Making Revolution in Egypt: The April 6 Youth Movement in a Global Context 9781350987081, 9781786733047

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Dedicated to my parents, Feryal and Semir Sonay; my brother, Tarik Sonay; and to Stamatia Blaga. Thank you for everything!

Published in 2018 by I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd London • New York www.ibtauris.com Copyright q 2018 Ali Sonay The right of Ali Sonay to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Every attempt has been made to gain permission for the use of the images in this book. Any omissions will be rectified in future editions. References to websites were correct at the time of writing. Library of Modern Middle East Studies 197 ISBN: 978 1 78453 866 8 eISBN: 978 1 78672 304 8 ePDF: 978 1 78673 304 7 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available Typeset in Stone Serif by OKS Prepress Services, Chennai, India Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1 “Our dream will not die”: flyer posted on April 6 Facebook page, 23 January 2015.

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Figure 5.1 “The strike [. . .] satisfies all players,” Al-Masry Al-Youm, 7 April 2008.

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Figure 5.2 Graffiti calling for a second strike in 2009.

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Figure 6.1 “Correcting the path of the January 25 revolution: the people want to try the corrupt.” Tahrir Documents (Watha¯ʾiq al-Tahrı¯r), 3 April 2011. ˙ Figure 7.1 The organizational structure of April 6.

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Figure 8.1 A photograph of graffiti, saying “Long live Egypt: 6 April General Strike.”

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Figure 8.2 An image of a bank note with the message “6 April 2009 General Strike: It is our right and we will take it/make it our own.”

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Figure 8.3 “Fasa¯d Award: April 6 expression competition, from the Occupied Lands of Egypt.”

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Figure 8.4 “April 6 holds a competition to select the most corrupt individuals in 2010.”

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Figure 8.5 Advertisement for “al-Qilla Mundassa Conference III: From the Occupied Lands of Egypt.”

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Figure 8.6 The Aprilian Voice, 25 January 2013, (left to right) “Political terms” and “The stuck revolutionaries.”

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Figure 8.7 “April 6th Youth Movement – Who Are We???” Tahrir Documents (Watha¯ʾiq al-Tahrı¯r), 20 September 2011. ˙ Figure 8.8 “Grab the fulu ¯ l: the black list,” Tahrir Documents (Watha¯ʾiq al-Tahrı¯r), 2 November 2011. ˙ Figure 8.9 A depiction of Egypt’s volatile situation after the revolution between the police, military, the election procedure, protesters, and the killing of one April 6 member, “Jika.” Cairo, 5 January 2013 (author’s own image).

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This project builds on my doctoral dissertation. It developed in the friendly and cooperative environment of the Philipps-Universita¨t Marburg, which facilitated many fruitful conversations. Without that atmosphere, this study would not have been possible. I would like to express my deep gratitude to my supervisors, Rachid Ouaissa and Cilja Harders, for their time and, above all, advice in shaping the study’s main framework. I would also like to sincerely thank Friederike Pannewick, Albrecht Fuess, and Christoph Schumann for having confidence in my doctorate project from the beginning. In addition, I owe many thanks to all my colleagues at the Center for Near and Middle Eastern Studies and the research network Re-Configurations: History, Remembrance and Transformation Processes in the Middle East and North Africa. I am very grateful to Coady Buckley for proofreading and Munizha Ahmad-Cooke as well as Ian McDonald for copy-editing the draft; to Ahmed El-Soud for helping me to transcribe the interviews and to the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) for their generous financial support, which allowed me to undertake my fieldwork. Many friends have encouraged me during these six years. Thank you! I also would like to thank my editors at I.B.Tauris, Sophie Rudland and Arub Ahmed, for their support and assistance throughout the publication process.

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Last, but not least, and at the same time first and foremost, I am very much obliged to all the people in Egypt I had the chance to meet, who trusted me and let me just be among them. !‫ﺍﻟﻒ ﺷﻜﺮ‬

NOTE ON TRANSLATION AND TRANSLITERATION

The transliteration of Arabic terms and names follows a simplified version of the guidelines set out in the International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES). Where a common English spelling exists, I have opted for that. In direct quotes, I have kept the spellings as they appear in the original sources. Interviews were mostly recorded in colloquial Egyptian. IJMES suggests using a colloquial transliteration system close to the IJMES system. This has been adhered to as far as possible. Elements of Egyptian colloquial language have been added in two ways: g has been used for Jı¯m (‫ )ج‬throughout the work, when spelled in that form, as in all transliterated interviews, and when used in an Egyptian political context, for example Gamal instead of Jamal Abdel Nasser. Secondly, important colloquial terms have been transliterated in accordance with A Dictionary of Egyptian Arabic: Arabic –English by El-Said Badawi and Martin Hinds.1 In specific instances – as when citing from Egyptian newspapers or reproducing movement material – the Arabic script has been kept in order to maintain immediate authenticity. When citing an author with both an English and Arabic reference entry, the name used in the English version has been preferred over the Arabic reference for consistency.

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Based on The Chicago Manual of Style,2 interview citations are indicated by using the term “personal communication” abbreviated as “pers. comm.” The interview number corresponds to the numbered list of interviews in the Appendix. Unless otherwise specified, all translations are my own.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AO AGEG CANVAS IMF MB MENA region NDP NGO PO SCAF SMT

Administrative Office of April 6 (al-Maktab al-Ida¯rı¯) The Egyptian Anti-Globalization Group (al-Magmu ¯ ʿa al-Misriyya li-Muna¯hadat al-ʿAwlama) ˙ ˙ Centre for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies International Monetary Fund The Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwa¯n al-Muslimu ¯ n) Middle East and North Africa region National Democratic Party (al-Hizb al-Watanı¯ ˙ ˙ al-Dı¯muqra¯t¯ı) ˙ Non-governmental organization Political Office of April 6 (al-Maktab al-Siya¯sı¯) Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (al-Maglis al-Aʿla¯ li-l-Quwwa¯t al-Musallaha) ˙ Social Movement Theory

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

Injustice should not be understood to imply only the confiscation of money or other property from the owners, without compensation and without cause. It is commonly understood in that way, but it is something more general than that. Whoever takes someone’s property, or uses him for forced labour, or presses an unjustified claim against him, or imposes upon him a duty not required by religious law, does an injustice to that particular person [. . .] Those who deny people their rights commit an injustice. Those who, in general, take property by force, commit an injustice. Ibn Khaldu ¯ n1 Punishment is part of political activism, and punishment is of little value compared to sorting out the disentangling of Egypt from corruption, despotism, and the regime. April 6 Facebook page, 4 November 20142 On 25 January 2015, four years after the iconic images from Tahrir Square (Tahrir) in Cairo, full of communal solidarity, inclusiveness and hope, these events were overturned and transformed into their exact antithesis. All activities having been postponed because of the recent death of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, events commemorating Tahrir were forbidden in order to forestall protests by various groups and movements.3 The initial “opening up of political life in Egypt”4 proclaimed by Amr Ali, the then general coordinator of the 6th of April Youth Movement (Harakat ˙ Shaba¯b 6 Ibrı¯l, henceforth referred to as the more common “April 6 Youth Movement” or “April 6”) in the wake of the 25 January Revolution once more seemed to close. Active since its establishment in 2008, April 6 has been one of the main organizers of protests and, in the wake of the

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revolutionary events of 2011, an important youth group. It has thereby garnered considerable Egyptian, regional and international media attention, exemplifying an influential youth movement engaging in the realization of democratic politics and characteristically using contemporary technologies – most notably, social media. However, the initial enthusiasm and exuberant expectations regarding a smooth democratic transition for the Arab Spring have proved to be premature. Consequently – hinting at the civil wars in Syria and Libya, the stifling of the opposition in Bahrain and the volatile situation in Yemen – a reductionist discourse of an “Arab Winter” has emerged, refuting the contingency and the processual character of the ongoing developments. For the time being though, looking at the course of the last six years, Egypt’s path toward democratic government holds little promise for the near future. Exclusionist and repressive policies by various political actors, beginning with the increasingly institutionalized processes after the revolution, eventually culminated in the overthrow of an elected president and his administration in a military coup in July 2013. This was followed by steps taken to restrict political expression – such as a new protest law, introduced in November 2013, requiring the organizers of protest marches to notify the police of any action and to obtain the police’s approval of such actions in advance. Protests against this law by various political groups, including April 6, resulted in the arrest of Ahmed Maher and Mohamed Adel, two of the movement’s most important and prominent figures. They were subsequently sentenced to three years in jail along with other activists for organizing a nonapproved, and thus illegal, protest march.5 (Ahmed Maher was released from prison on 5 January 2017,6 and Mohamed Adel on 21 January 2017.)7 In April 2014, the movement was banned by a court in Cairo on the basis of “acts that tarnish Egypt’s image as well as espionage.”8 Notwithstanding the ban and a number of its main organizers having been jailed, the movement is still informally pursuing its political activities and calls to demonstrate. Thus, its call for protests on the fourth anniversary of the revolution was promoted under the slogan “Our dream will not die” (“Hilmuna¯ ra¯fid yamu ¯ t”). It went on to claim, in a flyer ˙ ˙ posted on its Facebook page (see Figure 1.1): Waves of revolutions came successively because whoever took over the rule after removing an irresponsible one, has not believed in its [i.e. the revolution’s] just demands. This is still unattainable under a regime continuing the irresponsible path of oppression, aggression, and the eating up of Egyptians’ rights with deception as well as unprecedented repression, subjection, killing, and arrests [. . .]

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The current regime proved that it came to observe the restoration of the irresponsible regime and to release it from prison and to punish the youth who revolted against its corruption under which we witnessed economic decisions that resulted in a complicated life for Egyptian citizens [. . .] April 6 Youth Movement announces its participation in the events of 25 January in Cairo and the governorates. We call on everybody who believes in the goals of the January Revolution regardless of his affiliation and without holding up any political and party slogans, just to be there on the streets and public squares with the Egyptian flag and holding up the revolution’s demands as Bread, Freedom, Social Justice and Human Dignity [. . .] This is the moment to reunite once again to demonstrate to the corrupt regime the persistence of the revolution as long as we breathe it and our dream refuses to die. In order to defend our right to live in a free and just homeland, we either live a dignified life or die on the path of freedom, bread, dignity, and justice for those succeeding us. April 6 Youth Movement, Egyptian Resistance Movement.9 When looking at the content and style of the flyer, several signifiers give us a first impression of April 6’s political subjectivity. One initial observation is the reference to a hegemonic entity, which is conceived as obstructing a functioning and socially just state of Egypt. Thus, there is a despotic (istibda¯d) antagonist, denoted as a corrupt regime (niza¯m fa¯sid) ˙ that must be confronted and pressured in order to realize change in Egypt and attain the dreams of a better future. In this context, the polity is a social imaginary constructed around democracy, freedom and social justice, to be achieved through organized pressure on the regime. Thus, the movement’s demands, organization and the employed tools to achieve those demands are indicated. With regard to the possibilities of this social change in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), research prior to the Arab Spring focused predominantly on the constellation of political and socioeconomic factors that underpinned the dominant authoritarian setting. While analyzing the strategies used by the State to preserve its power constitutes a necessary perspective in order to understand the social consequences of change, there has been little focus on the simultaneous emergence and unfolding of internal dynamics of change and opposition, such as the transformative effects of everyday life or social movements. This approach has contributed to one-sided explanatory models.

Figure 1.1 “Our dream will not die”: flyer posted on April 6 Facebook page, 23 January 2015.

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Concomitantly, these often binary approaches have been accompanied by an over-emphasis on Islam – in contrast to secular contexts – as the central category according to which politics and social processes in the MENA region have been understood. A second issue is that countries in the MENA region have often been conceived of as a monolithic entity, both politically and culturally, and thereby somehow detached from political and socioeconomic processes occurring on a global scale. This is evident, for instance, when looking at theories of social movements that have been formulated to a large extent without empirical data from the Middle East and North Africa. In this sense, the cycles of protest since 2011 have marked a turning point with respect to the frameworks and methods employed to analyze societies and their interaction with power structures in the MENA region. More recently, there have been more “bottom-up” analyses that supplement the “top-down” approaches mentioned above, focusing instead on social actors and their impact on the processes of social change. Thus, when looking at the contemporary academic literature on the MENA region in the social sciences and humanities there is increasing reference to the social dynamics of the Arab uprisings, which moves away from the Arab exceptionalism10 referred to above. The uprisings have highlighted the limits and inadequateness of understanding and conceptualizing political processes, both in general and in the MENA region, through the use of binary models such as those that dominate media discourses – for example, Arab Spring vs Arab Winter, democracy vs authoritarianism, modern vs traditional or Islamic vs secular. Instead, they have shown just how hybrid and contingent events that rupture assumed realities can be. These reflections constitute the reason why this study aims at going beyond binary understandings of social processes while working out the complex interrelationships underlying them. During the same time that the MENA region has been experiencing the Arab uprisings, the world in general has witnessed a wave of protest dynamics – for instance, the Occupy Wall Street movement in the US as well as similar protests in Spain, Greece and Turkey, among others. These have coincided with the socioeconomic ramifications that followed the world financial crisis in 2008. As a consequence, the simultaneity of these developments has manifested a global moment and given rise to the questioning and reconceptualizing of supposedly familiar notions such as politics, social justice, human dignity, democracy and capitalism, while going beyond categories such as the “West” or “the Arab World.” In this sense, April 6 is interpreted from a perspective that also goes beyond Egypt and the MENA region, placing the events in Egypt in a

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global context. The hypothesis is that the contentious manifestations entailed in these events are relevant to understanding the condition of contemporary social-movement dynamics on a global level.

Methodology Methodologically, the study has been realized by combining a sociohistorical framework with a qualitative, empirical approach. I spent almost six months in total in Egypt for fieldwork during two research trips in 2012 and 2013. During this time, 40 semi-structured interviews with activists, scientists and journalists (42 individuals in total) were conducted. There were 27 interviews with members of April 6, from various organizational levels up to the highest echelons of the group. The remainder included members of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), the Kifaya movement and the Egyptian Current Party, as well as relevant social scientists and journalists from Egyptian and international media. These perspectives from outside the movement were important in order to obtain critical hints and information about ambiguous contexts and to put things into perspective within a broader framework of Egyptian and global politics. In addition, I attended protest marches organized by the movement as well as press conferences, public video screenings, performances and art exhibitions. Due to the organizational density of political activism in the capital, the majority of the fieldwork took place in the Greater Cairo area, including Giza, but locations such as Alexandria and Luxor were also included. Approaching the movement as an outsider was difficult and required several steps. On arriving in Cairo, I had contact details from persons in other movements and parties. While I attempted to approach the movement with the help of these people, I also simultaneously followed posts on Facebook and Twitter that mentioned activities, their dates and locations. I eventually took the decision to attend a protest march against the imprisonment of political activists, where I was able to speak directly to the movement’s members and thus gradually build a network of individuals that enabled me to approach the interview candidates. The selection of interviewees was determined on the one hand by the need to include candidates from the movement’s various hierarchical levels while maintaining a geographical balance. Knowing that most activists are concentrated in the Greater Cairo area, this method was also applied within Cairo. On the other hand – though most of the members are male – I also attempted to achieve a balance with respect to gender as far as possible. In total, 40 hours of audio material was recorded. In addition to the interviews as primary sources, the movement’s own publications,

INTRODUCTION

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such as flyers and leaflets, as well as photos taken by myself were collected. Moreover, data from social media has been utilized, such as discussion threads, announcements of events and political decisions, pictures and videos. Secondary sources consulted include books and articles in academic journals and newspapers in English, Arabic and German, as well as, to a lesser extent, French. It was important to consider that in the case of fieldwork, particularly based on interviews with people who remain active within the field being studied, there is potential for unintended consequences for research partners, i.e. the interviewees. Mark Israel and Iain Hay list the most important codes of ethics guiding social scientists’ conduct during their research.11 In addition to instances of immediate hazard during participant observation or interviews, I sometimes had doubts regarding the potential impact the research on site would have on the participants. Therefore, I was also concerned that my research would put my partners and interviewees at potential risk due to political communication with a foreigner, which remains a highly sensitive issue in Egypt. Thus, keeping in mind the deteriorating security situation for political activists and researchers since the military coup of 2013 – as well as the fact that April 6 is an informal movement with founding members who have occasionally been imprisoned since its beginnings, and which has been banned by court since April 2014 – I have decided not to use the names of the interviewees but to simply mention their position, except in cases where this has been explicitly requested by the movement or the interviewee in concern. Thus, all interviews were conducted according to core ethical standards, including the concepts of “informed consent”12 and “confidentiality.”13 Anonymity can also be crucial when using the internet as a data source. This creates an ethical imperative to not put communities and individuals involved in the research at risk, especially in light of increasing discussions globally of online-interaction surveillance. Scholars have been engaged in working out guidelines for ethical research,14 such as requiring repeated consent from individuals involved, regardless of whether the internet context is public or private.15 For example, April 6 has numerous groups on Facebook, and in addition to a central page, each of the governorates, neighborhoods and committees also have platforms. While these are publicly accessible, there are also private groups for maintaining internal procedures such as voting, which were left out of this analysis. An additional challenge when using online data was the ephemerality of the April 6 Facebook site, reflecting the movement’s changing and fluid character.

