P. 87

Ludlow, General Edmund 20

Macleans of Mull 29

Maitland, John, second earl of Lauderdale,

later Duke of Lauderdale 25–26, 28,

30–31, 34–35, 49, 61, 83, 122

Maule, William, M.P., later Baron of

Exchequer in Scotland 148

McMillan, Alexander, Deputy Keeper of

the Great Seal 108

McNaughton, Colin, of Jamaica, ‘black

servant of’ in Edinburgh Tolbooth,

1746 109

Mercer, Lieutenant Colonel James 24

Middleton, John, first earl of Middleton

30, 36; as Royal Commissioner to the

Scottish Parliament, 1661 28–29, 31; as

Commander-in-Chief of the army in

Scotland 29

Millar, Andrew, London bookseller and

publisher 162

Mitchell, Sir Andrew, M.P., later UK envoy to Prussia 149–150 Mitchison, Professor Rosalind 122–123 Molesworth, Robert, first Viscount Moles-

worth 115

Monck, General George, later first Duke of

Albemarle 9, 12, 14, 19–22, 25–30, 55,

82; letter to General Lambert advocating

execution of rebels in Scotland, 1655

23–24

Montgomery, Alexander, eighth earl of

Eglinton 23

Montgomery, Sir James, of Skelmorlie,

Ayrshire 44

Morgan, Colonel (later General) Thomas 19, 24–25 Moyle, General John 111

Murray, Elizabeth, countess of Dysart in

the peerage of Scotland 49, 61

Murray, Sir James, of Philliphaugh,

Selkirkshire 64

Murray, James, second duke of Atholl 107

Murray, Sir Mungo, of Garth, Perthshire 24–25 Murray, William, M.P., later first earl of

Mansfield 154

Musselburgh, Midlothian 109

Macaulay, Thomas Babington, M.P. 46

MacIntosh, Dr, Gillian 29–30

Mackenzie, Sir George, of Rosehaugh 1, 28

Mackenzie, Sir James, Lord Royston, SCJ 93

Mackenzie (or Stuart Mackenzie), James

103, 155, 164

Mackenzie, Dr. Kirsteen 12, 13

Nairnshire 72, 86

National Covenant of Scotland, 1638 51

Navigation Acts of the English Parliament

32, 122, 124. 131

The Netherlands, United Province of 4, 26,

30, 42–45, 47, 50–52, 63, 115, 128;

First Anglo-Dutch War 20; Second

Kincardineshire 23

King, Professor Peter 2

Kinross-shire 72

Index 191 Anglo-Dutch War 31, 124; Scottish

regiments in the army of the Nether­ lands 44, 47; Dutch troops in Scotland,

1716 84, 96; Dutch Reformed Church

(Hervomde Kerk) 52–53

‘New Caledonia’ in Panama 51

Newcastle Upon Tyne 24, 113

Newton, Sir Isaac 73, 115

Nicoll, John 8, 9, 14

Ogilvy, James, sixth earl of Findlater and

third earl of Seafield (previously Lord

Deskford) 127

O’Gorman, Professor Frank 3

Oswald, James, of Dunnikier, Fife, M.P. 133

Oxford 114

Paterson, John, Church of Scotland Bishop of Ross from 1662–1679 19

Paterson, William 51

Paymaster General, English and British

Treasury 85, 87

Pelham, Henry, M.P. 114, 127, 144,

147–151, 153–154

Pelham-Holles, Thomas, first duke of

Newcastle under Lyme 86, 91, 96, 108,

114, 127, 144–148, 151–152, 161, 164

Pentland, Professor Gordon 156

Perthshire 23, 43, 47, 82, 124, 128;

Thornhill in Norrieston Parish 163

Pitt, William, M.P. and Secretary of State

152, 154–156, 161

Plumb, Professor J.H. 88, 133

Porter, Professor Roy 115

Portugal 50

Presbyterianism 14, 36, 43–46, 93, 129

Preston, Battle of, 1648 16

Primrose, Archibald, first earl of Rosebery 64

Pringle, Thomas, Deputy Keeper of the

Signet Seal 94

Pringle, Sir Walter, Lord Newhall, SCJ

93–94 Privy Council of England 29–30 ‘Protester’ clergy in the Church of Scotland 9, 12, 13

