Making the Crooked Straight: A Contribution to Bahá'í Apologetics

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THE CROOKED STRAIGHT A Contribution to

Baha’i Apologetics

Udo Schaefer _

|

Nicola Towfigh Ulrich Gollmer

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MAKING THE CROOKED STRAIGHT

ae

324

00 MAKING THE CROOKED STRAIGHT A CONTRIBUTION TO BAHA’I APOLOGETICS by Udo Schaefer + Nicola Towfigh + Ulrich Gollmer translated from the German by Dr. Geraldine Schuckelt

GEORGE RONALD OXFORD

‘

'

Claremont

:

School of Theology

‘

Claremont, CA

_3

GEORGE RONALD, Publisher 46 High Street, Kidlington, Oxford OX5 2DN

Original German-language edition Desinformation als Methode © Georg Olms Verlag GmbH, 1995, Hildesheim, Germany This translation © George Ronald 2000 All Rights Reserved

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN-0-85398-443-3

Typesetting by Sigrun Schaefer Printed and bound in Great Britain by Biddles, Ltd.

Quod curiositate cognoverunt,

superbia

amiserunt. St Augustine, Sermones 151

Souls such as these cause the straight to become crooked. ‘Abdu’l-Baha Will and Testament 2:13

Melius est, ut scandalum oriatur, quam ut veritas relinquatur. Pope

Gregory

the Great

(Hom.

VII in Ezekiel, quoted from Migne Patrologiae Cursus Completus Series Latina, vol. 76, p. 842)

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) he cites, like Rémer before him, Browne’s!*° opinion that ‘Abdu’l-Baha must have ‘deliberately and purposely antedated the “Manifestation” of Baha’u’llah’.!?? Ficicchia claims that Baha’u’llah,

who frequently refers to the events in the Garden of Ridvan,!?° ‘opportunistically adopted the number speculations of the Ba-

surrounding His own position’ (ibid., p. 127). On Baha’u’llah’s ‘messianic consciousness’ and his ‘messianic secret’ see Buck, Symbol and Secret, p. 64ff.; See also Gollmer, below, p. 595, note 83.

192. 22 April-3 May 1863. In 1863 the New Year (Naw-Ruz) fell on 22 March, so that the Ridvan period lasted from 22 April to 3 May. Normally, Naw-Ruz falls on 21 March, Ridvan thus beginning on 21 April and ending on 2 May. 193. Baha’ismus, p. 125 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 194. God Passes By, p. 153. 195.

Baha’ismus, pp. 109, 123, 124.

196. ibid. p. 125. This passage demonstrates the pattern of Ficicchia’s argumentation: he quotes Rémer and then states: ‘Rémer’s standpoint coincides with that of Professor Browne who remarks on this matter “(... )?.? In this way, Ficicchia conveys to the uncritical reader the impression that two researchers have independently come to the same conclusion, whereas in reality Romer, knowing neither Persian nor Arabic, is totally dependent on Browne and merely adopts the latter’s judgement. 197. JRAS 1892 (April), p. 306. 198. e.g. Kitab-i-Aqdas 75; Lawhu’r-Ridvan (= Gleanings 14); and in particular in the Stratu’s-Sabr, which was revealed on the day of his declaration in the Garden of Ridvan. For a detailed discussion see Towfigh, below, pp. 610ff.

64

On Ficicchia’s Methodology

bis’!”? ‘in order to remain within the nine/nineteen pattern’,2 and therefore dated the Ridvan declaration ex post to the year 1863, thus making it correspond to the Bab’s allusion concern-

ing the year nineteen.”°! Ficicchia approvingly cites Romer,20

who

designates

the declaration

in Baghdad a ‘historical

construction ad maiorem gloriam of Baha’u’llah’.2°

Like

Baha’u’llah’s mystical vocation to his prophetic office, the ‘Festival of Ridvan’, an annual celebration by Baha’is in commemoration of this declaration and the most important festival in the Baha’i calendar, is regarded by Ficicchia as a ‘questionable

event’.?°4 Hence, Baha’u’llah is presented as a prophet who falsifies history, lies and deceives. 199. Baha’ismus, pp. 129 (Ficicchia’s emphasis), 109. 200. ibid. p. 110. 201. ibid. pp. 125ff. 202. Die Babi-Beha’i, p. 75. 203. Baha’ismus, p. 124. 204. ibid. p. 126. It is quite possible to ignore all evidence emanating from the religion in question, while assembling a mass of critical remarks made by chroniclers outside the religion and uncritically presenting these as the indisputable truth. But as demonstrated here, there is more to being a ‘researcher on religions’ (ibid. p. 313) than this. Someone who enters this arena without appropriate educational background should at least be acquainted with the methods and theoretical foundation of this academic discipline. If progress has been made in this field, it is the recognition that ‘historical effects can only come from historical reality and that it is unacceptable to try to explain an event— particularly a sacred one—differently from the way it explains itself (Schoeps, Religionsgesprdch, p. 148). It is therefore unacceptable to dismiss Paul’s experience on the road to Damascus or the revelation experienced by the Prophet Muhammad as described in the Qur’an as hallucinatory self-delusion by epileptics, as frequently happened in the past (see, for instance, Buhl, who declares such events as falling into the

psychiatrist’s field of competence (Das Leben Muhammeds, p. 139)). In their monographs on St Paul, the Jewish thinkers Ben-Chorin and Schoeps have accepted Paul’s vision on the road to Damascus as reality: ‘Only an ignoramus could overlook the fact that through his Damascus experience Paul was put into a state of alertness, even over-alertness, that endowed him for the rest of his life with powers that are truly

65

Chapter 2 ¢ Udo Schaefer It is, of course, possible to contrast the divergent positions

of the Baha’is and the Azalis and investigate them with regard to the historical evidence and according to logical, psychological, sociological, and ideological criteria. However, Ficicchia does none of these things. Instead, he ‘knows’ from the outset that Baha’u’llah was the usurper, disputing the rank of Subh-iAzal and bringing about the division of the Babi community

through his personal craving for power.”°> If one is to believe Ficicchia, Baha’u’llah at first “fully recognized’ the “suprem-

acy’°° of his brother, and even followed his call to return to Baghdad from the mountains of Sulaymaniyyah to which he

had withdrawn ‘in annoyance’.?°” Ficicchia believes in all seriousness that Baha’u’llah admitted as much, since in the Kitab-i-

unique. This weak man, evidently sick, was now capable of achievements that later whole organizations were unable to emulate. Only a philistine could speak of hallucinations. Reality is that which has real effects. That the Damascus experience within Paul had a real effect through him cannot be disputed’ (Ben-Chorin, Paulus, p. 18). Schoeps writes: ‘If one wishes to understand what happened at this point in the life of the Apostle and to see the consequences of this event for his life, one has to presume in its entirety the reality of this meeting as testified in the epistles and documents.’ Schoeps distinguishes between the religious-historical perspective and the theological. For the Christian theologian, Paul met the resurrected Son of God, whereas it is expected

of the religious studies scholar only ‘that he acknowledge the factual result of his meeting with the crucified and exalted Jesus of Nazareth. Hence, he should believe that Paul believed’ (Paulus, pp. 47f.). By condemning out of hand Baha’u’llah’s mystic call and the revelation in Baghdad of his messianic secret as a forgery and a lie, Ficicchia has unmasked himself. His judgement is unobjective and frivolous. 205. Baha’ismus, pp. 18, 290. 206. ibid. p. 113. In reality, Baha’u’llah respected Mirza Yahya as head of the Babi community until the time that he raised his claim to be the Promised One foretold by the Bab. 207. ibid. p. 112. Baha’u’ll4h explains the reasons for his two-year withdrawal to the mountains of Kurdistan in the Kitdb-i-Igan (279

(pp. 251f.)). See also Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, pp. 117ff.; Balyuzi, Baha'u'llah, pp. 115ff. To call these reasons ‘annoyance’ is a trivialization in which there is, of course, method.

66

On Ficicchia’s Methodology

Iqan he mentions the ‘hour when, from the Mystic Source, there came the summons bidding Us return whence We came’.?° The “Mystic Source’ is, in Ficicchia’s estimation, none other than Subh-i-Azal. He does not even attempt to provide an explanation or evidence for this erroneous, quite bizarre interpretation.2°? The fact that the ‘usurper’ was eventually successful (the majority of the Babis showing allegiance to Baha’u’llah and only very few retaining support for Subh-i-Azal) is due, in

Ficicchia’s opinion, to Baha’u’llah’s character as the more deci-

sive and skilful figure,?!° who was ‘simply far superior in experience and decisiveness’ to his younger brother.?!! Baha’u’llah was also the ‘more consistent’, which ‘led to the gradual supercedence of Subh-i-Azal and the ultimate supremacy of his elder

brother’.2!2 Moreover, Ficicchia argues, Baha’u’llah with ‘his claim to be Man yuzhiruhu'llah corresponded much more closely with the messianic hopes of the mass of the believers than the

quiet and cautious Subh-i-Azal, who exercised restraint with

regard to such claims’.?! The misrepresentation of the prophetic figure of Baha’u’llah

continues in Ficicchia’s portrayal of Baha’u’llah’s description of his own station. Ficicchia does indeed mention that in Baha’i prophetology the idea of the divine messenger as an incarnation of God (fulil) is ‘firmly rejected’.?!4 He even quotes a relevant

but obscure text?!> and refers to a relevant passage in the Kitab-

208. Kitab-i-Iqdn 278 (p. 251). 209. For more detail see Towfigh, below, pp. 605ff. 210. Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 229. 211. Baha’ismus, p. 96. 212; libidp.-105: 213. ibid. p. 96. 214i ibid. p2213. 215. The Surat at-Tawhid which he ascribes to Baha’u’llah and of which he does not give any source. For further discussion see below, p. 266, note 43.

67

Chapter 2 «Udo Schaefer

i-Iqan.?!° Both texts leave the reader in no doubt that the concept of the ‘Manifestation of God’ rules out any incarnation and, hence, any identification of the prophet with God. Yet in the next breath Ficicchia calls upon a verse in the Suratu’lHaykal as evidence that ‘personal equivalence with the Deity’ is

claimed ‘when Baha’u’llah identifies himself with God?" The erroneousness

of this statement

will be analysed

in detail

later.?}® This frivolous treatment of a sacred text in accordance

with Goethe’s dictum: Im Auslegen seid frisch und munter, legt ihr’s nicht aus, so legt was unter,7!?

is instructive with regard to the approach taken by Ficicchia throughout his ‘standard work’. The way a text is interpreted in the Faith itself does not interest him in the least. He alone, who

(thanks to his three-year membership of the Baha’i community)

is presented as an ‘outstanding expert on Baha’ism’,??? knows how a scriptural passage is to be interpreted. Thus, the reader is constantly informed of how Ficicchia interprets and understands

the passages cited, rather than of how they are understood in the tradition of the Baha’i community. This kind of presentation not

only contradicts the World Council of Churches’ Guidelines?” whereby dialogue is to be conducted ‘on the basis of mutual trust and a respect for the integrity of each participant’s iden-

216. Sections 192-199. 217. Baha’ismus, p. 213 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 218. See below, pp. 260ff. 219. ‘Be not afraid to interpret! If that fails, then read something into it.’ J.W. v. Goethe, ‘Zahme Xenien II’, quoted from Goethes Gedichte in zeitlicher Folge, p. 953 (no English edition). 220. Hutten, Seher, Gribler, Enthusiasten (12th aan p. 827. 221. See above, pp. 23-26.

68

On Ficicchia’s Methodology

tity’,?? but is also blatantly unscholarly. Someone who wishes to find out about a religion would, of course, like to know about

the beliefs of the community professing that religion, not how the author of a monograph interprets its scripture. Furthermore,

Ficicchia evidently understands nothing of hermeneutics:?2? that every passage of scripture can be understood only in the context of other relevant passages and that in hermeneutical interpretation apparent contradictions between various texts can be re-

solved. This process ought to be self-evident to a ‘researcher on religions’.??4 However, Ficicchia seems little concerned with ‘understanding’ but chooses solely to point out alleged contradictions, to disclose supposed errors, and thus to drive the char-

acter of the texts as revealed scripture ad absurdum.??> The claim to be the ‘Mahdi’, which is mentioned again and

again by Ficicchia,”*° was never raised by Baha’u’llah, nor does Ficicchia provide any source for this assertion; simply because there is no such source. The term ‘Mahdi’ does not appear any-

222

Partin Gala:

223.

On this subject see Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method. See

also Dann J. May, ‘A Preliminary Survey of Hermeneutical Principles within the Baha’i Writings’. 224. Baha’ismus, p. 313. 225.

An attitude that is condemned in the Qur’an: ‘He it is who hath

sent down to thee the Book. Some of its signs are of themselves perspicuous;—these are the basis of the Book—and others are ambiguous (mutashdbihdt). But they whose hearts are given to err, follow its figures, craving discord, craving an interpretation’ (3:5). See also Kitdb-i-

[gan 283 (pp. 254f.). 226.

‘Baha’u’llah, who appeared in public declaring, for his part, to

els 25 22s be the promised Mahdi . . .” (p. 270), also pp. 21, OS Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 230; Lexikon der Sekten, column 100, The same error is made by Reinhart Hummel, keyword

‘Baha’i’, in Taschenlexikon Religion und Theologie (TRT) Wall, IL p. 136. On this subject see Gollmer, “Zur Darstellung der Baha’iReligion in neueren theologischen Lexika’, in Baha 'i-Briefe, no. 47, p. 29, and his discussion below, pp. 421ff., SYANEG

69

Chapter 2 + Udo Schaefer where in the writings of Baha’u’llah.?’ Ficicchia’s constant use of the term demonstrates once more his strong dependence on

Romer and the meagre attention he pays to Baha’u’llah’s own testimony. He cites Baha’u’llah only when he considers it op-

portune to do so. He even quotes?”* a passage from the Suratu’lMuluk according to Romer’s version?”’ rather than as it appears in the published primary text. Either he did not know that an

authentic translation of the Suratu’l-Muluk is included in the

anthology Gleanings from the Writings of Bahd’u'lléh,2*° or else he prefers to cite secondary sources because he mistrusts the published primary sources.

His mocking remark that Baha’u’llah could ‘imagine’ governments ‘only as monarchies’”?! and the information that,

according to the Suratu’l-Muluk, the ‘courts’ are the ‘represen-

tatives of the Deity’?3? is undoubtedly intended to portray Baha’u’llah as an antiquated figure exuding the spirit of the an-

cient Orient.?°> Here Ficicchia supposes ‘the ancient oriental reverence towards kings as the earthly embodiments of the De-

ity’ to be afoot, linked with a sly ‘tactic’ of Baha’u ’llah through

227. Baha’u’llah claimed to be ‘Man yuzhiruhu'llah’ (“He whom God will make manifest’) foretold by the Bab and that his advent fulfilled all the promises of past prophecy, including, in particular, the return of Christ and the eschatological expectations of Islam (and hence also the expectations concerning the Mahdi in popular Islam). The Bab is the Qa’im, Baha’u’llah the Qayyum (this subject has been discussed by

Kamran Ekbal, ‘Irtibdt-i ‘aqd’id-i Babiyya bd ‘aqd’id-i Sayhiyya’, in Khooshi-ho 3 (1991), Landegg Academy, pp. 17-42). See also Gollmer, below, pp. 421ff, 571ff. 228.

229. 230. 231. Romer 232. 233.

Baha’ismus, p. 135.

Die Babi-Beha’i, p. 101. The passage he quotes appears in 118:3. Baha’ismus, pp. 161, 134. Ficicchia has taken this verbatim from (p. 100), without citing the source. : ibid. p. 134, note 27. ibid.

70

On Ficicchia’s Methodology

which he hoped to gain the support of the rulers for a ‘theo-

cratic global hegemony’ 234 Neither in the Suratu’l-Mulik nor anywhere else in Baha’u’llah’s scripture is there any mention of the ‘courts’, let

alone of their being described as ‘representatives of God’. Those to whom Baha’u’llah addressed his words were the rul-

ers,”>> who at that time were largely monarchs.2°° One may be favourably or unfavourably disposed to Baha’u’llah’s respect for the rank of kingship (notwithstanding his criticism of the monarchs of his day) and to his concept of world government,?3’ but to denounce these views as a mere ‘tactic’, an opportunist gesture intended solely to gain the support of the rul-

ers in seeking to establish ‘theocratic global hegemony’**® is completely preposterous. Moreover, when Ficicchia incorrectly states that the ‘courts’ (and not the rulers) are ‘representatives of God’, this is, in the case of this author, certainly not an in-

stance of negligence, a /apsus linguae, but a tactical move: it is a semantic trick in the interests of his biased presentation. When one considers that in the German-speaking countries Ficicchia was addressing, monarchy finds few defenders, the reader was

bound to associate ‘courts’ not with the abstract idea of a democratic constitutional monarchy, which Baha’u’llah legitimates, but rather with the excesses that, in the course of history, have 234. 235.

ibid. p. 271 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). See Gleanings 110; 113:9; 114:1, 6, 13, 16, 19, 20; 115:3; 116:1,

2; 118:1; 119:1-2.

236. In the Kitab-i-Aqdas Baha’u’llah addresses the ‘rulers of America and the Presidents of the republics therein’ (88). 237. For more detail on this subject see Gollmer, below, pp. 427-435, 448-456, 464 ff. 238. A constantly recurring demagogic slogan with which Ficicchia attacks Baha’u’llah’s plan for a new world order (see Baha’ismus pp. 36, 119, 270, 271 (Ficicchia’s emphasis), 321, 380, 390, 393, 399,

415, 429). On this subject see Gollmer, below, pp. 418ff., as well as his doctoral thesis Gottesreich und Weltgestaltung. Grundlegung einer politischen Theologie im Baha ’itum (unpublished).

71

Chapter 2 ¢ Udo Schaefer

brought monarchy into discredit: excessive pomp and ceremony, a wasteful, often decadent lifestyle, sycophancy, intrigues, corruption, nepotism and the like. Further evidence of Ficicchia’s malicious intentions is that Rémer’s thesis, to which Ficicchia continually refers and which he frequently exploits without citing the source, includes the correct statement that: “In this sura, the kings are presented by Beha, as by the Bab before him, as

representatives of the deity on earth.’3? Concerning the assertion that the Baha’is ‘as is well known’ supported the royalist

cause and conspired with the Throne**? during the Persian revolution in order to gain advantages that were ‘haggled over’

by ‘Abdu’l-Baha,?“! the reader is referred to the detailed discussion by Ulrich Gollmer below.?” Ficicchia’s malevolent intentions are revealed once again

in his characterization of Baha’u’llah’s antagonist, Mirza Yahya (Subh-i-Azal), with whom Ficicchia is clearly in sympathy. He endeavours to transform this man—who, Ficicchia alleges, has

been disparaged ‘by Baha’ist historiography’**?—into an angelic figure whom the Bab regarded as the ‘Promised One’.?*4 Hence, Mirza Yahya is depicted as an extremely loveable, kind, even saintly figure, as ‘a quiet, introverted lad who dedicated

himself completely to metaphysical studies’,24> ‘an introverted youth inclined to states of mystic rapture’, 246 ‘spiritualized character’ ‘with a mystic disposition’,?*” of the same spiritual

239.

Die Babi-Beha i, p. 101, note.

240. Baha’ismus, pp. 394f., 272. 241. ibid. p. 273, note 46. 242. below, pp. 418ff., esp. pp. 451ff. 243.

Baha’ismus, pp. 184, 101, note 33.

244. 245. 246. 247.

ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid.

p. p. p. p.

101. 97. 20; Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), Do229. 98.

72

On Ficicchia’s Methodology

essence as the Bab,?4® ‘quiet and cautious’,24? a person who, following the example of the Bab, ‘became increasingly withdrawn, adopting the way of life of a saint and Safi mystic’.?>° The poems of Qurratu’l-‘Ayn?>! ‘penetrated deep into the soul of the sensitive youth and inspired him to compose sacred verses (ayat)’.?°? Nowhere does Ficicchia seriously examine the image of

Mirza Yahya, the works of Baha’i historians and their sources.?°> He is not interested in an objective presentation of the character of Subh-i-Azal. Even a conspirator such as Siyyid Muhammad-

i-Isfahani, who led Yahya ‘astray’°* and whom Shoghi Effendi called ‘the Antichrist of the Baha’i Revelation’,2°> wins the sympathy of Ficicchia, who is impressed with his consistency

and loyalty towards Subh-i-Azal.?°° The message Ficicchia desires to convey here is that the truly angelic figure of Yahya was robbed of his legitimate rights by a power-hungry, assertive brother. This is a clear instance of history being turned upside-

down. IV. FICICCHIA’S PORTRAIT OF ‘ABDU’L-BAHA ‘Abdu’l-Baha, too, appears in a curiously murky light: as a

‘god-like, omniscient being’,?>’ who shares the ‘prophetic na-

248. ibid. 249. ibid. p. 96. 250. ibid. p. 111. 251. A noted poet, the only woman among the eighteen disciples of the Bab, called Tahirih. 252. Baha’ismus, p. 99. 253. On this subject see Towfigh, below pp. 618ff., 631ff. 254. Kitab-i-Aqdas 184. 255. God Passes By, p. 164; see also pp. 127, 186ff. 256. Baha’ismus, p. 130. 257. ibid. p. 197 (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

fie)

Chapter 2 ¢ Udo Schaefer

ture’”>® of his father, as an individual who insisted on his ‘prophetic status’?>? and willingly submitted to the ‘exalted personality cult’ associated with this claim.?° According to Ficicchia, the figure of ‘Abdu’l-Baha is ‘much more to the fore than that of his father, the founder of the religion’.?°! As a representative of the ‘progressive wing’ which eventually prevailed over ‘Mir-

za Muhammad-‘Ali and his conservative supporters’,?° ‘Abdu’l-Baha managed to ‘adapt’*°? the Bahda’i teachings to Western

thinking and to ‘bring Christian

ideas into Baha’-

ism’,?°* with the result that ‘the Islamic and, in particular, the Si‘i and Sufi-theosophist legacy was largely suppressed’ and

even today ‘remains for the most part unknown’?® to Western Baha’is. For opportunistic reasons, from’

propagating

the

‘religious

‘Abdu’l-Baha law

‘abstained

promulgated

by the

prophet’, because he felt, that ‘the laws of the Kitab al-Aqdas would encounter resistance in the West and would not exactly

promote the spread of the Faith in the Occident’.?©° In Ficicchia’s view, ‘Abdu’l-Baha dissimulated the core element of the new Covenant, its Law, so that ‘out of the normative religion of observance there gradually emerged a generally open “movement”, a kind of “super-religion”’ which then, ‘in this new disguise’, when ‘transferred to the Western cultural sphere’, was

‘happily associated with the ideals of humanism and Christian individual ethics’ .?°7

258. ibid. p. 192. 259. ibid. p. 278. 260. ibid. p. 198. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267.

ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid.

p. p. p. p. p.

196. 198. 203. 204 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 293.

74

On Ficicchia’s Methodology

How is anyone supposed to recognize the figure of ‘Abdu’l-Baha in this derisive portrait in which Ficicchia makes

a mockery both of Baha’i doctrine and of the simple facts? “Abdu’l-Baha never saw himself as a god-like, omniscient being, nor did he claim ‘prophetic status’, as is shown by his adopted title, “Abdu’l-Baha: ‘servant of Baha’.

There

were,

it is true, individual

believers

during

‘Abdu’l-Baha’s lifetime who assigned him equal status with Baha’u llah, seeing him as a Manifestation of God and the

“Return of Christ’. “Abdu’l-Baha himself decisively rejected

such exaggerated claims.76* In a doctrinal letter?© that forms the foundation of all Baha’i theology, Shoghi Effendi devoted

an entire chapter to the rank and status of “Abdu’I-Baha, portraying these in detail in the light of ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s own testimony. Yet Ficicchia has deliberately ignored both these categorical statements and Balyuzi’s comprehensive monograph on

the life and works of ‘Abdu’l-Baha,?”° which is not even listed in his bibliography. Myron M. Phelps, an American lawyer and

an adherent of Buddhism,2”7! who visited ‘Abdu’l-Baha in “Akka in 1902 and was deeply impressed by him, provided later

generations

with

an

extremely

favourable

description

of

‘Abdu’l-Baha’s character and the circumstances of his life.?”

268. ‘No one must believe that ‘Abdu’l-Baha is the “second Coming of Christ” . . . he is the Manifestation of Servitude . . . the Commentator of the Book’ (Tablets of Abdul-Baha Abbas, vol. 2, pp. 432f.);, “My station is the station of servitude . . . I am the Interpreter of the Word of God’ (quoted from Shoghi Effendi, World Order, p. 133, see also p. 139). 269. ‘The Dispensation of Baha’u’llah’, in World Order, pp. 97ff. 270. ‘Abdu’l-Bahd. The Centre of the Covenant of Baha'u'llah, London, 1971. 271.

Ficicchia’s statement (p. 201) that he was a Baha’i is incorrect.

272. Life and Teachings of Abbas Effendi, New York-London, 2nd

edn. 1912; new edition under the title The Master in ‘Akkd, revised and annotated with a new Foreword by Marzieh Gail, Los Angeles, 1985.

75

Chapter 2 ¢ Udo Schaefer

Ficicchia refers to this work several times,?”> but chooses not to reveal its contents to the reader. Instead, he makes use of nine-

teenth-century church missionary magazines?’* and obscure articles by incompetent authors.?’> His assertion that ‘Abdu’l-

Baha was regarded as a ‘god-like, omniscient being’ is deduced from a statement by Shoghi Effendi?’® in which he lists a sequence of attributes characterizing ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s unique status as ‘Centre of the Covenant’. This statement, quoted by Ficic-

chia, provides absolutely no basis for his assertion. None of the attributes goes beyond the rank and station assigned to ‘Abdu’]Baha; none claims him to be a god-like figure. Therefore, in order to substantiate his thesis, Ficicchia

hastily includes two footnotes””’ referring to articles by the neurologist Rasmussen and the Christian missionary Stileman,?”® probably in the assumption that no-one would go to the trouble of seeking out these obscure essays. Examination of these sources reveals that they, too, provide no foundation whatever

for Ficicchia’s assertions.

273.

Baha’ismus, pp. 187, 198, 201.

274. e.g. Church Missionary Intelligencer (Baha’ismus, p. 198). 275. e.g. Emil Rasmussen (Baha ’ismus, p. 197). 276. God Passes By, p. 245. 277. Baha’ismus, p. 197, note 18 and p. 198, note 19. 278. ‘The followers of Beha in Persia’, in Church Missionary Intelligencer (vol. XLIX (1898), pp. 645ff. ). The article concerning this ‘strange sect’ is informative solely in that it reports how, in their dialogue with Christian theologians, Baha’is in Isfahan gave allegorical interpretations to statements in the New Testament, in contrast to the traditional literal interpretation (as the Christians had always done with the Old Testament in their arguments with the Jews). Furthermore, the missionary highly commends the Baha’is for their friendliness and cordiality. Quoting Baha’u’llah’s commandment: ‘Consort with the followers of all religions in amity and concord’ (Kitab-i-Aqdas 144; Tablets 3:5; 4:10; 7:13), he confirms that—as far as Christians are concerned—

the Baha’is act accordingly. Ficicchia does not consider this worthy of mention; here, as elsewhere, he filters out all positive comments.

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On Ficicchia’s Methodology

Rasmussen, who sees in the phenomenon of religion nothing but the result of mental defects and—without listing any sources—includes seven pages on ‘the new religion’,”” asserts

that “in the holy Writings of the Baha’ists’ it is claimed that ‘Jewish, Christian and Mohammedan

prophecies prove ‘Abdu’l-

Baha to be the Son of God, . . . the returned Christ’.2°° This suffices for Ficicchia. Although they are freely available to him he has chosen not to consult the ‘holy Writings of the Baha’ists’, which paint a very different picture. Stileman clearly depicts the discussion in the early Baha’i community about the station of ‘Abdu’l-Baha. This discussion came to an end once Shoghi Effendi had clarified the situation for those who had not previously had access to “Abdu’l-Baha’s own statements on the

matter. Stileman writes: ‘Some of the Behai's maintain that he is also, like Beha, a Divine manifestation, and not a mere man. Others hold that he is in no sense Divine, and support their argument by referring to words of his own, to the effect that he is nothing more than a servant of Beha. These latter also believe

that there will be no further Divine manifestation for a thousand

279. ‘Der Baha’ismus’, in Zeitschrift fiir Religionspsychologie, vol. 1, pp. 382ff. As in his previous article on ‘Jesus’, he expresses his firm conviction that ‘a person who builds his whole life around the fixed idea that he is a divine being or tool must be suffering from a mental disorder’ (p. 385). He regards some of the ‘religious pioneers’ as epileptics, others as hysterics or paranoiacs. That the Bab and Baha’u’llah are ‘even typical paranoiacs could easily be documented’ (ibid.). He calls their teachings ‘crazy ideas’ interspersed with ‘fragments of gold picked up from the general zeitgeist’. Concerning ‘Abdu’l-Baha he does, nevertheless, concede that it is doubtful ‘that this man is to be considered

mentally defective’ (p. 388). Strangely, this abstruse article—in which we are told, for instance, that the idea of an ‘immortal soul’ is a ‘pecu-

liar, mythological hoax’ (p. 386)—ends with the statement that ‘this trio’ (the Bab, Baha’u’llah and ‘Abdu’l-Baha) will probably be ‘a source of enlightenment for those’ who ‘wish to establish their lives on the basis of experience, reality and understanding’ (p. 389). 280.

Emil Rasmussen, ibid. p. 385.

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Chapter 2 ¢ Udo Schaefer

years.’?8! The latter position was supported by ‘Abdu’I-Baha’s own testimony and by statements made in the Kitab-i-Aqdas.?*?

That which Ficicchia presents as official doctrine was, in fact, the opinion of a minority within the early Baha’i community and for which there was no basis in Baha’i scripture; neither was this opinion expressed any longer following the dogmatic clarification of the matter.?®° Here, too, we gain insight into Ficicchia’s methods: the

writings of critics, however obscure and academically worthless, together with long-forgotten ideas that were expressed occasionally as elements of Baha’i belief by isolated individuals

in the past are granted far greater credibility than ‘Abdu’lBaha’s own testimony, Shoghi Effendi’s authoritative statements of doctrine, and the ‘catholic’?*4 belief of the Baha’i community, the consensus in docendo et credendo. Moreover,

Ficicchia does not indicate when and on what occasion “Abdu’IBaha is supposed to have insisted on his ‘prophetic status’. The charge that ‘Abdu’l-Baha allowed himself to become

the object of an ‘exalted personality cult’ is an extremely serious one in German society, given the historical experiences of Hitler’s dictatorship and the communist régime in the East. 281. Church Missionary Intelligencer, p. 645. 2823.37, 283. For details see Peter Smith, ‘The American Baha’i Community, 1894-1917: A Preliminary Survey’, in Momen (ed.), SBB, vol. 1,

pp. 100ff.; see also Hollinger, ‘Ibrahim George Kheiralla and the Baha’i Faith in America’, in Cole and Momen (eds.), SBB, vol. 2, p. 121; Smith, ‘What is a Baha’i? Concerns of British Baha’is, 1900-1920’, in Momen (ed.), SBB, vol. 5, pp. 232ff.,; Stockman, The Baha'i Faith in America. Origins 1892-1900, vol. 1, pp. 81ff., 136, 152, 163, 168, 191.

284. In the sense of the Catholic principle formulated by Vincentius de Lérin (d. 450 BCE): ‘Magnopere curandum est, ut id teneamus, quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est, hoc est enim vere proprieque catholicum’ (‘Great care must be taken that we keep to that which has been believed everywhere, always and by all, for that is really and truly Catholic’, Commonitorium, ch. 2.5, quoted in Mirbt, Quellen, vol. 1, no. 432, p. 203).

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On Ficicchia’s Methodology

Here again, Ficicchia provides no verifiable facts but merely delivers a damning verdict that the critical reader, in the absence of further information, is not in a position to question. What, then, are the facts? That “Abdu’l-Baha was an outstanding figure in religious history is undisputed among scholars in the field of religious

studies. All those he met were deeply impressed by him. Even Browne who, as already mentioned and as will be discussed in

detail later,?®° was inclined to support the views of the Azalis, paid tribute to the greatness of ‘Abdu’l-Baha.?*° A letter published on 24 September 1913 in the Egyptian Gazette by the renowned Hungarian orientalist Arminius Vambéry, who had met “Abdu’l-Baha in Budapest in 1913, likewise pays homage to “Abdu’l-Baha, culminating in Vambéry’s declaration that: ‘I am lost in admiration.’?8” Lord Lamington, then Governor of the British Indian provinces of Bengal, Bombay and Madras, who met “Abdu’l-Baha in Haifa in 1919, wrote of him: ‘There was never a more striking instance of one who desired that 285. See Towfigh, ‘below, pp. 529ff. 286. ‘Seldom have I seen one whose appearance impressed me more . . . Subsequent conversation with him served only to heighten the respect with which his appearance had from the first inspired me. One more eloquent of speech, more ready of argument, more apt of illustration, more intimately acquainted with the sacred books of the Jews, the Christians, and the Muhammadans,

could, I should think, scarcely be

found even amongst the eloquent, ready, and subtle race to which he belongs. These qualities, combined with a bearing at once majestic and genial, made me cease to wonder at the influence and esteem which he enjoyed even beyond the circle of his father’s followers. About the greatness of this man and his power no one who had seen him could entertain a doubt’ (A Traveller’s Narrative, p. xxxvi). Ficicchia’s selective, arbitrary treatment of the sources is demonstrated here, too. He always quotes Browne’s critical comments but takes no notice of passages in which Browne expresses his admiration for Baha’u’llah and ‘Abdu’l-Baha. He even withholds from his readers Browne’s extremely impressive report on his meeting with Baha’u’ll4h in Bahji (A Traveller’s Narrative, pp. Xxxix-xl; see Towfigh, below, pp. 661ff. 287. quoted in Balyuzi, ‘Abdu ’l-Bahd, p. 8.

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mankind should live in peace and goodwill and have love for

others by the recognition of their inherent divine qualities.’?** ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s travels in the USA in 1912, during which he spoke in churches, synagogues and universities and about which

many details have been recorded in a wealth of newspaper reports, testify to the overwhelming impression made upon people

by ‘Abdu’l-Baha and the admiration and reverence with which

he was regarded.”®? A Unitarian minister dedicated an entire book to his many meetings with ‘Abdu’l-Baha.?”° Ficicchia, however, appears to have come across neither this work nor

Lady Blomfield’s The Chosen Highway,”?! nor any of the numerous published accounts by early pilgrims.??? Perhaps the most impressive expression of the widespread love and esteem for “Abdu’l-Baha was demonstrated at his funeral, where his coffin was followed both by representatives of the political world and by the dignitaries of three world relig-

288. ibid. p. 29. 289. See ‘Abdu’l-Baha, The Promulgation of Universal Peace. Talks Delivered by ‘Abdu’l-Baha during His Visit to the United States and Canada in 1912, compiled by Howard MacNutt, Wilmette, IIl.: Baha’i Publishing Trust, 2nd edn. 1982; Momen (ed.), The Babi and Baha’i Religions 1844-1944. Some Contemporary Western Accounts, Oxford: George Ronald, 1981, pp. 315-452. A review of this book has been published by Denis McEoin, in Religion (1982), vol. 2, pp. 405ff. 290.

Howard Colby Ives, Portals to

Freedom, Oxford, 2nd edn. 1974.

291. 1940, repr. Wilmette, Ill., 1975. Further literature: ‘Abdu ’l-Bahd in Canada, Toronto, 1962; ‘Abdu’l-Baha in Edinburgh, London, 1963;

‘Abdu'l-Baha in London. Addresses and Notes of Conversations, Chicago, 1921 (2nd edn. 1982); Werner Gollmer, Mein Herz ist bei euch. ‘Abdu ’l-Baha in Deutschland, Hofheim, 1988; ‘Abdu’l-Bahd in Wien (18-25 April 1913), Vienna, 1988; Allan L. Ward, 239 Days. ‘Abdu’lBaha’s Journey in America, Wilmette, Ill.: Baha’i Publishing Trust,

1979; Ramona A. Brown, Memories of ‘Abdu’l-Bahd. Recollections of the Early Days of the Bahd’ i Faith in California, Wilmette, Ill.: Baha’i Publishing Trust, 1980. 292.

Such as Julia M. Grundy, Ten Days in the Light of ‘Akka, Wil-

mette, Ill.: Baha’i Publishing Trust, rev. edn. 1979.

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On Ficicchia’s Methodology

ions: the High Commissioner for Palestine, governors, the diplomatic corps, the leading figures of the Muslim communities, headed by the Mufti, clergymen of the Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox and Anglican churches and of the Jewish communities, the notables of the land, and a huge crowd of people who revered and loved him. The speeches by the Mufti, the Greek Orthodox Bishop, Islamic clergymen, and writers, along with

the obituaries published in such newspapers as Le Temps??? and The Times,?*4 testify to the world-wide esteem for ‘Abdu’lBaha.”?> Even the former head of the EZW itself, Kurt Hutten—hardly someone who might be suspected of being uncritical in his assessment of the Baha’i Faith—could not but admit that ‘these figures?”° . . . are among the most noble religious figures seen by the world in the nineteenth century’ and that

they made ‘a deep impression upon all who met them’.2%” Ficicchia finds most of this unworthy of mention; hardly a word

of these matters is revealed to the reader. In all the major world religions, the founders and their apostles are the objects of special reverence (which sometimes escalates into worship). In addition to Christ, Mary, the leading apostles Peter and Paul, the other apostles, the evangelists, the Church Fathers (in particular St Augustine), and the numerous

saints are especially revered and are even incorporated into Church ritual. The figure of the Buddha is also revered, as are

293. 19 December 1921. 294. 30 November 1921. 295. See also Balyuzi, ‘Abdu’l-Bahd, pp. 464ff. 296. The Bab, Baha’u’llah and ‘Abdu’]-Baha. 297. Seher, Griibler, Enthusiasten (10th edn.), pp. 296f. The 12th edn., published posthumously with major amendments, does still contain this concession, albeit immediately undermining its validity by referring to ‘the numerous claims to personal power, intrigues, acts of violence and internal quarrels that characterized the early period of Baha’i history’ (p. 804). Ficicchia, who helped compose the entry for this edition, certainly left his mark!

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Chapter 2 ¢ Udo Schaefer

the fourteen ‘Infallible Ones’,?* the Prophet Muhammad, his daughter Fatima and the twelve Imams in Shi‘a Islam. No-one has ever gone so far as to express the absurd notion that this archetypal religious attitude of devotion constitutes a “personality cult’, i.e. to debase it by using a concept associated with the

mystification of holders of political power. It is certainly true that the Baha’is love and revere “Abdu’l-Baha, who enjoyed public and inter-religious recognition and admiration outside the Baha’i community. It is also true that the anniversary of his passing is a day of remembrance and that his portrait hangs in

the homes of many Baha’is.?”? These are not instances of sycophancy, but of the archetypal religious attitude of reverence,

homage, and devotion to which Ficicchia is evidently blind. It is necessary to correct a further erroneous judgement that results from Ficicchia’s tendency to force historical facts into the Procrustean bed of an inappropriate framework based on the categories ‘conservative’ and ‘progressive’. Since “Abdu’lBaha never claimed any authority other than that conferred

upon him in the Kitab-i-“Ahd, it is wrong to see him as the representative of the ‘progressive’ wing, or to portray Mirza Muhammad-‘Ali, who rebelled against the succession pre-

298. Persian: jahar-dah ma‘sum (see Heinz Halm, Der schiitische Islam, p. 43). 299. This circumstance, which Ficicchia (Baha’ismus, p. 198) cites as evidence that ‘the person of ‘Abdu’l-Baha is today (particularly in the West) much more to the fore than that of his father, the founder of the religion’, is in fact evidence to the contrary. Photographs of the Bab and Baha’u’llah are not circulated and are shown only extremely rarely because they are ‘Manifestations’ and as a precaution against the danger of iconolatry. It is for the very reason that ‘Abdu’l-Baha, despite his exalted rank as ‘the perfect Exemplar of (Baha’u’llah’s) teachings’ (Shoghi Effendi, World Order, p. 134), does not possess the ontological station of prophethood, that such restraint is not required. Ficicchia’s hypothesis is also contradicted by the fact that the anniversary of the passing of ‘Abdu’l-Baha is not a holy day like those of the Bab and Baha’u’llah, but only a day of remembrance on which work is not suspended.

82

On Ficicchia’s Methodology scribed by Baha’u’llah, as incorporating the ‘conservative’ faction:°°° a schismatic, which Mirza Muhammad-‘Ali was, is exactly the opposite of a conservative. The fact that he employed dogmatic arguments in his attacks on ‘Abdu’l-Baha certainly does not mean that these arguments were his driving motives, as

Ficicchia would have us believe.*°! Muhammad-‘Ali, whose wounded vanity and unbridled craving for admiration prevented him from accepting the designation of ‘Abdu’l-Baha as head of the community, wished to take over this position himself and therefore disputed the legitimacy of ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s authority. In order to win over followers Muhammad-‘ Ali needed to make use of theological arguments. Ficicchia’s remarks about “Abdu’l-Baha’s proclamation of the Baha’i Faith are equally erroneous. It is indeed true that “Abdu’1-Baha always adapted his words to his audience and that in the West he emphasized those aspects of the revelation which his audience could best appreciate. “Abdu’l-Baha, who was

gifted with an extraordinary capacity for empathy,°*° wished his listeners to understand his message. It would have been folly to present a Western public with the mystical aspects of the revelation in the context of Shi‘a Islam, since people would have neither understood them nor been interested in them. A similar approach was taken by the Apostle Paul on the Areopag in

Athens,>°? when he ‘became a Greek to the Greeks’ and even cited a Greek poet.°°* After him, too, the young Christian community demonstrated “its adaptability by selecting for emphasis from the wealth of biblical ideas those that corresponded to the

300. Baha’ismus, p. 196. 301. ibid. pp. 194ff. 302. ‘psychologisch einfuhlig’ (psychologically sensitive) (Theodor Loeppert, Die Fortentwicklung der Babi-Baha’i im Westen, p. 35). 303. See Acts 17:22 ff. 304.

Acts

17:28; in I Cor.

15:33 he also cites the Greek dramatist

Menander, although he does not identify it as a quotation.

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longings of the people of Antiquity: monotheism, knowledge

(Gnosis) and the hope of eternal life’.*°> This was not and is not opportunism; it is not a chameleon-like ‘adaptation’ of the revelation to different ways of thinking. One cannot speak of an implantation of Christian ideas into Baha’i doctrine on the basis

that “Abdu’l-Baha discussed Christian topics from the point of view of the Baha’i revelation,*°° for all methodical thought concerning a new revelation, all theology, must inevitably confront the question as to how it relates to the previously revealed

religion. Furthermore, the fact that “Abdu’l-Baha did not put at the forefront of his teaching in the West the mystical and theo-

logical dimension of the revelation as elements of the continuity from Islam does not mean that he dissimulated anything. ‘“Abdu’l-Baha did nothing other than follow the advice of Baha’u’llah to present ‘the word of God according to the hearer’s

particular measure of understanding and capacity, that perchance the children of men may be roused from heedlessness

and set their faces towards this Horizon’ .°®” Like all human activities, the task of teaching and promoting the Baha’i Faith is

subject to the commandment to abide by the dianoetic cardinal

virtue of hikma: prudence and wisdom.*°8 To deduce from ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s teaching methods that he was willing to sacrifice his own identity for opportunistic gains, as Ficicchia suggests, is foolish, to say the least.

305.

Evangelisches Kirchenlexikon, keyword ‘Mission’, column 1342.

306. In the table talks given by ‘Abdu’l-Baha in ‘Akka which are recorded in Some Answered Questions, the questions on Christian themes were posed by Western pilgrims. 307. Tablets 17:28. 308. See ibid. 6:52; 7:7, 32; 11:41; 13:5; 17:43; Gleanings 163:5; Epistle 63 (p. 36), Hidden Words, Persian 34; Will and Testament 3:11

(p. 259). Concerning hikma I refer to my forthcoming Bahd’i Ethics (Part III).

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On Ficicchia’s Methodology

He has evidently never come across the term ‘incultura-

tion’>°? which is connected with the fact that divine revelation is conveyed to mankind within the context of human culture, i.e. that every revelation is bound up with the history of a specific section of the human race and associated with a particular

culture, so that the Glad Tidings?! must be depicted in such a way that they can be understood by people of a different culture. The apostle Paul is the model par excellence of missionary

adaptation,*!! and since his time Christian missionaries have always been on the look-out for points of correlation with other cultures, thereby discovering parallels (‘equivalent patterns’) and cultural values whose similarity to the Gospel teachings —

could be used as starting points for the preaching of Christian

doctrine.*!* The new Catechism of the Catholic Church confirms this and states that the Church’s mission can be conducted ‘only gradually’: “It must involve a process of inculturation if the Gospel is to take flesh in each people’s culture. There will

be times of defeat.’3!5 It should also be realized that an ecclesiastical publication is hardly entitled to accuse another religious community of opportunism because of such inculturation, considering that the work of conveying and presenting the message of Christ in contemporary terms has often tempted Christian theologians 309. The implantation of the divine message into the different cultures of humankind (see Catechism, no. 854). 310. Bisharat. 311s ee | Cor 19-23: 312. Reinhart Hummel would hardly approve of the term opportunism being used to refer to his statement that: ‘In order to be “victorious” in missionary work, the message must of course adapt and inculturate’ (‘Apologetische Modelle’, p. 6). On this subject see also: Giancarlo Collet, keyword ‘Inkulturation’, in Peter Eichler (ed.), Neues Handbuch

theologischer Grundbegriffe, vol. 2, pp. 394-407, Engelbert Mveng SJ, ‘Evangelium

und

Inkulturation’,

in zur

(Jan./Feb. 1994), pp. 3ff. 313. no. 854.

85

debatte,

vol.

24,

issue

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Chapter 2 ¢ Udo Schaefer

into interpreting this message according to the prevalent philosophy or political ideology and thus assimilating disparate

ideas.>!4 Nevertheless, this fact, which raises the question of the 314. The susceptibility of Christian theologians to whatever ideology is currently predominant was demonstrated in Nazi Germany in 1933, when the majority of the Protestant clergy joined the ‘German Christian’ organization, whose most radical members went as far as demanding the abolition of the Old Testament and calling for the Aryan paragraph (the law precluding non-Aryans from becoming public servants) to be applied in the Church. This development was opposed by the Bekennende Kirche (Confessional Church) which was founded in the mid1930s by Church leaders such as Martin Nieméller who were influenced by the theology of Karl Barth. The overwhelming majority of Protestant bishops supported Hitler’s racist policies and the war against the Soviet Union. With the exception of a few, they offered no resistance to the National Socialists’ policy towards the Jews. The Church even revoked the membership of baptized Jews (which was impossible according to ecclesiastical dogma and church law: ‘semel christianus, semper christianus’). On 17 December 1941 the Bishops of Saxony, Mecklenburg, Schleswig-Holstein, Anhalt, Thuringia and Liibeck published the following declaration: ‘With numerous documents, the National Socialist German leadership has irrefutably proven that the war, in its world-wide extent, has been instigated by the Jews. In both its domestic and foreign policy, it has therefore made decisions and taken measures against the Jews in order to secure German

life . . . as Dr Martin Luther, on the

basis of bitter experiences, long ago raised the demand to take the harshest of measures against the Jews and expel them from German territory. Christian baptism changes none of the racial characteristics of the Jew, his nationality or biological essence. A German Protestant Church has the duty to cultivate and promote the religious life of German citizens. Christians of Jewish race have no space and no rights within it. The undersigned Protestant churches and churchleaders have therefore broken off all relations with Christian Jews’ (Joachim Beckmann, Die evangelische Kirche im Dritten Reich, p. 481; see also Jo-

chen-Christoph Kaiser and Martin Greschat (eds.), Der Holocaust und die Protestanten. Analysen einer Verstrickung, Frankfurt/M.: Athenaeum Verlag, 1988). The influence of Nazi ideology was considerable in the Catholic church, too. Prominent Catholic theologians such as Karl Adam and Michael Schmaus welcomed and supported Hitler’s racial policies (see Georg Denzler and Volker Fabricius (eds.), Christen und Nationalsozialisten,

Frankfurt/M.,

Fischer-Verlag,

1993).

The

same

susceptibility has been evident in recent decades in the adoption of Marxist ideas and the uncritical employment of Marxist modes of inter-

86

On Ficicchia’s Methodology

identity of ecclesiastical preaching, is—as we learn from Heinz Zahrnt—the most normal thing in the world: theology ‘always has a body that is dressed in different garments in accordance

with the times’.*!° At various times, therefore, it speaks the language of ‘Aristotelian, Gnostic, Neoplatonic, Kantian, Marxist, and Existentialist thought—and also in the conceptual terms of

C.G. Jung. And why shouldn’t it?’3!® How simple it is when it is one’s own faith that is concerned. Furthermore, depicting ‘Abdu’l-Baha as an unprincipled opportunist serves Ficicchia’s purpose of supporting the ridiculous allegation that he sacrificed the ‘claim to absoluteness

and exclusivity so consistently upheld by his father’>!” and dispretation in Protestant theology, whereby Karl Marx has been termed ‘the new Aristotle of theology’ (‘Karl Marx als neuer Aristoteles der

Theologie’, in Hans Meier, Kritik der politischen Theologie, pp. 34 and 52). In this connection see also Schaefer, Dominion, pp. 16-20. The charge of opportunism has been raised by Nikolaus Lobkowicz against the ‘supposedly enlightened theologians’ who ‘listen intently at the bosom of the world to chart the development of the zeitgeist’? (Nikolaus Lobkowicz and Anselm Hertz, Am Ende der Religion? Ein Streitgesprach, p. 36). 315. An elegant formulation that can conjure away any loss of identity. Nevertheless, the question is raised whether the concept of ‘theology after the death of God’ which demanded of believers that they should ‘believe in God atheistically’ (Dorothee Sdlle, Atheistisch an Gott glauben, Olten, 1968; dtv 1994), or the idea of feminist theology

(‘Our Mother, who art in Heaven’) are merely fashionable garments or represent a renunciation of central doctrines of the Christian faith. 316. Gotteswende, p. 156. 317. Here again, we see how Ficicchia fails to make distinctions between different phenomena.

The claim to truth, the Word

of God, is

always absolute. A revealed religion without a claim to absoluteness is a contradictio in adiecto (see Schaefer, Beyond the Clash, pp. 58f.). ‘Abdu’l-Baha never left any doubt as to the absolute validity of and need for obedience to the revealed word. That faith is a requirement for salvation (Kitdb-i-Aqdas 1; Tablets 5:4, 11-12) corresponds to Jewish, Christian and Islamic doctrine (see Schaefer, Beyond the Clash, p. 117). The ‘claim to exclusivity’ alleged by Ficicchia, according to which the other religions are not paths to salvation, has never been raised and would contradict the revelational concept of the ‘single, indivisible re-

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Chapter 2 ¢ Udo Schaefer

simulated the normative character of the Baha’i Faith, turning the religion of God into a ‘free-thinking’ ‘movement’ open on

all sides’. This hypothesis is contradicted in the same breath by the statement that, after the passing of “Abdu’l-Baha, Shoghi

Effendi rejected this “free-thinking attitude’ and directed the community back ‘into the uniformity of dogmatic attachment to

the religious law’,>!® yet ‘paradoxically neglected to announce this change’.3!? These alleged escapades in connection with the Law of God are completely unfounded and serve the sole purpose of evoking in the reader the impression that the Word of God is treated in an arbitrary, manipulative way. Once again, Ficicchia offers no evidence in support of his accusations. The fact of the matter is that far from concealing the contents of the divine law

as revealed in the Kitab-i-Aqdas, ‘Abdu’l-Baha in his lectures and conversations in the West, made frequent reference to it,>”° occasionally explaining certain social norms*! yet without going into detail about the laws of the Kitab-i-Aqdas. Of course, there was no need to do so at that time. God’s revelation is a comprehensive framework guiding all aspects of human existence. The complexity and multi-faceted nature of the revealed message is unfolded in the course of a long developmental process before the eyes of contemporary man, who according to the testimony of Baha’u’llah is ‘feeble and far-

removed from the purpose of God’ 3”? This fact must always be

ligion of God’ (The Bab, Qayyumu’l-Asma’, Selections 2:24:2; see also Kitab-i-Aqdas 180. For further discussion of this subject see below, pp. 276ff.). 318. Baha’ismus, p. 293. 319. ibid. p. 294. 320. See Promulgation, pp. 217, 435, 454; Some Answered Questions 12:4; 45:1; 65:1-4 (pp. 63f., 171, 238). ' 321.

See Paris Talks, ch. 44, 46, 50.

322.

quoted from Kitab-i-Aqdas, Introduction, p. 6.

88

On Ficicchia’s Methodology accounted for in teaching the faith, the capacity>?> of each particular individual being taken into consideration. It would be unwise to confront people first with those aspects of a revelation that exceed their capacity. The Baha’i Faith is therefore introduced to people by explaining the general principles, the fundamental doctrines concerning God, creation, revelation, the individual and humanity, and the question of salvation, before the core of the divine Covenant, the Law, can be presented. Unless the individual understands the dogmatic foundations upon which the divine norms rest, it would be folly to present

the Law itself. Even if Ficicchia does not understand this, it should at least have been obvious to EZW’s theological editors. Moreover, during ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s lifetime the norms portrayed in the Kitab-i-Aqdas were only partially in force in the

Orient and not at all in the West. In accordance with the will of

the founder of the faith, they are introduced gradually,>”* as part of a historical process, partly because a number of regulations bearing the character of public law assume the existence of a different type of society. For this reason, too, “Abdu’l-Baha did not have occasion to focus his teaching on this catalogue of

norms. Hence, Ficicchia depicts “Abdu’l-Baha as a cult figure with a hypertrophied sense of mission who, for the sake of missionary success opportunistically sacrificed the most sacred principles and the identity of the faith of Baha’u’llah, and who unscrupu323. A general principle immanent in the concept of progressive revelation: ‘I have many more things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now’ (John 16:12). According to Baha’u’1lah, ‘the light of Divine Revelation hath been vouchsafed unto men in direct proportion to their spiritual capacity’ (Gleanings 38; 89:4). This principle is evident also in the work of teaching the faith and in the introduction of the various laws: ‘One must guide mankind to the ocean of true understanding in a spirit of love and tolerance’ (Baha’u’llah, quoted from Kitdb-i-Aqdas, Introduction, p. 6), ‘subdue the citadels of men’s hearts with the swords

of wisdom and of utterance’ (Epistle 93 (p. 55)). 324.

For further detail see pp. 338ff.

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Chapter 2 « Udo Schaefer

lously dissimulated the law of God, compensating for this amputation by adopting elements from other faiths until his religion

in its ‘new guise”>”> of ‘religious freethinking’>”° eventually succeeded in attracting adherents. V.

THE PORTRAIT OF SHOGHI EFFENDI

Unbridled hatred characterizes Ficicchia’s portrayal of Shoghi Effendi, to whom ‘Abdu’l-Baha granted auctoritas interpreta-

tiva in appointing him in his Will and Testament to the position

of ‘Guardian of the Cause of God’.32” Ficicchia looses no opportunity to launch malicious attacks on him. Thus, the caricature he paints of Shoghi Effendi is particularly malevolent. As the figure depicted as responsible for the rearrangement of the

Baha’i community into a ‘self-contained organization with a

rigid structure and leadership’,°?* Shoghi Effendi is seen as an ‘omnipotent’,??? ‘unapproachable autocrat’, as an ‘absolute

autocrat’,*?! a ‘new Pope’ and ‘supreme inquisitor of the Baha’i world that has now been forced into line’.*3* Having come to power as the result of a forged will and testament, he ‘exercised

unlimited supremacy over the believers’*? and ‘concerned’>*4 himself exclusively with the organizational build-up of the community, directing his attention throughout his life ‘to the

325. Baha’ismus, p. 293. 326. ibid. p. 187. 327. Vali-Amru’Ildah. 328.

Baha’ismus, Foreword, p. 12.

329. ibid. p. 284; Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 226. 330. Baha’ismus, p. 304 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 331.

Lexikon der Sekten, p. 102.

332. ‘Offener Brief an die Baha’i der Schweiz,’ August, 1974. 333. Baha’ismus, p. 294. 334. Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 233.

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On Ficicchia’s Methodology

consolidation of his own power’.°3° Like ‘Abdu’l-Baha, he was the

object—Ficicchia

alleges—of

an

‘exalted

personality

cult’,3° who provided ‘his subjects’>>7 with ‘strict leadership’>38 and ‘sat in harsh judgement over his own countrymen’,>*? ruling them with ‘an iron hand”>“° and attacking opponents ‘with full force’.34! What is more, Ficicchia alleges, he introduced ‘strict censorship regulations, the prohibition offree expression of opinion’ and many other circumscriptions>”? that ‘completely stifled the free spirit of the era of ‘Abdu’l-Baha and sacrificed the original beliefs for the secularization that was

now taking place’.7*? Furthermore, it is claimed, Shoghi Effendi ‘destroyed and reversed’>** ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s instructions regarding the Mashriqu’l-Adhkar,**° moulded by the spirit of religious tolerance, and ‘purposely prevented the establishment of a col-

lective system>** of leadership’3*” as had been prescribed by Baha’u’llah. Again and again Ficicchia attacks the ‘rigorism of

the Guardian’,*** his ‘rigorous rulership’,>*? his ‘unrealistic

335. ibid. p. 377. 336. This accusation appears three times, Baha ’ismus, pp. 302, 309, 342 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 337. ibid. p. 306. 338. ibid. p. 302. 339. ibid. p. 308. 340. Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 233. 341.

Baha’ismus, p. 305.

342. 343. 344. 345.

ibid. pp. 302 (Ficicchia’s emphasis), 300, 379. ibid. p. 302. ibid. pp. 248f. House of Worship. This refers to the supreme ‘House of Justice’.

346. 347. Baha’ismus, p. 314. 348. ibid. p. 291. 349. ibid. p. 293.

91

Chapter 2 + Udo Schaefer self-approbation’, and his ‘pompous’,?~° ‘long-winded’, ‘awk-

ward’, ‘hazy’, ‘incomprehensible’, ‘arrogant style’,>°! his ‘rude tone’, and his ‘harsh words’.*>” The reader is given the impression that the Baha’i community was headed by a brute (unmensch).

Here Ficicchia shows himself to be following in the wake

of his spiritual mentor Hermann Zimmer*?

who pursued

Shoghi Effendi with paranoiac hatred throughout his life. Most

of the alleged ‘facts’>°* listed by Ficicchia in this context will be dealt with in later chapters. There is no point in analysing every one of his offensive remarks. However, a few will be discussed here, since they illustrate Ficicchia’s distorted view of

his subject and reveal his tendentious methodology. In order to brandish the alleged autocratic rulership of Shoghi Effendi, Ficicchia mockingly remarks that Shoghi Effendi permitted the use of titles such as ‘His Highness’ and ‘His Eminence’ to refer to his person, titles that not even ‘Abdu’IBaha had laid claim to.>°> This criticism is completely unfounded. For one thing, it is an accepted custom that the leaders of relig-

ious communities (such as the head of the Ismailis*>°® or the Dalai Lama) are honoured in public life or in diplomatic circles

with special forms of address.3°’ ‘Abdu’l-Baha, too, was ad350. p. 308. 351. 352. 353. 354.

Materialdienst

15/16,

Issue

38 (1975),

p. 332; Baha’ismus,

Baha’ismus, pp. 28, 306, 308. ibid. p. 308. For details see Gollmer, below, pp. 724ff. The alleged testament forgery, autocratic leadership style and

omnipotence

of the Guardian,

prohibition

of the free expression

of

opinion, censorship, secularizing tendencies etc. 355. Baha’ismus, p. 304. 356. al-ismd ‘iliya. 357. According to Canon Law, the Pope has claim to the title ‘His Holiness’ or ‘Holy Father’; the cardinals are entitled to be addressed as “Your Eminence’; and the bishops, apostolic nuncios, and leading curial

92

On Ficicchia’s Methodology

dressed as “Your Eminence’ by the British military governors in Palestine.*°* In his communications with the believers and with Baha’i institutions, on the other hand, Shoghi Effendi never

used titles of honour in reference to himself, let alone raising the claim to such titles. Doctrinal letters to Baha’i communities were always signed “Shoghi’, and personal letters were often

signed ‘your true brother Shoghi’.>°? In correspondence, Shoghi Effendi addressed the believers as ‘Dearly beloved co-workers’ 3° ‘Beloved of God’,>°! ‘Dearly beloved friends’,3°2 ‘Friends and

fellow-heirs of the grace of Baha’u’llah’,> ‘Best-beloved brothers and sisters in the love of Baha’u’llah’,>™ etc.

Despite being endowed with sovereign functions and doctrinal authority, his dealings with the ‘people of God’ were anything but high-handed. That he was not a sinister autocrat

prelates are addressed as ‘Excellentia reverendissima’ (Most Reverend Excellence). 358. See Balyuzi, ‘Abdu’l-Bahd, p. 434. In 1920 he was awarded a knighthood, and hence given the title ‘Sir’, by the British crown in recognition of his humanitarian activities and his work to reduce the suffering and hunger of the population during the first world war. Although he accepted this honour, he never used the title. Ficicchia’s assertion (Baha ’ismus, p. 304, note 67) is an instance of disinformation. 359. In May 1922 in a letter to the Baha’i world Shoghi Effendi wrote: ‘May I also express my heartfelt desire that the friends of God in every land regard me in no other light but that of a true brother, united with them in our common

servitude to the Master’s Sacred Threshold,

and refer to me in their letters and verbal addresses always as Shoghi Effendi, for I desire to be known by no other name save the one our Beloved Master was wont to utter, a name which of all other designations is the most conducive to my spiritual growth and advancement’ (Baha ’i Administration, p. 25). 360. World Order, p. 3. 361. ibid. pp. 51, 161. 362. ibid. p. 123. 363. ibid. p. 161. 364. The Advent of Divine Justice, p. 1.

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Chapter 2 ¢ Udo Schaefer

tuling over his ‘subjects’,°° but was instead the ‘shepherd’ ap-

pointed to administer the Cause of God who guided the ‘little flock’ in a spirit of love and consultation, is evident on every page of his immense correspondence with the Baha’i world,

which from the start until his death exudes the spirit of joint responsibility, joint service and fraternal love.3° Through the manner of his leadership Shoghi Effendi himself exemplified best to the believers that *. . . the keynote of the Cause of God is not dictatorial authority but humble fellowship, not arbitrary power, but the spirit of frank and loving consultation’.*°7 The image portrayed by Ficicchia of Shoghi Effendi as an unapproachable autocrat is belied, too, by Shoghi Effendi’s simple lifestyle. Averse to all luxury and pomp,>*® he led a life that bordered on asceticism.*©’ In order to avoid the develop-

ment of any kind of personality cult, he demanded from the be-

365. Baha’ismus, p. 306. 366. Thus, Shoghi Effendi wrote in a letter to the American Baha’i community from the early period of his Guardianship (14 November 1923): ‘Fellow-labourers in the Divine Vineyard: Upon my return, after a forced and prolonged absence, to the Holy Land, it is my first and most ardent wish to renew and strengthen those ties of brotherly love and fellowship that bind our hearts together in our common servitude to His sacred Threshold’ (Baha ’i Administration, p. 50). That Shoghi Effendi saw the Baha’is not as his ‘subjects’, his ‘rabble’ (‘fufvolk!’), but as his co-workers, is evident from such expressions as ‘my humble suggestions’ (Bahda’i Administration, p.27) and from his frequently expressed interest in the proposals and advice of the believers (e.g. Bahd’i Administration, p. 33 etc.). 367.

Shoghi Effendi, Bahd’i Administration, p. 63.

368. His wedding, for instance, was very simple, almost spartan, away from the public gaze, in the presence of close family only (Rthiyyih Rabbani, Priceless Pearl, pp. 152ff.). 369. Extremely economical, he always travelled third class when on private railway journeys in other countries, he ate simple food and when on private journeys stayed in simple hotels (ibid. pp. 60f.).

94

On Ficicchia’s Methodology

ginning that the Baha’is refrain from celebrating his birthday.?”° He made it absolutely clear that the doctrinal authority con-

ferred upon him did not raise him to a station above that of a normal human being and must not result in his being granted any special privileges: To pray to the Guardian of the Faith, to address him as lord and master, to designate him as his holiness, to seek his benediction, to celebrate his birthday, or to commemorate any event associated with his life would be tantamount to a departure from those established

truths that are enshrined within our beloved Faith. The fact that the Guardian has been specifically endowed with such power as he may need to reveal the purport and disclose the implications of the utterances of

Baha’u llah and of ‘Abdu’l-Baha does not necessarily confer upon him a station co-equal with those Whose words he is called upon to interpret.>7!

The way in which Ficicchia exploits the sources in order to lend a glimmer of credibility to his portrait is evident from the following: Shoghi Effendi divides Baha’i history into three epochs:

the ‘Heroic’ or ‘Apostolic Age’ that ended with the death of ‘Abdu’1-Baha; the ‘Formative Age’ characterized by the worldwide development of the Baha’i Faith, the unfoldment of a world-embracing order, and the restructuring of the political

world in the ‘Lesser Peace’;>”” and ultimately the ‘Golden Age’ in which the fruit of the revelation of Baha’u’llah, the “Most Great Peace’, the ‘Kingdom of God on earth’, will have become

370. The Bahda’i Newsletter. The Bulletin of the National Spiritual Assembly of the United States and Canada, no. 29, p. 2. 371. World Order, p. 151. 372. On this concept see Gollmer, below, pp. 427ff., and Gottesreich, ch. 9.2.1; idem, ‘Der lange Weg zum GréBten Frieden’, in Baha ’iBriefe, issue 50, pp. 128ff.; issue 52, pp. 199ff.

OF

Chapter 2 ¢ Udo Schaefer

reality. The intermediate epoch, the Formative Period, was also

termed the ‘Iron Age’>”? in contrast to the future Golden Age. Ficicchia cunningly picks up on this and identifies the ‘Iron Age’ with Shoghi Effendi’s period of office. He subtitles a section of his book ‘The “Iron Age” of Sawqi Efendi’,?”4 and

alludes elsewhere to Shoghi Effendi,>’> saying: ‘The strict leadership of the Guardian, termed the “Iron Age” by [the Guard-

ian] himself’,?”° deluding the reader, who will not generally have access to the sources, into thinking that Shoghi Effendi himself used this epithet to characterize his own period of office. In reality, it is quite clear from the context of the quotation Ficicchia is referring to, that the ‘Iron Age’ is a long-lasting epoch whose end is currently not in sight and whose name is

merely intended to distinguish it from the “Golden Age’. Hence, Ficicchia has found a link to lend a hint of plausibility and probability to his proposition concerning Shoghi Effendi’s ‘strict leadership’, ‘rigorism’, ‘iron hand’ and autocratic rule—a transparent manceuvre.

Other examples of the author’s irresponsible and highly suspect methods are his frequent conjectures about historical events for which he admits he has no tangible evidence, con-

jectures which have a subliminal influence on the message conveyed to the reader that the official depiction of these events is obscure and dubious. Having been appointed ‘Guardian’ following the sudden

death of ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Shoghi Effendi left Palestine in Spring 1922 for several months. He went to the Swiss Alps in order to restore his health, which had suffered badly as a result of the pain and sorrow felt at the loss of his beloved grandfather and owing to the new burden of the responsibilities of his office, 373. God Passes By, pp. 26, 93, 324. 374. Baha’ismus, p. 278. 375. God Passes By, p. 324. 376.

Baha’ismus, p. 302.

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On Ficicchia’s Methodology

and to gather strength for the difficult tasks that lay ahead.>”” Ficicchia finds these reasons ‘hardly convincing’ since, he opines, Shoghi Effendi could have found peace and seclusion in the Holy Land! It is much ‘more probable’, he asserts, that Shoghi Effendi “faced strong opposition, and therefore might have de-

cided to leave the country again as quickly as possible’.>7* As usual, Ficicchia has no facts on which to base his doubts about

the explicit reasons given by Shoghi Effendi himself. In his

deep pathological mistrust, with his ‘evil suspicions’,>”? Ficicchia always senses manipulations and cover-ups behind authentic reports. Consequently, he does not shrink from informing his readers by means of vague expressions of suspicion and untenable conjectures. Elsewhere, too, we repeatedly encounter vague, conjectural formulations that, while really saying nothing, are clearly

intended to sow doubt in the minds of the reader as to the

Baha’i presentation, expressions such as ‘might have had’,3*° ‘might have been’,**! ‘it can be assumed that . . .”,>°* or ‘it cannot be ruled out that . . .” 383 Here are a few more examples: In connection with the Conference of Badasht in 1848 and the Babis’ break with the Shari‘a which occurred there, Ficic377.

See Ruhiyyih Rabbani’s report concerning this, Priceless Pearl,

pp. 57ff.; Taherzadeh,

Covenant,

p. 285; Bramson-Lerche,

‘Some

As-

pects of the Establishment of the Guardianship’, p. 263ff.; concerning his absence Shoghi Effendi himself writes: ‘I look back to the unfortunate circumstances of ill-health and physical exhaustion that have attended the opening years of my career of service to the Cause’ (Bahd’i Administration, p. 51). 378. Baha’ismus, p. 302 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 379.

I Tim. 6:4.

380.

Baha’ismus, pp. 130, 296.

381.

ibid. pp. 98, 333, note 51.

382.

ibid. pp. 61, 98, 333, note 51.

383.

ibid. pp. 95, 159, note 68. On p. 301, note 62, such formulations

occur twice in succession: ‘Thus, it cannot be ruled out that... ‘However, it can also not be ruled out that...”

97

’ and,

Chapter 2 ¢ Udo Schaefer

chia writes: ‘It can be assumed that the Master>*4 would at least have adopted the role of mediator.’38° However, he does not

reveal the basis for this assumption. He presents no dogmatic or historical research or evidence about the subject, only pure speculation. Ficicchia emphatically casts doubts on a quotation from

the Persian Bayan cited by Shoghi Effendi,*®° in which the Bab had made an early reference to the order of Baha’u’llah, because, he surmises, such a statement would contradict the fact that the Bab had appointed not Baha’u’llah but Subh-i-Azal as his successor. Here again, we are confronted with pure assumptions: ‘It is therefore to be assumed that the original quotation in the Persian Bayan does not contain the name of Baha’u’llah but merely a vague reference to Man yuzhiruhu'llah, and it is also hardly possible that there might have been a reference to the later, at that time completely unknown, “order” of Baha’u-

"11ah."2°7 However, Ficicchia’s suspicion that Shoghi Effendi inserted the name ‘Baha’u’llah’ into the text is easy to prove

false: the Persian original>®* contains the Arabic verse: ‘Tuba liman yanzura ila nazmi Bahd’i’ll4h wa yadkura rabbahu.>*®? Shoghi Effendi’s translation is perfectly correct: “Well is it with

384. Meaning the Bab. 385. Baha’ismus, p. 61. 386. World Order, pp. 146f. 387.

Baha’ismus, p. 333, note 51.

388. The original text has never appeared in print. However, copies have been in circulation in Iran and Iraq ever since it was written in 1848. The text from which I have quoted is a photomechanical reproduction made at the request of the National Spiritual Assembly of Iran on 15 April 1954, of which 50 copies were made. The text was kindly made available to me by Dr Kamran Ekbal. On the content of this work and its bibliography see Muhammad Afnan, in Encyclopédie Philosophique Universelle, vol. Ill, 1, pp. 1917-1919. 389.

Bayan 3:16.

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On Ficicchia’s Methodology

him who fixeth his gaze upon the Order of Baha’u’llah and rendereth thanks unto his Lord!’ As if this frivolous allegation of forgery were not outrageous enough, Ficicchia adds to it a lie, namely the assertion that it is not possible to check the facts “since the relevant sources are kept locked up in the archives of the Baha’i leadership in Haifa’.>°° Again, this assertion is completely unfounded. As in so many cases, Ficicchia gives no basis for his statement nor does he explain the methods by which he arrived at such a

conclusion. He has never contacted the World Centre of the Baha’i Faith requesting access to the original Persian text, which he would be incapable of reading anyway. Why should this text be kept there under lock and key? What sense would it make to keep a text locked up since so many copies of it have been in circulation among the Middle-Eastern believers ever since it was written? Furthermore, this text has been available in a European language for almost a century. The French orientalist Nicolas translated the work into French.>?! Ficicchia, to

judge from his bibliography,°”? was certainly acquainted with this book. If he had gone to the trouble of checking the text before

spreading it abroad, he would have found the French version of the above verse: ‘Heureux celui qui regarde sur l’ordonnance

de la Splendeur de Dieu,” et remercie son Dieu.”3°* The ridiculous allegation that the Baha’i World Centre keeps these sources locked away, thus preventing clarification of the matter, is just as malicious as the lie, which will be dis-

cussed in detail later, that the contents of the Kitab-i-Aqdas are

390.

Baha’ismus, p. 333, note 51.

391.

Seyyéd ‘Ali Mohammed dit le Bab. Le Béyan Persan, trad. du

Persan par A.-L.-M.

Nicolas, Paris: Librairie Paul Geuthner, tome 4,

1911, 1913, 1914. 392.

Baha’ismus, p. 437.

393.

‘Splendeur de Dieu’ = Baha’u’Ilah.

394.

unité III, porte 16.

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Chapter 2 + Udo Schaefer

withheld from the believers.°”° Ficicchia’s motives are obvious. His arbitrary reproach as to the treatment of the sacred scriptures is intended to place the supreme Baha’i institution, which is responsible for the entire globe, in a negative light and thus to

shatter the credibility of the Baha’i Faith as a whole. This again demonstrates how irresponsibly this author of what is supposed

to be a scholarly work goes about raising allegations of forgery, and how unscrupulously he manipulates the truth in pursuit of his thinly veiled personal agenda of discrediting the Baha’i Faith at all costs. Even Baha’u’llah’s testimony concerning his mystic call-

ing—for Ficicchia a ‘questionable event’>”°—is cast into doubt in the following way: ‘It cannot be ruled out that this is a later

artificial construction of the Baha’is or of their prophet him-

self.°3?’ What in the world is there that can be ruled out? An academic study should be based on facts, not on assumptions; it must present what happened, not what cannot be ruled out. Further examples of the methods of this author who has so

“strictly observed the standards of research in the field of religious studies’>”® are, for instance, the nice expression ‘scheint. . . nicht aus der Luft gegriffen’>”? (seems . . . not to be pure invention) with which he lends credibility to the allegation made in the Azali report Hasht Bihisht that Baha’u’llah ordered the per-

petration of a murder,*®° or the assumptions he makes, without any basis in fact or findings, about why Shoghi Effendi led a

life of ‘seclusion’. He writes thus:

395. For details see pp. 322ff. 396. Baha’ismus, p. 126. 397. ibid. pp. 95, 109f. 398. ibid. Foreword by Michael Mildenberger, p. 12. 399. ibid. p. 186, note 142 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 400. ibid. Concerning the murder allegations see Towfigh, pp. 650 ff.

100

below,

On Ficicchia’s Methodology Was it really only shyness or modesty, which, after all, hardly seem to fit in with his character? Or were there

other people in Haifa who held the reins of power and merely used the youthful and introverted Shoghi as a pretext so that they could wield power themselves unhindered? The truth of such a hypothesis has not yet

been established and must be left to future research in situ. There are, however, certain indications that make the existence of an anonymous power concentration in the background seem a definite possibility.4°

In principle anything is possible, but what ‘certain indications’ he has in mind he keeps to himself. Just two pages later, he then admits: “There are no indications of people who might have

been able to dispute Sawqi Efendi’s position.’4°? Even the fact that Shoghi Effendi did not leave a will occasions Ficicchia to

assert the existence of speculation about ‘an anonymous power concentration in the background, . . . which now wished vent the continuance of the Guardianship or possibly [!] sumption of office by a successor, should one have been nated’.4°3 There never were any such speculations. The only

to prethe asdesigperson

doing any speculating is Ficicchia. Neither were there any

‘power struggles’4°4 that Ficicchia alleges took place regarding the successorship to Shoghi Effendi.*°°

Ficicchia’s discussion about whether it was Shoghi Effendi himself or others who forged the Will and Testament of

401. 402. 403.

ibid. p. 304. ibid. p. 306. ibid. p. 316 (Ficicchia’s emphasis), p. 304.

404.

ibid. p. 316. 405. The attempt of Mason Remey to usurp the Guardianship and his subsequent excommunication constituted an isolated case and did not take place until three years after Shoghi Effendi’s death.

101

Chapter 2 + Udo Schaefer ‘Abdu’l-Baha*” is of a similar quality. He simply assumes that forgery is a proven fact: Is the famous Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha really a forgery of the Guardian, or is it ultimately the work of a strong lobby that wanted to prevent the establishment of a supreme Bait al-‘adl, in order to exercise power without hindrance? Did Sawai Efendi know of it, or was he, as ‘Guardian’ and willing puppet, merely abused as a pretext for the power of an anonymous group? In this matter we find ourselves in the arena of

speculation.*°7

Someone who is inclined to ‘speculation’*”” 2408:is not well suited to

the role of religious historian. VI.

FICICCHIA’S DISTORTED IMAGE OF THE BAHA’I COMMUNITY

Whereas the presentation of Baha’i doctrine, which one would expect to be at the heart of a standard work about a still relatively little known religion, is sketchy, colourless and contains a

multiplicity of errors,*? Ficicchia’s revenge culminates in his portrayal of the community and its order, for which he was able

406. 705ff. 407. 408.

On this subject see Gollmer, below, pp. 674ff., in particular pp. and 763ff. Baha’ismus, p. 305 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). ‘Ein Kerl, der spekuliert, “A man to speculation bound Ist wie ein Tier auf diirrer Heide, is like a senseless beast upon a barren heath Von einem bésen Geist By evil spirit led in circles im Kreis herumgefihrt,

round and round,

Und rings umher liegt schéne, while lush and green wide griine Weide.’ meadows spread beneath.’ (Goethe, Faust I, Faust’s Study, Mephistopheles (p. 80)). 409. See below, pp. 260ff.

102

On Ficicchia’s Methodology

to find words of commendation as late as 19774!° and of which he now longed reader value.

(in 1981) paints a truly horrific picture. Because he beto this community himself for a few years, the uncritical is easily inclined to take his damning judgement at face After all, such phenomena do exist elsewhere. Among

the wide range of new religious offers of salvation*!! there really is much that is enigmatic and evokes repugnance: obscure, recondite structures, organizations that cut themselves off from the outside world and wield excessive power that results in the suppression, incapacitation and exploitation of believing souls, leading to their complete psychological dependency. Criticism of the Baha’i community and its allegedly authoritarian, autocratic structures is the dominant theme in Ficic-

chia’s book. It is found on the inside cover and in the foreword by the editor, who attributes what he sees as the slow rate of the community’s growth to the fact that ‘out of the Baha’i movement that was open on all sides and looking out on the world has developed a rigidly structured and managed self-contained organization’ .*!?

410.

In his letter to the Baha’i World Centre dated 29 March 1977, he

wrote: ‘Close study of the Baha’i administrative order and comparison with the institutions of other religions has shown me that our system— notwithstanding all possible shortcomings—is the most suitable and the best thought out . . . I believe that the administrative order forms a solid foundation on which the community can develop and perfect itself. I may state with satisfaction that I know of no other religious institution that offers more suitable conditions for this than the Baha’i administration.’ 411. Erroneously called ‘sects’. These are better described as ‘destructive

cults’

(see Schaefer,

The Bahda’i Faith:

Sect or Religion?,

Baha'i Studies, no. 16, pp. 1ff. and the bibliography provided there; see

also Reinhart Hummel, Gurus in Ost und West. Hintergriinde, Erfahrungen, Kriterien, Stuttgart, 1984; idem, ‘Jugendreligionen—Mis-

sionierende Gemeinschaften?’, in Zeitschrift fir Mission (1981), pp. 135-140). 412. Baha’ismus, p. 12. Mildenberger here adopts Ficicchia’s thesis aired in Materialdienst

3 (1975),

p. 233, where

103

in almost

identical

Chapter 2 + Udo Schaefer

Ficicchia’s criticism is easy to invalidate as long as it is related to verifiable facts. He has committed a number of major errors that distort the image of the community and its social order. In order to prove his thesis concerning the incapacitation of the individual believer, he does not shrink from making blatantly false assertions, even when he must have known better. The difficulty is that in many instances we encounter diffuse

condemnatory judgements for which—when they are not deduced from demonstrably false information—Ficicchia provides no verifiable facts or sources. The editors must surely have noticed this shortcoming, and it is probably for this reason that

they so clearly emphasized the author’s subjective experience; after all, they assert, he was “for a long time himself a member’ of this community and ‘knows it as few other people do’.*!? Thus they attempt to attribute to him indisputable, unquestioned authority, to appoint him, so to speak, as the supreme judge in the matter of “Baha’ism’. He himself refers to his ‘own experi-

ences and observations’.*!4 Nevertheless, recourse to subjective experience is no substitute for academic rigour or simple honesty. His subjective condemnatory judgement resulting from his

experience*!> as a member of the community does not per se constitute scholarly or accurate information.

In order for his

personal experience to have any value or validity whatsoever, his findings must first be investigated and verified through

some manner of objective research and not derive solely from words Ficicchia asserts that: ‘Out of the “Movement” open on all sides resulted a rigid structure.’ 413.

ibid. Foreword by Michael Mildenberger, p. 12—an astonishing

judgement!

414. ibid. p. 30. 415. The question is inevitably raised as to how someone who during his three-year membership of the community did not attract attention as being particularly knowledgeable and competent could so rapidly have acquired knowledge if the Baha’i Faith is ‘a self-contained structure’ into which ‘not even the average believer is granted insight’ (Baha ’ismus, p. 29).

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On Ficicchia’s Methodology

the subjective experience of one individual whose motives are

hardly dispassionate.

Ficicchia’s frontal attack on the administrative order*!® is

directed first against its legal foundations. The order that has developed in the course of history and exists now is not, we are

instructed, identical with that intended by the religion’s foun-

der. The organizing process that began after the death of ‘Abdu’l-Baha has ‘taken a different route from that prescribed by the prophet’.*"” For one thing, Ficicchia asserts that the ‘central authority’, the leadership body responsible for the entire globe,*!® is not to be found anywhere in the canon of scripture

by Baha’u’llah, in particular not in the Kitab-i-Aqdas.*!? Baha’u'llah did not provide for any higher central authority,

any supreme ‘House of Justice’,*”° but only the establishment of the local ‘Houses’.*?! The lack of a supreme authority was

recognized and remedied only by ‘Abdu’l-Baha, who wrote this institution into his “Testament’, which is why the Will and

416. The term ‘Baha’i administration’ that was introduced into English by Shoghi Effendi has been translated into German by the unfortunate phrase

‘Bahd ‘i-Verwaltungsordnung’.

This term is restrictive and

provokes misunderstanding and aversion on the part of the uninformed reader. That it refers to the legal order of the community including its institutional structure is not immediately recognizable even to theologians and scholars of religious studies. The correct term would be ‘Gemeindeordnung’ or ‘Ordnung der Gemeinde’. This term, which is commonly used in Church law, is translated into English in Karl Barth’s Church Dogmatics, vol. IV, 2 § 67,4 p. 667 as ‘the order of the community’. 417. Baha’ismus, pp. 318f. 418. This refers to the Baytu’l ‘adl al-a‘zam, the ‘Universal House of Justice’. 419.

Baha’ismus, pp. 331, 319.

420.

ibid. p. 331.

421.

ibid. p. 319, note 5, pp. 356, 372.

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Testament and not the ‘suppressed Kitab al-Aqdas’ is the constitutional document of the administrative order.*?? Yet Ficicchia never tires of casting doubt upon the authenticity of this Testament,‘”? which he describes as the text that

has ‘supreme priority’ among the sacred writings of the Baha’i Faith and that clearly stands ‘in its significance . . . before the

Kitab al-Aqdas’.4?4 Time and again he portrays it as ‘disputed’,*”° finally presenting the forgery theory upheld by only a handful of dissidents as a proven fact and leaving open only the question as to whether Shoghi Effendi, the appointed “Guardian of the Cause of God’, had forged it himself, or whether it was ‘the work of a strong lobby’.4?° Were ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s Will and Testament indeed a forgery, there would be no scriptural le-

gitimacy for either the Guardianship or the Universal House of Justice or the national “Houses of Justice’. Ficicchia thus insists that these institutions were written into the Will and Testament

of ‘Abdu’l-Baha ‘contrary to the instructions of Baha’u’1lah’47 and his ‘already established regulations concerning the succes-

sion’ .4?8 Ficicchia further sees the only institutions legitimated by authentic scripture as being the local ‘Houses of Justice’, whose ‘leadership role’, ‘authority and functional power’ were

restricted by the Testament,’”? since the ‘Kitab al-Aqdas . . . prescribes that after the death of “Abdu’l-Baha the leadership

should pass on to collective bodies (Buyiit al-‘adl)’ °°

422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430.

ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid.

p. 331. pp. 282ff., 324. p. 282. pp. 324, 293ff. p. 305. pp. 280f. p. 279. pp. 284, 280, 294. p. 192. 106

On Ficicchia’s Methodology

In a logical salto mortale Ficicchia then proceeds to complain that this supreme “House of Justice’ (which in his opinion

should not exist) was not established until forty-two years after the passing of “Abdu’l-Baha. He then accuses Shoghi Effendi of preventing the establishment of this ‘collective system of leadership’ for thirty-six years, preferring right up to his death to

‘go it alone’ in shaping the destiny of the community.*?! The Universal House of Justice, which according to Ficicchia was a creation of ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s fraudulent Testament, should, he opines, have been established immediately after the death of ‘Abdu’l-Baha.*3? It seems not to have dawned on him that this criticism causes him to get tangled up in his own argumentation and to contradict himself with regard to the forgery theory. As he sees it, the administration “rests on rocky foundations’ which

is why, he remarks cynically, it is obliged to make itself credible and legitimate itself ‘through constantly repeated praise of

its uniqueness and exceptionality’,*3 a status which he elsewhere concedes. *34 Concerning the order of the community, the reader is also instructed that Baha’ism has “a rigid hierarchical leadership,— “infallible” because it is “prescribed by God Himself’,—an administrative order that is destined to bring together all relig-

ions and nations into its theocratic uniform system’ .*°> The national bodies are, he asserts, merely ‘executive organs of the

supreme organ of legislative power in Haifa’.*°° The ‘doctrinal

431. ibid. pp. 361, 314, 350. 432. ibid. p. 360. 433. ibid. p. 332. 434. ‘This is indeed unique in religious history that the founder of a religion has left not only a written law (Kitab al-Aqdas) but also directives for the later organizational form of the community’ (ibid. p. 422). 435. ibid. p. 28 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 436. ibid. p. 391.

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authority’ invested in the Guardianship was, ‘perforce’,*3” ‘transferred to the Universal House of Justice’** and became henceforth, as in the Catholic Church, an element of jurisdictive power. Thus the Universal House of Justice has become the ‘sole authoritative doctrinal organ’*?? and hence a ‘salvational

institution’, ‘an authoritative “ecclesiastical institution” ’.44° In this connection Ficicchia speaks of the ‘doctrinal legis-

lation’ of the Universal House of Justice,**! through which the former principle of the division of powers (between “doctrinal

power’ and ‘jurisdictive power’“”) was supposedly revoked, **#? and he repeatedly refers to what he calls the ‘churchification’ of

the Baha’i community***: ‘Hence, in the Baha’i Faith, too, an organization took over the revealed message and now interprets it ex opere operato for all believers . . . Thus the organization

has turned into a salvational institution.’“° Ficicchia even goes so far as to assert that the Baha’i ‘administration’ claims ‘to be the sole . . . divinely ordained salvational institution on

earth’ **© In short, the administrative order of Baha’u’llah is depicted as ‘anti-democratic’,“*” as ‘a rejection of democracy’ that can be traced ‘as far back as the founder of Baha’ism’**®

437. 438. 439. 440. 441.

ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid.

p. 364. p. 367. p. 368. (Ficicchia’s emphasis). p. 367.

442. On these concepts see my doctoral thesis, pp. 94ff. 443. Baha’ismus, p. 366. 444. ibid. pp. 337, 278, 421. 445. ibid. pp. 420, 421 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 446. ibid. p. 332 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 447. ibid. p. 339. 448. ibid. p. 340 (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

108

On Ficicchia’s Methodology who, he claims, saw in civil liberties nothing but ‘a gateway for

sedition and confusion’.*” This extremely distorted portrayal of the Baha’i administrative order results partly from the incompetence of the author, who has completely misunderstood so many things, partly from

his arrogance in thinking he knows and understands the Baha’i Faith better than anyone else, but first and foremost from his self-declared embittered enmity towards the representatives of

that order, whom he pledged to fight ‘with all possible means’ .4°° It is quite astounding how thoroughly Ficicchia, who, after

all, had access to my doctoral thesis in German,**! has misunderstood the legal foundations and structures of the Baha’i community and how peculiarly he has interpreted it to suit his own purposes. As if this were not enough, Ficicchia’s image of the community and its religious practice is one long indictment

made up of variously formulated charges throughout the book, from the introduction to the back cover, culminating in the condemnation of the order of Baha’u’llah. This Ficicchia describes

as a ‘strictly regimented, . . . rather abstruse system’,*>? a ‘selfcontained structure into which not even the average believer is

granted insight’,*°? an ‘ossified organization caused the ‘failure and cause it ‘was bound to

‘authoritarian power instrument’ ,*** an caught up in the profane’*°> that has perversion’*~° of its own principles become into collision with the findings of

449. ibid. pp. 340, 275, 389. See my discussion below, pp. 301ff. 450. See the letter to the World Centre dated 5 April 1978, already cited above, p. 33. 451. Die Grundlagen der ‘Verwaltungsordnung’ der Baha’i, Heidelberg, 1957. 452. Baha’ismus, p. 28. 453. ibid. p. 29 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). See above, p. 90, note 415.

454. 455.

ibid. p. 414 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). ibid. p. 253 (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

456.

ibid.

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Chapter 2 ¢ Udo Schaefer

science and rationality the more it insisted on its own claims to

power and its own doctrinal pronouncements (dogmas)’,*>’ an ‘omnipresent ,*>® ‘all-determining organization’*°? in which ‘everything is ordered and regimented’*° because ‘organizational uniformity and dogmatic absoluteness are given priority, whereas independent spiritual investigation and freedom of religious practice are rejected’ .*°!

Ficicchia portrays the Baha’i community as one in which all independence is stifled because individuals have to give themselves up and submit to an anonymous, omnipotent and repressive organization, a community in which the possibilities of individual creativity are reduced to naught in the vice-like clutches of the repressive system, which is, nevertheless, a ‘secure enclosure’ for all those “who cannot cope with the problems of life’, that ‘protects them from the need to overcome

life’s difficulties’;4°? a community in which those who join must relinquish their faculty of critical reason, their selfresponsibility and self-determination, and submit to a process of self-incapacitation; a community in which no-one dare even

breathe because anyone who speaks up is ‘silenced’,4°? where ‘the response to any critical thought or attempt at innovation in

its own ranks is immediate exclusion from the community’,*4 where “deviant opinions on doctrine are rigorously suppressed’, and where ‘freedom of religious practice, free expression of opinion and individual interpretation of the scripture is re-

jected’ and the individual 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464.

ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid.

p. p. p. p. p.

253 404 429. 422 426

believer

(Ficicchia’s emphasis). (Ficicchia’s emphasis). (Ficicchia’s emphasis). (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

110

must

unreservedly

‘be

On Ficicchia’s Methodology guided by the attitude of the collective whole and its organiza-

tion’ .46> The supreme principle of this religious community, we are

led to believe, is its ‘clearly defined authority principle’ ,4 the demand for ‘unconditional obedience’ and the ‘strict duty to

obey the omnipresent organization’ .*©’ Above all, the believer is subject to the “unconditional duty to obey’ ‘centralist decrees’*68 of the organization.*©? The qualities demanded of the believer are “self-surrender and uncritical subordination rather than self-discovery and self-responsibility’*”°: ‘The believer is obliged, in all that he does, to keep to the regulations laid down by the scriptures and the organization. Thus the believer himself thinks as the leadership wishes him to think and he desires what the leadership desires. He is completely harnessed to the system and is absorbed by it.’*7! Consequently, ‘continual instruction does not promote the development of individual critical reasoning—criticism is frowned upon, indeed forbidden. Rather it is intended to teach “correct” behaviour as the organization un-

derstands it.’*”? Religious instruction, the catechise, suddenly becomes ‘ideological schooling’ that, Ficicchia asserts, supplants ‘independent thought concerning contemporary issues

and current problems’ .*7> In the religious education of children, who

according

to Baha’u’llah’s

commandment

should

be

465. ibid. p. 417 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 466. ibid. p. 405. 467. ibid. p. 404 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 468. Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 238. 469.

ibid.

470.

Baha’ismus,

pp. 413f.

(Ficicchia’s

15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 238. 471. Baha’ismus, p. 413. 472. 473.

ibid. ibid. (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

Ll

emphasis),

Materialdienst

Chapter 2 + Udo Schaefer

trained ‘in the principles of religion’,*”* Ficicchia can discern only ideological ‘schooling’,*”> a ‘subtle use offorce in matters of faith’ that contradicts the professed principle of the inde-

pendent investigation of truth,4’° a principle that ultimately proves ‘an illusion’ which ‘lacks any connection with reality’477 Again and again there is mention of ‘organizational decrees’,*78 ‘centralist decrees’*”? or ‘organizational commands’ .*°° Baha’i religiosity and orthodox belief consist, Ficicchia claims, ‘not in careful adherence to the beliefs that were originally revealed but merely in acceptance of and adherence to organiza-

tional decrees’.*®! Anyone who ignores these ‘is excommunicated’,*®? for the ‘Baha’i leadership’,**? the ‘management’ *** to whom the individual owes ‘unconditional and uncritical obedi-

ence’,*®> ‘does not tolerate any deviance’ .4°¢ 474. ‘Schools must first train the children in the principles of religion, so that the Promise and the Threat recorded in the Books of God may prevent them from the things forbidden and adorn them with the mantle of the commandments; but this in such a measure that it may not injure the children by resulting in ignorant fanaticism and bigotry’ (Tablets 6:28). 475. Baha’ismus, pp. 412, 260. 476. ibid. p. 265 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 477. ibid. p. 412 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 478. ibid. pp. 288, 418, 422. 479.

Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 238.

480. Baha’ismus, p. 413. The same vocabulary appears in Ficicchia’s entries in Lexikon der Religionen (p. 42) and Lexikon der Sekten (p. 103). 481. Baha’ismus, p. 422 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 482. ibid. p. 288. 483. ibid. pp. 26, 28, 29, 288, 302, 325, 377, 413, 414, 430; Lexikon der Sekten, p. 103.

484. ibid. p. 325. 485. ibid. p. 288. 486. ibid. 112

On Ficicchia’s Methodology

Ficicchia drums into his readers in many different con-

texts*®” that the ‘formation of personal opinion’,48® the ‘free expression of opinion’, and, above all, criticism of any kind are absolutely forbidden. In this community, he maintains, prohibitions apply also to the ‘se/f-critical analysis of the doctrines of the faith’, ‘any attempt at profound reflection and the opportu-

nity for free theological research by the individual’,*®? even any form of scriptural exegesis,’”° any allegorical interpretation of the scripture,*?! any commentary on the scripture,*?? in particular on the Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha,*?> any ‘individual search for meaning’4?4—for ‘the believer has no competence in this field’.*”> If we are to believe Ficicchia, even the Bab, who himself gave allegorical interpretations to the holy scriptures of the past, prohibited the interpretation of his writings,” and Baha’u’llah followed in his footsteps by categori-

cally forbidding any form of scriptural exegesis.*°” Thus, the Baha’i is ‘denied even the individual search for meaning in the contents of the revelation, since everything has already been

said and there is nothing left to say’.*”°

487. ibid. pp. 275, 300, 302, 325, 345, 365, 417, 423ff.; Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), pp. 238, 236. 488. 489.

ibid. pp. 275, 302. ibid. p. 29 (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

490.

Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 237.

491. Baha’ismus, pp. 91, 167, 325, 338, 345, 365 note 422ff. 492. Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 232. 493.

Baha’ismus,

p. 305;

Materialdienst

15/16,

Issue

py232.

494. 495. 496. 497. 498.

ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid.

p. 365 note 181, pp. 345, 417. p. 341. pp. 87, 90, 91, 167. pp. 167, 325, 338, 365, 417, 422, 423, 429. pp. 422f. 113

181, 417,

38

(1975),

Chapter 2 + Udo Schaefer

This prohibition of critical thought and free expression of Opinion is secured by means of ‘extremely strict censorship regulations’,*”’ by ‘forbidding the reading of oppositional lit-

erature”? and through the sword of Damocles hanging over the head of every Baha’i, the constant threat of ‘rigorous exclu-

sion’! from the community.°°? In these prohibitions, as in the ‘wholesale rejection of liberty’, Ficicchia sees ‘signs of inher-

ently predetermined stagnation’ °° Thus, ‘total submission to his own system’°** is demanded of the believer: “Renunciation of his own religious insights in favour of absolute obedience to authority.’°°> This means ‘total possession being taken of the individual and religious and ethical action being prefixed by the all-determining organiza-

tion’,-°° the utter spiritual incapacitation of the believers by an omnipotent, omnipresent system which ‘eradicates all views and influences that do not conform to the Baha’ist claim to absoluteness and its theocratic ideas’ and which insulates itself against ‘new findings and insights’ by means of ‘extreme in-

flexibility in the forms of its doctrine, ritual and law’.°°7 Thus, the institutions of the Baha’i community raise ‘a power claim that is total in character—both spiritual and political’.°°8 The

renunciation

of personal

freedom

in decision-

making and in shaping one’s personal life that is demanded of

499. 500. (1975) 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508.

ibid. p. 379 note 4, pp. 300, 302. ibid. (Ficicchia’s emphasis), Materialdienst pee st. ibid. p. 302 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). ibid. pp. 288, 300, 334. ibid. p. 423 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). ibid. p. 334 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). ibid. p. 428. ibid. pp. 428f. ibid. (Ficicchia’s emphasis). ibid. p. 429.

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38

On Ficicchia’s Methodology the individual, the ‘required subordination’, the individual believer’s ‘religious and social dependency’ has, according to Fi-

cicchia, come to the point where the question must be asked “whether the Baha’i Faith will ever be able to acquire open and

liberal structures’.°°? For the ‘rejection of one’s own critical rationality’ makes the believer ‘open . . . to a totalitarian system

of leadership’.*!° Hence, Ficicchia continually emphasizes in varying contexts the ‘totalitarian character’>!! of the Baha’i community and its administrative order along with its “extremist’ ideas and aims.°!* He sees the Baha’i community as an ‘authoritarian power instrument that uses unattainable utopian ideals about the future in its desire to increase its prominence

and ultimately work itself to the top of a world government’,>!3 ‘a dictatorial system of rule’ which, he even attests, is imbued

with ‘radical political ideas with fascist tendencies’.°!* Indeed, he already discerns in the firmament the ‘cadres’>!> ready for service in a theocratic hegemony ‘super omnes gentes et omnia regna’,>'® ready to march ‘in step according to the guidelines

ordained from on high?'’ for the ‘complete seizure of power’,-!® for the planned ‘centrally ruled, theocratically ori-

509. 510. 511. 512. 513.

ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid.

p. 427. p. 414. pp. 400, 409. pp. 399, 409. p. 414 (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

514.

Materialdienst

15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 238. He had already

raised the accusation of fascism in his ‘Open Letter to the Baha’is of Switzerland’ in August 1974. 515. Baha’ismus, p. 380. 516. (‘Over all peoples and all realms’), ibid. p. 429 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 517. ibid. p. 418 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 518. ibid. p. 399. Ficicchia purposely uses this word ‘machtergreifung’ which is generally used only in the context of reference to the assumption of power by Hitler.

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ented unified global state’’’’ 2519 on the ‘path to absolute world supremacy’.>2°

Therefore, Ficicchia sees the Baha’i Faith as a real danger to society because, like ‘certain secular radical political group-

ings’, it rejects ‘individual freedom of choice’ and thus encour-

ages ‘a dictatorial system of rule’.°?! A religious community that regards the secular political systems (state governments) as

a mere ‘fetish’>2” and that aims to overthrow the existing social order, need not be surprised that it is ‘prohibited in many states because of “state-threatening and subversive activities” ’.°?°

The ‘formally professed loyalty towards the state’ and the ‘abstinence from political activity’ are sheer opportunism, merely ‘pragmatic considerations that will be retained only until the community, currently still in its infancy, is in a position to real-

ize its declared goals’.°?4 Ficicchia does not shrink from presenting the commandment of loyalty and obedience to govern-

ment, so frequently reiterated in the writings of Baha’u’llah and *‘Abdu’1-Baha, as a tactical ploy, as an expression of the alleged

practice of tagiyya.>*° The consequences for the Baha’i communities are, if Fi-

cicchia is to be believed, disastrous: the private and family lives of the believers, who are kept ‘constantly on the go’ with

519. Baha’ismus, p. 425 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 520.

ibid. p. 391; see also Lexikon der Sekten, column 104. For a dis-

cussion of these charges see Gollmer, below, pp. 421ff. 521. Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 238. ho Baha’ismus,

p.

p. 387,

Materialdienst

15/16,

Issue

38

(1975),

d

523. Baha’ismus, p. 393, Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 238. Ficicchia here adopts the arguments of the clerical persecutors of the Baha’is in Iran. 524. Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), pp. 238f. 525. ibid. p. 239. Taqiyya is the term given to the duty, practised in Shi‘a Islam, to deny one’s faith when faced with danger. For discussion see pp. 352ff.

116

On Ficicchia’s Methodology ‘schooling, missionary work and major events’,>° are ‘pushed

into the background by the constant work for the faith’,>?” often leading to broken marriages and divorce.°*® Ficicchia speaks of ‘deep resignation’ on the part of the believers.°*? Many with-

draw from the ‘community life that they perceive as austere’ .°>° Many ‘new believers’ feel ‘deceived, betrayed and misled’ and

soon resign from the faith.*?! The number who ‘break away is very large, but is covered up by the organization’.*°? Those who stay do so by ‘adapting’, out of ‘an inclination towards ritual

and “the exotic” ’, and in the ‘search for leadership and secu-

rity in a rigid organization’ >>> Elsewhere the reader does, it is true, discover that Baha’i community life “is characterized by

lively activity’** and that the individual Baha’i is ‘accepted and understood’ in the community: ‘Everyone is together and being together removes the restricting feeling of being alone

with ideas and ideals that find no echo in the world around. The community is “home” and provides security: there one can find comfort, there one can gather renewed courage and regain one’s

energy’.°°> Evidently, Baha’i community life is not, after all, quite as austere as Ficicchia has led us to believe.

526. Baha’ismus, p. 383. 527. ibid. 528. ibid. 529. ibid. p. 404. 530. ibid. 531. ibid. p. 405. 532. ibid. p. 404. It should be noted in this connection that the number of withdrawals from the faith is not high and is certainly not covered up. It is published each year in the Annual Report of the National Spiritual Assembly. 533. ibid. p. 405 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 534. 535.

ibid. p. 401. ibid. p. 410.

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A community like the one portrayed by Ficicchia would

not be surprised to find that its ‘alienation from the non-believing

outside world’ is constantly increasing,™°* that ‘the danger of renitence and schism’ is growing,°*’ and that the believers, who are subject to ‘the strict duty to obey the omnipresent organiza-

tion’ ,°® are not prepared for interfaith dialogue,->? which they regard as ‘pointless’,>*° and indeed ‘refuse all constructive ef-

forts in the ecumenical and social sphere’.°*! Ficicchia asserts in apparent seriousness that the Baha’is reject “social construction and ecumenical cooperation between the religions’ as

‘useless “patching up” ’.°4? Not even the principle of the ‘unity of humanity’, the noble goal of Baha’u’llah’s message, is spared Ficicchia’s criticism. He sees in this principle mere ‘verbal pronouncements’: “One hears nothing of social projects and active cooperation in (internal) state or (inter-) denominational

campaigns’,°*? this being so, in particular, because contacts ‘with secular and religious organizations’ are ‘not even attempted’ by the Baha’is, “unless they can somehow be used for

publicity purposes’.°** Ficicchia, who speaks of the ‘unworldly isolation’ of the Baha’is from the outside world, calls the Baha’i

Faith a ‘self-satisfied “sect” concerned with its own particular special interests’.°4° The work of the Baha’i International Community as a non-governmental organization (NGO) at the

United Nations—whose mere existence totally belies his image 536. ibid. p. 29 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 537. ibid. (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 538. ibid. p. 404 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 539. ibid. pp. 29, 23. 540. Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 238. 541. ibid. 542. Baha’ismus, pp. 391-392: ‘Flickschusterei’. 543. ibid. p. 408. 544. ibid. p. 409. 545. ibid.

118

On Ficicchia’s Methodology of a completely self-interested community that cuts itself off from the outside world—is mockingly described by Ficicchia as

‘zealous propaganda work’**°: ‘Membership of these UN bodies is of merely propagandistic value, since nothing is known of active participation in the programmes

run by these institu-

tions;?>47 VII. FICICCHIA’S SEMANTICS One of the most revealing characteristics of Ficicchia’s book is

its emotionally loaded, tendentious, demagogic and often cynical vocabulary, which ought to have caught the reviewers’ attention. He has a penchant for calling the promulgation of the

Baha’i teachings ‘emsig’>4* (busy, zealous). Although he knows that monocratic offices are foreign to the Baha’i community and that all juridical power rests with democratically elected selfadministrative bodies, he constantly speaks, when referring to the National Spiritual Assemblies*” or to the Universal House

of Justice, of the ‘organization’,~°° the ‘management’,>>! the ‘leadership’,>°? or even ‘die Zentrale’*>> implying an anonymous religious power apparatus, an Orwellian ‘Big Brother’. Another outstanding feature is Ficicchia’s fondness

for

certain adjectives whose frequent use attunes the unwary reader 546. ibid. 547. ibid. p. 392 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 548. ‘busy propaganda work’ (ibid. p. 409), ‘the busily proselytizing ... Baha’i Faith’ (ibid. pp. 381f.). 549. The forerunners of the national ‘Houses of Justice’. 550.

Baha’ismus,

pp. 28, 253, 404f., 413f., 417f., 421, 429, Materi-

aldienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), pp. 232, 235f. 551.

ibid. pp. 288, 325, 413. 552. ‘Fihrung’, ibid. pp. 28f., 246, 288, 302, 323, 325, 377, 413, 414, 430; Lexikon der Sekten, column 103. It is only a short step from ‘Fithrung’ to ‘Fuhrer’! 553. Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 237 (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

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to the author’s viewpoint, psychologically influencing him in such a way that it will not even occur to him to doubt the allegation of fascism raised against the Baha’i Faith. He finds par-

ticularly endearing the attributes ‘unbedingt?>** (unconditional), ‘bedingungslos”>°> (unquestioning), ‘kritiklos’>>° (uncritical), ‘streng’>>’ (strict), ‘duBerst streng’>>® (extremely strict), ‘straff>>?

(rigid, tight), ‘starr’>®° (inflexible, rigid), ‘strikt?>°! (strict), ‘rig-

oros’>® (rigorous), and ‘zentralistisch’>® (centralist): hence, the obedience owed to the institutions is always described as ‘un-

conditional’ or ‘unquestioning’,

as in ‘unconditional and un-

critical obedience towards the management’,°® and the ‘strict duty to obey the omnipresent organization’ °° Loyalty to the

Covenant of God turns into ‘unquestioning’, ‘uncritical loyalty’.°°”

The community is ‘rigidly organized’, 568 has a ‘rigid a ship’,>©° a ‘strict leadership’,>”° an ‘infallible leadership’,>”! 554.

Baha’ismus, p. 405, note 52; p. 288.

555. 556. 557. 558. 559.

ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid.

p. 428. pp. 288, 413, 417. pp. 234, 255, 300, 302, 308, 379, 404, 427f. p. 379, note 113. pp. 28f., 338, 375, 377, 405, 418.

560.

ibid. p. 428; Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), pp. 233, 239.

561. 562. 563. 564.

ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid.

p. 346. pp. 251, 291, 293, 302, 411. pp. 390, 398, 400, 425. pp. 405, 428; Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 237;

Lexikon der Sekten, column 103.

565. Baha’ismus, p. 288. 566. ibid. p. 404 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 567. Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 236. 568. Baha’ismus, p. 338 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 569. ibid. pp. 29 (Ficicchia’s emphasis), 28. 570. ibid. p. 302. 571. ibid. p. 413; Lexikon der Sekten, column 103.

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On Ficicchia’s Methodology

‘rigidly organized hierarchy’,-” a ‘rigid organization’,°”> an ‘omnipresent organization’,°"™* a ‘strictly regimented, . . . rather

abstruse system’>’> to which the believer ‘unquestioningly submits’.°’° What is demanded is ‘total submission to the laws and decrees of a rigid organization that rejects as inadequate all independent thought and action on the part of the believers and presents itself as being in full possession of truth and of infalli-

ble conduct’ [!].°”” In his foreword, Mildenberger, too, takes pleasure in describing the Baha’i Faith as a ‘rigidly structured

and managed self-contained organization’.*”® Some terms are taken directly from the ‘Devil’s Dictionary’, as when Ficicchia accuses the ‘organization’ of having ‘eradicated unpleasant

historical facts and elements of doctrine’,°” of ‘eradicating’ non-conformist views and influences>®? and even of having ‘eradicated

all the

inhibiting

stipulations

of the

Kitab-i-

Aqdas’ >®} Thus the reader is given the impression of a spiritless, brutal power apparatus run by cadres who rule mercilessly with

‘centralist’>®? ‘organizational decrees’**? or ‘organizational com-

572.

ibid. p. 338 (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

573.

ibid. pp. 375, 379, 405, 418; Lexikon der Sekten, column

104.

Hutten also speaks of a ‘rigid organization’ in Seher, Gribler, Enthusiasten (12th edn., p. 824). 574. ibid. p. 404 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 575. 576. 577.

ibid. p. 28. ibid. p. 428. ibid. p. 375 (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

578. 579. 580. 581.

ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid.

p. p. p. p.

12. 325. 428. 258 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 582. Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 238. 583. Baha’ismus, pp. 288, 418, 422.

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Chapter 2 « Udo Schaefer

mands’,°*4 making of the believers mere objects of these “decrees’, duty-bound to slavish obedience, while the apparatus

itself is ‘almost exclusively’ concerned with the ‘establishment and consolidation of the “administrative order” and with the execution of its decrees’, i.e. concerned with itself.°®° That these semantics are not the product of coincidence, but rather of cunning method, is evident from the immense number of different rhetorical formulations employed by the author (who ironically accuses the Baha’is of ‘verbal aggres-

siveness’>®°) when he places the Baha’i community on a par with radical right-wing, dangerous political groupings°**” and even expresses sympathy for the prohibition of the Baha’i Faith

‘in many states’ because of its alleged subversive goals.°* What is more, he makes such observations even though he knows full well that the Baha’is reject ‘on principle any form of

violence and, hence, also revolution’ .>®? Among these rhetorical formulations that belie any common sort of objective analysis and which unmask the true char-

acter of his misrepresentation are the following: ‘eradicated’,>”° ‘centralistically ruled’,°?! ‘centralistically directed’,>”? ‘centralist unified state’?

‘rigorous rule of the Guardian’,-”*

584.

ibid. pp. 413, 288.

585.

Ficicchia in Lexikon der Sekten, column 104.

‘the

586. Baha’ismus, p. 425. 587. Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 238. See also above, Day note zi:

588. p. 238. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. pao2

Baha’ismus, p. 393; Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), On this subject see Gollmer, below, pp. 457ff. Baha’ismus, p. 275. ibid. pp. 258, 325, 428. ibid. p. 398. ibid. pp. 390, 393, 425. ibid. p. 389 (Ficicchia’s emphasis); Maden 3 (1995),

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On Ficicchia’s Methodology

Guardian’s standard line’,>?> ‘totalitarian character’,>*© ‘total demands’,°”” ‘total possession’,°?® ‘total submission’ °°? ‘totalitarian system of leadership’,©° ‘strictly regimented’ system,°°! ‘authoritarian power instrument’,°°? ‘uncritical aman. tion’ °°? ‘schooling’,©* ‘ideological schooling’,©°> ‘constant

schooling’, 606 ‘imperialist tendency’,®°’ ‘disciplining of the masses’ ,°°® ‘Bevormundung’ ©? (the restriction of the believers’ right to make

independent

decisions)

‘blind allegiance’,°!®

‘power political background’ ,°"! ‘enforcement of Baha’ism’ ,°!? ‘enforcement

of the Baha’ist theocracy’,°!?

‘enforcement

of

[their] own religion’,°!* ‘uniformity in its own system, egalitarianism under the Baha’ist flag’,®'> claim to ‘absolute world su-

594. Baha’ismus, p. 293. 595. ibid. p. 300 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 596. ibid. p. 400. 597. ibid. p. 402. 598. ibid. pp. 428f. 599. ibid. p. 375 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 600. ibid. p. 414. 601. ibid. p. 28. 602. ibid. p. 414 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 603. ibid. pp. 413, 417 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 604. ibid. p. 412. 605. ibid. p. 413 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 606. 607. 608.

ibid. pp. 413, 412. ibid. p. 425 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). ibid. p. 428 (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

609. 610. 611.

ibid. p. 425. ibid. p. 428. ibid. p. 425 (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

612. 613. 614. 615.

ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid.

p. p. p. p.

22. 424. 425. 393 (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

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Chapter 2 « Udo Schaefer

premacy’,°!® ‘the path to absolute global hegemony’,°!” ‘radical political ideas’,°® ‘extreme ideas’,°!? ‘extremist demands’,°”°

‘fascistic tendencies’,°*! marching ‘in step according to the guidelines ordained from on high’,®* ‘complete seizure of power’ (machtergreifung).°? The believers, who are thus incapacitated and caught in the stranglehold of an omnipresent administration, are described by Ficicchia as Shoghi Effendi’s ‘subjects’,°?* as ‘the faithful rab-

ble’,°?> ‘the ordinary rabble’®° and even as ‘the vulgar rabble’®?’—a greater degree of cynicism can hardly be imagined! Elsewhere, too, we encounter clear examples of the author’s subjective, manipulative use of language, such as in the formulation ‘the same Schaefer says, however . . . ’,©2® ‘Schae-

fer . . . admits’©2? or ‘Sawqi Efendi admits’.©° In neither of these instances referred to by Ficicchia is anything conceded, ‘admitted’ or confessed to under pressure of evidence; the cited passages simply present facts of which Ficicchia feels he can take advantage. The emotional bias of this researcher is re-

616. ibid. pp. 22, 270f., 321, 415, 429. 617. ibid. p. 391. 618. ibid. p. 396 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 619. ibid. p. 400. 620. ibid. p. 393. 621. Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 238. 622. Baha’ismus, p. 418 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 623. ibid. p. 399. See above, p. 90, note 518. 624. ibid. p. 306. 625. ibid. p. 317: ‘das gldubige FuBvolk’. 626. ibid. p. 392, note 31: ‘das gewohnliche FufBvolk’. 627.

Letter from Ficicchia to the author, dated 21 June

gemeine Fufvolk’. 628. Baha’ismus, p. 339. 629. ibid. p. 349. 630. ibid. p. 124.

124

1981:

‘das

On Ficicchia’s Methodology vealed elsewhere, too, in impudent formulations such as ‘thus

oracled Sawai Efendi’®! or ‘the Baha’is smile in a superior

way’,°*? and four pages further on they again smile in a superior way: ‘The Baha’is respond to such charges®* with a superior smile.”©34 Ficicchia may indeed have met with such a response on one occasion, but such a generalized statement is of no academic value; it serves merely to make the Baha’is appear to be

arrogant, bigoted sectarians. When

Ficicchia

presents

or

mentions

opponents

of

Baha’u’llah or ‘covenant-breakers’,> on the other hand, he uses the most flattering attributes.°°° Thus White, who rebelled against the legal institutions of the Baha’i community in the ~

1920s and initiated the testament forgery hypothesis,©” is referred to as ‘a courageous opponent’,®*® whereas a figure of great merit such as Mishkin Qalam,°°? the famous calligraphist, who was exiled by the Turkish Sultan to Famagusta, is termed a

‘Baha’i spy’.©*° The extent to which Ficicchia twists language in order to employ it as a weapon, an instrument for his disinformation, is evident in his explanation of the term ‘covenant-

breaker’. He asserts that the Arabic term used in the scripture is

631. 632. 633. cerned

ibid. ibid. This with

p. 397: ‘so orakelte schon Sawgi Efendi’. p. 406. refers to the charge of being ‘a self-satisfied “sect” conits own particular special interests’ (ibid. p. 409).

634.

ibid. p. 410.

635.

For discussion of this term see below, p. 232, note 449.

636. 637.

See below, pp. 141ff. On this subject see Shoghi Effendi, World Order, pp. 4ff., 8, Ta-

herzadeh, Covenant, pp. 347ff.; Bramson-Lerche,

‘Some Aspects of the

Establishment of the Guardianship’, pp. 269ff. For a detailed analysis see also Gollmer, below, pp. 724ff. 638.

Baha’ismus, p. 337, note 72.

639. See Taherzadeh, Revelation, vol. 1, pp. 25ff.,; Momen (ed.), The Babi and Baha’i Religions, p. 306. 640. Baha’ismus, p. 186.

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Chapter 2 ¢ Udo Schaefer

‘najas’ (he obviously means najis,°*!) which signifies impurity, refuse, and is used in Shi‘a Islam in reference to all unbelievers

including Jews and Christians. Thus, Ficicchia implies that the Baha’is make use of a vocabulary that is contemptuous of other

people.°*? In fact, the Arabic term used in Baha’i scripture is nagidu’l-mithag,°® which literally means ‘breaker of the covenant’. Hence, Ficicchia’s book is disqualified as an academic work by simple virtue of its manipulative, tendentious language. The purpose of his writing is not information, but argumentation. Instead of enlightenment, he offers agitation.

VIII. THE BAHA’IS—SECTARIAN ESCAPISTS AND DANGEROUS EXTREMISTS? We will now examine two further examples of the author’s dis-

dainful and incessant denouncements of alleged manipulations, examples which expose his own distortion of the truth. 1. On the charge of ‘unworldly isolation’ As pointed out earlier, Ficicchia accuses the Baha’is of ‘un-

worldly isolation’®“ and repeatedly alleges that they show no interest in social development projects or interfaith dialogue.®*> In this connection, he writes:

‘Social development and ecu-

menical cooperation among the religions are therefore rejected

as useless “patching-up”.’®*° As a source for the term ‘patchingup’ (Flickschusterei), which he places in quotation marks, he

641.

On this term see SEI, pp. 431ff.; Hans Wehr, Arabisches Worter-

buch, p. 1249. 642. Baha’ismus, p. 287. 643. On the etymology of this term see below, p. 232, note 449. 644. Baha’ismus, p. 409 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 645. ibid. pp. 23, 29, 391ff., 408. 646. ibid. pp. 391f.

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On Ficicchia’s Methodology

cites the Baha’i information booklet

Umwelt und Wertord-

nung.°*’ The word Flickschusterei does indeed occur there, but in a completely different context: with reference to the global

character of the ecological crisis. There it is maintained that the political instruments of the nation state are no longer adequate for dealing with global problems and that what is required in-

stead is solidarity among all peoples and a global ethic.°48 The

passage in question runs as follows: Unified

action

requires

that there be agreement

on

fundamental standards and values. Partial solutions do not take us very far. Even where they alleviate suffer-

ing they must not distract us from our task: to seek and to find a new, practicable system of values that can be accepted as valid by all people throughout the planet. All else is mere patching-up. Who can provide us with a new value system appropriate to the needs of all human beings, on the basis of which the divisions between the peoples and their inability to cooperate can

be overcome? From the context it is perfectly clear that ‘patching-up’ refers to national solutions to problems, to attempts to cure symptoms,

i.e. “partial solutions’ that can at best alleviate suffering. Nowhere is there any mention at all of ‘social development’ or

“cooperation between the religions’. Ficicchia is just borrowing vocabulary to suit his own purposes. That he knew what he was doing and that this is no mere oversight is demonstrated by the fact that just three pages before he quoted correctly three times

647.

(Environment and Value System), Hofheim, 1975, p. 4.

648. An insight to which Hans King has devoted three books (Global Responsibility: In Search of a New World Ethic, London: SCM Press, 1991; Hans Kiing and Karl-Josef Kuschel (eds.), A Global Ethic, London: SCM Press, 1993; Hans Kiing (ed.), Yes to a Global Ethic, London: SMC Press Ltd., 1995) and which is also conveyed by the report of the Club of Rome (Alexander King and Bertram Schneider, The First Global Revolution, New York: Pantheon Books, 1991).

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Chapter 2 « Udo Schaefer

from the same booklet,°” presenting a correct interpretation of the Baha’i position: ‘The theocratic world order necessitates “the renunciation of the fetish of national sovereignty”.’®°

Some form of international authority, to which parts of presentday national sovereignty will be transferred, is urgently required in the interests of world peace, since ‘it is becoming more and more evident that the nation state has become a dangerous

anachronism’.°>! The political unification of the world will be possible only ‘when the holy cow of national sovereignty has

been slaughtered’? ©? By quoting the term Flickschusterei in a completely different context, Ficicchia has produced a conscious distortion in order to substantiate his criticism. As for the charge itself, it should be pointed out that there

is no basis whatever for accusing the Baha’is of ‘unworldly

isolation’ .°*4 In keeping with the instructions given by Baha’ulah to his followers to ‘Consort with the followers of all religions in a spirit of friendliness and fellowship’®> . . . ‘with

amity and concord’,®*® the Baha’is have never had reservations about contact and cooperation with those of other faiths.°7 649. Erroneously cited as Umwelt und Weltordnung (Environment and World Order), in fact entitled Umwelt und Wertordnung (Environment and Value System). 650. 651. 652.

quoted from Umwelt und Wertordnung, p. 4. ibid. ibid. p. 8. :

653. Baha’ismus, p. 389—a standpoint that, along with demands for a ‘global order’, was articulated at the ‘Parliament of the World’s Religions’ in September 1993 (compare Kiing and Kuschel (eds.), A Global Ethic, pp. 18, 77ff.). 654.

ibid. (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

655.

Tablets 3:5; 4:10; 7:13.

656. Kitdb-i-Aqdas note 169.

144—on

the term ‘consort’

see below, p. 284,

657. Many Baha’is encourage their children to participate in denominational religious education classes (Catholic or Protestant) offered in schools, in order to acquaint them with Christian doctrine. It was with

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On Ficicchia’s Methodology

Their efforts to develop good relations with representatives of other religions are multifarious and have not infrequently met with considerable success. A large number of Baha’i commu-

nities have established friendly relationships with Catholic and

Protestant Christians, with Muslims and Jews, often including the clergy of the various faiths. Baha’is are often invited to interfaith services and are increasingly playing an active part in the growing inter-religious dialogue all over the world. In Germany, Baha’is are occasionally permitted to set up exhibitions and celebrate their New Year festival®® in church-owned

buildings.©? In a world that is increasingly devoid of religious faith, the Baha’is are making efforts to develop a foundation for dialogue

and collaboration based on humanity’s common spiritual heri-

tage®° and shared perspectives that unite the world’s religions.°°! They do all in their power to overcome the baneful

spirit of exclusivism, mutual dissociation and condemnation, dogmatism and self-opinionatedness, fanaticism and intolerance that have so strongly affected human history and rained down catastrophe upon the nations. Basing their lives on the belief this goal in mind that I, for instance, sent my daughter to a grammar school run by the Protestant Church (the Elisabeth-von-Thadden-Schule in Heidelberg), despite the costs involved. 658.

‘Naw-Ruz’ on 21 March.

659. Something that ought not to happen, according to the Lutherisches Kirchenamt (Office of the Lutheran Church). Horst Reller’s Handbuch Religidse Gemeinschaften (Manual of Religious Communities) (3rd edn. 1985), which was commissioned by this body, includes a chapter on ‘Baha’ismus’. Under the subtitle ‘Advice for Practical Conduct towards the Community’, it is stated that: “Church rooms may not under any circumstances be made available to the Baha’is’ (5.7.12 d). It is hardly surprising that such an attitude is expressed, since the entry in the manual is largely based on Ficicchia’s monograph. 660. See Suheil B. Bushrui, Retrieving our Spiritual Heritage: A Challenge of our Time. Inaugural Lecture, University of Maryland, 1994. 661. On interfaith dialogue see also below, pp. 282ff.

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Chapter 2 ¢ Udo Schaefer

that the historical religions represent the corpus of the “one and

indivisible religion of God’,®°? and that they ‘have proceeded

from one Source, and are rays of one Light’,°® the Baha’is view the dialogue between the religions that has come into being in the past few decades as the first step towards rapproche-

ment and peace among the various faiths, a reconciliation

which, as Kiing has most convincingly pointed out,°* is an essential prerequisite for lasting world peace. The value of such

efforts is also reflected in the Declaration of the Parliament of

the World’s Religions on the need for a global ethic.°°° Therefore, the goal of Baha’is in participating in this exchange is not

conversion but mutual understanding and mutual appreciation. Indeed, the goal in this is a universal change in attitudes,°° an objective especially dear to Baha’is since, as discussed in pre-

vious publications,°°’ Baha’is believe that openness to other religious traditions expands one’s own consciousness and inevitably leads to a deeper understanding of one’s own faith.°% Mutual trust, communication, and cooperation can develop only in a process of dialogue that is characterized by openness, honesty and understanding, or through an encounter that ‘honestly

662.

The Bab, Selections 2:24:2; compare also Kitab-i-Aqdas: ‘This is

the changeless Faith of God, eternal in the past, eternal in the future’

(182). 663. Epistle 18 (p. 13). 664. See Christianity and the Religions of the World, pp. 440ff. 665. published in King and Kuschel (eds.), A Global Ethic, pp. 13ff. 666.

Leonard Swidler, ‘A Dialogue on Dialogue’, p. 57; idem, ‘Inter-

religious and Interideological Dialogue’, p. 26. 667. See Schaefer, Beyond the Clash, pp. 146ff. 668. As pointed out by Fazel, “Interreligious Dialogue and the Baha’i Faith-Some Preliminary Observations’, in McLean (ed.), Revisioning the Sacred: New Perspectives on a Baha’i Theology, SBB, vol. 8, Los Angeles: Kalimat, 1996.

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On Ficicchia’s Methodology

takes account of both that which unites and that which divides’ °°? That the Baha’is have until recently been involved in this dialogue more at the grass-roots than at the academic level is due mainly to the fact that they have only just begun (at this early stage in their history hardly surprisingly) to present their

faith in reflective literature conforming to academic standards,°” and that they occasionally encounter difficulties in being accepted as competent partners in scholarly circles. Nevertheless, they have always been willing participants in interfaith dialogue. For decades Baha’is have observed ‘World Religion Day’ in January, inviting representatives of various faiths and de-

nominations to speak on a common theme.®”! As in many other countries, the Baha’is of Germany are actively involved in the WCRP*°”? and EAWRE®” and try not to miss any opportunity for interfaith meetings and dialogue. At the centenary of the

passing of Baha’u’llah in the Paulskirche in Frankfurt am Main the key-note speaker was Prof. Dr. theol. Johannes Lahnemann

of the University of Erlangen-Niirnberg,°’* who is a board member for the German section of the WCRP.°”> Official Ba669. J. Lahnemann, ‘Die Frage nach Gott in einer sékularen Welt und der Dialog der Religionen’, p. 32. 670. As discussed by Fazel, ibid. 671. It is noteworthy that in the 1960s and 70s the EZW, which published Ficicchia’s book, criticized in the periodical Materialdienst members of the Protestant clergy who accepted invitations to speak at these ‘World Religion Day’ events, reproaching them with having allowed themselves to be used by the Baha’is for their purposes. 672. World Conference on Religions and Peace. 673. Europdische Arbeitsgemeinschaft fiir Weltreligionen in der Erziehung (European Working Group on World Religions in Education). 674.

Published in: Gedenkfeier zum Hundertsten Jahrestag des Hin-

scheidens Baha’u’llahs. Eine Dokumentation, Hofheim, 1992.

675. In Berlin and Osnabriick Baha’is have recently been elected as chairpersons of the local section of WCRP.

131

Chapter 2 « Udo Schaefer ha’i representatives were present at the World Day of Prayer for Peace on 27 October 1986 in Assisi, as they were, too, at the Parliament of the World’s Religions in Chicago from 28 August

to 4 September 1993.°7° In September 1994 on the occasion of the “V. Niirnberger Forum’ organized by the chair of Religious Education at the University of Erlangen-Niimberg, at which theologians and scholars of religious studies from 13 countries conferred on the subject The Global Ethic in Education, I had the honour of presenting a paper on ‘ “Baha’u’llah’s Unity Paradigm”—a foun-

dation for global ethics?’°’’ and of participating in a panel discussion with Professor Kiing. At the “VI. Niirnberger Forum’ in October 1997 representatives of the great religious traditions of the world, experts in theology, religious studies, education and other humanities subjects from many countries contributed to the topic ‘Interreligious education 2000. The future of interreligious and intercultural dialogue’. I was invited to present a paper on ‘Das Bild von der Menschheitsfamilie im Bahd’itum

und die Realitdten hartndckiger Grenzziehungen’®”® which has since been published in the conference proceedings.°” In September 1998 at an international symposium in Osnabriick on the

occasion of the 350th anniversary of the Westfalian Peace®®° with its topic “Peace among the religions as a precondition for 676. See Kiting and Kuschel (eds.), A Global Ethic, pp. 28, 122f. 677. My contribution has been published in the conference proceedings (Johannes Lahnemann (ed.), ‘Das Projekt Weltethos’ in der Erziehung, Hamburg, 1995). An enlarged version has been published in the journal Dialogue and Universalism, edited by the Polish Academy of Science,

Warsaw,

issue

11-12

(1996),

entitled

‘Baha’u’llah’s

Unity

Paradigm: A Contribution to Interfaith Dialogue on a Global Ethic’. 678. (The Baha’i concept of the family of humankind in Baha’ism and the realities of entrenched delimitations). 679. J. Lahnemann (ed.), Interreligidse Erziehung 2000. Die Zukunft der Religions- und Kulturbegegnung, Hamburg: ebv-Verlag, 1998. 680. by which the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) between Catholics and Protestants in Europe was concluded.

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On Ficicchia’s Methodology

world peace’, I represented the Baha’i Faith in a panel discussion between exponents of the world’s religions and delivered a paper on “Ewiger Friede?—Perspektiven aus der Bot-

schaft Bahd’u’llahs’®®! which has been published in the conference proceedings. °°? The Baha’i International Community participated in the World Faith and Development Dialogue held in London in Feb-

ruary 1998 under the auspices of the International Consultancy on Religion, Education and Culture (IROREC). Representatives

included the president of the World Bank Dr James D. Wolfensohn together with high-level representatives of the world’s religions including the Baha’i Faith, Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Jainism, Judaism, Sikhism and Taoism. Between them, they represented the religious traditions followed

by an estimated three billion people. The reader may judge for himself what is to be made of Ficicchia’s charge that the Baha’is ‘reject any form of interfaith dialogue’®** and try only to establish ‘contacts with religious

organizations’ when these ‘can somehow be used for publicity

purposes’ .°* The assertion that the Baha’is do not show the least interest in social development projects is likewise untrue. Here is not the place to list the multitude of social projects in which the

Baha’is world-wide are involved. A brief reference to some sta-

tistics and published reports must suffice.°*° 681. (Universal Peace? Perspectives from the message of Baha’u’ lah). 682. Detlef Kréger (ed.), Religionsfriede als Voraussetzung fir den Weltfrieden, Osnabriick 2000. 683. See ‘A Dialogue on Spirituality and Development’, in The Baha’i World 1997-98, Haifa, 1999, pp. 61-70.

684. Baha’ismus, pp. 29, 23. 685. ibid. p. 409. 686. See Uta von Both, ‘Entwicklungsprojekte in der Baha’i Weltgemeinde’, in Bahd ’i-Briefe, issue 53/54 (December 1987), pp. 18ff. In

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Chapter 2 ¢ Udo Schaefer

Finally, Ficicchia’s repeated claim that the activities of the Baha’is at the United Nations are ‘of merely propagandistic value’ because ‘nothing is known’ of active cooperation in UN

programmes,°*’ is simply another instance of malice. Perhaps nothing was known to him because he did not take the trouble to seek relevant information. Had he done so, he could easily have found out that the Baha’i International Community, accredited with the United Nations as a non-governmental organization since 1948, has since 1970 enjoyed consultative status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations and with UNICEF, as well as informal working relations with the World Health Organization (WHO) and the UN Environment Program (UNEP). Baha’i involvement covers the fields of peace-building measures, human rights, education, health, the environment, promotion of women’s rights, crime prevention, etc. The Baha’is have been represented at all the major UN world conferences and have produced for each one a statement on the issues concerned.®°* The Baha’{ International Community UN offices, whose headquarters is in New York with an office in Geneva and regional representatives in Addis Ababa, Bangkok, Nairobi, Rome, Santiago, Vienna and Suva,

Fiji, devotes its efforts to presenting the impulses emanating from Baha’u’llah’s revelation—in particular from his concept of the human being, his ethical precepts and his doctrine of the unity of humanity—in such a way as to stimulate thought in the consultative meetings of the various global organizations and

thus to contribute to the solution of the world’s problems.°°? 1992 there were 21 agricultural projects, 52 conservation projects, 56 health projects, 52 women’s projects, 178 secondary schools, 488 primary schools and 280 further education projects (see The Six Year Plan 1986-1992: Summary of its Achievements, p. 127). 687.

Bah2’ismus, pp. 392, 409.

688.

Seep. 413, note 532.

689. The quarterly journal One Country ublished by the Baha’f International Community in New York reports regularly on the multitudi-

134

On Ficicchia’s Methodology

That this work is appreciated is demonstrated by the fact

that the world-wide Baha’i community is cited in a study®”

commissioned by UNESCO concerning the ever more urgent

need for a global ethic®’! as an outstanding example of how a common system of values, a new ethic, practised throughout the

world can integrate people of different races and multifarious

cultures: “The practice of this religious community provides verifiable proof that such equality between people all over the world leads not to cultural impoverishment or levelling, but, on the contrary, to a day-to-day “cultural exchange” that is far above the average. It is noteworthy that the Baha’i world com-

munity has especially taken up the cause of the cultivation and promotion of all cultures.”©”” The fact that Ficicchia maliciously dismisses these concrete efforts to promote the welfare of humanity as ‘zealous

propaganda work’ merely reveals the depth of his vengeance against the religious community to which he once belonged.

2. On the charge of subversion In order to substantiate his thesis that the Baha’i Faith is a threat

to the state owing to its ‘extremist demands’,®? Ficicchia writes:

There is only one humanity, ergo only one state and one government (= Baha’i administration). All secular systems are a ‘fetish’ and ‘must be disposed of’. That

nous projects in this field, as well as the social projects Ficicchia purports not to exist. See also below, p. 413, note 520 and p. 430, note 67; p. 443, note 125. Many of these projects are listed in the Website of the Baha’i International Community, www. bahai.org. 690.

Ervin Laszlo (ed.), Rettet die Weltkulturen, Stuttgart, 1993.

691. See King, Global Responsibility: In Search of a New Ethic and also A Global Ethic. 692. Laszlo (ed.), Rettet die Weltkulturen, p. 18. 693. Baha’ismus, p. 393.

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World

Chapter 2 + Udo Schaefer is also the reason why Baha’ism is prohibited in many states because of state-threatening and subversive ac-

tivities.”

The first sentence of this passage provokes the reader’s impres-

sion that Ficicchia uses a formula that is taken from Baha’i literature. In reality himself in order to tures. The formula ment’ is an obvious Volk, ein Reich,

it has been cunningly coined by Ficicchia signalize fascist totalitarian goals and struc‘one humanity, one state and one governallusion to the well-known Nazi slogan ‘ein

ein Fiihrer’.©°° No Baha’i reading this sen-

tence, which reappears verbatim in his book,°”® would recognize the doctrines of Baha’u’llah in it. The conclusion that follows is an invention of Ficicchia’s as well, a pathetic parody of

the political goals of the Baha’i Faith.°?’ By stating in the second sentence that “Ail secular systems are a “fetish” and “must be disposed of” ’, Ficicchia deludes the reader through his use

of quotation marks and italics into thinking he is quoting from the Baha’i scripture. Here again he provides no sources. Indeed, there are none, for nowhere in the Baha’i literature is it stated that the secular systems must be ‘disposed of’. The term ‘fetish’ was used by Shoghi Effendi but in a quite different context: he

uses it in reference to the principle of national sovereignty in international law, to characterize the anachronistic legal struc-

tures of the family of nations that still stand in the way of the federal world commonwealth promulgated by the Baha’is. The relevant passage reads as follows: World unity is the goal towards which a harassed hu-

manity is striving. Nation-building has come to an end. The anarchy inherent in state sovereignty is moving

694. Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 238. 695. (One people, one Reich, one leader!) 696. Baha’ismus, p. 393; the only change is that instead of ‘= Baha’i administration’ Ficicchia writes ‘which is its own’.

697.

On this subject see Gollmer, below, pp. 421ff.

136

On Ficicchia’s Methodology towards a climax. A world, growing to maturity, must abandon this fetish, recognize the oneness and wholeness of human relationships, and establish once for all the machinery that can best incarnate this fundamental

principle of its life.°® It is not that the secular ‘systems of rule must be removed’ but that the principle of national sovereignty must be ‘abandoned’. What is demanded, then, is a new political philosophy, not the violent overthrow of the existing order. Ficicchia’s manner of quoting Baha’i sources is marked not by negligence (which would in itself render questionable the author’s qualifications as a researcher on religions) but by linguistic falsification through which he accuses the Baha’is of subversive motives and seeks

to legitimate the prohibition of the Faith in certain countries.”

698. World Order, p.202. This demand—raised almost 60 years ago—for the overcoming of national sovereignty, combined with the demand for a global order, is of urgent topicality. These demands were raised insistently by the American speaker Gerald O. Barney, author of the report “Global 2000’, in his speech to the Parliament of the World’s Religions in 1993 (Kiing and Kuschel (eds.), A Global Ethic, pp. 98ff.): ‘The idea of the “sovereignty” of modern nation states is false. Nations are not independent entities subject to no other power on earth. They are all interdependent and very much subject to the health and welfare of the entire ecosystem of Earth, of which they are but a modest part. The

imaginary lines around nations, the “borders”, generally have no relationship to the boundaries

of watersheds,

airsheds, and other natural

systems and complicate the development of mutually enhancing Earthhuman relationships. The rules (laws) nations establish to govern human and institutional behaviour within their borders are generally based on the assumption that the non-human part of Earth is simply a “resource” of no value until “used” by humans. National states must change themselves radically’ (Global 2000 Revisited, p. 64; see also Yehezkil Dror,

Ist die Erde noch regierbar?, Munich, 1995). 699. The Baha’i Faith was prohibited for ideological reasons in the communist-ruled states and in Germany under Hitler. It is prohibited in many Islamic countries for theological reasons, because the claim of a

post-Islamic divine revelation is regarded by Islamic orthodoxy as heresy and apostasy.

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The same method is encountered in his book, where he writes—this time referring expressly to the above quotation from Shoghi Effendi—‘Sawqi Efendi called the existing state orders and their legal systems a “fetish” that must be re-

moved’.”°° Again the ‘fetish’ of national sovereignty, which according to Shoghi Effendi must be overcome, is turned into the fetish of ‘the existing state orders and their legal systems’, and again Ficicchia adds the phrase ‘that must be removed’, thus falsely signalling to the reader that the Baha’is pursue subversive motives. Three pages later, Ficicchia does honour to the

cause of truth when he says: ‘Therefore Sawqi Efendi calls national sovereignty a “fetish” that must be abandoned’,”?! but

once again the context’°? in which he places this sentence constitutes a malicious falsification of the political aims of the

Baha'is. These two instances exemplify how Ficicchia distorts his object of investigation through reinterpretation, exaggeration, changes in emphasis and simple falsehoods in order to fit the

caricature he has drawn.

700. Baha’ismus, p. 387. 701. ibid. p. 390. 702.

The preceding sentence reads: ‘In this order there is no scope for

a secular, democratic, parliamentary and, furthermore, federal common-

wealth’ (p. 390). For detailed discussion see Gollmer, below, pp. 421ff., 451 ff.

138

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CHAPTER 3

FICICCHIA’S PORTRAIT OF THE COMMUNITY AND ITS ORDER How is this deliberately distorted portrait of the Baha’i community and its institutions to be corrected? How are we to make straight what Ficicchia has made ‘crooked’?! Since this work is only concerned with correcting Ficicchia’s portrayal, with its multitude of factual errors and misinterpretations, we have no

choice but to refer the reader who is interested in the community’s self-image to the relevant literature on the Baha’i ad-

ministrative order. So far two doctoral dissertations have been written in German that deal with the administrative order, each from a different perspective. An (unpublished) dissertation in

political science? examines the order of the community 1:

of

. for souls such as these cause the straight to become crooked’

ae‘Abdu’ 1-Baha,

Will and Testament 2:13 (p. 22)). Abdu’ ]-Baha is

using a metaphor that frequently occurs in the Qur’an: . Why do you bar from God’s way (sabil) the believer, desiring to make it crooked’ (‘waj; see 3:94; 3:99; 7:45; 7:86; 11:19; 14:3 etc.). This metaphor can

also be found in Isa. 40:4 and Luke 3:5: ‘. . . and the crooked shall be made straight’. 2. Udo Schaefer, Die Grundlagen der ‘Verwaltungsordnung’ der Baha’i (The Foundations of the ‘Administrative Order’ of the Baha’is), Heidelberg, 1957; Kent Beveridge, Die gesellschaftspolitische Rolle der Baha’i-Verwaltungsordnung innerhalb der Gemeinschaft der Baha’i, unter besonderer Betrachtung der zwei leitenden Institutionen (The socio-political role of the Baha’i administrative order in the Baha’i community, with particular reference to its two leading institutions), Vienna, 1977.

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Baha’u’llah and also considers the development of the administrative structures following the death of Shoghi Effendi. I.

THE BACKGROUND: THE PROTESTANT CONCEPT OF LAW

Ficicchia’s description of the community and its order is wrong in nearly every point. It should be pointed out, however, that he is not the first to criticize the legally constituted Baha’i community from a Protestant point of view. In his book on religious movements outside the church, the late head of the EZW, Kurt

Hutten,* expressed sharp criticism of the transformation of what was originally a charismatic movement into an organized, legally structured community. His sympathies were with the small number of dissidents styling themselves “Free Baha’is’

and ‘Liberal Baha’is’ and calling for a community free of legal structures and institutions, and Hutten believed this handful of

individuals to be the legitimate heirs of the original community.> He saw in the Baha’i community’s developing institutionalization nothing but ‘confessionalism’,® amounting to the community’s Fall from Grace, so to speak, in which the ‘freeflowing movement’ turned into a soul-destroying ‘organiza-

tional apparatus’.” Ficicchia’s attacks on the Baha’i community follow in the same tradition. Therefore, before turning to the details of Ficicchia’s accusations, we need to consider Hutten’s

3. Ulrich Gollmer, Gottesreich und Weltgestaltung. Grundlegung einer politischen Theologie im Baha ’itum (The Kingdom of God and the shaping of the world: Foundations of a political theology in the Baha’i Faith).

4. Seher, Griibler, Enthusiasten, 10th edn., pp. 317ff., 12th edn., pp. 810ff. In 1970, I had a controversy with Dr Hutten; see Schaefer, ‘Answer to a Theologian’. 5. ibid. 10th edn., pp. 318ff.; 12th edn., p. 822; Ficicchia, Baha’ismus, pp. 293, 377.

6. 7.

For a critique of this term see above, p. 22, note 35. Seher, Gribler, Enthusiasten, 10th edn., p. 219.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order underlying assumptions about the basic premises of Protestant

legal thought.® In contrast to Catholic legal doctrine in which law is seen as part of the divine order of creation, as a divine institution, Martin Luther regarded law and the state as necessary only be-

cause of mankind’s Fall from Grace: ‘Politia autem ante peccatum nulla fuit.”? In his 1523 pamphlet Temporal Authority,

Luther called law a ‘makeshift’ that is required to protect the good from the bad in their lives on earth, a device that would be unnecessary if the world were populated entirely by Chris-

tians.!° Thus, law and the state have only ‘a temporary significance’ according to Protestant doctrine. They are at best ‘a rela-

tive good’!! and are ‘unessential’.!2 Furthermore, as pointed out by the Protestant theologian Emil Brunner, the relationship between justice and love “was not made clear by the Reformers’!3 and is ‘one of the most disastrous obscurities in the doctrine of the law of nature’.!4 The secular cardinal virtue of justice associated with the idea of law has ‘at best a merely secondary status’!> in traditional Protestant doctrine on virtue. In Protestantism there is a high degree of tension between the con-

8. On this subject see my discussion in Grundlagen, pp. 42ff., The Light Shineth, pp. 97ff., Dominion, pp. 242ff.; Beyond the Clash, pp. 98ff. 9.

Luther, Works, vol. 1: ‘Lectures on Genesis’ (2:15-17), pp. 101-115.

10. ibid. vol. 2, ‘The Christian in Society’, pp. 88f. 11. Gustav Radbruch, Legal Philosophy, pp. 129, 127. 12. ibid. p. 129. 13. Justice and the Social Order, p. 263, note 5.

14. ibid. p. 266, note 19. 15. Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie, pp. 329-331. In an appropriate formulation he states that: ‘Human relationships are determined by the commandment of love, the relationship of man to God by the attitude of faith, and the relationship of God to man by the promise of mercy’ (p. 330). This section is absent in the English-language edition.

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cepts of justice and mercy, and a tendency ‘to dissolve justice in

a sea of mercy’.!© It is thus no wonder that in the spiritual sphere there is an even more reserved attitude to the concept of law. One of the reasons for the emergence of Protestantism was protest against the Catholic thesis of the legally constituted Church founded by Christ and, hence, based on ius divinum, an attitude expressed

symbolically by Luther’s burning of the Corpus Turis Canonici in the market square at Wittenberg in 1520 and later set out philosophically in his pamphlet Wider das Bapsttum zu Rom,

vom Teuffel gestiftet,‘7 published in 1544. According to Protestant doctrine, ecclesiastical law is ‘ius humanum’, a purely human phenomenon.!® Since that law is in human hands and is, like all earthly phenomena, historically determined, no legal

constitution of the Church can be regarded as having absolute validity.!? Thus, the legal form taken on by the Church may be of any type:2° ‘There is no such thing as universal Church law’,?! no ‘perfect form of law which is therefore universally

16. ibid. p. 332. 17. ‘Against the Papacy in Rome founded by the Devil’, no English edition. 18. This explains why, in Protestant thought, order is always regarded as extending from below to above, whereas appointed order, order that comes from above and extends downwards,

is treated with great reser-

vation. In his article (‘Das protestantische gegen das katholische Europa’) published in the Siiddeutsche Zeitung on 12 January 1993, Eric Hoesli correctly points out that: ‘Owing to its history, Protestantism is associated with the dispersion of political power . . . and with the rejection of any central or international institution . . . Being determined by these old organizational forms of their churches, the Protestants love that which is built up from below, and despise anything that is forced upon them from above, including any revival of a central religious or political authority.’ 19. Siegfried Reicke, Kirchenrecht, p. 363. 20. Holstein, Kirchenrecht, p. 228. 21. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. IV, 2, p. 690.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

valid for the Christian

community

at all times

and in all

places. ’22 Protestant scepticism towards law as a phenomenon that is

incompatible with spirituality culminated in the late nineteenth century in Rudolf Sohm’s thesis that the ‘enslavement’ of the Christian community (the geistkirche?3) to law and the development of canon law constituted the Church’s ‘Fall from Grace’. The only true Church as Christ had intended it is the ‘iebes-

kirche’*4 whose essence is to be perceived solely in the mysterious association of the believers with Christ through divine grace, whereas the hierarchically ordered rechtskirche?° is that which has been made out of Christ’s Church owing to the feeblemindedness and little faith of the community and the human desire to ensure security. On the basis of a purely positivist understanding of the concept of law and a one-sided pneumatic and charismatic concept of the Church, he asserted that: “The essence of the Church is spiritual, the essence of law is

worldly’,?¢ from which he concluded that: “Church law contradicts the essence of the Church.’2’ The fanciful idea of an pneumatic community (of ‘pneumatic anarchy’ or a ‘pneumocracy’?®

polemically presented by Sohm in contrast to the legally constituted Church) found approval with the Swiss theologian Emil Brunner, who also regarded canon law as the great evil, the

22. ibid. p. 117. 23. ‘The Church of the spirit.’ According to Sohm, this is based on Jesus’ statement that: ‘Where two or three of you have gathered together in My name, there I am in their midst’ (Matt. 18:20). 24. ‘The Church of love’. 25. ‘The Church of law’. 26. Kirchenrecht, vol. 1, p. 1.

27. ibid. p. 700. 28. A Church without legal structures that is ruled by the Holy Spirit alone (see Matt. 18:20).

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great ‘misunderstanding of the Church’.?? The fact that the essentially pneumatic community has taken on a legal form is, in Sohm’s estimation, a result of increasing ‘weakness of faith’, the

work of those of ‘little faith’3° and, according to Brunner, is a ‘substitute for the missing fullness of the Holy Spirit’,>! a sign of the ‘loss of the Messianic existence’, of the ‘weakening of

Messianic consciousness’: ‘What we need is the Holy Ghost’ ,3? he argues. As Brunner sees it, “the decisive act of Luther’s reformation was not the publication of the thesis of 1517’ but ‘the burning of the Corpus Iuris Canonici, on Dec. 10, 1520. Church law as such is the work of those who are weak in faith’.*3

Sohm’s basic conviction rests on the belief that the realm of the spirit can never be expressed in juridical terms, that religious truth cannot assume a legal structure without relinquishing its essence, for the Spirit of God that governs the people of God

‘blows where it wishes’ .34 Although these hypotheses are now regarded by Protestant scholars of Church law as outdated, they did have major histori-

cal effects.3> Even today they exert a subliminal influence in the Church and have resurfaced in the sociology of religion. Gustav Mensching, a religious studies scholar strongly influenced by

29. As expressed in the title of his book Das Mifverstandnis der Kirche, published in Stuttgart in 1951 (The Misunderstanding of the Church, London: Press, 1953).

Lutterworth

Press,

1952; Philadelphia:

Westminster

30. See Matt. 6:30; 14:31.

31. Das Mifverstandnis der Kirche, p. 58 (quoted according to the German edition). 32. ibid. p. 132 (quoted according to the German edition). Karl Barth discussed these positions in his book Church Dogmatics, vol. IV, 2, § 67,4: ‘The Order of the Community’, pp. 676ff. 33. op. cit. p. 132. 34. John 3:8. See Sohm, Kirchenrecht, vol. 1, p. x. On this subject see

Grundlagen, p. 44. 35. Wirkungsgeschichte (Gadamer), see above, pp. 22-23, note 38.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order Protestantism, sees spirit and form as having an inverse reciprocal relationship to one another: the vitality of the spirit is char-

acterized by a minimum of legal organization.3® He regards the very existence of a legal organization as a criterion for the loss of the original spirit: the form is a substitute for the non-existent spirit. Thus, he asserts: “Where the spirit unifies and guides people there is no need for an organized form, but where the vitality of the spirit is waning there arises the need for a unify-

ing and guiding form.’>7 The same argument is presented by Joachim Wach, sociologist of religion, who also regards the legal organization of a religious community as a spiritual danger

for the directness of the religious experience and the life of the spirit itself.38 It is understandable that Hutten abhors any form of established order and criticizes the administrative order founded by

Baha’u’llah. Yet this criticism reveals a fundamental contradiction: as a Protestant theologian rooted in a legally constituted Church and knowing that ‘ecclesiastical history is pervaded by

the tension between spirituality and institutions’,>° he criticizes the process of institutionalization and legal incorporation in a community whose legal form was shaped by its founder, calling

this process ‘churchification’ and a renunciation of the ‘spiritual legacy of the Prophet’. In Hutten’s estimation, ‘the “apparatus”

replaced the “movement”.4? The dissidents who rebelled against the assumption of legal structures and the legal incorporation of the Baha’i commu-

36. Soziologie der Religion, p. 186. 37. Mensching, ibid. pp. 186f.; on this subject see also Beyond the Clash, pp. 93ff. 38. Sociology of Religion, pp. 149f. 39. Zahrnt, Gotteswende, p. 129.

40. Seher, Griibler, Enthusiasten, 10th edn., p. 319.

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nity under Shoghi Effendi*! all came from a Protestant background and were strongly influenced by Protestant ideas and steeped in the Protestant perspective concerning the incompati-

bility of spirituality and law. In Ficicchia’s case it was not, it is true, theological conviction that motivated him but rather his sworn enmity towards the institutions of the Baha’i commu-

nity,*? his irreconcilable hatred, which ‘fortuitously for him’ coincided with the Protestant positions described above and suddenly, through the publication of his book, acquired a sounding-board that had not existed previously.

In my doctoral thesis*? I discussed at length that law** is immanent in the Baha’i community, that its legal form is not a

renunciation of its essence or a surrogate for the Holy Spirit, but is, instead, an indispensable means to ‘ensure . . . the unity of the Faith, the preservation of its identity, and the protection of

its interests’,4° and that the legally constituted Baha’i community should not be judged according to criteria taken from a

completely different context.*© Karl Barth very pertinently asks of an unlegislated Christian community ‘how their purely spiritual fellowship of love is to exist in the world, and to coexist with other human societies’4”7—a question worth passing

41. For details see Bramson-Lerche, ‘Some Aspects of the Establishment of the Guardianship’, pp. 265ff. In particular, see below, pp. 680ff. and 753ff. 42. See p. 33. 43. Grundlagen, pp. 59ff. 44. The concept of law deduced from the revelation of Baha’u’llah cannot be discussed in detail here. I can do no more than refer the reader to the relevant literature (Grundlagen, pp. 50ff.; Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 12; Walbridge, Sacred Acts, Sacred Space, Sacred Time, pp. 3-29; Schaefer, Baha ’i Ethics, ch. 4 (in preparation). 45. Shoghi Effendi, World Order, p. 10. 46. i.e. from the field of ecclesiology, the study of Protestant legal doctrine. 47. Church Dogmatics, vol. IV, 2, p. 683.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order on to Protestant critics of the legally incorporated Baha’i community: How is this community supposed to survive in this

world as a ‘free-flowing movement’?48 How could the Baha’i community have mobilized world public opinion concerning the

violent persecution and continuing suppression of the Iranian Baha’is by the ayatollahs’ regime and caused the United Nations and numerous national parliaments*? to condemn these

violations of human rights*® and many politicians to raise their voices—with a la longue a visibly moderating influence on the Iranian authorities—had it not been a legally structured organ-

ism with institutions that are authorized to take action? The spirit of the Baha’i Faith without its legal form, its humanitarian doctrines without legal incorporation of the community, would be, as Shoghi Effendi puts it, ‘tantamount to a mutilation of the

body of the Cause’ that would only result in the disintegration of its component parts, and the extinction of the Faith itself’ .>! Had the Baha’i community remained in a state of ‘pneumatic anarchy’

after the passing

of ‘Abdu’l-Baha

it would

have

ceased to exist long ago. II. FICICCHIA’S CRITIQUE OF THE ORDER OF THE BAHA’I COMMUNITY AND ITS FOUNDATIONS

1. The Universal House of Justice —not foreseen by Baha’u lah? Ficicchia’s assertion that Baha’u’llah did not provide the local Houses of Justice with a higher, central body, and that the su-

preme elected institution of the Baha’i community, the Univer-

48. Kurt Hutten, Seher, Griibler, Enthusiasten,

10th edn., pp. 319ff.;

12th edn., pp. 824ff. 49. Including the German Bundestag in a resolution passed on 25 June 1981; see Die Baha’i im Iran. Dokumentation, pp. 50-57. 50. On this subject see below, p. 358, note 219; Gollmer, pp. 457ff.

51. World Order, p. 5.

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Chapter 3 ¢ Udo Schaefer sal House of Justice, is not mentioned either in the Kitab-i-

Aqdas nor in any other of his writings and appears only in the testament>? of ‘Abdu’l-Baha, is patently erroneous. He has obviously failed to realize that Baha’u’llah has not given distinct terms to the various levels of the Baytu’l ‘adl (House of Jus-

tice). The verse in the Kitab-i-Aqdas*? in which Baha’u’llah commands the establishment of a Baytu’l ‘adl in every town obviously refers to the local level. In fact, Baha’u’llah has ordained a supreme House of Justice in clear language. In the eighth Ishraq of his Tablet of Ishraqat he revealed: The men of God’s House of Justice have been charged with the affairs of the people. They, in truth, are the Trustees of God among His servants and the day-

springs of authority in His countries.*4 The context of the following verse indicates that this text refers

to a House of Justice with universal jurisdiction: O people of God! That which traineth the world is Justice, for it is upheld by two pillars, reward and punishment. These two pillars are the sources of life to the world. Inasmuch as for each day there is a new problem and for every problem an expedient solution,

such affairs should be referred to the House of Justice that the members thereof may act according to the needs and requirements of the time. They that, for the

sake of God, arise to serve His Cause, are the recipients of divine inspiration from the unseen Kingdom. It is incumbent upon all to be obedient unto them. All

matters of State should be referred to the House of 52. Baha’ismus, pp. 319, 331, 356. In his earlier article (‘Der Baha’ ismus’, in Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 232) he knew better:

‘This body, ordained by Baha’u’llah himself, was never convened during the lifetime of the “Guardian”. 53. 30: 54. Baha’u’llah, Tablets 8:60. °°

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order Justice, but acts of worship must be observed accord-

ing to that which God hath revealed in His Book.>> Baha’u’llah’s repeated references to the ‘world’ and his explicit statement that this body has no jurisdiction in the field of ritual (‘acts of worship’, “bddat), which would not make any sense in

the case of local or national Houses, indicate clearly that a House of Justice of universal competence is intended. Other passages*® show clearly through references to the functions assigned to a body of this name that the entire global community is intended, presupposing that it is an institution responsible for the whole world. Verse 42 places a particular responsibility in the hands of the ‘House of Justice’ with the

qualifier ‘should it be established in the world by then’. It is clearly evident that what is meant is not the local ‘House’ but a universal body. The task of setting a legal restriction on interest (which is expressly permitted by Baha’u’llah) is also assigned to the ‘House of Justice’ (singular!),°” as is the responsibility of stipulating punishments for adultery, sodomy and theft,>* or establishing impediments to marriage on the grounds of blood

relationship.>? The logic of the matter points in the same direction as the grammatical evidence: supplementary legislation to the divine

law®° can only be global and not local in character. For example it is stated in the Kalimat-i-Firdawsiyyih:©!

55. Tablets 8:61. 56. Kitadb-i-Aqdas 42; Tablets 7:19; 7:30; 8:52; 8:62; 8:78. 57. Tablets 8:78. 58. ‘Questions and Answers’, no. 49. 59. ibid. no. 50. 60. Ficicchia is wrong when he claims (Baha’ismus, p. 357, note 149) that many Baha’is incorrectly believe that this body can cancel the norms of the divine law. 61. Tablets 6:29.

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Chapter 3 « Udo Schaefer It is incumbent upon the Trustees of the House of Justice to take counsel together regarding those things which have not outwardly been revealed in the Book, and to enforce that which is agreeable to them. God will verily inspire them with whatsoever He willeth.

Clearly what is referred to is a ‘House of Justice’ with authority to provide supplementary legislation—i.e. a supreme body responsible for the entire community. Even Ficicchia’s mentor, Hermann Romer, to whom he is indebted for numerous errors, spoke of the ‘supreme Baytu’l ‘adl’ that is “founded on

the local collegia’.© While the term Baytu’l ‘adl al-a‘zam or Baytu’l ‘adl al-‘umimi® was later introduced by ‘Abdu’l-Baha for the sake of distinction, it is not true that he did so for the first time in his testament,°4 as Ficicchia asserts. These terms

were used much earlier,® 2. ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s testament—disputed? ‘Abdu’1-Baha’s Will and Testament® is not ‘disputed’ .®’ It was challenged only by a tiny band of Western dissidents who—un-

62. Die Babi-Beha’i, p. 118. 63. General, comprehensive House of Justice. O40. 1°172 1725; 2:8, 2.9 (pp. Li, 14215, 20). 65. For instance in Some Answered Questions, a collection of ‘Abdu’l-

Baha’s replies to questions asked of him between 1904 and 1906 (45:4 (pp. 172-73)). In a later talk held in New York on 2 December 1912, for example, he said: ‘A universal, or international, House of Justice shall

also be organized. Its rulings shall be in accordance with the commands and teachings of Baha’u’llah . . . This international House of Justice shall be appointed and organized from the Houses of Justice of the whole world’ (Promulgation, p. 155). See also ‘Abdu’1-Baha, Selections 187:2 (p. 215). On this subject as a whole see Gollmer, below, p. 690, notes 45 and 46, as well as Gottesreich, ch. 11.2.1).

66. Ficicchia’s assertion that this document is ranked higher than the “suppressed Kitab al-Aqdas’ and that it is regarded by the Baha’is today as having ‘supreme priority among the scripture’ (Baha ’ismus, pp. 282, 331), a claim for which he provides neither facts nor sources, is errone-

E52

Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order able to read Arabic or Persian and therefore possessing utterly

inadequate knowledge of the scripture*’—misunderstood the nature of the Baha’i Faith, seeing it as an ethereal ‘movement’, free of legal structures, a mere platform for interfaith dialogue, an ecumenical movement seeking to unify the religions. Consequently, they rebelled against the implementation of the legal structures outlined by Baha’u’llah and initiated after the death of “Abdu’l-Baha. These people, who were especially opposed to the institution of the Guardianship, seized upon the allegation of

forgery raised by an American, Ruth White,® in order to dispute the legitimacy of the legally incorporated community.”° This protest against the organization of the community, to which I devoted a whole chapter of my doctoral thesis,’! should be seen in the right perspective. Although Ficicchia cites ‘aver-

sion’ to Shoghi Effendi and ‘resistance among broad sections of

ous. Together with the Kitab-i-Aqdas and the Kitab-i-‘Ahd, the Testament is the Charter of the Baha’i administrative order. Nevertheless, it

is still lower in rank than the scripture revealed by Baha’u’llah. According to Shoghi Effendi, the words of ‘Abdu’l-Baha ‘are not equal in rank, though they possess an equal validity with the utterances of Baha’u’llah’

(World Order, p. 139). See also Gollmer, below, p. 704,

note 127. 67. Baha’ismus, p. 296, note 35, pp. 293ff., 324.

68. In the early twentieth century only very few of the Tablets of Baha’u’llah and ‘Abdu’l-Baha had been translated into Western languages. 69.

‘Abdu’l-Baha’s

Alleged

Will

is Fraudulent,

Rutland,

Vermont,

1930; ‘Abdu’l-Bahd’s Questioned Will and Testament, Beverly Hills, 1946. For detailed discussion see Taherzadeh, Covenant, pp. 347ff.; Bramson-Lerche,

‘Some Aspects of the Establishment of the Guardian-

ship’, pp. 269ff. 70. On the forgery theory see Gollmer, below, pp. 678ff. 71. Grundlagen, § 9: ‘Die Baha’i-Lehre und die Problematik der rechtlichen Organisierung religiéser Gemeinschaft’ (‘Baha’i doctrine and the issue of the legal organization of a religious community’), pp. 42-60; see also Taherzadeh, Covenant, p. 343.