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Outline of the Book In order to approach its hypothesis and illustrate its findings meaningfully, the book is structured as follows: in Part I, building on Chapter 1’s introduction and the methodological approach, Chapter 2 presents a theoretical overview delineating the current state of research and thus contextualizing the research question within the relevant debates and concepts. In line with this study’s logic of focusing on social dynamics from the bottom up, Social Movement Theory (SMT) is used to focus specifically on how hegemonic (state) practices are contested. That is: How are demands articulated? What kind of organizational structure is beneficial? Which instruments are employed in order to realize the articulated demands effectively? As the established strands of SMT rarely refer to the MENA region, the aspects that are lacking will be explained by recent theorizations of Middle Eastern dynamics of contention, which are of importance in informing this study’s arguments – for instance, Asef Bayat’s “social nonmovements.”16 SMT also refers to the global transnationalization of protest movements, but again the MENA region has until recently been underrepresented. In this respect, approaches to global interconnectedness – for instance, world-systems theory – are of importance. As will be seen, urban contexts – such as spaces with increased political and economic power networks, which thereby create comparable political and socioeconomic implications on a global scale – play a central role in explaining where, exactly, contentious dynamics evolve. Reading contemporary protest dynamics from a global viewpoint puts essentialist assumptions of Arab exceptionalism into perspective without overlooking specificities of context in Egypt. Building on this conceptualization, Part II functions as a crucial preparatory stage embedding the subsequent analysis of April 6 in a sociohistorical context. It delineates how the longing for and eventual emergence of an authentic Egyptian nation within colonial and postcolonial settings was accompanied by notions of power and contention. Beginning with the revolution of 1919, the account in Chapters 3 and 4 proceeds chronologically from formal independence to Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak, ending with the eventual fall of Mubarak in the wake of the protests in January and February 2011. Based on these elaborations, Chapter 5 explains the initial phase of the April 6 Youth Movement. This historical approach is necessary in order to comprehend the emergence of April 6 in 2008 and to contextualize its politics. Building on the account of the movement’s emergence, Part III divides the empirical data along the three characteristic movement dimensions –

INTRODUCTION

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namely, the demands, organizational structure and the employed contentious repertoire. The period covered in this analysis begins with the movement’s establishment in 2008 and ends shortly after its formal ban in 2014. Chapter 6 displays how the movement members aim to realize socioeconomic security, individual perspectives, political participation and the end of repression. In order to achieve these aims, the corrupt system responsible for their suppression has to be removed. These demands reflect a very fundamental understanding of politics. As a reaction to decades of arbitrary formal politics, this understanding also reveals an informal approach: a preference for remaining outside of politics as a pressure group, and a refusal to form a political party. This narrative reflects a globally observable political discourse that treats idealistic demands as marginal. In order to challenge that political system, many movement members have argued that pressure from below is needed, which necessitates an organizational presence at the local level. Accordingly, the development of the organizational structure depicted in Chapter 7 reflects these demands. The movement was established in 2008 as a Facebook group to support a workers’ strike on 6 April 2008. As a consequence, digital technologies have played a significant organizational role from the outset. The findings, however, reveal that their function has depended on the changing political context and opportunities. The informal approach to politics can also be observed at the organizational level. Membership is loose and fluctuating; being in a process of evolution, the structure has central and non-central elements. Organizational flexibility has simultaneously been the movement’s strength and weakness. Indeed, it was the reason for powerful mobilizations at specific moments in 2008 and on 25 January 2011. After the revolution, however, with a renewed formal transitional period, fragmentations occurred when members established alternative movements, left for formal parties or established a party. Within this framework, the more educated and globalized decision makers opted increasingly for a simultaneous formalization of the movement’s activities, particularly by taking the MB’s organization as a grassroots movement and its affiliated institutions – foundations, NGOs and a political party – as an example. The youth, organized mostly in local neighborhood communities, rejected these policies, illustrating the challenges between political formality and informality as a result of decades of authoritarian rule. In connection with the above findings, Chapter 8 explains the repertoire of contention employed to exert the required pressure. In terms of coordination and mobilization, digital technologies were at the center in the beginning. In the post-revolutionary period, when the movement leaders and members acknowledged the onset of a new phase, repertoires

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were adjusted on the ground in order to remain relevant. As a resourcepoor movement, digital technologies remained a substantial platform for visual and textual public interventions. Thus, both an Egyptian and global audience (many posts were in English) could be addressed while reproducing the movement’s internal identity. After Hosni Mubarak and during the rules of successive presidents Mohamed Mursi and Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, pressure for compliance with revolutionary demands continued through the organization of protest marches and occupations of public space, often in cooperation with other movements and parties. Finally, in Chapter 9, the main hypotheses and findings are interpreted in order to draw conclusions about contemporary contentious politics beyond Egypt. Building firstly on relevant intellectuals’ interpretations of the modern and recent history of political and socioeconomic conditions in Egypt and the MENA region, it sheds additional light on the context in which movements such as April 6 emerge, unfold and contract in a historical context. Secondly, the chapter illustrates the need for and suggests a new analytical (also methodological and theoretical) terminology, which does not regard the Middle East as a region detached from global developments. The impact of the Arab uprisings and movements like April 6 has revealed the fact that concepts like politics, democracy, modernity, social justice and freedom are still articulated and contested on a global scale. In order to underscore this approach, references are made to contemporary intellectual debates and interpretations of contentious politics that go beyond the MENA region.

CHAPTER 2 CONCEPTUALIZING CONTENTIOUS POLITICS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT

In order to approach the book’s guiding hypothesis in a comprehensive way, this chapter theoretically grounds the key concepts. This will help to classify contemporary Egyptian political activism, and thereby situate it both in contemporary national and global contexts. This chapter will also look at the existing research on April 6.

Social Movements and Contentious Politics In the images of the protests in Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya and Syria since 2011, we have seen how large segments of those societies came together to express their disapproval of how life and the space given for it to unfold in different spheres – such as politics, the economy and the arts – had been restricted by the State and its institutions. Most importantly, people no longer had any hope and felt dispossessed of their present and future. Over time, societies have developed a number of practices to articulate such grievances, which were observable during the Arab uprisings: demonstrations, occupations of urban spaces and buildings, sit-ins, protest music and literature, and street art. Revolutions throughout history have developed as one answer to this mood of dispossession shared by substantial parts of society, while displaying a varying degree of organization and employing specific repertoires of contention to articulate their demands. The scientific observation of collective articulations and their dynamics emerging from these moods is, in particular, conducted by SMT, a set of interconnected theoretical

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strands. While SMT is too broad a terrain to be summarized here in its entirety,1 those aspects will be taken into consideration that help to explain the book’s purpose. The book therefore uses the terms “social movement dynamics” and “contentious politics” interchangeably. Both denote processes explained aptly by David Snow, Sarah Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi as: collectivities acting with some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally or culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which they are a part.2 Thus, both refer to processes occurring in a setting outside institutionalized party politics. By “opposition,” I mean a space of formal political procedures regardless of the prevailing political system – be that democratic or authoritarian. SMT developed predominantly in European and North American academia after World War II. Initially, social movements were correlated with the formation of the working class, which in the wake of industrialization and the emergence of the nation state aimed at transforming the capitalist system. The shift from class struggle in favor of new contestations, beginning in the 1960s, marked a transition to “new social movements.” In particular, the student protests of 1968 – which Ahmed Abdalla shows were also diffused to Egypt3 – and both the civil rights and anti-war movements in the US contributed to a valorization of the street as a locus for negotiating social concerns and thus politics in a field beyond formalized party politics.4 These dynamics were new in the sense that novel issues based on identity, sexuality, ethnicity or environment – including, for example, women, black and other ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians, and environmentalists – came to the forefront.5 Simultaneously, forces underlying the social context were going through a transformation process, which entailed an increasing diversification and informationization of capitalism, eventually resulting in the much-cited neoliberal restructuring of economic and social policies.6 A major trait of these new social movements was that they comprised mainly a middle class identifying itself with post-material values and displaying, therefore, an anti-modernist stance that derives its social capital from education and professional positions in society.7 New social movements also entailed changes regarding forms of contestation. Hence, the preference for non-hierarchical modes of organization, occupations of buildings and squares, and the creation

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of subcultural spaces.8 These transformations are aptly summarized by ¨ rgen Habermas, albeit in a Western context: Ju In the last ten to twenty years, conflicts have developed in advanced Western societies that, in many respects, deviate from the welfarestate pattern of institutionalized conflict over distribution. These new conflicts no longer arise in areas of material reproduction [. . .] and they can no longer be alleviated by compensations that conform to the system. Rather the new conflicts arise in areas of cultural reproduction, social integration and socialization [. . .] In short, the new conflicts are not sparked by problems of distribution, but concern the grammar of forms of life.9

Articulating Demands As already indicated, social movements’ main function is to articulate certain grievances and demands. SMT conceptualizes these articulations by referring to “frames.” Frame analysis10 of collective action elucidates how “meaning is attributed to events through the combination of observational prompts, established cognitive categories and the lived experience of individuals.”11 This is important for collective actors in order “to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists.”12 Frames have been analyzed particularly through the lens of social-movement organizations.13 Frame analysis usually has three successive components: diagnostic, prognostic and motivational.14 The diagnostic dimension constitutes a process by which a social issue is identified by specific individuals, organizations and movements as important enough to mobilize for. It entails a definition of those responsible and a subsequent process of negotiating the meaning and future trajectory of the problem involving a number of “social actors (state agencies, political parties, groups with hostile interests, media operators).”15 Frames are usually selective and reductionist in composition, and subsumed under a “dominant theme.”16 The prognostic element states in what way the diagnosed issue could be solved, and corresponding new configurations of social utopias are developed.17 Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor classifiy an additional four patterns of prognosis: a “supportive” position would embrace a political project – for example, globalization; a “rejectionist” position would fundamentally oppose and mobilize around an alternative, non-capitalist social system; positions understood as “alternatives” also denote a critical stance, aimed at creating new organizational spaces within the existing capitalist system; finally, the

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“reformist” point of view highlights the importance of reordering specific socioeconomic processes of globalization so that broader segments of society can benefit.18 The motivational dimension implies the interpretive process of persuasion and inducement to engage in collective action.19 In order for this to happen successfully, frames “do not only address the level of social groups and of collective actors, but link the individual sphere with that of collective experience.”20 Likewise, “they must generalize a certain problem or controversy, showing the connections with other events or with the condition of other social groups; and also demonstrate the relevance of a given problem to individual life experiences,” to enable “new definitions of the foundations of collective solidarity, to transform actors’ identity in a way which favors action.”21

Organizational Structures Organizational cohesion has been regarded as a prerequisite for the successful mobilization of resources,22 and thus mobilization in general.23 One central question concerning this subject area is how organization influences mobilization; to what extent does it facilitate or inhibit? Observations that hierarchical organizations are particularly successful have increasingly been criticized.24 Several concepts express the networking processes that sustain movement activism, which are organized by “movement professionals.”25 Different organizational structures may induce new dynamics in mobilization.26 Organizational variety occurs in an “organizational field” where organizations interact with each other, displaying not necessarily a single trajectory but an evolutionary understanding of organizational development.27 According to empirical evidence presented by Elisabeth Clemens and Debra Minkoff,28 newly established organizations that are limited in size and lack centralization have particular difficulty in garnering social legitimacy compared with institutionalized and established organizations. Due to novel forms of organization, the function of leadership is increasingly a negotiated issue,29 particularly in informal spheres where concepts such as internal democracy, “prefigurative politics” and “horizontality” (such as in the anti-globalization movement) are prevalent.30 In contrast to the traditional view mentioned above – i.e. the stronger the organizational cohesion and identity, the more successful the contentious politics – Dieter Rucht highlights the benefits of “weak identities.”31 Building on Mark Granovetter’s concept in “The strength of weak ties,”32 Rucht conceives weak identities as

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expressions of societal transformations, having a number of advantages in contemporary mobilizations.33 Formerly, collective identity was bound to cohesive and “lifeworldly” entrenched social groups and classes; therefore, constructing identities was less difficult than it is nowadays.34 Current mobilizations are characterized by the integration of much smaller social segments, which are often simultaneously active in other groups. Thus, today, strong identities are only to be found on the margins of society, both on the right and left.35 Three reasons are identified here: firstly, young activists and interested circles share an inclination toward temporal and non-formalized structures, including hard slogs and “trench warfare.” Second, due to their ideological openness these groups reach a broader mobilizable social segment than hitherto. Thirdly, alliances are therefore more easily constructed and held together by a vague integrative frame, as is observable in the anti-globalization movement.36 Current mobilizations are therefore characterized by integrating much smaller social segments than previously, which are often simultaneously active in other groups. The underlying factors in these processes are firstly, individualization and an increased spatial mobility; secondly, the decreased attribution of meaning to traditional value and belief systems in a globalizing and interconnected world; and thirdly, as a consequence of both these trends, the tendency of the younger generation to be politically active temporarily and situationally.37 Although Rucht’s approaches are developed specifically in a European context, his argumentation – as will be seen – is also relevant to the Egyptian case.

Repertoires of Contention Perhaps the most fundamental feature that distinguishes social movements from more formal political actors such as parties is that the former depend on “the collective use of conventional and innovative methods of political participation to try to persuade or coerce authorities into supporting a group’s aims.”38 Charles Tilly describes contentious repertoires as “performances.”39 It is useful to differentiate between non-confrontational (or insider) and confrontational (or outsider) tactics. The former can include “boycotts, dramaturgy, lawsuits, leafleting, letterwriting campaigns, lobbying, petitions, and press conferences,” whereas the latter may encompass “sit-ins, demonstrations, vigils, marches, strikes, motorcades, symbolic actions, boycotts of classes, blockades, and other illegal actions such as bombings.”40 As already stated, occupations of buildings or squares also need to be taken into account. Newer forms of repertoires emerged in the nineteenth century with the establishment

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of nation states, which entailed a different public sphere and set of aims. Consequently, contentious repertoires then tended to include “strikes, marches, electoral rallies, public meetings, petitions, insurrections, and public demonstrations.”41 Nowadays, the role of digital technologies in mobilization processes is increasingly highlighted.42 Repertoires of contention are also very important when looking at internal processes in movements, such as collective identity. Three characteristics can be identified: “the level of organization among collective actors; the cultural frames of meaning used to justify collective action; and the structural power of these participants.”43 Concerning the question of how the “level of organization” influences confrontational or conventional repertoires, arguments are made for both based on empirical research. Rucht specifies that formal groups in particular tend to employ conventional repertoires.44 Organizations with “decentralized and participatory democratic” and also informal structures induce “innovative but confrontational actions.”45 This brings us to the “cultural frames of meaning”46 – that is, the selection of repertoires according to the ideational alignment of individuals and collectives.47 Finally, the “structural power” of protesters indicates habitus, as in Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of the term,48 and thus social-status structures’ access to formal political and economic resources. The more access is possible, the more collective action remains conventional in form.49 Younger individuals, and specifically students, are classified by various scholars50 as “likely to participate in disruptive protest because they are available for ‘high risk’ forms of protest, have fewer countervailing ties to the constraints of adulthood, and have limited access to politics through other means.”51 Finally, it has to be said that repertoires are crucial for both taking collective action and building solidarity and collective identity.52 Regarding the question of when repertoires of contention are used, SMT provides us with a concept concerning timeframes: “waves” or “cycles” of mobilization occurring at moments of opportunity.53 Protest waves display an expansion that can encompass various social segments and countries. Ruud Koopmans deliberately refers to an “interdependence of contention across space and time.”54 With regard to the process of expansion and contraction of protest waves, much depends on the immediate strategies that various participant groups and organizations prefer. Thus, some opt for institutionalization in formal politics, whereas others radicalize their demands and repertoires. Koopmans elucidates how strategies of cooptation and repression by the incumbents cause the institutionalization and radicalization of certain groups and organizations.55 Donatella Della Porta and Olivier Fillieule raise the important factor of policing

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and police violence in contributing to radicalization processes.56 While Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly cite, for instance, “a combination of exhaustion, sectarianization and cooptation,”57 others argue that the innovative character of action declines.58 Most importantly, the end of political opportunities is brought in to explain demobilization.59 The analysis of the April 6 Youth Movement below displays overlapping factors.

Contentious Politics in Authoritarian Contexts Although SMT refers to various thematic dynamics in different political systems, it focuses mainly on formal processes. This is a consequence of the fact that most of the empirical data and case studies still – although this is gradually changing – concern Europe and North America. However, informal networks exist in one form or another in every society. In authoritarian settings, particularly, they are more prevalent.60 I understand the difference between formality and informality in two ways. On the one hand, in an institutionalist way, they constitute fixed legal procedures with an arbitrary practice to varying degrees.61 On the other hand, following Cilja Harders, informality can also be understood as factual social practices on the ground due to the absence of the State and its regulation – be that in terms of welfare services or political activity.62 With regard to the Middle East and North Africa, Guilain Denoeux comprehensively explains in his seminal work, Urban Unrest in the Middle East: a Comparative Study of Informal Networks in Egypt, Iran, and Lebanon,63 the importance of informal networks for political activism, specifically in cities in the region. In an idealized pattern, formal organizations are characterized by cohesive ideologies and sophisticated internal structures set out in writing. Informal groups, on the other hand, are upheld by personal ties consisting of friends, neighbors or ethnic and confessional peers, without displaying an internal structure or a collective identity of the sort that might, for instance, be manifested in a program.64 In reality, differences are rarely that clear and Denoeux regards both forms “less as dichotomies than [as] poles on a continuum.”65 Throughout the post-colonial world, state control and a lack of political organizations enjoying popular support have “led informal groups and associations to assume functions – including mediating disputes, allocating resources, conveying information, and providing for order and social integration – that, in more institutionalized political settings, have become the responsibility of formal organizations.”66 Given the additional advantages of small size and solidarity, and the difficulty of exact localization, Denoeux concludes,

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MAKING REVOLUTION IN EGYPT where repressive regimes make it difficult or impossible for political opposition to express itself through the channels of formal organizations such as political parties, labor unions, and interest groups, dissent is likely to take the form of small, personal groups based on informal ties and loyalties.67

In light of the long duration of authoritarian rule in the Middle East and North Africa, in what configurations could oppositional dynamics have been articulated? Bayat’s concept of “social nonmovements”68 is an insightful approach in grasping the answer to that question. He defines them as follows: In general, nonmovements refer to the collective actions of noncollective actors; they embody shared practices of large numbers of ordinary people whose fragmented but similar activities trigger much social change, even though these practices are rarely guided by an ideology or recognizable leaderships and organizations. The term movement implies that social nonmovements enjoy significant, consequential elements of social movements; yet they constitute distinct entities.69 Bayat argues further that the nonmovements have become the main form of articulation for marginalized sectors, like “the urban poor, Muslim women, and the youth.”70 These nonmovements, as masses of individuals, have been growing through the practices of everyday life, new sectors of economic activity or new communities, and have been asserting a form of the “right to the city”, to use Henri Lefebvre’s conception.71 A crucial point here is that these practices are engaged in by large numbers of people. Bayat explains the impact as follows: A large number of people acting in common has the effect of normalizing and legitimizing those acts that are otherwise deemed illegitimate. The practices of big numbers are likely to capture and appropriate spaces of power in society within which the subaltern can cultivate, consolidate and reproduce their counterpower.72 This question about space brings us inevitably to the question of “where” the political resides in this process. Bayat persuasively explains why space should be considered a conceptual tool when he proposes that “beyond asking why and when a given revolution occurred, we should also be asking where it was unleashed and why it happened where it did.”73

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Hence, collective identities are built “primarily in public spaces – in neighborhoods, on street corners, in mosques, in workplaces, at bus stops, or in rationing lines, or in detention centers, migrant camps, public parks, colleges [. . .] what I have called ‘passive networks’”.74 Bayat illustrates his argument with the cases of youth in Egypt and women in Iran, of whom the latter were for many years able to wear their veils in such a way as to allow part of their hair to be visible. The forging of these collective identities can also be promoted by mass media and new forms of digital technology, such as social media, thus bypassing the physical space of immediate national surveillance and creating a new mode of Benedict Anderson’s “imagined communities”75 among atomized individuals and activist networks. Bayat’s Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East and Linda Herrera’s Being Young and Muslim: New Cultural Politics in the Global South and North76 particularly dwell on questions of youthfulness and the reasons why many young people in the MENA region, and Egypt in particular, feel socially and politically marginalized. What makes Bayat’s and Herrera’s analysis so valuable is their consideration of how everyday life practices contribute to social change. A particular emphasis is thereby placed on how youth engage in reclaiming a certain habitus associated with “youthfulness”,77 forging “passive networks” in public spaces,78 particularly referring to the emergence of April 6 from just such passive networks: The new information technology, in particular the current social networking sites such as Facebook, can bypass the medium of physical space by connecting atomized individuals in the world of the Web, and in so doing create a tremendous opportunity for building both passive and active networks. The Egyptian April 6 Youth Movement built on such media to connect some 70,000 people.79 In this context, however, and as indicated in the Introduction, the analysis of contentious politics in the MENA region has been dominated mainly by two approaches – namely, looking at modes of authoritarianism and looking at Islamism. On the one hand, regime stability, oppositional weakness and the lack of processes of democratization in the region have been explained by institutional arrangements such as the role of the security apparatuses and the military, as well as by the regime’s ability to accumulate rents by oil sales, foreign aid and emigrant remittances rather than collected taxes.80 On the one hand, since the 1970s a cultural normativity of Islamist morality as well as forms of

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extremism assumed the most dominant and visible ways of challenging state hegemony.81 Nonetheless, there has been a gradual consideration of social and oppositional dynamics that confirms the applicability of SMT in the MENA region.82 Also, studies on everyday life and not necessarily focusing on the Islamist current83 have formed basic texts applying the theoretical approaches of SMT to the MENA region. In addition, studies on protests among workers and peasants need to be mentioned.84 In “Youth movements and the 25 January revolution,”85 Dina Shehata divides the decade beginning in 2000 into four periods, which finally culminate in the events of 25 January 2011. She thereby delineates the trajectory of the protests emerging out of action related to issues outside Egypt – such as the conflicts in Palestine, Iraq and Lebanon – which then developed into a focus on internal issues, particularly with the establishment of the Kifaya movement, from which several youth movements emerged. Maha Abdelrahman pursues a similar approach in Egypt’s Long Revolution: Protest Movements and Uprisings86 by emphasizing that it is crucial to keep in mind the contentious dynamics unfolding in the decade prior to the successful occupation of Tahrir Square in order to understand what has been happening since January 2011. Abdelrahman thereby divides these years into three categories – namely, the worker’s movement, the pro-democracy movement (including movements such as Kifaya and April 6) and the everyday protests of ordinary citizens. Both Shehata and Abdelrahman also highlight the development of what was perceived as a “political” departure from articulations such as those by Kifaya demanding predominantly formal constitutional changes. The youth groups emerging from Kifaya, however, increasingly tried to merge political and socioeconomic issues, an effort that was eventually symbolized in the slogan “Bread, Freedom, Social Justice and Human Dignity.” Likewise, both emphasize the distrust of many youth groups such as April 6 toward formal political parties and procedures in general, which eventually launched the post-revolutionary transition process on a challenging trajectory for April 6. Finally, Ahmed Tohamy’s Youth Activism in Egypt: Islamism, Political Protest and Revolution87 also refers to April 6 in one of his chapters in order to explain the contemporary traits of Egyptian political activism, but without placing the movement in a global context. It might be useful to read both Tohamy’s book and this study alongside each other. Similarly to Tohamy, April 6 in this book is analyzed in the light of the political and socioeconomic contexts between opportunities and constraints.