Pufendorf, Samuel von 115

Pulteney, William, later earl of Bath 84, 92

Religious toleration after 1651 14, 20

Restoration 3, 10, 15, 19, 24–26, 29–30,

42, 45, 53, 66–67

‘Revolution’ of 1688/9 2, 3, 42, 48, 54;

European context of 41, 45

Riley, Dr. Patrick W.J. 64, 87

Robertson, Professor John 116, 165

Robertson, Reverend William (later

Principal of the College of Edinburgh)

56, 115

Roman Catholicism 48, 61, 82, 106,

112, 115

Rome 1, 4, 116

Rössner, Dr Philipp R. 132, 134, 137

Royal African Company 50

Royal Bank of Scotland 96

Row, Revd William 19

Royal Burghs of Scotland 30–31

Royal College of Physicians, 1681 34

Russell, Professor Conrad, 42

Saltoun, East Lothian 36, 42

Sankey, Dr Margaret 115

Scone, Perthshire 8, 19, 161

Scotland, Board of Annexed Estates

127–128, 152; Forfeited Estates, 1716

86, 88; payment of debts on Perth

Estate by UK Treasury 144, 153

Scotland, Board or ‘Commission’ of

Police 149

Scotland, Board of Trustees for the

Encouragement of Fisheries and

Manufactures 89, 96, 154

Scotland, Burghs of Barony 123

Scotland, Commission of Chamberlainry

and Trade 67

Scotland: Conventions of Estates during the Restoration monarchy 31; Conven­ tion of Estate 1689 (later the Parliament of William II) 43–44 Scotland, Court of Admiralty 4, 67;

conviction and execution of Captain

Thomson Green of the Worcester, 1705

69–70

Scotland, Scottish Court of Exchequer from 1708 67, 73, 87, 101, 108, 127

Scotland, Courts of Regality 126

Scotland, Customs and Excise duties 73,

82–83, 108, 129, 154

Scotland, ‘Enlightenment’ culture in 1–3,

42, 112–117

Scotland, government of 1659–1660

24–27; corruption after 1660 30–31

Scotland, Justices of the Peace 20, 72, 92

Scotland, Keeper of the Great Seal 102,

107, 114

Scotland, Keeper of the Privy Seal 85, 102,

107, 156

Scotland, Keeper of the Signet Seal 94,

108, 152

192 Index Scotland, Law courts 67, 144; Court of Judicature, 1652–1659, 33–34; Court of Justiciary, Lord Justice General 56, 68, 85, 89, 93, 114; courts not in session 1660 22; Court of Session, right to exclude crown nominees, 1674 34; Desuetude 33; Glasgow Commissary Court 33; Heritable Jurisdictions, abolition of, 1747 153; Inner House of the Court of Session 33–34, 89, 92–93; Judges appointed at Royal Pleasure, 1677–1689 34; Legal authority over the actions of the army in Scotland; 70, 102; sovereignty of Court of Session 32–33, 70, 126 Scotland, Lords of Treasury pre 1707 48, 73, 129 Scotland, Privy Council 30, 32–33, 42, 47–48, 50, 52–54, 65, 67, 69–70, 83, 122, 149; Court of Session post 1708 taking on some of the functions of Privy Council 70, 107; Committee on Trade 1681 122, 124 Scotland, Records of the Kingdom, 1651 10 Scotland, Parliament of 31, 33, 35, 50, 122–123; Act Recissory 1661 and Act of Indemnity 1662 29; Act anent lands lying run-rig and Act for division of commonties 1695 125; ‘Claim of Right’, 1689 43–44, 46, 56; commissioners to negotiate union with England approved by last session of William II’s Parliament, 1702 61, 63; Lords of the Articles 52; Parliament of 1703–1707 political opposition in 45, 51 Scotland, population of 132; Scottish migration to English colonies 63, 157 Scotland, rebellions: Rebellion of 1666, against government of Charles II 30–31; Rebellion of 1679 against government of Charles II 31, 34–35; Rebellion of 1685 ‘Argyll’s rebellion’ 42; Rebellion of 1715 against government of George I 75, 82, 85, 87; Rebellion of 1745–46 against government of George II 46, 54, 56, 109, 114, 129, 146; Rebellion thought possible, 1759 142 Scotland, Royal Burghs 14, 72, 101, 123 Scotland, Royal Mint 73 Scotland, Royalists 20–21, 24–25, 29 Scotland, Secretaries of State before 1707 26, 31, 65–67, 75 Scotland, Sheriffs in 15, 43, 50, 153