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the believers’,”2 only a few rebelled against the establishment of the institutions and against the authority of the Guardian, and these confused individuals were eventually expelled as “cove-

nant-breakers’. The publicity given to them by Hutten and Ficicchia is out of all proportion to their number and significance. Even Ficicchia admits that this tiny band was never more than

‘a handful of members’, that the group existed ‘practically only on paper’ and that a rival community was never established.” It is therefore totally misleading to depict this as a ‘schism’’4 in the Baha’i community.7° 3. The Guardianship—a dictatorship? Ficicchia’s ignorance and incompetence is revealed in his assertion that the establishment of the Guardianship in “Abdu’]-

Baha’s Will and Testament is a violation of Baha’u’llah’s sti-

72. Baha’ismus, p. 297. 73. ibid. p. 378. Zimmer was ‘the last of the Mohicans’ (see Gollmer, below, p. 775, note 460). 74. ibid. pp. 29, 289, 331

note 49; Materialdienst

15/16, Issue

38

(1975), p. 239. The same assertion is made by Flasche in the LThK (3rd edn. 1993, keyword ‘Baha’i-Religion’), where he refers to three schisms in the Baha’i Faith. However, he overlooks the fact that neither the re-

bellion of Muhammad-‘Ali against the authority of ‘Abdu’l-Baha nor the circle of dissidents around Ruth White resulted in the formation of a rival community, and that the ‘schism between the Baha’is and the Azalis’ is concerned with a conflict of prophetic claims and is not primarily to do with the establishment of rival communities (see Towfigh, below, pp. 672ff., and Gollmer, below, pp. 687ff.).

75. It is a matter of terminological taste when one speaks of a ‘schism’ in a religion. Not every divisive, schismatic action results in a schism in

the community of believers. There have been many schismatics in the Church, yet one does not speak of an ecclesiastical schism every time an individual member of the church performs an action constituting the ecclesiastical offence of ‘schism’. In traditional usage, divisions are only termed ‘schisms’ when they lead to the formation of a rival community and when they are successful over at least a certain historical period.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

pulations regarding the succession. He has evidently failed to grasp the basic structures of the Baha’i community’s constitutional law, the fundamental principle of the separation of powers,’° i.e. the separation between jurisdiction, on the one hand, and interpretative authority on the other, despite the fact that this is all clearly explained in my doctoral thesis,”” to which he had access and from which he likes to quote abundantly. The question will be left open as to whether he does not understand these structures or whether he does not want to understand

them.78 The elected bodies prescribed by Baha’u’llah constitute one pillar of the administrative order. These are in possession of all the elements of jurisdictive power, i.e. the classical trio of legislature, judiciary and executive. The institution of the

76. It is not a mere distinction of powers, since the two powers, jurisdictive authority (made up of the legislature, judiciary and executive), and doctrinal authority (magisterium, lehramt)—i.e. the authoritative interpretation of the scripture—are invested in different bodies, each independent of the other, called the ‘twin pillars’ (Shoghi Effendi, World Order, p. 147) upon which the order of the community rests. Shoghi Effendi expresses this independence in his statement that: ‘Neither can, nor will, infringe upon the sacred and prescribed domain of the other. Neither will seek to curtail the specific and undoubted authority with which both have been divinely invested’ (ibid. p. 150). The idea developed by Montesquieu and Kant of a ‘balance of powers’ through which the separated powers are kept under control by a system of mutual restraint (‘checks and balances’), is not applicable to the separation of powers in the order of the Baha’i community. It would not be appropriate in a system that bears theocratic traits and whose sovereignty proceeds not from the believers but from God. 77. Grundlagen, pp. 94ff., 100ff. 78. In his book I appear several times in the role of chief witness, even for statements that I did not make in the form given. There are many things that he simply refuses to acknowledge, tending again and again to reinterpret what is said. That he is very much aware of this tendency is clear from the letter he wrote to me on 21 January 1981. In this letter he cynically stated that my thesis had been ‘an extremely useful help’ and he was particularly keen to ‘give it belated publicity at last. Whether you will be happy about it, I cannot judge.’

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Chapter 3 ¢ Udo Schaefer

Guardianship, on the other hand, is a continuation of the teaching office held by “Abdu’l-Baha and of his position as head of the

Faith and ‘Centre of the Covenant’. Since the Guardian is invested only with the power of interpretation and since—apart

from his role as ‘head’ of the ‘Universal House of Justice’7?9— he does not share in the power of jurisdiction of the ‘Houses of Justice’, it is misleading when Ficicchia speaks of ‘absolute

authority’,8° an ‘autocracy’,®! ‘unlimited supremacy over the believers’,’? of the ‘omnipotent and infallible head of the com-

munity’°3 and of the ‘omnipotent Guardian’.84 The same goes for Flasche’s dictatorship’®> “With all this tatorial power

description of the Guardianship as a ‘one-man or Hutten’s statement in his book on sects that: the testament provided the “Guardian” with dic. . . The free-flowing movement was fettered by a

“Guardian”, who was invested with papal authority.’®¢ This comparison is as astonishing as it is incorrect. Has the theologian Hutten failed to realize that canon law®’ grants the Pope, iure divino, power in all aspects of ecclesiastical leader-

79. Will and Testament 1:25 (p. 14). 80. Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 232. 81. Baha’ismus, p. 294. 82. ibid. 83. ibid. p. 284. 84. Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 236. 85. Die Baha ’i-Religion, p. 95. 86. 10th edn., p. 318f. 87. ‘. . . qui ideo vi muneris sui suprema, plena, immediata et universali in Ecclesia gaudet ordinaria potestate, quam semper libere exercere valet’ (can. 331 CIC). The powers of the Pope as formulated here include: a) supreme power—there is no spiritual authority above the Pope in the Church, b) full power—this comprises all spheres, c) direct power—the Pope is not bound to any intermediate institution in the exercise of his authority, and d) universal power—the~Pope has priority both in the Church as a whole and in all sub-churches (Peter Kramer, Kirchenrecht, Il, p. 100).

156

Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

ship,®® including the classical powers of legislation, judiciary and executive as well as teaching authority? Has he forgotten that, in addition, the Pope—like all bishops—has the power of ordination (potestas ordinis) and absolute sovereignty over the Ecumenical Council of the Catholic Church? To equate the Guardian with the Pope is an egregious error, since among all these powers the Guardian is invested solely with power of in-

terpretation.®? Why does Hutten call this ‘dictatorial power’?9° The ‘leadership of the community’ was certainly not passed on ‘to a single individual’.?! The ‘authority and func-

tional powers’ of the elected bodies were not ‘largely restricted’??

88. Formerly called ‘potestas iurisdictionis’, following the CIC 1983 termed ‘potestas regiminis’.

of

89. Ficicchia’s assertion that Shoghi Effendi remained until his death “sole ruler and, as such, in possession of jurisdictive power to which de iure he was not entitled’ (Baha ‘ismus, pp. 348 and 335, note 63), is an over-generalization and, hence, incorrect. In so far as he had to make

practical decisions for the guidance of the community and, as the temporary institution of appeal, he did indeed exercise jurisdictive functions. However, this was because the institution responsible for these duties had not yet been established and his authority in these fields was a temporary measure with a substitutive character, as I indicated in my doctoral thesis: ‘It is natural that, in the early stages of the development of a community, the already existent organs must carry out the vital functions of institutions that, although prescribed, have not yet been established’ (Grundlagen, p. 144). The same point is made by Gollmer (Gottesreich, ch. 12.1). The legal developments initiated by Shoghi Effendi, the legal structures founded on his interpretation of the scripture and written into the statutes of the decision-making bodies, were described by the Guardian himself as temporary and dependent upon the approval of the Universal House of Justice: “And when this Supreme Body will have been properly established, it will have to consider afresh the whole situation’ (Baha ’i Administration, p. 41). On this subject see also p. 172, note 179. 90. A comparison of the Guardianship with the Papacy, the Caliphate and the Imamate is to be found in my doctoral thesis, Grundlagen, pp. 151 ff. 91. Baha ’ismus, p. 280. 92. ibid.

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Chapter 3 « Udo Schaefer

by the Guardianship; in fact, they were not affected by it at all, since Baha’u’llah had nowhere implied that the institution of

the Baytu’l ‘adl would be responsible for interpreting the holy texts. How could the unity of the Faith be preserved if, according to Ficicchia’s theory, only the local Houses of Justice had been provided for and these were responsible for matters of

doctrine, too? How were decisions concerning doctrine to be made by the Houses of Justice to be established in every town?

This demonstrates how ill-considered and absurd Ficicchia’s hypotheses are. 4.

On the alleged ‘doctrinal legislation’ by the Universal House of Justice

One is rendered speechless by Ficicchia’s utter disregard for the scripture and official doctrine of the Baha’i Faith. His apodictic assertion that the office of authoritative interpretation of the scripture was transferred ‘perforce’ to the Universal House of

Justice following the death of Shoghi Effendi,?3 whereby this authority became a component of jurisdictive power, as in the

Catholic Church, and his further conclusion that the principle of the separation of powers?* was abandoned and the Universal

House of Justice raised to the status of an ‘organ of teaching authority’,?> is completely unfounded. Not content with this, he goes on to conjure up the idea of “doctrinal legislation’ laid

down by the Universal House of Justice,?© something which— as Ficicchia knows perfectly well—did not exist even during

the Guardian’s lifetime, neither as a fact nor as a concept. From

93. ibid. pp. 364, 368. 94. Here:

the separation

of jurisdictive

power

from

interpretative

authority; on this subject see Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 11.2.2, and 12.1.

11.2.3

95. Baha’ismus, pp. 368, 366. 96. ibid. p. 367. The term appears several times on 1 this page, in one case in italics.

158

Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

among the reasons given in my doctoral thesis why interpretative decisions made by the Guardian are not comparable with ex cathedra decisions by the Pope and do not constitute doctrinal legislation,?’ Ficicchia cites the sentence: ‘The believers are not commanded, but informed, as to what they should believe.’

However, this is immediately dismissed as ‘legalistic hairsplitting’ intended to distract attention from the ‘unpleasant

subject of dogma’.?® My statement in the same passage that, according to Baha’i doctrine, faith is an inner act that cannot be decreed and that blind submission to authority would be a vio-

lation of human conscience and dignity,°? does not interest Ficicchia in the least. The Universal House of Justice has never claimed authority in the sphere of doctrine and has repeatedly made it clear that no interpretative authority exists subsequent to the death of

Shoghi Effendi.!®° Ficicchia refers to the Constitution of this

97. Grundlagen, pp. 135ff. The doctrinal statements made by ‘Abdu’lBaha and Shoghi Effendi have the character of explanations, they have never been creeds, formulas in which the truth is engaged within the restrictive bounds of a definition of faith. On the issues surrounding such definitions see King, Infallible? An Inquiry, pp. 129ff., 136ff. 98. Baha’ismus, p. 344. This reproach is directed against me of all people, despite the fact that I have criticized the reservations among Baha’is about the use of the term ‘dogma’ and have not hesitated to emphasize the dogmatic character of Baha’i doctrine and doctrinal decisions (Grundlagen, pp. 133ff. See also below, Appendix, p. 787, note 13). 99. Grundlagen, p. 135. With reference to Shoghi Effendi (World Order, pp. 151ff.), Gollmer also stresses that: ‘In the Baha’i Faith the individual’s faith is an inner act, performed directly before God; it cannot be decreed. The doctrinal statements of the Guardian are therefore explanatory in character. They do not aim at blind submission to the authority of the Guardian but rather at a process of growing insight during the individual believer’s lifelong analysis of the scripture’ (Gottesreich, ch. 11.2.2). 100. ‘... the Universal House of Justice will not engage in interpreting the Holy Writings’ (letter dated 25 October 1984, quoted from Messages from the Universal House of Justice 1963-1986, p. 646); also letters dated 9 March 1965 and 27 May 1966 (Wellspring of Guidance,

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Chapter 3 ¢ Udo Schaefer

body,!°! in which he claims ‘its right to the exercise of interpretative authority is expressly emphasized’.!°? Not surprisingly, he omits any mention of the paragraph in which such a right is supposedly enshrined, since no such statement exists. !® It would be futile to speculate as to why Ficicchia does this. Does he wish to demonstrate once again how the ‘organization’ casts overboard its noble legal principles—in this case

that of the separation of powers—‘in an opportunistic manner’?104 Perhaps his ‘bearing of false witness’!°> is to be seen in the context of the hypothesis repeatedly expressed concerning

the alleged ‘churchification’ of the Baha’i community,!° i.e. his assertion that the community has been turned into an ‘eccle-

siastical institution’,!°7 stalt)’ 108

‘a steward

of the grace

(heilsan-

5. The community: a ‘steward of the grace’? This assertion, too, is utterly mistaken and does not become any more correct by being repeated. A whole section of my doctoral

pp. 52, 53, 88); letters dated 20 October 1977, 28 October

1991 and a

Memorandum from the Research Department dated 14 May 1991. 101.

The Constitution of the Universal House of Justice, Haifa, 1972.

102.

Baha’ismus, p. 365, note 180.

103. With respect to scripture, the preamble (Declaration of Trust) lists only the following spheres of competence: ‘Among the powers and duties with which the Universal House of Justice has been invested are: To ensure the preservation of the Sacred Texts and to safeguard their inviolability, to analyse, classify, and co-ordinate the Writings’ (Constitution, p. 5).

104.

Baha’ismus, p. 129 (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

105. Ex. 20:16; Deut. 5:17. See the World Guidelines I, 22; see above, p. 26.

Council

106. Baha’ismus, pp. 337, 278, 368, 421. 107. ibid. pp. 278, 337, 368. 108. ibid. pp. 332, 368, 421, 428 (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

160

of Churches,

Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

thesis!©? deals with the reasons why, quite apart from any considerations of terminology, the Baha’i community does not constitute, by its nature, a ‘church’ or a ‘steward of the grace’. Irrespective of the institutional characteristics that the Baha’i community has by virtue of the existence of an interpretative

authority,!!° it is not a ‘church’ or a ‘steward of the grace’ because one of the two constituent structural elements of all ecclesiastical institutions (i.e. ‘the administration of the Word and

the administration of the sacraments’!!!) is absent. Whereas the office of the Guardian as ‘the expounder of the Word of God’!!2 can be well considered as an ‘administration of the Word’, there has never been any administration of sacraments,

simply because they do not exist in the Baha’i system. In the Faith of Baha’u’llah there is no objectification of divine grace and, hence, there are no sacraments.!!3 Divine grace is not ad-

109.

Grundlagen,

§ 15, pp. 103-109;

see also Schaefer,

The Baha’i

Faith: Sect or Religion?, pp. 5ff. 110. See Grundlagen, pp. 91-93. 111. See Ernst Troeltsch, The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches, p. 478; Karl Adam, The Spirit of Catholicism, pp. 143ff. 112. Will and Testament 1:16 (p. 11). 113. According to Karl Adam it is ‘one of the profoundest truths of Catholic theology that besides the purely personal, the religious and moral relation of the Christian to Christ, as manifested in faith and sanctifying love, there is also an extra-personal and wholly factual relation, which consecrates the Christian bidingly to Christ independently of his subjective life in grace, which gives him Christ irrevocably for his own, which incorporates him once and for all into Christ’s high priesthood’. Grace is imparted to man ‘only on the basis of this sacramental order and within it’. The sacraments not only confer divine grace, but also impart ‘to the soul of the Christian an abiding religious character, whereby the soul is incorporated in the high-priesthood of Christ in a greater or less degree according to the substance and nature of the sacrament, and remains permanently incorporated therein (character indelebilis), even though—as in the case of the damned—this impersonal and objective relation to Christ results in no abiding subjective and personal relation of grace and blessedness’ (The Spirit of Catholicism, pp. 143-145; 213ff.).

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Chapter 3 ¢ Udo Schaefer

ministered and ‘granted’. There is no clergy invested with “existential and eternal holy authority to conduct

sacramental

works’.!!4 The practice of confession, in particular, is absent in the Baha’i Faith,!!> i.e. there is no ‘forum internum sacramentale’. There are no ecclesiastical functionaries who claim to be representatives of God, whatever they bind or loose on earth being bound or loosed of heaven; no authorities that impart grace to the believer. There is no jurisdiction within the realm

of conscience,!!6 and no mediation of grace to the believer.!!7 When it suits him, Ficicchia quotes at length from my thesis, but he has ignored these details and thus saved himself the effort of analysing the reasons given there. He insolently mis-

interprets those passages where Shoghi Effendi stresses the uniqueness and authenticity of the order of Baha’u’llah,!!® alleging that these statements amount to the claim that the Baha’i

Faith is ‘the sole, true divinely ordained and beatifying steward

of the grace on earth’.!!9 For him, the exclusivist Catholic formula!2° does not suffice: he has the audacity to assert with regard to interpretative authority in the Baha’i Faith that the

114.

Eichmann-Morsdorf, Lehrbuch des Kirchenrechts, vol. Il, p. 96.

115. Indeed, it is expressly forbidden (see Kitab-i-Aqdas 34; Tablets 3:14). 116. ‘Abdu’l-Baha has emphasized that conscience, the kernel of human dignity, is beyond the grasp of any authorities, that it is ‘one of the private possessions of the heart and the soul’: ‘In the realm of conscience naught but the ray of God’s light can command, and on the throne of the heart none but the pervading power of the King of kings should rule (A Traveller’s Narrative, p. 40)... The conscience of man is sacred and to be respected . . . Convictions and ideas are within the scope of the comprehension of the King of kings, not of the kings, and soul and conscience are between the fingers of control of the Lord of hearts, not of (His) servants’ (ibid. p. 91). 117.

See also Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 6.2-6.4; 11.2.3; 12.1.

118. World Order, pp. 14S5ff. 119. Baha’ismus, p. 332 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 120. ‘Extra Ecclesiam nulla salus’, formulated by St Cyprian, bishop of Carthage (200-258 CE) in De unitate Ecclesiae 6.

162

Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

‘organization has taken over the revealed message’ and now

‘interprets it ex opere operato for all believers’ .12! This is all nonsense, for the phrase ‘ex opere operato’ originates from the scholastic sacramental doctrine of the Catholic

Church and refers to the correlation between the sacraments and divine grace, which is known as an opus operatum, because the grace conferred is not given as the result of any deserving on the part of the giver or receiver. The ritual of administering the sacraments has the effect of conferring divine grace. The formula ‘ex opere operato’ expresses the ‘objective and instru-

mental efficacy of the sacraments’.!?? It makes no sense at all in connection with the authoritative interpretation of doctrine, nor

has the Church ever used it in connection with teaching authority. This lapse reveals once again both the author’s lack of competence in the field of theology and religious studies, and his personal agenda. It is certainly most strange that this glaring error was not corrected by the editors.

121.

Baha’ismus, p. 420.

122.

See LThK,

vol. 7, column

1184ff.; vol. 9, column

218ff. Karl

Adam elucidates the theological termini technici: ‘According to Catholic theology the sacraments work ex opere operato, and not ex opere operantis, that is to say that the sacramental grace (which, as distinguished from transient actual grace, effects a permanent union with God) is not produced and effected through the personal ethico-religious efforts of the recipient, but rather through the objective accomplishment of the sacramental sign itself. In every sacrament there is something objectively given (opus operatum), namely, the special conjunction according to the institution of Christ of a material element (the ‘matter’) and certain words (the ‘form’). When this conjunction is effected in the

recipient according to the intentions of the Church, then the sacrament is a

‘work of Christ’? (opus Christi) which independently of the subjective share of the recipient (opus operantis) by force of its valid accomplishment causes the sacramental grace’ (The Spirit of Catholicism, pp. 27f.).

163

Chapter 3 + Udo Schaefer 6.

Shoghi Effendi charged with having prevented the establishment of the Universal House of Justice

That Ficicchia—despite paying lip-service to the ideal of aca-

demic objectivity!23—is not actually very interested in conveying objective information, seeking instead to persuade the reader, is revealed inter alia by his inclination to repeat in a

multiplicity of contexts assertions that denigrate the image of the Baha’i Faith, emphasizing them by the frequent use of italics, and thus attempting to ram his message into the reader’s head. An example of this tendency is the fanciful allegation

that, over a period of thirty-six years, Shoghi Effendi prevented the ‘establishment of a collective system of leadership’ in order to ‘go it alone’ in ruling over the Baha’i community. This alle-

gation occurs no fewer than three times.!24 To substantiate his hypothesis, Ficicchia is content with

the fact that the Universal House of Justice was not established until 1963, after the death of Shoghi Effendi in 1957, and with a

quotation from ‘Abdu’l-Baha from which he concludes with incredible logic that this institution ought to have been set up

immediately after ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s death.!2° If the passage cited by Ficicchia is read in context, it becomes evident that it provides no grounds whatever for such a conclusion. It reads as follows: ‘After ‘Abdu’l-Baha, whenever the Universal House of

Justice is organized, it will ward off differences’ !2°—the time when it is to be established is thus left completely open. The fact that “Abdu’l-Baha—contrary to the expectations of many

believers!2”—did not regard the time ripe for the erection of this

123. Baha’ismus, p. 30. 124. ibid. pp. 314, 350, 360f. 125. ibid. p. 360. 126. Quoted from Star of the West, vol. IV (23 November 1913), p. 238. 127.

See Taherzadeh, Covenant, p. 334; Bramson-Lerche,

pects of the Establishment of the Guardianship’, p. 263.

164

‘Some As-

Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order institution during his own

lifetime or immediately after his

death, is evident from a report by his chronicler, Mirz4 Mahmud Zarqani, according to which ‘Abdu’l-Baha, who was concerned about the activities of the covenant-breakers, stated: ‘If the time were propitious, the House of Justice could be brought

into being and it would protect the Cause.”!28 The reasons why this supreme institution could be estab-

lished only quite some time after the death of ‘Abdu’l-Baha are obvious. According to ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s testament, the Universal House of Justice is to be elected by the members of all the Na-

tional Spiritual Assemblies,!2? which are to represent all the Baha'is throughout the world. When Shoghi Effendi took office there was not a single National Assembly in existence. Just as one does not begin building a house by constructing the roof, but rather by laying the foundations, the local Houses of Jus-

tice—currently still called “spiritual assemblies’—had to be established first, and only when the local institutions in a particu-

lar country had developed into a sufficiently stable foundation could a National Spiritual Assembly be formed. As early as 1929, Shoghi Effendi pointed out that the establishment of the Universal House of Justice presupposed religious freedom (including the right of a religious community to organize its affairs in accordance with its own laws and to hold elections) for the Baha’i communities of Iran and the adjoining countries under Soviet rule, where the majority of Baha’is were resident at the

time.!3° Moreover, with regard to the national bodies Shoghi Effendi wrote that: “Not until they are themselves fully representative of the rank and file of the believers in their respective

128.

Kitab-i-Badayi‘u’l Athar, vol. 1, p. 250; quoted from Taherzadeh,

Covenant, p. 286. 129. Will and Testament 1:25; 2:8 (pp. 14, 20). 130. World Order, p. 7. In the countries adjoining Iran in the former Soviet Union, this has been possible only since the end of the Soviet regime.

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Chapter 3 ¢ Udo Schaefer

countries, not until they have acquired the weight and the experience that will enable them to function vigorously in the organic life of the Cause, can they approach their sacred task, and

provide the spiritual basis for the constitution of so august a body in the Baha’i world.’!3! These conditions were met in 1963, when one hundred years after the events of Ridvan the Universal House of Justice was elected for the first time by

fifty-six National Spiritual Assemblies. !52 Ficicchia again declares these reasons ‘unconvincing’ without subjecting them to any analysis. Instead he mocks: “The reference to the need for consolidation of the organizational structures also seems contradictory in view of the fact that they are usually portrayed as unsurpassable in their “uniqueness”

and “perfection”.’!33 Yet what have the ‘uniqueness’ of the administrative order, which Ficicchia elsewhere concedes, !34 and its potential ‘perfection’ to do with the task of establishing it? After all, the order of the community does not emerge spontaneously; it must be set up and developed, something that can occur only in the course of a long and difficult historical process.

7. On the subject of infallibility Perhaps his most distorted portrayal of the Baha’i institutions is

Ficicchia’s frequently recurring assertion that the charisma!

131.

ibid. See also Bramson-Lerche,

‘Some Aspects of the Establish-

ment of the Guardianship’, pp. 275ff. 132.

The Bahda’i World, vol. XIV, Haifa, 1974, p. 427. There are cur-

rently (1999) 181 National Spiritual Assemblies. 133. Baha’ismus, p. 361. 134. ‘It is probably unique in the history of religion that the founder of a faith has left not only a written law (the Kitdb al-Aqdas) but also guidelines as to the later organizational formation of the community’ (Baha’ismus, p. 422). Hence, he admits that this is, indeed, the case!

135. The Greek term, taken from the New Testament (see Rom. 6:23; I Cor. 7:7), is used in the original sense: a gift of grace, a gift of God.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

of ‘infallibility’ is claimed for all elected bodies, the Houses of Justice at local, national and international level. Over and over again, as if turning a prayer wheel, he

writes of the ‘infallible leadership’,!>° the ‘infallible organization’,!37 the ‘infallible administrative order’,!38 and the ‘infallible hierarchy’.!39 Even in his short entry in the Lexikon der Religionen'* he does not fail to emphasize that: ‘Baha’ism has a rigid, centralist organization . . . Its decrees are held to be outpourings of the divine Will and infallible’,!4! thus persuading the reader that the Baha’is claim all their administrative bodies to be immune to error. Ficicchia repeatedly stresses that: ‘The decisions of the National Spiritual Assembly are also regarded as infallible\*2 . . . Here, too, the decisions!*3 made are held to be a direct outpouring of the divine Will and are therefore in-

fallible.’44 Elsewhere, too, he speaks of the ‘infallibility of the national and local bodies’,!4> and even of the ‘claimed infalli-

bility of the local bodies’.!4° The same assertion is made in his

entry in the book Lexikon der Sekten.'47 136.

Baha’ismus, pp. 28, 161, 413; Lexikon der Sekten, column 104.

137. Baha’ismus, pp. 290, 371f., 374, 429. On page 405 he speaks of the infallibility ‘of the Guardian and the institutions’, thus implying that, in addition to the Universal House of Justice, the local and national

bodies are deemed infallible. 138. ibid. p. 393. 139. ibid. p. 429. 140. ed. Hans Waldenfels, Freiburg: Herder-Verlag, 3rd edn. 1996. ‘Baha’ismus’, p. 47, see also Lexikon der Sekten (ed.

141.

keyword

145.

ibid. p. 372; Lexikon der Sekten, column 104.

146.

Baha’ismus, p. 371, note 196.

147.

column 103.

Hans Gasper, Joachim Miiller and Friederike Valentin, Freiburg: Herder Verlag, 3rd edn. 1991) column 104. 142. Baha’ismus, p. 371 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 143. In this case, those made by the local spiritual assemblies. 144. Baha’ismus, p. 374 (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

167

Chapter 3 + Udo Schaefer This utterly confused and blatantly erroneous presentation points to the fact that Ficicchia has again purposely distorted and reinterpreted this concept, knowing well that it is histori-

cally burdened!48 and conjures up all sorts of negative connotations,!4? and speculating on the likely negative response to the term from the readership, so as to make the order of the Baha’i community appear all the more repulsive. Were such a comprehensive claim to freedom from error really to be raised, it would indeed be extremely suspect and an expression of presumptuousness, human hubris, arrogance, ignorance and foolishness. A

community that upheld such a claim would appear ridiculous. However, the image Ficicchia portrays is a complete distortion of the Baha’i doctrine on infallibility.

‘Infallibility’!5° is a complex term which has, according to Baha’u’llah, ‘numerous meanings and diverse stations’.!5! In the context of Ficicchia’s misrepresentation two specific forms of ‘infallibility’ must be discussed which are distinguished in Baha’i scripture as, on the one hand, essential infallibility, and

on the other, infallibility that has been conferred through divine bestowal.!52

148. Even in Christian theology it King, Infallible? An Inquiry, 1972). ans do not even ascribe this charisma have erred with regard to the question

is highly controversial (see Hans A significant number of theologito Christ, since he is presumed to of parousia.

149. A claim to infallibility appears to contradict human nature. Today, ‘in the age of fallibilism, infallibility is an obsolete claim’ (Heiner Barz, Postmoderne Religion, p. 136). 150. ‘isma (immunity from error and sin), from ‘asama, ya ‘simu = to protect, to save from. 151.

Tablets 8:17.

152.

See ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Some Answered Questions 45:2.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

a) Essential infallibility (al-‘isma adh-dhdtiyya) The doctrine of ‘isma has its origin in Islam, where it has been deduced and developed from the Qur’an. Both Sunni and Shi‘a authorities have ascribed to the prophets immunity from error and sin.!°3 The prophets are ma ‘sum, i.e. sinless, immaculate, morally infallible and rendered by God immune to error, infallible in their judgement and decree. With powerful challenging language Baha’u’llah has confirmed this concept and formulated

the doctrine of the ‘Most Great Infallibility’!54 in the Kitab-iAqdas!>° and in the Ishraqat.!5° Accordingly, infallibility is restricted exclusively to the ‘Manifestation of God’ :!57 He Who is the Dawning-place of God’s Cause hath no partner in the Most Great Infallibility. He it is Who, in

the kingdom of creation, !*° is the Manifestation of ‘He doeth whatsoever He willeth’!°?.!60 Thus, essential infallibility is an inherent attribute of prophethood; it is an exclusive characteristic of the ontological station of the Manifestation of God (just as the sun’s rays are inherent in the sun), and consequently a basic element of Baha’i

prophetology. !®! 153. Orthodox Sunni theologians apply ‘isma in unlimited fashion to the prophet Muhammad. Some Sunni authorities extend it to all prophets. According to Shi‘a doctrine ‘isma is inherent also in the Imams; see SEI, ‘isma, p. 178ff. 154. al-‘ismatu’l-kubra; see also the keyword ‘ ‘Isma’ in SEI, p. 178. 155. 47. 156. Tablets 8:17ff. 157. al-mazharu’l-ilahi. 158. ‘dlamu’l-khalq. 159. The quotation in Baha’u’llah’s text is from the Qur’an, see 3:40; 14:27; 22:18, etc.

160. Kitab-i-Aqdas 47. 161. See the summary of Baha’i doctrine on the nature and station of the Manifestation in Kitdb-i-Agqdas, note 140. On this subject see also

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Chapter 3 ¢ Udo Schaefer

By virtue of their inherent infallibility the Manifestations

‘understand all things’!® out of their ‘existential knowledge’ .!® Everything that emanates from them ‘is identical with the truth and conformable to reality . . . Whatever they say is the Word of God, and whatever they perform is upright action’.!64 When Ficicchia asserts!®> (without citing any source!) that the House of Justice also shares in this charisma of the Most Great Infallibility, his statement is false and explicitly contradicted by Baha’i scripture.

b) Conferred infallibility (al-‘isma al-sifatiya)'® One fundamental distinction between essential infallibility and conferred infallibility is that the latter covers only one of the two categories of ‘ismd, i.e. immunity from error, the infallibil-

ity of judgement. Conferred infallibility does not imply freedom from sin, sinlessness, immaculateness.!°7 In the Baha’i Faith infallibility has been exclusively con-

ferred, on the one hand, on the office of ‘Abdu’l-Baha!®8 as the ‘Centre of the Covenant’!©? and Shoghi Effendi as the ‘Guard-

below, pp. 262ff.; John S. Hatcher,

‘The Doctrine of the “Most Great

Infallibility” in relation to the “Station of Distinction” ’, in John Hatcher and William Hatcher, The Law of Love Enshrined, pp. 59ff.; Schaefer, Beyond the Clash, pp. 124ff. 162. ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Tablets 8:17.

Some

Answered

Questions

40:6;

Baha’u’llah,

163. ‘ilm al-wujudi. 164. ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Some Answered Questions 45:5. 165. Baha’ismus, p. 161. 166. ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Some Answered Questions 45:4. 167. ‘No Guardian of the Faith . . . can ever claim to be the perfect exemplar of the teachings of Baha’u’llah or the stainless mirror that reflects His light . . . he remains essentially human’ (World Order, p. 151). 168. Baha’u’llah, Kitdb-i-Aqdas 121, 174; Kitab-i-‘Ahd (Tablets 15:9). 169. ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Will and Testament 1:6 (p. 6f.).

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

ian of the Cause of God’ (valiy-i-amru'lldh)!” in their capacity as authoritative interpreter of the holy Writ, as ‘expounder (mubayyin) of the Word of God’!7! on the one hand, and on the Universal House of Justice on the other.!72 Both institutions, the Guardianship and the Universal House of Justice, are covered

by the assurance that: ‘Whatsoever they decide is of God.’!73 In order to refute Ficicchia’s ludicrous assertion that Baha’i doctrine depicts absolutely everything decided by the elected institutions (the Houses of Justice at local, national and international level) as an outpouring of the divine Will and thus ‘infallible’, it would suffice to point out that according to the explicit

holy text the local and national bodies are not invested with this charisma.!74 Even so, the critical reader would still be confronted with the fact that in this case human authorities (the Guardian and the Universal House of Justice) are exalted above

the category of the merely human,!7> a proposition that is regarded with great scepticism in our secular world. Can such a belief be upheld at all without violating the principles of rational thought? I think the charisma of infallibility should be reflected upon with the intention of arriving at an understanding that does

not imply a sacrificium intellectus. It is therefore important at this juncture to consider the critical issue of the immanent limits of conferred infallibility. The question must be discussed as to whether absolutely everything written and spoken by the Guardian claims to be free from error, and likewise, whether everything

decided by the Universal House of Justice, even down to day-

170P ibid, tat 72.3213 (pp. 11, 21): 171,, .ibid..1:16:(p.14). 172. See pp. 149ff. of this chapter. 173. Will and Testament 1:17 (p. 11). 174. As will be discussed in detail on pp. 188ff. 175. Which is characterized by the saying: ‘Errare humanum est’ (To err is human).

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to-day administrative decisions or trivial matters, is governed

by ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s dictum ‘Whatever they decide is of God’.!7° In other words, is the infallibility conferred upon these institutions unrestricted or does it have inherent limits? The question is easier to answer in the case of the Guardianship than in that of the Universal House of Justice, because Shoghi Effendi himself defined the limits of the infallibility

conferred upon his office. His infallibility reached as far as the sphere of his interpretative power (auctoritas interpretationis).'77 It was restricted to his office, 1.e. to his authoritative interpreta-

tion of the scripture!78 and his role as protector of the faith. Beyond these functions the Guardian was expressly not infallible,!79 and indeed he made no decisions concerning anything 176.

Will and Testament 1:17 (p. 11).

177.

See Grundlagen, pp. 138ff.; Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 11.2.2.

178. The question arises whether the Guardian’s infallibility extends also to his judgements on issues of morality, as it is claimed for the teaching authority of the Pope (see below, p. 174, note 187). I think this question has to be answered affirmatively. It is true that the revelation of Baha’u’llah does not give support to the concept of natural law (ius divinum naturale), on which Catholic doctrine is, based (Thomas Aquinas called it lex aeterna, lex indita non scripta (S. th. 1,2 q. 91 a.2)). Baha’i ethics is theonomous (from Greek, theos: God; nomos: law) and voluntaristic in the sense that all moral values have their origin in the decisions of God’s arbitrary Will (‘He doeth what He willeth and ordaineth whatsoever He pleaseth’ (Tablets 8:19; Kitdb-i-Aqdas 7)... “He shall not be asked of His doings (op. cit. 161)). This concept of ethical voluntarism leaves no room for the idea of natural law. However,

if all morality is based on God’s sovereign Will as it is expressed in his revelation to mankind, it must be concluded that the Guardian’s power of interpretation (and with it his infallibility) covers also all issues of morality. 179. ‘The infallibility of the Guardian is confined to matters which are related strictly to the Cause and interpretation of the teachings; he is not an infallible authority on other subjects, such as economics, science, etc. ... The Guardian’s infallibility covers interpretation of the revealed word, and its application. Likewise any instructions he may issue having to do with the protection of the Faith, or its well-being must be closely obeyed, as he is infallible in the protection of the Faith’ (letter dated 17

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

‘that is not in the teachings’.!8° As far as the recorded facts are concerned, his historical works do not fall within the sphere of his doctrinal authority and are therefore not covered by the charisma; however, those parts of his historical writings that constitute ‘narrative theology’, where it is ‘his interpretation of the

theological significance of historical events’!®! that is at the forefront, this charisma is, indeed, brought to bear.

October 1944 written on behalf of Shoghi Effendi, quoted from Bramson-Lerche, “Some Aspects of the Establishment of the Guardianship’, p. 257 and with reference to the literature cited on p. 284). In this context it should be emphasized that not everything the Guardian decided in the field of Baha’i administration was the result of an authoritative interpretation of the revealed text. In the early stage of development of the community, when its institutions were still in their infancy and a legislative body was absent, because the Universal House of Justice, which has been empowered with supplementary legislation, had not yet come into existence, the Guardian had to serve the need of the moment.

Some

of his decisions on administrative principles had a preliminary character; they were, as Shoghi Effendi clearly formulated, dependent on the decision of the Universal House of Justice which, when it is established

‘will have to consider afresh the whole situation, and lay down the principle which shall direct . . . the affairs of the Cause’ (Bahd’i Administration, p. 41). Thus, administrative principles that have been provisionally adopted by the Guardian can be changed by the Universal House of Justice. Sen McGlinn has drawn attention to this point in his commentary on Seena Fazel and Khazeh Fananapazir’s article “Some Interpretive Principles in the Baha’i Writings’, in BSR, vol. 7 (1997) p. 84ff. On this subject see above, p. 157, note 89, also Appendix, p. 788, note 15.

180. Letter written by Shoghi Effendi dated 29 September 1953. 181. Bramson-Lerche, ‘Some Aspects of the Establishment of the Guardianship’, p. 258, where it is pointed out that Shoghi Effendi, despite his extremely careful research, made some insignificant errors in his book God Passes By (Bramson-Lerche, ibid. p. 285, note 20). Robert Stockman, too, states that: ‘The same observations are true of “Abdu’l-

Baha and Shoghi Effendi who quote informations that appear to be historically inaccurate in their books. Shoghi Effendi’s secretary stated the Guardian was not infallible in matters of economics and science and apparently he did not claim infallibility in matters of history (though his historical writing clearly reflects a very high level of precision and accuracy)’ (quoted from Abstracts of lectures delivered at the ‘Fourth

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Chapter 3 + Udo Schaefer

With reference to the Universal House of Justice it is stated that this institution has been made ‘the source of all good

and freed from all error’!82 by God, and that whatever it decides is ‘the Truth and the Purpose of God himself’ .!83 Baha’u’llah himself has given the assurance: ‘God will verily inspire them

with whatsoever He willeth.’!84 They are ‘the recipients of divine inspiration from the unseen Kingdom’.!8° Hence, the charisma of infallibility rests not upon the community as a whole (as in the Catholic Church)!8* and not upon the individual members of the House of Justice (who remain essentially human), but upon the office, which constitutes the objective, in-

herent limit of infallibility.!87

H.M. Arjmand Conference on Scripture’, 4-6 November gen, Netherlands). 182. ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Will and Testament 1:25 (p. 14). 183. ibid. 2:7 (p. 19). 184. House 185. 186. potest 187.

1994, Nijme-

Tablets 6:29. From the context it is obvious that the supreme of Justice is the addressee of this promise. ibid. 8:6. As formulated by St Thomas Aquinas: ‘Ecclesia generalis non errare’ (‘The Church as a whole cannot err’) (S. th. Suppl. 25,1). In comparing this with the infallibility of the Pope (see can. 749

CIC; Catechism, nos. 891, 2035), which even ‘extends to the individual

commandments of the natural moral law’ (ibid. no. 2036), it is evident that there are differences not only in content but also in legitimation: papal infallibility is legitimated by means of deduction. According to canon law, the Pope’s jurisdictive primacy, which implies doctrinal authority, is based on the calling of Peter to his station as leader of the apostles (Matt. 16:18; John 1:42; 21:15; Luke 22:32) and on the apostolic succession of the Bishop of Rome to the station of Peter. The infallibility of the Pope in his ‘teaching office’ is deduced from the promise of the Holy Spirit (Matt. 28:20): ‘And lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the age’, and the promise of the ‘Spirit of truth’ (John 14:16ff.), through which the purity and authenticity of the faith preached by the apostles and their successors is guaranteed forever (see Luke

10:16; for more

detail on this subject see LThK,

vol.

10, col-

umn 482ff.). These deductions are disputed by the non-Catholic churches and are controversial even within the Roman Church (see King, Infalli-

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

There is no explicit statement either in the scripture or in the writings of Shoghi Effendi concerning the specific spheres

in which the functions of the Universal House of Justice are granted the charisma of infallibility, and no statement on the subject of immanent limits has yet been made by the Universal

House of Justice itself. This issue, which has far-reaching psychological implications and their understanding legal authority of that from the fact that it has

on the consciousness of the believers of the Faith but no relevance for the Supreme Body (which derives simply been ordained by Baha’u’llah), is still

undiscussed in the relevant literature.!88 I think there are good grounds for reasoning that, analo-

gous to Shoghi Effendi’s self-restricting interpretation, the infallibility conferred on the Universal House of Justice has immanent limits, and hence that this charisma does not extend to all its acts but covers only the functions formulated in ‘Abdu’!Baha’s testament. These are the enactment of legislation and the making of decisions on ‘problems which have caused difference, questions that are obscure and matters that are not ex-

pressly recorded in the Book’,!®? i.e. in all matters on which the scripture is silent and which are of universal relevance. It is not

my purpose to analyse this complex issue in depth, and to do so ble?, pp. 53ff., 64ff., 88ff.). The term ‘infallibility’ in the sense of the inability to fall into error is not found anywhere in the New Testament. The institutions of the Guardianship and the Universal House of Justice, on the other hand, are directly legitimated by the scripture, namely Baha’u’llah’s Kitab-i-Aqdas and ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s Will and Testament. The promise of the charisma of immunity to error is, as shown above, an explicit component of Baha’i scripture. 188.

In my doctoral thesis, which was published in 1957 before the

death of Shoghi Effendi, I left open the question as to whether this institution’s immunity to error extended to other spheres beyond that of its legislative power, while at the same time expressing my preference for a restrictive interpretation of the relevant passages in the scripture (Grundlagen, p. 174). More recently this question has been dealt with by Gollmer (Gottesreich, ch. 12.4.3). 189. Will and Testament 2:8 (p. 20).

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Chapter 3 ¢ Udo Schaefer

would go beyond the scope of this book.!%° Thus, quite a number of arguments!9! remain undiscussed, and those brought forth can only be outlined here. I should like to make one thing clear: my proposal of a restrictive interpretation of those passages of the text that invest the Universal House of Justice with infallibility should not be misconstrued as an attempt to adjust opportunistically a concept

that has negative connotations in our secular society and is regarded as a provocation by sceptical contemporaries, in order to make it acceptable to the consciousness of people that are ‘fee-

ble and far removed from the purpose of God’.!9? It is not my intention to deny or to reduce anything that has been conferred on the House of Justice by the Holy Text, thus recklessly undermining its spiritual authority. My aim is, rather, to examine the sources in order to attain a better understanding of the pro-

visions of Baha’u’llah and ‘Abdu’l-Baha and to provide a rationally satisfying answer to these crucial questions. My only purpose in touching on the different aspects of this issue is to make the Faith and the authority of the supreme institution invulnerable against the attacks and the cynical criticism of those

contemptuous of religion, and against the ridicule of critics, by offering an interpretation that is logically unassailable and can be accepted as reasonable by people of good will. For the purpose of the present work it will suffice if I con-

fine myself to the following points: 1. The starting point of these reflections is the fact that from the very beginning the supreme House of Justice, which possesses the fullness of jurisdictive power, has been envi-

sioned as a legislature and invested with the function of supplementary legislation. Whereas the norms of the Book that

190. I will do this in a separate paper in preparation. 191. Such as the grave apologetic implications of a.claim to unlimited infallibility, different aspects of divine guidance, etc. 192.

Baha’u’llah, quoted in Kitdb-i-Aqdas, Intro., p. 6.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

constitute the Law of God are valid and unchangeable for at

least one thousand years!%3 and have been formulated on a more abstract level, the House of Justice has been empowered to elaborate these laws and to provide for subsidiary laws according to the requirements of a steadily changing society through supplementary legislation. This is its paramount purpose and

function.!%4 This indicates that the future development of Baha’i law will not come about, as was the case in Islam, through authori-

tative interpretation'®> by the ‘ulama’,'%° but rather through supplementary legislation by an authorized legislature that is, moreover, empowered to abrogate its own laws and to adapt its own legislation to the exigencies of a continuously changing world. 193. See Kitab-i-Aqdas 37. 194. This becomes obvious from the many statements of ‘Abdu’lBaha and Shoghi Effendi. The following passage may suffice: ‘From these statements it is made indubitably clear and evident that the Guardian of the Faith has been made the Interpreter of the Word and that the Universal House of Justice has been invested with the function of legislating on matters not expressly revealed in the teachings. The interpretation of the Guardian, functioning within his own sphere, is as authoritative and binding as the enactments of the International House of Justice, whose exclusive right and prerogative is to pronounce upon and deliver the final judgement on such laws and ordinances as Baha’u lah has not expressly revealed’ (Shoghi Effendi, World Order, pp. 149f.). 195.

as ‘Abdu’l-Baha elucidated in a Tablet (quoted in Kitab-i-Aqdas,

Intro., p. 5). The significance of the provisions made by Baha’u’llah and ‘Abdu’1-Baha for the future development of Baha’i law becomes apparent if it is considered in the context of Islamic law. An important difference from the Islamic system is that Baha’u’llah has exempted ‘acts of worship’ (‘ibdddt), the rituals, from supplementary legislation. They must be observed ‘according to that which God hath revealed in His Book’ (Tablets 8:61), whereas the prescriptions of the shari‘a comprise also regulations relating to worship and ritual duties. 196. In the Baha’i Faith opinions of the ‘learned’, the ‘ulamd’ fi’l Baha’ (see Kitab-i-Aqdas 173), have no authority unless they are endorsed by the House of Justice (‘Abdu’l-Baha, quoted from ibid., Intro., p. 5).

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Chapter 3 ¢ Udo Schaefer

In the sphere of legislation it makes much sense that the Universal House of Justice has been invested with infallibility,

because by virtue of its infallibility the supplementary law passed by this body is sacred law, i.e. part of the divine law,!?7 as it is ‘the Truth and Purpose of God himself’ !98 and has ‘the same effect as the Text itself’.!9? Thus the Baha’i sacred law has been provided ‘with an essential element of flexibility’.2 It is constituted both by the laws Baha’u’llah has given his people in the Kitab-i-Aqdas (which is the kernel of the Law of God) and by the supplementary law enacted by the Universal House of Justice.

2. This proposed restrictive interpretation is supported by the testimony of the sources. Pneumatic direction, unerring guidance,?°! has been promised by Baha’u’llah and ‘Abdu’lBaha each time in the context of those scriptural passages that define the /egislative competence of this body, and on every occasion this promise is accompanied by a reference to the *Book’ or the “Holy Text’: It is incumbent upon the Trustees of the House of Justice to take counsel together regarding those things which have not outwardly been revealed in the Book, and to enforce that which is agreeable to them. God

will verily inspire them with whatsoever He willeth,

and He, verily, is the Provider, the Omniscient.292 Inasmuch as for each day there is a new problem and for every problem an expedient solution, such affairs should be referred to the House of Justice that the

197. 198. 199.

ius divinum, see Grundlagen, p. 77ff. See also below, pp. 273ff. Will and Testament 2:7 (pp. 19f.). ibid. 2:8 (p. 20).

200.

Universal House of Justice, in Kitdb-i-Aqdas, Intro., p. 6.

201. 202.

‘freed from all error’ (Will and Testament 1:25 (p. 14)). Baha’u’llah, Tablets 6:29.

178

Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order members thereof may act according to the needs and requirements of the time. They that, for the sake of God, arise to serve His Cause, are the recipients of divine inspiration from the unseen Kingdom. It is incumbent upon all to be obedient unto them. All matters of State should be referred to the House of Justice, but acts of worship must be observed according to that

which God hath revealed in His Book.2% And now, concerning the House of Justice which God hath ordained as the source of all good and freed from all error . . . By this House is meant the Universal

House of Justice . . . Unto this body all things must be referred. It enacteth all ordinances and regulations that

are not to be found in the explicit Holy Text. By this body all the difficult problems are to be resolved. . . This House of Justice enacteth the laws and the gov-

ernment enforceth them.2 Unto the Most Holy Book every one must turn and all that is not expressly recorded therein must be referred

to the Universal House

of Justice. That which this

body, whether unanimously or by a majority doth carry, that is verily the Truth and the Purpose of God

himself.?°> It is incumbent upon these members (of the Universal House of Justice) to gather in a certain place and de-

liberate upon all problems which have caused difference, questions that are obscure and matters that are not expressly recorded in the Book. Whatsoever they

decide has the same effect as the Text itself.2°

203. 204. 205. 206.

ibid. 8:61. ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Will and Testament 1:25 (pp. 14f.). ibid. 2:7 (pp. 19f.). ibid. 2:8 (p. 20).

179

Chapter 3 + Udo Schaefer This is a strong argument in favour of the view according to which infallibility covers only acts of legislation. The ‘Book’,

the ‘Holy Text’, is of universal validity. From this it can be concluded that only those decisions are ‘infallible’ that are likewise of universal validity. It should be noted that the spheres of competence defined in ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s testament in the context of supplementary legislation (to resolve ‘all the difficult problems’, to “deliberate

upon problems which have caused difference, questions that are obscure’), are to be counted as legislative functions.2°7 The explicit recourse to the Holy Text in each case and the reference to

these additional functions as amounting to the regulation of “matters that are not expressly recorded in the Book’, combined

with the express statement that all decisions made as part of this sphere of competence have ‘the same effect as the Text itself’2°8 reveal clearly that this refers not to ad hoc executive/ administrative or judicial decisions, but only to those that are of general, universal relevance. 3. A restrictive interpretation, which is also advocated by

Gollmer,? is further substantiated by the fact that the decisions of the Universal House of Justice are not revelational in char207. An example of ‘problems which have caused difference’ might be the decision of the Universal House of Justice that ‘there is no way to appoint or to legislate to make it possible to appoint a second Guardian to succeed Shoghi Effendi’ (6 October 1963, Wellspring, p. 11). This decision on a vital issue of the world community was an act of legislation. The decision has the character of a law, because it was an authori-

tative clarification of the question whether one of the two pillars of the constitutional order was to continue or not. This clarification by a ‘statute of specific provision’ (Mafnahmegesetz) is of permanent legal relevance for the entire world community. Its public announcement meets another prerequisite of legislation, that a law must be brought to the attention of the people by its publication. 208. It is not conceivable that this statement should also include decisions of administrative or judicial nature or even decisions on trivial matters. 209.

Gottesreich, ch. 12.4.3.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

acter. The Holy Spirit does not function as a deus ex machina. The Universal House of Justice is not a mere recipient, transformer and mouthpiece of the Holy Spirit. Its decisions do not come about through quasi-prophetic inspiration (‘quasi per inspirationem’, ‘Divino afflante Spiritu’), but they are reached instead in the course of a rational discursive process in which, subsequent to the establishment of the facts and the clarification of the normative guidelines set out in the scripture, a formal

process of consultation leads to a consensus, and finally to a decision reached by majority vote or by the achievement of unanimity. The weight of the fact that the Universal House of Justice operates in a rational way and decides after having conducted a

rational consultation cannot be over-estimated. As I have already pointed out,?!° the Baha’i community is not in possession of some kind of “Delphic Oracle’, to which everyone can appeal whenever he is in a quandary. This would be an unreflected, even magical idea of the unerring guidance pledged to the House, an utterly unacceptable attitude that would foster people’s inclination to avoid making independent decisions and to

escape the bearing of responsibility by submitting difficult matters to the Universal House of Justice in order to obtain ‘infallible guidance’. 4. Infallibility is not, as the Universal House of Justice has

expressly stated,?!! synonymous with omniscience. Like any other decision-making body, the Universal House of Justice is

dependent on information,”!? but the quality of this information

210. 211.

Grundlagen, p. 290. Letter dated 22 August 1977. 212. ‘The Universal House of Justice in arriving at a decision needs to have before it all the facts involved in the matter. If, after making a decision, new facts emerge, it may well be changed’ (letter dated 13 August 1981). ‘With regard to decisions taken by the Universal House of Justice itself, instructions it issues, and the relationship of these to the information supplied, it is obvious that the nature of a decision or

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varies according to the level on which the decision is made. At the executive and judicial levels, knowledge of the historical facts of a specific case is required, while at the legislative level what is needed is general knowledge of the matters to be regulated. As to the first category, the ascertainment of historical facts, the House of Justice is dependent on others. The factual information necessary for executive and judicial decisions 1s

gathered by subordinate institutions or other individuals. An infallible decision would require that, in every case, the factual information provided were absolutely error-free, something that simply is not possible. There can be no guarantee that all the facts relevant to the decision are indeed compiled, or that even if such were the case, these facts are correctly assessed as to their respective importance before being conveyed to the Uni-

versal House of Justice.?!3 If this cannot be guaranteed, then there can be no guarantee on the absolute correctness of decisions made at these levels. The correctness of any decision in such an instance is conditional: it depends on the correctness and absolute reliability of the information provided concerning the matter in hand. Conditional infallibility, however, is a con-

tradictio in adiecto. A decision that is based on fragmentarily or wrongly transmitted relevant facts cannot but be wrong and must be corrected. The Universal House of Justice’s statement

that a decision can be ‘corrected’ when ‘new facts emerge’2!4 confirms this interpretation. The situation is different in the case of legislation (the es-

tablishment of general abstract norms) and of decisions on speinstruction is affected by the information on which it is made’ (letter dated 26 May 1993). 213. As a former member of a National Spiritual Assembly I have many years experience of how fragmentary the information given in reports to the Universal House of Justice occasionally was. 214. Letters dated 13 August 1981 and 22 August 1977. See below, p. 186.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

cific issues of universal relevance.2!5 In these cases, the decision is made at the abstract level of norms; it is independent of any concrete historical case and the ascertainment of its relevant facts. What is required is general information. Here, too, the Universal House of Justice needs to inquire into the conditions of all aspects of the matter to be regulated and to know the legal

dogmatic implications?!© of legislation. However, legislation is not dependent on the clarification of historical data and the provision of facts by other institutions or individuals that always remain fallible. The House of Justice is thus independent of the

necessarily fallible acts of other institutions or individuals. This independence of the supreme body is a logical precondition for a decision that is free of error and a manifestation of the Will of God as it is stated in the scripture:

215. A decision that is of universal relevance is one that has legal relevance for the ‘people of Baha’ i.e. for the world Baha’i community. Since its establishment in April 1963 the Universal House of Justice has passed only a few decisions that must be considered as legislation: the decision on the issue of the continuation of Guardianship (see above, p. 180, note 207) and of the institution of the Hands of the Cause, the enactment of the law of huququ’llah by its message of Ridvan 1991, and the enactment of the ritual provisions of the Kitab-i-Aqdas referring to the obligatory prayers, fasting and dhikr (see verses 10, 13, 16-18; ‘Questions and Answers’, no. 62, 66-67, 75-77) by its announcement to

the world community on 28 December 1999. These enactments are not classical laws in the sense of setting general abstract norms, however, they are known in jurisprudence as ‘loi d’instruction’, ‘introductory law’ (Einftihrungsgesetz). 216. Legal dogmatics and legal techniques are among the necessary foundations of any type of legislation. This legal dogmatic groundwork, which is a prerequisite for the clarity and reliability of the law laid down, will be conducted by the ‘scholars’ or the ‘learned ones in Baha’ ° (al-‘ulama’ fi'l Baha’, from ‘dlim, ‘the knowing’, derived from the verb ‘alama, to know), who are at ‘the focal centre of the legislative (power)’ (see Kitdb-i-Aqdas 173, ‘Abdu’l-Bahé, Secret, p. 37) but whose legal views ‘have no authority unless they are endorsed by the House of Justice’ (‘Abdu’l-Baha, quoted from Wellspring, p. 85). On the whole sub-

ject see also Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 11.2.3; 12.4.3.

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Chapter 3 ¢ Udo Schaefer That which this body, whether unanimously or by majority, doth carry, that is verily the Truth and the Pur-

pose of God Himself.?!7

217.

Will and Testament 2:7 (p. 19), 1:17 (pp. 19, 11). The analogy

that Ficicchia has taken over from Rémer (Die Babi-Beha’i, p. 118) whereby the infallibility of the Universal House of Justice is compared with the Islamic principle of consensus, ijmd‘ (pp. 162, 281), is hardly convincing. It is true that infallibility is claimed in both instances, but that is the only thing the two have in common. We shall discuss ijmd‘ first: whereas Shi‘a Islam possessed a doctrinal authority in the form of the Imamate (see Momen, An Introduction to Shi‘i Islam, pp. 148ff.), Sunni Islam did not have any such institution—the Caliph was the worldly representative of the Prophet and did not possess doctrinal authority (see Grundlagen, p. 151, note 498 and the literature cited there). Nevertheless, there developed an institution in Sunni Islam that led to the gradual authoritative clarification of dogmatic issues. From the hadith passed on by Ibn Madja: ‘My people will never agree on an error’, it was deduced per argumentum e contrario that a consensus, ijmd‘, on a question of faith would always be based on truth. An ijmd‘ was held to exist when the recognized religious scholars of a period, the mujtahids, agreed on a question of faith. Anything that had once been decided by ijma‘ was regarded as the truth and deemed binding for all time (on this subject see Bergstrasser, slamisches Recht, pp. 131ff.; Goldziher, Introduction, pp. 50ff.; SEI, p. 157). The following differences exist between ijmd‘ and those legislative acts of the Universal House of Justice that are granted the charisma of infallibility: a) ijma‘ is neither an institution nor a decision made and proclaimed at a particular point in history, but is, rather, a statement that at a particular point in the past there was a consensus omnium doctorum, b) legal issues and questions of faith are authoritatively clarified by ijma‘. The Baytu’l ‘adl al-a‘zam is a body that makes decisions that are not concerned with matters of doctrine. It has no interpretative authority, it is rather a legislature that has never existed in Islam; c) its legislation is preceded by consultation, whereas ijmd‘ was not based on consultation between all the recognized mujtahids because the institution of a council never developed in Islam. Jjmd‘ could only ever be ascertained postero tempore; d) an ijmd‘ requires a consensus omnium, whereas the Universal House of Justice makes its decisions on the basis of a majority vote following consultation.

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5. A crucial point is the question of the amendability of decisions made by the House. Infallible decisions are ‘the Truth and the Purpose of God himself’. As manifestations of the divine Will such decisions are, in principle, as unchangeable for human beings as the Will of God. The Will of God cannot be ‘corrected’, infallible acts are not liable to ‘correction’.

The Guardian’s interpretations of the holy Writ are infallible and therefore unchangeable.?!® The legislation of the House of Justice is infallible and would therefore not be liable to abrogation had “Abdu’!-Baha not provided a clausula salvatoria, an explicit provision in his testament, according to which the Universal House of Justice has not only the power ‘to enact laws that are not explicitly recorded in the Book’, but also ‘the power

to repeal the same’.?!° Only by virtue of this clause is the House of Justice empowered to abrogate its own legislation and to

adapt the law ‘to the exigencies of the time’22° so that it is ‘the Initiator and the Abrogator of its own laws’ .2?! If one were to extend infallibility to decisions of the House

of Justice in the sphere of its administrative, executive and judicial powers, this body would not be empowered to correct its

own judgements when new facts have emerged, since the Text does not provide such an explicit clausula salvatoria for decisions outside the supplementary legislation. This result would

be unacceptable. In my estimation this is a further argument in favour of the view that executive and judicial decisions are not covered by infallibility.

218. ‘Future Guardians . . . cannot “abrogate” the interpretations of former Guardians’ (Shoghi Effendi, from a letter written on his behalf, dated 19 February 1947). ‘The Guardian reveals what the scripture means, his interpretation is a statement of truth which cannot be varied‘ (the Universal House of Justice in a letter dated 9 March 1965, quoted from Wellspring, p. 52). 219. ibid. 2:8 (p. 20). 220. ibid. 221. ibid.

185

Chapter 3 ¢ Udo Schaefer 6. In this context it should be noted that there is a qualita-

tive difference between the abrogation of a law made by the Universal House of Justice in order to supersede it by a new law that is appropriate to the changed conditions, and the cancelling of a decision in the sphere of executive or judicial power owing to the emergence of new facts. By abrogating one of its laws, the House of Justice does not ‘correct’ its former legislation, but rather, adapts it to the changed conditions on earth. Only ‘circumstances having profoundly changed and conditions having altered’ legitimates the House of Justice’s abrogating and

adapting of its own laws to the ‘exigencies of the time’ .2?2 The change of a decision related to the administrative and

judicial power of the House in the same matter after new facts have emerged is of a different quality. However one looks at it,

the change owing to new facts is a ‘correction’. There are two contradictory judgements of which only one can be true. If one claims infallibility for all administrative or judicial decisions of the House of Justice, the problem arises as to how one can cope with contradictory decisions of the same House of Justice in the same matter in a reasonable way. How is one to escape the logical dilemma? I think the claim to infallibility for both decisions

is untenable; it cannot be maintained without violating the principles of logical thinking.

The ‘infallibility’ of an erroneous and therefore corrected decision cannot be upheld by means of the sophistical argument that the (wrong) decision would have been free of error if the

facts on which it had been based had been correct. This would amount to a merely hypothetical infallibility, whereby it is not the decision itself that is infallible, but rather the process by which it was arrived at. This sort of argument would reduce the principle to an absurdity. Thus the fact that such decisions are liable to correction appears to me to constitute another rational

222.

ibid.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

argument the view that they are not covered by the conferred

charisma of infallibility. 7. The objection that could be made, namely that this interpretation does necessarily result in a reduction of the divine guidance that is granted to this supreme institution, cannot be

discussed here.??3 All I intend to say here is that even if the specific divine guidance that manifests itself in infallibility does not cover its administrative and judicial decisions, the Universal

House of Justice undoubtedly partakes in that general divine guidance promised to all Houses of Justice, the prime requisites of which have been enumerated by ‘Abdu’l-Baha.?24 8. It goes without saying that the view expressed here is of no consequence for the /egal authority of this body, because this is not based on its specific charisma but rather results simply

223. 224.

I have to refer to my paper in preparation. ‘The prime requisites for them that take counsel together are pu-

rity of motive, radiance of spirit, detachment

from all else save God,

attraction to His Divine Fragrances, humility and lowliness amongst His loved ones, patience and long-suffering in difficulties and servitude to His exalted Threshold. Should they be graciously aided to acquire these attributes, victory from the unseen Kingdom of Baha shall be vouchsafed to them . . . The first condition is absolute love and harmony amongst the members of the assembly. They must be wholly free from estrangement and must manifest in themselves the Unity of God... Should

harmony

of thought

and absolute

unity be non-existent,

that

gathering shall be dispersed and that assembly be brought to naught. The second condition: they must, when coming together, turn their faces to the Kingdom on high and ask aid from the Realm of Glory. They must then proceed with the utmost devotion, courtesy, dignity, care and moderation to express their views. They must in every matter search out the truth and not insist upon their own opinion, for stubbornness and persistence in one’s views will lead ultimately to discord and wrangling and the truth will remain hidden . . . Should they endeavour to fulfil these conditions the Grace of the Holy Spirit shall be vouchsafed unto them, and that assembly shall become the centre of the Divine blessings’ (Selections 43; 45; Bahd’i Administration, pp. 21f.) Thus, ‘Abdu’lBaha makes clear that the guidance of the Holy Spirit will be granted only to those assemblies whose consultation is conducted under the conditions he has set out in these passages.

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from

the fact that this institution

has

been

ordained

by

Baha’u’llah. Being the supreme body, it has the final say??> in all spheres of its powers. All its decisions must be uncompro-

misingly adhered to.22© The spiritual authority of the supreme House of Justice reaches far beyond its authority to have the final say in all matters. It manifests itself in its infallible legislation, by virtue of which the Baha’i community is permanently

in possession of an institution that ensures ‘the continuity of that divinely-appointed authority which flows from the Source

of our Faith’ and safeguards ‘the unity of its followers’.227 c) All the other decision-making institutions, the local and national ‘Houses of Justice’, are also promised divine guidance, but only under certain, legally unverifiable circumstances that

have been defined by ‘Abdu’l-Baha.228 They have not been granted infallibility. Ficicchia’s assertions to the contrary are blatantly false.

One indication that the local and national bodies do not share in the charisma is the fact that both their governing statutes and

the Constitution of the Universal House of Justice?29 include rights of review and appeal to ensure that erroneous decisions can be revised. Such rights would be superfluous and meaningless if the decisions of the local and national assemblies were

also an expression of the divine Will. That the regulation concerning stages of appeal stands in contradiction to the alleged

infallibility of the local and national bodies that are subordinate

225. One could paraphrase the famous dictum by Augustine (‘Roma locuta, causa finita’, Sermones 151,10) to say ‘Haifa locuta, causa finita’ (Haifa has spoken, the matter is closed). 226. This obedience to the two supreme institutions (the Guardianship and the Universal House of Justice) has been strongly emphasized by ‘Abdu’1-Baha in unequivocal and emphatic language (see Will and Testament 1:17 (p. 11)). 227.

Shoghi Effendi, World Order, p. 148.

228.

See above, p. 187, note 224.

229.

Constitution, Art. VII (The right of review), VIII (Appeals).

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

to the Universal House of Justice is something that Ficicchia

has recognized and pointed out twice in his book.23° Yet this contradiction did not cause him to question his erroneous opinion; he merely saw it as proof of the absurdity of the system.

He completely rejects the idea that he might himself be in error when he ascribes “infallibility’ to these institutions. He refers in all seriousness to my dissertation, which states that the

elected institutions of the Baha’i community are simultaneously ‘channels’ for divine guidance, and that the guidance of the

Holy Spirit is also promised to the local and national bodies on condition that their consultations are conducted in a spirit of purity, selflessness and detachment. The quotations from ‘Abdu’lBaha23! that were cited verbatim in my thesis?32 and, hence, must have been available to Ficicchia, clearly show what high moral standards and what an enormous measure of self-discipline are demanded in Baha’i consultation, so that—as I stressed in

my study?33 —the fulfilment of these conditions can never be legally ascertained. Ficicchia, by contrast, writes: “While its?34 immunity to error is presumptive, i.e. not attached to any prerequisites, the in-

fallibility of the national and local bodies is connected to the condition that its consultations are conducted ‘in a spiritual at-

mosphere of purity and selflessness’?3°—although it would undoubtedly be difficult to find a standard measure for the assessment of this.’23 Without realizing that a promise of guidance that is dependent on the fulfilment of the highest of moral

230. Baha’ismus, p. 371, note 196, p. 374. 231.

See above, p. 187, note 224.

232. Grundlagen, pp. 162ff. 233. ibid. p. 174. 234. i.e. that of the Universal House of Justice. 235. This is a quotation from my doctoral pp. 123, 174). 236. Baha’ismus, p. 372.

189

thesis

(Grundlagen,

Chapter 3 ¢ Udo Schaefer

demands means that these institutions are not free from error, that conditional infallibility is a contradiction in terms, he casually disregards these unambiguous scriptural statements. That Romer,237 to whom Ficicchia is obviously indebted for his evaluation despite the absence of a reference, should have expressed the idea that the ‘local collegia’ possessed ‘the same infallibility and authority’ is forgivable, considering the sparsity

of the information available at that time. As he himself declares,238 Rémer owed his knowledge exclusively to Browne’s list of the contents of the Kitab-i-Aqdas?%? and ‘scattered quotations in his book’, to Hippolyte Dreyfus?4? and Goldziher,2* i.e. to authors whose knowledge was very limited at that early

stage. The fact that Ficicchia, who had at his disposal all the sources that had meanwhile been published (in particular the compilation Geistige Rate—Hduser der Gerechtigkeit, Hofheim,

1975,242 in which it is made clear on every page that the local and national bodies are fallible institutions), should choose deliberately to ignore these publications can only be explained by his deep resentment towards the object of his ‘research’. The insolence with which he continually presents his impudent interpretations as Baha’i doctrine, and the obdurateness with which he rejects any form of reproach, to the point of insisting on his erroneous judgement even after his mistakes have been

237. Die Babi-Beha 7, p. 118. 238. ibid. p. 109. 239. JRAS (1900), pp. 354ff. 240.

Essai sur le Baha’isme.

Son histoire, sa portée sociale, Paris,

1909; 4th edn. 1973. 241. Vorlesungen iiber den Islam, Budapest, 1910; 2nd edn. Heidelberg, 1925; 3rd edn. 1963. English edition under the title Introduction to

Islamic Theology and Law, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981. 242. The Local Spiritual Assembly, London: Baha’i Publishing Trust, no date; and The National Spiritual Assembly, London: Baha’i Publishing Trust, 2nd enlarged edn. 1973.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

pointed out to him,?43 disqualify him as a competent and reliable scholar. The shamelessness with which he distorts everything is also evident from his discussion on the subject of the ‘infalli-

243. In a letter dated 20 March 1991 and addressed to a Baha’i who had written to the Herder-Verlag publishing house concerning obvious errors in Ficicchia’s entry in the Lexikon der Sekten (keyword ‘Baha’i’), he insisted on the correctness of his presentation. Once again I am brought forward as chief witness for the argument that the local and national bodies are also deemed

infallible. Thus, he refers to the fol-

lowing passage in my doctoral thesis (Grundlagen, pp. 41ff.): ‘The or- ~ der of the Baha’i community is characterized by the fact that its rules are binding. Obedience to these norms is not merely left to the believers’ discretion or recommended to them, they are, rather, authoritative

and are valid irrespective of the will of those concerned; their validity is universal

and not restricted to specific cases.

These

norms

are both

compulsory and a matter of personal obligation: they are followed by the members of the Baha’i community in the conviction that they must be followed (opinio necessitatis). That these regulations are not merely conventions is demonstrated by the fact that their validity is long-term and that—in so far as they are divine norms— . . . they are unchangeable and definitive, and cannot be removed by the community. Hence, it must be concluded that these norms are legal norms.’ This discussion was intended to demonstrate that the statutory norms of the Baha’i community are legal norms and not merely conventional rules. This has nothing whatsoever to do with the question of infallibility. The legal character of these norms would not be altered one jot or tittle if the teaching office and the Universal House of Justice were not bestowed with the charisma of infallibility. Ficicchia, who evidently does not understand what my discussion is all about, then refers to another passage of my thesis, in which I present the theocratic structural elements of the order

of the Baha’i

community:

‘Hence,

the administrative

order

is

theocratic in character: God himself governs his people—not through a Delphic Oracle but through a revealed Book and through legal institutions that have been granted the charisma of infallibility’ (ibid. p. 92). What is meant here is the Guardianship and the Universal House of Justice, as I go on to explain. Yet Ficicchia insolently reads something completely different into this passage, asserting that: ‘It is evident from the text that the national and local bodies are also intended.’ His confused and self-opinionated deductions show how ill-prepared he is for dealing with such subject-matter and how unsuited he is as a participant in academic discussion.

19]

Chapter 3 ¢ Udo Schaefer

bility of the Guardian’. With reference to my thesis?*4 he correctly states that: “Since the Guardian is granted infallibility only on appointment to his office, this is not an innate characteristic, but rather a bestowal. Hence, the Guardian is not infal-

lible as regards his conduct, i.e. he is not sinless.’24> Yet in the very next sentence he concludes from what he regards as the

‘exalted cult of the Guardian’2*® that the Baha’is nevertheless “seem to ascribe innate infallibility’ to the Guardian ‘just as to

the Prophets’.247 What ‘seems’ to be the case here is turned on the next page into proven fact. From an utterance of ‘Abdu’lBaha (which Ficicchia quotes) made shortly after the birth of Shoghi Effendi concerning the outstanding spiritual qualities and abilities and the future work of the child, Ficicchia comes to the hasty conclusion that: “What is (in childhood) perfect, unmatched and sublime is altogether flawless, and hence infallible and sinless. Thus, what we see here is not an omniscience and infallibility that are bestowed only upon appointment to

office; they are quite clearly innate qualities.’248 In this way, Ficicchia attributes to Shoghi Effendi an ‘innate infallibility’ accompanied by sinlessness—qualities that, according to the

teachings of Baha’u’llah, are characteristics exclusive to the Manifestations, as has already been pointed out. As if that were not enough, he even equates the charisma of infallibility conferred upon the office of the Guardian with ‘omniscience’, an

attribute that can be ascribed to no human being. In fact, according to Baha’i doctrine, Shoghi Effendi is invested only with ‘conferred infallibility’ in the execution of his office. Such exaggeration is merely a play by Ficicchia intended to undermine the Baha’i Faith’s credibility.

244. Grundlagen, pp. 130ff. 245. Baha’ismus, pp. 341f. 246. ibid. p. 342 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 247. ibid. 248. ibid.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

Not content even with that, Ficicchia allows himself to be so carried away by rage as to fall into the booby-trap of assert-

ing that the ‘rigid organization’ presents itself ‘as being in full possession of truth and of infallible conduct’.249 A sinless organization? It has been known from antiquity that: ‘Nihil novi

sub sole!’,?°° and as Ben Akiba has remarked: ‘It’s all been seen before!’, as was also recognized by Goethe when he wrote: What man can think aught foolish, prudent aught,

save what the Past already thought?25! yet never before has anyone come up with the idea of collective sinlessness, the sinlessness of a corporate body. Now here Ficicchia really does show originality!

Just as in legend where everything the Phrygian King Midas touched turned to gold, so it would seem that whatever falls into the hands of Ficicchia is disfigured beyond recognition to accommodate his personal bias. Without the least scruple this author, having assured his readers early in his book of his endeavour to ‘place his findings and presentations on scientific

foundations’,2°2 proceeds to disregard the relevant scriptural passages.2°3 He does not even quote them, let alone subject them to serious analysis. Possibly he does not even know them. Nevertheless, even here his distorting deductions do not suffice him. Having asserted, contrary to the testimony of scripture, the ‘innate infallibility’ and sinlessness of the Guardian, and then

having gone on underhandedly to equate infallibility with the attribute of the ‘omniscience’ that is exclusive to God, and then

having further propounded in all seriousness that the Baha’is

249. ibid. p. 375. 250. Eccl. 1:9 (‘And there is no new thing under the sun’). 251. Faust II, Act II, Mephistopheles (p. 250). 252. Baha’ismus, p. 30. 253.

Kitab-i-Aqdas 47; Tablets 8:17, ‘Abdu’1-Baha,

Questions, ch. 45.

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Some Answered

Chapter 3 ¢ Udo Schaefer claim ‘infallibility of conduct’ (i.e. sinlessness) for all their in-

stitutions, he finally tops it with a downright lie: “Indeed, it is in this sense that the Baha’is are instructed concerning the person of Sawqi Efendi.’254 These innumerable instances of misinformation clearly demonstrate what this ‘proven expert’2°> meant when he threatened in his letter to the Baha’i World Centre?*¢ that he would take every opportunity to fight the faith of Baha’u’ lah ‘with all possible means’ .2°7 8. Freedom to teach—teaching authority Just how distorted is Ficicchia’s image of the community and its structures also becomes evident in his statements concerning the believer’s freedom to proclaim the message of Baha’u ’llah and to instruct others in the Faith (/ehrfreiheit) on the one hand, and the teaching authority of the Guardian, i.e. his task of giv-

ing an authentic interpretation of the Word of God, on the other. He finds the discussion of this subject in my doctoral thesis2>% ‘unclear and contradictory’,?°° since there is no freedom of instruction to speak of.2°° (Similarly, he accuses me of ‘sophistic hair-splitting’,2°! ‘legalistic hair-splitting’26 and platitudes,2% and attests to “fundamental errors’ in my thesis since it corresponds to ‘the opportunistic diction of the current Baha’i lead-

254. Baha’ismus, p. 343. 255. Herder-Verlag publishing house, letter dated 8 May 1991. 256. See above, p. 33. 257. Herder-Verlag publishing house, letter dated 8 May 1991. 258. Grundlagen, pp. 109ff. 259.

Baha’ismus, p. 343, note 100.

260. 261. 262. 263.

ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid.

p. p. p. p.

344, note 108. 345, note 110. 344. 332.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

ership’ .26*) The possibility that he might be the one who is in error simply does not occur to him. This reminds me of one of

Lichtenberg’s aphorisms: “When a book and a head collide and a hollow sound results, is it always the fault of the book?’2®5 Let us consider the relevant points in detail: a) Ficicchia has misunderstood both the term ‘power of interpretation’? (/Jehrgewalt) and the concept of freedom to teach, the individual’s freedom and duty ‘of teaching His Cause

(amr) ,2®7 since he is of the opinion that the one excludes the other.?°8 In arriving at this assessment he probably fell victim to his oft-articulated conviction that the believers are not author-

ized to undertake any ‘individual search for meaning’ in the revealed texts,2©? that all scriptural exegesis is forbidden to them,?”° as it had already been prohibited by the Bab?7! and Baha’u’llah272 (which in principle would have excluded the possibility of an interpretative office ever coming into existence). The view (occasionally expressed by individual Baha’is in

the past) that interpretation of the scripture is wholly forbidden, rests upon a misunderstanding’? caused by a list of the ‘prohibitions’ contained in the Kitab-i-Aqdas, which was published in the Synopsis and Codification of the Laws and Ordinances of the Kitab-i-Aqdas and in which the ‘Interpretation of the Holy

264. 265.

266. 267.

ibid. p. 323, note 20. Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, Werke, Aphorismen, p. 166. See Grundlagen, pp. 107ff. See also below, Appendix, p. 790. Baha’u’llah, Gleanings 158.

268. Baha’ismus, pp. 344f. 269. ibid. pp. 338, 345, 365, 417, 426, 428. 270. ibid. pp. 29, 91, 338, 345, 365; Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 237. 271. Baha’ismus, pp. 87, 90ff., 167. 272. ibid. p. 249, note 20, citing Rosenkranz, p. 325. 273. Ihave already discussed this in Jn a Blue Haze, pp. 29ff.

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Writ’ has been enumerated.?”4 For some time there was confusion among the believers. Many were misled into the assump-

tion that in the community of Baha’u’llah, apart from the authoritative interpretation given by “Abdu’l-Baha and Shoghi Effendi, individual interpretations are prohibited—a view which

observers have often found difficult to understand. It is indeed hard to imagine a religion in which exegesis of the scripture is not allowed.

This misconception was closely connected with a mistaken idea of what ‘interpretation’ is. Interpretation, exegesis, is the methodical search for meaning, without which the Word of God would be inapplicable and pointless. Every proclamation of the Faith that goes beyond pure quotation, every translation into another language, even reflection about the revealed Word, the search for meaning in pectore, is ultimately interpretation: ‘In-

terpretation creates meaning.’27> Moreover, as is the case in law and in ethics, concrete behaviour must be subsumed under the

moral guidelines and norms of the scripture. This indispensable subsumption is not possible without interpretation, since the application of a norm presupposes its comprehension. The sense and purpose of a norm, the ratio legis, must be clear, as must

also its relationship to other norms in the hierarchy of values. Prohibiting interpretation would be tantamount to prohibiting thinking, and nothing would be more contrary to the Purpose of God than the intellectual castration of his believers. Interpretations by the believers are not at all forbidden. In fact, they ‘constitute the fruit of man’s rational power’ .276 Individual interpretation, however, is not authoritative, and

authority is not an intrinsic element of interpretation. Authoritative interpretation has been monopolized by Baha’u’llah by

274.

under D 1 yi. (p. 47).

275.

Buck, Symbol and Secret, p. xix.

276. Kitab-i-Aqdas, note 130.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

conferring it on ‘Abdu’l-Baha as his successor.277 ‘Abdu’1-Baha himself has defined his function. In the context of his response to a question (referring to the details of the prohibition of gam-

bling in the Kitab-i-Aqdas?’8) he indicated that the specification of these details is left to the Universal House of Justice and

stated: ‘Abdu’l-Baha is the interpreter of the Book (mubayyini-kitab) and not the enactor (mu ’assis) of laws (ahkdm)

not revealed in the Book.279 When “Abdu’l-Baha in turn designated Shoghi Effendi as the Guardian of the Cause of God (valiyi-i-amru 'llah) he defined the function of this office as the authoritative interpreter of scripture by using the same term:

He is the expounder (mubayyin) of the Word of God.28° Establishing an auctoritas interpretativa?®! simultaneously implies the exclusion of any other interpretation that claims authority. In his Lawh-i-Ittihad (Tablet of Unity) Baha’u’llah

has abolished the institution of the clergy.28? Thus, there exists in the community of Baha’u’llah no separate class of divines such as the ‘ulamd’ in Islam, who expound religious law with binding authority. The findings of the ‘learned ones in Baha’’ (al-‘ulamda’ fi’'l Baha’) have no authority, unless they are en-

dorsed by the Universal House of Justice. 277.

Kitab-i-Aqdas 121, 174; see Tablets 15:9.

DISMISS. 279. Quoted from Ishraq Khavari, Ganjinih-yi-hudid wa-ahkam, New Delhi, 1980, p. 345 (translation authorized by the Research Department of the Baha’i World Centre). 280. Will and Testament 1:16 (p. 11). 281. The term tabyin used by Cole (‘Interpretation in the Baha’i Faith’, in BSR, vol. 5.1 (1995), p. 11) to designate authoritative interpretation is evidently derived from the related word mubayyin used by ‘Abdu’1-Baha in his Will and Testament. 282.

See Taherzadeh, Revelation, vol. 4, p. 191ff.

197

Chapter 3 « Udo Schaefer No general prohibition of interpretation is contained in the

Kitab-i-Aqdas. On the contrary: The two verses that deal with this subject make clear that the believers are generally authorized to interpret the scripture. Individual interpretation is ac-

cepted within certain boundaries. Everyone has the right to arrive at his own understanding of the Holy Text and to express

his opinion, as long as no claim to authority is made.283 However, there are some hermeneutic rules2*4 that have to be complied with. Baha’u’llah has affirmed in several of his

Tablets the distinction between those verses that are susceptible to an allegorical interpretation (ta’wil) and those that relate to subjects such as laws and ordinances, worship or rites ( ‘ibdddt). In this case the outward, literal, obvious meaning must not be conjured away by a figurative interpretation. The Kitab-i-Aqdas makes that clear: Whoso layeth claim to a Revelation direct from God, ere the expiration of a full thousand years, such a man is assuredly a lying impostor . . . Whosoever interpreteth (tafsir, ta’wil) this verse otherwise than its ob-

283. See Shoghi Effendi, Baha’i Administration, p. 63; Principles of Baha’i Administration, p. 25. This view is also evident from a statement by the Universal House of Justice: ‘A clear distinction is made in our Faith between authoritative interpretation and the interpretation or understanding that each individual arrives at for himself from his study of its teachings. While the former is confined to the Guardian, the latter,

according to the guidance given to us by the Guardian himself, should by no means be suppressed. In fact such individual interpretation is considered the fruit of man’s rational power and conducive to a better understanding of the teachings, provided that no disputes or arguments arise among the friends and the individual himself understands and makes it clear that his views are merely his own’ (Wellspring, p. 88; see also Kitab-i-Aqdas, note 130). 284. On this subject see Seena Fazel and Khazeh Fananapazir, ‘Some interpretive principles in the Baha’i Writings’, in BSR, vol. 2.1 (1992), pp. 4ff.; Sen McGlinn, ‘Commentary on Fazel and Fananapazir’s “Some interpretive principles in the Baha’i Writings” °, in op. cit., vol. 7 (1997), pp. 84ff.; Cole, “Interpretation in the Baha’i Faith’, in op. cit., vol. 5.1 (1995), pp. 1ff.

198

Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order vious (zdhir) meaning is deprived of the Spirit of God and of His mercy which encompasseth all created

things . . . 285 This verse is of far-reaching theological and legal consequence because it defines the period of validity of the divine law as at

least one thousand years. A figurative, metaphoric interpretation of this definition has been excluded.28° A metaphoric interpretation (ta’wil) of scriptural passages is generally accepted. Particularly susceptible to this process

are, as Christopher Buck has formulated, ‘the non-transparent passages of scripture—parables, figurative speech, and apoca-

lyptic visions which are in some sense “dark”’287 . . . ‘Prime texts for ta’wil are the “ambiguous” or figurative verses of the Qur’an, known as the mutashdbihdt on the basis of Qur’an

3:7.’288 The Kitab-i-Iqan is an allegorical interpretation (fa wil) of biblical and qur’anic eschatology.28? However, the Kitab-iAqdas gives a general hermeneutic rule in order to prevent the subversion of the text by unwarranted figurative interpretation: Whoso interpreteth (ta’wil) what hath been sent down from the heaven of Revelation, and altereth its evident (zadhir) meaning, he, verily, is of them that have per-

285. 37. A similar statement was made by Baha’u’llah shortly after his declaration in 1863 in his Kitab-i-Badi‘ (see Taherzadeh, Revelation, vol. 1, pp. 279f.; vol. 2, p. 381).

286. In one of his Tablets Baha’u’llah specifies that ‘each year’ of this period ‘consists of “twelve months according to the Qur’an, and of nineteen

months

of nineteen

days each,

according

to the Bayan”

’

(quoted from Kitab-i-Aqdas, note 62). 287. Symbol and Secret, p. xix. 288. ibid. p. 83. 289. ‘It treats the so-called “third part” of the Qur’an, eschatological verses requiring an interpreter (mu ‘awwil), one who performs ta ‘wil. Properly speaking, therefore, Baha’u’1lah’s role is that of a mu ‘awwil’ (Buck, op. cit. p. 82).

199

Chapter 3 * Udo Schaefer verted the Sublime Word of God, and is of the lost

ones in the Lucid Book.29° Thus, it is clear and evident that Ficicchia’s assertion ac-

cording to which Baha’u’llah has forbidden all exegesis is absolutely false. Neither did the Bab do so. Ficicchia refers?! in

this connection to his informant Romer??? and to the Arabic Bayan,?*> although in both cases he is unjustified in so doing. Romer does not speak at all of a general prohibition of exegesis

on the part of Baha’u’llah or the Bab, but merely of a prohibition of allegorical interpretation in the context of the verse in

the Kitab-i-Aqdas in which it is stated that the divine law is to be valid for a minimum of a thousand years;?9* the general hermeneutic rule laid down in verse 105295 appears not to have been familiar to him. Neither did Romer assert the existence of a prohibition of exegesis on the part of the Bab, claiming only a prohibition of allegorical interpretation,??© which is also incorrect. It is highly likely that the passage in the Arabic Bayan cited by Ficicchia was adopted uncritically from Rémer, who cites the verse number but not the content of the verse. Although Ficicchia lists Nicolas’ French translation of this work in his bibliography he has probably not consulted it, otherwise he could easily have recognized that there is no prohibition of

exegesis in the Bayan. The relevant verse reads as follows: “Je n'ai permis a personne de commenter le Béydn, si ce n'est en

290. 105. 291. Baha’ismus, p. 167. 292. Die Babi-Beha’i, p. 127. 29313: 294.

See above, p. 199, note 285.

295. 296.

quoted above, note 290. See Die Babi-Beha’i, p. 127.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

conformité avec le commentaire que j’en donne.’??7 Hence, the Bab, like Baha’u’llah in the Kitab-i-Aqdas, rejects only such

interpretation of his writings as contradicts his own explanation of it. Furthermore, in the Persian Bayan? the Bab established rules for the commentary on the scripture revealed by him, in order to prevent corruption of the sacred texts through errors in translation. It follows from this that commentary is permitted. Here again we encounter Ficicchia’s technique of semantic distortion: whereas Romer speaks of a prohibition of the ‘allegorical interpretation of the Law, as was done previously by the

Bab (Bayan)’,29? Ficicchia turns this into a prohibition of all ‘exegesis and allegorization of his holy writings’ 3° A prohibition of commentary on the scripture, in particular

on ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s testament, such as Ficicchia predicates,3°! does not exist. He writes: “Any commentary or criticism of the

testament—as indeed of the doctrines of Baha’ism in their entirety—was forbidden to the believers, and even the very slightest violation punished by excommunication’ ,3° yet he provides neither details nor sources for such an inference.5°? Who has ever prohibited commentary on the Will and Testament and the 297. Arabic Bayan 2:3. Badi’ullah Panahi) reads fassartu.’ 298. 3:18. In Nicolas’ veut commenter une chose

The Arabic text (for which I am obliged to Dr thus: ‘Md adhantu ahadan yufassiru illa ma French translation the text reads: ‘Celui qui de ce qui reste du Point...’

299. Die Babi-Beha’i, p. 127. 300. Baha’ismus, p. 167. 301. ibid. pp. 300, 305; Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 232. 302.

Baha’ismus, p. 300. 303. For his assertion that ‘all commentary on the testament is forbidden and this is declared a test of loyalty to the faith’ (p. 305, Ficicchia’s emphasis), Ficicchia refers to Ahmad Sohrab. However the lack of bibliographical details make this unverifiable. It is possible that Ahmad Sohrab, who was excommunicated as a covenant-breaker (see Taherzadeh, Covenant, pp. 343-348) did indeed make such an assertion—it does not, however, correspond to the facts of the matter.

201

Chapter 3 « Udo Schaefer other revealed texts? When was this done, and where is there

any written evidence of such a prohibition? Who has ever been excommunicated

owing to the ‘very slightest violation’? On

this our author keeps silent. In his bibliography2 he lists David Hofman’s work A Commentary on the Will and Testament of ‘Abdu ’l-Baha (Oxford, 1955), and even quotes from it several

times.3°5 How is this possible? Did he fail to notice that if his opinion were correct such a work could not exist? How does Ficicchia explain the fact that the Baha’i community has produced a wide range of secondary literature about the faith, in-

cluding numerous dissertations and doctoral theses3®°—not to mention the many publications of the Associations for Baha’i

Studies in various countries—none of which could have been written without scriptural exegesis? How can it be that individual believers who have studied Arabic have translated into English hitherto unpublished texts by Baha’u’llah, sometimes

along with detailed commentaries?2°7 Who could make a criti304. Baha’ismus, p. 444. 305. ibid. pp. 283, 346. 306. Inter alia Nicola Towfigh, Schépfung und Offenbarung aus der Sicht der Baha’i-Religion, Hildesheim, 1989. A list of doctoral theses is included in The Baha’i World, vol. XVIU, Haifa, 1986, pp. 890ff.

307. Such as Lambden’s ‘A Tablet of Baha’u’llah of the late Baghdad Period: Lawh-i-Halih, Halih, Halih. Ya Bisharat’, in BSB 2.3 (December 1993), pp. 105-112; idem, ‘A Tablet of Mirza Husayn ‘Ali Baha’u’llah of the Early ‘Iraq Period: The Tablet of All Food (Lawh-i-Kull at-Ta’am)’, in BSB 3.1 (June 1984), pp. 105-112; idem, ‘The Mysteries of the Call of Moses: Translation and Notes on Part of a Tablet of Baha’u’llah addressed to Jinab-i-Khalil’, in BSB 4.1 (March 1986), pp. 33-79; Momen, in ‘‘Abdu’1-Baha’s Commentary on the Islamic Tradition “I was a Hidden Treasure” (Shar-i-Kuntu Kanzan Makhfiyan)’, in BSB 3.4 (December

1985),

pp. 4-35;

Lambden,

‘A Tablet

of Baha’u’llah

Com-

menting on that Verse of the Most Holy Book (Kitab-i-Aqdas) about the Need for an International Language and Script’, in BSB 4.3-4 (April 1990), pp. 28-49; Cole, ‘Baha’u’llah’s Commentary on the Surah of the Sun. Introduction and Provisional Translation’, in BSB 4.3-4 (April 1990), pp. 4-27; Fananapazir, ‘A Tablet of Mirza Husayn ‘Ali Baha’u*}lah to Jamal-i-Burwjirdi: A Full Provisional Translation’, in BSB 5.1-2

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

cal analysis of Ficicchia’s ‘standard work’ if a prohibition of exegesis had resulted in the veritable amputation of the believers’ brains? What is most perverse is that Ficicchia does not merely make false assertions but then proceeds to illustrate them in highly imaginative ways in order to arouse the impression that he is simply reporting that which the Baha’is believe and what they have been told by their ‘headquarters’. To take just one example, when Ficicchia claims that the Baha’is are ‘denied even the individual search for meaning in the contents of the revelation’, he hastily adds as a reason: ‘since everything has

already been said and there is nothing left to say’.3°® He makes no attempt to inform his readers as to where this is written and who said it. Indeed, it is not written anywhere and I, for one, have never encountered such nonsense. Ficicchia has cunningly invented this as a prelude to his judgement that this is among the clear ‘signs of inherently predetermined stagnation’ and an

‘intellectual stagnation’ 3°°

(January 1991), pp. 4-12; Cole, ‘Baha’u’llah’s Surah of the Companions: An Early Edirne Tablet of Declaration. Introduction and Provisional Translation’,

in BSB

5.3-6.1

(June

1991), pp. 4-74; Lambden,

‘The Seven Valleys of Baha’u’llah: A Provisional Translation with Occasional Notes’, in BSB 6.2-3 (February 1992), pp. 26-74; Cole, ‘Redating the Sirah of God (Surat Allah): An Edirne Tablet of 1866 (?) — Provisional Translation Appended’, in BSB 6.4-7.2 (October 1992), pp. 4-17; Fananapazir and Lambden, “Baha’u’llah’s Tablet to the Physician, Introduction, Provisional Translation and Notes’, in BSB 6.4-7:2

(October 1992), pp. 18-65; Lambden, “A Further Tablet of Baha’u’llah to Faris the Physician’, in BSB 7.3-4 (June 1993), pp. 22-47; Shahrokh Monjazeb,

‘The

Tablet

of Baha’u’llah

to Queen

Victoria

(Lawh-i-

Malikih): An Introductory Note and Completed Translation’, ibid. pp. 421; Shahriar Razavi, ‘The Tablet of the Seven Questions of Baha’u’llah

(Lawh-i-haft pursish): An Introductory Note and Provisional Translation’, ibid. pp. 48-68. 308. Baha’ismus, pp. 422f. 309. ibid. p. 423 (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

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b) As I have demonstrated elsewhere,3!° the existence of a teaching authority does not exclude general freedom to teach. I will leave to the informed reader the task of judging what is unclear, contradictory or sophistic in that discussion. Ficicchia does not want to accept that the Baha’i community is governed by the principle of freedom to teach, according to which every believer is authorized to proclaim the message

of God, because it does not fit into the image of the Baha’i Faith that he is trying to convey. How can there be any freedom

to teach if the individual search for meaning is prohibited? How could the teachings of the Baha’i Faith spread if there were no teaching liberty, given the fact that there is no special rank of believers entrusted with the task of promulgating Baha’i beliefs? What happens at the ‘mass events’, with which, as Ficicchia so cynically remarks, ‘the believers are kept constantly on

the go’?3!! The less said about such absurd allegations the better.

c) The believer’s freedom of instruction is based on the

general obligation to teach the faith with which Baha’u’llah has entrusted his followers. Every believer is called upon to pass on the message of Baha’u’lah: Teach ye the Cause of God, O people of Baha, for God hath prescribed unto every one the duty of proclaiming His Message, and regardeth it as the most meritorious

of all deeds.3!2 Of all the gifts of God the greatest is the gift of Teaching. It draweth unto us the Grace of God and is

our first obligation. Of such a gift how can we deprive ourselves? Nay, our lives, our goods, our comforts, our

310. Grundlagen, p. 108ff. 311. Baha’ismus, p. 383. 312.

Baha’u’llah, Gleanings 128:10; 157:1.

204

Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order rest, we

offer them

all as a sacrifice

for the Abha

Beauty and teach the Cause of God.3!3 The appeal that ‘haply thou mayest guide thy neighbour to the

Law of God, the Most Merciful’3!4 is addressed to every believer and is firmly anchored in scripture, being encountered in

various forms throughout.2!5 Compliance with this commandment is one of the duties placed upon the believers through the

Covenant,3!© i.e. the duties of the believer before God, these being affected neither by the jurisdictive powers of the elected bodies nor by the bearer of interpretative authority. This takes on even greater importance when one considers that there is no clergy in the Baha’i Faith. For this reason every individual believer is challenged to understand the fundamental verities of the Faith and to reflect on their significance, so as to be able to

present them to others in their ‘pure form’.3!7 The message of Baha’u’llah could be spread so rapidly only because every sin-

gle Baha’i is called upon to proclaim the word, each according to his gifts and opportunities, not only some few missionaries with a special mandate. Hence, the believer need not be assigned specific authorization to teach the faith as in the Catholic Church (where the

right and duty to preach the Word requires a special missionary assignment, the missio canonica,>8) nor can any person or in-

313. 314.

‘Abdu’l-Baha, Will and Testament 3:10 (p. 25). Baha’u’llah, Gleanings 161:1.

315.

See also Tablets 2:12; 5:17; 7:5; 10:11; 13:5; Will and Testament

3:9-10, 1:21-22 (pp. 25, 13), Gleanings 157:2 etc. 316.

As is shown also by Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 11.2.1.

317.

See Shoghi Effendi, Principles of Baha'i Administration, p. 11. as follows in can. 1328 CIC (1917): ‘Nemini ministeFormulated 318. rium praedicationis licet excerpere, nisi a legitimo Superiore missionem receperit, facultate peculiariter data, vel officio collato, cui ex sacris canonibus praedicandi munus inhaereat.’ The CIC 1983 no longer contains the term ‘missio’. Regulations concerning these matters are set out in the canones 763-767 CIC. What stands out is the reversal of the legal

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Chapter 3 ¢ Udo Schaefer

stitution release the believer from this duty or remove his liberty to teach. Even the withdrawal of a believer’s administrative rights as a result of serious, repeated violations of the law of Baha’u’llah does not affect the right (and the duty) of that be-

liever to promulgate the faith.3!? Consequently, there are no disciplinary proceedings aimed at preventing a believer from teaching the faith. The precaution available to preserve teaching purity and the unity of the community is excommunication, a

measure which, however, is an ultima ratio?2° and may be administered only in the case of “covenant-breaking’. In promulgating the faith the believer has the inalienable right to offer his own understanding of the scripture. Concerning this, Shoghi Effendi stated that We should not restrict the liberty of the individual to express his own views so long as he makes it clear that these views are his own . . . God has given man a ra-

tional power to be used and not killed. This does not, however, mean that the absolute authority does not remain in the revealed Words. We should try and keep as near the authority [i.e. the scripture] as we can and show that we are faithful to it by quoting the Words of

Baha’u’llah in establishing our points. To discard the authority of the revealed Words is heretic and to suppress

completely

individual

interpretation

of those

Words is also bad. We should try to strike a happy me-

dium between these two extremes. 3!

situation: whereas in the earlier CIC no-one was authorized to preach unless he had express permission to do so, every ordained clergyman (bishop, priest, or deacon) is now authorized to preach unless this authorization has been limited or withdrawn. 319. The only restriction is that believers whose administrative rights are currently suspended are not called upon for service in public proclamation activities. 320. 321.

See Grundlagen, pp. 35ff., 142ff. and below pp. 224 ff. Quoted in Principles of Baha’i Administration, pp. 24f.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

Without this strict adherence to the scripture and its authentic interpretation by the bearers of the teaching authority, Baha’i doctrine would be at the mercy of human arbitrariness. Nevertheless, it should be noted that according to Baha’u’llah the Word of God is multidimensional: ‘its meaning can never be

exhausted’.322 The Holy Text imparts a multiplicity of meanings as it is recorded in the hadith quoted in the Kitab-i-Iqan: Every knowledge has seventy meanings . . . We speak one word, and by it we intend one and seventy mean-

ings.323 The dogmatization of doctrine that has characterized ecclesiastical history, the formulation of religious truths in definitions and decrees, is absent in the Baha’i Faith. Within the Baha’i community, therefore, there are certainly diverse opinions over the whole spectrum that is covered by scripture. That the principle of freedom to teach leads to ‘a great variety of views on many questions’ is a diversity of opinions that is expressly wel-

comed.324 The demand is expressed that in Baha’i theology ‘no controversy should arise about the matter’ and ‘the possibility of a variety of views on the subject’ must be guaranteed:3?° ‘Scholarship should be non-contentious and diverse. ’326 Hence, the believer has no authority in teaching the Baha’i Faith; he does not share in the authoritative formulation of its

322.

Gleanings 89:1.

323. hadith, quoted from Kitdb-i-[qdn 283 (p. 255). 324. Letters from the Universal House of Justice dated 20 October 1977 and 28 May 1991, p. 5. On this subject see also Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 11.2.3.

325. McLean, ‘Prolegomena to a Baha’i Theology’, Baha’i Studies, 5.1 (March-June 1992), p. 49. 326. ibid.

207

in Journal of

Chapter 3 ¢ Udo Schaefer

doctrines.327 Such authority is possessed solely by the scripture and by the interpretative office of the Guardianship.328 This office is necessarily authoritative32?—without such authority it would be completely superfluous—and the authoritative inter-

pretations given by the Guardian are, of course, binding.*3° The existence of a teaching authority does not contradict the freedom to teach; indeed the one is conditional upon the other, since freedom to teach does not mean ‘anything goes’ but rather limits itself within certain bounds. Loyalty to the scripture is its

prerequisite.°3! Freedom to teach depends on ‘the individual’s commitment to the scripture. The scripture is and will remain

the obligatory foundation for all interpretations. ’352 That Ficicchia does not understand this foundation is evident from his repeated criticism of the ‘dogmatic bond to Ba-

327. Ficicchia’s assertion, made with reference to my discussion of this subject (Grundlagen, p. 103), that ‘the believers have no rights’, is an over-generalization and is therefore wrong. 328.

In the Catholic Church, by contrast, all preaching is authoritat-

ive: ‘... behind ecclesiastical authority stands Jesus Himself... When the Catholic priest proclaims the Word of God, Christ Himself preaches through him. Certainly this authority of Christ is most plainly and strikingly expressed in the doctrinal pronouncements of His Vicar; but it is present also in the preaching of a simple parish priest in his remote village church. “Christ Himself speaks through His disciples; His voice is heard through those whom He sends” ’ (St Augustine, In Ev. Joann., XLVII,5)’ (Karl Adam, The Essence of Catholicism, pp. 24, 26). 329. Something that Ficicchia apparently thinks is his own discovery (Baha ’ismus, p. 344, note 108). 330. The teaching office in the Catholic Church also demands ‘religious obedience by the will. . . and by the rational powers’ (Catechism, nos. 892, 87). 331.

‘The believers

should be careful not to deviate,

even

a hair-

breadth, from the Teachings. Their supreme consideration should be to safeguard the purity of the principles, tenets and laws of the Faith’ (Shoghi Effendi, Dawn of a New Day, p. 61). 332.

Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 11.2.3.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

ha’u’llah’,393 the alleged ‘dogmatization’ 334 and the ‘propagation of dogmatic absoluteness’33> because it excludes ‘personal religious freedom’,

‘lived religiosity’,33° the ‘self-responsibility

of the individual’,*37 ‘independent spiritual investigation’ and ‘free religious practice’>38—whatever he imagines that to be— and from his assertions concerning the ‘surrender of one’s own spiritual insights in favour of absolute obedience towards the

authorities in matters of faith’.73° Religious faith is, by its very nature, unconditional, it demands unreserved commitment. If there were no dogmatic foundation in scripture, the Baha’i Faith would not be a religion. To reproach a religion on the grounds that it is dogmatically bound up with its founder is absurd.

9. Prepublication review—a censorship? What is the truth regarding Ficicchia’s allegations of “extremely

strict censorship regulations’34° with which he evokes images of Metternich and totalitarian regimes? All works written by believers about the Baha’i Faith, as well as all translations from the original texts, are reviewed prior to publication. Both the reviewing of primary literature translated from the original and that of secondary literature about the faith were initiated by

333.

Baha’ismus, pp. 379, 166, 268, 290.

334.

ibid. pp. 278 (Ficicchia’s emphasis), 318, 343, 377, 426.

335.

Lexikon der Sekten, column 104.

336.

Baha’ismus, p. 290.

337. 338.

ibid. p. 377. ibid. pp. 417, 29, 288, 300, 345, 413, 426.

339.

ibid. p. 428.

340.

ibid. p. 379, note 4, pp. 300, 302; Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38

(1975), pp. 231f. Ficicchia ought to have asked himself why such regulations should be necessary, if the believers are already forbidden to engage in any individual search for meaning and to express any opinions.

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Chapter 3 ¢ Udo Schaefer

‘Abdu’l-Baha.34! This is intended, in the first instance, to ensure the authenticity of the original in the translation,34? and in the second, as Shoghi Effendi explained,>*3 to prevent incorrect self-presentations—which cannot readily be recognized by outsiders and are later difficult to rectify—from damaging the public image of the faith, considering that it is still young and its doctrines relatively unknown. The purpose of these reviews

is to eliminate errors and to avoid misrepresentations.344 The community should present ‘an accurate understanding of its purpose to a largely sceptical public’.34° As Gollmer has correctly pointed out, it is not permissible for the elected bodies responsible for the review process to let ‘differences of interpretation that are within the scope of scripture to result in re-

fusal to grant permission for publication’.34° Academic studies (dissertations and doctoral theses) that are not made publicly

341. See ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Tablets, vol. 1, p. 124; vol. 2, p. 464; Shoghi Effendi, Baha ’i Administration, p. 23. 342.

In the churches, too, no-one is allowed to produce and publish

translations of the Bible without permission. According to can. 823-832 CIC, publication of the books of the Bible may only take place with Church authorization. Translations into a living language require approval by the Holy See, the ‘Imprimatur’. Commentaries must correspond to ecclesiastical tradition. Catholics were forbidden to read any translations by non-Catholics, including those of the Eastern Church (see Morsdorf, Lehrbuch, vol. II, pp. 431ff.).

343. Baha'i Administration, pp. 38ff.: ‘They must supervise in these days when the Cause is still in its infancy all Baha’i publications and translations, and provide in general for a dignified and accurate presentation of all Baha’i literature and its distribution to the general public’ (Baha ‘i Administration, p. 38). 344. See Shoghi Effendi, letter dated 15 November 1956, quoted in a letter from the Universal House of Justice dated 28 October 1991. 345.

Universal House of Justice, in Individual Rights and Freedoms

in the World Order of Baha’u’llah, p. 19. 346. Gottesreich, p. 381.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

available outside academia are exempt from the review proc-

ess.347

The reviewing of publications was always described by

Shoghi Effendi as a temporary measure,?48 necessary only as long as the faith is in its infancy.349 He gave the assurance that: If certain instructions of the Master3°° are today particularly emphasized and scrupulously adhered to, let us be sure that they are but provisional measures designed to guard and protect the Cause in its present state of infancy and growth until the day when this tender and precious plant shall have sufficiently grown to be able to withstand the unwisdom of its friends and

the attacks of its enemies.>>!

347. Memorandum from the Secretariat of the World Centre, 8 September 1991, printed in BSB 6.4-7.2 (October 1992), p. 125. 348.

World Order, p. 9.

349.

Individual Rights and Freedoms, p. 19.

350. Agqd: atitle given to ‘Abdu’l-Baha. 351. Baha’i Administration, p. 63. In Individual Rights and Freedoms (42-47) the Universal House of Justice addressed the issue of prepublication review and reaffirmed this view, rejecting as premature requests for its abandonment. In 1995 Barney Leith in an interesting article (‘Baha’i review: Should the “red flag” law be repealed?’, in BSR 5.1, pp. 27ff.) raised the question again and in 1997 following a request for guidance on the issue the Universal House of Justice reaffirmed the current policy, pointed to the responsibility of Assemblies to ‘educate’ the reviewers in their duties, and restated the purpose of such review as ‘to help Baha’fs to avoid injuring the Faith, and misleading the general public, by inadvertently distorting its nature or teachings in their published writings’ (letter from the Universal House of Justice, 24 March 1997, p. 2). The review process ‘is not, and could not be, to protect the

Faith from outside criticism .. . Baha’fs should learn how to understand such criticism and deal with it appropriately.

Informed,

constructive

criticism from non-Baha’is can be both illuminating and helpful. such

criticism

is

ill-informed,

but

not

ill-intentioned’

Often (ibid.).

Baha’u’llah Himself cautions his followers: ‘Warn, O Salman, the beloved of the one true God, not to view with too critical an eye the sayings and writings of men. Let them rather approach such sayings and

Ott

Chapter 3 + Udo Schaefer Such reviews are not ‘a result of teaching restraints as is the im-

primatur in the Catholic Church’.5°? They do not constitute ‘surveillance of publications in order to keep pernicious writ-

ings away from the community of believers’.5°3 Most importantly, they do not serve to suppress publications, to eliminate undesirable opinions, to enforce conformity and monopolize

thought—on the contrary, diversity of opinion is welcome. It should not go unmentioned that the reviewing committees have occasionally found themselves in conflict with authors. I, myself, have had negative experiences in this regard in the past. Conflicts inevitably arise when the individuals appointed as reviewers are not sufficiently qualified and are not in possession of the level of competence required for the task in hand. Competence and proficiency are prerequisites for such a

review. Problems are also bound to occur when the reviewer loses sight of the true purpose of the process, namely the elimi-

nation of errors, and starts to take his own views as the yardstick for judging the content or linguistic style of the work, as if his role were that of co-author. The same applies when, for instance, the reviewer tries to prevent the author expressing con-

clusions that he himself does not share, even though they are within the sphere of interpretation supported by the scripture. Such attitudes ignore the fact that, in the Baha’i Faith, truth is

not laid down in a one-dimensional way but, as I have pointed

out,>°4 is manifested in a diversity of interpretations, as exwritings in a spirit of open-mindedness and loving sympathy’ (Gleanings 154:1). In the same Tablet, with regard to actual attacks on the Faith he says: ‘Those men, however, who, in this Day, have been led to

assail, in their inflammatory are to treated differently. It to his ability, to refute the Faith of God’ (ibid.). 352. Gollmer, Gottesreich, 353.

writings, the tenets of the Cause of God, is incumbent upon all men, each according arguments of those that have attacked the ch. 11.2.3.

LThK, vol. 2, column 742; see also Mérsdorf, Lehrbuch, vol. II,

p. 432. 354. See above, p. 207.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

pressed by Baha'u'llah in the Kitab-i-Iqan. Dogmatism on the part of reviewers is inappropriate. The sacred right of the individual ‘to self-expression, his freedom to declare his conscience

and set forth his views’>> has been acknowledged by the Guardian in unequivocal language: No one has the right to impose his view or opinion and

require his listeners to believe in his particular interpretation of the sacred and prophetic writings. I have no objection to your interpretations and inferences so long as they are represented as your own personal observations and reflections. It would be unnecessary and confusing to state authoritatively and officially a dogmatic Baha’i interpretation to be universally accepted

and taught by believers.3°° In cases where reviewers have clearly exceeded their re-

mit, it is up to the bodies responsible to find a solution to the problem. If the reviewing process functions correctly, it can be very fruitful for the author. Competent advice stimulates new ideas and self-critical reflection, and can result in a much improved manuscript. I have always benefited from having my manuscripts reviewed critically by friends who have expertise in various fields, in addition to the usual review process. 10. Forbidden books?

There have never been any regulations ‘forbidding the reading

of oppositional literature’3>” and ‘hostile books’,>>8 as asserted by Ficicchia. In the Baha’i Faith there is no concept of forbidden books, no Index liberorum prohibitorum, as exists in the

355. Shoghi Effendi, Bahd’i Administration, p. 60. 356. Shoghi Effendi, letter of 6 April 1928, quoted from Unfolding Destiny, p. 423. 357. Baha’ismus, p. 379, note 4 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 358. Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 237.

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Catholic Church.3>9 Here again Ficicchia offers no evidence for his allegations. He does not cite a single source where such a prohibition is supposedly expressed. As far as the covenant-

breakers3©° are concerned, they are, according to divine law, to be shunned following their excommunication because ‘they will utterly destroy the Cause of God, exterminate His Law and ren-

der of no account all efforts exerted in the past’.3°! Nevertheless, Baha’i scripture contains no stipulations that prohibit the

reading of their literature. Neither have the institutions ever pronounced such a prohibition; they have only cautioned the believers in strong terms that it is better to avoid reading these works because if readers do not have profound knowledge of

Baha’i history and doctrine, such literature can succeed in undermining their faith. Ficicchia was himself informed of the legal situation in a letter from the Universal House of Justice dated 2 October 1974. Page 8 of this letter contained the following statement: ‘Finally, we should like to answer the question as to whether the believers are permitted to read the litera-

ture of the covenant-breakers. It is not forbidden.’ Despite this, he proceeded to dish up this untruth both in his essay published in 1975362 and in his book six years later. He chose to withhold from his readers explicit information he had been given. 11. Freedom of expression prohibited?

Ficicchia’s nonsense about the prohibition of the free expression of opinion*®? and on the exercise of any kind of criti359. Initiated by Pope Pius IV in 1559 and finally regulated in can. 1397 of the CIC (1917). The last official edition of the catalogue was published in 1948. 360. For details on this term see pp. 224ff. 361. Will and Testament 2:9 (p. 20). 362. Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 232. 363. Baha’ismus, pp. 275, 300, 302, 325, 346 note 113, pp. 365, 417, 423, 427; Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), pp. 236, 238.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

cism364 runs through his book like a cantus firmus. These alleged prohibitions provide Ficicchia with an inductive foundation for all the accusations he raises against the Baha’i community and its institutional order. If these accusations were justified, they would indeed be ominous for the community. A community that has banished the human right to the free expression of opinion—a right which is nowadays guaranteed in the Constitution of every democratic state—would truly deter anyone from joining it, since to do so would amount to an act of self-incapacitation. However, this allegation is once again false. In all the many instances in which it is mentioned, the only sources that Ficicchia uses to try to prove the existence of such a prohibition

are two utterances by ‘Abdu’l-Baha.5®° One comes from an epistle written in 1912 to the Baha’i community of San Francisco. Here ‘Abdu’]-Baha states that: According to the clear text of the Kitab al-Aqdas and other tablets, the Centre of the Covenant is the remover of all difficulties, for He is the interpreter of the Book. Not one soul has the right to elucidate the text

of the Book, whether in public or private.>% The other passage is taken from the Will and Testament of *Abdu’1-Baha: To none is given the right to put forth his own opinion

or express his particular convictions. All must seek guidance and turn unto the Centre of the Cause and the

House of Justice.3°7 Both these passages are unmistakably concerned with the Covenant of God and the institutions that are at the focus of this

364. 365. 366. 367.

Baha’ismus, pp. 413, 29, 288, 300, 345, 359ff., 417, 426. ibid. pp. 345f.. Star of the West, vol. VIII (19 January 1918), p. 223. 3:12 (p. 26).

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covenant: the bearer of interpretative authority and the Universal House of Justice. Both deal with the issue of successorship to ‘Abdu’l-Baha. No-one should insist on his opinion on this matter, no-one should claim authority and thus ‘raise the standard of revolt, wax stubborn and open wide the door of false

interpretation’.3°8 This is a call for loyalty to the ‘Centre of the Covenant’, not a general prohibition of the free expression of opinion. This fact becomes even clearer when one examines the

Persian original of the Will and Testament.3° The term ‘right’ is expressed by the Arabic word haqq,3” which is objectively closer in meaning to ‘authority’, whereas a general prohibition of the free expression of opinion would probably be expressed

by the term mujaz. This is the sense in which these texts have always been understood. No-one other than Ficicchia has ever interpreted

them in the sense of a general prohibition on freedom of expression. In my doctoral thesis the relevant passage is printed in its full context. The statement cited by Ficicchia is annotated, the

note reading as follows: “This sentence refers only to the regulation of the successorship.’37! In support of this position I refer to Hofman who expresses the same view in his commentary on the Will and Testament.372 Without analysing this, and without giving any further reasons, Ficicchia brusquely rejects this view as unfounded and insists that the said passages mean ‘that any

open expression of opinion at all is strictly forbidden’ 373 The reader may judge for himself how convincing Ficic-

chia’s interpretation is, an interpretation which puts him out on

368. Will and Testament 3:12 (p. 26). 369. ‘nafsi ra haqq-i-ra’y wa i‘tiqgdd-i-makhsusi na(h), bdyad kull igtibds az markaz-i-amr va Baytu'l-‘adl namayand.’ 370. reality, divine truth, divine law (see SEI, pp. 126ff.). 371. Grundlagen, p. 127. 372. Commentary, p. 26. 373. Baha’ismus, p. 346, note 113 (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

216

Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

an intellectual limb. In any case, the question must be raised as to whether it is the task of an author describing himself as a ‘re-

searcher on religions’374 to inform the public about how he interprets a particular passage of scripture, or whether it would not be more appropriate for him to give his readership guidance as to how the text is understood inside the community of believers and what legal consequences are drawn by that community. However, Ficicchia is possessed not merely of the ability unwaveringly to interpret texts differently from the way they

are interpreted in the community and filter out what he sees as expedient, he also purposely ignores sources that he knows attest to the right to freedom of expression and even raise such expression to the status of an obligation. On the subject of con-

sultation among the believers in the community, “Abdu’l-Baha states that: The members thereof must take counsel together in such wise that no occasion for ill-feeling or discord

may arise. This can be attained when every member expresseth with absolute freedom his own opinion and setteth forth his argument. Should any one oppose, he

must on no account feel hurt for not until matters are fully discussed can the right way be revealed. The shining spark of truth cometh forth only after the clash

of differing opinions .

. The honoured members must

with all freedom express their own thoughts.37> This quotation is found on pages 162 and 163 of my doctoral thesis. Before and immediately following it there is the follow-

ing discussion of its contents: The believers are, however, not only entitled but even obliged to give free expression to their opinions, be-

cause it is only after the clash of different opinions 374.

ibid. p. 313.

375.

Quoted from Shoghi Effendi, Baha ’i Administration, pp. 21f.

217

Chapter 3 « Udo Schaefer that truth can be found . . . Independence of judgement is therefore an important characteristic of Baha’i consultation . . The said method of consultation is not restricted to the activities of the believers within the

elected

institutions.

On the contrary,

the believers

should practise it in their daily lives. The relations of these bodies to one another and to the believers should

also be determined by the principle of consultation.” I subsequently cite Shoghi Effendi, who designates the right to freedom of expression as one of the basic rights of the Baha’is: Let us also remember that at the very root of the Cause

lies the principle of the undoubted right of the individual to self-expression, his freedom to declare his con-

science and set forth his views.377 Ficicchia was very well acquainted with these utterances

of ‘Abdu’l-Baha and Shoghi Effendi and my commentary on them, since in his book378 he quotes a sentence from my thesis that immediately follows the above quotation from Shoghi Ef-

fendi. It is evident from his book?” that he had also read the letter from the Universal House of Justice to a member of the Swiss Baha’i community dated 23 March 1975,38° in which— with reference to Shoghi Effendi?®!—the inalienable right to freedom of expression is emphasized. This proves that his assertion concerning the prohibition of the freedom of expression results not merely from the wilful manipulation of a scriptural passage but is made despite his knowing better. Once again we can see what he meant by his announcement in his letter dated

376. Grundlagen, pp. 162f. 377. Baha'i Administration, p. 63. 378. Baha’ismus, p. 360. 379. ibid. p:. 150. 380. ibid. note 35. 381. Bahda’i Administration, p. 63.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

5 April 197878? that he would fight the Baha’is ‘with all possible means’. Freedom

of expression,

freedom

of speech—‘a

funda-

mental principle’3®3 of the Baha’{ Faith—should, of course, ‘be disciplined’*4 in accordance with the standard set out by Baha’u ’llah, namely that: ‘Human utterance is an essence which aspireth to exert its influence and needeth moderation . . . this

hath to be combined with tact and wisdom.’385 Speech requires ‘an acute exercise of judgement, since both the limitation of

speech and the excess of it can lead to dire consequences’ .386 All views and ideas should therefore be expressed ‘with the ut-

most devotion, courtesy, dignity, care and moderation’ .7°’ It should be oriented towards the common good, an approach which implies ‘the profundity of the change in the standard of public discussion intended by Baha’u’llah for a mature soci-

ety’.388 It should be noted, however, that these are aspects of individual ethical responsibility; they are not instructions amounting to group-imposed constraints, let alone to institutional regimentation or surveillance. 12. Criticism prohibited? Freedom of expression necessarily implies the right of criti-

cism.389 A community that—as Ficicchia zealously and repeat-

382.

See above, pp. 33.

383. Universal House of Justice, Individual Rights and Freedoms (p. 12).

24

384. 385.

ibid. Tablets 13:14.

386.

Individual Rights and Freedoms 27 (p. 13).

387.

‘Abdu’l-Baha, quoted from Bahd’i Administration, p. 22.

388.

Individual Rights and Freedoms 29 (p. 14).

389.

For a detailed discussion of the function of criticism inside the

community see Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 13.2-3.

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Chapter 3 ¢ Udo Schaefer

edly assures his readers—banishes every critical thought from its midst and responds to such criticism by “immediate exclu-

sion from the community’,39° would soon fall apart: ‘The system needs criticism as an element of self-regulation. ”39! The rank of human reason,29? man’s critical faculties, is unique in the scripture of Baha’u’llah. ‘4g? is the ‘supreme emblem of God’,3%4 a ‘sign of the revelation’,>9> the ‘first and foremost among these favours, which the Almighty hath con-

ferred upon man’.3¢ It is intended that man should use this gift of intellect: “God has given man a rational power to be used and

not killed.’397 The divine revelation has—as the Universal House of Justice emphasizes —‘nothing to fear from the exercise of reason’, for ‘the more one thinks about it and studies it,

the greater are the truths that one discovers within it’.39° It would therefore be more than surprising if a religious community that values the critical faculty so highly were to insulate

itself against criticism from its own members,??? as Ficicchia

390.

Baha’ismus, p. 426.

391.

Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 13.2.3.

392.

On the role of human reason see Nader Saeidi, ‘Faith, Reason

and Society in Bahai Perspective’, in World Order (Spring/Summer 1987); see also Udo Schaefer, Die Freiheit und ihre Schranken, pp. 3252, 59ff. and my discussion in Bahd’i Ethics. 393.

Reason, rationality, insight, mind, intellect, intelligence.

394. Secret 2 (p. 1). 395.

Gleanings 83:1.

3962s 1bid95:1: 397. Shoghi Effendi, quoted from Principles, p. 25. 398. Letter dated 1 September 1975. 399. “How can there be the candour called for in consultation if there is no critical thought? How is the individual to exercise his responsibilities to the Cause, if he is not allowed the freedom to express his views?’ (Universal House of Justice, Individual Rights and Freedoms 31 (p. 14)).

220

Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

incessantly asserts,4°° claiming not only that the expression of critical opinions is forbidden but also that ‘every critical thought’ [!] results in “immediate exclusion from the community’ 4°! This assertion is yet another deliberate distortion of the principles governing the Baha’i community. In reality, criticism

has ‘its institutionally defined place’4°2 in the order of the community. Criticism may be addressed, for a start, directly to

the decision-making institutions: ‘The Baha’is are fully entitled to address criticisms to their assemblies.’4°3 However, this is not merely the nght of the individual Baha’i. It is, as Shoghi Effendi has pointed out, the believer’s vital responsibility . . . to offer fully and frankly, but

with due respect and consideration to the authority of the Assembly, any suggestion, recommendation or criticism he conscientiously feels he should in order to improve and remedy certain existing conditions or

trends in his local community.4 Correspondingly, it is the duty of the assembly ‘to give careful

consideration to any such views submitted to them’ .4°5

400. Baha’ismus, pp. 29, 288, 401. ibid. p. 426. Ficicchia’s 38 (1975), p. 233) that Ahmad ‘criticism’ is incorrect. Sohrab,

300, 345, 413, 417, 426. statement (Materialdienst 15/16, Issue Sohrab was excommunicated owing to who never doubted the authenticity of

the Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha, was expelled from the com-

munity as a ‘covenant-breaker’ because of his attacks on the Guardianship and his schismatic activities. He had gathered a number of supporters in two organizations founded by himself: ‘The New History Society’ and ‘The Caravan of East and West’. The latter—as Ficicchia correctly states—had the character of a ‘worldwide correspondence club’. His attempt at establishing an alternative community failed miserably. On this subject see Taherzadeh, Covenant, p. 344. 402.

Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 13.2.3.

403. Shoghi Effendi, The National Spiritual Assembly, p. 22. 404. Letter dated 13 December 1939, quoted from Individual Rights and Freedoms 32 (p. 14f.). 405.

Shoghi Effendi, ibid. p. 15.

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Chapter 3 ¢ Udo Schaefer

Moreover, the individual has the right to express “open and

constructive criticism’*° in public at gatherings held at various levels. The Nineteen Day Feast,4°? which also ‘fulfils various administrative needs and requirements of the community’, is a setting ‘for open and constructive criticism and deliberation regarding the state of affairs within the local Baha’i commu-

nity’.4°8 Then there is the National Convention, an annual meeting at which delegates from all regions of a country elect the National Spiritual Assembly, a forum for each delegate to participate in a dialogue with representatives of the entire national community and where criticism can be publicly expressed.

Shoghi Effendi, who calls ‘consultation, frank and unfettered’ the ‘bedrock’ of the order of the community,4° writes on this subject: It is a fundamental principle of the Administration not to restrict, under any circumstances, the freedom and privilege of the delegates to express freely and fully their ideas, feelings, grievances and recommendations, so long as they do not encroach upon the established

principles of the Administration.*!°

406. ibid. 33 (p. 15). 407. The Baha’i calendar consists of nineteen months of nineteen days each (plus four intercalary days). On the first day of each month the community gathers for worship, consultation and shared food. 408. Individual Rights and Freedoms 33 (p. 15). 409. Principles of Baha’i Administration, p. 68. 410. Letter dated 12 August 1933 to an individual believer, quoted from National Convention no. 15 (p. 30). The conditional clause concerning abuse (‘. . . so long as they do not encroach . . . ’) is not an arbitrary restriction of freedom of opinion but a barrier immanent in any right: every right can be forfeited through abuse, even constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights (see Art. 18, German Constitution (Grundgesetz)).

222

Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

This right is documented in Article 13, para. III of the statutes of the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is in Germany, in which it is stated that: The delegates have the right to express their opinion freely, openly and independently. They should unburden their hearts and speak frankly of their hopes and concerns, but in a moderate and dispassionate manner.

Ficicchia may possibly have deduced the alleged prohibition on criticism,*!! for which he does not cite any sources, from the prohibition of obstructionism. The members of an assembly are obliged to be loyal to decisions made by majority

vote and should not ‘object to or censure’4!2 such decisions outside the assembly. This regulation is intended to prevent the authority of the assembly being undermined by destructive criticism and obstructionism from within, ‘for otherwise the order of the Cause itself will be endangered . . . and confusion

and discord will reign in the community’.4!3 Hence, protection is guaranteed for ‘the right of the critic to express himself’, but

‘the unifying spirit of the Cause of God must also be preserved, the authority of its laws and ordinances safeguarded, authority

being an indispensable aspect of freedom’.*!4 Though one may not particularly like this regulation, to deduce from it an allencompassing prohibition of criticism is entirely dishonest. As Gollmer has rightly pointed out, however, criticism is

‘in the Baha’i context not a value in itself’ but is rather ‘an instrument’ for the correction of decisions or states-of-affairs. It should therefore be ‘stripped of its polemical and destabilizing function. Criticism must not lead to partisan structures, since

411. Baha’ismus, pp. 29, 300, 345, 359ff., 288, 413ff., 417, 426. 412. ‘Abdu’l-Baha, quoted from Baha'i Administration, p. 22, The Local Spiritual Assembly, p. 8. 413. Shoghi Effendi, quoted from Individual Rights and Freedoms 33 (p. 15). 414. ibid. 34 (p. 15).

223

Chapter 3 ¢ Udo Schaefer strife and conflict are expressly condemned in the Baha’i scripture. Neither should it be a means for participants to promote their own self-importance, or to conduct indirect electoral propaganda’; it should, instead, be motivated by “honest con-

cern for the common good’.*!5 Thus, the duty of the critic is responsibility, and that of the

institutions is unconditional openness to criticism.*!® The relationship of the Baha’is to their institutions is therefore not one

of ‘uncritical obedience’*!” or ‘uncritical submission’,4!® but of critical loyalty: “Loyalty and obedience are not at all the same as blind acceptance: they are an essential complement of the

free use of reason that the Faith enjoins.’4!° 13. Covenant-breaking and excommunication In his efforts to present the order of the Baha’i community as a merciless, repressive system, Ficicchia repeatedly draws his reader’s attention to a regulatory measure that exists in various forms in all incorporated societies, unions and associations, in all religious communities and also in all churches: exclusion, expulsion or excommunication. In so doing he no doubt counts

on the well-known fact that the current zeitgeist has little sym-

pathy for such legal precautions.420 The information he gives concerning this is a complete

distortion of the actual state of affairs. He tries to convince the reader that anyone who diverges in the slightest degree from the

415.

Gottesreich, ch. 13.2.3.

416.

See Shoghi Effendi, Baha’i Administration, pp. 63ff.

417.

Baha’ismus, p. 288.

418.

ibid. pp. 413ff., 417.

419. 19.75%

Letter from the Universal House of Justice dated 1 September

420. As is clearly demonstrated by public reaction to church disciplinary proceedings relating to issues of doctrine, for instance.

224

Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

“‘management’#?! is invariably catapulted out of the community: “Whoever ignores organizational decrees . . . is excommuni-

cated;’422 ‘even the slightest violation leads to immediate excommunication; ’4?> ‘the response to any critical thought or attempt at innovation in its own ranks is immediate exclusion

from the community.’424 From this, the reader is bound to think that excommunication is a daily occurrence in the Baha’i community, an impression that Ficicchia intensifies by the use of

adverbs such as ‘rigorously’42> and ‘immediately’ ,4?6 i.e. such a measure is taken unhesitatingly, without further ado, stante pede. One only wonders that this community still exists; with such a rigorous practice of excommunication it ought long ago to have bled itself white, to have become a victim of self-liquidation. Here again it is necessary to put straight what Ficicchia

has made ‘crooked’. a) Wherever people join together on a legal basis to form associations, rules are adopted to prevent constant damage be-

ing inflicted by disloyal members. A footballer who continually scores own-goals will not be with his club very long. A politician who publicly discredits his party’s policies and repeatedly votes with the opposition will soon reap the consequences. The

statutes of most clubs or associations and of all political parties contain paragraphs that regulate expulsion procedures. The matter is no different with religious communities. Nowhere is the danger of factional divisions, segregation, false claims to authority, stumbling blocks or betrayal greater than

421. 422. 423. 424. 425.

Baha’ismus, p. 413. ibid. p. 288. ibid. pp. 300, 334. ibid. p. 426. ibid. p. 302 (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

426.

ibid. pp. 300, 426.

ZL

Chapter 3 ¢ Udo Schaefer

here, where the highest of values, truth itself, is at stake.427 Without certain precautions against subversive attacks from within that threaten the faith’s doctrinal unity and the unity of

its adherents, the community would be at the mercy of human arbitrariness, defenceless against attempts to provoke division. All religions have provisions in some form or other for expul-

sion from the community.4?8 In Judaism, apostates were excommunicated by the Synedrion and not permitted to enter the synagogue.42? On the basis of the New Testament,*3° the Church has developed a complex legal framework relating to

excommunication.4!_

Excommunication—previously

with

a

distinction between the ‘greater’ and the ‘lesser’ interdict—exists in both the Catholic and Protestant churches and is given

the blessing of the highest authorities, St Thomas Aquinas*32 427. On the concept of the ‘stumbling block’ see above, p. 43, notes 40 and 41. 428. Even in Zoroastrism (see Yasna 49:3). On religious history see LThK, vol. 1, column 1224ff. 429.

See John 9:22; 12:42; 16:2.

430.

See Matt. 18:15-18; I Cor. 5:1-5; II Tim. 3:2-5: ‘For men will be

... holding to a form of godliness, although they have denied its power; and avoid such men as these.’ 431. The term, the various forms and the effects of excommunication were regulated in the canones 2257-2267 CIC (1917). In the new Codex

published in 1983, the institute of excommunication was subjected to radical pruning in response to the altered situation. A person is now to be excommunicated only ‘with the greatest reservation and for serious offences’

(*. . . censuras

autem,

praesertim

excommunicationem,

ne

constituat, nisi maxima cum moderatione et sola delicta graviora’, can. 1318 CIC), e.g. for schism, apostasy or heresy (can. 751, 1364) or for abortion (can. 1398), for which it is an automatic consequence (ipso iure).

432. guilty means world doers

‘As far as heretics are concerned, they have made themselves of a sin that justifies not only their expulsion from the Church by of an edict of excommunication, but also their removal from this through capital punishment . . . Thus, if forgers and other evilare lawfully put to death by secular princes, how much more law-

ful it is for heretics, immediately after their conviction, not only to be

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and Martin Luther.433 In both churches excommunication was applicable not only to serious ecclesiastical offences such as

heresy,*34 apostasy and schism, but also to a wide range of misdemeanours

such as desecration of holy days, disruption of

church services, etc.435 In the Protestant church, such misdemeanours resulted in secular punishment; even severe corporal punishment ‘was commonplace’.*?° In view of these facts, it is

excluded from the community of the Church but, quite rightly, to be executed for heresy’ (S. th., Pars Ila-IIae q. 11, a 3). 433. ‘With heretics there is no need for any particular ado, they can be condemned without a hearing. And while they perish at the stake, the believer should attack the evil at its roots and wash his hands in the blood of the Bishops and the Pope, who is the devil in disguise’ (Tischreden III, 175). Calvinist treatment of dissidents was not in the least any more moderate, as demonstrated by Calvin’s order for the physician Michael Servetus to be burned at the stake for publishing his antiTrinitarian tract. 434. The rigour with which Christians of other denominations were condemned is shown by the following example: The court preacher of the Margrave of Ansbach was convicted of Calvinism. In a report by theologians of the Lutheran University of Tubingen it was stated that arrest and banishment were much too mild penalties for a heretic. Since capital punishment was prohibited, the appropriate punishment ought to be life imprisonment in a fortress with periodical attempts at conversion. Should the attempts at conversion not bear fruit, the heretic would

have to be treated as a madman and incarcerated for life (Ernst Walter Zeeden, Die Entstehung der Konfessionen, p. 115). 435. The ceremony of excommunication takes the form of a curse: anathema sit (see Gal. 1:9; I Cor. 16:22). According to the Consistorial Order of Mecklenburg published in 1570, the person to be excommunicated was to be ceremonially delivered to the devil by the priest during a church service ‘for the destruction of his flesh’ (I Cor. 5:5). It was the duty of the priest to call for ‘God’s terrible anger and disgrace’ to descend upon him so that ‘he should be excluded and cut off from the communion of all the saints in heaven and on earth and be accursed and eternally damned along with all the devils in hell’. The members of the church community were forbidden, on pain of severe punishment, ‘to consort with the excommunicated’ (quoted from Zeeden, Konfessionsbildung, p. 163). 436. Zeeden, ibid. p. 164.

227

Chapter 3 ¢ Udo Schaefer disconcerting that a work published under ecclesiastical auspices should be permitted to denounce the completely different

law on excommunication in the Baha’i Faith as a ‘mediaeval inquisitional practice’ 437 It is, of course, unmistakable that the erosion of traditional

Christian faith43® has led to the obsolescence of the ecclesiastical regulations concerning excommunication. They are not suited to the current situation in which hundreds of thousands of people in Germany leave the Church every year. The more

Protestantism has broadened out into theological pluralism, the less possible it has become to define the term heresy. If the Protestant Church were to take traditional orthodox Church doctrine as its standard, large sections of its membership would

have to be excommunicated: “Anyone who wanted to permit nothing but the “pure doctrine” would have to throw the majority out. That would be a sure path to sectarianism.’*?9 Therefore, it has been decided to make a virtue out of necessity: to cast off what is today seen as historical ballast, and instead to

turn tolerant.44° The same tolerance is also demanded of others: in the name of tolerance they call for a non-binding pluralism of doc437. Baha’ismus, p. 337 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 438. According to the theologian Gottfried Ktienzlen the churches have ‘lost their religious monopoly. The Church and Christianity have become options for religious practice on the market of religious possibilities’ (‘Kirche und die geistigen Strémungen der Zeit’, p. 19). Moreover, central concepts of Christian doctrine, such as grace and sin,

are ‘not even known’ among some of the younger generation in the Christian community (Barz, Postmoderne Religion, pp. 252, 137). 439. Elmar zur Bonsen, ‘Auf dem Weg in ein neues Heidentum. Sind die traditionellen Kirchen nur noch Auslaufmodelle?’,

in Stiddeutsche

Zeitung, 5/6 March 1994. 440. Members of the clergy who publicly express doubts about Church doctrine, and who visibly live in conflict with that doctrine or propagate ways of life that are not sanctioned by the Church risk being subjected, at most, to disciplinary proceedings, but not to excommuni-

cation.

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trines and, instead of a legally constituted community, they seek a pneumatic ‘free-flowing movement’ in which everything is open to question and everyone can do as he likes, an organization that no longer has any real identity (and which can therefore all the more easily be written off). The historically conditioned views current today are taken as the norm, and a concept of truth and a concept of a community substituted for the actual community in question, without allowance for differentiation.

Thus, provision for excommunication is made to appear a relic of the pre-modern era. b) The order of the Baha’i community is not an innovation forced upon it by external circumstances but an integral part of the Covenant of God established between Baha’u’llah and the believers. Acknowledgement of this order is therefore ‘not an appendage but an indispensable element of Baha’i doctrine, in-

separable from the highest truths espoused by the faith’.44! The (lesser) Covenant serves to preserve the unity of the commu-

nity*42 and is therefore ‘the mighty stronghold’,**#3 a ‘fortified

441. Grundlagen, p. 32. 442. For an explanation of the ‘lesser Covenant’ see Gollmer, below, pp. 687ff.; Taherzadeh, Covenant, pp. 273-313. Religious history shows that in all religions the division of the community by subversive members of that community has always been felt to be a serious threat and a major transgression. In Buddhist doctrine, the loss of the unity of the community, its di-

vision, is presented as a most serious offence, for which the offender will atone in hell until the end of the age (see above, pp. 45): ‘There is one thing in the world, O monks, which, in coming into existence, ex-

isteth to the disadvantage and unhappiness of many people, to the detriment, disadvantage and misery of many people, gods as well as men. What is this thing? (It is) dissension in the Order. For in an Order that hath been divided, there are reciprocal quarrels as well as reciprocal abuse, reciprocal disagreement and desertion, and there (i.e. in such an Order) they are discontented and enjoy no contentment, and there is diversity of opinion (even) among those who are content.’ To this effect spake the Blessed One, and hereupon said the following: “A disturber of the Order stayeth for an aeon in punishment and perdition; for he that delighteth in society and abideth not in the Law, falleth from Security;

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having (also) broken up a concordant Order he burneth for an aeon in perdition’ (Itivuttaka, § 18). Unity in the community, on the other hand,

leads to ‘the advantage and happiness of many people, to the benefit, advantage and happiness of many people, gods as well as men: For in a concordant Order, O monks, there are neither reciprocal quarrels nor reciprocal abuse, nor is there reciprocal disagreement and desertion and there (i.e. in such an Order) they are contented and enjoy contentment,

and among those who are contented there is further (contentment). To this effect spake the Blessed One, and hereupon said the following: Happy is the concord of the Order, and the kindliness of those in concord, for he that is delighted by concord, and who abideth in the Law,

falleth not from Security. Having also made the Order concordant he rejoiceth for an aeon in heaven’ (ibid. §§ 18, 19). In the Qur’an, the preservation of the unity of the community and the danger posed by the ‘Hypocrites’ (al-mundfiqun, for discussion see above, p. 45ff.) to the existence of the umma is a frequently recurring motif. It is a God-given commandment: ‘Observe this faith, and be not divided into sects therein’ (Qur’dn 42:11; 3:100). In the Qur’an, Jesus is shown to have observed this commandment, saying ‘And truly this your religion is the one religion; and I am your Lord; therefore fear me. But men have rent their great concern, one among

another, into sects, every

party rejoicing in that which is their own’ (Qur’dn 23:54-55; 21:94; 3:17; 6:160; 5:16). On this subject see also Khoury, Was sagt der Qur’an zum heiligen Krieg?, pp. 35ff.,; Busse, Die theologischen Beziehungen des Islams zu Judentum

und Christentum, p. 134, Zirker, Christentum

und Islam, pp. 128ff. In what is known as the ‘Pontifical Prayer’ for his disciples and his community, Christ prays that the unity of the community of his followers may be preserved (‘ut omnes unum sint!’ = ‘that they may be one’ (John 17:11, 21). St Paul exhorted the early Christians to ensure that ‘there be no divisions among you, but you may be made complete in the same mind and in the same judgement’ (I Cor. 1:10). The apostolic epistles repeatedly condemn those who undermine the unity of the Christian community (see pp. above, pp. 46ff.). In contrast to this position, Rudolf Sohm, a professor of canon

law, presented ecclesiastical

unity as superfluous, even damaging (see Hans Barion, Rudolf Sohm und die Grundlegung des Kirchenrechts, p. 20) and the (Protestant) scholar of religious studies Gustav Mensching was of the opinion that the elementary structural requirements of a religious community consist not in unity but rather in a complexity of forms, since these are based on the

religious life itself (Soziologie der Religion, p. 257). Nevertheless, it cannot be overlooked that the unity of God’s people has always been a desideratum on the part of the churches, who are.today so painfully lacking in unity that Catholics and Protestants cannot even celebrate the

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fortress of the Cause of God and the firm pillar of the religion of God’.*44 This unity is extremely valuable and its preservation a high, legitimate goal, since loss of unity would mean religious divisions, which would inevitably lead to the splintering of the creative, formative power immanent in divine revelation. For this reason, Baha’u’llah warns his followers in the Kitab-i-‘ Ahd: Let not the means of order**> be made the cause of confusion and the instrument of union an occasion for

discord.*46 For a community that proclaims the cause of the spiritual and

political unity of the whole world, its own unity would be its Achilles’ heel were there no legal precautions to preserve the order that guarantees this unity and protects the community from division. This protection consists in there being provision for the

expulsion of a community member who threatens the Covenant

Eucharist together. Unity and universality are essential elements in Protestantism, as well as in Catholicism. The attempt has been made to compensate for the lack of empirical, visible unity by introducing the concept of the ‘invisible church’ (on this subject see Holstein, Kirchenrecht, p. 125; Grundlagen, p. 60). The fact that St Paul is highly praised for his efforts to preserve the unity of the Church as the one body of Christ (see Evangelisches Kirchenlexikon, keyword ‘Mission’, column 1341 with reference to I Cor. 1:13; 10:17) makes it all too obvious that

Ficicchia employs double standards concerning this matter: something that is highly valued by the Church—the unity of God’s people—is given a pejorative interpretation when applied to the Baha’is, being referred to as the ‘preservation of organizational exclusivity (Baha’ismus, p. 287 (Ficicchia’s emphasis)), or the ‘organizational exclusivity to which the individual is obliged uncritically to subordinate himself (ibid. p. 417, Ficicchia’s emphasis; Lexikon der Sekten, keyword ‘Baha’i’, column 104). 443. Will and Testament 1:17 (p. 11). 444. ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Tablets of the Divine Plan, p. 49. 445.

i.e. religion.

446.

Tablets 15:12; see also 15:4.

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Chapter 3 ¢ Udo Schaefer by attacking the divinely-ordained order and its institutions, and

who presents an internal threat to the unity of the community.*47 c) Excommunication under Baha’i law differs from that in ecclesiastical law with regard both to its preconditions and to its effects. Excommunication is applicable only in cases of covenant-breaking and is therefore highly exceptional. The divine law does not contain a legal definition of this offence, but it is clear from many scriptural passages that only exponents of sub-

version*4® and sedition are covenant-breakers.*4? According to *“Abdu’1-Baha: One of the enemies of the Cause is he who endeavours to interpret the words of Baha’u’llah and thereby colours the meaning according to his capacity, and collects around him a following, forming a different sect,

promoting his own station, and making a division in

the Cause.*>°

447. See Will and Testament 1:5; 3:9 (pp. 5-6; 25). 448. Ficicchia criticizes my use of the term ‘subversive elements’ in my doctoral thesis (Grundlagen, pp. 35 and 133). However, I consider this choice of vocabulary correct. I did not call the covenant-breakers ‘criminal vermin’, as Ficicchia asserts (Baha ‘ismus, p. 336, note 68),

but merely drew an analogy with § 42e of the German criminal law valid at that time. This paragraph made it possible for people who were a constant danger to society (termed ‘dangerous habitual criminals’ in § 20a) to be permanently eliminated from society by ‘preventive detention’ (now in § 66 of the German criminal law).

449.

ndqidu'l-mithdq: ‘breaker of the Covenant.’ Derived from nagqd:

break, violation, destruction, offence; nagada: to destroy, to break, to

violate, to transgress, to revolt. Ndqid is the participle active, first root (see Wehr, Arabisches Worterbuch, pp. 1306f.). On the term naqd almithdq (covenant-breaking), which is of Qur’anic origin (2:27; 4:155; 5:13; 13:20; 13:25), see MacEoin, in EI, 1993 edn., vol. VII, p. 921. The Arabic words ‘ahd and mithdq, from which this term is derived, have

been translated into English using the word Covenant, which appears throughout the King James Bible as the accepted translation for the Hebrew b’rith and the Greek diatheke. 450. Star of the West, vol. III, p. 8, quoted in Esslemont, Baha’u’llah and the New Era, p. 124.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

A covenant-breaker is someone who tries to ‘sow the seeds

of doubt in the hearts of men’,*>! who expends ‘great effort to shake the faith of feeble souls’,4>* promotes ‘discord’, and brings about ‘division’.4°3 Such a person attempts to ‘subvert His word’,*>4 stirring ‘sedition in the land’,45> and using ‘divers measures and various pretexts that he may separate the gather-

ing of the people of Baha’,*°° ‘advancing claims for which God hath sent down no warrant’ .457 The motives of the covenant-breakers are described in the scripture as deriving mostly from their wish to follow their

‘own desires’,*4>8 from their ‘ambitions’,459 and their ‘wish for leadership’4©° and ‘envy’, which is ‘the chief reason why men’ fall ‘away from harmony and love into mischief and hate’4®! and ‘turn aside from the Straight Path’.4°? ‘Abdu’l-Baha has described the development of such people: ‘Feelings of not being recognized, of being underrated, of being slighted’ lead to a

‘know-all attitude, self-assurance, the delusion of being infallible’ which results in ‘blind criticism of each and everything that the leader or the leaders decide or do... Thus every Judas works himself up into feelings of being Prometheus, he causes the weaker, unstrength-

451.

Will and

Testament

1:17;

1:2, 4, 5; 2:10

(pp. 12, 3, 5, 21);

‘Abdu’1-Baha, Selections 185:4 (pp. 211f.). 452. ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Selections 185:2 (p. 211). 453. Will and Testament 1:10,17; 2:12; 1:20 (pp. 9, 12f.). 454. ibid. 1:17 (p. 11). 455. ibid. 1:10 (p. 9). 456. ibid. 1:17 (p. 11). 457. ibid. 2:10 (p. 21). 458. ibid. 2:5 (p. 18); Selections 187:3 (pp. 215f.), 186:6 (p. 214).

459. 460. 461. 462.

Selections 187:1 (p. 215). ibid. 186:6 (p. 214). ibid. 141:2-3 (p. 163). ibid.

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ened and uncritical followers of the community to waver and vacillate. He particularly attracts to himself the youth without experience of life, he knows how to bind

to himself the emotional and illogical, uncritical female members of a faith, in brief the Judas works on the line of least resistance. The desire for prestige, a craving for power, the ever-thirsty feeling of self pro-

pels him further on his path away from God.*63 “Abdu’1-Baha calls the covenant-breakers “‘mischief-makers’ who ‘with many stratagems, are seeking leadership, and in order to reach this position they instil doubts among the friends that they

may cause differences, and that these differences may result in their drawing a party to themselves’.4°* Covenant-breakers are ‘souls that are deprived of the Spirit of God and are lost in pas-

sion and self and are seeking leadership’ .4° These people present a special threat because they do not usually declare their evil intentions openly but instead ‘they se-

cretly sow the seeds of suspicion’,*©® and because ‘outwardly they assert their firmness and steadfastness’

while ‘inwardly

[they] are engaged in agitating souls’.4°7 ‘The faithless’, who ‘by day and night, openly and privily do their utmost to shake the foundations of the Cause (amru ‘Ilah)’ and who ‘kindle secret sedition and strife’ appear as ‘sheep, yet inwardly they are

463. Quoted from an answer ‘Abdu’l-Baha gave on 27 January 1910 in Haifa to a question put by an English missionary, why ‘he and his venerated father, the Baha’i Prophet, could not find undivided recogni-

tion in his own family’. This answer was reported by ‘Abdu’1-Baha’s physician, Dr Josephine Fallscheer, a witness of this conversation, in her fourth letter to a German Baha’i, Mrs. A. Schwarz, Stuttgart. The

letter sional 464. 465. 466. 467.

was published in Sonne der Wahrheit, vol. 11 (1931), p. 9 (provitranslation). Selections 186:6 (p. 214). ibid. 185:1 (p. 210). ibid. 185:4 (p. 212). ibid.

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naught but ravening wolves. Sweet in words, they are but at heart a deadly poison’ :48 No doubt every vainglorious one that purposeth dissension and discord will not openly declare his evil purposes, nay rather, even as impure gold, would he seize upon divers measures and various pretexts that he may

separate the gathering of the people of Baha.*©? The violators of the Covenant

‘are lying in ambush and by

every means desire to cause dissension among the friends’ .47° For this reason, they are also referred to as ‘hypocrites’47! from whom the Cause of God must be protected, for souls such as these cause the straight to become crooked and all benevolent efforts to produce contrary

results*72 .. . Should they be suffered to continue they would in but a few days’ time, exterminate the Cause

of God, His word.473

The covenant-breaker has struck with his axe at ‘the root of the Blessed Tree’.474 The Law of God therefore provides that the covenant-breaker, along with all who continue to associate with him, be ‘cast . . . out from the congregation of the people of

Baha’ .47> Thenceforth, the believer who has been excommun-

468. ibid. 233:18 (p. 315); see also Rom 16:17-18, where the believers are warned against those ‘which cause division and offences contrary to the doctrine’, who ‘serve not our Lord, but their own belly; and

by good words and fair speeches deceive the hearts of the simple’. 469. Will and Testament 1:17 (p. 470. Selections 186:1 (p. 213). 471. al-mundfiqun (for discussion 472. Will and Testament 2:13 (p. (‘waj) see Qur’dn 43:94; 7:43,84; chapter (p. 141).

12). see above, p. 45ff.). 22). Concerning the word ‘crooked’ 11:22; 14:3. See also note 1 of this

473. ibid. 3:8 (p. 25). 474. ibid. 1:5; 3:9 (pp. 5, 25). 475. ibid. 1:17 (p. 12).

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icated is no longer a member of the Baha’i community.*7 Covenant-breaking is an offence sui generis, its closest similar-

ity to canon law being the concept of schism,*”7 i.e. “separation from the community, caused by seditious elements’ .478 A person is pronounced a covenant-breaker by means of a declaration, and expulsion from the community is constitutive; it cannot, in contrast to canon law, take place automatically

(ipso facto). Excommunication, an act of self-purification on the part of the community, means that contact is not permitted between the believers and the person who has been excommu-

nicated. Any such contact would, according to divine law, con-

476. For discussion of the differences between the Baha’i law concerning excommunication and canon law on this matter, see my doctoral

thesis (Grundlagen, p. 36). 477. CIC, can. 751. If the offence of ‘covenant-breaking’ is compared with the ecclesiastical offences of apostasy, heresy and schism (can. 751, 1364), it is evident that apostasy definitely does not fall in this category: ‘Freedom of religion renders’, as Heshmat Moayyad aptly states, ‘the conceptual apostasy, irtiddd, incomprehensible and meaningless to Baha’is, a concept that legitimizes the execution of so many blameless individuals even today’ (‘The Historical interrelationship of Islam and the Baha’i Faith’, p. 84). If he loses his faith, every believer has the right to leave the community of Baha’u’llah without any form of stigmatization, for ‘God Himself does not compel the soul to become spiritual. The exercise of the free human will is necessary’ (‘Abdu’lBaha, quoted from Esslemont, Bahda’u’llah and the New Era, p. 125). Baha’u’llah also says: ‘Whosoever desireth, let him turn aside from this

counsel and whosoever desireth let him choose the path to his Lord’ (Lawh-i-Ahmad, in Prayers, p. 211). Thus Walbridge aptly states that ‘in the Baha’i Faith apostasy is not considered a crime and the believer who renounces his faith falls into the same category as any non-believer and incurs no blame’ (Sacred Acts, p. 265). This state of affairs was presented in my doctoral thesis (Grundlagen, S. 35). Ficicchia is wrong when he asserts that apostasy results in excommunication (p. 288) and is even equated with covenant-breaking (p. 290). Owing to the broadranging doctrinal and interpretational liberty existing in the Baha’i Faith, the concept of heresy is virtually unknown. : 478.

LThK, vol. 9, column 404.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

stitute an act of covenant-breaking.479 Covenant-breakers are to

be avoided*®? because it is their desire to ‘utterly destroy the Cause of God, exterminate His Law and render of no account

all efforts exerted in the past’.48! Someone who has been excommunicated can be readmitted to the community, and this has indeed occurred ‘whenever

the sincerity of their intentions was proven’.482 Ficicchia’s assertion*®3 that prior to readmission they were required to make a “public confession of guilt and remorse’ is utterly false and is probably intended to evoke images of totalitarian states and in-

quisitorial practices. In fact, public confessions are completely forbidden in the Baha’i Faith. If Baha’u’llah has forbidden the confession of sins*84 “because it hath never been nor will ever be conducive to divine forgiveness’

and because

‘God . .

.

wisheth not the humiliation of His servants’,48> it follows that a public confession of guilt and remorse would be all the more inappropriate.

d) Excommunication*®® is an act of self-assertion, and ‘self-assertion is not evil per se’.487 No community can be ex479. See Will and Testament 2:12 (p. 21). 480. One of the ‘most fundamental principles of the Cause of God is to shun and avoid entirely the covenant-breakers’ (ibid. 2:9). The distinction that previously existed in canon law (prior to 1983) between ‘toleratus’ and ‘vitandus’ (can. 2258 CIC including the prohibition of civil contact can. 2267; see Mérsdorf, Lehrbuch, vol. Ill, pp. 393ff.), which was relinquished in the new Codex, does not exist in the Baha’i Faith. A person who has been excommunicated is always vitandus, but must not be hindered in the exercise of his civil rights and liberties (see below, p. 256, and Gollmer, below, p. 741, note 301).

481.

Will and Testament 2:9 (p. 20). 482. Ruhiyyih Rabbani, Twenty-five Years of the Guardianship, p. 21. 483. Baha’ismus, p. 337. 484. Kitab-i-Aqdas 34. 485. Tablets 3:14. 486. This must be distinguished from the withdrawal of administrative rights, the only sanction currently available to the elected bodies in

23)

Chapter 3 « Udo Schaefer pected to sacrifice its identity out of mistaken tolerance. Ex-

communication is the u/tima ratio in extreme cases where serious violation of the Covenant is continued after cautions have been issued. The assertion that this measure is taken in response

to ‘the slightest violation’ and ‘every critical thought’48® is just as untrue as Ficicchia’s claim that expulsion takes place “immediately’. Ficicchia himself experienced the forbearance

with

which the institutions observed his schismatic activities and the patience with which they tried over a long period of time to per-

suade him to stop these activities.48° He knows, too, that he was excommunicated only after he had thrown down the gauntlet to the World Centre and, not without a degree of pride, had declared himself a ‘covenant-breaker’. In the past forty years there

have been only two cases of excommunication in Germanspeaking Europe, one of these being Ficicchia’s. His book itself

is probably the best proof that this step was inevitable. 14. ‘Tricks’ and ‘the pressure of the plan’ in missionary ac-

tivities?49° The “missionary work’ of the Baha’is comes in for particularly strong castigation in Ficicchia’s book. He speaks of ‘offensive

cases of violations of Baha’i law. It involves the temporary removal of voting rights and eligibility for election, the right to participate in the administrative meetings of the local Baha’i community (the Nineteen Day Feast), and the right to contribute to the Baha’i fund. 487. An oral statement of Hans Kiing at the V. Nurnberger Forum on 28 September 1994. 488. Baha’ismus, pp. 288, 300, 345, 413, 426. 489. In a communication he called an ‘Open Letter’ addressed to the Universal House of Justice and the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Switzerland dated 7 December 1974, he writes concerning his excommunication that: ‘It seems not to have been easy for the inquisitors of the House of ‘Justice’ in Haifa, since it was a long time be-

fore they threw me out.’ 490.

The term ‘mission’ is discussed in the Appendix, below, pp. 785ff.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

missionary propaganda’,*?! of the ‘imperialist tendency of its own missionary activities’4?? with a ‘power-political background 43 by which he obviously intends to express the idea that such missionary activities are motivated by nothing other than a desire for power, for a ‘complete seizure of power

(machtergreifung)’,4°* for ‘world supremacy’.49> He especially loathes what he calls the ‘missionary strategy’ ,4%° i.e. the fact that the Baha’i community conducts its proclamation—the term “missionary work’ is not customary—in a methodical way, that the spread of the Baha’i Faith takes place according to plans. He calls this ‘an extremely peculiar endeavour: as if a religion

could be planned nine years ahead! A set of spiritual values is managed and marketed on all continents just like any ordinary

commodity’.497 Finally, the reader learns that ‘Baha’ism, with its zealous missionary activities and large-scale investment’ is

relatively unsuccessful in comparison with ‘Islam, which carries out its missionary work without major financial investment’ 498 It is true that the expansion of the Baha’i Faith takes place according to methodical, systematic plans. Even during Baha’u*1lah’s life time, a systematic approach was taken in responding to the call addressed by Baha’u’llah to all his followers to teach

491. 492. 493. 494.

Baha’ismus, p. 18. ibid. p. 425 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). ibid. ibid. p. 399 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). For discussion of the impli-

cations of this term see above, p. 115, note 518.

495. 496. 497.

ibid. p. 429. ibid. p. 424, note 76. ibid. p. 384 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 498. ibid. pp. 381f. The difference between the expenditure of a religion encompassing approximately one billion people and a community of states with their joint resources, in comparison with a community of around 5-6 million believers with only voluntary donations at its disposal, is self-evident.

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the faith, promising to all those ‘that have forsaken their coun-

try’ for the ‘triumph of My Cause’ that they will be assisted by the Holy Spirit and their service designated ‘the prince of all goodly deeds’.*99 In a series of epistles addressed to the American Baha’i community between 1917 and 1919, “Abdu’l-Baha called for systematic efforts to carry the Baha’i teachings around the entire globe, providing specific guidelines for the

achievement of this goal.° In his testament he calls upon the believers to follow in the footsteps of the disciples of Christ,

who ‘with absolute detachment scattered far and wide and engaged in calling the peoples of the world to the Divine Guid-

ance’.°°! The unfolding of ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s “Divine Plan’ took place under the guidance of Shoghi Effendi who, from 1937 on, initiated a series of successive plans for the promulgation of the

Baha’i teachings first in America and later in Europe, Africa and Asia. An impressive account of the expansion of the faith

during this period has been provided by Ruhiyyih Rabbani.>° The Universal House of Justice guides the world community with further plans along the same path. Despite the relatively small number of its adherents (approx. 5—6 million), the faith is

now geographically the most widespread after Christianity .>% Ficicchia’s judgement that ‘a set of spiritual values is managed and marketed on all continents just like any ordinary commodity’ is self-defeating. Nothing is more characteristic of

the modern world than the methodical planning of life’s events. While all governmental and economic activities are planned, the promulgation of the Word of God is expected to be left to

499.

Gleanings 43:1; 157:1.

500. Tablets Trust 1977.

of the Divine Plan,

Wilmette,

Ill.: Baha’i

501. Will and Testament 1:15 (p. 10). 502. Priceless Pearl, pp. 381-435. 503. Encyclopaedia Britannica Book of the Year 1992.

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Publishing

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chance, to take place without planning. A ‘specialist’>°4 ought at least to know the history of the Church. From its earliest days, Christian missionary work was conducted in a planned

manner.>°> St Paul preached ‘systematically, at focal points of economic and cultural life’. ‘From the outset’ he ‘trained younger co-workers and entrusted them with individual assign-

ments’.°°° To this day, Christian missionary work is conducted in a planned, systematic way; it is not simply left to proliferate without control. In 1622, Pope Gregory XV set up a congrega-

tion of cardinals specifically for missionary work.°°7 This body resembled a general staff, planning and carrying out missionary

work under papal direction. Either Ficicchia is unaware of these facts, or he thinks: ‘Quod licet Jovi non licet bovi.”5°8 As regards the ‘plans’ of the Baha’i community, it should

be noted that Ficicchia’s absurd claim that these plans ‘prescribe exactly how many proselytes are to be gained within a set period in a particular country or locality’> is untrue. The plans contain goals for the establishment of groups and for the open-

ing of new territories. The extent to which Ficicchia presents matters exclusively from the perspective of their possible de-

generation is evident from his assertion concerning ‘the pres-

sure of the plan’>'© and the use of ‘tricks and machinations’ >"! By raising accusations such as these, it is easy to stir up opinion

504. Ficicchia is described as such in the Lexikon der Religionen, edited by Hans Waldenfels (p. vii). 505.

See Evangelisches Kirchenlexikon,

keyword

‘Mission’,

column

1342-44. 506. ibid. column 1339; see Acts 16:1ff.; I Thess. 2:2ff.; II Tim. 4:10; Titus 1:5ff.

507. Sancta Congregatio de Propaganda Fide. 508. ‘What is permissible for Jove is not permissible for the ox.’ 509.

Baha’ismus, p. 424, note 76; p. 384.

510. 511.

ibid. p. 424, note 76 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). ibid. p. 384 (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

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Chapter 3 ¢ Udo Schaefer

against a faith in a society that (rightly!) disapproves of fanatical proselytization. Hence, such claims are very damaging to the reputation of the Baha’i Faith. If there have been excesses

by individuals who have been over-zealous or unwise in promulgating their beliefs, these are not the rule, nor is there any strategy behind them. A missionary strategy based on ‘tricks and machinations’ would be built on sand; it would be void of the virtue of hikma,>!2 which Baha’u’llah has stressed as the

cardinal principle for the teaching of the faith.*!5 Similarly, what Ficicchia asserts is the practice of deliberately leaving converts in the dark as to the doctrines of the Baha’i Faith and with regard to the requirement that one resign

from one’s former religion, is not missionary strategy either. It would be foolish to push people into the Baha’i Faith*!* for the sake of apparent rapid growth, and thus to accept people into

the community who do not know what they are letting themselves in for and who may soon regret the step they have taken.

When Ficicchia writes that ‘the doctrines of the faith’ are ‘as far as possible, not mentioned in detail’ to potential converts, only

being made known ‘after conversion’,>!° he is making a statement that can only be described as absurd. When he states that

512. The Arabic term hikma includes both dianoetic virtues, prudence and wisdom. Both are always focused on the moral good. Those who are guided by the desire to preserve their own interests and who think only of their own benefit are not wise and prudent, but selfish, because hikma

is always based on the purity of intentions (on this subject see my Baha ’i Ethics, in preparation). 513.

Gleanings

163; Tablets 6:52; 7;7, 33; 11:31, 41; 13:5, 41; Hid-

den Words, Persian 36; Will and Testament 3:11 (p. 25). 514. This would go against Baha’u’llah’s express admonition that: “The wise are they that speak not unless they obtain a hearing, even as the cup-bearer, who proffereth not his cup till he findeth a seeker’ (Hidden Words, Persian 36). On the subject of teaching methods see Schaefer, Dominion, pp. 253-256. : 515.

Baha’ismus, pp. 404f., 424.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

no knowledge of the faith is required of converts,>!6 he is correct only to the extent that someone who wishes to join the community is not subjected to an examen rigorosum, because it is not possible to ‘examine’ a person’s faith. In Western countries, converts have usually investigated the faith carefully for quite some time before they join the community. Ficicchia’s

repeated criticism that the normative elements of the Baha’i Faith are deliberately withheld from converts>!” is disproved by the simple fact that in Germany, for instance, every new believer is provided with a selection of Baha’ literature, including Hermann Grossmann’s Der Baha’i und die Bahda’i-Gemein-

schaft,>'8 in which the norms that are binding upon the believer are set out.