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Youth, Youth Movements and Generations Youth and their predicaments have been one of the main denominators when describing the Arab uprisings and the global momentum in 2011. In SMT, youth are mainly used as a starting point, thereby highlighting the fact that they have a central role in a certain milieu – for instance the youth organizations of parties, or certain subcultural currents often associated with “‘social problems’.”88 Bayat, on the other hand, proposes a different approach: by conceptualizing youth as an intermediate period between childhood and adulthood, he understands it as being characterized by “a series of dispositions, ways of being, feeling, and carrying oneself (e.g., a greater tendency for experimentation, adventurism, idealism, autonomy, mobility, and change) that are associated with the sociological fact of ‘being young’”.89 Based on this understanding, youth movements are ultimately about “reclaiming youthfulness”90 – that is, about “defending or extending” this youthfulness.91 Intensified urbanization means that the process of becoming a youth today increasingly happens in cities, where identities are formed in urban space, as reflected by the aforementioned nonmovements.92 Roel Meijer positions youth in the Arab world, during both identity formation and preparation for life after youth, in a triangular configuration of family, state and street. While these spheres have a certain complementarity, they also have a conflictual relationship with each other.93 While Meijer and other scholars94 reiterate the relatively diminishing role of the family in national-identity formation in the wake of the formation of post-colonial states – which took over important aspects of socialization – the State itself began to retreat from these policies at the beginning of the 1970s.95 As a consequence, a gradual resignification of the street, in terms of socialization96 and political mobilization, had begun.97 In this sense, Meijer’s observation can be understood as a prediction of the global processes analyzed here: It appears that the higher educated among the present younger generation are more oriented towards European languages, media and cultural forms than the previous one. They are also less religious and attach more importance to democracy. The eclecticism and pragmatism of the modern youth give reason to believe in its capacity to provide surprises.98 Considering these processes, we must not forget the endurance of the ambivalent relationship between the State and its youth: there were, and still are, expectations on the part of the State regarding the role of youth and the State’s simultaneous control of youth’s “deviation” from the

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normatively set path. A so-called “Youth Bulge” exists in Egypt, with the 15–29 age group constituting at least 40 per cent of the working population.99 When looking at the socioeconomic and political consequences of this bulge, some scholars establish causation between the number of young people and political stability – that is, the more the former number increases, the more the latter decreases.100 Illustrating the feeling of socioeconomic marginalization among Egyptian and Middle Eastern youth – including the youth bulge – a series of quantitative studies and surveys underline these phenomena.101 The Institute of National Planning’s Egypt Human Development Report 2010 shows that approximately 25 per cent of the population (or 20 million people), belong to the 18 – 29 age group.102 Considering the conceptual fluidness of youth, it is helpful to embed the notion of youthfulness in an understanding of society that is more flexible and reflective of social change. The concept of adolescence, similar to youth, denotes a period between childhood and adulthood, but introduces the notion of generation.103 What it brings into focus, and also helps us to grasp in the Egyptian context, is the dialectical configuration of “individuation” and “generation.”104 Individuation means the process of growing up and the structure of promoting or impeding possibilities that ¨ glichkeitsraum” in the author’s original German.105 this entails – “Mo Generation, in turn, refers to the changing contexts of these possibilities, thereby implying one’s own disposition and also one’s succeeding generation.106 Thus, adolescence can be understood as a regulating force in terms of if and how social transitions occur. It is a fact that the youth in Egypt and the Arab world cope with a number of empirical socioeconomic problems, being affected by poverty, unemployment and lack of perspective, as explained by several scholars,107 which inhibits individuation and thus generational transitions, as King argues, and leads to a “prolonged adolescence”108 or “wait adulthood.”109 Diane Singerman transfers this observation to the Egyptian context, pointing out that: the fact is that young people in Egypt and the larger Middle East have been disproportionately disadvantaged by neoliberalism and a demographic youth bulge. They were economically excluded by high unemployment and the difficulty of securing what are considered to be good jobs in the formal sector; they were politically excluded by authoritarianism and state repression; and they were socially excluded by the limbo of “waithood” or prolonged adolescence as marriage and entry into adulthood was delayed, in part due to the high cost of marriage.110

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Informality, marginalization and thus the domestically often-cited term of the aforementioned alienation111 (ightira¯b)112 have been particularly evident in urban space, as in gated communities for the upper (middle) class,113 accompanied by the discourse on security (amn) and stability (istiqra¯r), discursively excluding poorer people as a burden.114 Rapid urbanization, 115 the subsequent emergence of informal neighborhoods – the ʿashwa¯ʾiyya¯t – and the transformation of the “social contract” between the regime and populace, have created “drop-outs or desperate souls with no channel to express their grievances.”116 Many of these descriptions apply to the Egyptian case. Samer Soliman117 distinguishes between two diverging segments of the middle class who are important for understanding April 6’s membership. Whereas one part constitutes the traditional middle class, the second segment specifically encompasses a middle class more frequently exposed to global influences in lifestyle, consumption and networks.118 This second group has emerged as a consequence of the neoliberal economic restructuring, globally and also in Egypt with the economic policies since the 1970s. Rachel Heiman, Mark Liechty and Carla Freeman concretize this distinction: Theoretically, these dual (dueling) middle classes represent different visions of the state, different modes of capitalist (re)production, and (perhaps most interestingly for anthropologists) different forms of subjectivity, imbricated within shifting fields of gender, race, ethnicity, and geography.119 In this context of cosmopolitanism, global identity and urbanity, a series of works has been published focusing particularly on Cairo, which was reflected during the 2011 revolution in the narrative of the prominence of “globalized youth.”120 On the conceptual level, Heiman, Liechty and Freeman’s edited volume The Global Middle Classes: Theorizing Through Ethnography looks at the socioeconomic contexts in which contemporary middle-class subjectivities are constructed and embedded. In the course of neoliberal thought and implementation, there are tendencies “that ‘middle-class’ has become not just an increasingly common category of selfidentification, but – perhaps even more important – an aspirational category.”121 This aspirational category implies – as in times of precarity, notably in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis – “feelings of insecurity that infuse middle-class subjectivities around the globe [. . .] which includes a host of context-specific desires, aspirations, and anxieties.”122

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Globalizing Movements At this point, it becomes evident that contemporary social movements are embedded in complex processes. In this context, it would be a reductionist approach to confine our analysis to a national framework alone. Although SMT has indeed taken into consideration cases in other areas of the globe, the integration of the Middle East and North Africa is still in its early stages and “exceptionalist perspectives” remain influential – regarding the region as being “on the margin of global developments,”123 and thus missing important contributions to theory building. Joel Beinin and Fre´de´ric Vairel make the criticism that SMT, when applied to cases in the MENA region, usually only confirms its applicability to that region.124 I argue here that using mainstream SMT approaches to global activism still leaves shortcomings in the conceptualization of contemporary contentious politics in a global context, as exemplified by April 6. Globalization has been examined by social scientists from many differing perspectives, and it is therefore difficult to establish a conceptual consensus.125 Depending on the point of view, globalization is a flow of “goods”;126 it is a global network, sustained by information technology;127 or it reflects the global hegemony of neoliberalism.128 There is at least agreement that it is a process of compressing time and space while intensifying global interactions generally.129 Representatives of world-systems theory in the 1970s, such as Immanuel Wallerstein, tried to understand the MENA region in the context of these global interactions. The capitalist world was characterized by uneven dependencies. Economies on the periphery – like that of Egypt – were understood, due to colonialism, as structurally dependent on the countries in the core, mainly Europe and North America, or what would be described as the West.130 This dependency was caused by a division of labor and manufactured goods whereby the periphery focused on primary export products and agriculture under exploitative conditions, while the core manufactured surplus goods.131 These arrangements also create anti-systemic movements. Wallerstein conceptualizes anti-systemic movements within the framework of his world-systems approach, beginning with “social” and “national” movements: Social movements were conceived primarily as socialist parties and trade unions; they sought to further the class struggle within each state against the bourgeoisie or the employers. National movements were those which fought for the creation of a national state, either by combining separate political units that were considered to be

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part of one nation – as, for example, in Italy – or by seceding from states considered imperial and oppressive by the nationality in question – colonies in Asia or Africa, for instance.132 Samir Amin expands on Asia and Africa, and thereby explains the consequences of the eventual hegemony of the national movement, allowing us to trace an arc in the following chapters with regard to the Egyptian context: In Africa and Asia, the history of the past century had been that of the polarization of the social movement around the struggle for national independence. Here the model was that of the unifying party, setting itself the objective of bringing together social classes and various communities in a vast movement that was disciplined (often behind more or less charismatic leaders) and effective in its action toward a single goal. The regimes that emerged after independence became broadly stuck in this heritage, the single– party state deriving its legitimacy solely from the achievement of the goal of national independence.133 Because of the lack of significant change, the “global revolution” of 1968 took shape and initiated a new set of dynamics such as environmentalism, feminism and movements for civil rights opposed to racism – again, these were occasionally divided between revolutionary and reformist agendas.134 Another important group comprised human-rights organizations, which have proliferated since the emergence and diffusion of a human-rights discourse in the 1980s.135 Finally, the most recent dynamic has been the emergence of the anti-globalization movement in the 1990s, resulting in the World Social Forum, which aims at bringing together various strands of leftists, environmentalists, human-rights activists and so on, into a transnational movement. Since the events surrounding the WTO (World Trade Organization) summit in Seattle in 1999, SMT literature has emerged that takes into consideration global social processes, institutional frameworks and the dynamics of transnational social movements derived from these.136 SMT provides us, in this context, with the “diffusion” approach, which looks at how different movements influence each other as “campaigns in different locales are rarely isolated and independent from each other.”137 Diffusion needs a “transmitter,” an “adopter,” an “innovative” good and a “channel” or medium.138 It can occur directly in networks, or indirectly through a “sense of shared identification,”139 often fostered by media. The means for this become increasingly affordable and convenient due to

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digital technologies and the global standardization of English.140 Thus, “diffusion” explains the international unfolding and development of repertoires of contention, organizing practices, demands and frames of reference.141 McAdam and Rucht reinforce this notion by stating that “protest makers do not have to reinvent the wheel at each place and in each conflict [. . .] They often find inspiration elsewhere in the ideas and tactics espoused and practiced by other activists.”142 Likewise, in accordance with the world-systems approach, SMT argues that “although there are exceptions in the social movement sector as in others, moving from center to periphery, from the ‘first’ to the developing world, brings a reduction in influence.”143 Despite the ongoing hegemony of the core over the periphery, the Arab Spring has manifested the fact that global diffusion processes necessitate a much more nuanced perspective. “Externalization,” as a subcategory of the diffusion approach, denotes the political orientation of social movements along supranational lines – that is, the framing of demands in a global narrative. For instance, resource-poor organizations employ a strategy of aligning themselves with globally active NGOs, particularly in the developing world.144 An example from Egypt would be the protests by political activists since 2002 against external developments, such as the conflict between Israel and Palestine and the 2003 Iraq war, wherein members of organizations close to the anti-globalization movement were active at international meetings, which facilitated the flow of foreign solidarity.145 The most significant aspect of these dynamics are “transnational collective actions.”146 These are activities, organized on a global level, targeting “international actors, other states, or international institutions.”147 For instance, the realization of the World Social Forum has been possible though the institutionalization of ideas, such as issues touching upon the return of materialism, the importance of loose organization, the distrust of formal politics and the role of the internet.148 Global conferences like the World Social Forum are opportunities to find common ground in order to cooperate on global issues.149 However, this work requires considerable resources, which few organizations have. What, then, is the motivation for developing such a global orientation? In this respect, four elements can be identified: “brokerage, certification, modeling, and institutional appropriation.”150 Brokerage, for instance, refers to processes of frame-bridging and network connections, through individuals or organizations.151 Modeling has the same meaning as “diffusion”: the integration of ideas and repertoires within a new movement or country, which facilitates the start of contentious waves.152 Here, knowledge is not just diffused from the core to the periphery but also the other way around, as stated by Jackie Smith.153 Structures that

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facilitate political opportunities are more constrained in the periphery than in the core.154 Thus, global processes structurally affect states on the periphery to such a degree that actors within social movements cannot “ignore global processes and institutions.”155 The salient fact regarding these theories of transnational movements is that local contexts are taken into account insofar as they are involved explicitly in global agendas. Indeed, although having commonalities with the anti-globalization movement in terms of demands, organization and mobilizing strategies, the contentious dynamics of 2011 have emerged in a setting distinct from contentious initiatives against global issues and institutions. In this argument, the global context appears to be constituted by institutions representing global political and economic functions challenged by transnational operating organizations. It is evident that these theorizations are not sufficient to understand the contentious dynamics of 2011, which unfolded mainly in local settings but in a global context and on a global scale. The question that arises here is how can one grasp the local articulations of social movements that are not necessarily in direct contact or organized as a joint movement around a global institution or globally framed topic? Saskia Sassen’s concept of “global assemblages”156 offers a suitable understanding for approaching these questions and furthering this study. She argues that spaces such as territories and institutions were initially shaped within a national context.157 Thus, we can conclude that what renders these “processes part of globalization even though they are localized in national, indeed in sub-national, settings is [the fact] that they are oriented towards global agendas and systems.”158 Sassen continues to dwell on the possible global assemblages constituted by local social activism that are facilitated mainly by digital technologies: As even small, resource-poor organizations and individuals can become participants in electronic networks, it signals the possibility of a sharp growth in cross-border politics by actors other than states. This produces a specific kind of activism, one centered on multiple localities yet connected digitally at scales larger than the local, often reaching a global scale [. . .] By being part of such a global network, place-based activists concerned almost exclusively with local issues have gained something vis-a`-vis their local or national governments, or other entities they are aiming at engaging or addressing for claim-making. What they have gained is not money or power per se, but perhaps something akin to political clout through the often suggestive power of global networks and the particular subjectivity it can engender.159

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Sassen argues further that technology alone could not have enabled these processes, but that “transboundary politics is the result of a complex mix of institutional developments. Perhaps crucial among these are globalization, both as infrastructure and as an imaginary and the international human-rights regime.”160 This multiplication of localities by the simultaneous and imaginary social action entailed in the mix of digital networks and their embeddedness in the users’ social environment facilitates the emergence of assemblages.161 Sassen explains further that although these assemblages are informal, they have constituted “a greater distribution of power”162 in the form of the multiscalarity of localities, and have thereby turned globality into a resource for resource-poor actors. According to Sassen, these dynamics of “digitization have enabled the ascendance of sub-national scales, such as the global city.”163 In addition to other important political and economic hubs, the Egyptian capital can be categorized in this manner. Diane Singerman makes the following comment: The city of Cairo, like all global mega-cities, is entrenched in processes of globalization where flows of labor, capital, and information are re-shaping its physical boundaries, the structure of the economy, and its political landscape. Neoliberal globalization has not, of course, gone unchallenged [. . .] In being shaped by globalization, Cairenes, have also translated its imperatives into their own vernacular, finding ways to ride through the politicaleconomic changes of globalization with minimal disruption. Many have also directly resisted or transformed globalization.164 Thus, Singerman concludes that “pockets of Egyptian civil society and social and religious movements continue to call for greater political and social rights, freedom, and representation.”165 Accordingly, Egyptians “both internalize globalization’s logic and resist it, thus influencing the physiognomy of globalization in Cairo.”166 In this sense, Singerman concurs with Sassen and Bayat that political activism – including the aforementioned multi-local form of transnational activity in a territoriality classified as global assemblage – is focused mostly on cities. Thus, 2011 could be described as a moment when multiple socialmovement dynamics unfolded in a concentrated timeframe. The global context in which protest movements operate has been thematized by a range of scholars since 2011.167 Marlies Glasius’ and Geoffrey Pleyers’ article “The global moment of 2011: democracy, social justice and dignity”168 can be regarded as both an apt example and a summary of the

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works mentioned above. In it, three common characteristics that activists from around the world have shared since 2011 are worked out: (1) common infrastructure of networks and meetings that facilitate rapid diffusion; (2) a generational background shaped both by the precarity of paid work and by exposure to and participation in global information streams; and, most fundamentally, (3) a shared articulation of demands and practices. We further argue that three interconnected concepts have been at the core of both demands and the identity of these movements: democracy, social justice and dignity.169 These three characteristics will be used heuristically to illustrate the global context and structure the book’s arguments. With the aim of contributing to the analysis of Middle Eastern politics without essentialist – and thus, exceptionalist – concepts, it is hypothesized here that it is necessary to embed the Egyptian context in the global political and socioeconomic processes to which it is exposed. In order to understand the outlined context of the present study and its underlying conceptual framework, we must first provide an overview of modern Egyptian history and the dynamics of contentious politics that this entails.