Scotland, smuggling 111 Scotland, Solicitor General 102, 108, 135 Scotland, tax, General Monck to lobby English Parliament for reduction, 1660 25 Scotland, tea trade 131 Scotland, trade with England pre 1707 122–126 Scotland, urban growth, 34 164 Scotland, visitation of colleges, 1690s 53 Scotophobia in the UK 34, 162 Scots Law 1, 12 Scots soldiers in English army, 1660 21 Scott, (formerly Crofts), James, duke of Monmouth and first duke of Buccleuch 35 Scott, Professor James C. 2–3, 5 Scott, Dr Richard H. 108, 150 Scott, William, of Ancrum, Roxburghshire 83 Scottish Highlands 44, 47–48, 109, 127, 142, 144, 153, 155, 164 Scottish nobility 11–12, 15, 23, 25, 30, 34, 43, 55, 108, 122 Scrope, John, Baron of Exchequer on Scotland (later Chief Secretary of the Treasury in London) 67, 87, 89 Scrymgeour, John, Lord Dudhope, later earl of Dundee 24 Seven Years War, 1756–1763 2, 117, 132, 136–137, 142–143, 164 Sharp, James, Archbishop of St Andrews, 1661–1679 25–26, 35 Sheriffmuir, battle of 83, 95 Shields, Revd Alexander 35 Shire commissioners in Scotland for the collection of tax, 1659 21–22 Simpson, John M., historian 103 Sinclair, John, ninth Lord Sinclair 25 Smith, Adam, Comptroller of Customs at Kirkcaldy, Fife 75 Smith, Adam, professor and author 75, 114–115, 128, 133–136, 163 Smith, William, of Adderbury, Oxon. 114 Smollett, Tobias George 46 Smout, Professor T.C. 68, 128, 136–137 Society of the Writers of the Signet 8 Solemn League and Covenant, 1643 8, 9, 11–14, 16, 19, 29, 51 Sophia, Electress of Hanover 69 Spain 4, 50, 74, 129, 161 ‘Squadrone Volante’, Scottish Whigs hos­ tile to the Dukes of Argyll In United Kingdom of Great Britain Parliament 70, 86–87, 90, 103

Index 193 St John, Henry, styled first Viscount Bolingbroke 104–105, 112–113 St John, Oliver 10 Stanhope, James, first earl of Stanhope 50 Stanhope, Philip Dormer, fourth earl of Chesterfield 150 Steuart (later Steuart Denham), Sir James, of Coltness, Lanarkshire 135 Steuart, William, M.P. 92 Stevenson, Professor David 8, 11 Stewart, Sir James, of Kirkfield and Coltness, Lanarkshire 22 Stewart, or Steuart, James, of Goodtrees, Midlothian 51, 135 Stirling 10, 83 Stirlingshire 23, 72 Stirling, Robert, of Jamaica 109 Stuart, Charles Edward, eldest son of James Francis Edward Stuart and grandson of James VII and II 46, 109, 135, 143 Stuart, John, third earl of Bute 2, 92, 103, 114, 143, 154–156, 161–162, 164 Sutherland, shire of 72, 86 Sutherland (formerly Gordon), John, sixteenth earl of Sutherland 72, 86 Sweden, 50; Gothenburg, 131 Swinton, John, later Lord Swinton SCJ 128 Szechi, Professor Daniel 84, 115 Tantallon Castle, East Lothian 21 Taxation 3, 4, 12, 21, 25, 123; Excise tax pre 1707 73; Excise tax post 1707 67, 73, 92–94, 107–108, 129; Land Tax in England 63, 105, 152; Land Tax in Scotland 21, 105; Malt Tax in Scotland, post 1707 4, 56, 74, 87–88; 90–91, 102, 105–106, 151, 153; Revenue from in Scotland 31–32, 44, 82, 87, 93–94; Treasury ministry in London post 1707 86–89, 108, 129–131, 137, 144, 153–154 Taylor, Professor Stephen 133 Temple, Richard, first Viscount Cobham 146 ‘Tender of Union’ (see Declaration of the Parliament of England, considering the settlement of Scotland, 1651) 11–15, 62 Tenure of land by tenants in Scotland 10, 15, 127 Textile manufacturing 64, 82, 132, 136 Thompson, Professor Edward P. 85, 88 Thomson, William, town clerk of Edinburgh 1660 25 Thurloe, Lieutenant, of Deloraine’s Regiment, 1725 102