15. ‘Complete renunciation of Christian beliefs’? Withdrawal from the Church as a precondition for joining the Baha’i community is not petty denominationalism but a logical consequence: unless one is intellectually schizophrenic, one

cannot simultaneously believe as a Christian in the future return of Christ and, as a Baha’i believe that Christ’s return has already taken place through the epiphany of Baha’u’llah. Just as one cannot be at once a Jew and a Christian or Muslim, nor,

likewise, a member of two denominations of the same religion (e.g. both a Catholic and a Protestant), one cannot simultaneously be a Baha’i and a member of another religious commu-

nity. When confronted with the Word of God, one is obliged to make a choice, as reflected in Christ’s statement that: ‘He who

loves father or mother more than Me is not worthy of Me.’>!?

516. 517. 518.

ibid. pp. 384, 425. ibid. pp. 251, 404. Hofheim, 3rd edn. 1994 (The Baha’i and the Baha’i Community).

519.

Matt. 10:37.

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Chapter 3 ¢ Udo Schaefer

‘No one, after putting his hand to the plough and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God.’*?° Whereas Ficicchia (incorrectly!) claims that the need to withdraw from the Church is not made known to the convert until after his conversion, he states elsewhere that: “In Baha’i literature current in the West, mention is generally made of “resignation from the Church”’—so he concedes this, after all! He then goes on to make the cryptic remark that: *. . . this means not only denominational detachment from Catholicism or Protestantism, for example, but the complete renunciation of

Christian beliefs or of any other religious affiliation.’*2! What does Ficicchia mean by ‘the complete renunciation of Christian beliefs’? Dissociation from Christ would mean renouncing the

central Baha’i doctrine of the unity of the Manifestations. Baha’u’llah’s scripture contains testimonies to the sacrifice of Christ as a cosmic event, glorifying the figure of Christ and his divine Word: ‘Blessed is the man who, with a face beaming

with light, hath turned towards Him.’52? Shoghi Effendi therefore calls the Baha’is’ belief in Christ ‘firm’, ‘unshakeable’ and ‘exalted’: ‘It is only from the dogmas and creeds of the churches that we dissociate ourselves.’°23 Thus, no one can accept Baha’u lah without recognizing Christ, too, as a Manifestation of God. For quite a number of the many Jews who have con-

verted to the Baha’i Faith, this has been the greatest stumblingblock. Ficicchia’s contention that in addition to withdrawal from the Church ‘the complete renunciation of Christian beliefs’ is demanded of Baha’is is a perfidious instance of disinformation, by means of which, in combination with other false

520.

Luke 9:62; see also Rev. 3:15-16.

521.

Baha’ismus, p. 334, note 59.

522. Gleanings 36:3. 523. Principles of Baha’i Administration, p. 30.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

assertions,°?4 he attempts to present the Baha’is as hostile to the Church and even as enemies of Christianity. 16. The community—anti-democratic, centralist, secular? According

to

Ficicchia,

the

order

of the

community

of

Baha’u llah is ‘anti-democratic’>25 and ‘centralist’.52° The reader is told that the ‘rejection of democracy’ can be traced ‘as far back as the founder of Baha’ism’ who, he claims, saw in civil liberties nothing but ‘a gateway for sedition and confusion, and there-

fore demanded unquestioning submission to his laws’.527 Moreover, the development

of this order has, Ficicchia contests,

‘brought about a major shift towards the profane’;528 indeed, this order is an ‘ossified organization caught up in the profranc ee In considering these accusations, the following points should be taken into account:

a) Baha’u’llah’s critical remarks in the Kitab-i-Aqdas*3° concerning people’s demands for liberty,°3! upon which Ficicchia’s judgement is based, will be discussed in the next chap-

ter,-°2 where Baha’u’llah’s concept of liberty is examined. It will then become evident that Baha’u’llah rejects neither individual liberty nor the principles of democracy.

524. Alleged attacks on Christian moral theology (Baha’ismus, p. 412), polemics against other religions (ibid. p. 425). 525. ibid. p. 339. On this allegation see also below, pp. 421ff. 526. ibid. p. 390. 527. ibid. pp. 340, 275. 528. ibid. pp. 28, 422. 529. ibid. p. 253 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 530.

122-125.

531.

Baha’ismus, pp. 234, 340, 389.

532.

See below, pp. 301 ff.

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Chapter 3 ¢ Udo Schaefer

b) The structural principles underlying the order of the community of Baha’u’llah, which are the model for his new world order, are certainly not those of contemporary parliamentary democracy based on party politics. As Shoghi Effendi has shown,>?? this order brings together elements of all three forms of government described by Aristotle, yet it cannot be

equated with any of them.°34 On no account is it ‘anti-democratic’,>35 since the democratic elements, along with the theocratic traits, are dominant. My doctoral thesis contains the following passage on this subject: In the Baha’i ‘administrative order’ jurisdictive power rests exclusively on bodies elected from below, i.e. by the believers. The guiding principles are those of selfadministration and collegial authority, both of which are in complete contrast to the ecclesiastical, monocratic episcopal principle; the principle of consulta-

tion>*° replaces the principle of personal discretionary decision. An inalienable principle of the Baha’i administrative order is that individual personalities have no authority whatever in the sphere of jurisdiction. This is emphasized repeatedly in the writings of

Shoghi Effendi: ‘Assemblies and not individuals constitute the bedrock

on which

the Administration

is

built’*37 .. . The rejection of any kind of leader princi-

533. World Order, p. 152. 534. See Grundlagen, pp. 120ff. There, I defined this order as ‘a democratically constituted theocratic system with monarchic and aristocratic elements’ (p. 123).

535. Baha’ismus, p. 339. 536.

See Grundlagen,

pp. 61ff.; Schaefer, Dominion,

pp. 247-250;

Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 11.2.3 and below, pp. 473ff.

537. Letter written on behalf of Shoghi Effendi quoted from Principles of Baha’i Administration, p. 19. Ficicchia’s assertion that the ‘Hands of the Cause of God’ constitute a clerical rank, a class of salaried officials and functionaries, is not correct. Membership of the elected decision-making bodies is determined by election and each po-

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

ple and the preference for the collegial principle is equally valid in the field of missionary work: the ‘pioneers’—as Baha’i missionaries are called—do not enjoy any privileges

in the newly formed,

developing

communities . . .°38 As far as the elected bodies are concerned, the communal order is largely democratic in character. The democratic principle is more consistently upheld here than in other democratic orders, be-

cause it is not only in theory that every believer is si-

multaneously a voter and a candidate for election>3° to jurisdictive office; election to such office is feasible in

practice, since the voters cannot be influenced beforehand in favour of certain individuals by such means as nominations, voting lists and candidatures. The rules forbidding the formation of parties and the exertion of any kind of influence on elections serve both the

democratic and the theocratic principles.°4° Ficicchia makes no mention of any of these reasons, thus sparing himself the effort of subjecting them to serious analysis and of justifying his accusation that the Baha’i Faith is ‘antidemocratic’. His reference to the lack of a separation of pow-

ers*4! does not suffice for such a judgement, since while being a characteristic of the constitutional state based on the principles of Montesquieu, the séparation des pouvoirs is not an essential characteristic of democracy itself. Furthermore, it is not yet at sition is open for new membership at each election. Even the members of the Universal House of Justice do not receive a fixed salary. The staff employed at the Baha’i World Centre have temporary work contracts. Even the appointed institutions, the ‘Hands of the Cause of God’ and the ‘Counsellors’, are purely honorary offices and have no sacramental functions. 538. Grundlagen, pp. 105f. 539. Concerning Baha’i electoral law see Grundlagen, pp. 159ff.; Dominion, pp. 245-247, Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 11.2.2 and below, pp.

470ff. 540. Grundlagen, p. 121. 541. Baha’ismus, p. 340.

247

Chapter 3 + Udo Schaefer all clear whether the current concentration of powers in the decision-making institutions is a fundamental, unchangeable prin-

ciple of the order.*4? As long as the cause of Baha’u ’llah is still in its infancy, the implications of the scripture are not fully evi-

dent.°43 Pointing to numerous scriptural passages that imply a future separation of powers, Gollmer has emphasized the tem-

porary character of the present concentration of powers expressed in the term ‘jurisdiction’ .**4 Even Ficicchia’s reference>*> to Shoghi Effendi’s statement that ‘the basic assumption which requires all democracies to depend fundamentally upon obtaining their mandate from the people is altogether lacking in this Dispensation’ since the bear-

ers of the mandate ‘are not . . . responsible to those whom they represent’°4° does not lend support to his argument. For one thing, Ficicchia withholds from the reader (not unintentionally, to be sure) the introductory part of the sentence, namely: “The

administrative order of the Faith of Baha’u’llah must in no wise be regarded as purely democratic in character inasmuch as... . 547 The order of the Baha’i community is certainly not ‘purely democratic’, but that does not make it ‘anti-democratic’. The

fact should not be overlooked that there are parliamentary democracies in which the members of parliament are not, in principle, responsible to the electorate. The German Constitution,

the Grundgesetz,>** contains the succinct statement that: ‘They shall be representatives of the whole people, not bound by orders and instructions, and shall be subject only to their conscience’—something that, in practice, is often undermined by

542. Grundlagen, p. 105. 543. Baha'i Administration, p. 42. 544.

Gottesreich, ch. 12.1.

545. Baha’ismus, p. 340. 546. World Order, p. 153. 547. ibid. 548.

Basic Law, Art. 38, para. I, sentence 2.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

the demands of party discipline. When making the above statement, Shoghi Effendi probably had in mind the British model of parliamentary democracy, and perhaps also grass-roots democratic systems with their imperative mandates and the regulations enabling deputies to be voted out of office at any time. In addition, his statement raises the question of each respective system’s claim to legitimacy: democracy is based on the sover-

eignty of the people, whereas the order of Baha’u’llah rests on the sovereignty of God. It is therefore wrong to deduce an ‘anti-

democratic’ structure from this quotation. It will be seen in the discussion of the political goals of the Baha’i Faith>4? that the world order of Baha’u’llah is not a ‘rejection of democracy’

(especially not a rejection of the idea of federalism,°*°) as Ficicchia tries to suggest despite all the evidence to the contrary. c) Neither is the order of Baha’u’llah ‘centralist’ in character, however frequently Ficicchia may repeat this assertion

without providing any reasons for it.°>! The Houses of Justice owe their existence and authority to original, not derivative,

law. By virtue of divine law they are autonomous self-administrating bodies within the framework of the prescribed hierarchy. The world community, the ‘people of Baha’, needs such a hierarchical order, since otherwise it would not be a living, active organism but merely an atomized agglomeration of autonomous local communities. Being a part of the community as a whole does not degrade the local or national bodies to the status of ‘executive organs for the supreme legislative power in

Haifa’ ,>>? i.e. mere branches of the World Centre, as Ficicchia would have us believe.°°3 Centralism, whether in the commu-

549. See below, pp. 421ff. 550. Baha’ismus, pp. 268, 389, 390. 551. ibid. pp. 390, 398, 400, 425. See also below, pp. 432ff. 552.) Ibid, p: 391: 553. Just as the diocesan bishop is not a mere executive organ of the metropolitan bishop or papal curia to whom he is subordinate.

249

Chapter 3 ¢ Udo Schaefer nity hierarchy or as a political phenomenon, is rejected in the scripture as an ‘evil’>*4 because it ‘promotes despotism’.>°> The overcoming of centralization is even described as “the exigency

of the time’.°°° Shoghi Effendi repeatedly warned against centralistic tendencies, both as regards a future world common-

wealth>57 and within the Baha’i community. In this connection, he called upon the elected bodies to endeavour to maintain the balance in such a manner that the evils of over-centralization which clog, confuse and in the long run depreciate the value of the

Baha’i services rendered shall on one hand be entirely avoided, and on the other the perils of utter decentrali-

zation with the consequent lapse of governing authority from the hands of the national representatives of the

believers definitely averted.>>® Ficicchia was acquainted with at least one of these warn-

ings, since he cites°*® the relevant scriptural passage.*©° However, he then goes on to claim, with his characteristic impudence, that Shoghi Effendi must have changed his attitude, for

whereas he had formerly*®! seen the national independence of states as a guarantor against ‘the evils of over-centralization’, there is now no longer ‘any place’ for a ‘federative common-

wealth’*° in this order, because the Bahd’is are, in reality,

554. World Order, p. 41. 555. Promulgation, p. 167. 556. ibid. 557. World Order, p. 41.

558. Bahd’i Administration, p. 142. 559.

560. World 561. 562.

Baha’ismus, p. 390, note 25.

A letter written by Shoghi Effendi on 28 November Order, p. 42. 1931. Baha’ismus, p. 390.

250

1931, in

Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

striving for a ‘centralist unified state’,> a ‘centrally ruled global state’,°°+ a ‘centrally ruled, theocratically oriented unified global state’*®°—an assertion that is completely unfounded, since it contradicts the whole of Baha’i scripture.5® It should also be added that the frequently mentioned cen-

tralist or organizational ‘decrees’ and ‘orders’,°®’ which have supposedly superseded the ‘teachings that were originally revealed’ [!] and utterly determine the religious life of the indi-

vidual,>°8 have been invented by Ficicchia. An institution with responsibility for the entire globe—the ‘zentrale’ as Ficicchia likes to call it—that constantly tried to prescribe what decisions were to be made by the 181 national and 13,232 local bodies

now in existence,>©? and that continually issued decrees to more than 5 million believers on how they are to run their lives, would be a top-heavy bureaucracy incapable of functioning.

Our researcher’s imagination has run away with him—or have perhaps a few pages of Orwell’s /984 slipped in among his

sources? A further noteworthy point is that in the 1920s and 1930s, when the initially amorphous Baha’i community was gradually

taking on a legal form, and the legal structures inherent in the scripture—either in explicit statements or by inference from certain passages—were being formulated in statutes, Shoghi Effendi set the course, through his world-wide correspon-

563. ibid. p. 389 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 564. ibid. p. 398. 565. ibid. p. 425 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 566. For discussion see Gollmer, below, pp. 432ff. 567. Baha’ismus, pp. 288, 413, 418, 422; Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 238; Lexikon der Sekten, column 104. 568. Baha’ismus, p. 422. Ficicchia speaks of ‘total possession being taken of the individual and religious and ethical action being prefixed by the all-determining organization’ (p. 429). 569. Statistics provided by the Baha’i World Centre, 1997-98.

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Chapter 3 ¢ Udo Schaefer

dence,°”° for the establishment of a global community that was organic in character, i.e. formed according to the same principles at both local and national levels. How else could this have been achieved other than through global control from the centre? Only when the common features of the various communities have created the necessary foundation for a truly global community do the relative independence and diversity of the individual communities become possible. Organic growth means

diversity emanating from a common root. The principle behind the establishment of the community of Baha’u’llah might be stated as follows: as much unity as necessary, and as much diversity as possible.

d) What does Ficicchia mean by the ‘profanization’ of the Baha’i Faith? Once again, this is a pejorative, unreflected slo-

gan that he bandies about without providing any reasons for this reproach. One can merely deduce from his premise that ‘the

Baha'i Faith, too, has lapsed into institutionalization and profanization’>"! that he sees the process of the legal incorporation of the faith as a process of profanization, as having “brought about a major shift towards the profane’.°7? Profanization>”? is synonymous with ‘desecration’. Presumably, Ficicchia wants to express the idea that through its legal incorporation the Baha’i Faith has lost its mystic dimension, its original sacred contents, and has deteriorated instead into a purely secular organiza-

tion.>74

570. Published in World Order, Wilmette, Ill., 8th edn. 1938; Bahd’i Administration, Wilmette, Ill., 1st edn. 1945, Messages to America, Wilmette, Ill., 1947.

571. Baha’ismus, p. 422 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 572. ibid. p. 28. 573. From Latin profanus = ‘outside the temple’. 574. Similarly, the Protestant theologian Rainer -Flasche sees the Baha’i Faith as having shifted from the ‘originally mystic and theosophical idea of unity . . . to pure pragmatism’ and a ‘vulgar-positivist humanitarian ideology’. He asserts that this religion ‘has not only lost

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

This assertion reflects a prejudice rooted in Protestant doctrine, and prevalent among sociologists of religion, whereby spirituality and organizational forms are held to be incompati-

ble, as already discussed above.*75 Anything that takes on legal structures is per se ossified, an ‘ossified organization caught up

in the profane’.°’ This raises the question as to whether every religious community, as soon as it begins to take on an organizational form, is on the way to becoming profane, and whether

the legally constituted Church can be termed an ‘ossified organization’. If the legal incorporation of a community of believers amounts eo ipso to its profanization, as Ficicchia and Flasche surmise as a result of their spiritualistic prejudices, then the Church must already have sunk into profanization in antiquity, since it has been legally incorporated from very early times. This judgement must also apply to the Protestant churches, which were legally incorporated from their inception. It must be asked, too, whether a community whose founder lent it a legal form, and which is now developing those prescribed structures, can be accused of relinquishing its sacred

purpose and of having become ossified in a secular form? Can this accusation be laid against a religion whose adherents have so urgently been called upon to bring about change on the earth

by rousing this profane world and placing it under the Will of God? It should be noted, moreover, that the mystic dimension of the Baha’i Faith is not a question of law but of the relation-

ship of each individual and of the community as a whole to the

its identity’ but ‘in many spheres does not even know about its origins’. He goes on to attest a ‘loss of the original mystic religiosity sometimes lapsing into a purely secular banal philosophy’ (‘Die Baha’i-Religion zwischen Mystik und Pragmatismus’, pp. 94-97). He provides no facts to reveal whence he derives his devastating appraisal. 575. See above, pp. 142ff. 576. Baha’ismus, p. 253 (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

253

Chapter 3 + Udo Schaefer divine. The mystic sources are preserved in the scripture*””/— how could they possibly have been lost? 17. Ficicchia’s (mis)judgement of the Baha’i community

The preceding sections were written in order to demonstrate the erroneous nature of most of the ‘facts’ upon which Ficicchia bases his (mis)judgement of the Baha’i community, his vilification that pervades every chapter of his book. How, though, is one to respond to his defamatory, subjective evaluation, his of-

ten cynical criticism of the community to which he once belonged? What can one say when faced with the allegation that

for the majority of believers the Baha’i Faith is a “secure enclosure’ offering ‘protection and security’ for all those ‘who cannot

cope with the problems of life’, an ‘enclosure’ in which they can avoid ‘critical analysis of their beliefs and of life;’°7® in short, that the Baha’i community is nothing but a refuge for society’s

failures?>”? The only possible response to such a biased, malevolently distorted view of the Baha’i community and its institutions as an authoritarian system of repression is to contrast this portrayal

with the maxims to which these institutions are committed. Their decisive characteristic is the essential spirituality with which the institutions are imbued. Without this, they

577.

See, for example, Darius Ma’ani, ‘Die mystischen Dimensionen

des Kitab-i-Aqdas’, in Gesellschaft ftir Baha’i Studien (ed.), Aspekte des Kitab-i-Aqdas, pp. 193-222. 578. Baha’ismus, p. 426. 579. Critics of religion, in particular Sigmund Freud, have regarded religion in itself as the result of a mere projection of desire, and as infantile wishful thinking on the part of adults who long for the security of childhood.

If Ficicchia thinks in such categories, so be it; however,

his being permitted, in a book edited by an organ of the Church, to direct against the Baha’is an allegation that is raised against religion in general reveals that pronouncing noble maxims is one thing, acting in accordance with them quite another.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

would be spiritless organizations that could achieve nothing. That the order of the community with its institutional structure is not an end in itself and is certainly not a mere ‘surrogate for the Holy Spirit’ (Sohm) is something that was frequently reiter-

ated by Shoghi Effendi,°®° as demonstrated by the following extract: The Baha’i Faith, like all other Divine Religions, is thus fundamentally mystic in character. Its chief goal

is the development

of the individual

and

society,

through the acquisition of spiritual virtues and powers.

It is the soul of man which has first to be fed. And this spiritual nourishment prayer can best provide. Laws and institutions, as viewed by Baha’u’llah, can become

really effective only when our inner spiritual life has been perfected and transformed. Otherwise religion will degenerate into a mere organization, and becomes

a dead thing.*8! Shoghi Effendi, the very person Ficicchia holds responsible for the alleged authoritarianism of the institutions, has pro-

vided abundant guidance as to the spirit that should prevail in the community and its institutions. Hence, ‘the spirit of the Cause is one of mutual cooperation, and not that of a dictator-

ship’.>82 Those called upon to serve in the institutions should ‘have regard for the interests of the servants of God, for His sake, even as they regard their own interests’.°83 They should be ‘like unto shepherds’>8* and always bear in mind that ‘the key580.

See World Order, p. 9.

581.

From a letter to an individual believer dated

8 December

1935,

quoted from The Importance of Prayer, Meditation and the Devotional Attitude, compiled by the Universal House of Justice, March 1980, p. 14. 582. The Local Spiritual Assembly, p. 15. 583. Baha’u’llah, Kitdb-i-Aqdas 30. 584. The Local Spiritual Assembly, p. 14 (from a letter dated 30 August 1935, written on behalf of Shoghi Effendi to the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of the United States).

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Chapter 3 ¢ Udo Schaefer

note of the Cause of God is not dictatorial authority but humble fellowship, not arbitrary power, but the spirit of frank and lov-

ing consultation’ .**° Their function is not to dictate, but to consult, and consult not only among themselves, but as much as possible with the friends whom they represent. They must regard them-

selves in no other light but that of chosen instruments for a more efficient and dignified presentation of the Cause of God. They should never be led to suppose that they are the central ornaments of the body of the Cause, intrinsically superior to others in capacity or

merit, and sole promoters of its teachings and principles. They should approach their task with extreme humility . . . They must, at all times, avoid the spirit of exclusiveness, the atmosphere of secrecy, free themselves from a domineering attitude, and banish all forms of prejudice and passion from their deliberations. They should, within the limits of wise discretion, take the friends into their confidence, acquaint them with their plans, share with them their problems and

anxieties, and seek their advice and counsel.°6 The decision-making

bodies should practise the art of

leadership, the first requirement of which is readiness ‘to use the energy and competence that exists in the rank and file of its followers’ .>87 As Shoghi Effendi emphasized with regard to a covenantbreaker, even acts of “disaffection or estrangement, or recantation of belief? do not justify any interference with the recog-

585. Baha'i Administration, p. 63 (also in The Local Spiritual Assembly, p. 14). 586. ibid. p. 64 (also in The Local Spiritual Assembly, p. 11). 587. Shoghi Effendi, quoted from Hornby, Lights of Guidance, no. 61. It must be emphasized that these quotations are taken not from representative material seeking to present a good image, but from compilations intended for practical use by the institutions and the believers.

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

nized civil rights of a person in a free society, or any action that would ‘impinge upon them, even to the extent of the eye of a needle’. According to Shoghi Effendi, violation of this principle would be ‘tantamount to a reversion on their part . . . to the ways of those of a former age’, and would ‘reignite in men’s

breasts the fire of bigotry and intolerance’ 588 This protection of individual rights is guaranteed by the Constitution of the Universal House of Justice, the preamble (Declaration of Trust) enumerating the duties and responsibilities of this institution. These are: ‘to safeguard the personal rights, freedom and initiative of individuals’, ‘to be responsible

for ensuring that no body or institution within the Cause abuse its privileges or decline in the exercise of its rights and prerogatives’, and ‘to be the exponent and guardian of that Divine Justice which alone can ensure the security of, and establish the

reign of law and order in, the world’.°°° It is, of course, a well-known fact that reality rarely conforms to ideal principles. The Baha’i Faith does not have the theological concept of the ‘fallen nature of man’, however, as expressed in the Qur’an, man’s weakness is acknowledged: ‘For

man hath been created weak.’>9° For that reason man can, at best, be on the path towards perfection but he can never achieve that state. Hence, the sacred is also only imperfectly manifested

on earth. The process of the development of the orginally charismatic following of Baha’u’llah into an organic, global community that is capable of action and is united not only by

588. Shoghi Effendi, letter written in July 1925 to the Baha’is in Iran (translated by the Research Department of the Universal House of Justice). 589. The Constitution of the Universal House of Justice: Declaration of Trust, pp. Sf. 590.

4:32; 8:67. Man’s sinfulness, weakness and ingratitude is a fre-

quent theme in Baha’i scripture. However, the doctrine of original sin derived by St Augustine from the biblical parable of the Fall from Paradise is rejected (see ‘Abdu’1-Baha, Some Answered Questions 29:8, 30:1-12).

257

Chapter 3 ¢ Udo Schaefer the bonds of faith and love but also by law is, like all organic growth, a slow and very arduous process with many crises, dis-

ruptions, setbacks and new beginnings. The initial phase is always the most difficult. The new communities are often established by people who have joined the Baha’i community at some point but whose characters are frequently still determined by a society that is in turmoil. Only gradually do these people develop an identity as Baha’is and gain a deeper understanding of these principles. The contemporary Baha’i community is not a reflection of the heavenly concourse; rather, it is on a pilgrimage towards that goal. The difficulty of a religious existence in the diaspora and the problems encountered in building up a community in a re-

jecting, sceptical and hypercritical environment are evident from the epistles of St Paul. How tiny the communities were to whom he addressed his words, how great were their problems, and how sharply they reflected the spirit of the ‘old Adam’! And yet they were the foundation of the ecclesia triumphans and of Western culture. It is not easy to belong to a small religious minority in a world of quite different dimensions. The Baha’is have no clergy entrusted with responsibility for the prom-

ulgation of the faith; every believer has the task of engaging in dialogue with the outside world, and each one does so as best he can. Naturally, some of what is said is in need of correction and

self-critical reflection. The Baha’i institutions, too, are as yet only in their infancy. The cardinal virtues of wisdom (hikma) and justice (‘adl), to which they are committed, are ultimate goals.

It is infinitely difficult to make wise judgements and just decisions. The preliminary nature of the local and national Houses of Justice is expressed in the fact that they do not yet bear this title, being known at present as “spiritual assemblies’.

In other words—where is a human community to be found that is free of defects and shortcomings? A just appraisal of a religious community ought to take all this into account. Yet

even if a former insider were to pay attention solely to the

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Ficicchia’s Portrait of the Community and its Order

shortcomings of the community and view them through a mag-

nifying glass, he would still not see the distorted picture so deliberately painted by Ficicchia. As Lichtenberg astutely remarked: “The most dangerous lie is a truth that is moderately

distorted.’*9! This is reassuring, since Ficicchia’s defamatory criticism is sO excessive, so zealous and reviling, that with the facts having now been put straight, the critical reader—provided he is seeking information and not confirmation of his prejudices—can be expected to reach his own judgement on

Ficicchia’s pasquinade.

591. Aphorismen (‘Uber die Religion’), p. 117. The same idea is expressed by Isaac Asimov when he says: “The closer to the truth, the better the lie’ (Foundation’s Edge, p. 248).

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CHAPTER 4

FICICCHIA’S PRESENTATION OF BAHA’I DOCTRINE Ficicchia’s description of Baha’i doctrine is, in many instances, fragmentary, contracted, and over-simplified, so that only the most prominent errors will be dealt with here. I. ON THE CONCEPT OF REVELATION It is misleading for Ficicchia to portray Baha’i doctrine as

holding that “Revelation is not a real event that takes place between God and man—an event in which God himself participates and assumes human form. Here, revelation is a book’. For if divine revelation only takes place realiter when God ‘assumes human form’ (i.e. through incarnation), then Judaism, Islam, Buddhism and Zoroastrianism could not be considered ‘revealed’ religions. In effect, only Christianity as perceived by the Church (together with certain forms of Hinduism), might qualify, since the other world religions portray revelation as a

process by which the attributes of God are made manifest through a human intermediary, not a process by which the essence of the infinite God itself becomes incarnate. Even though the Baha’i Faith is a ‘religion of the book’, revelation is considered a real event, since the book is inextri-

cably associated with the personality and life of the conveyor of God’s message. For the Baha’is, the Manifestation, Baha’u’Ilah,

1. Baha’ismus, p. 216.

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Ficicchia’s Presentation of Baha ’i Doctrine

is the ‘Word of God’, the Jogos, the ‘Book of God’ sent down ‘in the form of the human temple’,” the ‘Living Book Who proclaimeth in the midmost heart of creation: “Verily, there is none

other God but Me, the All-Knowing, the All-Wise.””? Ficicchia’s statement that ‘the Prophet is, hence, not a figure of salvation but a receiver and transmitter of divine commands’ is a non-scriptural, non-sensical reduction of the content of Baha’i scripture—especially of its prophetology, the doctrine concerning the Manifestations of God, as this statement confuses different aspects of prophethood. In reality, all Manifestations of God are figures of salvation; all have constituted instances of theophany—divine intervention in the human

world. The eschatological promises of the religions concerning the ‘day of the Lord’> have been fulfilled through the advent of Baha’u’llah. The day has dawned on which the people ‘will

meet their Lord’.® The ‘Day of God’,’ ‘the Lord of days’® that was ‘promised unto you in all the scriptures’,? the day ‘in which mankind can behold the Face, and hear the Voice, of the Prom-

ised One’,!° ‘whereon the grace of God hath permeated and

pervaded all things’,'! has at long last arrived. The fact that Ficicchia has never come across the idea of salvation in the Baha’i writings, which is a frequently recurring

2. Baha’u’llah, quoted from The Proclamation of Baha'u'llah, p. 84; Gleanings 52:1. 3. Kitab-i-Aqdas 168; see also 134. 4. Baha’ismus, p. 84. 5.

6.

Amos 5:18; Isaiah 2:12.

liga’u'llah, Qur’dn 2:43; see also 29:23;

18:111;

Igan 149-152 (pp. 139-144). 7.

yawmu'lléh, Gleanings 7:2; 5:1, 14:2; 16:1-3; 25 ete.

8. 9. 10. 11.

ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid.

76:3. 144:3. 7:1. 142:1.

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13:2; Kitab-i-

Chapter 4 * Udo Schaefer theme in the scripture of Baha’u’llah, reveals the superficiality of his knowledge concerning the object of his research. Baha’u"Ilah is the ‘Redeemer’!? of ‘the peoples and kindreds of the

earth’,!> and his teachings bring ‘salvation in both this world and in the next’.!4 The soteriological dimension of his revelation is expressed in numerous passages. It is stated, for instance, that ‘He hath drained to its dregs the cup of sorrow, that all the peoples of the earth may attain unto abiding joy, and be filled

with gladness’,!* and that he has borne ‘ills and troubles, that ye may sanctify yourselves from all earthly defilements’.!° ‘He, in truth, hath offered up His life as a ransom for the redemption of

the world’!” . . . ‘We, verily, have come for your sakes, and have borne the misfortunes of the world for your salvation.’ !®

II. ON THE STATION OF BAHA’U’LLAH What Ficicchia writes about the central theme of Baha’i theology,! its prophetology—i.e. the doctrine concerning the ‘Mani-

festations of God’*°—is self-contradictory.2! From the multitude of passages on this subject he selects a single quotation

from the Suratu’l-Haykal, with the sole purpose of conveying to 12. ibid. 85:3.

13. Tablets 15:14; see also Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 93. 14. Gleanings 37:3. 15. ibid. 45. 16. ibid. 141:2; see also 142:2; Hidden Words, Persian 52; Tablets 2:7; Prayers and Meditations 32:3; 34:1; 48:2; 65:4; 66:7; 86:1; 92:2; 111:2; 116:5; 117:1; 141:1; 180:5; Kitab-i-Aqdas 158.

17. Gleanings 146. 18. Tablets 2:7. 19. For detailed discussion of this term see McLean, ‘Prolegomena to a Baha’i Theology’, in Journal of Baha’i Studies, vol. 5.1 (1992), pp. 25-67. 20. mazharu'llah; for more detail see Cole, The Concept of Manifestation in the Baha’i Writings, Association for Baha’i Studies, Ottawa, 1982.

21. Baha’ismus, pp. 212ff.

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Ficicchia’s Presentation of Baha’i Doctrine

the reader the impression that a blatant contradiction exists between the rejection of the doctrine of incarnation (huli/), on the one hand, and the alleged identification of Baha’u’llah with God, on the other. Hence, Baha’u’llah’s station remains curiously indistinct.

The alleged contradiction in Baha’u’llah’s statements concerning his own station does not, in fact, exist. It has been invented mala fide by Ficicchia. One of the fundamental teachings of the Baha’i Faith is that God does not incarnate himself: Know

thou of a certainty that the Unseen can in no

wise incarnate His Essence and reveal it unto men.?? Baha’u’llah states categorically that there is ‘no tie of direct

intercourse to bind the one true God with His creation’ and that ‘no resemblance whatever can exist between the transient and the Eternal, the contingent and the Absolute’.? The ‘Manifestations of God’, the divine messengers—and, hence, Baha’u’llah himself—are God-created beings and are not identical

with God through ‘hypostatic union’,”* although they are on a different ontological plane than ‘ordinary’ humans.”> Thus, the

Christian dogma of the Holy Trinity”° is rejected, as it is in the Qur’an.?’

22. Gleanings 20. The concept of incarnation (hulu!) has been decidedly rejected by Baha’u’llah (see also Kitab-i-Iqan 104 (p. 98)). 23. ibid. 27:4; 148. 24. See Catechism, no. 252.

25. On this subject, and on Baha’u’llah’s doctrine of the ‘three worlds’ (dlamu’l-haqq, ‘dlamu’l-amr, ‘dlamu’l-khalq) see Beyond the Clash, pp. 120ff. 26. On this subject see Louis Henuzet, ‘Formation du dogme de la Trinité’, in La Pensée Baha’ie, no. 120 (Autumn 1993), pp. Sff. 27. See 5:18; 5:76; 2:110; 43:169;

112; see also Heribert Busse, Die

theologischen Beziehungen des Islams zu Judentum und Christentum, pp. 55ff.

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In accordance with Baha’u’llah’s mirror analogy,?® God cannot be perceived directly and knowledge of God is possible

only via the ‘mediator’? of the Covenant, the ‘sanctified mirror’ of the Manifestation.*° In the Manifestations man encoun-

ters God: Whoso recognizeth them hath recognized God. Whoso hearkeneth to their call, hath hearkened to the Voice of God, and whoso testifieth to the truth of their Revelation, hath testified to the truth of God Himself.

Whoso

turneth away

from them, hath turned away

from God, and whoso disbelieveth in them, hath disbelieved in God. Every one of them is the Way of God that connecteth this world with the realms above, and the Standard of His Truth unto every one in the kingdoms of earth and heaven.*!

Relative to man, the Manifestation is God;>” yet relative to God, he is “coarser than clay’. Hence, Baha’u’1lah states: When I contemplate, O my God, the relationship that bindeth me to Thee... . I am moved to proclaim to all created things ‘verily I am God!’; and when I consider my own self, lo, I find it coarser than clay.>3

28. Kitab-i-[qan 106 (pp. 99f.); ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Some Answered Questions 54:4. 29. See Gal. 3:19; I Tim. 2:5; Hebr. 8:6; 9:15; 12:24.

30. Gleanings 19:3. The term ‘Manifestation of God’ (Arabic: al-mazharu’lldh) is a technical term in Baha’i scripture for the traditional terms Prophet (nabi) and Messenger (rasul). On this subject see Towfigh, Schépfung und Offenbarung, pp. 172ff.,; Cole, The Concept of Manifestation, pp. 18ff.; Schaefer, Beyond the Clash, pp. 124ff. 31. Gleanings 21; see also Tablets 5:11.

32. Kitab-i-Igdn 196 (p. 178f.). 33. quoted from Shoghi Effendi, World Gleanings 49; Epistle 70, 74 (pp. 41, 43).

264

Order,

p. 113:

see

also

Ficicchia’s Presentation of Baha’i Doctrine

It is in this sense, and in the context of his categorical affirma-

tion of the essential unity of the Prophets** that Baha’u’llah’s statements concerning his own station are to be understood. The verse from the Suratu’|-Haykal cited by Ficicchia is also to be seen in this light, and should not be regarded as identifying Baha’u’llah with God or SuEzestne that he is of the same es-

sence as God: Naught is seen in My temple but the Temple of God, and in My beauty but His Beauty, .. . and in My pen

but His Pen, the Mighty, the All-Praised. There hath not been in My soul but me Truth, naught could be seen but God.?

and in Myself

The “Temple (Aaykal) of God’ is a symbol for the Manifestation of God among men, a symbol for Baha’u’llah. This ‘Temple’

has been made into a mirror that reflects the sovereignty of God.?” Elsewhere, too, Baha’u’llah refers to himself as the “Temple of

God amongst men’,*® a figurative term that is also used to symbolize Christ in the Gospel of John.3? Despite the abundance of statements on the subject of his

station, Baha’u’llah was accused by his clerical opponents”° of having identified himself with God. Baha’u’llah decisively refuted this allegation: Certain ones among you have said: “He it is Who hath

laid claim to be God.’ By God! This is a gross calumny. I am but a servant of God Who hath believed in

34. Gleanings 34:3. 35. See Epistle, 70, 74 (pp. 41-43). 36. quoted from Shoghi Effendi, World Order, p. 109. 37. Concerning the Suratu’l-Haykal see Taherzadeh, vol. 3, pp. 133-146. 38. Gleanings 146. 39. 2:19-21; see also Matt. 26:61; 27:40; Rev. 21:22.

40. See Epistle 69 (p. 41).

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Revelation,

Chapter 4 » Udo Schaefer Him and in His signs, and in His Prophets and in His angels. *!

It is highly improbable that Ficicchia was unaware of these central tenets of Baha’i theology, especially since he refers to the Kitab-i-Iqan*? and to another relevant passage ascribed to Baha’u’llah.*? Why, then, does he try to give the reader the im-

pression of a ‘personal equivalence with the Deity’? Is it to lend substance to his criticism of Baha’u’llah’s ‘exaggerated sense

of self-importance’, and his ‘self-glorifying manner’*°? Or is 41. Gleanings 113:18. On this subject see also Stephen Lambden’s essay, ‘The Sinaitic Mysteries: Notes on Moses/Sinai Motifs in Babi and Baha’i Scripture’, in Momen (ed.), SBB, vol. 5, pp. 14 9ff.

42. See sections 192-198 (pp. 177-181). 43. Baha’ismus, p. 213. Ficicchia quotes Baha’u’llah from a doubtful source, a ‘Surat at-Tawhid’ in which the doctrine of the Holy Trinity and the concept of incarnation is criticized. A Tablet of that name does not exist among the writings of Baha’u’llah. Perhaps he means the Madinatu’t Tawhid (The City of the Unity), of which, however, only a short passage has been translated (see Gleanings, section 24. On this Tablet see Taherzadeh, Revelation, vol. 1, pp. 109ff.) As the Bab has

revealed a Stratu’t-Tawhid it might be that Ficicchia is quoting from that. Since no authentic translation of this stra exists, it remains com-

pletely obscure where Ficicchia has taken the German text. He does not give any source and the quoted sentences are unknown. 44. Baha’ismus,

pp. 179, 307, 128. Ficicchia’s criticism, which

im-

plies that Baha’u’llah speaks with usurped authority, is not an academic judgement but a mere dogmatic one. Instead of leaving open the question of truth, as is the accepted methodological requirement in the field of religious studies, he uses his personal judgement as the criterion for his research

findings.

In so doing, he fails to realize that traditional

standards cannot be applied with reference to the prophetic claims of the founders of the world religions, as illustrated, for example, by Christ’s

statement that: ‘All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth’ (Matt.

28:18;

see also Luke

11:31-32).

Here,

Ficicchia

writes

on a

similar level and with the same arrogance as the author Alfred Worm (see above, p. 37, note 2), who asserts in his book on Jesus: ‘The “Jesus

of John” is lacking in goodness and modesty. He exudes self-confidence and absolutism’ (pp. 59f.), he is ‘. . . a conspicuous, egocentric, rather exaggerated person’ (p. 144). 45. Baha’ismus, p. 128.

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Ficicchia’s Presentation of Baha’i Doctrine

it simply to demonstrate the contradictions Ficicchia purports to have found, and thus to obscure Baha’u’llah’s clear doctrine of the “hidden God’ who remains inaccessible even to ‘the devout-

est of mystics’ and ‘the most accomplished amongst men’?*° III. ON THE BAHA’{ DOCTRINE OF GRACE Ficicchia’s statements on the subject of grace do not correspond to Baha’i doctrine. With reference to the idea of the Covenant, he writes: ‘By concluding a covenant with humanity, God is no longer purely arbitrary, but is a power that shows love and justice.’47 A few pages later he expresses the same thought in connection with the law of fasting. He quotes from the Lawh-iNaw-Ruz,*® where it is stated that all human works require acceptance by God: For the doings of men are all dependent upon Thy good-pleasure,

and

are

conditioned

by Thy

behest.

Shouldst Thou regard him who hath broken the fast as one who hath observed it, such a man would be reckoned among them who from eternity had been keeping the fast. And shouldst Thou decree that he who hath observed the fast hath broken it, that person would be

numbered with such as have caused the Robe of Thy Revelation to be stained with dust, and been far removed from the crystal waters of this living Foun-

tain,*°

46. ‘Ten thousand Prophets, each a Moses, are thunderstruck upon the

Sinai of their search at His forbidding voice, “Thou shalt never behold Me”; whilst a myriad Messengers, each as great as Jesus, stand dismayed upon their heavenly thrones by the interdiction, “Mine Essence thou shalt never apprehend!” ’ (Gleanings 26:3). 47. Baha’ismus, pp. 216f. 48. Naw-Ruz (New Year) follows the end of the month of fasting at the Spring equinox. This festival has a 5,000-year tradition in Persia. 49. Prayers and Meditations 46:2.

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and he correctly comments that ‘the acceptance of the fast by God is purely a matter of grace and is independent of the efforts

of the fasting individual’.*° However, in the act of divine grace Ficicchia sees nothing but arbitrariness: “Despite the idea of the

covenant with man, the pure arbitrariness of God again be-

comes evident here.”>! This judgement is in need of correction. It is not through the conclusion of the archetypal Cove-

nant*? that the ‘God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob’,*> who Baha’u’llah professes,°* became ‘pure love and justice’. According to the scripture, God is unchangeable in his essence; he always remains ‘the same’.°> The highest attributes, such as

love and justice, are inherent in the essence of God, and hence do not come into being over time. From the point of view of Baha’i doctrine, it is, to borrow a phrase of Shoghi Effendi, ‘sheer blasphemy’ to suggest that God is a capricious despot who casts off his ‘pure arbitrariness’ and turns into a God of

love and justice only upon the conclusion of the ancient Covenant for the salvation of mankind. Such a suggestion contradicts Baha’u’llah’s doctrine concerning the nature of God: i.e. that everything is subject to change, whereas. God alone is unchangeable: From everlasting Thou wert alone, . . . and wilt abide for ever the same with no one else to equal or rival Thee.~°

50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55.

Baha’ismus, p. 241. ibid. p. 242, note 13. See Qur’dan 7:171: ‘a-lastu bi rabbikum’—‘Am I not your Lord?’. Ex. 3:6; Matt. 22:32; Rev. 3:13; Qur’dn 12:38; Tablets 17:122. Tablets 17:122. ; Prayers and Meditations 16:2; 24:3; 27:3.

56. ibid. 114:4; 78:3; 79:2; 163:4.

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Ficicchia’s Presentation of Bahd’i Doctrine

Ficicchia’s statements seem to reflect the ‘vulgar attitude’*” whereby the God of the Hebrew Bible is presumed to be a God ‘of anger and revenge’, the God of Islam a projection of ancient oriental despotism, while the Gospel professes the ‘God of love and compassion’°°’—an obvious stratagem intended to prove the

superiority of the Christian image of God.*? In the Lawh-i-Naw-Ruz, it is not the ‘pure arbitrariness of

God’ that becomes evident, but His absolute sovereignty. In the Baha’i Faith, as in Islam, the vertical relationship is very much emphasized: trust in God (tawakkul), the fear of God (taqwa), dependence on the Creator, and obedience (fd ‘ah) towards him. The relationship of God to man is determined, as in Judaism®

and Islam, by the terms ‘rabb’ and ‘ ‘abd’—Lord and servant.°!

It is not seemly for the servant to reproach his Lord® or to dispute with him, for ‘he [hath] mercy on whom

he will have

mercy’® . . . ‘but God doth what he will’® . . . ‘He shall not be 57. Heinz Zahrnt, Gotteswende, p. 115.

58. Heinz Zahrnt calls this an ‘impious myth’: ‘As regards the anger and love of God, the two Testaments hardly differ at all’ (ibid. p. 115). 59. Even though each divine dispensation has accentuated certain attributes of the same God in accordance with the respective requirements of the time, it is wrong to speak of the ‘God of the Old Testament’, the ‘God of the New Testament’ or the ‘God of the Qur’an’, as still frequently occurs, as if it were not always the same God. 60. ‘Abad is the usual word used in prayer by the believer to characterize himself before God, the Lord (see for instance Ps. 86:2: ‘O thou my God, save thy servant that trusteth in thee’; see also I Sam. 3:19). Concerning this, Lothar Perlitt writes: ‘The word ‘adbdd is used to describe the state of closely belonging to God and the most intimate relationship with God’ (‘Gebot und Gehorsam im Alten Testament’, in Wolfgang Bohme (ed.), Gehorsam—eine Tugend?, p. 11). 61. In Christ ‘the relationship between Lord and servant has been completely embodied in the relationship between father and son’ (Lothar Perlitt, ibid. p. 24). 62. Rom. 9:20. 63. ibid. 9:18. 64. Qur'an 2:254.

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Chapter 4 ¢ Udo Schaefer

asked of his doings."® The same idea is expressed repeatedly in the Kitab-i-Aqdas: He doeth what He pleaseth.

He chooseth,

and none

may question His choice.©

The decisions made in unrestrained freedom by the sovereign divine Will are, however, never acts of capricious arbitrariness,

‘but the resolutions of truth, reason and justice’;°’ God’s judgement is ‘absolute wisdom, and is in accordance with reality’ .©

The passage from the Naw-Ruz Tablet cited by Ficicchia is of enormous theological significance, since it constitutes an iron barrier against any form of legalism, any system of ethics based on merit alone. It is a rejection of any form of compulsion in religion. Man cannot avail himself of divine mercy by any means—neither through sacraments ex opere operato, nor through

the outer fulfilment of the divine law. The rabb- ‘abd paradigm indicates clearly that compliance with the law does not grant

man the right to make any demands on God. Rather, it indicates the sovereignty of God’s decisions: all human works stand in

need of divine acceptance.°’ The ethic enshrined in the law is not one that is based purely on merit, with legalistic criteria of

observance, an accusation sometimes made from the point of view of the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith (sola

fide). A restriction of the demands to the debitum legale laid down in the form of legal norms is merely a summary of what 65. ibid. 21:23. 66. 7; see also 47, 131, 157, 161, 162. This idea is a Jeitmotiv running throughout the Tablets of Baha’u’llah; see, for instance, Gleanings 68:5; 114:18; 129:12; Tablets 5:13; 6:56; 7:40; 8:12; 8:17; 8:19; 12:12; 12:17; 14:14; 17:10. On the concept of the Covenant see McLean, Dimensions

in Spirituality, pp. 53ff. The relationship between God and man is described there as a ‘suzerain-vassal relationship’. See also my discussion below, p. 396ff. 67. Paris Talks 47:1. 68. Some Answered Questions 45:5 (pp. 173f.). 69. Kitab-i-Aqdas 161; Gleanings 135:5.

270

Ficicchia’s Presentation of Bahd i Doctrine

man really owes to God. For what is required is not just literal compliance with the letter of the law. The law requires that the

believer fulfil the demands made upon him out of innermost devotion. In one of his earliest writings, Baha’u’llah expresses it thus: Walk in My statutes (hudiud) for love of Me.”°

The opening verses of his Book of Laws also contain the exhortation: Observe My

My beauty. 7!

commandments

(hudid), for the love of

Ficicchia’s disrespectful reproach that the Baha’i Faith is a

‘normative religion of observance’,” a ‘strict religion of observance’,’? is wrong, since Baha’i religious life is definitely not

confined to mere ‘observance’ of the duties arising from the Covenant. The idea that the worth of all human acts is dependent

upon the Will of God ‘is of the essence of His Faith’.”4 Hence, there is no danger that compliance with the law might lead to

self-righteousness and eventually cause the believer to ‘boast’,”> because nobody can be certain whether his acts are pleasing to God and whether they will be judged acceptable before God. The salvational status of the believer remains unsure, for none knoweth what his own end shall be. How often hath a sinner, at the hour of death, attained to the essence of faith, and, quaffing the immortal draught,

70. Hidden Words, Arabic 38.

71. 72. 73. 74. Toy

Kitab-i-Aqdas 4. Baha’ismus, p. 293. ibid. pp. 234, 427 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). Gleanings 135:5. Epht 293.1 Core 1:29:

76. For discussion of this subject see Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 6.4.

271

Chapter 4\¢ Udo Schaefer hath taken his flight unto the celestial Concourse.”” And how often hath a devout believer, at the hour of his soul’s ascension, been so changed as to fall into the nethermost fire.”

Therefore, the believer should be humble and ‘should forgive the sinful, and never despise his low estate’.’”” The believer who

abides in the Covenant of God and strives with all his heart to walk in the statutes of God, lives his life in the confidence of God’s mercy. That God’s grace and compassion are a central theme in Baha’i scripture goes entirely unmentioned in Ficicchia’s “stan-

dard work’. The image of God as a despot that Ficicchia conveys to his readers, along with his judgement that the Baha’i

Faith is concerned only with the ‘observance’ of capricious and arbitrary regulations, are belied by the multitude of scriptural passages testifying to the boundlessness®? and immensity®! of

God’s mercy, which ‘hath preceded (sabagat) all creation’ ,®? which ‘embraceth all things’,®? and is the pre-condition for all life.84 God’s mercy has ‘been shed over both the obedient and the rebellious’,®> surpassing his wrath and excelling his justice.8° Without it, ‘the entire creation would perish, and all that 77. For instance, the thief on the Cross (Luke 23:42).

78. Kitab-i-igdn 214 (pp. 194f.). 79. ibid., see also Gleanings 145. 80. Prayers and Meditations 41:3; 93:3; 180:7. 81. ibid. 81:5; 91:3; 101:7; 123:1 etc.

82. Kitab-i-Aqdas 14. 83. Qur’an 7:155. 84. ‘Who is he that can claim to have fixed his gaze upon Thee, and toward whom the eye of Thy loving-kindness (‘inaya) hath not been directed? I bear witness that Thou hadst turned toward Thy servants ere they had turned toward Thee, and hadst remembered them ere they had remembered Thee’ (Prayers and Meditations 161:2). 85. ibid. 157:1. 86. ibid. 81:4.

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Ficicchia’s Presentation of Baha'i Doctrine

are in heaven and on earth would be reduced to utter nothingness’ .®”

IV. ON THE BAHA’i CONCEPT OF HUMAN NATURE®® According to Ficicchia, Baha’is believe that the human soul is ‘non-created immaterial spirit’,®? and that man is ‘a predestined

being’.*° Both these statements are false. a) According to ated, even the /égos. not pre-existent, nor souls are incarnated

Baha’u’llah, everything except God is creThe human soul is not ‘non-created’; it is is the Beyond a kind of bank from which for their earthly existence. The soul ‘is

phenomenal’®! and comes into being through the act of procreation, at the moment of conception.”? ‘Once it has come into

existence, it is eternal.” b) Ficicchia’s assertion that man is a ‘predestined being’ (his fate being written upon the ‘Preserved Tablet of Life’ and ‘thus precisely determined in its sequence’), does not correspond with Baha’i doctrine. The section entitled ‘free will, pre-

destination, suffering and happiness’®* shows that Ficicchia does not understand these terms. While he initially points out

87. ibid. 58:4. 88. It is not my intention here to present statements on human nature found

in Baha’i

scripture, but merely

to correct

certain

errors.

On

Baha’i anthropology (in the sense of a philosophy of human nature) see the discussion in my Bahd’i Ethics, Part II, ch. 5; see also my publication In a Blue Haze, pp. 38ff.; Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 6.

89. 90. 91. 92.

Baha’ismus, pp. 220, 228. ibid. p. 234. Some Answered Questions 38:4 (p. 151). See Shoghi Effendi in Hornby, Lights of Guidance, no. 697. This

is one of the cardinal differences from the Manifestation,

who is pre-

existent (see John 8:53; Rev. 1:8, Some Answered Questions 28:4; 38:6fay 93. Some Answered Questions 38:4 (p. 151). 94. Baha’ismus, pp. 232ff.

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Chapter 4 ¢ Udo Schaefer

correctly that man is ‘a free being that makes independent decisions’, he then goes on to place free will in relation to the demand in the Kitab-i-Aqdas that man submit to the law of God, concluding from the demand of compliance with the law—an element of faithfulness to the Covenant—that: “Hence, freedom

has no place in the system of this strict religion of observance.’?> What, however, does religious obedience, i.e. voluntary submission to the will of God, have to do with free will? Free will is not the subject of the passage he quotes. Its existence is simply taken for granted, since obedience is always ‘free’. Indeed, free will®® is the precondition for such obedi-

ence. The passage from the Kitab-i-Aqdas”’ cited”® by Ficicchia is concerned with moral freedom (liberty) and its limits.?? From the insight that this freedom is not arbitrary, but rather has lim-

its, one cannot deduce that man is a ‘predestined’ being.

A doctrine of predestination a la Luther! or Calvin,!®! or in the sense of the Islamic jabriyya or the orthodox

Sunni

ash‘ariyyah'? has never developed in the Baha’i Faith. When ‘Abdu’1-Baha points out that God’s foreknowledge of a thing is

not ‘the cause of its realization’,!°> the meaning is precisely the opposite of what Ficicchia has supposed. It indicates that the individual’s destiny is not predetermined through divine Will, neither as regards salvation nor with respect to earthly fate. The promise of reward and the threat of punishment pronounced in

95. ibid. p. 234. 96. On this subject see my Bahd’i Ethics, Part II, ch. 5, 4c.

97. 122-125. See below, p. 301, note 294. 98. Baha’ismus, pp. 233-234. 99. see below, pp. 305ff. 100. See his text De servo arbitrio (1525), WA 18, pp. 600-787. 101. Institutio religionis christianae (1559). 102. On these two terms see SEI, p. 80, keyword ‘Jabriya’. 103. Some Answered Questions 35:2 (p. 138).

274

Ficicchia’s Presentation of Baha'i Doctrine

the Law,!® together with the strong emphasis on moral responsibility, are set out under the presumption that man can decide

for himself whether or not to follow the commandments of God. Whereas the animal realm is “captive to matter’, God has ‘given freedom to man’.!°> Therefore, man has ‘the power both to do

good and to do evil’.!°° His sinfulness!®” is considered not to be his destiny, but to be his personal failing. Hence, any form of determinism is rejected, whether its origin be philosophical,

biological or theological.!°° It must be noted that the expression ‘the Preserved Tablet of Fate’ mentioned by Ficicchia is not a Baha’i term. The ‘Pre-

served Tablet’ is a Qur’anic concept!” that appears fairly frequently in the scripture of Baha’u’llah.!!° He identifies this term with his own mission: By God! The Preserved Tablet has appeared; it walks

amongst His Servants and calls out: ‘This is the day promised unto you in the holy books of old. 3}

According to ‘Abdu’l-Baha, the ‘Preserved Tablet’ is identical with Baha’u’llah’s

Book of the Covenant

104.

Tablets 3:25; 8:55; 8:61; 11:6.

105.

Paris Talks 9:17; 11:6.

106.

ibid. 18:3.

(Kitab-i-‘Ahd).!!?

107. This is expressed in the long daily obligatory prayer, in which the believer repeatedly confesses himself to be a ‘sinner’ whose “back is bowed’ under the burden of his ‘sins’ (Bahd’i Prayers, p. 14), as well as in numerous other scriptural passages (‘for my heart is prone to evil’ (Prayers and Meditations 124:2). On this subject see also Bahd’i Ethics, Part II, ch. 5, 4d.

108.

For discussion of this subject see Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 6.4.

109.

See 85:22: al-Lawh al-Mahfuz. See Tablets 14:2; 17:51, 110, 126, 128.

110.

111. Quoted from Athdr-i-Qalam-i-A'ld, vol. II, p. 18. Ishraq Khavari

(ed.), Rahiq-i-Makhtum, vol. II, p. 349 (authorized translation by the Research Department of the Baha’i World Centre). 112.

See Ishraq Khavari, ibid.

275

Chapter 4 ¢ Udo Schaefer The ‘written Tablet of Fate’ alluded to by Ficicchia is to be

found only in Some Answered Questions''> and is part of a question directed to ‘Abdu’l-Baha, not part of his answer.!!4 V. ON CLAIMS TO ABSOLUTENESS AND EXCLUSIVENESS

When Ficicchia writes about the claims of the Baha’i Faith and its relationship with the other religions he makes some correct statements, but important matters are so distorted by overaccentuation or simplification that they cannot be left unrefuted, especially because his deductions

insinuate that the Baha’is

pursue goals contrary to those prescribed by their scripture. Ficicchia’s observation: ‘The Baha’i Faith is not what it is generally presumed to be—an inter-religious movement’!!> is indubitably correct. That was precisely the misunderstanding that caused some believers to rebel against the implementation of legal structures in the community, the starting process of in-

stitutionalization;!!° they had seen Baha’u’llah’s revelation as a mere call for religious unity, an all-inclusive movement, a platform for interfaith dialogue. Kurt Hutten also deliberately promoted this misconception, writing that the “Baha’i Movement’ ought to ‘avoid like the plague’ the danger of ‘itself becoming a

“denomination”’.!!” Because the Baha’i Faith ‘competes with its own doctrines and traditions’ it has, according to Hutten, ‘fallen victim to confessionalism’.!!8

LIS. 114.

S353 The subject of predestination has also been discussed by Goll-

mer, Gottesreich, ch. 6.4, q.v.

115. Baha’ismus, p. 268. Elsewhere (ibid. p. 293), on the other hand, he states that ‘Abdu’l-Baha, ‘while disregarding the dogmatic regulations of the Kitab-i-Aqdas’ presented ‘Baha’ism as “an ecumenical religious movement” that promotes fraternization among all religions’. 116. See above, pp. 142ff. 117. Seher, Griibler, Enthusiasten, p. 319. 118. ibid.

276

Ficicchia’s Presentation of Baha’i Doctrine

However, according to the testimony of scripture, Baha’u*|1ah’s revelation is God’s message to mankind. It is the ‘Glad

Tidings’,!!° the ‘word of truth’,!?° ‘the straight Path of Truth’,!?! ‘a Light which is not followed by darkness, and a Truth not over-

taken by error’.!”? According to his own testimony, Baha’u’llah is the ‘Spirit of Truth’ promised in the Gospel of St John,!3 who ‘is come to guide you unto all truth’.!24 He is God’s ‘straight, undeviating Path amidst the peoples of the earth’.!*° Thus, the Baha’i Faith, like all revealed religions, raises a claim to truth that is not merely a post-modern, subjectivist postulation, but rather a claim that is unconditional and universal, valid for all: ‘If it be true’ says ‘Abdu’l-Baha, “it is for all; if not, it is

for no one.”!?6 This universal concept of truth is at the foundation of all religions and was formulated in various forms by St

Augustine. !?’ The universality of the Baha’i Faith results from its claim to be the truth. Owing to this claim to absolute, universal validity and the consequent demand for obedience to the

119.

Bishardt, see Tablets 3; 1:4; 2:11; 6:25; 7:6 etc.

120. Tablets 9:6. 121. Gleanings 81. 122. Tablets 8:17; 17:45. 1232 162413: 124. Tablets 2:12; Gleanings 116:1. 125. Kitdb-i-Aqdas 186; see Qur’dn 1:6. 126. ‘Abdu’l-Baha, quoted from Esslemont, Bahd’u'llah and the New Era, p. 236. 127. ‘Quia communis et omnibus veritas. Non est nec mea, nec tua; non est illius, aut illius: omnibus communis est’ (Enarrationes in Psal-

mos LXXV, tum tuum.

17 (20)). ‘Non habeo quasi privatum meum, nec tu priva-

Veritas nec mea sit propria, nec tua, ut et tua sit et mea’

(ibid. CII, 11 (25)).

Dek,

Chapter 4 * Udo Schaefer

divine message, Ficicchia is certainly correct in ascribing to the Baha’i Faith a ‘claim to absoluteness’.!28

This judgement may be astonishing to those whose conviction has been deeply moulded by the basic insight that ‘religious truth is not absolute but relative’—a ‘fundamental principle’ of the Baha’i revelation that has been formulated by

Shoghi Effendi.!?? However, this conclusion is not at all a contradiction to his statement, as he was quite evidently referring to

the historical religions, to their mutual relationship, their dependence on the historical conditions of their age, and to the relativity of human knowledge,!?° not to their unconditional

claim to truth. Taken out of context, used as an easy formula, this state-

ment can be easily misunderstood in the sense of post-modern relativism. In relation to previous and to future revelations of

God, to the changing conditions on earth and to the growing

spiritual capacity of mankind,!*! religious truth is relative.!>? In relation to the unconditional claim to truth, which has been

raised by all the world religions, it is absolute. The truth that 128.

Baha’ismus,

pp. 293, 268, 334, 418; Materialdienst

3 (1995),

p. 92. For discussion of this issue see Schaefer, Beyond the Clash, pp. 58ff. On the relativity of divine revelations see also op. cit. pp. 131ff. 129. ‘Its [the Baha’i Faith’s] teachings revolve around the fundamental principle that religious truth is not absolute but relative, that Divine Revelation is progressive, not final’ (World Order, p. 58). 130. See I Cor. 13:12; Qur’dn Gleanings 33:1; 38; 84:1-3; 89:2-4.

2:213; Hidden

Words,

Arabic

67;

131. ‘All that I have revealed unto thee with the tongue of power, and have written for thee with the pen of might, hath been in accordance with thy capacity and understanding, not with My state and the melody of My voice’ (Hidden Words, Arabic 67; see also Gleanings 38). 132. As man has no access to absolute truth and as each revelation has been brought to mankind in accordance with its spiritual capacity, its stage of development and its level of understanding, relativism is, as Momen formulated, a basis for Baha’i metaphysics (‘Relativism: A Basis for Baha’i Metaphysics’, in Momen (ed.), SBB, vol. V, p. 185ff). On the whole subject see also Schaefer, Beyond the Clash, pp. 60ff., 135ff.

278

Ficicchia’s Presentation of Bahd’i Doctrine

emanates from God is absolute. We can accept or reject it, but once accepted it is authoritative, categorical, above criticism

and not in need of rational justification. All human thought, all philosophy is relative. In philosophy one can be selective and eclectic. The same cannot be done with divine revelation. In the Kitab-i-Iqan Baha’u’llah disparages those who accept from the

revelation only these elements which correspond to their ‘inclinations and interests’ and ‘reject those which are contrary to

their selfish desires’ .!3° The Qur’an says: Believe ye then part of the Book, and deny part?!34

However, does this claim to absoluteness imply also a ‘claim to exclusiveness’, as Ficicchia asserts? Do the Baha’is regard their faith as “the only true and the sole valid religion for

the present era’,!3> as ‘alone valid and right’,!°° as ‘the only true and valid religion of God’,!3” the ‘sole true message’?!38 Have the earlier religions been ‘done away with’!° as a result of the

new revelation? The question concerning the relationship of the Baha’i Faith to the historical revealed religions requires a more discriminating answer than Ficicchia’s exaggerated and oversimplified formulations. Every religion has at some point been

faced with the question of its relationship to preceding religions. They are all set in the continuum of a particular tradition, whether this be of the Abrahamic or Middle Eastern religions or of the religions of Asia. The relationship of a religion to the tradition in which it stands, and to the religions outside of that tra-

133. section 181 (p. 169). 134e 2279; 135. Baha’ismus, p. 393 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 136. 137. 138. 139.

ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid.

pp. 416, 418. pp. 214, 424 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). p. 423. p. 21.

279

Chapter 4 + Udo Schaefer dition, is deduced from the concept of revelation as defined by

the faith in question. !*° The doctrine of progressive, cyclically recurring divine

revelation!*! and the mystical unity of the religions is the theological keystone of the Baha’i Faith, the new theological paradigm. The historical revealed religions, the chain of Prophets from Adam to Baha’u’llah, constitute ‘the one and indivisible

religion of God’,!*? the ‘changeless Faith of God, eternal in the past, eternal in the future’.!*° The revelation of Baha’u’llah is, as ‘Abdu’l-Baha expressed it, “not a new path to salvation’, but

the ‘ancient Path’,!*4 cleared of the historical baggage inevitably accumulated by the religions in the course of history. It is the new ‘Book of God’, the “unerring Balance’ on which ‘whatsoever the peoples and kindreds of the earth possess must be

weighed’,!*> and through which ‘truth may be distinguished from error’.!*¢ It is the true Reformation,!*” the Day of Judge140. For more detail on this subject see Schaefer, Beyond the Clash, pp. 75ff.; Hans Zirker, Christentum und Islam, pp. 55ff., 140.

141.

‘God hath sent down His Messengers to succeed to Moses and

Jesus, and He will continue to do so “till the end that hath no end” ’

(Suratu’s-Sabr, quoted from Shoghi Effendi, World Order, p. 116; see also Gleanings 24; 34:3). The same idea is expressed in the Bhagavad Gita (IV:7-8), and in the Buddhist canon, where it is formulated as follows: ‘Those who in the long past were perfected ones, fully SelfAwakened Ones—these Lords had an equally excellent Order of monks that they led properly, even as the Order of monks is now being led properly by me. And those, who in a distant future will be perfected ones, fully Self-Awakened Ones—these Lords will have an equally excellent Order of monks that they will lead properly, even as the Order of monks is now being led properly by me’ (Majjhima Nikaya, vol. II, no. SCP 3i)): 142.

The Bab, Selections 2:24:2.

143. Kitab-i-Aqdas 182. 144. Quoted from Sonne der Wahrheit | (1947), p. 1. 145. Kitdb-i-Aqdas 99; 183. 146. ‘Lawh-i-Ahmad’, in Baha ’i Prayers, p. 210. 147. See Schaefer, Beyond the Clash, pp. 139ff.; 143ff.

280

Ficicchia’s Presentation of Baha ’i Doctrine

ment for the religions, the ‘time of harvest’!4* announced in the St Matthew’s Gospel, as Baha’u’llah made clear in his Tablet to Pope Pius IX: Verily, the day of ingathering is come, and all things have been separated from each other. He hath stored away that which He chose in the vessels of justice, and

cast into fire that which befitteth it.14° This viewpoint provides the criteria for assessing the role of the

historical religions. Their claim to truth is recognized and accepted. They are of divine origin and are manifestations of the

divine Word;!*° they do not, as Ficicchia assumes,!*! merely possess a share of the truth through the /ogos spermatikos. Neither have these religions been ‘done away with’ as a result of the new revelation, nor has a time limit been set on their claim to truth. The testimony of the Torah, the Gospel and the

Qur’an remains the truth. These books of God are an integral

part of scripture in the broadest sense of the word;!>? all religious truths contained in them are ‘facets’!°> of an ultimate truth whose immense depths will always remain unfathomable to humankind. Only to the extent that time alters the social condition of humankind does the ‘old law’ lose its validity—i.e. revelation takes account of the changing conditions of human society so that each new religion is appropriately fashioned by 148. 13:30ff.; 13:36ff. 149. Proclamation, p. 86. 150. kalima: the Word of Creation. The term /dgos is definitely not identical with ‘aq/, reason, as Ficicchia states (pp. 78, 80). According to the Traditions of Muhammad, al-‘aqlu’l-awwal, original reason, stands for the first created being. 151.

Baha’ismus, p. 424.

152. In Baha’i Houses of Worship, where only the Word of God should be heard, readings are taken even from holy scriptures whose traditions are very fragmented, such as the Bhagavad Gita and the Buddhist canon. 153. Shoghi Effendi, Guidance for Today and Tomorrow, p. 2.

281

Chapter 4 ¢ Udo Schaefer its founder to foster laws that best advance society. In other

words, revealed religious law has a type of historical apparel whereby instead of destroying the ‘old law’, it fulfils it. Whereas the ‘horizontal’ dimension of revelation (that sphere

that is concerned with the development of a constantly changing world and with forms of worship—law and ritual) is, so to speak, the variable, the ‘vertical’ dimension, the eternal nucleus

of the religion of God that ‘does not change nor alter’!>4 is the

constant. !>° It follows from this, first, that the religions of mankind are to be taken seriously and are greatly honoured, since they all originate ‘from one Source’,!*° even though they have taken various paths of development in the long course of history, and their original unity is only perceptible to those whose eyes are able to penetrate the veils of their diversity and see beyond that

which has been conditioned by historical events.!>’ Through the epiphany of Baha’u’llah they have neither been “done away with’ and declared ‘invalid’, nor is his revelation the ‘only true’ path to salvation, “alone valid and right’. The conviction of the Baha’is that the Adamic cycle has come to a close, that Baha’u-

lah has fulfilled the promises of the revelations of the past and initiated a new world era, that the fullness of truth and salvation is to be found in his revelation, is not the foundation for a claim

to exclusiveness!*® in the sense that salvation is not to be found

154. Some Answered Questions 11:9 (p. 47). 155. See Schaefer, Beyond the Clash, pp. 137ff. The Catholic theologian Hans Zirker correctly concludes that: ‘Baha’ism does away with the historical topos of exclusive finality without disputing the possibility of a claim to absoluteness’ (Christentum und Islam, p. 140.) 156. Gleanings 132:1. 157. See Seven Valleys, pp. 11ff. 158. For a discussion of these claims in Christianity and Islam see the essays by Fazel and Fananapazir, ‘A Baha’i Approach to the Claim of Exclusivity and Uniqueness in Christianity’, in Journal of Bahda’i Studies, vol. 3.2 (1990-91), pp. 15ff., and ‘A Baha’i Approach to the Claim

282

Ficicchia’s Presentation of Bahd’t Doctrine

in the other religions. Faith in the bearer of God’s message as a

precondition for salvation!®? is not a doctrine unique to Baha'u'llah; it conforms to the testimony of the New Testament

and the Qur’dn,!®° and even to the religion of Zoroaster.!° What is required is belief in all the Manifestations, all of whom share equal status as the embodiments of divine inspiration.

Whoever rejects one of them has rejected them all.!® The theological universalism manifested in the doctrine of the unity of religions and expressed in the essential oneness of humanity is not a mere theoretical position but has far-reaching practical consequences in the realms of law and ethics. Legal’ norms, attitudes and religious practices that aim to make distinctions between followers of different religions, and in which

other religions are degraded and their adherents discriminated against, are rejected in the revelation of Baha’u’llah. In his scripture we find: a) the explicit abrogation’*’ 163 of the Shi‘a concept of ‘uncleanness’ (najdsat), according to which all non-Muslim peo-

ples are considered ‘unclean’!

and are to be shunned;!®

of Finality in Islam’, in ibid. vol. 5.3 (Sept.-Dec. 1993), pp. 17ff. I refer also to Seena Fazel’s interesting paper ‘Understanding Exclusivist Texts’ in Bahd’i Scriptural Studies, vol. 1, Los Angeles: Kalimat, 1995.

159. Heilsnotwendigkeit, see Kitab-i-Aqdas 1; Tablets 5:4; 5:11-12; ‘Lawh-i-Ahmad’, in Bahd’i Prayers, pp. 209ff., ‘Lawh-i-Ziyarih’, in Prayers and Meditations 180:3 (p. 238f.), Persian Bayan 3:15. 160.

57:9; 48:28; Mark 16:16; John 3:18; Matt. 10:32; Luke 12:8-9.

161. ‘O you mortals, when you master those rules which the Wise One has established, and which convey good mobility and immobility, and (when you master) what long-lasting harm (is in store) for the deceitful, as well as (what) benefits for the truthful, then (the things) desired will in future be available through them’ (Gathas, Yasna 30:11). 162. ‘He who turns away from this Beauty hath also turned away from the Messengers of the past and showeth pride towards God from all eternity to all eternity’ (Lawh-i-Ahmad, in Baha i Prayers, p. 212). 163. Kitab-i-Aqdas 75. 164. The law found in the Qur’dn (9:28) according to which the mushrikin (idol-worshippers) are regarded as unclean is extended in

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Chapter 4 ¢ Udo Schaefer

b) the prohibition of cursing!® and vilification of the followers of other faiths, as is practised in some religions;!©” c) the abrogation of the prohibition against marrying fol-

lowers of another religion. !° The removal of discriminatory barriers is the prerequisite for the commandment directed by Baha’u’llah to his followers, a commandment unique in all the holy scriptures; namely, to

consort with the followers of all religions “with amity and concord’, ‘in a spirit of friendliness and fellowship’.!©? This comShi‘a law to all non-Muslims, including the ‘People of the Book’, i.e. Jews and Christians. The physical substance of the unbeliever is declared ritually unclean and is listed among the things that cause ritual uncleanness. Food or vessels for food and drink become unclean as soon as they have been touched by an unbeliever (for further detail see Goldziher, Introduction, pp. 213ff.; see also SEI, keyword ‘Nadjis’, pp. 431ff.) 165.

See Tablets 7:27.

166. la’n, from la’ana, yala’an: to curse; derivative mal’un: accursed (see Tablets 3:26; 4:21; 8:62; 15:2).

167. Shi‘a religious law requires the cursing of religious opponents: ‘To fail to practise it is a religious lapse’ (Goldziher, Introduction, p. 181). With reference to the Shi‘a clergy, Baha’u’llah states that: ‘From the lips of the members of this sect foul imprecations fall unceasingly, while they invoke the word “mal’un” (accursed)—uttered with a guttural sound of the letter ‘ayn—as their daily relish’ (Tablets 7:27). A similar attitude existed in Christianity, too. Over the centuries, early ecclesiastical apologists, Church Fathers, Popes, Church teachers

and reformers cursed the Jews as having been condemned and disinherited by God. The anti-Jewish phrase in the prayer of intercession ‘pro perfidis iudaeis’ was not removed from the Good Friday and Easter Sunday liturgy until 1955. 168.

See Kitab-i-Aqdas

139; ‘Questions and Answers’,

84. Whereas

the Qur’an (5:7) permits Muslim men to marry women of the Jewish and Christian faiths, this is forbidden in Shi‘a law, in which adherents of the

other monotheistic religions are equated with the idol-worshippers (mushrikun, see Qur’dn 2:220). According to both Catholic and Protestant law there is also an impediment to marriage between Christians and non-Christians. 169.

ibid.

144; Tablets

3:5; 4:10; 7:13.

The Arabic

verb

‘ashara,

yu'ashiru is etymologically related to the terms mu‘ashira (clan, tribe, close kinship) and ‘ashir (companion, comrade, friend), giving it a strong

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Ficicchia’s Presentation of Baha'i Doctrine

mandment abolishes the ancient distinction used by earlier re-

ligious systems for the sake of their own self-preservation, according to which humanity was divided into ‘believers’ (the recipients of God’s mercy), and ‘unbelievers’ (the objects of

God’s wrath and damnation).!7° Moreover, this exhortation implies not only the repeal of the Qur’anic commandment not to

befriend infidels!”! (or Jews and Christians);!7 it is also a call for the Baha’is to conduct interreligious dialogue!”> in this very spirit in order to overcome the negative attitudes of division, dogmatism, opinionativeness and blindness towards those of

other faiths.!”4 Reconciliation among the religions!”> is a goal

emotional component in the sense of ‘to be on close familiar terms with’ a person. The word ‘consort’ is used in this sense. 170. ‘In this way Baha’u’llah expressed the oneness of humankind, whereas in all religious teachings of the past the human world has been represented as divided into two parts: one known as the people of the Book of God, or the pure tree, and the other the people of infidelity and error, or the evil tree. The former were considered as belonging to the faithful, and the others to the hosts of the irreligious and infidel—one part of humanity the recipients of divine mercy, and the other the object of the wrath of their Creator. Baha’u’llah removed this by proclaiming the oneness of the world of humanity, and this principle is specialized in his teachings, for he has submerged all mankind in the sea of divine generosity. Some are asleep; they need to be awakened. Some are ailing; they need to be healed. Some are immature as children; they need to be trained. But all are recipients of the bounty and bestowals of God’ (‘Abdu’1-Baha, Promulgation, p. 454). 171.

See Qur’dn 3:27, 3:118; 5:58; 60:9.

172. ibid. 5:56. 173. See my discussion of this subject above, p. 128ff.; see also Seena Fazel, ‘Interreligious Dialogue and the Baha’i Faith: Some Preliminary Observations’, in McLean (ed.), Revisioning the Sacred: New Perspectives on a Baha'i Theology, SBB, vol. 8. Los Angeles: Kalimat, 1996; Schaefer, ‘Baha’u’llah’s Unity Paradigm: A Contribution to Interfaith Dialogue on a Global Ethic’, in Dialogue and Universalism, vol. VI.11-

12 (1996), pp. 23-41. 174. See Schaefer, Beyond the Clash, pp. 72ff. 175. See ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Selections 223:1 (p. 281).

285

Chapter 4 * Udo Schaefer of heilsgeschichte,'"® since this is the foundation stone for “uni-

versal reconciliation’,!”” the precondition for lasting world peace. !78 Furthermore, we find in the scripture of Baha’u’llah deep

respect for the virtues of tolerance!”? and forbearance,!*° severe denunciation of religious fanaticism!*! and express warnings against zealous proselytization,!®? bigotry,'®? idle theological ‘disputation’,!®* ‘fruitless excursions into metaphysical hair-

176. Literally: the history of salvation. The German word heilsgeschichte, however, is more complex. It conveys a microcosm of meanings: God’s purpose for mankind together with his actions in history aiming at the redemption of man and the salvation of humankind. In the Baha’i Faith heilsgeschichte is seen as a continual process, structured by the epiphanies of the revealed religions, the coming of the ‘Day of God’, the promised ‘Day of God’, the ‘Day of Resurrection’ (vawmu ’'l-qiydmah) in Baha’w’llah, who has inaugurated a new universal age in which all mankind will come under the shelter of the law of God, and the Most Great Peace (which is identical with the promised Kingdom of God on earth) will be established. 177. ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Selections 77:1; 13:1; 35:8; 227:2 (pp. 113f., 28, 71, 296f.); Gleanings 119:4; Tablets 11:8; 11:23.

178. Literature on this subject: ‘Tablet to the Hague’, in ‘Abdu’lBaha, Letter and Tablet from ‘Abdu’l-Baha to the Central Organization for a Durable Peace, The Hague, Chicago: Baha’i Publishing Society, 1920; The Universal House of Justice, To the Peoples of the World: A

Baha’i Statement on Peace by the Universal House of Justice on the Occasion of the International Year of Peace, published by the Association for Baha’i Studies, Ottawa, 1986; Ulrich Gollmer, ‘Der lange Weg zum Gréften Frieden’, in Baha 'i-Briefe, issue 50 (October 1985),

pp. 128ff.; issue 52 (December 1986), pp. 207ff.; Schaefer, Dominion, pp. 139-144. 179. Tablets 4:12; 11:21. 180.

Hidden Words, Persian 48; Tablets 17:28, Gleanings 115:4.

181.

‘a desolating affliction’, ‘a world-devouring fire’ (Epistle 19 (p. 14)).

182.

Hidden Words, Persian 36; Gleanings 5:23, 163:5.

183. Tablets 6:28. 184. Kitab-i-Aqdas 77, 177; Tablets 17:40; Secret 186 (p. 106).

286

Ficicchia’s Presentation of Baha’i Doctrine

splittings’.'®° ‘Abdu’l-Baha, too, warned against ‘the investigation of useless conceits’,!®° ‘useless hair-splittings’ and ‘empty,

fruitless debates’ that lead to no result ‘except acrimony’.!87 Religion, whose purpose is to promote love, harmony and peace among men,!** must not result in alienation, discord, conflict,

hostility and hatred.!®° What is demanded, then, is more than tolerance. What is required is loving association with the followers of other religions ‘with joy and radiance’ (rawh wa rayhan), full of ‘tender

mercy’ and ‘free from animosity and hatred’.!° Thus, as Baha’u llah has stated, ‘the doors of love and unity have been © unlocked and flung open to the face of men’, and all that has hitherto separated people in spiritual matters and ‘hath caused

dissensions and divisions’ has ‘been nullified and abolished’. !*! The interfaith dialogue demanded by Baha’u’llah is not an

end in itself. Its ultimate goal is to serve the highest purpose of religion, namely ‘to safeguard the interests and promote the unity of the human race, and to foster the spirit of love and fel-

lowship amongst men’.!*? Therefore, Baha’u’llah calls upon the religious leaders and the world’s rulers to arise and bring about a reformation of the world, to consult together and ‘administer

to a diseased and sorely-afflicted world the remedy it requireth’.!?? Thus, the Baha’is are exhorted to cooperate with the

185. Kitdb-i-Aqdas, note 110 (pp. 214f.). 186. ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Secret 186 (p. 106). 187. 188.

ibid. See Tablets 11:6; Gleanings 34:5.

189.

See Tablets

11:15; 4:11; 6:40,47; Gleanings

156.

‘Religion is

like a remedy; if it aggravates the disease then it becomes unnecessary’ (‘Abdu’1-Bahé, Selections 227:9 (p. 299); see also Paris Talks 39:1). 190.

Tablets 3:5; 4:10, 11; 7:13; Kitab-i-Aqdas 75, 144.

191. 192. 193.

Tablets 7:13. ibid. 11:15. ibid. 11:14.

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Chapter 4 ‘¢ Udo Schaefer

other religions in joint service for the welfare of the whole human family.

Shoghi Effendi has summarized the Baha’i attitude towards the historical religions, emphasizing their unity and eternal validity. The central nature of the question under scrutiny

justifies citing the relevant passages at length: The Revelation, of which Baha’u’Ilah is the source and centre, abrogates none of the religions that have preceded it, nor does it attempt, in the slightest degree, to distort their features or to belittle their value. It disclaims any intention of dwarfing any of the Prophets of the past, or of whittling down the eternal verity of their teachings . . . Unequivocally and without the least res-

ervation it proclaims all established religions to be divine in origin, identical in their aims, complementary in their functions, continuous in their purpose, indispensable in their value to mankind! . . . Nor does the Baha’i Revelation, claiming as it does to be the culmination of a prophetic cycle and the fulfilment of the promise of all ages, attempt, under any circumstances, to invalidate those first and everlasting principles that animate and underlie the religions that have preceded it. The God-given authority, vested in each one of them, it admits and establishes as its firmest and ultimate basis. It regards them in no other light except as different stages in the eternal history and constant evolution of one religion, Divine and indivisible, of which it itself forms but an integral part. It neither seeks to obscure their Divine origin, nor to dwarf the

admitted magnitude of their colossal achievements . . . Far from aiming at the overthrow of the spiritual foundation of the world’s religious systems, its avowed, its unalterable purpose is to widen their basis, to restate their fundamentals, to reconcile their aims, to reinvigorate their life, to demonstrate their oneness, to restore

194.

World Order, p. 57f.

288

Ficicchia’s Presentation of Baha’i Doctrine the pristine purity of their teachings, to coordinate their functions and to assist in the realization of their highest aspirations. !?°

To see in all this nothing but verbal pronouncements and op-

portunistic motives, and to depict the Baha’is as extremely ‘in-

tolerant’!%° is in itself malicious. That Ficicchia then even goes on to assert that ‘coexistence among different religions is rejected’,!?” that the goal of ‘Baha’i missionary work’, with its “polemics against the other religions’, is ‘the annihilation of all

existing religions’,!?® reveals the extent to which his hatred has blinded him to reality. VI. EMPHATICALLY RATIONALIST, HOSTILE TO SCIENCE, AND ESOTERIC, ALL AT ONCE? Ficicchia’s statements concerning rationalism, science and eso-

tericism!*? are so confused, contradictory, and muddled that it would be pointless to discuss them in detail. On the one hand, he constantly attempts to place the faith of Baha’u’llah in the context of the Western Enlightenment, coming in the wake of

the ‘modern cultural movement in the Middle East’?”° and even 195. ibid. p. 114 (see also ibid. p. 166). 196. Baha’ismus, pp. 277, 416ff. If this is the case, it is strange that in civil proceedings relating to serious violence that occurred between Hindus and Muslims (sparked off by the destruction of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya, which had been built in 1582 on the site of a Hindu temple), the Supreme Court of India should have cited the Baha’i community and the Baha’i Faith as exemplary for the solution of such conflicts: ‘A neutral perception of the requirement for communal harmony is to be found in the Baha’i Faith’ (Transferred Case no. 41, 42, 43 and 45 of 1993; Writ Petition no. 20 B, 1993; 186, 1994, pp. 91-93

of the verdict). 197. Lexikon der Sekten, column 101. 198. Baha’ismus, p. 425. 199. ibid. pp. 167ff., 187ff., 252ff. 200. ibid. pp. 90, 87, 166, 255. The term is taken from Rémer (Die Babi-Beha’i, pp. 90, 114, 117, 119, 121, 124).

289

Chapter 4 * Udo Schaefer ‘essentially related to the protagonists of the Young Turks’ Revo-

lution’.2°! He regards it as ‘rationalism celebrating real propagandist triumphs’? and, citing Goldziher,?°? he even equates the Baha’i Faith with ‘religious free-thinking’.2°* On another occasion he writes that ‘the Baha’i Faith presents itself as emphatically rationalist’,2°> implying that this is a false image. On the other hand, Ficicchia asserts that the Baha’i Faith is hostile to science, stating that it has ‘an attitude of conflict and contro-

versy towards science’ .?°° The hadith cited in the Kitab-i-Iqan: The most grievous of all veils is the veil of knowl-

edge,207

is made to serve as evidence for his absurd assertion that Baha’u’llah rejects all scientifically based knowledge ‘insofar

as it does not originate from the revelation’.?°* For this reason, he seriously expects that the Baha’i Faith will in the future demand that, ‘all sciences must be studied exclusively from its own books, as soon as this is more or less possible’ [!]?°?

Baha’u’llah and ‘Abdu’l-Baha have made a multitude of statements on science, religion, reason, knowledge and education that convey quite a different picture. The acquisition of

knowledge is imperative:

201.

Baha’ismus, p. 252.

202.

ibid. pp. 253f.

203. Goldziher refers in turn to the judgement of a Christian missionary in Persia, a Reverend F.M. Jordan, according to whom the Baha’is are nothing but ‘simple irreligious rationalists’ (Introduction, p. 253). 204. Baha’ismus, p. 187. 205. ibid. 206. ibid. p. 167, note 89.

207. Kitab-i-iqdn 205 (p. 188). 208. Baha’ismus, p. 254. 209. ibid. p. 167.

290

Ficicchia’s Presentation of Baha’i Doctrine

Knowledge is one of the wondrous gifts of God. It is incumbent upon everyone to acquire it ee Know!edge is as wings to man’s life, and a ladder for its ascent. Its acquisition is incumbent upon everyone?!! |.

Let the loved ones of God, whether young or old, whether male or female, each according to his capabilities, bestir themselves and spare no effort to ac-

quire the various current branches of knowledge, both spiritual and secular, and of arts.”!? Science is given a status with religion; both are the ‘wings’ with which man can soar to the heights of knowledge: ‘It is not possible to fly with one wing alone!’, says ‘Abdu’lBaha.?!3 Were man to fly ‘with the wing of religion alone’ he would ‘quickly fall into the quagmire of superstition’ while

‘with the wing of science alone he would also make no progress, but fall into the despairing slough of materialism’.?!4 The sciences are ‘droplets of reality’,?!> and ‘the unshakeable foun-

dation’ of this ‘new and wondrous Age’.*!© Baha’u’llah confirms that: “Great indeed is the claim of scientists and craftsmen

on the peoples of the world’,?!” for ‘the man of consummate learning and the sage endowed with penetrating wisdom are the

two eyes to the body of mankind.’!® In his political treatise Risdliy-i-Madaniyyih,?!? ‘Abdu’1-Baha passes harsh judgement

210.

Baha’u’llah, Tablets 4:24.

211,

ibid-75:1'5.

212.

‘Abdu’l-Baha, cited in Excellence in all Things, no. 24.

213.

Paris Talks 44:14.

214. 215. 216. 217. 218.

ibid. Selections 72:3 (p. 110). ibid. 109:1 (pp. 134f.). Tablets 5:15. ibid. 11:24. 219. Bombay 1299/1882; English edition: Secret of Divine Civilization, Wilmette, Ill.: Baha’i Publishing Trust, 2nd edn. 1970.

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on the zealous opponents of reform in Persia, who turned against ‘newfangled methods’ and ‘importation from foreign

countries’2”° and resisted all attempts to adopt the scientific and technical achievements of the West. Baha’u’llah, too, praises ‘the sun of craftsmanship’ that “shineth above the horizon of the

occident’ and announces to those who are hostile to progress: ‘One must speak with fairness and appreciate such bounty. ’?21 Education and the acquisition of knowledge are religious

obligations for all people,?”” for ‘knowledge is a veritable treasure for man, and a source of glory’.??> It is ‘the cause of human

progress’,”24 whereas ‘the root cause of wrongdoing is ignorance’.?”° For the backward nineteenth-century Persian State, “Abdu’l-Baha demanded ‘the extension of education, the development of useful arts and sciences, the promotion of industry

and technology’,?”° and the introduction of compulsory schooling.?”’ In his public talks during his visit to the United States and Canada ‘Abdu’l-Baha time and again praised the power of intellectual investigation and scientific acquisition and the phi-

losophers of former times, especially Socrates,?2® Plato??? and Aristotle:?°° The most noble and praiseworthy accomplishment of man ... is scientific knowledge and attainment”! . . . 220 oecrel.21,.55 (pps.12,5.31)) 221. Tablets 4:22. 222. ibid. 5:15; Selections 97:2 (p. 126); Secret 64 (p. 35). 223. Tablets 5:15. 224. ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Selections 111:8 (p. 137). 225. ibid. 111:1 (p. 136). 226. Secret 25 (p. 14). 227. ibid. 198 (p. 111). 228. Promulgation, pp. 327, 363. 229. ibid. pp. 213, 327, 348, 356. 230. ibid. pp. 327, 348, 356. 231. ibid. py29:

292

Ficicchia’s Presentation of Baha’i Doctrine Science is the first emanation from God toward man. . . All blessings are divine in origin, but none can be

compared with this power of intellectual investigation and research, which is an eternal gift producing fruits of unending delight.?>2 . . . Philosophy develops the mind.?*3

In certain passages, it is true, a qualification is attached to these statements. Baha’u’llah praises those sciences that ‘can

profit the peoples of the earth’,?** that ‘result in advantage to man, will ensure his progress and elevate his rank’,??> that “bring forth their fruit, and are conducive to the well-being and tranquillity of men’.7°° He does not approve of ‘those which begin with words and end with words’.??” What does he mean

by this? According to Shoghi Effendi, he is alluding to ‘theological treatises and commentaries’,

‘fruitless excursions into

metaphysical hair-splittings’ that ‘encumber the human mind rather than help it to attain the truth’.?* This judgement is probably also to be applied to sterile philosophical studies and scholastic discussions that lead to nothing but ‘idle conten-

tions’,?°? ‘useless hair-splittings and disputes’,?*° for Baha’u*|lah attests that: “The majority of Persia’s learned doctors devote all their lives to the study of a philosophy the ultimate

yield of which is nothing but words.’?4! Shoghi Effendi emphasized:

232. ibid. pp. 49f. 2330 1DIds Dp, 215. 234. Tablets 5:15. 235.eibidsi1:17. 236. Epistle 32 (p. 19). 237. Tablets 5:15; 11:18; Kitab-i-Agdas 77, 177; Epistle 32 (p. 19). 238. quoted from Kitdb-i-Aqdas, note 110 (pp. 214f.). 239. Tablets 17:40. 240. Secret 186 (p. 106). 241. Tablets 11:18.

293

Chapter 4 ‘* Udo Schaefer

Philosophy, as you will study it and later teach it, is certainly not one of the sciences that begins and ends

with words.

Fruitless

excursions

into metaphysical

hair-splitting is meant, not a sound branch of learning

like philosophy.?47

One would think that at some point in the course of his

‘comprehensive study of the sources’,?* this ‘outstanding expert’ on the Baha’i Faith would have come across these statements in the Baha’i writings. One can only assume that either

he was unaware of them or he deliberately ignored them, withholding from the readers the fact that the acquisition of knowl-

edge, ‘learning and the use of the mind, the expansion of consciousness, and insight into the realities of the universe and the hidden mysteries of Almighty God’ are described as the “mightiest pillars’ and “‘unshakeable supports of the Faith of

God’?*4_a statement that hardly conforms to the obscurantist image of this religion that Ficicchia conveys. His judgement that the Baha’i Faith is hostile to science?*° rests upon the evidence of a single sentence, a hadith quoted by Baha’u’llah in the Kitab-i-Iqan: ‘The most grievous of all veils is the veil of knowledge.’?*° Here again, Ficicchia reveals his perverse methodology. He has torn the quotation out of its con-

text, withholding from the reader the fact that what is being referred to are specific branches of knowledge, namely those of

‘metaphysical abstractions, of alchemy, and natural magic’?47 and, in particular, the academic disputes and ‘idle pursuits’ of theologians, whose knowledge acts as a veil preventing them

242. Letter on behalf of Shoghi Effendi to an individual, 15 February 1947, in Unfolding Destiny, p. 445. 243. 244. 245. 246.

Michael Mildenberger in his Foreword to Ficicchia’s book, p. 12. ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Selections 97:1 (p. 126). Baha’ismus, pp. 167, 254. Kitab-i-Igan 205 (p. 188); see also Tablets 17:40.

247. Kitab-i-Iqdn 203 (p. 186). 294

Ficicchia’s Presentation of Bahd’i Doctrine

from recognizing the new revelation.?48 Hence, Baha’u’llah is referring to those sciences that, as he puts it, ‘begin with words

and end with words’.””? To deduce from this a general hostility

to science, ignoring all other relevant scriptural statements, is

another instance of Ficicchia’s malevolent manipulation. This reproach does not, of course, prevent Ficicchia from arrogantly

reprimanding “Abdu’l-Baha’s

statement concerning the rela-

tionship between science and religion?>° for its alleged failure to take into account that ‘the essence of the religious lies in the numinous, the irrational’ 29!

What is more, Ficicchia purports to find an ‘emphatically esoteric aspect to Baha’ism’, remarking that ‘Baha’u’llah and

the strictly orthodox?>? Baha’is nevertheless single out an esoteric circle of chosen ones who are in possession of the complete truth’.2°3 He supports this proposition by referring to a verse from the Lawh-i-Hikmat, which he again quotes not from

248. ibid. 205 (p. 187). See also John Hatcher, in John Hatcher and William Hatcher, The Law of Love Enshrined, pp. xiiff. 249.

See above, p. 293, note 236. Elsewhere, too, Baha’u’llah passes

judgement on his theological antagonists and the knowledge claimed by them to be the criterion of truth: ‘The accumulations of vain fancy have obstructed men’s ears and stopped them from hearing the Voice of God, and the veils of human learning and false imaginings have prevented their eyes from beholding the splendour of the light of His countenance’ (Tablets 17:40). 250. ‘Religion and science walk hand in hand, and any religion contrary to science is not the truth’ (Paris Talks 40:18). This is not a description of a current condition but, as has been pointed out by Gollmer in a discussion of the essay by R. Hummel published in the Taschenlexikon Religion und Theologie under the editorship of Erwin Fahlbusch, ‘it is a normative programme aiming at the central problems of ethics and scientific theory in our technical civilization’ (Baha ‘i-Briefe, issue 47 (April 1984), p. 29). 251. Baha’ismus, p. 253 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 252. Who are these meant to be? What other categories are there? 253. Baha’ismus, p. 188.

295

Chapter 4 ‘+ Udo Schaefer

the published primary source?** but from Goldziher.2°> However, this verse states only that Baha’u’llah has not revealed

everything.?°° There is never any mention of the existence of a selected inner circle of believers who have been initiated into some secret doctrine. Ficicchia, who himself seems to take such

pleasure in speculation, has simply adopted Goldziher’s vague speculations”>’ on this matter, as Rémer had done previously.?°° Evidently, Ficicchia does not understand the term “‘esotericism’. This term, in its original sense, designates a doctrine ac-

cessible only to the initiated, a secret doctrine of a religion or school. Hence, esoteric (sometimes used pejoratively) means

‘secret, only known to an initiated or enlightened minority’. This is the accepted meaning today, in the era of the New Age

movement and the reawakening of gnosis, and this is the sense in which it is employed by Ficicchia. It should be noted, at this

juncture, that in the Baha’i Faith there is neither any secret

doctrine, as Ficicchia implies, nor any ‘esoteric circle??? of a ‘chosen few’. In the Kitab-i-Aqdas, Baha’u’llah condemns those

who lay claim to inner knowledge, and still deeper knowledge concealed within this knowledge. Say: Thou speakest false! By

254.

Tablets of Baha’u’llah, Haifa, 1978.

255. Introduction, p. 249. 256. None of the Manifestations has revealed everything: ‘All that I have revealed unto thee with the tongue of power, and have written for thee with the pen of might, hath been in accordance with thy capacity and understanding, not with My state and the melody of My voice’ (Hidden Words, Arabic 67, compare also Gleanings 89:2-4; John 16:12). 257. “He appears to have kept some esoteric ideas for a chosen few’ (Introduction, p. 249). 258. Die Babi-Beha i, p. 143. 259. Baha’ismus, p. 188.

296

Ficicchia’s Presentation of Baha’i Doctrine God! What thou dost possess is naught but husks which We have left to thee as bones are left to dogs.7

Elsewhere, he affirms that They that are the worshippers of the idol which their imaginations have carved, and who call it ‘Inner Real-

ity’, such men are in truth accounted among the heathen.7°!

In addition to this meaning, the term esotericism has another connotation evidently unknown to Ficicchia. In theology, there has always been the idea that the Word of God possesses an. outer (exoteric) and an inner (esoteric) meaning. This distinction, whereby the Word of God contains an inner, mystical meaning that becomes evident only to those who progress along the mystical path and penetrate the veils of self, who have freed

themselves “from impediments and from such allusions, idle fancies or vain imaginings as “cannot fatten nor appease the hunger”2©’ 263 is something that has played an important role in

Islam, especially in the Shaykhiyya, the school of Shaykh

Ahmad al-Ahsa’i.2°* The same distinction is to be found through-

out the writings of Baha’u’llah.2° The revealed prayers fre260. 261. 262. 263. 264.

Kitab-i-Aqdas 36. quoted from ibid. note 60. Qur’an 88:7. Baha’u’llah, Tablets 11:22. bdtin (inside, hidden), zahir

B. Radke, keyword:

(outside,

visible).

See

also

‘Baten’, in EIR, vol. 3, pp. 895ff.; SEI, keyword

‘Batiniya’, pp. 6Off.; Amanat, Resurrection, pp. 12, 117f., 409; Kamran Ekbal, “Das Messianische Chronogramm Muhammad Shahs aus dem Jahr 1250/1834’, in Proceedings of the Second European Conference of Iranian Studies, p. 154. On this subject see also John Hatcher, The Ocean of His Words, ch. 5 (‘The Huris of Inner Meaning: Solving the Mysteries of Figurative Language’), pp. 165-231.

265. See Kitéb-i-[gan 284 (p. 256); Seven Valleys, pp. 34ff., 58ff.; Tablets 6:25,26;

11:22; also in Baha’u’llah’s commentary

on the Sura

al-Shams (Qur’dn 91): Cole, ‘Baha’u’llah’s “Commentary on the Surah

297

Chapter 4 ¢ Udo Schaefer

quently contain requests for divine assistance in recognizing these mystic truths, ‘the musk of hidden meanings’,“°”> following examples show: Graciously assist me,

266

as the

O my God, . . . to tear asunder

the veils that have hindered me from recognizing Thee, and from immersing myself beneath the ocean of Thy knowledge;?°”

. cause him?©® to learn Thy well-guarded mysteries;?? Grant that we also be informed of Thy mysteries;?” .

. Manifest and make evident the signs of Thy one-

ness which have been deposited in all the realities of life;?”! ... that we may... . declare Thy mysteries;/2 ... Make known unto me what lay hid in the treasuries

of Thy knowledge and concealed within the repositories of Thy wisdom.?73

Ficicchia has obviously failed to understand all this, otherwise he would not judge passages of scripture that relate to the mystical dimension of the Faith as ‘esoteric’, as he does, for in-

stance, when he cites a statement in Some Answered Questions in which ‘Abdu’l-Baha explains that everything the Manifesta-

of the Sun”, Introduction and Provisional Translation’, (April 1990), pp. 4ff.; ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Selections 31:13;

204:2; 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 212: 273:

219:5 (pp. 66, 141, 167, 251f., 275). Prayers and Meditations 177:4. ibid. 163:2. i.e. the praying believer. ‘Abdu’1-Baha, Selections 19:16 (p. 44). Baha’i Prayers (English edition) 93:1 (p. 96). Baha’i Prayers, p. 111. ibid. p. 23. Prayers and Meditations 177:10.

298

in BSB 4:3-4 118:2; 142:9;

Ficicchia’s Presentation of Baha’i Doctrine

tion of God says and does is ‘absolute wisdom, and is in accordance with reality’ and that those who do not understand ‘the

hidden secret of one of His commands and actions’ should not oppose it.?”4 Ficicchia comments on this with the opinion that: “Here again, the esoteric aspect of Baha’i doctrine is clearly expressed.’2”> This opinion is completely mistaken. The quotation from ‘Abdu’l-Baha says nothing other than the fact that divinely revealed laws are apodictic and can be expressed rationally only in part, that revelation transcends the categories of

rationality (as Ficicchia knows only too well, as shown by his

pedantic upbraiding of ‘Abdu’I-Baha,””°) and that revealed laws have validity and must be obeyed. This is no new discovery, but rather an ancient truth. As

long ago as the 12th century CE, Moses Maimonides pointed out that the purpose behind the laws of the Torah was evident in

very few of them.?”” Does that make Judaism ‘esoteric’? Does Jesus’ distinction between those ‘inside’ to whom ‘has been given the mystery of the kingdom of God’ and those who are

‘outside’ who ‘get everything in parables’?”* imply the existence of a secret doctrine for ‘the chosen few’?

Elsewhere, Ficicchia correctly refers?’? to my doctoral dis-

sertation,”®° stating that the human capacity to know is limited when it comes to moral values and that the primary source for

274. 45:6. 275. Baha’ismus, p. 253, note 98 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 276. See ibid. pp. 252f. 277. See Daldlat al-Ha’irin: The Guide of the Perplexed, ch. XXXI, pp. 106ff. Concerning the purpose of divine laws Michael Friedlander writes as follows: ‘What share each individual precept has in the attainment of this end (i.e. of human happiness) we cannot state with certainty, because in the Torah the reason and purpose of each precept is, with very few exceptions, withheld from us’ (The Jewish Religion, p. 243).

278. Mark 3:11; compare also I Cor. 5:12; Col. 4:5; I Thess. 4:12. 279. Baha’ismus, pp. 320ff. 280. Grundlagen, pp. 51ff.

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Chapter 4 «Udo Schaefer

ethics is divine revelation. This is hardly something that could be designated

‘rationalism

celebrating

real propagandist

triumphs’.”®! Yet, further on, Ficicchia sees ‘the tragic fate of Baha’u lah’ as resulting from the fact that “he attempted, on the one hand, to reconcile religion and science with one another, but created, on the other hand, a law that is unalterable because it is “infallible” and cannot be modified even when new (and

scientifically well-founded) findings require it’.?8? Ficicchia finds this law, in particular, ‘peculiar’?*? and ‘abstruse’?*4 (i.e.

the very opposite of ‘emphatically rationalist’?®>), and he senses throughout Baha’u’llah’s works the spirit of the ‘ancient ori-

ent’,”°° ‘the borrowing of ancient oriental ideas that even modern Islam regards as out-dated’.?®” Ficicchia alone might know how all these characteristics are conjoined: the strong influence of the Western Enlightenment, the alleged proximity to the freethinkers, yet simultaneously the close proximity to esotericism,

strong hostility towards science,7** and the rejection of liberty and democracy”®’ expressed in the ‘ancient oriental’ spirit of

restoration.

Baha’i doctrine is neither ‘emphatically esoteric’??? nor ‘emphatically rationalist’,??! as is proven by its theonomous

system of ethics alone.??? 281. Baha’ismus, p. 254. 282. ibid. p. 253. 283. ibid. p. 26; Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 236. 284. Baha’ismus, p. 430. 285. ibid. p. 187. 286. ibid. p. 135, note 27. 287. Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 236. He nevertheless fails to give any justification for this reproach.

288. 289. 290. 291.

Baha’ismus, p. 167. ibid. pp. 233f., 275, 340, 389f., 423. ibid. pp. 188, 233. ibid. p. 187. 300

Ficicchia’s Presentation of Baha'i Doctrine

VII. ON THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY2”2 From the verses in the Kitab-i-Aqdas criticizing man’s striving

for liberty””* Ficicchia concludes that freedom has no place ‘in the system of this strict religion of observance’,2®> and that Baha’u’llah disapproves of ‘the provision of civil liberties’ be-

cause they ‘lead only to sedition and confusion’.2® Ficicchia 292.

On this subject, and on the role of reason, see my Bahd’i Ethics,

Part II, ch. 6, 3-5 (in preparation). 293. For detailed discussion of the ideas presented in this section refer to Schaefer, Die Freiheit und ihre Schranken. Zum Begriff der Freiheit in Baha’u'llahs Kitab-i-Aqdas, Hofheim, 1994. This treatise will be

included in my Baha ’i Ethics (in preparation). 294. The verses (122-125) that Ficicchia refers to are cited here to enable the reader to judge for himself: “Consider the pettiness of men’s minds. They ask for that which injureth them, and cast away the thing that profiteth them. They are, indeed, of those that are far astray. We find some men desiring liberty, and priding themselves therein. Such men are in the depths of ignorance. Liberty must, in the end, lead to sedition, whose flames none can

quench. Thus warneth you He Who is the Reckoner, the All-Knowing. Know ye that the embodiment of liberty and its symbol is the animal. That which beseemeth man is submission unto such restraints as will protect him from his own ignorance, and guard him against the harm of the mischief-maker. Liberty causeth man to overstep the bounds of propriety, and to infringe on the dignity of his station. It debaseth him to the level of extreme depravity and wickedness. Regard men as a flock of sheep that need a shepherd for their protection. This, verily, is the truth, the certain truth. We approve of liberty in certain circumstances, and refuse to sanction it in others. We, verily, are the All-Knowing. Say: True liberty consisteth in man’s submission unto My commandments, little as ye know it. Were men to observe that which We have sent down unto them from the Heaven of Revelation, they would, of a certainty,

attain unto perfect liberty. Happy is the man that hath apprehended the Purpose of God in whatever He hath revealed from the Heaven of His Will that pervadeth all created things. Say: The liberty that profiteth you is to be found nowhere except in complete servitude unto God, the Eternal Truth. Whoso hath tasted of its sweetness will refuse to barter it for all the dominion of earth and heaven.’ 295. Baha’ismus, p. 234 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 296. ibid. p. 275.

301

Chapter 4 ¢ Udo Schaefer regards this as a ‘rejection of democracy’, since “Baha’u’llah

demands unquestioning submission to his law’.??” Even though Ficicchia is in good company in expressing

this opinion, sharing it with orientalist Ignaz Goldziher??® who also misunderstood these verses as a judgement against political

freedom, such an interpretation is nevertheless erroneous. This blatant misunderstanding demonstrates once again that it does not suffice to have briefly been a member of the Baha’i community, to have superficial knowledge of the primary sources and to have gathered together the judgements of outside critics, however prominent, in order to comprehend the meaning of a passage of scripture and to evaluate it correctly. If one seeks to understand the concept of liberty at the root of the Baha’i revelation and to interpret the verses cited by Ficicchia correctly, what is required is a systematic, analytical investigation of the

scripture as a whole, a hermeneutic evaluation of all relevant statements by Baha’u’llah concerning his image of man, the question of political power, and in particular the relationship

between freedom and order, as well as all other passages concerning freedom. Careful analysis of Baha’u’llah’s writings demonstrate that his critical judgement regarding the human desire for liberty is not a rejection of freedom, and that this passage is

not about constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties. A study??? published recently by Cole is highly informative with regard to Baha’u’llah’s idea of political order and contradicts the judge-

ments reached by Goldziher (and, hence, also by Ficicchia). a) The word hurriyyah, which is used in the Kitab-i-Aqdas for ‘liberty’ or ‘freedom’ is definitely not equivalent to the We-

stern concept of liberty stemming from Enlightenment phi-

297. ibid. pp. 340, 389, 275. 298. Introduction, p. 251. 299. ‘Iranian Millenarianism and Democratic Thought in the 19th Century’, in International Journal of Middle East Studies 24 (1992), pp 126.

302

Ficicchia’s Presentation of Baha ’i Doctrine

losophy. As well as meaning liberty, hurriyyah® has (and had, especially in the nineteenth-century Middle East) additional connotations of libertinism, immorality, wantonness, free-

thinking,*°! and even of antinomianism or political nihilism 3° Baha’u’llah’s criticism of hurriyyah (usually translated as liberté, liberty) is aimed against libertinism, not against democratic liberties and human freedom that is kept within the

bounds of moderation. b) It must also be taken into account that divine revelation

is a historical phenomenon: it takes place within a historical context, frequently reflecting historical events and tendencies and contemporary developments. In order to interpret the pas-

sage in the Kitab-i-Aqdas correctly, one must take into consideration the fact that the French Revolution—which was associated not only with the democratic liberties gained through it but also with the excesses perpetrated in its name, as well as with its atheism—had taken place only a few decades previously. One must remember, too, that the European zeitgeist was al-

ready strongly characterized by nihilism,>°> that the theoreti-

cians of anarchism (Stimer, Proudhon, Bakunin, Nechajev, and

Kropotkin) were contemporaries of Baha’u’llah, that at that time anarchist circles were attempting to shake the foundations of the existing order by carrying out assassinations, and that the Kitab-i-Aqdas was revealed at the time of the Paris commune,

whose horrors evoked repugnance everywhere. In the face of these political developments—all

of which

occurred

in the

name of freedom—it is small wonder that the concept of liberty

300. For a more detailed discussion of this term see Schaefer, Freiheit, p. 26, note 86; see also Baha ’i Ethics, Part II, ch. 6, 1 and 2.

301. See Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam, pp. 108ff. 302. See Cole, ‘Iranian Millenarianism and Democratic Thought in the 19th Century’, pp. 215ff. 303. On this subject see Wolfgang Kraus, Nihilismus heute oder Die Geduld der Weltgeschichte, Frankfurt, 1985.

303

Chapter 4 ¢ Udo Schaefer was also associated with these negative aspects and thus influenced the meaning of the word hurriyyah itself, developed linguistically to include pejorative connotations. c) That Goldziher’s judgement is mistaken is evident from the fact that in all his Tablets, especially in his epistles to contemporary rulers, Baha’u’llah condemns nothing more strongly than the tyranny of the powerful, the oppression of the people,

all forms of arbitrary rule, despotism and totalitarianism.>*™* Even in his earliest work, Hidden Words, there is a warning to

the ‘oppressors on earth’>°> against the rule of tyranny. According to the Lawh-i-Magsud, ‘the rulers and kings of the earth’ should be ‘mirrors of the gracious and almighty name of God’

and should ‘shield mankind from the onslaught of tyranny’.>°° Yet, in reality, Baha’u’llah sees justice being ‘tormented by the scourge of injustice’,>°” its light ‘dimmed?2°® because ‘the tab-

ernacle of justice hath fallen into the clutches of tyranny and oppression’,°°? with the result that ‘the earth will be tormented by a fresh calamity every day and unprecedented commotions

will break out’.?!° Without qualms, Baha’u’Ilah held up a mirror to the monarchs of his day, decrying their arrogance, their dishonesty and injustice, their opulence and extravagance,>!!

calling upon them to rule with justice, to ‘safeguard the rights

of the downtrodden’ and punish the wrong-doers*!?—hardly

304.

See Tablets 7:6, 8, 24; 8:52; 9:3; 11:6, 11, 23; etc.

305.

Hidden Words, Persian 64.

306. Tablets 11:8. 307. ibid. 4:23. 308. ibid. 8:52; 7:6. S09 miDidat LLL: 310. ibid. 311. See Gleanings 114; 118. 312. ibid.116:3, Kitab-i-Aqdas 89.

304

Ficicchia’s Presentation of Baha’i Doctrine evidence of an attitude favouring restoration, or of an ‘ancient

oriental admiration for kings’,>!> as Ficicchia purports. ‘The reign of justice’ that Baha’u’llah says ‘will assuredly

be established amongst the children of men’>!4 is a rule of law in which the power of the rulers will be retained within the bounds of law and justice. Hence, al- ‘adlu wa’l-insdf,>'> justice, is the cardinal virtue of those who exercise power. This also

explains why Baha’u’llah favours the constitutional, democratic monarchy, and why he approves

of the combination of ‘the

majesty of kingship’ which ‘is one of the signs of God’!© with the democratic form of government.3!” In the Lawh-i-Dunya?!® and in his Tablet to Queen Victoria,*!° he praised the British form

of government—monarchy

combined

with democratic

rule—since parliamentary consultation strengthens ‘the foundations of the edifice of thine affairs’ and calms the hearts of the

people.>”° This shows that he desires the constitutional state that

respects human dignity and protects human rights.32! His statement that, “Liberty must, in the end, lead to sedition, whose flames none can quench’??? does not relate, as Goldziher assumes and as Ficicchia tries to make out, to the civil liberties provided for in a modern constitutional state, but rather to absolute freedom in which no bounds are accepted or

in which excessively wide bounds are arbitrarily set: i.e. he is

313. Baha’ismus, p. 135, note 27. 314.

Tablets 11:6.

315.

See Baha’i Ethics, Part III for further discussion.

316.

Tablets 3:28.

317.

ibid. 3:28; 7:31; Epistle 104, 105 (pp. 61f.).

318.

Tablets 7:31.

319. Epistle 104 (p. 61), see also Gleanings 119, 120, Taherzadeh, Revelation, vol. 3, p. 123. 320. Epistle 104 (p. 61). 321. See ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Selections 71:2 (p. 109). 322.

Kitab-i-Aqdas 123.

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referring to unbridled liberty. As Cole makes clear, Baha’u’llah

rejected “antireligious libertinism’, the liberty/license for leading to sedition or public turmoil (fitna) and to immorality. On the other hand, he did not reject the positive aspects of liberty writing ‘we ap-

prove of liberty in certain circumstances and refuse to sanction it in others’. His reservations about liberty/license did not, as Goldziher apparently suspected,

derive from a belief in absolutism or in the monopoly of a church over opinion. Unlike their contemporary, Pope Leo XIII, the Bahai leaders insisted on representative government and urged that the state treat all re-

ligions with equal toleration. 377 d) Baha’u’llah approves of liberty ‘within the restraints of

moderation’ (a cardinal value to which everything, even the

highest of values, is subordinate,>?* for ‘if a thing is carried to excess, it will prove a source of evil’3*°). Concerning liberty and civilization, he says, However much men of understanding may favourably regard them, they will, if carried to excess, exercise a

pernicious influence upon men.>2° Hence, it is of unbridled liberty, or licentiousness, that Baha’u’-

llah is speaking when he states that liberty will ultimately ‘lead

to sedition, whose flames none can quench’ .227 e) Baha’u’llah’s concept of ‘true liberty’ is thus a rejection of the illusion of an anarchic society in which people who have grown up in the absence of any authority will spontaneously

achieve true self-determination. It is a rejection of revolutionary 323. ‘Iranian Millenarianism and Democratic Thought in the 19th Century’, pp. 15f. with additional source references. 324.

Gleanings 164:2.

325. Tablets 6:31. 326. ibid. 11:19. 327. Kitab-i-Aqdas 123.

306

Ficicchia’s Presentation of Baha’i Doctrine

anarchy. Baha’u’llah has also rejected the idea of a society in which there are no taboos and whose goal is emancipation from

all traditional patterns of behaviour, i.e. a permissive society where everyone is allowed to do as he likes provided he does

not violate the rights of others.>?* The principle of moderation (i ‘tiddP*) is valid not only for political liberty, but for all human activity. What, then, is liberty within the bounds of moderation? f) The answer to this question leads us into the field of Baha’i epistemology. Baha’u’llah’s writings convey the funda-

mental idea that reason (‘aq/**°), which is highly praised in the sacred texts,>3! is nevertheless limited and is unable to discern the limits of freedom with absolute certitude. In order to recognize the values that set these limits, man is dependent on the

superior reason of divine revelation. Judged from the standpoint of religion, man’s hubris is that he “glimpses the source of a

deep rebellion, which leads him to reject the Truth and the Good in order to set himself up as an absolute principle unto himself’ ,>9? that he believes he knows himself what is good and

what is evil, desiring to be like God: ‘And ye shall be as Gods, knowing good and evil’,>*3 whereas determining good and evil

is not man’s prerogative, but God’s.>*4 The insight that the complexity of society is beyond the capacity of human rationality and experience and that man is

328. For detailed discussion see Freiheit, pp. 30, 35ff.; Baha'i Ethics, Part II, ‘ch. 6, 3:

329.

See Bahd’i Ethics for analysis of this term.

330. For further detail see Schaefer, Freiheit, pp. 45ff.; idem, Bahda’i Ethics, Part II, ch. 6, 3-5; see also Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 13.2.2.2. 331. See Gleanings 83:1; 95:1; Paris Talks 11:4; 23:6; 44:15, 25; Secret, p. 1; Promulgation, pp. 63ff., 128, 175ff., 231, 287, 293, 316,

373 ff. 332.

Pope John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor, no. 86; see also no. 102.

333.

Gen. 3:5.

334.

See also Veritatis Splendor no. 35, pp. 112f.

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Chapter 4\+ Udo Schaefer

incapable of penetrating and comprehending society in its entirety has led modern social critics to concede that there are

realms that are inaccessible to the human ratio. They speak of

‘limited rationality’?*°—a realization that corresponds to the philosophical insight that all knowledge is provisional or hy-

pothetical in character and ultimately cannot be verified.*°° This insight, that ‘we know in part’,>°” is also conveyed by scripture. The fact that man cannot reliably recognize what is good and what evil is confirmed in the Qur’an: Yet haply ye are averse from a thing, though it be good for you, and haply ye love a thing though it be bad for you: And God knoweth; but ye, ye know not."

The same is implied in a prayer by Baha’u’ lah: Ordain Thou for me, O my God, the good of this world and the world to come, and grant me what will profit me in every world of Thy worlds, for I know not what will help or harm me.

The uncertain nature of human knowledge in the field of morality is expressed also in the Kitab-i-Aqdas in the context of the verses on liberty, where Baha’u’llah states that: They ask for that which injureth them, and cast away

the thing that profiteth them.>?

Man’s dependence on divine revelation, which provides him with sure guidance along the “Straight Path’, is expressed in the

scripture in numerous metaphors. The Manifestation, for in335. Friedrich Tenbruck, Zur Kritik der planenden Vernunft, pp. 23ff.; Helmut Schelsky, Die Arbeit tun die anderen, p. 195. 336. Karl Popper, Objective Knowledge, pp. 75ff.; idem, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 280. 337.

I Cor 13:9.

338.

2:213; see also Prov. 14:12; 16:25.

339. Prayers and Meditations 163:3. 340. Kitdb-i-Aqdas 122.

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Ficicchia’s Presentation of Baha'i Doctrine

stance, is described as ‘the true Physician’, who ‘prescribeth, in

His unerring wisdom, the remedy’.**! Human reason is doomed to failure if it attempts to establish universally binding moral values in the absence of a fixed standard. It is neither able through discussion to reach a consensus omnium in these matters, nor to make the values it has recognized universally binding, since man, for good reason, does not accept fellow human beings as authorities in moralibus. Moreover, a purely rational system of ethics could only be conceived for our earthly life, since reason knows nothing of a future world, and man cannot

determine which structures need to be established on earth in order to gain salvation in the world to come. Human nature is always the same. Accordingly, the differ-

ent divine revelations manifest themselves in their ‘vertical dimension’>“? as the ‘changeless Faith of God, eternal in the past, eternal in the future’>*3 as ‘the one and indivisible religion of

God’,>* referred to in the Qur’an as Jslam3* The world, however, is in constant flux, human society is constantly changing and developing. The social norms (such as those concerning marriage, family, inheritance, criminal law, etc.) need to be

‘transformed according to the requirements of the time’.>*° For reasons that have been discussed above, human rationality with341.

See Gleanings

16:3; 34:6; 106:1-2;

120:3. The metaphor of the

‘physician’ is also found in the Buddhist canon. Buddha describes himself as the ‘wise physician’ who has been sent out into the world. He prescribes the remedy in accordance with the condition of the patient (Sutta Nipata, Brahmadatto no. 444 and Adhimutto no. 722). 342. On the two-dimensional nature of revelation see Gleanings 34:5; on the concepts of the ‘vertical’ and the ‘horizontal’ dimension see Schaefer, Beyond the Clash, p. 141ff.; idem, Dominion, pp. 125ff. 343.

Kitab-i-Aqdas 182.

344.

The Bab, Selections 2:24:2.

345.

For more on this subject see Schaefer, Beyond the Clash, pp. 79,

71 note 79. 346.

Baha’u’llah, from an untranslated Tablet, quoted in Esslemont,

Bahd’u’llah and the New Era, p. 163.

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Chapter 4 « Udo Schaefer

out an established standard is unable to set down a universally

accepted code of social norms.°47 g) The limits to liberty are therefore not set merely at the point where the rights of others are infringed upon.>4* They lie also in structures that are determined by normative premises—

the image of man*4’—and by metaphysical postulates. The question of the nature of human dignity is ultimately beyond the comprehension of rational, scientific knowledge,*°° because it is answered by the preceding question as to the meaning and goal of human existence. This question can only be answered by religion.

Hence, many of Baha’u’llah’s laws are determined by the goal of protecting man from establishing structures that are contrary to his divine purpose, his exalted station as ‘the noblest

and most perfect of all created things’,>°! as God’s image**? and trustee.>°> Therefore, it is stated in the Kitab-i-Aqdas, 347. Reason is generally guided by personal interest: it sees what it wants to see and can provide convincing arguments for a particular position, and—if necessary—equally well for the opposite one. Reason can be used to justify anything, as Montaigne described in his Essays (vol. 2, ch. XII, pp. 284, 279, 285ff). For more details refer to my Bahd’i Ethics, ch. 6, 4. As to ‘society’s need for salvation’ I refer to Dominion, pp. 128-132. 348. As this is expressed in Article 2 of the German Constitution (Basic Law). Whereas the limit to liberty is set in accordance with what is termed the ‘moral law’, this term is interpreted as the ‘moral consciousness of society’ and is thus relativized—not to mention the difficulty of defining the contents of a constantly changing moral consciousness (see Maunz and Dirig, Grundgesetz. Kommentar, note 16 to art. 2.1). 349. On this subject see Schaefer, In a Blue Haze, pp. 38ff.; idem, Bahd ’i Ethics, Part I, ch. 2, 5; Part II, ch. 5, 2; Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 6.

350. Schopenhauer called ‘human dignity’ as a basis for moral legislation an ‘empty phrase’, ‘cobwebs and the soap-bubbles of the Schools’, and ‘merely theological Morals in disguise’ (The Basis of Morality, § 13, p. 148; § 12, p. 133).

351. Kitdb-i-[qan 109 (pp. 102f.). 352.

Hidden Words, Arabic 3.

353.

Gleanings 109:2.

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Ficicchia’s Presentation of Baha’i Doctrine

That which beseemeth man is submission unto such restraints as will protect him from his own ignorance, and guard him against the harm of the mischief-maker.

Liberty causeth man to overstep the bounds of propriety, and to infringe on the dignity of his station. It de-

baseth him to the level of extreme depravity and wickedness.>*4

The law of God provides man with ‘this very sense of honour

and dignity’,>°> and many of its norms clarify the ‘bounds of propriety’ and the “dignity of [man’s] station’, which would otherwise be nothing but empty phrases. The Law is therefore not restricted to its function as a preserver of legal goods. It is—in Jewish terms*>°—a barrier to sin,

and protection against the ‘agent of sin’,>>’ because it preserves man from debasement, depravity and wickedness: We, verily, have commanded you to refuse the dictates of your evil passions and corrupt desires, and not to

transgress the bounds which the Pen of the Most High hath fixed, for these are the breath of life unto all cre-

ated things.>>°

God’s sovereign will determines the bounds of liberty. Freedom within these bounds Baha’u’llah calls ‘true liberty’ and ‘perfect liberty’, as expressed in his statement:

354. Kitab-i-Aqdas 123. 355. ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Secret 170 (p. 97). 356. See Hans-Joachim Schoeps, Jtdisch-christliches Religionsgesprach, p. 55. 357. A doctrine of Rabbinic theology on the origin of sin, derived from Gen. 5; 6; 8; 21 (Sukka 52b, Sanh. 91b). On the meaning of the

Hebrew word yezer in Gen. 6:8 and 8:21 (‘for the yezer of man’s heart is evil from his youth’) and its misinterpretation from which the notion of original sin arose see Hermann Cohen, Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism, p. 181. 358.

Kitab-i-Aqdas 2.

ai

Chapter 4 ¢ Udo Schaefer True liberty consisteth in man’s submission unto My commandments, little as ye know it. Were men to ob-

serve that which We have sent down unto them from the Heaven of Revelation, they would, of a certainty,

attain unto perfect liberty . . . Say: The liberty that profiteth you is to be found nowhere except in complete servitude unto God, the Eternal Truth.*°?

According to his self-testimony, Baha’u’llah has come in order to guide all mankind to this ‘true liberty’. It is a testimony to the soteriological dimension of his mission that he himself asserts

that he has consented to be bound with chains that mankind may be released from its bondage, and hath accepted to be

made a prisoner within this most mighty Stronghold that the whole world may attain unto true liberty.°°°

Thus, liberty is the individual’s own self-determined moral adherence to the ordinances of God. God’s commandments are voluntarily fulfilled by the believer, who is responsible to God

alone.3°! True liberty is, paradoxically, the liberty that results from obedience to the will of God as manifested in the law. It is liberty in submission to God. This idea is hardly new. Ignatius of Loyola called this lib-

erty libertas oboedientiae. Obedience that leads to liberty, obedience as the mark of a noble soul, is also evident in Goethe’s

play Iphigenia in Tauris, the heroine stating that: I learnt obedience from my earliest youth, First to my parents, to a goddess next;

359.

ibid. 125; compare also Tablets 7:17.

360.

Gleanings 45; see also 141:2; Tablets 2:7; Epistle 89 (p. 53);

Hidden Words, Persian 52; Prayers and Meditations 34:1. 361.

Not, as Ficicchia would have the reader believe, to the ‘leader-

ship’ or ‘die Zentrale’.

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Ficicchia’s Presentation of Bahd ’i Doctrine

Submissive have I ever felt my soul Most beautifully free . . 362

Of course, obedience is a term that today, in an ‘epoch of almost boundless subjectivity . . . has almost entirely negative

connotations’>°? and is often equated with heteronomy, a term

that assumes the existence of authority and is even rejected by progressive theologians. Ficicchia, who is completely taken up by this zeitgeist, repeatedly criticizes the demand for obedience in his book,*® cynically equating it with uncritical resignation and self-alienation. However, it is a major deficiency for an author writing a monograph about a revealed religion not to know that the concept of obedience is an essential concomitant of the path to spirituality, a constituent element of all revealed religions.

362.2 \va3. 363. Lothar Perlitt, ‘Gebot und Gehorsam im Alten Testament’, p. 11. The cynical and sceptical view of scholars who adopt a secular approach to developing an understanding of the concept of obedience has been aptly described by Roxanne L. Lalonde in her noteworthy article, ‘Obedience: Liberty through Love of God in Practice’, in Journal of Baha ’i Studies, vol. 8.4 (September-December 1998), pp. 51 ff. 364. With reference to the obedience practised by the commandant of the Auschwitz concentration camp, Catholic theologian Hubert Halbfas regards a Christian who believes in the authority of God as a danger to democracy. He argues that, ‘Through his prayers, a child develops a faith in God that completely embodies the power of hierarchical authorities. Thus, prayer can cause the internalization of structures that promote involuntary life-long obedience and attachment to authority’ (‘Gegen die Erziehung zum Gehorsam’, in Vorgdnge, Issue 3 (1973), p. 59). Genuine and usurped authority are thus uncritically equated with one another. Nevertheless, the concept of obedience in systematic theology is still ‘of central significance’ (Christian Walther, ‘Freiheit und Gehorsam—Wie lassen sie sich vereinbaren?’, in W. Béhme (ed.), Gehorsam—eine Tugend?, p. 55). See also Schaefer, Dominion, pp. 152ff. 365. pp. 275, 340, 375; Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 236.

313

Chapter 4 * Udo Schaefer In the Gathas*©® of the Prophet Zoroaster, for instance, Sraosha, the personification of obedience, appears as the “greatest’ of the angels from God’s celestial sphere of light.3°” Ac-

cording to the Hebrew Bible, obedience to the will of God is the essence of religion. The efficacy of God’s Covenant is rooted in

the fear of God and in obedience to the law.°®* Jesus himself was an exemplar of obedience. He obediently submitted to the

will of God even unto death. He is the exemplary servant,> and he demands of those who follow him the fulfilment of God’s will as the prerequisite for membership in the Basilea.>”°

The precondition for salvation is obedience to Christ,*”! the

Gospel?’? and authority,?’”? and adherence to the commandments.>’4 That man ‘owes to God complete devotion and complete obedience, love from the depths of his heart and soul, with

all his thoughts and with all his strength,>”> is central to Jesus’ message about the Kingdom of God’.?”° Obedience to God, the Prophet and the will of God as embodied in the law (fda ‘ah) is a central concept in the Qur’an, inseparable from the Covenant of

God:

366.

Yasna 33:5; 43:12.

367.

see W. Hinz, Zarathustra, pp. 102ff.

368.

Proverbs 1:33; Ps. 128:1; See also above, p. 269, note 60.

369.

See Rom. 5:19; Phil. 2:8; Hebr. 5:8-9.

370.

Matt. 7:21; Luke 11:28.

371.

Rom. 6:16; II Cor 10:5ff.

372.

II Thess. 1:8; Rom. 6:17; 19:16; II Cor. 7:15.

373.

Rom. 13:1-7.

374.

John

14:15, 21; 15:10; I John 2:3-6; I Peter

1:22; Rom.

1:5;

16:26; Hebr. 5:9. On the whole subject see Veritatis Splendor, no. 102 (p. 167), Walter Schmithals, ‘ “Seid gehorsam.” Neutestamentliche Uberlegungen zum Gehorsam Christi und der Christen’, in W. Béhme (ed.), Gehorsam—eine Tugend?, pp. 25ff. 375.

Mark 12:30.

376.

Walter Kasper, ‘Religionsfreiheit als theologisches Problem’, in

Johannes Schwartlander, Freiheit der Religion, p. 211.

314

Ficicchia’s Presentation of Baha’i Doctrine And whoso shall obey God and His Apostle, and shall dread God and fear Him, these are they that shall be

the blissful.?””

Indeed, obedience is the very essence of religion, since the Qur’an calls the religion of God ‘Js/am’: submission to the will

of God.>78 According to Baha’u’llah, The essence of religion is to testify unto that which the Lord hath revealed, and follow that which He hath or-

dained in His mighty Book.?””

‘Submission unto His command’ is ‘the source of all good’.3®° “To observe every ordinance of Him Who is the Desire of the

world’*®! is one of the twin duties that constitute the Covenant of God. Obedience is the fundamental virtue, a pillar of Baha’i ethics: It is certain that man’s highest distinction is to be lowly before and obedient to his God; that his greatest

glory, his most exalted rank and honour, depend on the close observance of the Divine commandments and prohibitions. Religion is the light of the world, and the progress, achievement and happiness of man result from obedience to the laws set down in the holy

Books.?8?

377.

24:51; see also 3:125; 4:17; 4:62; 4:71; 4:82; 5:10; 24:51; 33:70;

48:17. 378. From aslama, to surrender (in a sense that is free of any connotation of despotism—the believer submittingly entrusts himself to God’s care). The word ‘Muslim’ is derived from the same source and means ‘one who has submitted himself to the Will of God’. 379. Tablets 10:4. 380. ibid. 10:2. 381. Kitab-i-Aqdas |. 382. Secret, p. 71.

315

Chapter 4'+ Udo Schaefer In fulfilling the duty of obedience, the Baha’i gains that liberty

that will guarantee his salvation in this world and the world to

come.383 When correctly understood, then, this concept of obedience as imparted in the Baha’i scripture never implies any

type of blind or slavish obedience,>** but rather a mature response to authoritative ordinance and guidance: It demands more of the believer than mere blind adherence to established regulations, it demands the exercise of all one’s powers in striving to attain God’s purpose and to live responsibly in accordance with that purpose in the context of modern society.>°>

383. See Gollmer’s discussion of the concept of an ‘ethical theocracy’ (Gottesreich, ch. 10.2.1). 384. Such as demanded from the members of the Society of Jesus, formulated by its founder, Saint Ignatius of Loyola.(1491-1556): ‘. . . perinde ac si cadaver essent’ (Const. Sj vi,1,1). 385.

Heiner Bielefeldt, ‘Menschenrechte und Menschenrechtsverstind-

nis im Islam’, in Europdische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift, 1990, p. 409.

316

CHAPTER

5

FICICCHIA’S PORTRAYAL OF BAHA’[ LAW I. THE LAW: A PROVOCATION Baha’u’llah’s revelation is not merely a message of salvation that discloses the metaphysical mysteries concerning God, revelation, humanity and the world;! it is also a prescription for

living. To Baha’is, Baha’u’llah is not just redemptor, he is also legislator. He is ‘the Judge, the Lawgiver and Redeemer of all

mankind’.? For the believer, the path to salvation is determined by the divine Covenant, and the heart of the Covenant is the law, the commandments and ordinances of God: “Walk in My statutes for love of Me.’ These commandments are, according to scripture, ‘the lamps of My loving providence’;* they are not

a ‘curse’, nor a ‘hindrance on the path to God’,® but the very ‘keys of My mercy for My creatures’.’ For the salvation of human society they constitute ‘the highest means for the maintenance of order in the world and the security of its peoples’,® the ‘essence of justice and the source thereof? . the ‘infallible stan-

In the process of progressive revelation. Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 93. Hidden Words, Arabic 38; see also Kitab-i-Aqdas 4.

Kitab-i-Aqdas 3. Gal. 3:13. H. Gogarten, Die Verkiindigung Jesu Christi, p. 58. Kitab-i-Aqdas 3. ibid. 2. CS! Ree ISD a Gleanings 88. NT

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dard of justice’:!° ‘He that turneth away therefrom is counted among the abject and foolish’, for ‘these are the breath of life unto all created things.”!! Such praise of the law is certainly not compatible with

Protestant doctrine i.e. the tenets of sola fide and sola gratia, and with the principles of ‘the freedom of a Christian’!? or the alleged incompatibility of law and cicchia’s book contains no critique logical positions, which would be lemizes (in a book that is, after all,

the Gospel.!3 However, Fion the basis of these theolegitimate. Instead, he popublished by an ecclesiasti-

cal office of information) against Baha’u’llah’s legislation purely on the basis of the modernist attitude held by the sceptical and irreligious person who lacks any concept or understanding of religious obligations and—horribile dictu!—faithful obedience; who rejects any possibility of absolute authority, accepting no authority but his own self according to the principle: ‘I am the Law!’!* The Western world, insofar as it thinks in religious categories at all, is shaped by the Christian tradition. Whereas the normative regulations of Catholicism affected the life of the individual down to the most intimate details, the Protestant brand of Christianity is strongly influenced by the antinomianism of the apostle Paul, according to whom divine law is only an episode in the divine plan of salvation, valid only until the advent of Christ;!> it is merely a ‘tutor to lead us to Christ’,!®

10. ibid.; see below, p. 414 ff.

11. Kitab-i-Aqdas 2. 12. ‘The Freedom of a Christian (1520)’, in Luther’s Works, vol. 31:

Career of the Reformer I, ed. Harold J. Grimm, trans. W.A. Lambert, rev. Harold J. Grimm. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1957. 13. An idea that Schoeps calls ‘as popular as it is false’ (Religionsgesprdch, p. 57). 14. Barz, Postmoderne Religion, p. 134. 15. Gal. 3:19.

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Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

for ‘Christ is the end of the law’.!7 According to St Paul the path of salvation revealed in the Gospel is made evident ‘once and

for all’ through Christ’s crucifixion.!® It is the path of divine

grace, not of divine laws. Thus for Protestants, the Christian ethos is not a life governed by revealed, absolute norms, but quite

simply ‘life lived in the face of the reality of God and in communion be with Jiingel guided

with Him. All else follows from our being permitted to Him in His love’.!? The Protestant theologian Eberhard professes the belief that ‘the Christian ethos is not by any normative ethic’, because in the Gospel ‘to live

in the truth’ is synonymous with ‘existing in love’.2° Divine legislation after Christ, whether that of the Qur’an or of the

Kitab-i-Aqdas, is thus regarded as an atavistic relapse into an earlier period of heilsgeschichte. The type of thinking that has been shaped by the ideas of the European Enlightenment and secularism, and that has gained world-wide dominance, has little time for such theological subtleties. A divine law equivalent to the legislation announced on Mount Sinai,2! with its unconditional demand of obedience and its establishment of unconditional, absolute limits to individual freedom of action, is seen as provocation. In a world where the determining factors are science and technology rather than

religious faith, and where ‘the individual has become the ulti-

16. 17. 18. 19.

ibid. 3:23. Rom. 10:4. See ibid. 6:10; Hebr. 7:27; 9:12 (epaphax), Jude 3. Rudolf Stahlin, in Christliche Religion, p. 81.

20. ‘Wertlose

Wahrheit’,

in Carl

Schmitt,

Eberhard

Jiingel,

and

S. Schelz (eds.), Die Tyrannei der Werte, pp. 5, 47ff. 21. ‘He is, in truth, the Speaker on Sinai Who is now seated upon the throne of Revelation’ (Tablets 5:11; see also 17:60). A detailed discus-

sion of Sinai motifs in the revelation of Baha’u’llah has been published in Stephen Lambden’s ‘The Sinaitic Mysteries: Notes on Moses/Sinai Motifs in Babi and Baha’i Scripture’, in SBB, vol. 5, pp. 65-143.

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Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer

mate authority’,?? such laws are perceived as anachronistic. The Baha’i utopian vision of peace, their cosmopolitan goals, their

efforts in the cause of world peace and for the solution of world problems—all these are viewed with sympathy, albeit combined with scepticism, even by people who have distanced themselves from religion. But specific religious laws with a categorical

‘Thou shalt!’ generally provoke negative reactions. Although enthusiasm for Enlightenment thinking has now ebbed, and many people, faced with the aridity of purely ra-

tional world-views, are now seeking spirituality and security in the transcendental, they are more readily prepared to entrust

themselves to new forms of irrationality?? than to accept the cast-iron precepts of God. Everything that enlightened reason

once considered to be ‘obscurantism’ has resurfaced: even the most bizarre psychological cults exert a strange fascination on large numbers of people. Yet when these same people are confronted with the laws of God, they appeal to reason, cavilling at norms that seem strange to them and do not conform to their ideas and desires. The reason for this is that people today value nothing more

dearly than their sovereign liberty in decision-making, their individual right to shape their own lives, their freedom to decide for themselves what is and what is not permissible as defined by their sense of moral autonomy. While the obscurantist sources

of truth offer what is presented as the meaning of life, enlightenment, expansion of consciousness, etc., they remain, when all is said and done, non-binding upon the individual: the individ-

ual keeps his liberty. Indeed, the very essence of their message is that everyone has the choice as to what is best for him, and that all paths are of equal value. This post-modern attitude of a

metaphysical ‘to each his own’, this complete subjectivization

22. Barz, Postmoderne Religion, p. 136. 23. See Schaefer, Beyond the Clash, pp. 35ff.

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Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

of truth,** explains why these alternative offers of salvation attract people much more easily than a revealed religion that places its followers under certain obligations. Where, as a matter of principle, mere opinions have replaced clear convictions, where any firm conviction, whatever its content, is regarded as suspect, and where the intellectual climate is determined by

‘unconditional aversion to anything that is unconditional’2> and by the motto ‘Anything goes!’,?® most people are at present inclined to the idea of a concrete, apodictic religious law with its absolute, non-questionable, obligatory nature as much as the

devil loves holy water.’ Thus for modern people the Book of Laws, the Kitab-i-

Aqdas, is most certainly a provocation.?* Baha’u’llah predicted that the Book would be a ‘stumbling-block’,?? a ‘Great Ter24. See Barz, Postmoderne Religion, pp. 134ff. 25. Hans-Jirgen Verweyen, ‘Die Magd der Theologie. Was kann der Theologe heute von den Philosophen erwarten?’, a contribution to the Philosophy Conference of the Katholische Akademie in Bayern (Munich, 18-24 October 1992) on the subject ‘Does faith need thought? On the rationality of religion’, extracts published in zur debatte (MarchApril 1993), pp. 5ff. 26. Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, p. 14. 27. The spiritual climate in Europe is the subject of a book, edited by a French sociologist of religions, Roland Campiche, Cultures Jeunes et religion en Europe, Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1997. In an interview with the Journal de Genéve et Gazette de Lausanne (Mercredi 17 Septembre 1997) Professor Campiche declared that the young people have rejected the authority of the Church: ‘II sont les fers de lance de la religion sans institution . . . Dans le supermarché religieux, ils choisissent de préférence le paradis et l’amour, et boudent l’enfer et le péché . . . Mais ils sont réticents 4 toute forme d’implication personelle et ne veulent pas de croyances qui les culpabilisent. Ce qui les intéresse, c’est une religion de confort et de libre-service . . . Le champ religieux est devenu un supermarché ov chacun choisit ce qui lui convient.’ 28. On this subject see my article: ‘“The Balance Hath Been Appointed’: Some Thoughts on the Publication of the Kitab-i-Aqdas’, in BSR, vol. 3.1 (1993), pp. 43ff. 29. See above, p. 43, note 41.

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ror’,>° since ‘most people are feeble and far-removed from the purpose of God’.?! Indeed, ‘the fears and agitation which the revelation of this law provokes in men’s hearts should’, he states, ‘be likened to the cries of the suckling babe weaned from

his mother’s milk’3? It takes little imagination to realize that among a critical and sceptical public a critique of Baha’u’llah’s legislation will fall on fertile ground. For this reason, Ficicchia has made Baha’u’llah’s normative commandments the main target of his attacks. II. SUPPRESSION AND DISSIMULATION OF THE KITAB-IAQDAS?

What Ficicchia conveys to his readers about the Kitab-i-Aqdas is, for the most part, a malevolent distortion of the heart of the Baha’i revelation, written with the unmistakable intention of contrasting Baha’u’llah’s gladtidings of all-encompassing love for humanity and of the world as the one home of the whole of mankind—to which, for transparent reasons, Ficicchia unexpectedly pays homage at the end of his book (very much to the reader’s surprise)—with traits that, when presented to an uncritical reader who is not in a position to evaluate the nature of Ficicchia’s book, are bound to destroy any sympathy for this religion and any trust in its representatives. According to Ficicchia, the Kitab-i-Aqdas is a hotchpotch

of regulations about ritual, organization, and civil law,?> whereas ‘theological statements and explanations are pushed into the

background’.** It is a manual of ‘rigorous’,*> ‘abstruse’,°° ‘pecu-

30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

Prayers and Meditations 61:2. Quoted from Synopsis and Codification, p. 4. Gleanings 88. Baha’ismus, p. 150. ibid.

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Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

liar’,>” ‘ancient oriental’,>® and ‘obscure”™*® regulations, a ‘rigorous religious law’.*? Of the norms cited*! by Ficicchia, many are distorted, while others are pure inventions. Such a characterization of the Kitab-i-Aqdas would in itself have been bad enough. Yet Ficicchia has gone further, de-

riving from the fact that there had, hitherto, been no authentic translation authorized by the Baha’i community, a preposterous theory that he then attempts to drum into his readers—from the

introduction*? to the penultimate page.*? Time and again** he reiterates his accusations in a wide range of contexts, presumably for fear that someone may overlook what he is trying to say. His ‘ceterum censeo’* is that the Baha’i community has sup-

85abid: p..251. 36. ibid. p. 430. 37. ibid. p. 26; Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 236. 38. ibid. 39. ibid. 40. Baha’ismus, p. 251. In his letter to the Baha’i World Centre dated

10 February 1977, Ficicchia had still written that: ‘The laws of the Aqdas are not a Skandalon for me. I do not reject them a priori.’ 41. ibid. p. 148ff. 42. ibid. p. 25ff. 43. ibid. p. 430. 44. ibid. pp. 25f., 149, 158, 160, 180, 188, 251, 253, 258f., 282f., 288, 293, 310, 323f., 331f., 334, 405, 420, 430; Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), pp. 236f., Lexikon der Religionen, p. 47, Lexikon der Sekten, p. 101. The same is true of the Handbuch Religiése Gemeinschaften (31d edn. 1985) no. 5.7.2. which was published by the Office of the Lutheran Church and is clearly based on Ficicchia’s monograph. In the 12th (posthumous) edition of Hutten’s Seher, Gribler, Enthusiasten, with which Ficicchia was involved, there is a long note (on p. 808) presenting Ficicchia’s hypotheses concerning the alleged concealment of the Kitab-i-Aqdas. 45. ‘Ceterum censeo Carthaginem esse delendam’ (‘By the way, I am of the opinion that Carthage must be destroyed’). This was the statement with which the Roman statesman Marcus Portius Cato (234-149 BCE) concluded all his speeches in the Roman Senate. Carthage was de-

325

Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer pressed this work, that this Book of Laws is a ‘thorn in the flesh’ of the ‘organization’,*© and that it is not published in its

entirety ‘for propagandistic reasons’.*” Because of the ‘sometimes peculiar and, especially in Western culture, abhorrent laws of their Prophet’*® it was feared, supposes Ficicchia, that there would be ‘negative effects on missionary work’. For this reason the believers were given only ‘a paltry selection of cer-

tain texts (mostly in an abbreviated fashion)’, whereas ‘the re-

mainder is quite simply withheld’. Ficicchia is convinced that: ‘The Baha’i organization is ashamed of its most holy book and knows that publication of the full content would result in an excessive number of withdrawals.’*° The book that ‘in any case is an obstruction to missionary propaganda in the West is there-

fore put aside as “incomplete” and “sketchy” and is directly substituted by the “perfect” Will of ‘Abdu’l-Baha’.°!

Indeed,

Ficicchia claims ‘Abdu’l-Baha himself had ‘played down’ the Kitab-i-Aqdas and ‘abstained the religious law promulgated cause he ‘felt . . . that the laws counter resistance in the West

from propagating and applying by the Prophet’, probably beof the Kitab-al-Aqdas would enand would not exactly promote

the spread of the Faith in the Occident’.°? Being well aware of the ‘impossibility of applying the Laws of Baha’u’llah’, the

stroyed by the Romans in the year 146 BCE at the end of the Third Punic War. 46. Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 236. 47. Baha’ismus, p. 251. 48. ibid. p. 26. 49. ibid. p. 149 (Ficicchia’s emphasis); Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 237. 50. Materialdienst, ibid.

51. Baha’ismus, p. 283 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 52. ibid. p. 293. 53. ibid.

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Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

‘Baha’i leadership’°* has largely abstained from making these known’,°> a state of affairs that is ‘accepted without contradiction’ by the believers, who are served up with mere

‘plati-

tudes’.°° This ‘deliberately overlooked’>” set of laws is unable

to assert itself “even within the community itself’, ‘let alone in a

world-wide theocracy’.°® The ‘deliberate suppression of the religious laws’®? has caused the Kitab-i-Aqdas

to be ‘dis-

placed’® by the Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha, which is given ‘highest priority among all the Baha’i writings’ and ‘whose significance is clearly greater than that of the Kitab alAqdas’.®! To the believers, from whom this work is ‘concealed

and withheld’® its contents remains ‘largely unknown’. The Kitab-i-Aqdas, Ficicchia assures the astonished reader, is an

object of secrecy, subject to the tagiyya®™ that Baha’u’llah offi54. 55. 56. 57. 58.

ibid. p. 430. ibid. ibid. p. 332. ibid.,p.288. ibid. p. 430.

59. ibid. p. 404 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). Elsewhere, the reader is told that it is not only the Kitab-i-Aqdas that is withheld from the believers but also ‘numerous other writings of their prophet are still suppressed today’ (pp. 332, 122, 180). 60. ibid. p. 323, 331. 61. ibid. p. 282; on this subject see above, p. 152, note 60. 62. ibid. One could certainly cite historical examples of such phenomena: for centuries the Bible was kept ‘under the clerical seal’ and was inaccessible to lay people who did not know Latin, because the Church feared that lay people reading the Bible for themselves would pose a threat to Church doctrine. Possession by lay people of a translation of the Bible was punishable by excommunication. Following the Reformation, the publication and possession of vernacular Bibles was subject to the granting of permission by the Roman Inquisition (RGG, vol. 1, pp. 1224ff.). 63. ibid. pp. 149, 324 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 64. ibid. pp. 406f., Lexikon der Religionen, p. 47, Materialdienst 3 (1995) 39790.

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Udo Schaefer

cially reintroduced® which is, he alleges, expressly permitted in the Kitab-i-Aqdas® and is, he claims, practised by adherents of

the faith.°’ Ficicchia regards this alleged intention of dissimulation as being confirmed by the fact that the ‘leadership’® presented the contents of the Kitab-i-Aqdas in its publication in 1973 of the

Synopsis and Codification of the Laws and Ordinances of the

Kitab-i-Aqdas: The Most Holy Book®? only in the form of ‘a fragmentary and, in parts, amended translation’,”® ‘in diluted,

“expurgated” extracts’.’! In Ficicchia’s estimation, this work contains only ‘a paltry selection of the texts of certain laws... , whereas the remainder is quite simply withheld or is then modi-

fied and cited in an “expurgated” form’.’” Ficicchia claims in all seriousness that the “‘Baha’i leadership’ has ‘rooted out all the unattractive and off-putting ordinances of the Kitab al-Aqdas, and has replaced them by others that appear expedient to missionary propaganda and proselytization’.’”> He adds the cynical

comment that the ‘leadership’’* deserves recognition for their ‘resolute courage in innovating and adapting to the modern

world’, but the fact ‘that the amended regulations are put in the mouth of Baha’u ‘lah himself’ is dubious, since he had forbid-

65. Baha’ismus, p. 181. 66. ibid. pp. 151, 152, 156.

67. ibid. pp. 399, 406, 407, 408; Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 239. 68. Baha’ismus, p. 26. 69. Haifa: Baha’i World Centre, 1973.

70. Baha’ismus, p. 180, note 118 (Ficicchia’s emphasis); Lexikon der Sekten, column 102.

71. 72. 73. 74.

Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 237. Baha’ismus, p. 149 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). ibid. p. 258 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). ibid.

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Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

den any alteration or modification of his laws.”> Ficicchia sums up with the statement: ‘Thus the revelation and the law present

themselves in a completely new, opportunistic guise that has little in common with what was originally said.’”° Ficicchia sees it as ironic that the Baha’is, in spite of these amendments

and interpolations, refer emphatically ‘to the authenticity’ of their scripture, while reproaching other religions for ‘falsifying

their scripture’.”” 75. ibid. pp. 258f. 76. ibid. p. 259. 77. ibid. When and where have Baha’is ever accused other religions of falsifying their sacred scripture? Ficicchia, who himself attests that his research findings are based on an ‘academically sound foundation’ (p. 30), does not give any source for this allegation. Neither does any such source exist. The Baha’is have never raised any such accusation. Even the traditional Islamic interpretation of the Qur’an (4:48), in which the Jews are reputed to have ‘perverted words’ of their scripture from their meanings (tahrif) is rejected by Baha’u’llah: ‘Can a man who believeth in a book, and deemeth it to be inspired by God, mutilate it?’ (Kitab-i-Iqan 94 (p. 87)). Baha’u’llah explains that what is meant by ‘perverting the words’ is an interpretation ‘according to their own inclination and desires’ by which the meaning of the text is distorted (ibid.). What Ficicchia may mean is the conviction that the holy scriptures of the various religions are not all of equal authenticity. The traditions of some

religions, such as Zoroastrianism,

Hinduism

and Buddhism,

are

highly discontinuous in comparison with those of the Semitic religions. The Austrian orientalist von Hammer-Purgstall, by contrast, attests ‘That we hold the Coran to be as surely Mahomet’s word, as the Mahometans hold it to be the word of God’ (quoted in William Muir, The Life of Mahomet, p. xxvii). The Baha’is regard the Qur’an as the only book other than the scriptures of the Bab and Baha’u’llah to be ‘an absolutely authenticated Repository of the Word of God’ (Shoghi Effendi, The Advent of Divine Justice, p.41). The Bible is ‘not completely authentic’ (Shoghi Effendi, quoted in Lights of Guidance 998), as has been confirmed by modern biblical criticism using the methods of historical analysis (see LThK, vol. 2, column 363ff.). Zahrnt formulates it as follows:

‘The Bible, the book between

the two covers,

is not the

“pure Word of God”.’ It is ‘not in itself the certificate proving God’s revelation, but is a testimony to people’s belief in God’s revelation’ (Gotteswende, p. 116). In cases of doubt, such as the divergent reports of Abraham’s sacrifice (see Gen. 22:9 and Qur’dn 37:102ff.), the Baha’is

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The reasons given by the ‘leadership’ as to why this work had hitherto not been published are, Ficicchia informs his readers, that the time for its publication is, ‘in the official mode of expression’, ‘not yet ripe’,’® the “full text is to be made accessible to a later generation’,’” since ‘the level of mankind’s matur-

ity’ requires the exercise of reservation,®° a provision that ‘amounts to its concealment ad calendas graecas’®! Ficicchia also asserts that ‘no texts in the Arabic original

are in circulation’® and claims this to be evidence that the book is subject to secrecy. He claims, moreover, that the Baha’is are forbidden to possess or to read the translation published in 1961

by the ‘orientalists’ Earl E. Elder and William Miller,®* this translation being designated in Haifa, he alleges, as a ‘a work of

Christian scheming’.*4 In doing so, he does not fail to add his

follow the Qur’4n and the scripture of Baha’u’llah (see Gleanings 22:1, where Baha’u’llah confirms the Qur’anic version). However, the

Baha’is do see the Word of God in the Bible and often read from it in private and public worship. 78. Baha’ismus, p. 188. 79. Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 237.

80. ibid. Hutten (Seher, Griibler, Enthusiasten, 12th edn., p. 808, note 20) also states that the official reason that the work had not been published is that ‘people are not yet mature enough to understand the full text of the book’. There has never been any official statement to this effect, and the publication of an authentic English edition of the full text in 1992 demonstrates the falseness of this accusation. 81. Baha’ismus, p. 188. At the Greek calends, i.e. never, as the Greeks

had no calends in their mode of reckoning.

82. ibid. pp. 149, 26. 83. Al-Kitab al-Aqdas or the Most Holy Book by Mirza Husayn ‘Ali Baha'u'llah, translated from the Original Arabic and edited by Earl E. Elder, Ph.D., D.D., and William McE. Miller, M.A., D.D., published

by the Royal Asiatic Society, London, 1961. 84. Baha’ismus, pp. 149f., 26; Lexikon der Religionen, p. 47, Lexikon

der Sekten, column 101; and recently again in Materialdienst 3 (1995), p. 90. The same arguments appear in Hutten, Seher, Griibler, Enthusiasten, 12th edn., p. 808, note 20.

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Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

personal comment that Elder and Miller’s English-language edi-

tion is a ‘concise introduction’, containing ‘useful notes to accompany the text’.8> He goes on to assert that believers are also for-

bidden ‘to translate and distribute the full wording’®® of the text: ‘Full translations, or extracts translated into other languages,

are forbidden by order of Haifa.’®” The extent to which the ‘Most Holy Book’ of the Baha’i Faith has allegedly lost its central significance and fallen into obscurity is underlined, according to Ficicchia, by the ‘fact’ that

the work is now ‘dismissed as “sketchy” and “incomplete” ’&8 and that ‘for Schaefer it is nothing but a “framework” ’.8? The author assesses this alleged process of ‘the renunciation of the Kitab al-Aqdas’ as ‘an “innovation” (bid’a) and, in the theo-

logical sense, even a heretical break’ .*° Il. DIFFICULTIES OF PUBLICATION

The accusation is monstrous: a religion that kept its “Most Holy Book’ under lock and key, publishing only an ‘expurgated’ version in which the unattractive, offensive texts had been ‘rooted

out’ and substituted by others that, for the sake of “missionary expediency’, were “put in its founder’s mouth’, would be— were it to be true—unique in history. A religion that claimed to be the ‘Path of Truth’ but was really based on lies and deceit, that cunningly deceived the whole community of its adherents,

leading them by the nose, would be devoid of the slightest credibility.

85. Baha’ismus, p. 26. 86. ibid. p. 253 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 87. ibid. p. 149 (Ficicchia’s emphasis); Lexikon der Religionen, p. 46. 88. Baha’ismus, pp. 310, 283.

89. ibid. p. 331, note 46 (with reference to my doctoral dissertation). 90. ibid. p. 319 (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

329

Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer Of course, paper will allow one to write anything one likes on it, and malevolent suspicions are usually more readily believed than positive testimonies. How, after all, could a reader who knows no better be expected to realize that this chronique scandaleuse consists of nothing but malicious slander, that it is a concoction of lies dreamed up by this researcher in order to completely destroy the credibility of the community to which he once belonged? Seeing through these lies is made especially difficult by the fact that his book was published under the aegis of a well-known ecclesiastical publishing house of academic repute. It comes as no surprise, then, that the Church Manual”! produced by the Lutherisches Kirchenamt (Office of the Ger-

man Lutheran Church) enlightens the reader at length concerning the ‘authoritarian and expedient utilization of the “revealed truth” ’ in the Baha’i Faith, concluding with the verdict that this

religion is ‘not credible because of the concealment of the Kitab

al-Aqdas texts’,?” and that even a scholar such as Johann Biirgel can write in his book review,?> with reference to the alleged concealment

of the Kitab-i-Aqdas,

of the ‘notorious

secret-

mongering of its”4 leaders’. But what are the real reasons, the explanation as to why no authentic translation of the Kitab-i-Aqdas was available for so long in a Western language—this being, after all, the very work

that contains the religious law and is assigned central significance in the scripture of Baha’u’llah, designated as the ‘Mother Book’ (Ummu 1-Kitdb) of the Baha’i revelation?

91. Kirchliches Handbuch, 3rd edn. 1985.

92. ibid. pp. 631ff. 93. In the journal Der Islam, 1985, p. 186. Professor Biirgel lectures in oriental studies at the University of Zurich. 94. i.e. the Baha’i community’s.

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Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’it Law

1. Previous publications and translations? After its revelation by Baha’u’llah

in the early summer

of

1873°° copies were initially made, as was the case with all Baha’u’llah’s other works, and—as Momen affirms—circulated

‘in great number’”’ among the believers,®® until it eventually appeared as a lithograph in Bombay in 1891 (as part of an anthology containing a number of texts of Baha’u’llah). The same edition appeared in print in 1896/97, again in Bombay. According to Momen,”? further authentic publications of the original text appeared in Cairo and Teheran. The original text was also published twice by non-Baha’is. The edition produced by

Kh.A. Enayat in Baghdad in 1931 for the Matba‘atu’l-AdabAmirikaniyyah publishing house contained several deviations from the authentic text. The other version was a copy of the Kitab-i-Aqdas published in the appendix to a work by ‘Abdu’r-

Razzaq al-Hasani entitled Al-Bdbiyun wa’l-Bahda’iyin (Sidon, 1957). Contrary to Ficicchia’s assertions, the Arabic text is widespread among Middle Eastern believers. Many Persian Baha’is possess an edition of this work in which neither year nor place

95. On this subject as a whole see Baharieh Rouhani-Ma’ani, ‘Das Kitabi-Aqdas: Seine Offenbarung und seine Bekanntmachung’, in Gesellschaft fiir Baha’i Studien (ed.), Aspekte des Kitab-i-Aqdas, pp. 31-50. 96. Not in 1875, as stated by Ficicchia (p. 148) who has taken over this error from William Miller. Kamran Ekbal has put forward some interesting arguments for an earlier dating of this event to the year 1868 (‘Islamische Grundlagen des Kitab-i-Aqdas, mit neuen Erkenntnissen zu seiner Datierung’, in Biirgel (ed.), Der Iran im 19. Jahrhundert, pp. 63ff.). 97. ‘The History of Writing and Transmission of the Kitab-i-Aqdas’, quoted from Abstracts of the Fourth Haj Mihdi Arjmand Conference on Scripture, which took place from 4 to 6 November 1994 in Nijmegen, The Netherlands. 98. Browne had no difficulty in procuring a copy of the work in Iran in 1888. 99. See above, note 97.

331

Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer

of publication is mentioned, owing to the prohibition on printing Baha’i books that exists in some Islamic countries. Many editions are probably photomechanical reprints. As I myself soon discovered, this work is accessible and is well known among the Baha’is in Arabic-speaking countries. The Universal

House of Justice made it clear in a letter! that there was no objection to the text being made available to new believers who

were formerly Muslims. The first translation of this work into a foreign language

was Toumanski’s Russian version,!®! printed in 1899, which was discussed by Browne in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic

Society.'°? That edition contains the complete Arabic original of the text, as well as parts of the Ishraqat.!? As early as the turn of the century, an English translation of the complete text was produced in the United States by a Baha’i of Lebanese origin, Anton Haddad.!°4 Although it was never printed, typescript

100. dated 11 April 1976. 101. A.H. Toumanski, Mémoires de l’Académie Impériale des Sciences de St Pétersbourg, classe des sciences, historico-philologiques, VIII. série, tome III, St Pétersbourg,

1899. The outstanding Baha’i

scholar

Mirza Abt’1-Fadl-i-Gulpaygani assisted Toumanski in his work. Concerning this translation, “Ali-Akbar Furttan writes: “Despite his having the assistance of Mirza Abu’1-Fadl-i-Gulpaygani and Aqa Mirza Yasif-iRashti, Toumanski’s translation is very literal and extremely inadequate’ (The Story of My Heart, p. 66). 102. (1900), pp. 354-357. A review of the contents of the Kitab-iAqdas by Browne—under the erroneous title of ‘Lawh-i-Aqdas’—is included in the JRAS, vol. XXI, new series, Part IV, pp. 972-982.

103.

See Tablets 8.

104.

Helen

S. Goodall

Papers, US

National

Baha’i Archives.

Loni

Bramson-Lerche quotes from this edition (‘Some Aspects of the Establishment of the Guardianship’, pp. 255, 282). Shoghi Effendi’s statement in a letter to a National Spiritual Assembly, dated 25 August 1927, probably refers to this translation (‘The Kitab-i-Aqdas should not be published as the existing translation is most inadequate’) (quoted from Extracts Regarding the Publication of the Kitab-i-Aqdas compiled by the Research Department at the Baha’i World Centre).

332

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law copies were circulated among American believers. By 1933, Adam and Lina Benke produced the first German translation on the basis of Toumanski’s Russian version. Copies of this typewritten preliminary translation, which never appeared in print,

were in the possession of some German Baha’is. In a letter! to Dr Adalbert Mihlschlegel, Shoghi Effendi called for a translation committee to be established by the German National Spiritual Assembly for the purpose of translating the Kitab-i-

Aqdas into German,!°° something which, however, never came about (presumably because of the lack of competent Arabists). The first authentic translation of parts of the text into English

was accomplished by Shoghi Effendi. In several sections! of the anthology Gleanings from the Writings of Bahda’u’lldah, published in 1939, as well as in other publications,!°* he made approximately one third of the text available to Western readers, albeit omitting the ritual and judicial laws of Baha’u’llah. A further translation of the entire work into English was produced

by Fadil-i-Mazindarani and Marzieh Gail, comprising not only the passages translated by Shoghi Effendi but also the remain-

der, including the appendix entitled ‘Questions and Answers’.!°? The manuscript was never printed but was circulated in mimeographed form among believers in the United States and to some extent in Europe. The only English-language edition of the en-

105. 106. 107. 108. p. 21; 109.

dated 5 March 1935. The Light of Divine Guidance, pp. 7Off. Sections 37, 56, 70-72, 98, 105, 155, 159, 165. The Promised Day is Come, pp. 24, 40; Baha’i Administration, World Order, p. 134. The Kitdb-i-Aqdas and Questions and Answers: Supplementary

to the Kitab-i-Aqdas, no date. Evidently other translations into English

had also been ventured, as Shoghi Effendi remarks in a letter dated 25 January 1937: ‘A few translations of the Aqdas have already been attempted into English, but none of them is sufficiently authoritative to deserve publication . . . ’ (quoted from Extracts Regarding the Publication of the Kitab-i-Aqdas, ibid.).