PART II THE ROAD TO 25 JANUARY 2011

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, in the last census to be held, there were thirty-five million Egyptians living below the poverty line. Unemployment, which reached its highest global levels, stood at ten million [. . .] Not to mention, of course, the dissolution of the middle class that, in any society, plays the role of graphite rods in nuclear reactors: they slow down the reaction and, if it weren’t for them the reactor would explode. A society without a middle class is a society primed for explosion. That is exactly what happened, but the explosion didn’t do away with the wealthy class. It decimated what remained of the middle class, and turned society into two poles and two peoples [. . .] When I look over the newspapers of the first decade of the century, I smell a whole lot of smoke. Ahmed Khaled Towfik1

CHAPTER 3 CONTENTIOUS POLITICS IN EGYPT: A HISTORICAL REFLECTION

This chapter illustrates the emergence of the April 6 Youth Movement from a historical contentious context reaching back to Egyptian independence from colonialism. It is important to be aware of this socio-historical background in order to understand contemporary socialmovement dynamics. The analysis thus discusses the main forces of opposition that the emerging nation state had to face, with a particular focus on the dynamics of youth and student movements. The increasing European domination of Egypt and the wider Middle East and North Africa, notably by Britain and France, began in the eighteenth century, and obviously challenged the centuries-old hegemony of the Ottoman Empire. Western influence not only developed on material, military and commercial levels,1 but also on the intellectual level.2 Ideas like modernization and centralization, and “national strength and unity and the power of governments,”3 as well as liberal notions like individualism, democracy and constitutionality were disseminated. Thus, a transnational, or as Christoph Schumann puts it, “transcultural”4 space of interaction emerged, creating a “liberal age.”5 Although this interaction developed in a hierarchical manner, with the European powers being more influential, the further evolution and relevance of this binary categorization in Western and nonWestern cultural spaces is also questioned in this study. With the prospect of nation states’ formation in the twentieth century, an internal struggle for the realization of a specific vision of the State emerged, wherein diverse ideological orientations – such as nationalism, liberalism, communism and Islamism – shaped the dynamics of contention.6

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Moreover, groups of different status, such as workers and students, were mobilized. Foreign hegemony in Egypt and in the Islamic world in general raised questions about the compatibility of modernity and Islam, and was dealt with extensively by European-educated religious scholars such as Jama¯l a-Dı¯n al-Afgha¯nı¯,7 Muhammad ʿAbduh,8 ʿAlı¯ ʿAbd al-Ra¯ziq9 ˙ and Rashı¯d Rida¯,10 contributing to the emergence of a discourse on ˙ 11 and its rationalist and nationalist “cultural awakening” (nahda) ˙ impetus. The nahda at the same time brought about – parallel to and ˙ vis-a`-vis modernity – the notion of “tradition/heritage” (tura¯th) and cultural “authenticity” (asa¯la). ˙

Revolutions and the Student Movement Napoleon Bonaparte’s expedition to Egypt from 1798 to 1801 marked the beginning of a new period of processes of political signification. The subsequent rule of the dynasty of the Ottoman governor Muhammad Ali was able to secure more autonomy from Istanbul. The dynasty’s aims to modernize and centralize the State resulted, on the one hand, in a process of constitutionality and the associated establishment of representative institutions.12 The high costs of modernization policies – such as the Suez Canal – and simultaneous military campaigns led, however, to mounting financial crises and dependency on British and French creditors.13 As a result of increasing foreign influence, nationalist dynamics emerged, such as the National Popular Party (al-Hizb al-Watanı¯ ˙ ˙ al-Ahlı¯) established in 1879.14 In the course of Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt in 1798 and the eventual British occupation in 1882, the country was increasingly incorporated into the global capitalistic market, entailing a structural transformation at the socioeconomic level.15 As we will see, the intrusion of state bureaucracy in Cairo and Alexandria into the surrounding territory thereby induced resistance in various forms. The nationalist segment of society dominated at the beginning of the twentieth century, and was accompanied by a liberal landed and urban middle class.16 In Egypt, this class was identified as the effendiya,17 being European-educated and thereby adopting “conceptions of modernity and progress, encompassing science, technology, education, social reform and cultural revival,” and later becoming primarily responsible “for a political programme of secularism, liberalism [. . .] nationalism and moderate women’s emancipation.”18 As already indicated, all these socioeconomic transformation processes produced several ideological discourses under nationalism,19 communism20 and Islamism – each struggling for different visions of an

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independent Egypt, resulting in the amplification of patriotism, Arabism and Islamism.21 Although nationalism and Islamism would remain the most hegemonic ideologies in the decades to come, it is important to follow Ilham Khuri-Makdisi22 in highlighting the synchronic emergence of comparable ideological formations on a global scale, and in recognizing that “radical”23 ideas were represented within liberal and nationalistic discourse. Radical circles in the Eastern Mediterranean emerged in Cairo, Alexandria and Beirut, all centers that were, as described above, increasingly “incorporated into the world economy and became plugged into global information and communications networks, which allowed news from all over the world to reach them promptly, thanks to the telegraph, news agencies, a reliable postal system, and a plethora of periodicals.”24 The confrontation of Egyptian nationalists with the British resulted finally in negotiations with the leading politician Saʿd Zaghlu ¯ l. After a tense negotiation procedure, Zaghlu ¯ l was arrested, which led to countrywide protests in March 1919 involving students, pupils and workers,25 among others. These events, which came to be known as the revolution of 1919 (Thawra 1919), opened the way for a unilateral declaration by the British government recognizing Egypt as an independent state in February 1922.26 Thus, the notion of revolution has, since then, been connected with a utopian national cause of collectivity represented by the State.27 Subsequently, a new constitution was issued in April 1923, establishing a constitutional monarchy with wide-ranging powers for the king over the legislature and executive, resulting in prospective power struggles between the monarch and political parties.28 These power struggles led to widespread accusations of “partyism” (hizbiyya), which neglected the ˙ nation’s welfare as a whole.29 As a result of the world economic depression, unemployment also increased, creating a “crisis of the educated in Egypt.”30 These developments and the accompanying terminology prefigure the underlying factors of the 25 January revolution. The 1930s were thus characterized by the increasing significance of a national awakening and the prospective prosperity of a generation of youth31 (shaba¯b), which was promulgated in particular by the educated class who saw the potential of the young to supplant the traditional order.32 This attitude was, however, also ambiguous. Thus, Lucie Ryzova argues that youth was “made,” so to speak, in order to control it in the course of the education process.33 In this atmosphere, it was particularly the workers and youth who increasingly distrusted and questioned the political system and its ability to achieve independence. One sign of this radicalization of politics was the establishment in 1933 of the fascist group Young Egypt (Misr al-Fata¯t) by students and ˙

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secondary-school graduates, which attracted members from these target groups.34 Alongside Young Egypt, Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), founded in 1928, and communist group activities were influential. The MB35 developed quickly into a mass movement, building on the charisma of its founder Hassan al-Banna¯, ˙ its engagement in social services and its network of mosques.36 Its constituency also mainly encompassed an urban, educated segment, largely classifiable as middle class.37 By November 1935, British pressure provoked massive student protests supported by wide segments of society.38 Young Egypt, the communists and the MB made up the largest share of the student movement.39 As a result, a United Front of various political parties was formed, further pressuring the king and the British.40 These events implied the establishment of the student movement as an important political factor, being subjected on the one hand to forces of co-optation while on the other simultaneously establishing independent influence.41 Due to the influence of the student movement, this period was named the “Years of Youth.”42 In parallel to the student movement, class struggles such as labor strikes took place. Located in Mahalla al-Kubra, a city with a tradition of textile manufacturing, the Misr Spinning and Weaving Company (Sharika Misr li-l-Ghazl wa-l-Nası¯g) was established in 1927 by the ˙ founder of Banque Misr,43 the nationalist entrepreneur Talʿat Harb. ˙ ˙ In the 1940s, with 25,000 workers, it constituted the biggest factory in the region.44 The company was therefore a politically significant symbol of national independence and modernization, while also reflecting political struggles. Accordingly, it is no wonder that a Mahalla company again came to play a central role on 6 April 2008. The first student uprising occurred in 1935/36, and “apart from pressing the leaders of the political parties to form the United Front, to restore constitutional rule and to pave the way for the signature of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, the student uprising [. . .] marked the emergence of the student movement as a distinct force in Egyptian politics.”45 In July 1938, there was a strike demanding an eight-hour day to replace the existing twelve-hour shifts, leading to a temporary closure and the arrest of numerous workers; some workers were even sentenced for participating in an event harming “national development.”46 A second student uprising began to evolve with the start of the academic year 1945/6. Nationalist activities increased after World War II, with new hopes regarding the ongoing British presence. Students and workers joined forces to establish the National Committee of Workers and Students (al-Lagna al-Wataniyya li-l-ʿUmma¯l wa-l-Talaba), which called ˙ ˙ for a general strike on 21 February 1946 with the support of communist

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organizations.47 Students at universities held several meetings in order to create a united front, which was eventually successful because of Britain’s power politics. A joint declaration was formulated for mounting pressure on Britain. Several demonstrations at university campuses were organized, the major events being a strike and protests against British occupation on 21 February 1946 in Tahrir Square.48 Although the committee of workers and students suffered from internal factionalism, due in part to its hierarchical structure, it induced a new momentum within the struggle for national liberation, characterized by a new emphasis and the framing of social issues by collective action.49 The atmosphere that resulted did indeed bear similarities to the type of contemporary contentious politics analyzed here: in terms of organizational composition, the movements were ideologically heterogeneous; national unity and independence were central; and although the youth were attached to political parties, “extra-parliamentary” formations in public spaces were also pursued because formal party politics was mistrusted.50

Co-opting Contention The preceding section has illustrated how the emerging Egyptian nation state evolved alongside contentious dynamics. This section elucidates how a populist polity was institutionalized, a development that subsequently caused a series of contentious dynamics. Foreign domination and the defeat of Arab forces in 1948 led to the increased politicization of army officers, particularly those of middle rank, and the eventual coup d’e´tat on 23 July 1952.51 The Free Officer Movement (Harakat al-Dubba¯t al-Ahra¯r),52 led by Gamal Abdel Nasser ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ and consisting of ideologically divergent officers – including communists, Islamists and nationalists – aimed foremost at establishing an independent “strong centralized state with a modern industrial economy.”53 Based on the aforementioned recent experiences, students and workers were regarded as a potential threat.54 In order to understand the subsequent process, I follow Hazem Kandil’s application of institutional realism, “which highlights the unrelenting power struggle between selfinterested institutions within the State. It conceives the State not as a reified or monolithic body, but as an amalgam of institutions, each with its own power-maximizing agendas.”55 After sidelining his rival Muhammad Nagı¯b, who became the first ˙ president56 after the coup, Nasser’s principal objective was to secure his 57 regime. His entire tenure was characterized by his corporatist strategy of controlling all relevant institutional and associational actors, so that they

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could not challenge his key position within the governing system.58 Thus, what followed was a rearrangement of the security establishment and the creation of new institutions within the Interior Ministry in order to guard the power holders.59 These institutions generated mutual suspicion, which enabled Nasser to play them off against one another.60 With regard to discourse, the first phase until Nasser’s ascendency to the presidency was characterized by rhetoric on independence from imperialism, modernization and a general break from the previous system.61 Accordingly, notions such as “dignity” and “patriotism” also became crucial signifiers in Egyptian politics.62 Nasser’s rule could be classified as a populist regime governing for the good of “the people” (al-shaʿb).63 Thereafter, the focus lay on the pivotal role of Egypt in achieving Arab unity and socialism.64 Thus, his use of Arab and Egyptian nationalism built on nationalist discourses already existent before his reign, which were finally institutionalized.65 These ideologically “grand narratives”66 were symbolically heralded and epitomized by the nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956 and the accompanying war.67 In this context, the country’s political struggles and the meaning of opposition could be suppressed by the interests defined by the State around a newly formulated social contract.68 Egypt’s socioeconomic structure before the coup of 1952 was based mainly on feudal structures.69 In order to cope with population growth, enable industrial modernization and consolidate his power, Nasser embarked in 1952 on land reform,70 as he had to break the power of the traditional landed elite.71 Thereby the upper echelons of the landed class were confronted with restrictions; subsequently, land was distributed among poorer landowners. The main beneficiaries of the reform, however, were the landowners in the middle, the “rural middle class.”72 Nasser thus succeeded in bringing the economy under state control. Even so, his principal adversary was the military under Field Marshall ʿAbd al¯ mir. An additional step toward more firm control of the military Hakı¯m ʿA ˙ and society as a whole was the establishment of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) in 1962.73 This was implemented after dissolving political parties in 1953, establishing instead the Liberation Rally74 (Gabhat al-Tahrı¯r),75 ˙ then, in 1958, the National Union, which constituted “a more pyramidshaped, district-based structure” but lacked ideological coherence.76 Finally, the sought-after ideologically entrenched social base did eventuate in the form of the ASU, which was to encompass two dimensions of society. As Kandil explains: It was methodically structured along two axes: one based on profession, with committees for workers, peasants, intellectuals,

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soldiers, and “patriotic” capitalists, as well as the Socialist Youth Organization77 for students; and another on residence, with district branches in the cities and basic units in villages [. . .] In short, it was supposed to represent the seat of political power.78 At the same time, Nasser promoted the social entrenchment of the ASU by nationalizing economic assets and, accordingly, expanding the state bureaucracy. Moreover, the bureaucracy also grew because of clientelistic welfare services following the 1960 move to allow every secondaryschool student a university place, with graduates being assured of employment.79 The main beneficiaries were, again, the rural middle class and the urban educated younger generation, together constituting the foundation of the ASU.80 As Carrie Wickham formulates, “[a]lthough Nasser claimed to represent the oppressed people, as a whole, a disproportionate share of state resources was channeled to urban, educated, lower-middle- and middle-class youth”81 constituting “the breeding grounds of activism”82 as illustrated by the student movement. In this way, state – society relations were based on a new contract, increasing the State’s legitimacy and resulting in a decreased mobilization of oppositional forces.83 Furthermore, the ASU had its own youth and student branches in addition to secret cells responsible for surveillance of “students, workers, and peasants”84 and the infiltration and homogenization of institutions such as universities,85 professional syndicates86 and trade unions.87 In this context of associational life, Law 3288 of 1964 promulgated that nonstate organizations had to be registered by the Ministry of Social Affairs, a move that the ministry would or would not undertake according to certain criteria. The ministry could appoint members of an association’s board, demand written reports on its activities, and supervise the collection of funds and their uses. Moreover, it has the right to dissolve the association and seize its assets on rather elastic grounds, for instance, if its activities ‘defy the general order and proper behavior’ (al-niza¯m al-‘amm wa’l-adab).89 This policy of control was completed by the so-called “democratic bargain”90 or previously mentioned “social contract,” under the heading of Arab Socialism,91 whereby society was offered welfare services in exchange for the renunciation of political participation and opposition. It was thus a strategy of depoliticization.92 In addition to the developments in education, these welfare policies included “housing,

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price stabilization, wages and salaries,”93 and subsidies on basic foods.94 Egypt thereby developed into a rentier state (al-Dawla al-Rayʿiyya),95 meaning that its budget was financed largely without levying taxes but via rents, such as those sourced through oil, emigrant’s remittances or foreign aid from the Soviet Union and oil-rich Gulf countries.96 This contributed to the co-optation and patronization of specific social segments, which were to be kept in reserve in order to sustain the incumbents.97 This style of government was increasingly referred to as a regime (niza¯m).98 To explain this, I follow Samer Soliman’s approach of drawing ˙ a distinction between the State (dawla) and the regime.99 The State is a configuration of institutions, and thus cannot be considered as an actor, whereas a regime is a network of individuals who guide and manage this configuration. Thus, with the ASU’s co-optation of the new rural and urban middle class, the State was also able to structurally control students and workers whose ability to mobilize people it feared most, due in part to the historical background illustrated above.100 It was also for this reason that students, to a great extent, refrained from being politically active until 1967.101 The State’s legitimacy and hegemony was, however, challenged again after the loss of the 1967 Six-Day War with Israel. With this new opportunity structure, students – including those within the ASU – and workers returned to active political engagement.102 An uprising began on 21 February 1968 in Helwa¯n, with workers protesting against the light ˙ sentences for air force officers for their part in the defeat.103 Students soon participated with demonstrations and sit-ins.104 The demands were similar to today’s: the release of colleagues, freedom of expression, a representative parliament and withdrawal of intelligence personnel. Graffiti slogans included “Down with the police state.”105 The uprising was also cross-ideological.106 Nasser reacted with a new cabinet and promised liberal reforms, announcing the 30 March Statement. Political activities at universities became freer again, allowing a central university newspaper and an increase in funding opportunities.107 Ahmed Abdalla concludes that the central impact of the uprising “was the spirit of selfconfidence which spread through the student body [. . .] By spawning the activists who were to lead them, the uprising had also laid the foundation for a later series of student actions.”108 In the wake of the 1960s and the Six-Day War, Egypt slipped increasingly into an economic crisis,109 particularly due to trade imbalances that resulted from a low level of exports.110 Thus, a political resignification of socialism and the social contract began.