Tobacco 82, 87, 130–131, 133 Toland, John 36, 115 Townshend, Charles, second Viscount Townshend 83, 90, 105 Townshend, Charles, M.P. and Chancellor of the Exchequer 142, 164 Townshend, General George, later first marquess Townshend 164 Treaty of Paris, 1763 2, 4, 143, 156, 161, 165 Treaty of Union, 1707 1, 3–4, 67–68, 90, 101, 105, 129–130, 137, 156 Treaty of Union, 1800 3 Treaty of Utrecht, 1713 104 Tübingen, Baden-Württemberg, Holy Roman Empire 135 Union negotiations between Scottish and English Parliaments, 1669–1670 31–32; 1702 53, 62–65; 1706 65, 67, 69; the ‘Equivalent’ 83 United Kingdom of Great Britain, Parlia­ ment: 1747 Abolition of Heritable Jur­ isdictions in Scotland Act 144, 148–149, 153; Scottish Banking Act: (Bank Notes (Scotland) Act 1765 136; Coinage Act of 1708 74; Disarming Acts 1716, 1725 87, 91, 95; Indemnity Act c.1747 135; Militia Bill 1760 164; Mutiny Act 1718 133; Naturalisation of Jews Act 1753/4 162; Peerage Bill 1718 85; ‘Press’ or Recruiting Acts, 1756–1758, 162–163; Scottish Toleration Act of 1712 36, 68; Scottish M.P.s and Representative Peers, possible influence of 68–69 United Kingdom of Great Britain 2, 3; Secretaries of State 75, 83–86, 90–91, 94, 101; 107–108, 145, 147, 152, 155, 161; Secretary for War 132, 142, 165 Ussher, James, Archbishop of Armagh in the Church of Ireland 36 Vane, Sir Harry, the younger 10 Venturi, Professor Franco 116 Wade, General George, later Field Marshall 90–91, 94–95, 102 Wales, 46–47, 82, 115–116 Wallace, Revd Robert 133 Walpole, Horatio (or Horace), brother of Sir Robert Walpole 147–148 Walpole, Sir Robert, later first earl of Orford 56, 84–88, 91–92, 95, 102–107, 110–113, 133–134, 144–145, 161

194 Index War of Spanish Succession 3, 74 Westminster Abbey 19, 110, 155, 161 Westminster Parliament 4, 36, 42, 45–46, 50, 52, 62, 67, 70–71, 83, 91, 129, 134, 154, 157 Wemyss, David, second earl of Wemyss 23 Wharton, Thomas, fifth Lord Wharton, later first marquess of Wharton 65 Whatley, Professor Christopher 123–124, 129 Whig political ideology 42, 45, 55, 91; ‘Patriot’ Whigs 70, 87, 90, 92, 94, 103–104, 108, 111, 133; 147, 150, 154; Whig ‘Junto’ 66, 70 Whitehaven, Cumberland, England 87 Whitlocke (Whitelocke), Bulstrode 13–15 Whyte, Professor Ian 125

Wightman, General Joseph 147 William II of Scotland, III of England and Ireland, prince of Orange, Stadholder in the Netherlands 42–45, 47, 50–55, 61–63, 104, 123, 128, 162 William Augustus, Prince, duke of Cumberland 144, 150, 153 Worcester, Battle of, 1651 8, 10, 14, 20 York, borough of 24 York Buildings Company, London, 1675–1764: Purchase of forfeited and annexed estates in Scotland following the Jacobite rebellion of 1715–1716, 86, 88 Young, Dr Margaret 124