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Chapter 5 * Udo Schaefer

tire work to appear in print was that made by Earl E. Elder and William Miller, published in 1961 by the Royal Asiatic Soci-

ety.!!° This translation was printed again as part of Miller’s book, The Bahda’i Faith: Its History and Teachings (South Pasadena, 1974). The existence of these publications alone shows that any

attempt to conceal the content of this text, had such ever been intended, would have been doomed to failure. For one thing, the original text had been published in the West (together with Toumanski’s Russian translation), so that anyone versed in Arabic—and an increasing number of young Western Baha’is are learning this language—or anyone with knowledge of Russian, would easily have had access to the text. Moreover, the non-authentic English translation (Mazindarani and Gail) produced in the United States was current among the Baha’is, and

anyone who was particularly interested was able to acquire the translation by Elder and Miller (now out of print), since it was

available through bookshops. I have long been in possession of both these translations. The laws, which had not yet been published in an official translation, and which Ficicchia finds so peculiar, were therefore known to many Baha’is.!"!

2. On the Royal Asiatic Society’s English-language edition of 1961 Ficicchia’s assertion that the Baha’i World Centre had forbidden the possession of the original text or of Elder and Miller’s translation, and had prohibited the translation of the unpub-

110. For bibliographical details see below, p. 328, note 83. 111. When Ficicchia points out (p. 323, note 20 and p. 311, note 79) that I was not acquainted with the complete text of the Kitab-i-Aqdas, this was indeed true at the time my doctoral dissertation was published in 1957, i.e. before the two English editions were available; the full text was accessible only to those who could read either the original Arabic or the Russian translation.

334

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’it Law

lished sections, is a cunning invention and absolutely untrue. Never does he cite any source for such prohibitions. The only prohibition that ever existed was that on publishing one’s own translation. It is also untrue that the Universal House of Justice ever called Elder and Miller’s translation ‘a work of Christian

scheming’.!!? Ficicchia supports this assertion with a reference to a letter from the Universal House of Justice to a Swiss Baha’i dated 23 March 1975. However, the phrase Ficicchia places in

inverted commas, misleading the reader into thinking that it is a quotation, is nowhere to be found in this letter. Rather, the

Baha’i World Centre merely pointed out that the commentary, in particular the introduction and translator’s foreword, are strongly influenced by the authors’ association with the covenant-breakers (Azalis) and opponents of the Baha’i Faith, that Miller attached major significance to the Nuqtatu l-Kadf, a his-

torical work whose sources are highly obscure,!!> that this is reflected in the translation, and that their work is obviously in-

tended ‘to discredit Baha’u’llah and belittle His Faith’.!!* It should be noted that the translators

were

not, as Ficicchia

claims, ‘competent orientalists with expertise in the fields of linguistics and religious studies’,!!> but rather Christian missionaries belonging to the Presbyterian Church who, frustrated

by the lack of success in Christian missionary work in Muslim countries, were unsympathetic towards the prospering Baha’i 112. Baha’ismus, p. 149; also asserted in Lexikon der Sekten, column 102, Materialdienst 3 (1995), p. 90 and Hutten, Seher, Griibler, Enthusiasten, 12th edn., p. 808, note 20. In his 1975 essay (Materialdienst

15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p.237) he claimed—without giving any source!—that ‘Haifa’ ignored the translation or cursed it as a ‘hostile forgery’. 113. On this subject see Balyuzi, Edward Granville Browne, pp. 62ff. and Towfigh, below, pp. 500ff. 114. Letter from the Universal House of Justice dated 14 August 1975. See also the information given on Elder and Miller in a letter of the Universal House of Justice dated 23 March 1975. 115. Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 237.

335

Chapter 5 '¢ Udo Schaefer community in Iran. This is why the Elder/Miller translation together with its introduction and footnotes ‘gives a grossly dis-

torted impression of Baha’u’llah’s Most Holy Book’.!!¢ If one wishes to know Miller’s attitude to the Baha’i Faith, one should read his two works along with Douglas Martin’s

critical essay “The Missionary as Historian’. Miller’s ‘concise

introduction’!” to the English edition of the Kitab-i-Aqdas and what Ficicchia calls his ‘useful comments’ are tendentious in

the extreme. One need not look far to discover Miller’s motive in publishing this work. After all, what would bring a Christian clergyman to undertake the laborious task of translating for publication the holy book of another religion from the original text, if not for the purpose of ‘enlightenment’ in furtherance of

his own interests? If left in any doubt, one should read Miller’s introduction to the history and teachings of the Baha’i Faith with which he

prefaces his translation, as well as L.T. Elwell-Sutton’s!!® review of Miller’s 1974 book The Bahd’i Faith''? in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society. The reviewer begins with the statement that: “This is a polemical work . . . an all-out attack on, a merciless tirade against, Baha’ism, but treated not, as one might

expect from the author’s credentials (Presbyterian missionary in Iran for 40-odd years), from the Christian, but from the Azali

point of view.’!?° The reviewer, who asks in astonishment why Miller, as a Christian clergyman, should have taken sides with the Azalis, provides the obvious answer: “We are bound to conclude that his purpose is to discredit Baha’ism’, to which he

adds the critical comment:

“But perhaps he ought not at the

116. Letter of the Universal House of Justice dated 14 August 1975. 117. Baha’ismus, p. 26. 118. Professor of Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Edinburgh. 119. Its History and Teachings, South Pasadena, Calif., 1974. 120. JRAS 2 (1976), p. 158.

336

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

same time to convey the impression that he has produced an

objective study’: “The mere accumulation of facts is no guarantee of impartiality. Balyuzi’s books on Baha’ism (previously reviewed in these pages) are also full of facts, but they present a picture diametrically opposite to that delineated by Miller in his

absorbing and witty book.’!?! 3. Problems of producing an authentic translation There are a number of reasons why the Kitab-i-Aqdas was not published in full for such a long time. For a start, it must be realized that translation of the holy texts from the Persian or Arabic original into English is an extraordinarily difficult and arduous enterprise. Meticulous precision and reliability are essential, because faulty translations have long-lasting negative repercussions. The language of the Baha’i revelation is that of late Islamic culture, i.e. of a spiritual and intellectual environment that is generally alien to the Western reader. Furthermore, the works of Baha’u’llah and the Bab are in a genuinely idiosyncratic style of language that is difficult to transpose into the literary language of a different cultural setting. We are immeasurably indebted to Shoghi Effendi for producing masterful translations of such works of Baha’u’llah as Hidden Words, the Kitab-i-Iqan,

Epistle to the Son of the Wolf, and anthologies such as Gleanings and Prayers and Meditations, etc., into the English language, thus rendering them accessible to readers outside the Islamic cultural sphere, and setting standards for future translations. Given the abundance of revealed texts, it is inevitable that priorities had to be set. Priority was given to those works that informed the world of the theological foundations of the faith,

its moral principles and its societal and political goals, i.e. those works that deal with the doctrines concerning God, revelation,

121.

ibid.

S37,

Chapter 5 * Udo Schaefer the Prophets, the image of man, the divine Covenant, the salvation of the individual and society, as well as the societal and legal structures of a future world and the prerequisites for world peace. As already emphasized above,!?? it is logical from a pedagogical point of view that these aspects of the revelation should be introduced first, before confronting people with the divine law itself. To proceed in the reverse order, presenting the law before its dogmatic foundation had been understood, would be to put the cart before the horse. Moreover, with the exception of the constitutional ties of the community that were valid from the outset and determined the community’s structure, the majority of the ritual and legal

norms are not yet in force. They were introduced not ipso jure

simultaneously with the revelation of the Kitab-i-Aqdas,!?> but as part of a gradual process, as will be considered below. Legal

norms of a public character, such as the regulations governing penal law, presuppose the existence of a Baha’i society, which

is currently nowhere to be found. For this reason, there was no particular urgency for the publication of the full text. 4.

On the nature of divine legislation

The main reason why the publication of the complete text was delayed is that a purely linguistic rendering of the text is insufficient, owing to the special character of divine legislation,

which differs from that of human codes of law. Like all human planning and action, state legislation is a rational process resulting in a rationally comprehensible, structured set of laws. The laws are set out systematically and corre-

spond to the logic of the matter in hand. The Kitab-i-Aqdas is not like that at all. Its contents are highly varied and sometimes

change abruptly: elucidations on fundamental theological is-

122. 123.

See above, pp. 88ff. as with the laws promulgated on Sinai or in the Qur’an.

338

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha ’i Law

sues, exhortations, ethical appeals, paraenesis and prophecies are strewn among the laws without any logical association with the context and without conclusively regulating the subject in

question. !*4 As noted as early as the nineteenth century by the Russian scholar Yevgenii Eduardovich Bertels, no systematic order is evident.!?> Describing this graphically, Taherzadeh comments that “There seems to be no visible pattern for the inter-

weaving of the two,!”° nor is there any apparent connection between them.’!?”? Hermann Rémer spoke of a ‘colourful confu-

sion’ of various regulations,!2® while Rosenkranz called the Kitabi-Aqdas ‘a miscellany of instructions’,!”? and the orientalist Chris-

tian Cannuyer describes the work as ‘assez désordonné’: ‘Il présente un caractére assez décousu, fait un peu de bric et de

broc.?!3°

These judgements are inappropriate. I have pointed out in

previous publications!+! that the founders of the world religions were not systematists, and that in the sense of a logical system The ‘Book of God’ has never book. Holy scriptures are not

their teachings are not doctrines of intellectual enlightenment. !3? constituted a theological handtreatises of rational instruction.

124. The prohibition of opium, for example, is found in verses 155 and 190; the obligatory prayers in verses 6, 8, and 14; the qibla in verses 6 and 137; the regulations concerning cleanliness in verses 46, 7476, 106; the prohibition of contention in verses 73, 95, and 148; of murder, homicide and arson in verses 19 and 62; and manslaughter in verse 188.

125. 126.

See Martin, The Kitdb-i-Aqdas: Its Place in Baha’i Literature, p. 4. meaning the law and metaphysical, mystical truths.

127.

Revelation, vol. 3, p. 277.

128. Die Babi-Behai, p. 109. 129. Die Baha’i, p. 32. 130. Les Baha’is, p. 70. 131. Grundlagen, p. 64; The Light Shineth, pp. 140ff., Dominion, pp. 219ff.; ‘ “The Balance hath been appointed” ’, p. 49ff. 132. Ficicchia quoted this approvingly from my doctoral dissertation (Baha ’ismus, p. 323).

339

Chapter 5 ‘¢ Udo Schaefer The Word of God is of a different quality altogether: it is an emphatic, eruptive, visionary outpouring, a primordial form of religious oratory rather than a systematically structured, dry, blood-

less tutelage, an arid instruction set out in plain terms: “All Divine Revelation seems to have been thrown out in flashes. The Prophets never composed treatises. That is why in the Qur’an and our own Writings different subjects are so often included in one Tablet. It pulsates, so to speak. That is why it is “Revelation”.’!53 The sacred is, as Rudolf Otto has defined it, ‘numinosum, fascinosum et tremendum’; it is, in its essence, beyond the rational, and eludes the categories of rationality. It has always been up to mankind to place the laws of God in systematic contexts, since these cannot otherwise be understood or applied. It should therefore come as no surprise that the Kitab-i-

Aqdas is not systematic in its presentation.!*4 Even the laws of the Torah, despite being edited by human hand, do not fall into

a logical context. Similarly, the Qur’an is written in a remarkably elliptical style, with abrupt changes of theme and no visible

evidence of a systematic structure.!3> For this reason, the ori-

133. Shoghi Effendi, Unfolding Destiny, p. 454. 134. If it were a systematic book, this would probably have been the first source of objections among the very theologians who criticize its lack of a systematic structure. 135. George F. Hourani expresses this fact when he states that: ‘It is not a book of philosophy or even theology’ (Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics, p. 15). That a fascinating architecture can be discovered behind the apparent disorder is something that has only become evident in the computer age. A study commissioned by the former Imam of the Mosque in Tucson, Arizona, Rashad Khalifa, and conducted at the Mas-

sachusetts Institute of Technology revealed that the Qur’an is constructed entirely on the basis of the number nineteen, as is reflected in an incredible wealth of data. Khalifa published the findings under the title ‘al-hisdbat al-elektriniyyah wa mu ‘jizat al-Qur’an al-karim’ (‘The Electronic Computation and the Wonder of the Holy Qur’an’, Beirut: Dar al-‘Ilm 1i’l-Malayin, 1983; also Quran: Visual Presentation of the Miracle, Tucson, Arizona: Islamic Productions, 1982), because he was convinced that this architecture, of which no human would have been

340

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

entalist Francesco Gabrieli called it ‘a dark, chaotic book’,!3¢

while von Glasenapp found it ‘unusual and wearisome’,!37 and Goethe commented: Boundless tautologies and repetitions form the body of this sacred book that time and again, whenever we take it up, initially repulses us, then attracts and astonishes us, finally winning our admiration!#®

Of all these opinions, Goethe’s perhaps does most justice

to the special character of this work of revelation. The captivating ardour, the poetic passion felt by Muslims when reciting

the Qur’an!*? is imperceptible to a reader who is dependent on translation and who remains a mere observer, just as the ‘art of fugue’ is inaccessible to the musically illiterate. The same is true of the language of the Kitab-i-Aqdas, whose dynamics and rhythm, whose hidden aesthetics can be experienced only by those who have been brought up in the

Arabic language, who know its literature and sense its spirit.!4° capable, proves the divine origin of the Qur’4n. However, the author was strongly attacked in the Muslim world, especially in Egypt, and suspected of being a crypto-Baha’i, because the number nineteen, along with the number nine, is held to be a sacred number by the Bab and Baha’u’llah, and is, for instance, the number on which the Badi‘ calen-

dar is based. According to a report published in the Malaysian newspaper News Straits Times on 25 December 1992 Khalifa has since been murdered. 136. ‘Muhammad und der Islam als weltgeschichtliche Erscheinungen’, in Historia Mundi. Handbuch der Weltgeschichte, vol. 5, p. 347. 137. Die nichtchristlichen Religionen, p. 180. 138. Translated from the German source Gedenkausgabe, vol. 3, ‘Epen, West-éstlicher Divan, Theatergedichte’, p. 433 (West-Eastern Divan). 139.

On the aesthetics of the Qur’an

see Nawid

Kermani,

Gott ist

schon. Das dsthetische Erleben des Koran, Munich: Beck Verlag, 1999. 140. For a discussion of Baha’u’llah’s linguistic style see Taherzadeh, Revelation, vol. 1, pp. 21ff.; vol. 3, pp. 228ff.; Suheil Bushrui, The Style

of the Kitab-i-Aqdas: Aspects of the Sublime, Bethesda: University Press of Maryland, 1995. A critical review of this book by Sen McGlinn has been published by the BSR, vol. 6 (1996), pp. 93-96. The author of this

341

Chapter 5 # Udo Schaefer The work is replete with mystical allusions that do not become

evident to the reader upon mere superficial perusal.!*! Indeed, Baha’u’llah does not wish the Kitab-i-Aqdas to be regarded as

nothing but a book of laws, a simple codex: Think not that We have revealed unto you a mere code of laws. Nay, rather, We have unsealed the choice Wine with the fingers of might and power. !42

The lack of a systematic structure is also evident in that the

work is not a numerus clausus of laws. Baha’u’llah’s legislation

is not finalized in this book. Numerous Tablets!*? revealed after the Kitab-i-Aqdas contain explanations of his laws established in the Kitab-i-Aqdas, as well as ‘subsidiary ordinances designed

to supplement the provisions of His Most Holy Book’.!** This review is puzzled by the structure of the Aqdas ‘and its apparent lack of literary unity’ (p. 393). However, such a book cannot be judged in terms of literary criticism. The book’s claim to be ‘revelation’ is not taken seriously if one explains the ‘lack of literary unity’ by speculations such as that structure might be ‘a deliberate imitation of the Qur’an, in which the surahs have been compiled in an arbitrary order’ (ibid. p. 94) or that Baha’u’llah might have revealed sections of the book to his secretaries ‘and accorded them the status of being part of the Most Holy Book, but did not himself determine the position in which every section should appear’ (ibid.). Such speculations are only possible on the premise that the Kitab-i-Aqdas is a human composition. 141. On this subject see Dariush Maani, ‘Die mystischen Dimensionen des Kitab-i-Aqdas’, in Gesellschaft fiir Baha’i Studien (ed.), Aspekte des Kitab-i-Aqdas, Hofheim, 1995, pp. 193-222. 142. 5 (Gleanings 155:5). Choice sealed wine (ar-rahiq al-makhtum) is a mystical term from the Qur’an (83:25) that describes the delight of those who enjoy nearness to God on the Day of Resurrection and to whom Baha’u’llah is referring here (see Ekbal, ‘Islamische Grundlagen’, p. 62; Schaefer, Freiheit, p. 14, note 21).

143. Arabic: Jawh, plural: alwah, means board, writing tablet, epistle. The term designates a piece of sacred scripture containing revelation. Like the ‘tablets of stone’ on which Moses received the Ten Commandments, this term is used to refer, in particular, to the revealed works of

Baha’u’1lah. 144. God Passes By, p. 216. See also, in particular, Tablets.

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Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

applies even to the ritual laws: not all regulations pertaining to ritual are included in the Kitab-i-Aqdas. The rites prescribed for

the hajj,'*° for instance, are presented in two stiras.!“© The ritual daily prayers were revealed elsewhere than in the Kitab-iAqdas.!4’ A source that is indispensable for understanding the Kitab-i-Aqdas is the appendix entitled ‘Questions and An-

swers’. Baha’u’llah permitted his amanuensis, Zaynu’]-Mugar-

rabin, a former mujtahid,'*® to ask questions concerning the application of the laws revealed in the Kitab-i-Aqdas. Only extracts from this list of questions along with Baha’u’llah’s answers, which are an integral part of his legislation, had previously been published,!*? and they were not available in the original to the translators Miller and Elder. Furthermore, on the basis of the interpretative authority

ascribed to them, “Abdu’l-Baha and Shoghi Effendi provided answers to numerous questions concerning the interpretation of laws. These interpretations are indispensable for the guidance of the believers and for the correct evaluation of the regulations laid down in the Kitab-i-Aqdas. It ought to be obvious that it

would have been meaningless for this work to be published without reference to these authoritative supplementary explanations and interpretations, and omitting to explain the religious, cultural and historical references contained in the work, as well as Baha’u’llah’s many allusions to the laws and customs of the

previous revelation. A mere verbatim translation that ignored all

145. Pilgrimage to the house of the Bab in Shiraz and the house of Baha’u’llah in Baghdad. 146. Striy-i-Hajj, see Taherzadeh, Revelation, vol. 2, pp. 240ff.; vol. 1, pp. 211 ff. 147. For details see below, pp. 385ff. 148. A doctor of Islamic law. 149.

in Fadil-i-Mazindarani, Amr va Khalq, vols. 1-4, Teheran, 1965-

1974.

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Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer

these texts would have been a fleshless skeleton inevitably leading to misunderstandings. There is, in addition, a feature that is peculiar to Baha’u*llah’s legislation, the knowledge of whichis indispensable if his law is to be assessed correctly. In contrast to early Judaism and Islam, in which the believers constituted a nation and where the revealed Law of God was immediately declared valid for the theocratic community, laying down the pattern for the structure of the new order, the expansion of the Baha’i Faith is taking place according to a paradigm that is similar to that evident in

the history of Christianity. Throughout his ministry, Baha’u’llah was a prisoner and exile at the mercy of state authority. At all times he was devoid of any power: he was a prophet, and not simultaneously the head of a nation state (as was the Prophet Muhammad). From the outset, the Baha’i communities have formed a diaspora within a completely different political environment. As in Christianity, the expansion of the Baha’i Faith is taking place in a long, leavening process of cellular reproduc-

tion. This set of circumstances means that many norms of the revealed law, in particular those related to state order, will not be applicable until some time in the unforeseeable future. The

Kitab-i-Aqdas contains certain norms written, as Shoghi Effendi put it, ‘in anticipation of a state of society destined to

emerge from the chaotic conditions that prevail today’.!*° This is particularly true of the penal provisions, which presuppose the existence of a state that is shaped in accordance with the political structures of Baha’u’llah’s revelation.

For this reason, divine law is brought into force not ipso iure, simultaneously with its revelation and proclamation, but step-by-step, as part of a historical process. This gradual introduction of the laws goes back to Baha’u’llah himself, who, in a previously unpublished letter to Zaynu’l-Mugqarrabin dated 27 Dhi’1-Qa‘dih (= 26 December 1875), stated that a number of

150.

Quoted from Synopsis and Codification, Intro. p. 7.

344

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

laws should be brought into force only when the time was

ripe.'*! The Universal House of Justice speaks of a ‘divinelypurposed delay in the revelation of the basic laws of God for

this age’!>? and cites the well-known passage from Gleanings! in which Baha’u’llah uses the metaphor of the rising sun to de-

scribe man’s capacity as the decisive factor in the outpouring of divine revelation, so that revelation has, to a certain extent, the character of a dialogue. This means that the dialectic relation-

ship between revelation and human thought,!>* whereby human capacity is taken into account in the revelation

of God’s

Word!°°—a relationship that is immanent in the principle of progressive revelation—operates not only in the chain of successive outpourings of divine revelation but also during the period of each prophet’s mission.

Taherzadeh rightly points out how difficult it is to detach people from time-honoured habits and customary ways of doing things that are simply taken for granted, and to bring them new

laws that mean a break with their previous pattern of life.!*° This necessary break with obsolete, worn-out forms and institutions, which every founder of a new world religion has conducted in order to adapt the religion of God to the needs and requirements of a new age, was not made abruptly by the Mes-

sengers of God, but was moderated. The Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides devoted a whole chapter of his book Daldlat

al-Ha ‘irin'*” to this issue, demonstrating just how strongly hu-

151.

Baha’i World Centre, Memorandum

of the Research Department

dated 21 January 1994 (N 78). 152. Synopsis and Codification, Intro., p. 5. 153. 154.

155. now’ 156. 157.

38. See Schaefer, Beyond the Clash, 2nd edn., pp. 137ff. ‘Ihave yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them (John 16:12; Gleanings 38). Revelation, vol. 2, pp. 353ff. The Guide for the Perplexed, ch. 32, pp. 106ff.

345

Chapter 5, ¢ Udo Schaefer

man nature resists sudden and radical changes in the pattern of life. God, who never alters human nature miraculously, takes account of this by avoiding direct decrees concerning the goal to be achieved, choosing instead to approach that goal indirectly. Thus, according to Maimonides, the forty years spent by the Jewish people in the wilderness of Sinai served to detach them from their customary pattern of life, their habits and traditions. Only after a new generation had grown up who had not

shared in the experiences of the Jews in Egypt did Moses lead them into the Promised Land. Maimonides also sees this as the reason why, in accordance with divine wisdom, heathen forms of worship were incorporated into the Torah, such as the institution of the Temple, sacrifice, altars and suchlike, but with the strict instruction that no being should be worshipped but the God who spoke through Moses: “By this divine plan, the traces of idolatry were effectively blotted out, and the truly great prin-

ciple of our faith, the Existence and Unity of God, was firmly established.’ !°® For the same reason, many aspects of ancient Arabian heathen religion were integrated into the law of the Qur’an, thus

surviving in a quite different context and with altered significance in order to provide a minimum of continuity in the pattern of the believers’ lives. The way in which God’s Law is adapted to the absolutely indispensable change in human capacity is exemplified by the laws concerning the consumption of intoxicating drinks. When the Prophet Muhammad forbade the Arabs to drink wine (which they consumed in excessive quantities) he introduced the prohibition gradually. The earliest statement in the Qur’an on this subject says that in wine and in games there are

both sin and benefits to mankind, but that the dangers outweigh the benefits:

158. ibid. p. 323. 346

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law In both is heinous sin, and uses for men, but the sin in them is more heinous than the usefulness. !°?

Later, those who were intoxicated were excluded from communal prayers: O believers, draw not near to prayer when drunken until you know what you say. !©°

you

are

Once the community has become firm in faith, one szira condemned wine and games of chance and commanded the Mus-

lims to refrain from them: O believers, surely wine and games of chance, and statues, and the divining arrows, are an abomination of Satan’s work! Avoid them, that ye may prosper. Satan only desires to precipitate enmity and hatred between you in regard to wine and arrow-shuffling,!®! and to bar

you from the remembrance of God, and from prayer. !® Baha’u’llah, too, followed this principle of the gradual,

gentle introduction of his laws.!©? An example of this is the introduction of monogamy. The explicit text of the Kitab-i-Aqdas forbids a man to have more than two wives, but this is qualified by the assurance that both partners will live in tranquillity if the

man is content with one wife.!°* An impartial interpretation of

159. Qur’an 2:216. 160. ibid. 4:46. 161. Arabic: maysir, a game of chance which was in use in preIslamic Arabia and by which people often lost all their property and even their wives. 162. ibid. 5:93-94. 163. ‘He is fully capable of revolutionizing the world through the power of a single Word. Having enjoined upon all men to observe wisdom, He Himself hath adhered to the cord of patience and resignation’ (Tablets 17:130). 164. ‘God hath prescribed matrimony unto you. Beware that ye take not unto yourselves more wives than two. Whoso contenteth himself with a single partner from among the maidservants of God, both he and

347

Chapter 5, ¢ Udo Schaefer

this text would imply that Baha’u’llah, like the Bab, permits bigamy but prefers monogamy.

The situation would then be

comparable to that in Qur’anic law whereby a man is permitted to take four wives on condition that he treats them equally.!® However, this condition is described elsewhere in the Qur’an as impossible to fulfil.'°° Early Islamic exegetes interpreted this Qur’anic law in a patriarchal sense, a man being regarded as having the legal right to four wives, and the monogamy intended by the Prophet being seen merely as an appeal to the believer’s conscience. Pious Muslims who wished to obey the

Prophet in all things therefore took only one wife. This traditional interpretation by Islamic lawyers, whose implication is that polygamy is legal and monogamy a matter of morality, is not a cogent one, however, Islamic states such as Tunisia that have prohibited polygamy and introduced monogamy justify their doing so by stating ‘that the Qur’anic command to do justice, coupled with a denial of the possibility of such justice, ne-

cessitates the prohibition of polygamy’.!©”? Modern Islamic advocates of women’s rights, who demand the abolition of polygamy, follow this line of argument.!® Since the members of the early Baha’i community were exclusively from countries in the Islamic cultural sphere, there were many men who were married to several women. Baha’u*}lah therefore postponed the intended explicit introduction of she shall live in tranquillity’ (Kitab-i-Aqdas 63; see also ‘Questions and Answers’ 30).

165. Qur’an 4:4. 166. ‘And ye will not have it at all in your power to treat your wives alike, even though you fain would do so’ (Qur’dn 4:128). 167.

Fazlur Rahman,

‘Laws

and Ethics

in Islam’,

in Hovannisian,

Ethics in Islam, p. 6. On the significance of the evolutionary interpretation of the Qur’4n for the Tunisian statute on the affairs of the individual, see Mohamed Charfi, Introduction 4 |’étude du droit, pp. 72ff. 168.

See Al-Anisa Nazira Zainaddin, Al-fatah wa ’sh-shuyikh, Beirut,

1348/1929; Rudi Paret, Zur Frauenfrage in der arabisch-islamischen Welt, pp. 29ff.

348

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law monogamy, leaving this to ‘Abdu’l-Baha who subsequently, a

generation later, made it clear that the ratio legis of this verse! is monogamy, since bigamy is made to depend on an impossible

condition, namely the just treatment of both wives. !7° That this interpretation by ‘Abdu’l-Baha—through which

the meaning and purpose of the law is made clear—does not overstep the bounds of his competence as authoritative interpreter, is demonstrated by the above-mentioned argumentation

of enlightened Islamic thinkers who have drawn the same conclusion from the analogous legislation found in the Qur’an. Anyone who, on the basis of hermeneutic principles, considers ‘Ab-

du’l-Baha’s interpretation!”! to be too audacious, might find it easier to accept if he realizes that this statement on the ratio legis can also be considered as an act of legislation. According to his own statement ‘Abdu’l-Baha was ‘mubayyin-i-kitab’ and not ‘mu ‘assis’, interpreter and not lawgiver.!7

Nevertheless, his appointment as successor and Baha’u’llah’s bidding that the faithful may refer whatever they do not under-

stand in the Book to him,!7? obviously implies legislative competence, too—albeit to a limited degree. This is evident from

169. Kitab-i-Aqdas 63. 170. Ficicchia’s assertion that ‘bigamy is permitted but is not exactly recommended’ (Baha’ismus, p. 156, (Ficicchia’s emphasis)) and his statement that ‘in the Baha’i Faith today, polygamy is de facto abolished, probably thanks to ‘Abbas Efendi, who was against it and presumably saw in it a considerable hindrance to missionary work in the West’ (ibid. p. 157, note 65), do not present the facts correctly. “Abdu’lBaha did not possess the authority to abrogate the divine law as he pleased, on grounds of expediency, as Ficicchia also implies elsewhere (ibid. p. 293). 171. According to which, in this context, bigamy really means monogamy. 172. The source is given above, p. 197, note 279. For more detail on this subject see Grundlagen, pp. 62ff., 65ff.; Gollmer, below, pp. 687ff.; idem, Gottesreich, ch. 4.2.4.2 and 11.2.2.

173. Kitab-i-Aqdas 121, 174.

349

Chapter 5\ Udo Schaefer

his Will and Testament in which he established the institutions of the Guardianship and the secondary Houses of Justice, and laid down the electoral procedures for the Universal House of

Justice and the succession of the Guardian. ‘Abdu’l-Baha was undoubtedly not a legislator in the sense of a Manifestation; he was neither authorized to abrogate or change the divine law nor to take over the competence of the Universal House of Justice for supplementary legislation. However, he had the authority to complete the legal framework of the order of the community and to carry out the intention of the divine law as it becomes evident from Shoghi Effendi’s statement: By leaving certain matters unspecified and unregulated in His Book of Laws, Baha’u’llah seems to have deliberately left a gap in the general scheme of Baha’i Dispensation, which the unequivocal provisions of the

Master’s Will has filled.!74

Thus, the gradual approach in establishing monogamy could only be adopted by Baha’u’llah through his having ‘Abdu’lBaha as his successor, to whom specific spheres of competence

were assigned and who bore charismatic authority. These unusual modalities in the Kitab-i-Aqdas, to which one cannot apply the standards of modern state legislative procedures but rather the biblical verse, ‘For my thoughts are not

your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, saith the Lord’,!”° demonstrate once again that publication of this work in a Western language without an adequate commentary, or even its translation by outsiders unfamiliar with all these circumstances, would only have led to misunderstandings. Such was indeed the case with the translation by the missionaries Elder and Miller. For all these reasons, ‘Abdu’l-Baha called for ‘a scientific committee of translators’ to be assigned to translate this work,

174. 175.

World Order, p. 4. Isaiah 55:8.

350

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

since a translation by a single person would be inadequate.!7°

Shoghi Effendi began to introduce ‘gradually and according to the progress of the Cause, those laws of the Kitab-i-Aqdas that in his estimation it was timely and practicable to apply and

which were not in direct conflict with the civil law’.!”7 At his request, the National Spiritual Assembly of Egypt drew up a systematic outline of Baha’i laws concerning the personal status of the individual, i.e. marriage, divorce and inheritance laws, as

early as the 1930s.!78 Towards the end of his life in 1957, Shoghi Effendi was working on a draft for a systematic synopsis of the contents of the Kitab-i-Aqdas, which was intended as an ‘essential prelude to the publication of the Most Holy

Book’.!”? This work was completed by the Universal House of Justice through its publication in 1973 of the Synopsis and Codification of the Laws and Ordinances of the Kitab-i-Aqdas.

The complete English edition,!®° along with supplementary texts and explanations, has now been published. Thus, Ficicchia’s malicious allegation that its contents are withheld has been proven false. That he used the mere fact that no authentic translation had yet been published to raise the slanderous and

damaging accusation that the book was being kept secret and its contents withheld, and that he was able to publish these allegations without any proof, simply on the basis of suspicion, is a

scandal. No less scandalous is the fact that despite the Englishlanguage publication of the Kitab-i-Aqdas in 1992, Ficicchia was still spreading his disinformation in his (slightly amended) entry in the fourth edition of the Lexikon der Sekten in 1994, where he continued to state that the ‘full text’ of the work is

176.

‘Abdu’l-Baha Abbas, Tablets of Abdul-Baha Abbas, p. 467.

177. Synopsis and Codification, Foreword, p. 6. 178. ibid. 179. ibid. 180. Baha’u’llah, The Kitdb-i-Aqdas: Baha’i World Centre, 1992.

351

The Most Holy Book,

Haifa:

Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer

withheld from the Baha’is because the regulations contained in

it would be detrimental to the missionary efforts of the faith.!®! The Protestant theologian Rainer Flasche also demonstrated his lack of up-to-date knowledge about the subject when, in an encyclopaedia entry in 1993, he glibly stated concerning the Kitab-i-Aqdas that: “Written in the language of God, Arabic, it is regarded as untranslatable and is not accessible in other lan-

guages.’!8? Ever since its initial publication,!®? the work has been generally available in the Arabic original. The St Petersburg publication of the original text along with a Russian

translation is available in most university libraries. Incidentally,

a new edition of the Arabic text was published in 1995.84 IV. SPECIFIC ISSUES

1. Tagiyya—a law of Baha’u’llah? Ficicchia attempts to give credibility to his allegation that the Kitab-i-Aqdas is being concealed by suggesting to the reader that this appalling instance of manipulation conforms to, and is thus morally legitimated by, a law allegedly included in the

Kitab-i-Aqdas known as tagiyya.!*° a) What is tagiyya? It is the concealment or denial of one’s faith when faced with persecution or when one’s life is endan-

gered. This institution is definitely not ‘established’ in the

Qur’an, as Ficicchia asserts. Only in very early verses!*° of the 181. Col. 102; this allegation was repeated as late as 1995 in Materialdienst 3 (1995), p. 90. 182.

LThK, 3rd edn., vol. 1, keyword ‘Baha’i-Religion’ (column 39ff.).

183. See above, pp. 331 ff. 184. The Universal House of Justice (ed.), The Kitdb-i-Aqdas: Most Holy Book, Haifa: Baha’i World Centre, 1992.

The

185. Baha’ismus, pp. 151, 405; Lexikon der Religionen, p. 47, Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), Dp. 239, 186. ‘Whoso, after he hath believed in God denieth him, if he were forced to it and if his heart remain steadfast in the faith, shall be guilt-

352

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

Qur’an are there statements from which the four Sunni schools of law, and also Shi‘a legal doctrine, have derived by means of legal analogy a general principle called tagiyya. In doing so, the

Shi‘a school has relied primarily on traditions from the Imams.!%7 Taqiyya (Persian: kitmdn) has become a particularly distinctive characteristic of Shi‘a Islam. Whereas Sunni legal doctrine gives believers the nght to conceal their religion in life-threatening circumstances, to do so is regarded as obligatory according to Shi‘a

interpretation.'8® The believer should avoid unnecessary martyrdom and thus preserve himself for the community of the

faithful.'®?

b) In asserting that tagiyya was officially reintroduced by Baha’u’llah,!° is expressly permitted in the Kitab-i-Aqdas!*!

and is frequently practised in the Baha’i community,!%? Ficic-

less: but whoso openeth his breast to infidelity—on such shall be wrath from God, and a severe punishment awaiteth them’ (16:107). ‘Let not the believers take the unbelievers for friends, rather than the believers—

for whoso does that belongs not to God in anything—unless you have a fear from them’ (16:108; 3:28). 187. In particular, the sixth Imam, Ja‘far as-Sadiq (see Momen, Shi 17 Islam, pp. 38ff., 183, 236).

188. ‘This uniquely Shi‘i conception of tagiyah (or kitman) as a high spiritual duty, rather than a pragmatic necessity, is grounded in a large body of reported sayings (hadith) of the first Shi‘i imam, ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib (d. AH 40/661 CE), and other early imams (notably Muhammad al-Bakir and Ja‘far al-Sddiq) which repeatedly stress the positive, essential role of tagiah as an integral part of religion (din) and true piety (taqwa; see Qur'an 49:13)’ (James Winston Morris, “Taqiyah’, in Encyclopedia of Religion, p. 337). 189. SEI, p. 562; ‘Allamah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i, Shi ‘ite Islam, pp. 223ff.,; Naser Makarem, in Michael M.J. Fischer, Iran. From Religious Dispute to Revolution, p. 68. 190. Baha’ismus, p. 181. 191. ibid. p. 151. 192.

ibid.

pp. 156,

399, 405f.,

408; Materialdienst

(1975), p. 239.

353

15/16,

Issue

38

Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer chia has again provided a generous serving from his cornucopia of lies. This is not the place for a detailed discussion of the extraordinarily complex issue of the fagiyya and its use in the

Babi and Baha’i communities. That will require in-depth research by future historians who will need to draw upon hitherto unpublished texts. The relationship between the principles of hikma

(wisdom) and tagiyya needs to be clarified.!?? As Gollmer has shown,!?4 the Bab did not publicly announce the full extent of his prophetic claims straight away. His message, which was “in opposition to the whole Shi‘ite concept of expectation’,!?> was

at first ‘skilfully hidden in a labyrinth of metaphors’.!?° In the Dala’il al-Sab’a!*’ he prohibited his disciples from making his true station known, in order to avoid persecution. But this appears to be more a result of hikma than of taqiyya. At first, the

Babis were not forbidden to make use of tagiyya.!?® The fact that they often refrained from its use is evident from the terrible persecution they suffered in the years 1848-1852. The only mention of the word taqgiyya that I have so far found in the writings of Baha’u’llah occurs in the collection

made by Fadil-i-Mazindarani, Amr va Khalg.'?? This text, which has not yet been translated, answers

a question concerning

taqiyya, from which it becomes clear that following the martyr-

193.

Susan Stiles-Maneck in her article (‘Wisdom and dissimulation:

The use and meaning of hikmat in the Baha’i writings and history’, in BSR, vol. 6 (1996), pp. 11ff.) primarily deals with hikma. The cardinal differences between these two concepts are not made clear, however. 194. See below, pp. 571 ff. 195.

Amanat, Resurrection, p. 201.

196.

ibid.

197. See John Walbridge, in Encyclopédie Philosophique Universelle, VOLS TVs spa 9 7: 198.

See ‘Abdu’1-Baha, Selections 129:8; Amanat, Resurrection, p. 201.

199.

Four volumes, Teheran,

1965-1974, RP Hofheim,

pwi28:

354

1978, vol. 3,

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

dom of Badi‘?°° Baha’u’Ilah instructed his followers not to give up their lives unnecessarily.?°! In certain letters of ‘Abdu’l-Baha not yet published in Western languages, the word tagiyya does occasionally occur, although it is not used in the sense of concealing one’s faith, but rather in the sense of hikma, i.e. wisdom, good judgement, and righteous behaviour?°?—a virtue that Baha’u’llah had especially emphasized with regard to confession of one’s faith,2°> and which implies caution. The assertion that fagiyya is expressly permitted in the Kitab-i-Aqdas and is common practice among Baha’is is totally untrue. There is not a single word on the subject in the Kitab-iAqdas. Presumably, Ficicchia relied for his information on

Romer,?°* who makes the same assertion. However, Romer did not have access to the text. Why did Ficicchia do this when he

at least had Elder’s and Miller’s (non-authenticated) Englishlanguage edition at his disposal? The term does not occur in Miller’s commentary, either. Ficicchia’s claim that tagiyya is

common practice in the Baha’i community? is yet another lie. The fact of the matter is that tagiyya, in the sense of a denial of one’s faith, is forbidden to the Baha’is. Shoghi Effendi has made it perfectly clear that Baha’is are not permitted to deny

their faith.2°° According to Shoghi Effendi, the duty to be truth-

200.

He was the messenger who delivered the Lawh-i-Sultan to Nas

iri’d-Din Shah in 1869 (see Balyuzi, Baha'u'llah, pp. 293-310; Taherzadeh, Revelation, vol. 3, pp. 176ff., 193ff.).

201. 202. 203. 204. 205. p. 239;

On this subject see Taherzadeh, Revelation, vol. 4, p. 305. Memorandum of the Research Department dated 7 March 1994. See Gleanings 163:5. Die Babi-Beha7, pp. 110, 141. pp. 156, 399, 406ff.; Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), Herder-Lexikon, p. 347,

206.

Ina letter dated 26 October 1927, for instance, he requested that

the members of the Persian Baha’i community should not deny their faith on official registration forms or in censuses and claim to be Muslims, Jews, Christians or Zoroastrians (see Fadil-i-Mazindarani, Amr va

355

Chapter 5 # Udo Schaefer

ful, which is described as ‘the foundation of all the virtues’,?°7 and the stigmatization of lying as the ‘most odious of attrib-

utes’, of which ‘Abdu’l-Baha says that “No worse or more blameworthy quality than this can be imagined to exist’,?°* does not even permit the use of an occasional ‘white lie’,?°? according to Shoghi Effendi.?!° Even the repeatedly emphasized and high-ranking duty of obedience to state authority must not lead to the denial of one’s

faith. The limit to the duty of obedience is the point at which the central aspects of religious belief are touched upon. On this subject, Gollmer writes that: “The preservation of community structures and the application of those parts of the divine law

that refer to those structures are expressly not counted among these central aspects . . . If necessary, Baha’is must be prepared to die for their faith. What is essential are the ethical principles of credibility and trustworthiness. Hence, the scripture repeatedly calls upon the believers to apply wisdom (hikma), but the

Shi‘a practice of tagiyya, the denial of one’s convictions in the

Khalq, vol. IV, pp. 385-386;

further sources

tagiyya are found in Abdu’l-Hamid

for the prohibition of

Ishraq Khavari, Ganjinih-i-Hudud-

va-Ahkam, p. 456). In the collection of letters from Shoghi Effendi to the Persian Baha’i community between 1922 and 1949 (Tawgi‘at-iMubarakih,

1922-1948, Teheran, 1973, vol. 3) there are frequent refer-

ences to this prohibition (see letters dated 21 August 1933, 1 November 1933, 23 April 1934, 1 February 1935, 23 December ber 1937). 207.

1935, 16 Novem-

‘Abdu’l-Baha, Tablets, vol. 2, p. 459.

208. Some Answered Questions 57:12. 209. The only exception is when employed by a physician on behalf of a patient’s welfare. This contrasts with the Shi‘a attitude expressed in a frequently cited proverb by Sa‘di: ‘A well-meaning and calming lie is better than an ominous truth’ (quoted from Fischer, Iran, p. 17). On the subject of truthfulness see: Trustworthiness. A Compilation of Extracts from the Baha’i Writings, compiled by the Research Department of the Universal House of Justice, London: Baha’i World Centre, 1987.

210. Living the Life, p. 11.

356

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

face of danger, is rejected.’*!! The sources cited by Gollmer are very clear on this point: ‘In such purely administrative matters

the friends are under the strict obligation of obeying the

authorities’.?!? ‘In connection with their administrative activities, . . . the considered judgement and authoritative decrees

issued by their responsible rulers must . . . be thoroughly respected and loyally obeyed. In matters, however, that vitally

affect the integrity and honour of the Faith of Baha’u’llah, and are tantamount to a recantation of their faith and repudiation of their innermost belief, they are convinced, and are unhesitatingly prepared to vindicate by their life-blood the sincerity of

their conviction.’?!3

Even when

state authorities reduce to

naught the rights of the Baha’is to freedom of worship, as is currently the case in Iran, the Baha’is place their principle of

obedience to the state above their own interests.?!4 They refuse, however, ‘to bow, preferring imprisonment and all manner of

persecution, including death . . . rather than follow the dictates of a temporal authority requiring it to renounce its allegiance to

its cause’.?!° If tagiyya were indeed a law of Baha’u’llah, and if it were practised by the Baha’is, how could one account for the many martyrs who testified to their faith with their own blood in the

time of the Bab and Baha’u’llah—all of whom could have

211.

See Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 10.2.2.

212.

Shoghi Effendi, The Light of Divine Guidance, p. 91.

213.

Shoghi Effendi, Baha’i Administration, p. 162, see also p. 122.

214. When the general public prosecutor of the Iranian Republic, Sayyid Husayn Moussavi-Tabrizi, decreed the prohibition of all bodies of Baha’i self-administration on 29 August 1983, the National Spiritual

Assembly of the Baha’is in Iran declared its own dissolution along with that of over 500 local spiritual assemblies in an open letter dated 3 September 1983 (published in Martin, ‘The Persecution of the Baha’is of Iran 1844-1984’, Bahd’i Studies 12/13 (Ottawa, 1984), pp. 82ff.), in which it also protested at this violation of the freedom of religion. 215. Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 372.

357

Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer saved their lives if they had repudiated their beliefs??!© From the 1979 Iranian revolution to the present day more than two

hundred

Baha’is have been executed by the revolutionary

courts, often without a court hearing, and on 23 November 1993 three Baha’is were sentenced to death in Teheran and Rafsanjan

on the grounds that they were ‘murtadd’?"” and ‘kuffar-i-harb?’ .?1® All of them could have saved their lives and been set free had

they consented to recant their faith. The Baha’is could avoid the constant infringement of their human rights and the general persecution”!? to which they are subjected if they were officially to

216. See Shoghi Effendi, ibid. pp. 199ff., 296ff., 370ff. 217. Apostates, see SEI, pp. 413 and 475 (ridda). 218. Unprotected infidels, who are at war with the Muslim nation. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27.1.1994; see also ‘Final Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran’, prepared by the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights, Mr. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, dated 28 January 1993 (E/CN. 4/1993/41) nos. 10, 34, 223-242, 252-257, 310-311). 219. Such as the arbitrary arrest of believers, refusal to provide birth certificates, passports, exit visas and trading licences, refusal of access to schools and universities, and to agricultural co-operatives, dismissal from the civil service with the demand that all earnings be repaid, cancellation of all pensions, refusal to provide medical treatment in hospitals, closure of shops, closure of all cemeteries and removal of all graves, and so on. The Baha’is’ lack of rights and their consequent vulnerability are illustrated by the fact that if a Baha’i is injured this does not result in any criminal or civil proceedings against the perpetrator, as shown by the following two examples: a) A woman was killed and a man seriously injured in a traffic accident caused by the negligence of another driver. In its verdict dated 5.11.1371 (25 January 1992) Criminal Court 1, Teheran (Dept. 143) merely fined the driver who had caused the accident, Amir Husayn Hatami, for violation of traffic regulations, and the charges of negligent killing and injury through negligence were dropped. The reason: both accident victims were Baha’is. For the same reason, the claim for compensation was rejected, since the victims did not fall into the category of ‘protection-worthy’ life. b) In the case against Sulayman and Rahman Iynullahi, who had robbed and subsequently murdered a Baha’i, Criminal Court 1, Dept. 4,

358

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

declare themselves Muslims or, if known as Baha’is, to publicly repudiate their religion in the three main newspapers. In Baha’i doctrine, denial or repudiation of one’s faith is morally impermissible even when one’s life is in danger. Among the highest virtues to which a Baha’i is duty bound are courage,

steadfastness (al-istigdma) in faith,?° readiness to vouch body and soul for the Cause of God, and to withstand all tests, hard-

ships and afflictions:?7! Be ye as firmly settled as the immovable mountain in the Cause of your Lord, the Mighty, the Loving.?2?

The highest form of steadfastness is self-sacrifice, being prepared to testify to one’s faith with one’s life in accordance with

the commandment to prefer ‘a martyr’s death??? in My path’??4 in Shahr-i Ray—in its verdict dated 21 September 1993 (no. 50830/6/72 )—acquitted the accused of the charge of murder and rejected the claim of blood-money, because the victim was ‘a member of the misled and misleading sect of Baha’ism’. As regards the legal position, the verdict refers to decrees by the Imam Khomeini. The accused were merely sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment for a breach of the peace, the term of imprisonment while awaiting trial being counted as part of the sentence. On the subject as a whole see the United Nations report (Economic and Social Council E/CN.4/1994/50) issued 2 February 1994 with the Final Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran prepared by the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights, Mr. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, nos. 7, 8, 14, 144-169, 221,

254, 257. On the theological reasons for the persecution see Payam Akhavan, ‘Implications of Twelver Shi‘ih Mihdism on Religious Tolerance: The Case of the Baha’i Minority in the Islamic Republic of Iran’, in Vogt, Kari and Tore Lindholm (eds.) Islamic Law Reform: Challenges and Rejoinders, Scandinavian University Press, 1994.

220. See Kitéb-i-Igan 262 (pp. 233f.), Kitab-i-Aqdas 134; Gleanings 134:1; 161:1; 66:11, etc. 221.

See Hidden Words, Arabic 48-51.

222.

Kitab-i-Aqdas 183. 223. Martyrdom is undoubtedly the greatest sacrifice that a human being can offer to God, on condition that it is the result of circumstances over which the believer has no control. On this subject see Taherzadeh,

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and ‘to shed thy life-blood on the dust’??> rather than to deny the Cause of God. Martyrdom is an act of religious truthfulness and uprightness; it is the ultimate demonstration, the consummate proof of the genuineness of the believer’s faith. The believers’ readiness to die for their faith is fundamental to Baha’i

life, as so impressively evidenced by the bloody persecutions of

the Baha’is in Iran over the past one hundred and fifty years.??° Yet here, as with all virtues, the commandment to observe ‘moderation’ is also applicable, so that the most noble of virtues

does not decline into the worst of attitudes, that of religious fanaticism.

When it is stated in the Kitab-i-Iqan that, ‘He?’ should not hesitate to offer up his life for his Beloved’,??* this does not mean that the believers should seek martyrdom, but rather that they should devote their whole life to the Cause of God and the promulgation of his message. On many occasions, Baha’u’llah

called upon the believers to do so with wisdom (hikma)*”? and to ensure their own safety. He warns his followers: In this Day, We can neither approve the conduct of the fearful that seeketh to dissemble his faith, nor sanction the behaviour of the avowed believer that clamorously asserteth his allegiance to this Cause. Both should observe the dictates of wisdom, and strive diligently to serve the best interests of the Faith.2°°

Revelation, vol. 2, pp. 94ff. On faith and denial and on the implications of martyrdom see McLean, Under the Divine Lote Tree, pp. 124ff. 224. Hidden Words, Arabic 45. 225. ibid. 46, 47, 71; Kitab-i-Iqan 215 (p. 195). 226. See Die Baha’i im Iran. Dokumentation der Verfolgung einer religidsen Minderheit, Hofheim: Baha’i Verlag, 4th edn. 1985.

227.

i.e. the seeker after God.

228. Kitab-i-Igan 214 (p.194). 229. Epistle 93 (p. 55), Tablets 11:31; 17:43. 230. Gleanings 163:5.

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Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’it Law

Similarly, we find in the Hidden Words the admonition that: The wise are they that speak not unless they obtain a hearing, even as the cup-bearer, who proffereth not his

cup till he findeth a seeker.?3!

c) Yet even this is not the end. Ficicchia not only claims, despite knowing better, that tagiyya was introduced by Baha’u‘lah and included in the Kitab-i-Aqdas; he reinterprets this institution—which according to the Islamic shari‘a allows the individual to dissimulate and, if necessary, deny his faith in the face of danger—and presents it as a general escape clause legitimating all kinds of dishonesty and deceit on the part of Baha’i institutions, as long as such behaviour seems opportune

for the purpose of proselytization and the preservation of power structures. Thus, the Baha’i Faith is portrayed as a kind of underground religion whose content and goals are subject to ad hoc changes according to the dictates of opportunism, and therefore elude proper analysis.

Many elements of Baha’i doctrine, such as loyalty to the

state and state authorities,?>” the need for obedience to the law, and the commandment to abstain from party politics, are re-

garded by Ficicchia as mere ‘opportunistic’?*? positions that ‘will probably be upheld as long as the growing community is unable to realize its declared goals. In this connection it is important to mention the Baha’ist use of tagiya—.e. the denial or

concealment of the faith and its goals’ [!].?°4 Elsewhere we find further examples of how Ficicchia manipulates and distorts terms: a word that means an individual believer’s concealment of his faith in the face of danger is transformed into ‘secrecy

231.

Hidden Words, Persian 36.

232. Tablets 3:8; 15:5; Gleanings 102; Epistle 143 (p. 89); ‘Abdu’1-Baha, Selections 125:28-30; Will and Testament 1:28 (p. 15). 233. Baha’ismus, p. 399 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 234.

ibid.

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about the religious system and the political goals of Baha’ism’ which ‘as an instance of tagiya is perfectly legitimate’, as was also ‘the denial that the former Iranian prime minister Amir Abbas Huvayda, who was executed in 1979, had been a member [of the Baha’i community]’.7°> According to Ficicchia, taqiyya permits the community and its institutions to camouflage their doctrines and goals, adapting them to the requirements of the day just as a chameleon changes its colour. Hence, the Baha’i Faith is constantly depicted as a religion of dishonesty, opportunism, deceit and lies. In this way, Ficicchia puts into practice his threat to “use all means’ to fight the Baha’i Faith in his attempt to discredit it. If this perfidious misinter-

pretation of tagiyya did not attract the attention of any of the reviewers, a reader who is not versed in the subject can hardly be expected to see through this malevolent trick.

2. The Kitab-i-Aqdas—a sketchy ‘framework’? If, as Ficicchia contends, the ‘Baha’i organization is ashamed of

its most holy book’,?°° if this work is ‘a thorn in its side’,?>” and it is therefore concealed and ‘withheld’,?** it might also seem plausible that this work is gradually being ‘suppressed’,?*? is

dismissed as ‘sketchy and incomplete’,?*° and relegated to the

235.

ibid. p. 408, note 55; also mentioned in Lexikon der Sekten, col-

umn 101. Ficicchia has again adopted the accusations raised by the clerical holders of power in Iran who asserted that Hoveida had been a Baha’i. In fact, he came from a Baha’i family but never joined the Baha’i community, of which one is not automatically a member simply by virtue of birth. 236. Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 237. 237. ibid. p. 236.

238. Baha’ismus, pp. 26, 149, 188, 332; Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 237. 239. Baha’ismus, pp. 323, 331. 240. ibid. pp. 283, 310.

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Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

status of a mere ‘framework’2*! that, as a charter for the new order, clearly ranks below the Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-

Baha.?*? This picture, too, is an utter distortion of the facts, a further example of his perfidious methodology. In order to illustrate this, however, it is necessary to consider the matter in detail. The divine law promulgated by Baha’u’llah is valid without alteration for a long period of time. Considering the constantly changing conditions on earth, legal norms that are to be in force for such a long time need to be presented at a high level of abstraction,?*? because a religious law that regulates specific

details once and for all like the halacha or shari‘a?** soon leads to rigid legal casuistry, to the petrification of the law. The laws of the Qur’an were interpreted and developed on a case by case basis by Islamic theologians, who were largely jurists. This process of specifying the law at an early stage led,

through interpretation, to the creation of a legal system, the

shari‘a, which through the catholic principle of ijmd 2* and the ‘closing of the gate of free interpretation’? clarified the legal

issues once and for all. Once a consensus doctorum had been

achieved, this remained binding for all time.?4” This unchange-

241. ibid. p. 331, note 46. 242. ibid. pp. 282ff., 310, 323ff., 331. 243. This applies to the judicial law, not to ceremonial law. The regulations relating to ritual are, by nature, specific. 244.

Shar‘: ‘the road to the water hole’. Hence, the clear path that

should be followed. 245.

See above, p.184, note 217.

246. bab al-ijtihdd, see explanation in SEI, p. 158. 247. See SEI, keyword ‘Shari‘a’, p. 527. ‘According to the general orthodox Muslim view, everyone is now and has been for centuries bound to what has been authoritatively laid down by his predecessors, no one may any longer consider himself qualified to give a verdict of his own in the field of fikh, independent of that of an earlier mujtahid’ (op. cit., keyword ‘Taklid’, p. 563).

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Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer

able, rigid legal system of the shari‘a**® led in the course of time to the cultural and historical petrification of Islam. The situation that existed in the early Muslim community became the standard for all political, social and economic develop-

248.

This system, like Roman law, is one of law that has been devel-

oped by jurists. Only a small number of the duties of the believer can be deduced directly from the Qur’an, in addition to which the recognized traditions (ahadith) of the Prophet Muhammad—and in Shi‘a Islam also the collections of sayings by the Imams—serve as sources for legal stipulations. Furthermore, in Sunni Islam, ijmd‘ (the consensus docto-

rum, see above, p. 184, note 217) and qiyds (analogical deduction, see SEI, p. 266) are also recognized sources of law (figh). Thus, the shari‘a is, for the most part, of human origin: it consists of interpretations of the divine law by jurists, for which infallibility was claimed on the basis of the ijmda‘ principle, although there is no scriptural legitimation for such interpretation. The idea of a ius humanum established by legislative bodies is nevertheless depicted as ‘a heathen idea. Legislation by mortals is contradictory to the divine Laws’ (Mohammed Khahl Zayyen, Fi Sabil al-Allah, Rome, 1985, p. 22).

In Shi‘a Islam the situation is somewhat different. The Sunni principle of consensus is reduced in significance because the application of ijma‘ is made dependent on its confirmation by the opinion of the infallible Imam. Reason (‘aql) takes the place of the ijmd‘, the governing principle being that of the independent determination of law on the basis of reason: ijtihdd. This is to be done, however, not by every believer but only by those who, through their studies of theology and their scholarship, have achieved the rank of mujtahid (‘one who exerts himself’) and are counted among the small number of qualified experts. The practice of ijtihdd is not permitted to lay people, who are expected to exercise taqlid (‘emulation’). Since in Shi‘a Islam infallibility is restricted to fourteen individuals (the Prophet, his daughter Fatima and the twelve Imams), all others being prone to error, the mujtahid can err. If he does err, the believer who follows him is not responsible. If two mujtahids contradict one another, the believer can choose whom he wishes to fol-

low. After their death, mujtahids do not retain any authority. The principle to be applied is that: ‘The dead have no voice’ (/d qaula lilmayyit). Hence, ‘the whole system is based . . . on the fallibility of every decision’, so that this system, in contrast to that of Sunni legal

theory, ‘is, in principle, infinitely adaptable and flexible’ (Heinz Halm, Der schiitische Islam, p. 119; on the subject as a whole see pp. 115-120; on the alteration of the system after the Iranian revolution, p. 160; on the legal principles of the Ustli school see Momen, Shi ‘i Islam, pp. 223ff.).

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Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

ments, an outcome that has been challenged by ‘innovative Islamic thinkers in modern times’ who have attempted to. revive

creative Qur’anic exegesis in order ‘to bring the adoption of Western

scientific and technical achievements

into harmony

with the Word of the Qur’an’.?4° The legal system revealed by Baha’u’llah provides different ways of avoiding the danger of divine law becoming a rigid structure that inhibits all further development, or of attitudes being rigidly upheld that are quickly outdated and fail to keep pace with developments in society. First, the legal norms established in the Baha’i revelation, which are regarded as divine law (ius divinum), obtain their specific character from the theological paradigm of progressive revelation and the setting of a minimum period of validity

amounting to a thousand years.”°° Unlike the Catholic ius divinum and divine law in Islam, the ius divinum in the Baha’i

revelation is not unalterable law, fixed for all eternity.2°! As Gollmer rightly points out, it is ‘not a finished structure, eternal in nature, but rather the situational divine answer to the needs of humanity during a particular age that is of limited duration.?°?

Divine law is not a direct expression of an unchanging divine purpose, but comes into being through the interrelation of human action with the will of God. The liberty of man, who has been created both fallible and perfectible, rules out the existence

249. Bassam Tibi, Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Change, p. 38. Among these are, in addition to Tibi, Mohamed Charfi, ‘Ali Morad and Nasr Hamad Abu Said. 250. See Kitdb-i-Aqdas 37. That a stipulation of this type should be made in sacred scripture is something new. It is a consequence of the concept of revelation whereby divine revelation is not a final, once-andfor-all event. 251. See Grundlagen, pp. 71ff. and Gollmer, below, pp. 697ff. 252. This period covers the entire epoch from one dispensation to the next. The period of validity for all other sources of law is—in accordance with its respective function—generally much shorter.

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Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer

of an unalterable law. Man himself forms his history in drawing closer towards and turning away from the divine Will. The law is intended as a guide and a remedy in this process: hence, it cannot be static any more than history itself can be, and it must reflect and adapt to the new conditions and challenges con-

stantly presented by history’.?>° Secondly, the order of Baha’u’llah possesses an element that is unique in religious history: a legislative body that is

‘freed from all error’?>4 and equipped with unchallengeable authority, and whose task it is to supplement the divine law with norms that can later be abrogated. Although not of the

same rank as divine law, this supplementary legislation has equal authority, and is of a quality that is distinct from any ius

humanum2°> The laws decreed by this legislative body, the Universal House of Justice, are the will of God?°* and have ‘the same effect as the Text itself”.?°7 The difference between this and the situation in the Catho-

lic Church?°® or in Islam?>? is considerable. The community of 253.

Gottesreich, ch. 12.3; see also my elucidations above, pp. 177ff.

254.

Will and Testament 1:25 (p. 14).

255. In order to express the idea that this law is of a different category than ius humanum, while also emphasizing its distinction from ius divinum, I have suggested the use of the term ‘indirect divine law’ (see Grundlagen, pp. 77ff.). 256. ‘Whatsoever they decide is of God’ (Will and Testament 1:17 (p. 11)), ‘That which this body, whether unanimously or by a majority doth carry, that is verily the Truth and the Purpose of God himself’ (murdd;, ibid. 2:7 (p. 19)), ‘God will verily inspire them with whatsoever He willeth’ (Tablets 6:29). 257.

Will and Testament 2:8 (p. 20).

258. There is no special category for laws established by the Church itself: they are ius humanum. The term ius divinum is restricted to revealed law as preserved in the New Testament and in tradition, as well as natural law that is evident to human reason (see Karl Mérsdorf, in LThK, vol. 6, column 246). 259. Islam acknowledges only divine law and its ethic application as a result of interpretation by recognized experts.

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Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

Baha’u’llah is an association of equals. The division has been overcome whereby the believers are separated into clergy and lay people, as in the Catholic Church,” or as in the Islamic umma in which the mujtahids (the scholars who make legal de-

cisions) are distinguished from the mass of the mugallid who are called upon to practise taq/id, i.e. to obey the legal decisions

made by the mujtahids.?®! In his Lawh-i-Ittihad?®? Baha’u’llah has abolished the clergy. The ‘learned ones in Baha’ (‘ulamd’) are highly praised in the Kitab-i-Aqdas,”© but their opinions on legal matters are not binding. Their intellectual efforts will cer-

tainly be indispensable for the further development of the divine law,?°* but authority is invested solely in the supreme body, which has been empowered to pass supplementary legislation,

which is formed as a result of general elections, and represents the world community. This legal structure allows for constant adaptation of the law—which

applies to the whole commu-

nity—to changing social conditions, since this legislative organ can repeal its supplementary laws at any time and can thus take

account of altered circumstances.”°° Hence the Kitab-i-Aqdas was designed a priori with this supplementary legislation in mind. Many of its laws and ordinances (such as those for the punishment of offences) are so

general and leave so much unregulated that they are completely impracticable without more detailed sub-regulations. Since the unchangeable divine law provides only an outline—certain fixed points of orientation, so to speak—and regulates only

260. According to divine law (can. 207 CIC) it is an hierarchical societas inaequale. 261.

See Momen, Shi‘i Islam, p. 224; SEI, keyword ‘Taklid’, no. 3,

pp. 563ff. 263.

See Taherzadeh, Revelation, vol. 4, pp. 191ff. See Kitdb-i-Agdas 173; Tablets 9:5; 15:7.

264.

See above, p. 183, note 216.

265.

Will and Testament 2:9 (p. 20). See also above, pp. 185f.

262.

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Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer

‘matters of major importance’,”©° while leaving large areas to be regulated by future supplementary legislation, it preserves its flexibility over the changing course of time.?©” However, these two categories (divine and indirectly divine law) represent only the highest level in the hierarchy of laws; they are the foundation upon which all subordinate legislation by the Baha’i community must be based. Gollmer, too, emphasizes that the revealed law is ‘not a complete, consistent legal structure’, but ‘merely marks the cornerstone of future Baha’i law, which, in-

cidentally, will certainly be alterable’.?° It is therefore correct to describe divine law as a “framework’. When Ficicchia cites me as a witness to his false deductions concerning the alleged ‘suppression’ of the Kitab-i-Aqdas, writing, ‘for Schaefer the Aqdas is no more than a “framework” as regards the social norms’,”°? his addition of the words ‘no more than’ cause my statement to be distorted. The sense in which the term ‘framework’ is used in my dissertation is clear:

it means a set of norms that has left room for supplementary legislation to be provided by an earthly institution entrusted

with this task. Likewise, the Will and Testament of “Abdu’l-Baha is sup-

plementary to the Kitab-i-Aqdas””° since it regulates hitherto unregulated details. The complementary nature of these two revealed works is expressed in Shoghi Effendi’s statement:

266.

‘Abdu’l-Baha, quoted from Kitdb-i-Aqdas, Intro. p. 4; compare

Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 12.2.

267. Ficicchia’s comments (Baha ’ismus, p. 253) clearly reveal that he has failed to understand the system, since he contends that the ‘tragedy’ of Baha’u’llah was that his efforts to harmonize religion, reason and science were condemned to failure owing to the introduction of unalterable laws. On this subject see “Abdu’l-Baha’s explanations (quoted in Kitab-i-Aqdas, Intro., pp. 4ff.) and Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 12.2. 268.

Gottesreich, ibid.

269.

Baha’ismus, p. 331, note 46.

270.

Kitdb-i-Aqdas, Introduction, pp. 3ff.

368

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law By leaving certain matters unspecified and unregulated in His Book of Laws, Baha’u’llah seems to have delib-

erately left a gap in the general scheme of the Baha’i Dispensation, which the unequivocal provisions of the Master’s Will have filled.?7!

With characteristic impertinence, words as meaning that Shoghi Kitab-i-Aqdas as ‘sketchy’ and fore needed to be substituted by

Ficicchia has interpreted these Effendi himself regarded the ‘incomplete’, and that it there‘the “perfect” Will of ‘Abdu’l-

Baha’ .?72 3. The sacred texts—falsified, interpolated? For a sacred text to be concealed is bad; for it to be falsified is even worse, and this is a charge that Ficicchia raises again and again. The ‘Baha’i leadership’ has not only ‘eradicated’ the un-

attractive laws of the Kitab-i-Aqdas, it has even ‘replaced them

by such laws as seem expedient for missionary propaganda’,?” so that the revelation and the law ‘appear in a completely new, opportunistic guise, that has little to do with what was origi-

nally said’.?’4 Elements of doctrine, Ficicchia informs us, have been ‘eradicated or rephrased to mean the opposite’.?”> Ficic-

chia claims that passages have been falsified not only in the Kitab-i-Aqdas but elsewhere, too, asserting that the Kitab-i-Iqan

is characterized by ‘alterations to and omissions from the text’ ,?"° as well as ‘later additions’ that ‘strongly assisted’ in underpin-

ning Baha’u’llah’s prophetic claims.?’” He declares the entire 271. World Order, p. 4. 272. Baha’ismus, p. 283. 273. ibid. p. 258. 274. ibid. p. 259 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 275. 276. 277.

ibid. p. 325. ibid. p. 122 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). ibid. p. 121 (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

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Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer

concluding paragraph of the Kitab-i-Iqan, in which the revealed

character of this work is emphasized, to be a ‘later insertion’ by the Baha’is, since prior to the proclamation of his mission in 1863, Baha’u’llah could not, he alleges, have claimed such a

work to have been revealed.?”8 To begin with, let us consider the alleged interpolation in the Kitab-i-Iqan. Ficicchia has simply taken over this idea from

Romer?” who considers a ‘later dogmatic insertion’ to be ‘likely’,78° supporting his ‘speculation’ [!] that ‘the manifestation of Beha in Baghdad in the years “9” and “19” are later dogmatic

constructions’.?*! Ficicchia turns Romer’s vague speculations into the certainty of ‘later additions’ .?®* In fact, the Kitab-i-

Iqan—which was revealed before the events of Ridvan—con-

tains a multitude of allusions to Baha’u’llah’s station?®? and to 278. ibid. note 22 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 279. Die Babi-Beha’i, p. 84. It was Browne who was ‘puzzled by the colophon [‘Revealed by the Ba and the Ha . . .] ending the Kitab-i-Iqan,

since he had difficulty reconciling any such revelatory claim to the fact that Baha’u’llah was still a Babi’ (Buck, Symbol and Secret, p. 4) and

held the opinion that the colophon probably ‘was added at a later date, after Beha’s claim had been put forward and accepted by the majority of the Babis’ (Browne, quoted from Momen, Selections, p. 253f.). Buck deals with the whole issue comprehensively in ibid. pp. 3-50. 280. ‘legt sich desto mehr nahe’ (Baha ismus, p. 84) (‘is all the more likely’). 281. Die Babi-Beha i, p. 84; see also my discussion, above, pp. 51ff. 282. Baha’ismus, p. 121 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 283.

See paras 17; 38, 65f.; 79; 102; 191; 289 (pp. 17, 38, 60ff., 71f.,

97, 176, 257). In para. 22 (p. 22) the Ridvan events in Baghdad are clearly anticipated when reference is made to ‘the waters of everlasting life which, from Baghdad, the “Abode of Peace” (Dar as-Salam), are being vouchsafed unto all mankind’. Baha’u’llah refers explicitly to Qur’an 10:25 and 6:127 in para. 188 (p. 174). Christopher Buck’s conclusion is illuminating: ‘Defence of the mission of the Bab—with all of its abrogatory implications—is the ostensible, indeed, the stated purpose of the Book of Certitude. On the subtle level of “sub-text”, however, advance legitimation of Baha’u’llah’s own authority looms. Within the ta’wil itself is a hidden dimension. Behind the symbolic exegesis itself,

370

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law his ‘messianic secret’?*4 that had not yet been unveiled but was known to ‘Abdu’1-Baha and others of his companions.?*®° However, to which passages in the Kitab-i-Aqdas is Ficic-

chia referring when he alleges ‘omissions and alterations to the text’ or ‘amended translations?’*®° Nowhere does he specify the content of these sweeping charges. When writing about the Kitab-i-Aqdas,”®” why does he not enumerate the passages that he considers ‘falsified’, ‘eradicated’, ‘omitted’ or ‘mistranslated’? We are left with no choice but to gather together all Ficicchia’s scattered remarks that might be of relevance to his sweeping

accusations. a) In connection with his assertion (also adopted from

Romer?*®*) that marriage is a duty and, hence, obligatory upon all believers,?®? Ficicchia refers to a statement in the Synopsis and Codification,” alleging that: ‘In the interests of propagating the faith in the West, the duty to marry decreed in the Kitabi-Aqdas is dispensed with, and it is stated that matrimony is

only “strongly recommended but not obligatory” ’.2?! He is, however, mistaken if he thinks the verse in the Aqdas, “Enter a messianic secret is concealed, and partly revealed’ (Symbol and Secret, p. 233). 284.

See above, p. 63, note 191.

285. These included Mirza Aqaé Jan, Haji Mirza Kamalu’d-Din, Mulla Muhammad-Rida, Nabil-i-Akbar, Haji Muhammad Ja‘far-i-Tabrizi, Shams-i-Jihan, Haji Mirza Muhammad-Taqi’ (see Taherzadeh, Revelation, vol. 1, pp. 24, 55, 84, 92, 97f., 128f., 198), Muhammad-Mustafa

Baghdadi (see ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Memorials of the Faithful 49:4). See also Gollmer, below, p. 595, note 84.

286. Baha’ismus, p. 180 (Ficicchia’s emphasis) and p. 180, note 118 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 287. ibid. pp. 148ff. 288. Die Babi-Beha’i, p. 121. 289. Baha’ismus, pp. 156, 257. 290. ‘Marriage is highly recommended but not obligatory’ (Synopsis and Codification C I, a, (p. 39)). 291. Baha’ismus, p. 257.

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into wedlock, O people’,?”” means that marriage is a legal obligation, since Baha’u’llah has explicitly stated in the appendix entitled ‘Questions and Answers’ that matrimony is not obliga-

tory.?"3 Ficicchia’s malicious accusation that Western believers have been misinformed ‘in the interests of the propagation of the faith’ is false. The appendix, “Questions and Answers’, which

was hitherto available only in Mazindarani and Gail’s unauthenticated and unpublished translation, was evidently unknown to Ficicchia. This is what happens when someone sets out to investigate a religion armed with nothing but his threeyear membership in the community. b) The same applies to the alleged concealment of the

practice of bigamy,?”* ‘as if it had never existed’. As shown in detail above,?”> bigamy was practised among the Middle Eastern believers only up to the time when “Abdu’1-Baha clarified

the matter, showing that the intention of the law?”® is monogamy.297

c) The prohibition of marrying non-believers that was in-

cluded in the Bayan but never came into force””® was not emphasized by Baha’u’llah in the Kitab-i-Aqdas, as Ficicchia claims, but was repealed.??? Since this commandment of the Bab was never validated by Baha’u’llah it was not ‘deliberately

2925563. 293.

Kitab-i-Aqdas, ‘Questions and Answers’ 46; note 91.

294. Baha’ismus, p. 257. 295. See above, pp. 347ff. 296. Kitdb-i-Aqdas 63. 297. Ficicchia’s statement that Baha’u’llah had four wives is incorrect. He had three wives, all of whom he had married before embarking on his prophetic ministry. They were: Asiyih Khanum, called Navvab (m. 1835), Fatimih Khanum, called Mahd-i-‘Ulya (m. 1849) and Gawhar Khanum,

whom

he married

before

1863

(see Taherzadeh,

Covenant,

pp. 114, 117ff.; Cole, keyword ‘Baha’-Allah’, in EIR, vol. 3, p. 426). 298. Kitab-i-Aqdas 139; note 158. 299. Kitdb-i-Aqdas, ‘Questions and Answers’ 84 (p. 131).

372

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha ’i Law

kept quiet’,°°° nor were mixed-faith marriages permitted contra legem. d) The ‘dowry’ which is paid by the bridegroom to the bride is neither one of the ‘numerous regulations’ to have been ‘waived’ nor is it something that has been withheld from the

Western Baha’is. It is dealt with on page 62 of the Synopsis and Codification. The dowry is an ancient legal institution known in many cultures, its purpose being to provide support for the wife

if her husband should die before her. It was also included in old German law (pretium virginitatis). This institution, which strikes Westerners as antiquated, has been removed from the civil codes of most Western states. Yet in many developing countries the dowry is an established legal institution with extremely negative consequences, because the horrendous amounts that are frequently demanded cause many families to fall into serious debt. With his law on this issue—which is intended not only for the West but for the entire world and should therefore not be judged according to Eurocentric thinking—Baha’u ’llah has not removed this institution but has fixed the amount to be paid at a moderate level, converting it into a more or less symbolic act in

confirmation of the marriage.>°! e) Ficicchia is also wrong when he asserts that the right to

divorce is ‘reserved solely for the man’ but that today, for opportunistic reasons, it is admitted for both marriage partners, a circumstance about which ‘the Baha’is are also kept in igno-

rance’.303

The verse that regulates divorce’** 304 only mentions the man’s wish to divorce his wife, nothing being said about whether the

300. Baha’ismus, p. 258. 301. See Kitab-i-Aqdas, note 93-95. 302. Baha’ismus, p. 258 (Ficicchia’s emphasis), Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 231. 303.

Baha’ismus, ibid.

304.

68.

373

Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer woman has the same right. From this omission Miller has con-

cluded that the wife does not possess this right.°°° Although logically permissible, this conclusion is premature. It is necessary to investigate the intention of the law. It must be taken into

account that every law is associated logically and systematically with other legal precepts and must be interpreted in the light of this context.

One point in contradiction to Miller’s premature conclusion is Baha’u’llah’s clear statement that after the year of pa-

tience?® prior to divorce the marriage can be resumed only if both partners agree. The will of the woman

is of equal legal

relevance to that of the man.°°” This indicates that the will of the wife is also of equal relevance should she wish to divorce

her husband. Furthermore, a potent argument in favour of this interpre-

tation of the law can be deduced from a comparable situation in

the laws governing inheritance.>°* Here again there is mention only of the man as the testator; the Kitab-i-Aqdas is silent concerning the inheritance of a female testator. In reply to a ques-

tion put to him by the legal scholar Zaynu’l-Muqarrabin,>° Baha’u’llah explained that the legal line of inheritance for a woman is analogous to that of a man.3!° These statements by

305. ‘As in Islam, Baha’u’llah confines the right to give the divorce to the husband. The wife cannot divorce her husband’ (A/-Kitdb alAqdas, p. 42, note 2). Miller’s assertion that according to Islamic law only the husband has the right to divorce his wife is not entirely correct. Under

certain conditions the Shari‘a also gives the woman

the

right to divorce her husband (see D.F. Mulla, Principles of Muhammadan Law, pp. 418-467; Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, pp. 164ff.). 306. Kitab-i-Aqdas 68. 307.

See ‘Questions and Answers’ 38 and 73.

308. Kitadb-i-Aqdas 20-29. 309. See above, p. 343. 310.

‘Questions and Answers’ 55.

374

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’t Law

Baha’u’llah>!! indicate that legal analogy is to be applied, i.e. that as a matter of principle, wherever the explicit wording of

the Kitab-i-Aqdas mentions only men, women have the same rights. This principle of legal analogy is all the more convincing since the legal equality of the sexes, i.e. the equality of men and

women, is a principle that dominates and is fundamental to Baha’i scripture as a whole. Thus, Baha’u’llah has stated: The Pen of the Most High hath lifted distinctions from between His servants and handmaideng and, through His

consummate favours and all-encompassing mercy, hath conferred plane.>!2

upon

all a station and rank

on

the same

Under these circumstances it would border on arbitrariness if the fact that something is not mentioned in the law were to be interpreted as constituting an exception to this fundamental principle. Hence, from the very beginning, from the days of Baha’u*}lah, there was never the least doubt that both marriage partners had the right to seek divorce. This legal position is reflected

also in statements by ‘Abdu’l-Baha and Shoghi Effendi. ‘Abdu’l-Baha explained in a letter?!3 that if the partners have been reunited after the year of patience, that year is no longer of any significance unless ‘one seeks divorce on a subsequent oc-

casion’.?!4 Shoghi Effendi emphasized: Concerning antipathy between husband and wife, the law concerning the Year of Patience becomes operative regardless of which party has been estranged.

In this

311.

ibid. 38, 78, and 55.

312.

Baha’u’llah, quoted from the compilation Women, p. 1.

313. To Mulla Yusuf ‘Ali Rashti, without date, Catalogue no. 39. 314. quoted from a Memorandum of the Research Department dated 11 July 1993 (emphasis added).

375

Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer

connection the two parties enjoy equal rights without any distinction or preference.

In reply to a question, he stated that the husband is obliged to provide financial support for his wife during the year of patience even if it was the wife who had petitioned for divorce.*!°

In its role as legislative body, the Universal House of Justice has stated concerning this subject that: ‘Abdu’1-Baha and the Guardian have made it quite clear that the principle enunciated by Baha’u’ll4h in the Kitab-i-Aqdas applies equally to men and women, and the law has always been implemented in this way.?!7

The equality of men and women, as “Abdu’l-Baha often explained, is a fundamental principle of Baha’u’llah; therefore the Laws of the Aqdas should be studied in the light of this. Equality between men and women does not, indeed physiologically it cannot mean identity of function .. . It is apparent from the Guardian’s writings that where Baha’u lah has expressed a law as between a man and a woman it applies mutatis mutandis, between

a women and a man unless the context should make this

impossible.>!8

The cardinal legal principle of gender equality has thus been declared a fundamental hermeneutic principle that is always

applicable unless the context explicitly indicates otherwise. Therefore, all passages referring to the relations between men

and women are to be interpreted in accordance with the princi-

315. Letter dated 23 December 1929 written on behalf of Shoghi Effendi to the Central Assembly of Persia. 316. Letter dated 6 November 1935 to the National Spiritual Assembly of Iran (quoted in the Memorandum of the Research Department dated 11 July 1993). 317. Announcement of 27 May 1980, quoted from-Messages from the Universal House of Justice 1963-1986, p. 449.

318. Letter of 28 April 1974, ibid., pp. 272f. 376

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law ple of equality.3!° This legal position existed from the outset and is not an instance of opportunistic adaptation to Western values. f) It is indeed true that the laws of inheritance in the Kitabi-Aqdas exclude non-believers.>2° However, one must take into

account that the statutory inheritance rights are only subsidiary, valid only in cases of intestacy.>?! Moreover, the law expressly

obliges all Baha’is to make a will.3?? Since, by contrast with Islamic law, the testator’s rights in making a will are unrestricted,**> the inheritance can be regulated as the testator desires without his being bound by the statutory inheritance rights.

Shoghi Effendi emphasizes that a Baha’i ‘is free to bequeath his property to any person irrespective of religion, provided however, he leaves a will specifying his wishes’, so that it is ‘always possible for a Baha’i to provide for his non-Baha’i wife, children or relatives by leaving a will’, and it ‘is only fair to do

319. This has far-reaching consequences. As already mentioned, the laws concerning inheritance, which only explicitly regulate circumstances arising from the death of a man, are applicable by analogy when it is the wife who has died (Kitab-i-Aqdas, note 38). The prohibition on a man marrying his stepmother (ibid. 107) is applicable by analogy to a woman, who is therefore not permitted to marry her stepfather. If a contract of marriage was made dependent on the virginity of the bride, the husband can demand annulment of the marriage if the woman was not virgo intacta (see ibid. note 47, and p. 150). The wife has the same right if the man, having claimed to have exercised pre-marital chastity, turns out not to have done so (Universal House of Justice, letter dated 28 April 1974). 320.

‘Questions and Answers’ 34.

321. Kitab-i-Aqdas (see note 38 no. 9). 322. ibid. 109. 323. ‘A person hath full jurisdiction over his property.’ After the payment of the huququ’llah and the repayment of any debts “all that is recorded in his will, and any declaration or avowal it containeth, shall

be acceptable’ (Kitab-i-Aqdas, ‘Questions and Answers’ 69).

377

Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer

so’.>24 Ficicchia, who sees in this a liberalization out of ‘con-

siderations of missionary strategy’,>*° could quite easily have been acquainted with the legal position, since it is presented in

the Synopsis and Codification, to which he refers.>?° In any case, his formulation, ‘non-Baha’is are deprived of inheritance

rights’>?7 is no more than a half-truth. g) Whenever Ficicchia does not understand something, he

jumps to the conclusion that manipulation has taken place.

When discussing the statutory inheritance regulations*?® he states incorrectly that the quota for children is 9/42 from 2520 shares. Concerning the doubling of the amount to 18/42 of the

share allotted to the children in comparison with the stipulations of the Bayan, as is mentioned in the Synopsis and Codifica-

tion,>*? Ficicchia remarks that in Miller and Elder’s translation no mention is made of this, from which he concludes: “Thus,

the probability cannot be excluded that this is again a later ad-

dition, not included in the original text.’°°° This shows once more the vigour with which he determines to accuse the Baha’is of interpolation and demonstrates yet again just how superficial

is his research. In the laws on inheritance Baha’u’llah retains the stipulations of the Bayan with one exception only, which is that he doubles the share of the deceased’s children. In the same verse of the Kitab-i-Aqdas, it is stated that:

324. Synopsis and Codification, p. 61 (no. 25). Questions resulting from the statutory obligation to make a will and the subsidiary law on inheritance

are dealt with by Seena Fazel,

(1994), pp. 71 ff. 325. Baha’ismus, p. 160. 3262p O0sNe 25: 327. Baha’ismus, p. 159. 328. Kitab-i-Aqdas 20-28. 329. 66, 3b (p. 43). 330.

Baha’ismus, p. 159, note 69.

378

‘Inheritance’,

in BSR

4.1

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha ’i Law When We heard the clamour of the children as yet unborn, We doubled their share and decreased those of the rest.>>!

In Elder and Miller’s translation, to which Ficicchia refers, this verse is definitely not withheld, being translated thus: ‘Indeed, We heard the clamour of the offsprings in the loins, We dou-

bled their wealth and took it away from others.’>2? The translators even explained this regulation in a note.**> Either Ficicchia overlooked this, or he did not understand it. In any case, the quota cited by him*** is incorrect, and his accusation of interpolation is groundless.

h) The ‘Right of God’ (Auqtiqu ‘llah*>) has been instituted by Baha’u’llah in the Kitab-i-Aqdas**® as a financial donation set at 19% of all income after the payment of expenses, al-

though certain possessions are exempt.*?” This offering is to be ‘expended for the diffusion of the Fragrances of God and the exaltation of His word, for benevolent pursuits and for the

common weal’.338 Concerning this, Ficicchia writes that it is difficult to determine whether the annual capital tax of 19 per 3314820: 332; .pii30. 333. This reads: ‘Baha’u’llah says that when he heard the protest of unborn children that they would not get enough of the inheritance, he doubled the amount for children and decreased the amounts for others. He does not state here what the proportion will be, but it is given in a Persian book called Question and Answer’ (p. 30, note 1). 334. Baha’ismus, p. 159. 335. ‘huqtqu'llah’ is the plural of ‘haqqu’llah’ (Right of God) and literally means ‘Rights of God’. On the meaning of this term see Vahid Rafati, ‘Haqq and Hugquq—Right and Rights’, in Huququ'llah Newsletter, issue 37 (July 1999), pp. 2-4. On the institution of huguqu’Ilah see Walbridge, Sacred Acts, p. 93.

3300.

97:

337.

See Kitab-i-Aqdas, note 125; ‘Questions and Answers’ 8, 42, 89,

90, 95. 338. Will and Testament 1:27 (p. 15).

379

Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer

cent? of the believer’s assets mentioned in the Kitab-i-Aqdas constitute ‘huguqu’llah’, since this name is an innovation, as is the stipulation that this sum should be paid to the “Guardian of

the Cause of God’3*? which is ‘to be regarded as an illegal diversion’ 34! In fact, the term ‘huququ ‘Ilah’ that Ficicchia sought in the Kitab-i-Aqdas in vain occurs twice in that work, although in

verse 97, where the donation is defined, the singular form is

used,>4? whereas in verse 28, in the context of the inheritance laws, we find the following: “Division of the estate should take place only after the huguqu ‘llah hath been paid, any debts have been settled .. . >. Furthermore, in the appendix ‘Questions and Answers’ Baha’u’llah mentions ‘huququ llah’ in ten different

places.*#7 In addition, he wrote about this rather complicated matter in numerous Tablets published in a special compilation

in 198634 (and therefore not available to Ficicchia when he was composing his book). In all these Tablets Baha’u’llah uses the term ‘huququ llah’. Of course, Ficicchia—having no knowledge of Arabic— had recourse only to the English edition of this work. In that edi-

tion, Miller is to be credited with having frequently placed the Arabic terms in brackets; however, haqqu llah or huququ 'llah are not among those he gives. While Miller translates the term haqqu llah in verse 97 rather imprecisely as ‘the duties owed to

339. This is incorrect. The amounts due to huququ’llah are not to be paid annually, but only once on each capital amount. 340. See ibid. 1:27 (p. 15). 341. Baha’ismus, p. 312. 342. haqqu’llah. 343. nos. 8, 9, 42, 44, 45, 69, 80, 90, 95, 102. 344. Huququ’llah: The Right of God. Compiled by the Research Department of the Universal House of Justice, Baha’i World Centre, published by the Baha’i Publishing Trust, Oakham, United Kingdom, 1986.

380

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha ’i Law

God’,3*> he does translate the term huqiuqu ’llah in verse 28 correctly*4°—something that has evidently escaped Ficicchia’s at-

tention. This suffices for Ficicchia to assert that the term does not appear in the Kitab-i-Aqdas and is therefore an ‘innovation’, a later interpolation. Once again we see clearly how unreliable his knowledge is, how superficially he works and how thoughtlessly he goes about denouncing alleged instances of manipulation.

But he does know for a fact that this offering is not ‘voluntary’ since “it is expressly demanded in the Aqdas and is also

a periodic state tax’.34” Even though he had access to the Synopsis and Codification, where this tax is described as a ‘spiri-

tual duty’,>48 he self-righteously asserts the opposite, for reasons

that probably he alone finds convincing.

In reality,

Baha’u’llah has made it quite clear that the law concerning taxation is a matter for the conscience of the individual believer (like prayer and fasting) and is not a legally recoverable obligation. The believer is responsible solely to God in this matter. Consequently, ‘to demand the huqug is in no wise permissi-

ble’34? and ‘no one should solicit such payment’.3°° Payment is strictly voluntary. i) Ficicchia declares the ‘Guardianship’ to be an usurpation instigated by Shoghi Effendi, since the Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha, in which this institution was established, is a

forgery,*>! and because the Guardianship is not mentioned in the Kitab-i-Aqdas. Concerning the note in the Synopsis and

345.

Al-Kitab al-Aqdas, London, 1961, p. 51.

346. ‘All this is to be paid after God receives His rights and the debts be paid’ (ibid. p. 21). 347.

Baha’ismus, p. 163.

348. p. 88, no. 24. 349. Huququ’llah, no. 9. 350. ibid. no. 32. 351. Baha’ismus, p. 2936f.

381

Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer

Codification®>* which states that the Guardianship was ‘anticipated’ in the Kitab-i-Aqdas, he asserts that no evidence for this institution is to be found in the Kitab-i-Aqdas and that the note

is ‘therefore a later insertion’ 3° It is true that the term ‘Valiy-i-Amru’llah’ does not occur

in the Kitab-i-Aqdas and that this institution is not defined there by its functions either. No-one has ever claimed such to be the case. The Kitab-i-Aqdas contains the stipulation that after the

passing of Baha’u’llah, authority over charitable endowments should pass to the Aghsan and thereafter to the ‘House of Jus-

tice’, should it be established in the world by then.3>4 The term Aghsadn>»> is used by Baha’u’llah to refer to the line of his lineal descendants. His succession, which also implies the authority of interpretation, also passes to the Aghsan, namely to ‘Abdu’l-

Baha>°* and later Shoghi Effendi.>°’ Furthermore, the Kitab-iAqdas does not specify to whom huququ’llah payments are to

be made. Shoghi Effendi saw this as an anticipation of the Guardianship.>°® This is why the Synopsis and Codification con-

tains the ‘Anticipation of the Guardianship’.°? This cannot be regarded as a ‘later insertion’ into the Kitab-i-Aqdas for the simple reason that it is not an explicit statement in the text itself, but is plainly recognizable as a conclusion deduced from

it.5©° It is not a question of whether Ficicchia finds this deduc-

352. 353.

pp.33; 35: Baha’ismus, p. 312, note 83 (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

354. 42. 355. lit.: branches. 356. Kitab-i-Aqdas (Tablets 15:9). 357. 358. 359.) 360. verses

121, 174 in association with the Kitab-i-‘Ahd

Will and Testament 1:2; 1:16ff.; 3:12 (pp. 3, 11, 25). World Order, p. 147. pprs335. This is clearly evident from Shoghi Effendi’s statements: ‘In the of the Kitab-i-Aqdas the implications of which clearly anticipate

382

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

tion plausible or not. Moreover, the legitimacy of the Guardianship does not depend on this passage. The Guardianship was

established by the Will and Testament?©! of ‘Abdu’l-Baha, the authenticity of which is indubitable.>° k) It only remains to consider the Synopsis and Codification of the Laws and Ordinances of the Kitdb-i-Aqdas, pub-

lished by the Baha’i World Centre in 1973, which Ficicchia obviously has in mind when he speaks of a ‘a fragmentary and, in

parts, amended translation’>® and asserts that only a ‘paltry selection of the texts of certain laws (mostly just in the form of headings)’ was published, all the rest being ‘suppressed and

then modified and reproduced in an “expurgated” form’ .>° This is utter nonsense. The work referred to is a kind of inventory of the contents of the Kitab-i-Aqdas. Apart from the sections published long before by Shoghi Effendi, it contains none of the text itself but rather, as Ficicchia has noticed, a list in the form of headings enumerating the subjects dealt with in

that book. The contents of the normative section of the Kitab-iAqdas are likewise presented not as a full text, but only in the

form of headings.2© This work was not intended as a substitute for the full translation of the Kitab-i-Aqdas but only as an intro-

duction in preparation for the publication of the complete work. Comparison with the now published authentic English edition

the institution of the Guardianship . . .’. (Shoghi Effendi, World Order, p. 147); ‘In it [Kitab-i-Aqdas] He [Baha’u’llah] . . . anticipates by implication the institution of Guardianship’ (Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 214). Bola 121 16tt 32 12"(ppss. Lith, 25): 362. On this subject see Gollmer, below, pp. 674ff. 363. Baha’ismus, p. 180, note 118 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 364. ibid. p. 149. 365. ibid. 366. For instance, ‘striking or wounding a person’, ‘manslaughter’, ‘arson’, ‘abrogation of specific laws and ordinances of previous Dispensations’ etc. (Synopsis and Codification pp. 47, 48).

383

Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer of the Kitab-i-Aqdas shows that the Synopsis and Codification was composed with great meticulousness. It really does list eve-

rything that is mentioned in the Kitab-i-Aqdas. It is completely untrue that this summary contains only a paltry selection of laws, the rest being suppressed. Such an assertion is easy to re-

fute by comparing it with the original or with the English edition. It would be interesting to know what Ficicchia regards as an ‘expurgated’ wording of the texts of Baha’u’llah’s laws. If the Synopsis does not contain the texts that specify the normative content of the Kitab-i-Aqdas because these had not yet been translated, they can hardly have been ‘expurgated’ or

‘modified’. The reader who does not have access to this work and is therefore unable to judge matters for himself—and is thus reliant on the author’s statements—is consciously misin-

formed so that Ficicchia can present another example of the Baha’is’ alleged manipulation of their sacred texts. A book intended as a provisional source of information pending publication of the full translation is portrayed as an abbreviated sub-

stitute for the publication of an authentic English edition, which

has been postponed ‘ad calendas graecas’.*®’ Anyone who obtains a copy of the English edition of the Kitab-i-Aqdas, which is now available, can judge the truth of Ficicchia’s information for himself, since the Synopsis and Codification is reprinted in

that book.3° We are indebted to the EZW (Central Office of the [Ger-

man] Protestant Church for Questions of Ideology) for recently publishing a review of the authentic English edition of the Kitab-i-Aqdas. This review was written by Manfred Hutter, a scholar in the field of religious studies, who teaches at the University of Graz. It was commissioned by the EZW

367.

Baha’ismus, p. 188. See also p. 328, note 81.

368.

Kitab-i-Aqdas, pp. 141ff.

384

and pub-

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

lished in its journal Materialdienst3© for which we are grateful. Hutter unambiguously refutes the ‘groundless speculations’

of the ‘former Baha’i Ficicchia’ concerning instances of ‘withholding and modifying the text’ and the alleged eradication of ‘laws that might be unattractive in the West’. Hutter states the following: If one compares the official translation with that of E.E. Elder and W. McE. Miller, as well as random sections of

the Arabic text published by A.H. Tumanski, it is evident not only that these speculations are pure inventions but that a positive judgement can definitely be made

concerning the official translation as a whole... . The translation committee has produced a faithful and complete reproduction of the Arabic text.>”°

The competent judgement of an academic expert will provide

significant support for the Baha’is, who are constantly being confronted with Ficicchia’s defamatory accusations. Nevertheless, it will take a long time before this misjudgement comes to the attention of all those who have been taken in by Ficicchia’s

arguments, accepting his disinformation at face value and disseminating it further. V.

SOME CORRECTIONS REGARDING THE CONTENT OF PARTICULAR LAWS

1. On ritual daily prayer?”! There are two types of prayer in the Baha’i Faith: the salars” on the one hand and du ‘a’ and mundjah on the other. Both types

369. ‘Der Kitdb-i-Aqdas—Das Heilige Buch der Bahda’i’, no. 6 (1995), pp. 172ff. 370. ibid. p. 174. 371. For detail on the subject of prayer and meditation see McLean, Dimensions in Spirituality, pp. 101-125. 372.

Persian: namdz.

385

Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer

are revealed prayers, the saldt having been revealed exclusively

by Baha’u’llah, the du ‘a’ and mundjah by the Bab, Baha’u’Ilah,

‘Abdu’l-Baha and Shoghi Effendi. Those defined as sald”? are ritual prayers, for which particular forms are prescribed and which are to be performed daily; they are therefore referred to as ‘obligatory prayers’. They are not public liturgical communal prayers as in Islam, a practice that was abrogated by the Bab. According to the Kitab-i-Aqdas, the believer should say the obligatory prayers in solitude.>”4 Ritual daily prayer and fasting

‘occupy an exalted station in the sight of God’, 37° they are ‘the

two pillars that sustain the revealed Law of God’.3”° The du ‘a’ comprise a large number of revealed prayers for certain occasions and requirements (as e.g. for divine assistance, protection, detachment, forgiveness, healing, spiritual qualities etc.), whereas

the mundjdh are more in the character of communing with God.>”” When Ficicchia writes that the Baha’i Faith rejects ‘the use

of one’s own extempore prayers’,>”® this is correct as far as prayers recited in company are concerned. In community meetings, the Nineteen Day Feasts, and during worship in the Mashriqu ‘lAdhkar (House of Worship) use is made of the revealed prayers only. There are no impromptu prayers by anyone who feels

moved by the Holy Spirit, as is customary in certain churches. However, the believer is free to use not only revealed prayers,

but also his own, when he communes with God in private. 373. Kitdb-i-Aqdas 6, 8-13. On this subject see Walbridge, Sacred Acts, p. 46. 374. ibid. 12. 375. Kitab-i-Aqdas, ‘Questions and Answers’ 93. 376. Shoghi Effendi, quoted from Principles of Bahd’i Administration, p. 8. 377. The Persian edition of the compilation Prayers and Meditations, edited by Shoghi Effendi, is entitled Mundjat. On this subject see Walbridge, Sacred Acts, p. 49, on prayer in general p. 42. 378. Baha’ismus, p. 428.

386

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

Ficicchia states that in the Kitab-i-Aqdas the performance of prayers five times a day, as in Islam, has been reduced to

three times—morning, midday and evening.*” This is not correct. Originally, Baha’u’llah had, it is true, revealed an obliga-

tory prayer outside the Kitab-i-Aqdas that was to be performed

three times daily, and this is referred to in verse 6.38° Later, however, Baha’u’llah revealed the three obligatory prayers?*! that are in use today,>* thus replacing the prayer revealed earlier and substantially altering the nature of the obligatory pray-

ers by providing the believer with a choice.*®? Each day, the individual can decide which one of these prayers he wishes to perform, but must adhere to the prescribed times and forms for the one selected. The short obligatory prayer is said once a day

between midday and sunset, and the long obligatory prayer once in twenty-four hours, with only the medium-length prayer being performed three times, in the morning, at midday and in the evening. This obligation to pray is thus flexible, is adapted to the conditions of our technological society and is much less of a burden on the believer than the five daily prayers in Islam. The law concerning fasting is also less rigorous: it has been reduced to a nineteen-day month, as compared with the Islamic

fast throughout the much longer month of Ramadan. Owing to the use of the solar Badi‘ calendar, the month of fasting always

falls in the temperate season of year.?*4 This law of obligatory prayer is well-known to all Baha’is;

it is one of the fundamentals that is made known to all believers at least when they join the community of Baha’u’llah, if not

earlier. In a booklet about the duties of the believer and about 379.

ibid. pp. 152, 237.

380.

See Kitab-i-Aqdas, notes 3, 4 and 9.

381. Lawh-i-Saldt. 382.

See ‘Questions and Answers’ 63.

383.

See Kitdb-i-Aqdas, ‘Questions and Answers’ 65.

384.

In the month of ‘Ala’, 2-20 March.

387

Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer

Baha’i community life that—at least in the German community—is presented to every new Baha’i, the law concerning the

daily ritual prayers is presented in clear and precise terms.>*° Ficicchia was certainly acquainted with this booklet, as shown

by his list of references.*®° Furthermore, the prayer books in widespread use all contain the obligatory prayers, along with the accompanying instructions. It can hardly be imagined that

this ‘outstanding expert on Baha’ism’3®’ should not have been in possession of such fundamental knowledge. It is probable

that, as a result of his ‘evil suspicions’>®* as regards all information produced by the Baha’i community, he simply ignored it all and relied exclusively on Elder and Miller’s translation which contains only the original regulations given in the Kitab-

i-Aqdas and makes no mention of later developments. Ficicchia’s mocking remark that the prayers are ‘valued

less for their depth than for their number’ since the Baha’i Faith ‘precisely prescribes the wording and the number of the daily prayers’, whereby ‘even the most intimate relationship with the

Godhead is subject to minutely detailed regimentation’,>®? reveals just how ignorant this ‘competent scholar’>”° is, for this remark amounts to a condemnation of all religions in which there are obligatory prayers as well as prayers for individual

needs.°”! These obligatory prayers have a strictly formula-like 385. Hermann Grossmann, Der Baha’i und die Baha’i-Gemeinschaft, pp. 45ff. 386. Baha’ismus, p. 444. 387. Hutten, Seher, Griibler, Enthusiasten (12th edn.), p. 827. 388. I Tim. 6:4. 389. Baha’ismus, p. 428. 390. Lexikon der Religionen, p. vii. 391. According to the Mishna (Berakhot 3, 4) every male believer is required to recite the Shema (‘Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God is one

Lord’) twice a day, in the morning and in the evening. Like Judaism, the Zoroastrian religion has several prayers that the believer is required to perform at set times (see Friedrich Heiler, Prayer, p. 348). In early

388

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

quality; they are not the free language of the heart but the recitation of religious texts whose wording is fixed. ‘Legally pre-

scribed’ prayer derives directly from the divine Covenant. In the short daily obligatory prayer prescribed by Baha’u’llah the believer testifies to the purpose of man’s creation: I bear witness, O my God, that Thou hast created me to know Thee and to worship Thee.>72

It is an expression of humility and surrender to the will of God: I testify at this moment, to my powerlessness and to Thy might, to my poverty and to Thy wealth. There is none other God but Thee, the Help in Peril, the Self-Subsisting.>?>

‘Legal’ prayer ‘is the confession of faith which distinguishes the godly from the godless, the believing from the unbelieving’>4 and is ranked higher than petitioning prayer It is true that Reformation theologians protested strongly against legally prescribed prayer, in which they saw nothing but an expression of self-righteousness based on the doing of good deeds, and a

Christian times it was customary for the Lord’s Prayer to be recited three times daily, and throughout the centuries the Catholic Church has

retained the pattern of morning and evening prayers and grace before meals (the Lord’s Prayer and the Ave) (see Catechism , no. 2698; LThK,

vol. 4, column 538ff.). In Islam, the obligatory prayers (salat) consist of the recitation of the first Stra of the Qur’an (al-Fatiha) and the two last Sutras, as well as the dhikr, the ‘remembrance

of God’

in which the

name Allah is called out in short expressions of praise. Ritual prayer in Islam is even more formalized than in Judaism: the time and direction of prayer, and the movements to be performed during prayer, are specified in detail. 392. Prayers and Meditations 181 (p. 240). 393. ibid. 394. Friedrich Heiler, Prayer, pp. 348f. 395.

LThK, vol. 4, column 545.

389

Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer

profanation of the sacred.°?° However, the Protestant theologian

Friedrich Heiler has come to a different conclusion: The great mass of average people need fixed religious forms to which in their spiritual dependence they can cling; they need some stern compulsion to drive them away from the concerns of daily life and lift them up to a higher world. They need the motives of hope and fear which spur them on to a religious life and to the discharge of their moral duties.

He recognizes the danger of externalization associated with ritualized prayers, but also realizes that ‘meritorious prayer in the universal legalistic religions has acted at all times as a

mighty lever in the spiritual life’.>?’ ‘Obligatory prayer and fasting occupy’, as Baha’u’llah

states, ‘an exalted station in the sight of God.’>?* According to “Abdu’l-Baha, the obligatory prayers promote ‘humility and submissiveness’. The believer who ‘holdeth communion with God, seeketh to draw near unto Him, converseth with the true

Beloved of his heart, and attaineth spiritual stations’.*”? In his monumental work on prayer, from which we have quoted above, Friedrich Heiler has devoted a whole chapter to this type

of prayer,*° which we urgently recommend should be read by the author in question. 2. On the cut of the hair For Westerners it may come as a surprise that provisions on the cut of the hair or the beard are among the subjects of a sacred book. However, many rules about dress, hair, or beards have

396. See Friedrich Heiler, Prayer, p. 282. 397. ibid. p. 352. 398. Kitab-i-Aqdas, ‘Questions and Answers’ 93.. 399. ibid. note 3. 400. Prayer, pp. 347ff.

390

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

their origin in the laws and traditions of the great religions: ‘For example, the Shi‘ih clergy adopted for themselves a distinctive head-dress and robes and, at one time, forbade the people to adopt European attire. Muslim practice in its desire to emulate the custom of the Prophet, also introduced a number of restric-

tions with regard to the trim of the moustache and the length of the beard.’4°! The Kitab-i-Aqdas also contains some instructions about the personal appearance of the believers, including the cut of

the hair and beard. The image of man—in his capacity as imago Dei—evidently includes his outward appearance. Hence, it is stated in the Kitab-i-Aqdas: The Lord hath relieved you, as a bounty on His part, of the restrictions that formerly applied to clothing and to

the trim of the beard . . . Let there be naught in your demeanour of which sound and upright minds (‘uqil mustagimah) would disapprove, and make not yourselves the playthings of the ignorant,*02

Similarly, the Law of God includes certain regulations concerning the cut of men’s hair. The shaving of the full head

or of the scalp—as is prescribed in some religious traditions*° (and practised by many young men today)—is forbidden,** and men are not permitted to grow their hair beyond the ear-

lobes.*°> This prohibition may be intended to overcome relig401. 402.

Kitab-i-Aqdas, note 175. Kitdb-i-Aqdas 159. A very similar statement appears in Tablets

3:12. The trim of the beard is not mentioned in the Qur’an. However,

the Traditions (ahadith) do include recommendations concerning clothing and the beard (see Maulana Muhammad ‘Ali, A Manual of Hadith, ch. XXIX, nos. 6, 11-15).

403. In Buddhism on becoming a monk, and formerly in Catholicism upon admission to the clergy (‘ordo ad faciendum clericum’, can. 108, § 1 CIC old version). 404. Kitab-i-Aqdas 44. 405.

ibid. see Kitab-i-Aqdas, note 69.

391

Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer ious customs which require the hair to be worn long or left un-

cut,4° or perhaps it is meant to prevent the adoption of bizarre hairstyles, as is the fashion today. No-one should look brutish, aggressive or primitive. In this context it should be borne in

mind that ‘refinement’ (/atafah)*"’ is a key term in Baha’u*|lah’s Kitab-i-Agqdas : Adopt ye such usages as are most in keeping with refinement.

Cleave ye unto the cord of refinement with such tenacity as to allow no trace of dirt to be seen upon your garments . Be ye the very essence of cleanliness (/atdafah)

amongst mankind.*°?

By the way, the apostle Paul was also of the opinion that ‘if a

man has long hair, it is a dishonour to him’.*!° However, the Kitab-i-Aqdas does not prohibit ‘the wearing

of sideburns’.*!! Ficicchia has copied this directly out of Romer’s book.4!? Whereas Romer did not have access to the Kitab-i-Aqdas,

Ficicchia could have seen from the English

translation he refers to that there is no reference to ‘sideburns’.

406. These might include the long hair of the dervishes, the hair of Sikhs, which is not allowed to be cut at all, and the long locks of orthodox Jews. 407. On the wide range of meanings of this concept with both spiritual and physical implications see Kitab-i-Aqdas, note 74. The following meanings are enumerated: ‘Elegance, gracefulness, grace, cleanliness, civility, politeness, gentleness, delicacy and graciousness, as well as being subtle, refined, sanctified and pure.’

408. Kitab-i-Aqdas 46. 409. ibid. 74. 410. I Cor. 11:14. 411. Baha’ismus, p. 156. 412. Die Babi-Beha’i, p. 122.

392

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha ’i Law

Neither, incidentally, does the Kitab-i-Aqdas prescribe the

use of knives and forks, as Ficicchia asserts;*!? but rather forbids the plunging of hands into food,*!* a custom in many parts of the world. 3. Baha’i holy days and the Mashriqu’l-Adhkar

As regards Ficicchia’s information on Baha’i holy days, it should be noted that it is indeed correct that Baha’is, who commemorate nine holy days on which work should be suspended, do not also celebrate Jewish, Christian and Muslim holy days, just as it would never occur to a Christian to cele-

brate Yom Kippur or the Feast of Tabernacles. Since the use of their own calendar and the commemoration of the holy days that mark the passing of the year are a significant part of a believer’s Baha’i identity, Shoghi Effendi advised that the West-

ern believers no longer celebrate Christian festivals. It is not true that these festivals are regarded by the Baha’is as ‘super-

stitions’,*!> as Ficicchia asserts.*!© Although not celebrated by Baha’is, the Christian holy days are respected as days of religious worship. Just as guests from other faiths are welcome to share in worship on the occasion of Baha’i holy days, the Baha’is have no qualms about attending midnight mass or any other religious service. It should be emphasized that the Baha’i

holy days are definitely not ‘exclusively internal occasions to

which non-believers are not admitted’, as Ficicchia claims.*!” Non-Baha’is are welcome at all community events to mark holy 413. Baha’ismus, p. 156. 414. Kitab-i-Aqdas 46; note 73. 415. Baha’ismus, p. 246. 416. The quotation from ‘Abdu’l-Baha cited by Ficicchia (ibid.) has been removed from its context. ‘Abdu’l-Baha did not refer to the festival in celebration of Christ’s birth as ‘superstition’, but rather used this term in reference to the ‘decorated tree’.

417.

ibid. (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

395

Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer

days. All community festivals are open to everyone as a matter of principle. Such occasions are indeed welcome opportunities to present the faith and the community. Only the Nineteen Day Feasts are internal events, since they include consultation on the

community’s affairs.*!® Ficicchia’s statements concerning the Mashriqu 1-Adhkar,

the ‘House of Worship’, are also revealing as regards his meth-

odology.*!? He cites ‘Abdu’l-Baha, who describes the buildings intended to complement the Mashriqu ’1-Adhkar*® and adds: When these institutions . . . are built, the doors will be opened to all the nations and religions. There will be ab-

solutely no line of demarcation drawn. Its charities will be dispensed irrespective of colour and race. Its gates

will be flung wide open to mankind.*”! Ficicchia then goes on to pronounce his verdict: “This postulate of ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s, which bears the spirit of religious tolerance, was, however, later destroyed and reversed by the “Guardian”

of the Baha’i Faith, Sawqi Efendi.’42? As evidence in support of this charge he quotes Shoghi Effendi, who, however, does not contradict a single word of “Abdu’l-Baha’s statement but deals instead with a completely different issue, namely whether the Mashriqu’l-Adhkar is open for “mixed religious services’, i.e. for the liturgies of the various religions, to which he replies

in the negative. All are welcome to participate in worship in the Mashriqu'l-Adhkar and to use the social facilities associated with it. Anyone, whether a Baha’i or not, is welcome as a reader

during worship. Mixed worship involving representatives of various religions is, of course, possible, provided it consists

only of readings from the sacred scriptures of the world’s re418. Even here it is stipulated that any non-Baha’is who are present should not be asked to leave: ‘As to non-Baha’is attending: this should by all means be avoided, but if a non-believer comes to a Nineteen Day Feast, they should not be put out, as this might hurt their feelings’ (from a letter dated 21 September 1946 written on behalf of Shoghi Effendi, quoted from The Nineteen Day Feast, p. 28).

394

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

ligions. Worship, which according to ‘Abdu’l-Baha should be conducted without liturgy, involving the use of the human voice and the divine Word alone, is incompatible with the liturgical ceremonies of other religions. Thus, Shoghi Effendi has neither

‘destroyed’ nor ‘reversed’ ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s postulate.*4?3 Equally untrue is Ficicchia’s assertion that the comple-

mentary buildings that ‘Abdu’]-Baha said should be constructed around the Mashriqu’l-Adhkar*** do not exist and ‘are also not planned’ .*”° Quite apart from the fact that the construction of Houses of Worship (such as the European House of Worship in Hofheim, near Frankfurt am Main, Germany) is a major financial burden for the relatively small national Baha’i communi-

ties,*?° so that work on the complementary buildings has not yet been started, there is, in fact, a retirement home attached to the Mashriqu’l-Adhkar in Wilmette, Illinois, United States.47” What is more, how could Ficicchia possibly know that such institutions are ‘not planned?’ It is a capricious assertion designed to

419. 420. etc.

Baha’ismus, pp. 248f. Orphanage, hospital, home for invalids, educational institutions,

421. Baha’i World, vol. IX, p. 490. 422. Baha’ismus, pp. 248f. 423. ibid. p. 249. 424. In 1980 there were five of these, by 1994 seven. 425. Baha’ismus, p. 250. 426. The large Baha’i communities are mainly to be found in Third World countries, where financial resources are very limited. 427. Ficicchia’s claim that the seat of the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is in the United States in Wilmette, near Chicago, is “the most important focal point of world-wide Bahd’ism after ‘Akka and Haifa’ is completely wrong. The Baha’i community of the United States is indeed the largest national Baha’i community in the Western world, but for the rest of the Baha’i world it is of significance only in that the Mother

Temple of the West, the Mashriqu'l-Adhkar,

is located there,

and that the foundation stone for this building was laid by ‘Abdu’]-Baha

himself.

395

Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer

avoid contradicting his accusations brought forward elsewhere that the Baha’is, ‘despite their affirmations about social justice’,

are not interested in social welfare and that they have not carried out any ‘social works’ apart from ‘a few ABC-schools in

rural areas of “developing countries” ’.4?8 VI. CORRECTIONS OF OTHER DISTORTIONS 1. On the dogmatic foundation of the law Ficicchia’s impression that in the Kitab-i-Aqdas ‘theological statements and explanations are pushed into the background’,

being replaced by ‘practically oriented legislation’,‘”? is also in need of correction. In fact, this work is replete with ‘doctrine’.

Along with the Kitab-i-Iqan, the outstanding work of the early period of Baha’u’llah’s ministry, the Kitab-i-Aqdas is the depository of central doctrines, the keystone of all Baha’i

dogmatics. While the central theme of the Kitab-i-Iqan is the doctrine of progressive revelation and the mystical unity of the Manifestations, that of the Kitab-i-Aqdas is the doctrine

of God’s sovereignty,°° of the nature of the Manifestations,**! of the divine Covenant,*? of the law and divine grace,**? of the

legitimation of secular power*** and the doctrine concerning human liberty.*3° Baha’u’llah’s legislation is founded upon the doctrine of the absolute sovereignty of God and the ‘Most Great

428. Baha’ismus, p. 392.

429. ibid. p. 150. 430. 431.

Kitdb-i-Aqdas 161-163. ibid. 47, 143.

432. 433. 434.

ibid. 1, 2. ibid. 3, 4. ibid. 81, 82.

435.

ibid. 122-125; on this subject see my discussion above, pp. 302ff.

396

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

Infallibility’*°° of the Manifestations, and the whole of Baha’i ethics and law is based on the sovereign, arbitrary will of

God,*?’ of whom it is said: He doeth what He pleaseth. He chooseth, and none may question His choice.*38

This absolute sovereignty of the divine Will is expressed in cate-

gorical, even provocative, language: Were He to decree as lawful the immemorial had been forbidden, had, at all times, been regarded given the right to question His

thing which from time and forbid that which as lawful, to none is authority. Whoso will

hesitate, though it be for less than a moment, should be

regarded as a transgressor.*?°

This ‘sublime and fundamental verity’44° has been made the comerstone, the very touchstone, of faith: if anyone fails to acknowledge this, “the winds of doubt will agitate him, and the

sayings of the infidels will distract his soul’.*4! Whoever believes and acknowledges it, on the other hand, ‘will be endowed with the most perfect constancy’ and ‘attain unto salvation in

both this world and the next’.4? These cardinal statements of doctrine from the Kitab-iAqdas ought to have been known to Ficicchia, since they had

436.

al-‘ismatu’l-kubra, Kitéb-i-Aqdas 47, 148, 183, Tablets 8:17ff.,

Some Answered Questions 45. 437. The doctrine of ethical voluntarism continues in the tradition of outstanding Christian thinkers (Paul, Augustine, Duns Scotus, William

of Ockham, Calvin, Luther) and orthodox Sunni doctrine (Hourani, Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics, p. 24). For a detailed discussion see Schaefer, Bahd’i Ethics, Part Il, ch. 5, 2.

438. 439. 440.

Kitab-i-Aqdas 7. ibid. 162 (Gleanings 37:2). ibid. 163 (Gleanings 37:3).

441. 442.

ibid. ibid.

397

Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer long been available in the anthology prepared and published by Shoghi Effendi in 1939, Gleanings from the Writings of Baha’u-

‘llah** That he nevertheless asserts that theological issues are pushed into the background in this work gives the reader a false impression of its contents and demonstrates once again the superficial extent of his knowledge. 2. On the balance between justice and love

In the chapter dealing with the social and ethical doctrines of the Baha’i Faith, Ficicchia states correctly that justice*** occupies a unique station in Baha’u’llah’s system of ethics. However, he follows this with a remark that places the whole of

Baha’i ethics in a distorted, rigoristic**> light: ‘The exercise of individual clemency and spontaneous forgiveness of injustices

that have been committed is less meritorious in the strictly normative Baha’i system than literal adherence to the law.’4¢ In order to put this right, one would have to examine in detail the relationship between justice and love, which would be beyond the scope of this book. Here again, we can see just how easy it is to produce false impressions by means of casual remarks, for which no evidence is given, and thus to create distortions that are difficult to refute in a limited space. For a more

thorough examination of the issues, the reader is advised to consult my essays on this subject in my forthcoming monograph

443. The German edition: Ahrenlese aus den Schriften Bahd’u’llahs, first appeared in book form 1961. 444. al-‘adlu wa'l-insdf (insaf, not ‘ihsdn’ (goodness), as Ficicchia (p. 254) mistakenly states). The source given for this quotation, in which justice is described as the most fundamental of human virtues, is also incorrect: the text is not from the Lawh-i-Ahmad, but from the Lawh-i-‘ Ali (Gleanings 100:6). 445. For a discussion of Ficicchia’s charge of rigorism see below, pp. 409ff. 446. Baha’ismus, p. 255.

398

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

Baha'i Ethics. \t can only be emphasized here that in Baha’ullah’s catalogue of virtues, justice is the highest of worldly

virtues,**” and that although tension exists between justice and other virtues such as love, mercy, compassion and forgiveness, there is no essential conflict between them as is some-

times supposed in Protestant doctrine.*4* The God professed by Baha’u’llah is not only a God of love, compassion and mercy,

but also a ‘God of justice’*”? and of ‘wrath’*° who chastens, punishes and avenges.**! In God, the tension between love and justice is superseded in a paradoxical unity, as Hermann Cohen has described with reference to Judaism: ‘And God is, as the God of justice, at the same time the God of love. Justice and love are reciprocal concepts of God’s being.’*>?

In the chapter of Some Answered Questions from which

Ficicchia cites a short passage out of context,*? ‘Abdu’l-Baha discusses at length the tension between love and justice, making it clear that in the field of ethics love, mercy, compassion and forgiveness belong to the realm of interpersonal relationships

and should determine the conduct of individuals with one another, whereas justice belongs to the realm of the social order. Referring to a one-sided emphasis on loving forgiveness, ‘Abdu’1-Baha says:

447.

See Hidden

Words, Arabic 2; Tablets

10:23; Gleanings

100:6.

This corresponds fully with philosophical tradition (see Plato, The Republic, p. 64 (no 336e); Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics V, 3 [1129b] as well as Thomas Aquinas: ‘Jn ipsa iustitia simul comprehenditur omnis virtus, et ipsa etiam est virtus maxime perfecta’ (In Eth. L. V, 1.I], no. 907)). 448. See above, pp. 143ff. and the literature cited there. 449. 450. 107f.). 451. 452. 453.

Paris Talks 34:7. Gleanings 66:13; Prayers and Meditations 81:4; 83:3 (pp. 104, Gleanings 66:2; 103:5; Tablets 8:8. Religion of Reason, p. 433. Baha’ismus, p. 255.

399

Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer As forgiveness is one of the attributes of the Merciful One, so also justice is one Lord.**4

of the attributes

of the

Accordingly, the highest norm as regards the social order is not

love but justice, a fact that must be reflected in penal law*°> in particular. Society has the inalienable right ‘of defence and of

self-protection’,*>° whereas the individual is morally obliged to forgive the one who has committed an injustice against him and

to ‘return good for evil’.4°’ The Sermon on the Mount is not, in principle, a guide to

political action but rather a radicalized personal ethic.*°* Its radical demands are not intended ‘to establish a new code of laws, to outdo the Jewish law (the Torah) by making its regulations more stringent. Instead, they appeal to the human heart

and wish to spur it on to the highest of moral attainments’ .*°? That it is not loving forgiveness and mercy but justice that governs the realm of social order is in correspondence with Chris-

454. Some Answered Questions 77:8. 455. On the implications of Baha’u’llah’s revelation for penal law see my essay on ‘Crime and Punishment: Baha’i Perspectives for a Future Criminal Law’, in Law and International Order. Proceedings of the First European Bahda’i Conference on Law and International Order, De Poort, The Netherlands, London: Baha’i Publishing Trust, 1996.

456. Some Answered Questions 77:6. AST, 1bid-77:5! 458. There are, however, unmistakable political implications in certain statements such as ‘blessed are the peacemakers’ (Matt. 5:9) or “blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth’ (Matt. 5:5). On this subject see also Gollmer, ‘Der lange Weg zum GréBten Frieden’, in Baha ‘i-Briefe, no. 50, pp. 140-147. 459. Rudolf Schnackenburg, Die Bergpredigt, pp. 33f. The Reformers strongly rejected the idea that legal order on earth was rendered invalid through Jesus’s expiatory sacrifice, and that social and legal institutions should be guided solely by the content of the Sermon on the Mount (see Paul

Althaus,

‘Die Todesstrafe

als Problem

ppez2otl.31if):

400

der christlichen

Ethik’,

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

tian tradition: ‘Justitia fundamentum regnorum.’*© According to Augustine, what distinguishes the state from an organized band of robbers is the fact that its standard is that of justice.**! Perhaps nothing endangers the social order more than this one-sided shift in emphasis to the secular value of ‘humaneness’, the precise content of which has become confused but which has absorbed the genuinely Christian values of love, compassion and mercy and has been put into effect in the wrong place, namely in the institutions of social order. Love, which is not simultaneously ‘just’ when applied in the social order, has degenerated, as Emil Brunner has appropriately expressed it, into ‘sentimentality’ and has been turned into ‘the poison, the solvent which destroys all just institutions’*°’—a thought that can be traced as far back as Thomas Aquinas, who says that justice without love is ‘cruelty’ while love without justice is ‘the mother of disintegration’ .*° Ficicchia has failed to comprehend any of this if he deduces from the high rank assigned to justice*®* in Baha’u’14h’s hierarchy of values that Baha’i ethics place little value on individual clemency*® and the forgiveness of wrongdoings. In reality, forbearance,4 tolerance,4°’ meekness,*©8 patience,*

460.

The motto of Emperor Francis I (1708-1765).

461. ‘Remota itaque iustitia quid sunt regna nisi magna latrocinia?’ (De Civitate Dei, lib. IV, cap. IV; ‘In the absence of justice, what is sovereignty but organized brigandage?’ The City of God, vol. I, IV,4). 462.

Justice and the Social

Order,

p.129. On this subject see also

Schaefer, Dominion, pp. 179ff., 183ff., 218ff. 463.

In Matthaeum S,2. 464. ‘the best beloved of all things’, ‘the sign of My loving-kindness’ (Hidden Words, Arabic 2), ‘The essence of all that We have revealed for thee’ (Tablets 10:23). 465. Hidden Words, Persian 48; Tablets 17:28; Gleanings 115:4; 137:4; 154:1. 466. Hidden Words, Persian 48; Gleanings 115:4. 467.

Tablets 4:12; 11:21.

401

Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer

and benevolence?” are all virtues that, while subject to the cardinal virtue of moderation, are elements of love for man-

kind*’! and are repeatedly emphasized: Be forbearing one with another . . ee

. . overlook the faults of one another for My name’s sake.*73

Baha’u’llah calls upon his followers to show a ‘spirit of love and tolerance’ in order to ‘guide mankind to the ocean of true

understanding’.*”4 All people are exhorted to adorn themselves ‘with the vesture of forgiveness and bounty’.*7> The commandment of love is not repealed as a result of the cardinal virtue of justice, but the justice of the social order must not be disrupted by an over-emphasis on love, compassion and mercy. In the Kitab-i-Aqdas Baha’u’llah expressly warns against this, saying: Beware lest, through compassion, ye neglect to carry out the statutes of the religion of God; do that which hath been bidden you by Him Who is compassionate

and merciful.4”° The remark that the penal laws, too, have been prescribed by

the all-bountiful, all-merciful God is a clear admonition against

468. Epistle 149 (p. 93). 469. Gleanings 134:2. 470. ibid. 5:1, 3; 109:2; 137:4; 146; Tablets 7:4. 471. On the subject as a whole see my Bahda’i Ethics. 472.

Hidden Words, Persian 48.

473. 474. 475.

Gleanings 146. quoted from Synopsis and Codification, p. 4. Tablets 6:36.

476. 45, which stipulates the punishment for theft. A very similar admonition appears in the Qur’an (24:2) in connection with the punishment of adulterers: “And let not compassion keep you from carrying out the sentence of God.’

402

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law man’s hubris in thinking himself more merciful than the allmerciful God, of whom it is said: Of those who show forth mercy, Thou art in truth the Most Merciful.*”7

According to Jewish tradition, justice is the attribute of the

Messiah, *”* the mark of the messianic age.*”? Early on, the Bab identified the revelation of Baha’u’llah with the ‘advent of divine justice’.48° Baha’u’llah promises that in the fullness of time ‘the reign of justice will assuredly be established amongst the children of men and the effulgence of its light will envelop

the whole earth’.48! 3. A casuist system of ethics? The path to salvation opened up by Baha’u’llah is described by

Ficicchia as ‘emphatically casuist’,*8? and he says of Baha’i ethics that: “The Baha’i Faith sets strict standards; its ethics are

emphatically casuist and reject any kind of antinomianism.’**?

However, this description is—sit venia verbo!*®4—utter nonsense. Either he does not understand Baha’i ethics or he does not know what the term ‘casuist’ means. In fact, he probably understands neither the one nor the other. These references

ATipmavletsisul>: 478.

479. expect edged all the 480.

Isaiah 11:5; Micah 4:3; Deut. 10:20; Prov. 10:25.

Isaiah 26:9; see Cohen, Religion of Reason, pp. 429ff. The Jews of the messianic age, ‘that the Unity of God will be acknowluniversally, and that justice and righteousness will flourish over earth’ (Friedlander, The Jewish Religion, p. 160). Selections 6:11:5 (p. 161). This has become the title of a book:

Shoghi Effendi, The Advent of Divine Justice, Wilmette, 1939.

481. 482. 483. 484.

Tablets 11:6. Baha’ismus, p. 226 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). ibid. p. 251 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). May the word be excused!

403

Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer

might also indicate that he has been assisted by theological editors, since casuistry is suspect in Protestant thought. To take the last point first: the statement that the Baha’i Faith rejects ‘any kind of antinomianism’ is very peculiar indeed. A legalistic religion is, per se, the very opposite of anti-

nomianism. The only antinomianist currents to have existed in the Baha’i community were those of the Western covenantbreakers,*®> who had never grasped the essence of Baha’u’llah’s revelation. Ficicchia himself is one of them.

In legal language, ‘casuistry’*®° defines an order in which the conditions of life are not shaped systematically on the basis of generalized principles, but rather on the basis of individual rules to deal with specific cases. In ethics or moral theology,

‘casuistry’ is understood to mean ‘methodical instructions for the application of general moral norms to specific cases (Casus

conscientae) in particular circumstances’.*®’ Religious casuistry occurs ‘when an attempt is made to solve moral conflicts in a

religious way through the clarification of the individual case’ .488 The precondition for a casuist approach is the existence of universal, binding norms, a moral doctrine with clearly defined demands, which are then discussed with reference to the case at hand and defined in such a way as to facilitate the determination of personal moral imperatives or the reaching of moral judgements concerning a particular deed. Casuistry as ‘situation-

dependent ethics’, and a ‘late stage of religious morals’,*®? ex-

485. Ficicchia pp. 377ff.).

reports

on

such

tendencies

(see

Baha ’ismus,

486.

derived from casus: a case.

487.

LThK vol. 6, column 18ff.

488.

Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, vol. III, column 1166.

489.

ibid.

i

404

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

ists in Confucianism and Buddhism, in the halacha*® and the shari‘a,*?! and in the Western world since the Stoics.49? Catholic moral theology, in particular, has made use of casuistry since the early Middle Ages. It came into being as a support for the practice of confession, although elements of it were already to be found in the writings of the Church Fathers, in Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Cyprian, and Ambrose. In the 17th and 18th centuries, casuistry superseded the former systematic moral theology with its emphasis on virtues, resulting in the ever more concise definition of vio-

lations of the law. One of the most prominent, yet also contro-

versial, casuists was Alfonso di Liguori;*”? Blaise Pascal*®* was one of its sharpest critics. It is evident that a system of ethics that is integral to a revelation can never be genuinely casuist. The laws of the Torah and the Qur’an are not casuist. Even where they give specific instructions these are always general and valid for all people and all time. The application of laws in specific cases pre-

supposes the existence of general, abstract norms. Casuistry is a 490. Where ‘the scrupulous attempt to apply the divine commandments to individual cases bears within itself the tendency to ever more subtle exaggeration’ (ibid. column 1167). 491. In which, ‘the soul-destroying pedantry of the jurists’ who interpret the Word of God results in ‘absurd sophistry and dreary exegetical trifling: in thinking up contingencies that will never arise and debating riddling questions in which extreme sophistry and hair-splitting are joined with the boldest and most reckless flights of fancy’ (Goldziher, Introduction, pp. 62f.). On casuistry in Islam see also Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, p. 205.

492. As exemplified in the discussion concerning the behaviour of two shipwreck victims who have at their disposal only a single plank (‘the plank of Carneades’) that would hold one person (see Cicero, De officiis, II, 90). 493. 1696-1787, canonized in 1839 by Pope Gregory XVI and raised to the status of Doctor of the Church (doctores), of which there are 30 in

total. He is the patron of father confessors and moral theologians. 494. Lettres a un provincial, 1656-57.

405

Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer method of application, a way of interpreting the ethics upon which it is based; it is, by its very essence, method, not content. In the past, the revealed laws of a religion were only developed into a casuist system through their application, such as in the assessment of priorities when conflicting duties were at stake. When Ficicchia pronounces judgement on ‘Baha’i ethics’ it should be noted that it is not possible for him to refer to relevant secondary literature of a philosophical or moral theological

nature. The study of ethics is a discipline of philosophy; it is the systematic, analytical and methodical understanding and portrayal of the moral order, not the order itself. This analysis of the principles behind individual moral precepts, the clarification of the role of reason in understanding moral norms and principles, is, ultimately, indispensable in order for this morality to be interpreted and applied. At the current early stage of the Baha’i Faith’s development—the middle of its second century—there has not yet been such a systematic analysis of Baha’i ethics. Since the ethical imperatives of the revelation are strewn

throughout the sacred scripture—from Baha’u’llah’s earliest writings to his last major work, the Epistle to the Son of the

Wolf*?>—it is very difficult to recognize the underlying ethical system in order to present the general outlines of Baha’i ethics and the characteristic features thereof.*”° In view of the diversity of the normative statements in the Baha’i scripture, any attempt to bind these into a self-contained system is ultimately doomed to failure. Nevertheless, two dif-

495.

Lawh-i-Ibn-i-Dhi’b.

496. An initial study of Baha’i ethics has been presented in my short book entitled Jn a Blue Haze: Smoking and Baha’i Ethics, Stockholm: Zero Palm Press, 1997. A more detailed study will appear in my Bahd’i Ethics. An instructive contribution to the study of Baha’i ethics has been made by Ihsan Halabi, “Ethische Aspekte des Aqdas’, in Gesellschaft fiir Baha’i Studien (ed.), Aspekte des Kitab-i-Aqdas, pp. 276-302. Different in its approach is William Hatcher’s recent publication Love, Power, and Justice, Wilmette, Ill.: Baha’i Publishing Trust, 1998.

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Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

ferent types of instruction in questions of morality can be discerned. These are, on the one hand, indispensable commandments and prohibitions that have the quality of law; and on the other hand, moral goals, instructions for action directed towards

what is good and right, towards an existence in which those virtues come to bear that reflect the attributes of God. The first category can be called deontological, and the second teleological: a religious ethic of being. The two categories are not contradictory but, rather, clearly complementary; they are different types of ethical ordinances both of which have the same ultimate goals—God’s good-pleasure, the perfection of the individual human being, and his achievement of heavenly bliss. Thus, as pointed out in my book on the subject, Baha’i ethics do not constitute ‘a dry, bloodless ethic of duties’*?’ but are instead the foundation of ‘a methodical holistic approach to living un-

der the Word and the Law’.*?8 It is unlikely that “casuistry’ will ever come into being in the Baha’i Faith, and even where normative ethics need to be applied to a particular case this will certainly not result in a

‘binding decision affecting every small detail of belief or prac-

tice’? or, even worse, to a dreary ‘appraisal of religious life that prove[s] detrimental to the inwardness of religion’,°°° as has happened in the interpretation of Islamic law. This is so because, from the very outset, an attitude has been immanent in

the revelation of Baha’u’llah that emphasizes the need to‘. . . clarify the governing principles, to make binding pronouncements on details which are considered essential, but to leave a

497.

Bahda’i Ethics, ch. 9 (forthcoming).

498.

Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 7.4.

499. Letter of the Universal House of Justice of 3 January quoted from Messages 1963-1986, p. 518. 500. Goldziher, Introduction, p. 63.

407

1982,

Chapter 5, ¢ Udo Schaefer

wide area to the conscience of the individual’.°°! The prohibi-

tion of confession°™ is also a factor that will work against the development of casuistry. Ficicchia’s work does not reflect in the slightest the inestimable richness and unfathomable depth of Baha’i ethics. It is possible that with his verdict of its being “emphatically casuist’

he was referring to the deontological structures>°? in this system of ethics. But even this statement is incorrect because the teleological structures, the ethics of being (seinsethik), are very much predominant. Hence, through his nonchalant judgement of Baha’i ethics, which he could support with neither his own

research findings nor those of others, and for which he—as usual—gives no reasons, he has once again revealed his incompetence in this field. It is astonishing, however, that even the

theologian Rainer Flasche makes the statement that ‘patterns of action and behaviour . . . are regulated down to the smallest de-

tail’*°* in the Kitab-i-Aqdas. He has clearly relied too heavily on his mentor Ficicchia, as the text of the Kitab-i-Aqdas, which would have shown him otherwise, was evidently not accessible to him; he describes it as ‘untranslatable’ and ‘not available in other languages’ .>°

501.

Letter of the Universal House of Justice of 3 January

1982,

quoted from Messages 1963-1986, p. 518; see also Schaefer, Freiheit, pp. 59-62; Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 12.4.

502. Kitab-i-Aqdas 34; Tablets 3:14. 503. For instance, the prohibition of calumny and backbiting (Kitdb-iAqdas

19; Tablets

3:26, 8:62;

15:2; Hidden

Words,

Persian 44, 66;

Arab. 27) is a general, abstract norm, completely detached from the individual case and therefore not ‘casuist’. An instance of casuistry would be a discussion as to whether a manager who had written a negative report about an employee had violated the prohibition on backbiting. 504.

40. 505.

LThK, 3rd edn. 1993, vol. 1, keyword ‘Baha’*i-Religion’, column

ibid.

408

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’it Law 4. A rigorous religious law?

Ficicchia describes Baha’u’llah’s legislation as ‘a rigorous re-

ligious law’>® and speaks of ‘rigorous moral standards in Baha’ism’ that are ‘withheld’ from converts ‘while the missionary propaganda reproaches the Christian churches on . . . their moral theology in particular’.>°” As far as the last of these charges is concerned, Ficicchia provides no reference—as is the case with most of his allega-

tions. The reader does not find out when and where the Baha’is are supposed to have criticized the Churches’ moral theology. As far as I can see, no such criticism has ever been published. With respect to Catholic moral theology, I have not criticized the traditional, strict standards of the Church but rather the change in attitude to these standards under the influence of

secular, humanist academic thinking °°? Can Baha’u’llah’s catalogue of norms be described as ‘rigorous’? ‘Rigorous’ means relentless, severe, harsh, ruthless. A Baha’i does not see it that way. The law of Baha’u’llah, like

the commandments of all religions, is strict. Man is categorically called upon to obey: “Thou shalt!’ In our present-day soci-

ety, as discussed earlier,°” everything that is strict, everything that cannot be determined by the individual, is regarded as severe and rigorous. Ficicchia is a typical representative of this attitude. Yet, considering the theological support he was given, it cannot be ruled out that he is intentionally provoking associa-

506. Baha’ismus, p. 251 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). After all that has been stated hitherto, his comment that in practice this law is ‘de facto non-obligatory’, especially since it is ‘unknown’ to the Baha’is (p. 251 (Ficicchia’s emphasis)) need not be discussed further. 507.

ibid. pp. 411f. (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

508.

Schaefer, Dominion, pp. 222-226; Freiheit, p. 48, note 198. Pope

John Paul II has strongly criticized this development in his encyclical Veritatis Splendor, 1993. 509. See above, pp. 319ff.

409

Chapter 5 * Udo Schaefer tions with a terrible deformation of legal ethics, namely rig-

orism. This is a rigid, petty attitude held by unenlightened zealots in support of a purely static interpretation of the law, in which—as in the myth of Procrustes—every individual difference is forced into a single uniform norm. This attitude, which

has recurred intermittently throughout religious history—for example, Montanism and the Inquisition—is definitely not the spirit mediated by the revelation of Baha’u’Ilah. Baha’u’llah has branded fanaticism and bigotry, to which rigorism can easily lead, as a “world-devouring fire’ and a ‘desolate affliction’.°!° He has expressly warned against zealotry and

hanbalistic’'! rigidity in the observation of the laws, stating that, “since most people are feeble and far-removed from the purpose of God’, the believers should exercise tact and wisdom

in applying the laws.°!? Moreover, the emphasis is clearly on the commandments related to goals: to right being, which results in right action—

the ‘fruits of the tree of man’>!3—and to a ‘good character’, which ‘surpasseth the light of the sun and the radiance thereof’ ,>!4 to ‘a virtuous life’, ‘pure and holy deeds’, ‘valiant acts’, and ‘a

saintly character’.>!> The accent is not so much on the observation 510. Epistle 19 (p. 14); Tablets 6:28. ‘Abdu’l-Baha states that: ‘One of the principal reasons why people of other religions have shunned and failed to become converted to the Faith of God is fanaticism and unreasoning religious zeal’ (Secret, p. 53). 511.

Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (780-855) was the founder of that one of the

four Sunni schools of law (madhhab) that was characterized by particu-

lar severity and narrow-mindedness (see SEI, pp. 20ff.). I have coined the term ‘hanbalistic rigidity’ for reasons of historical reminiscence. The term 1s not to be found in the Baha’i scripture (nor do I know of any passage in the scripture in which the Hanbali school of law is criticized). 512. Baha’u’llah, quoted from Kitdb-i-Aqdas, Intro. p. 6. 513. Epistle 46 (p. 26). ~ 514. Tablets 4:13; 6:27; 8:56; 11:28; 15:11. S15: abide 7:11,

410

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha ’i Law

of the individual points of the law, on specific ‘works’, but rather on ‘a methodical holistic approach to living under the

Word and the Law’°!® whose ethos is related to faith in divine salvation through Baha’u’llah and participation in the new divine Covenant, the foundation of Baha’i life. This attitude im-

plies the awareness that man—‘created weak’>!” but exhorted to strive for perfection>!*—is at best engaged in a pilgrimage on ‘the path of holiness’*!? to his goal, the ‘celestial city’.52° Thus, emphasis is laid not only on the limitations set by the commandments but simultaneously on the believer’s growth and

development towards that goal, as the ‘Glad Tidings’°?! make clear. VII. ON THE NATURE OF THE LAW OF GOD

Ficicchia is at liberty to call Baha’u’llah’s laws peculiar, oriental, or even abstruse. He will certainly not be alone in his

judgement. This only confirms the experience that in the normative realm, the realm of values, man’s rational judgement generally arrives at very diverse, often extremely antagonistic results: ‘The world is full of reasonable people accusing each

other of unreasonableness.’°? Someone who regards the Western standard of civilization as the ultimate ideal and the measure of all things, or who sees the Eurocentric hierarchical organization of the present world and the values of post-modern society as infallible parameters, will look upon the laws of Baha’u’llah with different eyes from someone who is both aware that our

516.

Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 9.

517.

Qur’dn 4:32.

518.

See Matt. 5:48.

519. Hidden Words, Persian 8. 520. ibid. Persian 17. 521. Bisharat. 522. Emst Jinger, An der Zeitmauer, p. 169.

411

Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer present-day views are historically conditioned, and open-minded

enough to seek new horizons in order to escape the increasing moral confusion of the modern world. Whatever the content of such a law, it would never meet with universal approval.

Ficicchia’s supposition that the Law of God revealed in the Kitab-i-Aqdas would not exactly promote the spread of the faith in the West is not far wrong. In a hedonistic society in which

almost all taboos have been removed, consumption being an absolute priority and there even being calls for a constitution-

ally guaranteed ‘right to drug-induced euphoria’,°”> there is inevitably considerable resistance to prohibitions—which are also

laid down in other religions—such as those on fornication,>”4 gambling,°2°> consuming alcoholic drinks>*° and other intoxicating drugs,>”’ especially opium and its derivatives.*”° In ad-

523. As in the document submitted by the Litbeck District Court to the German Federal Constitutional Court (2Ns/KI 167/90) on 19 December 1991, in which it is claimed that a ‘right to drug-induced euphoria’ can be deduced from the basic right to the free development of the personality guaranteed in Art. 2 of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz (Basic Law), published in NJW 1992, 1571-1577. See also my discussion of this in Jn a Blue Haze, p. 47). 524. Kitab-i-Aqdas 19, 49, see also Deut. 23:3; 23:18; Matt. 15:19; Mark 7:21-22; Gal. 5:19; I Cor. 5-9; Eph. 5:5; Hebr. 12:16; I Petr. 4; Rev. 21:8; 22:15; Qur’dn 17:34; 24:2; 25:68; 60:12. The third of the

five commandments (Panica Sila) of Buddha reads: ‘I undertake the precept to abstain from misconduct in sensual actions’ (see Saddhatissa, Buddhist Ethics, pp. 87ff., 102ff.). 525. Kitab-i-Aqdas 155; Qur’an 2:216; 5:93-94. 526.

ibid. 119; see Qur’dn 2:216; 4:46; 5:92, 93. The fifth of the five

commandments of Buddha reads: ‘I undertake the precept to abstain from liquor that causes intoxication and indolence’ (see Saddhatissa, Buddhist Ethics, pp. 87, 108ff.). While there is no prohibition on wine in the Bible, there are restrictions in connection with religious services (Lev.

10:9; Numb.

6:1-4; Judges

13:4, 14; Ez. 44:21) and numerous

warnings against its excessive consumption (Prov. 20:1; 29:30; Isaiah Sill; 28:7; Joel 1:5;

F'Cor.5:11; 6:10; Gal. 3:21; Eph s:18):

527. Kitab-i-Aqdas 155; see also the compilation Prohibition of Intoxicating Drinks, ed. The National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of

412

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

dition, the legitimation of the death penalty for murder (al-gatl)

and serious arson,°2” as well as the marking of thieves after the third offence,**° are in sharp contrast to the legal attitudes pre-

valent today,°?! at least in the West, especially in the light of the most far-reaching demands of modern criminology for ‘decriminalization’ and “depenalization’ of the criminal law and for the ‘non-labelling’ and ‘destigmatization’ of law-breakers>*? or

New Zealand, Auckland, 1986. On this subject see also A.M. Ghadirian,

In Search of Nirvana: A New Perspective on Alcohol and Drug Dependency, Oxford, 1985. The use of tobacco, which the Bab had expressly forbidden in the Persian Bayan (9:7) is not included among the drugs

prohibited in the Kitab-i-Aqdas, as is erroneously stated by Flasche (LThK, 3rd edn., vol. 1, column 40). However, smoking is strongly disapproved of (see ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Selections 129. On this subject as a whole see also Schaefer, In a Blue Haze). 528. Kitab-i-Aqdas, ibid. 155; 190. 529. ibid. 62. 530. ibid. 45. Not by ‘branding’ as is done to cattle, as Ficicchia repeatedly asserts (p. 155, note 62, pp. 163, 261), but by a ‘mark’ to be

placed upon the forehead. The word ‘brand’ does not appear. 531. For further detail see Schaefer, ‘Crime and Punishment’, pp. 39ff., 44f. Even the churches, who until the 1960s and 70s saw the pur-

pose of punishment primarily as retaliation and expiation of wrongdoing (see LThK, vol. 10, column 229ff. with reference to the dictum, ‘Punitur

quia peccatum est’) and legitimated the death penalty (see Paul Althaus, ‘Die Todesstrafe als Problem der christlichen Ethik’, p. 21; Wolfgang Trillhaas, Zur Theologie der Todesstrafe, p. 48), have now ‘come into line’ with the general development of attitudes and have begun to call for ‘conciliatory

measures’,

whatever

that means.

Nevertheless,

the

Catechism (1994) does not exclude capital punishment in severe cases (no. 2266). 532. These are terms used in working papers presented to the participants in the Seventh United Nations Congress on ‘Crime and Crime Prevention’ in Milan in August 1985 (see A/CONF. 12175 dated 31 May 1985, nos. 49-58). I had the honour of representing the Baha’i International Community at this Congress and to present a ‘statement’ on the issues in question. I mention this only to point out the erroneous nature of Ficicchia’s assertion that the accreditation of the Baha’i International Community at the United Nations only serves the purpose of ‘zealous propaganda work’ (p. 409).

413

Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer

even for the abolition of penal law altogether.**? Little imagination is required to see that Baha’i regulations, contradicting as they do what is seen as plausible in modern society, will

come in for harsh criticism. The conflict between the two different sets of values, that of Western secular civilization and

that of the Book of God, is inevitable. This is why Baha’u’llah has uttered the warning: Weigh not the Book of God with such standards and sciences as are current amongst you, for the Book itself is the unerring Balance established amongst men. In this most perfect Balance whatsoever the peoples and kindreds of the earth possess must be weighed, while the measure of its weight should be tested according to its own standard, did ye but know ies

Hence, man is not ‘the measure of all things’,°>> but rather the unfathomable Will of God is the ‘infallible standard’>*® of all morality.°>7 It should be remembered that in the past as well, the Law

of God did not find acceptance because it was inherently convincing. Instead it was accepted purely on the basis of the

533.

See Arno Plack, Plddoyer fiir die Abschaffung des Strafrechts,

Munich, 1974; Helmut Ostermeyer, Die bestrafte Gesellschaft, MunichVienna, 1976; Gerhard Mauz, Das Spiel von Schuld und Sihne. Die

Zukunft der Strafjustiz, Cologne, 1975; Hans Schneider, ‘Behandlung in Freiheit’, in psychologie heute, issue dated 9 September 1978; Uwe Wesel, ‘Schafft die Gefangnisse ab!’, in Siiddeutsche Zeitung, magazine issue dated 13 September 1991 and in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, magazine issue dated 26 November 1993. On this subject see also HansJoachim Rauch, ‘Brauchen wir noch eine forensische Psychiatrie?’, in Festschrift fir Heinz Leferenz, pp. 387ff., as well as the same author’s article ‘Situation und Tendenzen der forensischen Psychiatrie’ in the annual publication Forensia, vol. 1 (1990), pp. 74ff. 534. 535. 536. 537.

Kitab-i-Aqdas 99; see also Gleanings 88. Protagoras (480-410 BCE). Gleanings 88. I refer to Part II of my forthcoming Bahd’i Ethics.

414

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha’i Law

authority of the messenger who brought it. The laws of the Totah were accepted as being the Will of God on the authority of

Moses, and those of the Qur’an on the authority of the Prophet Muhammad. The moral ordinances of the Gospels became binding upon the People of God on the authority of Jesus Christ

and the Church.°3® The norms of religious morality cannot be taught in a rational manner by means of demonstration, nor are they dependent upon rational justification;>*? they are valid because they are an element of faith, and because the bearer of the

revelation has testified to their truth. This does not mean that these apodictive norms are not rational, but rather that being the Will of God, they are inaccessible to human reason because they are, as ‘Abdu’l-Baha says, ‘absolute wisdom’ and ‘in accordance with reality’.°4° Moses Maimonides accuses those who see no sense in the ordinances of the Torah of thinking

538. St Augustine even stated that: ‘Ego vero evangelio non crederem, nisi me catholicae ecclesiae conmoveret auctoritas’ (quoted from Mirbt, Quellen zur Geschichte

des Papsttums,

vol.

1, no.

369,

p. 170). 539.

as is argued by modern moral theologians (see Alfons Auer,

Autonome Moral und christlicher Glaube, pp. 12, 21, 28-30, 46, 47; Franz Boéckle, Fundamentalmoral, Munich, 1977; idem, ‘Werte und Normbegriindung’, in Hans Béckle (ed.), Christlicher Glaube in moder-

ner Gesellschaft, pp. 37ff.; Mieth, “Gewissen’, ibid. pp. 137ff.). Josef Pieper sees this as a break with traditional doctrine and as an adaptation to the ‘general moral consciousness of our time’, the expression of ‘a process of fundamental change in spiritual values’ (Das Viergespann, p. 18). In his 1993 Encyclical Letter Veritatis Splendor, Pope John Paul II criticized this separation of faith and morality under the influence of modern

secularization

and, with reference to Rom.

12:2, rejected the

process of adaptation to secular moral theories (Veritatis Splendor, nos. 75ff.). He regards this as a renunciation of ‘sound doctrine’ (II Tim. 4:3), as conforming ‘to this world (Rom. 12:2)’ (no. 85), as the hubris of modern man who ‘would like to decide for himself what is good and what is evil’, and as the very temptation that caused man’s Fall from Grace: ‘And ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil’ (Gen. 3:5; Veritatis Splendor, no. 102). 540. Questions 45:5.

415

Chapter 5 ¢ Udo Schaefer

they are more perfect than their Creator,>*! and the apostle Paul denies the right of man to argue with God.**? According to Islamic doctrine, the Will of God as manifested in the law is be-

yond human understanding. It is ta ‘abbudi: it must be accepted

as it is.°43 This is the meaning of the verses: ‘God doth what he will’>“4 and ‘He shall not be asked of his doings’.**° Those who believe know that the purpose of the Laws of

God is, as is stated in the Torah,>** the happiness of mankind: Whoso keepeth the commandments of God shall attain everlasting felicity.°4”

Whoever sets out upon the “Straight Path’ will increasingly gain

insight into the wisdom of the laws and will trust in Baha’u*}lah’s promise: O My servants! Sorrow not if, in these days and on this

earthly plane, things contrary to your wishes have been ordained and manifested by God, for days of blissful joy, of heavenly

delight,

are

assuredly

in store

for

you.

Someone who does not believe is like a ‘man sick of a rheum’

to whom ‘a pleasant perfume is as naught’.*4? In the Book of God he ‘perceiveth naught but the trace of letters, for in the sun,

the blind findeth naught but heat’.°*° Ficicchia has lost his “sense of smell’—no wonder, then, that he no longer perceives

541. Daldlat al-Ha’irin, ch. 31, p. 321. 542. Rom. 9:20. 543. See SEI, p. 525. 544. Qur’dan 2:254; 14:32. 545. ibid. 21:23. 546. Deut. 4:40. 547. Gleanings 133:1. 548. ibid. 153:9. 549. Seven Valleys 38 (p. 20).

550. Kitab-i-Iqan 230 (p. 209). 416

Ficicchia’s Portrayal of Baha ’i Law the ‘perfume’ in which he once delighted, and that, indeed, to

him ‘a sweet fragrance seemeth foul’.>>! His clever, methodical disinformation may well continue for some time to fulfil its purpose and damage the reputation of

the Baha’i Faith in German-speaking countries: “Semper aliquid

haeret!>°* However, it will eventually become evident that such a work cannot affect the religion of Baha’u’llah, because God ‘hath established His Revelation upon an unassailable, an enduring foundation’ which ‘men’s fanciful theories’ cannot

undermine.°°

551.

Seven Valleys 38 (p. 20). 552. ‘Something always sticks.’ This dictum originates from the Greek historian Plutarch (50-125 CE). 553. Baha’u’llah, Suratu’l-Haykal, quoted from World Order, p. 109.

417

CHAPTER 6

BAHA’{ POLITICAL THOUGHT Nowadays, people are quick to suspect any call for political power raised in the name of religion, and rightly so. The memory

of all the injustice, suffering and blood-shed endured by humanity in the name of God or religion under totalitarian regimes

and ideologies is still all too strong. Indeed, such things continue up to the present day. Religious fundamentalism and the claims to power associated with it are gaining ground not

only in the Islamic world but also in Western countries, where fanatical and militant sects—often with hidden agendas— frequently make the headlines. Ficicchia mobilizes these fears cleverly in order to turn his

readers against the Baha’i Faith wish to create a theocratic order, as Ficicchia would have his readers believe; according to him this goal is even kept secret, concealed behind an outer facade of tolerance, peacefulness and loyal citizenship. The real political goals of the Baha’is are, he suggests, authoritarian, decidedly hostile to liberty, and antidemocratic. He calls the Ba-

ha’is ‘radical’! and ‘extremist’,? and even attests to their ‘radical political ideas with fascist tendencies’? Anyone who doubts these assertions—perhaps because they have personal contact with the Baha’i community—is told that it is common practice

1. Baha’ismus, p. 396. 2. ibid. 3. ‘Der p. 238.

Baha’ismus’,

; in Materialdienst

418

15/16,

Issue

38 (1975),

Baha ’i Political Thought

among Baha’is to conceal one’s real convictions (tagiyya),* and that, anyhow, the mass of the believers do not even know what the real goals are.° This is a cunning move, for it cuts short any attempt at correcting this misinformation: any such attempt can be dismissed as an expression of ignorance or conscious deception.

It is therefore not enough to point out that the faith of Baha'u'llah is a religion of love, compassion, forgiveness and justice, that peace—real peace, practised in daily life—is one of its primary goals, that injustice and repression are openly condemned and that peaceful action is taken against them. It is not enough to say that the Baha’i community relies not on repression but on the power of example, not merely preaching nonviolence but actually practising it even in the face of violent

persecution.® Nor is it enough to state that this faith is most definitely democratic in both its political credo and in its com-

munity structures, and that diversity and plurality are as much an element of the Baha’i image of man as are self-responsibility and freedom. The only way to respond to Ficicchia’s perfidious strategy

of disinformation and immunization against the Baha’i Faith is to analyse his distortions and manipulations one by one, setting out the true state of affairs together with the necessary back-

4. ‘Secrecy about the religious system and the political goals of Baha’ism are .. . as an instance of taqiyya .. . perfectly legitimate’ (ibid. p. 408, note 55). On tagiyya see Schaefer’s explanation above, pp. 352ff. 5. Baha’ismus, pp. 151, 156, 181, 240, 399, 405, 407f.; for details see also Schaefer, ibid.

6.

On the persecution and suppression of the Baha’i community in

Iran see below, p. 441, note 120 and pp. 457ff.; also Schaefer, above,

p. 358, note 219.

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ground information,’ so that readers may draw their own conclusions. I.

THE BAHA’i COMMUNITY: AUTHORITARIAN AND ANTIDEMOCRATIC?

Ficicchia’s statements about the political attitudes and goals of the Baha’i community follow immediately upon his assertions concerning the structure of the community, extrapolating these

into the political sphere and into the future. The ‘ideological schooling’

of the believers

with its alleged goal of ‘self-

surrender and uncritical subordination’* now becomes a ‘power claim that is total in character—spiritual and political’? ‘marching in step according to the guidelines ordained from on

high,’'° is turned into ‘complete Machtergreifung’;'' the allegedly centralist structure of the community

corresponds to a

centralist world state;!* the ‘imperialist tendency’ of Baha’i missionary

efforts parallel what he calls imperialist power

claims.'> We have already seen what is to be made of Ficicchia’s charges against the community:!* they are nothing but distortions, misrepresentations, inventions and lies. When one’s premises themselves are false, it is quite justifiable to doubt the validity of any conclusion based on them.

7. This necessarily brief summary is based on a monographical study of this subject: Gollmer, Gottesreich und Weltgestaltung. Grundlegung einer politischen Theologie im Baha’itum (The Kingdom of God and the World Order. Foundations of a Political Theology in the Baha’i Faith, thesis, unpublished). 8.

Baha’ismus, p. 413.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid.

p. 429. p. 418 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). p. 399; on this term see above p. 115, note 518. pp. 389, 398, 400, 425. p. 425 (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

14. Schaefer, above, pp. 141 ff.

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Baha ’i Political Thought 1. The Baha’i Faith—‘political Mahdism’?

Ficicchia strikes at the heart of Baha’i political attitudes and

ideas, ‘knowing’ that the Baha’i Faith’s ‘rulership ideal is based

on political Mahdism . . . ’.!° In making this allegation, he subtly plays upon an anti-Islamic reflex in the Western reader.!®

Political Islam provokes fear.'’ The figure of the Mahdi per-

sonifies political Islam like no other image. Knowing this, Ficicchia deliberately implies that the Baha’is see Baha’u’llah as

the Mahdi of Islam. He realizes that the various Mahdi revolts!® have become deeply ingrained in the collective consciousness of Western readers and that in popular thinking the figure of the Mahdi is equated with brutal violence, assassinations, obscurantism, fanaticism and despotism. The Mahdi is associated with ‘holy war’ (jihad), revenge against the enemies of Islam, world

conquest, the ‘claim to political hegemony’,!? fire and the sword.?° 15. Baha’ismus, p. 390. 16. Despite some welcome corrections in comparison with the previous edition, the entry included under the keyword ‘Baha’i’ in the fourth edition of the Handbuch Religiése Gemeinschaften, p. 817) published in 1993 under the auspices of the Office of the Lutheran Church, still relies heavily on Ficicchia, as is reflected in the statement that: ‘Baha’ism still shows its Islamic spirit in its aim of achieving absolute world supremacy through the establishment of an indirect theocracy.’ 17. One only has to consider such works as John Laffin, Islam. Weltbedrohung durch Fanatismus, Munich,

1980, or Gerhard Konzelmann,

Die islamische Herausforderung, Hamburg, 1980. 18. Especially the Mahdi Revolt in Egypt (1881-85) which has frequently been depicted in literature and in the cinema. 19. Baha’ismus, p. 36. 20. Ficicchia cannot but admit that the Baha’i community pursues its goals only by peaceful means, through example and persuasion, and so he states that ‘any form of violence is and always has been rejected as a matter of principle’ (Baha’ismus, p. 275), also “What is sought is not the violent overthrow of the existing religions and political systems .. .” (ibid. p. 266). Nevertheless, formulations such as these are mostly parenthetical and submerged under the constant references to the alleged

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It is of little relevance to Ficicchia that Baha’u’llah never

described himself as the Mahdi?! and has never been regarded as such by the Baha’is;?” nor even that in the Baha’i sacred writings this term is reserved for a different person, namely the

Bab.”* It is also completely irrelevant that even Romer, whom Ficicchia otherwise holds in such high esteem, pointed out that the Mahdi ideal as depicted by the Bab has nothing to do with a claim to worldly power but designates, instead, a soteriological

and spiritual form of leadership.24 Ficicchia is equally unconcermed by the fact that Baha’u’llah formally abrogated the concept of jihdd,?> and that the call for peace and understanding is

‘claim to world power’. Furthermore, Ficicchia presents the fundamentally reconciliatory character of the Baha’i Faith in a way that is typical for him: ‘Despite this aggressive element’—by which he means the Baha’is’ readiness to present arguments in support of their convictions despite social and political pressure—‘religious war, i.e. conflict using weapons, is forbidden’ (ibid. p. 264). 21. Pointing out this fact seems to make little impression elsewhere, either. In two letters (dated 10 March 1989 and 30 November 1992) to members of the production team of the Handbuch Religidse Gemeinschaften I criticized this error in the third (1985) edition and referred to my remarks concerning Reinhart Hummel’s entry (keyword ‘Baha’i’, in Taschenlexikon Religion und Theologie, vol. 1) in Bahda’i-Briefe 47 (April 1984), p. 29. Despite this, the fourth (1993) edition of the Handbuch (p. 806) states once again that Baha’u’1lah ‘raised the claim that he was the returned Mahdi . . . His single-mindedly promulgated claim to be the Mahdi aided him to victory’. 22. Nevertheless, Ficicchia gives the impression that he is citing passages of Baha’i scripture, for instance when he refers to ch. 45 of Some Answered Questions (Baha’ismus, p. 134). In fact, this chapter deals with the station of the ‘Manifestations’, the prophetology of the Baha’i Faith. The only concrete example given is that of Jesus Christ. The word Mahdi does not appear, nor is any reference made to the characteristics of this figure. 23. See Gollmer, below, pp. 572ff. The Bab preferred, for good reason, the title Oa ’im. 24. Die Babi-Beha7, pp. 19f.; see also above, pp. 19ff., 182 25. Baha’u’llah, Tablets 3:4; compare also 3:29; Epistle 41-44, 61, 92-

94, 122, 127f. (pp. 24f., 34f, 54-56, 74f., 77f.).

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the supreme maxim that should regulate relations between both religions and states.*° Ficicchia consciously negates the doctrines and the life of Baha’u’llah?’ and asserts the following: *Baha’u’llah, who declared upon his advent that he was the

promised Mahdi, then raised his own claim to world suprem-

acy.’”8 From ‘the world supremacy assigned to the Imam Mahdi’, which he alleges was claimed by Baha’u’llah, he then in-

solently derives the conclusion that the Baha’is are striving for

‘the creation of a theocratically unified world state’ .?° This provides the foundation for all further assertions about the political goals of the Baha’i Faith. The fact that this foundation is purely fictional is apparently of no importance to Ficicchia. The Mahdi is infallible; consequently, there is no

room for independent, self-responsible thinking; the whole system can function only on the basis of obedience to com-

mands.*° The existence of an infallible body with a claim to world supremacy means that there is no room for democratic

26. ‘Consort with the followers of all religions in a spirit of friendliness and fellowship. Whatsoever hath led the children of men to shun one another, and hath caused dissensions and divisions amongst them, hath, through the revelation of these words, been nullified and abolished’ (Baha’u’llah, Tablets 7:13; see also Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 9.2).

27. Statements such as the following: ‘It is not Our wish to lay hands on your kingdoms. Our mission is to seize and possess the hearts of men. Upon them the eyes of Baha are fastened’ (Gleanings 105:6) are dismissed by Ficicchia with the remark that Baha’u’llah ‘had, in fact, never given up his claim to political leadership. He was, however, enough of a realist to see that he would never be able to achieve this goal during his lifetime’. He goes on to assert that Baha’u’llah opportunistically followed the example of cooperation with the state authorities ‘in place of open confrontation’, but that ‘the ultimate goal, that of the realization of theocratic world supremacy’ was retained without limitation, but with the ‘House of Justice’ instated as its executor (Baha ‘ismus, pp. 270f.; Ficicchia’s emphasis). 28. Baha’ismus, p. 270. 29. ibid. p. 22 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 30. ibid. pp. 28, 166f., 426-429.