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Between Mobilization and Demobilization After Nasser’s death in September 1970, the hitherto vice president, Anwar al-Sadat, became his successor. Lacking any initial broadly accepted legitimacy, he took several steps to gain political stature, which finally led to the increased tendency of the regime to highlight the importance of security and stability.111 Economic crises after the war and Sadat’s subsequent strategy of power maintenance resulted in a new social contract and a renewed wave of contentious dynamics. Students’ activity at universities intensified as their spaces of expression expanded once again, and they demanded the liberation of the occupied territories in the Sinai Peninsula and a transition to democracy and social justice.112 Following the arrests in January 1972 of several students who were protesting against these developments, a huge demonstration was organized in Cairo with a sit-in in Tahrir Square, before demonstrators were ultimately dispersed.113 Pressure was rising with regard to war; students protested regularly in favor of it and for a democratization process, which led to a nationalist and leftist student rebellion in 1972 – 3.114 Sadat at the same time aimed to further secure his stance vis-a`-vis the military, which he suspected of conspiring against him. He considered the US and integration with the Western bloc an effective means of countering this.115 It was with this motive that Sadat managed the October War of 1973, in order to have a politically victorious outcome and to open up the opportunity for a political agreement with the US. He could thus survive the military defeat by Israel,116 as Egypt could garner legitimacy for peace talks by referring to its initial successes in controlling Sinai.117 The peace talks ended with the Camp David Accords in September 1978, at which Sadat made politico-military and economic concessions, and as well as peace with Israel – and the accompanying demilitarization of the Sinai – contributed “to the global war to contain communism (and later Islamism), opening up the economy to foreign investors, and preferably signaling an opening of the political system.”118 For the present study, understanding the economic aspect of these processes is crucial. New economic policies along Western capitalist patterns needed an “opening” (infita¯h).119 The ASU with its state officials ˙ loyal to Nasser was no longer suitable, so Sadat needed a new societal base to provide him with social, and thus political, power. As Soliman puts it, influential social groups or movements could not emerge without being attached structurally to the State.120 Hence, Sadat had to create them by himself. The social segment most suitable to his infita¯h policies was a new ˙ business class that took over the function of regime support.121 It was

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derived from the “state bourgeoisie of the public sector and the bureaucracy, some 34,000 public-sector managers and 11,000 senior administrators.”122 To accelerate this initiative, Sadat also reimbursed many members of the old landed elite.123 These corporatist124 policies resulted in an intensified polarization of an already polarized socioeconomic structure.125 The ideological framing that began under Nasser thereby increasingly lost ground and gave way to an economic logic of individual success, leading to mounting imports for consumption and real-estate construction, which resulted in even higher levels of debt.126 In 1976, Sadat carved out three platforms (mana¯bir), grouping them into a left,127 right128 and centrist block out of which the National Democratic Party (NDP) was formed in 1978.129 This party system was composed in such a way that it enabled the formation of opposition parties. However, these would ideally be loyal to the new power balance. This is why the Political Parties Committee, headed by an NDP official, had to authorize new parties.130 With this introduction of multi-partyism, Sadat aimed to enable the further co-optation of social forces.131 For the first time, this new structure connected the business elite, the bureaucracy and political cadres, forming the basis for the NDP. The ASU was thus transformed into the NDP. The composition of the ruling entity changed from political functionaries to state-related businessmen.132 Joel Beinin elaborates plausibly on the character of the NDP: The NDP is not a political party as the term is commonly understood. Its ideology is malleable and serves to justify the regime’s policies, whatever they may be; it has little or no local political organization; it does not have a transparent mechanism for selecting candidates for office. It is a machine for distributing patronage and an arm of the regime which would have no coherence without access to state power.133 With this novel type of capital creation, Egypt was reintegrated into the world economy.134 But neoliberal policies imposed by institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank at the end of the 1970s – particularly on states with debt problems – forced these states to recognize “structural adjustment programs” in order to reform their economic systems.135 These programs were aimed at guaranteeing the continuing liquidity of these governments by cutting “state subsidies on basic consumer goods, thus raising the cost of bread and other necessities [. . .] government spending on social services (education, wealth, social welfare) and [. . .] investments in the public sector.”136 The accompanying

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social exclusion resulted in so-called Bread Riots (intifa¯dat al-khubz).137 ˙ For instance, in Egypt on 18 – 19 January 1977, in addition to bread the subsidies for sugar and tea were cut and scores of students, Nasserist public workers and Islamists took to the streets.138 Larbi Sadiki indicates that the protests took place after the 1976 parliamentary elections, in order to stress their political significance in addition to their socioeconomic dimension, and adds, In these protests, the people’s taste for participatory politics is nurtured, and their dissidence is unleashed by directly challenging political authority. The rebellious street binds together political dissidents, marginals, the unemployed and disillusioned youth. They acquire a spontaneous solidarity and, in their common consciousness of being actual or potential victims of the regime, they direct their anger at high status and regime symbols.139 Sadat met with student leaders such as ʿAbd al-Munʿim Abu al-Futu ¯ h from ˙ the MB and Hamdeen Sabahi from the Nasserist current, who both became important figures at later stages and in the course of the 2011 uprising.140 Eventually, the President cancelled the subsidy cuts.141 The NDP, however, also incorporated the numerous security officials of the ASU and relied specifically on the Interior Ministry and its State Security Investigations Service (SSIS) in order to continue to control and repress oppositional elements in society, such as universities and factories.142 Finally as shown, Nasser’s land reforms were amended, enabling the reempowerment of the landed class.143 All in all, these processes resulted in a sharp restriction of the opportunities for political expression, as well as limiting organization among potentially contentious groups such as workers, peasants, and students. In parallel, Sadat sought additional social support for his new political orientation. He therefore tried to adapt to the increasing political role of the Islamist discourse, and thus to improve his relationship with the MB,144 which, though banned since 1954, had been able to maintain its social influence.145 This step was also designed as a counterweight to the communist and Nasserist support in the bureaucracy.146 In addition, control of the professional syndicates and trade unions was partially lifted in 1975, when simultaneous membership of the ASU was deemed no longer compulsory. As a result, the syndicates in particular – where the MB could build a strong presence – developed from this point into crucial sites of power struggles with the regime.147 Thus, the 1970s saw the emergence of a new Islamic normative order148 exerting a high degree of political and moral

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authority. Egyptian youth – particularly its educated segments – remained largely demobilized or increasingly joined Islamist organizations due to socioeconomic marginalization.149 By the early 1990s, the proselytizing and associational work of the movement – with its core organization150 of the MB – had penetrated a large segment of society. Affected by these Islamic influences, the ruling elites also employed a religious and nationalistic vocabulary, thus marginalizing critical voices and their demands for democratic reform.151 Wickham concisely summarizes these consequences of the infita¯h: ˙ The regime-led political and economic liberalization, however, served less to forge new ties between the state and educated youth than to deepen their mutual disengagement, thus paving the way for the latter’s mobilization by Islamic groups.152 The increase in Islamist influence, however, led the regime in 1979 to adopt counterbalancing laws on university campuses, where political parties were no longer allowed to mobilize. This was crucial for suppressing future political parties’ mobilizing capabilities.153 Toward the end of his presidency, Sadat in addition reacted to the increasing criticism of his domestic and foreign policies by arresting scores of “politicians, journalists, and intellectuals.”154 Socialist and nationalist activists and intellectuals155 were also influenced by the potentials of this new religious narrative in order to achieve Arab strength in general and, particularly, against Israel. They thus constituted a group of “new partisans of the heritage (Turathiyyun Judud),”156 placing “greater emphasis on Islamic authenticity as a necessary component of a national awakening or attempts to synthesize aspects of their thinking with Islamism.”157 It is important to note this development here, as it marked the beginning of a more flexible ideological understanding of contentious politics, enabling connections between cross-ideological frames that are crucial for understanding April 6.

The Corrupt Regime Sadat’s successor in October 1981 was Hosni Mubarak, air force commander and vice president since 1975.158 As already indicated above, Mubarak came to power at a time of deep political and socioeconomic crisis, intensified by Sadat’s assassination. Mubarak needed new momentum and systemic legitimacy, as the regime had already begun to abandon its ideological commitment since the introduction of Sadat’s new social contract. A first step was, therefore,

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the resumption of the discourse on guaranteeing security and stability.159 Islamist activists such as those of the MB, who were arrested in the wake of Sadat’s murder, were released; they were also able to contest parliamentary elections in 1984 and 1987.160 This is why observers divide Mubarak’s 30-plus years of rule into two parts: he initially loosened the regime’s grip on opposition actors in the early years.161 Nevertheless, the deep economic crisis that the country went through in this period forced the government to sign an “Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme” with the IMF and the World Bank in 1991, once more intensifying and reformulating the tools of authoritarianism in order to control society’s reactions.162 This liberal momentum once again gave rise to the emergence of an increasingly contentious dynamic, encompassing student protests in 1984 in several campuses – against police interference, as, after Sadat’s assassination, universities were rigorously controlled.163 An increasingly alienated generation emerged, thus destroying any ability to plan for the future, discussing the “crisis of the youth” and their apathy toward politics, which, according to Abdalla, had specifically socioeconomic reasons – as will be seen, in more detail, below.164 Furthermore, strikes occurred in Mahalla al-Kubra in February 1985.165 Beinin illustrates the character of these strikes, which had similarities with the 1977 Bread Riots: The diffuse and sporadic character of these protests – spontaneous rioting or localized labor strikes rather than a sustained campaign of political and economic action – is partly the result of the structural and ideological heterogeneity of urban workers and the delegitimization of left politics in the open-door era.166 The left’s weakness developed due to the strengths of Islamist actors such as the MB participating in parliamentary elections and those for syndicates, as the latter constituted the main challengers to the incumbents. Islamist radicalization in the 1990s once more prompted a political crackdown, including arrests and frauds in the 1990 and 1995 parliamentary elections.167 But, despite these restrictions on oppositional activities, the 1980s and 1990s did indeed witness dynamics of dissent, which subsequently resulted in the formation of new parties and movements – as will be explained, in detail, below.168 A further reaction since the late 1980s has been the increasing establishment of NGOs, which were supported by the regime to a certain degree as long as it thereby garnered support in its fight against militant Islamists.169 Many of the initiators were

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activists from the 1970s’ student movements (dubbed the “Generation Seventies” [Gı¯l al-Sabʿı¯na¯t]), who resorted to promoting human rights and democratization.170 Concomitantly, the State’s budget was increasingly contracted due to the debt crisis in 1989 so that, under pressure from the IMF, structural adjustment policies were introduced in order to bring debt under control through privatizations and subsidy cuts.171 The reforms were aimed at allowing Egypt to remain within the international trade market.172 Furthermore, the budget was restricted and additional subsidies were cut.173 The government also sought local loans from institutions such as the National Investment Bank, enabling the regime to gain access to insurance and pension funds.174 It was in the course of these developments that the new capitalist class, which since the infita¯h had ˙ “acquired a steadily growing share of control over the country’s material 175 and human resources,” began to position itself increasingly in politics and the bureaucracy, thus contributing to a “Bourgeoisification of the NDP.”176 As a result, a reconfiguration between the regime and the emerging business class set in in favor of the latter.177 This class particularly approached the circle of Hosni Mubarak’s son, Gamal Mubarak, and in 2004 eventually constituted a large segment of the cabinet under Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif.178 The regime depended on this circle due to its global business connections179 against the backdrop of the high level of domestic debts, amounting to 67.4 per cent of the country’s GDP in 2009.180 Also, foreign debts, particularly to the IMF, were increasing grossly.181 As a result, a new tax regime was gradually brought into force, thus transforming the rentier state system into a “predatory state.”182 Furthermore, the government introduced an inflation tax183 and, in the wake of the IMF program, taxes on sales on Egyptians abroad and, finally, on income.184 Regime power formerly linked to rents therefore began to decline.185 Although taxes mounted, the deficit increased. Thus, while privatizations intensified186 wages declined, particularly for the middle class, and unemployment and poverty increased following oilprice decreases in the Gulf and the subsequent return of emigrants.187 But the most important reason for the ballooning deficit was the fact that capital, in general, was transferred away from workers and peasants to private enterprise.188 At the same time, the developmentalist discourse of “the wheel of production” (ʿagalat al-inta¯g)189 promoted by politicians and media made clear that these steps were necessary in order to guarantee Egypt’s successful economic performance on the world stage. Segments of the middle class and youth suffered increasingly from a lack of life prospects.190 As explained earlier in the theoretical

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outline in Chapter 2, these socioeconomic consequences were particularly evident in urban contexts.191 All this was backed up by the Interior Ministry as, in order to sustain this system of administration, repression was necessary, further increasing the police-state character of the regime.192 As a result, social pressure to make the regime accountable began to develop.

Changing Contentious Politics As outlined in this chapter, the Egyptian authoritarian polity – while coopting and positioning its supporting segments in times of strategic realignments during the different presidencies – was able to maintain control and restrict contentious dynamics, but it could not entirely remove them. This section summarizes the main characteristics of these contentious dynamics, illustrating how they evolved as a reaction to the repressive and arbitrary nature of the authoritarian state and its understanding of, and interaction with, the opposition. The ruling elite in Egypt has remained organized in a stable structural setting at the top of society since the revolution of 1952.193 This continuity is its primary patrimonial characteristic. Thus, Timothy Mitchell presents the various reformations and liberalizations of the regime as “a multilayered political readjustment of rents, subsidies, and the control of resources,”194 in order “to concentrate public funds into different hands, and many fewer.”195 Whereas during Nasser’s tenure the main financial supporter was the Soviet Union, this role had been taken over by the US since Sadat. The rentier system and neo-patrimonialism sustained the regime.196 This is why Soliman has summarized Egyptian history since 1952 as “the regime’s success story and the state’s failure.”197 Consequently, this created a highly restrictive structure of opportunities. Soliman goes on to explain that the “regime since Nasser ha[s] not accepted anything less than unconditional support in order to open the door of participation in politics to these forces.”198 Thus, Mubarak’s regime was finally able to discourage even the merest attempt at political action and contention.199 With regard to the role of class, and particularly the middle class and its relationship to the regime, Rachid Ouaissa and Soliman200 differentiate between two sections of the middle class in Egypt: on the one hand, the petite bourgeoisie and, on the other hand, the professional and white-collar workers. In the wake of Sadat’s opening policies, the middle class, particularly the educated section, benefited from the new policies and entrenched itself in the private and public sector while others had to accept more unattractive jobs, and many remained

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unemployed.201 Thus, despite there being a winning and losing side in any case, both sides lost their dependence on and belief in the State, and further developed their autonomous structures. The profiting side preferred globalization, private socialization and the free flow of information – such as through the internet – leading to an intensified ideational detachment from the State and distrust toward its corrupt character.202 The other side reacted with disdain, passivity or informal activism, as in Bayat’s nonmovements. These patrimonial social contracts – or, as Sadiki dubs Nasser’s polity, this “democracy of bread”203 (dı¯muqra¯tiyyat al-khubz) – created an understanding of politics as “largely deferential and non-participatory, conditional on the state’s providential capacity,” referring to “politics as an undesirable game of power [. . .] which leads to the avoidance of politics.”204 The Bread Riots, however, indicated a new signification of politics when one of the central slogans of the 25 January protests was “ʿAysh,205 Hurriyya, ʿAda¯la Igtima¯ʿiyya, Kara¯ma Insa¯niyya!” (“Bread, ˙ Freedom, Social Justice, Human Dignity!”). Thus, it can be inferred, with Soliman, that the Egyptian case “illustrates the difficulty of instituting tax reform under an authoritarian regime,”206 risking the creation of new waves of contention. The consequential process of the demise of rentierism: does not necessarily lead to democratic transformation. However, it has generated important changes in the Egyptian political sphere, opening new realms that can be exploited democratically. For example, the regime’s attempts to extricate itself from financial difficulties led to the rising power of the capitalist class with respect to the ruling elite, a development that drove the latter to embrace or contain elements of this class in order to expand its social base and bolster itself with fresh economic and human resources [. . .] While we can rule out the possibility that this class will oppose the regime or contribute in a direct way to overthrowing it, the fact that it controls vast economic resources reorders the political equation in Egypt. First, it has given rise to a plurality of power centers [. . .] In addition, the politicization of businessmen led to the politicization of other segments of society. [. . .] In particular, it has stirred considerable rancor among intellectuals and segments of the middle class who feel increasingly marginalized by the growing hold of private capital over politics and government in Egypt. The rise of the Kifaya (Enough) movement that is opposed to the scheme to secure the heredity succession of Gamal Mubarak, who is closely connected to powerful circles in the business

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community, is a symptom of the mounting anger among the intelligentsia.207 As an ambivalent outcome of the business elite’s new role, the emergence of fresh, independent media facilities contributed to the shaping of a new public sphere, thereby reconfiguring the possibilities of opportunity structures and frame alignments, and accordingly challenging the statemedia narrative. As examples, one could cite the newspapers Al-Masry AlYoum and al-Shorouk as well as the television channels Dream TV and ONTV.208 In this sense, Holger Albrecht’s conceptualization of opposition and contentious politics in Egypt under Mubarak as symptoms of a “liberalized authoritarian regime”209 is illustrative. Opposition forces could unfold; this was observable, for instance, when decades-old parties played a central role in formal politics after the fall of Mubarak. Nevertheless, the degree of freedom afforded the opposition forces was controlled by the regime. Albrecht helps us to understand the relationship between the regime and opposition by classifying them as having been codependent.210 He differentiates between four dimensions of opposition in the Egyptian setting: representation,211 legitimacy,212 channelling213 and moderation.214 Albrecht further groups opposition actors into three categories,215 which characterize their different linkages to the regime: loyal,216 tolerated217 and anti-systemic.218 Albrecht’s analysis also makes clear how ambivalently the relationship between the regime and opposition forces has developed. On this point, both Eberhard Kienle and Albrecht illustrate how processes of relative political liberalization and deliberalization since Sadat have alternated between providing opportunities for opposition forces and contentious politics.219 Thus, the partial political liberalization by Sadat was followed by intense repression toward the end of his presidency. As seen, Mubarak also began his tenure by liberalizing specific spaces for opposition actors, while deliberalizing in the 1990s and then backtracking again after 2005. Albrecht and Kienle rightly emphasize the importance of informal arrangements in oppositional politics in this authoritarian setting220 – what Ann Lesch describes as “Democracy in doses.” 221 Taking parliamentary elections as an example: they first took place in October 1976 and then in June 1979, the parties affiliated with Sadat clearly winning on both occasions.222 Thus, in the course of Mubarak’s takeover the first parliamentary elections in 1984 and 1987 could be classified as turning points.223 Mubarak was still preoccupied with consolidating his power, thereby letting opposition figures – mainly Islamists – out of prison and allowing the participation of the MB in the parliamentary

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elections in 1984 together with the New Wafd Party.224 The elections in 1987 were characterized by an alliance between the MB, the Socialist Labor Party and the Liberal Party.225 In the final result 20 per cent of the seats went to parties other than the NDP and to independent candidates. Consequently, during the elections in 1990 and 1995, manipulation226 by the regime increased NDP seats to 94 per cent in 1995.227 In addition, the Muslim Brothers were repressed in the course of the 1995 parliamentary elections in order to curb their renewed success.228 Other repressive measurements included stricter control of professional syndicates, trade unions229 and the university’s elections of faculty deans and the student federation.230 Accordingly, “authoritarianism is able to adapt itself to new conditions, and temporary political ‘decompression’ does not signal its end.”231 In this respect, economic liberalization can also be characterized as controlled, as this process encompassed only “segments of the private sector close to the regime or able to influence its decisions.”232 State employment even increased during the period 1970–80.233 Since the mid2000s, as already indicated, those segments attached to private enterprise were finally able to dominate the NDP.234 Albrecht further explains the political dilemmas in terms of formality and informality: One consequence of the insecurity of formal rules and procedures is that informal arrangements play a prominent role in authoritarian politics. Law and the judiciary will not ultimately judge on the “legality” of contentious activism; and election processes and results do not necessarily reflect on an opposition’s strength and the balance of power between authoritarian incumbents and their challengers. Hence, the success of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 2005 parliamentary elections (eighty-eight seats) in comparison with the 2000 elections (seventeen seats) did not necessarily indicate an increasing strength regarding its popular support or mobilization capacities, but rather the regime’s significant changes in the management of electoral policies.235 Thus, in summary it can be said that Egypt’s search for independence, modernization and thereby authenticity since the early twentieth century has brought about a political setting with important implications for the articulation of opposition. From the republican era in 1952 until the revolutionary events of early 2011, presidents inherited a flexible but also stable regime structure. They were thus able to maintain their power by framing their legitimacy in a narrative of knowing and trying to achieve the best for the one-dimensional collectivistic unit: the people. This was achieved by the regime’s discourse of speaking in the name of a

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social consensus pertaining to Egypt’s political will, all the while guaranteeing the necessary stability. The regime itself thereby entrenched its social base in Egyptian society’s diverse segments (through the socalled social contract) while, as illustrated, increasingly losing ground over time in terms of representative capacity and legitimacy. The regime’s determination to stay in power resulted in the simultaneous deployment of co-optation and repression of the opposition. Consequently, contentious politics and the opposition developed a highly fragmented and suppressed character. In addition to co-opted and controlled formal political parties and civil-society actors, separate informal activities emerged – such as those among workers, students, and later particularly Islamists. Although there were attempts to connect these struggles, the increasing dominance of Islamist narratives shaped the contentious politics that emerged after 1967. The following chapter will show how, at the same time, neoliberal discourse and privatization policies implied a gradual separation of political and socioeconomic demands articulated by contentious actors. It could also be shown that processes of transnational diffusion – as illustrated by the development of radical ideas in the early twentieth century and the student movement in 1968 – played a role throughout the period. By and large, however, the loose organizational structure of informal groups, the inherent fragmentation, and the overall drift away from politics – particularly among the young – made the toolkit of mobilization and the employment of contentious repertoires all too predictable for the regime authorities. Nevertheless, a new structure of opportunity – and, hence, a transformation of this configuration – began to develop early in 2000. This prepared the ground for a new episode in Egyptian contentious politics, which culminated in the revolutionary moments of January 2011. This process was characterized by cross-ideological alliances and the “street” as the central space of action – symbolizing legitimacy within an environment controlled by a regime associated with despotism; corruption; and, thus, failure. This is clarified in the following chapter using the example of April 6.