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decision-making.3! Any type of secular order is incompatible with the theocratic claim.” This invention is also employed to justify what Ficicchia claims is a ‘rejection . . . of the idea of a republic’, since a republic is ‘diametrically opposed to . . . the

Mahdi ideal’.*3 The facts that Baha’u’llah died in 1892, and that there is no longer a charismatic personality heading the Baha’i community, are of no interest to Ficicchia. He simply transposes the alleged power claim of ‘political Mahdism’ onto the

community’s institutions,** the ‘system’,*> or its ‘headquarters’ (zentrale),>° as he likes to call the democratically elected supreme administrative body of the faith. 2. A ‘claim to total power’ or fulfilment of eschatological

prophecy? Ficicchia presents the scriptural statements concerning a future Kingdom of God on earth as a claim to world supremacy—in accordance with the ideas of “political Mahdism’ which he attributes to the Baha’i Faith. There are two aspects to this alleged claim to power, which together amount to total control. The first is uniformity of thought and action, ‘total posses-

sion being taken of the individual’ who then ‘thinks and does

only what the organization wishes’.>’ These allegations will be dealt with later.*®

31. ibid. pp. 269-271, 390.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

ibid. pp. 269, 387, 390f., 393. ibid. p. 271. See ibid. ibid, p. 28. Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 237. _ Baha’ismus, p. 428f. See below, pp. 440ff.

424

Baha ’i Political Thought The second is Ficicchia’s allegation that the Baha’i Faith claims world-wide political power.2? When the Baha’i writings

speak of ‘the Most Great Peace’,*? the ‘Golden Age’,*! the ‘Kingdom of God on earth’ and an ‘earthly Paradise’,*? this is interpreted as ‘a demand for its own, centralistically governed global state’.

The reality is that this is a malevolent distortion of the

character of these statements.*> Ficicchia seems to forget that analogous statements are also found in the sacred scriptures of

other religions.4° God’s call to mankind, followed by man’s

39. We will spare the reader any comment on Ficicchia’s additional allegation of fascism (‘Der Baha’ismus’, in Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 238). This allegation is in and of itself enough to discredit his arguments. 40. For instance Baha’u’llah, Gleanings 119:3; words addressed to Browne, Peace 17 (p. 7); ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Paris Talks 34:6; Promulgation, pp. 11, 12, 19, 28f., 39, 55, 57; Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By,

p. 411; Promised Day, p. 4. 41. The ‘last Age of the Baha’i Dispensation’ (Shoghi Effendi, Citadel of Faith, p. 114), which will reach its ‘ultimate fruition’ and ‘efflorescence’ in ‘the fullness of time’ (Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, pp. 321f, 26): 42. ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Tablets of the Divine Plan 11:12 (p. 73); Promulgation, pp. 39, 55, 399; Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, pp. 26, 321f., 411; Citadel of Faith, p. 40; World Order, pp. 157, 168, 202. 43. ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Selections 220:1; Tablets of the Divine Plan 14:11 (p. 97); Promulgation, pp. 39, 369, 399, 441, 461, 470.

44. Baha’ismus, p. 398.

45. It is no coincidence that Ficicchia neither refers to nor quotes any sources in support of these charges. This makes it easier to keep up the fiction. 46. It is telling that—with the exception of a few incidental and erroneous comments on page 233—his chapter on eschatology (Baha ‘ismus, pp. 227-236) in the Bahda’i Faith deals solely with individual eschatology and makes no mention of universal eschatology which is treated in a much broader and more intensive way in the scripture. Thus, Ficicchia ignores a central issue of Baha’i political thought. On this subject, see Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 9.

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rejection of his admonitions and warnings, and the subsequent Day of Judgement and a new beginning, the promise of salva-

tion in a divinely-ruled kingdom of peace at the end of time: all these are fundamental motifs in various religions.4” They are

frequent in both the Old and the New Testaments.** How else, for instance, is one to judge the drastic statements announcing

the supremacy of Israel over all other nations: Thou shalt also suck the milk of the Gentiles, and shalt suck the breast of kings; and thou shalt know that I the

Lord am thy Saviour .. . Thy people shall be all right-

eous: they shall inherit the land for ever. . .4

What is to be made of the New Testament expectation of a ‘King of Kings and Lord of Lords’ out of whose ‘mouth comes a sharp sword, so that with it he may smite the nations; and He

will rule them with a rod of iron’?*° And what about the theocratic vision in Revelation 22: And the throne of God and of the Lamb shall be in it, and His bond-servants shall serve Him. . . because the

Lord God shall illumine them; and they shall reign forever and ever.>!

Are Christianity and Judaism to be accused of seeking world power on account of these statements? Indeed, would such a

47. See for example Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return, or, Cosmos and History, pp. 112ff. 48. See Ginter Klein, keyword ‘Eschatologie: Neues Testament’, TRE, vol. 10 (1982), pp. 270-299; H.D. Preuss (ed.), Eschatologie im AT (Eschatology in the Old Testament), Darmstadt,

1978; Rudolf Smend,

keyword ‘Eschatologie: Altes Testament’, TRE, vol. 10 (1982), pp. 256264; Benjamin Uffenheimer, keyword ‘Eschatologie: Judentum’, TRE, ibid. pp. 264-270. 49. Isaiah 60:16, 21. 50. Rev. 19:15f. ST ibid 22395;

426

Baha ’i Political Thought charge be justifiable considering the eschatalogical nature of

these texts?°? The statements made in Baha’i scripture on the subject of

the ‘Kingdom of God’*? are none other than the reiteration of

the promises made in the Biblical (and non-Biblical)** religions. Just as Christians call in the Lord’s Prayer for the coming of the Kingdom of God, Baha’is ask in prayer: ‘O God, establish the

Most Great Peace.’°> The hope of the future Kingdom of God is an eschatological promise in the Baha’i Faith, too. A claim to power is specific. Eschatological visions are not. Indirectly, Ficicchia confirms the eschatological nature of these statements

by remarking that: “The Baha’is do not have specific ideas about the character of their theocratic global state.’°° Indeed,

how could they, when what is meant is not seizure of power, but a prophetic promise of a world free from war, hatred and

violence?

3. The need for peace’ It cannot be denied, however, that the prerequisites for and the route towards this eschatological future are described much

52. The authors of the Handbuch Religiése Gemeinschaften (4th edn. 1993) have taken over Ficicchia’s allegation of a Baha’i claim to ‘absolute world supremacy through the establishment of an indirect theocracy’ (p. 817) and suggest the following ‘practical behaviour’ towards the Baha’is ‘in preaching and teaching’: ‘In preaching, this can be emphasized in contrast to New Testament texts relating to eschatology and the Kingdom of God’ (p. 817f.). 53. For a detailed discussion see Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 9.

54. For a general survey see R.J. Zwi Werblowsky, keyword “Eschatology: An Overview’, ER, vol. 5 (1987), pp. 148-151. 55. ‘Abdu’l-Baha, in Bahd’i Prayers, p. 103.

56. ‘Der Baha’ismus’, inMaterialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 236. 57. On the Baha’i concept of peace see Gollmer, ‘Und Friede auf Erden’ (‘And Peace on Earth’), in Bahd’i-Briefe 50, vol. 14 (1985),

pp. 128ff., and 52, vol. 15 (1986), pp. 207ff.; Gottesreich, ch. 9.2.

427

Chapter 6 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer more specifically in the Baha’i scripture than in the Old or New

Testaments. After all, how could the latter contain any mention of a world parliament, a world tribunal or world executive? The reason for this lies in the assumption that the promises of peace upheld—sometimes over thousands of years—by the religions will be fulfilled in the era of Baha’u’llah.°® Peace is ‘the crying need of the time’,*? an existential necessity, this century’s most urgent global and social requirement, indispen-

sable for humanity’s survival and future welfare.°° Mankind’s salvation, its heilsgeschichte, involves two consecutive epochs associated in the Baha’i sacred writings with this expectation of peace. The first of these is a period in

which war will be outlawed and a peaceful order will gradually be established throughout the world, in which war will finally be overcome and will cease to be used as a tool of politics. According to the scripture, the beginnings of this epoch, known as

the “Lesser Peace’, will be discernible in the very near future. It will be followed, at an unspecified future date, by the ‘Most

Great Peace’, an age in which this peace, initially guaranteed by external means with legal and institutional safeguards, will be taken to heart by the peoples of the world and transformed into

a peace that is established in the soul of humanity. This epoch will be equivalent to the promised “Kingdom of God on Earth’.

Some of the expectations associated in Baha’i scripture with

this eschatological era of peace will be outlined later.°! First, however, we shall examine the conditions and prerequisites for the ‘Lesser Peace’.

58. On the structure of Baha’i thought concerning salvation (heilsgeschichte) see the detailed discussion of this topic in Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 8 and 9. 59. ‘Abdu’1-Baha, Star of the West, vol. VII.6 (1916), p. 41.

60. ibid. p. 4; op. cit. VII.15, p. 136; Promulgation, pp. 125f., 153; Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 282; World Order, p. 37. 61. See below, pp. 435ff.

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The need for the “Lesser Peace’ is evident both from the development of armaments technology, which in itself poses a

threat to mankind’s survival,° and from the globalization of problems that cannot be solved by nation states acting in isola-

tion.®? The peace that is required, and that is promised, is therefore more than an end to war: what is needed is a universal, all-

encompassing peaceful order.°* Such a peaceful order is, from the outset, a central feature of the announcements, admonitions and warnings contained in the Baha’i writings. Contrary to Ficicchia’s assertions, these are the principles which will enable the world to take responsibility for its own actions; they are not

the basis for some theocratic claim. Given well over a hundred years ago, they are good counsel for the world, displaying pro-

phetic foresight concerning developments that threaten our very existence. Baha’u’llah’s recommendations and admonitions are directed expressly at a world that has rejected his revelational claims—and, hence, the offer of salvation through the ‘Most

Great Peace’. 62. ‘The future cannot, however, be compared with the past, because

the arms and war implements of the past were very simple, while the modern

armaments

can, in a short time, exterminate the whole of the

human world, and so they are beyond the endurance of mankind’ (‘Abdu’l-Baha, in Star of the West, vol. XI.17 (1921), p. 288. See also Promulgation, pp. 123f.). 63. ‘The well-being of mankind, its peace and security, are unattainable unless and until its unity is firmly established’ (Baha’u’llah, Gleanings 131:2). ‘In like manner all the members of the human family, whether peoples or governments, cities or villages, have become increasingly interdependent. For none is self-sufficiency any longer possible, inasmuch as political ties unite all peoples and nations, and the bonds of trade and industry, of agriculture and education, are being strengthened every day’ (‘Abdu’l-Baha, Selections 15:6). 64. ‘ Shoghi Effendi describes a vision of realized eschatology in the contingent world. This is not static. Rather it must be understood as evolutionary, as the gradual realization and unfoldment of the transforming potential of Baha’u’llah’s revelation. The milestones in this process are outlined by Shoghi Effendi without detail as to content or time-

scale: the transition from the “Lesser’ to the ‘Most Great Peace’

89. God Passes By, pp. 93, 26, 351; Promised Day, pp. 120f., 4.

90. ‘Abdu’1-Baha, Tablets, vol. 2, p. 312. 91. Ficicchia, Baha ’ismus, p. 265. 92. Handbuch Religiése Gemeinschaften, 4th edn., 1993, p. 810. 93. See the overview

of these in Shoghi

pp. 97ff.

436

Effendi,

God Passes

By,

Baha'i Political Thought

will take place gradually. It is a process involving the spiritualization of the world and its masses, the unification of all races, belief systems, classes and nations, evolving into the new world order of Baha’u’llah, the creation of a new world culture as the first stage in the development of the ‘Golden Age’ of the Cause

of Baha’u’1lah.?4 This development has been called the coming

of age of mankind,”> the prerequisite for the ‘Most Great Peace’.”° It is a process of heilsgeschichte. In the course of this development, the faith of Baha’u’llah will—according to Baha’i scripture—gradually gain widespread recognition, eventually becoming accepted as a state religion, and the Universal House of Justice will be established as humanity’s supreme legislative

organ in a ‘Baha’i commonwealth’.?’ The order of the community as it exists today is merely a shimmering of the light to come, a nucleus around which the future ‘World Order of Baha’u’llah’ will take shape.?® The ‘Golden Age’, of which the “Most Great Peace’ is a part, is thus the (provisional) end of and

point of contact between the social evolution of mankind and

94. Shoghi Effendi, World Order, p. 163, Promised Day, p. 128, Mes-

sages to the Baha’i World, pp. 155f. 95. Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 411, Promised Day, pp. 122, 128; World Order, p. 163.

96. Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. Elsewhere, this world culture is described purpose’ of the Most Great Peace (Citadel 97. See Shoghi Effendi, Messages to the

411.; Promised Day, p. 128. as ‘the offspring and primary of Faith, pp. 7, 6). Baha'i World, p. 155, World

Order, pp. 7, 11f., 19f. The legislative function of the Universal House

of Justice will presumably be restricted to the supreme norms of (indirect) divine law (see ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Testament 1:25, 2:8f. (pp. 14, 20)). The House will certainly not replace a future world parliament, which is also mentioned in the scripture. 98. ‘The Administrative Order is certainly the nucleus and pattern of

the World Order of Baha’u’llah, but it is in embryonic form, and must

undergo major evolutionary developments in the course of time’ (letter dated 27 April 1995 written on behalf of the Universal House of Justice to an individual believer).

437

Chapter 6 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer the development of the community of Baha’u’llah.”? This is associated also with the expectation of a new synthesis between religion and politics, whose separation the scripture describes as

essential for the time being.!°? The precondition for such a synthesis, however, is that religion should no longer be ideological or political in character and that politics should not be conducted on the basis of categorization into ‘friends’ and ‘foes’ .10! Parallel to events in the world as a whole, which will take

place in accordance with the ‘Great Plan of God’! and eventually proceed via the ‘Lesser Peace’ to the ‘Most Great Peace’, the Baha’i community itself will also go through various stages

of development: from the “Heroic Age’ of its early years, via the various stages of the ‘Formative Age’, to the “Golden Age’

of the dispensation of Baha’u’llah.!°? During the ‘Formative

99. See Shoghi Effendi, Promised Day, pp. 120f. 100. ‘With political questions the clergy, however, have nothing to do! Religious matters should not be confused with politics in the present state of the world (for their interests are not identical). Religion concerns matters of the heart, of the spirit, and of morals. Politics are occu-

pied with the material things of life. Religious teachers should not invade the realm of politics; they should concern themselves with the spiritual education of the people; they should ever give good counsel to men, trying to serve God and humankind; they should endeavour to awaken spiritual aspiration, and strive to enlarge the understanding and knowledge of humanity, to improve morals, and to increase the love for justice. This is in accordance with the Teaching of Baha’u’llah. In the Gospel also it is written, “Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s, and unto God the things which are God’s” ’ (‘Abdu’1-Baha, Paris Talks 49:9-12. (U.G.’s emphasis)). 101. On this subject see below, pp. 453ff., 465ff. 102. See Shoghi Effendi, Citadel of Faith, pp. 32f., The Universal House of Justice, Wellspring of Guidance, pp. 133f. 103. Shoghi Effendi, Citadel of Faith, pp. 4ff.; God Passes By, Foreword, pp. xiliff., 323f.; World Order, pp. 97f., 140f. For an overview of

these phases in the community’s development see ‘The Epochs of the Formative Age’, an explanation by the Research Department of the Uni-

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Baha ‘i Political Thought

Age’ the development and increasing maturity of the institutions of the faith!°4 will be accompanied by their growing influence on the world at large.!°> Nota bene: the expectation is not that the Baha’is will try to make their influence felt, but rather that the societies of the world will increasingly look to the

community of Baha’u’llah and its institutions for advice and assistance. There is no set duration for the ‘Formative Age’, but it is definitely expected to last a long time.!°° In the ‘Golden

Age’ it is expected that the Baha’i community and humanity will be completely unified: the internal affairs of the community and the process of world history will fuse.!°’ Religion and poli-

tics will be reconciled. !° One point must, however, be borne in mind: God is and will always remain the Lord of History, he “doeth what He pleaseth’. Every glimpse of the future that God grants to mankind is an expression of his mercy, consolation and guidance. It is never a limitation on his sovereign will. The more specifically man tries to define the future plan of God for humanity’s

salvation, the more probable it is that his assumptions will be wrong. The promise of guidance inherent in the Covenant of God implies a relationship of trust—particularly where no clear

prescriptions or definitions are to be found.

versal House of Justice dated 5 February 1986, published in The Six Year Plan. Summary of Achievements, Haifa: Baha’i World Centre, 1993. 104. See Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, pp. 324ff., World Order, pp. 156f. 105. See letter dated 31 January 1985 written on behalf of the Universal House of Justice, published in Peace 76:3 (p. 45). 106.

See

‘Abdu’l-Bahd in London, p. 106, Shoghi Effendi, Promised

Day, p. 129; Shoghi Effendi, quoted from a the Universal House of Justice, published in 107. Shoghi Effendi, Citadel of Faith, pp. 108. For an explanation of the underlying low, pp. 465-451 and pp. 470-473.

439

letter dated 29 July 1974 of Peace 71:2 (p. 43). 32f. concept of politics see be-

Chapter 6 @ Ulrich Gollmer

However one regards this vision of eschatology in the contingent world, one thing is certain: it is not a plan of action

for the take-over of power, as Ficicchia would have us believe. Regardless of how one assesses the prospects for the realization of this vision, the idea of the Kingdom of God on earth—along with its conditions of peace, justice, compassion and love—is, both for the individual Baha’i and the community as a whole, a constant source of guidance and a permanent benchmark for ail action in the world. The material aspects of the ‘Kingdom of

God’ are an essential part of all elements of the ‘new type of

politics’.!°? Baha’i elections and consultation, for example, are—when fully understood and correctly practised—an opportunity to experience today the forms of behaviour that will characterize the future ‘Kingdom of God’.

6. Claim to power or service to humanity? Ficicchia’s talk of a Baha’i claim to power implies that the Baha’is or their institutions desire to exercise power over others. In reality, the task of the Baha’is is completely different.

What they are asked to do, their sole intention,!!° is ‘to serve all nations’,!!! to ‘dedicate’!!* themselves to, and ‘be occupied’

with ‘service to the world of humanity’.!!3 By embodying

unconditional trustworthiness,!!4 love!!> and service,!!® they

109.

See below, pp. 464ff.

110.

As ‘Abdu’l-Baha, in Prayers, p. 110.

111. Baha’u’llah, Tablets 15:13. 112. ibid. 11:24. 113. ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Prayers, p. 110. 114. Baha’u’llah, Gleanings 130:1. 115.

‘O Lord! Make us brethren in Thy love, and cause us to be lov-

ing toward all Thy children. Confirm us in service to the world of humanity so that we may become the servants of Thy servants, that we may love all Thy creatures and become compassionate to all Thy people’ (‘Abdu’1-Baha, Promulgation, p. 301).

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should act as ‘leaven’!!” for the gradual transformation of ‘the contending peoples and kindreds of the earth’!!8 into a world of humanity, compassion and affection. Service to other people— regardless of religious affiliation—is raised to a criterion of true humanity: That one indeed is a man who, today, dedicateth himself to the service of the entire human race. !!9

This corresponds to the task with which Jesus Christ entrusted his disciples. It is certainly not to be interpreted as a claim to

power. The Baha’i community does not revel in feelings of triumph: instead, it is a forebearing!?° and, above all, a serving community. Just as the individual, according to Baha’i doctrine, achieves ethical maturity and perfection only through service to God and to fellow humans—and has indeed been created for the

116. Service to humanity is also expressly set out as a goal in the education of children (‘Abdu’1-Baha, Prayers, pp. 36f., Prayers (British edn. 1951), pp. 58f.) 117. Matt. 13:33. 118. Baha’u’llah, Gleanings 43:7. 119. ibid. 117. 120.

‘You must...

be kind to all men; you must even treat your ene-

mies as your friends. You must consider your evil-wishers as your wellwishers. Those who are not agreeable toward you must be regarded as those who are congenial and pleasant so that, perchance, this darkness of disagreement and conflict may disappear from amongst men and the light of the divine may shine forth’ (‘Abdu’l-Baha, Promulgation, p. 470). ‘He must return good for evil, and not only forgive, but also, if possible, be of service to his oppressor. This conduct is worthy of man: for what advantage does he gain by vengeance?’ (“Abdu’l-Baha, Some Answered Questions 77:5). For specific examples of how these aims are reflected in practice in the face of violent persecution, see Christine Hakim, Les Bahd’is ou la victoire sur la violence, Lausanne: Favre, 1982, and Olya Roohizadegan, Olya’s Story. A Survivor’s Dramatic Account of the Persecutions in Iran, Oxford: OneWorld, 1993.

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purpose of service!?!— the Baha’i community, too, is required, above all, to serve humanity. The ethical maxims addressed to the individual are transferable, ceteris paribus, to the community. Be worthy of the trust of thy neighbour, and look upon

him with a bright and friendly face. Be a treasure to the poor, an admonisher to the rich, an answerer of the cry of the needy, a preserver of the sanctity of thy pledge ... Be unjust to no man, and show all meekness to all men. Be as a lamp unto them that walk in darkness, a joy to the sorrowful, a sea for the thirsty, a haven for the distressed, an upholder and defender of the victim of oppression. Let integrity and uprightness distinguish all thine acts. Be a home for the stranger, a balm to the suffering, a tower of strength for the fugitive ... Be an ornament to the countenance of truth, a crown to the

brow of fidelity, a pillar of the temple of righteousness, a breath of life to the body of mankind . . .!?? Be ye loving fathers to the orphan, and a refuge to the helpless, and a treasury for the poor, and a cure for the ailing. Be ye the helpers of every victim of oppression, the patrons of the disadvantaged. Think ye at all times

of rendering some service to every member of the human race. Pay ye no heed to aversion and rejection, to disdain, hostility, injustice: act ye in the opposite way. Be ye sincerely kind, not in appearance only. Let each

one of God’s loved ones centre his attention on this: to be the Lord’s mercy to man; to be the Lord’s grace. Let him do some good to every person whose path he crosseth, and be of some benefit to him. Let him im-

121.

‘That one indeed is a man who, today, dedicateth himself to the

service of the entire human race’ (Baha’u’llah, Tablets 11:13). ‘The glory and majesty of man are dependent upon his servitude to his fellow creatures’ (“Abdu’1-Baha, Promulgation, p. 107). 122.

Baha’wllah, Gleanings 130:1.

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Baha ‘i Political Thought prove the character of each and all, and reorient the minds of men. In this way, the light of divine guidance

will shine forth, and the blessings of God will cradle all mankind: for love is light, no matter in what abode it dwelleth; and hate is darkness, no matter where it may make its nest. oe

This service is to be directed not primarily towards the community itself, nor to the individual in his need for salva-

tion!”* or as a recipient of charity;!*> the unequivocal focus of service is responsibility for the world as a whole.!?° There is no partisan weighting in the distribution of this service. The Baha’i Faith does not have a dualistic image of the world with distinctions between believers and infidels, good and evil, saved or unsaved. Its principle is that of unity: metaphysically as the

unity of God, the Creator of all human beings, and his universal mercy; practically as an ethical standard in all dealings with the peoples and nations of the world and as responsibility for the preservation of Creation. Thus, the concept of unity is not—as

123.

‘Abdu’l-Baha, Selections 1:7.

124. Although the obligation of all believers to teach the faith is based upon the right of every individual to be acquainted with Baha’u’llah’s claim and to decide for himself either for or against it. 125. For examples of Baha’i social and development projects see, for instance, Uta von Both, ‘Entwicklungsprojekte in der Baha’i Weltgemeinde’ (Development projects in the Baha’i World Community), in Baha ’i-Briefe 53-54 (December 1987), pp. 18ff.; “UNIFEM—Baha’i project strikes a responsive chord’, One Country, 5.3 (Oct-Dec 1993), p. 1ff.; ‘In Swaziland, New Dawn Engineering makes appropriate, labor-“unsaving” devices’, op. cit., 5.2 (July-Sept 1993), pp. 12-14; ‘Helping “street kids” in Brazil find a new life’, op. cit., 5.4 (Jan-March

1994), pp. 1ff.; ‘In Swaziland, partnership proves vital to pre-school education’, op. cit., 4.3 (July-Sept 1992), pp. 8-10; “Baha’is in Australia to promote cross-cultural harmony’, op. cit. 6.4 (Jan-March 1995), pp. 12ff. See also ‘Baha’i Development Projects’, www. bahai.org, 1998. 126. As shown by the following admonition: “Be anxiously concerned with the needs of the age ye live in, and centre your deliberations on its exigencies and requirements’ (Baha’u’ll4h, Gleanings 106:1.)

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Ficicchia contends!2”—a claim to a unified, uniform state under Baha’ leadership, but is, rather, an expression of care, of nonpartisan, unrestricted personal responsibility in the service of all creatures: ‘Blessed and happy is he that ariseth to promote the best interests of the peoples and kindreds of the earth . . . The earth is but one country, and mankind its citizens. ’!?®

7. ‘Total possession . . . taken of the individual’?! The alleged totalitarian hold on the individual is a case of conscious defamation. The precise opposite is true: the Baha’i sacred writings are expressly understood as a guarantor of human

rights.}3° The only really total claim is that of God over his creatures.!3! This claim is one of boundless love. Man owes everything to his Creator—his physical existence, his life as a social being, his future, and his salvation. This claim, which

derives from man’s total dependence on God, has not been fully devolved onto any earthly institution, neither socio-political,

nor religious.!*? Indeed, it is this total claim of the Creator over his creature that stands in the way of any other total claim. Totalitarian ideologies and systems of any type are incompatible with the sovereignty of God and his special relationship with

every human individual. Any attempt to take control, to degrade man to the status of a means to some end, is a presumptuous usurpation of the power reserved for God alone, a violation of

127. Baha’ismus, pp. 267f. 128. Baha’u’llah, Tablets 11:13. 129. Ficicchia, Baha’ismus, pp. 428f. 130.

On this subject see Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 7.3: ‘Zwischenbi-

lanz’ (‘Provisional appraisal’). 131.

On the development of the doctrine of divine sovereignty see

Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 5.1 and 2, ch. 6.2, ch. 7.1.

132. On the limited transfer of sovereignty and the division of powers in the Baha’i system see below, pp. 700ff. For a more detailed discussion see Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 12.1.

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Baha ‘i Political Thought

divine sovereignty. The relationship between the Creator and his creature is direct and unique; it does not require the interces-

sion of a salvational institution, a ‘Master’,!53 ‘Exemplar’,!34 a salvational corporation or hierarchy.!3° One of the consequences of this is the guarantee of the freedom and inviolability of an individual’s personal convictions. ‘Abdu’l-Baha calls conscience ‘one of the private possessions of the heart and the soul’

that must not be surrendered to any institution, whether spiritual or secular.!3° The special relationship between the Creator and his creature is, above all, diametrically opposed to any totalitarian attempt to take possession of the individual through any type of ideology. 9” Divine sovereignty is complemented by the concept of man as a being created in the image of God, each individual

being a unique, distinctive creature. Moreover, the absolute sovereignty of God with regard to salvation means that no hu-

133.

Such as a shaykh in Sufism, who has ‘almost unlimited author-

ity’ over his followers: to serve him is the highest honour for a believer, ‘even if it were only that he “cleaned Junayd’s latrines for thirty years” ’. No progress is possible without the guidance of the Master; the shaykh helps his pupil ‘to give birth to a true “heart” and nourishes him with spiritual milk like a mother’. He must be followed unquestioningly even in error, for ‘When someone has no sheikh, Satan becomes his sheikh’

(Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, pp. 103f.). The ‘spiritual descendancy’

(isndd) of the shaykh, the ‘Master’, ‘Elder’ or

‘Leader’ is an important source for his authority (L. Massignon, keyword

‘Tasawwuf’,

SEI, p. 582; Roy Mottahedeh,

The Mantle

of the

Prophet, pp. 148ff.). 134. Such as, in particular, the marja’ at-taglid, the ‘exalted exemplar’, the ‘most exalted source of emulation’ in Shi‘a Islam. 135. Like the Catholic Church. 136. ‘Convictions and ideas are within the scope of the comprehension of the King of kings [God], not of kings, and soul and conscience are between the fingers of control of the Lord of hearts, not of [His] servants’ (Browne, A Traveller’s Narrative, p. 165.) 137. See Shoghi Effendi, Promised Day, pp. 117f, World Order, pp. 30, 43; The Universal House of Justice, To the Peoples of the World LiZE (p29).

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man being is permitted to pass judgement over others, especially judgement of a condemnatory nature. Since no-one can be

sure of his own salvation, and since one is also unable to judge that of others, one must regard all human beings as equal; a fact that derives from our status as created beings, and one that we

neither can nor should overcome.!?® Social consequences of the equality of all people before God!%? are the equality of all be-

fore the law!*° and equal rights to ‘well-being’.!*! Indeed, the Baha’i doctrine of divine sovereignty can be interpreted as a justification for religious individualism. In any case, it is the basis for the uniqueness, dignity and inviolability of every human individual and, hence, of his inalienable rights. Il. BAHA’U’LLAH—ROYALIST AND HOSTILE TO LIBERTY? Not only does Ficicchia present a distorted picture of Baha’i political ideas concerning the future, but he also tries to show

that antidemocratic

attitudes have characterized the Baha’i

Faith’s doctrine and practices from its very inception. Here,

again, he refers to ‘political Mahdism’.!42

138. The idea of equality is even cited by Bahaé’u’llah as the reason why all people are created from the same material: ‘Know ye not why We created you all from the same dust? That no one should exalt himself over the other. Ponder at all times in your hearts how ye were created’ (Hidden Words, Arabic 68). “Abdu’l-Baha stresses the need for man to avoid dissociating himself from his fellow humans, ‘never attempting to be singled out from the others’ (Secret, p. 39). 139.

Baha’u’llah, Hidden

Words, Arabic 68; also Kitdb-i-Aqdas

72;

Gleanings 5:4; ‘Abdu’1-Baha, Promulgation, p. 182. That this does not mean equality between guilt and innocence is evident from Gleanings 93:7. On the equality of the various races before God see Baha’u’llah, quoted in Shoghi Effendi, The Advent of Divine Justice, pp. 31ff. 140. ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Paris Talks 47:2, 4, 6; Promulgation, pp. 182, 318. 141. ‘Wealth is most commendable provided the entire population is wealthy’ (‘Abdu’l-Baha, quoted from Secret, p. 24; seé Baha’u’llah, Tab-

lets 4:17, 19; 6:9, 27, 41; 7:5; 7:29, 41; 8:44, 52-54; 11:11f., 11:37; 15:4). 142. Baha’ismus, pp. 270ff.

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Baha ‘i Political Thought

In order to provide evidence for his thesis he makes a diversion into the early history of the Baha’i Faith. On the basis of the positions represented by the Baha’is during the Constitutional Revolution in Persia in 1907-09, along with a few statements by Baha’u’llah on the subject of kingship and the concept of liberty, Ficicchia deduces that the Baha’is reject the republican form of government, civil liberties, democracy and all representative organs. He depicts the Baha’i community as a royalist party, a supporter of absolute monarchy.

As ‘proof’ for this allegation, Ficicchia asserts the existence of an essential similarity between the Mahdi ideal and the ‘monarchical principle’.!43 We have already seen what is to be

made of the idea of “political Mahdism’ that Ficicchia alleges to

be characteristic of the Baha’i Faith.'44 What is more, anyone who knows the history of Shi‘a Islam will realize that Ficicchia’s argument is, in itself, anything but convincing. In fact, the idea that power is the rightful preserve of the Mahdi alone

has always meant that monarchical claims have been treated with reserve. Ficicchia then immediately amends his initial statement,

arguing that it is actually only an opportunistic alliance. Baha’u*llah, Ficicchia asserts, offers the governments, especially the ruling monarchs, an assurance of ‘/oyalty . . . as long as they guarantee liberty for Baha’ism and are prepared to smooth the

way for its theocracy’.!4> The claim to world power remains; only the tactics have changed, Baha’u’llah now trying ‘to in-

volve the rulers directly in this plan’.!4° This opportunistic tactic is also, Ficicchia alleges, reflected in the development of doctrine: ‘The kings are therefore described as the “representatives of God on earth” and monarchy as the ideal form of gov143. ibid. p. 271. 144. See above, pp. 421 ff. 145. Baha’ismus, p. 271 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 146.

ibid. p. 271.

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ernment .. .”!47 At the same time, he argues, Baha’u’1lah established the ‘principle’ that ‘the guaranteeing of civil liberties (and, hence, also of a republic) would only lead to sedition and

confusion’ .!48 What is to be made of this? As they stand, both these state-

ments are untrue. Ficicchia’s deliberate distortion of Baha’u*}lah’s concept of liberty has already been examined at length

by Schaefer.!*? All these assertions are examples of his characteristic ploy of juggling with fragments of truth, part of his strategy of disinformation. The truth is that Baha’is are obliged, through the sacred

writings of their faith, to be loyal towards the authorities of the state in which they reside. It is not true that this loyalty is at-

tached to certain conditions. It is also untrue that this loyalty is a question of tactics rather than a matter of principle. This issue

will be dealt with in detail later.!>° 1. Baha’u’llah’s statements concerning kingship As far as Baha’u’llah’s statements on the subject of kingship

are concerned,!°!

it is true that Baha’u’llah described kings as

‘the emblems of His sovereignty’!>? and that he wished to up-

hold the institution of kingship in its function as ‘a sign of God’ .!°3 However, there is no mention of monarchs, let alone of ‘the

147. ibid. 148. ibid. p. 275. 149. See above, pp. 301ff. The passage cited by Ficicchia as ‘evidence’ for his assertion (Kitdb-i-Aqdas 125) does not refer—as Ficicchia claims—to ‘civil liberties’ but to an attitude of nihilism and libertinism that refuses to accept any norms other than the unrestrained desires and drives of the individual. 150.

See below, pp. 468ff., 305ff.

151.

For a detailed evaluation see Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 7.4.

152.

Gleanings 105:5 (U.G.’s emphasis), 112; 139:5.

153.

Tablets 3:28.

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Baha ‘i Political Thought

courts’, as Ficicchia asserts,!°4 being representatives of God or wielding delegated power. It is even falser to claim that Baha’u"lah regards ‘monarchy’ as ‘the ideal form of government’ .!°> It is no coincidence that Ficicchia provides no source of reference for this assertion. What Ficicchia fails to mention are the obligations that Baha’u’llah places upon the kings and rulers in governing over their subjects, a catalogue of requirements that is universally valid,

a general ethic of government.!*° Ficicchia also omits any reference to Baha’u’llah’s criticism of the principle of absolute monarchy. Baha’u’llah states unambiguously that: ‘From two ranks amongst men power hath been seized: kings and ecclesi-

astics.’!>7 Monocratic systems are no longer in keeping with the times. He says that, ‘one of the signs of the maturity of the world’ will be that ‘kingship will remain with none willing to bear alone its weight’.!** This indicates all types of monocratic structure, whether the bearers of office are called ‘kings’, ‘leaders’ or whatever. Baha’u’llah does see a possible future for kingship in combination with a parliamentary system of government.!°? He explicitly states that: ‘A republican form of government [al-jumhuriyya] profiteth all the peoples of the

world’.!®© Evidently, then, there is no question of a condemnation of republican government. In his 1875 treatise calling for the reform of Persian society, ‘Abdu’l-Baha

demanded

that

154. Baha’ismus, pp. 134f., note 27. 155. ibid. p. 271 (U.G.’s emphasis). 156.

On this subject see Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 7.4.

157. Quoted from Shoghi Effendi, Promised Day, p. 72. 158. Lawh-i-Shaykh Salman, quoted op. cit. 159. ‘If the sagacious combine the two forms into one, great will be their reward in the presence of God’ (Tablets 3:28). Elsewhere, the British model is expressly praised in this connection (ibid. 7:31; Proclamation 4:3 (p. 34); compare also Epistle 104 (p. 61)). 160.

Tablets 3:28.

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membership of parliament should be made “dependent on the

will and choice of the people’!®! rather than being determined by royal appointment. In the same document he describes the establishment of parliamentary, consultative bodies as ‘the very

foundation and bedrock of government’.!© In so doing, he carries on Baha’u’llah’s consistent support for parliamentary and

democratic institutions and patterns of behaviour.!© The kind of kingship advocated by Baha’u’llah is not autocratic or absolute monarchy, but constitutional monarchy on the British or Scandinavian model, for example.!®* Moreover, it should be realized that the historical context of the term ‘king’ (sultan) is complex and is not necessarily to be equated

with a royal dynasty.!©° Nowhere in the writings of Baha’u’llah is there any indication that the dynastic principle must be retained. A monarchy can just as well be electoral in character.

Indeed, the context of Bishdrdt'®© would seem to support this idea. There is not a single text in which Baha’u’llah states that

kingship is an office to be held for life. One might even imagine an elected position of monarch for a fixed period of office. Although this interpretation ought perhaps not to be taken too far,

it might be pointed out that a constitutional monarchy bound to the constitution, laws and parliament of a country is not much different from the head of state of a parliamentary democracy,

such as that of the Federal President (Bundesprdsident) in Ger161. The Secret of Divine Civilisation 45 (p. 24). 162. ibid. 30 (pp. 16f.). 163. See Cole, ‘Iranian Millenarianism and Democratic Thought in the 19th Century’, pp. 1-26. 164.

As, for instance, in Tablets 7:31.

165. In Arabic,

the word

sultan is an abstract

concept

meaning

‘authority’, ‘government’, ‘force’, ‘rule’, see Bernard Lewis, The Politi-

cal Language of Islam, 51ff, keyword ‘Sultan’, Lexikon der Islamischen Welt, ed. Klaus Kreiser, Werner Diem and Hans-Georg Majer, vol. 3,

Stuttgart, 1974, p. 130. 166. Baha’u’llah, Tablets 3:28.

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Baha ‘i Political Thought

many.

However

that may

be, what

appears

important

in

Baha’u’llah’s concept of a ‘king’! is the symbolic nature of an office that is above political partisanship, and that both personi-

fies and promotes unity. !°° 2. A power political alliance between church and state?

What is the truth behind the charge’©? of historical partisanship in support of the royalist party and Baha’i ‘conspiracy with the

court’? Juan R. Cole, an orientalist and Chair of Middle Eastern History at the University of Michigan has produced several studies concerning the roots of the constitutional and demo-

cratic movements in the Near and Middle East in the nineteenth

and early twentieth centuries.!”° His investigations have revealed considerable

participation

in this movement

by the Baha’i

community. In stark contrast to Ficicchia’s assertions, Cole has

167. The fact that even under the conditions favoured by Baha’u’114h—and despite the absence of concomitant political power—the conspicuous character of this office poses a threat to the ethical integrity of its holder and imposes a high level of responsibility is evident from the following statement: ‘Well is it with him who, for love of God and His Cause, and for the sake of God and for the purpose of proclaiming His Faith, will expose himself unto this great danger, and will accept this toil and trouble’ (Baha’u’llah, Lawh-i-Shaykh Salman, quoted from Shoghi Effendi, Promised Day, p. 72). 168. Yehezkil Dror, professor of Political Science at the University of Jerusalem, recently emphasized the significance of such symbolic figures in his report to the Club of Rome (Jst die Erde noch regierbar? pp. 221, 220). 169. Baha’ismus, pp. 271 ff. 170. ‘Iranian Millenarianism and Democratic Thought in the 19th Century’, pp. 1-26; ‘Autobiography and Silence: The Early Career of Shaykhu’r-Ra’is Qajar’, in Johann Christoph Birgel and Isabel Schayani (eds.), Der Iran im 19. Jahrhundert und die Entstehung der Baha’iReligion, Hildesheim: Olms Verlag, 1998; ‘Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida: ‘A Dialogue on the Baha’i Faith’, in World Order 15, no.

3.4 (1981), pp. 7-16.

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concluded that the Baha’i community was not only in close contact with the democratic and reform-oriented forces in the region but that the religious propaganda of the Baha’is constituted the earliest, the most widespread, and over a long period, the most outspoken advocacy of parliamentary and democratic

reform. Cole also concludes that the doctrine and behaviour of

the Baha’is, across the broad spectrum!”! inevitable in a community of its size,!’? were in conformity with one another. Thus, Ficicchia’s repeated allegation of discrepancy between rhetoric and practice also have no justification in historical terms.

Cole’s discriminating analysis shows that the Baha’i community was outspokenly critical in its attitude towards royal absolutism and supported constitutional, parliamentary and democratic reforms. The Baha’is, in clear contrast to the Shi‘a clergy—contemporary Iranian propagandists, together with Ficicchia, are only too pleased to omit any mention of the support of the conservative majority of the clergy for the royalist party —demanded legal and political equality for all. The right of the masses to education was also among the reforms demanded by the Baha’is. Others included legal security, the protection of property, the right to freedom from bodily harm, the legal equal-

ity of the sexes, and freedom of conscience. In concurrence with the liberal reformers of the time, Baha’u’llah calls for consultation, discussion and parliamentary decision-making.

He stands out from others, however, in his outspoken support for the under-privileged. The social and moral implications of

laissez-faire liberalism are rejected.

171. For examples of liberal conservative and radical democratic attitudes see ‘Iranian Millenarianism’, pp. 3, 18-20 and ‘Autobiography and Silence’. 172. Around 1900, the number of Baha’is in Persia lay between 50,000 and 100,000 in a total population of approximately 9 million (see Smith, ‘A Note on Babi and Baha’i Numbers in Iran’, Iranian Studies 15 (1984), pp. 295-301).

452

Baha i Political Thought Baha’u’llah explicitly acknowledges, on the other hand, the legitimacy of the secular state, something that Cole is not alone in recognizing. The Iranist Mangol Bayat had previously come to see this as an epochal hiatus, a revolutionary innova-

tion in the context of Islamic societies: ‘Bahaism embraced what no Muslim sect, no Muslim school of thought ever succeeded in or dared to try: the doctrinal acceptance of the de facto secularization of politics . . .”!7 3. Non-violent neutrality or partisanship? The Baha’is differed from other reformers of that era on two points, however. First, they sought to achieve the reforms entirely by peaceful means. The Baha’is were unquestionably to be counted among the opposition to royalist absolutism, but

they were—as Cole puts it—!7* ‘a non-violent, loyal opposition’.!7> This characteristic was and is unacceptable to those who divide the political spectrum into the categories ‘friend’ and ‘foe’, and who see violence as a legitimate, even inevitable tool in political conflict.

This principle of non-violence is the main reason for the Baha’is’ reservations about the second phase of the Constitutional Revolution. Between 1905 and 1907, ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Baha’u’llah’s son and successor, also supported the constitutional movement. In the remaining years, however, the Baha’is took a neutral stance, because they foresaw civil war. The Baha’is did not regard this as an acceptable path. True to the

adage ‘he who is not with me is against me’ the Baha’is now

173. Mysticism and Dissent, p. 130. 174. Strictly speaking, ‘opposition’ is a term the Baha’is themselves would find inappropriate. This term indicates enmity, no matter how formalized and peaceable. Such partisanship, however, is not the aim of the Baha’is, even if they seek to make their principles and proposals heard and these are in conflict with prevailing beliefs and attitudes. 175.

Cole, ‘Iranian Millenarianism’, p. 20.

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came to be seen by the militants on both sides of the conflict as belonging to the other party.!’° Ficicchia has adopted the

judgement of the militant constitutionalists. He explicitly condemns the Baha’is’ non-violence as counter-revolutionary.!”” Since it is obvious that the Baha’is did not side with the royalists, he alleges that they did so secretly. The Baha’is not only ‘tolerated the government’s corrupt policies’, they ‘quietly’ supported them and conspired ‘secretly with the court’.!”® It is no wonder that Ficicchia produces no. evidence whatever for these serious allegations. 4.

Universalism versus nationalism

The second sphere in which the Baha’is were distinct from other reformist groups was in their fundamental attitude of universalism. As well as loving their own country, the Baha’is

have always been world citizens.!”? Baha’u’Ilah clearly foresaw how peace and progress would increasingly be dependent on

global conditions: The well-being of mankind, its peace and security, are unattainable unless and until its unity is firmly established. 18° .

176. Their role as social scapegoat has even been acknowledged by Shi‘a historians who are not favourably disposed to the Baha’is. Thus, Hamid Algar (Religion and State in Iran: 1785-1906, p. 151) points out that: ‘(The Baha’is) came to occupy something of a position between the State and ulama, not one enabling them to balance the two sides, but rather exposing them to blows which each side aimed at the other. The government, interested in maintaining order, would resist the persecution of the Baha’is by the ulama, but would equally, when occasion demanded, permit action against the Baha’is.’ 177. Baha’ismus, p. 275. 178. ibid. 179. ‘It is not his to boast who loveth his country, but it is his who loveth the world’ (Baha’u’llah, Tablets 7:13). 180. Gleanings 131:2.

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Baha ‘i Political Thought

Owing to this future-oriented universalism, the Baha’is were accused by their nationalist opponents of siding with the imperialist powers and of supporting Persia’s ‘quasi-colonial dependence’, a charge that is all too willingly taken up by Fi-

cicchia.!*! This reflects once again a very simple logic: whoever is not a nationalist must, by definition, be an enemy of the nation. Ficicchia evidently shares this view. He speaks explicitly

of a ‘progressive nationalist revolution’.!®? As chief witnesses he calls upon Browne!®3 and Romer,!*4 who also doubted that

‘victory for the Baha’is would be good for Persia’ .!*° Browne’s and Romer’s doubts about the desirability of stronger Baha’i influence on Iranian politics was a result of the

political premises on which they based their arguments. These are significant insofar as they draw attention once more to a fundamental difference in political thinking: for the Baha’is, a peaceful order at global level is necessary, in which all states have their place and conflicts are solved only by peaceful means. ie

Without such unity, rest and comfort, peace and universal reconciliation are unachievable. led

Romer and Browne, by contrast, were still caught up in nineteenth-century thinking with its emphasis on the nation state. Romer and, especially, Browne could imagine a renais-

181. Baha’ismus, p. 272. 182. ibid. p. 275. 183. See below, pp. 529ff. 184. See below, pp 546ff. 185.

Ficicchia, Baha’ismus, p. 277.

186. It is of interest to note that during the audience granted to Browne in ‘Akka it was about this peaceful order that Baha’u’llah spoke

(see Browne, Introduction to A Traveller’s Narrative, vol. 1, p. xl. See

also Towfigh, below, pp. 663f. 187.

‘Abdu’l-Baha, Selections 77:1.

455

Chapter 6 * Ulrich Gollmer sance in Persia only under a national, if not nationalist, ban-

ner.!88 The universalism of Baha’i doctrine was, for them, not only utopian and unrealistic, but even a ‘betrayal’!®? of the na-

tional interests of the Persian people. !”° The attitude of Browne and Romer should not be too sharply condemned, since it reflected contemporary views. Since then, however, nationalism has propelled the world into two devastating wars and has more recently raised its ugly head

in the Balkans and in East Africa. Ficicchia ought to know better than Rémer and Browne. The fact that he nevertheless adopts their judgement

as his own

without

describing and

188. That Browne sided with the Azalis was at least partly due to this conviction (see Towfigh, below, pp. 539ff. 189. Romer, Die Babi-Beha7, pp. 157f. 190. The Nazi regime in Germany took the same view: in a letter dated 3 August 1937 from the Gestapo (secret police) to the Foreign Office, the ‘Reichsfiihrer-SS

and Chief of the German

Police in the

Ministry of the Interior’, Heinrich Himmler, justified the prohibition of the Baha’i community as of 21 May 1937 by reference, in particular, to the Baha’is’ ‘pacifist and international attitude’. The extent to which nationalist and racist arguments were used against the Baha’is is illustrated by the example of Paul Scheurlin (Die Sekten der Gegenwart (Present day sects), 2nd edn. 1921, published by the Protestant Society’s publishing house, Quell-Verlag), whose presentation was strongly influenced by Rémer: ‘Of course, the victorious Herrenvolk, the English, especially its ladies, cultivate Bahaism as a mere religious sport. However, it is remarkable that just when the Ger-

man people need the Gospel of Jesus Christ and manly decisiveness for the sake of their strength and national self-awareness, the tired old oriental, Abdul Baha, is offering them—through his disciples—a soft cosmopolitanism and a vague religion for all and sundry. We cannot at present conceive that a significant segment of our population might fall prey to the religious and national faint-heartedness that threatens it from Bahaism’ (p. 175). He does not even shy from expressing openly antiSemitic sentiments: ‘In France it is especially the enlightened Jews who, under the influence of another of their race, Hyppolyte [sic] Dreyfus, have made Bahaism socially acceptable’ (p. 171). ‘In the light of what has been said, it is understandable that it is primarily Jews who are participating in Bahaism’s propaganda in the West’ (p. 174).

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Baha’

Political Thought

evaluating the premises on which it was based reveals that his intention was to defame the Bahda’js. 5.

Justified ‘opposition’ or persecution of a non-violent religious minority?

It is especially perfidious that Ficicchia ascribes equal guilt— perhaps even the main responsibility—for the persecution of the Baha’is in Khomeini’s Iran to the Baha’is themselves. The reason for this persecution, Ficicchia alleges, is not the dogmatic exclusion of the possibility of any divine revelation after Muhammad,!*! so that every Bahd’{ is seen as an apostate!??

191. This results from the customary theological interpretation of the Qur’anic description of Muhammad as the ‘seal of the prophets’ (Qur’dn 33:40). In his report entitled ‘Human Rights in the Muslim World: Socio-Political Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives’ (Harvard Human Rights Journal 13 (Spring 1990), p. 25, note 50), Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im states the following: ‘The Baha’is claim to be adherents of an independent religion and specifically state that they are not a sect of Islam. Iranian authorities reject that claim, because Islam does not accept the possibility of revelation after the Qur’4n. The Baha’i faith cannot therefore qualify as an independent religion according to Shari‘a. The Baha’is of Iran have been subjected to severe persecution since the founding of their faith during the nineteenth century.’ As long ago as 1925, however, a religious court in Egypt had recognized the religious

independence of the Baha’i Faith: ‘The Baha’i Faith is a new religion, entirely independent, with beliefs, principles and laws of its own, which

differ from, and are utterly in conflict with, the beliefs, principles and laws of Islam’, (see Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 367), while in 1939 an official fatwa by the Grand Mufti of Egypt stated: “We hereby declare that this Community is not to be regarded as Muslim . . . whoever among its members had formerly been a Muslim has, by virtue of his belief. . . renounced Islam, and is regarded as beyond its pale, and is subject to the laws governing apostasy as established in the right Faith of Islam’ (ibid. p. 368).

192.

The 1984 annual report of Amnesty International (pp. 449f.) af-

firms that: ‘The Baha’is are the only significant religious minority not

to be recognized in the Constitution . . . In the view of Amnesty International the only reason for their imprisonment was their religious adherence, which the Iranian authorities regard as heretical.’

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Chapter 6 @ Ulrich Gollmer

deserving of the death penalty according to Islamic law.!”? No, the real reason for the persecution and terror inflicted on the Baha’i community is, he states euphemistically, ‘the conflict between the state authorities and Baha’ism’, the causes of

which are to be found ‘in the essence of this religion’.!*4 In Ficicchia’s eyes, there are not persecutors and the persecuted, no wave of persecution planned and conducted by the ruling powers, but a ‘conflict’ in which both parties are to blame. Indeed, the Baha’is, it would seem, are more to blame since ‘the conflict’ has its causes “in the essence’ of their religion. Ficicchia expressly adopts the justifications given by the

Iranian persecutors for their treatment of the Baha’is.!?> He accuses the Baha’is of being ‘advocates and supporters of the imperial state doctrine’ and suspects them of ‘conspiracy with the

throne’.!°° Hence it is not surprising, moots Ficicchia, that the ‘anger of the masses is also directed against the Baha’is’,!?’ and that, according to the somewhat less strongly worded allegation in the Handbuch Religiédse Gemeinschaften, ‘the Baha’is, as

loyal supporters of the former regime, are increasingly subject

193. The relevant stipulations in the shari‘a cannot be justified by reference to the Qur’an. It is specifically stated in the Qur’an that judgement concerning apostasy is reserved for the beyond, where ‘wrath from God’ and ‘a severe punishment’ (Qur’dn 16:108) will be dealt upon the culprits (see also 2:214; 3:84ff.; 4:137;

5:59; 9:69f.). Only

later tradition authorizes the community to pass judgement in this matter and sets the death penalty as the standard punishment (see W. Heffening, keyword ‘Murtadd’, SE/, pp. 413f.). 194. Appendix, ‘Zur neueren Entwicklung des Baha’ismus’ (‘On recent developments in Baha’ism’), in Hutten, Seher, Gribler, Enthusiasten, 12th edn. (1982), p. 827. 195. On further accusations and their background see Amin Banani, ‘Die Baha’i im Iran—Religion oder Komplott der Kolonialmachte?’, in Baha ’i-Briefe 48, vol. 13 (1984), pp. 48ff. Banani is Professor Emeritus of Islamic Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles. 196. Baha’ismus, p. 395 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). 197. ibid.

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Baha’ Political Thought

to public criticism’ .!?* In a document produced by the Office of the Archbishop of Vienna, which is likewise based on Ficicchia’s claims, we find the following statement: ‘Since the Baha’is spoke out against democratization and reform of the governmental structure of the country even during the lifetime of Baha’u’llah and—albeit secretly—conspired with the court,

they are now being faced with the full fury of the masses.”!%? The state terrorism of the ‘Islamic Republic of Iran’, to which

over two hundred Baha’is have so far fallen victim and which has inflicted imprisonment and torture upon hundreds more, through which tens of thousands have been robbed of all they possessed and been condemned to hunger as a result of a rigorous prohibition on their employment; which has refused children from Baha’i families access to education and a future; and which has not even shrunk from systematic desecration of the

dead; this state terrorism has suddenly become ‘the full fury of

the masses’? and understandable ‘attacks by the outraged

population’.?°! The parallels with the euphemisms that characterized the inhuman terminology of the totalitarian regimes of recent German history are unmistakable. It is a scandal that such things should be propagated by official publications of

Christian churches.?°? 198.

p. 807.

199.

Claudia Pfleger and Friederike Valentin, Baha'i. Geschichte—Le-

hre—Praxis (Baha’i: History-Teachings—Practice, Dokumentation 1 (1981), Department for Questions of Ideology, Sects and Religious Communities in the Office of the Archbishop of Vienna, p. 11. This passage has been taken almost verbatim from Ficicchia’s article *Verfolgungen von Baha’i im Iran’ (Persecution of the Baha’is in Iran), in Materialdienst 3 (1979), p. 75. See also above, p. 24, note 44.

200. ibid. 201. ibid. p. 74. 202. It is noteworthy that Reinhart Hummel, then Head of the Evangelische Zentralstelle fir Weltanschauungsfragen, published a factual article about the persecution of Baha’is in Iran in Materialdienst 11 (November 1983), which is in complete contrast to Ficicchia’s polemi-

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The views of the German Parliament, the Bundestag,?°> as well as of the European Parliament? and the United Nations? are in stark contrast to those of the ‘Islamic Republic of Iran’— and of Ficicchia. It is thanks to these institutions, and to other

governments and parliaments,”°° that the persecution of the Baha’is has become less vehement in the past few years, although it is by no means over.?°7

cal arguments and accusations. In Materialdienst 8 (1985), Hummel also gave Udo Schaefer the opportunity to report on the persecution. 203. Resolutions passed on 25 June 1981 (Paper no. 9/614) and 4 December 1991 (Paper no. 12/1706).

204. European Parliament Resolutions passed on 19 September 1980 (European Communities’ Gazette, no. C 265/101), 10 April 1981 (C 101/112) and 15 July 1993 (C 255/156-157). 205.

For instance,

Commission

on Human

Rights,

United

Nations

Economic and Social Council, 10 October 1980 (E/cn. 4/1413); Final Report by the Special Emissary of the Commission on Human Rights, Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, concerning violations of human rights in Iran, 28 January 1993 (E/CN.4/1993/41)); United Nations General Assembly, 48th session, 30 November 1993 (A/C.3/48/L.58). Copies of further documents have been published in Der Nationale Geistige Rat der Baha’i in Deutschland (ed.), Die Bahda’i im Iran. Dokumentation der Verfolgung einer religidsen Minderheit (The Baha’is in Iran. Documentation of the persecution of a religious minority), pp. 72ff. 206. Such as the Resolutions of the Congress of the United States of America passed on 30 June 1982 (S. Con. Res. 73), 30 September 1982 (H. Con. Res. 378), 15 June 1984 (H. Con. Res. 226) and 8 August 1988 (S. Con. Res. 120). On further resolutions and commentaries see: Die Baha’i im Iran, pp. 100ff. 207. In his report on the fourth round of German-Iranian talks on human rights held in Teheran in October 1994 (‘Der schéne Schein ist langst verblasst. Vom Sinn eines Menschenrechtsdialogs mit Teheran’ (The beautiful image faded away a long time ago: on the meaning of a human rights dialogue with Teheran), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28 March 1995), Udo Steinbach writes that: ‘The whole dilemma of the discussion was evident once again when it came to the subject of tolerance. Islam does indeed have a tradition of tolerance . . . But can this tolerance be equated with the right to freedom of religious worship and the equality of all irrespective of religion, race and the like, as established by the European Enlightenment? That this is not, in fact, the case

460

Baha i Political Thought In other respects, too, Ficicchia is open to the propaganda

of those who persecute the Baha’is in Iran.?°8 He claims, for instance, that the Baha’is ‘profited a great deal’ from their posi-

tion as “direct supporters of the court’.2°? The Shah ‘welcomed them as allies in his constant struggle against the influence of the Shi‘a clergy’; they were ‘substantial participants’ in the overthrow of Mossadegh in 1953; and they ‘even provided the country’s Prime Minister’ in the person of Amir Abbas Hoveyda, who was condemned to death in 1979 by an ‘Islamic revolutionary court’ on a charge of ‘corruption and economic mismanagement’.?!°

None of this is true.”!! Just like the official propaganda of the “Islamic Republic’, Ficicchia simply ignores the repression was made clear by a representative of the Bahai community in Germany who was a member of the German delegation. In solidarity with the Bahai community in Iran, he reported on specific cases in which Bahais in Iran have been persecuted and even executed. At least it was possible to have a detailed discussion on this topic—that had been refused in previous talks in Hamburg. However, at the end it was stated bluntly that Islam did not permit the recognition of the Bahais as a religious community.’ Incidentally, the representative of the Bahai community mentioned here was Udo Schaefer. 208. A certain sympathy with the Khomeini regime is unmistakable. He speaks, for instance, of an ‘anti-monarchist uprising’ (Appendix, ‘Zur neueren Entwicklung des Baha’ismus’, in Hutten, Seher, Griibler,

Enthusiasten, 12th edn. (1982), p. 827) which is ‘basically nothing other’ than ‘a renewal of the nearly seventy-year old demand’ for a ‘democratic constitution’ (Materialdienst 3 (1979), p. 75; see also Baha’ismus, pp. 394f.). 209.

Materialdienst 3 (1979), p. 76.

210. Appendix, ‘Zur neueren Entwicklung des Baha’ismus’, in Hutten, Seher, Griibler, Enthusiasten, 12th edn. (1982), p. 827, Baha’ismus, p. 395; Materialdienst 3 (1979), p. 76. 211.

In its Report no.

51, The Baha'is

of Iran, London,

3rd edn.

(1985), p. 8, the Minority Rights Group expressly states that: “Since Qajar times the accusation of being a Baha’i has been a way of discrediting an enemy. Even if the charge is false some mud is likely to stick. What matters in Iran today is not so much whether Baha’is as a group actually co-operated with the former regime, but that most Iranians be-

461

Chapter 6 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

suffered by the Baha’is during the Shah’s regime. In addition to day-to-day discrimination, there were acts of state terrorism and

waves of violent persecution during this period, too?!?—although on a much smaller scale than has been the case since 1979. The worst wave of persecution took place in 1955, shortly after the overthrow of Mossadegh; in which, Ficicchia alleges, the Baha’is had collaborated, and which had supposedly brought them benefits. Then, too, the United Nations successfully intervened on behalf of the Baha’is. When Hoveyda became Prime Minister in 1965 some of his political opponents accused him of being a Baha’i. In order to disprove this he initiated a package of anti-Baha’i laws and measures, including the introduction of special taxes on Baha’i property and the dismissal of numerous

Baha’is from the civil service. In fact, Hoveyda’s father came from a Baha’i family, but had been excluded from the community on account of his political activities. Hoveyda himself was

never a Baha’i.?!3 When the Shah founded the Rastakhiz Unity

lieve they did, while they have no chance to prove the charge false.’ Since the second half of the nineteenth century, the Baha’is constitute

the collective scapegoat of Iranian society, a function that is not dissimilar to that of the Jews in European history. The genocide researcher Leo Kuper (The Prevention of Genocide, p. 152) describes the current role of the Baha’is as follows: ‘Its members are ranked with the American Satan and with the imperialists generally as scapegoats for the woes of the present régime. But the Baha’is have always been traditional scapegoats in Iranian society from the earliest origins of the Baha’i faith in the mid-nineteenth century.’ 212. See, for example, Muhammad Labib, The Seven Martyrs of Hurmuzak, Oxford, 1981; Douglas Martin, ‘The Baha’is of Iran under the

Pahlavi Regime

1921-1979’, Middle East Focus 4.6, 1982, pp. 7ff.;

Geoffrey Nash, Jran’s Secret Pogrom, ch. 2, pp. 44ff. 213.

Nevertheless, Ficicchia ‘discloses’ Hoveyda’s membership of the

community and accuses the “Baha’i leadership’ of concealing it from the community (Baha’ismus, pp. 385f., 408). The authors of the Handbuch Religiése Gemeinschaften do at least point out that: ‘Abbas Horveida [sic], who was Prime Minister from 1965 to 1977, has wrongly been described as a Baha’i’ (p. 807 in the 4th edn., 1993).

462

Baha ’i Political Thought

Party in 1975 and demanded that all Iranians join it, the Baha’is were the only social group that had the courage to refuse. With his distorted image of the political attitudes and goals of the Baha’i community, Ficicchia is obviously keen to provide new ammunition for existing and potential persecutors. He States that: ‘It appears that in the young nation-states of the

“Third World”, who are still at the stage of establishing their identity, the [Baha’is’] extreme position on political issues and their demand for their own, centralistic world government

arouses mistrust and is seen as a kind of neo-colonialism.’?!4 The fact that the Baha’is are blacklisted by an “Arab Boycott Bureau’ in Cairo and are frequently the target of reprisals and

persecution in several Islamic states, and that in communist countries their faith was forbidden in accordance with the ideological verdict on religion in general, is not taken by Ficic-

chia as evidence of the totalitarian tendencies of the societies or governments in question. He ascribes this repression, instead, to

the circumstance that ‘in countries where Baha’ism is better known’ it has a ‘notorious reputation as a “fanatical sect” that is

“a threat to the state” ’.2!5 Completely reversing the true state of affairs, Ficicchia speaks of ‘resistance’ against the Baha’is ‘out-

side Persia too’2!® and expresses the expectation that this ‘is

likely to increase’.?!7 One can hardly fail to sense Ficicchia’s subliminal hope that this might also occur ‘in the Western states in which Baha’ism has always enjoyed a great degree of freedom’, if only—thanks to him—people were to recognize the

‘radical political ideas”*'* of the Baha’i community whose goals are ‘highly extreme, intolerant and not in the least apoliti-

214. Baha’ismus, p. 398. 215. 216. 217. 218.

ibid. p. 396. ibid. ibid. p. 398. ibid. p. 396 (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

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Chapter 6 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

cal’,?!9 however carefully the Baha’is hide them on account of ‘opportunistic considerations’ that ‘will be retained only until the community, currently still in its infancy, is in a position to

realize its declared goals’.?° The tragedy is that Ficicchia has already achieved a certain amount of success in his campaign of

defamation.?7! III. ON THE WAY TO A NEW TYPE OF POLITICS The contrast between the power-political cynicism implied by Ficicchia and the true political aims of the Baha’is could not be

greater. Ficicchia is guilty of an extremely exaggerated form of

what the World Council of Churches?” has described as one of the dangers of a syncretistic approach, which should be avoided in inter-faith dialogue: ‘A second danger is that of interpreting a

living, faith not in its own terms but in terms of another faith or ideology. This is illegitimate on the principles of both scholar-

ship and dialogue.’?*3 This means that if one intends to conduct scientific analysis without thwarting dialogue before it has even begun, the self-image of the community in question must be taken seriously. Ficicchia describes an abomination that bears

no similarity whatever to the real Baha’i community, its goals and ideals. The Baha’i community regards itself as a serving

community that wishes to play Ficicchia, by contrast, portrays dulging in ‘political Mahdism’. ously incompatible, he adds a

a conciliatory role in the world. it as a power-hungry group inSince these two ideas are obvifurther bundle of assumptions.

The ideological basis for all Ficicchia’s assertions is that of

219. 220. 221.

ibid. p. 399. ibid. See Schaefer, above, p. 7, note 27.

222. In the Guidelines on Dialogue with People of Living Faiths and Ideologies, edited by the World Council of Churches, Geneva, 1979. See also Schaefer, above, pp. 23ff. 223

ebalv2s 0.

apalo:

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Baha ’t Political Thought

conscious deception on the part of the Baha’is, their real goals

being hidden behind their propaganda, the religion being characterized by power-political cynicism. That this is in sharp

contrast both to the history of the Baha’i community and to the

ethical principles to which the Baha’is are committed?2* demonstrates that dialogue is the last thing on Ficicchia’s mind— not to mention his claim to academic objectivity.

1. The concept of politics in Baha’i scripture??> The Baha’i Faith is very definitely ‘a religion of the Book’ .?° The Baha’i scripture is the binding foundation for the faith of

every Baha’i. If one wishes to understand the real basis—the standard and constant benchmark—of Baha’i political thought and action, there is no alternative but to investigate their scripture. Even a superficial examination of the scripture will show

that Baha’i attitudes to politics cannot be reduced to a simple formula. Statements that suggest an apolitical and quietist atti-

tude?” stand beside others that—as we have seen??8—reveal definite political preferences and goals. How do such apparently contradictory texts relate to one another? For Ficicchia the answer is quite simple: without reference

to the scripture he assures his readers that all statements concerning the abstinence of the Baha’is from politics are opportunistic and only reflect the present powerlessness of the com224. See, for instance, Trustworthiness: A Compilation of Extracts from the Baha’i Writings, Research Department of the Universal House of Justice, London: Baha’i Publishing Trust, 1987. 225. For a detailed analysis see Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 10.2.2. and ch. 14.

226. See Schaefer, The Light Shineth, pp. 120ff. 227. ‘Avoid politics like the plague’ (Shoghi Effendi, Baha'i News, no. 241 (1951), p. 14). ‘He [Baha’u’llah] hath . . . forbidden them to interfere at all with political problems’ (‘Abdu’1-Baha, Tablets, p. 498). 228.

Above, pp. 448-457.

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Chapter 6 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

munity;?2? at the same time, he regards these statements as a smokescreen for the real power claims of the Baha’i Faith. This

might appear logical to a reader who is familiar with issues of power politics and is critical of ideologies. If, however, one is not content with this and is prepared to undertake a study of the sources, it soon becomes clear that matters are very different. Evidently, the term ‘politics’ (or “political’) is used with various meanings in the scripture. It is used both descriptively and normatively. In its descriptive sense, ‘politics’ signifies the political behaviour that has been prevalent throughout human history. “Abdu’l-Baha says of this type of politics: ‘[its] foundation is

war’.”° This type of behaviour, described by ‘Abdu’l-Baha as ‘old’,?3! ‘ancient’23? and ‘human policy’,?*> is characterized by delimitation, defence, aggression and the desire to assert one’s own interests. This type of political activity is concerned with

the retention or acquisition of power, in which all participants in the political arena are classified as either allies or opponents, friends or enemies. When the scripture states that Baha’is should not engage in politics, it is this type of political activity

that is meant. The Baha’is should not take sides against others. Neither should they allow themselves to be used as ‘the tools of

unscrupulous politicians’”>4 and unexpectedly drawn into political conflicts. The task of the Baha’is is to overcome barriers, not to build new ones; they should heal wounds, not inflict them. It is therefore vitally important that Baha’is, whether as

229. 230. whose peace

Baha’ismus, p. 399. Tablets, vol. I, p. 39. He expresses the wish that ‘ancient politics foundation is war be discarded and modern politics founded on raise the standard of victory’.

231. Promulgation, p. 278. 232.

Tablets, vol. I, p. 39.

233.

‘Abdu’l-Baha, Selections 227:16.

234.

Shoghi Effendi, World Order, p. 64.

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Baha ’i Political Thought

individuals or as a community, should not become involved in the partisan, antagonistic forms of political activity.?7?> The best of ends does not justify all means. Power politics and partisanship are in direct contradiction to Baha’i principles. They are incompatible with the values of unconditional universalism, the existential requirement to work for peace and reconciliation,

and the obligation to serve the entire human race that characterize the Baha’i Faith. That does not mean, however, that the Baha’i Faith is apolitical. The goals of world peace, justice and the unity of man-

kind by themselves alone clearly show that such a statement would be nonsense. What should distinguish the Baha’is from others is a qualitatively different type of political activity. This

new type of political behaviour is based on the normative requirement for politics set out in the scripture: the form of poli-

tics appropriate for Baha’is is what is termed ‘divine policy’ .?°° Its characteristics

are consensus,

integration, justice, mercy,

compassion, and love.?3” As a result of the example set by the Baha’i community, this new type of political behaviour should spread throughout the world and bring about change. The instrument of ‘divine policy’ is Baha’i consultation, a subject to

which we shall return in due course. This implies a qualitative change in the character of politics. Politics is to be governed by new normative principles. It must change from strategically oriented action based on shrewd alliances and power politics aimed at asserting particular (indi-

vidual, group, national etc.) interests, to action that is directed 235. Therefore, a Baha’i who takes this seriously cannot also be a member of a political party: partisanship and universal reconciliation are incompatible. 236. ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Selections 227:16, 28; Star of the West II.19 (1912), p. 7; ibid. V.9 (1914), p. 134; ibid., V.10, p. 154; see also

Shoghi Effendi, World Order, p. 65; God Passes By, pp. 281f. 237. On the relationship between justice and love see Schaefer, above, pp. 398ff.

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towards universal understanding. It is hard to imagine a more

dramatic transformation: “That which was applicable to human needs during the early history of the race can neither meet nor satisfy the demands of this day, this period of newness and con-

summation.’”3° Belief in the possibility of such a transformation stems from the conviction that human interests are, in principle, non-antagonistic in character, that in the long term everyone will benefit from behaviour that is directed towards understanding and consensus. In this world so strife-torn and full of hatred the Baha’is wish to play a conciliatory role.?*? It is not surprising that such a conviction is rooted in an image of man

that is not restricted to the material.?4° 2. Loyalty to state authority This attitude of reconciliation and understanding is also the foundation for the obligation placed upon Baha’is to show upright loyalty towards the authorities of the State in which they reside.”4! ‘Abdu’l-Baha accounts for this by reference to the internal strife evident in most contemporary societies: ‘Security and trust have vanished from among the people. Both the gov-

238. “Abdu’l-Baha, quoted in Shoghi Effendi, World Order, p. 165. 239. As expressed, for instance, in the following passage: ‘I charge you all that each one of you concentrate all the thoughts of your heart on love and unity. When a thought of war comes, oppose it by a stronger thought of peace. A thought of hatred must be destroyed by a more powerful thought of love . . . When soldiers of the world draw their swords to kill, soldiers of God clasp each other’s hands! So may all the savagery of man disappear by the Mercy of God’ (‘Abdu’1-Baha, Paris Talks 6:7,9). 240. See To the Peoples of the World. A Baha’i Statement on Peace by the Universal House of Justice, published to mark the United Nations’ ‘Year of Peace’, 1986, p. 5. 241.

See

Baha’u’llah,

Tablets

3:8;

15:5,

7; Epistle

142

(p. 88);

‘Abdu’l-Baha, Selections 225:30;, Testament 1:8,28 (pp. 8, 15), Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 132; World Order, p. 64.

468

Baha ’i Political Thought

erned and the governors are alike in danger.’4? It is therefore not enough to obey the laws ‘either with the hope of reward or from fear of punishment’. Instead, what is needed are people who act ‘peacefully and loyally’, ‘honestly and frankly’. The

Baha’is are exhorted to do just this.?7 This loyalty is to be upheld even when a government turns against the Baha’i commu-

nity itself.24+ Even in the face of persecution and death-threats the Baha’is must act peacefully, since it is better for them if

they ‘have suffered themselves to be killed rather than kill’.?4° That this does not signify a blind, quietist acceptance of the

prevailing conditions is shown by the history of the community. Nevertheless, any necessary changes are to be attained by peaceful means, through persuasion and a broad consensus.

Revolutionary impatience is alien to the Baha’is.?*° ‘In order to establish a better social order and economic condition, there

must be allegiance to the laws and principles of government.’?4” The transformation of politics, for which the Baha’is are striving, will take place not through words but through deeds. Moti-

vated by their faith, the Baha’is are confident in the long-term effectiveness of example and common sense. Yet the Baha’is have even more of political relevance to offer to the world than just their universalist and irenic goals

and their conciliatory behaviour. The community is both a practice ground and a model for the new type of politics demanded in the Baha’i scripture. The methods of political action

242.

Selections 225:28.

243.

ibid.

244.

Shoghi Effendi, Bahd’i Administration, pp. 161f., The Light of

Divine Guidance, p. 91; God Passes By, pp. 371f., World Order, p. 65.

245. Epistle 122, 128 (pp. 75, 78). 246. Knowledge that the soul lives on after death makes it easier to be patient, as does faith in the coming of the promised Kingdom of God on earth. 247. ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Promulgation, p. 238.

469

Chapter 6 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

it practises can function as a model outside the community as well.

3. Baha’i elections:7** a non-partisan form of democratic appointment of government Wherever people live together, community issues have to be decided upon. Such decisions need to be arrived at, coordinated and carried out. Without making any value judge-

ment, and irrespective of the decision-makers and the specific forms used, this process can be termed ‘government’. The alter-

native is the break-up of the community; at its worst turning into the never-ending conflict of each individual against society

as a whole. It is one of humanity’s cultural achievements that forms of government are gradually being discovered that citizens perceive as being just and reasonable, not suppressive. One of the

main problems is to combine a high degree of social complexity, participation, rational decision-making and efficiency. In political practice, various systems of democratic elections have evolved in response to this challenge. In political philosophy, the theories of communicative decision-making have tried to go

one step further.4? Baha’i elections and Baha’i consultation are a part of this democratic tradition, but they are also models for problem-solving with a unique starting point rooted in the normative concept of politics as described above. The electoral

system and consultation are substantial elements of political practice in the Baha’i community, although they are certainly

not the only ones.?°° They are used here to illustrate the points under consideration.

248.

For details see Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 13.1.

249. Among the best known representatives of this trend are Jurgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel. 250.

See Gollmer,

Gottesreich,

ch.

11: ‘Die Gemeindeordnung

als

Ubungsfeld und Modell 1: Die Institutionen’ (‘Community organization

470

Bahai Political Thought

When Ficicchia accuses the Baha’is of having theocratic structures, he uses this term in the sense current at the time of

the Enlightenment, when ‘theocracy’ was depicted as the antithesis of enlightened forms of social and political life, and as

synonymous with obscurantism and deceit by the clergy.?°! In this context, the words ‘theocratic’ and ‘democratic’ are perceived as opposites. This need not necessarily be so. The order of the community of Baha’u’llah can, indeed, be described as ‘theocratic’. It

is theocratic in that the fundamental features of this order were established by the founder of the faith himself—and

hence,

Baha’is believe, by God. In particular, the institutions that alone are authorized to make decisions, the ‘Houses of Justice’, were

established by Baha’u’llah himself.?°? In this case, however, ‘theocratic’ is not the opposite of ‘democratic’, as Ficicchia supposes. The order of the Baha’i

community combines the theocratic origin of its institutions with a decidedly democratic means of selecting those who hold office in those institutions.?°? In the Baha’i community, there is no office with decision-making authority whose members are not selected by democratic means, i.e. by election. The whole community participates in this election. The nine members of the local ‘spiritual assemblies’ are elected an-

nually by universal, free and secret ballot among the members of the local community. The national decision-making bodies, as a laboratory and Model 1: the institutions’). A definite element of grass-roots democracy is the community meeting known as the ‘Nineteen Day Feast’, see op. cit., ch. 11.2.4.

251. For a historical survey of the use of this term see Bernhard Lang, ‘Theokratie: Geschichte und Bedeutung eines Begriffs in Soziologie und Ethnologie’ (‘Theocracy: history and meaning of an expression on sociology and ethnology’), in Jacob Taubes (ed.), Theokratie, pp. 11-28; Wolfgang Hibener, ‘Texte zur Theokratie’ (‘Texts on theocracy’), op. cit., pp. 78-126. 252. See Kitab-i-Aqdas 30. 253. See also Schaefer, above, pp. 245ff.

47]

Chapter 6 * Ulrich Gollmer

the ‘national spiritual assemblies’, are also elected annually by delegates who have been elected by the community as a whole. The supreme institution of the Baha’i world, the “Universal House of Justice’ is elected every five years by the members of all the national spiritual assemblies, so that the members of this body are determined through a three-stage electoral process involving the entire global community. Of far greater importance than this formal framework for

Baha’i elections are the principles according to which they are conducted. This demonstrates the new political concepts of the Baha’i Faith. Elections in the Baha’i system are not a struggle

for political power conducted within the bounds of formal constraints. It is not the aim of Baha’i elections to measure support for rival manifestos or to represent different interest groups in a political contest. In Baha’i elections there is no nomination of candidates, no electoral propaganda, and no campaigning. Factionalism and partisanship are prohibited. It is not the aim to have one’s interests represented, nor to express a preference for

certain policies or political ideals, but rather to select the most suitable individuals. Baha’i elections are concerned solely with choosing personalities. Their goal is to elect those people to decision-making offices who will not concentrate on their own

interests but will cooperate with their fellow members to promote the general good. Election to such an office is not a right to which an individual is entitled by virtue of any special achievements, his material standing, his education or any other

attributes; neither is it an honour to be striven for;?°* and it is most definitely not a means of satisfying one’s power instincts:

‘In a Baha’i election no one is trying to be elected.’?°° Therefore, in the criteria given in the scripture for determining the

254. The Universal House of Justice, Memorandum 1988, in Baha’i Elections 18.

of 16 November

255. Letter dated 20 March 1991 written on behalf of the Universal House of Justice to an individual believer.

472

Baha ’i Political Thought

suitability of an individual for electoral office priority is placed on the person’s qualities of character. Only someone who is

‘upright’, ‘loyal’, ‘honest’?°° and free of ‘prejudice, passion and partisanship’*°’ can hope to meet the requirements of Baha’i consultation.

4. Anew model for political decision-making Where politics are not intended to serve the assertion of interests and the gaining of personal or group benefits, the nature of

political decision-making must also be different. The instrument for this new quality of political decision-making is Baha’i consultation. Baha’i consultation is a form of communicative decision-making. It presents itself not as a philosophical theory but

as real practice. Consultation is a rational instrument for the joint definition of goals and for their joint realization. At the same time, consultation is a method whereby conscious or unconscious fixations, prejudices, vested interests and mental blocks

among the participants in the consultation process can gradually be brought to light and cancelled out. Consultation helps to transform individual interests into communal ones and thus to optimize both ends and means for the benefit of all. Consultation is an instrument of social self-governance in a society that is coming of age. It is also a fundamental ethical attitude, a way of life. The process of consultation reflects the overcoming of the conflict-oriented friend/foe paradigm and its replacement by

a pattern in which rational agreement is directed towards peace and the optimization of common interests. Through this process, diverse interests in society, as well as the individual and society, can be reconciled. Politically mature citizens and a politically mature society will support one another. The sign of

maturity is responsibility. To achieve such a level of maturity,

256. 257.

Shoghi Effendi, letter dated 1 July 1943, in Bahd’i Elections 13. Letter dated 11 August 1933, in Baha’i Elections 11.

473

Chapter 6 * Ulrich Gollmer

we must first use a consultative process in which all are equals to discover the criteria necessary for creating responsibility. This beginning will enable us to progress toward making appropriate decisions which can then be carried out in unity.

This is not the place for a detailed presentation and analy-

sis of Baha’i consultation.2°? The following quotations from Baha’i scripture can, however, provide an impression of the prerequisites, the means and the ethics of consultation: The prime requisites for them that take counsel

to-

gether are purity of motive, radiance of spirit, detachment from all else save God, . . . humility and lowliness amongst His loved ones, suffering in difficulties.?°?

patience

and

long-

[All] must take counsel together in such wise that no occasion for ill-feeling or discord may arise. This can be attained when every member expresseth with absolute freedom his own opinion and setteth forth his argument. Should anyone oppose, he must on no account feel hurt for not until matters are fully discussed can

the right way be revealed.?©° The

first condition

is absolute

love and harmony

amongst the members of the assembly. They must be wholly free from estrangement .. . They must then proceed with the utmost devotion, courtesy, dignity, care and moderation to express their views. They must

258.

For this see Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 13.2 (13.2.1 on ‘Consulta-

tion as a fundamental social principle’; 13.2.2 on ‘Preliminary thoughts for a theory of consultation’; 13.2.2.1 on ‘The primacy of ethics’; 13.2.2.2 on ‘Coordinates for the methodical use of reason in the consultation process’; 13.2.3 on ‘Systematic distortions of consultation’; 13.2.3 on ‘The pragmatics of institutional consultation’). See also Consultation: A Compilation, Research Department of the Universal House of Justice, Wilmette, Ill., 1980.

,

259.

‘Abdu’l-Baha, Selections 43.

260.

ibid. 44.

474

Bahai Political Thought in every matter search out the truth and not insist upon their own opinion, for stubbornness and persistence in one’s views will lead ultimately to discord and wrangling and the truth will remain hidden . . . It is in no wise permissible for one to belittle the thought of another . . . Should they endeavour to fulfil these conditions the Grace of the Holy Spirit shall be vouchsafed unto them, and that assembly shall become the centre of the Divine blessings.7°!

At present, consultation is primarily used for matters relating to

the organization of the community.

Without it, the Baha’i

community’s institutions would not be what they are; they would be nothing but another democratically elected religious body. Consultation as a way of life is also a constituent element

of Baha’i marriage and family life and in all spheres in which people have to make joint decisions and act together. It is obvious that such radical changes of attitude and behaviour cannot take place overnight, but the Baha’i community is on the way to

doing so.”©? It is as much a training ground as a model for this new pattern of social life. Beyond the community, Baha’i con-

sultation is a living model of non-particularist communicative

261.

ibid. 45.

262.

Even

after his first attacks

on the Baha’is, Ficicchia

still ac-

knowledged this. He wrote: ‘You do not deny that mistakes are bound to be made wherever people associate with one another. I realize that the inevitable disagreements that arise from day to day do not constitute grounds for leaving or rejecting the community as a whole. Human faults should, instead, serve to motivate one to work with others in order

to consolidate the community, even if there are repeated set-backs. The development and consolidation of community life depends on the readiness of its members to practise tolerance and forebearance. I believe that the administrative order presents a firm foundation upon which the community can develop and be perfected. I can say with satisfaction that I know of no other religious institution that can offer more suitable conditions for this than the Baha’i administrative order’ (letter to the Universal House of Justice dated 29 March 1977).

475

Chapter 6 * Ulrich Gollmer

decision-making, a model offered to anyone interested in a new style of political discourse. 5. Responsibility for the world we live in

A God who reveals himself to mankind is evidently interested in his creatures; when this revelation contains ethical norms, laws and structures that are directed not only towards the salva-

tion of the individual but also towards the conditions of the individual’s life, then divine interest in the order of the world is evident, too. The world itself is an object of salvation, of divine

mercy. Even if the world in its natural and social aspects is accepted as something positive—as

in the case of the Baha’i

Faith—it should nevertheless not be left to itself. It must be fostered and developed. The world should be shaped into a place where people are no longer hostile to one another, where greed, cold-heartedness and cruelty no longer prevail, but where, instead, understanding, affection and sympathy are predomi-

nant. Man should no longer be ‘a wolf unto his fellow man’,? but rather his servant and friend. A social and spiritual climate must be created in which the talents and faculties of every individual can be developed to the benefit of both the individual and society. The Judaeo-Christian tradition has a term for a world such as this: the “Kingdom of God on earth’, or heaven

on earth. It is the Baha’is’ conviction that such a world is not a fantastical utopia in an imaginary never-never-land. Neither do they believe that such a transformation could ever be achieved through human will and human reason alone. Lasting peace, especially peace in human hearts, is possible only as a gift of divine mercy: “Other powers are too weak and are incapable of

accomplishing this.’*°* However, this peace will not simply fall 263. ‘Homo homini lupus.’ This dictum from_the Roman comic dramatist Plautus (250-184 BC) is at the core of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. 264.

‘Abdu’l-Baha, Promulgation, p. 12.

476

Baha ’i Political Thought

out of the blue; the divine mercy bestowed must be manifested through human action: ‘Endeavour, ceaseless endeavour, is required. ’2°° Ficicchia tries to dismiss the will to regenerate the world as illegitimate. If he denies the ability of religion to introduce a creative impulse into the world, to create new conditions, to change what is possible for human beings to achieve, then so be

it?©°_he is certainly not alone in his opinion. As a Baha’i, one can also live with his attempts to make the vision of such a future appear ridiculous. However, the defamatory and distorted

picture he paints of the Baha’is’ honest intention of working peacefully and in a spirit of service towards a more just, hu-

mane and peaceful world, is something that must be corrected. The fact that others have thoughtlessly adopted his distorted

view, in spite of the testimony of the scripture and the community, is an odious vexation.

265.

‘Abdu’l-Baha, Secret, p. 66.

266. It is noteworthy, however, that he did not always see it this way: ‘Is this world order not after all a utopia?—We see the realization of world peace not in the form of a state of paradise suddenly appearing out of the blue, in which all problems and conflicts quite simply solve themselves . . . Just as physical force as a means of solving individual disagreements has been overcome,

it is possible to overcome

war as a

means of power, without people turning into angels. This world peace will be the fruit of an unfolding process of transformation, the nucleus of which is the new revelation’ (‘Kurzreferat tiber die Baha’i-Religion’, 3 February 1972, p. 14). ‘The Baha’is see improvement of the world situation not in revolution, but in evolution, in development from below.

Political revolution and violent overthrow do not lead to true progress and peace; history has provided sufficient proof of that. Rather, development comes about through changes in people’s minds, attitudes and beliefs. What must be changed is man himself, along with his ethical and moral values, so that he can perceive humanity as one family and one community. This is the goal of the Baha’is.. .’ (undated manuscript, p. 4).

477

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Beier 22 1, ea ' Biprectelis tab ja tote tes era1) bl sofort nat eat + AS es se aie > ~s afiitt tom ect bee & forrera:magia Qeaepiee itr, ee coralie ne tis oni Caeas GR Baha’ulah is the founder of a new religion: to the Baha’is he is the

Man yuzhiruhu 'llah foretold by the Bab. The Baha’i community has remained to this day single and undivided. 6. Finally, Browne’s tendency to sympathize with the weaker side and give it his support may also have contributed to his partisanship in favour of Mirza Yahya Azal. As early as 1877-78, during the Russo-Turkish war, which had first in-

52. Tarikh-i-Jadid, Intro., p. ix.

53. ‘Indeed the usefulness of his later works is marred by his preoccupation with reviving a dispute which was long since over. Almost twenty years before Browne’s interest in this subject was aroused, Baha’u’1llah had put forward the claim to be “He Whom God shall make manifest”, foretold by the Bab. The vast majority of Babis, including the survivors amongst the Bab’s Letters of the Living, those of the Bab’s own family who were believers, and the majority of the most eminent believers surviving, accepted this claim and rejected the feeble, uninspiring leadership of Mirza Yahya, Subh-i-Azal’ (Momen, The Babi and Baha’i Religions, p. 32). 54. See my discussion below, pp. 672f. 55. See my discussion below, pp. 628ff., 672f.

542

Ficicchia’s European Sources

spired Browne’s interest in the Orient, he spoke of his support for the Turks, who as the losing side were deserving of his sympathies: ‘At first my proclivities were by no means for the Turks; but the losing side, more especially when it continues to struggle gallantly against defeat, always has a claim to our sympathy, and moreover the cant of the anti-Turkish party in England, and the wretched attempts to confound questions of abstract justice with party politics, disgusted me beyond meas-

ure. Ere the close of the war I would have died to save Turkey, and I mourned the fall of Plevna as though it had been a disaster

inflicted on my own country.?>© He may have seen in Mirza Yahya, too, the minority deserving of sympathy. He mentioned

repeatedly that Mirza Yahya had very few followers and that he sometimes even had to go to market himself in order to buy basic necessities.*” In Browne’s publications from 1891 onwards, and in his introductions and commentaries in works he edited such as A Traveller’s Narrative (1891), Tarikh-i-Jadid (1893),

Kitab-i-Nuqtatu’l-Kaf (1910) and Materials for the Study of the Babi Religion (1918), he clearly expresses his sympathy for the minority, i.e. for Mirza Yahya, and later for individuals such as

Khayru’llah, who tried in vain to claim leadership among the Baha ’is in the West around the turn of the century.*8 In later years Browne’s interest in the Babi and Baha’i faiths waned, which was probably at least partly due to the ve-

56. A Year Amongst the Persians, p. 8. 57. ‘Mirza Yahya appears to have been almost without supporters at Adrianople, so that, according to his own account, he and his little boy were compelled to go themselves to the market to buy their daily food’ (A Traveller's Narrative, p. 99, note 1). Elsewhere, too, Browne expresses his sympathy, when he says: ‘Subh-i-Ezel was so completely deserted that, as he himself informed me, he and his little boy had to go themselves to the bazaar to buy their food’ (Tdrikh-i-Jadid, Intro., p. xxii). 58. See Richard Hollinger, ‘Ibrahim George Kheiralla and the Baha’i Faith in America’, in Cole and Momen (eds.), From Iran East and West, SBB, vol. 2, pp. 95-133; and Balyuzi, Edward Granville Browne, pp. 114-155.

543

Chapter 9 ¢ Nicola Towfigh

hement response of a reviewer to A Traveller's Narrative.°° The reviewer criticized Browne for his subjective attitude to the object of his research and dismissed Babism as a completely insignificant phenomenon, unworthy of academic investigation. Although Browne also received many positive comments and

reviews concerning his publication, this extremely negative review appears to have affected him deeply. More than ten

years later he commented on it in the Foreword to Phelps’ Life and Teachings of Abbas Effendi, remarking on the reviewer’s lack of expertise in the field and declaring that: “Increasing age and experience, (more’s the pity!) are apt enough, even without the assistance of the Oxford Magazine, to modify our enthusiasms .. ©! Hence, he increasingly devoted himself to other aspects of oriental studies, publishing a variety of works, such as A Literary History of Persia From Firdawsi to Sa‘di (1906), The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909 (1910) and The Persian Constitutional Movement (1918), works that are still read and appreciated today. Edward Granville Browne died at the age of 64 on 5 Janu-

ary 1926, just a few months after the death of his wife in June 1925. He is still renowned as an outstanding orientalist, promoter of Persian studies in the West and researcher on the subject of the Babi and Baha’i religions. The material he so tire-

lessly assembled still remains a rich source for anyone studying the faiths of the Bab and Baha’u’llah. Nevertheless, because Browne was not an objective, non-partisan researcher and therefore committed some serious errors, it is important for the reader to examine his work critically and to make careful com59. Oxford Magazine (25 May 1892), p. 394. 60. See Momen, The Babi and Bahda’i Religions, p. 36. 61. Phelps, Life and Teachings of Abbas Effendi, Intro., p. xiv.

544

Ficicchia’s European Sources parisons with other sources. Only if this is done can the reader profit from Browne’s publications. To read his works uncritically will inevitably impart a very one-sided, false perspective on the subject.

545

Chapter 9 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

II. THE PROTESTANT MINISTER HERMANN ROMER In the Introduction to his monograph,®? Ficicchia lists among his sources the work of a Protestant theologian, Hermann R6mer.®3 Ficicchia does, indeed, owe a great deal to this source, especially in the section of his book concerning Babi and Baha’i

history. R6mer® produced the first major work on the Babi and Baha’i faiths to be published in German. His work was a dis-

sertation entitled Die Babi-Beha 7,©> which was approved by the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Tubingen on 11 May

1911. An identical edition®® was published in 1912 by the German Oriental Mission in Potsdam and by Quell-Verlag, Stutt-

gart,°’ the same publishers who were later to publish Ficicchia’s monograph. His dissertation was not the first work produced by Romer on the Babis and Baha’is. As early as 1908°° and 1910 he had discussed these religions in essays—the latter under the title

62. Baha’ismus, p. 25. 63. His name appears in most literature as ‘Roemer’. In fact, this spelling is found only in the title of his book, where the name is written in capitals. Elsewhere, it is always spelled Romer. 64. His curriculum vitae (p. 193 of his dissertation) shows that he was born on 8 July 1880 in Pfrondorf near Tiibingen as the son of a Protestant minister. He studied in the Faculties of Theology and Philosophy in Tiibingen and Halle. After graduating in theology he took up an ecclesiastical position in the German State of Wiirttemberg. 65. The subtitle reads: ‘A Study Concerning the Religious History of Islam’, published in the year 1911 by the publishing house of the German Oriental Mission, Potsdam. 66. The subtitle, however, was altered, now reading: ‘The latest Mohammedan sect’.

67. In the copy located in the Wtrttemberg State Library the original publisher’s name (Verlag der Deutschen Orient-Mission, Potsdam) is erased and replaced by Quell-Verlag, Stuttgart. 68. ‘Der Beha’ismus’, in Evangelisches Missions-Magazin, new series,

vol. 52, pp. 321-31.

546

Ficicchia’s European Sources

‘Die behaistische Propaganda im Abendland’ [‘Behaist Propa-

ganda in the Occident’].© In these essays, he presented the Baha’is as part of a large-scale movement among Asian relig-

ions directed against Christian missionary efforts.” Romer

was

a Protestant theologian,

not an orientalist.

Having no knowledge of Arabic or Persian, he made use of the materials available in European languages, which he listed systematically and with great meticulousness.”! Rémer’s ability to collate and interpret the sources, which were very sparse in

comparison with what is available today, is truly impressive; that he sometimes made false assumptions can hardly be held against him. He relied for most of his information on the works of Browne—and he not only reproduced Browne’s errors’ but even intensified them through pointed emphasis. The philosophical and theological background for his understanding of

the Babi-Baha’i religion was shaped by Ignaz Goldziher;”3 something that was also to have major consequences for his interpretation of the sources. Despite this dependence on infor-

mation provided by others, along with the resulting misinter-

69. ‘Die Propaganda ftir asiatische Religionen Basler Missionsstudien, issue 10, pp. 45-55. 70. In the preliminary remarks in his essay ‘Der he characterizes this as follows: ‘What is new is now participating in the construction of a natural future . . . This syncretistic process, from which

im Abendland’,

in

Behaismus’ (p. 321), that the East itself is world religion of the a modern Enlighten-

ment in both East and West is expecting salvation, has been drawing

attention for years (especially since the Congress of Religions in Chicago in 1893) and, from year to year, it is becoming an increasingly strong countercurrent to our mission.’

71. Die Babi-Beha 7, pp. 2-8. 72. See Towfigh, above, pp. 492ff. and below, pp. 660ff. 73. As Romer states in his

Foreword, Die Babi-Beha 7, p. iii. His main

sources were the following texts by Goldziher: Die Religion des Islams: Kultur der Gegenwart I, section 3.1 (1906), pp. 127-130; Vorlesungen tiber den Islam, pp. 295-305. For other texts by Goldziher referred to by Romer, see Die Babi-Beha’7, p. v.

547

Chapter 9 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer pretations, his work is definitely an independent achievement, a survey the like of which had never previously been seen. Nevertheless, the fact must not be overlooked that R6mer’s study reveals a very definite bias, a bias which, to be fair,

he declares openly several times in his book: “My study sprang from the practical need to counter the propaganda of the Beha’is

in Germany, after I had witnessed the establishment of the Beha’i Association in Stuttgart when I was municipal vicar there in 1907. It is also intended to serve the Christian mission in the Muhammedan world.’”4 ‘The missions must have a clear picture of the Beha’is and know whether they are to be regarded as allies or rivals. The propaganda that has been conducted in the West by the Beha’is for several years has finally made an investigation such as this an urgent requirement.’7> Hence, Rémer’s work must be regarded, on the one hand,

in the context of the Christian mission to the Orient. As recent research has revealed,’® there was at first disagreement within the Christian missionary movement as to how the Babi and Baha’i faiths should be assessed. Whereas they were initially viewed as a means of breaking down the otherwise rigid front

of Islamic belief,” and as a group that would play into the 74. Die Babi-Beha 7, Foreword, p. iii. 75. ibid. Intro., p. 1. 76. Momen, ‘Early Relations between Christian Missionaries and the Babi and Baha’i Communities’, pp. 49-82; Martin, ‘The Missionary as Historian’, pp. 43-63. 77. Relations with the Baha’is were at first friendly, even warm. Pastor W. Faber reports (in the appendix to Friedrich Carl Andreas, Die Babi’s in Persien, p. 68), for instance, that: ‘The contact which I had established in 1892 with influential Babis, and which Dr Zerweck and

Pastor Kézle intended to sustain, was the main reason given by the Persian government to the Foreign Office of the German Reich for the expulsion of the German missionaries. In the eyes of the Persian government, the Babis have always been and still are dangerous revolutionaries, whom the government seeks to annihilate by fire and the sword, whereas in reality they are pioneers of truth, liberty and law in the dark land of Persia, sacrificing their lives with such courage and joy as has

548

Ficicchia’s European Sources

hands of the Christian missionaries,’® this view gradually gave way to the conviction that the Baha’is posed a dangerous threat

seldom been seen in the history of the world.” However, that not all Christians shared Faber’s hope that ‘Babism’ might be a ‘preliminary step towards Christianity’ was evident from A. Socin’s response (Die christliche Welt. Evangelisch-Lutherisches Gemeindeblatt fiir Gebildete aller Stdnde, vol. 10): ‘Basically, we are concerned here with Muslims of a particular type; their dogma that Christianity is but a subordinate stage in the development of their religion, and of religions in general, will always prevent them from advancing closer towards Christianity.’ On the initially friendly contacts with missionaries of the British Church Missionary Society see Momen, ‘Early Relations’, pp. 63ff. Probably the first mention of the Bab to be published in German was in an article by an American missionary, Austin Henry Wright, ‘Bab und seine Secte in Persien’, in Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenldndischen Gesellschaft, vol. 5, pp. 384f. 78. This can also be seen from the following statements: ‘There is, of course, the fact that its followers [i.e. the Babis] lend an open ear to the message of the Gospel, and if the hope of rapid and major missionary success among them is sanguine, then it is possible that Babism will act as a gateway through which the Gospel will gain access to the Mohammedan

world’

(Gustav

Warneck,

in Allgemeine

Missions-Zeitschrift,

vol. 21, p. 136). ‘Having emerged from the bosom of Islam, Babism has been a major challenge to orthodox Mohammedanism because of its steady growth, and some have prophesied that a great future lies ahead for it in the orient. The missionaries working in Persia frequently come into contact with it, and, owing to its friendly attitude towards Christi-

anity, the hope has been expressed that this religious movement might perhaps be the threshold over which the Gospel may reach the hearts of the Muslims .. . What makes us Christians look towards the Babis with some hope is the circumstance that with their more liberal religious thinking they are less hostile to Christianity than the Mohammedans. Indeed, they are sometimes very friendly and are very attentive towards the Gospel. Regarded by the bigoted Mohammedans as heretics, subjected to hatred and suppression, it is probably natural that they should feel a certain affinity with Christianity. Many eagerly read the Holy Scripture, and so it is possible that the Word of Truth will gradually open their eyes, and they will realize that they have only come half way. However, this hope, which was held even decades ago, has so far mostly been deceptive’ (editorial in Evangelisches Missions-Magazin, new series, vol. 38, pp. 13, 25). Evidence for the gradual change in this assessment of the Baha’is (who were still referred to as Babis) is provided by the article written nine years later by Julius Richter (in Allgemeine

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Chapter 9 « Ulrich Gollmer

to Christian missionary efforts among the Muslims.”? In terms of both its content and the time of its composition, Romer’s work belongs to the second of these two phases.°®°

Missions-Zeitschrift, vol. 30, p. 242): ‘Nowhere does anyone seem to have come any closer towards the Babis, in whom great hopes were placed in the past; their acknowledgement of the Holy Scripture and certain Christian doctrines is cancelled out by their arbitrary interpretation of the scripture, when one thinks one has them trapped on account of a scriptural proof they slip out of the net with their “Now let us analyse this passage and get to the heart of it.” ’ These statements throw a different light on Ficicchia’s assertion that the Baha’is are not open to dialogue (Baha ’ismus, pp. 23, 29). 79. This culminates in the demand expressed by J.R. Richards, a missionary of the Church Missionary Society stationed in Shiraz, that any Iranian seeking baptism should be required ‘to declare publicly before the whole Church that they consider Baha’u’llah a false prophet’. He went on to suggest that: ‘Some such formula as the following would probably meet the case: “I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God; that He really died on the Cross for our salvation; that He really and truly rose from the dead, leaving behind Him an empty tomb; that He was really and truly seen by the disciples as the Gospels bear witness. I believe that He alone is the Saviour of the world. I deny the doctrine of rij ‘at, by which I am to believe that Jesus was Moses returned, and that Mohammad,

the Bab and Baha’u’llah were

“returns” of Jesus, and I

declare it to be false teaching. Accepting Jesus as my Lord and Saviour I declare

Mohammad,

the Bab

and Baha’u’llah

to have

been

false

prophets and false guides, leading men away from the truth” ’ (The Religion of the Baha ’is, pp. 236f.). 80. Rémer himself summarizes this process in the following terms: ‘The generally friendly attitude towards Christianity has brought the Babis under Beha Allah (Baha’u’llah) into contact with the Christian missions in Persia, . . . which for decades held the hope that the sect would act as a transition stage from Islam to Christianity . . . The Christian missions in Persia have now realized, however, that Babism is not doing

groundwork for them but is a rival that, with its allegorical interpretation of the Bible, is immune to all attempts at Christian conversion...’ (Die Babi-Beha7, p. 140). Even social institutions run by the Iranian Baha’i community, in particular the running of a school in Teheran, is regarded by Rémer as ‘an important propaganda tool’ that merely ‘sails under the flag of philanthropy’. He asserts that this school ‘was set up to rival the American missionary schools in Persia’ (ibid. p. 149).

550

Ficicchia’s European Sources

On the other hand, Rémer’s work also had the aim of providing arguments against Baha’i missionary efforts in his local-

ity.8! It was inevitable that these two goals would cause the author to be on the look-out for aspects that could be used critically against the Baha’is. For this reason, Rémer was open to

the Azali arguments presented by Browne,®? as well as to the distortions by Muslim critics reproduced by Gobineau,®3 and he uncritically adopted these positions. This was to have obvious

effects on R6mer’s depiction of the history and doctrines of the Babi and Baha’i faiths. 1. Romer’s presentation: its structure and influence on later works Romer divided his dissertation into four sections which present

the main historical events in the development of the Babi and Baha’i faiths chronologically up to Romer’s own time. The long first section covers the period from the establishment of the

Babi community up to the succession issue following the execution of the Bab.84 The second section deals with the leading role of Baha’u’llah during the period in Baghdad and Adriano-

ple, and with the gradual transformation of the community.® The third part describes the shaping of the Baha’i Faith by Baha’u’llah during the period of his exile in Palestine.8° The

fourth part covers the time of “Abdu’l-Baha’s leadership up to

81. He speaks in this context of a ‘focal point of Behaist propaganda’ (Die Propaganda, p. 49). 82. See Towfigh, above, pp. 496ff., pp. 522ff. and Gollmer, below, pp. 660ff. 83. See, for instance, Gollmer, above, p 483, note 5.

84. Die Babi-Beha 7, pp. 9-72. 85. ibid. pp. 72-108. 86. ibid. pp. 108-144.

551

Chapter 9 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

about 1908, necessarily excluding his journeys®” to Egypt, Europe and North America.®8 Despite its chronological structure, R6mer’s interest was

not really in the history of the Babi and Baha’i communities. The history merely provided a framework for discussing the content. He described at length some of Baha’u’llah’s works, which were known to him from descriptions and sometimes

from early translations.®° His main interest was in fundamental aspects of theology in Babi and Baha’i doctrine, especially the issues of the concept of God, prophetology, anthropology and salvation.2° Thus, even in the presentation of history, the underlying subliminal bias is unmistakable.

Until its rediscovery by Ficicchia,?! Rémer’s study had been largely forgotten. The reasons for this are self-evident: his material reflects what was known at the turn of the century, the

sources he used? are all available in European languages®? and

87. ‘Abdu’]-Baha’s imprisonment came to an end in July 1908 as a result of the Young Turk Revolution, so that after a period of physical recuperation he was able to undertake several lengthy journeys between August 1910 and December 1913. The large number of talks delivered during these travels are an important source for understanding Baha’i views on central topics of interest in the Western world in the period leading up to the first world war (see ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Promulgation of Universal Peace, Paris Talks, ‘Abdu’l-Bahd in London: Addresses and Notes of Conversations, London 2nd edn. 1982; Werner Gollmer, Mein Herz ist bei euch. ‘Abdu’l-Baha in Deutschland, Hofheim, 1988). These

were not available to Rémer when preparing his dissertation.

88. Die Babi-Beha7, pp. 144-177. 89. ibid. pp. 97-134. 90. The relevant passages are scattered throughout the book, but especially in Sections 1 and 4. Furthermore, in two appendices (pp. 178-192) Romer attempts to identify ‘related phenomena’ in Islam past and present. 91. ‘It was .. . a matter of concern to me to allow the especially valuable statements and thoughts expressed by Romer to be heard once again’ (Baha ’ismus, p. 25). 92. Rémer divides his sources into the following. five categories: (1) The early works of Gobineau and Kazem Beg, and the subsequent works

552

Ficicchia’s European Sources

are therefore directly available to non-orientalists, and moreover

his theological interpretation of the doctrines of the Baha’i Faith is inaccurate. Orientalist publications, in particular, have therefore concentrated on the direct sources and on the original research of Browne, Nicolas, etc. rather than on R6mer’s second and third-hand analysis. For this reason—despite his undeniable achievement in producing an independent monographical survey of the knowledge available at the ttme—R6omer’s study has hitherto been rightly disregarded outside the German-speaking countries. His work Die Babi-Beha7 appeared only as a reference in a few German-language articles and treatises in the

fields of theology and religious history.?4 A review of Rémer’s dissertation appeared about two years after its publication.?° Richard Schafer’s polemical text Die neue Religion des falschen Christus. Wider den Beha’ismus!®© is based almost

of Ethé, v. Kremer, Vambéry, Dorn, Baron Rosen and Huart; (2) the works of Browne; (3) works by Baha’is (amongst whom he erroneously includes Nicolas); (4) reports by Christian missionaries, (5) recent German works (including Goldziher). 93. Moreover, as far as the Baha’i texts are concerned, the translations

now available are of vastly improved quality. 94. Such as Ernst Dammann, Grundrif der Religionsgeschichte, Stuttgart, 1972, pp. 104-107; Rainer Flasche, “Die Religion der Einheit und Selbstverwirklichung der Menschheit—Geschichte und Mission der Baha’i in Deutschland’, in Zeitschrift fir Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft, vol. 61 (1977), pp. 188-213, Hans-Jirgen Kornrumpf, keyword ‘Baha’i’, in Lexikon der islamischen

Welt, vol. 1,

Stuttgart, 1974, pp. 83-84; Ginter Lanczkowski, review of F. Ficicchia’s Baha’ismus, in Theologische Rundschau, vol. 48 (1983), p. 209; R. Mielck,

‘Vom

Bahaismus

(1923), pp. 138-144;

in Deutschland’,

Gerhard Rosenkranz,

gelisches Kirchenlexikon,

vol. 1, Gottingen,

in Der Islam,

keyword

vol.

13

‘Baha’i’, Evan-

1956, col. 291f.-292; Paul

Scheurlen, Die Sekten der Gegenwart, Stuttgart: Quell-Verlag, 2nd edn. 1921, pp. 169-175, 4th enl. edn. 1930, pp. 408-417. 95. Arthur Christensen, in Der Islam, vol. 5, pp. 389-390.

96. ‘The new religion of the false Christ. Down with Beha’ism!”, Cassel, 1912. The work ends with a call for recruits to the ‘Deutsche Orient

$53

Chapter 9 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

exclusively on Romer. The only other author to have used

Romer as a source on a large scale is Gerhard Rosenkranz.*’ That no Baha’{s?8 have dealt in detail with Romer’s work is therefore not surprising. It would be unfair to criticize him now, after more than eighty years, for his misinterpretations and (inevitable) limited knowledge. It must, however, be demonstrated why it is not possible to use ROmer as an unverified source, as Ficicchia has done. 2.

R6mer’s portrayal of Babi and Baha’i history

In accordance with his goal of ‘countering the propaganda of

the Beha’is in Germany’,?? Rémer concentrates on those statements in his sources that, from the viewpoint of a predominantly Christian readership, are likely to cast a negative light on the Baha’is. Anything that fails to fit into the ideal image of a conflict-free, harmonious community of saints appears as if through a magnifying glass: blown up out of proportion, fuzzy and distorted. Whereas Gobineau! and Browne, in their desire

Mission, Potsdam’, who were the first publishers of Rémer’s book Die

Babi-Beha 7. 97. Die Baha’i. In particular, Rosenkranz adopted Rémer’s categorization of the Baha’i Faith as neo-Platonic, although he also placed a certain emphasis on the independent nature of Baha’i doctrine in crucial aspects such as its prophetology (pp. 52ff.). A further work in the same tradition is Flasche’s “Gnostische Tendenzen innerhalb neuer Religionen’, in Una Sancta, vol. 41, pp. 339ff., especially pp. 341-343; on this subject see below, p. 564, note 140. 98. With one exception, in which, however, only one aspect is discussed and R6mer’s work is mentioned more or less in passing: Claudia Gollmer, Die metaphysischen und theologischen Grundlagen der Erziehungslehre der Bahda’i-Religion, MA dissertation, University of Stuttgart, 1982-83,

unpublished. This work includes a critique of the one-sided interpretation of Baha’i doctrine as neo-Platonic (see pp. 11, 64, 79, 86, 99). 99. Foreword, Die Babi-Beha’7,, p. iii. 100.

The

fundamental

attitude of these

authors

to foreign

cultures

could hardly have been more different. The conclusion drawn by Eber-

554

Ficicchia’s European Sources

to understand, had allowed themselves to be emotionally caught up in the subject of their research, Rémer’s study is character-

ized by detachment and scepticism.!°! The fact that he consistently refers to the Babi and Baha’i faiths as a ‘sect’!9 is testimony to this. Similarly, his conclusion that reports about the missionary successes of the Bab are evidence of “mass hys-

teria’, and even of a ‘religious epidemic’,!° reveals his attitude to the subject-matter. Critical statements made by Baha’u’llah

about certain rulers and the representatives of the Shi‘a clergy

hard Straub (‘Die Gétterdimmerung des Abendlandes. Der mifverstandene Arthur de Gobineau’, in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 December 1982) about Gobineau’s attitude towards other cultures applies both to Gobineau and, to a certain extent, to Browne. He wrote: ‘Gobi-

neau’s reputation in the Third World is due not least to the fact that he constantly drew a polemical contrast between the originality, independence and even the dignity of African and Asian poetry, art and social mores, and Europe, which he saw as becoming more and more inferior.’ Romer, on the other hand, is all too obviously and unquestioningly convinced of the superiority of his own cultural and religious tradition. 101. A small but significant indication of Rémer’s pejorative attitude is his treatment of the many reports about Babi and Baha’i martyrs. Gobineau, Browne and Western eye-witnesses had shown great admiration for these martyrs (the earliest eye-witness account in German is a letter written by an Austrian captain, von Goumoens, dated 29 August 1852, printed in Oesterreichischer Soldatenfreund, vol. 5.123 (12 October 1852), and in Die Presse, Vienna, no. 242 (13 October 1852). For a se-

lection of further reports see Momen, The Babi and Baha’i Religions, pp. 83-90, 100-105, 132-146). Rémer, however, depicts the Babi and Bahai martyrs as figures who have fallen victim to pseudo-religious hysteria, and describes their devotion as conscious stage-acting, as a state of ‘artificial Sufi ecstasy’ (Die Babi-Beha7, p. 35). He especially accuses Quddis, towards whom the Azali sources are particularly hostile, of having ‘taught’ the Babis ‘joy in death’ (p. 36). Only in the case of the Bab himself does he admit a similarity to the martyrdom of “Jesus of Nazareth’, although he immediately qualifies this by the words: ‘however fundamentally different their religious orientation’ (p. 36). One has the impression that he is desperately trying to avoid any comparison to early Christian acts of martyrdom.

102. e.g. Die Babi-Beha 7, pp. 69, 134, 144f., 148, 154, 160, 173, 175, 178. 103. ibid. p. 37. 555

Chapter 9 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

of his time are described by Romer as ‘personal attacks’,!°4 and the exhortations and warnings addressed to them by Baha’u’llah

are described as a ‘curse’.!°5 Rémer is especially keen to spread reports about disagreements over the succession,! so-called schisms!°7 and both real and alleged acts of violence. !°8 Romer’s use of historical sources appears in a particularly

negative light when one examines his treatment of the murder charges raised against Baha’u’llah and the Baha’is. These accu-

sations can be traced to one source alone: the Azali apology, Hasht Bihisht. Romer was acquainted with this text as a result

of Browne’s publication of excerpts from it.!°? However, while Browne had emphasized the polemical character of the work!!° and clearly stated clearly that he was unable to confirm the

104. ibid. p. 126. 105. ibid. pp. 106, 108. 106. e.g. ibid. pp. 64ff., 69ff. 107. e.g. ibid. pp. 38f., 149. The same spirit is evident in the headings ‘Succession conflicts and schism’ (Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 229) and ‘So young and already a schism’ in an article entitled ‘Die Baha’i’ written by Marburg theologian Gerhard Rosenkranz which appeared in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on 3 May 1958. Rosenkranz later distanced himself from this editorial interpolation and explained that he considered the term ‘schism’ to be ‘inappropriate in this context’ (in Schaefer, Die Baha’i-Religion im Spiegel christlicher Betrachtung. Ein Briefwechsel, pp. 38ff.). On this subject see also Schaefer, above, pp. 50f., 154 note 70, and Towfigh, below, pp. 671 ff.

108. Especially the charge of murder raised against Baha’u’llah and his followers (Die Babi-Beha’i, pp. 80, 94, 137f.; see also Towfigh, below, pp. 650ff., but also other accusations and allegations of violence, in particular those raised by the covenant-breakers (e.g. Die Babi-Beha’i, pp. 148, 158). 109.

A Traveller’s Narrative, Note W, pp. 352ff.

110.

In the introduction to his summary of the Hasht Bihisht, p. 356,

he states that: ‘These sections occupy many pages, are of a violently

polemical character, and contain grave charges against the Beha’is and vehement attacks on their position and doctrines.’

556

Ficicchia’s European Sources

charges raised in it,!!! Romer presents the murder allegations in this ‘historical work’!!? as fact—despite the lack of any other evidence. Romer’s assertion that ‘religiously motivated murder is not unusual in the orient and is even sanctioned by the exam-

ple of Muhammed

himself’!!3 is understandable only in the

context of the prevalent attitude of Christian and Eurocentric arrogance and its consequent anti-Islamic prejudice. In order to increase the credibility of the allegations, R6mer even goes so

far as to distort statements made in his sources.!!4

Hutten!!5 and Ficicchia!!® took over Rémer’s portrayal of events, the latter placing even more emphasis on these aspects.

The charge of historical falsification!!” that is so central to Ficicchia’s book is also to be found in Rémer’s work, albeit in-

111. ibid. p. 364. 112. It is referred to as such by Rémer, Die Babi-Beha7, p. 4. 113. ibid. p. 137. While it is undeniable that today in particular religiously and politically motivated acts of violence have taken place in the name of Islam, these can no more be ascribed to Muhammad and the Qur’an (see, for instance, Bassam Tibi, ‘Ist der islamische Terrorismus ein Dschihad?’, in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 March 1995, pp. 8-9) than corresponding phenomena in the traditionally Christian Western world can be ascribed to Jesus. 114. Romer asserts (Die Babi-Beha 7, p. 80), for instance, that ‘after a heated argument’ (‘nach erregter Auseinandersetzung’) with Dayyan, Baha’u’llah ordered his murder. However, what Browne had written in his summary of the Hasht Bihisht (A Traveller’s Narrative, Note W,

p. 357) was ‘after a protracted discussion with him’. By turning the ‘protracted discussion’ into a ‘heated argument’ Romer adds extra weight to the charge by supplying a motive. For further details on this matter see Towfigh, below, pp. 652ff. 115.

Seher, Gribler, Enthusiasten, 12th edn. 1982, pp. 800-804, 822-826.

116. The following assertion has the character of a leitmotif in his book: ‘The history of Babism/Baha’ism is one of a constant striving for religious supremacy, of personal power struggles, intrigues and violence’ (Baha’ismus, p. 288). See Schaefer, above, pp. 41f, 100; Tow-

figh, above, pp. 554ff. 117. On this subject see Schaefer above, pp. 41, 52ff., 63ff.; Gollmer, above, pp. 481ff.; Towfigh, above, pp. 500ff., 522ff.

Sey

Chapter 9 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

frequently and with greater reservation.!!® Likewise, Romer is partisan in his selection of sources and the weighting given to

them.!19 Just as Ficicchia was to do later, he gives unquestioning precedence to Azali sources in portraying the conflict be-

tween Baha’u’llah and Mirza Yahya Azal!2°—although it must 118. See for example Die Babi-Beha7, pp. 68, 75f., 84, 136. In most cases this charge is based on the contradictions between Baha’i and those accounts of the Kitdb-i-Nuqtatu’I-Kaf, which Romer did not recognize as Azali fabrications but mistook for an independent early Babi source (Die Babi-Behai, pp. 4, 61f.). Owing to this false assumption, Rémer also misinterprets the—in fact hardly surprising—conformity between the Kitab-i-Nuqtatu 'l-Kaf and the Hasht Bishisht, another Azali work,

as evidence

for the credibility

of the latter (Die Babi-Beha’,

pp. 68f.; on this matter see also Towfigh, above, pp. 500ff., 522ff. 119. Ideological considerations play a crucial role in this. In interpreting the Babi and Baha’i faiths, Rémer had decided to view both as a single theosophical sect (the reasons for this are explained below, pp. 559ff.). Therefore, he not only preferred Azali sources because they could more easily be used in support of this interpretation, but he even postulated his interpretation as the criterion of truth: whatever supported his interpretation he regarded as credible, and whatever contradicted it he saw as dubious. For instance, one of the reasons why he considered Mirza Yahya Azal to be the Bab’s legitimate successor was because the wavering recluse Mirza Yahy4a—in contrast to Baha’u’ll4h with his leadership qualities—embodied what Rémer saw as a theosophical Mahdi ideal, a ‘kindred spirit’ of the Bab as Romer imagined a harbinger of theosophic Mahdism (Die Babi-Beha7, pp. 67f.). Hence for Rémer, his interpretation with its inherent prejudices was more important than a critical analysis of the sources. 120. One of the reasons for this is undoubtedly the fact that even in Rémer’s time the Azalis had no particular attraction for potential converts either in the Orient or in the Christian West, whereas the far more

numerous Baha’is with their intensive missionary activities were regarded as a nuisance. The following statement is characteristic of Romer’s attitude: ‘Just as the light starts to dawn in the Mohammedan world, there appear spokesmen from out of the de-christianized circles of the West who conjure up a form of religious glad tidings for the world—something at which the Christian mission has long been slaving away with the gospel of sin and divine grace’ (Rémer, ‘Der Behaismus’, p. 330). Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that Rémer—in contrast to Ficicchia—does not simply take every Azali assertion at face value: when doubts arise he remarks upon them (e.g. Die Babi-Beha 7, p. 128),

558

Ficicchia’s European Sources

be pointed out in Rémer’s defence that it was not until after the

completion of his study that the availability of sources shifted dramatically in favour of the Baha’i accounts. The same goes for Rémer’s estimation of the Kitdb-i-Nuqtatu’l-Kdf as an inde-

pendent, original Babi source,!?! an assumption made by Browne that has since been proven completely fallacious. !22 3. Romer’s interpretation of Babi/Baha’i doctrine There was another reason, too, for Rémer’s fondness of the Kitab-i-Nuqtatu’l-Kaf. the highly speculative and inflated character of this book is, as he sees it, welcome evidence in support

of his chosen interpretation of Babi and Baha’i doctrine. !23 Romer rightly sees the Babi and Baha’i religions as one.!24 However, this causes him to depict Baha’i doctrine against the background of a peculiarly esoteric and speculative interpretation of Babism. Romer sees Babi doctrine, including the Baha’i Faith, as nothing but one more among countless theosophical

systems. This image of Babism emanates from two sources in particular: the preference of certain orientalists for the especially exotic and mysterious passages in the scripture of the

the same applies to instances when he relies solely on Azali sources (ibid. p. 79). 121.

See above, p. 558, note 118.

122.

See Towfigh, above, pp. 500ff.

123.

See, for instance, Die Babi-Beha 7, pp. 38f.

124. ‘Babism is a single phenomenon and the neo-Babism of the Beha’is is not an original creation’ (ibid. p. 172). Concerning the relationship between the dispensations of the Bab and Baha’u’llah, Shoghi Effendi (Unfolding Destiny, p. 426) writes: ‘. . . the Unity of the Baha’i revelation as one complete whole embracing the Faith of the Bab should be emphasized . . . The Faith of the Bab should not be divorced from that of Baha’u’llah.’ Nevertheless, the Bab is regarded as an independent theophany, each of the two dispensations having its own law (see also God Passes By, pp. 27f., World Order, pp. 61ff., 120ff.).

559

Chapter 9 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

Bab,!2> and the esoteric and speculative Azali literature, which

he therefore regards as expressions of true Babism.!26 Romer interprets the scripture of Baha’u’llah and ‘Abdu’!Baha against this background. He therefore considers Baha’i doctrines that are concerned with practical matters to be external, at best the (more or less conscious) influence of the cultural

movement inspired by the West,!?” or even as mere superficial cosmetic features designed to make the Baha’i Faith more attractive in its missionary efforts in Europe and North Amer-

ica.!28 The Baha’i Faith, R6mer contends, is not alone in this

125.

Browne, keyword ‘Bab, Babis’, in Hastings, Encyclopaedia of

Religions and Ethics, vol. 2, p. 306; Gobineau,

Les Religions et les

Philosophies, pp. 285ff.; Goldziher, Introduction, p. 247. Also by the same author: Die Richtungen der islamischen Koranauslegung, Leiden, 3rd edn. 1970, pp. 258f.; and ‘Verhdltnis des Bab zu friheren SufiLehrern’, in Der Islam, vol. 11, pp. 252ff. See also Rémer, Die Babi-

Beha’, pp. 25-29. 126. The most important of these, apart from the Kitab-i-Nuqtatu 'lKaf, is the text Hasht Bihisht,

Towfigh, above, pp. 522ff.

127. It is not only central doctrines of the Baha’i Faith that are, according to Rémer, ‘a reflex of that cultural movement’ (Die Babi-Beha’, p. 172). The Babi and Baha’i faiths as a whole ‘have resulted from the cultural movement of our times’ and are part of ‘the consequent rising tide of Hellenistic theosophy in Shi‘ite Islam’ (ibid.). ‘In this respect the influence of the West has been a blessing, if only there were not the error of their thinking that these were their own ideas, and that they must now bestow them upon the rest of the world’ (Rémer, ‘Der Baha’ismus’, p. 329; see also Die Babi-Beha7,

pp. 114, 117, 119, 121, 124,

129, 132, 140, 143, 153f., 158, 168, 174f.). 128. The practical theology and ethics of the Baha’i Faith, especially under ‘Abdu’1-Baha, are depicted by Rémer as ‘a process of modernization’, as the removal of the ‘obscurantist features’ of the Bab’s religion ‘through even more extensive adaptation to Western culture’ (ibid. p. 172). This fagade of ‘open public promulgation without esoteric doctrines’ contrasted, in Rémer’s opinion, with a certain esoteric element, a

nucleus of beliefs which ‘if they do not meet with acceptance or even sense hostility, the Babi-Beha’is reserve as a secret to be revealed only to a chosen few ‘ (ibid. p. 143). Ficicchia uses this to support his assertion that the Baha’is employ taqgiyya, the intentional concealment of

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Ficicchia’s European Sources

intention: ‘As an international theosophical sect, Behaism belongs

in the

same

category

as

modern

occultist

pseudo-

Buddhism and pseudo-Vedantism.’!29 Romer’s tone clearly reveals that, to him, the label ‘theosophy’ implies something notorious or shady. According to Romer, “Behaism’ is ‘a water shoot that thrives in the interna-

tional mire of a theosophy of humanist orientation’.!3° Like theosophy itself, it is a mere fashion, ‘a sign of the times’.!3! In “Abdu’l-Baha,

‘the theosophists

have one

more

fashionable

idol’ .132 This opinion becomes clearer when seen in the context of contemporary theological judgements of theosophy: legitimate forms of cognition are philosophy!33 and theology. Both are rational in their cognitive methods. Whereas philosophy proceeds from the human capacity to think, theology takes as its

starting point the revealed Word of God, which, however, is understood by means of rational thought. Theosophy also bases its view of the world on God, but claims that revelation can be recognized by natural—innate or learned—perception. This

perception is not content with the limited (rational) cognitive potential of theology or philosophy, but seeks to attain a more comprehensive, higher degree of cognition through intuition.

Theosophy deals directly with man’s longing for knowledge and understanding, and promises to fulfil that longing. Theosophy is therefore an exaggeration of man’s desire for cognitheir real beliefs (on this subject see Schaefer, above, pp. 352ff. and Gollmer, above, pp. 418ff.). 129. Quoted from Arthur Christiansen’s review of Rémer’s Die BabiBeha 7, in Der Islam, vol. 5, p. 390. 130.

Romer, ‘Der Behaismus’, p. 331.

131. ibid. 132. ibid. 133. One of the criticisms directed by Rémer against Baha’u’llah is that in his Lawh-i-Hikmat he depicts the great Greek philosophers as theosophists (Die Babi-Beha 7, p. 132).

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tion!34 and is, thus, the very opposite of the faithful acceptance of the undeserved and ineffable grace conferred by the Cross.!3° By labelling the Babi and Baha’i faiths a theosophical system, Romer achieves two things. First, this label provides

him with an overall framework around which he is able to interpret all the available sources without having to become too involved with their true content and meaning. This also enables him to compensate for the linguistic shortcomings and lack of precision in most of the translations available to him. Secondly, taking the Babi and Baha’i faiths to be just another strain of theosophy means that they are no longer a challenge to Christian theology—something that is very agreeable to Romer in view of his intentions. Once the label “theosophi-

cal’ has been affixed, these two religions simply become old wine in new bottles; the ‘nucleus’ of their doctrines has long 134. That the attitude of the Baha’i Faith is quite different from this is shown by the epistemological studies conducted by Momen (‘Relativism’, SBB, vol. 5, pp 185ff.) and Claudia Gollmer (Grundlagen, III.2, pp. 67-75).

135. Hutten’s theological critique of the Baha’i Faith culminates in his conclusion that the Baha’is ‘are helpless when confronted with the message of the Cross’ (Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, 27 October 1968. This article was a scathing critique of Huschmand Sabet’s Der gespaltene Himmel, Stuttgart, 1967. Schaefer’s ‘Answer to a Theologian’ was published in The Light Shineth in Darkness, pp. 45-105). According to Hutten, the Fall from Grace and Salvation, ‘the history of God’s intervention in human

life’ through Jesus, form ‘the nucleus of

Christian belief’ that ‘cannot be reconciled with Baha’i doctrine’ (Seher, Griibler, Enthusiasten,

12th edn.

1982, p. 821). Apart from the

claim that the Christian act of salvation is singular and unique, there are, in fact, many more points of contact than one might expect in view of such polemics. Although the terms used are different, Baha’i doctrine also acknowledges man’s sinfulness and regards this as having been overcome solely through the undeserved gift of divine grace. Any potential future rests upon this grace alone. The strong emphasis in Baha’i doctrine on active acceptance of divine grace by the individual and the resulting stress on individually and socially responsible action (instead of a self-satisfied moralizing attitude leading to paralysis) could certainly be a starting point for fruitful dialogue.

562

Ficicchia’s European Sources

since been dealt with by Christian theology, and the substance of these doctrines has already been ‘seen off’ .!36 In taking this approach, the belief system presented by Romer appears strangely pale and featureless, becoming blurred amongst the countless analogies to and differences from sur-

mised precursory ideas.!37 To be sure, the incompleteness of R6mer’s presentation is, on the one hand, a consequence of the incomplete state of the sources. After all, ROmer had access to the writings, especially those of the Bab, only in the form of fragments and second-hand descriptions. This was not sufficient

for a full appreciation of Babi doctrine. Furthermore, it is obvious that Romer gladly takes advantage of this diffuse picture of the object of his research,!38 since it reflects his foregone conclusion concerning the Babi and Baha’i religions. He cannot and will not understand them as an independent religious impulse,!3° but only as a temporary trend

136. Rosenkranz (Die Babi-Behai, p. 59) expresses it thus: ‘His doctrine is not new; it is the ancient doctrine of oriental theosophy. The turbulence created in Christian theology by the beat of wings of this oriental spirit is nothing new either. May it serve once again to remind the Christian faith of its uniqueness!’ 137.

Claudia Gollmer, for instance, points out that Rémer overlooks

the specifics of ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s concept of creation because he attempts to trace this idea back to Avicenna (Grundlagen, p. 79, note 65; p. 86, note 85).

138. Paul Scheurlen (Die Sekten der Gegenwart, 2nd edn. 1921, also published by Quell-Verlag, Stuttgart), who also refers to Rémer, states that: ‘What we are dealing with in Bahaism is a mish-mash of religious and philosophical elements from neo-Platonism, Islam and Parseeism. These are mixed with Western ideas taken from Darwinism, rationalism,

cosmopolitanism, scientism, together with a strong dose of theosophy. Bahaism is a religion of pantheistic sentimentalism. The religious element of the Bahai teaching must appear blasphemous to the Christian. . .’ @al75): 139. Criticisms raised by Hippolyte Dreyfus against similar tendencies in older literature are dismissed by Rémer with the remark that: ‘As a Beha’i, Dreyfus has a vested interest in asserting the singularity of Babism and/or Beha’ism’ (Die Babi-Beha 7, p. 180).

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Chapter 9 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

in the profusion of theosophical heresies. The remarkable lack of definition and unoriginality of Babism and the Baha’i Faith

as depicted by Romer are central to his approach.!4° Romer has the ability to convey this impression in a methodologically skilful way. He concentrates on those aspects of doctrine that he can trace to earlier currents and trends—doing

so with a high degree of erudition.!4! He is not so much con-

140. The same applies to certain other historiological and typological approaches, such as that of Flasche (“Gnostische Tendenzen innerhalb neuer Religionen’, pp. 339ff., esp. pp. 341-43). Amazingly, Flasche attributes ‘gnosticizing tendencies’ even to the Baha’i Faith. Yet the central criteria of gnostic thinking—a dualist world-view, the devaluation, even condemnation, of everything that is earthly, purely spiritual salvation from the world and an egotistical view of salvation that results from this—are completely absent from Flasche’s typology of gnosis, or (as in the case of dualism) are reduced to the status of ‘secondary phenomena’. What he regards as gnostic elements in the Baha’i Faith, on the other hand, are the idea of revelation as a gradual divinely induced process of education in the world, the concept of progressive revelation with its relativization of each specific historical instance of revelation, the idea of man’s increased self-realization over the course of his historical development and in the process of heilsgeschichte, the reference to and analysis of Shi‘a Islamic eschatology (see below, pp. 571ff.), and the idea of the prophet as a mediator between God and man. He also ascribes a ‘gnosticizing foundation’ to the universalism of Baha’i doctrine—‘namely the manner of thinking from a basis of unity towards a goal of unity’—and to the ‘symbolism of light’ expressed in the name Baha’u’llah (‘Glory of God’) himself. His conclusion is that: ‘When one surveys all the elements outlined here, it is possible, in my opinion, to say that the Baha’i Faith offers a neo-gnosis as a means of and path to salvation’ (p. 343). However, since his criteria are so indistinct that “gnostic tendencies’ can be discerned in almost every religious, political or social current, and that, furthermore, he makes no mention of any

criteria whose presence or absence show a group not to be gnostic in character, the cognitive value of the above statement seems to me to be somewhat dubious. Using this manner of argument, it would be easy to prove that the Church Fathers who fought against early Christian gnosticism, were themselves adherents of a form of gnosis. 141. Nevertheless, in the eyes of his reviewer Arthur Christiansen, he does not go far enough: ‘Roemer’s references on this subject could be supplemented here and there’ (Der Islam, vol. 5, p. 389).

564

Ficicchia’s European Sources

cerned with clarity of terms. Apart from the main epithet of

‘theosophical’,!42

he

also

uses

predicates

such

as

neo-

Platonic,!43 Plotinic,!44 gnostic,!45 hurific,!4 polytheistic,!47

pantheistic,!48 Ishmaelite,!°3 ling under the ernistic school

cabbalist,!4? occultist,!5° ecstatic,!5! esoteric, !52 and Safi!*4—all of which Romer regards as falgeneral category of ‘theosophical’.!°5 As a ‘modof Muhammedan theosophy’,!>° the Baha’is are

basically ‘a dervish order’,!5” an ‘esoteric sect’ !°8 with an aversion against ‘discursive thinking’,!5? which would, of course, hardly be compatible with the ‘inspiration believed to come from 142. Die Babi-Behai, pp. 10, 20, 22, 31, 38, 48, 49, 57, 74, 88, 103, 112, 114, 131, 133, 149f., 152, 160f., 174-176. 143. ibid. pp. 13, 22, 32f., 44, 49, 113, 160f., 164, 166, 168, 172, 176; Die Propaganda, p. 47. 144. Die Babi-Beha7, pp. 25, 33, 40, 51. 145.

ibid. pp. 9, 21, 45, 118, 131; Die Propaganda, p. 47.

146. Die Babi-Beha7, pp. 21, 111, 176. 147. ibid. p. 71. 148. ibid. pp. 11, 33; Die Propaganda, p. 47. 149. Die Babi-Beha7, pp. 24f., 109, 111, 178. 150. ibid. pp. 29, 167. ISissibidrpp. 37f,, 71. 152. ibid. p. 143. 153. ibid. pp. 43ff., 49, 51, 172. 154, ibid spp. 135i 3715,421., 53, 815.83,°89, 102, 142f., 152, 161; 164, 167f., 173, 176. 155. The absurd ideas that can result from such labelling are exemplified by the entry written by Horst E. Miers (keyword ‘Bahai’, Lexikon des Geheimwissens, pp. 60ff.), who blatantly asserts that: ‘Most of its teachings are taken from the esoteric doctrine of H.P. Blavatsky.” Along with Henry Steel Olcott, Helen Petrovna Blavatsky (1831-1891) founded the Theosophical Society in 1875.

156. 157. 158. 159.

Die Babi-Beha’, p. 175. ibid. ibid. p. 139. ibid. p. 169.

565

Chapter 9 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

magic’!6° and the ‘secret knowledge’!®! and ‘love magic’ !° this inspiration imparts. To Romer, theosophy is evidently a vague collective term for amorphous, predominantly neoPlatonic ideas and esoteric doctrines. The lack of any definition for the term ‘theosophy’ is not coincidental. Apart from Romer’s addition of certain currents in Islam, the same subsumption is made in the entry under the keyword ‘Theosophie’ in the Realenzyklopddie fiir protestan-

tische Theologie und Kirche published in 1862.6 It is stated there that ‘theosophy’ is not a precise term in religious studies but is used ‘in accordance with the various meanings ascribed to it’ to refer to ‘an uncertain, indefinite and vague idea of an

uncertain, indefinite and vague type of religious knowledge’ .!®4 When Romer strays away from the intentional vagueness of this theological term, his misinterpretations become especially obvious.

The Baha’i Faith’s concept of God,!® its prophetology!® and doctrine on creation (emanation)!©’ are, in Rémer’s eyes,

all neo-Platonic in origin.!®° Indeed, it is undeniable that neoPlatonic elements are to be found in Babi and Baha’i doctrine. However, there are two problems with Romer’s approach: first, the fact that he ignores the historical argumentative and didactic 160. ibid. pp. 29, 97. 161. ibid. pp. 31, 146; also ‘secret science’, p. 167. 162. ibid. pp. 167. 163. by J.P. Lange, vol. 16, Gotha, Ist edn. 1862, pp. 27-31. 164. ibid. p. 27. 165. Die Babi-Beha7, pp. 22ff. 166. ibid. pp. 31f., 38. 167. ibid. pp. 161ff. 168. For detailed discussion of these doctrines see Cole, ‘The Concept of Manifestation in the Baha’i Writings’, in Baha’i Studies 9, Ottawa 1982; Claudia Gollmer, Grundlagen; Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 5.1-5.3; Momen, ‘Relativism: A Basis for Baha’i Metaphysics’, in SBB, vol. 5, pp. 185ff.; Towfigh, Schépfung und Offenbarung.

566

Ficicchia’s European Sources

context of these elements, and secondly, that he hugely exaggerates these elements, interpreting the whole of Babi and Baha’i scripture in accordance with this foregone conclusion. No religion comes into being in an historical and intellectual no-man’s-land. Every religion addresses the needs of particular people. These people, however, are under the influence

of traditional ways of thinking. Yet religious communication requires understanding. Hence, if a new religious content is to be conveyed, this can be done at first only through the use of existing models and customary thought patterns. Every new re-

ligion arises within the sphere of influence of an existing religious tradition, adopting or rejecting the images, terms, attitudes,

motives, and institutions of that tradition, sometimes developing them further, sometimes adding marginal or new elements, and thus eventually developing its own specific tradition and its own religious language. In this sense religion—every religion—

is syncretistic.!6 Christianity is no exception.!79 However, every religion is also much more than the sum of all such

adopted traditions, for these are not what determine its specific character, its own identity.!7! A study that examines only the traditional elements that have been adopted, and even takes

particular elements of tradition as absolute standards for the

169. See also Schaefer, Beyond the Clash, pp. 137ff.; John Hick, God Has Many Names, pp. 67, 83, 103. 170. This point is expressly conceded by Rosenkranz in his discussion with Schaefer: ‘Syncretism is a phenomenon of religious history. What religion is not syncretistic?’ (Schaefer, Die Baha’i-Religion im Spiegel christlicher Betrachtung, p. 41). 171. It is this that gives rise to criticism on the part of Baha’is when they find it impossible to recognize their own religion in certain publications. Dismissing this as over-sensitivity or as a refusal to enter into dialogue (Ficicchia, Baha’ismus, pp. 23, 29, Materialdienst 15/16, Issue

38 (1975), p. 238; Reller and Kiefig (eds.), Handbuch Religiése Gemeinschaften, 3rd edn. 1985, pp. 633f.; p. 811 of the 4th edn. 1993) can hardly be expected to promote dialogue.

567

Chapter 9 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

interpretation of the whole, cannot result in an adequate evalua-

tion of the religion in question. This is precisely the methodological flaw in Rémer’s work. Just a few examples will suffice to illustrate the point. Proceeding from a neo-Platonic

emanation

doctrine, Romer

sees the Babi-Baha’i doctrine on creation as ‘strictly spiritualist’: ‘The acosmism of this idea of emanation first becomes

clear from the devaluation of matter.’!72 The Baha’i scripture, by contrast, emphasizes the value of the world in itself, de-

scribing it as ‘good’,!73 ‘at its creation whole and perfect’,!”4 and given to man for his use and pleasure,!7> but also for his responsibility.!7© Responsibility for the world is a fundamental doctrinal principle.!”” Yet Romer asserts that, ‘its ethics are cast in the same pantheistic mould’!”8 and are an expression of unworldly ‘neo-Platonic gnosis’.!7? Romer also interprets the image of man presented in the scripture as neo-Platonic. Trapped in this pattern of thinking, Romer states that, according to Baha’i doctrine, man’s spiritual nature is ‘pure spirit without

individual reality’.!8° He goes on to claim that: ‘There is there172. Die Babi-Beha i, p. 162. 173. ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Some Answered Questions 74:6. 174. Baha’u’llah, Gleanings 120:1. 175. Escapism, puritanism and asceticism are rejected in the Baha’i scripture, because God ‘hath ordained every good thing . . . in the earth’ for mankind: ‘Eat ye, O people, of the good things which God hath allowed you, and deprive not yourselves from His wondrous bounties’ (Baha’u’llah, Gleanings 128:4; see also Kitab-i-Aqdas 36; Qur’dn 5:87, Esslemont, Bahda’u'llah and the New Era, p. 99). 176.

Baha’u’llah, Tablets 15:13. For details see Gollmer, Gottesreich,

ch. 5.3 (‘Die Welt als wohlgeordnete Schépfung’) and 9.3 (‘Reich Gottes und Welt’). 177. On this subject see Gollmer, ibid. keyword ‘Weltverantwortung’. 178. Die Propaganda, p. 47. 179. ibid. 180. Die Babi-Beha7, p. 164, with reference to ‘Abdu’]-Baha’s Some Answered Questions.

568

Ficicchia’s European Sources

fore no individual immortality of the soul, but only general im-

mortality’,!8! and that the soul itself is regarded ‘not as something individual, but only as the general spirit’.!8? In reality, however,

‘Abdu’l-Baha speaks of the ‘personality of the ra-

tional soul’!83 that is ‘immortal and lives eternally’ .!84 ‘Abdu’lBaha also refers expressly to the individuality of both soul and

body in his rejection of the idea of reincarnation,!®> because every soul, ‘even as the body, has its own individuality’. 186 187 These examples will suffice to illustrate this point. It was usual for “Abdu’l-Baha to try to promote his audience’s understanding by using terms and models with which they were already familiar. The form, however, was only a me-

dium for conveying a message; it was not the message itself. ‘Abdu’1-Baha’s thinking is highly abstract, and he brings a wide variety of models into play. In so doing, he demonstrates great

skill in finding points of contact and analysing them. It is undeniable that neo-Platonic ideas and figures of speech are used in Some Answered Questions, a collection of transcriptions of

table talks given by ‘Abdu’l-Baha. This fact misled Romer into making a serious error of judgement, for he mistakenly assumed the form to be the message. It is therefore no wonder that he failed to perceive the great practical political goal of the Baha’i Faith, the oneness of mankind, since this idea does not fit into his neo-Platonic or theosophical image of the religion.

181. ibid. 182. Die Babi-Beha’, p. 49. 183. Some Answered Questions 66:5. On the immortality of the individual soul see also Baha’u’llah, Gleanings 81. 184. Some Answered Questions 67:7. 185. ibid. 81. 186. Paris Talks 20:10. 187. ch. 6.

On details on the Baha’i image of man see Gollmer, Gottesreich,

569

Chapter 9 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer To summarize: Rémer’s study was a considerable achieve-

ment in its day. As regards the sources available at that time, as well as Roémer’s selection and evaluation of those sources, however, it is far from being state-of-the-art research. Romer’s primary interest in this faith from his point of view as a theolo-

gian and pastor is clearly evident not only in his depiction of Babi/Baha’i history but, to an even greater extent, in his interpretation of the doctrines of this religion. All scriptural statements are forced into a Procrustean bed of a theosophical/neo-

Platonic interpretation of Babism and are thereby deformed, sometimes beyond recognition. Nevertheless, R6mer’s monograph is a unique document of its era in German-speaking Europe, and is undoubtedly of

historical interest. It can be used as a direct source on Babism and the Baha’i Faith, however, only with the very greatest of

caution. Ficicchia’s concern is not for an historical appreciation of Romer’s achievement. Neither is he motivated by a desire to correct Romer’s errors and misinterpretations. He reads his work not with the eyes of an historian, nor with those of a researcher in the humanities. First and foremost, Ficicchia refers

to Romer whenever the latter can be used polemically against the Baha’is, completely irrespective of the interpretational con-

text!88 and the truth of the statement in question.

188. By seizing upon statements made in Rémer’s monograph without reference to Rémer’s argumentational context, Ficicchia has ended up with additional errors and inconsistencies in his own presentation.

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CHAPTER 10

SOME ASPECTS OF BABI AND BAHA’{ HISTORY I.

MAHDI CLAIM AND MESSIANIC SECRET So that the people might not be seized with perturbation by reason of a new Book and a

new Revelation! Ficicchia’s portrayal of the history of the Bab leaves the reader

with the impression that the Bab himself did not really know what claim to religious leadership he was making—or that he

opportunistically varied his claims according to the circumstances of the moment. Hence, Ficicchia asserts, the ‘claim made at the beginning of his ministry’ that he was the ‘Mahdi’

was ‘withdrawn in 1846’.2 Having at first only ‘begun to announce the imminent return of the hidden Imam Mahdi’, he was ‘driven by his fanatical supporters’ to make such a claim.3 Thus, the founder of the Babi Faith is presented not as the ex-

ecutor of a divine mission, but as a plaything in the hands of a fanatical crowd. That this does not conform to the image of the

1.

The Bab, ‘Dala’il-i-Sab‘ih’, in Selections 4:4.

2. 3.

Baha’ismus, p. 21. ibid. p. 36.

my

Chapter 10 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

Bab in Baha’i literature* is obvious. It does not conform, either, to the latest research findings.» How, then, did Ficicchia come to make such statements? 1. Ficicchia’s sources

The main source for Ficicchia’s allegation concerning the Bab’s

withdrawal of the claim to be the Mahdi°—at least the only source he actually cites—would appear to be the Tarikh-iJadid.? However, a reader looking for the passages referred to®

will be surprised to find that they come not from the 7arikh-iJadid, as Ficicchia claims, but from Appendix 2, which was

added by Browne for his edition of the work. This Appendix 2 is none other than a summary of the Kitab-i-Nuqtatu’l-Kdf, a

4. See for example, ‘Abdu’l-Baha, A Traveller’s Narrative, Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, ch. 1-4; Muhammad-i-Zarandi, The DawnBreakers; Balyuzi, The Bab.

5. It is now agreed that the claims made public by the Bab were gradually increased over the years, culminating in the unreserved proclamation of a new religion with its own book and its own religious law. There is still discussion as to whether this ultimate claim was already immanent in the Bab’s early references to himself (as is argued by Amanat, Browne

and Momen),

or whether this cannot be

fully ascertained (as is the opinion of MacEoin). For a summary of this issue see Lawson, ‘The Terms “Remembrance” (dhikr) and “Gate” (bab) in the Bab’s Commentary on the Sura of Joseph’, in SSB, vol. 5, pp. Iff. 6. In the 12th edn. (which was revised by the EZW) of his book Seher,

Griibler,

Enthusiasten,

p. 797, Hutten

has repeated Ficicchia’s

portrayal of events. In the 11th edn. 1968, p. 290, on the other hand, he had stated the following: ‘Ali Mohammed Shirazi referred to himself not only as the Bab = gate, but for a time also as the Nukta (i.e. primal point, namely of the Qur’an) and thus indicated that he was the Imam Mahdi, although he ascribed to the “Mahdi” a purely religious, non-political mission.’ 7.

Baha’ismus, pp. 68, 92f.

8. Térikh-i-Jadid, pp. 330, 336, 374-382. 572

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History

source whose credibility is doubtful.® Ficicchia evidently thinks

it superfluous to mention this. A further surprise follows as soon as one reads the pages cited by Ficicchia: there is no unambiguous historical evidence for Ficicchia’s assertion. The first passage (p. 330) concerns the interpretation of an

Islamic tradition! which the author of the Nugtatu 'l-Kaf relates

to the history of the Babi revelation, associating it with the

events!! he describes.!2 There is no explicit reference to a withdrawal or transfer of the station of Mahdi. The second passage (p. 336) does indeed report that the Bab transferred his claim to be the nugqta (point) to Quddius. Browne himself calls this an “extraordinary and novel doctrine’ and cites at length the metaphysical speculations of the Nugta-

9. See Towfigh, above, pp. 500ff. 10. The subject of this tradition is a conversation between Imam ‘Ali and Kumayl ibn Ziyad, one of his pupils. It concerns the—rather vague—answer given by the Imam ‘Ali to the question ‘What is truth?’. Browne cites this tradition in English on p. 329. 11. The first five years of the Babi dispensation. The author’s speculative theological interest is strongly evident: a good third of the text is concerned exclusively with this aspect (as Browne points out,

Tarikh-i-Jadid, Appendix 2, pp. 327f.). 12. If Browne was correct in stating (Tdrikh-i-Jadid, Appendix 2, p. 329) that the Babis related this highly cryptic tradition to the revelation of the Bab and ascribed great significance to it, this constitutes interesting evidence of the gradual disclosure of the claim to divine revelation (see below, the sections entitled “The Messianic secret’, pp. 579ff., and ‘The Bab’s claim’, pp. 586ff.). The interpretation given in the Nuqtatu’l-Kaf, however, is solely that of the author of this part of the manuscript—whoever that might be. At present, the question remains open as to whether the events reported in this part of the Nuqtatu’l-Kaf were adapted to this interpretation and its underlying bias. Whatever the case, the Nuqtatu’l-Kdf is far more a reflection of the low morale of many Babis and of the wild speculation among certain sections

of the community

after the Bab’s execution,

rather than a

reliable historical source. One thing is certain at this point: ‘It definitely does not reflect the doctrines of the Bab.

pp. 500ff.).

573

. .’ (Towfigh, above,

Chapter 10 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

tu’l-Kdf,'3 which serve as the only justification for this statement. Thus, Browne clearly points out how strongly this assertion contradicts all the other sources. Showing not the slightest

degree of reservation, however, Ficicchia suddenly turns this allegation into an undisputed historical fact. It should be mentioned incidentally that the term ‘Mahdi’ is not to be found in

his source at all. The last passage referred to by Ficicchia (pp. 374-382) is Chapter 11 of Appendix 2, which is entirely devoted to the life of Mirza Yahya Azal!* up to the time of the martyrdom of the Bab.!5 Apart from a short introduction, it is a translation of those parts edly Azali of the Babi source, the prising: its

of the Nugtatu’l-Kaf that are written from a decidviewpoint and present the transfer of the leadership community to Azal.!© Given the biased nature of the hagiographical character of this section is hardly surmain objective is that of legitimizing Azal’s leader-

ship claim. Nor does the alleged transfer of the station of nugta (the term ‘Mahdi’ is not to be found here, either) from the Bab to Azal come unexpectedly. What is interesting, however, is that the words ascribed to the Bab and placed in quotation marks do not, in themselves, actually say this at all: it is evident from the form that this statement is merely a deduction made by

13. Tarikh-i-Jadid, Appendix 2, pp. 336f. 14. Concerning Azal see below, pp. 605ff., 618ff., 631ff., and Schaefer, above, pp. 72ff. 15. The chapter heading selected by Browne ‘Subh-i-Ezel and Beha’ is somewhat misleading, since Baha’u’llah appears only as a marginal figure, in his relationship as half-brother to Azal. On the portrayal of the relationship between Azal and Baha’u’llah in the Nuqtatu’l-Kaf see Towfigh, above, pp. 500ff. 16. Browne attached great significance to this passage because he erroneously dated it to the year 1850. In fact, it was written much later, most probably not until after the death of the alleged author, see Towfigh, above, pp. 500ff.

574

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History

the author of these passages.!7 This fact fits in with the circumstance that no such statements have ever been found in the

scripture of the Bab.!8 According to Ficicchia, Baha’u’llah later usurped the sta-

tion of Mahdi and relegated the Bab to a mere forerunner.!9 In fact, Baha’u’llah, contrary to Ficicchia’s assertions, never referred to himself as Mahdi or Qa’im.?! The station of Qa’im is

17. ‘And what he meant by “Him whom God should manifest” after himself was Hazrat-i-Ezel and none other than him, for there may not be two “Points” at one time. And the secret of the Bab’s saying, “Do thus and thus,” while Ezel was himself also a “Proof”, was that at this time

His Holiness “the Reminder” (Bab) was the Heaven of Volition, and Ezel was accounted the Earth of Devotion and the product of purified gifts, wherefore was he thus addressed’ (Tarikh-i-Jadid, Appendix 2 (Nuqtatu’l-Kaf), pp. 381f.). 18. On the ‘document of appointment’ produced by the Azalis as evidence of Azal’s succession see Towfigh, above, pp. 500ff., and below,

631ff. It should be noted that neither the wording of this letter nor the terms used in it support the thesis of a formal transfer of leadership or of the station of Mahdi. 19. Interestingly, Ficicchia in this case adopts Hutten’s interpretation. In the very first edition (1950, p. 97) of Seher, Gribler, Enthusiasten, Hutten wrote: “According to the retrospective doctrine of the Bahais, the Bab is regarded as the herald who announced the prophecy: the Imam Mahdi will come... Baha’u’llah was then the fulfilment of this prophecy.’ 20. For-example, pp..21, 75, 94f.; 105, 117,123, 132, 172, 177,270. Other authors who refer to this ‘standard work’ have since taken the same line, e.g. Rainer Flasche, keyword ‘Baha’i-Religion’, LThK, vol. 1, p. 39; Joseph Henninger, review of Ficicchia’s ‘Der Baha’ismus’, in Anthropos 78, p. 937; Reinhart Hummel, keyword ‘Baha’i’, Taschen-

lexikon Religion und Theologie, vol. 1, p. 136; Olaf Schumann, review of Ficicchia’s

‘Der Baha’ismus’,

in Der Islam, vol. 62, p. 185; Udo

Tworuschka, Die vielen Namen Gottes, p. 50; Reller and Kiefig (eds.), HRG, 3rd edn. 1985, pp. 629; 4th edn. 1993, p. 806. See also Gollmer,

above, pp.

420ff.

21. However, this error is to be found in much earlier German litera-

ture, too: e.g. that by Rémer (Die Babi-Beha’i, p. 58), and Richard Hartmann (Die Religion des Islam, p. 197).

525

Chapter 10 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer expressly reserved for the Bab alone,?? and the same is true of the designation of Mahdi, although this term is extremely rare

in Baha’i scripture.23 One of the dogmatic foundations

of

Baha’i doctrine is that the Bab was not merely the herald and

precursor of the dispensation of Baha’u’llah,?4 but that he was 22. As Baha’u’llah explicitly states in his Kitdb-i-[gan (114ff. (pp. 107ff.)); see also Gleanings 9:1, where Baha’u’llah clearly distinguishes his revelation from that of the Qa’im; Shoghi Effendi, Passes By, pp. 4, 5, 12, etc.; World Order, pp. 62, 100, 125.

God

23. For instance, ‘Abdu’l-Baha, A Traveller’s Narrative, p. 14. On the

identity of the Mahdi and the Qa’im: Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, pp. 57f. On the appearance of two Manifestations, the first of whom is identical with the Mahdi: ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Some Answered Questions 10:14-15. On both titles, Mahdi and Qa’im, see Buck, Symbol and Se-

cret, pp. 59ff. 24. At the time of Nicolas and Browne, this misunderstanding appears to have been widespread (both protested strongly against the idea, e.g. A.-L.-M. Nicolas, ‘Les Béhais et le Bab’, in Journal Asiatique, vol. 222, pp. 257ff.; Qui est le successeur du Bab?, p. 15; Browne, Introduction to A

Traveller’s

Narrative,

p. xiv;

Introduction

to

Tdrikh-i-Jadid,

pp. xxiii, xxxif.; Introduction to Kitab-i-Nuqtatu 'l-Kaf, p. xxivf.), which also indicates that many Baha’is were also unsure of the station of the Bab in the scripture. See Shoghi Effendi: ‘That the Bab, the inaugurator of the Babi Dispensation, is fully entitled to rank as one of the selfsufficient Manifestations of God, that He has been invested with sover-

eign power and authority, and exercises all the rights and prerogatives of independent Prophethood, is yet another fundamental verity which the Message of Baha’u’llah insistently proclaims and which its followers must uncompromisingly uphold. That He is not to be regarded merely as an inspired Precursor of the Baha’i Revelation . . . is a truth which I feel it my duty to demonstrate and emphasize’ (‘The Dispensation of Baha’u’llah’, in World Order, p. 123). These sentences are to be

found not in some remote text but in Shoghi Effendi’s summary of the Baha’i Faith’s central doctrines. It is astounding that the author of a ‘standard work’—who, moreover, was a member of the Baha’i commu-

nity for several years—should have overlooked this of all sources, not to mention the numerous other passages in Baha’i literature which say the same, such as: ‘Abdu’l-Baha,

Will and Testament 2:8; Some Answered

Questions 43:5; Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 27. Nicolas did at least change his attitude towards the Baha’is after reading ‘The Dispensation of Baha’u’llah’, as he made clear in the following statement: ‘Je ne sais comment vous remercier ni comment vous exprimer la joie qui

576

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History

the founder of an independent religion with its own ‘Book’ and

its own law. In Baha’i prophetology, the Bab’s station is that of an independent Manifestation,?> equal in rank with Muhammad, Christ and Baha’u’llah.?° Although the Bab did not transpose the expectation of the Mahdi, whose coming was fulfilled in his own person, to the

future,?7 he did indicate in numerous passages? in his scripture inonde mon coeur. Ainsi donc, il faut non seulement admettre mais aimer et admirer le Bab. . . Que Baha’u’Ilah lui ait, par la suite, succédé,

soit, mais je veux qu’on admire la sublimité du Bab . . . Gloire 4 Shoghi Effendi qui a calmé mon tourment et mes inquiétudes, gloire a lui qui reconnait la valeur du Siyyid ‘Ali-Muhammad dit le Bab’ (‘I do not know either how to thank you nor how to express the joy which fills my heart. Surely, one should not only acknowledge the Bab, but love him . . It may be that Baha’u’llah has taken his place, but I want the sublimity of the Bab to be admired . . . Glory be to Shoghi Effendi, who has calmed my torment and my anxiety, glory be to the one who recognizes the value of Siyyid ‘Ali-Muhammad, called the Bab’ (letter to Edith Sanderson, from whom Nicolas had received a copy of the text; reprinted in Bahd’i

World, vol. VIII, p. 625; see also Momen,

The Babi

and Baha ’i Religions, pp. 37f.)). 25. Ficicchia denies this (‘. . . from then on, Bab was to them (the Baha’is) only the bab (in the literal sense of the word: “door” or “gate” to the Imam Mahdi) and the “precursor” of the Mahdi who had appeared in the person of Baha’u’llah’, Baha ‘ismus, p. 21). It is an open question whether this statement was made out of ignorance or because this doctrine would have contradicted Ficicchia’s thesis concerning Baha’u’llah’s alleged usurpation of the rank of Mahdi, as well as undermining his allegations of historical and doctrinal falsification by the Baha’is. Regrettably, the misunderstanding about the supposed relegation of the Bab appears likely to be propagated further: it has already been taken up by the (anonymous) author of the entry on the Baha’is in Reller and KieBig, HRG,

3rd edn.

1985, p. 629, and is repeated in the 4th edn.

1993, p. 806.

26. See for instance Shoghi Effendi, World Order, pp. 61ff., 123ff. 27. The distinction between his own claim to be the Mahdi and the promise of the imminent appearance of the Man yuzhiruhu ‘lah seems to present difficulties to some interpreters (e.g. Romer, Die Babi-Beha is p. 58 and of course Ficicchia, Baha ‘ismus, p. 95). Romer, in fact, presents the conceptual key to this question on the same page, describing it as ‘the Christian expectation of parousia, in the form given to it in Is-

577

Chapter 10 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer the coming of another eschatological figure of salvation, a theo-

phany to come after him,2? whom he usually designated Man yuzhiruhu’llah, ‘He whom God shall make manifest’.3° This prophecy was fulfilled by Baha’u’llah, who proclaimed himself to be the Promised One foretold by the Bab.

lam for its own use’; in other words ‘these Manifestations

are never-

ending’, ‘each Manifestation of the primal will also announces the next’ (pp. 58f). The paradigm of progressive revelation must have been so alien to Rémer, however, that he could only interpret the intensity of the references to Man yuzhiruhu’llah as meaning that the Bab ‘thus returned to his original function as bab to the hidden Imam Mahdi who was soon to appear’ (pp. 59f). Interestingly, this confusion is not evident in either Browne or Nicolas. On the dogma of ‘progressive revelation’, which is central to Babi doctrine, see: The Bab, Persian Baydn 2:7, 4:12, 5:4, 7:13, (Le Béyan Persan, vol. 1, pp. 68ff.; vol. 2, p. 141; vol. 3, p. 10; vol. 4, p. 36; The Bab, Selections 3:35, 3:34:1, 3:15:2-3, 3:17; 4:10:4-

6); Kitab-i-Asma’ 17:4 (Selections 5:15:4); Preface to Dald’il-i-Sab ‘ih (Le Livre de Sept Preuves, pp. 3ff). For a brief outline of this doctrine see Browne, Foreword to Nuqtatu’l-Kaf, pp. xxviff., Bayat, Mysticism, pp. 101f. 28. The references to the Man yuzhiruhu’llah collected by Browne from the Persian Bayan alone and listed in the introduction to the Kitabi-Nuqtatu’l-Kaf and the following index cover about four pages (pp. XXix-xxx1i, ]xix-1xxi). 29. On the question of the time-scale of this prophecy see below, pp.610ff. 30. On page 94 writes: ‘The fact hiruhu’llah” and Mahdi indicates

of his book, Ficicchia comes close to the truth when he that Hazrat-i Bab used the rather vague term “Man yuz did not speak more simply and clearly of the expected that he saw the Man yuzhiruhu’llah as more than the

Mahdi of the Muslims, recognizing in him, instead,

a new Messenger of

God and the founder of a new religion . . .” He immediately goes on, however, to diminish this insight. The obvious conclusion—and one that is certainly in keeping with Muslim tradition (see C.G. Anawati, keyword

‘‘isd,? in EJ 2nd

edn., vol. 4, pp. 84f., Momen,

Shi‘i Islam,

pp. 166, 170; Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, pp. 165f.)—that what is meant is a second figure of salvation, distinct from the Mahdi, seems

not to have occurred to him.

578

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History

2. The Messianic secret The case of Ficicchia’s assertions about the allegedly vacillating claims of the Bab could now be considered closed. Yet if

this thesis is stripped of its polemical intention and its implausible embellishments, a historical phenomenon is revealed that is

deserving of closer scrutiny: the Bab’s claims could obviously be interpreted on several different levels. His followers pro-

claimed him to be the embodiment of various eschatological figures of salvation. For some years, the Bab appears to have

veiled his true spiritual identity from the public at large. Like Jesus in the Gospel of St Mark, the Bab at first tried to prevent his messianic secret being revealed to the general public. However, as in Jesus’ case, he was only partly successful in doing so, owing to the zeal of his followers and admirers, and, again like Jesus, his claim became caught up in an explosive mixture of eschatological expectations of a religious and political character. In the case of the Bab, as in that of Jesus, the actual

claims made became confused with others that were publicly attributed to him, resulting in a miscellany of various claims that to the contemporary observer were at first difficult to dis-

tinguish. It is probably due to this situation that Browne attached any significance at all to the statements made in the Nugtatu’l-Kaf concerning this issue. It is necessary to elucidate matters by briefly examining the eschatological expectations in Shi‘a Islam, the religious and political circumstances of the

time, the claims raised by the Bab and their chronology.3! 3. The religious and political background

Account must be taken of the fact that the Bab’s claim was raised in a social environment in which it was extremely dan31. This presentation is based on chapter 3 of my doctoral dissertation Gottesreich und Weltgestaltung and the sources of reference cited there.