CHAPTER 4 CONTENTIOUS POLITICS SINCE THE 2000 S: A TURNING POINT

As illustrated in the previous chapter, Egypt’s formal level of opposition developed in a political setting, leaving the associated political procedures oscillating within a liberalized authoritarian regime displaying highly arbitrary and informal attributes. The accompanying rise of a diverse Islamist movement was characterized by that movement’s engagement in welfare services, thereby replacing important functions of the State. Consequently, the Islamist movement and its branches in civil society – such as the professional syndicates, for instance – developed into focal points of oppositional activity.1 However, not just the Islamists took this path. The increasing formation of NGOs in the context of the economically and politically partial and ambivalent liberalization process described above entailed many activists from the 1970s’ student movements resorting to the promotion of human rights and democratization.2 Street politics3 as a primary locus of contentious politics has had, in this setting, moments of great visibility and activity, and moments when such activity has been restricted. As discussed in Part II, for example, street politics has declined since the 1980s because programs of economic restructuring designed by the IMF were introduced, which had a less severe impact on the population.4 But inherent in the ambivalence of the regime’s restrictive and repressive strategies was the occasional opening of opportunity structures for oppositional dynamics. Thus, different avenues of resistant dynamics began developing from the late 1990s up to, and with particular intensity in, the early 2000s. On one level, the population steadily drifted – as a result of the decreasing social role of the State – into informal spheres in order to survive in everyday life, leading

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to an increased prevalence of social nonmovements as previously elaborated on with reference to Bayat and Guilain Denoeux.5 The socioeconomic marginalization of people provoked spontaneous street protests against market and welfare reforms, and exclusion from services such as electricity and water.6 On another level, due to the intensified neoliberal economic policies – and the cost-saving mechanisms and privatizations that these entailed – a workers’ movement grew.7 Finally, a further movement emerged calling for systemic changes of the regime and an end to repression, thereby demanding democratization. In order to grasp these processes – which will serve as preparation for a thorough understanding of the April 6 movement – we should keep in mind the parallel unfolding of what Michaelle Browers calls the cross-ideological cooperation and alliancebuilding among political and social forces in Egypt and the wider Middle East,8 which in turn opened up new opportunities for oppositional politics. In the Egyptian context, we have already seen the alliances that the MB constructed in the parliamentary elections in the 1980s. This was only possible thanks to the diminishing capability of utopian ideologies in the construction of collective meaning. These processes unfolded in a hegemonic context that was, as shown, increasingly losing its power to create social consensus, so that the agendas of the regime and various social segments had begun to diverge significantly: The Egyptian state in 2011 was a patchwork of its own histories. It had reversed many of its commitments to economic planning and social welfare, but retained key political hallmarks of the 1950s and 1960s, like a strong military and intelligence apparatus and tightly controlled civil society groups, unions and student organizations.9 Based on this background, the essential traits of this new wave of contentious politics as a whole will be illuminated. In this respect, I follow Dina Shehata’s temporal and Maha Abdelrahman’s thematic classificatory units in explaining social movements during the period 2000 – 11.10

The Workers’ Movement, the Egyptian Anti-Globalization Group, Kifaya and Tadamon Several contentious dynamics have appeared since the 2000s, influencing the emergence of the April 6 Youth Movement. Dina Shehata divides the wave of social-movement dynamics between 2000 and 2011 into four

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periods, whereas Abdelrahman divides this novel wave of contention into three thematic parts – namely, “the pro-democracy movement, labour struggles, and ‘market-relations-based protests’”.11 Joel Beinin and Marie Duboc illustrate the importance and scope of the workers’ movement in paving the way for the revolutionary momentum in 2011: In Egypt from 1998 to the end of 2010 well over two million workers participated in 3,400-4000 factory occupations, strikes, demonstrations, or other collective actions [. . .] The upsurge of overt workplace-based labour protests during the past decade profoundly transformed Egyptian political culture. These actions involved public and private sector factory workers, bakers, civil servants, teachers, tax collectors, medical doctors, transport workers, and garbage collectors; other public protests in this period included demonstrations against water shortages and poor housing and sit-ins staged in front of government offices. Workers most commonly presented bread-and-butter demands, sometimes literally, as in the protests over shortages of subsidized bread in the spring of 2008. They did not initiate the demonstrations that toppled President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011. But their collective actions over the course of more than a decade formed an important component of the matrix of forces propelling that mobilization.12 With regard to the labor movement, these struggles intensified in the wake of the Unified Labor Law of 2003, which allowed for strikes but only after the approval of the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF).13 The 2006 Mahalla strike is of crucial symbolic importance here, heralding as it did the events of April 2008.14 Additionally, the protests in opposition to market relations emerged spontaneously via disenfranchised people protesting, for instance, in response to the inability of state institutions to guarantee the necessities of everyday life such as “health care, electricity, running water and affordable basic foodstuffs.”15 These features overlap with those of Bayat’s nonmovements. The pro-democracy movement and its constituent groups showed a high level of cross-ideological cooperation between Islamists, nationalists and liberals, as well as an intense level of horizontal networking. The movement, however, remained firmly middle class in its membership and was, in the initial phases, unable to discursively reach out to other social groups. To understand these processes in their full context, we will turn to

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an analysis of the pro-democracy movement from the perspective of youth activism, which led to the emergence of April 6. The first period that Shehata introduces lasted from 2000 to 2003.16 This process began in the regional context, during the crises in Israel/ Palestine in 2000 and the Iraq war in 2003, which triggered new waves of protest on Egyptian streets since Egypt could not play a decisive role.17 Thus, the structure enabling opportunities for change was widened. It began with the Egyptian Popular Committee in Solidarity with the Palestinian Intifada (EPCSPI) in 2000 and the Popular Campaign for the Support of Resistance in Palestine and Iraq and Against Globalization in 2002.18 These networks were already characterized by “coalition-building and dynamic processes of networking, involving different political factions and ideological programmes.”19 Abdelrahman highlights these processes: “(1) taking political claims and protests against the regime and ruling elite to the streets, (2) working outside the sphere of organized, formal political institutions, and (3) demonstrating an interchangeable membership and a fluid process of coalition- and network-building.”20 In the course of these developments, the Egyptian Anti-Globalization Group (al-Magmu ¯ ʿa al-Misriyya li-Muna¯hadat al-ʿAwlama – AGEG)21 was ˙ ˙ established in 2002. I will dwell on this group in more detail, as it can in many ways be interpreted as a precursor of April 6. Recalling the question of globalizing movements from Chapter 2, the discourses of the alterglobalization movement had diffused into the Egyptian context and its political activist scene. There was influence from the Global Justice Movement and its institutions such as the World Social Forum, in which several of AGEG’s initiators had participated.22 AGEG engaged in distributing print media, including that translated from English sources, explaining the problematic consequences of capitalist globalization and thereby addressing the predicament of workers in Egypt.23 Visual media was circulated, including screenings of documentary films during public events and meetings with other movements and parties.24 Accordingly, given the loose-network character of AGEG, many activists were simultaneously active in other organizations, such as NGOs; Kifaya; and, particularly, the Revolutionary Socialists.25 In this sense, members of AGEG displayed a habitus that could be described as cosmopolitan, educated, multilingual, middle class, and having “multiple belongings and flexible identities”26 in the sense of Dieter Rucht’s “weak identities”27 and like the members of other local branches of globally oriented social movements.28 This organizational interconnectedness, however, rendered certain groups vulnerable at times, as political circumstances required concentration in one group only. This was the case with AGEG, as most of its members were also associated with the Revolutionary

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Socialists, and retreated when such a commitment was demanded by the latter.29 The fact of being upper class entailed, in some instances, a habitus displaying “a paternalist approach when attempting to mobilise people for political and social action. They came with preconceived ideas about how workers needed to be ‘helped’”.30 Additionally, foreign connections had been problematic since the establishment of NGOs in the 1980s.31 AGEG also contributed to a new understanding of politics, outside its traditional structures, which was not about directly taking power but about exerting street power.32 Shehata’s second period, 2004 –6, fell in a time of greater opportunity. The Egyptian Government felt the increasing pressure of global powers, particularly the US Administration’s calls on Arab governments for democratization due to a reorientation of US foreign policy in the wake of 11 September 2001. In the course of the protests against the Iraq war in March 2003, a first initiative focused on the domestic context emerged under the name Popular Campaign for Change (al-Hamla al-Shaʿbiyya min agl al-Taghyı¯r), ˙ founded by leftist and human-rights activists.33 This platform gradually merged with the more influential Egyptian Movement for Change (alHaraka al-Misriyya min agl al-Taghyı¯r) and, in brief, the Kifaya movement ˙ ˙ was established in the Fall of 2004 by an ideologically diverse group of people, mainly from a social class defined as the “middle-class [and] urban intelligentsia.”34 Among them were activists from ideologically different parties and movements, including Islamists (occasionally the MB and the al-Wasat Party), Marxists (Revolutionary Socialists), Nasserists (al-Karama Party) and liberals (El-Ghad Party),35 but it was particularly dominated by “nationalists and leftists.”36 This fact points to a prominent presence for Nasserist discourse, which “never ceased to play a crucial role in forming the opposition’s political language in Mubarak’s final years.”37 One important figure, for instance, was the journalist ʿAbdel-Halı¯m Qandı¯l, ˙ who was editor of the journal al-ʿArabı¯, thereby playing an inspiring role for many young people.38 An end to both Mubarak’s rule and the emergency law were Kifaya’s central demands, along with preventing Gamal Mubarak from succeeding his father.39 Browers divides the group into three generations: “an old guard, the so called ‘middle generation’ [. . .] and a youth generation.”40 Whereas the small group of the older guard was already active in the 1940s, the middle generation (the most influential group) was politicized during the student protests of the 1970s.41 At the same time, a considerable number of young people joined Kifaya, establishing the Youth for Change (Harakat Shaba¯b min agl al-Taghyı¯r) section.42 Youth for ˙ Change was also characterized by its horizontal structure as one of the

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aforementioned groups in this section. As we will see, April 6 in turn built on this organizational experience. Youth for Change had a Political Office with a guidance function, and specific subcommittees like “the popular mobilization committee, the socialization committee, the artistic committee, the communications committee, and the committees for the governorates.”43 Youth for Change followed Kifaya in its demands and called for democratic change, equal rights and access to universities, as well as “access to education, health care, housing and employment” for youth.44 Change conceived of on this basis differed from the opposition’s usual expectations of “reforms from above.”45 After the first demonstrations in late 2004, Mubarak indeed amended the constitution and for the first time allowed presidential elections with more than one candidate, thus playing into the movement’s hands.46 In this sense, Kifaya worked as an agency to widen the political opportunity structure, thus shifting the borders of what was sayable; thinkable; and, finally, doable. The movement was able to organize small demonstrations, which were short-lived but attracted new middle-class – and, particularly, younger – segments of society into action, by rupturing the discourse of fear and passivity through criticizing and protesting against Mubarak.47 But Kifaya’s ambivalent social stance was also manifested herein. By focusing on the regime’s highest representative, it neglected the socioeconomic implications of regime policies for everyday life and thereby failed to demonstrate the relevance of its demands to a wider audience.48 Furthermore, its loose organization, operating without a firm leadership, made it attractive as a partner in alliances but many of these failed on the basis of this structure. Finally, though, after the presidential elections of 2005, Kifaya lost its capacity for mobilization. As Abdelrahman states, [t]he loose organizational structure and the absence of leadership were the trademarks of these protest networks and were, indeed, among their major rallying points in mobilisation against the regime and set them apart from stale, traditional political organisations. However, these characteristics meant that the different groups lacked a robust base from which to reach out and attempt coordination let alone create a broad coalition.49 An additional structural reason behind the limits to the successful outreach of the movement was state repression, which also created a distance between the various contentious forces by separating them physically. Thus, Abdelrahman argues comprehensively that the regime

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succeeded also in discursively forging a differentiation between “economic” and “political” demands in order to keep the opposition fragmented, thus safeguarding the system’s hegemonic interests.50 Other organizations reflecting similar ideational and organizational patterns emerged. Among them was Shayfeencom (from shayfı¯nkum, “We Watch You”), established in 2005, which engaged in the legal observation of elections.51 There was also Women for Democracy, or alSha¯riʿ Lı¯na¯ (“The Street is Ours”), which mobilized against sexual harassment and finally merged with Kifaya.52 Finally, there was the 9 March Group for Academic Freedom, established in 2003 to protest for academic freedom and against the securitization of campuses.53 Regarding these groups’ organizational structure, and of relevance for understanding April 6, Abdelrahman emphasizes: The structure of the group was loose, with no real hierarchy or leadership [. . .] Decisions were always reached by a vote, with the majority opinion prevailing. [. . .] Like other groups during this decade, the 9 March Group consisted of members of different political meanings. Its individual members were also active in several other groups and networks such as Kefaya.54 After the 2005 presidential elections, there was a clampdown on parties and movements such as Kifaya, which temporarily reduced their political activism, and this subsequently caused a reorientation toward political blogging.55 Online activism particularly made itself felt in the third of Shehata’s periods, 2006–09. Looking at internet penetration in Egypt, there were an estimated 10 million users in 2008,56 23 million in 2010 and 39 million in 2013.57 There were about 822,000 Facebook users in 2008,58 4.2 million in 201059 and about 14 million in 2013.60 This new development created new possibilities of mobilization via the medium – for example, the production of textual, visual and audio material independently from state-owned media, also paving the way for social media.61 Young people were also increasingly looking for alliances with other popular groups. Hence, the foundation of Tadamon (meaning “Solidarity” and “Togetherness”) by members of Youth for Change in 2007, which was aimed at both overcoming the socially detached activism of Kifaya and strengthening the bonds with social movements of other classes.62 The growing labor movement and the strike in Mahalla in 2006 convinced many young people that cooperation with other groups and movements was needed in order to bring about social change.63 Tadamon also stressed the simultaneous connectedness of economic and political demands in order

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to achieve a unified front against the regime and employ new repertoires of contention: Egypt wakes up every day to tens of protests of all classes [. . .] Workers from Mahalla, property tax collectors, university professors, their ˙ students, physicians, engineers, and journalists [. . .] We saw and participated in the democracy movement of 2005 [Kifaya] and learned thereby the most important lesson: The struggle begins in the streets, among the people [. . .] The fight for democracy cannot begin detached from economic and social struggles [. . .] Now the struggle for changing the dictatorial regime [niza¯m dı¯kta¯tu ¯ rı¯] starts ˙ anew [. . .] But although the struggle’s space expanded with all of the factories and fields [. . .] the majority are not connected with each other. This huge flood has to turn into one river [. . .] in order to be able to uproot oppression and despotism [zulm wa-istibda¯d]. New ˙ repertoires are needed which go beyond the two understandings of the political elite that looks down on demanding struggles [. . .] and those with limited horizons, detesting politics and just considering social and economic aims.64 This call for unity across classes entails a particular understanding of politics and how to mobilize for it, which we will see again with regard to April 6: Our problems are the same and those who steal from us are the same [. . .] We must unite and we must also think about the future of Egypt [. . .] Politics is not something for other people. If politics means the future of Egypt then we are all politicians and we will not allow them to poison our lives and the future of our children.65 Tadamon also displayed a cross-ideological character, comprising members active in the liberal El-Ghad Party, the Revolutionary Socialists and the Islamists. Furthermore, the movement’s organizational structure was horizontal, with the same committees as Youth for Change. Tadamon particularly supported various labor activities, legally and with media support.66 It eventually split in the course of the strike on 6 April 2008 – explained further below – due to disagreements over strategy, and many members joined the new group established out of these developments – namely, April 6.67 These interactions between formal political parties and the new generation of youth movements were mutually important, as they would later be for April 6 as well. These movements could be understood as pools from

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which parties were able to attract new members, while movement activists could rely on party resources and a formal status when prosecuted.68 Shehata’s final period began in 2010, and developed into the revolutionary mobilization for 25 January. Parliamentary elections in 2010 and presidential elections in 2011 charged this phase, with crucial meaning. When Mohamed ElBaradei – the Nobel Prize winning former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency – returned to Egypt in 2010, the National Association for Change (NAC) was formed in order to promote his candidacy for presidency in 2011.69 A list with seven demands guaranteeing free and fair elections was presented with the signatures collected for their realization.70 In addition to ElBaradei’s return, the torture and death of the young blogger Khaled Said in Alexandria in June 2010 had a huge impact on Egypian society. Wael Ghonim, who become a symbol of the 25 January events, established the Facebook page “We are all Khaled Said” to commemorate the blogger, which contributed tremendously to a renewed contentious dynamic. Ghonim also cooperated initially with April 6 in several protest activities in January 2011.71 The empirical data presented in this study underline that both ElBaradei’s return and the death of Khaled Said were turning points in mobilizing many young people for political activism. This chapter has illustrated the emergence of intensified contentious politics in Egypt since the 2000s, which displayed a new discursive and organizational positioning toward the regime. Shehata stresses, firstly, the generational aspect of youth setting themselves apart from an older, dominant generation. Secondly, she hints at the importance of informal politics “outside the existing institutional structures.”72 Kifaya, composed largely of 1970s’ student activists who had left formal politics in the 1990s, displayed the character of being “more action-oriented in their discourse” and adopted “a more consensual approach that focused more on what united Egyptians rather than on what divided them.”73 Thereby, these forces, in contrast to the formal opposition, tended to be radical in the sense of demanding not just reform by the regime itself but systemic change through social pressure from below.74 A third feature is the “nonideological and cross-ideological nature” of these movements.75 In line with the approach to speak for all Egyptians, the new movements’ attention was on joint action toward universal concepts like freedom, democracy and social justice. Consequently, in contrast to former crossideological alliances, these movements were characterized not by membership based on an institution representing a certain ideology, but on an individual membership with the envisioned potential “to overcome many of the long-standing divisions that have weakened the