579

Chapter 10 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

gerous to express unorthodox religious ideas.3? It is no coincidence that thousands of Babis and Baha’is paid for their faith

with their lives.33 Persia was an authoritarian state with totalitarian characteristics. In all matters related to religion the instruments of state power were at the almost unrestricted disposal of the leading clergy. Memories of the power struggle

between two rival groups among the Shi‘a clergy, the Akhbari and the Usuli, were still fresh. The instruments used in this con-

flict were by no means limited to argumentation.54 The victory of the Usuli school meant that the former relatively liberal intellectual climate in Persia was replaced by zealous and narrowthought minded orthodoxy, in which all deviant or unconventional

thinking was branded heretical and subjected to persecution.>5 32. One can perhaps better imagine the public mood if one reads what appeared little more than ten years ago in Egypt, one of the most liberal Muslim countries, in the renowned newspaper Al-Ahram (21 January 1986). The following quotation is the conclusion of a long statement about the Baha’is by the Vice-Chancellor of Al-Azhar University—a respected centre of Islamic scholarship: ‘Those who have sinned against Islam and the State should vanish from life and not be able to declare openly their disdain for Islam. This is a serious matter, and speed and zeal are required on the part of the legislative, juridical and executive powers of government in order to take appropriate measures . . . This splinter group has not yet been given the attention it deserves, although it is the crime of crimes and a sin of the most heinous kind.’ 33. In very recent times, since the ‘Islamic revolution’ of 1979, more than 200 Baha’is have been killed on account of their faith (on this subject see: Der Nationale Geistige Rat der Baha’i in Deutschland (ed.), Die Baha’i im Iran. Dokumentation der Verfolgung einer religidsen Minderheit, Hofheim, 4th edn. 1985).

34. One of the measures used was that of declaring opponents to be unbelievers (takfir), the effect of which was comparable to excommunication from the Catholic church, but state power was also used, as were

specially recruited bands of terrorists (/uti). Compare Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran, p. 110; Bayat, Mysticism, pp. 22ff., Halm, Die Schia, pp. 131, 139; Momen, Shi‘iIslam, pp. 115f., 127f., 199.

35. Bayat (Mysticism, p. 35) states that: ‘. . . when theological differences of opinion also implied political differences, especially if the mujtahid’s function in society was challenged, . . . the latter’s hostility

580

Some Aspects of Babi and Bahda’t History

Despite considerable backing in the royal court and among the populace, the two leaders of the Shaykhi school3°—both recognized mujtahids?’—had had the takfir3® imposed upon them.3? In

turned into active belligerence . . . Persecution of thought occurred when its practical consequences and its political implications clashed with the influential organized religious authority . . .” (see also ibid. pp. xuiff.; Halm, Die Schia, p. 139). 36. Shaykh Ahmad al-Ahsai, the founder of the Shaykhi movement, (1166-1241 AH/1753-1826 CE), and his successor, Siyyid Kazim (d. 1259/1843). On the doctrine and history of the Shaykhis under their first two leaders see Bayat, Mysticism, pp. 37-56; Browne, A Traveller’s Narrative, Note E, pp. 234-244; Huart, keyword ‘Shaikhi’, EJ, 1st edn., vol. 4, 1934, pp. 279f.; MacEoin, From Shaykhism, pp. 50-124, Momen, Shi ‘i Islam, pp. 225ff.; Nicolas, Essai sur le Chéikhisme, 4 vols., Paris, 1910, 1911 and 1914; Rafati, The Development of Shaykhi Thought in Shi ‘i Islam, 1979; idem, ‘The Development of Shaykhi Thought in Shi‘i

Islam’, in Moayyad

(ed.), The Baha’i Faith and Islam, pp. 93-109;

Scholl, keyword ‘Shaykhiyah’, in ER, vol. 13, pp. 230-233. The Shaykhi

movement is described from the viewpoint of the later Kirmani school in Corbin, L’Ecole Shaykhie en Théologie Shi‘a, Teheran,

1967; idem,

En Islam iranien: Aspects spirituels et philosophiques, vol. 4, pp. 205300; ‘Pour une morphologie de la spiritualité Shi‘a’, in Eranos-Jahrbuch, vol. 29, pp. 71-81. On the classification of the Kirmani school and the works of Corbin see Amanat, Resurrection, pp. 68f.; MacEoin, ‘Early Shaykhi Reactions to the Bab and His Claims’, in SBB, vol. 1, pp. 148. After the death of Siyyid Kazim, those Shaykhis who did not be-

come Babis split up into three main schools, all of which developed back towards Usutli orthodoxy. Their main centres were Karbila, Tabriz and Kirman. The most important was the Kirmani school. There are now about 500,000 Shaykhis in Iran, Iraq and the Gulf region (Bayat, Mysticism, p. 59; Momen, Shi i Islam, pp. 229ff., Rafati, Development, pp. 138ff.).

37. In the formal hierarchy of the Usutli clergy, this rank is the prerequisite for ijtihdd, innovative interpretation on the basis of independent judgement. In legal terminology, the participle active, mujtahid (‘one who exerts himself’), designates the rank of a scholar who is able and entitled to carry out ijtihdd on account of his knowledge of the principles of legal scholarship (usu! al-figh). Laypersons and the lower clergy are obliged to submit to his authority in all questions of religious law. Ritual acts—including prayer—are ‘valid’ only if performed according to the example of a living mujtahid. With the doctrine of taqlid, ‘empowerment’, the Usuli mujtahids raised a de facto claim to a monopoly on salvation.

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Chapter 10 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

view of the central dogma of the finality of the religion of Muhammad”? and the Islamic legal provision of the death penalty for apostasy and for attempting to convert a Muslim to any

other religion,*! it takes little imagination to realize what the consequences would be if someone were to openly promulgate a new, post-Islamic religion—consequences that later history

was to confirm in all too bloody terms. In order to afford at least some initial protection to his followers and to his divine mission, the Bab evidently took the approach of gradually unfolding his public announcement concerning his claims, and in doing so made use of the eschatological expectations of his Shi‘a environment.

38. Compare

Halm, Die Schia,

p. 140; MacEoin,

From

Shaykhism,

pp. 75ff.; Rafati, Development, pp. 192ff. On the term itself see above, p. 580, note 34. 39. In contrast to Shi‘a orthodoxy, the Ascension of Muhammad (mi ‘raj) and the resurrection of the dead (qiydma), for instance, were given allegorical, rather than literal, interpretations. The presence of the Hidden Imam was also understood as a spiritual presence, rather than physical life in a secret place on the earth (Bayat, Mysticism, pp. 43ff.; Corbin, Terre Céleste et Corps de Résurrection, pp. 146-64, including texts by Shaykh Ahmad on this subject, op. cit., ch. 9, pp. 281ff.; Huart, keyword ‘Shaikhi’, EJ, lst edn.; MacEoin, From Shaykhism, pp. 77f.; Momen, Shi ‘i Islam, pp. 227f.; Nicolas, Essai, vol. 3, pp. 23-45; Rafati, Development, pp. 106-122; idem, Shaykhi Thought, p. 104).

40. It is of some interest in this connection that Western scholars in the field of Islamic studies also doubt the justification of reference to Qur’an 33:40 in support of this dogma. In that verse, Muhammad merely places himself in the sequence of prophets and confirms their customary practice by taking a certain approach. A possible model for this is found in I Cor. 9:2, where the concept of the ‘seal’ is likewise used to signify confirmation. It was not until a later hadith that the term ‘seal of the prophets’ (khdtam an-nabiyin) was interpreted as the definitive culmination of divine revelation (see Nagel, Rechtleitung und Kalifat, p. 24, Joseph Horowitz, Koranische Untersuchungen, p. 53). 41. See W. Heffening, keyword ‘Murtadd’, SEI, pp. 413f.

582

Some Aspects of Babi and Bahd’i History

4. The eschatological expectations of heterodox Shi‘a Islam

The expectation of a figure of salvation who will appear at the time of the end is nothing new to most Shi‘a groups, who as a minority in the Islamic world have frequently been subjected to persecution. Wherever religious or political movements of a Shi‘a character failed, it was always hoped that the struggle could be continued later, after the return of the figure in whom

the followers of each respective movement set their faith.42 Af-

ter the break in the line of the Imams, this idea became prevalent not only in the heterodox Shi‘a milieu, but also in the

Imamite (Twelver) Shi‘a school.*? According to later Imamite tradition, the twelfth Imam was born in the year 869; but for fear of continuing persecution by the Abbasid rulers, his existence was at first kept secret. After the death of his father, he contacted his disciples only via four intermediaries (‘go-betweens’) (naib, pl. nuwwab), ‘messengers’ (safir, pl. sufard) or ‘gates’ (bab, pl. abwab); this period is called the ‘lesser occultation’ (al-ghayba al-sughrd’). In the year 941, communication was

broken off. From this time on, according to Imamite dogma, the Imam remained in concealment—the ‘greater occultation’ (al-

ghayba al-kubra’)—until his promised return. This return of the Twelfth Imam is described as an eschatological event. The true community of the faithful will be 42. The belief in the occultation (ghayba) of the Imam and the expectation of his victorious return (raj‘a) began with the death of Muhammad-al-Hanafias, a son of Imam ‘Ali (though not a direct descendant of Muhammad), around the year 700 CE. According to the doctrines of Fourer Shi‘a (Kaysdniyya) the line of the Imams ends with him. 43. ‘Ali al-Hadi (the tenth Imam) and his son Hasan al-‘Askari (the eleventh Imam) lived under the strict supervision of the Abbasid court as virtual prisoners. There was controversy among contemporary Shi‘a Muslims as to whether al-‘Askari had left a male successor when he died (around the turn of the year 873/74 CE). (On the confusion among the Shi‘a during this period see, for example, Sachedina, Jslamic Messianism, pp. 40ff., where as many as twelve schools are identified that diverge from the line that predominates today).

583

Chapter 10 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

restored and divine law established. The twelfth Imam ‘will fill the earth with justice and fairness, as it was formerly filled with repression and tyranny’.*4 This was associated in popular belief

with the promise of earthly power and violent revenge on all enemies of the faith: one of the epithets of the twelfth Imam

being sdahib al-sayf, ‘Lord of the Sword’. His most important titles are Mahdi (‘the rightly guided one’)*? and Qa’im (“He who will arise’).4© The collection of traditions related to this event is very divers: as well as Qur’anic verses and statements attributed to Muhammad or the Imams, Jewish, Christian and

Zoroastrian traditions have been assimilated.47 They include

apocalyptic expectations about the ‘time of the end’,*® along with ideas of a purely worldly eschatology or of a mere revitali-

44. Imamite tradition, quoted from Halm, Die Schia, p. 45.

45. Passive participle of the Arabic verb hadd, ‘to guide’, ‘to lead’. The term itself does not occur in the Qur’an. The designation al-mahdi was probably used at first—without any eschatological sense—as a title of honour for Muhammad or Abraham or of the Imams “Ali and Husayn (see Halm, Die Schia, p. 22; Madelung, keyword ‘al-Mahdi’, EJ, 2nd edn., vol. 5, pp. 1230ff.). 46. According to Imamite tradition, it was Ja‘far as-Sadiq, the sixth Imam, who expressly postulated the identity of the two figures of salvation, the Mahdi and the Qa’im (Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, p. 61). See also Madelung, keyword ‘Ka‘im 41 Muhammad’, EJ, 2nd edn., vol. 4, pp. 456f. 47. See A. Abel, keyword ‘al-Dajjal’, EJ, 2nd edn., p. 77; Amanat, Resurrection, p. 2, note 5; C.G. Anawati, keyword fsa’ , EI, 2nd edn., vol. 4, pp. 81, 84f.; Mary Boyce, Zoroastrians, pp. 148, 152; Heinz Halm, keyword ‘Dawr’, EI, 2nd edn., Supplement, Fasc. 3.4, p. 207. On

Parsee eschatology and apocalyptic writings see Geo Widengren, Die Religionen Irans, pp. 102f. 48. Thus, the majority of Shi‘a authors expect the rule of the Mahdi to be followed immediately by the resurrection of the dead and the Last Judgement. There is no consensus on the duration of his rule in Imamite sources (see A. Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, pp. 176ff.).

584

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History zation of Islam. In heterodox circles it is also expected that the

Mahdi will bring a new ‘Book’, i.e. a new religion.*? The attitude of the established clergy to chiliastic expectations was generally one of reservation.*° All speculation about the time of the Mahdi’s return was frowned on, and anyone who

engaged in such speculation was persecuted.*! If any attention was paid to eschatological traditions at all, they were either regarded as relevant to an era that was beyond earthly time, or they were subordinated to the dogma of the finality of the Qur’an and the shari‘a. In any case, the clergy—like the Chris-

tian churches—had accustomed themselves to the delay of parousia.

49. Momen, Shi‘i Islam, p. 169. Sunni critics reject this because it would in effect amount to a new revelation after Muhammad;

see, for

instance, the heresiography of Abu Mansur ‘Abd al-Qadir b. Tahir alBaghdadi (d. 429/1037), Al-Farq Bayn al-Firaq, in which the idea of Islam being superseded in the ‘Last Days’ is counted as a heretical doctrine (see Rafati, Development, p. 5). On this discussion see A, Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, pp. 175ff. Whereas the orthodox Imamiya attempt to interpret these traditions as fully reinstating the Islamic order that was originally intended, heterodox groupings (such as the Qarmati, see Madelung, keyword ‘al-Mahdi’, EJ, 2nd edn., vol. 5, p. 1236) do not

shrink from this consequence. This issue is controversial among the Isma‘ilis, too (see Halm, Kosmologie und Heilslehre der friihen Isma‘iliya, pp. 19f.; Madelung, “Aspects of Isma‘ili Theology: The Prophetic Chain and the God Beyond Being’, p. 55); for evidence of such an expectation see van Ess (Chiliastische Erwartungen und die Versuchung der Géttlichkeit, p. 56). In addition, there is the idea of the abrogation (raf‘) of the shari‘a without substitute, connected with a renewal of original monotheism by the Mahdi (Halm, keyword ‘Bateniya’, EJR, vol. 3, p. 862). It is not surprising that the Baha’i sources (e.g. Shoghi Effendi, Unfolding Destiny, p. 426) take up the traditions associating the Qa’im with a new holy book and a new law. 50. In his sermons, Aq4 Muhammad

Baqir Bihbahani, the universally

acknowledged leader of the Ustli clergy in the 18th century, even went so far as to imply that it was futile to wait for the return of the Imam by arguing that circumstances made it impossible to bear the difficulties and hardships associated with his return (Amanat, Resurrection, p. 42). 51. Amanat, Resurrection, pp. 55f.

585

Chapter 10 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer The two founders of the Shaykhi movement, by contrast, preserved the memories of the Shi‘a eschatological traditions

and revitalized pious worship of the Imams and faith in the guidance given by them. Thus, they strengthened charismatic and individual religiosity against the formal hierarchy of the

religious scholars. They expressly rejected the claim of the mujtahids to the unquestioning obedience (taglid) of the lay-people

and lower clergy.*°? Especially within the close circle of followers, they claimed direct inspiration from the Hidden Imam and

associated with this cautious hints about the imminent ‘time of the end’ and the coming Renewal.*? This laid the foundation for the development of a strong messianic consciousness

among

major sections of the Shaykhi movement, which made them receptive to the claim and the teachings of Siyyid *Ali-Muham-

mad, who proclaimed himself the “Bab’ in the year 1260 AH/ 1844 CE.%4 5. The Bab’s claim

The Bab was born into a merchant family in the southern Persian city of Shiraz. Although he was a Siyyid, a descendant of

52. Bayat, Mysticism, p. 49; Scholl, keyword ‘Shaykhiyah’, ER, vol. 13ap. 231. 53. See Amanat, Resurrection, pp. 56ff.; Rafati, Development,

pp. 136,

177-186; Muhammad-i-Zarandi, The Dawn-Breakers, pp. 33f. The constant threat of the consequences of takfir caused the adoption of an attitude of tagiyya, the cautious veiling of the real meaning. Reports show Siyyid Kazim to have expressed himself much more clearly within the close circle of his followers, see Muhammad-i-Zarandi, op. cit. pp. 40ff.; Amanat, Resurrection, pp. 60f. On the full body of Shaykhi doctrines

that paved the way for the Bab, see Rafati, Development, pp. 168-85. 54. The two most detailed accounts of the transition from the Shaykhi school to the Babi religion and the latter’s further development are to be found in Amanat (Resurrection and Renewal: The Making of the Babi Movement

in Iran,

1844-1850,

Ithaca,

London,

1989) and MacEoin

(From Shaykhism to Babism, unpublished thesis, Cambridge, 1979). For an overview see Smith, The Babi and Baha’i Religions, Part I.

586

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History

the Prophet, he did not undergo any particular religious or theological schooling. Above all, he did not receive the formal

education of the Shi‘a clergy.°> For this reason, his religious authority could stem only from sources completely outside the usual pattern. Along with other elements of non-institutional religious authority such as holiness*® and personal charisma,>” he was also able to make use of the latent expectations com-

monly held in the Shi‘a culture in which he lived. Graded according to the degree of extraordinariness, these were: the claim to esoteric knowledge through inspiration from the Imams; a special form of association with the hidden twelfth Imam; and

the apocalyptic or chiliastic function of the Mahdi or Qa’im. However, the claim to direct revelation from God and to a new religious dispensation superseding the Qur’an was something that went beyond traditional Shi‘a expectations.

The claims publicly raised by the Bab himself, or by his followers on his behalf, therefore followed the line of these ex-

pectations. The title “Bab’, by which he was most widely known, was consciously associated with the designation given to the

55. He underwent the schooling customary for someone of his social background: approximately six years in a local maktab, followed by practical training in his uncle’s business and several years as an independent merchant. Being deeply religious, the Bab made contact with the Shaykhis and in 1839-40 he probably also attended some seminars

by Siyyid Kazim, although he did not take up formal religious studies (see Amanat, Resurrection, pp. 113-146). 56. On various reports concerning his extraordinary piety see, for example, ibid. pp. 147f. 57. On the effect of his personality see Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, pp. 11f., 14f., 19f.; Amanat, Resurrection, pp. 109, 132, 171; Bayat,

Mysticism,

pp. 97,

99;

Muhammad-i-Zarandi,

The

Dawn-Breakers,

pp. 91, 102f., 206ff., 278f., 280f., 332. On the effect of his words (spoken and written), as well as those of his emissaries, see Amanat, ibid.

pp. 172f.; Bayat, ibid. pp. 109f.; mad-i-Zarandi, ibid. p. 212. For counts see also Stephen Lambden, Bab’, in Smith (ed.), In Iran. SBB,

Shoghi Effendi, ibid. p. 12, Muhaman evaluation of hagiographical ac‘An Episode in the Childhood of the vol. 3, pp. 1ff., esp. pp. 19ff.

587

Chapter 10 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

four ‘gates’ to the hidden Imam during the ‘lesser occultation’.

This concept of the babu ‘l-imdm, the gate to the hidden Imam,>® which was generally understood by most people, was followed by other concepts that were peculiar to the Shaykhis, in par-

ticular the identification of the Bab with the ‘fourth pillar’.°? It was not until July 1848, during the interrogation ordered by Grand Vizier Haji Mirza Aqasi in Tabriz, that the Bab openly

proclaimed himself to be the Qa’im.© The scripture of the Bab, however, bore witness to his real

claim from the very outset.®! Although his claim to a new revel58. See MacEoin, From Shaykhism, pp. 172f.,; idem, ‘Hierarchy, Authority, and Eschatology in early Babi Thought’, in Smith (ed.), In Iran. SBB, vol. 3, pp. 98f. This common interpretation of his chosen title was denied by the Bab under duress in the Vakil Mosque in Shiraz in 1845. This was interpreted by outsiders as a recantation of his claims, but it was in fact only a rejection of a misunderstanding that was only to be expected and was probably intentional. The Bab did not withdraw his real claim, which went much further than this (Amanat, Resurrection,

p. 255; Muhammad-i-Zarandi, The Dawn-Breakers, pp. 154ff., Tarikh-iJadid, pp. 50-54). 59. rukn-i-rabi‘,

see MacEoin,

From

Shaykhism,

pp. 170ff.; idem,

Hierarchy, ibid. p. 116. The Shaykhis logically reduced the Imamite principles of religion (usu! ad-din, i.e. the oneness of God (tawhid), the prophetology (nubuwwa), resurrection and the Last Judgement (ma ‘dd), the Imamate and the justice of God (‘ad/)) to three: the oneness of God, Prophethood, and the Imamate, but added a further principle which stated that there is always a ‘true Shi‘a’ (shi ‘t-i-kdmil) who acts as a

mediator between the hidden Imam and the believers (Amanat, Resurrection, pp. 54f.; Bayat, Mysticism, pp. 49ff.; Scholl, keyword ‘Shaykhi-

yah’, ER, vol. 13, p. 231). On the Kirmani interpretation of the ‘fourth pillar’, which differs from this, see Bayat, ibid. pp. 66ff., 75ff.; MacEoin, From Shaykhism, pp. 168f. 60. Amanat, Resurrection, pp. 199, 201, 385ff.,; Browne, A Traveller’s

Narrative, Note N, pp. 291ff. 61. The scripture of the Bab contains a number of descriptions of the Bab’s own function and rank. In the Qayyimu’1l-Asma’, for instance, we find the terms dhikr (“Remembrance (of God)’, ‘Reminder’) and nuqta (‘Point’;

see Amanat,

Resurrection,

pp. 201ff.). Dhikr is a Qur’anic

term (7:61). Shaykh Ahmad had used this term in reference to the Prophet Muhammad (Amanat, ibid. p. 202, note 273). The term nuqta

588

Some Aspects of Babi and Bahd’i History

ation superseding Islam was not clearly and unambiguously

stated until 1847 in a text entitled Qa’imiya and written during his imprisonment in Mah-Ku,® this can hardly have come as a surprise to anyone who had learned to read between the lines

and to understand allusions and metaphors.°3 This claim had already been evident in the first of his prophetic writings, the Qayyumu’l-Asma’®. That this was recognized not only by the was described by Gobineau (‘qu’il était le Point, c’est-a-dire le générateur méme de la vérité, une apparition divine, une manifestation toute-

puissante’, Les Religions, p. 144) and Browne (Introduction to Nugqtatu’l-Kdf, p. xxvii) as identical with the primal will of God, the manifestation of the divine. For a detailed discussion of the terms dhikr and bab see Lawson, ‘The Terms “Remembrance” (dhikr) and “Gate” (bdb) in

the Bab’s Commentary on the Sura of Joseph’, in SBB, vol. 5, pp. 1-63, esp. pp. 11ff. Lawson demonstrates that the term bdb also has several meanings: as well as the traditional meaning of the Gate to the hidden Imam, bdbiyya refers to the rank of the Imams themselves, and even to

the station of prophethood. On further references by the Bab to himself see, for example, Shoghi Effendi, World Order, p. 126. 62. Amanat, Resurrection, pp. 375ff.

63. In all totalitarian societies the technique of conveying implicit meanings is highly developed. In the states of the former ‘eastern bloc’, for instance, it was often possible even to publish dissident ideas if they were presented in a consciously indeterminate way, the intended meaning of which could easily be deduced by the initiated. 64. For details see Lawson, ‘Terms’, ibid. pp. 1ff. This was even evi-

dent from the outer form of the Qayyumu’l-Asma’ (Lawson, ‘Terms’, ibid. p. 6; MacEoin, Shaykhism, p. 158). On the specific nature of such scripture by the Bab, which differ from all traditional forms of tafsir (commentary, interpretation), see also Lawson, ‘Qur’4n Commentary as Sacred Performance: The Bab’s tafsirs of Qur’4n 103 and 108’. One of

the accusations laid against the author of the Qayyimu’l-Asma’ in the verdict against ‘Ali Bastami was therefore: ‘That he had produced a book that resembled the Qur’an in its format, with stras, verses, discon-

nected letters, etc.” (Momen, ‘Trial’, ibid. pp. 119ff. and others). 65. This text is known by a number of titles: as the “Commentary on the Surih of Joseph’ (Tafsir Surat Yusuf), as Qayyimu’l-Asma’ and as Ahsan al qasas (Lawson, ‘Terms’, ibid. p. 1). On the date of this text: the first part of the text was composed during the night of 22-23 May 1844, when the Bab announced his claim and his mission for the first time (to Mulla Husayn). Whereas some sources conclude from this that

589

Chapter 10 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

circle of Babi leaders but also by the mujtahids, who were hostile to the Bab, was revealed as early as 1845 in the verdict pronounced against Mulla ‘Ali Bastami,°° one of the Bab’s leading disciples, and in the text Izhdq al-batil®’ completed by Muhammad Karim Khan Kirmani in July of the same year, both of which refer to the Qayyumu’l-Asma’. Moreover, because of the missionary or chiliastic impatience of some Babis, the Bab’s policy of caution could not always be upheld. From very early times, chiliastic hopes were

placed in him and in his mission.

External circumstances

the text was written within a period of forty days and was already being circulated by the autumn of 1844, MacEoin (From Shaykhism, pp. 157f.) deduces by means of literal interpretation of some references to the Ka‘aba that the text was completed during the Bab’s pilgrimage to Mecca (whence he returned in May 1845). Since the wording also permits the allegorical, mystical interpretation of these passages —analogous to scriptural passages concerning the Ascension of Muhammad— this later date is not cogent (MacEoin himself appears also to have changed his opinion on this matter, Sources, p. 56). The documents and reports concerning the trial of Mulla ‘Ali Bastami (the second person to have professed his belief in the Bab), in which the Qayyamu’l-Asma’ plays a crucial role, clearly indicate the later date to be erroneous Bastami had taken up missionary work in Baghdad in August 1844 and was imprisoned in October of the same year (Momen, ‘The Trial of Mulla ‘Ali Bastami: A combined Sunni-Shi‘i Fatwa against the Bab’, in

Iran. Journal of Persian Studies 22, pp. 113-143, Amanat, Resurrection, pp. 220ff.). 66. Momen, ‘Trial’, pp. 113-143. One of the charges against ‘Ali Bastami was that the author of the Qayyumu’1l-Asma’ had raised a claim of divine revelation (p. 119 and elsewhere). 67. MacEoin, ‘Early Shaykhi Reactions to the Bab and His Claims’, pp. 1-47, esp. p. 34. 68. The polemical objection raised in some Western accounts (initially through Gobineau’s Les Religions, p. 144) that the Bab, either as a re-

sult of increasing arrogance or under pressure from his most radical followers, continually raised new and incompatible claims, originated from the work of the Persian court chronicler, Mirza Taqi Mustawfi

(1801-1880, better known as Lisanu’l-Mulk or Sipihr), who was hostile to the Bab. For a critique of this work see Bayat, Mysticism, p. 88. Compare also Amanat, Resurrection, pp. 199ff.,; Mirza Abu’l-Fadl, Let-

590

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History

were, indeed, suited to the propagation of a political and revolutionary claim to Mahdihood. Political instability, economic ruin, and pressure from European powers meant that there was a widespread desire for fundamental change and renewal in Persia. It is obvious that some of those who initially supported the Bab were hoping for such revolutionary change, especially since the year 1260 AH was, according to the Islamic calendar, exactly one thousand years since the ‘occultation’ of the twelfth

Imam, so that messianic expectations were running high. Like Jesus, who, in a comparable situation, had to subdue expectations of a political messiah, the Bab had to dampen false hopes and, as far as possible, gradually transform these into a deeper understanding of his mission.®? This is probably another reason for his approach of making his claims public only gradually, almost hesitantly. A political saviour is expected to act differ-

ently, with speed and decisiveness.

Baha’u’llah’s Book of Certitude (Kitab-i-Iqan)” is an interesting document dealing with such chiliastic expectations and

revealing a new concept of the function of the Qa’im, that differs from traditional ideas. That this work correctly describes

the Bab’s own image of his station is evident from his scripture?! and from his biography.’2 The Book of Certitude was ters and Essays 1886-1913, pp. 107ff. For description and evaluation of the court chronicles as a source see also Browne, A Traveller’s Narra-

tive, Note A, pp. 173-192; Tarikh-i-Jadid, Introduction, pp. xiv, xxxix. 69. There is a clear parallel between the initial chiliastic enthusiasm

for the Bab, together with the subsequent disappointment felt by many of his followers, which resulted in their rejection of him, and the Bibli-

cal accounts of the enthusiastic reception given in Jerusalem to the ‘King of the Jews’ by these followers, who, however, evidently failed to follow him. 70. This work was written around

Baha’u’llah’s own religious 71. This is the conclusion p. 20), who states: ‘Even in is already clear that the Bab ideal.’

1862, before the proclamation

of

ministry. reached even by Rémer (Die Babi-Beha’i, the commentary on the Sura of Joseph . . . it has not a political but a theosophical Mahdi

591

Chapter 10 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer written in response to questions posed by Haji Mirza Siyyid Muhammad, an uncle of the Bab. He took particular exception to the discrepancy between the Bab’s claim to be the Qa’im and

his obvious powerlessness, which did not at all correspond to the traditional expectation of the Qa’im as an earthly ruler.”> In his reply, Baha’u’llah distinguishes between the fundamental transcendental sovereignty of the Manifestations of God (maz-

har-i-ilahi, mazhar-i-zuhir;’4 among whom he expressly counts the Bab as the Qa’im) and their external appearance in the physical world.”> The fact that the Qa’im—and most previous Manifestations—are, at least initially, not in possession of any

72. This is evident, above all, in his refusal to accept the political and military support offered by Mantchihr Khan, governor of Isfahan (Balyuzi, The Bab, pp. 114ff.). 73. Similarly, ‘Abdu’l-Baha contrasts the expectation among the Jews of an earthly, political messiah with the spiritual reality of Christ (Selections 20:1-3).

74. In addition to these central concepts, these figures of salvation are referred to by a number of other terms in the Baha’i scripture: nabi (prophet), rasul (messenger, prophet), mursal (messenger, prophet), safir (messenger, mediator), safiy (the friend, the chosen one). For details see Towfigh, Schépfung, pp. 170ff. A basic summary of Baha’i doctrine concerning the Manifestation is to be found in Shoghi Effendi, World Order, pp. 112ff. See also the presentation of the concept of prophethood in the Baha’i Faith in Cole, Concept, esp. pp. 1f., 8f., 11ff.; Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 5.2 and 7.1; Towfigh, Schépfung, ch. 4.

75. ‘Verily, He . . . holdeth, for all time, undisputed sovereignty [sult an] over all that is in heaven and on earth, though no man be found on earth to obey Him. He verily is independent of all earthly dominion [mulk] . . . (Kitab-i-Iqgan 102 (p. 97)). The Manifestations ‘have, each

and every one of them, been endowed with all the attributes of God, such as sovereignty [saltanat], dominion [‘azamat], and the like, even though to outward seeming they be shorn of all earthly majesty [salt anat-i zahirih]’ (110 (pp. 103f.). ‘By sovereignty [saltanat] is meant the all-encompassing, all-pervading power [qudrat] which is inherently exercised by the Qa’im whether or not He appear to the world clothed in the majesty of earthly dominion [istildyih-zahiri]’ (ibid. 114 (p. 107)). This has parallels in the sovereignty of God, ‘which is hid from the eyes of men’ (Prayers and Meditations 47:1 (p. 52)).

592

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History

earthly power,’© is regarded as a test for mankind.”” The true seeker will find the path to God despite the lack of external power on the part of God’s messenger.’® The transforming power of the Word of God, the soteriological mission of the

Manifestation,’”? power.

takes

precedence

over

any

direct earthly

The gradual unfolding of his claim was commented upon by the Bab himself and by some of his leading disciples. In his 1847/48 work Dala’il-i-Sab‘ih, for example, the Bab describes

the gradual unveiling of his religion and the claims associated with it as a pedagogical act, as divine mercy intended to facilitate people’s adaptation to the huge challenge posed by a new

revelation from God.®° Similar arguments were presented by 76. This is shown vividly at the beginning of the Kitab-i-Iqan. 77. ‘Were the Eternal Essence to manifest all that is latent within Him,

were He to shine in the plenitude of His glory, none would be found to question His power or repudiate His truth . . . How, then, can the godly be differentiated under such circumstances from the froward?’ (Gleanings 29:3, see also 38; Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 6.4).

78. On the qualities of the ‘true seeker’ see Kitab-i-Iqan 2ff (pp. 3ff.), and especially 213-219 (pp. 192-200). For the implications of this for the Baha’i concept of human nature see Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 6.4. 79. This refers both to the individual and to society, which will, in the

long term, be pervaded by its ethical influence and will thus be transformed (see Gollmer, ibid. ch. 7.2). 80. ‘Consider the manifold favours vouchsafed by the Promised One, and the effusions of His bounty which have pervaded the concourse of the followers of Islam to enable them to attain unto salvation. Indeed observe how He Who representeth the origin of creation, He Who is the Exponent of the verse, “I, in very truth, am God”, identified Himself as

the Gate (Bab) for the advent of the promised Qa’im, a descendant of Muhammad, and in His first Book enjoined the observance of the laws of the Qur’an, so that the people might not be seized with perturbation by reason of a new Book and a new Revelation and might regard His Faith as similar to their own, perchance they would not turn away from

the Truth and ignore the thing for which they had been called into being’ (Dala’il-i-Sab‘ih, quoted from The Bab, Selections 4:4). Lambden has provided a provisional translation of Baha’u’llah’s Surat al Fath (‘Some Notes on Baha’u’1lah’s Gradually Evolving Claims of the Adri-

593

Chapter 10 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer Mirza Muhammad-‘Ali Zunuzi, known as Anis, during his interrogation in Tabriz in 1850. He said that the reason for the gradual unfolding of the full extent of the Bab’s claim was ‘the

gradual promotion of the people’s spiritual status’ .*! Assuming this is not to be taken as a retroactive justification, we can deduce from this and the available sources the fol-

lowing pattern: the Bab first revealed his full claim to only a small number of his closest disciples, this claim initially being presented to the outside world in terms and expressions that can be interpreted in such a way that he appeared to be only charismatically inspired. The choice of terms corresponded to the spiritual and/or eschatological expectations of his audience. However, these statements can be interpreted on several different levels, depending on the method of interpretation. This ambiguity made it possible to avoid a radical breakaway from the religious background and native soil from which it sprang. Careful analysis, however, shows traditional terms and claims anople/Edirme Period’, in BSB, vols. 5.3-6.1 (June 1991), pp. 79f.), where Baha’u’!lah makes a similar statement about his own dispensation and then draws parallels with the Bab ‘He [Bab] . . . said, “I am the Gate of Knowledge (bab al-‘ilm) and whosoever is convinced of the truth of My Claim (haqqi) in addition to that (fuq dhalika: surpassing that station), hath assuredly invented lies about Me and acquireth great sin within himself”. Then [later] He said, “I am the Qa’im, the True One (al qa’im al-haqq) . . . This, verily, is assuredly (the Reality of) Muhammad, the Messenger of God (rasul allah) . . .” He [subsequently] said, “I am the Primordial Point (nuqtatal-awwaliyya)’. And when the beings of a number of predisposed souls were refined, thereupon the veils were torn asunder and there rose up from the Dawning-Place of Holiness [the Bab’s claim], “I verily am God, no God is there except Me, thy Lord and the Lord of all the worlds” . . .” Similarly, Baha’u’llah states in the Lawh-i Khalil (ibid. p. 80): ‘. . . in the beginning of the year 60 [1260 AH/1844 CE]. He [the Bab] was manifested, at the beginning of His appearance, in the garment of Gatehood (bi-gamis al-babiyya) . . . then He replaced it with the garment of Sanctity (bi-qamis al-wilaya) . . . [later] He revealed himself unto them with the name of Lordship (bi-ism al-rububiyya) and cried out, “I verily, I am God, no God is there except Hm: ga-cncs 81. Quoted from Amanat, Resurrection, pp. 199f.

594

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History to have been implicitly invested from the outset with newer meanings bearing much wider implications. These were not made explicit until a later stage in the community’s develop-

ment. In a parallel process, the Babi community gradually took on the status of an independent religion. A similar development—ceteris paribus—is to be seen in

the case of Baha’u’llah.®? This is a pattern that is frequently to be found in religious history. We find it, for example, in Muhammad’s initial reservation to declare his mission, contrasted with his eventual ending of shared worship with the Jewish commun-

ity of Medina, and the indications of Jesus’ messianic secret in the Gospels (the interpretation of which is a source of much

controversy in the literature)’4—all of these can be interpreted as falling into this pattern. The same cautious approach is evident in the Bab’s atti-

tude to Islamic law. At first, the Babis were exhorted to obey the Islamic shari‘a,®> indeed through his own example and through his commentaries the Bab called for a particularly strict

82. See Lambden,

‘Some Notes’, ibid. pp. 75ff.; Cole, ‘Baha’u’llah’s

‘Sirah of the Companions’, esp. pp. 8, 22. Probably the first scholar to have used the term ‘messianic secret’ in connection with Baha’u’llah was Cole, ‘Baha’u’llah and the Naqshbandi Sufis in Iraq, 1854-1856’, in SBB, vol. 2, p. 15; see also p. 19; idem, keyword “Baha-Allah’, E/R,

vol. 3, p. 424. On the origin of the term see below, note 84. 83. Symbolized by his alteration of the direction of prayer from Jerusalem to Mecca. 84. The term ‘messianic secret’ was coined by the New Testament scholar William Wrede, whose work (Das Messiasgeheimnis in den Evangelien. Zugleich ein Beitrag zum Verstdndnis des Markusevangeli-

ums, Gottingen, 3rd edn. 1965) marked a milestone in New Testament research on this issue. For more recent discussions see Heikki Raisanen, The ‘Messianic Secret’ in Mark (Studies of the New Testament and its

World), Edinburgh,

1990, C.M. Tuckett (ed.), The Messianic Secret,

London, 1983.

85. For evidence of this see MacEoin, ‘Early Shaykhi Reactions’, ibid. p. 19; Momen, ‘Trial’, ibid. p. 142.

595

Chapter 10 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer interpretation of the law.’ Simultaneously, however, he sought

to draw attention to its inner meaning.®” It was not until the summer of 1848, when the bounds of Shi‘a expectations were

overstepped, that the Bab broke with Islamic law.8® It was superseded by the laws of the Persian Bayan, the shari‘a of the Babi Faith.’ Both in practice and in doctrine, then, the new community initially developed within the existing system; only

gradually did it become obvious that the new faith must inevitably go beyond the forms a loyalties of Shi‘a Islam, only then did the break become an inescapable consequence. Although the Bab’s claim was always intended as an announcement of a

new theophany, its public promulgation was prepared slowly, and in accordance with the expectations generally held in Per-

86. For example, additional prayers were made obligatory, smoking was prohibited, the extraordinary reverence for the Imams was made evident through a particular ritual at the grave of the Imam Husayn, and the ‘spiritual seeker’ had to undergo a special programme of fasting and prayer (see Smith, The Babi and Baha’i Religions, p. 33). 87. Smith, ibid. 88. See Amanat, Resurrection, pp. 324ff., Muhammad-i-Zarandi,

The

Dawn-Breakers, pp. 292ff. Contrary to the Bab’s intention, this break with Islamic law probably also encouraged antinomianist tendencies among the Babis, see for instance Browne, Tdarikh-i-Jadid, Appendix I], p. 357.

89. The paradigm of prophethood includes (at least in the Islamic context) the function of lawgiver. Nevertheless, most of the laws of the Bab that went beyond the strictly religious were never implemented (as is clearly pointed out by Shoghi Effendi in a letter dated 17 February 1939, Dawn of a New Day, p. 77; Hornby, Lights of Guidance, 2nd edn., no. 1545). From the Baha’i viewpoint, the real reason for the Bab’s sometimes drastic laws is the need to break with the Islamic order and thus to prepare the way for the revelation of Baha’u’llah (see Kitab-iAqdas, note 109). For a survey of the laws of the Babi religion see Smith, The Babi and Baha’i Religions, pp. 34f., see also Afnan, keyword ‘Le Bab’, Explications en arabe/en persan (Bayan-i-arabi/ Bayani-farsi), Encyclopédie Philosophique Universelle, vol. Il.1, pp. 19171919; Browne, ‘A Summary of the Persian Bayan’, pp. 323ff. For a crit-

ical assessment see Amanat, Resurrection, pp. 409f.

596

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History sia’s Shi‘a environment, since it was bound to be perceived as a

supreme Skandalon in an Islamic society.

597

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh

II. BAHA’U’LLAH’S CLAIMS As already shown above,” Ficicchia’s descriptions of Mirza Yahya Azal and Baha’u’llah clearly indicate his bias in favour of one over the other. Mirza Yahya Azal is portrayed as ‘an in-

troverted youth inclined to states of mystic rapture’,?! whereas Baha’u’llah is described as ‘ambitious’,?? ‘opportunistic’,?? and ‘cynical’.?4 Ficicchia assumes the supremacy of Mirza Yahya Azal?> and sees Baha’u’llah’s actions as constituting his ‘grad-

ual displacement’. Hence Ficicchia is convinced that ‘the split was demonstrably caused by Baha’u’llah’,®” that Baha’u’llah

was guilty of incitement to murder®® and attempted murder,?? and that the date ascribed to Baha’u’llah’s declaration of his mission was a ‘later artificial construction’ on the part of the

Baha’is.!©° In order to examine Ficicchia’s arguments, we will need to consider Baha’u’llah’s claim, the personality of Mirza

Yahya Azal and his position within the Babi community, against the historical background. Despite the deep respect in which Baha’u ’llah was held by

the Babis, it was never his desire to seize power or to be preferred over others. In his Book of Certitude he testifies that:

90. See Schaefer, above, pp. 58ff. 91. Baha’ismus, p.20. This description Browne (see 7arikh-i-Jadid, Intro., p. xxi)

92. ibid. p. 96. 93. ibid. p. 129. 94. ibid. 95. ibid. p. 101. 96. ibid. p. 105. 97. ibid. p. 290. 98. ibid. p. 111f. 99. ibid. p. 141. 100. ibid. p. 125 (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

598

is obviously

taken

from

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History On every side We witness the menace of their spears, and in all directions We recognize the shafts of their arrows. This, although We have never gloried in any thing, nor did We seek preference over any soul. To everyone We have been a most kindly companion, a most forbearing and affectionate friend. In the company of the poor We have sought their fellowship, and

amidst the exalted and learned We have been submis-

sive and resigned. !°! Neither was it Baha’u’llah’s intention, therefore, to belittle the station of Mirza Yahya Azal or to diminish his esteem, which had, however, already been reduced as a result of his own be-

haviour. As Louis Henuzet rightly points out,!°2 Baha’u’llah was not a rival of Mirza Yahya Azal for leadership of the community; rather, Mirza Yahya’s rivals were those who sought

leadership over the Babis or over certain parts of the community.

It was probably in order to demonstrate clearly that he did not wish to dispute Mirza Yahya Azal’s role as head of the community, and in the hope of calming the situation, that

Baha’u’llah withdrew to the mountains of Kurdistan in April 1854 and spent two years in solitude there. He himself wrote of

this period and his subsequent return to Baghdad: The one object of Our retirement was to avoid becoming a subject of discord among the faithful, a source of disturbance unto Our companions, the means of injury

to any soul, or the cause of sorrow to any heart.!9 Baha’u’llah’s claim, which he announced in 1863 in the Garden of Ridvan in Baghdad, was much more profound and far-reaching than a claim to leadership of the Babi community.

101. Kitab-i-[qan 277 (pp. 249f.) 102. Les Bahd’is par Christian Cannuyer: Le Point de vue d'un baha’i, p. 21.

103. Kitdb-i-Iqan 278 (p. 250f.). 399

Chapter 10 + Nicola Towfigh His promulgation of his mission opened up a new chapter in the

history of religion: that of the Baha’i Faith. In his scripture, the Bab had repeatedly indicated the coming of ‘Him whom God

shall make manifest’ (Man yuzhiruhu Ilah). Baba’u’\lah claimed to be that very figure of prophecy. The Bab wrote of the concept of progressive revelation, which is confirmed in the scripture of Baha’u’llah. This doctrine is based on the idea that there is only one God, who guides and teaches humanity by means of religion. Hence, all the major religions originate from a single source and are meant to guide people to lead their lives in accordance with the will of God and to promote the development of the human race. In the text Dala’il-i-Sab’ih, the Bab speaks of the Messengers of God in the following terms: In the time of the First Manifestation the Primal Will

appeared in Adam;

in the day of Noah

it became

known in Noah; in the day of Abraham in Him; and so in the day of Moses; the day of Jesus; the day of Muhammad, the Apostle of God; the day of the ‘Point of the Bayan’; the day of Him Whom God shall make manifest; and the day of the One Who will appear after Him Whom God shall make manifest.. Hence the inner meaning of the words uttered by the Apostle of God, ‘I am all the Prophets’, inasmuch as what shineth re-

splendent in each one of Them hath been and will ever

remain the one and the same sun.!°4 Thus, the founder of each religion simultaneously announces the coming of the next divine Messenger: The Lord of the universe hath never raised up a prophet nor hath He sent down a Book unless He hath established His covenant with all men, calling for their acceptance of the next Revelation and of the next

104. The Bab, Selections Bayan II:8).

4:10:6

(p. 126); see also 3:39:1

600

(Persian

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History Book; inasmuch as the outpourings of His bounty are

ceaseless and without limit.!® Believers are therefore required to recognize and accept the Word of God in its new form if they are to continue to receive

divine guidance. For this reason, the Bab demands that the Muslims recognize him.! Similarly, the Babis should turn to “Him who God shall make manifest’ as soon as he should ap-

pear.!°7 The moment a new revelation appears, it fulfils the prophecy of the previous religion and supersedes it. The Bab praises the Promised One and mentions him, as Browne cor-

rectly states,!°8 on every page of the Persian Bayan. The Bab constantly exhorts his followers to accept the Promised One and not to cause him the same suffering as that which the Bab him-

self had endured at the hands of unbelievers. He orders the Babis to repeat every nineteen days a verse from the Bayan on

the subject of acceptance of the Promised One.! Finally, he stresses the rank of the Promised One by stating that the glory (Bahd’) of the Bayan is Man yuzhiruhu ‘llah.!'° 1. The prophecy concerning the advent of Man yuzhiruhu’llah

The Bab evidently foresaw the imminent advent of the Promised One whom he described in such glowing terms. This is

clear from many of the statements he made to contemporaries,

105.

ibid. 3:12:1 (Persian Bayan VI:16 (p. 87)).

106.

ibid. 3:20:2; 4:3:1; 4:5:2.

107. fbid 13:2 051993245. B 267193332312 3 37 5:7:1; 5:8:1; 5:9:2; 6:4:1; 6:13:2 and others.

S34i12 5:52; 5 :6:1;

108. JRAS XXI.IV (October 1889), p. 927. 109. Persian Bayan VI:8. '

110. ibid. TT:14: cust afl o jg GegluesSS This verse not only em-

phasizes the exalted station of the Promised One but may also be understood as an allusion to the person of Baha’u’ lah.

601

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh

whom he exhorted to recognize both himself and—as soon as

he appeared—the promised Man yuzhiruhu'llah. In a letter written to a Muslim clergyman named Sulayman, for instance, he called upon the addressee to turn to him (the Bab), since he would otherwise be accursed. If he failed to accept the Bab, God would forgive him only if he turned, by means of a letter,

to ‘Him whom God shall make manifest’!!!—i.e. in the near future, during Sulayman’s lifetime. From another letter, written by the Bab to the Sharif of Mecca and others, it is again evident that the Bab expected the Promised One to appear during the lifetime of the Sharif. The Bab admonished the Sharif of Mecca to embrace the Cause of God and to implore that the matter of thine allegiance be brought to the attention of Him

Whom

God

shall make

manifest,

that He may

graciously enable thee to prosper and cause thy fire to

be transformed into light.!12 Furthermore, it is implied in the Persian Bayan that Man yuzhiruhu’llah would appear during the 19 years following the Bab’s declaration of his mission (1844); i.e. in the period up to

the year 1863, although God alone would know the hour of his coming.!!3 The early Babis, too, clearly expected the Promised

111.

The Bab, Selections 1:9:7.

112. 113.

ibid. 1:7:3 (p. 30). Persian Bayan VI:3. The Persian text reads as follows:

jh sade 58S coal alle sighsdallla rps Gyea9 5s daly ste G spb lane5bgly Lag! sulejd pal Guu SIS yall iyas ylasl jUpbl dian pfys4S oye calle ...1e. ‘And concerning the manifestation of Him Whom God shall manifest, God knows in what limit of years He will manifest him; but his advent is to be expected from the beginning of the Revelation until the number of the Vahid (19) for in each year the announcement of the Faith may occur at any moment.’ Browne’s translation of this passage is somewhat inaccurate: ‘And concerning the manifestation of Him whom God shall manifest, God knows in what limit of years He will manifest him; but watch from the beginning of the Manifestation until the num-

602

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History

One to arrive soon.!!4 Only this can explain the fact that during the years immediately following the martyrdom of the Bab so

many proclaimed themselves to be the Promised One. In contrast to this, the Azali doctrine that the Promised One was to appear only after 1511 or 2001 years was based on statements made by the Bab in the Persian Bayan concerning Ghiyath (Help) and Mustaghdath (He who is called upon for

help),!!> from which the numbers 1511 and 2001 are derived by means of the Abjad system. This is interpreted as an indication

that the promised Man yuzhiruhu ‘lah will not appear until this length of time has elapsed.!!© This argument was probably developed by the Azalis in order to dismiss Baha’u’llah’s claim. They certainly referred to this in their rejection of Baha’u’1l4h,

as Browne confirms: “To these texts!!7 the Ezelis specially appeal in justification of their rejection of Beha’u’llah’s claim to

be the Promised Deliverer . . .”!!8 It is clear from the words of the Bab in the Persian Bayan, however, that the Azali view does not conform to that of the Bab when the latter expresses the

hope that the Promised One would come before the end of the Mustaghath: None knoweth save God as to when the Manifestation shall be. Whenever it occurs all have to follow the ber of the Wahid (19) for in each year Faith in one of the letters will appear’ (Browne, ‘A Summary of the Persian Bayan’, in Momen, Selections, p. 376). In the Persian original, the crucial phrase 1s bi-harfi zahir gardad, the term bi-harfi expressing that the revelation will appear through a single letter of the Promised One, i.e. suddenly. This sudden appearance is also prophesied elsewhere in the Persian Bayan; see also Browne, JRAS XXIII (July 1889), p. 515.

114. Mirza Haydar-‘Ali confirms in his memoirs that: ‘In those days many were convinced that the advent of “Him Whom God shall make manifest” could not be far off (Stories from the Delight of Hearts, p. 8). 115.

Persian Bayan II:17, [I:15.

116. See Kitab-i-Nuqtatu’l-Kaf, Intro., pp. xxvf. 117. On Mustaghdath. 118. JRAS (April 1892), p. 299.

603

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh Point of Truth and thank God. However, it is hoped of

God’s grace that it will arrive before the Mustaghath

and the Word of God will be exalted by it.1!9 It is obvious from these words that the Bab regards the Mustaghath as a period of time during which the Manifestation will appear. Baha’u’llah evidently shares the Bab’s cyclical view and also sees Ghiydth and Mustaghath as cycles within which the Promised One will appear. He speaks of the year 9 within

the Mustaghdth in which Man yuzhiruhu 'llah has appeared. !2° In response to the Azali objection that he was already announcing the advent of the Promised One, Baha’u’llah argued: Shake off, O heedless ones, the slumber of negligence, that ye may behold the radiance which His glory hath spread through the world. How foolish are those who

murmur against the premature birth of His light. O ye who are inly blind! Whether too soon or too late, the evidences of His effulgent glory are now actually manifest. It behoveth you to ascertain whether or not such a light hath appeared. It is neither within your power nor mine to set the time at which it should be made manifest. God’s inscrutable Wisdom hath fixed

its hour beforehand. !2! The Bab, too, was convinced that the Promised One ‘might ap-

pear at any time’,!22 as Browne correctly observed.

119.

Persian Bayan III:15. The Persian text reads:

GosendISaly aychcodyyadlluecosh sypldyalle Sh asal daSI sins) betll Sub ystalas cha alii,

38 pipe dN aK Li5) suayi liens GC canggl Jaci

120. Rahiq-i-Makhtum, p. 514. The year nine refers to the summons experienced by Baha’u’llah in Teheran in the year 1852/53, nine years after the Declaration of the Bab. On Mustaghdath see also Kitdb-i-Iqan 276 (p. 248). 121. Gleanings 50. 122.

A Traveller’s Narrative, Intro., p. XVII.

604

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History

2. Two alleged proofs of the supremacy of Mirza Yahya in Baghdad After the attempt by a Babi to assassinate Nasiri’d-Din Shah in 1852, an unprecedented wave of persecution swept over the Babis, with large numbers being arrested, tortured and killed.

Baha’u lah, too, was arrested and imprisoned!?3 for four months

in the Siyah-Chal, a foul-smelling, vermin-infested, subterranean dungeon in Teheran, until he was released as a result of the combined intervention of the Russian ambassador, Count Dolgorouki, pressure from his family and reports produced by

the courts dealing with the case.!24 In spite of his innocence, Baha'u'llah was compelled to leave the country shortly afterwards. He was exiled to Baghdad,!2° then part of the Ottoman

123. The official Teheran gazette Vaqdyi-yi-Ittifagiyih reported that Mirza Husayn-‘ Ali Nuri (Baha’u’llah’s original name) and several other Babis, who had not been found guilty of conspiracy, had been condemned by His Majesty to life imprisonment (issue no. 82 dated 10 D iq’adih 1268 AH/26 August 1852 CE). See the English translation of this newspaper report, which provides an unvarnished account of the persecution inflicted on the Babis, in World Order: A Baha’i Magazine, vol. 13.2 (Winter 1978-79), pp. 12f. 124. Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, pp. 104f. 125.

A decree issued by Nasiri’d-Din Shah commanded

Baha’u’llah

to leave Persian territory within one month of his release from prison, although he was permitted to select the country of exile himself, as Ficicchia rightly points out (Baha ’ismus, p. 103; see also Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 106). Russia’s diplomatic representative, Count Dolgorouki, offered Baha’u’llah asylum in the territories of the Russian Empire. However, Baha’u’llah did not take up this offer, choosing to go to Baghdad instead ‘in pursuance of an unerring instinct’ (ibid.), and possibly also to avoid being accused of political partisanship (see Baha’i International Community (ed.), Bahd’u’llah, p. 9). Ficicchia’s assertion (Baha ’ismus, p. 103) that ‘according to his own testimony’ Baha’u’llah ‘was escorted to the border by a guard of honour’ is incorrect. The statement made by Baha’u’llah to which Ficicchia here refers says only that the party was ‘escorted by officers in the service of the esteemed and honoured governments of Persia and Russia’ (Epistle 36 (p. 22))—something quite different from a ‘guard of honour’.

605

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh

Empire, arriving there with some members of his family on 8 April 1853, having undertaken a perilous winter journey, under severe weather conditions, through the mountainous terrain

of western Persia. After the attempt on the life of the Shah, Mirza Yahya Azal had gone into hiding in Mazindaran, Gilan and Kirmanshah, subsequently coming to Baghdad, though he himself had not been exiled.

too, al-

Ficicchia constantly endeavours to substantiate his thesis that the Bab’s legitimate successor was Mirza Yahya Azal, and that Baha’u’llah later disputed his rank. Against this background, the question becomes significant as to whether it was

Baha’u’llah or Mirza Yahya Azal who arrived in Baghdad first, and which brother followed the other to that city. Quite apart

from the fact that the order in which they arrived does not provide any definitive indication of the supremacy of either brother, Ficicchia’s assertion that Mirza Yahya Azal arrived in Baghdad

before Baha’u’llah!?¢ is incorrect. He not only contradicts Baha’u*llah’s own account!27 but also that of Browne in his notes in A Traveller’s Narrative, a work which he is otherwise keen to quote. Browne reports that Mirza Yahya Azal told him that he

had arrived in Baghdad after Baha’u’llah, disguised as a der-

vish. !28 Ignoring these sources, without mentioning them in this

context and without subjecting them to critical analysis,!2? Ficicchia relies solely on another statement by Browne, in which

126. Baha’ismus, p. 104. 127. Epistle 242 (p. 166). 128. A Traveller’s Narrative, p. 375. Although Browne doubts the accuracy of the date given by Mirza Yahya for their arrival in Baghdad (1852)—which is, indeed, incorrect—he has no such doubts about the order in which they arrived there. In the Azali apology, Hasht Bihisht, the question is left open as to who arrived in Baghdad first (p. 301). 129. In a different context, he even quotes Baha’u’llah’s statement that Mirza Yahya had arrived in Baghdad two months after his own arrival (Baha ‘ismus, p. 179); hence, this statement was not unknown to him.

606

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History he writes that: “Both ultimately escaped to Baghdad, where they arrived about the end of 1852, Baha’u’llah, who was imprisoned in Tihran for four months, arriving soon after his half-

brother.”!3° The following objections are to be raised against this portrayal of events: not only is it wrong to say that both brothers escaped to Baghdad, since Baha’u’llah, in contrast to Mirza Yahya Azal, had been forced into exile, but the order in which they arrived is reported incorrectly. Browne’s statement not only contradicts the testimonies of both parties directly in-

volved, Baha’u’llah and Mirza Yahya Azal, which are of course of greater historical authenticity and value, but it is also inconsistent with his own statement in A Traveller’s Narrative.'3! A second alleged source concerning the order of their respective

arrivals, which Ficicchia includes as a note,!32 in fact makes no mention at all of this matter. The inclusion of this additional source might, however, give the reader the impression that Ficicchia’s assertion is a scientifically validated, verifiable conclusion. Ficicchia also brings in what he alleges to be a further proof of the supremacy of Mirza Yahya Azal. He evidently feels the constant need to seek out evidence that might substantiate Azal’s supremacy, concluding again and again that the leadership turned ‘increasingly to the more consistent Baha, however’, which ‘led to the gradual supersedence of Subh-i

Azal and eventually to the supremacy of his elder half-brother, and even later to a complete break between the two’.!* In other words, Ficicchia asserts that power was usurped by Baha’u’Ilah.

With regard to what he postulates to be the ‘supremacy’ of Mirza Yahya Azal, Ficicchia also claims that Baha’u’llah re-

130.

Hastings, Encyclopaedia of Religions and Ethics, p. 302.

1310S pi 375: 132. namely

Browne,

JRAS

XXI.IV

(cited in Ficicchia, Baha’ismus, p. 104).

133.

ibid. p. 105.

607

(October

1889),

pp. 945-948

Chapter 10 ee Micole Towfigh

turned to Baghdad from Kurdistan in 1856 at the command of Mirza Yahya Azal: “Thus, Ganab-i Baha obeyed his brother’s call to return to Bagdad, showing again that at that time he (superficially at least) fully acknowledged the latter’s suprem-

acy.’!34 Ficicchia arrives at this conclusion by interpreting the ‘mystic source’ that caused Baha’u’llah to return!>° as the voice of Mirza Yahya. 136 This idea clearly originates from Browne, !37 although—counter to the principles of academic research—Ficicchia makes no reference to this work. It is true that Mirza Yahya Azal, along with many other

members of his family and the Babi community, had asked Baha’u’llah to return.!38 Mirza Yahya, who had by now lost all control of the disintegrated Babi community in Baghdad, obvi-

ously had an interest in the revival of the community and the restoration of order that Baha’u’llah, with his innate authority, was expected to bring. Nevertheless, it was not Mirza Yahya, but the voice of God, that caused Baha’u’llah to return. This is

clearly evident from the choice of words and from the con-

foxes? 134. ibid. p. 113. 135. Kitdb-i-[qdn 278 (p. 251). 136. Baha’ismus, p. 112. 137. English introduction to the Kitab-i-Nuqtatu’l-Kdf, p. xxxii, see also Persian introduction, p. 1z; JRAS XXI.IV (October 1889), p. 946.

138. See Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 126; Balyuzi, Bahda’u‘Ilah, p. 122. Buck quotes from a later Persian Tablet of Baha’u’llah called ‘Lawh-i Maryam’ in which Baha’u’llah mentions God’s Predestination being the cause for some believers to make inquiry for him. Buck draws the conclusion: ‘Though the “Mystic Source” is likely the same as “God’s Predestination”, in practical terms the return seems to have been occasioned at the urging of several Babis: Subh-i-Azal, Baha’u’llah’s twelve-year-old son ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Baha’u'llah’s brother Aqay-i Kalim, Shaykh Sultan, and Javad the woodcutter (Balyuzi, Baha'u'llah, pp. 121f.) (Buck, Symbol and Secret, p. 40). 139. The Persian text (Kitdb-i-Iqan 278 (p. 167)) reads: ub jalue gym) aSa jal pinos 5 483 G wal

608

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History

The mystic source, the source of the divine command, or the source of revelation (masdar-i-amr) is a term that is found with some frequency in the scripture of Baha’u’llah. It is always used in reference to God, not to a human being. In one of Baha’u’llah’s texts, for instance, he praises the virtue of steadfastness in the Cause of God, which should be such that no-one

is able to come between the believer and the mystic source (masdar-i-amr), i.e. God.!*° It is also clear from the context that Baha’u’llah means God when he speaks of the mystic source, for he draws a contrast between the human and the divine Will. A few lines above the cited reference he states: We knew not, however, that the mesh of divine destiny exceedeth the vastest of mortal conceptions, and the

dart of His decree transcendeth the boldest of human designs. None can escape the snares He setteth, and no soul can find release except through submission to His

will. 141 Furthermore, it was his concern about the Cause of the

Bab, which ‘was on the verge of being completely obliterated’,!42 that induced Baha’u’llah to return. Hence, Ficicchia’s assertion that Baha’u’llah returned in response to the call of Mirza Yahya Azal and at this time fully acknowledged the lat-

ter’s ‘supremacy’ !*3 is completely false.

140. See Baha’u’llah, Aydt-i-ilahi, p. 38. There are numerous other passages in the scripture of Baha’u’llah in which it is unmistakably clear that masdar-i-amr refers to God (for instance Kitab-i-Badi’, pp. 343 and 351; Lawh-i-Ibn-i-Dhi’b, pp. 80 and 104; Aydt-i-ilahi, p. 366).

141. Kitdb-i-Iqan 278 (p. 251). 142. God Passes By, p. 126. 143. Baha’ismus, p. 113.

609

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh

3. On the dating of Baha’u’llah’s declaration Before leaving Baghdad and setting out for Istanbul in 1863,

Baha’u’llah spent the period from 22 April to 3 May in the garden of Najib Pasha, which is known as the Ridvan Garden. Najib Pasha, a person of standing in the city, had heard about the large number of people who were coming to visit Baha’u’llah in order to bid him farewell. He therefore offered Baha’u’llah the use of his spacious garden on the banks of the Tigris for this purpose. There, after having kept silent about his mystical call-

ing in the Siyah-Chal in Teheran for ten years, Baha’u’llah announced the claim that he was the Promised One to a small group of Babis. The precise circumstances of his announcement

and the words he used are not known. Throughout Ficicchia’s publications, one repeatedly comes across comments and interpretations aimed at destroying Baha’u’llah’s credibility as a prophet and implying dishonesty

and opportunism on his part. An example of this is Ficicchia’s allegation that Baha’u’llah’s announcement in 1863 that he was the Messenger of God was a ‘later, artificial construction by the Baha’is’, intended to make this event conform ‘to certain prophecies made by Hazrat-i Bab’ that ‘associated the advent of

the Mahdi with the mystic numbers nine and nineteen’.'44 Ficicchia concludes that Baha’u’llah opportunistically

adopted

the number

speculations

of the Babis and set the date for the advent of the Mahdi nine or nineteen years after the declaration of the Bab.!4°

Ficicchia’s judgement that these claims were made out of opportunism is based solely on his premise that Baha’u’llah’s revelation and calling cannot have come from God, and that, on

the contrary, Baha’u’llah’s actions were motivated by dishon144. 145.

ibid. p. 125 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). ibid. p. 129 (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

610

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History esty and selfishness. He even suggests that Baha’u’llah himself did not really believe in his vocation to his divine mission in the Siyah-Chal, nor in his declaration in the Garden of Ridvan. Incidentally, this quotation from Ficicchia’s book reveals two points: first, he indirectly admits that the numbers nine and nineteen played a crucial role in the Babi Faith with regard to the date of the expected new revelation; second, it is again evident that Ficicchia is incapable of distinguishing between the

advent of the Mahdi and that of the promised Man yuzhiruhu ’llah.146 Ficicchia refuses to accept that Baha’u’llah declared his mission in the Garden of Ridvan in 1863, since otherwise Subh-i-Azal, who was also in Baghdad, would doubtless have heard about it, with the result that the break between them would inevitably have oc-

curred at this time rather than later.!47

It is uncertain whether Mirza Yahya Azal was already fully aware of the significance of Baha’u’llah’s declaration at this

time, or whether he only suspected it. He was presumably not present among the small circle of associates to whom Baha’ulah made his declaration in the Ridvan Garden. However, even if he did hear about it, he abstained from making any public comment on it, perhaps because of his indecisiveness—a qual-

ity of his that even Ficicchia, albeit in a different context, attests to;!48 or possibly because he was not yet fully aware of the nature of Baha’u’llah’s claim. Moreover, the claim was made just before leaving for Istanbul, in the middle of preparations for

departure.

146. See my discussion above, pp. 599ff. 147. Baha’ismus, p. 124. 148. ibid. p. 127.

611

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh No comment was made by Mirza Yahya Azal until later in

Edirne, where Baha’u’1lah, in an epistle entitled Suriy-i-Amr, !? officially requested a statement from him as the Bab’s appointed

trustee.15° This own hand, sets yuzhiruhu 'llah revelation. This

document, written in Arabic in Baha’u’llah’s out clearly Baha’u’llah’s claim to be the Man foretold by the Bab and entrusted with a new claim implied that a new dispensation had been

initiated, that a new religion had come into being, and that the period of Mirza Yahya Azal’s trusteeship was over.

In his introduction to the Kitab-i-Nuqtatu 'l-Kaf,'!>! Browne mentions that some Baha’i sources, details of which he regret-

tably omits, date the declaration of Baha’u’llah as ‘He whom God shall make manifest’ to the year 1280 AH/1863 CE.152 With reference to a poem by Nabil that Browne had edited and translated, !>3 however, he calculates the date of the declaration to 1283 AH (1866-67 CE). Verse ten of this poem states that, at the age of fifty, Baha’u’llah removed the veil from his face and

the sun of Baha’ ‘emerged from the clouds’.!54 Browne inter-

149. Published in Majmu ‘ih Baron Rosen, pp. 33-40. 150. See my discussion below, pp. 621f. 151. p. xxxiif. 152. It is true that this date is to be found in many Baha’i sources, e.g. ‘Abdu’1-Baha’s talk in Bahji on 29 April 1916 (Risdliy-i-Ayyam-iTis ‘ih, p. 330; Ustad Muhammad-‘Aliy-i-Salmani, My Memories of Baha'u'llah, p. 22; Mirza Abu’1-Fadl, Letters and Essays, p. 68, Shoghi

Effendi, God Passes By, pp. 151-156. Baha’u’llah, too, refers to his declaration on the first day of Ridvan, but does not mention the year (Kitab-i-Aqdas 75). 153. JRAS XXI.IV (October 1889), pp. 983-990. 154. ibid. pp. 984, 988: stead te ek ae es teOe

got SG laa G4 yu do9 5 els dud cyelle y cha Glos volo Ab. 3! us

ole

“2

In the wording vasdyat va vildyat-i-ishan the personal pronoun ishdn refers to both substantives conjointly and therefore to the Bab himself.

612

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History

prets this to mean Baha’u’llah’s manifestation. Elsewhere, however, he cites 1863 as the date of the declaration, making mention of ‘the Manifestation of Beha’u’lla4h about 1863’,155 despite the fact that he had already published Nabil’s poem by this time. In A Traveller’s Narrative, too, he does not fix on one specific date for this event, 1866/67 being mentioned in the in-

troduction in reference to Nabil’s poem,!*® and 1864 being referred to in the notes. 157 Thus, Browne appears to have been uncertain on this point. This uncertainty is probably due to the fact that three

dates are relevant in connection with Baha’u’llah’s vocation and manifestation: his spiritual calling in the Siyah-Chal in Teheran in 1852, the declaration of his divine mission to a group of followers in the Garden of Ridvan in Baghdad in 1863, and finally

the broad public proclamation of the new faith in Edirne in 1867 in the form of epistles addressed to the rulers and mon-

archs of the time. !°8 The date mentioned by Nabil in verse ten of his poem clearly refers to the third stage, the public proclamation of the faith from Edirne. Nabil means that Baha’u’llah openly announced his mission in Edirne, most notably through his epistles to contemporary rulers and monarchs. Hence, he ‘emerged from the clouds’ and revealed—in Nabil’s figurative lan-

guage—the radiance of the sun, which had hitherto been obscured. Browne does not recognize the three-stage process in which Baha’u’llah made his mission known, and therefore assumes a single date. In his endeavour to identify a single date,

For at that time it was not a testamentary disposition of Mirza Yahya Azal that was under discussion, but rather that of the Bab.

155. Introduction to Phelps, Life and Teachings of Abbas Effendi, p. XXV. 156. A Traveller’s Narrative, p. Xvii. 157. ibid. Note W, p. 350. 158.

See also Hatcher and Martin, The Baha’i Faith, pp. 37f.

613

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh

Browne regards the later date as ‘more probable’.!°? Browne’s error consists not in his having identified the later date, but rather in his setting of a single date and failing to take account

of the two earlier ones.!®° The year he settled upon is indeed correct; however, it does not relate to the internal announcement of Baha’u’llah’s station but only to the public proclamation of the new faith. The public proclamation is, of course, more spectacular than the prior internal announcement, so it is not surprising that Browne considers this the relevant date.

Nabil’s poem, however, contains not only a clear reference to the public Edirne; it also tion to a small an allusion to

proclamation of Baha’u’llah’s mission made in refers to Baha’ ’llah’s announcement of his stagroup of believers in Baghdad. In verse 7 there is Baha’u’llah’s presence in Baghdad following his

return from the mountains of Kurdistan: ‘Zawra’ (i.e. Baghdad)!©! in honour became like Yathrib and Batha (i.e. Medina and Mecca); His lovers assembled from all directions (lit. from

159. Kitab-i-Nuqtatu’l-Kdf, Intro., p. xxxill. 160. By fixing upon a single date, Browne comes up against apparent contradictions which, however, can easily be explained. In a comparison of various Baha’i sources, for instance, Browne found a discrepancy of up to fourteen years in the reported dates of Baha’u’llah’s declaration of his mission (JRAS (April 1892), p. 304). The period extending from Baha’u’1lah’s vocation in the Siyah-Chal and the public proclamation of his station in Edirne was indeed fourteen years. Browne is also confused by the fact that A Traveller’s Narrative contains the earlier date, whereas Mirza Abut’1-Fadl mentions a later one (ibid. p. 703). However, the quotation by Mirza Abw’l-Fadl referred to here actually demonstrates especially clearly that the Bahda’is believe the station of Baha’u’llah to have been revealed gradually, since he speaks of the greatness of Baha’u’llah that became manifest in ‘Akka. The quotation does not refer to the date of Baha’u’llah’s manifestation, as Browne had

assumed. In a letter to Alexander Toumansky, which Browne had definitely seen, Mirza Abu’|l-Fadl had mentioned 1863 as the date of Baha’u’llah’s declaration, which concurs with the date cited in A Traveller’s

Narrative (see Mirza Abt’1-Fadl, Letters and Essays, p. 68). 161. al-Zawrad’ = Baghdad (Adolf Wahrmund, Handwérterbuch neu-arabischen und deutschen Sprache, vol. I, first part, p. 59).

614

der

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History

the four quarters); the standard of God (or “of the truth”) was

set up by His rule.’!®2 The cities of Mecca and Medina were both focal points of the Islamic faith in which Muhammad had lived and spread his teachings. Similarly, Baghdad was blessed with the presence of the new Manifestation, Baha’u’llah. The

banner of God was hoisted through his rule (salftanatasch). The hoisting of the banner of God is an obvious indication that Baha’u’llah’s station as a Manifestation of God had already been revealed in Baghdad. Thus, Nabil elsewhere describes Baghdad as the place where Baha’u’llah’s ‘cause was destined

to mature and unfold itself to the world’ .!© That Baha’u’llah set out his claim to independent prophethood as early as 1863, and not in 1866/67, is also evident from

the text Suratu’s-Sabr!®4 revealed on 22 April 1863 (the first day of Ridvan), from the Lawh-i-Hawdaj, !® written on the way to Istanbul, and from the Lawh-i-Naqus (Tablet of the Bell)! revealed on 19 October 1863 in Istanbul. All these texts contain the statement that he has manifested himself and that the Day of God is come. A central passage of the Suratu’s-Sabr reads as follows: O Baha’

of Spirit! Do not conceal

thyself in these

veils. Manifest thyself through the power of God, then

162. JRAS XXI.IV (October 1889), pp. 984-987:

Jah a9 yp cates 5 Jee Sle ys wh bales ad y oo ind 5 bad sid aan cos lee 5! gy Glie

sab Lys Ga gly! ptt 5!

163. 164. Ishraq 165.

Dawn-Breakers, p. 593. Stratu’s-Sabr is also known as Lawh-i-Ayyub. Original text in Khavari (ed.), Ayydm-i-Tis ‘ih, pp. 262-304. In La’dli’u’l-Hikma, vol. I, pp. 12-16. 166. The Lawh-i-Naqis is also known by the title Subhanaka-Ya-Hu. Original text in Ishraq Khavari (ed.), Ayydm-i-Tis ‘ih, pp. 100-106. A description

of contents

is found

in Taherzadeh,

pp. 18-28.

615

Revelation,

vol.

2,

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh break the seal of ‘I am the Spirit’ which hath, for an eternity of eternities, been sealed with the seal of preservation. This to the end that the perfumed breezes of

this primordial

‘I am’ might blow upon all created

things, perchance contingent reality might be enlivened through the Breath of the All-Merciful and rise up for the sake of the Cause (amr, command) on the Day in which the Spirit appeareth from the direction of

the Dawn.!67 In the Lawh-i-Nasir,!®8 which was revealed soon after Baha’u’llah’s arrival in Edirne, Baha’u’llah again openly announces his claim to be the Promised One. In his description of this text, Browne states correctly that this ‘. . . appears to be the

earliest of his writings wherein he distinctly and uncompromisingly puts forward his claims’.!©° Baha’u’llah says in the Lawh-i-Nasir: Shouldst thou rend asunder the grievous veil that blindeth thy vision, thou wouldst behold such a bounty as

naught, from the beginning that hath no beginning till the end that hath no end, can either resemble or equal.

167.

Provisional translation by Lambden,

in BSB, vol. 5.3-6.1

(June

1991), pp. 82f. 168. Original text in Majmu ‘ih-i Alwah, pp. 166ff, extracts in English translation contained in Gleanings 53 and 75. 169. JRAS XXI.IV (October 1889), p. 949. See also ‘Abdu’l-Baha, A Traveller’s Narrative, pp. 96f., note 1. However, Browne mistakenly calculates the date of its composition as the year 1866-67 (JRAS XXIIV, October 1889, p. 951), because the text mentions a period of twenty years during which Baha’u’llah was confronted with his opponents, i.e. twenty years of persecution since his acceptance of the Babi Faith. Although Browne rightly states that Baha’u’lla4h was among the first Babis, he dates his conversion to the year 1847, whereas Baha’u’-

llah in fact became a follower of the Bab as early as 1844 (see The Dawn-Breakers, p. 107; Esslemont, Bahd’u’llah and the New Era, p. 24;

W. Momen, A Basic Dictionary, p. 39). Thus, the year in which the Lawh-i-Nasir was composed was 1863/64 (depending on whether the calculation is based on twenty lunar or solar years).

616

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha'i History

What language should He Who is the Mouthpiece of God choose to speak, so that they who are shut out as

by a veil from Him can recognize His glory? The

righteous, inmates of the Kingdom on high, shall drink deep from the Wine of Holiness, in My name, the all-

glorious.

None

other besides them will share such

!70 benefits. In a later Tablet,!7! Baha’u’llah himself discusses three important announcements that were made in the Garden of Ridvan: first, the abrogation of jihdd; second, the affirmation that a thousand years would pass before the appearance of the next Manifestation of God; and third, that through his utterance all creation had been made new. These statements, too, presuppose Baha’u’llah’s station as an independent Manifestation of God. It is even evident from the Hasht Bihisht, the polemical Azali text attacking the Baha’is, that Baha’u’llah had raised his claim while still in Baghdad: Now

when Mirza Husayn

‘Ali [Baha’u’llah] beheld

matters in this disordered state, he bethought himself

of advancing the same claim himself . . .!72

170. Gleanings 53:2. There is also an interesting reference in the account by Aq4 Muhammad-Riday-i-Qannad-i-Shirazi to the revelation of the mysteries in the year 80 (1280 AH/1863 CE) in the house of Baha’u’llah in the district of Muradiyyih in Edirne (see Balyuzi, Bahda’u'llah, p. 220). This was the first house inhabited by Baha’u’llah after his arrival in Edirne, and he stayed there only a short time. The ‘revelation of the mysteries in the year 80’ refers to the announcement of Baha’u’llah’s station as a Manifestation of God, the station which had

been intimated to him ten years before (1852). 171. This Tablet was revealed on 14 Muharram 1304 AH (1886/87). The contents of this Tablet, which is registered at the Baha’i World Centre under the number INBA Xerox Coll. vol. 44:225, have been summarized by Lambden (BSB, vol. 5.3-6.1 (June 1991), p. 82); see also Taherzadeh, Revelation, vol. 1, pp. 278-281.

172. Quoted from A Traveller’s Narrative, p. 358. The original text (Hasht Bihisht, p. 303) reads as follows:

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Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh

This circumstance is even cited as the reason why the Persian ambassador demanded that the Ottoman government

remove

Baha’u’llah from Baghdad.

Ill. MIRZA YAHYA AZAL Mirza Yahya Nuri was born in Teheran in 1831/32, the son of a government minister and landowner, Mirza Buzurg of Nur, and his concubine Kuchik Khanum from Kirmanshah.!73 After the death of their father in 1839, Baha’u’llah took over responsibil-

ity for bringing up his half-brother, who was about eight years old at the time. Baha’u ‘lah having embraced the faith of the Bab in 1844, Mirza Yahya Azal likewise became a Babi in 1846 at the age of 14. In about 1849, the Bab appointed Mirza Yahya Azal as head

of the Babi community,!”4 although the youthful Mirza Yahya feared persecution on account of his religion and therefore remained in hiding most of the time. Browne, for instance, reports that: “The latter (Ezel) remained for the most part secluded from

the eyes of men. . .”!7> Other sources, too, concur on the subject of Mirza Yahya Azal’s life of seclusion, his habit of disguising himself as a Jew, Arab or dervish, and his strong fear of being recognized as a Babi; even the Azali apology Hasht Bihisht makes no secret of his disguises.!7© On the contrary,

BSjl by egged Cel apdoe cplatamum 1 p20 173.

A Traveller’s Narrative, Note W, p. 373.

174.

For details see below, pp. 631ff.

175.

JRAS XXI.IV (October 1889), p. 943, and Encyclopedia of Re-

ligions and Ethics, vol. II, p. 302. 176. Hasht Bihisht, p. 301, quoted in the appendices of A Traveller’s Narrative, Note W, p. 354. The author of the Persian introduction to the

Kitab-i-Nuqtatu'l-Kdf also reports about Mirza Yahya Azal’s disguises (pp. lh/lta). Baha’i sources also confirm the statements concerning Mirza Yahya’s life of seclusion: ‘Abdu’1-Baha, A Traveller’s Narrative, p. 89; Mirza Abu’l-Fadl, The Baha’i Proofs, p. 57; Shoghi Effendi recounts that: ‘To the latter town he had fled, disguised as a Baghdad Jew,

618

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History

taqiyya, the concealment of one’s religious beliefs under compulsion or threat of danger, is praised in the Hasht Bihisht as a

virtue and a religious duty.!77

He also hid after the attempt on the life of Nasiri’d-Din

Shah in order to escape possible persecution.!78 He then followed Baha’u’llah into exile in Baghdad, where he arrived about two months after Baha’u’llah, even though he had not

been exiled himself.!7? Mirza Yahya Azal’s move to Baghdad was entirely voluntary. His name was not mentioned in the Shah’s decree ordering the exile of Baha’u’llah. Since he had freedom of movement, Baha’u’llah advised him, shortly after his arrival in Baghdad, to return to Persia.!8° Had he done so, he could have drawn together the Babis, who were demoralized

following the martyrdom of the Bab and because of the violent pogroms against them, and could have restored their morale. However, Mirza Yahya Azal did not heed Baha’u’llah’s re-

and become a shoe merchant. So great was his terror that he is reported to have said on one occasion: “Whoever claims to have seen me, or to

have heard my voice, I pronounce an infidel” ’ (God Passes By, p. 164). 177. See Bayat-Philipp, Mirza Aqa Khan Kirmani, p. 221: ‘Hence, taqiyya became the ordre du jour for the Azali Babis [sic]. Though it does not appear in Mirza ‘Ali Muhammad’s Bayan, it is no surprise to us to see it figuring in Hasht Bihisht as a primary virtue, in fact as a religious duty.’ On the concept of taqiyya see Schaefer, above, p. 352ff. 178.

Hasht Bihisht,

p. 301;

‘Abdu’l-Baha,

A Traveller’s

Narrative,

Dal 179. See above, pp. 605ff. 180. Baha’u’llah, Epistle 242 (p. 166). The passage in question reads: ‘About two months after Our arrival in ‘Iraq, following the command of His Majesty the Shah of Persia—may God assist him—Mirza Yahya joined Us. We said unto him: “In accordance with the Royal command We have been sent unto this place. It is advisable for thee to remain in Persia. We will send Our brother, Mirza Musa, to some other place. As

your names have not been mentioned in the Royal decree, you can arise and render some service”.

2 >

619

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh

quest, preferring to remain in Baghdad, where he settled down

as a cloth merchant operating under an assumed name.!8! During the period in Baghdad, Siyyid Muhammad-iIsfahani allied himself with Mirza Yahya Azal. He exercised considerable influence over him and can be regarded as the driving force behind Mirza Yahya Azal’s later rebellion against Baha’u’llah. It is reported that Siyyid Muhammad-i-Isfahani constantly took advantage of his intellectual superiority in order

to ridicule Mirza Yahya Azal and show him up in front of others. According to Baha’u’llah, the latter ‘was made to err’,!8? had been ‘led astray’!83 and was deceived by Siyyid Muhammad-i-Isfahani. !84 Because Mirza Yahya Azal lived a life of seclusion, whereas Baha’u’llah took care of the Babi community in Baghdad, Baha’u lah was held in ever greater respect by the Babis, while

the reputation of Mirza Yahya Azal declined. Mirza Yahya responded to this with envy and now began—with the support and at the instigation of Siyyid Muhammad-i-Isfahani—to plot

against Baha’u’llah and to create unrest in the community, which eventually led to Baha’u’llah’s withdrawal to the mountains of Kurdistan.!8° During the two years of Baha’u’llah’s absence, the situation in the Baghdad Babi community worsened. Mirza Yahya Azal refused to speak either to the Babis who were resident in Baghdad or to Babis who had travelled

long distances to see him, the nominal head of the community. Instead, he consorted only with his relatives and close associ-

181. See Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 114. 182. Epistle 114 (p. 70). 183. Kitdb-i-Aqdas 184; see also ibid. note 190 and 192. 184. Epistle 243 (p. 167). 185. In the Lawh-i-Maryam Baha’u’llah writes that he left Baghdad ‘that the fire of hatred might die down’ (Ishraq Khavari (ed.), Rahiq-iMakhtim, vol. Il, p. 431). He also explains the reasons for his departure in the Kitab-i-fqan (see my discussion above, p. 599).

620

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History

ates, as is confirmed in the Hasht Bihisht.'86 He also appeared unwilling or unable to demonstrate in his own life the high

moral standards set by the Bab, nor could he establish them in the community. As a consequence, the leaderless community

fell apart, moral standards broke down and the situation became progressively more chaotic. Under these desperate circumstances various Babis tried to assume positions of leadership and claimed to be the Promised One foretold by the Bab. Mirza Yahya Azal appears sometimes to have tolerated these pretend-

ers and sometimes to have seen to their liquidation.!87 He was evidently incapable of conducting intellectual debate. His work Mustaygqiz, which was written during this period and which was directed against his supposed rival, Dayyan, was effectively a

diatribe culminating in the call for Dayyan’s murder.!88 When Baha’u’llah returned to Baghdad after the two years spent in the mountains of Kurdistan, he quickly managed to reunite the community, to restore confidence and imbue the Babis with a new spirit, thus remarkably improving the reputation of the faith, which had suffered severely as a result of the confu-

sion during the previous few years. Many Babis therefore looked upon Baha’u’llah with deep respect, even reverence, which only served to intensify Mirza Yahya’s envy still further. Mirza Yahya Azal was not mentioned in the farmdn issued by the Ottoman authorities ordering Baha’u’llah to go to Istan-

bul.!89 For a long time, he was uncertain about where he should go, but then finally decided to make his way to Istanbul, too. He

therefore joined Baha’u’llah and his companions at Mosul and accompanied them—again

in disguise—to the capital of the

186. Hasht Bihisht, p. 301. 187. According to the Kitdb-i-Nugtatu’l-Kaf, Mirz4 Yahya ostensibly rejected the various ‘Manifestations’ while actually welcoming them and ‘regarding them as enhancing the glory of the Theophany centred in

himself’ (quoted from Browne, Tarikh-i-Jadid, Appendix II, p. 387).

188. 189.

see below, p. 657. see below, pp. 640ff.

621

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh

Ottoman Empire.!% In Istanbul Mirza Yahya Azal again plotted against Baha’u’llah and his followers. Accounts written by Mirza Abu’l-Fadl show that supporters of Mirza Yahya Azal

conspired with Shi‘a clerics in an effort to bring harm upon Baha’u’llah.!9! Some Baha’is were even arrested, having been denounced either by Mirza Yahya himself!%? or by his supporters These intrigues, and Baha’u’llah’s refusal to court the favour of Istanbul officials, eventually led to his being exiled to Edirne. There, the final break occurred between Baha’u llah and

190. Ficicchia writes of these events as follows: ‘Subh-i-Azal, who did not join the caravan immediately and repeatedly considered emigrating to India, eventually joined the group—indecisively and in disguise—but was recognized everywhere as a Babi leader and received with honour’ (Baha’ismus, p. 127). It is interesting to compare this with the eye-witness accounts of Aqa Rida and ‘Abdu’l-Baha according to which Mirz4 Yahya was unknown to the travellers, with the exception of Mirza Aqa Jan, Siyyid Muhammad-i-Isfahani and, of course, members of his family. Aqa Rida recounts that Mirza Yahya, who had joined the group in disguise in Mosul, and with whom he had had no previous acquaintance, revealed his true identity to him, although most of the group remained unaware of who he was, some thinking him a travelling Jew who had joined the caravan for security. Thus, Ficicchia’s statement that Mirza Yahya was received with honour as a Babi leader cannot be true. Mirza Yahya himself explained why he had not joined the caravan until it reached Mosul: ‘I did not come away from Baghdad with you, because I feared you would be handed over to the Persian authorities, and so I disguised myself and left, to escape that eventuality’ (quoted from Balyuzi, Bahda’u’llah, p. 183). 191. ‘The leading followers of Ezel agreed with the chief Shi‘ites to antagonize the Bahais, and prejudiced the high officials of Turkey against this community by all kinds of plots and intrigues’ (Mirza Abwt’1-Fadl, The Baha'i Proofs, p. 62). 192. The imprisonment and banishment of Mishkin Qalam, a follower of Baha’u’llah, appears to be directly attributable to Mirza Yahya, for instance. It is evident from the state documents in Cyprus that Mishkin Qalam, who was exiled there together with the Azalis, had been accused of heresy by Mirza Yahya Azal (quoted from Browne, A Traveller’s Narrative, Note W, p. 382). 193.

Browne, ibid. p. 99.

622

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History

Mirza Yahya Azal, after the latter had repeatedly attempted to

murder his half-brother,!°4 and after Baha’u’llah had proclaimed his mission in a letter to Mirza Yahya, the Suriy-i-Amr (Surih of Command) and demanded that he at last make a decision as to whether he would accept or reject Baha’u’llah. Shoghi Effendi reports that in response to Baha’u’llah’s letter Mirza Yahya Azal made a rival claim to be a recipient of divine revelation

and demanded the unquestioning submission of the peoples of the East and the West to his authority.!9> The Azali texts, such as the Hasht Bihisht, make no mention of this. The consequence

was a complete break. Although most of the exiles sided with Baha’u’llah, a group formed nonetheless around Mirza Yahya Azal and Siyyid Muhammad-i-Isfahani who continued to plot against Baha’u’llah and his followers and to make calumnious reports to the authorities about them. In a letter to the Sublime Porte, the governor of Edirne stated that Siyyid Muhammad was a supporter of Mirza Yahya Azal, and that Baha’u’llah indeed had cause for complaint about the activities of these two

individuals.!96 According to accounts by Aqa Rida!®7 and Ustad Muhammad-‘Aliy-i-Salmani,!9° writings containing slander and lies were sent to Persia and ‘Iraq, and they of them at first hand. It is also known that sent one of his wives to a government Baha’u’llah had cheated his brother of his

report seeing some Mirza Yahya Azal office to say that rightful allowance

and that the family was starving.!9° Aga Rida, on the other hand, confirms that the needs of Mirza Yahya and his family 194. 195.

For details see below, pp. 667ff. God Passes By, pp. 166f.

196.

File 1475, no. 9, in the Ottoman State Archives (see Momen, The

Babi and Baha’i Religions, p. 199). 197. Quoted in Balyuzi, Baha'u'llah, p. 232. 198. My Memories of Baha'u'llah, p. 103. 199. On this subject, see the allegation made by Mirza Mihdiy-iGilani, an Azali, in a letter quoted by Baha’u’llah in the Kitdb-i-Badi'‘ (p. 326); see also ibid. pp. 323-333.

623

Chapter 10 + Nicola Towfigh

and supporters were never neglected.29 Siyyid Muhammad-iIsfahani travelled to Istanbul in order to make a false accusation against Baha’u’ll4h at the Persian Embassy, asserting that Baha’u’llah intended to send an agent to Persia to kill the

Shéh.201

A significant event occurred in September 1867. At the request of one of the Babis, a public disputation (muhdbila) was arranged between Baha’u’llah and Mirza Yahya Azal ‘so that a discrimination might be publicly effected between the true and

the false’.2°2 Mirza Yahya agreed, and he determined that it should take place in the Sultan Salim Mosque in Edirne. Baha’u’ lah went to the appointed place, but Mirza Yahya Azal failed to

appear—a fact, incidentally, that even Ficicchia?°? concedes. Thus, he avoided the confrontation, which was tantamount to his utter defeat. The continual Azali intrigues eventually resulted in Baha’u’llah’s being exiled to the prison city of “Akka in the Holy Land and Mirza Yahya’s being sent to Famagusta on Cyprus in 1868. Mirza Yahya spent the entire second half of his life there, first as an exile of the Turkish Sultan, and from 1881

200.

See Balyuzi, Bahda’u’llah, p. 232.

201.

See Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 168.

202. ibid. p. 168. This type of disputation has a long tradition in religious history and is comparable with the Day of Judgement in which truth triumphs over falsehood. Moses initiated a mubdhila when he appeared before Pharaoh requesting the release of the Israelites and transforming his staff into a snake as a symbol of divine power (see Ex. 4:18 and 7:8-13; see also Qur’dn 3:6; 7:104-119). Baha’u’lla4h alludes to this incident in the Old Testament when he says of the forthcoming dis-

putation with Mirza Yahya Azal: “This is Mine hand which God hath turned white for all the worlds to behold. This is My staff; were We to

cast it down, it would, of a truth, swallow up all created things’ (quoted from Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 169). 203.

Baha’ismus, p. 130.

624

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History

as a pensioner under the British authorities.2°* He was evidently regarded in Famagusta not as a Babf, but as a Muslim divine.2 He at least kept up the appearance of following Islamic customs and practices. Baha’u’llah mentions, for instance, that he retained the custom of rawdih-khdni (the traditional bewailing of

the martyrdom of Ima4m Husayn).2 It is clear that he made no attempt to convey the Bab’s teachings to the native popula-

tion.2°7 In 1890, Professor Browne travelled to Cyprus, spending two weeks there and talking for several hours each day to Mirza Yahya Azal. He described his first meeting with him as follows: . we ascended to an upper room, where a venerable and benevolent-looking old man of about sixty years of age,

somewhat

below

the middle

height,

with

ample

forehead on which the traces of care and anxiety were apparent, clear searching blue eyes, and long grey beard, rose and advanced

to meet us. Before

the mild

and dignified countenance I involuntarily bowed myself with unfeigned respect; for at length my longcherished desire was fulfilled, and I stood face to face with Mirza Yahya Subh-i-Ezel (‘the Morning of Eter-

204. Following the Russo-Turkish war, administration of Cyprus— hitherto part of the Ottoman Empire—was transferred to Britain in

1878, although Turkey retained nominal title. In a letter dated 27 April 1881, Mirza Yahya thanked the governor of Famagusta for his release—he had evidently been informed by a letter dated 24 March 1881 ‘that he might consider himself free to go where he pleased’. His

request, made in the same letter, that he be granted British citizenship or placed under British protection was, however, Narrative, Note W, p. 382).

rejected (Traveller’s

205.

Momen,

206.

Epistle 178 (pp. 121f.) It is mentioned in the Hasht Bihisht that he did not send anybody

207.

‘The Cyprus Exiles’, p. 97.

out to teach the faith (tabligh) (p. 316).

625

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh nity’), the appointed successor of the Bab, the fourth

‘Letter’ of the ‘First Unity’ .28 Following Browne’s visit to Cyprus, Mirza Yahya remained in contact with him through correspondence. It is evident from Browne’s comments concerning this correspondence that Mirza Yahya Azal had very few of the Bab’s writings at his disposal in Cyprus. Browne supplied him with some Babi literature, sending it from England. Browne’s report that Mirza Yahya added his own interpolations and made corrections to one of the writings of the Bab that he had received from Browne and of which he had not previously had a copy reveals

much about his character.2° In view of the fact that the writings of the Bab were, of course, regarded by the believers as holy scripture, it is surprising that Mirza Yahya Azal obviously did not hesitate to make his own additions. Yet he also expressed the pious wish that nothing should be altered by interpola-

tion.2!° At the same time he repeatedly accused the Baha’is of interpolation and falsification of the scripture,?!! and later even of the destruction of some of the writings of the Bab.2!2 However, other evidence clearly reveals that honesty and truthfulness were not necessarily among Mirza Yahya’s greatest virtues. Thus, it is hardly surprising that Mirza Yahya Azal, who

had not shrunk even from attempted murder in order to promote his own interests, should have had no qualms about using comparatively harmless methods, such as slander. In one instance of this, he raised the serious and groundless accusation that about

twenty of his followers had been murdered by Baha’is in

208.

A Traveller’s Narrative, Intro., p. xxiv.

209. JRAS (July 1892), p. 447. 210. ibid. p. 463. 211. ibid. p. 447 (note); A Traveller’s Narrative, p. 341. 212. ibid. Note U, p. 343.

626

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History

“Akka.?!3 He also stated that the drinking of wine was not prohibited among the Baha’is.2!4 When Mirza Yahya made this statement in 1889, sixteen years had already passed since the revelation of the Kitab al-Aqdas—which includes the express prohibition of alcohol and drugs. Yet even before that, Baha’is had already been forbidden to drink alcohol on account of the laws of the Bab, which remained valid until the appearance of

the new Book of Laws.?!5 Mirza Yahya Azal had numerous

wives and many off-

spring. The sources speak of 11, 12 or 17 wives.2!© However, only two of his wives and seven of his children accompanied him to Cyprus.?!” According to the Hasht Bihisht, he permitted

213. He can remember the names of only five of those allegedly killed, however. Three of these really were murdered in ‘Akka, namely Aqa Khan Kaj-Kulah, Siyyid Muhammad-i-Isfahani and Mirza Rida Quli (see below, pp. 657ff.). Concerning the others Mirza Yahya said: ‘I forget at present the names of the others, but about twenty of my followers were killed by Beha’is at Acre’ (JRAS XXI.IV (October 1889), pp. 995f.). 214. ibid. p. 995. 215. In the Arabic Lawh-i-Ahmad, which was revealed in Edirne, Baha’u’llah admonishes his followers to obey the laws ‘which have been enjoined in the Bayan by the Glorious, the Wise One’ (Bahd’i Prayers, p. 210). This shows clearly that Baha’u’llah upheld the validity of the laws of the Bab until the revelation of a Baha’i Book of Laws. 216. Mirza Yahya’s son Ridvan ‘Ali speaks of eleven or twelve wives (Browne, JRAS (1897), p. 767). In the course of his research, Momen

found evidence of seventeen wives (‘The Cyprus Exiles’, pp. 88ff.). In his Epistle to the Son of the Wolf (p. 148), Baha’u’llah refers to Mirza Yahya, saying that he was always surrounded by five handmaidens of God. He probably mentions only five wives because Mirza Yahya never lived with all his wives at once. Thus, he left his first two wives behind

in Persia when he went to Baghdad, and at least two of his wives remained in Baghdad when he left for Istanbul. 217.

Browne, A Traveller’s Narrative, Note W, pp. 376-383.

627

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh

his followers to marry up to 19 wives.”!8 Children were not to live with their parents but to be brought up by foster-mothers.?!? Over the remaining forty years of his life, which he spent

in Cyprus, he was compelled to witness how the Baha’i community steadily grew, while the number of his followers dwindled away. As Browne had repeatedly remarked, the great majority of the Babis had turned to Baha’u’llah, Mirza Yahya en-

joying very little support,22° and this development continued to the extent that Mirza Yahya Azal was in the end completely alone.22! Of the eighteen ‘witnesses of the Bayan’ whom Mirza Yahya Azal had appointed as his closest associates,

eleven

turned away from him and became Baha’is.22? He lost his two sons-in-law and supporters, Shaykh Ahmad-i-Ruhi and Mirza Aga Khan Kirmani, who were politically active, working with

Siyyid Jamalu’d-Din al-Afghani in Istanbul, when they were

218. Hasht Bihisht, p. 144. The Bab had limited the permissible number of wives to two.

219. 220.

ibid. Browne, Introduction to Kitab-i-Nuqtatu’l-Kdf, pp. xxxi, XxxXilii,

xlviil; Introduction to A Traveller’s Narrative, p. xvii. In the introduc-

tion to Kitdb-i-Nuqtatu’l-Kdf (p. xxxiii) Browne makes the following remarks as to why he was not surprised that people were attracted to Baha’u’llah: ‘That, in spite of violent dissentions, Baha’u’llah’s claim should have been ultimately accepted by the great majority of the Babis will astonish no one who has attentively considered what is said by the Bab as to “Him whom God shall manifest”, for if the Bab produced “verses” in the style of the Qur’an, so did Baha’u’llah; if the Bab’s personality proved the truth of his claim by the all-compelling influence which it exerted over his followers, so did Baha’u’llah’s; and, as we have seen, God alone knew when “He whom God shall manifest” would

appear, and none could falsely lay claim to that high station’ (Browne is referring here to the Persian Bayan VI:8; see also JRAS XXL III (July 1889), p. 515). 221. As early as 1892 he mentions ‘the fewness of (my) friends’ (ibid. p. 452). ; 222. Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 233.

628

Some Aspects of Babi and Bahd’i History 497

executed

in Tabriz

in 1896,

following

the assassination

of

Nasiri’d-Din Shah by supporters of al-Afghani.223 Mirza Yahya Azal died in Famagusta in 1912 and was buried according to Islamic, not Babi, ritual, because there were

no Babis present who could have conducted a Babi funeral.224 He had originally intended his son Ahmad Bahhdj, the eldest son from his relationship with Fatima, his fourth wife, to be his successor. However, a disagreement arose between father

and son that resulted in civil court proceedings.2° Many years later (in 1921) Ahmad Bahhaj went to Haifa and joined the Baha’i community. He died in 1933 and was buried in the

Baha’{ cemetery.22° The second intended successor to Mirza Yahya Azal was Mirza Hadi Dawlatabadi from Isfahan, who was also the leader of the Azalis in Persia. Owing to the renewed persecution in the 1880s, he renounced the Babi Faith and held diatribes against the Bab and Bahda’u’llah in the mosque.227 Nevertheless, he remained leader of the Azalis in

223.

v. Grunebaum, Der Islam II, pp. 194f. For further information on

Shaykh Ahmad-i-Ruhi and Mirza Aqd Khan Kirméni see also my argumentation above, pp. 522ff. 224. See Browne, Materials, p. 312. Describing the funeral, Mirza Yahy4’s son Ridvan-‘Alf (Constantine the Persian) remarked: ‘But none were to be found there of witnesses to the Bayan (i.e. Babis), therefore the Im4m-Jum‘a of Famagusta and some others of the doctors of Islam, having uttered (the customary) invocations, placed the body in the coffin and buried it.’ 225.

Momen,

‘The Cyprus Exiles’, p. 95.

226. See Lady Blomfield, The Chosen Highway, pp. 237f.; Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 233; Momen, ‘The Cyprus Exiles’, p. 90. So as not to offend the old man, Shoghi Effendi instructed pilgrims to avoid any allusion to the erroneous actions of his father (Balyuzi, Bahd’u’llah,

Deon): 227. Bahd’u’ll4h mentions that Hadi had denied his faith (Epistle 252 (p. 174)) and comments in the Kalimat-i-Firdawsiyyih on his behaviour: ‘He ascended the pulpit and gave voice to that which hath caused the Tablet to cry out in anguish and the Pen to wail’ (Tablets 6:59). Elsewhere, he reprimands him for his two-facedness and hypocrisy, urges

him to recognize the truth and admonishes him to renounce his leader-

629

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh Persia. He died a few years before Mirza Yahya Azal, who

thereupon appointed Mirza Hadi’s son, Mirza Yahya Dawlatabadi, as his successor. The latter lived in Teheran and became a

Member of Parliament and a prominent figure in public life.??8 He evidently had little interest in the Babi religion.??? Today, it would appear that there is no longer an Azali leader. Indeed, there does not even seem to be an Azali community. With the exception of isolated efforts exerted by a Cyp-

riot grandson of Mirza Yahya Azal, Jalal Azal, who died in 1971, and by an Azali in Iran called Qasimi, who published a small number of Azali writings between the 1940s and 1960s, there have been no further attempts to promote the cause of

Mirza Yahya Azal or to publish Azali books. There is evidently no collection of writings and no Azali archive, as MacEoin’s

research has shown.?3° Azal’s descendants who still live in Cyprus are Muslims and know little about the history of their family or about their religious past. Riza Ezel, grandson of Mirza Yahya Azal, who tends his grandfather’s grave, regards Mirza

Yahya Azal as a Muslim saint.?3! A sociological study23? has established that the Azalis do not form a distinct, active group, and that a kind of paralysis has set in. No growth is taking place. The Azalis do not present themselves as such, but are ship (Tarazat, Tablets 4:33-34). It is also clear from this passage that Hadi had forbidden the Azalis to consort with Baha’is (op. cit. 4:35); see also Taherzadeh, Revelation, vol. 4, pp. 174-176.

228. known which circles

Jalal Azal, a grandson of Mirza Yahya Azal, denied the wellfact that Mirza Hadi Dawlatabadi had been appointed successor, may be regarded as evidence of a possible conflict within Azali over the question of succession (Momen, ‘The Cyprus Exiles’,

p. 106). The attacks made in the Azali text Hasht Bihisht against Azal’s children, who are described as despicable villains, may also be an indi-

cation 229. 230. 231. 232.

of this (p. 316). MacEoin, Sources, p. 38. ibid. pp. 2 and 38. Momen, ‘The Cyprus Exiles’, p. 97. ibid. pp. 103-106.

630

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History

integrated into Muslim society, making use of the services provided by and for the wider Muslim community. Azali literature consists primarily of polemics against Baha’u’llah, so that the Azalis can be defined more by their opposition to the Baha’is than by any identity of their own.

IV. MIRZA YAHYA AS HEAD OF THE BABiS AND OPPONENT OF BAHA’U’LLAH It is evident from various Azali and Baha’i sources that Mirza Yahya Azal occupied a special status in the Babi community,

which had been bestowed on him by the Bab.?33 From the outset of his mission (1844), the Bab had faced fierce resistance on the part of the Shi‘a clergy and the state authorities, with the result that his remaining years, until his martyrdom in 1850, were spent mainly in prison. It was probably for this reason that he appointed a head for the young community. While in prison, he appointed Mirza Yahya Azal as leader of the Babi commu-

nity, probably in 1849.234 Because of his appointment to this

233.

Mirza Yahya Azal was evidently known also by the name Subh-

i-Azal. This is, at least, the title used by Browne,

and it is probably

through his works that this title was first made public. In Azali works (such as Hasht Bihisht) and works written under Azali influence (such

as the Kitab-i-Nuqtatu ’l-Kaf or Gobineau’s Les Religions) Mirza Yahya is referred to by the title Hadrat-i-Azal, not Subh-i-Azal. The origin or first use of the title Subh-i-Azal has not yet been identified. This title of honour was evidently not conferred on him by the Bab, who only called him Thamaratu’l-Azaliyya and ‘Ismu’l-Azal (see Mirza Yahya, Mustayqiz, pp. 391f.). However, the Bab did employ the title Subh-i-Azal in reference to various other leading Babis (see the commentary

on the

Hadith of Kumayl, Teheran Baha’i Archives MS 6006C, pp. 74ff.), so that it is quite possible that Mirza Yahya was occasionally thus designated. I am indebted to Stephen Lambden for drawing my attention to the Hadith of Kumay].

234. ‘Abdu’l-Baha does not cite the exact date but mentions only that this appointment was made after the death of Muhammad Shah, which occurred in 1848 (A Traveller’s Narrative, pp. 62f.). Browne states that Mirza Yahya was appointed to this rank in July/August 1849 (Tdrikh-i-

631

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh position, Mirza Yahya was highly respected in the Babi community until the 1860s. Unfortunately, no written document in

the Bab’s own hand exists that could establish beyond doubt the rank of Mirza Yahya Azal. Mirza Yahya evidently based the legitimacy of his position on a letter written by the Bab in Ara-

bic, which was translated by Browne?» as follows: God is the Most Great with the Uttermost Greatness. This is a letter on the part of God, the Protector, the

Self-Existent. To God, the Protector, the Self-Existent.23° Say, ‘all originate from

God’.

Say ‘all return

unto

God’. This is a letter from ‘Ali before Nebil,237 the Remembrance

of God

unto

the Worlds.

Unto

him

whose name is equivalent to the Name of the One238 (wahid=28), the Remembrance of God unto the Worlds. Say, ‘Verily all originate from the Point of

Jadid, Intro., p. xviii). In a hitherto unpublished article, Momen

con-

cludes that the appointment was made towards the end of 1849.

235. Browne received this document from Mirza Yahya Azal via Captain Young, a middleman in Cyprus. Browne published it, along with the English translation, first in JRAS XXI.IV (October 1889), pp. 996f. and again in 1893, reproducing it as a facsimile in Tdrikh-iJadid, p. 426. 236. The writings of the Bab are highly mystical. When an epistle begins with the statement that the letter is addressed by God to God, this may indicate the notion that God promulgates eternal wisdom, which he alone can fully comprehend. Both the Bab, acting as the mouthpiece of God, and man, who is the recipient of God’s message, are eclipsed by the greatness and sublimity of God. 237. According to the Abjad system (the customary system in the Arab and Persian cultures for the calculation of the numerical values of words), the numerical value of the name Nabil corresponds to that of Muhammad (92). Thus ‘Ali before Nabil is equivalent to ‘‘Ali-Muhammad’, which was the Bab’s given name. 238. According to the Abjad system, Vahid (the Single, the One) has a numerical value of 28, as does Yahya. Men by the name of Yahya are therefore often called Vahid, as in the case of the great Baha’i scholar Vahid (Siyyid Yahya-i-Darabi). Browne reports that this scholar was granted the title ‘the first Vahid’, whereas Mirza Yahya was known as ‘the second Vahid’ (Tarikh-i-Jadid, Appendix II, p. 380).

632

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History Revelation’ (Nukta-i-Beyan). O Name of the One! Keep what hath been revealed in the Beyan, and what hath been commanded. Verily thou art a Mighty Way

of Truth.239 Browne attached great significance to this letter and called it ‘a document of great historical interest, viz. the appointment of Subh-i-Ezel [Mirza Yahya Azal] by the Bab as his succes-

sor’.240 Making no distinction between the rank of a successor and that of a vicegerent, Browne continues: “This document furnishes us with the grounds whereon Subh-i-Ezel’s claims to

be the Bab’s vicegerent are based.’24! Elsewhere, Browne states that the appointment was made explicitly.242 Browne evidently regards the role of a successor or vicegerent as that of a kind of vali, who leads the community until the coming of the new

Manifestation.2*3 He at least inserts the term vali in one of his English translations, although it does not occur at all in the Per-

sian original.244 He does so in reference to Shi‘a tradition and Shi‘a understanding, whereby Muhammad, acting under divine

command, appointed the Imam ‘Ali, his cousin and son-in-law, as vali or vasi. According to Shi‘a belief, “Ali is authorized to

interpret the revelation of Muhammad after the latter’s death. He is endowed with divine guidance, is infallible and free of error and sin (ma ‘sum). The rank of “Ali is so exalted that any

disobedience to him is commensurate with disobedience to Muhammad and, hence, to God himself. In addition to the declaration of faith /a ilaha illa’llah, Muhammadun rasilu’llah (There is no God but God and Muhammad is his messenger),

239.

Browne, JRAS XXI.IV (October 1889), pp. 996f.; Tarikh-i-Jadid,

p. 426. Also cited in Balyuzi, Edward Granville Browne, pp. 38f. 240. JRAS XXI.IV (October 1889), p. 996. 241. ibid. p. 997. 242.

Tarikh-i-Jadid, Intro., p. xviii.

243. 244.

See JRAS XXI.IV (October 1889), pp. 997f. See my discussion above, pp. 508ff.

633

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh

the Shi‘a call to prayer (adhdn) contains the additional statement ‘Aliun

valiu'lla4h

(‘Ali is God’s

(friend/helper/defender/vice-

gerent).245 Thus, when Browne uses the term vali to refer to Mirza Yahya, this indicates a parallel between the rank of “Ali in Shi‘a Islam and that of Mirza Yahya in the Babi Faith. No such a parallel ever existed, however. It is extremely interesting that the document that Browne regarded as the document appointing Mirza Yahya Azal as the Bab’s successor and vicegerent does not actually mention any such successorship. The wording of the text does not indicate the appointment of Mirza Yahya Azal as successor or vicegerent; indeed, nothing can be discerned in it that might indicate

even his appointment as head of the community.24° The duty to keep what was revealed in the Bayan and had been commanded was the obligation of every follower of the religion and that of

Mirza Yahya Azal as nominal leader of the community in particular. To be called ‘a Mighty Way of Truth’ is indeed a very great honour and may be an indication of Mirza Yahya’s function as head of the community. However, this designation is not

exclusive in character, especially in view of the indefinite article that precedes it. Hence, the precise rank to which Mirza Yahya Azal was appointed cannot be determined from this document. Moreover, it would appear that no other texts among the scripture of the

Bab are concerned with the status of Mirza Yahya Azal. Although Browne collated several more letters written by the Bab that were obviously addressed to Mirza Yahya Azal, these con-

tain only general instructions that do not permit any conclusions to be made concerning his rank.247 It can therefore be assumed 245.

See EI, keywords ‘ ‘Ali’, ‘Imam’, ‘Ithna’, ‘ ‘Ashariya’; and EIR,

keyword ‘ ‘Ali b. Abi Taleb’. 246. In his interpretation of the Bab’s letter to Mirza Yahya, Ficicchia goes even further, asserting that it indicates Mirza Yahya to be both the Point (nugta) and the promised Man yuzhiruhu’llah. —

247. JRAS (July 1892), pp. 476-479. 634

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History

that no explicit document of appointment exists. This assumption is supported by the fact that the wording of the inscription at the grave-site of Mirza Yahya Azal is identical to that of the

Arabic letter cited above.?48 A notice written in English at the site reads: “The text on the wall has been written by the Bab, “The Primal Point’—Great and Glorious is His Dignity— nominating Subh-i-Azal as His Successor in the Babi Relig-

ion.’249 If an explicit written appointment had existed, it would presumably have been exhibited here or published by the Azalis, which, however, is not the case. That Mirza Yahya Azal was at least appointed head of the community is, nevertheless, undisputed, even if his appointment was never set down in writing. This is indicated not only by the Azali and Baha’i sources, which mention such an appointment, but also by reports concerning individual Babis who travelled to Teheran or, later, to Baghdad in order to meet the head of the

community.?°° The question inevitably arises as to why it was Mirza Yahya Azal, who was only 18 years old at the time, that the Bab selected to be head of the community. He was, after all, someone who had never stood out in any way, an anxious person who often chose to go into hiding, and whose capacity to serve as head of the community was de facto extremely limited,

whereas there was no lack of other renowned and high-ranking Babis who far excelled him in terms of knowledge, scholarship and courage.

248.

Iam indebted for this information to Dr Momen, who has visited

the grave of Mirza Yahya Azal in Cyprus. 249.

Momen, ‘The Cyprus Exiles’, p. 99.

250.

Siyyid ‘Abdu’l-Rahim, one of the participants in the Conference

of Badasht, for instance, recounts that he travelled to Teheran to visit

Mirza Yahya Azal (quoted in Haji Mirza Haydar-‘Ali, The Delight of Hearts, pp. 10f.).

635

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh ‘Abdu’l-Baha provides a convincing answer to this ques-

tion, which Ficicchia even briefly cites in another context.?>! However, Ficicchia carefully avoids any critical analysis of ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s statement, because to do so would have cast doubt on his own argument. “Abdu’l-Baha first describes how both the Bab and Baha’u’llah were in very great danger and

were under threat of severe punishment. Baha’u’llah was by now well-known as a Babi, especially in Teheran, so that it appeared advisable to divert attention away from him: . some measure should be adopted to direct the thoughts of men towards some absent person, by which means Baha’u’llah would remain protected from the

interference of all men.?52 For this reason, Mirza Yahya Azal was selected as nominal head of the community, so that Baha’u’llah would be able to

continue guiding the community’s affairs without becoming even more conspicuous and therefore being subject to even greater repression. Mirza Yahya Azal, on the other hand, was

not in danger, since he led a life of seclusion.2*3 Such an approach made sense, and this interpretation is supported by the following facts: first, Mirza Yahya Azal was a half-brother of Baha’u’llah, about fourteen years his junior, and had been brought up and educated by him. It could therefore be assumed that Baha’u’llah, in concordance with his brother, would

be able to continue his work unhindered without drawing attention from outside. Second, the history of the Babi Faith shows

clearly that Baha’u’llah was instrumental in shaping the destiny of this religion from its very inception. His teaching activities in Mazindaran, for example, contributed significantly to the spread of the infant faith. He also played a central role in the Confer251. Baha’ismus, p. 125. 252. A Traveller’s Narrative, pp. 62f. 253.

ibid.; Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 29; Hatcher and Martin,

The Baha’i Faith, p. 35.

636

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History

ence of Badasht in 1848, at which the Bab’s religious law was

brought into force, thus establishing the new faith’s independence from Islam.254 In addition, there was always a special spiritual bond between the Bab and Baha’u’llah, so that when the Bab felt his end to be near he sent to Baha’u’llah all the scriptures in his possession, his writing utensils, his seals and rings. An eye-wit-

ness account of this has been given by Nabil.2°5 Finally, ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s version is confirmed by reports concerning the period in Baghdad prior to Baha’u’llah’s return from Kurdistan, which cast light on Mirza Yahya Azal’s con-

duct at this time. About 25 Babis claimed to be the Promised One who had been foretold by the Bab.2°® Mirza Yahya Azal’s response to these pretenders was to do nothing. Ficicchia him-

self admits that ‘he did not know what to do in this situation and even tolerated such usurpatory tendencies . . . ’.2>7 Neither did Mirza Yahya Azal make any response to the crimes committed by some of the Bab’s followers; he may even have instigated

254. 298. 255.

See Muhammad-i-Zarandi (Nabil), The Dawn-Breakers, pp. 292Nabil reports that the Bab placed all the documents and revealed

texts in his possession, along with his pen-box, seals and agate rings, in

a case which he then gave to Mulla Bagir, one of the Letters of the Living. The Bab also gave him a letter addressed to his secretary Mirza Ahmad and asked him to bring the case to Mirza Ahmad. Nabil was present when the case was handed over at Qum and describes the event in great detail. After reading the Bab’s letter, Mirza Ahmad, whose original name was Mulla ‘Abdu’l-Karim-Qazvini, set off immediately for Tehe-

ran in order to pass the case on to Jinab-i-Baha, as Baha’u’llah was known at that time, in accordance with the Bab’s request (Muhammad-iZarandi,

The

Dawn-Breakers,

pp. 504f.).

See

also

‘Abdu’l-Baha,

A Traveller’s Narrative, pp. 25f. and Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, pp. 51 and 69. There is no evidence to support the conflicting assertion made in the Hasht Bihisht that the Bab had sent his possessions to Mirza

Yahya Azal. 256. See Balyuzi, Baha'u'llah, p. 121. 257. Baha’ismus, p. 105.

637

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh

them himself.25% The inability of Mirza Yahya Azal to lead and

revive the community has been proven beyond doubt.?>? Nevertheless, Browne was of the opinion that Mirza Yahya was the Bab’s appointed successor and had been unanimously recognized as such by the Babis: During the period which elapsed from the Bab’s death till the advancement of Beha’u’llah’s claim to be ‘He whom God shall manifest’ (i.e. from 1850 to 1864 at any rate) he was recognized by all the Babis as their

spiritual chief.2°° Yet elsewhere he contradicts this statement, saying that speculative metaphysics threatened to destroy all order and discipline

among the Babis between 1850 and 1853, since it permitted every member of the community to become a law unto himself, with the result that there were as many ‘Manifestations’ as there

were Babis.¢! If Mirza Yahya Azal had indeed been so unanimously recognized as head of the community and as the Bab’s successor, why was it that a power vacuum had arisen causing

many Babis to advance their own claims to rival that of Mirza Yahya Azal? On his return from Kurdistan Baha’u’llah, by contrast, quickly succeeded in reviving the community and restoring its ethical principles, even though he was not its nominal head. He

consolidated the faith of the Babis in Baghdad and entrusted

258. See below, pp. 652ff. It is reported that Siyyid Muhammad-i-Isfahani, who had incited Mirza Yahya’s usurpation, organized bands of robbers to attack pilgrims (Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 125). 259. Hatcher and Martin, The Bahd’i Faith, p. 36: ‘. . . Mirza Yahya withdrew into seclusion, leaving Siyyid Muhammad to settle the theological questions that arose as best he could. The would-be leader had demonstrated his incapacity for the position he had sought so vigorously. The lesson was not lost on the majority of his fellow Babis.’ 260. A Traveller’s Narrative, Note W, p. 350. 261. Phelps, Life and Teachings of Abbas Effendi, Intro. by Browne, p. XXXVI.

638

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History individual believers with the task of collecting, copying and distributing the writings of the Bab. Nabil reports that as early as 1267 AH/1851 CE, while still in Persia, Baha’u’llah had called upon the Bab’s amanuensis, Mirza Ahmad, ‘to collect and transcribe all the sacred writings, the originals of which

were, for the most part, in his possession’ .262 Mirza Ahmad took up this task with enthusiasm.73 In Baghdad, Baha’u’llah took this project further, asking Mirza Yahya Azal and another Babi to make two copies of the works of the Bab and take these

to Persia.2°4 Mirza Yahya Azal undermined Baha’u’llah’s efforts by not taking the copies to Persia, as requested, but leaving them in Baghdad and travelling to Istanbul. Ficicchia, who

never tires of assembling evidence that might indicate the dominance of Mirza Yahya Azal, deliberately overlooks this assignment with which Baha’u’llah entrusted his half-brother. Otherwise, he might have realized that the affairs of the Babi

religion were by this time already being run by Baha’u’llah, who gave instructions to Mirza Yahya Azal, and that Mirza Yahya Azal did not act as the real and acknowledged chief of the Babis, as Ficicchia would like his readers to believe. He endeavours, however, to take advantage of this matter in order to call into question Baha’u’llah’s moral uprightness. Ficicchia alleges that it was a ‘cynical notion’ for Baha’u’llah to send

Mirza Yahya to Persia to distribute the writings of the Bab, ‘since as the recognized head of the Babis he would have been

surrendering himself to certain destruction there’ .?°> That this cannot have been the case is evident from the fact that Mirza Yahya Azal, unlike Baha’u’llah, had neither been

expelled from Persia nor summoned to Istanbul, the authorities were apparently not interested in him at all. This is particularly

262.

Muhammad-i-Zarandi, The Dawn-Breakers, p. 587.

263. 264.

ibid. p. 592. See Baha’u’llah, Epistle 243 (p. 167).

265.

Ficicchia, Baha ’ismus, p. 129.

639

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh

clear from a document that Browne acquired from the French orientalist A.-L.-M. Nicolas, who had studied the Babi Faith. This document is a letter from the former foreign minister of Persia, Mirza Sa‘id Khan, to the Persian envoy in Istanbul, Haji Mirza Husayn Khan, dated 10 May 1862, demanding the ban-

ishment of Baha’u’llah. They obviously held him responsible for the revival of the Babi Faith, which had been thought to

have been eradicated after the massacre of 1852.26 No mention was made of Mirza Yahya Azal, as Nicolas stresses in his letter

to Browne.?°7 Browne himself later published this document.28 The Persian authorities demanded only that Baha’u’llah be banished by the Ottoman government, and that the consequent

summons to Istanbul referred to Baha’u’llah alone. That no mention was made of Mirza Yahya Azal shows that his life of

concealment and his refusal to receive Babis was of benefit to him in that the authorities did not regard him as a leader of the Babi community and therefore paid no particular attention to him. Since Ficicchia is constantly at pains to raise the status of Mirza Yahya Azal, he does all he can to avoid going into detail on this matter. He speaks casually of an ‘invitation to the Babis to leave Baghdad and settle in Istanbul. The Babi leaders con-

sented . . . ’.26? However, he fails to explain why, if this were the case, Mirza Yahya Azal ‘did not join the caravan immediately and repeatedly considered emigrating to India’, eventually

joining the group ‘indecisively and in disguise’.27° The term ‘invitation’ is misleading, even though that was the official term

266. It was stated of the Babis that ‘their roots were torn up’ (quoted from Browne’s translation in his Materials, p. 283). 267. Quoted ibid. p. 276. 268. ibid. pp. 277-287. 269. Baha’ismus, p. 123. 270. ibid. p. 127.

640

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History

used, as is confirmed in Baha’i literature.27! The constant endeavours and numerous petitions submitted by the Persian consul in Baghdad,

Mirza

Buzurg

Khan-i-Qazvini,

eventually

caused the Ottoman authorities to order Baha’u’llah to move to Istanbul, in accordance with Mirza Buzurg’s requests. His further exile to Edirne just four months later shows clearly that his sojourn in Istanbul was but a waystage in Baha’u’llah’s forty-year-long imprisonment and exile. Browne states correctly that, while still in Baghdad, Baha’u*|lah was already regarded by the enemies of the Babis as head of the community, and that “consequently it was against him

that their proceedings were chiefly directed’.272 Elsewhere, Browne reports that in Baghdad Mirza Yahya Azal had lived in almost complete seclusion and had left the leadership to Baha’u’llah, “who thus gradually became the most prominent

figure and the moving spirit of the sect’.273 Even the Azali apology Hasht Bihisht confirms that Mirza Yahya Azal ‘passed

his days and nights behind the curtains of seclusion apart from believers and others’.274 It is also evident from Hasht Bihisht that in Baghdad Baha’u lah occupied a prominent position as a

practical manager of affairs.27> Browne, too, confirms that in the years between the martyrdom of the Bab and the end of the Baghdad period, Mirza Yahya Azal was nominal head of the community, although even at this stage Baha’u’llah ‘actually took the most prominent part in the organization of affairs’ 27° The same opinion is expressed by the author of the Persian in-

271. Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, pp. 147f.,; Balyuzi, Baha'u'llah, 1d. Heysy

272.

JRAS XXIV (October 1889), p. 944.

273.

Tarikh-i-Jadid, Intro., p. xxi.

274.

Quoted in Browne, A Traveller’s Narrative, p. 355.

275.

This is formulated in Hasht Bihisht (p. 301) as follows:

o2e eager aa4l GRY oa ol 5 edge Sod: gale plain by 276. JRAS XXI.IV (October 1889), p. 887.

641

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh

troduction

to the Kitdab-i-Nuqtatu’l-Kaf,

who

reports

that

Baha’u’llah had always assisted Mirza Yahya Azal in running affairs and that he was, in fact, the real head of the Babi community, even though leadership was formally in the hands of

Azal.277 However, Baha’u’llah was not primarily concerned with

the organizational administration of the community, but rather with its spiritual and ethical revival and guidance. This was brought about through conversations with believers and especially through the works composed during this period, such as the Book of Certitude, the Hidden Words, or the Seven Valleys.

Browne reported in 1889 that Baha’u’llah’s Book of Certitude, which in his view provided a comprehensive survey of Babi

doctrine,2’8 was being eagerly read and was highly respected by all Babis.2”? He went on to describe it as ‘a work of great merit, vigorous in style, clear in argument, cogent in proof, and dis-

playing no slight knowledge of the Bible, Kur’an, and Traditions on the part of the writer. It fully deserves the high estimation

in which it is held by the Babis’.28° He assesses Baha’u’llah’s writings in general as instructive, powerful and eloquent.28! Elsewhere, Browne mentions that Mirza Yahya Azal, too, had written several books, which, however, were regarded as of secondary

importance even among his own supporters.282 Baha’u’llah, by contrast, received queries and requests for

spiritual guidance even from eminent Babis. This is evident not only from a question raised by one of the Letters of the Living, which was answered by Baha’u’llah,?®3 but also from the exis277. Kitab-i-Nuqtatu 'l-Kaf, Persian Intro., p. mim. 278. JRAS XXI.IV (October 1889), p. 913. 279. ibid. p. 944. 280. ibid. p. 948. 281.

Tarikh-i-Jadid, Intro., p. xxvii.

282. JRAS XXIII (July 1889), p. 518. 283. ibid. pp. 272, 316.

642

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History

tence of several texts written by Baha’u’llah in response to questions, such as the Seven Valleys, Lawh-i-Kullu’t-Ta’4m

and the Book of Certitude. All these points indicate clearly that Mirza Yahya Azal did not stand out among the Babis as head of the community, even though he nominally held this position. From the outset, spiritual leadership and the running of the community’s affairs appear to have been concentrated around the person of Baha’u’llah, despite Mirza Yahya’s official status. Mirza Yahya was obviously unwilling to play the role the Bab had intended by acting as Baha’u’llah’s mouthpiece and leading the community in accordance with Baha’u’llah’s instructions. He appears to have sought his own, independent leadership and to have disregarded

the role assigned to him by the Bab.284 His failure to give any spiritual or administrative guidance to the community at all, however, resulted in the above-mentioned moral decline and

state of desperation among the Babis.2®> If Baha’u’llah was to prevent the complete disintegration of the community, he would

sooner or later have had to take affairs into his own hands without the intended mouthpiece, with the result that attention was directed not towards Mirza Yahya Azal, as had been planned,

but towards Baha’u’llah alone.

284. In the Kitab-i-Aqdas, revealed more than a decade later, Baha’u’llah directed the following words to Mirza Yahya Azal: ‘Say: O source of perversion! Abandon thy wilful blindness, and speak forth the truth amidst the people . . . Granted that the people were confused about thy station, is it conceivable that thou thyself art similarly confused? Tremble before thy Lord and recall the days when thou didst stand before Our throne, and didst write down the verses that We dic-

tated unto thee—verses sent down by God, the Omnipotent Protector, the Lord of might and power. Beware lest the fire of thy presumptuousness debar thee from attaining to God’s Holy Court. Turn unto Him, and fear not because of thy deeds. He, in truth, forgiveth whomsoever He desireth as a bounty on His part; no God is there but Him, the Ever-

Forgiving, the All-Bounteous’ (184). 285. See above, p. 621f.

643

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh The fact that Mirza Yahya Azal had been nominated head of the Babi community was never disputed by the followers of

Baha’u’llah, as Browne also attests.28° Shoghi Effendi, the Guardian of the Baha’i Faith, speaks of the ‘nominee of the Bab’ and the ‘recognized chief of the Babi community’ .?87 He also states, however, that the Bab never nominated a ‘successor’ or ‘vicegerent’ and refrained from appointing ‘an interpreter of His teachings’, for ‘so transparently clear were His references to the Promised One, so brief was to be the duration of His own Dis-

pensation, that neither the one nor the other was deemed necessary.’288 Since Ficicchia is evidently unable to distinguish between the terms ‘successor’ and ‘leader’ of the Babi community, he alleges that the statements made by Shoghi Effendi are contradictory, the Bab having, on the one hand, not appointed a successor and Mirza Yahya being described, on the other hand, as

the ‘recognized chief of the Babi community’.2®° In fact, there is a major difference between these two functions. The term ‘successor’ can be understood to mean the office of vali (vildyat), which implies unrestricted administrative and spiritual leadership. The terms ‘leader’ and ‘chief of the Babi community’ indicate administrative leadership and certainly do not imply infallible spiritual guidance or authority to interpret the revealed texts. The very fact that the Bab appointed Mirza Yahya

Azal to act as head of the community during the Bab’s own lifetime, while he continued to be the spiritual leader and to reveal sacred scripture, shows that the function to which Mirza Yahya was nominated was not that of a successor but was, rather, of an administrative nature.

286. JRAS XXI.IV (October 1889), p. 997. 287. Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 163. 288. ibid. p. 28.

289. Ficicchia, Baha'ismus, p. 184, note 135, in reference to God Passes By, pp. 28 and 163.

644

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History

As an aside it is worth mentioning that Ficicchia would have been of greater service to his readers if he had made it clear when he introduced terms which he had devised himself, instead of placing them in inverted commas, implying they are quotations. The term ‘provisorischer Sachwalter’ (‘provisional trustee’), for example, is not found in any of the sources he

Cited4 What is not recognized by the Baha’is, then, is the claim of Mirza Yahya Azal to be the Bab’s successor and his arbitrary claim to continued leadership even after Baha’u’llah declared in 1863 that he was the new Manifestation of God. To the Baha’is, Mirza Yahya Azal was ‘the centre provisionally appointed pend-

ing the manifestation of the Promised One’2!—no more and no less. This view is confirmed by a statement made by the Bab himself. In a letter to Mirza Yahya Azal, the Bab expressly pointed out that Mirza Yahya would lose his authority upon the

advent of the Promised One: ...

And if God cause one like unto thee to appear in

thy days, then he it is to whom shall be bequeathed the

authority on the part of God the Single, the One.?%? Mirza Yahya Azal himself, under the influence of Siyyid Muhammad-i-Isfahani, evidently laid claim not only to the function of leader of the community, the capacity that was as-

signed to him by the Bab, but also to the rank of successor to the Bab.293 Hence, he extended his rightful claim to leadership

290. 291. 292.

ibid. p. 184. Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 127. Quoted in JRAS (July 1892), p. 478. 293. He appears to have claimed this at least to Captain Young in Cyprus, since the latter wrote the following note on the above-mentioned of Subh-idocument when sending it to Browne: ‘Copy of appointment (1889), (ibid. Bab’ the by written original successor, Ezel as Bab’s p. 997). Shoghi Effendi also confirms that he made this claim: see God Passes By, p. 114: ‘claimed to be the successor of the Bab’.

645

Chapter 10 + Nicola Towfigh

of the community to that of successorship, thus claiming an authority to which he was not entitled and which he was unable to exert amongst the followers of the Bab. It was therefore Mirza Yahya Azal who was the usurper and not Baha’u ’Ilah, as

Ficicchia would have his readers believe. The Bab had warned Mirza Yahya against such error: Beware, beware, lest the Nineteen Letters of the Liv-

ing and that which hath been revealed in the Bayan veil thee!294 Interestingly, Mirza Yahya Azal quotes the Bab’s warnings with reference to him in his book Mustaygqiz: the Bab had apparently recommended that he seek protection from other Babis, since—probably in view of his youth and inexperience—he

compares him to a newly hatched chick of whom the Babis should take care. After praising his qualities, the Bab writes

prophetically, obviously aware of what was to come: Raise him with your attentive love and confirm him with the winds of your attachment. Protect him from everything that might cloud the waters of his love in his self, suffocate the breath of his attachment in his essence, extinguish the fire of his nearness in his being

and scatter the dust of his ensnarement in envy.2% Browne sets out clearly the different positions, stating that: They [the Baha’is] admit that Mirza Yahya was the vicegerent of the Bab, but declare that his right to exercise authority ceased on the appearance of ‘He whom

294. Quoted from ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Will and Testament 1:4 (p. 4). 295. Mirza Yahya, Mustaygqiz, quoted from Samandari, in ‘Andalib Editorial Board (ed.), Mahbub-i-‘Alam, p. 332. The Arabic original reads as follows:

Say TLL ands 5ptm eLissol leo ait

sigh usas9 Ladi i Gaols Sy LIS Seaghiaaly Gal gddale GUS ta 9 GUS (3 G53 SL pil 4 GIS i oy 646

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History God shall manifest’ and the commencement of the new dispensation which he ushered in. That ‘He whom God shall manifest’ has the right to assume the fullest authority—this authority extending to the abrogation of old and the addition of new ordinances—is conclusively proved by the Beyan itself. The whole question

on which the Babi schism? hinges is therefore this: “Is Beha “He whom God shall manifest”, or not?’ If he is, then Subh-i-Ezel’s appointment ceases to be valid.

If not, then Subh-i-Ezel is undoubtedly the Bab’s cho-

sen successor.2?7 Mirza Yahya Azal’s claim to leadership of any kind expired with the advent of the Promised One foretold by the Bab, the Man yuzhiruhu ‘llah.

Perhaps in order to evade this inescapable conclusion, Ficicchia goes even further, not only assigning the succession to Mirza Yahya Azal but even presenting him both as the new Manifestation of God, Man yuzhiruhu llah, prophesied by the

Bab, and as the Mahdi 2?8—claims that Azal himself apparently did not advance? and of which Browne makes no mention in any of his works. Ficicchia’s assertions are completely untenable. The following three points alone demonstrate how groundless Ficicchia’s arguments are and how false the theories he propounds: 1. The witness Ficicchia calls upon in support of his argu-

ments is R6mer,3°° whose statement on this subject depends solely

296. On the question of schism see below, pp. 671f. 297. JRAS XXI.1V (October 1889), pp. 997f. Here too, however, the terms ‘vicegerent’ and ‘successor’ are misplaced; the role in question was really that of leader of the community. 298.

Ficicchia, Baha ’ismus, pp. 100f.

299.

See below, p. 650, note 314.

300. Die Babi-Beha’i, pp. 68ff.

647

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh

on a single paragraph from the Kitdb-i-Nuqtatu 'l-Kdf>°! We have already examined the reliability of the Kitab-i-Nuqtatu 'l-

Kaf as a source,>°? including the passage referred to by R6mer.3°3 Analysis of the Kitab-i-Nuqtatu ’'l-Kaf shows that it may be studied as an interesting curiosity, but that it definitely can-

not be regarded as a reliable source concerning Babi history. Hence, a statement that relies exclusively on the Kitab-i-Nuqta-

tu 'l-Kaf must necessarily be treated with caution. 2. As in many other instances in his book,3 Ficicchia equates Man yuzhiruhu ‘lah with the Mahdi. This failure to distinguish between two completely different entities reveals a regrettable lack of knowledge about the fundamental doctrines of

the Babi Faith. The Bab advanced the claim that he was the promised Mahdi>® or Qa’im, although, as he himself stated, he

did not reveal the full extent of this claim immediately.3%° The 301. Although Romer refers to Tarikh-i-Jadid, the passage is actually an extract from the Kitdb-i-Nuqtatu’l-Kdf translated by Browne and published in an appendix to Tarikh-i-Jadid. 302. See above p. 507f. 303. See above, pp. 508ff. 304.

For instance Baha ’ismus, pp. 94f., 101, 129, 132, 265, 270.

305.

Browne, A Traveller’s Narrative, p. 20.

306.

The Bab, Selections 4:4; see also Gollmer, above, pp. 579ff. In

his introduction to vol. I of Le Béyan Persan (pp. iii-v), the French orientalist Nicolas writes: ‘Tout le monde s’accorde 4 reconnaitre qu’il lui était de toute impossibilité de proclamer hautement sa doctrine et de la répandre parmi les hommes. II] devait agir comme le médecin des enfants, qui enrobe une drogue amére sous une couche de sucre pour amadouer ses jeunes malades. Et le peuple au milieu duquel il a surgi était et est encore hélas! plus fanatique que ne |’étaient les Juifs 4 1’époque de Jésus, et la majesté de la paix Romaine n’était plus la pour arréter les excés furieux de la folie religieuse d’un peuple surexcité. Donc, si le Christ, malgré la douceur toute relative d’ailleurs, du milieu dans lequel il précha, crut devoir employer la parabole, Séyyéd Ali Mohammed, a fortiori, dit déguiser sa pensée sous de nombreux détours et ne verser que goutte a goutte le philtre de ses vérités divines.’ This passage is cited in French in Dawn-Breakers. The English translation reads as follows: ‘All agree that it was completely impossible for him to proclaim

648

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History Promised One whose advent the Bab foretold, on the other hand, is Man yuzhiruhu ‘llah, ‘He whom God shall make manifest’. There is a clear and unambiguous distinction between the Mahdi or Qa’im, whose advent is prophesied in Islam and is fulfilled through the revelation of the Bab, and the Man yuzhiruhu ‘llah, whose coming is announced by the Bab in countless passages of his scripture. Neither Mahdi nor Man yuz-

hiruhu 'lldh is a transferable title. This failure to differentiate between the two categories leads to the mistaken conclusion that the Baha’is no longer re-

gard the Bab as ‘the embodiment of the Mahdi (who had now appeared in the person of Baha) . . . °3°7 This is incorrect, since the Baha’is consider the Bab, as they always have done, to be the Mahdi and Qa’im as well as the founder of an independent

religion and a Manifestation of God, Baha’u’llah being regarded, on the other hand, as the Man yuzhiruhu 'llah foretold by the Bab and as the founder of the Baha’i Faith, but not as the

Mahdi or Qa’im.3°8 It is not true, as Ficicchia asserts, that ‘Baha’u’llah now declared himself to be the promised Mah-

di’ .3°9 Baha’u’llah never advanced any such claim. Ficicchia is therefore unable to provide any evidence for his assertion and does not cite any source. Indeed, he occasionally reads “Imam

his doctrine out loud and broadcast it amongst the people. He had to act like a paediatrician, coating his bitter medicine in sugar to sweeten it for his little patients. And the people from whose midst he emerged was and is—alas!—even more fanatical than were the Jews at the time of Jesus; and the authority of the Pax Romana no longer existed, which otherwise could have halted the furious excesses of the people, whom religious delusions had caused to become overexcited. If Christ, despite the rela-

tively calm environment in which he preached, felt the need to use parables, then Siyyid ‘Ali Muhammad definitely had to disguise his ideas in numerous comparisons and administer the water of his divine verities drop by drop’ (ibid. p. 94). 307. Baha’ismus, p. 110. 308.

For detailed discussion see Gollmer, above, pp. 579ff.

309. Baha’ismus, p. 270.

649

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh

Mahdi’ into statements in which this figure is neither mentioned

nor intended.3!° 3. As Ficicchia himself emphasizes repeatedly,3!! and as

Browne also reports,?!2 Mirz4 Yahya Azal and his followers believed that the promised Man yuzhiruhu’llah would not appear until at least 1000 years had elapsed, because the religion of the Bab would first have to spread further and its law be adopted, at least in some countries of the world. They were also convinced that two Manifestations would not appear in such rapid succession. At any rate, the followers of Mirza Yahya Azal were of the opinion—as Browne reported in 1889—that

the Promised One had not yet appeared.3!3 Thus, if Mirza Yahya Azal were to be true to his own beliefs, he could not

have claimed this rank for himself.?!4 V. THE CASES OF MURDER AND ATTEMPTED MURDER

Let us turn our attention to that deplorable episode involving several cases of murder and attempted murder, and the allegations raised against Baha’u’llah in connection with them. The sole foundation for these allegations is the Azali apology Hasht

310. ibid. p. 172, for example. Here, Ficicchia summarizes the contents of Baha’u’llah’s Tajalliyat and refers, among other things, to ‘cer-

titude in Baha’u’llah as the returned Imam Mahdi’. This concept is, however, completely absent in Tajallfyat (see Tablets 5:13-14). 311.

BahZismus,

312.

JRAS XXIII (July 1889), pp. 514f.

pp. 95, 129.

313.

ibid. p. 505.

314. In response to Baha’u’llah’s claim that he was the Promised One, Mirza Yahya nevertheless later declared (in Edirne) that ‘he had been made the recipient of an independent Revelation’ (Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 167). Certain statements in Mirza Yahya’s work Mustayqiz,, (pp. 390-393) also might imply such a claim. The question of

whether he also claimed to be the fulfilment of the Bab’s prophecies relating to Man yuzhiruhu’llah still remains open, however. As far as I am informed, Mirza Yahya did not deal with this question in his writ-

ings.

650

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History

Bihisht,3!> which Browne brought to prominence through his translation and list of contents in the appendix to A Traveller’s Narrative.!© However, while Browne repeatedly emphasizes

the highly polemical character of the Azalf apology?!” and points out clearly that he is not in a position to verify the justifi-

cation of the allegations,3!§ Romer and Ficicchia suddenly present the accusations as proven facts and the Azali chronicle Hasht Bihisht as a reliable source from which statements can be quoted and presented as the truth without further verification. After all, allegations of murder present an ideal opportunity to cast doubt on the character of Baha’u’1lah and to bring him and his followers into moral disrepute. Someone who uses criminal means to achieve his goals can have no credibility as a ‘Manifestation of God’. It is impossible to believe in a prophet who removes opponents by means of murder. There are therefore only two alternatives: either he is not a messenger of God— which is the alternative favoured by ROmer and Ficicchia—or the murder allegations are mere inventions intended to besmirch the name of the revealer of God’s word and to destroy his credibility. The following passages will show the latter to be the

case. It should be pointed out in anticipation of the conclusions to be drawn from the forthcoming analysis that the evidence, both written and circumstantial, reveal the tendentious character of the Hasht Bihisht and demonstrate clearly that the allegations 315. Hasht Bihisht is definitely not a reliable source. See my discussion above, pp. 522ff. 316.

A Traveller’s Narrative, pp. 352-364, Note W. 317. As in, for example, ibid. p. 362, Note W: ‘The author of the Hasht Bihisht, after indulging in a good deal of strong invective, gar-

nished with many allusions to Pharaoh, the Golden Calf, and Samiri,

brings forward further charges against the Beha’is’. See also p. 356: ‘These sections occupy many pages, are of a violently polemical character, and contain grave charges against the Beha’is and vehement attacks on their position and doctrines.’ 318.

ibid. p. 364, Note W.

651

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh raised in that work are not only inventions but in many cases constitute detailed reports of the shameful deeds committed by Mirza Yahya Azal and his accomplices themselves, acts which they subsequently ascribed to their rivals. 1. The murder of Dayyan Siyyid Asadu’llah of Khuy was an influential and devoted follower of the Bab, who had designated him “Dayyan’ (Judge).

Mirza Yahya Azal’s leadership in Baghdad was so weak and the state of the community so desperate that, as has already been shown, a considerable number of Babis advanced leadership claims. One of these was Dayyan, who, for a time, raised such a claim and questioned Mirza Yahya’s authority as nominal head of the community. Mirza Yahya saw him as a threat to

his authority. As he was unable to persuade the shrewd and influential Dayyan to acknowledge his claim to leadership, he composed a tract entitled Mustayqiz with the intention, as the

foreword points out,?!9 of rebuking Dayyan and refuting his claims.

Eventually, Mirza Yahya ordered his servant Mirza

Muhammad-i-Mazindarani to seek out Dayyan in Adhirbayjan and murder him.32° This order could not be carried out immediately because Dayyan had, in the meantime, set out for Baghdad, where he met Baha’u’llah, who had returned from the

mountains of Kurdistan shortly before. At this meeting Dayyan recognized Baha’u’llah as the Man yuzhiruhu 'llah foretold by the Bab, even before Baha’u’llah had advanced this claim. As

the Bab had promised him, he was the third person to believe in Baha’u’llah. A few days later Dayyan fell victim to the planned

murder.32!_ Another Babi called Mirza ‘Ali-Akbar was also

319. Mustaygqiz, pp. lf. 320. See also Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, pp. 124f.; Balyuzi, Baha’u’llah, p. 124. . 321. Balyuzi, ibid.

652

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History

murdered by Mirza Muhammad-i-Mazindarani on the orders of

Mirza Yahya.*?? In his work Epistle to the Son of the Wolf, Baha’u’llah laments the death of this believer, who had been honoured by the Bab, and declares that his murder was insti-

gated by Mirza Yahya.323 Ficicchia, by contrast, asserts with reference to Romer and

Gobineau that it was Baha’u’llah who ordered the murders. The passage reads as follows: ‘In the years 1853/54, Mirza Asad’ullah Tabrizi, known as Dayyan (Judge), advanced the claim that he was the Mahdi. Count Gobineau reports that in “Arabistan (Husistan), where he intended to form a party, he was seized by the Babis and drowned in the Satt al-‘Arab. It is reputed to have been Ganab-i Baha himself who, after a heated

argument with Dayyan, commanded his servant Mirza Muhammad of Mazindaran to slay him.’324 What is to be made of this? First, it must be realized that

the situation as regards the sources is not as Ficicchia presents it. His paragraph, quoted above, is taken almost verbatim from

Romer’s text.325 However, Ficicchia evidently did not have access to the sources cited by Rémer, or at least he did not take the trouble to check them out, otherwise he would have noticed that on the page cited Gobineau does not make any mention of

the crime in question. In a different passage,>° there is merely a statement saying that Dayyan, after Mirza Yahya had already

been agreed upon as the Bab’s successor, had announced himself to be the new Bab (/e nouveau Bab), whereupon the Babis (Gobineau calls them religionnaires) drowned Dayyan in the

Shatt-al-‘Arab.327 Even though this statement is incorrect, since 322. See Baha’u’llah, Kitdb-i-Badi‘, p. 293. 323. Baha’u’llah, Epistle 253 (p. 175). 324. Baha’ismus, pp. 111f. 325. Die Babi-Beha’i, p. 80. 326. Les Religions, pp. 277f. 327. ibid.

653

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh it is neither true that Mirza Yahya had been agreed upon as the

Bab’s successor32® nor that Dayyan continued to uphold his claim at the time of his murder,329 it does indicate a motive for the deed: Dayyan nize Mirza Yahya on the other hand, sibly be construed *}lah is mentioned

was liquidated because he refused to recogAzal’s claim to leadership. Gobineau’s work, contains nothing whatsoever that could posas an allegation against Baha’u’llah. Baha’uonly once in this work, and in a completely

different context.33° Furthermore, R6mer did not support his assertion that it

was Baha’u’llah who, ‘after a heated argument’,?3! had ordered the murder of Dayyan by reference to Gobineau but rather to Browne’s extracts from Hasht Bihisht.532 Had Ficicchia gone to the trouble of comparing Browne’s formulation (‘after a protracted discussion’) with Rémer’s German translation (‘nach

erregter Auseinandersetzung’, i.e. ‘after a heated argument’), he might have realized that Romer’s formulation implies a possible motive for the murder that is otherwise completely absent. The Persian original mentions only a meeting with many questions

and answers (su ‘dl va javab-i-besiar kardih), 333 Thus, the only source for the murder allegations raised

against Baha’u’llah is and remains the Azali work Hasht Bihisht. The following circumstantial evidence leaves us in no doubt that it was Mirza Yahya Azal himself who was responsi-

328.

See above, pp. 631ff.

329.

In the Kitab-i-Badi‘ (p. 253), Baha’u’llah exonerates him of this

reproach. Samandari also reports seeing a letter in which Dayyan retracted the claims he had once raised (‘Andalib Editorial Board (eds.),

Mahbub-i- ‘Alam, p. 326). 330.

Gobineau, Les Religions, p. 277. Here, Gobineau

merely men-

tions that the wife of Jinab-i-Baha had brought up Mirza Yahya (Hadrati-Azal). 331.

Die Babi-Beha’i, p. 80.

332.

A Traveller’s Narrative, Note W, p. 357.

333.

Hasht Bihisht, pp. 302f.

654

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History ble for the crimes which that source ascribes to Baha’u’llah, as the Baha’i sources also testify: a) Dayyan had great love for Baha’u’llah. He had sought

him out in Baghdad and had recognized him as the Promised One.334 Baha’u’llah, for his part, repeatedly praises Dayyan in his works#35 and condemns his murder in the following terms: This oppressed one, who was the repository of the knowledge of God, together with Mirza ‘Ali-Akbar,

one of the relatives of the Primal Point?3°—upon him be the glory of God and His mercy—and Abu’1-Qasim-

i-Kashi and several others suffered martyrdom through the decree pronounced by Mirza Yahya... I swear by God, the deeds he committed were such that Our Pen is

ashamed to recount.337 What motive was he supposed to have for murdering him? b) Mirza Yahya Azal, on the other hand, was engaged in serious conflict with the murder victim. He had specially written a 395-page book (Mustayqiz) opposing him and attacking him on account of the claim he had raised. If it was in anyone’s interest to have him out of the way, it was in Mirza Yahya’s. c) What is more, this text has the character of a diatribe. Mirza Yahya does not engage in argument and analysis but throws insults at Dayyan, calling him by offensive names such as Abu’sh-Shurur (Father of Wickedness),33° Abu 'd-Dawahi (Fa-

ther of Misfortune)339 or Shaytan (Satan).34°

334. Baha’u’lla4h mentions that Dayyadn had attained his presence (Epistle 257 (p. 177)). See also Balyuzi, Baha'u'llah, p. 124. 335.

Epistle 253-257 (pp. 174-177); Kitab-i-Badi’, p. 253.

336.

i.e. of the Bab.

337.

Epistle 253, 255 (pp. 175f).

338. Mustayqiz, pp. 88, 111, 113, 121, 141-143, elsewhere. 339. ibid. pp. 179, 198, 215, 227. 340. ibid. pp. 203f.

655

145-147,

151 and

Chapter 10 + Nicola Towfigh

d) Mirza Yahya Azal’s work Mustayqiz culminates in what amounts to a public call for the murder of Dayyan, the English translation of which is given by Browne: Subh-i-Ezel . . . not only reviles him in the coarsest language, but expresses surprise that his adherents ‘sit silent in their places and do not transfix him with their

spears’, or ‘rend his bowels with their hands’ 34! e) In addition to the unconcealed call for Dayyan’s murder in Mustayqiz, there is a further witness who casts light on the

events in question. A sister of Mirza Yahya, who had taken sides with him, had received a letter from ‘Abdu’l-Baha in

which he demonstrated to his aunt that Mirza Yahya’s demands were untenable. Her reply—known as Risdliy-i-‘Ammih

(The

Aunt’s Treatise)—is most revealing. She makes no attempt to deny Yahya’s responsibility for the murder of Dayyan. On the contrary, she even attempts to justify Mirza Yahya’s actions by

arguing that Dayyan had been ‘the Father of Wickedness’342 and Mirza Yahya’s decision (hukm) the Will of God.3%3 f) The negative verdict against Dayyan as expressed in Mirza Yahya’s Mustaygiz and in the Risdliy-i-‘Ammih is retained unchanged by the authors of Hasht Bihisht. They brand him, instead, as the ‘Judas Iscariot of the Babi revelation’ 344 In view of the written testimonies of Mirza Yahya’s own

book Mustayqiz and of his followers in Risdliy-i-‘Ammih and Hasht Bihisht, as well as that of Baha’u’llah in the Epistle to the

Son of the Wolf, the reader may form his own opinion as to whether the allegations raised against Baha’u’llah in Hasht Bihisht are justified or whether they are, instead, merely intended

341. 342. Daoo:

Browne, Materials, p. 218. ‘Risdaliy-i--Ammih’,

in Tanbih

343. ibid. p. 90. 344. Hasht Bihisht, p. 283. 656

al-nd’imin,

Teheran,

no

date,

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History to divert the blame away from Mirza Yahya Azal and to defame

Baha’u’Ilah. 2. The murder of three Azalis in ‘Akka

In 1868 Baha’u’llah had been exiled together with a number of his followers to the prison city of ‘Akka. The Ottoman authori-

ties had also sent at least two Azalis to ‘Akka, presumably in the hope that they would

provide

detailed

reports

of the

Baha’is’ activities. They did indeed spy on the Baha’is, doing so with considerable zeal and success. They diligently informed the authorities, for instance, whenever any Baha’i pilgrims arrived in ‘Akka, thus ensuring that the visitors were immediately expelled from the city.345 According to Aqa Rida,34° the two Azalis who had been exiled to ‘Akka along with the Baha’is, Siyyid Muhammad-i-Isfahani and Aga Jan Big, were accommodated for the first two or three days in the citadel, but were then removed at their own request to a room above the city gate, from where they could observe all new arrivals. Many of the pilgrims who wished to see Baha’u’llah had travelled all the way from Persia to ‘Akka on foot and were naturally very disappointed when they were then compelled to leave the city im-

mediately. The Azalis also falsified the scripture of Baha’u’Ilah through amendments and interpolations, in order ‘to make them sound heretical, anti-social and provocative’ 347 It was against the background of these Azali intrigues that a despicable deed was to be committed, with dire consequences

for the Baha’is. In the night of 22 January 1872,348 in an act of

345. 346. 347.

Balyuzi, Baha'u'llah, p. 288. Quoted in ibid. p. 276. ibid. p. 323.

348.

See Momen,

The Babi and Baha’i Religions, 1844-1944, p22:

General

Governor

of Syria, who, according to British consular docu-

The murders were committed during the governorship of Subhi Pasha,

657

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh

desperation,

seven

followers

of Baha’u’llah

murdered

three

Azalis, namely Siyyid Muhammad-i-Isfahani, Aga Jan-i-Kaj-Kulah and Mirza Rida-Quliy-i-Tafrishi, even though “He [Baha’u’llah] Himself had stringently forbidden His followers, on several occasions, both verbally and in writing, any retaliatory acts against their tormentors’.349 Baha’u’llah was appalled when he heard about the murders. In attempting to put an end to the intrigues and repression caused by the followers of Mirza Yahya

Azal by means of murder, the seven followers of Baha’u’llah had consciously acted against his will. Baha’u’llah alludes to their behaviour in his scripture: My captivity can bring on Me no shame. Nay, by My life, it conferreth on Me glory. That which can make Me ashamed is the conduct of such of My followers as

profess to love Me, yet in fact follow the Evil One. They, indeed, are of the lost.3°°

For Baha’u’llah, this was the worst thing that during his ministry, a catastrophe that caused pain than any enmity or persecution suffered at opponents; it was the darkest chapter in Baha’i

he experienced him far greater the hands of his history.3>! The

chronicler Aga Rida describes the uproar caused by this terri-

ble deed among the inhabitants and authorities of ‘Akka.352 Baha’u’llah was taken from his house for questioning. According to the account of Muhammad-Javad-i-Qazvini, he was asked during the interrogation whether he thought it right that

his men should commit such a dreadful crime. Baha’u’llah responded by saying:

ments, arrived in Damascus on 27 October 1871 and remained in office

until January 1873 (FO 195.976 and 1027, see Balyuzi, Bahd’u’llah, p. 329.) 349. Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 189. 350. Baha’u’llah, Gleanings 60:1. 351. See also Schaefer, above, pp. 47ff. 352.

Cited in Balyuzi, Baha'u'llah, p. 326.

658

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History Should a soldier under your command break a rule, would you be held responsible and punished for it?3>3

Baha’u’llah remained in custody for seventy hours, after which he was permitted to return to his domicile. The seven murderers were condemned and imprisoned for seven years. Regarding this matter, Ficicchia again tries to defame Baha’ u 1lah and bring him into moral disrepute by asserting that he was connected with the murder of the three Azalis and that he silently tolerated this act of violence. Ficicchia writes at length of the ‘assassinations of the three Azalis sent to ‘Akka’, of which, he asserts, ‘only marginal mention, if any mention at all, is made in Baha’? historiography’. He continues, saying that: ‘According to statements made by Baha’u’llah’s daughter Bahiya Hanum, these murders were committed without his foreknowledge. Nevertheless, Baha’u’llah was charged and for a few days was once again placed in confinement along with his followers. Among the Azalis who had been removed was the person behind Subh-i-Azals, Hage7 Sayyid Muhammad Isfahani, the “Antichrist of the Baha’i Revelation”, whose murder is referred to by Baha’u’llah in the Kitab al-Aqdas as a “divine judgement”. The report in the Hast bihist that accuses Baha’u’1lah of having ordered the murders himself is, however, hardly tenable. Nevertheless, he did permit the violent acts of his fol-

lowers to continue as long as his own position was not completely assured, and the fact that religiously motivated murder is not unusual in the orient should also be taken into account. Professor Browne himself was instructed by the Baha’is in Siraz that a prophet had to remove an enemy of his religion and of the community just as a physician must remove a gangrenous limb. This statement is reminiscent of the passage in Baha’ist scrip-

353.

Quoted from ibid. p. 327; see also Shoghi Effendi, God Passes

By, p. 190.

659

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh

ture indicating that a prophet is favoured by God even if he has committed murder. ’3>4 It seemed to me worth quoting this passage in its entirety and scrutinizing it systematically, since it is typical of Ficicchia’s approach. The various criticisms and assertions made in this passage will therefore be examined in the following paragraphs.

a) First of all, it is not true that Baha’i historiography makes no or only marginal mention of these murders. Shoghi Effendi, for instance, deals with the incident and its conse-

quences in great detail.5°° b) It is true that one of the murder victims, Siyyid Muhammad-i-Isfahani, is described as the ‘Antichrist of the Baha’i Revelation’ 35° However, it is untrue that his murder is referred

to as ‘divine judgement’ in the Kitab-i-Aqdas. Siyyid Muhammad-i-Isfahani is not mentioned by name in the Kitab-i-Aqdas,

although in one paragraph that probably refers to him it is stated that ‘God hath laid hold on him’.3°7 This formulation is an Arabic idiom commonly used to describe a person’s death, the idea

being that God alone is Lord over life and death. The text says neither that Siyyid Muhammad-i-Isfahani was murdered, nor that his murder was ‘divine judgment’, as Ficicchia claims.

c) Although the allegation raised by the authors of Hasht Bihisht that Baha’u’llah had ordered the murders himself is so

unfounded that even Rémer?°8 and Ficicchia3>? doubt the asser-

354.

Ficicchia, Baha’ismus, pp. 185f.

355.

Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, pp. 189-191. See also Taher-

zadeh, Revelation, vol. 3, pp. 234ff.; Balyuzi, Baha’u’Ilah, pp. 317-330.

356. ibid. p. 164. The coming of the Antichrist is prophesied not only in Christianity, but also in Islam: it is prophesied that he will try to sabotage the advent of the Promised One on the Day of Judgement. 357. Kitab-i-Aqdas 184: ‘God hath laid hold on him who led thee astray’ (see also Browne’s translation of extracts, JRAS XXI.IV (Octo-

ber 1889), p. 980). The Arabic original (p. 64) reads: atyet cyo all! aa! oa 358. Die Babi-Beha’i, p. 137.

660

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History

tion, they do believe the claims made in Hasht Bihisht in another case in which Baha’u’llah is supposed to have called for the murder of an individual. Why they should reject the one allegation yet accept the other is a complete mystery. d) Ficicchia’s assertion that Baha’u’llah permitted the murders to continue “as long as his own position was not com-

pletely assured’>®° is utterly void of any foundation. It is again based on a statement by Romer,*¢! who in tum relies solely on the material collected by Browne in A Traveller’s Narrative (Note W), i.e. on the allegations made in the Azali apology, Hasht Bihisht. Permitting a murder to be committed means knowing about it and keeping silent about it. Ficicchia seeks to

give this allegation that Baha’u’llah tolerated the murders in silence some plausibility by remarking that religiously moti-

vated murder is not unusual in the orient. Since Baha’i scripture is sO unambiguously and decisively against any kind of violence—especially in the religious sphere—Ficicchia completely destroys his own credibility by resorting to such arguments. Moreover, if one considers the fact that Baha’u’llah was already in forced exile, it is hardly likely that he would have been per-

mitted to return to his house after cross-examination had there been the slightest suspicion that he was implicated in the mur-

ders or had had any knowledge about them beforehand. e) The scripture of Baha’u’llah categorically forbids the killing of a human being on the grounds of religion. Jihdd was

renounced by Baha’u’llah.°? The promulgation of religion is permitted solely by means of the spoken and written word, the use of violence or force of any kind is proscribed: Know thou that We have annulled the rule of the sword, as an aid to Our Cause, and substituted for it

359. Baha’ismus, p. 186. 360. ibid. 361. Die Babi-Beha’i, p. 137. 362.

Tablets 3:4; 3:29.

661

Chapter 10 + Nicola Towfigh the power born of the utterance of men. Thus have We irrevocably decreed, by virtue of Our grace. Say: O people! Sow not the seeds of discord among men, and

refrain from contending with your neighbour.3® Similarly, he states elsewhere that: He hath, moreover, ordained that His Cause be taught through the power of men’s utterance, and not through

resort to violence. Thus hath His ordinance been sent down from the Kingdom of Him Who is the Most Ex-

alted, the All-Wise.3°4 And finally: This people need no weapons of destruction, inasmuch as they have girded themselves to reconstruct the

world. Their hosts are the hosts of goodly deeds, and their arms the arms of upright conduct, and their com-

mander the fear of God. Blessed that one that judgeth with fairness. By the righteousness of God! Such hath been the patience, the calm, the resignation and con-

tentment of this people2®> that they have become the exponents of justice, and so great hath been their forbearance, that they have suffered themselves to be killed rather than kill, . . . What is it that could have

induced them to reconcile themselves to these grievous trials, and to refuse to put forth a hand to repel them?

What could have caused such resignation and serenity? The true cause is to be found in the ban which the Pen

of Glory hath, day and night, chosen to impose . . 3

363.

Gleanings 139:5.

364.

ibid. 128:10.

365.

This text refers to believers in Mazindaran.

366. Baha’u’llah, Epistle 122 (pp. 74f.). The “ban which the Pen of Glory hath, day and night, chosen to impose’ refers to the use of violence, which Baha’u’llah had strictly forbidden among his followers.

662

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History

And in his Testament, Baha’u’llah sets out clearly the goal of his mission: The aim of this Wronged One in sustaining woes and tribulations, in revealing the Holy Verses and in demonstrating proofs hath been naught but to quench the flame of hate and enmity, that the horizon of the hearts

of men may be illumined with the light of concord and

attain real peace and tranquillity.3°7 Browne, who was received by Baha’u’llah

in Bahji in

1890, later wrote of the impression made on him by Baha’u’llah and the words he spoke: The face of him on whom I gazed I can never forget, though I cannot describe it. Those piercing eyes

seemed to read one’s very soul; power and authority sat on that ample brow . . . No need to ask in whose presence I stood, as I bowed myself before one who is

the object of a devotion and love which kings might envy and emperors sigh for in vain! A mild dignified voice bade me be seated, and then continued: ‘Praise be to God that thou hast attained! .. . Thou hast come to see a prisoner and an exile . . .We desire but the

good of the world and the happiness of the nations; yet they deem us a stirrer up of strife and sedition worthy of bondage and banishment . . . That all nations should become one in faith and all men as brothers; that the bonds of affection and unity between the sons of men should be strengthened; that diversity of religion should cease, and differences of race be annulled—

what harm is there in this? . . . Yet so it shall be; these fruitless strives, these ruinous wars

shall pass away,

and the ‘Most Great Peace’ shall come. . 368

367.

Kitdb-i-‘Ahd, in Tablets 15:2. 368. A Traveller’s Narrative, Intro. pp. xxxixf.

663

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh

In view of these teachings, one can easily imagine Baha’u’llah’s

horror at hearing about the murders. Baha’u’llah always acted in accordance with his own doctrines; for him there was no exception or compromise. f) True to his doctrines, Baha’u’llah had forbidden his followers to commit acts of revenge and had even sent an irresponsible Arab believer back to Beirut because he ‘had medi-

tated avenging the wrongs suffered by his beloved Leader’ 3% Baha’u’llah’s letter to this believer was translated by Browne. In it, he writes: Go hence and do not perpetrate that wherefrom

chief will result.37°

mis-

g) The statements made by Ficicchia in the passage quoted above demonstrate once again the author’s tendentious and un-

academic treatment of his sources. He considerably alters the contents of the source: thus, whereas Browne describes his con-

versation with a single Babi Siyyid in Shiraz,371 Romer states that Browne obtained his information from ‘the Babis in Si-

raz’372 and Ficicchia finally turns this into ‘the Baha’is in Siraz’ 373 So, to start with, one Babi is transformed into an entire Baha’i community, the use of the plural signifying that the opinion in question is one that is widely held. It is clear from Browne’s report, however, that this opinion was that of a single Babi. This opinion cannot be generalized, and, what is more, it is evidently based on specific events in Islamic history and is

therefore to be seen in a completely different context. Ficicchia’s further manipulation of the source, whereby Babis are suddenly described as Baha’is, has serious conse-

369.

Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 189.

370.

Materials, p. 54; see also Balyuzi, Bahd’u’llah, p. 323.

371.

A Traveller’s Narrative, Note W, p. 372.

372. Die Babi-Beha’i, p. 137. 373. Baha’ismus, p. 186.

664

Some Aspects of Babi and Bahda’i History

quences. The term Babi, which Browne used indiscriminately at

a time when a single, united Babi community had long since ceased to exist, leaves three possibilities open: that the person in question was a Babi, an Azali or a Baha’i. The early Babis de-

fended themselves with weapons, since the Bab had permitted the use of weapons

in cases of emergency and had allowed

mujdhada (fighting for the faith).374 Baha’u’llah had forbidden jihad and violence in any form.37> The followers of Mirza Yahya, on the other hand, did not share Baha’u’llah’s renunciation of violence. They believed it right to kill unbelievers. Thus, it is stated in Hasht Bihisht that: “Anyone who does not enter the altar of the heart and the unity (of God)>”° is subject to the sentence of execution and death.’37’ Thus, it can be assumed that the person in question was a Babi or Azali, not a Baha’i, as

Ficicchia would have his readers believe. h) Finally, Ficicchia attempts to corroborate his statements by reference to a quotation from ‘Abdu’l-Baha mentioning the murder committed by Moses and thus conveying to the reader the impression that “Abdu’l-Baha approves of an act of murder by a prophet. However, one searches in vain for any such statement either in the passage cited or anywhere else in the Baha’i scripture. In the chapter referred to by Ficicchia,

‘Abdu’l-Baha praises Moses as a Manifestation of God and says that: To prevent an act of cruelty, Moses struck down an Egyptian and afterward became known among men as a murderer, more notably because the man He had killed was of the ruling nation. Then He fled, and it

374.

Persian Bayan VII:6 (see also Momen, Selections, p. 388).

375. 376.

See Tablets 7:7. i.e. anyone who does not believe.

377.

ySid pS cumsd dangly slhd arteG ly US ot p. 172: washglHAS 665

Chapter 10 + Nicola Towfigh was

after that that He was

raised to the rank of a

Prophet!378 Thus, the point of ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s statement is definitely not— as Ficicchia makes it appear—that ‘a prophet is favoured by

God even if he has committed murder’.3’7? Furthermore, the deed committed by Moses occurred before his vocation to the

rank of a prophet and not during his prophethood.3° Yet Ficicchia goes even further. He accuses Baha’u’llah himself of murder in presenting as fact a statement in Hasht Bihisht that a certain Aqa Mirza Nasru’llah, a brother of Rida Quliy-i-Tafrishi, who had been murdered in ‘Akka, had been

‘poisoned by Baha’u’llah when they were still in Edirne’.3®! Ficicchia presents the infamous slander contained in Hasht Bi-

hisht as fact, although elsewhere he expresses doubt about the credibility of statements made in this source.38? The criteria used by Ficicchia to determine the credibility of statements in Hasht Bihisht are unclear. As always, the authors of Hasht Bihisht merely raise the allegation without giving any evidence. The fact is that Mirza Nasru’llah died in Edirne of natural

causes. 383 That the Azalis were quick to accuse Baha’is of murder or attempted murder is shown not only by the work entitled Hasht Bihisht but also by the complaint made by Ridvan-‘ Ali, a son of

Mirza Yahya Azal, that the Baha’is had tried to poison him on a visit from Cyprus to ‘Akka. Browne regards this allegation as unfounded, stating that:

378. Some Answered Questions 5:7. 379.

Ficicchia, Baha ’ismus, p. 186.

380. On this subject see Schaefer, above, p. 59, note 172. 381. Baha’ismus, p. 143, taken from Hasht Bihisht (p. 306), quoted in A Traveller’s Narrative, Note W, p. 361.

382. Baha’ismus, p. 186. 383.

Balyuzi, Edward Granville Browne, p. 36.

666

Some Aspects of Babi and Bahd’i History He also believed (but, as it appears to me, without any grounds) that an attempt had been made to poison him; and he congratulated himself on his safe return to Cy-

prus.384

3. The attempted murders committed by Mirza Yahya in

Edirne While Ficicchia aims to present Baha’u’llah as a murderer in the above-mentioned section of his book, he carefully avoids casting a similar light on Mirza Yahya Azal. He makes no mention whatever of the murder attempts carried out by Mirza Yahya, although numerous sources testify to these acts. As has been seen above, Mirza Yahya Azal is portrayed by Ficicchia as ‘an

introverted youth inclined to states of mystic rapture’,3%5 an image into which murder attempts simply do not fit. That this image of the mystic youth is in need of correction is shown by the coarse and worldly language he uses, to take just one aspect of his character. His many wives, and the call for the murder of an individual in his work Mustayqiz, indicate that his inclination to

“states of mystic rapture’, to which Ficicchia attaches such importance, cannot have been very strong. Ficicchia does not name Mirza Yahya as the perpetrator of

the attempt on Baha’u ‘llah’s life, but creates the impression that Haji Siyyid Muhammad-i-Isfahani was responsible for it: In spite of the apparent loyalty shown to Subh-i-Azal

[Mirza Yahya Azal] by the believers, he actually only had a few real followers. One of these was Haggi Sayyid Muhammad Isfahani, a staunch representative of orthodox Babism. He was a loyal supporter of Subhi-Azal and tried to preserve what he could. It would

seem that, to this end, even methods of violence were

384. JRAS (1897), p. 768. 385. Baha’ismus, p. 20.

667

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh resorted to. According to reports, an attempt was made to get rid of Ganab-i Baha by means of poison. The murder attempt failed, but Ganab-i Baha fell ill and he was left with a shaking hand until the end of his

life 386 By adroitly avoiding naming the perpetrator of this deed, Ficic-

chia leaves the reader in the dark as to who was really responsible for the poisoning of Baha’u’llah. The other two attempts by Mirza Yahya Azal to murder Baha’u’llah are not even mentioned, although there are numerous The three attempts on Baha’u’llah’s Yahya will be described here in brief. About one year after arriving Azal’s desire to win back his former

accounts in the literature. life perpetrated by Mirza in Edirne, Mirza Yahya leadership became so in-

tense that he sought to remove Baha’u’llah, who had by this time won a high degree of respect. It now became clear that Mirza Yahya would not shrink from anything—including the murder of his own brother—in order to achieve recognition and leadership among the Babis and to dispose of the object of his

envy. In the first instance, Mirza Yahya Azal attempted to kill his half-brother by coating the inside of his tea-cup with a toxic

substance.387 This caused Baha’u’llah to be seriously ill for four weeks, the symptoms including severe pain and a high fever. As a result of the poisoning, Baha’u’llah retained a shaking hand for the rest of his life, and his handwriting was visibly altered.

Comparison of documents written in Baha’u’llah’s own hand before and after this attempt on his life clearly show the conse-

quences of the poisoning.3°8

386. 387.

ibid. p. 130 (Ficicchia’s emphasis). Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 165.

388.

e.g. a facsimile print of the inside cover of the Striy-i-Amr,

which was written after the attempt on his life, in Taherzadeh, Revela-

tion, vol. 2, p. 2. On the subject of Mirza Yahya Azal’s attempt to mur-

668

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History The second instance of attempted murder directed against Baha’u’llah occurred some time later, when Mirza Yahya poisoned the water in the well used by Baha’u’llah’s family and companions. This resulted in sickness breaking out among the exiles. The chronicler Aga Rida reports that Badri-Jan of Tafrish, one of Mirza Yahya’s wives, who had left him for a while, revealed Mirza Yahya to have been responsible for poisoning the

well-water 389 The third attempt on Baha’u’llah’s life took place in about 1866 and was reported by Ustad Muhammad-‘Aliy-i-Salmani, the barber. Mirza Yahya Azal had tried to persuade him to carry out the murder. During a visit to the baths one day, Mirza Yahya indicated to the barber that he should kill Baha’u’Ilah. The barber, however, was so angry about this that he was inclined to kill Mirza Yahya there and then, but refrained from

doing so for fear of causing Baha’u’llah’s displeasure.39° The barber spoke first to Mirza Musa, another of Baha’u’llah’s brothers, about the incident. Mirza Musa was not surprised and

remarked that Mirza Yahya Azal had long intended to bring

about the death of Baha’u’llah.39! Aga Rida gives his witness that Mirza Yahya had for a long time nurtured enmity towards Baha’u’llah, designing to bring about His death . . . Mirza Yahya’s attempt to subvert and induce the barber was, according to Aqa

der Baha’u’llah and Baha’u’llah’s subsequent illness as recounted by Aga Rida, see also Balyuzi, Baha'u'llah, p. 226. 389. See ibid. p. 225. 390. The barber’s account has been published in Ustad Muhammad‘Aliy-i Salmani, the Barber, My Memories of Baha'u'llah, trans. Marzieh Gail, Los Angeles, 1982 (trans. of Zindigi-yi Ustad Muhammad‘Ali Salmani), pp. 50-52; see also Taherzadeh, Revelation, vol. 2, pp. 158f. (a translation of the Persian original, which is quoted in Ishraq Khavari, Rahiq-i-Makhtim,

vol. II, p. 675) and Balyuzi, Baha'u'llah,

pp. 227-229. 391. Ustad Muhammad-‘Aliy-i Salmani, the Barber, My Memories of Baha'u'llah, p. 52.

669

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh Rida, of long standing, covering a period of at least three months until he was emboldened to speak so

openly to the barber.?92 The authors of Hasht Bihisht again turn this into an accusation

of attempted murder committed by Baha’u’llah, alleging that he

had incited the barber to put Mirza Yahya Azal to death.3? Thus, once again, we see the attempt to place the blame for Mirza Yahya’s actions on Baha’u’lah. Concering the accusations levelled against the Baha’is in Hasht Bihisht, Browne writes: It is with great reluctance that I have grave accusations brought by the author Bihisht against the Beha’is. It seemed to ingratitude even to repeat such charges

from whom

I myself have experienced

kindness, and in most of whom

set down the of the Hasht me a kind of against those

nothing but

the outward signs of

virtue and disinterested benevolence were apparent in a high degree. Yet no feeling of personal gratitude or friendship can justify the historian (whose sole desire

should be to sift and assort all statements with a view to eliciting the truth) in the suppression of any important document which may throw light on the object of his study. Such an action would be worse than in-

gratitude; it would be treason to Truth. These charges are either true or false. If they be true (which I ardently hope is not the case) our whole view of the ten-

dencies and probable influences of Beha’s teaching must necessarily be greatly modified, for of what use are the noblest and most humane utterances if they be associated with deeds such as are here alleged? If, on the other hand, they be false, further investigations will without doubt conclusively prove their falsity, and

392. Balyuzi, Baha'u'llah, pp. 227 and 229. 393. Hasht Bihisht, p. 305.

670

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History

make it impossible that their shadow should hereafter

darken the pages of Babi history.3%4

Browne’s final words have proven true. The allegations raised against Baha’u’llah in the Hasht Bihisht are untenable,

and their shadow has indeed proved incapable of darkening the pages of Babi and Baha’i history. It is therefore all the more regrettable that Ficicchia should have dragged them up again,

while ignoring the evidence amassed since their publication through which their falsity is proven beyond doubt. VI. ON THE QUESTION OF SCHISM

Since the foregoing section has dealt in detail with the claim of Baha’u’llah and the rank of Mirza Yahya Azal, the question arises as to whether a schism took place in the religion of the Bab. This term appears with regrettable regularity in secondary literature. Ficicchia speaks of a split that was ‘demonstrably caused by

Baha’u’llah’ 39° Browne formulates the matter rather more vaguely, but associates the schism, as he calls it, with Baha’u’llah’s pub-

lic declaration in Edirne? and refers to Mirza Yahya Azal’s opinion that Baha’u’llah’s claim amounted to usurpation and rebellion.397 Furthermore, Browne states that the Babis had been divided as a result of the rivalry between Baha’u lah and Mirza Yahya Azal into two sects, the small group of Azalis and

the large majority of Baha’is.3°8 By using such terms as division and schism, both Browne and Ficicchia fail to realize that the term schism can only be

394.

Browne, A Traveller’s Narrative, pp. 364f., Note W.

395.

Baha’ismus, p. 290.

396. JRAS XXI.IV (October 1889), p. 948. 397.

A Traveller’s Narrative, Intro., p. xvii.

398.

Kitdb-i-Nuqtatu’l-Kaf, Intro., p. xxx; see also A Year Amongst

the Persians, p. 329.

671

Chapter 10 ¢ Nicola Towfigh used when a religious community has been divided. In the case at hand, however, the situation is completely different:

Baha’u’llah founded a new faith with all the characteristics of an independent religion. The Baha’i Faith is an independent

religion, not a sect of Babism or of any other religion.*?? It has its own founder, its own sacred scripture and a Book of Laws

that supersedes the religious law of the preceding religion. Baha’u’llah declared himself to be the promised Man yuzhiruhu’llah, whom the Bab had described in glowing terms and whom he had unambiguously called upon his followers to

acknowledge and recognize.*°° Mirza Yahya Azal, on the other hand, remained a Babi and regarded himself as the Bab’s successor. He refused to recognize Baha’u’llah as the Promised One foretold by the Bab and used every possible means to oppose him. This behaviour was contrary to the instructions issued by the Bab. The Bab had not only called upon his followers to

recognize the Promised One but had stated in the Persian Bayan that even if someone raised this claim wrongly, he should be

left to himself and God.*°! If one assumes indeed the Promised One foretold by the ya Azal failed to recognize him and was the Bab. As the appointed head of the

that Baha’u’llah was Bab, then Mirza Yah therefore disloyal to Babi community, he

ought not only to have recognized the Promised One himself

and passed his own authority over to him, but he ought also to have encouraged the community to recognize him. However, he

held fast to his claim to be the Bab’s successor and tried to force the Babi community to submit to his authority. Thus, the term schism is inappropriate in connection with the conflict between Mirza Yahya Azal and Baha’u’llah, since 399.

See

Theologische

Realenzyklopddie,

vol.

V, p. 131; Schaefer,

The Baha’i Faith: Sect or Religion? pp. 9-20; v. Glasenapp, Die nichtchristlichen Religionen, pp. 60-62; Jockel, Die Lehren der Baha ’iReligion, p. 23. 400. See above, pp. 630. 401. Persian Bayan VI:8.

672

Some Aspects of Babi and Baha’i History

no division within a religion occurred. Moreover, it is not really possible to speak of an Azali sect, since there was neither a community nor anything that set this group apart from the

Muslim environment.‘

It is also questionable whether the

Azalis constituted a splinter group of the Babi Faith, or whether they had reverted to Islam. The Azali work, Hasht Bihisht, for

example, states that the Babis and Azalis do not belong to a new religion, and that, on the contrary, the Qur’an retains its full validity and the Bayan is merely a commentary with a

complementary legal function whose validity is limited.4° The small group that once centred around Mirza Yahya Azal remains a historical curiosity, a brief episode that has long since passed into history.

402. See above, p. 630. 403. Hasht Bihisht, pp. 264f., 297f.

673

CHAPTER 11

THE WILL AND TESTAMENT OF ‘ABDU’L-BAHA When ecclesiastical institutions are accused of the forgery or suppression of historical documents, the allegations meet with considerable resonance among that section of the public that

loves a scandal and is also antireligious, or at least anticlerical, in its attitudes. Recent publications critical of the Church, such as Karlheinz Deschner’s! remorseless critique in which he lashes

out indiscriminately against every aspect of Christianity, or certain publications on the subject of the Dead Sea Scrolls,”

have taken advantage of this trend. Serious journalists distance themselves from such works, while academics usually just ignore them. It is all the more astonishing, therefore, that in their discussions of the Baha’i Faith, church officials and scholars of

religion have shown no hesitation in disseminating an allegation of forgery raised by only a handful’ of outsiders,4 none of whom

1. Kriminalgeschichte 1988 and 1990.

des

Christentums,

3 vols.,

Reinbek,

1986,

2. Such as Michael Baigent and Richard Leigh: VerschluBsache Jesus. Die Qumranrollen und die Wahrheit iiber das friihe Christentum, Munich, 1991.

3. Ficicchia himself confirms that at least the German ‘branch’, the ‘Weltunion fiir Universale Religion und Universalen Frieden’, exists practically ‘only on paper’ (Baha’ismus, p. 378). In fact, the (mediocre) response to the activities of White and Zimmer (see below, pp. 724ff.) never extended beyond German-speaking Europe. To speak of the

674

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha was competent to make such a judgement; a judgement, moreover, that is belied by every piece of historical and factual evidence. What we are referring to here is the Will and Testa-

ment of “Abdu’l-Baha, a document that is of crucial significance for the development of the Baha’i community and Baha’i identity. Referring directly to Ficicchia, radio and TV programmes, specialist articles, reviews and encyclopaedia entries are increasingly describing this document and the

regulation of the succession contained in it as ‘disputed’. The Marburg theologian Rainer Flasche, who was described in a 1992 TV documentary? as an ‘expert’ on the Baha’i Faith, goes even further, making the apodictic assertion in an entry in the renowned Lexikon fiir Theologie und Kirche (LThK) that:

“*Abdu’l-Baha did not leave a testament . . .*© Flasche even surpasses Ficicchia when he continues: “Nevertheless, a “Will and Testament” of ‘Abdu’l-Baha surfaced in New York in 1922, appointing Sawqi Effendi (Shoghi Effendi), his grandson, as successor, which led to a new schism.’? What is extremely un-

usual is that he provides no evidence at all for this preposterous assertion: not one of the sources listed lends even the slightest support to this thesis—except for Ficicchia’s much more

restrained formulation. It must be conceded that however painful it may be for a believer when a figure he reveres is accused of forgery—especially when the legitimacy of the religious system to which he belongs is thus called into question—such feelings and sensi‘German branch’ of a ‘World Union’ implies the existence of an international organization, which, however, never came into being.

4. In fact, only by two, who were referred to by Ficicchia: White and Zimmer, see below, pp. 724ff. 5. Die unbekannte Religion. Was will der Bahda’i-Glaube? 30 June 1992 im ZDF (Second German TV Station). 6.

LThK, vol. 1, 3rd edn. 1993, p. 40.

7. On the issue of ‘schism’ see also Schaefer, above, pp. 50ff., 154 note 75, p. 229 note 442, and Towfigh, pp. 671ff.

675

Chapter 11 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

bilities must not be permitted to hinder or obstruct academic research into the religion in question. Nevertheless, it does not say much for the quality of academic research if such a grave charge is taken at face value, evidently without verification. It would appear irrelevant that the document in question is not disputed within the religious

community, that its legal validity has never been doubted, and that it has repeatedly been used as the basis for decisions in

courts of law.® The plain fact of such an allegation being raised —no matter by whom, with what motive and with what competence—seems to suffice as justification for the charge. Once

raised, the accusation of forgery reproduces itself, being apparently confirmed by references to itself. It is carried forward by means of self-reference, its only verification is through itself,

and it is further intensified each time it appears.? Perhaps it is the patient, friendly manner of the Baha’is that has encouraged a rather lax treatment of the doctrinal and historical facts con-

cerning their religion. However, under the banner of interfaith dialogue, to which some of the participating institutions and

individuals explicitly swear allegiance,!° one would have ex-

8. See below, pp. 705ff. 9. This development has reached its highest point so far in the above statement by Flasche in LThK. 10. For instance, in the foreword to the Lexikon der Religionen (p. vi), the editor Hans Waldenfels explicitly states the following: ‘Working for peace and understanding between religions and thereby calling them anew to God’s message for the world will be a decisive contribution to the welfare and future of all people on this earth.’ This idea was even more pronounced in the Guidelines on Dialogue with People of Living Faiths and Ideologies edited by the World Council of Churches and published by the EZW (Arbeitstexte 19, VI (1979)): ‘Christians begin their reflection on community . . . in the light of a basic Christian confession but in terms which may also find understanding and even agreement among many of other faiths and ideologies’ (Part I, A 1 (p. 3)). *. . . self-serving descriptions of other people’s faith are one of the roots of prejudice, stereotyping, and condescension’ (Part III, 4 (p. 18)). ‘Dialogue can be recognized as a welcome way of obedience to

676

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha

pected a more responsible treatment of these facts, conforming,

at the very least, to the minimum standards of academic research.!! The forgery theory owes its relative popularity in Germanspeaking Europe to the efforts of one institution in particular: the Protestant Central Office for Questions of Ideology (known

in Germany by its German initials EZW). As the specialist organ of the Protestant (Lutheran) Church in Germany (known in

Germany by its German initials EKD), this institution has a major influence on the style of argumentation and dialogue used with non-ecclesiastical or non-Christian religious groupings and ideologies. Whereas the absurd accusation of forgery found al-

most no resonance elsewhere,!? it was given considerable coverage by Kurt Hutten in his book on sects!3 before being raised the commandment of the Decalogue: “Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour.” Dialogue helps us not to disfigure the image of our neighbours of different faiths and ideologies’ (Part II, C 17 (p. 10)). 11. This ought to be expected from Flasche, in particular, since he is an especially sharp critic of traditional religious studies (‘Religionswissenschaft als integrale Wissenschaft von den Religionen’), where he argues that this academic field has ‘largely become a credo-science’, in which there is an ‘incestuous relationship’ between science and faith (p. 225). When he demands that research on religion should ‘take its systems from the specific historical material’ (p. 226), he is primarily criticizing the influence of religious theory of whatever kind on the methodology of religious studies as an academic discipline; however, the fundamental principle that all results ‘must be verifiable or disprovable on the basis of the material’ (p. 232) needs to be understood in a

straight-forward, elementary way. 12. This was in spite of the fact that, according to Zimmer, he had sent the English translation of his book (A Fraudulent Testament Devalues the Bahai Religion into Political Shoghism, Waiblingen, 1973), ‘to the departments of comparative religions and history in all the institutes of higher education in the world . . . , the editorial staffs of all newspapers and periodicals of our globe as well as to all the libraries of the large cities of all continents’ (Shoghism, p. 34). 13. Seher, Gribler, Enthusiasten, which was also published by QuellVerlag, Stuttgart. In the first (1950) edition there was not yet any mention of this; instead, Hutten expressed understanding for the testament’s

677

Chapter 11 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer to the status of ‘fact’ in Ficicchia’s

‘standard work’ on the

Baha’i Faith,!4 which was published by the same institution. I.

THE FORGERY THEORY

Ficicchia takes it for granted that ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s testament is a forgery. He supports this assertion by means of two theses: first,

he discerns a contradiction between the liberal, philanthropic doctrines of ‘Abdu’l-Baha and the ‘rigorist’ statements made in the Will and Testament; second, he cites the findings of a graphologist that ‘not a single line of the document is identical with

the handwriting of ‘Abdu’l-Bahd’.'° What is to be made of these two theses will be seen in the following paragraphs. These ‘findings’ do not originate from Ficicchia’s own research. He relies for this information on two individuals, Ruth White and Hermann Zimmer, both of whom were—like Ficicchia, but more conspicuously so—strong opponents of any kind of religious ‘organization’, seeing in the development of Baha’i

precautions: ‘His (Shoghi Effendi’s) leadership was challenged, too . . . The clear regulations made in the testament regarding Shoghi Effendi are therefore understandable . . .” (pp. 95f.). Later (up to the 11th edn. 1968, p. 295), the forgery allegation was connected with the issue of institutionalization that was at its root: ‘Should the Baha’i community remain a free-flowing movement or become an authoritarian, regulated organization?’ Hutten’s choice of words clearly indicates his preference. In the 12th edn., published in 1982 (pp. 802f.), this background issue is omitted, and we read instead: ‘The authenticity of the testament was disputed, and there arose serious conflicts that persist to the present day.’ The evidence cited in support of this assertion is Ficicchia’s Baha ’ismus (pp. 293-302), the chief witness and, indeed, the only person in whom ‘serious conflicts . . . persist to the present day’. It is noteworthy that the publication details printed in the 12th edition show it to have been edited by the EZW of the Protestant Church. 14. As it was described in Mildenberger’s foreword and in the publisher’s advertisements for the work. For a discussion of this claim see above, pp. 481 ff. 15. Baha’ismus, p. 299 (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

678

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha

institutions the Baha’i community’s Fall from Grace.!© We shall return to their activities and ideas in due course. Since both the theses taken up by Ficicchia are to be found in the earlier polemics of White and Zimmer, reference to these will be required when dealing with the specific allegations made.

Anyone who is at all acquainted with the doctrines and history of the Baha’i Faith would soon know what to think of the remarks made by White and Zimmer—simple perusal would suffice. However, their theses have been effectual irrespective of the arguments used to support them: once initiated, their allegations took on a life of their own, being perpetuated by a process of self-referencing. Ficicchia knows all too well

why he presents their theses without becoming involved in arguments

and counterarguments.

In particular,

he remains

completely silent concerning the numerous discussions and letters in which fellow-believers and community representatives tried to clarify the early questions of those who rebelled against

the testament;!7 he also omits any mention of the arguments presented to him on this subject.!® If this issue is to be clarified once and for all, there is no alternative but to examine at least a

few specific points raised by White and Zimmer, even though their theories are really unworthy of such attention.!? What is

16. See below, pp. 753 and also Schaefer, above, pp. 141ff. 17. White did at least print some of the letters she had received (e.g. Enemy, pp. 89ff.), and Zimmer quoted from a letter from Ruhi Afnan, a witness to the events (Shoghism, pp. 95f.). 18. Not only did a number of personal conversations with Ficicchia take place, even after he had broken away from the community, but the main arguments and background information were supplied to him in writing, e.g. in a letter from the Universal House of Justice dated 2 October 1974, in an essay written by ‘Ali-Akbar Furttan in December 1974, and in a letter from Udo Schaefer dated 16 September 1974. 19. It is a particularly onerous task to have to read Zimmer’s book: it is thoroughly polemical and even spiteful. It is highly speculative, full of factual misunderstandings and errors, confused in its argumentation

679

Chapter 11,¢ Ulrich Gollmer intended here, therefore, is to present some background information and place the testament issue in a broader religious and historical context. II. THE RELIGIOUS AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND In any religion, the period immediately following the death of the charismatic founder is an especially critical time. The loy-

alty and love of most of the new faith’s disciples are closely and exclusively associated with the figure of salvation they revere.

Since they have, in the short time that has passed, had little or no instruction, the mass of believers cannot be expected to be in possession of in-depth knowledge concerning the doctrine and content of the new religion. As long as the founder is alive, differences in knowledge and interpretation, personal incompati-

bilities and rivalry are bridged by this individual’s supreme, undoubted authority. The death of the founder creates

a vacuum

that permits all these differences to assert themselves. Only with difficulty do the orphaned believers manage to develop a new identity, no longer dominated by the physical presence of

the saviour, and to renew their loyalty as a group. Although the majority soon recognizes the need for a certain degree of institutionalization in order to secure the cause of the founder for the future, disputes nevertheless arise over the questions of what is to be done, and how.?° This was the case in early Christianity, traces of this conflict being clearly evident in the New Testament;?! the same

and excruciatingly repetitive. Under analysis is very difficult indeed.

these

circumstances,

objective

20. On the various forms of institutional promises of salvation see Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 11.1.2. On the reaction in the outside world

see Gollmer, above, pp. 481ff. and Towfigh, above, pp. 492ff. 21. As in the statement that: ‘There be some that trouble you, and would pervert the gospel of Christ. But though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed . . .” (Gal. 1:7-8) or in the refer-

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The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Bahd

disputes about the correct interpretation of the Word of God and

the legitimacy of the Prophet’s institutional and personal successors have plagued the history of Islam up to the present day. In addition to an almost immeasurable number of sometimes tiny sects,?? the large schism between the Sunni and Shi‘a Muslims has its roots in this very issue.

Baha’u’llah was not unaware of this problem. Especially in view of the new faith’s mission of bringing about the oneness

of mankind,” it was important to ensure that the single community did not end up as a plurality of rival sects. This does not mean, on the other hand, that the Baha’i Faith was to be turned

into a monolithic block of identical attitudes and ideas.24 The

ence to ‘false brethren’, and to people who had been ‘unawares brought in, who came in privily’ (Gal. 2:4). See also Acts 15:24, 39; Gal. 2:11ff.; 3:1ff.; 5:7-12; I Cor. 1:10ff.; 14:26-33, 37. On the various cur-

rents, especially the tensions between Jewish Christians and Gentile Christians, see Wilhelm

Schneemelcher, Das Urchristentum,

Stuttgart,

1981. 22. In his Al-Milal wa’l-Nihal (Beirut, n.d.), the outstanding work on heresies in Islam, ash-Shahrastani (d. 1153) describes seventy-two dif-

ferent heretical sects. However, some of these are based on very arbitrary fine distinctions motivated by the tradition attributed to Muhammad: ‘The Jews are divided into seventy-one sects and the Christians into seventy-two, but my community will be divided into seventy-three sects’ (quoted from Watt and Marmura, Der Islam II, p. xvi).

23. As in his statement that: ‘The fundamental purpose animating the Faith of God and His Religion is to safeguard the interests and promote the unity of the human race, and to foster the spirit of love and fellow-

ship amongst men’ (Tablets 11:15) ‘. . . fix your gaze upon unity. Cleave tenaciously unto that which will lead to the wellbeing and tranquillity of all mankind. This span of earth is but one homeland and one habitation’ (ibid. 6:27). ‘The well-being of mankind, its peace and security, are unattainable unless and until its unity is firmly established’ (Gleanings 131:2). ‘He Who is your Lord, the All-Merciful, cherisheth in His heart the desire of beholding the entire human race as one soul and one body’ (ibid. 107. See also Shoghi Effendi, World Order, pp. 42ff., 202ff.). 24. Baha’u’llah explicitly warns against the type of ‘union’ ‘that would lead to disunity’ (Tablets 11:14).

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Chapter 11 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

unity sought by Baha’u’Ilah was and is to be found in the huge diversity of individuals and cultures. Neither does this mean that there are not sometimes individuals and small, short-lived

groups who depart from the community and go their own way —there have already been numerous examples of this in Baha’i

history.25 It has, however, been possible to avoid the development that has plagued previous religions, namely the division of the mainstream community as a result of a profound and per-

manent schism.?6 Three measures, in particular, serve this goal of preserving the unity of the community: the safeguarding of the doctrinal foundations of the religion, the creation of an institutional framework based on law, and the stipulation of the immediate suc-

cession. First and foremost there had to be no doubt about the validity of fundamental beliefs of the new faith. To be recog-

nized as being ‘valid’ revelations of the divine Will, these had to be set down in writing, authorized by Baha’u’llah himself and promulgated in his name. Oral traditions recounting sayings

25. See Taherzadeh, Covenant, for an overview.

26. On this subject Shoghi Effendi writes that: ‘Were anyone to imagine or expect that a Cause, comprising within its orbit so vast a portion of the globe, so turbulent in its history, so challenging in its claims, so diversified in the elements it has assimilated into its administrative structure, should, at all times, be immune to any divergence of

opinion, or any defection on the part of its multitudinous followers, it would be sheer delusion, wholly unreasonable and unwarranted, even in the face of the unprecedented evidence of the miraculous power which its rise and progress have so powerfully exhibited.’ Nevertheless, he continues:

‘That such a secession, however, whether effected by those

who apostatize their faith or preach heretical doctrines, should have failed, after the lapse of a century, to split in twain the entire body of the adherents of the Faith, or to create a grave, a permanent and irreme-

diable breach in its organic structure, is a fact too eloquent for even a casual observer of the internal processes of its administrative order to either deny or ignore’ (Messages to America, p. 50).

682

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha and actions, even of the founder himself, are therefore not used

as a basis for the establishment of norms in the Baha’i Faith.27 This uncompromising emphasis on the written word as the means of recording and promulgating the religion’s teachings applied explicitly also to the later succession and to the establishment of community structures. The community of Baha’u-

*}lah was not to be left at the mercy of conflicting interpretations and claims and, hence, to historical chance; instead, it was to unfold in accordance with the divine Will as articulated by Baha’u’llah. This guidance for the development of the commu-

nity is contained in two documents, in particular: the Kitab-iAqdas, the ‘Book of Laws’, and the Kitab-i-“Ahd, the ‘Book of the Covenant’. Both these texts contain fundamental stipulations concerning the main institutions and their responsibilities, as well as about the immediate leadership succession and the organization of the community. The stipulation that leadership of the community must be transferred to “Abdu’l-Baha immediately after the passing of Baha’u’llah is especially clear and

emphatic.28 The appointment of ‘Abdu’l-Baha as interpreter of the scripture and ‘Centre of the Covenant’ also endows him

with legislative authority.?? 27. On the sola scriptura principle see Schaefer, Grundlagen, pp. 6670; on the anti-traditionalist attitude of the Baha’i Faith see also Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 4.2.4.2 and 11.1.1.

28. Kitab-i-‘Ahd 9; Kitab-i-Aqdas 121. In his study of the transformations undergone by the Baha’i Faith in its history so far, Johnson concludes his discussion of the rank and legal status of ‘Abdu’l-Baha by stating that: ‘The point of the matter is that Baha’u’ll4h appointed ‘“Abdu’l-Baha as his successor to whom the believers were to turn for guidance after his passing, and ‘Abdu’l-Baha, therefore, was in a position to make whatever decisions or modifications in the religion he considered necessary or expedient’ (A Historical Analysis, p. 236). 29. In this connection, Shoghi Effendi speaks of an identity of will, of ‘mystic intercourse’ between the founder of the Baha’i Faith and the ‘Centre of the Covenant’ whom he had appointed. Hence: ‘The purpose of the Author of the Baha’i Revelation had . . . been so thoroughly infused into the mind of ‘Abdu’l-Baha’ that ‘their aims and motives

683

Chapter 11 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer As was to be expected, ‘Abdu’l-Baha met with a certain amount of resistance against his authority and against his measures to organize the community. The focus of opposition was—

as in Baha’u’llah’s lifetime?°—within his own family. “Abdu’lBaha’s main opponent was

his younger half-brother,

Mirza

Muhammad-‘Ali.3! While this opposition led to setbacks and delays, it was prevented from having long-term effects by the existence and terms of the Kitab-i-“Ahd. “Abdu’l-Baha was undisputedly acknowledged in the community as the ‘Centre of the Covenant’, although there were isolated instances of rebellion against him personally and against his position.? In particular, there was the constant enmity of Mirza Muhammad-‘Ali

[have] been so completely blended’ (God Passes By, pp. 325f.). Elsewhere (in a letter dated 19 March 1930 to Major Tudor Pole) Shoghi Effendi wrote that ‘Baha’u’llah and the Master have both revealed a set of laws and administrative principles . . . for the guidance, the spread, the consolidation and protection of the Faith after them’. It is therefore probably a matter of terminological taste, and particularly a question of one’s preference for either a mystic or an institutional/legal viewpoint, whether one regards ‘Abdu’1-Baha as a legislator appointed by Baha’u*]l4h or whether, by emphasizing the mystic bond between the two figures, one sees ‘Abdu’1-Baha’s legislation as interpretation and hence as part of the law promulgated by Baha’u’llah directly. Whichever view is taken, the fact remains that through a large number of his explanations and rulings (concerning such matters as the prohibition of polygamy, the status of women, the institution of the Guardianship, the Hands of the Cause of God, the national House of Justice), ‘Abdu’l-Baha created a

new legal framework that is binding upon all believers. From an institutional and legal point of view, this cannot be understood other than as legislation. On this subject see also Gollmer, Gottesreich,

ch. 11.2.2.

See also Schaefer, above, pp. 34 ff. 30. See Towfigh, above pp. 618ff., 630ff. 31. Compare Balyuzi, ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Covenant, chaps. 8, 11, 13-16, 18.

pp. 52ff.,

57ff.;

Taherzadeh,

32. The most significant such individual in the West was Ibrahim Kheiralla (Ibrahim Khayru’llah), who was initially one of the most outstanding protagonists of the Baha’i Faith in the United States (see Richard Hollinger, ‘Ibrahim George Kheiralla and the Baha’i Faith in America’, in SBB 2, pp. 94-133; Taherzadeh, Covenant, ch. 21).

684

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha

and his associates who used every means to try to discredit ‘Abdu’1-Baha in the eyes of the local population and the Ottoman authorities. It was predictable that this enmity and the dangers it presented to the community would endure even after the death of ‘Abdu’l-Baha. What, then, was more logical than that ‘Abdu’l-Baha should follow the example of Baha’u’llah and regulate the succession in the form of a testament, as a precaution against this and similar future threats to the unity of the community? The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha was probably written between 1901 and 1908.33 at a time when difficulties

33. This is at least the view held by Balyuzi (‘Abdu ’l-Bahd, p. 484). It is relatively certain that this date is correct for the first two sections of the Will and Testament. The testament consists of three sections written at different times; none of the sections is dated. Further research will be

required in order to date them more accurately. It can be stated for certain that the first two parts were composed

later than February

1903,

since ‘Abdu’1-Baha includes in them a reference to a letter from Mirza Badi‘u’llah (1:6; 2:4, 10, 12), which was written at that time. Passage

1:7 of the Will and Testament mentions a Commission of Inquiry deployed against ‘Abdu’l-Baha. The wording and the fact that ‘Abdu’lBaha does not mention the outcome of the inquiry indicate that these lines were written during or shortly after the Commission’s visit to ‘Akka. Shoghi Effendi concurs with other Baha’i sources in stating that there were two Commissions of Inquiry (God Passes By, pp. 266, 269f.). Balyuzi (‘Abdu’l-Baha, Tablets, vol. 1, pp. 112f., 118ff.) dates the first of these to 1904 and the second to the winter of 1907 (as does Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, pp. 266, 269). The circumstances described by ‘Abdu’l-Baha conform to the description given by the first Commission. On the basis of ‘inherent evidence’ that he does not go into, Ahmad Sohrab (Analysis, p. 13) dates the first section of the testament to the years 1905 to 1907. What can be stated with some certainty is that the first section was composed after February 1903, probably between 1904 and 1907. ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s postscript to the first section announces that this section had been concealed for ‘a long time’, indicating that a long period must have elapsed between the composition of the first and second sections. ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s reference to a direct threat of danger (Tablets, vol. 1, p. 25; vol. 2, pp. 372, 462; vol. 3, p. 600) may well be connected with the events described by Shoghi Effendi (God Passes By, pp. 267, 269, 275, 302, 305f.) that took place at the

685

Chapter 11 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

had again arisen with the Ottoman government and ‘Abdu’lBaha’s life was under direct threat as a result of the intrigues

contrived by the group surrounding Muhammad-‘Ali.34 His intention was to bequeath to the community the basic structures that would preserve its unity and promote its development as

time of the second Commission of Inquiry. A plausible hypothesis is that the first section was written in about 1904 and the second in the winter of 1907. However, the dates of the two Commissions of Inquiry have not yet been ascertained beyond doubt, and further research is required (see below, note 34). According to Sohrab (Analysis, p. 13), the second section of the testament was composed after the Young Turks’ Revolution of 1908 and before ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s journey to America in 1912. While he can attest the second date by reference to the fact that the seal used by ‘Abdu’1-Baha on the first and second sections was lost during his travels in America, he cannot offer any evidence for the first

date. The third section does not contain any inherent reference to a particular date. Nevertheless, Sohrab (ibid. pp. 13ff.) does mention the fact

that the third section is not sealed but bears the signature of ‘Abdu’lBaha in the form in which he was wont to authorize documents after the loss of the seal. If it proves possible to confirm Sohrab’s distinction between two forms of signature used by ‘Abdu’1-Baha before and after the loss of the seal, the third section of the testament can be dated to the

period between 1912 and 1921. 34. See Balyuzi, ‘Abdu’l-Baha, pp. 91ff., 106ff., 110ff. The precise dates of the two Ottoman Commissions of Inquiry are still uncertain. Momen (The Babi and Baha’i Religions, pp. 322f.) states with regard to this matter that: ‘There is a problem concerning the dates of this Commission, since Baha’i accounts agree that there were two Commissions of Inquiry, one arriving in about 1904 and another in 1907. The details given in these accounts from the British Consular authorities agree well with the details for the second of these two Commissions: the name of the Chairman, the dismissal of the Governor

of ‘Akka and other offi-

cials, the dispatch of a representative of the Persian Embassy in Istanbul. It is quite clear from these British Consular accounts, however, that

this Commission arrived in 1905 and not 1907. It may be, of course, that the Commission came twice.’ Documents in the Ottoman state archives also confirm the date 1905 (ibid.). ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s life was threatened

once again in the final months of the First World War (November 1917 to summer 1918), when his enemies intrigued against him and denounced him to the Turkish military authorities (see Balyuzi, ‘Abdu’lBaha, pp. 425ff.; some sources in connection with these events are reproduced in Momen (ed.), The Babi and Baha’i Religions, pp. 332ff.).

686

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha

outlined in the Kitab-i-Aqdas, and to place the believers under the obligation to abide by these regulations. Hence, the testament contained stipulations regarding the central institutions of

the community, their functions, the modes for determining membership of the institutions, and general rules of behaviour for holders of office and for the believers in general. III. ON THE CONTENT OF ‘ABDU’L-BAHA’S WILL AND TESTAMENT According to Ficicchia, the Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’lBaha marks the onset of a new stage of community development, which he calls the ‘Iron Age’> of Shoghi Effendi, a

period which he describes as one of rigorist, authoritarian and illiberal reorganization.*¢ In support of this assertion, Ficicchia attempts to present “Abdu’l-Baha’s testament as a foreign body in the history of the community, stating that it is polemical in

35. This is the title of ch. 8 in Ficicchia’s Baha ’ismus, p. 278. The alteration of the value content of this term is typical of Ficicchia’s approach. Ficicchia takes a term from Baha’i scripture, surreptitiously injects it with a new content and gives the reader the impression that this altered value content is the real meaning of the term. In fact, Shoghi Effendi uses the term ‘Iron Age’ as part of a rough division of the faith’s development into three periods. The first period, known as the ‘Apostolic’ or ‘Heroic’ Age, is followed by a period in which the establishment, development and consolidation of ‘the institutions, local, na-

tional and international, of the Faith of Baha’u’llah’ (God Passes By, p. 324). This epoch, with its emphasis on the development of the Faith’s structures,

its institutions,

was

called the ‘Formative’

or ‘Iron Age’

(Citadel of Faith, p. 5; God Passes By, pp. xiii, 324). Ficicchia is evidently acquainted with at least the latter of these references (Baha ’ismus, pp. 206f., p. 302) but he turns this term into an epithet describing a very severe, cold, ‘iron’ style of leadership, a distortion that is obviously intended to defame the Baha’i Faith, and a meaning which he even tries to ascribe to Shoghi Effendi himself: ‘The strict leadership of the Guardian, which he himself described as the “Jron Age” ...’ (ibid. p. 302 (Ficicchia’s emphasis)). For further discussion see Schaefer, above, pp. 95ff. 36. For details see Schaefer, above, pp. 90ff., 149ff., 224ff., 254ff.

687

Chapter 11 + Ulrich Gollmer character and contains anti-democratic regulations that incapacitate the individual. He makes no attempt at an academic

analysis of the document, considering neither its significance in religious history nor its historical effects. In Ficicchia’s opinion,

‘Abdu’l-Baha’s testament contains ‘nothing that might relate to the world’ except—as he puts it—the appointment of Shoghi Effendi as ‘the omnipotent and infallible head of the commu-

nity’,>7 which he regards as constituting a departure from the ‘regulation of the succession established by Baha’u’llah’.38 The contents are otherwise dominated, he claims, by ‘caustic’ warn-

ings against the covenant-breakers.*? Thus, Ficicchia turns against ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s precautions to preserve the unity of the community, which was understandably his main concern in view of the experiences of both Baha’i history and the history of religion in general. This can

only be a skandalon* to someone who objects to the goal in itself. The remainder of Ficicchia’s description of this document presents a completely distorted picture. He ignores, for instance,

the importance of the testament for the development and organization of the community’s institutions.4! Moreover, his portrayal of the functions and powers attendant to the office of Guardian is not just selective, one-sided and partisan, it is quite

37. Baha ’ismus, p. 284. 38. ibid. pp. 279f. 39. ibid. p. 284. On the terms ‘covenant-breaking’, ‘covenant-breaker’ see Schaefer, above, p. 232, note 449. On Ficicchia’s description of the

language of the Will and Testament see Schaefer, above, p. 47, note 87. 40. see Schaefer, above, p. 43, note 40 and 41.

41. This obviously conscious endeavour to play down the significance of the Will and Testament contradicts Ficicchia’s own presentation of the institutions of the faith (Baha’ismus, pp. 340ff.)—despite all the errors made by Ficicchia in this presentation, it does at least demonstrate clearly that the Will and Testament was instrumental in establishing the present form of the institutions.

688

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Bahd

simply wrong.*? Although this is not the place for a detailed analysis of the document in question,*3 we will briefly examine the significance of the testament for the unfolding of the world

order of Baha’u’llah,*4 of which the order of the Baha’i com-

munity forms a part and which is the primary target of Ficicchia’s attacks. Particular attention will be paid to the institutions of the “Houses of Justice’ and the Guardianship, and on the separation of powers between the institutions as emphasized in the testament.

42. On this institution see also Schaefer, above, pp. 154ff.

43. Especially in view of the fact that such analyses already exist: Hermann Grossmann, Das Bindnis Gottes in der Offenbarungsreligion,

pp. 64ff, and especially David Hofman, A Commentary on the Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Bahda, Oxford, 4th edn. 1982. Ficicchia evidently knows the latter of these two texts and even quotes from it (p. 283), but he ignores its real content. The specific regulations set down in the Will and Testament are discussed in detail in the context of each subject in Schaefer, Grundlagen, and Gollmer, Gottesreich. For discussion of cer-

tain specific points see also Schaefer, above, pp. 166ff., 224ff. 44. Only, of course, as far as can be done at present. Baha’is understand the Will and Testament to be the ‘Charter’ which ‘called into being, outlined the features and set in motion the processes of, this Administrative Order’ (Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 325). Consistent with this view, Shoghi Effendi made it plain in the same text that the implications of this document could not be fully appreciated in his generation—and

the same

is still true

today.

Esslemont,

for instance,

avoided discussing its contents—probably because he sensed that this was not yet possible—and instead merely printed some extracts in the Appendix to his introductory work Bahd’u’llah and the New Era, first published in 1923, pp. 409-414). Ficicchia’s comment on this modesty is characteristic. He regards it as evidence of comprehensive censorship and the prohibition of all independent interpretation: ‘Any commentary or criticism of the testament—as indeed of the doctrines of Baha’ism in their entirety—was forbidden to the believers, and even the very slightest violation punished by excommunication’ (Baha’ismus, p. 300). To support this assertion, Ficicchia refers to a passage in the Will and Testament (3:13) which rejects any individual’s claim to a universally binding interpretation, making it appear that this amounts to a general prohibition

on

scriptural

exegesis

213ff.).

689

(see

Schaefer,

above,

pp. 194ff.,

Chapter 11 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha contains a substantial number of additions to and definitions of the central institutions of the community, including the assignment of functions to these institutions. Hence, it is an important milestone in the development of the order of Baha’u’llah. Let us first turn our attention to those institutions that, as elected bodies, are re-

sponsible for the leadership of the community and are entrusted with legislative and judicial tasks. These institutions have their origin in Baha’u’llah’s Kitab-i-Aqdas, which provides for the

establishment of the Baytu’l-‘adl, the ‘House of Justice’.* However, the distinction between the various levels of this in-

stitution and the method of determining its membership originate from “Abdu’1-Baha. Baha’u’llah’s command to his followers to establish a ‘House of Justice’ ‘in every city’*® evidently

45. ‘The Lord hath ordained that in every city a House of Justice be established wherein shall gather counsellors to the number of Baha, and should it exceed this number it doth not matter. They should consider themselves as entering the Court of the presence of God, the Exalted, the Most High, and as beholding Him Who is the Unseen. It behoveth them to be the trusted ones of the Merciful among men and to regard themselves as the guardians appointed of God forall that dwell on earth. It is incumbent upon them to take counsel together and to have regard for the interests of the servants of God, for His sake, even as they regard their own interests, and to choose that which is meet and seemly. Thus hath the Lord your God commanded you. Beware lest ye put away that which is clearly revealed in His Tablet. Fear God, O ye that perceive’ (Kitab-i-Aqdas 30). 46. ibid. Ficicchia quotes this section of the Kitab-i-Aqdas and concludes from it that ‘Baha’u’llah had not intended there to be a supreme House of Justice but had commanded the establishment of many local Houses of Justice’ (Baha’ismus, p. 356) and goes on to state apodictically that what were intended as local bodies had ‘had a. . . supreme world body . . . imposed on them, contrary to Baha’u’1lah’s instructions’ (pp. 280f. (Ficicchia’s emphasis)). It should be pointed out that the establishment of local institutions does not, of course, exclude the possi-

bility of there being a superior, international institution. Nowhere does Baha’u’llah state that the “Houses of Justice’ must be restricted to the local level. On the contrary: Ficicchia deliberately overlooks all passages in the scripture of Baha’u’llah in which functions are assigned to

690

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Bahd

refers to a local institution.47 The functions assigned to the Baytu 'l-‘adl elsewhere very clearly transcend the local level.48 Shoghi Effendi concludes from this that the foundations for

both the local and international ‘Houses of Justice’ are laid in the Kitab-i-Aqdas.4? Baha’u’llah appears not to have made any explicit distinction between different hierarchical levels of the ‘Houses of Justice’, however. This was left to ‘Abdu’l-Baha, who expressly distinguished between the local (Baytu l-‘adl or

Baytu l-‘adl-i-mahalli)®° and the Universal House of Justice (Baytu 'l-‘adl-i-a‘zam

or Baytu’l-‘adl-i-‘umumi:

‘general’

or

‘comprehensive’ House of Justice),>! and in his Will and Testament

formally introduced the Baytu’l-‘adl-i-khustsi:

‘secon-

dary’ [lit.: ‘special’] House of Justice>? as an intermediate national institution.*3 There is no mention in the scripture of Baha’u ’llah of how

the members of the various levels of the “Houses of Justice’ are to be appointed. The only stipulation concerns the minimum

number of members, which is laid down in the Kitab-i-Aqdas.*4 It was ‘Abdu’l-Baha who ruled that the members of these bodies were to be elected. As regards the form of the elections, he these institutions that clearly extend beyond the local level and which cannot be fulfilled by a large number of local bodies. He also overlooks the many references to the “House of Justice’ as a singular institution (e.g. Tablets 7:30; 8:61). See also Schaefer, above, pp. 149ff. 47. See Kitab-i-Aqdas 48, 49. 48. e.g. Kitab-i-Aqdas 42; Tablets 7:19; 7:30; 8:52; 8:61; 8:78.

49. World Order, pp. 5ff., 146ff. 50. e.g. Tablets, p. 6, Promulgation,

p. 455, the same

is implied in

Will and Testament 1:25 (p. 14). 51. Will and Testament 1:17; 1:25; 2:8; 2:9 (pp. 11f., 14f., 20); Selec-

tions 187:2; Questions 45:4 (pp. 172f.),; Promulgation, p. 455. 52. Will and Testament 1:25: later also called Baytu’l-‘adl-i-milli (‘national House of Justice’) or (rarely) Baytu'l- ‘adl-i-markazi (‘central House of Justice’). 53. See Shoghi Effendi, World Order, pp. Sf. 54. 30 and note 50.

691

Chapter 11 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

refers in very general terms to the principles of democratic elections in western countries.°> His decision that the election of the supreme institution of the community, the Universal House of Justice, should take place in three stages is a norma-

tive ruling specified in his Will and Testament.*° There ‘Abdu’1-Baha states that the Universal House of Justice is to be elected by the members of the national institutions.°’ The electoral laws for the local and national institutions were later elaborated and standardized by Shoghi Effendi.** However, Shoghi Effendi emphasized that all his decisions and recommendations concerning the electoral process were made, as a matter of principle, with the reservation that all details of electoral law not dealt with by Baha’u’llah and ‘Abdu’l-Baha were

to be regulated by the Universal House of Justice.°? The main functions assigned to the ‘House of Justice’ were

already evident in the scripture of Baha’u’llah. There is evidence of executive, legislative®! and judicial®? responsibilities. The specifications concerning the legislative function of the House, however, are contained in the Will and Testament of

‘Abdu’l-Baha. There it is stated that the Universal House of 55. Tablets, vol. 1, p. 7; Will and Testament 1:25; 2:7 (pp. 14f., 19f.);

as well as a further text quoted in The Universal House of Justice, Wellspring of Guidance, p. 48. 56. Promulgation, p. 455; idem, quoted in Shoghi Effendi, Baha ’i Administration, p. 84, and in Wellspring of Guidance, p. 48.

57. 1:25) (ps.14): 58. This was done particularly during the early years of the Guardianship (see, especially, his letters of 12 March 1923 and 12 May 1925, Baha'i Administration, pp. 37-41, 84f. For details see Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 13.1, esp. 13.1.2).

59. Baha’i Administration, pp. 41, 135. 60. e.g. Kitab-i-Aqdas 21, 42, 48, ‘Questions and Answers’ lets 3:25; 7:22; 8:59.

98; Tab-

61. Tablets 6:29; 8:58; 8:78.

62. Kitdb-i-Aqdas, ‘Questions and Answers’ both to the legislative and the judicial spheres.

692

49 and 50 could refer

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha

Justice is responsible for enacting laws on all matters that have

not already been clearly regulated in the scripture.© The laws of the House have ‘the same effect as the Text itself’ .°* However,

whereas the laws of Baha’u’llah are valid for the full duration of his dispensation and cannot be altered,® the Universal House of Justice has the competence

to amend

or repeal its own

laws.®© This enables it to respond flexibly to changing circumstances, and is indeed the reason for this stipulation.®” The judicial function of the Universal House of Justice is also reflected in the Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha. This institution is responsible for adjudicating on all matters of contention: “Unto

this body all things must be referred’.©* The function of the Universal House as the undisputed supreme institution of the

Baha’i community is also set out in ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s testament, being formulated as: That which this body, whether unanimously or by a majority doth carry, that is verily the Truth and the Pur-

pose of God himself.°? These are not the only innovations and specifications made

in the Will and Testament. The legal foundation”? for the insti63. Will and Testament 1:25; 2:7, 8 (pp. 14f., 19f.).

64. ibid. 2:8 (p. 20). 65. ‘This body [the Universal House of Justice] can supplement but never invalidate or modify in the least degree what has already been formulated by Baha’u’llah’ (Shoghi Effendi, letter of 11 August 1935, in Hornby, Lights of Guidance, 2nd edn. no. 1145). 66. Will and Testament 2:8 (p. 20). Schaefer (Grundlagen, pp. 61ff.)

has expressed this in his distinction between divine law (in the narrower sense) and indirect divine law. On this subject as a whole see Schaefer, above, pp. 185, 365ff. On the character and prospective development of Baha’i law, see Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 12.2-4.

67. Will and Testament 2:8 (p. 20). 68. ibid. 1:25 (p. 14). 69. ibid. 2:7 (p. 19). WOribid 120: 1:22: 1:16: 1:17; 3:12 (pp. 118, 25):

693

Chapter 11 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

tution of the ‘Hands’,”! and a new definition of their functions,’ is also found in this document. The attitude and behaviour of the Baha’is towards secular authority”? that was enjoined upon the believers by Baha’u’llah is not only given special empha-

sis’4 but is supplemented by important additional injunctions.7> The introduction of the institution of the Guardianship

also

brought about a more precise definition of the functions and spheres of competence assigned to the Universal House of Jus-

tice7® and the establishment of a clear separation of powers between these two institutions. This separation of powers will

be discussed in due course. Undoubtedly the most important and, at first sight, the

most spectacular innovation’’ in the Will and Testament is the institution of the Guardianship. Although in his own testament78 Baha’u’llah had provided for such a personal successor after the death of ‘Abdu’l-Baha, a new situation had arisen owing to the 71. Baha’u’llah himself gave the title ‘Hand of the Cause of God’ (sing. and pl. ayddi-i-amru’llah) to a few especially worthy believers. On this institution, its functions and development see The Ministry of the Custodians 1957-1963: An Account of the Stewardship of the Hands of the Cause, Haifa, 1992; Paul E. Haney, ‘The Institution of the Hands of the Cause of God’, in Bahd’i World 13 (1970), p. 333; Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 11.2.3.

72. Will and Testament 1:2; 1:13; 1:17; 1:19; 1:21; 1:22 (pp. 3, 10-13). In the Stratu’l-Haykal, Baha’u’llah provides a prophetic vision of the rank and tasks of the ‘hands’ (quoted in Shoghi Effendi, World Order, pp. 109f.). Whether this is a reference to a particular institution or merely a description of an outstanding but informal attitude of service to the Word of God is something that cannot be ascertained. 73. Concerning the principle of loyalty towards the state, its laws and institutions of authority see Gollmer, above, pp. 468ff. 74. ibid. 1:8 (p. 8). Ho, ADIG-nI222 1:25, (ppl sin). 26.21bid lh 122532772 2:8515.12 (pp tite P45 Lote 2517 77. On certain indications in the scripture of Baha’u’llah concerning this office see below, pp. 70Sff. (esp. note 134). 78. Tablets 15:9.

694

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’|-Baha

fact that the prospective successor, Mirz4 Muhammad-Ali, ‘ had broken away from the faith.’? The office of Guardian was created by ‘Abdu’l-Baha in order to ensure continuity in the leadership and development of the community under these changed conditions. “Abdu’|-Baha formally introduced this institution in

his testament,®° simultaneously naming the first holder of this office,®! describing the main functions®? of the Guardianship, and setting out the prerequisites and conditions for succession to this office in the future.8? The Guardian (Vali-Amru’llah) was the successor to ‘Abdu’l-Baha in his teaching office,®* as well as leader and head of the community, albeit with consid-

79. See above, pp. 680ff., and also Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, ch. 15; Balyuzi, ‘Abdu’l-Bahd, pp. 52-61; Taherzadeh, Covenant, esp. ch. 8 and 11; for discussion of certain details see also below, pp. 70S5ff. 80.

Will and Testament

1:2; 1:16; 1:17 (pp. 3, 11).

81. This was his grandson, Shoghi Effendi, ‘that primal branch of the Divine and Sacred Lote-Tree, grown out, blest, tender, verdant and flourishing from the Twin Holy Trees’. This statement refers to the fact that Shoghi Effendi was related, through his mother, to the family of Baha’u’llah, and through his father to the family of the Bab (Will and Testament 1:2; 1:16; 3:11-12 (pp. 3, 11, 25ff.). The metaphor of the ‘pearl’ that had emerged from ‘the Twin surging seas’ (1:2 (p. 3)), alludes to a verse of the Qur’an (55:19-22) which the Imamiya interpret as a reference to the Imamate, in particular to ‘Ali, Fatima and Hasan or Husayn (see Momen, Shi‘i Islam, p. 153). 82. The Guardian

is the authorized

expounder of the faith; he is re-

sponsible for its protection, which includes ensuring that the believers do likewise (1:17; 3:13 (pp. 17, 26)); he is the permanent head of the Universal House of Justice (1:25 (p. 14)); he has the right to relieve a member of this body of his office should he ‘commit a sin, injurious to the common weal’ and to hold elections to fill the vacancy that arises as a result (1:25 (p. 14)); he appoints the Hands of the Cause of God (ayddi-i-amru’lldéh) and guides them in their work (1:20; 1:22 (pp. iS); he is the recipient of the Huqiqu’Ilah (1:27 (p. 15)).

83. 1:16; 1:18; 1:19 (pp. 11f.). However, Guardian, did not appoint a successor. 84. Lehramt.

Shoghi Effendi,

the first

For details see Schaefer, Appendix, pp. 792ff. See also

Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 11.2.2 and 12.1.

695

Chapter 11 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

erably more limited®> functions than those of “Abdu’|-Baha himself. The only real innovation, therefore, was in the individual appointed to this position and in the definition of the institu-

tional functions of the office. Nevertheless, this is the starting point for the main objection against the Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha, which Ficicchia has taken up. White and Zimmer refused to accept

innovations. That they were wrong to do so will soon become evident. It is not only that their objections were based on completely false assumptions; closer scrutiny reveals that there are striking contradictions between the arguments brought forward by White and Zimmer respectively, contradictions that Ficicchia has ignored.

White did not deny ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s right, in principle, to enact new laws or create new institutions. Instead, she criticized

certain points and contrasted her own private understanding of what she had heard and read of ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s statements with the terms of the Will and Testament. Statements that were ‘repeated once or twice’®’ in this document contrasted, in her opinion, with hundreds of statements made by ‘“Abdu’l-Baha during his lifetime, ‘which by far outweigh the instructions

that were found after his death’.88 She did not dispute that the

85. See the discussion on the separation of powers, below, pp. 701ff. 86. By virtue of this special status ‘Abdu’l-Baha, along with Baha’u*llah and the Bab, is one of the three central figures of the Baha’i Revelation (see the classic work of Baha’i dogmatics written by Shoghi Effendi, ‘The Dispensation of Baha’u’llah’ (1934), in World Order, pp. 97-157), although unlike them he does not possess the rank of a Manifestation (ibid. pp. 132ff., 136ff.). 87. She refers, in particular, to the stipulations regarding the Guardianship, the Hands of the Cause of God and the three-tier structure of the Houses of Justice. 88. Enemy, pp. 94f.

696

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha

doctrinal foundation upon which she based her objections was

extremely selective and incomplete.®? Zimmer, on the other hand, had a finalist and exclusivist

conception of revelation. In his view, the word of the founder of a religion is completed during his lifetime, contains everything there is to be said, is comprehensible to all, needs no explana-

tion or supplementation, and additions are impermissible. Thus, he rejected the idea of the gradual unfoldment of a revelation over the course of time. Baha’u ’llah ‘left nothing unsaid’, and,

he argued, it is unthinkable that the Baha’i Faith might continue to develop, and certain aspects be made more distinct, after the

death of its founder.?° The Manifestation?! alone, in Zimmer’s opinion, could have legislative authority;

even

“Abdu’l-Baha

could not fulfil this function.9? It is not without a certain irony that, in propounding this view, Zimmer adopted the arguments used by Muhammad-

‘Ali93 and his followers against ‘Abdu’l-Baha,”4 i.e. of the very group whom White regarded as the initiators of the “Bahai Or-

ganization’ that she so vehemently opposed.?> Apart from the

89. See, in particular, below, pp. 753ff. 90. Shoghism, pp. 70-78. 91. On the term ‘Manifestation’ (al-mazharu'l-ilahi, mazhar-i-zuhur) as the designation for a theophany see Schaefer, above, pp. 169 and 262ff.; see also Towfigh, Schépfung, pp. 21ff., 170ff.; Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 5.2. and 7.1.

92. Shoghism, pp. 41ff. According to White, in stark contrast to the testimony of scripture (see Shoghi Effendi, World Order, p. 131ff.), the rank of ‘Abdu’l-Baha is superior to that of Baha’u’llah (Enemy, ppwlloe). 93. On this subject see above, p. 684 and below, pp. 714ff. 94. For instance, one of the accusations raised against “Abdu’1-Baha is that he had claimed the ‘rank of the origin’, i.e. that he claimed the

status of a theophany (see Mirza Muhammad-Javad-Qazvini, in Browne, Materials, p. 77). 95. See, for example, Enemy, pp. 36, 88, 124f., 210f. For details of White’s allegation that the order of the Baha’i community had its origin

697

Chapter 1] ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

fact that this fundamentalist scriptural rigorism amounts to an

outright negation of a major part of Baha’u’llah’s scripture,?° this attitude contradicts the express intention of the order created by Baha’u’llah, which is consciously so designed that its identity will be preserved despite constant change. The structures, institutions and laws created by Baha’u’llah are the foundation and framework, the nucleus of an organism that is destined to

grow and develop. His law is not static, promulgated once and for all time. The ability to adapt to changed circumstances is one of the functions with which the successor institutions established by the founder are entrusted, albeit to varying ex-

tents and in different fields.°’7 These are an express element of the assignment of prophetic legitimacy to the institutions. The religious elites of the past are criticized in the scrip-

ture for having misunderstood the real aims of the divine lawgiver and for having caused the early obsolescence of their

religious system®® by bringing external aspects of law and order to a standstill, and by neglecting the fact that ‘the material

world is subject to change and transformation’.%? In order to take account of this change, religion must be living, vitalized, moving and progressive. If it be without motion and non progressive, it is without the divine

life; it is dead. 19°

Moreover, Baha’u’llah was evidently well aware that the world in which his dispensation was to come to fruition would

in a conspiracy led by Mirza Muhammad-‘Ali and his followers see below, pp. 753ff. and pp. 763ff. 96. Namely, the aspects of the order of the community and the world order of Baha’u’llah, see below, pp. 753ff. 97. On this subject see the discussion on the separation of powers below, pp. 701 ff. 98. See “‘Abdu’l-Baha, Some Answered Questions 11:10-11; 25-30; 14:7. 99. ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Promulgation, p. 161; see also pp. 97f., 339, 365.

100.

ibid. p. 140.

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The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha

be characterized by major, accelerated change.!°! The era of Baha’u’llah is designated the ‘period of newness and consummation’,'°? in which ‘all human forces are reformed’.!3 During such a period, in particular, it is essential that developments are

initiated ‘at the appropriate time and place’,!°4 since ‘for each

day there is a new problem and for every problem an expedient

solution’.!°5 The substance of the divine impulse must remain

alive in the face of change, in order to push forward the evolutionary process initiated by the Word of God. An instrument must be created that is able to act ‘according to the exigencies

of the time and the dictates of wisdom’.!° One of the essential goals of the Covenant of Baha’u’llah is to guarantee this identity despite change. The many testimonies to the uniqueness of this Covenant basically relate to this specific feature: the Covenant of Baha’u’llah includes the promise that the unity of the community will be preserved—not as something static, separated from the world and its vicissitudes, conservative and rigid,

but as a body that is able to remain open to the world and in 101.

See Tablets 3:25; 8:61; 8:78. This awareness is reflected, for in-

stance, in the following passage by ‘Abdu’l-Baha: ‘What a wonderful century this is! It is an age of universal reformation. Laws and statutes of civil and federal governments are in process of change and transformation. Sciences and arts are being moulded anew. Thoughts are metamorphosed. The foundations of human society are changing and strengthening . . . Ethical precedents and principles cannot be applied to the needs of the modern world. Thoughts and theories of past ages are fruitless now .. . The morals of humanity must undergo change. New remedies and solutions for human problems must be adopted. Human intellects themselves must change and be subject to the universal refor-

mation’ (Promulgation, p. 144). 102. ‘That which was applicable to human needs during the early history of the race could neither meet nor satisfy the demands of this day and period of newness and consummation’ (ibid. p. 438). 103.

ibid. p. 278.

104.

Baha’u’llah, Tablets 11:31.

105.

ibid. 3:25; 8:61.

106.

ibid. 8:78.

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Chapter 11 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

constant flux, one community united under the Word and Will of Baha’u’!lah. The appointment of ‘Abdu’]-Baha as “Centre of the Cause of God’ and the authority conferred upon him, and likewise on the Universal House of Justice, to enact supplementary laws concerning all matters not clearly regulated in the “Book of

God’,!°7 is intended to preserve the vitality and adaptability of the order of Baha’u’llah. Baha’u’llah was obviously very concerned to equip the institutions he created to succeed him with the necessary authority and assurances to enable them to act

according ‘to the needs and requirements of the time’ .!°8 In addition to the fundamentally false objection to the existence of a new institution, White and Zimmer—and following in their footsteps Ficicchia, too, of course— also protested against the specific definition of the office of Guardian as described in the Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha. Accord-

ing to the original German-language edition of Zimmer’s work, the Will and Testament gives the Guardian the status of ‘world

pope and world emperor’.!° Impressive though this pithy expression may sound, it far exceeds the true legal status of the office of Guardian. Secular power is one thing the office of

Guardian of the Baha’i Faith does not carry with it.1!° There are also few similarities between the papacy and the Guardianship apart from the fact that both institutions function as heads of the two religions in question and constitute the highest teaching

107. 108.

‘Abdu’l-Baha, Will and Testament 1:25, 2:8 (pp. 14, 20). Baha’u’llah, Tablets 3:25; 8:61.

109. Shoghism, p. 68. In the English translation the expression used for “Weltpapst und Weltkaiser’ is ‘King of the world? (ibid. p. 90). 110. On this subject see Schaefer, above, 154ff.; for further detailed discussion see Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 11.2.2.

700

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu ’l-Bahd office (/ehramt)—but on the latter point the differences are far

greater than the similarities. !!! Furthermore, Zimmer’s dictum and Ficicchia’s assertion cited at the beginning of this section both ignore the separation of powers in the order of Baha’u’llah, which is prescribed in the

very document that is at issue here.!!2 The conscious and planned institutionalization of the original prophetic impulse is a special feature of the Baha’i Faith. Connected with this planned transfer of prophetic sovereignty—first set out by Baha’u’llah, in particular in his Kitab-i-“Ahd and Kitab-i-Aqdas, then by ‘Abdu’l-Baha in his Will and Testament—is the regulation of the functions, duties and sovereign rights transferred to the successor institutions. Especially remarkable among these is the grad-

ual separation and limitation of powers. Unrestricted

power

is the prerogative

of God

and his

Manifestations alone: ‘He doeth what He pleaseth.’!!° It is up to the Manifestations themselves how they employ the secular and spiritual powers bestowed upon them by God, and how they transfer these powers to the respective institutions appointed to succeed them. Baha’u’llah is the sovereign Manifestation for his era. He appointed ‘Abdu’l-Baha as the ‘Centre of the Covenant’. This office—which, it should be noted, is singular

and unique!!4—is the successor institution par excellence in the Baha’i Faith. It is invested with divine sovereignty in a measure

111. For a comparison of the papacy and the Guardianship see Schaefer, above, pp.174ff., esp. note 187; idem, Grundlagen, pp. 151ff.; Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 11.2.2.

112. In view of the stipulations laid down in the scripture and their application in the community’s history so far, White’s allegation that ‘.. . these successors [the Guardian, i.e. Shoghi Effendi] are to be supreme dictators over the House of Justice’ is utterly ridiculous (White, Enemy, p. 54). 113. See, for example, Kitab-i-Agdas 7, Gleanings 101; 102; 103:6; 3: 114. Shoghi Effendi, World Order, pp. 131ff.

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Chapter 11 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

unequalled by any other, later successor institutions.!!> After ‘Abdu’l-Baha, the institutional legitimacy transferred to other offices or bodies was both divided and reduced. In his testament, ‘Abdu’l-Baha established two institutions that were henceforth to be regarded as the central successor institutions:

the ‘twin institutions’ of the Guardianship!!° and the Universal House of Justice!!7 (which had already been provided for by Baha’u’llah).

Neither of these two

institutions

succeeds the

Manifestation with respect to individual salvation; this rests exclusively on the direct relationship between the individual believer and God (or the Manifestation of God). Neither of the twin institutions (or those who hold office in them) functions as a model of piety or righteousness for the believers; the function of exemplar—which is understood to mean emulation in a self-responsible, thoughtful way—is reserved solely for ‘Abdu’]-

Baha. The functions with which the successor institutions are entrusted are of a social nature, relating to the community. They include the binding interpretation of scripture, legislation in all matters not clearly and directly regulated in the “Book of God’, and the practical leadership of the community. Whereas the latter task is shared by both institutions, the former

two are subject to a strict division of powers: authoritative interpretation is the sole preserve of the Guardian,!!® and com-

115.

On the restrictions on the power invested in this office as com-

pared with the Manifestation, see Shoghi Effendi, ibid.; see also Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 11.2.2.

116.

On the indirect references to this office in the scripture of

Baha’u ’Ilah see below, p. 706, note 135.

117. Will and Testament 1:17,25; 2:7, 8; 3:12 (pp. 11f., 14f., 19f., 25f.); on this subject see also Shoghi Effendi, World Order, pp. 147ff. 118. On the role and tasks of the Guardian see.‘Abdu’l-Baha, Will and Testament 1:2,16-18, 20, 22, 25, 27; 3:12 (pp. 3, 11-15, 25f.); see also Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 11.2.2. On the teaching office see also Schaefer, above, pp. 194ff.

702

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha

plementary legislation can be enacted only by the Universal

House of Justice.1!9

This separation of powers continues despite the fact that

the office of Guardian is vacant.!2° In the Baha’i Faith, there is currently no body empowered to provide an authoritative inter-

pretation of the scripture.!?! The exclusive right to provide such an interpretation was reserved for Baha’u’llah,

‘Abdu’l-Baha

and Shoghi Effendi.!22 The Universal House of Justice fulfils only the tasks specifically designated to it,!23 and expressly ad119. The text that is crucial in drawing the distinction between the respective powers of these two institutions is Shoghi Effendi’s work, World Order, pp. 147ff. On the separation of powers in the Baha’i community see also Schaefer, above, pp. 154, 246f.; Gollmer, above, pp. 432ff., and Schaefer, Grundlagen, pp. 110f., Gollmer, Gottesreich,

ch. 12.1. On legislative power in particular see Schaefer, Grundlagen, pp. 104, 171; Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 12.2-4.

120.

Shoghi Effendi died in 1957 without having appointed a succes-

sor. The Universal House of Justice, which was elected for the first time

in 1963 and—in the words of ‘Abdu’l-Baha—is responsible for resolving all questions ‘that are obscure and matters that are not expressly recorded in the Book’ (Will and Testament 2:8 (p. 20)), decided that it was not in a position to draw up regulations for succession to the office of Guardian (the wording of this resolution is quoted below, p. 704, note 126). 121. On the freedom of the individual believer to teach the faith while being obliged to adhere to the scripture see Schaefer, above, pp. 194ff.; Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 11.2.2.

122. This does not mean that interpretation is no longer permissible. Without individual attempts to understand the meaning of scripture, it would be impossible for understanding to be deepened and for faith to be put into practice. However, such interpretation must be regarded as that of an individual, and therefore as provisional; no individual believ-

ers have the right to claim that their interpretation is binding upon others. See Schaefer, above, pp. 195ff.

123. It is erroneous to assume that the vacancy of the office of Guardian means that ‘the distinction originally drawn between the functions of teaching and administration on the one hand and legislation on the other has been permanently removed’ (Meinhold, Religionen, p. 335). Meinhold had called the separation of powers between the Guardianship and the Universal House of Justice the characteristic fea-

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Chapter 11 ,* Ulrich Gollmer

heres to the prescribed separation of powers.!4 Part of the legislative competence assigned to the Universal House of Justice is the creation of new institutions within its sphere of compe-

tence.!29 As was exemplified in the case of the Guardianship, the Universal House of Justice has excluded the possibility of its creating institutions beyond the bounds of this sphere of

competence. !26 Thus, the Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’]-Baha

is not an

unexpected innovation in the Baha’i Faith, neither as regards its form nor in the trend it represents. It is a continuation of what

Baha’u’ll4h began in his Kitdb-i-Aqdas and Kitdb-i-‘Ahd:!27 ture of the Baha’ Faith, the feature in which lay ‘the significance of this

organization’ (pp. 338, 334). Ficicchia’s assertion that ‘the authority, rights and obligations were all transferred to the Universal House of Justice’ (Baha@’ismus, p. 363 (emphasis added)) and that teaching authority was therefore also exercised by the Universal House of Justice (ibid. pp. 363ff.) is also false: “The Universal House of Justice neither “can, nor will ever, infringe upon the sacred and prescribed domain of the other” ’ (letter dated 23 October 1984 written on behalf of the Universal House of Justice to an individual believer, in Messages from the Universal House of Justice 1963-1986; see also Constitution of the Universal House of Justice, p. 4; letters from the Universal House of Justice dated 9 March 1965 and 27 May 1966, in Wellspring of Guidance, pp. 52f., 88. For detailed discussion see also Schaefer, above, pp. 158ff.).

124.

Constitution, ibid.; letter of the Universal House of Justice dated

9 March 1965, in Wellspring of Guidance, pp. 50f., 52f. and 7 December 1969, in Messages from the Universal House of Justice 1968-1973, pp. 38, 42. 125. Such as the International Boards of Counsellors, to whom the Cause have gradually been transfer of functions see Gollmer,

Teaching Centre and the Continental most of the functions of the Hands of transferred. For the reasons for this Gottesreich, ch. 11.2.3.

126. “After prayerful and careful study of the Holy Text .. . the Universal House of Justice finds that there is no way to appoint or to legislate to make it possible to appoint a second Guardian to succeed Shoghi Effendi’ (telegram of the Universal House of Justice 6 October 1963, in Wellspring of Guidance, p. 11). 127. Ficicchia’s assertion that the Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’]Baha ‘has supreme priority among all the Baha’i scripture’ is utterly absurd. He alleges that it “is the most important text of all in the Baha’{

704

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Bahd

the preservation and simultaneous development of the divine

impulse in a world of rapid social change. IV. THE APPOINTMENT OF SHOGHI EFFENDI AS ‘GUARDIAN OF THE FAITH’—A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW!28 White and Zimmer asserted that the Baha’i communities were taken completely by surprise when Shoghi Effendi was appointed

“Guardian of the Cause of God’. They claimed that there had never previously been any indication that Shoghi Effendi was to occupy a special status, and that ‘Abdu’l-Baha had never hinted

at the creation of an hereditary institution.!2? This may well inFaith today’ and its significance ‘is clearly greater than that of the Kitab-i-Aqdas . . . and all other writings of the prophet’ (Baha’ismus, p. 282). Ficicchia fails to realize that Baha’i scripture is a single corpus, the individual parts of which cannot be played off one against the other. The foundation is the Word of God revealed by Baha’u’llah, to which the explanations given by ‘Abdu’l-Baha and Shoghi Effendi are important supplements. See also Schaefer, above, p. 152, note 66, pp. 324ff., 362ff. 128. I am especially grateful to the Universal House of Justice as well as the Research Department and Archives Office in Haifa who provided me with copies of documents and letters stored there and upon which this historical outline is largely based. 129. Zimmer is wrong when he asserts that, in contrast to the testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha,

the testament of Baha’u’llah, the Kitab-i-‘Ahd,

was already known in the community before Baha’u’llah’s death (Zimmer, Shoghism, pp. 56, 94). While Kitab-i-Aqdas 121 does include a stipulation concerning the succession, no name is mentioned. Although it was generally acknowledged in the community that this passage referred to ‘Abdu’l-Baha, the formal appointment of “Abdu’l-Baha made exclusively in Bahd’u’llah’s testament, the Kitab-i-‘Ahd.

was Al-

though Baha’u’llah had probably written the testament about one year

before his death, he kept its contents to himself (Taherzadeh, Covenant,

p. 142). It is probable that Baha’u’ll4h revealed the identity of his successor only in a personal letter to ‘Ali-Muhammad Varqé, and this was not made known among the believers (ibid. p. 141; the letter is included in the unpublished compilation by Fadil-i-Yazdi, Mindhiju’l-Ahkdm, vol. 1, p. 657). It was not until the last few days of his final illness that Baha’u’llah handed his testament to ‘Abdu’l-Baha. The Kitab-i-“Ahd and hence Baha’u’llah’s successor came to be known only through the

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Chapter 11 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

deed be true of the average Western Baha’i at the time of

White.!3° The situation was, however, different where the Iranian Baha’fs were concerned. In the context of Shi‘a Islam—from

which the majority of early Iranian Baha’is originated!3!—the idea of a member of the prophet’s family fulfilling a special

function was a very familiar one. In Twelver Shi‘ism!3? the Imams have a healing and leading role in the community. They are all direct descendants of Muhammad and were specially designated by their predecessor. The appointment of ‘Abdu’l-Baha by

Bahd’u ll4h had already been reminiscent of this.!33 Moreover, there are references in Baha’u’llah’s scripture to special roles

for his descendants.!34 It was only to be expected that ‘Abdu’lBaha would not leave the community without special spiritual guidance after his death, and that the person assigned to give

this guidance would be one of his own descendants.!3° public reading of the testament. This took place on the ninth day after the passing of Baha’u’llah. It was read out by Aq Riddy-i-Qannad before nine witnesses and again, in the afternoon of the same day, by Majdu‘d-Din before a large group of Baha’is in the Shrine of Baha’u’llah (Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 238; Balyuzi, ‘Abdu’l-Bahd, p. 52; Taherzadeh, Covenant, pp. 141f., 144ff., 150). 130. Yet even in America such expectations were expressed. For instance, an American believer who referred in her inquiry to Isaiah 11:6 and wished to know whether this text referred to a real, existing child, received the following reply from “‘Abdu’l-Baha: ‘Verily, that child is born and alive and from him will appear wondrous things that thou wilt hear of in the future .. . therefore forget this not as long as thou dost live inasmuch as ages and centuries will bear traces of him’ (the text was published in Rabbani, Priceless Pearl, p. 2). 131.

See Smith, Babi and Baha’i Religions, part | and II.

132.

For

the

historical

background

see

Momen,

Shi‘i

Islam,

esp. pp. 11 ff., 147ff.; Halm, Die Schia, esp. pp. 34ff.; see also Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 3.

133.

See also Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 11.2.2 ‘Die Erbinstitutionen’.

134.

e.g. Kitdb-i-Aqdas 42, 61, 121, 174; Tablets 15:10, 11, 13.

135. A letter written by “Abdu’l-Baha in, according to the Persian manuscript, 1903, for example, shows that direct enquiries concerning this had been made by Persian Baha’is (a translation of this letter is in-

706

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Bahd

It was probably not expected, however, that the one ap-

pointed to fulfil this role would be Shoghi Effendi. That is not to say that there had not been references to him before.!36 Had cluded

in Shoghi

Effendi,

World

Order,

p. 150).

Dr Yunis

Khan-i-

Afrukhtih, who had served ‘Abdu’]-Bahd as a secretary and interpreter, recounts in his memoirs concerning his years in ‘Akka that when “Abdu’1-Baha was asked if his successor had already been born, he answered: ‘Yes, that is true’, and that in reply to a further question he stated: ‘The victory of the Cause of God is in his hands’ (Khdtirdt-iNuh-Sdlih ‘Akké (Memories of nine years in ‘Akka), Teheran, 1953 (109 BE), pp. 344ff.; a reprint appeared in Los Angeles,

tion in preparation;

1983, English edi-

see also Rabbani, Priceless Pearl, pp. 2ff.). Dr

Yunis Khan first spent three months in ‘Akka in 1897, and from 1900 he

was there for several years. 136. Perhaps the most interesting reference to him is that of a Swiss physician, Dr Josephine Fallscheer-Ziircher, a Christian who lived and practised medicine in Haifa from December 1905 to December 1912. Dr Fallscheer acted as general practitioner to the Bahd’i community in Haifa ‘especially to the female members’ (Gerda Sdun-Fallscheer, Jahre des Lebens, p. 376). Thus, she frequently came into social contact with ‘Abdu’l-Baha. Her daughter Gerda Sdun-Fallscheer recorded that: ‘She [Dr Fallscheer] enjoyed visiting the home of Abbas Effendi [‘Abdu’lBaha] with its strangely spiritual atmosphere . . . At that time, an English writer, Miss Stefany Stevens, later known as Lady Drower, was also

living in Haifa . . ., and she and my mother became friends. Both of them collected the wise talks and sayings of the “Persian God”, as the people of Haifa called Abbas Effendi. Many years later, my mother placed these recorded sayings at the disposal of the Baha’i community

in Stuttgart’ (ibid.). Extracts of these records were subsequently published in the journal Sonne der Wahrheit, including the following report about a meeting with the young Shoghi Effendi: ‘At first I did not notice that behind the tall, dignified man his eldest son [sic], Shoghi Effendi, had entered the room . . . I had already seen the child fleetingly on a few other occasions. Behia Khanum [Bahiyyih Khanum] had recently informed me that this young boy of perhaps twelve years of age was the oldest direct male descendant of the family of the Prophet and destined to be the only successor and representative (vazir) of the Master...

.

Behia Khanum and I withdrew to the right near the window and in lowered voices continued

our conversation

in Turkish.

However,

I never

removed my eyes from the still very youthful grandson of Abbas Effendi [‘Abdu’1-Baha].’ Dr Fallscheer noted down the following words of ‘Abdu’l-Baha addressed to her and Bahiyyih Khanum after Shoghi Effendi had left the room. ‘My grandson does not have the eyes of a trail-

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Chapter 11 «Ulrich Gollmer

it not been for an arbitrary ruling by the immigration authorities!37 that thwarted ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s intentions,!38 Shoghi Effendi would have accompanied him on his travels to America and Europe and would therefore have been known to the Baha’is of the West. For two years, until leaving for study in

England,!3? Shoghi Effendi

was

‘Abdu’l-Baha’s

constant

companion; he was present when ‘Abdu’l-Baha received pilgrims, when he was fulfilling representational duties and during negotiations with religious and state authorities and

blazer, a fighter or a victor, but in his eyes one sees deep loyalty, perseverance and conscientiousness. And do you know why, my daughter, he will fall heir to the heavy inheritance of being my Vazir (Minister, occupant of a high post)? . . . Baha’u’llah, the Great Perfection . . . chose this insignificant one [‘Abdu’l-Baha] to be His successor, not because I was the first born, but because His inner eye had already discerned on my brow the seal of God. Before His ascension into eternal Light the blessed Manifestation reminded me that I too—irrespective of primogeniture or age—must

observe

among

my sons

and grandsons whom

God would indicate for His office. My sons passed to eternity in their tenderest years, in my line, among my relatives, only little Shoghi has the shadow of a great calling in the depths of his eyes’ (quoted from Rabbani, Priceless Pearl, p. 12). 137. Perhaps owing to an intrigue by Dr Amin Fareed, one of ‘“Abdu’1-Baha’s companions (ibid. p. 21). 138. ‘Abdu’l-Baha had embarked on the SS Cedric, together with his companions, on 25 March 1912 in Alexandria. In Naples, Italian doctors came on board and diagnosed Shoghi Effendi and two other members of the group as having eye infections with which they would not be allowed to enter the United States. On the grounds of this—dubious—diagnosis, all three were sent back to Egypt. Italy and Turkey were still at war, and ‘Abdu’l-Baha and his companions were regarded as Turks (Balyuzi, ‘Abdu’l-Bahd, pp. 171f.). 139. In the above-mentioned conversation with Dr Fallscheer (note dated 6 August 1910, quoted in Sonne der Wahrheit 10 (1930), p. 140), ‘Abdu’l-Baha had already indicated that his successor would need to acquire an excellent command of the English language and that he therefore planned to provide for Shoghi Effendi to study in England. On Shoghi Effendi’s studies at Oxford University (Balliol College) see Riaz Khadem, Shoghi Effendi in Oxford, Oxford: George Ronald, 1999.

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The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha

representatives. !4° For the better-informed of the oriental Baha’is, the appointment of Shoghi Effendi could hardly have been sur-

prising in view of the fact that a few months before his death, ‘Abdu’l-Baha had all the properties of the Persian Baha’i com-

munity placed in the name of Shoghi Effendi.!4! There are various reports of the events immediately after Shoghi Effendi’s succession and during the early years of the

Guardianship.!4? For this reason, only a brief summary can be provided here. Future detailed studies will very probably bring additional facts to light.

‘Abdu’]-Baha died in the night of 27-28 November 1921 .!43 The news of his death was conveyed by telegraph throughout the world on the following day. The funeral took place on 29 No-

vember.!44 In order to establish whether ‘Abdu’l-Baha had left any instructions for that occasion, the members of his immediate family!4° gathered together to inspect his Will. This had

140.

Rabbani,

Priceless

Pearl,

pp. 27ff.,

Taherzadeh,

Covenant,

p. 284. 141. A copy of this letter is kept at the Baha’i World Centre Archives in Haifa. Unfortunately, this copy is undated, but since the text gives Shoghi Effendi’s present location as ‘London’, the letter must have been written between Spring 1920 and November 1921. Ficicchia’s allegation that the effect of Shoghi Effendi’s appointment had been ‘disconcerting, especially in Persian circles immediately surrounding ‘Abdu’l-Baha’ (Baha ’ismus, p. 294), is quite simply untrue. 142. Bramson-Lerche, ‘Some Aspects of the Establishment of the Guardianship’, in SBB 5, pp. 253-293; Rabbani, Priceless Pearl, ch. 2; Taherzadeh, Covenant, chs. 24 and 25. 143.

A detailed account of the events, including the funeral, is to be

found in Balyuzi, ‘Abdu’l-Bahd, pp. 452ff.,; see also Lady Blomfield and Shoghi Effendi, The Passing of Abdul-Baha, Haifa, 1922. 144. The funeral procession formed at 9 am on Tuesday, 29 November 1921 in front of the house of ‘Abdu’l-Baha in Haifa (Balyuzi, ‘Abdu 'l-Baha, pp. 453f.). 145. According to a report passed on by Alfred Diebold, it was stated by Ruhi Afnan, a grandson of ‘Abdu’l-Baha, in a letter dated 12 March 1930 (the original of which, unfortunately, no longer exists) that those

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Chapter 11 .¢ Ulrich Gollmer

been deposited in a safe, the key to which “Abdu’l-Baha had always carried with him. Because the Will was addressed to

Shoghi Effendi, it was decided that it should be resealed and its contents kept secret until Shoghi Effendi’s arrival in Haifa.!4¢ Shoghi Effendi was at this time in Oxford, where he had been studying for about two years. The telegraph relating the news of the passing of ‘Abdu’l-Baha reached the office of Major Tudor Pole in London at 9.30 am on 29 November. Tudor Pole summoned Shoghi Effendi so as to be able to inform him of the news in person. Nevertheless, the shock was so intense that Shoghi Effendi had to be cared for by friends in London for several days before being able to return to Oxford and prepare

for his departure to Palestine.!47 The journey was further delayed by passport difficulties, so that Shoghi Effendi did not arrive in Haifa until 29 December, accompanied by his sister

Ruhangiz!48 and Lady Blomfield.!4?

present were Khanum

‘Abdu’l-Baha’s

Rabbani,

Tuba

wife, his four daughters

Khanum

Afnan,

Rtuha Khanum

(Diya’i’yyih Shahid

and

Munavvar Khanum) and sons-in-law (Mirza Hadi Rabbani, Mirz4 Muhsin Afnan, Mirza Jalal Shahid and Ahmad Yazdi) and Ruhi Afnan (a son of Tuba Khanum) himself, who was the only grandson of ‘Abdu’|-Baha living in Haifa at the time. Bahiyyih Khanum, ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s sister, was not present as she was ill and confined to bed. 146. The same is reported by Rabbani, Priceless Pearl, p. 44f., in reference to telegrams sent by Bahiyyih Khanum to the Persian and American communities on 22 December 1921 (published in Star of the West XII.19 (2 March 1922), p. 303). In these telegrams, the communities were informed that “Master left full instructions in His Will and Testament’, although the contents were not described in any detail at this point. 147. Rabbani, Priceless Pearl, p. 39. In a personal letter (published in Taherzadeh, Covenant, pp. 278f.) Shoghi Effendi reported a few days later that: “The terrible news has for some days so overwhelmed my body, my mind and my soul that I was laid for a couple of days in bed almost senseless, absent-minded and greatly agitated’ (see also Rabbani, Priceless Pearl, p. 40). 148. She had been studying in England.

710

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha

A few days after his arrival—the exact date is unknown— the Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha was read out to Shoghi Effendi. According to his own testimony, he had hitherto known nothing about the existence of the Guardianship, let

alone that he himself was to be appointed ‘Guardian’.!°° Instead, he had expected that ‘Abdu’l-Baha might give him some special function in establishing the Universal House of Jus-

tice?!

149. Zimmer’s suspicion, so gleefully taken up by Ficicchia, that Shoghi Effendi’s delayed return to Haifa was due to Shoghi Effendi having spent this time, as also the period of withdrawal to the Swiss mountains extending from April to December 1922, forging the Will and Testament

of ‘Abdu’l-Baha,

is an instance of malicious calumny. Not

only does Ficicchia arbitrarily date the arrival of Shoghi Effendi in Haifa to four weeks later (i.e. ‘eight weeks’ after the passing of ‘Abdu’1-Baha, ‘even though the train and ship voyage via Trieste and Iskandariya would have taken less than two weeks’ (Baha ’ismus, p. 295)), this assertion can easily be proven to be false owing to the fact that copies of the original were sent to Spiritual Assemblies as early as January 1922, and even the official English translation was published in New York on 25 February 1922. Nevertheless, Zimmer claims that: “The

space of time between December, 1921 and the summer of 1922 might have been set aside for the completion of the fictitious testament of Abdul Baha’ (Shoghism, p. 71). 150. As reported, for instance, in Ugo Giachery, Shoghi Effendi, p. 15. 151. According to an account by Diya’i’yyih Khanum, the mother of Shoghi Effendi, ‘Abdu’l-Baha had issued instructions for Shoghi Effendi to be called back to Haifa by telegram. However, since ‘Abdu’lBaha was still in good health and in order not to alarm Shoghi Effendi, his family sent a letter instead. This did not arrive in London until after the death of ‘Abdu’l-Baha (Rabbani, Priceless Pearl, pp. 45ff.; this is confirmed by a report from Mrs. Krug, Star of the West XIII.4 (17 May 1922), p. 69). Thus, it was not possible for Shoghi Effendi to be prepared for his new office by ‘Abdu’l-Baha personally, Shoghi Effendi had to find his own feet in the new function assigned to him and develop a vision of the tasks ahead—which was probably one of the reasons for his extended period of withdrawal to the Swiss mountains, lasting from April to December 1922.

eA

Chapter 11,

Ulrich Gollmer

The Will was officially opened on 3 January 1922. On the same day, a Persian believer was commissioned to make official copies. On 7 January the Will was publicly read out to representatives of the Baha’i communities of Persia, India, Egypt, England, Germany, America, Italy and Japan. Shoghi Effendi was not present on either of these two occasions. Also on 7 January, the Persian community was informed by telegraph that Shoghi Effendi had been appointed “Centre of the Cause’ in

‘Abdu’l-Baha’s Will and Testament. The German and American communities were informed by telegram on 16 January of

‘Abdu’1-Baha’s stipulations regarding the succession. !>2 Copies of the Will and Testament were very soon in cir-

culation in the Iranian community.!*3 The first copy was begun immediately after the reading of the Will on 3 January, and on 7 January Bahiyyih Khanum

was

able to announce

its tele-

graphic transmission to Persia.!>4 In about mid-January, Shoghi Effendi selected eight passages from the Will and Testament

and sent them as a circular to the Baha’is around the world.!>> Also in January 1922, copies of the testament were sent to Spiritual Assemblies. Copies and extracts were conveyed by various means to a large number of addressees.!°© Shoghi Effendi evidently even sent copies of the Will and Testament to 152. The identical telegrams were worded as follows: ‘In will, Shoghi Effendi appointed guardian of cause and head of house of justice inform friends’ (Star of the West XII.17 (16 January 1922), p. 258). 153. Ficicchia, quite naturally, knows better: ‘The testament, written in Persian, was at first not published at all’ (Materialdienst 15/16, Issue 38 (1975), p. 231). 154.

Rabbani, Priceless Pearl, p. 47.

155. ibid. p. 48. 156. In Persia itself, official copies were made for further distribution. Such a copy (transcribed, and therefore including vowel symbols) written by Mirza ‘Ali Akbar-i-Milani, the Muhibbu’s-Sultan, dated 1 Ridvan 1301 Sh. (according to the Persian solar calendar = April 1922) is extant (registered under the manuscript number MC3/3/104 in the Haifa Archives).

712

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha

individual believers, including some that he knew to be opposed

to his appointment.!>7 By late Spring 1922, at the latest, the full text of the Will and Testament was generally available through-

out the Persian and American communities. !58 Naturally, it was some time before the docunient was translated into western languages. However, a preliminary translation into English was read out in New York as early as mid-

February 1922.!°? The official English translation, which Shoghi Effendi addressed in his accompanying letter to ‘The beloved of God and the handmaids of the Merciful in the United States and Canada’, arrived in New York on 25 February 1922. The first

extract to be published in German appeared in August 1922.16° The full German translation was read out at a special congress

in Stuttgart!®! on 16 September 1922.162 A German translation was printed in 1936.!93 157.

e.g. in a letter written in February

1922 to Nayyir Afnan, a

nephew of ‘Abdu’1-Baha, extracts of which appear in Rabbani, Priceless

Pearl, p. 48. 158. This can be concluded from the extant correspondence of Bahiyyih Khanum, e.g. from a letter to Siyyid Asadu’llah Qumi, a Baha’i from Tabriz, dated Ramadan 1340 AH (28 April-27 May 1922; the letter

is included in Bahiyyih Khanum: The Greatest Holy Leaf. A compilation from Baha’i sacred texts and writings of the Guardian of the Faith and Bahiyyih Khanum’s own letters, Haifa, 1982, p. 122), and from a letter

of the same date written to a Baha’i in Iran (ibid. p. 119). The original text first appeared in print in Cairo in 81 BE (1924-25). 159. According to White, it was even earlier, namely four weeks after the death of ‘Abdu’1-Baha, i.e. at the end of January 1922 (Questioned Will, p. 27). 160. Sonne der Wahrheit 2.6 (August 1922), pp 82f. The first extracts in English translation appeared in the booklet The Passing of ‘Abdu’lBaha, edited by Shoghi Effendi and Lady Blomfield and published in Haifa in January 1922. Further extracts were published in English in 1928, along with letters written by Shoghi Effendi, in Baha'i Administration.

161. In the Birgermuseum, Langestrasse 4. 162. Report on the Stuttgart Baha’i Congress Stuttgart, Sonne der Wahrheit 2.9 (November 1922), pp. 141ff. According to this report,

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Ulrich Gollmer

As was to be expected, the appointment of Shoghi Effendi in the Will and Testament as head of the community did not go unopposed. Immediately after the death of “Abdu’l-Baha, his half-brother Mirza Muhammad-‘Ali had advanced the claim that he was ‘Abdu’!-Baha’s rightful successor. He announced this claim not only directly among the Baha’i communities, but

made use of several Egyptian newspapers.!®4 In the United States, Shu‘a‘u’llah!®> functioned as a propagandist for Muhammad-‘ Ali.!6© Muhammad-‘Ali and his followers evidently tried to make use of the mass media in pursuit of their goals in other countries, too.!©” His claim was based on the succession regulation set out in the Kitab-i-“Ahd, the testament of Baha’u’llah. In this document, Muhammad-‘Ali had been appointed

similar events took place in all Baha’i communities throughout the world. In the afternoon of the following day (17 September 1922) the first National Spiritual Assembly of the German Baha’i community was elected. 163. Under the title Wille und Testament. A further edition including Baha’u’llah’s Book of the Covenant was also published in Stuttgart in 1936. In the early German community, most texts were initially circulated for many years in the form of typewritten manuscripts and carbon copies of these until eventually being published in print. The English translation of the full text was not published until 1944, although the text had been known to English-speaking Baha’is in manuscript form at least since Shoghi Effendi’s explicit instruction issued to the National Spiritual Assembly of the United States and Canada on 27 November 1924. 164. Taherzadeh, Covenant, pp. 276f. 165. the eldest son of Mirza Muhammad-‘Ali. 166.

journal

Taherzadeh,

Covenant,

in Kenosha,

p.277. As late as 1934, he founded

Wisconsin

entitled Behai

Quarterly

a

(Balyuzi,

“Abdu 'l-Bahd, p. 527, note 60), which, however, was only short-lived.

167. This is indicated, for instance, by a telegram from Bahiyyih Khanum to the American community dated 14 December (i.e. before Shoghi Effendi’s arrival in Haifa), in which she proposed countermeasures. The telegram is cited verbatim in Rabbani, Priceless Pearl, p. 49.

714

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu ’l-Bahd

successor to ‘Abdu’l-Baha.!©® However, since Baha’u’llah had explicitly made this appointment dependent upon Mirza Muhammad-*Ali’s continued loyalty to the Covenant,!© and

Muhammad-‘Ali had refused to follow ‘Abdu’l-Baha,!7° had opposed him!7! and become a covenant-breaker,!72 173 the Baha’i

communities did not recognize his claim. The campaigns conducted by Mirza Muhammad-‘Ali caused something of a stir but had no significant effect. Muhammad-‘Ali did not win any

168. Branch’

The Kitab-i-‘Ahd

nominates

‘Abdu’l-Baha,

the ‘Most Mighty

(Ghusn-i-A ‘zam) as leader of the community.

The text of the

Kitab-i-‘Ahd indicates that Mirzé Muhammad-‘Ali was to follow ‘Abdu’l-Baha in this function: ‘We have chosen “the Greater” [Mirza Muhammad-‘Ali] after “the Most Great” [“Abdu’l-Baha], as decreed by Him Who is the All-Knowing, the All-Informed’ (Tablets 15:9). 169. Baha’u’llah had stated unambiguously that: ‘He, verily, is but one of My servants . . . Should he for a moment pass out from under the shadow of the Cause, he surely shall be brought to naught.’ And: ‘Were We, for a single instant, to withhold from him the outpourings of Our Cause, he would wither, and would fall upon the dust’ (quoted in God Passes By, p. 251).

170. The Kitab-i-‘Ahd unequivocally affirms the superior station of ‘Abdu’l-Baha over Mirza Muhammad-‘Ali: ‘Verily God hath ordained the station of the Greater Branch [Ghusn-i-Akbar = Mirza Muhammad‘Ali] to be beneath that of the Most Great Branch [Ghusn-i-A ‘zam =‘Abdu’1-Baha]’ (Tablets 15:9). 171.

In his Will and Testament (e.g. 1:1; 1:17; 2:8; 2:10; 2:11; 2:13;

2:14; 3:10 (pp. 3, 11f., 20-22, 25) and in a large number of letters (some of which were published in Star of the West XII.14 (23 November 1921), pp. 231-235), ‘Abdu’l-Baha expressly warns the believers against Mirza Muhammad-‘Ali and his accomplices. 172.

On this term see Schaefer, above, p. 232, note 449.

173. For attempted, threatening nouncement

four years after the passing of Baha’u’llah, despite Muhammad-‘Ali’s constant intrigues, break, until Muhammad-‘Ali finally made of his rejection of ‘Abdu’l-Baha as ‘Centre

“Abdu’l-Baha to avert the a public anof the Cove-

nant’; see Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, ch. 15, Balyuzi,

‘Abdu’l-

Baha, pp. 51-61; Taherzadeh, Covenant, esp. ch. 8 and 11; see also ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Will and Testament 1:17 (pp. 11f.).

715

Chapter 11 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer support in the community and his few followers eventually re-

integrated themselves into the Muslim community.!74 Muhammad-‘Ali also tried to assert his claim on the basis of law. He did this employing a multi-track approach. One of these was to claim that, as his brother, he was entitled to part of

‘Abdu’l-Baha’s inheritance on the basis of Islamic law,!7> the shari‘a. At the same time, he demanded of the state authorities that he, as rightful successor to “Abdu’l-Baha, ought to be responsible for the supervision of the Shrine of Baha’u’llah. The British authorities refused to become involved, saying that it would not interfere in religious affairs. Thereupon, Muhammad-‘Ali turned to the Mufti of “Akka as the relevant Muslim

authority and demanded that he formally take over the Shrine of Baha’u ’llah. The Mufti, too, declared that he was not responsible, on the grounds that the Baha’i community was not under the jurisdiction of the Islamic shari‘a. In order to gain an

advantage, followers of Muhammad-‘Ali

forcibly seized the

keys to the Shrine of Baha’u’llah, thus compelling the authorities to step in. The Shrine was placed under police supervision, the inner tomb chamber sealed off, and the keys taken into custody. The British military administration evidently took the

issue so seriously that on 13 June 1922 the High Commissioner for Palestine!” reported personally about it to the British Min-

174.

Taherzadeh, Covenant, p. 363.

175. It was not surprising that Muhammad-‘Ali, in spite of his continued profession of loyalty to Baha’u’llah, was willing to submit voluntarily to Islamic jurisprudence, thus de facto acknowledging Islamic supremacy. Just a few years after ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s accession to office he had instituted legal proceedings against him and declared in court that Baha’u’llah had been merely a holy man who had lived in seclusion engaged in prayer and meditation; he stated that Baha’u’llah had never claimed to be a prophet and that it was ‘Abdu’l-Bahé who had imputed this claim to him (see ibid. pp. 198ff.). 176. Sir Wyndham Deedes.

716

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Bahd

ister for the Colonies.!77 The attitude of the British authorities was made public in its official mouthpiece the Palestine Weekly on 23 June 1922.!78 This statement expressed the expectation that a congress of representatives

of the world-wide

Baha’i

community would resolve the issue.!7? On 8 February 1923, however, Shoghi Effendi received a telegram from Jerusalem with the news that, following further investigation, the High

Commissioner had ruled conclusively in his favour.!8° Upon receipt of a letter from the Governor of Haifa dated 14 March 1923, the keys were then returned to the guards appointed by Shoghi Effendi. Although no documents have yet come to light

in which this is explicitly stated,!®! it may be assumed that the British mandatory government amended its attitude in view of the terms of the Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’1-Baha.

177. Winston Churchill. The report mentions three persons who claimed the right to supervise the Shrine of Baha’u’lla4h: Muhammad‘Ali, Shoghi Effendi and ‘Hussein Afnan, the son of the youngest daughter of Baha Ullah’. It is also evident from the report that the Baha’i communities throughout the world supported Shoghi Effendi. Deedes to Churchill no. 425, 13 June 1922. The report is also reproduced in Momen, The Babi and Baha'i Religions, p. 457.

178. Reproduced in ibid. 179. This opinion was also expressed by the Governor of Haifa in a letter dated 30 October 1922 to Bahiyyih Khanum, who was administering the affairs of the Baha’i community during Shoghi Effendi’s absence. He wrote as follows: ‘As has been stated publicly the Government feel [sic] that the custody of the Shrine at Acre as well as other important questions affecting the Bahai-ist organization should if possible be settled by a Congress of representatives of Bahai opinion throughout the World.’ 180.

See Rabbani, Priceless Pearl, pp. 70f.

181. Momen reports that during his research in the Israeli state archives in 1974 he came across file references in which the testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha was listed. In response to recent renewed enquiries, the Israeli state archives regretted that all further attempts to locate these documents would have to wait until the conditions for research in the institution had been improved.

ihe]

Chapter 1k ¢ Ulrich Gollmer Neither is this the only case where “Abdu’l-Baha’s Will and Testament was instrumental in securing rulings in favour of the Guardian in legal proceedings relating to the conflict between Shoghi Effendi and his opponents. A good number of these cases took place after allegations had been made public by White, whose forgery theory was known to Shoghi Effendi’s opponents in Palestine. If they had perceived even the ghost of a

chance of corroborating White’s suspicions, or at least of using them to win a temporary tactical advantage, there is no doubt at all that they would indeed have done so. They, of all people, stood to gain, should the sole document in support of Shoghi

Effendi’s legal status be called into question. The fact that they did not do so shows just how absurd White’s accusations were and still are. On the contrary, Ahmad Sohrab, one of the main propagandists among Shoghi Effendi’s opponents during the

final years of the Guardianship, explicitly confirmed the authenticity of the Will and Testament, !82 evidently out of concern that his position might be usurped by her and his credibility thus be destroyed. !83 Let us consider some specific examples of how the Will and Testament was regarded by the courts. In 1892 Mirza Muhammad-‘Ali and his family had taken possession of the

mansion in Bahji—the house where Baha’u’llah had spent the final years of his life and in which he had died. Further houses and lands around the Shrine of Baha’u’llah were also held by Muhammad-‘Ali

and other opponents of Shoghi Effendi.

In

January 1923, Shoghi Effendi laid claim to this property in the

182. ‘Never in thought, word or writing have I questioned the authenticity of the Will, nor denied the validity of the appointment of Shoghi Effendi ’ (Broken Silence, p. 49). 183. Analysis, p. 11. The name Ruth White does not appear even once in the whole of this text dealing at length with ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s Will and Testament; the only indirect reference is on pp. 11f.: ‘Claims that this document is a forgery have been set forth, both orally and in writing, but such an allegation is incorrect’ (ibid. pp. 11f.).

718

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu ’l-Bahd

name of the Baha’i community, for whom this land and these

buildings are sacred. On 3 June 1957, after years of difficult negotiations and legal proceedings, Shoghi Effendi was finally able to inform the Baha’i world of the success of his efforts; !84 following a number of partial successes and setbacks,!85 a verdict passed by the Israeli Supreme Court had ultimately decided the matter in favour of Shoghi Effendi. A further lawsuit erupted over Shoghi Effendi’s plan to transfer the remains of Mirza Mihdi!8° and Asiyih Khanum!87 from their graves in an “Akka cemetery to the Baha’i Gardens

on Mount Carmel.!88 Mirza Badi‘u’llah, a son of Baha’u’llah, made an official protest against this plan, probably in December

1939.189 He based his argument on his blood relationship to

184. Messages to the Baha’i World, pp. 120f. 185. In November 1929, Muhammad-‘Ali’s family left the mansion itself. After the necessary extensive repairs to the building, the British High Commissioner for Palestine, who was present at the opening ceremony, announced that it was to be handed over to Shoghi Effendi as a ‘Baha’i holy place’. In 1952, Shoghi Effendi succeeded in having a verdict overruled that the Civil Court in Haifa had passed earlier against him. In 1957, an eviction order was issued for the entire area of the

Haram-i-Aqdas, the holy precincts surrounding the Shrine of Baha’u’ lah. This was finally confirmed in the same year by the Supreme Court. 186. The ‘Purest Branch’ (Ghusn-i-Athar), ‘Abdu’1-Baha’s younger brother. He died on 23 June 1870 at the age of 22 while imprisoned in the Citadel of ‘Akka (see Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 188). 187. Asiyih Khanum, better known by the title Navvab, was the wife of Baha’u’llah (see Baharieh Rouhani, Asiyih Khanum: The Most Exalted Leaf entitled Navvab, Oxford, 1993). 188. Shoghi Effendi informed Morris Bailey, District Commissioner of Haifa, of this plan in a letter dated 2 December 1938 and asked for official permission to carry it out. Permission was granted on 29 December 1938 under file reference 374/1/G. 189. A second letter from Mirza Badi‘u’llah, to the British High Commissioner for Palestine, bears the date 17 December 1939. In this

letter, Badi‘u’llah claims that ‘as I am the only surviving son and heir of Baha Ullah’ [sic] he alone had the right to make such decisions (Mirza Muhammad-‘Ali had died in 1937).

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Chapter 11 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

Mirza Mihdi (half-brother), which, he argued, was closer than that of Shoghi Effendi and which ‘was entitled under Muslim

law to decide as to the disposal of the remains’ .!%° In this case, too, the ruling went in favour of Shoghi Effendi. One of the rea-

sons given for the dismissal of Badi‘u’llah’s case was the fact that the request for permission to transfer the remains came from Shoghi Effendi, the ‘recognized head of the Bahai com-

munity’.!9! Resistance against Shoghi Effendi came not only from the grouping around Muhammad-*Ali, however. In the early years of his Guardianship, Shoghi Effendi did indeed encounter tan-

gible resistance from within the community, emanating from a small but certainly influential minority!9? and including some members of ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s own family.!93 This resistance was directed against Shoghi Effendi personally, against his youth, !94 against his style of leadership, which was so different from that

of ‘Abdu’l-Baha,!%° against the universalism that he promul190. This was recorded in the fortnightly report of the District Commissioner of Haifa, reporting period up to 15 December 1939, point 14. The report also states that the request of Shoghi Effendi and the ‘recognized head of the Bahai community’ had been approved and that the remains had been transferred ‘without incident’. It was explicitly stated in the report that ‘Badia’u’llah and his faction . . . have identified themselves with the Moslem religion’. 191. Report of the District Commissioner, ibid. 192. Falah and Dr Amin Fareed had already turned against ‘Abdu’lBaha. They were now joined by Avarih, Hasan-i-Niku, Faydu’llah Subhi (‘Abdu’1-Baha’s secretary for several years) and Fa’iq (see Taherzadeh, Covenant, ch. 30).

193.

ibid. ch. 32.

194. At this time, the local authorities generally referred to Shoghi Effendi as ‘the boy’ (see Rabbani, Priceless Pearl, p. 54). 195. Shoghi Effendi evidently preferred not to succeed ‘Abdu’1-Baha as a similarly charismatic religious leader but to adopt, instead, a more sombre style of leadership. ‘Abdu’l-Baha had also clearly demonstrated solidarity with the Muslim community by regularly attending Friday prayers in the mosque. Shoghi Effendi ceased to follow this custom and

720

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Bahd

gated, and against what his critics perceived as the resultant

“westernization’ of the Baha’i Faith, which was increasingly drawing away from the Islamic forms and structures that had dominated the early community.!%° It had generally been expected that the Universal House of Justice would be established

immediately after the death of ‘Abdu’l-Baha.!9’7 The believers rightly supposed that his Will and Testament would include precise instructions as to how this institution was to be

elected.!98 In the event, however, these instructions were set out only as principles and there was no prescribed time-scale. It was therefore the responsibility of the Guardian to determine the appropriate time for the establishment of the Universal House

of Justice. In Shoghi

Effendi’s

opinion,

two

essential

conditions

should, if possible,!?? be fulfilled prior to the election of the first Universal House of Justice. The first of these was that the Baha’i community—and hence the National Spiritual Assemblies from whom the members of the Universal House were to be elected—should become multinational in character, at least

emphasized, instead, the independent status of the Baha’i revelation. On the very different conditions confronted by ‘Abdu’l-Baha and Shoghi Effendi see, for instance, Taherzadeh, Covenant, p. 290.

196. Having taken up office, Shoghi Effendi not only stopped attending Muslim Friday prayers, but also dressed solely in western-style clothes (he only occasionally wore a fez). 197. Even the Governor of Haifa expressed this expectation (Rabbani, Priceless Pearl, p. 55). 198. See above, pp. 687ff. 199. This does not mean that these constituted a conditio sine qua non. ‘Abdu’l-Baha had already considered establishing the Universal House of Justice when Shoghi Effendi was still a child in case he, ‘Abdu’l-Baha, should be separated from the community through death or imprisonment in solitary confinement. As a precaution, he therefore gave instructions for the election of the Universal House of Justice to Haji Mirza Taqi Afnan, the architect of the House of Worship in ‘Ishqabad (letter from the Universal House of Justice dated 9 March 1965, in Wellspring of Guidance, pp. 48f.).

721

Chapter 11\¢ Ulrich Gollmer

to a certain extent.2°° The second was that the local and national institutions should be consolidated, and that they should have

effectively taken over the functions assigned to them. The development and strengthening of these foundations was to be a

major focus of Shoghi Effendi’s work.?°! Nevertheless, some influential Iranian believers insisted on

the immediate election of the Universal House of Justice? and turned against Shoghi Effendi when he did not comply with their demands. In all these cases, the authenticity of the Will

and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha remained undisputed.2°? The personal integrity of those who had served as witnesses to its first reading was well known and above suspicion, “Abdu’lBaha’s handwriting and style were familiar from innumerable letters. Opposition to Shoghi Effendi developed in spite of and

contrary to the terms of the testament. It was not the authenticity of the Will and Testament that was challenged; the question raised by the small number of opponents was rather whether

200. Several times, this prerequisite seemed to be within reach. Shoghi Effendi pointed out that “Abdu’l-Baha was only prevented from taking the initial steps for the election of the Universal House of Justice by the unfavourable conditions in the Ottoman Empire (World Order, p. 7). Shoghi Effendi himself considered the basis adequate in 1929 provided the (political) conditions for an election conducted on Baha’i principles existed in Persia and in ‘the adjoining countries under Soviet rule’ (ibid.). This hope soon proved to be premature. On this subject see Schaefer, above, pp. 164f. 201. On this subject see Smith, The Babi and Baha’i Religions, pp. 120ff. 202. Owing to their personal popularity they would very probably have been elected members of this institution. 203. The only individual who temporarily doubted the authenticity of the testament was Avarih, a former high-ranking member of the Shi‘a ‘ulama’ and an outstanding teacher of the Baha’i Faith in Persia. He travelled to Haifa and was permitted to inspect the document for himself. He then became convinced that it was indeed genuine (see Taherzadeh, Covenant, p. 335). Nevertheless, he later turned against Shoghi Effendi.

7122

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha

‘Abdu’l-Baha was authorized to draw up such a ruling,?% or at least whether his choice had been wise. This personal opposition, which came partly from within

his own family,2°> overshadowed the early years of his Guardianship. The development of the structures of the community, however, continued unabated, irrespective of this opposition. Despite the prominence of certain opponents, the loyalty of the community was not affected. Contrary to Shoghi Effendi’s expectations, the opposition found almost no resonance among the

believers. White’s attacks turned out to be nothing more than a tiny marginal episode. It is hardly surprising that Shoghi Effendi did not concern himself at length with it in his writings, concentrating instead on explaining and consolidating the foun-

dations of the community order.? The last attack of this nature against Shoghi Effendi was

launched in the 1940s by Ahmad Sohrab, who had previously

204.

This was denied by the followers of Muhammad-‘Ali with refer-

ence to the Kitab-i-‘Ahd,

Muhammad-‘Ali (the Baha (the ‘Most Great the Kitab-i-‘Ahd and which constituted the Muhammad-‘Ali had p. 714. 205.

in which Baha’u’llah had nominated

Mirza

‘Greater Branch’) as the successor to ‘Abdu’lBranch’) (Tablets 15:9). By his open rejection of his embittered enmity towards ‘Abdu’l-Baha, breaking of the Covenant of Baha’u’llah, Mirza already forfeited this station; see also above,

For details see Taherzadeh, Covenant, ch. 32.

206. A series of letters to the Baha’is of the United States and Canada between 1929 and 1936 and published under the title The World Order of Baha'u'llah are among the most important texts for the establishment and further development of the order of the Baha’i community. In the first of these, dated 27 February 1929, Shoghi Effendi wrote: ‘I will not attempt in the least to assert or demonstrate the authenticity of the Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’1-Bahé, . . . I will only confine my observations to those issues which may assist them to appreciate the essential unity that underlies

the spiritual, the humanitarian,

and the administrative

principles enunciated by the Author and the Interpreter of the Baha’i Faith’ (World Order, p. 4).

723

Chapter 11\¢ Ulrich Gollmer

served as ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s secretary.2°7 As already mentioned, however, Sohrab avoided weakening his own position by adopting the absurd forgery theory and ensured that he was not suspected of doing so by explicitly vouching for the authenticity

of the Will and Testament.2°8 The later attempts by Zimmer and Ficicchia to revive the old attacks did not evoke any response at all in the community. V. THE INVENTOR OF THE FORGERY THEORY AND HER EPIGONES The myth of the forgery of ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s testament originated from an American by the name of Ruth White. Her influence in terms of the effects of her allegations was restricted to the Ger-

man-speaking areas of Europe. Within the community, this influence was further restricted to the period 1928-1932; the only remnant of her group to have remained active beyond this

period was Hermann Zimmer.

Outside the community,

her

theories enjoyed a late renaissance in the 1980s and 1990s thanks to the Evangelische Zentralstelle fiir Weltanschauungsfragen (EZW) and the publisher Herder-Verlag. White wrote her books and pamphlets against the “Baha’i Organization’ between 1927 and 1946; Zimmer wrote his diatribe against ‘Shoghism’ a generation later, in 1971. White had

become acquainted with the Baha’i Faith in Boston in May 1912, when she had sought an interview with ‘Abdu’l-Baha for

207. White, who thereafter sought to cooperate with him, had described him in 1929 in the following terms: ‘For though the lecturer tried to prove himself broad and liberal, he proved himself nothing but bewildered as far as the Bahai teachings are concerned . . . He also quoted whole paragraphs of Abdul Baha as his own, without specifying, or even hinting, that they were the words of Abdul Baha’ (Enemy, p. 78).

208.

Sohrab, Analysis, p. 11; Broken Silence, pp. 49, 52.

724

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha

a newspaper article.2°? She earned her living at that time as an actress, journalist and fashion artist,2!° before meeting and shortly afterwards marrying a Baha’i, Lawrence White.2!! Lawrence White was a lawyer and businessman from a well-to-do background,?!2 although his chief interest was in esoteric matters such as ‘cosmic consciousness’ and the psychology of ex-

traordinary religious experiences.?!3 Ruth White was evidently the dominant partner in this marriage.2!4 When she first came across the Baha’is she had already undertaken a considerable religious and ideological odyssey. Having been brought up as a Roman Catholic, she had first converted to Protestantism, then become an agnostic, and later developed strong socialist tendencies, at one time being on the verge of joining the Commu-

nist Party.2!5 Her identity as a Baha’i was completely and exclusively related to the person of “Abdu’l-Baha, although she

was highly selective in her acceptance of his teachings.?!© He alone, she wrote, had liberated her from her ‘atheistic com-

209. White, Questioned Will, p. 15. Her attention had been attracted to ‘Abdu’l-Baha through a photograph in a newspaper and it seemed to her that ‘Abdu’l-Baha was looking directly into her eyes ‘with benign serenity and the wisdom of the ages written on his face’ (Labyrinth, Daw) 210.

White, Labyrinth, pp. 15, 23, 110f.

211. It was his first and her second marriage. She had a daughter from her first marriage (ibid. pp. 34f.). 212. 213.

ibid. px35: ibid. p. 34.

214.

As is evident from ibid. p. 42, for instance. In 1941, Lawrence

White expressed the wish to return to the Baha’i community (this is apparent from a letter to Carrie Kinney written on 11 October 1941 on behalf of Shoghi Effendi) but was apparently unable to liberate himself from the dominating influence of his wife (see Bramson-Lerche, ‘Some

Aspects of the Establishment of the Guardianship’, in SBB 5, p. 279). 215.

White, Questioned Will, p. 101; Labyrinth, pp. 11f.

216.

See below, pp. 744ff.

725

Chapter 11\¢ Ulrich Gollmer

plex’.2!7 White assigned great importance to her dreams and powers of intuition, feeling that she was a tool of higher pow-

ers,2!8 and repeatedly claiming that she was the only person to have really understood ‘Abdu’l-Baha.?!9 From the outset, her relationship with the Baha’i community was one of distance.??° She reported with a certain pride that she had never been a

member of any of the community’s administrative bodies??! and that she had turned down an offer by a fellow-believer to finance a journey for the promulgation of the Baha’i teachings.??2 She was suspicious of Shoghi Effendi from the beginning, sup-

posing him not to have passed on to “Abdu’1-Baha a manuscript she had sent.223 According to her own account, she spontaneously rejected

the Will and Testament of “Abdu’l-Baha when she heard of its existence about four weeks after ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s death.224 Nevertheless, her public polemics did not begin until December

1927,225 when she wrote a letter to the National Spiritual Assembly of the United States and Canada once the institutional 217. Labyrinth, pp. 114, 12. Her acceptance of the Baha’i Faith had the character of conversion, which is described in sociological terms as a transformation in one’s world-view and a sudden change in one’s existence. 218. Questioned Will, pp. 51f.; Enemy, pp. 113f.; Labyrinth, pp. 39ff., 55f., 106-109. 219. ‘I sensed from the very first that the group who were known as Bahais represented something very different from that which Abdul Baha was trying to present to the world’ (Enemy, p. 24. See also Questioned Will, pp. 37f.). 220. As, for instance, in Enemy, p. 24. This went so far that even her reports about two pilgrimages to Haifa are interspersed with complaints about her fellow pilgrims (Labyrinth, pp. 59, 61, 65-68, 75, 136ff.). 221. Questioned Will, p. 37, Appendix, pp. 4f. 222. Labyrinth, p. 38; Enemy, p. 17. 223. Enemy, p. 206. 224. Questioned Will, p. 27; Enemy, p. 15. 225. Enemy, pp. 83f.

726

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha

development of the community under Shoghi Effendi had become unmistakably obvious.?6 White had already presented her ideas to all the Baha’i communities in the major cities during a journey across Amer-

ica in 1926.27 In April/May 1928, she travelled to Europe and “met practically all the Bahais in London’2?8—but without success. Only in Germany did she encounter any sympathy.229 She spent about two wecks in Stuttgart, at the home of Wilhelm

Herrigel,?3° one of the pioneers of the German Baha’i community.3! After her visit, Herrigel took sides with her. The reasons for this are complex. It was not that Herrigel was opposed, in principle, to the office of Guardian, or that he

rejected the Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha.”3? Evidently, tensions had developed over the years among some of the most prominent representatives of the German Baha’i community.

These tensions were ostensibly occasioned by the establishment

226. This included the development of the local and national spiritual assemblies, the composition and registration of statutes for these bodies (1926) and the registration of the name ‘Baha’i’ as a trademark (1928) —developments that were utterly abhorrent to White. 227. Enemy, p. 27. 228. ibid. p. 98. 229. ibid. pp. 100ff. 230. Herrigel was born in 1865. Having become a Baha’i before 1909, he met ‘Abdu’l-Baha in Spring 1913 and accompanied him from Stuttgart via Vienna to Budapest. 231. It is evident from a letter from Herrigel to the German Baha’i community dated 17 March 1930 that he had already been in contact with White for some time. 232. Herrigel supported ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s stipulations concerning his succession and frequently corresponded with Shoghi Effendi, whose backing he sought in his difficulties with the German Baha’i community. This went so far that in a public meeting, probably the “Baha’i Congress’ in 1926 or 1927, he quoted from personal letters he had received from Shoghi Effendi in order to display his connections with the head of the faith and thus to strengthen his position against the National Spiritual Assembly.

727

Chapter 11 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer of the community’s institutions. Shoghi Effendi had invited representatives of all national communities to a meeting in Haifa in late February 1922. The German representatives invited were

Consul Albert Schwarz233 and his wife Alice,234 and Wilhelm Herrigel.235 Although no details are known about this meeting,236 in which only Albert and Alice Schwarz were able to participate as German representatives, it is evident that two issues were at the centre of attention: the Guardian as successor to ‘Abdu’l-Baha and the organizational structure of the commu-

nity.237 Isolated references to the new emphasis on organizational development were soon to appear.?38 On 16 September 233. (1871-1931). He was a banker and controlled much of the energy supply of Wirttemberg. He bore the titles ‘Kommerzienrat’ (a title conferred on prominent businessmen) and ‘Royal Norwegian Consul’. Albert Schwarz was also a promoter of the arts and of social causes, such as the restoration of the medicinal baths in Bad Mergentheim. 234. (1875-1965) née Solivo, daughter of a Bavarian industrialist. She became a Baha’i before her husband, in 1911.

235. The telegram was published in Sonne der Wahrheit 2.3 (May 1922), p. 15. In her unpublished memoirs (Lausche den Worten des Erleuchteten. Meine Erinnerungen an ‘Abdu’l-Bahd, p. 138), Alice Schwarz dates this telegram to the beginning of 1922. 236. The reports in Sonne der Wahrheit 2.3 (May 1922), p. 47f.; 2.4 (June 1922), pp. 58ff; 2.5 (July 1922), pp. 75ff.) and in Lausche den Worten (pp. 139ff.) are very personal and general and reveal little of what was actually spoken about at this conference. A report on the fourteenth annual conference in Chicago, at which a report about the meeting in Haifa was also made, mainly describes the feelings of the

believers (Star of the West XIII.4 (17 May 1922), pp. 67ff. There are a few vague hints on p. 92). 237.

The latter is reflected, in particular, in a letter from Shoghi Ef-

fendi dated 5 March 1922 (reprinted in Bahda’i Administration, pp. 17ff.; first published in Star of the West XIII.4 (17 May 1922). An early German translation—in which there are some inaccuracies—appeared in Sonne der Wahrheit 2.5 (July 1922), pp. 66ff.). 238. As, for instance, in the election of an ‘Assembly of Nine’ (later designated Spiritual Assembly) on 4 May 1922 in Stuttgart (Sonne der Wahrheit 4 (June 1922), pp. 63f.). In connection with this report, the following statement appears: ‘. . . with Shoghi Effendi the Bahai Cause

728

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha

1922, at a ‘Baha’i Congress’,?9? the first “National Assembly’ of the German Baha’i community was elected.24° A certain amount of bureaucratic over-reaction2*! seems to have accompanied this organizational development in parts of

the German community and its new institutions.242 The community evidently had difficulty adapting to the new structure. Reports from the “Baha’i Congress’ show that on some points

Shoghi Effendi had not been properly understood.243 It is noteworthy that Shoghi Effendi sent repeated reminders—evidently with little success—asking the National Spiritual Assembly to has entered a new period: that of organizational structuring and ordered administration. Whereas Baha’u’llah is the Founder and ‘Abdu’l-Baha the teacher of the Bahai Faith, Shoghi Effendi will be regarded as its organizer.’ 239. ‘Bahai-Kongref’, later known as ‘Nationaltagung’ (National Convention). The invitation to the ‘Bahai-Kongref’ (Sonne der Wahrheit 7 (September 1922), p. 110) gives some indication of the historical significance that this congress, with the first election of a “Nationalrat’ (National Assembly, later ‘Nationaler Geistiger Rat’, i.e. National Spiritual Assembly), was to have for the German community. 240. Sonne der Wahrheit 2.8 (October 1922), pp. 124f. and 2.9 (November 1922), pp. 141ff. 241. Isolated statements imply that traditional ideas of authority were, to a certain extent, carried into the new bodies, e.g. Sonne der Wahrheit

2.8 (October 1922): ‘The spirit in which Bahai meetings should be held.’ 242. Thus, Shoghi Effendi’s secretary wrote on his behalf to the German community on 4 April 1930: ‘Shoghi Effendi hopes that as a result of Mrs. White’s activities the friends will become more united and feel to a greater extent the importance of their task. Perhaps, if we had endeavoured more, if we had sacrificed to a greater extent, if, following

the explicit wish of the Master [‘Abdu’1-Baha], we had sought to spread the Cause even more than we have done, Mrs. White and her like could

not criticize us to such an extent and say that the administration has killed the spirit. Let us therefore take a lesson from what has passed . . .’ (Shoghi Effendi, The Light of Divine Guidance, vol. 1, p. 36). 243. This is especially evident when the congress reports are directly compared with Shoghi Effendi’s letters of 5 March 1922 and 12 March 1923 (Baha’i Administration, pp. 17ff., 34ff.) concerning the structure, election and function of the institutions.

729

Chapter 11 # Ulrich Gollmer

submit regular reports.244 On the other hand, it was not easy for those believers who had so far acted as they thought best, independent of any community structure, to adapt to a system of democratic elections, consultation and majority decisions. In particular, Wilhelm Herrigel, who had been very active for many years giving public lectures, translating and propagating the Baha’i teachings, and who had played a considerable role in fostering the growth of the Stuttgart community, found these

new developments difficult to accept.24> Personal tensions between Herrigel and Schwarz, Chairman of the National Spiritual

Assembly, intensified these structural problems.2*° Despite repeated, intensive endeavours to bring about a reconciliation,?47

244. It was not until 27 January 1927 that the National Spiritual Assembly wrote a letter stating that it had been decided to send the minutes of their meetings to Shoghi Effendi and to take up regular correspondence. 245. This was exacerbated by the fact that young people were increasingly being elected onto these bodies, some of whom had a much higher level of formal education. Herrigel was largely self-educated. He had a strong Swabian accent, which audiences at his lectures in other

parts of Germany sometimes found distracting. His financial means were modest, especially in comparison with Consul Schwarz, and he was dependent on financial support for his extended lecture tours. Contrary to the express wish of the German National Spiritual Assembly, he attempted to increase his income by requesting direct financial assistance from American believers. 246. This is evident from various letters from Herrigel to Shoghi Effendi from 1923 onwards. In a letter written in early November 1923, Herrigel indicated that there had been problems for about four years, and asked Shoghi Effendi for his prayers. It is possible that this resentment was one-sided, since Albert Schwarz mentioned

in a letter dated

December 1925 that ‘especially the relations with Mr Herrigel and vice versa are very good’. 247. These were made by individual members of the National Spiritual Assembly and various German believers, and Shoghi Effendi also repeatedly sent representatives to Stuttgart to try to_effect a reconciliation. In a letter dated 6 June 1939 (The Light of Divine Guidance, vol. 1, pp. 97f.) Shoghi Effendi’s secretary wrote: ‘. . . because it is almost impossible for him [Shoghi Effendi] to intervene from such a distance

730

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha

the situation had become so tense that in the summer of 1928 Herrigel was open for a radical solution. If he was unable to come to terms with the institutions, then he might to try to do without them. Thus, White’s anti-institutional polemics fell on

fertile soil.248 In a letter dated 17 March 1930, Wilhelm Herrigel wrote to the German Baha’is declaring his withdrawal from the ‘or-

ganization (but not from the sacred Cause)’.249 At the same 497

time, he and a few like-minded individuals founded the ‘Baha’

World Union’.2°° Their only activity of any significance was the publication of a German translation of White’s Abdul Baha

and The Promised Age.?>! The group was unable to get itself established, and soon after Herrigel’s death? in 1932, some of and without hearing both sides, he ing that the friends should gather, ill-feeling and should solve their deep disappointment has not been compromising . .’

has written over and over again askshould talk frankly and fully without difficulty. This to Shoghi Effendi’s possible, Mr. Herrigel has been un-

248. This is also clear from what was probably Herrigel’s last letter to Shoghi Effendi, written on 3 March 1930. 249. He enclosed with his letter some extracts from White, The Bahai Religion and its Enemy: The Bahai Organization, translated into Ger-

man. 250. It is not possible to determine exactly how many individuals belonged to this group, since the documents were confiscated by the Gestapo after the prohibition of the Baha’i Faith by Reichsfiihrer SS Heinrich Himmler, on 21 May 1937 (Werner Gollmer, ‘Die Jahre des Verbots’, in Bahd’i-Nachrichten Issue 2 (April 145 BE), p. 21). Zimmer (Wiederkunft, 2nd edn. 1984, p. 52) writes of ‘approximately 40 followers’. According to oral reports, however, the number seems not to have exceeded one or two dozen. Eight persons are known by name. und das

VerheiBene

Zeitalter,

Stuttgart,

1930.

In

251.

‘Abdu’l-Bahé

252.

In correspondence between Thilde Diestelhorst, who had visited

the following year the group published a reprint of a publication of the Baha’{ Association of 1913 (published at that time under the title A Message to the Jews), which was a German translation of a talk by ‘Abdu’l-Baha: ‘Die wesentliche Einheit der religidsen Gedanken’ (‘The essential unity of religious thought’), Stuttgart, 1931.

the German

community

in 1931, and Shoghi Effendi, there are indica-

ial

Chapter 11 + Ulrich Gollmer

his followers returned to the Baha’i community.2°? Following the prohibition of the Baha’i Faith by the Nazi regime in 1937,

the ‘Baha’i World Union’ practically ceased to exist.2>4 After the reconstitution of the German Baha’i community in 1945,29° most of Herrigel’s former associates rejoined the community.?°° Hermann Zimmer was one of the first members of the grouping around Herrigel. They were relatives by marriage.?>’ Although Zimmer later emphasized that he had never been a member of the Baha’i community,?°* there is no doubt that he and his parents?°?—and a number of other members of his extended family2©°—had regarded themselves as Baha’is for many years. Like Herrigel, Zimmer was initially open in his

tions that Herrigel himself apparently sought reconciliation with the community shortly before his death. 253.

Zimmer, Shoghism, p. 105.

254. ibid. p. 108. 255. See Werner Gollmer, ‘Die Jahre des Verbots’, pp. 19ff., 9ff. 256. ‘That also many members of the former “Baha’i World Union” should now be seeking enrolment as believers greatly pleases him [Shoghi Effendi], and he feels you should by all means accept them as registered Baha’is, unless you yourselves have any reason to question some individual’s sincerity’ (letter of 22 November 1946 written on behalf of Shoghi Effendi to the German National Spiritual Assembly, in The Light of Divine Guidance, vol. 1, p. 111).

257. Zimmer’s maternal grandfather and Herrigel’s wife were brother and sister. Luise Zimmer (née Pfund), the mother of Hermann Zimmer, was at first among the believers who tried to mediate between Herrigel and the National Spiritual Assembly. After he broke away, she and her son both took sides with Herrigel. 258. Shoghism, p. 125. 259. His father had been killed in the First World War. ‘Abdu’|-Baha had expressed his sympathy to the family in a letter dated 13 July 1917. 260.

Except

for Mr.

and Mrs.

Herrigel,

Hermann

mother, the other members of the extended Késtlin) remained in the community.

32

Zimmer

family (Pfund,

and his

Bopp,

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha

attitude towards Shoghi Effendi.26! This was to change suddenly when, ‘as a young man’ he travelled without prior notice

to Haifa?©? while visiting relatives in Egypt?® and, to his great annoyance,?©4 found Shoghi Effendi to be absent.26 After the war, Zimmer was practically alone but continued his activities under various names such as ‘Bahai Weltunion’ (‘Bahai World Union’), “Weltunion fiir universale Religion und universalen Frieden’ (‘World Union for Universal Religion and Universal Peace’) or ‘Freie Bahai’ (‘Free Bahais’).2° Before 1960 his ac-

tivities were few and far between,?°” but during the 1960s he published a number of leaflets.2°8 In 1964 he conducted a lecture tour through Germany.”°? In 1969, for the first time, he ad-

261.

As is shown by the fact that he wrote to Shoghi Effendi as late as

6 June 1927.

262.

Shoghism, p. 89.

263.

The exact date of this visit has not been ascertained, but it defi-

nitely took place after Herrigel’s break with the community and before the outbreak of the Second World War. 264. As late as the early 1960s, he spoke to my grandfather very emotionally about his disappointment. 265. Hence his constant polemics concerning Shoghi Effendi’s absence from Haifa, e.g. Shoghism, pp. 86f., 89f., 91, 93.

266.

All these groups were registered under Zimmer’s private address.

267.

Only one publication is extant: Hermann

Zimmer, Die Wieder-

kunft Christi—von der die Prophezeiungen sprechen, Waiblingen, 1950. Two reprints appeared in 1984 and 1986. They include an appendix (‘Quo vadis, Bahai-Religion? Die Bahai-Religion ist zum “Shoghismus” geworden’), in which Zimmer repeats his allegations against the Baha’i community. 268. Most of which were reprints of older publications by the Baha’i community: Thornton Chase, Ehe Abraham ward, bin Ich! WaiblingenStuttgart, 1960 (reprint of an edition published in about 1913); idem, Zweck und Ziel der Bahai-Offenbarung, Waiblingen-Stuttgart, 1962; Myron Phelps, Life and Teachings of Abbas Effendi, New York-London, 2nd edn. 1912; new edition The Master in ‘Akkd, revised and annotated

with a new foreword by Marzieh Gail, Los Angeles, 1985.

269.

Zimmer, Shoghism, p. 125.

733

Chapter 11\¢ Ulrich Gollmer dressed the German Baha’i community in an ‘open letter’ in which he presented some of the theses later to be elaborated in

his book.27° The book was published in 1971, a total of 5,000 copies being printed and, according to Zimmer’s own account, sent to libraries and institutes throughout German-speaking

Europe.27! In 1973 he published 35,000 copies of an English translation, which was then distributed world-wide.272 The question remains open as to Zimmer’s source of finance for this

project considering that he had no organization to back him. Between 1977 and 1983 he sent a further five circulars to Baha’is in the United States, Germany, Austria and Switzer-

land. To his great frustration, these letters also failed to produce

the response for which he had hoped,?73 as was also the case with his newspaper advertisements?”4 and personal letters to some

individuals

who

had only recently joined the Baha’i

community. The numerous reports about the persecution of Iranian Baha’is under Khomeini’s government induced Zimmer to

submit a letter to the reader’s column in the Stuttgarter Zeitung,?7> in which—in a spirit reminiscent of the Iranian regime itself—he denounced the Baha’i community as a political group.?76 270. Eine Testamentsfalschung wertet die Bahai-Religion ab in den politischen Shoghismus, Waiblingen-Stuttgart, 1973. 271. Except for three hundred copies that he sent directly to members of the Baha’i community (according to a letter written by Zimmer on 10 February 1978 and ‘open letter’ of January 1979). 272. A Fraudulent Testament Devalues the Bahai Religion into Political Shoghism, announced in Zimmer’s ‘open letter’ of January 1979. A second edition appeared in 1980. 273. Shoghism, p. 113. He also laments this in Materialdienst 33, Issue 12 (1970), p. 139. 274. e.g. in the Stuttgarter Zeitung of 12 August 1977. 275. 5 September 1981. 276. It is interesting to note in this connection that after the prohibition of the Baha’i community under Hitler’s regime in 1937 (owing to ‘pacifist activities’), Zimmer had directed an appeal to the Reichsfithrer SS and head of the Gestapo, Heinrich Himmler, asking that the ‘free

734

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Bahd

The only tangible success to emerge from what was evidently a large-scale campaign of letter-writing?”” to newspaper editors

was a commentary in the Jiilicher Nachrichte.278 n VI. THE ARGUMENTS CONCERNING STYLE AND CONTENT

White demanded that the Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha be examined from three different perspectives:279 from the “spiritual perspective’-—i.e. whether the testament corresponds to the teachings and intentions of “Abdu’l-Baha as expressed during his lifetime; from the ‘literary perspective’—i.e. whether the style of the testament corresponds to that of ‘Abdu’l-Baha; from the graphological perspective—analysis of the handwriting allegedly proves the testament to be a forgery. Ficicchia seized upon these demands and presented the

theses set up by White and Zimmer. The form of his presentation, especially the lack of any counter-arguments or criticism, inevitably gives the reader the impression that these are verified

statements of fact.2®° The first thesis adopted by Ficicchia rests upon an alleged textual comparison: the rigorism reflected in

Bahais’ be excepted from the ruling, since they—in contrast to ‘political Shoghism’—did not pursue political aims (Shoghism, p. 126). He made a similar appeal to the Embassy of the USSR in 1967 (ibid. p. 65). 277. ‘Quo vadis, Bahai-Religion?’, of 5 April 1983. 278. on 23 April 1983. 279. According to White, these criteria were established by the graphologist Albert S. Osborne, who, however, was not prepared to take the part White intended for him (Enemy, p. 110). 280. Only on closer inspection does it become evident that, when the assertions

made

are particularly dubious,

Ficicchia

is careful

enough

only to cite others: ‘Hermann Zimmer . . ., who had tried to find scientific evidence in support of the testament “forgery” thesis by referring to earlier investigations by the American Ruth White, concluded that .. .’, ‘Hermann Zimmer is of the opinion that’ (p. 295), ‘wherefore, according to Zimmer’ (p. 297); ‘Ruth White and Hermann Zimmer considered it out of the question . . .’, ‘Zimmer presents . . . a very interesting stylistic analysis’ (p. 298 (Ficicchia’s emphasis)) etc.

ESD

Chapter 11, ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

the choice of words and the statements made in the testament do not, he argues, correspond to the language and vocabulary of ‘Abdu’l-Baha. What he is referring to are ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s admonitions concerning unity in the Baha’i community, the acceptance of and support for the institutions established to succeed him in the role of leading the community, and his warn-

ings about the covenant-breakers.?®! In White and Zimmer’s estimation, ‘Abdu’l-Baha was the personification of modesty, humility and meekness, of unconditional, unfailing love. The clarity and severity of style in certain passages in the testament therefore have ‘nothing to do with that of the historical Abdul

Baha’.282 The content and style of these passages are, by con-

trast, reminiscent of Shoghi Effendi’s God Passes By.?*3 It is interesting to note that neither White, nor Zimmer, nor Ficicchia ever made a clear distinction between perspective 1 (analysis of contents) and perspective 2 (stylistic analysis), which they themselves had set up as criteria. They avoided doing so for good reason. In order to conduct a stylistic analysis

one must have excellent knowledge of the language in question, in particular of its grammatical and stylistic characteristics and variants; only then is one in a positionto make judgements

about linguistic subtleties. The original of ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s Will and Testament is written in the Persian language. White and

Zimmer were just as ignorant of Persian?84 as Ficicchia?®> is 281.

On

the

issue

of

covenant-breaking

see

Schaefer,

above,

pp. 224ff. 282. Shoghism, p. 34. 283. For a brief description of this work see Gollmer, above, pp. 486f. 284. The strange results of this linguistic ignorance combined with paranoid suspicion are exemplified by the following. When reading the German edition of Baha’u’llah’s The Seven Valleys, p. 40, Zimmer came

across the term ‘Guardian of the Cause’. This caught his attention and he sought out older English editions (Ali Kuli Khan (‘Ali-Quli Khan), Seven Valleys, Chicago, 1906) and French (Hippolyte Dreyfus, L’Oeuvre de Baha’u'llah, vol. 1, Paris, 1923) of this work and discov-

ered that the term in question was translated by the phrase ‘Guardian of

736

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Bahd

the Command’ and ‘la Manifestation’, respectively (Shoghism, pp. 103ff.). In his opinion this could mean only one thing: the text was a forgery! He went so far as to state that: ‘In the American, English and German editions of the “Seven Valleys” from 1936 onwards, the term

“Guardian of the Command” (i.e. the Manifestation) was turned into “Guardian of the Cause”, i.e. Shoghi Effendi Rabbani! . . . This was very rewarding for the German translator, for a year later, in 1951, Dr Hermann Grossmann, was declared a “Hand of the Cause” for his incor-

rect translation’ (‘open letter’ of 4 April 1983, ‘Quo vadis, Baha’iReligion?’, p. 4; see also Shoghism, p. 155. Ficicchia brings this up with glee in his ‘open letter’ to the Baha’is of Switzerland’ (August 1974, pp. 4f.). If either of them had had access to the original text they would have seen that the term used by Baha’u’lléh is Vali-Amru’llah. This term has several meanings: vali, especially in the compound ValiAmru'llah (‘Guardian of the Cause of God’), is indeed the designation for the holder of the office of Guardian of the Baha’i Faith (for details see Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 4.2.4.2 and 11.2.2). However, vali covers

a whole spectrum of meanings: it is, for example, a designation for the Shi‘a Imams;

it is also used as a name

of God

or as a title of the

Prophet; it can be translated by the terms ‘protector’, ‘guardian’, ‘helper’, ‘benefactor’, ‘companion’, ‘friend’, ‘Lord and Master’ (Carra de Vaux, keyword ‘Wali’, in SEI, p. 629; Ryad Qadimi and Ihsan’u’ lah Himmat, Shishhizar lughat, Hofheim,

2nd edn.

1982). The term ‘amr

also has a wide variety of meanings: in a Baha’i context it is usually translated as ‘matter’, ‘cause’, ‘command’, or ‘revelation’ (see Towfigh,

Schépfung,

pp. 180f.

tried to convey

for detailed

the meaning

discussion).

Accordingly,

by a term that was

more

Dreyfus

interpretative,

whereas the translations by Ali Kuli Khan and Grossmann are closer to one of the possible literal meanings.

It would, however, have sufficed

for Zimmer or Ficicchia to consult the writings of Shoghi Effendi in order to dispel their suspicions. Shoghi Effendi responded to an inquiry on 8 January 1949 by stating that: ‘The word “Guardian” in the Seven Valleys has no connection with the Baha’i Guardianship’ (Unfolding Destiny, p. 453).

285. Zimmer and Ficicchia evidently had at best a mediocre command of even the English language, see Schaefer, above, p. 35. Zimmer’s lack of understanding of the art of translation and its difficulties is revealed on p. 97 of his book, where he rejects the statement that Shoghi Ef-

fendi’s studies in Oxford served to enable him to translate the primary literature of the Baha’i Faith into English in an appropriate style. He argued that Shoghi Effendi had already studied at the American University in Beirut and had also worked on the translation of a Tablet from ‘“Abdu’l-Baha to the Central Organization for a Durable Peace (Letter and Tablet from ‘Abdu'l-Bahda to the Central Organisation for a Dura-

eeu

Chapter 11 «Ulrich Gollmer

and thus they were unable even to read the original of the document they were attacking. They were therefore devoid of any competence whatever to conduct a stylistic comparison with other texts. Nevertheless, Zimmer mentions extensive “investigations of its style’: in other words, referring to “Abdu’lBaha’s Will and Testament compared with Shoghi Effendi’s God Passes By. With regard to this “stylistic comparison’ referred to by Fi-

cicchia2®° it suffices to point out that ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s Will and Testament was written in Persian and Shoghi Effendi’s God Passes By in English. What purports to be a stylistic compari-

son,287 however, is based in both cases on the German translation of these texts. The German Baha’i translators—all of whom were non-professionals—constantly referred to existing translations in an attempt to achieve a certain basic consensus

as to terms and expressions, in order to attain a degree of uniformity as regards style and quality. This alone adequately explains the similarity in the way certain points are formulated.

Moreover, the English translation of the testament, on which the German translation was based, was the work of Shoghi Effendi; hence, it is hardly surprising that the style of this translated text

might be seen as reminiscent of his own writings.?88 What is to be made of Zimmer’s statement that the Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha contains ‘expressions about the trespasses and conduct of his enemies which are missing in his

ble Peace, The Hague, Chicago: Baha’i Publishing Society, 1920) and thus was already able to speak and write English. 286. Baha’ismus, p. 298. 287. Shoghism, pp. 31ff.; 43f. 288. However, Zimmer’s so-called stylistic comparison is not even valid up to this point. All he manages to show between pages 40 and 44 is that certain terms such as ‘black-hearted’, ‘shameful’, or ‘infamous’

appear in both works as descriptions of the activities of covenantbreakers. In view of the fact that the content of these sections of both texts is the same, this is hardly surprising.

738

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha

remaining literature and which simultaneously oppose his teach-

ings’?289 As a matter of fact, this assertion is refuted in Ficicchia’s book, on pages 291f. of which are to be found several passages by ‘Abdu’l-Baha that correspond exactly to the warn-

ings and admonitions given in the testament.29° Nevertheless, Ficicchia cites and reinforces Zimmer’s argument;2%! he is apparently unaware of the self-contradiction inherent in his presentation. Zimmer, likewise, had been able to sustain his assertion only by dodging the issue. He, too, had access to a text by

‘Abdu’l-Baha?%? that corresponded in both content and style to those passages of the testament that constituted the bone of

contention.293 The obvious parallels did not, however, cause Zimmer to doubt his thesis.294 Neither did he attempt to seek out further parallels by systematically examining the talks and

writings of ‘Abdu’l-Baha.?%° Similarities with the passages of

289. 290. pressed

Shoghism, p. 31. There are also other warnings in urgent,

even

drastic

terms,

against covenant-breakers e.g.

in Bahd’i

World

ex-

Faith,

pp. 323, 357; Tablets of the Divine Plan 8:8 (p. 50); Promulgation, pp. 381f., 386, 456f.; Selections 185:1-5; 186:1-7; 187:1, 3, 4, 188:1-11,;

189:3, 6; 192:1. Another such text written by “Abdu’l-Baha is cited in White, Enemy, p. 158. 291. Baha’ismus, p. 298. 292.

Printed in Bahd’i World Faith, pp. 429ff. It was first published

in English translation in Star of the West XIII.1 (21 March 1922), pp. 19-25. A German translation appeared in Sonne der Wahrheit 2.4 (June 1922), pp. SOff. 293. Shoghism, pp. 74-77. 294. The report by Emogene Hoagg describing and commenting on the circumstances, which was published together with the English translation, also appears not to have made any impression on him (if he had indeed come across it). Hoagg had translated this letter from ‘Abdu’l-Baha into English together with Ali-Muhammad Baqir and Rth i Afnan, Star of the West XIII.1 (21 March 1922), pp. 25f. 295. On 13 July 1914 ‘Abdu’l-Baha wrote the following to Herrigel (published in German in a somewhat shaky translation in Star of the

739

Chapter 11 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer the testament that he rejected could mean only one thing: that

the letter containing these similarities must also be a forgery!?7° Even if this inoculation strategy is left aside, the assertion concerning the incompatibility of language and spirit reveals

not only Zimmer’s lack of knowledge of the scripture??’ but West XII.14 (23 November 1921): ‘These people are brutal violators of the covenant. May the friends eschew all contact with them. Association with these souls is unlawful . . . they will be the means of extinguishing the fire of the love of God. Conversation with them, even via intermedi-

aries, is not permitted.’ In a later letter (dated 8 April 1920, to a sizeable group of German believers, again translated on the basis of the above German translation) he wrote: ‘None of you is permitted to associate with them, since the diseases of the spirit, like the diseases of the

body such as cholera and cancer, are contagious.’ In the last issue of Star of the West before “Abdu’l-Baha’s death (XII.14 (23 November 1921)), Zimmer could also have tapped a rich source. Perhaps in anticipation of his death, ‘Abdu’l-Baha gives clear warnings against the covenant-breakers in numerous letters to a wide variety of addressees in a style similar to that of his Will and Testament. Some of these letters and telegrams were published in that issue of Star of the West. Similar warnings to the German believers were also issued earlier, such as those dated 4 July 1913 and 30 July 1914 to Alice Schwarz, and that dated 6 February 1920 to Herrigel and his wife. 296. Shoghism, p. 74. 297. To take just one example, Zimmer asserts that ‘the “wrath of God” never existed at all in Abdul-Baha’s vocabulary’ (ibid. p. 34). He therefore devotes two pages (33 and 34) to demonstrating where this term occurs in ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s testament and in Shoghi Effendi’s God Passes By, which, to him, constitutes clear proof of the forgery theory and indicates who the author of the forgery was. He has, of course, overlooked the fact that the term ‘wrath of God’ is used both by Baha’u’llah (e.g. Gleanings 121:5, 127:4; Kitab-i-Iqan 98, 125 (pp. 90, 119)—in the latter instance the expression is even explained) and by ‘Abdu’1-Baha in various writings and talks (e.g. Some Answered Questions 11; 16; Promulgation, pp. 352f., 363; Selections 225:29), often in

connection with covenant-breaking: ‘The violators of the Covenant will be degraded and dispersed, and the faithful cherished and glorified, for they cling to the Book of the Testament and are firm and steadfast in the covenant . . . after the appearance of the Book of the Testament there will be a great storm, and the lightnings of the anger and the wrath of God will flash, the noise of the thunder of the violation of the Covenant will resound, the earthquake of doubts will take place, the hail of tor-

740

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Bahd

also the fact that he had failed to understand ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s admonitions and warnings. Zimmer is right to say that love is the main characteristic of ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s personality and is a constantly recurring motif in his writings and talks. This is so to

the extent that ‘Abdu’l-Baha revoked the ancient dualistic divi-

sion of mankind into believers and unbelievers: ‘all are recipients of the bounties and bestowals of God’.298 For him, the categories ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ no longer exist—with one exception: when disunity threatens the community, a stop must be put to it. There must be determined resistance against anyone who attempts to destroy the basic unity of the believers and thus to prevent the goal of the faith of Baha’u’lla4h—the unity of the human race—from being achieved. The ultimate means of this resistance is excommunication: the person concerned is declared

ments will beat upon the violators of the Covenant, and even those who profess

belief will fall into trials and temptations’

Questions 11:53, 54). 298. Promulgation, p. 454. The context mankind, He (Baha’u’llah) says, “Ye are fruits of one branch”. By this it is meant like a tree, the nations or peoples are the

(Some Answered

reads as follows: all leaves of one that the world of different limbs or

‘Addressing tree and the humanity is branches of

that tree, and the individual human creatures are as the fruits and blos-

soms thereof. In this way Baha’u’llah expressed the oneness of humankind, whereas in all religious teachings of the past the human world has been represented as divided into two parts: one known as the people of the Book of God, or the pure tree, and the other the people of infidelity and error, or the evil tree. The former were considered as belonging to the faithful, and the others to the hosts of the irreligious and infidel— one part of humanity the recipients of divine mercy, and the other the object of the wrath of their Creator. Baha’u’llah . . . has submerged all mankind in the sea of divine generosity. Some are asleep; they need to be awakened. Some are ailing; they need to be healed. Some are immature as children; they need to be trained. But all are recipients of the bounty and bestowals of God.’

741

Chapter 11 ,¢ Ulrich Gollmer

a ‘covenant-breaker’.299 ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s love is not acosmic; rather, it includes responsibility for the world.3°? This readiness to protect the fundamental purpose of Baha’u’llah’s mission does not involve any personal hatred or condemnation of the ‘covenant-breaker’ on the part of ‘Abdu’l-

Baha.29! In the fulfilment of his ‘supreme obligation’, ‘Abdu’]Baha writes only with ‘the greatest regret’ of the dangers posed by the covenant-breakers and provides advice on how the com-

munity is to be protected and conflict avoided,3 ‘lest all these woes, trials and afflictions, all this pure and sacred blood that hath been shed so profusely in the Path of God, may prove to be

299.

See Schaefer, above pp. 224ff.

300. On the philosophical concept of ‘acosmism’ see, for instance, Schiitte, in Ritter (ed.), Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie, col.

128. 301. ‘This wronged one hath in no wise borne nor doth he bear a grudge against any one; towards none doth he entertain any ill-feeling and uttereth no word save for the good of the world .. .’ (Will and Testament 2:7 (p. 19)). A characteristic example of this attitude is evident in ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s intervention when some believers tried to prevent Hubbu’1lah, a covenant-breaker, from being employed as a teacher: ‘Do you mean to say that you consulted together and decided to stop a covenant-breaker earning a living? This is not the way to serve the Cause of God. In matters connected with one’s livelihood there should be no differentiation between a believer and a covenant-breaker’ (Yunis Khan, Khatirat-i-Nuh-Sdalih, pp.357f., quoted in Taherzadeh, Covenant,

p. 258). In a letter dated July 1925 written by Shoghi Effendi to the Baha’is in Iran, he wrote concerning a covenant-breaker: ‘. . . Nevertheless, the mere fact of disaffection, estrangement, or recantation of belief, can in no wise detract from, or otherwise impinge upon, the legitimate civil rights of individuals in a free society, be it to the most insignificant degree. Were the friends to follow other than this course, it would be tantamount to a reversion on their part, in this century of radiance and light, to the ways and standards of a former age: they would reignite in men’s breasts the fire of bigotry and blind fanaticism, cut themselves off from the glorious bestowals of this promised Day of God, and impede the full flow of divine assistance in this wondrous age.’

302.

Will and Testament 2:7 (p. 19).

742

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Bahd

in vain’ 393 A prayer that ‘Abdu’l-Baha included in his Will and Testament is the best proof of this attitude, which faces up to the realities of the world and does not evade the obligations arising out of these, and yet sets love and forgiveness above all

else in personal relationships.3°4 The contrast between the wording of this prayer and the

‘icy wind’>°> that Zimmer perceives in the text and spirit of the Will and Testament could not be more obvious. This becomes even clearer when one considers the following ‘evidence’ cited by Ficicchia for the allegedly hateful language of the testament in reference to the covenant-breakers: ‘abominable, loathsome, and disgusting slanderers of wily falseness, sinners, idiots,

doubters, cunning deceivers, ferocious lions, ravening wolves and bloodthirsty beasts’.3°© Strong words indeed. Unfortu303. ibid. 2:9 (p. 20). 304. ‘I call upon Thee, O Lord my God! with my tongue and with all my heart, not to requite them for their cruelty and their wrong-doings, their craft and their mischief, for they are foolish and ignoble and know not what they do. They discern not good from evil, neither do they distinguish right from wrong, nor justice from injustice. They follow their own desires and walk in the footsteps of the most imperfect and foolish amongst them. O my Lord! Have mercy upon them, shield them from all afflictions in these troubled times and grant that all trials and hardships may be the lot of this Thy servant that hath fallen into this darksome pit. Single me out for every woe and make me a sacrifice for all Thy loved ones. O Lord, Most High! May my soul, my life, my being, my spirit, my all be offered up for them. O God, my God! Lowly, suppliant and fallen upon my face, I beseech Thee with all the ardour of my invocation to pardon whosoever hath hurt me, forgive him that hath conspired against me and offended me, and wash away the misdeeds of them that have wrought injustice upon me. Vouchsafe unto them Thy goodly gifts, give them joy, relieve them from sorrow, grant them peace and prosperity, give them Thy bliss and pour upon them Thy bounty. Thou art the Powerful, the Gracious, the Help in Peril, the Self-Subsisting!’ (ibid. 2:5-6 (pp. 18f.)). 305. Shoghism, p. 59. 306. Baha’ismus, p. 284. A similar ‘quotation’ appears in Hutten’s book: ‘abominable, loathsome, and disgusting slanderers, ferocious lions, ravening wolves, bloodthirsty beasts’ (Seher, Griibler, Enthusias-

743

Chapter 11 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer nately, the reference provided by Ficicchia is only to “Abdu’lBaha’s Will and Testament in general, not to a specific passage. The real reason for this regrettable omission becomes evident only to the reader who goes to the trouble of reading through the Will and Testament of “Abdu’1l-Baha from beginning to end. The example cited by Ficicchia for the ‘pompous and rude lan-

guage of the testament’,>°’ for what he calls ‘vulgar execrations’ ,3°8 is nowhere to be found.>% It is a fraud.3!° VII. THE GRAPHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT Ficicchia knows very well that few things are more damaging to the reputation of a religious leader than the suspicion that his

position has been attained by means of document forgery. Since Ficicchia is also aware that the forgery theory rests on ex-

tremely shaky foundations,>!! he makes use of another dodge: ten, 12th edn., p. 814). In this connection, Hutten refers to the German 4th edn. of ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s Will and Testament, Frankfurt, 1964, p. 20.

That such a ‘quotation’ is found neither there nor anywhere else in the testament hardly comes as a surprise. 307. ibid. 308. ibid. 309. The only passage in the testament where some of the expressions included in Ficicchia’s ‘quotation’ do appear is Will and Testament 1:10 (p. 9). The context is as follows: ‘O God, my God! Thou seest this wronged servant of Thine, held fast in the talons of ferocious lions, of

ravening wolves, of bloodthirsty beasts. Graciously assist me, through my love for Thee, that I may drink deep of the chalice that brimmeth over with faithfulness to Thee and is filled with Thy bountiful Grace; so that, fallen upon the dust, I may sink prostrate and senseless while my vesture is dyed crimson with my blood. This is my wish, my heart’s desire, my hope, my pride, my glory. Grant, O Lord my God, and my Refuge, that in my last hour, my end may even as musk shed its fragrance of glory! Is there a bounty greater than this?’ 310. One must agree with Ficicchia when he refuses to ascribe ‘artistic and aesthetic qualities’ to this construction (Baha ’ismus, p. 284). 311. After all, he himself conceded in one of his letters (dated 10 February 1977) to the Universal House of Justice, the supreme institution of

the Baha’i community, that the ‘evidence’ produced by Zimmer was

744

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha

in order to give the appearance of objectivity, he merely cites the evidence given by White and Zimmer for their assertions. This gives him the opportunity to present the forgery theory without having to subject it to serious discussion and verification. The most effective argument used consists of a graphologist’s report in which, Ficicchia states, it is concluded that ‘not a single line of the document is identical with the handwriting

of ‘Abdu’l-Bahd’ 312 Now, a privately arranged graphologist’s assessment is a fine thing, especially if it does not have to face up to scrutiny in a court of law. Persons paying for such an assessment have a vested interest in a result that supports their own position—and the choice of graphologist will be made accordingly. The appointed expert—having once accepted the commission—will hardly be able to completely disregard his client’s expectations. If, nevertheless, the result unexpectedly turns out negative, all is not lost: the graphologist’s report can simply be shelved. If the result is usable, it lends itself perfectly for propaganda. Should

the other side allow itself to be pulled into the game by producing a counter-assessment, the whole procedure simply begins again, a process that, in principle, could go on for ever, constantly attracting new publicity. The desired negative effect would definitely be achieved: the uninformed observer would

conclude that there cannot be smoke without fire. The report cited by Ficicchia has never had to stand up to legal scrutiny; it was made to order in support of a particular argument, and merely served as an element in White’s destabi-

highly ‘unsatisfactory’, and he even acknowledged ‘that, strictly speaking, it is not your duty to produce counter-evidence, since you are not the accusers. Rather, it is up to the accuser himself (in this case Hermann Zimmer) to produce evidence for his assertion.’ Nevertheless, further on in the same letter he demanded ‘a neutral investigation by a qualified graphologist’. 312. Baha’ismus, p. 299 (Ficicchia’s emphasis).