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Egyptian opposition.”76 Finally, the use of information technology for organization, mobilization and aesthetics is also a trait that will be explored in more detail in the following chapters. This chapter has also illustrated the question of the challenging and intricate character of being oppositional and contentious in authoritarian settings. The protest wave since the beginning of the 2000s implied a “normalization of protest”77 and a gradual process of “breaking the fear barrier,”78 contributing thereby to the creation of a new activist subjectivity. Thus, having in mind the three social segments involved in the diffusion of protests since the 2000s – workers, the pro-democracy movement and the neighborhood protests – and also taking into account the emergence of new media outlets plus blogging and social media, “a process of politicization of formerly apolitical citizens was beginning to take root.”79 April 6 would finally emerge out of these diffusion processes. Taking this point of view into account will help us to comprehend the global context of April 6. Abdelrahman has already pointed to this context and its impact on preparing the ground for the 25 January events: [M]illions of Egyptians were revolting against the incrementally implemented but ultimately brutal end to the post-independence, developmentalist state and the birth of a neoliberal order. In the making for decades, the hegemony of the neoliberal order during the last years of Mubarak’s rule had become complete. Building a modernizing, developmentalist state in Egypt from the 1950s was, first and foremost, an apolitical project, backed by a global capitalist system and reliant on the rise of a new political class, new institutions and a new social base.80

CHAPTER 5 THE EMERGENCE OF THE APRIL 6 YOUTH MOVEMENT

Mahalla al-Kubra in the Nile Delta is one of Egypt’s most important industrial cities. From the onset of the policies of modernization initiated by the nation state, Mahalla has thus been filled with political meaning. Workers’ strikes at its large textile company have a decades-old history and had a significant political impact on contentious dynamics, such as those prevailing after the aforementioned strike in 2006. Finally, in 2008, there was a renewed call to strike on April 6 for a minimum wage of 1,200 Egyptian Pounds.1 The strike committee’s call reached various actors in the political landscape. Activists organized in the networks of Kifaya and Tadamon, and the El-Ghad Party also became aware of the planned strike.2 Ahmed Maher and Esraa Abdel Fattah, two activists from Kifaya and El-Ghad, cooperated with other Kifaya-affiliated activists such as Mohamed Adel, who was active in the Democratic Front Party,3 setting up a Facebook group to support the call and widen it into a general, countrywide strike.4 Within a week, the group grew to around 70,000 online sympathizers (currently more than 1 million).5 As well as advertising the event on Facebook, the organizers wrote notices on banknotes and used graffiti on walls.6 As a consequence, members of Tadamon joined the call while others within the groups argued against the strike, saying that “the labour movement had not sufficiently matured to galvanize a general strike.”7 In this mood of a gradual bridging of the political and economic discourses, illustrated by Tadamon, workers also increasingly employed a discourse that encompassed both spheres.8 The strike itself developed in an ambivalent manner. While security forces were already deployed in Mahalla on 2 April, and company management simultaneously offered better conditions, not all strike

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leaders cancelled the action. As a consequence, the next two days saw street clashes in the city between workers and security forces that were only halted following Prime Minister Nazif’s promise to introduce new subsidies and “a bonus of one month’s pay.”9 In Cairo, and throughout the country, the security forces were deployed and hindered people from forming gatherings or crowds. Ahmed Maher and Esraa Abdel Fattah spent 20 days under arrest during the course of the events.10 However, although the strike did not materialize beyond Mahalla, the developments were of symbolic importance as they showed the global public that mobilization against the political and social order in Egypt was possible.11 Aaron Reese examines the framing of the event using Egyptian newspaper reports presenting the effectiveness of the strike and the ability of state media to counter challenges to its narrative from independent media outlets.12 Al-Masry Al-Youm’s headline (see Figure 5.1), for instance, concludes impartially that the strike had satisfied all actors involved. After the strike, the April 6 Youth Movement was officially formed and held an initial conference at the Journalists’ Syndicate.13 A co-founder describes the subsequent process of how social media became the main meeting point at the beginning:

Figure 5.1 “The strike [. . .] satisfies all players,” Al-Masry Al-Youm, 7 April 2008.14

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Figure 5.2

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Graffiti calling for a second strike in 2009.15

After the strike we began to know each other better via our mails and met personally [. . .] and regularly. But at the beginning we were all virtual persons on Facebook [. . .] We also appeared in the media and to the world and began to protest [. . .] The workers’ main concern was the wage increase. We tried to resist the regime by bridging the economic condition with the political condition. The existing regime was responsible for the difficult economic situation and consequently if it did not give way there would be no improvement.16 Bearing in mind the context of contentious politics and its transformation since the 2000s, the emergence of April 6 becomes clearer. The majority of movement activists interviewed became members during the 18 days of the occupation of Tahrir Square, or soon afterwards, and not directly after its establishment. Of the activists interviewed, seven were co-founders of the movement. The rest had already been politically active before 25 January – either as independents or in groups like Kifaya, the MB, socialist groups at universities or the El-Ghad Party. Many people had known of the movement since the Mahalla strike in 2008 due to media coverage, as indicated above. Many activists were politicized by Khaled

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Said’s murder and the return of Mohammed ElBaradei. ElBaradei’s entry into Egyptian politics generated a new momentum. A former member of April 6’s Political Office states that many “apolitical youth saw in him an important, respected symbol, and hope. In 2010 people kept asking what an alternative to Mubarak would be. Many considered ElBaradei a potential alternative.”17 The following account by Ahmed Maher of how he became politically active illustrates why it is so important to embed the emergence of April 6 in an extended historical context: In the beginning, I was a student and I was pessimistic about what was happening in Egypt. There was no education, no jobs. There is a lot of corruption in Egypt. So I started to search, I wanted to join something. Also, at this time in 2003, I found that I loved novels, old novels that talk about the time before 1952, the military revolution, or the 1970s, the communists, the Muslim Brotherhood. This time was a very active time. There were the struggles against the king, or Sadat, or Nasser, or the communists and the Muslim Brotherhood also. I read many novels about many persons and there are many old movies that talk about the struggle against corruption and dictatorship. So I wanted to join something, but there was no movement, just political parties. So in 2003 I participated in the demonstrations against the war in Iraq. That was the first time I participated in politics and I heard of new groups supporting the Intifada, and those opposed to the war in Iraq. That was the first time I experienced other people talking the same language. I started to talk with these groups, young people and old figures; I heard a speech saying that our problems in the Middle East were based on the Arab regimes, the corruption and dictatorship. The resolution was to force these regimes to step down. Yes I said, these are thoughts I have to have. So I followed these groups and joined the Kifaya movement in 2004, and from Kifaya to Youth for Change and the April 6 Youth Movement.18 But as the coordinator of a local April 6 group in Cairo states, joining the movement before the uprising of 25 January carried serious consequences: I was hearing about the movement via the internet and news channels on TV [. . .] I was hearing about it before the revolution. They were preparing the revolution and directing people’s view on an unfolding revolution against a corrupt regime and tyrannical

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rulers. Joining the movement before the revolution was difficult because of intense observation by the state security and the Ministry of Interior. So the movement’s members were arrested regularly for directing people toward issues like the “fall of the regime.” Of course this is a great phrase. What does the fall of the regime mean? A regime more than 30 years old and fighting everybody [. . .] The movement was influential during and before the revolution, that is why the majority of the revolutionary youth participated in April 6: because they have a voice and they call for a stable life, which they long for. That is why our first slogan was “ʿAysh, Hurriyya, ʿAda¯la ˙ Igtima¯ʿiyya” [“Bread, Freedom, Social Justice”].19 After Mahalla and its popularization via Facebook, April 6 increasingly developed a name and unique characteristics for youth in opposition to the regime. The following comment, expressed by a former member of the co-founders’ committee, provides insight into the nature of these demands after the Mahalla strike, and how more “political” issues were incorporated in addition to the socioeconomic narrative during the strike: We passed through many periods. Since the movement’s establishment we were engaged with social and economic demands more than politics, or not more than politics, but we saw that in order to reach the people we shouldn’t be talking all the time about politics [. . .] the street cares about how to eat and how to afford things for the children. So we began firstly with these topics [. . .] For us 2008 was very much a workers’ year. We were in contact with many striking factories [. . .] So we were not talking politics. But in 2009 there was a change [. . .] we had political demands to a certain extent such as changes in the constitution, removing the emergency law and the linking of prices to wages.20 The periods mentioned above pertain particularly to the difficult period since 2009, which saw the failure of a renewed strike attempt and subsequent internal divisions due to the cross-ideological composition of the movement’s membership inherited from its predecessors. Chapters 7 and 8 examine this trajectory in more detail. As will be seen, the street is central to both the movement’s organizational structure and its repertoires. Bearing in mind the government’s autocratic policies, the limited opportunities for formal opposition, and police violence, the presence of April 6 on the street has given it credibility and appeal – a fact expressed by an activist from Giza:

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MAKING REVOLUTION IN EGYPT The movement was without fear – taking [to the streets] and its youth were arrested and beaten. This was among the things that I liked very much – it [the movement] had credibility among the people. And it still has. This street credibility attracted me. It touches the citizen directly.21

As has been shown the movement evolved in a highly repressive context. As Ahmed Maher, the movement’s former general coordinator, stated, although the amount of likes on the Facebook page was very high, “when we said OK we will turn this Facebook group into a movement in real life, just 50 to 100 persons came, it was not easy.”22 The newness of the endeavor and the difficulties ahead led to the study of successful examples of political activism beyond Egypt in order to learn how to operate in restricted opportunity structures, eventually posing the question of April 6’s foreign linkages. These pertain particularly to contacts of April 6 members with the Serbian movement Otpor (“Resistance”) in the early days of the movement, which, having been brought up by representatives of the Egyptian State (such as the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces – SCAF) and media outlets, posed a delicate issue. As indicated in the interviews, all activists deny having received any foreign assistance. It is, of course, very difficult to verify whether and how any aid has been provided. Nonetheless, it is useful to look at aid networks and the promotion of democracy as organized predominantly by the US. During the Serbian crisis in 2000, the European and US governments provided financial support for Serbian opposition parties and organizations.23 Thus, members of Otpor organized courses teaching non-violent protest tactics and also distributed Gene Sharp’s work From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation,24 which, as will be seen, was also common among April 6 members. Since Mahatma Gandhi’s non-violent struggle for Indian independence, “civil resistance has become an increasingly important feature of world politics.”25 As Timothy Garton Ash stresses with reference to empirical evidence presented in his co-edited book Civil Resistance and Power Politics, non-violent action is not always employed solely as a consequence of moral principles but sometimes on the basis of pragmatism.26 Furthermore, the construction of alliances thereby is crucial – as occurred in Eastern Europe, for instance.27 Subversive tactics were circulated through various media, such as those passed between Serbia and Georgia. Garton Ash thus concludes that: in fact, one can discern an international learning chain running through a series of neo-authoritarian regimes in newly formed

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post-communist states, where the leader was toppled and a more democratic – or at least, less undemocratic – government was installed, with the help of a more or less salient element of civil resistance: Slovakia 1998, Croatia 1999/2000, Serbia 2000, Georgia 2003, Ukraine 2004.28 The case of Serbia provides valuable insights into and parallels with the Egyptian case. Civil resistance against President Slobodan Milosˇevic´’s authoritarian politics began in 1991, following the occupation of a central square in Belgrade.29 From then on non-violent protests were directed against the series of wars that Milosˇevic´ waged in former Yugoslavia.30 Non-violence was important for Serbian activists due to the success of peaceful democratic transitions in other Eastern European countries.31 Thereby, “it is in the sphere of media that the interplay of creative approaches by local actors, technological innovations, and international support gave especially substantive results,”32 and this gave birth to a similar narrative in Egypt – namely, that of a technologically “savvy David against a seemingly almighty Goliath,” which “caught the attention of the international media and an international public.”33 Again, the initial driving force was young people – especially students.34 The Otpor movement, which was established in 1998 and which aimed at toppling Milosˇevic´, played an important role, having almost 18,000 members in 2000.35 It “chose a non-hierarchical, horizontal organization structure with no strong visible individual leaders, but a collective invisible leadership. It would attract apathy-ridden and disillusioned youth, especially through a series of regime mocking actions.”36 Otpor formed an alliance with the opposition and functioned at the same time as its supervisor.37 The campaign to challenge Milosˇevic´ in the presidential elections in 2000 was also supported by the EU and the US, both via programs promoting democracy and with an emphasis “especially on NGO support and aid to the opposition-controlled municipalities.”38 Institutions such as USAID, Freedom House39 and the International Republican Institute were particularly active, promoting branding and marketing strategies for how to sell revolutionary activism like a commodity.40 Although Otpor lost influence after the fall of Milosˇevic´ because many of its members joined political parties,41 the movement continued to be of importance. It played a crucial role in training the young people who organized Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2003. That country’s youth movement, Kmara (“Enough”), employed the same organizational structure and tactics as Otpor in order to mobilize hitherto apolitical segments of society, such as “graffiti, rallies, and theatre”;42 it also adopted the clenched fist as its symbol.43

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Likewise, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in 2004 was supported by European states and US institutions, such as USAID and Freedom House.44 Otpor activists also trained members of the Ukrainian youth movement Pora (“It’s Time”) in “how to create a ‘brand’, how to create a logo, symbols, and key messages.”45 Freedom House also supported Pora financially.46 While noting European and American support during these processes, it is also worth pointing out that the Russian Government introduced strategies to counter these efforts.47 Prominent members of Otpor, such as Slobodan Djinovic and Srdja Popovic, established the Belgrade-based Centre for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies (CANVAS) in 2004 as “a non-profit institution which relies solely on private funding.”48 Examining the list of the organization’s publications, it becomes clear that there is a focus on Arab countries. Fundamental publications such as Nonviolent Struggle: 50 Crucial Points49 and Canvas Core Curriculum: A Guide to Effective Nonviolent Struggle50 have been translated into Arabic and Farsi, and partially into Spanish and French. In addition to these protest guides there are country analyses of protests in, for example, Brazil, Bahrain, Burma, Egypt, Syria, Venezuela and Yemen.51 Another internationally based institution that was involved in disseminating guidelines on how to organize contentious politics was the Academy of Change (Aka¯dimı¯yya al-Taghyı¯r),52 established by Egyptian expatriates in London in 2006 and then in Qatar in 2009 “as a scientific institute that is specialized in studying and researching the sciences of social, cultural, and political transformations especially in the Arabic and Islamic region.”53 The Academy gave courses to Kifaya activists and was also influenced by Otpor, translating many works by figures such as Gandhi, Henry David Thoreau and Gene Sharp54 into Arabic. One April 6 activist from Cairo explains how the idea of a “nonviolent war” (al-harb al-la¯ ʿunf) was adopted by the movement: ˙ The first idea they [April 6] were convinced of was the method of non-violence as I said to you, which they took from the Academy for Change, which it in turn took from Otpor, enriching it with Gandhi’s principles. Gandhi is also considered a school and this element is named the philosophy of non-violence.55 Regarding US support, Linda Herrera points to the establishment of the so-called Alliance of Youth Movements by the Department of State in November 2008.56 James K. Glassmann, the under secretary of state for public diplomacy, remarked that direct US support of groups like April 6 may be disadvantageous, and that the actual task should be “to work

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behind the scenes to help activists build networks and to facilitate the production and dissemination of cyberactivist training materials.”57 With new policies after 11 September 2011, young people were also identified as a target group and USAID was empowered to organize activities such as workshops, which Herrera refers to as “Cyberdissident Diplomacy”58 – i.e. providing money for internet activists. The risks for activists vary as “[t]heir contact with the US government can range from very superficial encounters, like attending a reception or receiving training from a third party funded by USAID.”59 The function here is analogous to that of CANVAS60 – i.e. bringing together activists, politicians and media corporations like Facebook.61 These activities should not bring about “radical, revolutionary, or emancipatory politics, but [. . .] a modicum of democratic reform while growing consumer markets.”62 What becomes clear from the explanations above is the existence of a global network composed of established ideas on non-violent forms of contentious politics that enables a continuous transfer and learning process between and in other political settings, and which is reinforced by neoliberal branding and commodification strategies. This network is also supported by a largely non-transparent financing base sustained by the agendas of diverse governments. Maha Abdelrahman, for instance, refers to the consequent difficulties of foreign funding in Egyptian civil society.63 The politically significant consequences of actually being transparent make it difficult to obtain validated empirical data. As mentioned above, when I was interviewing April 6 activists the issue of relationships with activists abroad was very delicate, and understandably so considering the constant accusations by the regime in Cairo that April 6 was being funded by foreign actors and was therefore nonpatriotic. How this subject was dealt with depended on an individual’s rank within the movement. The higher echelons, such as the general coordinator or members of the Political or Administrative Office, spoke openly about visits to the Occupy Wall Street camp in New York or the involvement of Freedom House in establishing contacts with Otpor in 2009 for a visit to Belgrade. However, the majority of lower-ranking members who were interviewed denied any links and stressed cooperation with Arab activists instead. Amr Ali’s comment reflects these perspectives: We didn’t learn from Otpor. At the beginning of our organization we searched for an approach suitable for the Egyptian people. So we found the non-violent techniques as the Egyptian people by their nature don’t like violence and fear violent events. So we found some studies about non-violence and that there are successes here and

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MAKING REVOLUTION IN EGYPT there. Then we searched until we found Gene Sharp, the owner of that science. So we began to read the Arabic material we found on the internet. We realized that there were experiences which used the same approach as Otpor. So Otpor for us is an example, not the origin of the information and experience.64

The following three chapters constitute an in-depth analysis of the movement and illustrate how April 6 has been operating within the context outlined above. This analysis is structured according to the following categories: demands, organizational structure and the movement’s repertoire of contention.

PART III THE APRIL 6 YOUTH MOVEMENT AND ITS CONTENTIOUS CONTEXT

It’s infuriating. All year long the government has been talking about pluralism and democracy and the first multi-candidate presidential elections, and at the same time some unknown person writes in the metro that the president owns the state’s property and uses it to buy presents for a group attached to His Excellency and called His People. Contradictions enough to give you apoplexy. Khaled Al Khamissi1 Building on the historical context from which April 6 emerged, the following chapters will present the major empirical findings of this study. Before going into detail, it is necessary to explain how the analysis is structured regarding time and content. The research covers particularly the period from the establishment of April 6 in 2008 until its legal ban in April 2014, while referring to important developments thereafter. Thus, all the processes examined here should be contextualized against the backdrop of the main political events that unfolded during this period. It is, however, beyond the scope of this study to exhaustively recount all of the numerous political developments that took place. The initial period of the movement’s establishment has already been covered. The occupation of Tahrir Square, beginning on 25 January 2011 and lasting until Mubarak’s resignation on 11 February 2011, and the subsequent political developments have already been well documented by various other scholars and journalists.2 Thus, this analysis will first present the key political events and processes since 2011, focusing on the aspects that contribute to comprehending April 6’s context.