745

Chapter 11\¢ Ulrich Gollmer

lization campaign against Shoghi Effendi and the “Bahai organization’. White’s approach was certainly clever. In a registered letter dated 19 March 1930, she challenged Shoghi Effendi to provide the original of the Will and Testament for graphological

analysis in order to establish its authenticity.3!5 The audacity of this demand is remarkable: after all, the Will and Testament of *‘Abdu’1-Baha is a unique sacred text to the Baha’is. It is a singular, irreplaceable document, ranking among the most significant scriptures in mankind’s religious history. It would have been irresponsible towards the whole community and to future generations of believers if such a document had been submitted to

someone who, in her irrational hatred of the Guardianship, offered no guarantee of its safe return.

In addition, there were no circumstances that might have provided any reason to respond to White’s challenge. Shoghi Effendi had succeeded ‘Abdu’l-Baha as leader of the community on the basis of the testament, and the attitude within the community was completely unanimous. None of those who knew the testament and were familiar with ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s writings, his style and handwriting—in particular his secretaries and members of his family—had even the slightest doubt that White’s suspicion was utterly untenable and was not supported by any facts relating to the document itself. There were no grounds for doubting the genuineness of the testament—neither from the point of view of graphology or style, nor as regards its

contents. The Palestinian and Israeli authorities and courts of law have also confirmed this view,?!4 recognizing Shoghi Ef-

fendi as the legitimate head of the Baha’i world community and the legal successor to ‘Abdu’1-Baha.

However, White’s concern was not really for the testament but rather for her struggle against the transformation of the

313. Alleged Will, p. 8. 314. See above, pp. 705ff.

746

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha

Baha’i community from a pneumatic, amorphous association into a legally constituted community with institutions and legal structures,?!> a development that she hated. This is revealed in her open admission that: ‘I would not accept the nomination of

Shoghi Effendi nor would I obey him, even if graphologists said the testament was genuine’.>!© By challenging Shoghi Effendi in this way, White intended to confront him with an insoluble dilemma: if he were to agree to it, he would be placing the decision about the spiritual authority bestowed upon him by “Abdu’l-Baha in the hands of a private expert. If, as was only to be expected, he refused to do so, this could be used to great ef-

fect in her campaign in the West: anyone who was unable or unwilling to see through this manoeuvre was bound to see the refusal to submit the incriminated document as a weighty piece of evidence in support of the forgery theory. Since White had expected her demand to be refused, she had obtained, about two years earlier, an (incomplete) photo-

copy of the testament from a Baha’i in London who had financial obligations towards her.3!7 Shortly afterwards, she had requested and received a further (complete) copy from the Na-

tional Spiritual Assembly of the United States.>!8 She intended to present these copies to a graphologist, together with photo-

copies of some short sample texts?!? and three undated signatures by ‘Abdu’l-Baha from letters to American Baha’is.32° The

315. On this subject see above, pp. 744ff.; see also Schaefer, above, pp. 142ff. 316. Enemy, p. 94. 317. Questioned Will, p. 51. 318. Enemy, p. 106. 319. According to White, these were copies of the messages written by ‘Abdu’l-Baha in the Bible of the Unitarian Church, Montclair, and the Guest Bible of the City Temple, London, both from the year 1912 (Questioned Will, p. 56). 320. The details are described in ibid. pp. 56-62.

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Chapter 11\¢ Ulrich Gollmer

graphologist she selected was Albert S. Osbome3?! of Montclair, New Jersey, but he did not accept the commission.32? Osborne advised her that, if a graphological analysis was required, she

should select an expert from what was then known as Palestine,>23 probably assuming that such an expert would be familiar with Arabic and Persian script. In order to exert pressure in this direction, White wrote a letter to the British High Commissioner in Palestine, Sir John Chancellor, on 31 December 1928. In this letter she made a detailed presentation of her accusations and demanded that he set

up an official inquiry.32+ To her great disappointment, he rejected her proposals in a very brief letter dated 6 February

1929325 He merely pointed out that she was free to engage a solicitor in Palestine and to take legal action.32° White did not do this, however. She was probably well aware that her chances of winning a court case were as good as

nil. That would also have taken away the basis for any future agitation. Instead, therefore, she published an all-out attack on the “Bahai organization’ in the autumn of 1929. This work was

entitled The Bahai Religion and its Enemy, the Bahai Organization.

At the same time, she continued her search for a graphologist who was prepared to compile an expert’s report on the basis

321. It was he who advised her to have the testament studied first from the point of view of style and content, and only if there were grounds for suspicion to conduct a graphological analysis.

322. ibid. p. 54. 323. ibid. 324. This letter is cited verbatim in White, Appendix, this text, which White published before receiving a reply it is evident that she invested great hopes in this letter. the result of a possible inquiry, she expected it to have effect on the entire ‘Bahai organization’. 325. 326.

pp. 20ff. From from Palestine, Irrespective of a destabilizing

This letter is reproduced by White in Questioned Will, p. 55. ibid.

748

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Bahd

of her copies of the Will and Testament and the other texts she

had selected for comparison. Her endeavours were rewarded in London during the first half of 1930. Dr C. Ainsworth Mitchell, who, according to White, was employed at the British Museum and was editor of the journal The Analyst, accepted the commis-

sion. White’s journey to England, which was intended for this purpose, thus turned out to be worthwhile.

At first sight, the result of the analysis3?’ is fully in keeping with White’s hypothesis. In his report, Mitchell states that

the document is not written in the same handwriting throughout, and that the handwriting in the document, as well as ‘Abdu’!Baha’s signature on the cover, do not correspond to the sample texts. However, Mitchell himself points out very clearly in his introduction that these results cannot be regarded as conclusive: ‘In the absence of an opportunity to examine the original document, any conclusions to be drawn from an examination of the photographic enlargements must necessarily be of a provisional character contingent upon the accuracy of the photographic records. Moreover, some of the facts which are to be taken into

consideration in the scientific examination

of an original

document cannot be perfectly studied in a photographic reproduction, such as, for example, the ink, paper, penstrokes, and so on.’ Thus, Mitchell subjected his results to a very significant proviso.

Yet that is not all. One of Mitchell’s fundamental assumptions is that the handwriting samples provided were all pro-

duced at around the same time.328 This is not the case, however.

327. The copy I have of Dr Mitchell’s report was given to me by Hermann Zimmer. On the first page of the four-page report, a handwritten note appears in the top right-hand corner which reads: “Photostat copy of the Report of Dr Mitchell, sent to Mr. Herrigel by Ruth White, September 2, 1930.’ 328. ‘Assuming that the authenticated specimens of writing are of approximately the same period . . .” (page 1 of his report).

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Chapter I] ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

The samples used were both written in 1912, whereas the Will

and Testament was composed during three distinct periods.32? Whether or not Mitchell had the expertise required of a graphologist is an open question. In this case, however, he was certainly not competent for the task to which he was commissioned. The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha is written in Persian. How can a graphologist possibly assess the subtle dif-

ferences in handwriting, the form of the letters, the relationships between the individual letters, and so on, if he not only knows nothing of the peculiarities of the various, sometimes highly formalized, calligraphic styles of this script, but cannot even read it? Anyone who nevertheless wishes to use Mitchell’s report as ‘proof’ of the forgery theory ought to consider whether thousands of oriental Baha’is who had long been familiar with “Abdu’l-Baha’s handwriting and style would all have been deceived by the ‘forgery’ even though they—like Mitchell—had photocopies of the original text. What reasonable grounds would Mirza Muhammad-‘Ali and the other opponents of Shoghi Effendi have had for avoiding taking up the forgery the-

ory in their lawsuit35° against the Guardian other than their recognition that such a thesis was absurd? And last but not least: were all ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s secretaries, who had daily contact with his handwritten texts and letters, so blind or corrupt that they

failed to notice the obvious differences in handwriting pointed out by Mitchell? The testimony of one of “Abdu’l-Baha’s former secretaries is of particular interest in this connection—not because it is particularly strongly worded or is favourable to Shoghi Effendi

329.

The first section of the testament probably dates from the period

between 1904 and 1907, whereas the third section was written between

1912 and 1921. On the problems of dating the three sections see above, p. 685, note 33. 330. See above, pp. 705ff.

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The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha

but, rather, because it is the testimony of one of Shoghi Effendi’s most vehement opponents, Ahmad Sohrab. Like White, Herrigel and Zimmer, Sohrab turned against the institutions of the Baha’i community. He tried to build up his own organization, was involved in legal proceedings with the National Spiritual Assembly of the United States and Canada, and published a

number of polemical writings against Shoghi Effendi.33! Sohrab had been ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s secretary for eight years. He is certainly not inferior to Mitchell as a judge of the issue under con-

sideration here. Sohrab’s testimony was not commissioned; instead, it was part of a critical analysis of ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s Will and Testament and the institution of the Guardianship.332 Sohrab’s testimony is credible because it conflicts with his own vested interests: I have seen countless examples of his (“Abdu’l-Baha’s) handwriting and have watched him as he wrote letter after letter. Through those years of close association I became fully familiar with the turns, strokes and trims

of the art of calligraphy as used by him, which in Persian is called shekasteh. I have read and copied volumes of his works and am thoroughly conversant with his choice of words, his mode of expression and his manner of phraseology. I have listened to his talks, translated

his Tablets by the hundreds and interpreted his lectures before all manner of audiences, both in the East and in

the West. Besides these experiences, I have in my possession numerous examples of his handwriting, more than a hundred of which are in the form of Tablets addressed to me, some of the latter wholly in the Master’s

handwriting; the majority simply signed by him. Now, I have compared the photostat copies of the Will with

331. See Johnson, A Historical Analysis, pp. 311ff.; Smith, The Babi and Baha’i Religions, pp. 124f., Taherzadeh, Covenant, pp. 343ff. 332. The Will and Testament of Abdul Baha: An Analysis, New York, 1944.

751

Chapter 11]: ¢ Ulrich Gollmer the handwriting of Abdul Baha which is in my possession, and I find that both are written by the same person. Therefore, I can assert, without any hesitation and with no mental reservations, that the Will and Testament was

written, signed and sealed by Abdul Baha, every word

being his own handwriting.>°3 Interestingly, Mitchell did not wish to be named if his report was published; therefore, when it was first published by

White in 1930, its author was kept anonymous.?34 Sixteen years later, White seems no longer to have felt bound by the graphologist’s request and she published the report along with the

author’s full name,33° placing great emphasis on Mitchell’s position at the British Museum.33° Feeling that Mitchell’s report reinforced her thesis, White

undertook a further attempt at destabilizing the “Bahai organization’ of her homeland. To this end, she wrote a long letter dated 29 August 1930 to the Postmaster General of the United States in which she repeated all her allegations against the Baha’i institutions and called for an inquiry. She also made six

demands, one of which was that the Baha’i community should be denied access to the postal service of the United States.337

333. ibid. p. 11. 334. White, Alleged Will, pp. 14-16. 335. Questioned Will, pp. 63ff. 336. ibid. p. 56. 337. Alleged Will, p. 12. The entire letter is reproduced on pages 4 to 13. Her other demands were: that the National Spiritual Assembly, the local spiritual assemblies and the Baha’i Temple Fund of the United States and Canada

should be dissolved; that the journals The Bahd’i

News Letter and The Baha’i Magazine should cease publication; that Baha’i institutions should be forbidden to use the name

‘Baha’i’; that

the Green Acre Society (which provided courses on the doctrines of the Baha’i Faith) should be disbanded and its rights of ownership subjected to a court inquiry; that inquiries should be initiated into institutions associated with the Baha’i community, such as the World Unity Confer-

ences, the World Unity Foundation and the World Unity Magazine.

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The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha

Understandably, White seems not to have received a reply to these absurd demands. After this, she seems to have given up. Not until years later, when Ahmad Sohrab turned against the Baha’i institutions, did she seize what appeared to be

an opportune moment and revive the controversy in public.338 Sohrab, on the other hand, avoided weakening his position by resorting to the absurd allegation of fraud. Although he cooperated with White on many matters, he used his unequivocal declaration of the authenticity of the testament to ensure that his

arguments were not identified with hers on that issue.33° VIII. THE IDEOLOGICAL REASONS FOR REJECTING THE WILL AND TESTAMENT That White’s insistence on a graphological analysis of the testament was basically no more than a mock fight is demonstrated

by her repeated declaration that: ‘Whether the alleged will of Abdul Baha is authentic or spurious, the results of the administration of Shoghi Effendi and the National Spiritual Assembly

of Baha’is stand as a judgement of history against them.’34° She could hardly have stated in clearer terms that the question of the authenticity of the testament was a mere pretext. The real rea-

sons for her rejection of this document are theological and ideological in character. At bottom, the issue is one of a divergent conception of the nature of a religious community, and of

an understanding of religion that conflicts with what is stated in Baha’i scripture. The ‘judgement of history’ referred to by White relates to the development taken by the Baha’i community under the leadership of Shoghi Effendi. White’s verdict can

be understood only if one shares her premises, namely that religion and religious institutions are incompatible, that spirit 338.

Questioned Will, 1946. 339. See also Sohrab, Broken Silence, pp. 49, 52; New History, 12.4 (January 1943), pp. 9f. 340. Questioned Will, p. 100.

753

Chapter 11,¢ Ulrich Gollmer

and order, faith and religious structures are mutually exclusive concepts. This charismatic, pneumatic and diffuse misunderstanding of the concept of a community’s order, in direct contradiction of Baha’i scripture, was the inductive basis of all White’s virulent attacks on the community as it developed its legal structure under the guidance of Shoghi Effendi during the

1920s. It is Shoghi Effendi’s historic achievement to have introduced and established the Baha’i community’s institutions that

were first outlined by Baha’u’llah and later more clearly delineated by ‘Abdu’l-Baha. Innumerable letters have been preserved, especially from the early years of the Guardianship, in which he explained the tasks, aims and functions, but above all the spirit,

of the Baha’i institutions.3+1 The careful guidance given to these newly inaugurated institutions and the patient education of the believers in their tasks and duties continued throughout his term

as Guardian.342 A large number of letters are also concerned with the personal and social qualities required of those who serve on these bodies.3*3 Neither Zimmer nor White understood this qualitatively new

system

of cooperative

problem-solving

and

decision-

making.344 The nucleus of the Baha’i Faith’s message of

341. Many of these letters are included in Bahd’i Administration (letters 1922-1932), Wilmette, 6th edn. 1968. 342. For collections of letters and scriptural passages on this subject see, for example, The National Spiritual Assembly, London: Baha’i Publishing Trust, 2nd enlarged edn. 1973; The Local Spiritual Assembly, London: Baha’i Publishing Trust, no date; Bahd’i Meetings: The Nineteen Day Feast, Wilmette: Baha’i Publishing Trust, 1976; Bahd’i Con-

sultation, Haifa, 1978. A very important text for understanding the order of the Baha’i community is a letter dated 21 March 1934 written by Shoghi Effendi and entitled ‘The Dispensation of Baha’u’llah’, printed in World Order, pp. 97-157, esp. pp. 143ff. 343. e.g. Living the Life, London, 1974. 344.

See Gollmer, above, pp. 464ff., esp. 473ff.; see also Schaefer,

above, p. 217.

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The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Bahd

salvation, the realization of the ‘oneness of humanity’ as a

new social quality,34> is a concept that was foreign to them. Although Zimmer shared in the vision of the ‘Kingdom of God’, he believed that this could only be ‘established in the hearts of individual men’ and that, ‘in this same measure’, it would then—more or less automatically—‘grow up slowly on

the earth’ 346 Thus, the idea of the ‘oneness of mankind’ was turned into an idealistic dream, a pious hope void of any connection with historical and social reality. Society as a phenomenon in its own right, independent of individual piety and with its own direct connection to the creative Will of God, was not considered by Zimmer or White. They refused to accept the idea that it is not only the individual but also society that is in

need of divine salvation, and that religion is capable of exerting a direct influence on the world and changing the conditions of

life on earth.347 In their view, wherever religion aims to establish structures of order and law it becomes a contradiction in itself. Hence, what Zimmer mistakenly believed to be ‘the most

unpolitical religion in the world’ had been turned, in his opinion, into a ‘political religion’, a “state within the state’.348 Zimmer regarded religion exclusively as a matter of individual be345.

On the principle of the ‘unity of nations’, “Abdu’l-Baha states

that: ‘Without such unity, rest and comfort, peace and universal recon-

ciliation are unachievable. This illumined century needeth and calleth for its fulfilment. In every century a particular and central theme is, in accordance with the requirements of that century, confirmed by God’ (Selections 77:1). ‘In every Dispensation . . . the light of Divine Guidance has been focused upon one central theme . . . In this wondrous Revelation, this glorious century, the foundation of the Faith of God and

the distinguishing feature of His Law is the consciousness of the Oneness of Mankind’ (‘Abdu’l-Baha, quoted in Shoghi Effendi, World Order, pp. 113f.). In The Secret of Divine Civilization ‘Abdu’|-Baha cites some of the political, and institutional, prerequisites for attainment of such unity (117-125 (pp. 63-67)). 346. Shoghism, p. 61. 347. For detailed discussion of this concept see Gollmer, Gottesreich. 348. Shoghism, p. 13.

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Chapter 11\¢ Ulrich Gollmer

lief, ‘devout reverence’,34? an exemplary life of religious vir-

tue,?>° a ‘deepening of the love of God and a heightening of the love of mankind’ .*°! In White’s view, religion has much to do not only with

prayer and meditation but also with the interpretation of dreams and the feeling that one is guided by higher powers.3>2 Despite the countless statements in the scripture and the many explana-

tions given by ‘Abdu’1l-Baha,3>> neither Zimmer nor White understood that religion also has a social component. The dual

strategy of the Baha’i Faith, whereby the nobility both of individuals and of society is to be enhanced through a new culture of decision-making and conflict resolution,3>4 is something that remains a mystery to them.>°° In good Protestant tradition,3>° 349. ibid. p. 62. 350. ibid. pp. 61f. 351. ibid. p. 62. 352. e.g. Labyrinth, pp. 39ff., 106, 109. 353. Such as Some Answered Questions 11:9-13; here and in many other passages ‘Abdu’l-Baha explains the concept of religion having two dimensions, one of which is concerned with the spiritual aspects and remains essentially unchanged, whereas the other is concerned with man’s material (i.e. also social) existence at a particular time and therefore differs considerably from one religion to another. 354. “Abdu’l-Baha says that ‘the primary purpose in revealing the Divine Law’

is: first, ‘happiness in the after life’, and then, at a more

secular level, ‘civilization and the refinement of character in this’ (Secret, p. 46; see also pp. 59f.). 355. Perhaps the best summary of the paradigm shift associated with the salvational goal of the unity of mankind is that provided by Shoghi Effendi in World Order, pp. 42ff.: “Let there be no mistake. The principle of the Oneness of Mankind—the pivot round which all the teachings of Baha’u’llah revolve—is no mere outburst of ignorant emotionalism or an expression of vague and pious hope. Its appeal is not to be merely identified with a reawakening of the spirit of brotherhood and good-will among men, nor does it aim solely at the fostering of harmonious collaboration among individual peoples and nations . . . Its message is applicable not only to the individual, but concerns itself primarily with the nature of those essential relationships that must bind all the states and

756

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Bahd

law is the death-knell of eternal life, and with their decided inclination towards religious anarchy, order and institutions mark

the end of all religion.57 Salvation, by contrast, is the sole pre-

serve of free spirituality and spontaneous, intuitive guidance by

supernatural powers.358

nations as members of one human family. It does not constitute merely the enunciation of an ideal, but stands inseparably associated with an institution adequate to embody its truth, demonstrate its validity, and perpetuate its influence. It implies an organic change in the structure of present-day society, a change such as the world has not yet experienced ... It calls for no less than the reconstruction and the demilitarization of the whole civilized world—a world organically unified in all the essential aspects of its life, its political machinery, its spiritual aspiration, its trade and finance, its script and language, and yet infinite in the diversity of the national characteristics of its federated units . . . It represents the consummation of human evolution—an evolution that has had its earliest beginnings in the birth of family life, its subsequent development in the achievement of tribal solidarity, leading in turn to the constitution of the city-state, and expanding later into the institution of independent and sovereign nations. The principle of the Oneness of Mankind, as proclaimed by Baha’u’llah, carries with it no more and no less than a solemn assertion that attainment to this final stage in this stupendous evolution is not only necessary but inevitable, that its realization is fast approaching, and that nothing short of a power that is born of God can succeed in establishing it...’ 356.

For discussion see Schaefer, above, pp. 142ff.

357.

This is intensified by a tendency to think in contrasting catego-

ries. White’s world-view, in particular, is strongly dualistic, despite the

lip-service she pays to universalism (as in Appendix, p. 4). Both in terms of ideology and in relation to her fellow human beings, she evidently discerns only good and evil. What she accepts or rejects in a particular instance is changeable, but her fundamentally dualist approach remains constant. While prior to 1912 it was the ‘rich’, the ‘exploiters’, whom

she regarded as her ideological enemies (see Labyrinth, pp. 110ff.; Questioned Will, pp. 15, 19)—material needs being the most important—from the 1920s to 1940s it was ‘Bolshevism’ and the sectarianism of organized religiosity that became the object of her enmity (Enemy, pp. 15ff., 27ff.; Labyrinth, pp. 18f.). 358. Questioned Will, pp. 51f., Enemy, pp. 113f.,; Labyrinth, pp. 39ff., 106-109.

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Chapter 11 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

However, even White and Zimmer could not fail to concede that Baha’u’llah called for the establishment of “Houses of

Justice’359 and that initial steps in this direction were taken in North America under the guidance of ‘Abdu’l-Baha.3® This being the case, how could White and Zimmer continue to fight against these institutions? They did so by employing a concep-

tual trick, saying that although Baha’u’llah and ‘Abdu’1-Baha had, of course, spoken of the “House of Justice’, these statements

referred to the distant future.3°! These institutions, they argued, were not to come into being until all the people of the world had become Baha’is. By using definitions that are clearly contradict

the explicit texts of the scripture and the clear commandments

359.

See, for example, Kitab-i-Aqdas 21, 22, 30, 42, 48, 49; Tablets

3:24, 25, 27; 6:29, 34; 7:19, 22, 30; 8:52, 58-61, 63, 78. 360. For a survey of the early history of the Baha’i communities in North America see Peggy Caton, ‘A History of the Sacramento Baha’i Community,

1912-1991’, in SBB 6, pp. 241ff.; Deb Clark, ‘The Baha’is

of Baltimore, 1898-1990’, ibid. pp. 111ff.; S. Roger Dahl, ‘A History of the Kenosha L. Herrmann,

Baha’i Community, 1897-1980’, ibid. pp. 1ff.; Duane ‘The Baha’i Faith in Kansas, 1897-1947’, ibid. pp. 67ff.;

Richard Hollinger, ‘Ibrahim George Kheiralla and the Baha’i Faith in America’, SBB 2, pp. 94-133; idem, ‘Baha’i Communities in the West, 1897-1992’, SBB 6, pp. viiff.; William C. van den Hoonaard, ‘The De-

velopment and Decline of an Early Baha’i Community: Saint John, New Brunswick, Canada, 1910-1925’, ibid. pp. 217ff.; Smith, The Babi and Baha’i Religions, Part 3, ch. 7; Robert H. Stockman, The Bahd’i Faith in America. Vol. 1: Origins 1892-1900, Wilmette, Ill., 1985; idem, The

Baha’i Faith in America. Vol. 2: Early Expansion, 1900-1912, Oxford, 1995; Will C. van den Hoonard, The Origins of the Baha’i Community

of Canada, 1898-1948, Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1996. 361. ‘That is, when the majority of the peoples of the world become Bahais through deeds, they will naturally want to vote for the laws which Baha’o’llah and Abdul Baha have outlined for the economic readjustment of the affairs of the world. This is as follows: In each country of the world there will be established, by universal vote, what will

be known as Houses of justice. These will take the place of our senates and parliaments of the world’ (Appendix, p. 9).

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The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha

of Baha’u’llah,3% they attempted to strip the Baha’i Faith of its political and organizational aspects and defer them indefinitely. Although, White and Zimmer conceded, some kind of structural order will inevitably be required at some point in the distant future once the world is united—they at least seem to have accepted this as part of the goal of the ‘oneness of humanity —the Baha’i community itself, they argued, has no need for any such institutions. Any type of religious organization is, in

their view, per se ‘sectarian’ ,>®> ‘narrow’, particular,3°4 the ex-

pression of a ‘clan conception’. Freedom of conscience is, in their opinion, incompatible with the principle of obedience to

an organization.3© In any case, the duty to obey, they asserted, was owed solely to the Manifestation.*°” At best, ‘Spiritual Assemblies’ might legitimately be established on a completely

voluntary basis in order to coordinate the propagation of the Faith and to correspond with other Baha’is, but this was not a requirement>® and the ‘Spiritual Assemblies’ had nothing to do with the ‘Houses of Justice’.36? Baha’u’llah, Zimmer claimed,

‘says nothing of “institutions of a world redeeming order” ’,>7° 362. ‘The Lord hath ordained that in every city a House of Justice be established wherein shall gather counsellors to the number of Baha’ (Baha’u’llah, Kitab-i-Aqdas 30). 363. Enemy, p. 211. 364. Appendix, p. 5. 365. ibid. pp. 4, 7; Enemy, p. 80. 366. Appendix, p. 7; Enemy, p. 80. 367. Shoghism, p. 41. 368. Appendix, p. 8. 369. ibid. p. 10. 370. ‘They whom God hath endued with insight will readily recognize that the precepts laid down by God constitute the highest means for the maintenance of order in the world and the security of its peoples’ (Baha’u’llah, Kitab-i-Aqdas 2). ‘The world’s equilibrium hath been upset through the vibrating influence of this most great, this new World Order. Mankind’s ordered life hath been revolutionized through the agency of this unique, this wondrous System—the like of which mortal

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Chapter 11\¢ Ulrich Gollmer

and neither does ‘Abdu’l-Baha.37! Is not the Baha’i Faith ‘the Spirit of this Age’?372 Yet how, they ask in polemical tone, can spirit be organized? Being a Baha’i is synonymous with being conscious of the oneness of humanity—but “how can a state of

consciousness be organized?’373 In her efforts to defame

the community’s

institutions,

White went even further. Completely distorting the historical facts,374 she asserted that the first ‘Spiritual Assemblies’ in the United States had been established by opponents of “Abdu’]-

Baha.37> She even went so far as to make the absurd claim that the ‘Bahai organization’

was really pursuing the policies of

Kheiralla and Muhammad-‘Ali.37° In doing so, she overlooked the fact that it was “Abdu’l-Baha himself who had instructed that elections

should be held for the first Spiritual Assem-

blies.377 Zimmer also saw the developing order of the community as ‘a complete turnabout of the Baha’i religion’37® and a

eyes have never witnessed’ (ibid. 181). “Whatever is sent down from the heaven of the Will of God is the means for the establishment of order in the world and the instrument for promoting unity and fellowship among its peoples’ (Baha’u’llah, Tablets 6:26). 371. Shoghism, pp. 107f. 372. Labyrinth, p. 249. 373.

Enemy, p. 24.

374. The only event she can refer to is the formation in 1899 of the first Baha’i institution in the United States, a seven-member body founded

in Kenosha,

Wisconsin,

where

Ibrahim

Kheiralla was

active

(Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 260). On the history of the Baha’i institutions of the United States see above, p. 758, note 360.

375. Enemy, pp. 35, 208. 376. On this subject see Richard Hollinger, ‘Ibrahim George Kheiralla and the Baha’i Faith in America’, in SBB 2, pp. 94-133. 377. A report on the election of the very first Spiritual Assembly (in Teheran) in the year 1899 appears in Taherzadeh, Revelation, vol. 4, pp. 290, 293, 311f. 378. Shoghism, p. 13.

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The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha

‘direct contradiction to the commentary and explanations . . . by

Abdul-Baha’ 37? Anyone who is even moderately versed in the scripture and history of the Baha’i Faith will soon realize how bizarre

and fanciful these assertions are. It is therefore hardly surprising that they did not meet with any response within the Baha’i community. The origin and structure of the order of the com-

munity are clearly and distinctly set out in the scripture.3®° As well as the numerous texts by Baha’u’llah in which the institution of “Houses of Justice’ (sing. Baytu’l-‘adl) is established and its functions described,3*! there are also countless refer-

ences to this in the writings of “Abdu’l-Baha. A text published as early as 1909, for instance, disproves White’s assertion that the ‘Spiritual Assemblies’ have nothing to do with the ‘Houses of Justice’ intended by Baha’u’llah and provides several reasons why these bodies should (provisionally) be known by a

different name.?82 ‘Abdu’l-Baha expressly called upon the believers to establish Spiritual Assemblies.*83 He conducted lengthy and detailed correspondence with the new bodies.3*4 He revealed special prayers for Spiritual Assembly meetings.3*° He affirmed that he was ‘in ideal communication with any Spiritual

Assembly’ and that he and they were ‘linked by everlasting ties’;386 he assured the Spiritual Assemblies that they ‘are aided

379.

ibid. p. 15.

380.

For a detailed evaluation see Gollmer, Gottesreich, ch. 11.

381.

See above, pp. 690ff.

382.

‘Abdu’l-Baha, Tablets, p. 6. The main reason given for this pro-

visional name of ‘Spiritual Assembly’ is the as yet immature state of

these bodies (see Shoghi Effendi, God Passes By, p. 331, World Order,

pp. 6f.; Baha'i Administration, pp. 20, 37, 39). 383. Selections 38:5. 384. e.g. ibid. 37, 39, 40, 41. 385. e.g. ibid. 37:5; 42:5. 386.

ibid. 46:1.

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Chapter 11\¢ Ulrich Gollmer

by the Spirit of God’, that he himself is ‘their defender’, and that God ‘spreadeth His Wings’ over them3®’ and is ‘their supporter, their helper, their inspirer’ 788 He gave detailed instructions about the prerequisites for their work. The Assemblies must open themselves to the divine and ‘reflect the lights of the

heavenly Kingdom’ .38° Their progress is dependent upon their ‘unity and agreement’ .39° A whole series of Tablets (letters) are concerned with the spiritual, functional and organizational conditions for the work of a Spiritual Assembly,>%! in particular with the art of consultation, one of ‘the most potent instruments

conducive to the tranquillity and felicity of the people’.3?? Functioning Spiritual Assemblies are ‘the most effective of all instruments for establishing unity and harmony’ and for estab-

lishing ‘the Paradise of the All-Glorious’.393 ‘Abdu’l-Baha praises them as ‘the potent sources of the progress of man’3% and instructs the believers to turn to the Spiritual Assembly for advice

and to obey its decisions so that each individual will not simply act ‘after his own judgement (and) will follow his own desire

and .. . do harm to the Cause’ .395 White and Zimmer both ignored statements such as these

and clung stubbornly to their private conception of the Baha’i Faith as an unorganized spiritual movement—contrary to the express word of ‘Abdu’l-Baha, although they claimed to refer to him. The institutional and legal aspects of the Will and Testament are anything but an unexpected innovation; the Will and

387. Quoted from God Passes By, p. 332. 388. Selections 40:2. 389. Promulgation, p. 183. 390. ibid. Selections 44. 391. e.g. ibid. 43-45; Baha'i Consultation, 11ff., 19, 20, 23 (pp. 3, 5, 6). 392. ‘Abdu’l-Baha, quoted from ibid. 14 (p. 3). 393. Selections 41:2. 394. Quoted from God Passes By, p. 332. 395. Consultation 8 (p. 2).

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The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Bahd

Testament of “Abdu’l-Baha and the subsequent development of

the Baha’i community merely brought to the fore those aspects of ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s religious doctrine that White and Zimmer consciously neglected and suppressed. This becomes even more

obvious when “Abdu’l-Baha’s testament is seen in the context of religious history.3°° The Will and Testament is symbolic of an evolutionary concept of community development that White and Zimmer both refused to accept. To them it was irrelevant that this concept had been foreseen in the scripture from the very outset and was supported by the community itself. Although their struggle for a divergent religious concept understandably met with hardly any response within the community, their anti-institutional attitude was greeted with considerable sympathy outside it—particularly so, strangely enough, among

representatives of religious institutions.397 IX. ON THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE AND STRINGENCY OF THE ARGUMENTS

The arguments used by White and Zimmer in support of their divergent concept and in opposition to the “Bahai organization’

basically amount to a conspiracy theory. Political conspiracy theories usually come into being in order to justify an aggressive enemy image, to provide an excuse for a personal failure or to explain why a prediction has not been fulfilled. This frequently takes the form of a dualist explanatory model whereby all relevant relations are reduced to the categories friend or en-

emy, good or evil, light or darkness—ancient ManichaeanGnostic thought structures that constantly reappear in ever new

guises. Such attitudes do not allow for discriminating analysis

396.

See above, pp. 680ff.

397.

Hutten, for instance, devotes a sub-chapter to the ‘Protest against

Confessionalism in the Baha’i Religion’ (in Seher, Griibler, Enthusiasten, 11th edn. 1968, pp. 317-323), which he renamed ‘The Protest of the Free Baha’is’ in the 12th edn. 1982 (pp. 822ff.).

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and certainly not for self-relativization. Shades and nuances cannot be perceived through these spectacles; everything is seen as black or white, for or against.

Similarly, White and Zimmer tried to use their respective conspiracy theories to explain why the Baha’i Faith was developing in a way that was anathema to them. At the same time, they attempted to justify the failure of their own efforts. Why did their personal concept of the ‘truth’ fail to take root? Why did the Baha’i Faith, which they themselves regarded as the Will of God, the ‘spirit of the age’, take on a structure that di-

verged from what they considered the only legitimate form? These questions cry out for explanations. Yet White and Zimmer escaped this dilemma by means of a dualistic projection: their failure must be due to a huge conspiracy! They interpreted their own actions—as is typical in dualist-gnostic thought—as part of the eternal struggle of good over evil. What is presented is not reality but, rather, a gnostic projection. The ‘Bahai organization’ thus becomes the antithesis of all that is portrayed

as desirable and worthy. Zimmer lamented ‘a complete turnabout’3?8 in the Baha’i Faith. The ‘Baha’i organization’, he complained,

‘has turned into an instrument

of power

poli-

tics’,39° whose representatives are motivated by a ‘desire for might and money’,*° and are corrupt,4°! while the mass of the Baha’is are ‘gullible’4°? and ‘struck blind’,4° even ‘stone-

398. Shoghism, p. 13. 399. ibid. 400. ibid. pp. 111, 55, 85f., 91. 401. “They all sing the song of the one who pays them!’ (ibid. p. 126). Zimmer deliberately overlooks the fact that positions of office in community institutions are, with a few very labour-intensive exceptions, entirely voluntary.

402. ibid. p. 115. 403. ibid. p. 123. 764

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha

blind’.4°4 The lives of the believers, he alleged, are ‘complicated and limited’,4 there being ‘prohibition of free assertion of opinion’*°¢ and the individual conscience being subject to group constraints.407 In Zimmer’s view, ‘true triumphs attain obstinacy and lack of compromise with the Administration Bahai’ [sic]*°8 and the image he portrayed of the community was

one of the ‘darkest Middle Age’,*? ‘regression into the Age of the Inquisition’,4!° even of ‘spiritual concentration camps’.4!! Similar images were presented by White*!? and gleefully taken up by Ficicchia.*!3 It is hardly surprising that someone who regards any kind of religious organization as a deadly sin should see a ‘strictly regimented . . . system’4!4 even in the order of the community of Baha’u’llah. In a continuation of this pattern of projected images, real

successes achieved by the community are minimized, or presented by these individuals as merely temporary triumphs of evil over good. In order not to be discouraged, White and Zimmer deluded themselves with their unshakeable belief in their large numbers of ‘fellow disputants’4!> of whom, they were 404. ibid. p. 110. 405. ibid. p. 119. 406. ibid. p. 118. 407. ibid. 408. ibid. p. 119. 409. ibid. p. 112. 410. ibid. p. 47. 411. ibid. p. 84. 412. As, for instance, when she wrongly asserts that the individual must sacrifice his own conscience to the decisions of the Spiritual Assembly (Enemy, p. 47), that the individual believer is completely subject to the religious collective (p. 49) and must obey the ‘dictate’ of the institutions without reserve (p. 80). 413.

See Schaefer, above, pp. 209-224.

414. 415.

Baha’ismus, p. 28; see also Enemy, p. 80. Shoghism, page preceding the Foreword.

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Chapter 1] « Ulrich Gollmer

convinced, ‘especially there must be many . . . in Persia’.4!© No amount of facts could cause them to waver in this belief and Ficicchia,*!7 of course, gladly presents this delusion as a fact.*!8 In conclusion, they predicted the demise of the ‘Bahai organ-

ization’,*!9 asserting that it was ‘on the journey into the abyss’.42° The signs of its stagnation, indeed its gradual extinction were, they alleged, visible everywhere.*?! What is surprising, on the other hand, is that scholars in the field of religious studies and ecclesiastical institutions

should have been taken in by these projections. Knowing the

416. ibid. p. 113. 417. Baha’ismus, pe232.

p. 301;

Materialdienst

15/16,

Issue

38

(1975),

418. This also serves to justify the disproportionate attention paid to the assertions of White, Zimmer and Ficicchia in some—mostly ecclesiastical—publications (e.g. Hutten, Seher, Griibler, Enthusiasten, (see above, p. 763, note 397)). Similarly, Oswald Eggenberger (Die Kirchen, Sondergruppen und religidsen Vereinigungen.. Ein Handbuch, Zurich, 4th edn. 1986, p. 212) devotes an article to the ‘Free Baha’is’ that is almost as long as that on the ‘Baha’is’. 419. Enemy, p. 211. 420. Shoghism, p. 11. 421. e.g. ibid. p. 66. Ficicchia speaks of ‘genetically predetermined stagnation’ (Baha ’ismus, p. 432). Such predictions are nothing new. In the foreword to his book Bahd’ism: Its Origins, History, and Teachings (New York-London,

1931), Miller, who was working at the time as a

Presbyterian missionary in Mashhad, wrote that: ‘All impartial observers of Baha’ism in Persia are agreed that here in the land of its birth this religion . . . is now steadily losing ground . . . It is only a matter of time until this strange movement,

like Manichaeism

and Mazdakism

before

it, shall be known only to students of history’ (p. 9). Forty-three years later, however, he implicitly withdrew this prognosis by stating in the conclusion of his book The Baha’i Faith: Its History and Teachings (South Pasadena, 1974): ‘Whoever peruses the thousands of pages of the thirteen large volumes of The Baha’i World will be impressed by the fact that the Baha’i Faith is indeed a world faith’ (p. 349).

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The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha

experiences of early Christianity, they, of all people, ought to be

alert to such gnostic thought structures and attacks.422 Although both White and Zimmer presented conspiracy theories, the specific form used was different in each case. White believed Mirza Muhammad-‘Ali to be behind the trend towards organized religiosity and also behind the Will and Testament. She regarded Shoghi Effendi more or less as Muhammad-*Ali’s puppet whom he used only because he could not assume leadership of the Baha’i Faith himself, since his enmity towards “Abdu’l-Baha had thoroughly discredited him

in the eyes of the community.423 How was he, then, asked White, to regain his influence and pull the strings from behind the curtain? This, she surmised, would be possible only by finding a person who was completely above suspicion to take over the leadership of the community as his representative while remaining unquestioningly loyal to his policies. Muhammad-‘Ali therefore ‘consented to reign indirectly

through Shoghi Effendi’.424 White paints a highly conspiratorial scenario with the group around Muhammad-‘Ali secretly pav-

ing the way for the “Bahai organization’ during the lifetime of ‘Abdu’l-Baha, at first through ‘secret agents of Mohammed-

Ali’.425 Their real aim was ‘wealth and power’, and the sole

422. The struggle against Gnosticism continued throughout centuries of the early history of the Church. Especially in the second century Kurt Ahland (Geschichte der Christenheit, vol. 1, p. 97) considers that there was a ‘real danger of Gnosticism resulting in the dissolution of Christianity from within’. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the Christian dogmas took on their classical form in the process of ‘the conflict with Gnosticism’, which explains why ‘the churches have always been interested in their opponents’ (on this subject as a whole: Petr Pokorny, ‘Die gnostische Soteriologie in theologischer und soziologischer Sicht’, in Jacob Taubes (ed.), Religionstheorie und Politische Theologie, vol. 2, pp. 154ff.). 423. Enemy, pp. 86f., 124ff. 424. ibid. p. 124.

425. ibid. pp. 36, 210.

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Chapter 11 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer means

of achieving this was

the institutionalization

of the

Baha’i Faith.426 According to White, ‘Abdu’l-Baha became a tragic figure, probably suspecting the direction that develop-

ments were taking, but unable to resist the tide.42” She seems not to have been in the least disconcerted by the fact that this

did not correspond to the image of ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s personality presented elsewhere. Where there are conspirators, there must, naturally, also be

people who are taken in by the conspiracy. Those who supported the community institutions were therefore depicted by White as ‘blind tools unaware that they were in reality follow-

ing the policies of Mohammed-Ali’

[sic].428 The death of

‘Abdu’l-Baha marked the point at which the conspirators were

able to reap the harvests of their years of underground efforts and to set the Baha’i community on a new course, that of

Muhammad-‘Ali.429 That this ludicrous construction corresponds neither to the

historical facts nor to the clear statements made in Baha’i scripture is obvious. One of White’s key assumptions was that

of a conspiracy between the family of ‘Abdu’l-Baha*3° and Muhammad-‘Ali.43! Since she could not completely overlook Muhammad-‘Ali’s attacks on Shoghi Effendi, she was com-

426. ibid. p. 36. 427. In this connection, she speaks explicitly of ‘the martyrdom of ‘Abdu’1-Baha’ (ibid. pp. 16f.; see also Questioned Will, pp. 30, 37f.). 428. Enemy, p. 36. Ficicchia even goes so far as to depict the institutions themselves as the conspirators, while the mass of the believers allow themselves to be led by the nose, supporting and propagating in good faith a movement about whose real character they have been systematically deceived (e.g. Baha’ismus, pp. 26, 149, 188, 251, 253, 258f., 282f., 288, 404f. where the same assertions are made again and again; on this subject see Schaefer, above, p. 329). 429.

Enemy, pp. 36, 124f., 210.

430. From whom ibid. pp. 125f. 431. ibid.

she excepts only ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s sister and wife,

768

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha

pelled to play them down and, contrary to all the historical evi-

dence,*#? to dismiss them as eye-wash, as a mock fight designed to cover up the conspiracy.433 Moreover, White was convinced that the very fact that the Baha’i Faith was organizing itself

constituted covenant-breaking,*34 irrespective of the specific individuals involved.*3° In her view, anyone who participated in the institutionalization and legal formation of the Baha’i community, or who failed to resist these tendencies, was counted among the lost souls. Nothing could shake her condemnation of all organizational endeavours, even ‘if an angel from heaven

comes down’ with a message to the contrary.43° She implicitly turns this rigoristic attitude of anti-institutionalism against ‘Abdu’l-Baha himself, for she states that ‘even if the instructions in the will are authentic’, her private understanding of

what he said during his lifetime would always have absolute priority.437 However strong her feelings towards ‘Abdu’l-Baha, her ultimate loyalty was to her own ideological premises alone. Each new allegation or attack launched by White is nothing but a variation on her basic thesis, namely that the ‘Bahai 432. See above, pp. 70Sff. 433. Enemy, p. 126. However, what White presents as the ‘most overwhelming proof’ (Enemy, pp. 126, 163) of complicity between Shoghi Effendi and Muhammad-‘Ali is even more bizarre. In the yearbook The Baha’i World, vol. II, p. 207), of which Shoghi Effendi was

editor-in-chief, one of the works listed under publications about the Baha’i Faith (Part Four: ‘References to the Baha’i Movement in nonBaha’i works’) is Samuel Graham Wilson’s Bahaism and Its Claims (New York, 1915), a book in which vehement attacks are launched against

‘Abdu’l-Baha.

For

White,

that is sufficient

proof that it is

Shoghi Effendi’s intention to defame ‘Abdu’l-Baha! That despite all its faults and its unjustified criticism, Wilson’s book must be counted among the literature concerning the Baha’i Faith and should not be ignored, does not occur to her.

434. See Schaefer, above, pp. 224ff. 435. Enemy, pp. 211f. 436. ibid. p. 95. 437. ibid. pp. 94f.

769

Chapter 11 ¢ Ulrich Gollmer organization’ is the worst enemy, the gravedigger of the Baha’i Faith. She is not concerned with verifying this thesis by reference to the scripture or historical facts. She has only one aim in mind: to find allies who will support her in her struggle against organized religiosity and for a Baha’i Faith free of legal structures and institutions. Hermann Zimmer’s intention is identical, although he regards Shoghi Effendi himself as the enemy. While he also sus-

pects complicity on the part of Muhammad-‘Ali,43® he considers Shoghi Effendi the driving force. He accuses him of having forged the Will and Testament himself. The logic used by Zimmer in raising these allegations is in

need of brief explanation. Zimmer had taken early retirement in order to write his book.43? He saw it as providential that he had recently come across a popular-scientific work describing the

greatest forgeries in the history of the world.44° Fascinated, he engrossed himself in the book. He was particularly interested in

the ‘Donation of Constantine’*4! because this was a forgery that

438. Following in White’s footsteps, he presented Muhammad-‘Ali’s attacks on Shoghi Effendi as mere ‘sham fights’, but carefully avoided going into any detail on this issue (Shoghism, p. 44).

439. ibid. p. 125. 440. ibid. 441. An 8th-century forgery purporting to be a letter of Constantine the Great to Pope Sylvester I ‘giving him supreme authority, not only in his ecclesiastical position in the Church, but also over the lands of western Europe . . . this document must be adjudged the most successful and influential forgery ever perpetrated, since it held undisputed authority for more than 500 years’ (Herbert Waddams, The Church and Man's Struggle for Unity, p.98). In it, Constantine allegedly grants the Pope ‘the power and glorious dignity and strength and honour of the Empire, and we ordain and decree that he shall have rule as well over the four principal sees, Antioch, Alexandria, Constantinople and Jerusalem, as also over all the churches of God in all the world . . . and according to his decision shall all matters be settled which shall be taken in hand for the service of God or the confirmation of the faith of Christians .. . We convey to the oft-mentioned and blessed Silvester, universal pope, both

770

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Bahd

was to the advantage of organized religion. He soon became convinced that the Donation of Constantine was the direct

model for the forgery of the Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’lBaha! Had not Shoghi Effendi studied history at Oxford? Was it not true that the British Library in London was famed for the size of its collection? Surely it must contain all the documents and analyses relating to the Donation of Constantine! Shoghi Effendi must have studied these in great detail and modelled the

testament on them.*4? His suspicions quickly turned into certainty. He only needed to prove them. He found twenty-five

points*43 which he considered clear indications of a parallel construction of the two documents—however, it is an open question whether anyone other than the author might reach the

same conclusion.*44 Point number nineteen is especially curious. He discovered that thirteenth-century heretics did not doubt

the authenticity of the Constitutum Constantini or Donatio Con-

our palace, as preferment, and likewise all provinces, palaces and districts of the city of Rome and Italy and of the regions of the West; and, bequeathing them to the power and sway of him and the pontiffs, his successors, we do (by means of fixed imperial decision through this our divine, sacred and authoritative sanction) determine and decree that the same be placed at his disposal, and do lawfully grant it as a permanent possession to the holy Roman Church’ (in Henry Bettenson, Documents of the Christian Church, p.138ff.). 442. 443. 444.

ibid. p. 67. ibid. pp. 19-30. A few examples will suffice to demonstrate the character of this

‘evidence’: 1. Both documents are long; 2. ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s Will and Testament is divided into three parts (the third being, according to

Zimmer, mere repetition), while the Donation of Constantine has two parts; 3. both documents are signed; 4. Zimmer knows of no references to the Guardianship elsewhere than in the testament (see above, pp. 705ff.)—the Donation of Constantine was unknown until the middle of the eighth century; 5. an English translation of the Will and Testament was read in mid February, about two and a half months after the death of ‘Abdu’l-Baha and a month after the official opening of the Will and Testament—Constantine’s alleged Donation was initially not distributed; etc.

Tid

Chapter 11\+ Ulrich Gollmer stantini. According to Zimmer, this is paralleled by the fact that Ahmad Sohrab did not doubt the authenticity of the Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha, even though he was also a sworn opponent of the path pursued by Shoghi Effendi and an outspoken critic of his interpretation and application of Baha’i doc-

trine.445 Thus, the express recognition of the Will and Testament by an opponent of Shoghi Effendi—despite knowing about the forgery allegation—is seen by Zimmer as ‘proof’ of the forgery theory. Irrespective of their different views concerning the role of Shoghi Effendi, Zimmer and White present the same basic hypothesis. Both suspect a large-scale conspiracy involving all members of the family and all the influential believers in the

Holy Land.44° They are convinced that a well-prepared coup d’état must have been carried out by the “‘institutionalists’ who aimed to subvert the character of the Baha’i Faith.

Apart from the fact that the scripture and all the historical facts clearly indicate that White and Zimmer were wrong,**7 it is highly improbable that such a united conspiracy would have been feasible, given the differences in interests and aims which

now rapidly began to emerge. Moreover, the conspiracy thesis assumes that the will and the criminal energy existed to commit conscious fraud by forging a religious document, i.e. part of what the community regarded as sacred scripture, an expression

of the Will of God.*48 Is it really conceivable that not a single

445. 446.

Shoghism, pp. 26f. Zimmer, in particular, sets great store by a ‘reconstruction’

of

events.

447. See above, pp. 705ff. 448. Interpreting the statement in Qur’an 4:48. ‘Among the Jews are those who displace the words of their scripture’, Baha’u’llah states: ‘Verily by “perverting” the text is not meant that which these foolish and abject souls have fancied, even as some maintain that Jewish and Christian divines have effaced from the Book such verses as extol and magnify the countenance of Muhammad, and instead hereof have in-

772

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Bahd

one of the believers participating in such a conspiracy would have felt pangs of conscience and turned against it, or at least

have broken his silence some time later?449 If such a conspiracy

had existed, then those who had opposed ‘Abdu’I-Baha before and bitterly opposed Shoghi Effendi afterwards must also have been involved in it. They must also have kept the secret about

the conspiracy—despite the fact that they could have used it to deal the decisive blow against Shoghi Effendi at the time when he was slowly gaining ground and they were threatened with defeat. Thus, we can only conclude that this hypothesis is altogether preposterous and utterly ludicrous. It is not surprising

that the Baha’i institutions have hitherto*>° simply ignored White’s and Zimmer’s attacks and refrained, out of mercy, from

refuting them. Someone who argues in this way is hardly likely to be satisfied with any response.*>! serted the contrary. How utterly vain and false are these words! Can a man who believeth in a book, and deemeth it to be inspired by God, mu-

tilate it? . . . Nay, rather, by corruption of the text is meant that in which all Muslim divines are engaged today, that is the interpretation of God’s holy Book in accordance with their idle imaginings and vain desires’ (Kitab-i-Iqdn 93 (p. 86), emphasis added). 449. There is a prominent example of this dating from the lifetime of ‘Abdu’l-Baha: the letter ‘to the Baha’i World’ written on 4 February 1903 by Mirza Badi‘u’llah, in which he disclosed the machinations of

his brother Mirzé Muhammad-‘Ali against ‘Abdu’]-Baha. The English translation by Ameen Ullah Fareed (Aminu’llah Farid) was published under the title An Epistle to the Bahai World in Chicago in 1907; reprinted in Enemy, pp. 129-163. 450. With the exception of a few letters dealing with specific issues, such as those from the Universal House of Justice dated 2 October 1974, 23 December 1974, and 23 March 1975, extracts of which have been

published in The Power of the Covenant, Part 2, edited by the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Canada, pp. 18ff. 451. Nevertheless, Hutten complains in 12th edn. (published posthumously in 1982 and edited by the EZW) of his book Seher, Gribler, Enthusiasten (p. 823) that Zimmer ‘did not receive a response’ and accuses the Baha’is of secreting Zimmer’s book; he even goes so far as to

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Chapter 1] ¢ Ulrich Gollmer

X. CONCLUSION White and even Zimmer—at a time when they perhaps did not have ready access to the actual sacred texts—rebelled against something that appeared to them to be the ‘legal institutionalization’ of the original religious impulse and was therefore suspect (as well as being contrary to their personal religious tem-

perament).*>? Ficicchia, on the other hand, certainly did know about the crucial importance of the concept of the Covenant and, hence, the Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha for the self-image of the Baha’is and for their vision of human history as proceeding towards peace and justice. His cunning revival of the forgery allegation is a conscious, calculated attack on the foundations of the Baha’i Faith. It is part of his threat addressed to the community’s leading institutions ‘that you will from now on have me as an embittered enemy who will fight you with all

possible means at every opportunity’.*°3 The publicity achieved over the past few years has shown how successful this strategy

has been thanks to the assistance of Ficicchia’s influential allies.454 Whether this success continues depends partly on the question of the values to which these allies are ultimately com-

mitted.45> allege that ‘A Bahda’i Index was established and the reading of critical literature forbidden’ (ibid. p. 822). 452. On this attitude, which is based on the Protestant aversion to law, see Schaefer, above, pp. 142ff.

453.

From letter dated 5 April 1978 to the Universal House of Justice.

454.

If Zimmer is to be believed, ‘Kurt Hutten’, the former ‘Head of

the Protestant Centre for Questions of Ideology (EZW) saw it as very opportune when a young Swiss man, F. Ficicchia, who had belonged to the Baha’i group in Zurich for a short time, presented him with a critical manuscript on “Baha’ism, World Religion of the Future?”, and he passed it on unamended to the publishers Quell-Verlag in Stuttgart’ (Wiederkunft, pp. 61f.). 455. A hopeful sign is provided by the essay by Manfred Hutter, a scholar in the field of religious studies, that appeared in Materialdienst 6, Issue 58 (1st June 1995), pp. 172-178: “Der Kitab-i-Aqdas. Kern-

774

The Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha

But, apart from this public resonance, what has become of

the so-called ‘schism’,*°° the ‘serious’ and, as Hutten puts it, ‘ongoing . . . conflicts’4>7 surrounding the Will and Testament of “Abdu’l-Baha? White, the inventor of the forgery theory, gradually lost interest in the Baha’i Faith and became attracted to other religious currents that corresponded better to her emo-

tional, antinomian concept of religion.4°8 The ‘Free Baha’is’ constantly referred to by Zimmer are—as even Ficicchia admits**°—a fictional group that exists only on paper. Zimmer was, in fact, a solitary figure struggling alone on behalf of his obsession.*® Ficicchia, too, is a lone fighter whose attacks have

had no resonance within the community,*¢! although they have had considerable support from the Evangelische Zentralstelle

stiick der Lehren der Baha’i-Religion’ (‘The Kitab-i-Aqdas. Doctrinal nucleus of the Baha’i Faith’), which is characterized by deep knowledge of the subject and an attitude of fairness, and which is informative even

for Baha’is who are well-versed in their religion. 456.

The term used, for instance, by Flasche, LThK, vol. 1, p. 40.

457.

Hutten, Seher, Griibler, Enthusiasten, 12th edn. p. 803.

458. According to Miller (The Baha’i Faith, p. 262), White became a follower of the Indian guru Mehr Baba. 459. Baha’ismus, p. 378. 460. This is clear not only from his written admission that the ‘Bahai World Union’ ‘practically no longer existed’ after 1937 (Shoghism, p. 108) but also from Zimmer’s oral statement at the Baha’i information stand at the Frankfurt Book Fair in October 1979 that all surviving members of the former ‘Bahai World Union’ had returned to the Baha’i community, and that he was the only remaining vestige of the group. 461. For example, when he writes that ‘the division between the “institutionalists” and liberal currents is becoming more and more evident’

(p. 290) this is nothing but a groundless assertion made for the sake of expediency. In the Baha’i Faith—as in any pluralistic community—there are, of course, individuals of varying political temperament. It is, however, characteristic of the Baha’i community that no organizational trends or factions arise from this. The essential instrument of integration in community decision-making when there is a plurality of interests is consultation (see Gollmer, above, pp. 473ff.

775

fiir Weltanschauungsfragen (EZW).46? Today this so-called ‘schism’ does still have an existence, but it is found only in the

virtual reality of Ficicchia’s publication.

462. In Materialdienst 3 (1995) he was once again the ‘expert’ that the EZW entrusted with the task of reviewing Manfred Hutter’s book (Die Baha’i. Geschichte und Lehre einer nachislamischen Weltreligion, Marburg, 1994). However, the article by Manfred Hutter in Materialdienst 6 (1995) (see above, p. 773, note 455) indicates a change in attitude on the part of the EZW. Dr Reinhard Hempelmann, the editor-in-chief of Materialdienst, sent this publication to the German National Baha’i Centre in Hofheim, for which the Baha’is were very grateful. In his accompanying letter of 22 June 1995 he explained the context of the publication of Hutter’s article: ‘It has primarily to do with a revision of the EZW’s image of the Bahai Faith, which has been strongly influenced by Ficicchia. We wished to take account of the new translation of the Kitab and the prospective rebuttal of Ficicchia’s book. We are still awaiting the latter.” The publication of the present work marks the end of this period of waiting.

776

CONCLUSION This book was written in response to a state of affairs that had come to a head after developing over a number of years as a result of a pseudo-academic attack on the faith and on the community of Baha’u’llah. The accusations raised in that work

reached a wide audience through church publications, and for over 15 years the views of its author largely shaped the public perception of the Baha’i Faith in German-speaking Europe, damaging its reputation. This happened, moreover, at a time when the European public was becoming increasingly alarmed at the abundance of new, alternative offers of salvation, some with bizarre practices indeed. From the mid-1980s it was realized that certain groups had managed to build up huge business empires, avoiding taxation by concealing them behind a pseudo-

religious facade. Deep conflicts resulting from the psychological manipulation and economic exploitation of the supporters of

these groups were causes of serious public concern. In most European countries there was public debate on the subject of religious sects. In this emotional atmosphere, religious minori-

ties were subjected to hostile criticism. They were indiscriminately lumped together under the label of ‘sects’ and denounced

as a public threat.

1. This debate led to the setting up of an Enquéte-Commission by the German parliament in 1996 to investigate ‘so-called sects and psychological groups’. The commission has so far produced two reports.

qa

Udo Schaefer

It is not surprising that in this atmosphere—which was al-

ready unpleasant enough for the German Baha’i community— Ficicchia’s systematic disinformation fell on fertile ground. His picture of the Baha’i Faith was one of an authoritarian, cadredominated movement with totalitarian, fascist goals and hege-

monic strivings. In the new federal states of Germany, those of the formerly communist East Germany, the generally anti-religious

climate meant that the Baha’is were especially liable to being categorized among the destructive cults. In particular, the ‘In-

formation Centres on Sects’ run by the churches were responsible for disseminating Ficicchia’s materials, both orally and in print.

More than four years have now elapsed since the Germanlanguage publication of this rebuttal. The publication of this English-language edition provides us with an opportunity to

take stock of the book’s effect so far. Short-term expectations should not, of course, be raised too high. A monograph that has been described as a ‘standard work’, promulgated by the Church, and highly praised by theo-

logical reviewers, that is to be found in most major libraries and is frequently referred to in academic works, will undoubtedly remain influential for a long time to come, especially as no systematic presentation of the Baha’i Faith has yet been published that satisfies academic criteria. Even more damaging than his original monograph were Ficicchia’s two entries in the en-

cyclopaedias* published by Herder-Verlag, which functioned very effectively as vehicles for his disinformation. Even in the editions published after 1995, he continued to present his preposterous theories, retouching them only slightly. Despite having access to the rebuttal, the editors—Catholic theologians— 2. Lexikon der Sekten, Sondergemeinschaften und Weltanschauungen. Fakten, Hintergrtinde, Kldrungen, ed. Hans Gasper, Joachim Miller and Friederike Valentin, Freiburg, 3rd edn. 1991; 4th edn. 1994; Lexikon der Religionen. Phinomene—Geschichte—Ideen, ed. Hans Waldenfels SJ, Freiburg-Basel-Vienna, 1987, 3rd edn. 1996.

778

Conclusion

evidently found it difficult to dispense with Ficicchia as an author. However, in 1999 the editors of the Lexikon der Sekten

replaced Ficicchia’s article on the Baha’i Faith with one by a

competent author.

Nevertheless, effects are already discernible. The publication of Desinformation als Methode has palpably altered the

formerly very unpleasant situation facing the Baha’is. HansGeorg Gadamer’s insight—cited in the Introduction of this book—that ‘the simple fact of being put into writing’ lends ‘especially weighty authority to an argument’? has been fully con-

firmed. Instead of having to admit that they are uninformed of the contents of Ficicchia’s book or are unable to give a spontaneous response to a particular point when confronted with Ficicchia’s assertions, the Baha’is can now at least refer to the fact that the arguments have now been scientifically analysed and refuted.

Especially with regard to the debate on sects mentioned above, the fact that this work could be referred to in response to unjustified allegations has repeatedly been of inestimable value. Within the community, the book has also helped to reduce the level of anxiety when confronted with defamatory presentations of the Baha’i Faith, as well as helping Baha’is to realize

that the high virtue of trust in God (tawakkul) does not mean avoiding every controversy and, like the Mutawakkilin,* leaving the defence of the faith to God and adopting a stance of

silent humility in the face of attack. Dialogue is only possible

3.

Truth and Method, p. 241.

4. Lit.: ‘those who trust in God’, a group of Muslim ascetics who grotesquely exaggerate the ancient religious virtue of trust in God, refusing to take any action in pursuit of their own needs, and leaving everything to God. They apparently ignored the piece of practical advice recorded in Tirmidhi’s collection of traditions whereby a believer who asked the Prophet Muhammad whether he should tie up his camel or pray that it would not run away was told: J’gilhd wa tawakkal—Tie up (your camel) and trust (in God).

779

Udo Schaefer between equals. Interfaith dialogue presupposes mutual respect. Someone who unprotestingly allows himself to be treated without such respect will not find acceptance as a satisfactory partner in dialogue.

Furthermore,

the book

has brought about a greater

readiness among the Baha’is to take a rational approach to the revelation of Baha’u’llah and to reflect critically on their own beliefs. The Protestant Central Office for Questions of Ideology (EZW), which originally initiated and published Ficicchia’s

slanderous work, has published a review of Desinformation als Methode in its monthly journal Materialdienst.’ This review was basically an attempt to justify the EZW’s actions, since it had, after all, been responsible for the publication of an academically worthless book that had caused considerable damage. In this review, Ficicchia was not altogether discarded but the EZW was clearly trying to distance itself from him. The reviewer, Dr theol. habil. Ulrich Dehn, criticized the ‘eloquent

polemics’ that run throughout the book, as well as what he called the “missionary apologetic language’, but he conceded that the authors ‘had spared no pains with regard to the care and

thoroughness of their research’. He speaks of ‘meticulously prepared comprehensive patterns of argumentation and refutation’ and describes my discussion of religious hermeneutics as revealing ‘a wealth of knowledge’ and ‘remarkable erudition’. He welcomes the fact that the opportunity was taken to present fundamental principles, as for instance in Gollmer’s contribution on the prospects for peace and Towfigh’s informative

analysis of the sources. According to Dr Dehn, the contributions made in the book on specific aspects of the Baha’i Faith make

the work ‘interesting and recommendable even for a readership that had not especially been awaiting a rebuttal of Francesco Ficicchia’. His overall judgement is that ‘Ficicchia has indeed

5. 17 (1996), pp. 309ff. 780

Conclusion

not been ignored or . . . hushed up, but has been taken seriously at a high level’.® In a later article,’ Dr Dehn again took up the subject of the EZW’s attitude towards the Baha’is. In this contribution, he

distances himself even more from Ficicchia than in his earlier review, in which he had doubtless felt obliged to be considerate towards his colleague Michael Mildenberger, who had edited Ficicchia’s work. In this article, the reader is not only informed

about Ficicchia’s letter to the Baha’i World Centre in which he referred to himself as an ‘embittered enemy’ of the Baha’is and declared his intention of attacking them ‘with all possible means’, but he also learns of the recently initiated process of dialogue between the EZW and the Baha’is. The Baha’i Faith is referred to in the article as a ‘post-Islamic world religion’. Finally, in January 1996, I accepted an invitation from the reviewer to visit him in his office in Berlin, where talks were held lasting several hours in a remarkably objective, even friendly, atmosphere. Since this meeting, Dr Dehn has participated sev-

eral times in Baha’i events in various Berlin communities. This renunciation of the spirit of confrontation and the striving for objectivity is evident from other experiences, too. Quite a number of the ‘Information Centres on Sects’ who were

given copies of Desinformation als Methode reacted in a very positive way and emphasized that it was their intention to provide an objective presentation of the Baha’i Faith. The extent to which the attitude of the the churches towards the Baha’is has improved—irrespective of all the dogmatic differences—is re-

vealed by the following developments. In the summer of 1998, the renowned Protestant journal Evangelische Kommentare® published a report on the multi-

6. ibid. p. 311. 7. Materialdienst | (1997). 8. Monatsschrift zum Zeitgeschehen (1998), pp. 514 ff.

781

in Kirche und Gesellschaft 9

Udo Schaefer

religious society of Germany, in which representatives of Judaism, Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism wrote about their experiences. The issue also contained a report by a member of the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Germany, Christopher Sprung, concerning the experiences of the Baha’is with

the Christian majority,’ including discussion of the precarious situation brought about through Ficicchia’s publications. In his introduction, the editor-in-chief remarked that: “Now that the Baha’is have succeeded in correcting the erroneous images of them that had been circulating, they have recently gained appreciation from the churches as religious partners.’ Since then, Sprung has been appointed a member of the ‘Inter-faith work-

ing group in the Intercultural Council of Germany’ as a representative of the German Baha’i community. This working group unites representatives of the Catholic and Protestant Churches, the Central Council of Jews, the Central Council of Muslims

and the Chairman of the Buddhist Union of Germany. A member of the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is in Germany, Dr Nicola Towfigh, has been included in the forum “Mainzer Gesprache’ (Mainz Talks), in which representatives of the major religions cooperate at national level. A clear indica-

tion that the German Baha’i community is gradually being divested of its image as a ‘sect’, is the fact that Baha’is are in-

creasingly being invited to speak at religious congresses.!° Change is also evident in the field of comparative religious studies. Three academic reviews have so far been published: by

Prof. Dr Dr Manfred Hutter of the University of Graz in Aus-

tria,!! by Prof. Dr Christian Cannuyer of the Catholic Uni-

9. ibid. 10. See above p. 132ff. 11. Journal of Contemporary Religion, vol. 12.3 (October 1967).

782

Conclusion

versity of Louvain in Belgium,!* and by Prof. Dr Heshmat Moayyad of the University of Chicago.!? The reviewers have confirmed beyond doubt the book’s rank as an academic work. The verdict on the Baha’{ Faith pronounced in his review by the Catholic orientalist Cannuyer is impressive: Sécrété par I’Islam shi‘ite, considéré par les dyatu-llahs de Iran actuel comme une hérésie nuisible, relégué par d’autres au rang de secte, le bahd’isme est en réalité aujourd’hui une religion de dimension universelle qui n’appartient plus 4 la mouvance musulmane. C’est un ‘monothéisme abrahamique’ a4 part entiére: par ses doctrines originales, il mérite |’intérét. Par son message d’amour, sa tolérance et son action humanitaire, il suscite

la sympathie. Par ses nombreux martyrs, en Iran et ailleurs, il a droit au respect. He closes his review with the remark that: C’est ce respect que revendique le livre de Schaefer, Towfigh et Gollmer. La revendication est honorable et la plaidoirie fait mouche.

Further reviews are due to appear in relevant German specialist journals. The reaction of a reputed German scholar in the field of religious studies is particularly interesting. Having originally followed Ficicchia’s line, he decided, after reading this book, to acquire a number of the primary works of Bahda’i literature for his Institute, and he later made the Baha’i Faith the subject of a senior seminar, as part of which he visited the local Baha’i Centre along with about 70 students. During their visit, which lasted several hours, I had the opportunity of responding to

12. Mélanges de Science Religieuse, Université Catholique de Lille, Janvier-Mars 1997, pp. 116ff. An English translation of this review has been published in Baha'i Studies Review 8 (1998), pp. 69-72. 13. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 8 (November 1998), pp. 451 ff. 14. Mélanges de Science Religieuse, p. 118.

783

Conclusion

questions on theology, history and the Baha’i community. Later, the Professor and his students paid a visit to the House of

Worship in Langenhain, where they engaged in dialogue with Ulrich Gollmer, again over several hours. Interestingly, the Professor proposed that the Baha’i Faith should be made the subject of doctoral dissertations, since it offers a broad and

interesting field of research in religious studies. The themes that relate to the political and social dimensions of the Faith, which

are usually dealt with by the Baha’is when presenting the religion of Baha’u’llah to others (such as peace, world unity, international order, global governance, gender equality etc.), have not hitherto made the faith appear particularly interesting to scholars in

the field of religious studies. The deep theological, mystical dimension, that is at the heart of every revealed religion, has evidently yet to be discovered. Thus, it is already apparent that, in the long term, the expe-

rience of dealing with Ficicchia’s disinformation confirms the

dialectic whereby the ‘Letters of Negation’!>involuntarily cause the Word of God to be exalted, and spread His signs and tokens far and wide: Were it not for this opposition by the disdainful . . —how could news of the advent of the Primal Point and the bright dawning of the Day-Star of Baha ever have reached to east and west?

Goethe also has this dialectic in mind when his character Faust asks Mephistopheles who he is, and the latter replies: A portion of that egohood,

Which always evil wills and always works the good. !7

1155.

Baha’u’1lah, Prayers and Meditations

16.

‘Abdu’l-Baha, Selections 195:2.

th

Part One, Study.

784

184:3.

APPENDIX

ON TERMINOLOGY Some of the terms used in this book, in particular those which

originate from ecclesiastical law, have caused a certain amount of irritation and confusion amongst English-speaking readers,! a problem that reflects the difficulty of translating such terms. The borrowing of technical terms is without doubt problemati-

cal, and concern for doctrinal purity is indeed justified. Like previous revelatory scripture, especially the Bible and the Qur’an, the scripture of Baha’u’llah has its own termin-

ological system which, ‘though drawn from existing Arabic or Persian vocabulary”*, and rooted for the most part in the language of the Qur’an,> nevertheless includes some new coin-

ages.* These ‘mother words’° are fundamental concepts and are 1. They have been criticized as misleading and hampering the discussion not merely stylistically but also doctrinally. The view has been expressed that they might tend to vitiate the clear and precise language of Baha’u’llah, ‘Abdu’1-Baha and the Guardian.

2. 3.

Christopher Buck, Symbol and Secret, p. xxviii. This applies to numerous legal terms such as zind’ (premarital and

extramarital

sexual intercourse,

including adultery, see Kitab-i-Aqdas

19, 49; ‘Questions and Answers’, no. 49; see also ibid. note 75), liwath (sexual relations between men), al-gatl (murder, homicide, see Kitdb-i-

Aqdas 19, 62), diyyah (indemnity, see Kitdb-i-Agqdas 4, 56, 188), ‘ahd, mithdq (covenant), naqd al-‘ahd wa’l mithaq (covenant-breaking). On this subject see Kamram Ekbal, ‘Islamische Grundlagen des Kitab-iAqdas’, in Birgel, Der Iran im 19. Jahrhundert, pp. 53-89. 4. Such as the broad-ranging term Jatdfah (refinement, see Kitdb-i-

Aqdas 45, 74, 151; see also ibid. note 74 and 104) or mubayyin (the expounder, lit.: ‘the one who explains’, see ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Will and

Testament 1:16). Such terms are invested with new specific meaning.

785

Udo. Schaefer

the starting point of any Baha’i theology and jurisprudence. For this reason, they must be preserved in their pure form, free of the dust of terms coined in previous eras. Baha'u'llah therefore

admonishes

his followers:

‘Corrupt not the holy, the all-

embracing, and primal Word of God.”® The uncritical adoption of established terms originating from earlier periods in the development of religion undoubtedly facilitates discourse with a different cultural and religious environment, but inherent in such adoption lies the danger of unwit-

tingly assimilating certain elements into the Faith’s own doctrinal system. The extent to which the undiscerning adoption of

terms and patterns of expression and thinking can affect the content of a new revelation is demonstrated by the hellenization of early Christianity, in which reflection on the original teachings and the formulation of Christian dogma (in particular, the creed concerning the trinity, the Symbolum Nicaenum’) made use of Greek terminology and even Greek ideological thought

patterns, borrowing these from Platonism, Neo-Platonism and Neo-Pythagorism.® Islam was much more reticent in adopting concepts from Greek philosophy or other belief systems. Hence,

for instance, the term ‘theology’ has never been used. Instead, the term kaldm (discourse on the divine) was coined because

the term ‘theology’ was identified with the doctrine of the holy trinity. The Baha'is have, from the outset, retained a critical distance from traditional theological terms. This can be illustrated

by the example of the term ‘mission’. Although Baha’u’llah has, in numerous verses, “prescribed unto everyone the duty of

5.

See Baha’u’llah, Gleanings 74.

6. ibid. 153:4. d, S9 Cs, 8. For a detailed discussion of this subject see Lexikon fiir Theologie und Kirche, vol. V, column 213-222.

786

Appendix

teaching His Cause’,’ the Baha'is refrain from using the words

‘mission’ or ‘missionary’,!° because these terms are historically

burdened and the methods for disseminating Baha’u’llah’s message are essentially different from Christian mission. However,

one should be aware of the fact that the word ‘mission’ origi-

nally coined by Christian theology!! has meanwhile been taken out of the Christian context and is used today as a technical term in religious studies for any proclamation and propaganda conducted by a religious group. Given that this is the case, it

does not make sense to avoid this term in academic publications,!? and it should certainly not be asserted that the Baha’is

do not conduct missionary work. 9. Gleanings 158; see also ibid. 128:10; 144:1; 157:1; Tablets 2:12; 2:23; 5:17; 10:11; 13:4; Kitab-i-Aqdas 38, 53, ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Will and

Testament II1:10. 10. The Arabic texts use neither the word tabshir (the equivalent for ‘mission’) nor the Islamic da‘wa (which means ‘invitatory proclamation’). The term used in the sacred texts tabligh (‘transmission of the message’) was translated by Shoghi Effendi as ‘teaching’ (see Baha’u’llah, Gleanings 144:1,; 128:6, 10; 157:1; 158; Kitab-i-Aqdas 150, ‘Abdu’l-Baha, Will and Testament 1:14; 3:11). 11. from Latin: mittere: to send out.

12. This does not apply, of course, to the term ‘missionary’, which would be inappropriate for those Baha’is ‘that have forsaken their country for the purpose of teaching Our Cause’ (Gleanings 157:1) although it must be admitted that it has occasionally been used by Baha’i institutions in requests for residence permits to government offices in countries which recognize ‘missionaries’ as a category of voluntary workers. Even a purely technical use of the term ‘church’ for any legally constituted religious community, as has become customary in the sociology of religion (in which it is not uncommon to find references to an Islamic or Buddhist ‘church’), cannot be accepted with regard to the Baha’i Faith, as I have discussed at length in my thesis (see Grundlagen, pp. 73ff.). On grounds of both terminology and content, the legally constituted Baha’i community cannot by any means be designated the ‘Baha’i Church’ (see above, pp. 160ff., and below, pp. 792f.). 13. The often voiced and strongly emphasized assertion that the Baha’i Faith knows no ‘mission’ nor ‘missionary work’ simply because Baha’is do not use this term has encouraged and fostered the grave misunder-

787

Udo Schaefer While concern for the purity of the language and contents

of the revelation is undoubtedly justified, it must be realized that no-one involved in academic discourse in this field can avoid using generally accepted academic terms. It would be

impossible to present Bahai doctrine in an academic sphere while completely abstaining from the use of these terms and restricting oneself to the vocabulary of the holy texts. Whereas meditation on the scripture is not dependent on any set of academic terms, reflection on its philosophical, theological and

standing that they refrain totally from any attempt to spread the teachings of their faith. Scholars, journalists and sympathizers have often reacted with astonishment. How can such a community find followers, and how can it survive? Faced then with Baha’i ‘teaching activities’ and even plans for a global proclamation of the message of Baha’u’llah, people feel embarrassed and may be under the impression that Baha’is are dishonestly dissimulating their aims and methods — an accusation that has been made by Ficicchia. There are quite a number of other examples that demonstrate how ignorance and the wrong use of the proper theological terminology results in the spreading of erroneous distinctions such as: the Baha’i Faith is a religion without rites (an assertion which is evidently wrong: the qgibla, the prescriptions for the hajj, the fasts, the obligatory prayers, the communal prayer for the deceased, the dhikr, see Kitab-i-Aqdas

18, are without any doubt ‘rites’); a religion

without dogmas (fiom Greek, dogma: that which one thinks true, a religious doctrine, a tenet that is taken for true; apropos ‘tenet” see World Order, p. 166), without theology and without theologians (it is true that we have no clergy, no caste of clerical functionaries,

no priesthood;

however, al-‘ulama’ fi'l Baha’ (Kitdb-i-Aqdas 183) cannot but be regarded as theologians, i.e. those who reflect on the scripture, on issues of theology and of the revealed law); a religion without interpretation (on this subject see above, pp. 194ff.); a religion without tradition (of course, there exist many reported utterances of Baha’u’llah, ‘Abdu’lBaha and Shoghi Effendi, of anecdotes and historical accounts handed down, but they have no authority beside the authentic holy texts. As to the sola scriptura principle in the Baha’i Faith see Grundlagen, pp. 6670); a religion without the concept of sin (as maintained by a Baha’i in an interview with a correspondent of the Siiddeutsche Zeitung in Jerusalem in May 1992). Thus, the Faith appears to critical observers to be like a Lichtenberg-knife, a knife that has neither handle nor blade. The eradication of these deeply-rooted, wide-spread errors has proved to be extremely difficult.

788

Appendix

juridical contents cannot do without such terms. This is even more the case when these contents are to be presented in an

academic context and as part of interfaith dialogue with schol-

ars from other religions. Indeed, anyone engaging in interfaith

dialogue ought to be familiar with the terminology of religious studies and theology, and be able to present the contents of the

Faith in a way acceptable to the ‘scientific community’. If the use of academic terminology were to be regarded as taboo in an effort to preserve semantic purity, the Baha’is would run the risk of isolating themselves and subjecting the

revelation of Baha’u’llah to a semantic ‘Babylonian Captivity’, thus hindering its development and growth. This is particularly true with regard to the legal structures of the Baha’i community. Its institutions (including certain aspects of their functioning, such as the principle of consulta-

tion!*) are part of the revelation and therefore constitute divine law (ius divinum positivum).'> To present these structures and

their implementation in specific community structures to an academic readership necessitates the use of a legal parlance that cannot be developed without reference to existing legal terms. My doctoral thesis was an initial attempt to investigate the

order of the community of Baha’u’llah in accordance with the established standards of scholarship in the field of religious studies. Since there was, at that time, no academic literature to

which I could have referred, it seemed logical to adopt the method of comparing that order with ecclesiastical law. I was

14. See

Baha’u’llah,

Kitab-i-Aqdas

30;

Tablets

8:55;

9:4,

11:16;

17:44; Gleanings 120:1. 15. Certain structures, such as the current electoral system, are based

on explanations set down by Shoghi Effendi and are subject to amendment in future legislation by the Universal House of Justice: ‘When this Supreme Body will have been properly established, it will have to consider afresh the whole situation, and lay down the principle which shall direct, so long as it deems advisable, the affairs of the Cause’ (Shoghi Effendi, Bahd’i Administration, p. 41).

789

Udo Schaefer therefore dependent on the nomenclature

used in that disci-

pline.!© This was especially the case when I undertook to compare the Guardianship with the Papacy. I had no qualms about

this, since the terms adopted had long since been removed from their purely Christian context and were in common use as technical terms in the field of comparative religious studies. Moreover, the terms I borrowed were always intended merely as sug-

gestions and are open to discussion.!” Nothing could be further from my intention than that the order of Baha’u’llah should be forced into the Procrustean bed of a terminology that is foreign

to it, or to propound the adoption of canonical legal terms into Baha’i jurisprudence. The purpose of the numerous references in this book to my doctoral thesis, which was written over forty

years ago, is by no means to draw belated attention to it.!® Rather, since Ficicchia has taken it to pieces and used it for his Own purposes, quoting from it repeatedly, it was important for this rebuttal to examine his often bizarre interpretations and to

discuss the terms used in the thesis, as these are frequently taken up by Ficicchia. It is always difficult to translate legal terms into another

language, especially one that is associated with a different legal 16. My academic advisor, Prof. Dr. Reicke, taught ecclesiastical law and German legal history at the University of Heidelberg. 17. No academic analysis of my doctoral thesis has yet been undertaken. 18. It bore late fruit when,

some

years

ago,

the German

National

Spiritual Assembly appealed to the German Federal Constitutional Court against decisions of a State Court and a High State Court, according to which the legal structure of the Baha’i community was held to be in contradiction with the German civil code and not liable to being incorporated. This appeal could not have been appropriately formulated, the legal structures of our community could not have been analysed in terms of law other than by using the specific legal and theological vocabulary which I had introduced in my thesis. Such an appeal (or any thesis on the Baha’i Faith) cannot be written in a purely internal language that does not bring the scientific criteria to the attention of the non-Baha’i reader.

790

Appendix

culture.!? The translation of German legal terms into English has therefore been very difficult. Anyone who is not at home in this sphere can hardly be expected to find equivalent concepts. Since there are no German-English specialist dictionaries for

the field of theology and religious studies, it was necessary to seek out the relevant terms in academic literature written in English. The most important of these terms were the following: Jurisdiktionsgewalt:

the

‘power

of jurisdiction’.

This

power comprises the three classical powers described in political science: legislation, jurisdiction and execution (administra-

tion). In the Baha’i communal order the ‘power of jurisdiction’ has been conferred on the elected bodies, the Houses of Justice (Buyutu’l ‘adl) on the local, national and international level.

Lehrgewalt: can be translated as ‘teaching power’ or ‘power of interpretation’. The term refers to the monopolization of the authority to interpret and infallibly determine the re-

vealed doctrine in an authentic and binding way by a specific

office, such as the Papacy”° or the Guardianship.”! This authority can indeed be interpreted in legal terms as a ‘power’. In the Baha'i community, the power of jurisdiction and the power of interpretation are thus separated and rest on the two

distinct pillars of the community. Hence, the Baha’i communal order is characterized by the principle of the separation of pow-

ers,22 whereas in the Catholic Church, which upholds the principle of the concentration of powers,” the power of inter-

19. There are major differences between Anglo-American legal terminology and that of continental Europe. 20. As defined at the First Vatican Council, 1870.

21. Explicitly appointed and invested with infallible authority in Will and Testament 1:16-17: ‘He is the expounder of the Words of God’ and ‘under the shelter and unerring guidance of His Holiness, the Exalted One... Whoso opposeth him hath opposed God’. 22. See the discussion above, pp. 158, 247, 702ff. 23. ibid. see Can 331; see also the text above, p. 156.

791

Udo Schaefer

pretation is part of the potestas regiminis** (formerly called the potestas iurisdictionis) borne by the Pope.

Lehramt: in Canon law magisterium ecclesiasticum. In English-language Catholic literature this term has been trans-

lated in various ways. The official term would seem to be ‘teaching office’.2> However, the term ‘teaching authority’ is

also in use.2° The official Catechism of the Catholic Church*" defines the ‘teaching office’ as ‘the task of giving an authentic

interpretation of the Word of God’.?8 This task has, according to Catholic doctrine, been ‘entrusted to the bishops in communion with the successor of Pe-

ter, the Bishop of Rome’.”? Although the Catholic system is fundamentally different from the Baha’i one in its legitimation

as well as in the way it functions, the authority and task which has been conferred on the Guardian as ‘the expounder of the

Word of God’*° is quite comparable: to give the authentic, infallible interpretation of the revealed word. The term ‘teaching office’ denotes the office, which has been invested with the in-

terpretative authority (auctoritas interpretativa). I see no reason why the Guardian’s authority and task should not be considered as an ‘office’ for the authentic and authoritative interpretation, as ‘teaching authority’ or ‘interpretative authority’. Heilsanstalt: the Church regards itself as an ‘organ of grace’ or ‘steward of grace’ because, according to Christian doctrine, it conveys divine grace upon the believers through the

24. Can 331 CIC. 25. See Catechism of the Catholic Church, no. 85, 888ff. 26. See the English edition of Karl Adam, Das Wesen des Katholizismus

(The Spirit of Catholicism, London: where only this term occurs. 27. 28. 29. 30.

Nos. 888-892. No. 85. ibid. Will and Testament 1:16.

792

Sheed & Ward, 6th edn. 1934),

Appendix

administration of the sacraments. As I have shown in detail in my doctoral thesis, the organized Baha’i community is not a ‘church’ because there is no conveyance of divine grace

through appointed functionaries. In the Baha’i community divine grace is not administered by human functionaries; this sphere is exclusively reserved to the direct relationship between God and the individual.*!

31. On this subject see above, p. 155, note 76.

793

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbreviations

BSB Baha’ Studies Bulletin EI Encyclopedia of Islam EP Encyclopedia of Islam EIR Encyclopaedia Iranica ER Encyclopaedia of Religions HRG = Handbuch Religiose Gemeinschaften HWPh_ Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie LThK Lexikon fiir Theologte und Kirche JRAS Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society RGG Dre Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart SBB Studies in Babi and Baha’i History From vol. 5 (1988) called Studies in the Babi and Baha’i Religions SEI Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam TRE Theologische Realencyclopadie TRT Taschenlexikon Religion und Theologie ‘Abdu’l-Baha. ‘Abdu’/-Bahé in London. Addresses and Notes of Conversations. London: Baha’i Publishing Trust, 2nd edn. 1982. — Letter and Tablet trom ‘Abdu’l-Bahé to the Central Organization for a Durable Peace, The Hague. Chicago: Baha’i Publishing Society, 1920. — Memorials of the Faithful. Trans. from the original Persian and anno-

tated by Marzieh Gail. Wilmette, Ill.: Baha’i Publishing Trust, 1971. —

—

Paris Talks. Addresses given by “Abdu’l-Baha in 1911, first published 1912 as Talks by ‘Abdu’Il-Bahé Given in Paris. London: Baha’i Publishing Trust, 12th edn. 1995.

The Promulgation of Universal Peace. Talks Delivered by ‘Abdu’l-Bahd during His Visit to the United States and Canada in 1912. Howard MacNutt. Wilmette, IIl.: Baha’i Publishing Trust, 1982.

794

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826

INDEX OF NAMES

Abu Lahab (‘Father of Hell’) 47, 50

“Abdu’|-Baha (cont.) not Manifestation of God

“Abdu’l-Baha 42, 72, 73, 77, 78, 82, 9295, 905105; LO, (59) 196; 197, 210, 215, 324, 343, 349, 356, 371, 375, 382, 386, 394, 453, 456, 466, 468, 484, 485, 496, 502, 505, 526, 527, 534, 541, 612, 622, 631, 636, 665, 683, 690, 697, 699, 701, 705, 707, 756 admonitions and warnings of 741 concerning unity in the community 736 analysis of his handwriting from graphologist 735 appointment 700 as ‘Centre of the Covenant’ and interpreter of the scripture 170, 384, 683. 684 attitude towards covenantbreakers 232ff., 742 called for political reforms 539 ‘Centre of the Covenant’ 76, 684 charismatic authority of 350 death of 709 handwriting of 678 imprisonment of 552 interpreter 197, 215 his legislative competence 349f., 683f. love is the main characteristic of 741 Manifestation of Servitude 75

350

‘mubayyin-i-kitab’ 349 ‘the perfect Exemplar of the teachings’ 82 proclamation of 83 rank of 696

‘rigorist’ statements made in Will and Testament? 678 station of 715 successor of Baha’u’llah 349

teaching method of 83ff., 569 threat on life 686

on unity of nations 755 on universal reconciliation vocabulary of 232ff., 736

755

warnings about covenantbreakers

232ff., 736

Will and Testament of 685 Abu Said, Nasr Hamad

365

Adam 280 Adam, Karl 86, 161, 163, 208 Ahland, Kurt 767

Ahmad al-Ahsa’i, Shaykh 297 Ahmad Bahhaj 629 Ahmad Ibn Hanbal 410 Akhbari 580 Alfonso di Liguori 405 Algar, Hamid 454 ‘Alf al-Hadi (the tenth Imam) 583 ‘Ali, Imam 573, 583, 584, 633, 695 Ali Kuli Khan 736, 737 Amanat, Abbas

297, 354, 487, 495,

521, 572, 581, 586

827

Index of Names Bab (cont.) never nominated a ‘successor’ or

Ambrose 405 An-Na’im, 457 Andrae, Tor 62 Andreas, Friedrich Carl 548 Apel, Karl-Otto 470

‘vicegerent’ 644 original teachings of the 531 his personality 587 recantation of his claims? 588

Aqé Rida 623

station of 577

Aquinas, St, Thomas 174, 226, 399,

401 Aristotle 246, 399 Arjuna 43 Ash-Shahrastani 681

Badi‘, martyrdom of 355

Badi‘u’llah 720 Baha’u’llah 19, 79, 82, 91, 95, 200, 201, 386, $39, 54185942. 661, 681, 696,

Asimov, Isaac 259

Asiyih Khanum 719 Auer, Alfons 415 Augustine, St 48, 81, 208, 257, 277,

advent of 261

allegations raised against 650 banishment of 531

397, 401, 415 Avarih 720, 722

bond between Bab and 637 called for the establishment of ‘Houses of Justice’ 758 claim, his 611 to be the Promised One 598,

Bab, the 20, 50, 54, 56, 70, 72, 77, 82, 98, 113, 200, 201, 266, 348, 354, 370, 372, 386, 403, 413, 422, 483, 488, 495, 500, 503, 504, 507, 508, 510, 525, 529, 538, 542, 571, 610, 621, 652, 696 alleged withdrawal of the claim to be the Mahdi

42, 55, 58, 61, 66, 77, 98, 113, 149, 153, 488, 532, 533, 536, 58,5/15, 7 Olds 761

616 Covenant of 699 declaration in the Garden of Rid-

van 610, 611 epiphany of 282 family of 49 founder of a new intimation of his ministry 62 ‘judge, lawgiver 317 legislation 317,

572

announcement of a new theophany 596 bond between Baha’u’1lah and

637 claim of the 579, 586

to be the Qa’im 592 doctrines of the 508

founder of an independent religion 576 gradual unfolding of his claim 593

religion 542 prophetic and redeemer’ 344

‘messianic secret’ of 66, 370

first mention of, in German 549 a mere forerunner? 538, 575

mystic calling 100 passing of 523 a prisoner and exile 344 proclamation, public, in Edirne 613

laws of 627 letter to Mirza Yahya 536 limited number of wives to two 628 martyrdom of 507, 574

return from Kurdistan 535 station of 67, 262, 617 vocation of 613 wives of 372

the Redeemer

828

262

Index of Names Baha’u’1lah (cont.) ‘Word of God’ 260 world order of 689 Bahiyyih Khanum 707, 710-717 Bakunin 303 Balyuzi, H.M. 42, 52-54, 66, 75, 79, $16.9373355937, 497-502.15055 512. 514, 520, 530, 608 Barney, Gerald O.

Buber, Martin 18 Buck, Christopher

370, 487, 576, 608

Buddha 38, 45, 50, 81, 309, 412 commandments

of 412

Birgel, Johann Christoph Bushrui, Suheil 341

137

Cain and Abel

50

Barth, Karl 86, 105, 144, 146, 148

Calvin 227, 274, 397

Barz, Heiner 318, 320, 321 Bausani, Alessandro 487 Bayat, Mangol 453, 580, 581

Campiche, Roland 321 Cannuyer, Christian 339

Captain Young 632, 645

Bayat-Philipp, Mangol 522, 525

Cecilius 493 Celsos of Alexandria

Becker, C.H. 62 Bell, Daniel 492 Ben-Chorin, Schalom 18, 65 Benke, Adam and Lina 333

Bertels, Yevgenii Eduardovich Bielefeldt, Heiner

Charfi, Mohamed

482

365

Chase, Thornton 733 Christ see Jesus Christ Christiansen, Arthur 561, 564 Cicero 405 Clement of Alexandria 405 Cohen, Hermann 311, 399, 403 Cole, Juan R. 262, 297, 302, 306, 372,

339

316

Blavatsky, H.P. 565 Bockle, Hans 415 Both, Uta v. 443

450-453, 487, 513, 533, 537, 539, 543, 566, 592, 595

Browne, E.G. 19, 40, 49, 53-56, 58-59, 64, 79, 331-332, 370, 455-456, 483, 486, 489, 494-513, 515-522, 524, 526, 529, 544, 547, 553, 555-556, 560, 572-573, 576, 578-579, 601602, 606, 608, 612-614, 616, 618, 627-628, 631, 634, 638, 641, 646, 659, 661, 664 Azali arguments presented by 551

Constantine, Emperor 493 Constantine the Persian 629

Cyprian

17, 405

Dammann, Ernst 553

Dawlatabadi, appointed successor of Mirza Yahya 630 Dayyan 59, 557, 621, 652, 654, 655656

considered the Baha’i Faith too

cosmopolitan

330-331

540

his conversation with ‘Abdu’]-

murder of 528, 535, 652

Baha 526 his favourable attitude to Mirza Yahya 511 report on his encounter with Baha’u’llah 663 visit to ‘Akka 526 to Cyprus 533, 625 to the Holy Land 533

recognized Baha’u’llah as Man yuzhiruhu’llah 652

Brunner, Emil

143, 145-146, 401

Deschner, Karl-Heinz Devadatta 50

18, 41-42, 674

Diya’i’yyih Khanum

711

Dolgorouki, Count 605 Douglas, Martin 19, 53, 336 Drewermann, Eugen 19

Dreyfus, Hippolyte 456, 563, 736-737 Duns Scotus

829

397

Index of Names Gregory XV, Pope 241 Gregory XVI, Pope 405

Durant, William J. 62

Groer, Cardinal 25 Grossmann, Hermann

Ekbal, Kamran 297, 331, 342, 539 Elder, Earl E. 328-329, 334, 343, 350, 378-379, 385, 388

Goumoens, von

Eliade, Mircea 426 Elwell-Sutton, L.T. 336 Esslemont, J.E. 689

555

Habermas, Jiirgen 470 Haddad, Anton 332 Haji Mirza Ahmad 505 Haji Mirza Aqasi 588 Haji Mirza Jani Kashani 499, 501, 504, 507, 514, 521 Haji Seyyid Jawad 523 Haji Siyyid Javad-i-Karbila’i 532 Hakim, Christine 441

Fadil-i-Mazindarani, Abu’] 333-334, 343, 354-355, 372 Fa’iq 720 Fallscheer-Ziircher, Josephine 707 Fananapazir, Khazeh 282 Fareed, Amin

243, 388, 689,

737

708

Fatima 50, 82, 364, 528, 695 Faydu’llah Subhi 720 Fazel, Seena 130-131, 282-283, 285, 378, 484 Feyerabend, Paul 321

Halbfas, Hubert 313 Halm, Heinz 487

Flasche, Rainer

Hasan al-‘Askari (eleventh Imam) 583 Hasan (third Imam) 528, 695 Hasan-i-Niku 720

Hammer-Purgstall, v. 327 Hannibal 57 Hartmann, Richard

154, 156, 252-253,

352, 408, 413, 490, 553-554, 564, 575, 675-677, 775 Forel, Auguste, Professor

Hatcher, John

527

Freud, Sigmund 254 Friedlander, Michael 299, 403 Furutan, “Ali-Akbar

62

297

Hatcher, William 636, 638 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 48 Heidegger, Martin 16

332, 679

Heiler, Friedrich

388-390

Hempelmann, Reinhard 776 Gabrieli, Francesco 341 Gadamer, Hans-Georg 15-16, 23, 69

Henninger, Joseph 488, 575 Henuzet, Louis 599 Herrigel, Wilhelm 727-728, 730-731,

Gail, Marzieh 333-334, 372 Galen

739-740 withdrawal of 731 Hick, John 567 Himmler, Heinrich, Reichsfiihrer SS 456, 731, 734 Hitler 78, 86, 115, 137 Hoagg, Emogene 739 Hofman, David 202, 216 Hourani, George.F. 340, 397 Hovannisian, Richard G. 348

482

Glasenapp, Helmuth, v. 341 Gobineau, Comte de 483, 486, 500, 504, 511-512, 529-530, 537, 551552, 555, 560, 589-590, 631, 653654 Goldziher, Ignaz 62, 284, 290, 296, 302, 304-306, 405, 407, 547, 553, 560 Gollmer, Werner 731-732 Goethe, Johann W. v. 18, 68, 102, 312, 341

Hoveida

362, 461-462

Huart, Clément Imbault 553

830

Index of Names Hummel, Reinhart 26, 69, 85, 295, 422, 459-460, 575 Husayn (second Imém) 584, 596, 695

Khan-i-Afrukhtih, Yunis 707, 742 Khayru’1lah, Ibrahim 543, 684, 760

Hutten, Kurt 21-23, 81, 121, 142, 147,

Kropotkin 303 Kumayl ibn Ziyad 573

Klimkeit, Hans-Joachim

149, 154, 156-157, 276, 323, 328, 335, 388, 458, 461, 490, 557, 562, 743, 763, 766, 773-776 Hutter, Manfred

488

Kiienzlen, Gottfried 16, 26 Kiing, Hans 16, 127, 130, 137

34, 384-385

Ibn Hisham 517, 541 Ibn Ishaq 517, 541 Imam, Hidden 586, 587, 588

Lahnemann, Johannes 21, 131-132 Lambden, Stephen 266, 319, 484, 487,

593, 595, 616-617 Lamington, Lord 79

Imam, twelfth, occultation of 591 return of the 583

Ishraq Khavari, Abdu’l-Hamid 620, 669

Lanczkowski, Giinter 488

356,

Lang, Bernhard 471 Lapide, Pinchas 18 Laszlo, Ervin 135, 433 Lawson, Todd 487, 572, 589

Ja‘far as-Sadiq (sixth Imam) 353, 584 Jaspers, Karl 433

Leigh, Richard 674 Leo XIII, Pope 306

Jesus Christ

Lewis, Bernard

18, 47, 70, 144-145, 161,

303, 450

Lichtenberg, Georg Christoph 259

163, 208, 230, 240, 244, 280, 299, 314, 415, 422, 441, 456, 577, 579, 591, 648

Lobkowicz, Nikolaus

crucifixion of 319 the ‘end of the law’ 319

Loeppert, Theodor

expiatory sacrifice 400

Luther, Martin 318, 397

his messianic secret return of 243

195,

87

83

Loyola, Ignatius of 312, 316

595

143-144, 227, 274,

virgin birth of 43 Maani, Dariush 342 MacEoin, Denis 487, 497, 500, 505-

John Paul II, Pope 24, 307, 409, 415

John of Damascus 58, 482 Joseph and his brothers 50 Judas Iscariot 43, 47 Jung, C.G. 87 Jiingel, Eberhard 319 Jiinger, Ernst 411

506, 511-512, 520-521, 572, 581, 590 Mahdi 571-573, 575-578, 584-585, 587, 591, 610, 647-650 will bring a new ‘Book’ 585 Maimonides, Moses

299, 345, 346,

415 Manakji 514-515, 519

Kant, Immanuel 155 Karl Marx, termed ‘the new Aristotle

Manichihr Khan, governer of

Isfahan 592

of theology’ 87 Kazem Beg 552 Kedouri, Elie 540 Khan, Peter J. 494

Martin, Douglas

53, 336, 483, 494,

548, 636, 638 McGlinn, Sen

831

341

Index of Names Mirza Yahya (cont.) as leader of the Babi community 631 attempted murders committed by 667 attempts to murder Baha’u lah 668 the Bab’s successor? 510, 558, 633 buried according to Islamic ritual 629 claim that he was the new Manifestation of God 645 document of appointment 509 grave in Cyprus 635 intrigues of 622 known also as Subh-i-Azal 631 nominated head of the Babi

McLean, J.A. 130, 262, 270, 285, 360, 385 Meinhold, Peter 62, 703

Menander, Greek dramatist 83 Mendelsohn, Moses

18

Mensching, Gustav 146, 230 Messiah 43 Metternich 209 Mildenberger, Michael 17, 27, 100, 103-104, 121, 294, 487-488, 678 Miller, William 19, 24, 53, 328-329, 331, 334-337, 343, 350, 355, 374, 378-379, 380, 385, 388, 766, 775

Mirza Aga Khan-i-Kirmani 524

Mirza Abu’! Fadl-i-Gulpaygani 332, 503, 514, 519, 523, 612, 614, 622 Mirza Badi‘u’llah 685, 719 machinations of 773

Mirza Gani of KaSan 498

community

Mirza Husayn-i-Hamadani

514, 515,

520 Mirza Mihdi 720 Mirza Muhammad-‘Ali

534, 599, 644

rank of 634 remained a Babi and regarded himself as the Bab’s successor 672 rival claim to be a recipient of divine revelation 623 had seventeen wives 627 stayed in Cyprus 531 supremacy of 607 Mishkin Qalam 125, 622 Mitchell, Dr C. Ainsworth, graphologist 749, 752 report as ‘proof’ of the forgery theory 750 Moayyad, Heshmat 581 Momen, Moojan 278, 331, 364, 367, 370, 484, 486-487, 504, 542, 548549, 562, 566, 572, 581, 590, 627, 630, 632, 686 Montesquieu, Michel de 155, 247

Mirza Haydar-‘Ali 603 Mirza Hadi Dawlatabadi 629

49, 74, 83,

154, 684, 686, 695, 697, 718-719, 723, 750, 760, 767-768 accuses Shoghi Effendi having forged Will and Testament 770 claim to inheritance on basis of shari‘a 716 opposed appointment of the Guardian 714 Mirza Muhammad Qazvini 513 Mirza Nasru’llah 537 Mirza Rida-Quliy-i-Tafrishi 537 Mirza Yahya (Subh-i-Azal) 20, 40, 42 49, 52-57, 59, 61, 63, 66-67, 72-73, 98, 488, 500f., 503-505, 509-510, 513, 530-536, 538, 541-543, 558, 574, 598, 606, 609, 611, 618-619, 621, 625-626, 636, 643, 650, 652, 658 alleged proofs of supremacy 605 appointment of 510

Morad, ‘Ali 365

Moses 267, 280, 342, 346, 415, 624, 665-666

a Manifestation of God 665 vocation of 43, 59

Muhammad, Prophet 44, 49, 54, 58, 63, 65, 72,-74, 82-83, 344, 346, 364,

832

Index of Names Muhammad , Prophet (cont.)

Pius IV, Pope 214 Pius IX, Pope 281 Plack, Arno 414 Plautus 476 Plutarch 417 Pohl, Reynaldo Galindo 358 Popper, Karl 308

415, 457, 482, 517, 541, 577, 584 descendants of 706 his initial reservation to declare his mission 595

vocation, prophetic Muhammad

‘Abduh

507

451, 527, 540

Muhammad-Javad-i-Qazvini Muhammad Shah 631 Miihlschlegel, Adalbert

658

Procrustes 410 Proudhon, Pierre Joseph

Mulla ‘Ali Bastami 590 Mulla Baqir 637 Mulla Husayn 508, 512

Quddiis 56, 508, 520, 555, 573 Qurratu’l-‘Ayn 73,517

Nabil-i-A‘zam 484, 503, 508, 523-524 account of 637

Rabbani, Rthiyyih 94, 97, 706, 710 Radbruch, Gustav

poem of 613-614

Rahman, Fazlur 348, 358 Ranke-Heinemann, Uta 19

assassination of 540, 629

Rashad Khalifa, Imam

719

Nechajev 303 Nicolas, A.-L.-M. 99, 200-201, 483, 486, 489, 553, 576-578, 640, 648

340

Rasmussen, Emil 41, 76-77 Ratzinger, Joseph, Curia Cardinal Radbruch, Gustav 143-144

37

Reicke, Siegfried 144

Niemdller, Martin 86 Nipkow, Karl Ernst 21

Reland, Adrian 482 Remey, Mason 101 Richards, J.R. 550 Richter, Julius 549 Romer, Hermann 19-20, 24, 40, 52-53,

Origen 405 Orwell 119 Osborne, Albert S., graphologist 735, 748 Otto, Rudolf

143-144

Rafati, Vahid 487, 581, 585-586

Nasiri’d-Din Shah 355, 605, 619, 624 Navvab

303

333

58, 64f., 70, 72, 152, 184, 190, 200201, 339, 355, 370-371, 392, 422, 454-456, 495, 528, 536, 546-570, 575, 573, 577, 591, 647f., 651, 653654, 661, 664

340

interest in Babi and Baha’ doctrine 552 review of dissertation 553

Panikkar, Raimondo 21 Paret, Rudi 348 Pascal, Blaise 405 Paul, Apostle 18, 65, 66, 81, 83, 85,

work had the aim of providing arguments against Baha’i missionary efforts in his locality 551

230-231, 241, 258, 318, 392, 397, 416 his Damascus experience 66 Perlitt, Lothar 269, 313 Peter, Apostle 81

Rosen, Baron 553 Rosenkranz, Gerhard

20, 24, 53, 339,

546, 553, 556, 563, 567 Sa‘di 356

Phelps, Myron M. 75, 508, 544, 733

Pieper, Josef 415

833

Index of Names Siyyid Muhammad-i-Isfahani 73, 622624, 627, 638, 645, 657-658, 659660, 667 driving force behind Mirza Yahya 620 Smith, Peter 487, 596 Smith, Wilfred C. 21 Sohm, Rudolf 145-146, 230, 255 Sohrab, Ahmad 201, 221, 685-686, 723-724, 751, 753, 772 ‘Abdu’|-Baha’s secretary for eight years 751 confirmed authenticity of Will

Schacht, Joseph 374, 405 Schafer, Richard 553 Schelsky, Helmut 308 Scheurlin, Paul 456, 553, 563 Schimmel, Annemarie 445 Schmaus, Michael 86 Schoeps, Hans-Joachim 18, 21, 65,

311 Scholl, Stephen 487, 588 Schopenhauer, Arthur 310, 318 Schumann, Olaf 488 Schwarz, Albert, Consul 728, 730 Servetus, Michael 227

Shaykh Ahmad al-Ahsa’i 522, 581582, 588 Shaykh Ahmad-i-Ruhi 522-523, 531532, 540, 628-629 Shoghi Effendi

and Testament

32, 78, 91-92, 94, 96-

97, 100, 106-107, 125, 136, 138, 148-149, 153, 157, 159, 164, 196IO), PSB, BBS) SEI, SAS SBills SISK). 375, 382, 386, 393, 430, 484-485, 496, 675, 692, 707, 710, 767, 772 appointment of 705 interpreter, authoritative

18

Sylvester I, Pope 770

171,

Tabataba’i, Muhit 506, 513 Tacitus 55 Taherzadeh, Adib 339, 343, 345, 617 Tahirfh 73, 508, 520 Talmon, Shemaryahu 37

WTA OT, invited representatives of all national communities

718

Sodlle, Dorothee 87 Steinbach, Udo 460 Steinheim, Salomon Ludwig Stiles-Maneck, Susan 354 Stirner, Max 303 Swidler, Leonard 21 Stileman, Charles H. 76-77

728

laid claim to properties 718 “a new Pope’? 90 Opposition against 714, 723 portrayal of 90 recognized head of the Baha’i community 720 resistance against 720 style of leadership 720

Taubes, Jacob 471, 767 Tenbruck, Friedrich 308 Tertullian 405 Tibi, Bassam 365 Toumanski, A.H. 332-334, 385, 486,

515, 614 Trimondi, Victor and Victoria 28

different from that of ‘Abdu’1-

Baha 720 succeeded ‘Abdu’]-Baha as

Ustad Muhammad-‘Aliy-i-Salmanf, the

leader of the community 746 Shu‘a‘u’llah 714 Siyyid ‘Ali-Muhammad 586 Siyyid Jamalu’d-Din al-Afghani 540, 628 Siyyid Javad-i-Karbila’f 522-524 Siyyid Kazim 581, 586-587

barber 623, 669, 670 Vahid (Siyyid Yahy4-i-Darabf) 520, 632 Valentin, Friederike

25, 459

Vambéry, Arminius 79, 527, 553 Voltaire 482

834

Index of Names Wach, Joachim

147

William of Ockham 397 Wrede, Wilhelm 63, 595 Wright, Austin Henry 549

Waldenfels, Hans SJ 24, 488, 676 Warneck, Gustav

Watt, Montgomery

549

482, 681

Weizsicker, Carl Friedrich von White, Lawrence 725

433

White, Ruth 125, 153-154, 674-675, 678, 696-697, 700-701, 705, 713, 718, 724-727, 731, 735-736, 745746, 752, 753, 758, 760, 765, 772, 774-775 attack on ‘Bahai organization’ 748 Baha’i community has no need for organization 759 Baha’i Faith an unorganized spiritual movement 762 categorizes friend or enemy 763 destabilization campaign against Shoghi Effendi 745 ideological premises 769 inventor of the forgery theory Ws opposition to the ‘Bahai organization’ 763 her premises that religion and religious institutions are incompatible 753

Zahrnt, Heinz

269, 327

Zarathustra 314 Zaynu’|-Mugqarrabin 343-344, 374 Zimmer, Hermann 30, 92, 154, 674-

675, 677-678, 696-697, 700, 705, 711, 724, 731-732, 736-737, 739, 743, 745, 758-759, 765, 772-774 Baha’ Faith an unorganized spiritual movement 762 categorizes friend or enemy 763 developing order of the community is ‘a complete turnabout of the Baha’ religion’ 760 opposition to the ‘Bahai organization’ 763 regarded religion exclusively as a matter of individual belief 756 regards Shoghi Effendi as enemy 770 Zirker, Hans

Zoroaster 283

835

280, 282

GENERAL INDEX ‘abd 269 ‘abad 269 Abjad system 603, 632 abortion 226 Abraham 584 Abrahamitic religions 279 Abraham’s sacrifice 327

Akka 59 Al-Azhar University 580 ‘alamu’l-amr 263 ‘alamu'l-haqq 263 ‘alamu'l-khalq 263 ‘a-lastu bi rabbikum’ 268

absoluteness, claim to 87 absolutism, royal 452, 453

alcohol

alchemy 294

‘al-ghayba al-kubra’ 583 ‘al-ghayba al-sughra’ 583 alienation from outside world 118 amru'llah 234 analogy, legal 375 anarchic society 306 anarchism 303 anarchist circles 303 anarchy religious 757 revolutionary 307 inherent in state sovereignty 435 Anguttara Nikaya 38, 45 animal is ‘captive to matter’ 275 anthropology 552 Antichrist 482 of the Baha’i Revelation 73 coming of the 660 anti-democratic 245 antinomianism 303, 403, 404 Antiquity 253 Anything goes! 321 apologetic goals 17 apologetics 16, 17, 19, 20, 27 apostasy 27, 137, 226, 227, 236, 457, 458, 582

acceptance 270 acosmism

568, 742

action, responsible 562 Adamic cycle 282 ‘adl 258, 588 al-‘adlu wa'l-insaf 305, 398 Administrative order 31, 51, 102,

103, 105-109, 122, 135, 141, 147, 153, 155, 166-167, 246, 248, 437, 475, 486, 686 legal foundations of 105 not an end in itself 255 rights, withdrawal of 237 Adrianople 551 adultery 402 Age coming of 473 Formative 95 Golden

|

412, 495, 627

95, 96

Iron 96 new 345 ‘agent of sin’ (yezer) 311 Aghsan 382 aggression 466 agriculture 429 ahl al-kitab 527

836

General Index apostates 226 Apostolic Age 95 ‘apparatus’, the 147 ‘aql 220, 281, 307, 364 al-‘aqlu’l-awwal 281 arbitrariness 270 of God 268 arbitrary rule 304

Babism (cont.) speculative interpretation of 559 babu’l-imam 588 backbiting, prohibition of 408 Badasht, Conference of 519, 533

Badi‘ calendar 341, 387 Baghdad 536, 551 the ‘Abode of Peace’ 370 Baha’{ Administration 31, 105, 115 an ‘authoritarian power instrument’? 115 not an end in itself 255 the ‘grave-digger of the Baha’ Faith’? 770 has killed the spirit? 729

Archives, Baha’i 489

arrow-shuffling 347 arson

339, 413

asceticism 568 ash ‘ariyyah 274 ‘ashara

284

atheism 303 attributes of God 260 auctoritas interpretativa

90, 197

Baha’{ community

authority absolute 318 false claims to 225 individuals have no 246 of interpretation 343, 382 of the messenger 415 temporal 357 autocratic leadership 92 authoritarian goals 418 autonomy, national 434 ayddi-i-amru’llah 694 Ayodhya, Babri Mosque in 289 Azali 40, 42, 56, 58, 66, 79, 335, 336, 456, 530, 532 apologetics 528 doctrine 603 intrigues 657 sources 558, 559

122, 135, 229,

420, 442, 467, 678 allegedly centralist structure of 420 an association of equals 367 basic structures

155, 686

‘Catholic’ belief of 78 ‘Churchification’ of 108,

147, 160 development of its structures 723 establishment of 21 ‘a free-flowing movement’? 229, 678 history, three epochs of 95 initially amorphous 251 institutionalization of 769 legal incorporation of 149 organization of 153, 683

‘rigidly organized’? 120 shortcomings of 259 transformation of the pneumatically governed, into a legally constituted 147ff., 747 Baha’{ ethics 397-399, 410, 403ff., 407-410 categories of, deontological and teleological 407

bab 583 Babi doctrines of the 520

in Kirman 495 persecution of the 513 schism 647 Babi Faith, early history of the 514 Babism 544, 559

837

General Index Baha’i Faith geographically the most widespread after Christianity 240 basically ‘a dervish order’? 565 ‘compilatory character’ of? 62 an ‘esoteric sect’? 565 independent character of the 20 institutionalization of 768 prohibited in communist-ruled states 1377 in Germany under Hitler iB iimi32. relationship to the historical revealed religions 279 ‘religion of observance’? 274 ‘self-satisfied’? 118 a world faith? 766 Baha’i history, three epochs

Bayan (cont.) the shari‘a of the Babi Faith

596 Baytu’l-‘adl

Baytu’l-‘adl-i-a‘zam 105, 184, 691 Baytu’l-‘adl-i-khususf 691 Baytu’l-‘adl-i-mahalli 691 Baytu'l-‘adl-i-markazi 691 Baytu’l-‘adl-i-milli 691 Baytu’l-‘adl-i-‘umimi 691 beard, cut of the 390, 391 behaviour of believers 475, 495 Bekennende Kirche 86 believers

Shoghi Effendi’s ‘subjects’? 124 Shoghi Effendi’s ‘faithful rabble’?

95

Bible 60, 325, 327, 412, 435 translation of the 210 bigamy 348, 349, 372 bigotry 112, 257, 286, 410

21, 75, 207, 262,

fire of 742

266 Baha’{ World Centre 32 ‘Baha’i World Union’

Brahmanism 62 brethren, false 47, 681

731, 775

Baha’ism in Persia 766 ‘Baha’ist theocracy’ 123 Balance, the unerring 280 balance of powers 155 Basilea 314 bdtin 297 Bayan 57, 199, 372, 378, 510, 511, 527, 601, 602, 619, 627, 629, 634, 646, 673 Arabic 200, 201, 500 Persian

124

benevolence 402 Bhagavad Gita 43, 280, 281

Baha’i Houses of Worship 281 Baha’i International Community 118, 134 Baha’i theology

102, 149ff., 158, 761

distinction between the various levels 690

British Church Missionary Society 549 British mandatory government, decision of 717

brotherhood, spirit of, and good will 7156 Buddhism 62, 75, 260, 391, 405 Buddhist canon

280, 281

doctrine 229 Bundestag, the German parliament, resolution of 460

98, 201, 413, 488,

500, 506, 507, 508, 578, 601-604, 665, 672 Point of the 600 prohibition of marrying nonbelievers 372

calumny, prohibition of 408 Canon Law 92, 145, 156, 174, 236, 237

838

General Index cardinal virtue of justice 143 Carneades, the plank of 405 Carthage 323 casuistry 404, 405, 407 religious 404 Catechism of the Catholic Church 17, 85, 174, 208, 389, 413 categorization into ‘friends’ and ‘foes’ 438 Catholic Church 108, 157, 158, 163, 174, 205, 212, 214, 366, 367, 389 ecclesiastical authority in the 208 Catholic legal doctrine 143 Catholicism

Church Fathers 81, 405 Church law 105, 144, 145, 146

CIC see Codex Iuris Canonici city-state 757 citizenship, ethos of a world 430 civil rights of individuals 742 civilization

development ofa global 431 Western standard of 411 claims to absoluteness 276, 278, 282 to exclusiveness 276, 279,

282 false, to authority 225 to truth 15, 37, 87, 277, 278, 281 to power 110 cleanliness 392 clergy 162, 205, 228, 258, 438, 471 abolition of the 197 Codex Iuris Canonici (CIC) 156, 157, 174, 205f., 210, 226, 236f. coming of age 473 commandments 112, 410 ‘the lamp of My loving providence’ 317 and prohibitions 407 Commandments, the Ten 342 commentary on the scripture 113 Commission of Inquiry, Ottoman 685, 686 common good 219, 224 commonwealth federal world 136 federative 250 commune, la 303 communication 130

318, 391

‘censorship’? 114, 209, 689 centralism 245, 432, 434 is rejected 249 centralization evils of over- 250 excessive 434 Centre of the Covenant

156, 215,

216 ceremonies, liturgical 395 character indelebilis 161 charity 443 chiliastic expectations 585, 591 impatience 436, 590 Christian festivals 393 image of God 269 moral theology 245 theologians, susceptibility to ideology 86 Christianity 260, 484, 549, 550 reproach of being syncretistic and eclectic in origin 62 Church 17, 415 authority of the 321 doctrine 325 excommunication in the 325 history of the 46 of the spirit 145

religious, requires

understanding 583 communion with God 390 compassion

272, 399, 401, 419,

440, 467 competence 256 of reviewers 212 legislative of ‘Abdu’l-Baha 178, 180

839

General Index consultation (cont.)

competence (cont.)

principle of 218

of the Universal House of Justice

arational instrument

151, 160

contention, prohibition of 339

Continental Boards of Counsellors 704

Conference of Badasht 97, 635,

637 confession

conversion 227, 242, 244 converts 558

405

of faith 389 prohibition of 408 of sins

473

requirements of 473

concept of God 566 conditions of technological society 387

convictions within the scope of God 445 cooperation instead of confrontation 435

162, 237

conflict between Western secular

Corpus Turis Canonici

civilization and the Book of God 414 solution, peaceful

34, 144,

174, 205f., 210, 214, 226, 236f., 367, 391 cosmopolitanism 456, 563 Covenant 45, 232, 267, 268, 314, 317, 389, 396, 411, 715, 740

431

Confucianism 405 confusion 301

conjectures 96

ancient

conscience 159, 218, 248, 445 freedom of 452, 759

archetypical 268 of Baha’u’llah 699 breaking the 723 of God 49, 439 lesser 205, 229, 231, 236, 238

no jurisdiction within the realm of 162

the kernel of human dignity 162 consciousness, expansion of 320 consensus doctorum conservatism 492

covenant-breakers

motives of the 233

warnings against 232ff., 739, 740

constitutional

covenant-breaking

laws of the community movement 453 Revolution in Persia state 247

338

49, 50, 206,

224, 232, 236, 237, 688, 740, 769 craftsmanship, the sun of 292

447

craftsmen 291 creation 263 concept of 563 doctrine on 566 purpose of man’s 389 crisis, ecological 127 criticism 111, 142, 147, 201, 208, DVS y2193220 7221922252235 224. 243, 259 of absolute monarchy 449

94, 184, 217, 218,

220, 246, 256, 305, 452, 467, 470, 730 art of 762

Baha’i 440 the ‘bedrock’ 222 an instrument of social self-

governance

32, 40, 47, 51,

12561545165; 201, 214520 32" 233-238, 256, 335, 404, 556, 688, 715, 738, 742-743

363

conspiracy led by Mirza Muhammad-‘Ali 698 theories 763, 764, 767, 772

consultation

268

473

840

General Index criticism (cont.) blind 233 destructive 223 open and constructive right of 219 critics, ecclesiastical

demilitarization of the whole civilized world 757 democracy 300, 313, 447

222

parliamentary

40

crooked, the 45, 141, 225, 235 cults 320 destructive 103 cultural movement 560 culture(s) adaptation to Western 560 diversity of 433 new world 437 cursing, prohibition of 284 cycle, prophetic 288 Cyprus 55

Dala’il al-Sab’a

354, 593

disarmament, worldwide 431 discrimination of race, nationality,

Daldlat al-Ha’irin 345, 416 Damascus experience in reverse 33 Darwinism 563 Day of God

246, 248, 249,

450 principles of 245 rejection of? 302 depth psychology 19 despotism 304, 421, 434 global 433 destructive cults 103 determinism 275 development, socio-economic 431 dhikr 183, 389, 572, 588 dialogue 24, 131 between the religions 24, 130 dismissing 567 diaspora, existence in 258 dignity 301, 305, 310, 311 diocesan bishop 249

class, religion or gender 431 disputation 286 disputes, academic 294 dissensions and divisions 287 dissidents 21 judgements of 40 dissimulation 322 disturber of the order 229 diversity 419 emanating from a common root 252 of interpretation 212 of opinion 207, 212, 229 divine law 151, 232, 236 primary purpose of 756 divorce 373-375 doctrinal authority 174

261, 615

of Judgement 426 of Resurrection 342 death penalty 413, 458 Decalogue 26 decentralization with the consequent lapse of governing authority 250 decision-making 476, 754 political 473 declaration 613 Declaration of the Parliament of the World’s Religions 130 Declaration of Trust 160 decrees, organizational 112 decriminalization of law-breakers 413 defence and right of self-protection 400 Delphic Oracle 191

decisions

159, 568

legislation 158, 159 purity 206 unity 226 doctrines of the Babi religion 520

84]

General Index equality (cont.) of all people before the law 446 of races 446

dogma 110, 159 Christian 767

dogmatism 285 dogmatization

207, 209

of the sexes, fundamental principle 62, 375, 376

Donation of Constantine 771 a forgery to the advantage of organized religion 770 dowry 373

equilibrium of the world 759 escapism 568 eschatology

dress, rules about 390 drug 412, 495 induced euphoria, right to

individual

425

not a plan of action 440 Shi‘a 564

412 prohibition of 627 du‘@ 385, 386

universal

dualistic division of mankind

425

eschatological expectations 594

741

esoteric circle 296 doctrines 560, 566 knowledge, claim to 587

ecclesia triumphans 258 ecclesiastical law

425, 427, 584

in the contingent world 436

144, 232

ecclesiology 148 ecological crisis 127 Ecumenical Council 157 Edirne 59, 63, 203, 613, 614, 627

esotericism 289, 296, 297, 300 ethic, enshrined in the law 270

education

exclusivity, claim to 87 excommunication 201, 206, 214,

ex cathedra decisions 159 ex opere operato 108, 163

290, 292, 429, 431, 443,

452, 459, 472 of children 111, 441 spiritual 438 effective history (wirkungsgeschichte)

224ff., 689 act of self-assertion from the Church

237

226, 325,

580 ecclesiastical regulations ultimate means 741 exegesis 195 scriptural 113 symbolic 370

23

einfiihrungsgesetz 183 elections Baha’i 440, 470, 472 no campaigning 472 no nomination of candidates 247, 472 no propaganda 472

expectations, messianic

228

585, 591,

594 EZW 12, 16, 17, 19, 25-28, 30, 31, 33, 35, 81, 89, 131, 142

democratic 730 details to be regulated by the Universal House of Justice 692 emanation 566, 568 English style of Shoghi Effendi 35 Enlightenment 289, 300, 302, 319, 320, 471, 484 epistemology, Baha’i 307 equality 446, 460

‘fact-falsifying historiography’ 52 Fall from Grace 142, 143, 145, 562, 679 from Paradise 257 false teachers

842

43

General Index falsification of history 521, 557 famine in Palestine 527 fanaticism

freedom (cont.) of action 319

112, 129, 410, 421

from bias

blind 742 religious 360 fascism

115, 425

allegation of 120 religious 286 ‘fascistic tendencies’?

of expression

fear of God

115, 124

intellectual 36 moral 274 and order 302

political 302 of religious worship 460 to teach 194, 195, 204, 208 friend/foe paradigm 473 fullness of time 425 functions of the twin institutions 702

269, 314

393

federative commonwealth

250

feminist theology 87 ‘fetish’ 116, 128, 135, 136, 137, 138 finality of the Qur’4n 585 of religion 582 figh 363, 364 food, plunging of hands into 393

fundamentalism, religious future

gambling 412 games of chance 347 Gestapo

allegation of 99, 674, 678 foundations of the Baha’ Faith 774 of documents 744 theory 677, 724, 747, 750, TP thesis 735

order

398, 399, 402, 419

128, 137

problems 127 state 425 federal structure of the 434 globalization of problems 429 Gnosis, 84, 296, 564 struggle against 767 neo- 564 neo-Platonic 568

Formative Age 95, 439 162

foundations of the Cause of God 234 framework, legal 350 ‘Free Bahais’ 733, 735, 763, 775 free will 274 freedom

731, 734

ghayba 583 Ghiydth 603, 604 Ghusn-i-Akbar 715 Ghusn-i-Athar 719 Ghusn-1-A ‘zam 715 global conditions 454 ethicwl27-al30m185

calculated attack on the

fornication 412 forum internum sacramentale

418

peaceful 431 world structure of 338

forbearance 286, 401 forgery 66, 100, 102, 106, 107, 125

forgiveness

114, 214, 216,

2721892195222 individual 114, 116, 703

‘fascistic totalitarian goals’? 136 al-fasiqun 46 fasting 183, 267, 386, 387, 390, 596 al-Fatiha 389 Feast of Tabernacles federalism 249

28

of conscience 759 of convictions 445 to decide 320

274, 301, 302, 419

843

General Index Guardian (cont.) doctrinal statements of the 159 permanent head of the Universal House of Justice 695 responsible for protection of the Faith 695 role and tasks of 702 succession of the 350 vacancy of the office of 703

goals, political 418 God of ‘Abraham, Isaac, and

Jacob’ 268 arbitrariness of 269 is no capricious despot 268 Christian image of 269 concept of 566 essence of 268 Lord of History 439 sovereignty of 444 is unchangeable 268 God’s foreknowledge 274 mercy which ‘hath preceded

Guardianship

30, 94, 97, 101, 106,

108, 125, 153, 154, 156, 158, 171, 175, 183, 191, 208, 221, 381, 382, 689, 694, 711, 737, 751 comparison with Papacy, Caliphate and Imamate 157 established by the Will and Testament 383 establishment of the 350 main functions 695 prerequisites and conditions for succession 695 similarities between papacy and 700 Guidelines on Dialogue with People of Living Faiths and Ideologies 24, 26, 27, 676

all creation’, ‘embraceth all

things’ 272 plan for humanity’s salvation 439 God Passes By 54 Golden Age 95, 96, 437, 438, 439

Golden Rule 21 Gospel 85, 281, 415, 438, 456, 481, 492, 549, 680 government British form of 305 ethic of 449 representative 306 republican form of 447, 449 Governor of Haifa 721 grace 272 Baha’i doctrine of 267 divine 396, 562 graphologist 745, 748 Great Plan of God 438 government, obedience to 116 grace 228 no objectification of 161 grass-roots democratic systems 249 Guardian 90, 92, 95, 102, 106, 122, 194, 198, 688, 700 appoints the Hands of the Cause of God 695 authorized expounder of the faith 695

hada 584 hadith 184, 391 hagiography 482 hair 390 cut of the 390 of the dervishes of Sikhs 392

392

hajj 343 halacha 363, 405 Hanbalistic rigidity 410 Hands of the Cause 183, 246, 694 haqqu’llah 379, 380 harmony, communal 289

844

General Index Hasht Bihisht 100, 510, 513, 522, 532, 617, 619, 621, 623, 625, 641 b) 651, 654, 656, 660, 661, 666, 673 hatred 287, 468 religious 483 haykal 265 “He whom God shall manifest’? 510 heaven 508 hedonism 412, 482 heilsgeschichte 286, 319, 428, 437 heilsnotwendigkeit 283 hell 508 Hellenistic philosophy 62 heresy 48, 137, 226, 227, 228, 236, 493, 622 Islam depicted as 482 theosophical 564 heretical doctrines 682 heretics 23, 226, 227 hermeneutic

Houses of Justice (cont.) executive, legislative and judicial responsibilities 692 local 149 national 106 secondary 350 homicide 339 hubris, man’s

oneness of 283, 741, 755

humility 389

69, 302

huququ'llah

hierarchy of laws 368 principles 349 rules 21 Heroic Age 95, 438 heteronomy 313 Hidden Imam 582

183, 377, 379, 380,

382, 695 spiritual duty 381 strictly voluntary 381 hurriyyah

302, 303, 304

Huruf al-Hayy 508 hypocrites 235 hypostatic union 263 hysteria, pseudo-religious 555

Hidden Words, The 304, 642

hierarchy of values 196 High Commissioner in Palestine, British 748 Hijra 507 hikma, prudence and wisdom 84, 242, 258, 354, 355, 356, 360 Hinduism 260 Hindus 289 historiography 481 Baha’i 498 history, falsification of 57, 521 holy days, Baha’i 393 Holy Spirit 145, 146, 148, 174 surrogate for the law 255 Holy Trinity 263, 266 holy war 421

ideological schooling? 111 ideologies 418 ignorance 292, 311 ima‘ 184, 363, 364 ijtihad 364 innovative interpretation ‘ilm al-wujudi 170 image of the faith 210 of man

Imamate

302, 310, 468

184, 583

Imams, the twelve

82, 364

immorality 303, 569 impartiality 17 imperialist power claims 420

Houses of Justice 471, 689, 761

administrative bodies

307

hulil 67 human capacity 346 nature, Baha’i concept of 273 works require acceptance by God 267 humaneness 401 humanity maturity of 436

249

845

581

General Index imprimatur 210, 212 impulse, institutionalization of the prophetic 701 ‘inaya 272 incapacitation, spiritual 114

institutions decision-making 221 function of twin 702 hereditary 705

incarnation

obsolete, worn-out forms of 345 no salvational 445 institutionalization 252 of the community 142 process of 276 of the prophetic impulse 701 intellect 220 interfaith dialogue 21, 118, 126, 131, 133, 276, 285, 287, 676 meetings 131

68, 260, 263, 266

incest 493 incompatibility of spirituality and law? 148 incorporation, legal of acommunity 253 process of 252 inculturation

85, 567

Index liberorum prohibitorum 213 individuality of both soul and body 569 infallibility 166ff., 171, 174, 175, 181, 182, 185f., 191, 300, 485 conferred 170ff., 192 on the Universal House of Justice 175, 176, 178, 187 covers only acts of legislation 180 essential 169ff. of the Guardian

172f., 192

“Houses of Justice’ not granted 188 hypothetical 186 innate of the Guardian 193 limit of 174 of the Manifestation 169, 170 Most Great

169, 170

of the Pope 174 of the Universal House of Justice 184, 191 infidels, unprotected 358 inheritance 374, 377, 378 fora woman 374 law in Egypt 351 Inquisition 410 al-‘isma adh-dhatiyya 169 al-‘isma al-sifatiya 170 al-ismatu'l-kubra 169, 397 al-istiqama 359

international

services

434, 435

129

intermediaries, four 583 international order 435 interpolation 556 interpretation 196, 327, 343, 359,

364, 374, 702 by ‘Abdu’l-Baha 349 allegorical 113, 200 authoritative 196, 198, 702 reserved for Baha’u’llah,

‘Abdu’l-Baha and Shoghi Effendi 703 authority of 343, 382 of the Bab’s writings prohibited? 113 individual 206, 703 in Islam 366 of Islamic law

407

by Islamic lawyers 348 power of 157, 195 of the Qur’an 327, 348, 364, 366 theosophical 570 interpretative authority 158 office 208 intestacy, cases of 377

intolerance

129, 257, 289

General Index

intoxicating drinks 346 introductory law 183 invisible church 231 ‘Iron Age’ 96, 687 irrationality, new forms of 320 Islam 37, 70, 82, 84, 260, 269, 300, 344, 366, 387, 389, 482, 484, 681 isnad 445 Israeli Supreme Court, verdict passed by 719 i‘tidal 307 Itivuttaka 38, 45, 50 ius divinum 144, 365, 366 ius humanum 144, 364, 366 lustitia fundamentum regnorum 401

justice (cont.) governs the realm of social order 400 ‘infallible standard of 318 and love 143 love for 438 and mercy, tension between 144 reign of 305, 403 of the social order 402 social order is 400 ‘tormented by the scourge of injustice’ 304 without love is cruelty 401 justification by faith 270

Jabriyya 274 Jazirat-ash-shaytan 55 Jews 43, 76, 79, 86, 126, 129, 244, 284

Ka‘aba 590 al-kafirun 46 kalima 281 Kalimat-i-Firdawsiyyih Kashan, Bab in 503

jihad 421, 422

keynote of the Cause of God, not a

abrogation of 617 forbidden 665 renounced by Baha’u’llah 661

dictatorial authority 256 khatam an-nabiyin 582 Kingdom of God 36, 95, 314, 755

on earth 424, 435, 427, 428, 436, 440, 469, 476

journalism, investigative 37 joy and radiance (rawh wa rayhdn)

of Peace 426

287 Judaism

kingship

226, 260, 269, 299, 344,

succession regulations in 714

Judgement, Day 50, 584, 588

Kitab-i-Aqdas 74, 78, 88, 89, 105f.,

155, 157

juridical power

448

Kitdb-i-‘Ahd 82, 153, 231, 275, 683, 684, 701, 704, 705, 715, 723

388, 484 love and justice in 399 judiciary

151, 629

121, 150, 153, 169, 190, 200, 201,

119

215, 245, 319, 323, 324, 350, 520, 527, 627, 683, 687, 690, 691, 701, 704, 774

jurisdiction 155, 162, 246, 248 jurisdictive power 108, 155f., 158, 172, 176, 246

alleged suppression of the 31,

justice 258, 267, 268, 305, 398,

368 appendix of the 343 the depository of central doctrines 396 a hotchpotch of regulations? 322

399, 419, 434, 435, 440, 467 attribute of the Messiah 403 cardinal virtue 143 divine 257 essence of 317 and fairness 584

847

General Index Kitab-i-Aqdas (cont.) inheritance laws 39 keystone of all Baha’i dogmatics 396 language of 341 laws of the 88 a provocation 321 publication of the 329 a ‘rigorous religious law’? B26 ritual provisions in 183

law(s) (cont.) indirect 693 primary purpose of 756 dogmatic foundation of 396 a ‘framework’? 363, 368 future Baha’i law 368 of God, nature of the 411 gradual, gentle introduction of 347 hierarchy of 368 ‘Iam the’ 318 international 431 introductory 183

structure of 340, 342

a ‘stumbling-block’ 321 text of 38 withheld from the believers? 99

Islamic

377, 458

judicial 363 penal 400 Protestant concept of 142 scepticism towards 145 of the Qur’an 363 setting of general abstract norms 183 law-breakers 413 ; decriminalization of 413 non-labelling of 413 Lawh-i-Ahmad 627 Lawh-i-Dunya 305 Lawh-i-Hawdaj 615 Lawh-i-Hikmat 295, 561 Lawh-i-Ibn-i-Dhi’b 609 Lawh-i-Ittihad 197 Lawh-i Khalil 594 Lawh-i-Kullu’t-Ta’am 643 Lawh-i-Mahfuz 275 Lawh-i-Maqsud 304 Lawh-i-Maryam 608, 620 Lawh-i-Naqus 615 Lawh-i-Nasir 616

Kitdb-i-lqgan 68, 279, 396, 591, 642, 643 Kitab-i-Nugtatu'l-Kaf 496, 498, 500, 503, 541, 572, 578, 618, 642, 648 kitman 353 knowledge 290 acquisition of 292 inner 296 secret 566 kuffar-i-harbi 358

laissez-faire liberalism 452 language of the Baha’i revelation 337 manipulative use of 124 religious 567 a weapon, an instrument for disinformation 125 latafah 392 law(s) 196 of the Bab 627 of Babi and Baha’i dispensations 559 ceremonial 363 concerning the personal status 351 divine 270, 317, 318, 344, 363, 437, 584

Lawh-i-Naw-Ruz

267, 269

Lawh-i-Salat 387 Lawh-i-Shaykh Salman 449, 451 leaders, religious 287 leadership 119 of the community, practical 702 ‘learned ones in Baha’

848

183, 367

General Index legal dogmatics 183 principle of gender equality 376

liberty (cont.) “within the restraints of moderation’ 306 licentiousness 306

structures, inherent in the

literature, ‘critical’

scripture 157, 251 system, Baha’i 365 legislation 155, 349, 684, 702 Baha’u’llah’s 318, 342, 396 complementary 703 divine 319 nature of 338 on Mount Sinai 319 shari‘a 177 of the state, a rational process 338 supplementary 151, 152, 177, 367, 692, 693, 700, 702 legislative body, ‘freed from all error’ 366 legislative competence of ‘Abdu’lBaha 349 legislature 155, 157 legalism 270 lehramt 155 lehrgewalt 195 leitmotif 557 Lesser Peace 428, 430, 436, 438 ‘Letters of the Living’ 508, 522, 523, 542 letters of negation 48 libertas oboedientiae 312 libertinism 303, 448 ‘antireligious’ 306 liberty 114, 274, 300, 301, 302, 310, 311, 316, 320 civil 447, 448 concept of 447 demands for 245 perfect 311 political 307 true

496

liturgical ceremonies 395 Living Book 261 logos 261, 273, 281 logos spermatikés 281 Lord’s Prayer 389, 427 love 267, 268, 287, 399, 401, 402, 419, 440, 467, 468 degenerated into sentimentality 401 and fellowship of God 399 for humanity 322 and justice 23 tension between 399 for mankind 402 spirit of, amongst men 287 and tolerance 402 and unity loyalty 216 to the Covenant 120 critical 224 to the scripture 208 towards state authorities 116,

361, 448, 694 luti 580 lying 356

ma‘add 588 machtergreifung 124, 420 madhhab 410 Madinatu’t Tawhid 266 Magga 37 magisterium 155 Mahdi, Imam 56, 69, 422, 423, 447, 571, 572, 575 ‘the rightly guided one’ 584 identity of the 576, 584

306, 311

results from obedience to the will of God 312 unbridled 306

Mahdihood 57, 591

Mahdism political 421, 424, 432, 446, 464

849

General Index martyrs, Babi and Baha’i 555 Marxist ideas 86 masdar-i-amr 609 Mashriqu’I-Adhkar 91, 386, 393, 395 use of social facilities 394 mapnahmegesetz 180 ma‘sum 169, 633 Materialdienst 28, 30f., 33, 67, 9092, 103, 111-113, 115f., 118-122, 124, 131, 136, 150, 156, 213f., 221, 300, 323-326, 328, 355, 362, 418, 424-427, 459-461, 556, 712, 734, 766, 774, 776 materialism 291 matrimony 347, 371 maturity of humanity 436 increasing, of the institutions of the faith 439 sign of responsibility 473 of the world 449 maysir 347 Mazdakism 766 mazhar 508

Mahdism (cont.) theosophic 558 Mah-Ku, Bab’s imprisonment in 589 Majjhima Nikaya 280 mal ‘un 284 man his capacity 296 concept of 445 ‘created weak’ 411 his destructiveness 36 fallen nature of 257 image of 310 as imago Dei 391 has ‘the power both to do good and to do evil’ 275 purpose of creation 389 man’s capacity 345 spiritual nature 568 Man yuzhiruhu'llah

40, 57, 67, 70,

98, 488, 504, 510, 511, 531, 542, 577, 578, 600, 601, 602, 603, 611, 647, 648, 649, 672 Baha’u ’llah’s claim to be the 612 mandates, imperative 249 Manichaeism 766 Manifestations of God God-created 263

al-mazharu'l-ilahi

261, 508

mission, soteriological of the 593 mystical unity of the 396 nature of the 396 the true physician 309 mankind coming of age of 437 consciousness of oneness of Us division of, dualistic

secret

571ff., 579ff., 586, 595

consciousness of the Shaykhi 586 meta-history 486 metaphor of the ‘pearl’ that had emerged from ‘the twin surging seas 695

741

oneness of 569, 681, 756 well-being of 681 manslaughter 339 marja’ at-Taqlid 445 marriage

169, 262, 264,

592 mazhar-i-zuhir 592 mediator 588 meekness 401 mercy 272, 287, 399, 401, 467 divine 270 God’s, which ‘hath preceded all creation’, ‘embraceth all things’ 272 message of the Cross 562 messianic expectations in Islam 591

371, 373, 475

martyrdom 353, 359, 360

method, scientific

850

18

General Index methodology 21, 36, 40, 62, 65, 78, 266, 294 of religious studies 677 scientific 17 tendentious 92 militancy, Christian 24 minorities, protection of 435 mi raj 582 mirror analogy 264 mischief-makers on earth 45 Mishna 388 missio canonica

mission Christian

Most Great (cont.) Justice 435 Peace 286, 425, 427, 428, 429, 435, 436, 437, 438 Mufti of “Akka 716 muhabila, public disputation 624 mujahada, fighting for the faith 665 mujaz 216

mujtahid 184, 363, 364, 367, 580, 581, 590 claims of the 586

205

mulk, earthly dominion 592 al-mundfiqun 45, 230, 235

495

in Persia

335, 550

munajah 385, 386 mugallid 367

soteriological of the Manifestation 593 missionary activities 239

murder

efforts, Baha’i 551, 560 Christian 547

among Muslims 550 propaganda 239 strategy 239, 242, 378 work 239, 241, 247 Christian moderation

monogamy

murtadd 358, 582

241

al-mushrikun 283, 284 Muslims 289 Mustaghath 513, 603, 604 Mustayqiz 535, 621, 646, 650, 652, 655, 656, 667 mysteries, metaphysical 317 mystery cults 62 mystic dimension of the Baha’i Faith 253, 298 source 609 truths 298

219, 303, 307

monarchs 304 monarchy 39, 70 absolute 447 constitutional

339, 413

of three Azalis in ‘Akka 657f. cases of 650 charge raised against Baha’u’llah 556 of Dayyan 528 mursal 592

71, 305, 450

347, 349, 350, 372

monopoly, religious 228 Montanism 410 moral

Christian 245 confusion of the modern world 412 consciousness of society 310 law 310 theology 409 values 309 morality, ‘infallible standard’ of 414 Most Great Infallibility 170, 397

nabi 264, 592 naib 583 najasat 283 nagidu’l-mithaq 126, 232 narrative theology 54 nation-state 128, 455 National Convention 222

851

General Index national sovereignty a ‘fetish’ 128 National Spiritual Assemblies 119, 165, 472, 721 nationalism

456

narrow-minded 541 nations, family of 136 nature, man’s spiritual 568

natural magic 294 Naw-Ruz

64, 129, 267

Tablet 270

obedience (cont.) to the law

14, 315, 361

leads to liberty 312, 316 to an organization 759 to state authority

39, 356,

357 to the Will of God 269, 274, 312, 314 objectivity 17, 25, 28, 33 obscurantism

320, 421, 471

ideology, influence in the Catholic and Protestant churches 86 regime 456 neo-gnosticism 564 New Age 296 New Year 129 nihilism 303, 448

obstinacy of the people 492 occultation 583 ‘greater’ 583 ‘lesser’ 583, 588 of the twelfth Imam 591 One Country, journal 134 oneness of humanity 283, 569, 681, 741, 755, 756

Nazi

Nineteen Day Feast 222, 386

opinion, diversity of 212, 229

Noble Eightfold Path 38 non-violence 419

opium 339, 412, 495

norms 196 of religious morality, not

85, 87, 116, 160, 289, 327, 361, 362, 369, 373, 409, 423, 447, 610 oppression 304 order 302 of Bahaé’u’ll4h 109, 249 uniqueness and authenticity of 162

dependent upon rational justification 415 ritual and legal 338 nubuwwa

588

nugta 573, 588 Nuqtatu’l-Kéf 335, 558, 559, 579

obedience

122, 120, 191, 224, 316,

318, 319, 423 to the central figures of the Baha’{ Faith 32 to Christ, precondition for salvation 314 to the commandments of the Decalogue 26 concept of 313, 316

to the divine message 277, 3)i72 the essence of religion 315 fundamental virtue 315 to government 116

opportunism

37, 38, 39, 40, 58, 84,

of the community

166, 191,

221, 229, 245, 246, 350, 471 disturber of the 229 future 431 international 435 global

128, 137

structural elements of 191 theocratic 418 ‘organ of grace’

117, 121, 160, 161

organization 111 ‘all-determining’? 114 obedience to 759 ‘omnipresent’? 118 ‘organizational decrees’? 121 organizations, global 134 orientation, point of 20

General Index original sin 257 originality, lack of 564 orthodoxy 580

persecution (cont.) avoidance of 354 inflicted upon the Babis 507, 513, 515, 605 of the Baha’is in Iran

papacy, comparison with Guardianship 701 paradigm theological 280 of progressive revelation 365 Parliament of the World’s Religions 132, 137 parliamentary democracy 450 system of government 449 parousia 577 delay of 585 partisan politics 467 party politics 246 abstain from 361 Path, Noble Eightfold 38 patience 347, 401 year of 374, 375, 376 pattern, new, of social life 475 Pax Romana 649 peace 419, 427, 431, 440, 468, 476, 676 Abode of 370 among the various faiths 130 Baha’i vision of 320 eschatological realm of 435 and justice 774 Lesser

95, 428

Most Great 95 universal 429 world 320, 338, 477 penal law 400 abrogation of 414 people of Baha 249 of the Book 284 of infidelity and error 741 permissive society 307 persecution

354,

357-359, 419, 457, 460, 462, 469, 494, 530 of the Baha’is in Islamic states 463 of Baha’u’llah 616 of Christians 493 of thought 581 “personality cult’? 74, 78, 82, 91, 94 philosophical studies 293 philosophy 279, 293 cognitive potential of 561 political 470 pilgrimage 343 plan of God for humanity’s salvation 439 plans, systematic 239 plurality 419 pneumatic anarchy 145, 149 community 145 pneumocracy 145 pogroms against Babis 619 policy divine 467 human 466 political activity, abstinence from 116 goal of the Baha’i Faith 569 power 425 thought, Baha’i 425 politics new type of 440 secularization of 453 polygamy, abolition of 348 Pontifical Prayer 230 Pope 227, 284 ex cathedra decisions of the 159 infallibility of the 174

352, 357, 493, 580,

583

853

General Index Pope (cont.)

potestas iurisdictionis = potestas regiminis

ordinis

156, 157, 792

157

powers of the

156, 157

teaching office of 172 titles of 92 positivism, legal 145 power(s) claim to 418, 440

political 425 call for 418 politics 467 secular, legitimation of 396

struggles 557 total, claim to 424

two 155 pragmatism 252 prayer 596 daily 385 extempore 386 legal 389 obligatory 183, 339, 386-389, 390 in Islam 389 petitioning 389 ritual, daily, ‘the two pillars

that sustain the revealed Law of God’ 386 in Islam 389 in Judaism 389 preconditions 15 preconvictions 16 predestination

274, 276

pre-existence 273 prejudice 558 prepublication review 209 prerequisite for lasting world peace 130 presuppositions (vorverstdndnis) 16 Preserved Tablet 273, 275 pretium virginitatis 373 previous revelation, allusions to

343

Primal Point 655 primogeniture 708 principle of national sovereignty 136 ‘separation and distinction’ 44 pro perfidis iudaeis 284 problem-solving, cooperate 754 profanization 252 progress, human 292 prohibition against marrying followers of another religion 284 of alcohol and drugs 627 of obstructionism 223 promiscuity 483 promise of all ages 288 prophetic 427 Promised One, the 510, 511, 513,

531, 533, 536, 538, 601, 604, 616, 644, 650, 672 promises, eschatological 261 promulgation of the Baha’i teachings 240 property, full jurisdiction over one’s 377 prophecies, Jewish, fulfilment of al5) prophethood includes function of lawgiver 596 station of 589 prophetology 261, 262, 422, 552, 566 Baha’i 577 prophets of the past 288 proselytization 242, 286 protection of minorities 435 protest against confessionalism in the Baha’i Faith 763 Protestant church 227, 677 doctrine 318, 399 thought 404 legal 143

General Index Protestantism 143, 144, 147, 228, 244, 318 provision, specific 180 prudence (hikma) 84, 242 punishment 274 capital 413 purpose of 413 *“Punitur quia peccatum est’ 413 puritanism 568 purpose of man’s creation 389

rationality (cont.) categories of 340 limited 308 rawh wa rayhan (joy and radiance) 287 rawdih-khani 625 reality, inner 297 reason 196, 203, 205, 220, 224, 231, 233, 257, 290, 307, 309, 320, 364, 476 critical 110 role of, in understanding moral norms 406 voice of 430 rebellion 307

Qa’im 575, 576, 584, 587, 588, 591, 648, 649 Bab’s claim to be the 592 identity of the 576, 584 with a new holy book and a new law 585 al-qatl 413 Qayyumu’l-Asma’ 50, 57, 88, 588, 589 gibla 339 change of the 44 giyama 582 qiyas 364 Qur’an 230, 263, 281, 319, 327, 340, 341, 405, 415, 492, 587, 673, 695, 673 divine origin of the 341 finality of the 585 law of the 346 word of the 365

reconciliation

rabb 269 rabb-‘abd paradigm 270 rabbinic writings 62 raja 583 Ramadan 387 ar-rahiq al-makhtum 342 rasul 264, 592

rational power 198, 206, 220 thought 561 rationalism

130, 468

among the religions 285 spirit of 23 universal 286 redemption of man 286 of the world 262 refinement 392 reformation of the world 287 true 280 ‘reign ofjustice’ 305 reincarnation doctrine of 508 rejection of 569 relationship between father and son 269 hikma and tagiyya 354 relativism 278 religion(s) 290 ‘of the book’ 260 essence of 315 the ‘numinosum, fascinosum et tremendum 340 ‘of observance’ 301 the one and indivisible of God 280 prophetic 43 like aremedy 287 self-image of a 20 and science 295, 300

289, 290, 300, 563

rationality 307, 430

855

General Index revelation (cont.)

religion(s) (cont.) study of 15 two dimensions of 756 voice of 430 religious leaders 287 Studies 1552192452832 9433) 34 truth not absolute but relative 278 religiosity, individual 586 remedy, religion is like a 287

progressive

Young Turk’s

290, 552, 686

French 303 Ridvan 56, 63, 64, 65, 370, 599, 611, 612 Garden of 64 right of the individual to selfexpression 114, 214, 216ff., 222 Right Path 37 righteousness 435 rigorism 410 Risdliy-i-‘Ammih 656 Risdliy-i-Madaniyyih 291 rites 343 ritual claims to religious truth 16 laws 343 and legal norms 338 provisions 183 Roman Inquisition 325 Romans 481 rukn-i-rabi‘ 588 rule ofjustice 304 of law 305

renegade 23, 27, 28, 29 renewal 492, 586

renunciation of Christian beliefs 244 repression and tyranny 584 republic, idea of a 424 republican form of government 447 requirements of the day 362 of anew age 345 resentment 28 responsibility 151, 209, 219, 221, 224, 473, 476 moral 275 for one’s own actions 429 for the world 443, 568 resurrection corporeal 508 of the dead 584 retaliation and expiation 413 Return of Christ 75 revelation

345, 396, 564,

587, 600 soteriological dimension of Baha’u’llah’s 262 revenge forbidden 664 review process 210, 211 Revolution 477

rulers 71, 287, 304

Russo-Turkish war 542

260, 276, 277, 300, 307,

317, 340 character of dialogical 345 a comprehensive framework 88 man’s dependence on 308 doctrine of progressive, cyclically recurring divine 280 is not final 365 horizontal dimension of 282 post-biblical claim to divine 17

sabil 141 sacramental order 161 sacraments 161, 163 according to Catholic theology 163 working ex opere operato 270 sacred, profanation of the 390 safir 583, 592 sahib al-sayf 584

856

General Index Salat 385, 386, 389 salvation 261, 426, 476, 552, 562, Shs, Se), IBM claim to a monopoly on 581 is divine mercy 476 of humankind 286 individual 702 of mankind 268 need for 443 new religious offers of 103 path to 282 317 spiritual, from the world 564 Satan 347, 445 scepticism to law, Protestant 145 schism 51, 118, 154, 226, 227, 236, 534, 542, 556, 671, 675, 682, 775 inappropriate in connection with the conflict between Mirza Yahya and Baha’u'llah 672 inIslam 681 so-called 556 schismatics 23 scholarship 207 schooling, compulsory 292 schools 112 science

secular systems 135 secularism 319 secularization 91 of politics 453 security legal 435 system of the collective 431 sedition 233, 301, 306 seeker true, qualities of the 593 self-administration 246 self-alienation 313 self-determination 110

self-expression, right of the individual to 114, 214, 216-219,

Dp) self-incapacitation 110, 215 self-interpretation 40 self-interest, enlightened 430 self-protection, right of 400 self-realization 564 self-responsibility 110, 419 self-righteousness 271 self-sacrifice 359 “self-surrender and uncritical subordination’? 111 self-understanding 26 semantics 119, 122 tendentious 29

289, 290, 294, 677

equal status with religion 291 and religion, relationship between 295 and technology 319 ‘sciences which begin with words and end with words’

separation of powers

293, 295

scientism 563 scientists 291 scripture commentary on the 113 falsifying of 327 ‘seal of the prophets’ 457, 582 ‘sealed wine’ 342 secrecy, ‘general rule of 39 ‘secret’ teachings? 560 sects

155, 158, 160,

247, 248, 432, 689, 694, 696, 698, 701, 703, 704 Sermon on the Mount 400 service to humanity 440, 442 Seven Valleys 642, 643 sexes, equality of 62 shari‘a 363, 364, 405, 457, 458, 595 abrogation (raf‘) of 585 break with the 97 Sharif of Mecca 602 Shaykhiyya 297, 581, 586 Shema 388 Shi‘a 364, 583 clergy 452, 555

103,555

in Islam, seventy-two different heretical 681 theosophical 558

857

General Index Shi‘a (cont.)

concept of ‘uncleanness’ 283 historians 454 Islam 83, 116, 126, 184, 447, 560, 706 eschatological expectations of 564, 579, 582 law 284 legal doctrine

50, 353, 587

Shiraz 550 shortcomings of the community Doo Shrine of Baha’u’llah 706, 716-719 sideburns 392 sin 228 Sinai 267, 319, 338, 346 legislation on Mount 319 sinfulness, man’s 275, 562 sinner 271 as-sirétu’l-mustagim 37

Siyah-Chal 62, 605, 610, 611, 613, 614 skandalon

43, 49, 60, 688

smoking 413 prohibited 596 social development projects 126, 133 social order, based on justice not on love 400 teachings 62 society complexity of 307 in need of divine salvation USS sociology of religion 146 sola fide 270, 318

sola gratia 318 solution of conflict, peaceful 431 sotericism 289 soteriological dimension of the revelation 262 soteriology 312 soul ‘is phenomenal’ 273 human 273

soul (cont.) rational 569 transmigration of 508 sovereignty 592 absolute 269 divine

of God national

445, 701

265, 270, 396, 444 136, 138

of the people 249 speculation

98, 101, 102

spirit of the Cause is mutual cooperation, not dictatorship 255 Spirit of Truth 277 spiritualization of the world 437 spirituality 145, 147, 148, 253, 254, 320 state, constitutional 305 “state-threatening and subversive activities’? 116 station of ‘Abdu’]-Baha 715 statute of specific provision 180 steadfastness

359, 609

stigmatization 27 stirrers of sedition 45 Stoa 405 Stoic ideas 62 Straight Path 37, 277, 308, 416 strife and conflict expressly condemned 224 structure of the community 338, 728 federal, of the global state 434 of laws 338 legal 367 of the new order 344 political, of Baha’u’llah’s revelation 344 power 361 of the Qur’a4n 340 teleological 408 theocratic 471 of understanding 16 stumbling block 43 subjectivization of truth 320 submission

311, 315

General Index submission (cont.) to the Will of God 274 subsumption 196 subversion charge of 135 exponents of 232 succession, disagreement over 556 Sufism 445, 537 ecstasy in 555 sultan 592 Sunni doctrine, orthodox 397 Islam 184 legal doctrine 353 theory 364 principle of consensus 364 schools of law 353, 410

superstition 291 suppression 322, 325 supremacy, religious 557 Suratu Yusuf 50,57 Suratu'l-Haykal 68, 262, 265 Suratu’l-Muluik 70,71 Suratu’s-Sabr 280, 615, 668 Suratu't-Tawhid 266 Suriy-i-Amr 612, 623 symbolic exegesis 370 Synopsis and Codification of the Laws and Ordinances of the Kitab-i-Aqdas 351, 371, 373, 378, 381-384 a kind of inventory of the contents of the Kitab-iAqdas 383 provisional source of information 384 synthesis, new, between religion and politics 438 system that bears theocratic traits 155

ta ‘abbudi 416

ta‘ah 269, 314 tabligh 625

taboos 307, 412 tafsir 198, 589 Tafsir Surat Yusuf 589 tahrif 327 takfir 580, 581, 586 tagiyya 116, 325, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 361, 362, 419, 560, 586, 619 taqlid 364, 367, 581, 586 taqwa 269 Tarikh-i-Jadid 496, 499, 513, 534, 541, 572, 575 stylistic breaks in 516 tawakkul 269 ta’wil 198, 199, 370 teaching authority

93, 95, 108, 155,

157-159, 161-163, 174, 194ff., 205, 207-208 of the Pope 172 office 156, 174, 191, 207f., 695, 702 held by ‘Abdu’l-Baha 156 in the Catholic Church 208 of the Pope 174 testament forgery, alleged 31, 92 Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha 32 of Baha’u’llah 663 New 680 theft 402 theocratic global hegemony 71 structural elements 191 theocracy 421, 427, 447, 471 world-wide 325 theocratic order 418 theological pluralism 228 theology 84 Baha’i 21, 207 cognitive potential of 561 ‘after the death of God’ 87 of history 486 moral, Catholic

405

General Index theology (cont.) narrative 481 practical of the Baha’i Faith 560 theophany, independent 559 theosophical sect 561 Theosophical Society 565 theosophy 561, 562, 566 hellenistic 560 judgements of 561 Muhammadan 565 oriental 563 thieves, marking of 413 thought critical 114 patterns, customary models of 567 rational 561 thousand years 200 time of the end

584, 586

needs and requirements of the 700 tobacco

413, 495

concession tolerance

540

356, 440

truth absolute

278

criterion of 295, 558

independent investigation of 112 ultimate 281 triumphalism, ecclesiastical 24 truthfulness

356, 360.

Twelfth Imam, return of the 583 Twelver Shi‘a, Imams of 706

twin duties that constitute the covenant of God 315 tyranny 304

‘ulama’ 197, 367, 454 umma

230, 367

Ummu'l-Kitab 330 UNESCO 135 uniformity of thought 424 United Nations 118, 134, 149 unity 468 of the believers 741 of the community

228, 286, 287, 306, 401,

418, 460, 540 religious 91, 394 Torah 281, 299, 340, 346, 400, 405, 415, 416 ‘totalitarian system’? 123 totalitarianism 115, 304, 418 tradition 492 eschatological 585 oral 682 religious 567 traditional elements 567 ways of thinking 567 transfiguration 482 transformation, gradual 441 transmigration of souls 508 A Traveller’s Narrative

trustworthiness

518, 534,

536, 543, 544 tribunal, international 432 trust in God 269

206, 229,

230, 682, 685, 688, 699 in diversity 433, 434 of the Faith 148, 158 and fellowship among peoples 760 of the human race 741 legitimate goal 231 of the Manifestations 244 of mankind 467 mystical 280 of the Prophets 265 of religions 283 and universality in Protestantism

231

Universal House of Justice

106,

107, 108, 149, 158, 159, 165, 175, 184, 191, 216, 218, 247, 382, 472, 693, 700, 703, 711 electoral procedures 350 essential conditions to the election of the first 721

General Index humanity’s supreme legislative organ 437 legislative function of 437 organization of the 119 spheres of competence assigned to 694 the supreme institution 692 universalism

vocation (cont.) of Moses 666 voluntarism, ethical

‘waj 235 wantonness 303 war 466 warnings against ‘false apostles’ 46 wealth 446 Weltunion fiir Universale Religion und Universalen Frieden 674

467, 564

of Baha’i doctrine theological 283 usul ad-din 588 usul al-figh 581 Usuli 580, 585 clergy 581 mujtahids 581 orthodoxy 581 school 364 utopian hopes 36

397

456

Will and Testament

39, 47, 50, 84,

90, 101, 106, 113, 150, 152, 154, 165, 175, 201, 215, 216, 240, 350, 366, 685, 687, 689, 690, 692, 693, 696, 704, 711, 714 allegedly hateful language of 743 authenticity of the 221, 678,

2, TPS YP full text available 713 graphological analysis 746 not an unexpected innovation 704 language of 688 official English translation 713 question of the authenticity of 753 read out to Shoghi Effendi Wl stylistic analysis of 736 comparison 738 written in Persian 736 wine 346, 347, 412, 495 wisdom 84, 89, 219, 242, 258, 291, 309, 356, 360 withdrawal of administrative rights 206, 237

vali 509, 633

implies unrestricted administrative and spiritual leadership 644 Valiy-i-Amru'llah 90, 382, 695, TH values hierarchy of 196 moral 299 variety of views 207 Vatican 37 Veritatis Splendor, Encyclical Letter 307, 314, 409, 415 views, variety of 207 vilayat 509 implies unrestricted administrative and spiritual leadership 644 vilayat-i-ishan 510 violence 421 virginity of the bride 377 virtues 407 dianoétic 242 vocation Baha’u’llah’s mystical 65, 614

from the Church

243, 244

women’s rights 348 Word of God 196, 243, 561, 601 emphatic, eruptive 340 is multidimensional 207

861

General Index Word of God (cont.) transforming power of the 593

World Council of Churches 24 World Day of Prayer for Peace world government 71, 115

Word and the Law

world order, new 71 world peace 36, 128, 132, 320

evolutionary process initiated by 699 interpretation of the 681 living under the 407, 411 World Centre 194, 238, 247, 249 world citizens 454

equilibrium of the 759 executive 428 federal state 434 order of Baha’u’llah 698 new 437 parliament 428, 432 future 437 peace 467, 477 power, claim to 447 state, theocratically unified

423 supremacy 423, 427 claim to 423, 424 tribunal 428 view dualistic

essential prerequisite for 130 world problems 134 solution of 320 ‘world supremacy, absolute’? 124 world unity 136 worship, forms of 282 wrath of God 740

yawmu 'l-qiyamah 286 year of patience 374, 375, 376 yezer 311

Yom Kippur 393 Young Turks’ Revolution 686

zahir 297 az-zalimin 46 al-Zawrd’ (Baghdad) 614 zealotry 410

564

zeitgeist

World Conference on Religions and Peace (WCRP) 131

132

16, 77, 87, 303, 313

‘zentrale’ ‘119, 251 Zoroastrianism

THEOLOGY LIBRARY

CLAREMONT, CA ,

62, 260, 388

UDO SCHAEFER, born 1926, studied musicology and law at the Ruperto Carola University in Heidelberg. After receiving his Doctorate (doctor iuris utriusque) in the discipline of Church Law, he worked for thirty years in the German judiciary, first as a judge, and later as chief prosecutor at the State Court of Heidelberg. Author of numerous articles and books in the field of Religious Studies, with works translated into seven languages. NICOLA TOWFIGH, born 1959, Doctor of Philosophy, studied oriental studies, islamology, philosophy and German literature.

Works

as

a

free-lance

author,

lecturer

and

translator. ULRICH GOLLMER, M.A., born 1949, studied English literature, sociology, history and political science at the University of Stuttgart. Lector and manager of a publishing trust.

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