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The political landscape brought about by 25 January has been marked by an absence of the clear-cut hegemony of a single actor able to formulate a social consensus, though the SCAF was the most powerful within the institutional framework.3 In order to achieve that social consensus, and having only a small window of opportunity before a possible loss of legitimacy and influence in the face of high popular expectations, a road map of a “transition to democracy”4 was drawn up.5 This transition consisted of holding parliamentary elections, followed by presidential elections and the writing of a new constitution.6 As a first step, a constitutional committee amended certain articles, including the requirement to write a new constitution within six months of the parliamentary elections and restricting presidents to two terms of four years each. A referendum on 19 March 2011 was accepted by 77 per cent of the voters.7 This process of embedding the revolutionary dynamic in a formalized framework initially met with considerable opposition regarding the military’s role in politics. The resistance was articulated by many parties and movements already in existence, such as April 6, but also by new formations benefiting from the window of opportunity that had been open since January 2011. Distrust of formal political procedures was still widespread in the movement. This is why the aim was not to pursue the seizure of power by themselves but to continue to influence the political decision making process from outside, as a pressure group and through alliances with other movements and parties. In the summer of 2011, large protest marches led to a renewed occupation of Tahrir Square. The protesters’ main fear was that the revolution’s demands would be marginalized by the formalized process of transition directed by suspect political actors (such as the military), who had formed an indispensable part of Mubarak’s regime. This tense situation eventually culminated in clashes between protesters and security forces around Mohamed Mahmoud Street, just next to Tahrir Square, on 18 November 2011, when more than 40 protesters were killed.8 The subsequent parliamentary elections, from November 2011 to January 2012, were won by Islamist parties. The MB’s Freedom and Justice Party (Hizb al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAda¯la) ranked first, while the Salafist Al-Nour ˙ ˙ Party was second. Thus, Islamist discourse became crucial in early 2012 and had a considerable impact on the ongoing transition process. The movement witnessed a split in the course of these developments, with the establishment of the April 6 Youth Movement: Democratic Front (Shaba¯b 6 Ibrı¯l: al-Gabha al-Dı¯muqra¯tiyya). ˙ The presidential elections that followed unfolded in a conflictive environment. On the one hand, Mohamed Mursi from the MB was

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elected president on 30 June 2012 in a final ballot against Ahmed Shafiq, a candidate from Mubarak’s entourage supported by the SCAF.9 April 6 supported Mursi in order to prevent the former-regime candidate from taking power. Two weeks previously, the parliament’s lower house (The People’s Assembly), elected in January 2012, had been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Constitutional Court and dissolved, thereby putting the MB under pressure.10 As a result, there was an increasing polarization between the Islamist forces of the MB and the Salafis as well as other political forces from the liberal and leftist camps. Accordingly, the committee established to draft the new constitution – initially dominated by the Islamists, but encompassing other movements such as April 6 as well – was increasingly abandoned by the non-Islamists in protest at the lack of consensual mechanisms. Eventually, President Mursi “feared that the judiciary would also close the upper house and the constitutional assembly, he decreed11 on 22 November 2012, that those assemblies were immune from judicial action and that his own decrees were immune from judicial review”12 so that the new constitution could be passed. This decree symbolized for many Egyptians – including April 6 members – a continuation of Mubarak’s regime by a different actor. Thus, the MB temporarily took over the role of the regime. Street demonstrations as a reaction by April 6 and other “revolutionary” movements resumed, turning increasingly tense. These protests contributed to laying the ground for the gradual public delegitimization of the MB, leading to the eventual removal of Mursi.13 Thus, in the midst of this turmoil and the crisis between the Islamists and the secularists,14 a new campaign emerged in the spring of 2013, calling itself Tamarod (“Rebellion”). This campaign aimed at collecting more votes than those cast for Mursi and forcing him to resign.15 The eventual result was mass protests combined with widespread dissatisfaction regarding concrete improvements in everyday life under Mursi’s presidency, which led to military intervention on 3 July 2013. The move was called a revolution by its supporters, and a counter-revolution or coup d’e´tat by its opponents. April 6 was also influenced by this discourse, which meant a significant reorientation in view of the movement’s support of Mursi’s election. In the build-up to the coup, according to member accounts, the movement was subject to warnings and intimidation by the security agencies – it was told, before the June 2013 protests, to turn against Mursi.16 The fact that the movement was, at the same time, subjected to a perceived smear campaign by the MB led, in addition to the polarizing policies by Mursi, to an atmosphere in which, as a former member puts it, “many of the members did not become aware of these risks and did not care about it and they

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thought it would be a step in the 25 January revolution, not a coup by the state or a counter-revolution of the Mubarak regime.”17 Ideological factions within the movement, such as the Nasserist current, were mobilizing in favor of Tamarod trying to impose its power, but each faction’s relatively small membership was not enough to establish hegemony over the others.18 The eventual vote within the movement resulted in a majority supporting the demonstrations on 30 June.19 These events implied a reversal of the Islamist discourse and a return to one based on nationalist populism, stability and security in order to resume Egypt’s development and economic growth as a modern nation. These notions had, as already seen, been crucial for both Nasser and Sadat. Influential Nasserist intellectuals played a significant role in framing these events in 2013.20 In the hope of achieving stability, the regime now set up its road map the other way round. This time, the drafting of the new constitution needed to take place first, followed by presidential and parliamentary elections.21 The new constitution was approved in a referendum in midJanuary 2014. Presidential elections were held on 26–28 May 2014 and contested by two candidates, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Hamdeen Sabahi, with the former clearly taking the lead. This process was accompanied by the transfer of huge amounts of rentier cash from the Gulf countries supporting al-Sisi.22 By framing his position using Nasserist terminology, al-Sisi has been able to embody a socially inclusive nationalist narrative while marginalizing potential antagonists such as the MB and, increasingly, the revolutionary youth. Based on this nationalist and populist discourse, the opportunity for contentious oppositional politics has been restricted. This has had far-reaching consequences for April 6, which readjusted its framing and increasingly criticized policies following the military intervention. The best example is the November 2013 law limiting protests. This law includes detailed articles that regulate and restrict the organization of protest marches. Most importantly, it stipulates that protest marches must be registered with the police station responsible for the designated area three days in advance.23 In the wake of this, and without prior notification of a protest march, the general coordinator of April 6, Ahmer Maher, and another founder, Mohamed Adel, were arrested and sentenced to three years in jail.24 As a consequence of a lawsuit against the movement, April 6 was finally banned on 28 April 2014 by the Cairo Court of Urgent Matters “on charges of working to distort the image of the Egyptian state and espionage.”25 A trip to Gaza by movement representatives was presented as evidence.26 After the movement’s appeal, the decision was confirmed by the same court on 31 March 2015.27

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Against the backdrop of these processes, and following Lesch’s summary, it can be inferred that “in sum, Egypt has not experienced a reform of the military and security systems,” or “administrative changes.”28 Thus, the regime has managed to sustain itself using Nasserist references. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the dynamics of informal contentious politics contributed to an unprecedented opening up of the political opportunity structure, particularly between January 2011 and June 2013, which is present in the collective memory and which has to be analyzed and contextualized in order to understand the past, present and future. This means that, one way or another, these contentious experiences are stored in that memory and are likely to be reframed in future political contexts. An example of this ongoing momentum is the movement’s continued activism, regardless of the ban. In preparation for the eighth anniversary of its establishment, the campaign “The Eighth Start” (al-Intila¯qa al-Tha¯mina)29 was launched in April 2015 on Facebook signed ˙ by both fronts, very much facilitated by the prominent member from the Democratic Front, Mahmoud Samy.30 The official launch was due to be held at a press conference in Old Cairo, but was forbidden by the security forces;31 in protest, the meeting took place outside Cairo in the desert.32 Amr Ali, the general coordinator, said, “there would be no alternative to fighting corruption and oppression, which will tumble the state into the abyss, and that the movement will continue its activities despite state prosecution.”33 In addition, “a new vision and a new strategy”34 was announced, which will be elaborated on in the following chapter. The period since June 2013 is seen as the worst ever phase for political activism in Egypt.35 Although the movement is banned – many of its former leaders are in prison and members are subject to threats of disappearances and torture,36 used by the security services to intimidate political activists – the group is still active on the ground. This process has been accompanied by a certain fatigue among members, with many of them leaving the movement for security reasons. As Hassan Maher, a former member puts it, “I cannot say anything about this black year [2013], things were very bad, injustice, oppression and pain.”37 Being outside Egypt, it is difficult to acquire definite information on how the movement is operating in this situation as both current and former members are naturally more reserved about providing too much detail, the results of which could be life-threatening. Although Ahmed Maher was released from prison in January 2017, he is still obliged for another three years to report to a police station daily and to spend each night – from 6 pm to 6 am – there.38 The authorities are thus continuing to monitor his movements, and thereby any possible resumption of political activism. He is thus, for instance, not allowed to use a laptop or mobile phone while at the police station.39

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In this sense, activists increasingly perceived that the revolution’s demands could not have been realized and even to the contrary the political context began to be dominated by a military-controlled regime. This disappointment shattered the belief in being able to realize the conceived alternative for the country for which many efforts had been invested. These observations point to a new self-positioning among the movement’s members towards their political activism, characterized by two dimensions. On the one hand there is increasing experience of anxiety, hopelessness and consequently depoliticization. Likewise, a reorientation toward personal ambitions such as careers and family formation is visible. Recent fieldwork in Egypt verifies these trends. Vivienne Matthies-Boon’s study on how young activists – including also members from the April 6 Youth Movement – illustrate how the violent post-revolutionary phase, particularly since July 2013, has resulted in traumatic experiences among the activists. Instances of death, torture, and the feeling of a failed revolution led to an effect of depoliticization “as many activists largely withdrew from the political sphere and focused on their personal lives in an effort to mend their broken worlds,”40 as expressed by these feelings: Politics is a very bad investment in Egypt, as it carries severe repercussions on, time and effort. You cannot get even a 5 per cent return on the emotional investment you have made into politics. So now I am trying to move away from my addiction, and listen to music, talk about different stuff, and develop a new discourse with those around me. [. . .] Now I am gaining more control over my life again, despite these circumstances, I have to focus on my life.41

CHAPTER 6 DEMANDING CHANGE

This land doesn’t belong to us, Taha. It belongs [to those] who have money [. . .] Make money, Taha, and youʾll get everything. But if you stay poor they’ll walk all over you. Alaa al-Aswany1 The purpose of this chapter is to make concrete April 6’s articulated core demands and the way that their framing can be understood as global. As outlined in Chapter 2, demands framed in terms of solving social grievances constitute one of the central concepts of SMT.

Politics As a diagnostic term, politics has often been framed by April 6 members as something nonexistent – they stress that “there is no politics at all in Egypt”2 – or as a negative process, a “dirty game where you have to change colors, lie and play with your enemy to reach your aim, like the Machiavellian moment.”3 Thus, when the interviewees were asked about their aims and those of the movement, many answered that they would not describe them as political aims but human needs and that they do not want political postures but to control politics from the outside. Thus, Hassan Maher, a student responsible for the Giza Governorate’s Media Committee who was questioned about the specific aims of April 6, answered that its political demands have been very general in composition: Our demands are very general and obvious in nature. I want to see my country as a real democracy, with freedom, freedom of thought

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MAKING REVOLUTION IN EGYPT and factual expression, no exclusion. I want to see my country virtually developed and flourishing.4

Another member, from a local group in Cairo, who studied political science and now works as an accountant, emphasized the consequence of having these broad demands and – like many other interviewees – traced them back to an idealistic adherence to politics based on principles: As I told you April 6 is an important part of the revolutionary way or of the current revolutionary situation which is not completed yet, because a revolution develops like an embryo, it develops in steps until it is born [. . .] They [Egyptian politicians] do more of politics, and political work does not go well with revolutionary work as politics is about the possible and achievable whereas revolution is about principles and their implementation.5 This emphasis on principles underlying politics, for instance, is frequently used as a banner for the movement’s official Twitter page: “al-Wataniyya fawqa al-Siya¯sa wa-l-Maba¯diʾ fawqa al-Masa¯lih” (“Patri˙ ˙ ˙ otism over Politics. Principles over interests!”).6 The conception of politics and revolution based on principles and depending on patriotism can also be read in a further slogan frequently printed on flyers and leaflets, “Shaba¯b 6 Ibrı¯l, shaba¯b bi-yhibb Misr bi-gadd” (“April ˙ ˙ 6 Youth, youth truly loving Egypt”).7 This is echoed by the 34-year-old coordinator of the Luxor Governorate: You are a youth movement and you are doing things nobody does. You are against everything. If a real revolution will happen in this country, it needs a revolution of thought. We must explain the principles of politics.8 But based on this understanding of politics, questions about the movement’s demands and aims can also lead in a more fluid direction, where a broad and negative understanding of politics is combined with concrete demands addressed to the challenged regime – thus indicating an envisioned social alternative. The 24-year-old accountant responsible for media in a Cairo local group explains: Political demands, look I am against this question. Why? Because political demands are in my view related to power or to the will of power. We don’t have political demands. We want, we established April 6 to make freedom, social justice and human dignity possible.

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These are not political demands, but they are about people’s life. So, April 6 is more than politics, it is about people’s conscience. Politics is as you know dirty; there are selfish internal interests and greediness. We don’t care for these. We don’t have political ambitions, or political aims. Because all we demand is social justice, a minimum and maximum wage, a law regulating work so there is no unemployment, as for instance in the Netherlands.9

Alternatives The solution – that is, the prognostic side of April 6’s frame – is thus based on the realization of the movement’s main demands, which are clustered around key concepts such as democracy and a civil state (dawla madaniyya); the guarantee of political freedoms; social justice; and human dignity as formulated in the main slogan of the revolution, “Bread, Freedom, Social Justice and Human Dignity.” The political scientist cited above puts it this way: The most important aims are that we want Egypt to become a democratic civil state which respects human rights and implements social justice. These are the movement’s basic demands, which we are committed to. We understood that this was difficult to realize with the old regime, because the old regime was corrupt and dispossessing the Egyptians. It was a dictatorial regime without trustworthiness.10 At the beginning of the first protests in January 2011, however, regime change had not initially been a demand. But, as stressed by the same activist, “when we took over the square, you could hear more and more the demand to bring down the regime, which [the demand] was isolated on 25 January, but changed with 28 January,”11 the day when the protesters at Tahrir Square were attacked by regime thugs. Notwithstanding this partial abstractedness in framing political demands, many interviewees did in fact make more concrete what they mean by these broader concepts of change. When we look at these, it is clear that they are very focused on the fulfillment of social justice. Thus, a new understanding of dealing with socioeconomic problems and welfare services is required. The cited media person responsible for a neighborhood group in Cairo explains this by saying: We need a minimum and maximum limit for wages. The minimum for making a living, relating the wages to prices and not to

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MAKING REVOLUTION IN EGYPT production, as the constitution says. If my salary is 1200 Gineeh [Egyptian Pounds] and I buy meat for 100 Gineeh this is not nice. The prices have to be linked to the salaries. Social justice cannot exist without a limit on wages. It cannot be possible that someone earns 100,000 Gineeh and the other just 400 Gineeh per month. There must be a limit, as in Switzerland for instance, staying in the middle. Our middle class has to rise again. These are our demands, social demands rather than political.12

The interviewees’ framing illustrates the movement’s belief that both political and economic aims can only be approached in a combined manner. The main reason for this is that there are perceived factors obstructing the realization of these demands – principally, the regime. The coordinator of a local group in Cairo, an engineer by profession, explains Mubarak’s regime, pointing also to the MB rule at the time of the interview, as follows: This was a predatory regime [niza¯m hara¯mı¯] and a predatory ˙ ˙ government. They didn’t employ politics. They stole and used thugs. They didn’t have politics. And now there is a transition from this thuggish and predatory to an MB regime, using politics in a religious way through a particular religious point of view of their own and it is predatory in this framework. So it is using the same method of predation but within different religious politics.13 Thus, according to this understanding, everything hindering the correct implementation of politics at the cost of society and to the benefit of an exclusive circle who constitute the regime, is conceived as corruption. In the final instance, it is corruption characterized by “patronage, repression and the betrayal of people’s and citizens’ dignity [. . .] which brought us to the point of demanding it [change], not by force but peacefully.”14 That is why “the main aim of the movement is to fight corruption and to improve the country’s condition.”15 This eventually became clear with the slogan “al-Shʿab yurı¯d Isqa¯t al-Niza¯m” (“The People ˙ ˙ want the Downfall of the Regime”). Corruption displays itself most clearly, as indicated above, in the predatory way in which the economy was organized under Mubarak’s regime, as well as the socioeconomic ramifications of this (illustrated in previous chapters). In response to the question of how they would describe corruption, its function and implications for Egyptian society and politics, two media-committee members in a Cairo neighborhood group, both engineering students, explain its meaning in terms of a

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signifier representing a whole system of controlling people and reproducing the same system: Interviewee A:

They [the power-holders, then with President Mursi from the MB at the top] want to hegemonize the entire state and render their opinion the prevalent one. They want all of Egypt’s money and economy. They want the people to stay ignorant and uneducated so they cannot understand what they [the regime] do and remain quiet. Interviewee B: They just want the people to think about food. Interviewee A: Just food, so that they cannot think about politics. Interviewee B: Yes. So they do not think about politics and the economy, nothing. Interviewee A: So they do not think about what they [the regime] are doing, this is what they want. Interviewee B: They want to occupy people with thoughts of work and food. Interviewee A: Like Mubarak did for 30 years. Mubarak accustomed people to this for 30 years. Eat, drink and sleep, don’t think; watch TV but don’t think, don’t ask anything. Interviewee B: They want people to be unconscious. Interviewee A: Our aim is to bring this consciousness to people and say to them that if there is a wrong thing it is necessary to learn instead of being ignorant. It is better to know one’s own country, how Egypt developed this way and how it can get out of this situation.16

As indicated earlier, this strategy of bringing conscious knowledge to the people was also a driving force and a form of self-understanding since the emergence of the student movement in the 1930s. The following quote from Amr Ali, the former general coordinator, further illuminates the entrenched corrupt system, both explaining the network character of the regime and embedding these Egypt-specific processes in the framework of a global economic system: He [Mubarak] implemented a system of interests, personal interests for him and for the circles supporting him. So eventually we are against capitalism when connected to the regime in this way, and the global capitalist system linked to the US economically and

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MAKING REVOLUTION IN EGYPT politically. But at the same time we are against a return to a socialist system and state intervention in everything.17

This critique of both capitalism and socialism, and the self-understanding (of the movement) that it entails, is best expressed by Ahmed Maher, who infers that “we are very close to the social democratic idea or center left ideology.”18 As a result, explained an activist from Giza, “we went out to fight despotism [istibda¯d]. And that means change; everything existing in the developed countries must also be implemented here.”19 In addition to its Facebook page, these demands are formulated in a flyer, which is reproduced in Figure 6.1. These were distributed shortly after the revolutionary events in early 2011, with the movement calling for a protest at Tahrir on April 6 in order to “complete the process of cleansing and demand the accountability of the corrupt,” under the title “Tamh¯ıh masa¯r ˙ ˙ 25 Yana¯yir: al-shaʿb yurı¯d muha¯kamat al-fasa¯d” (“Correcting the path of the ˙ January 25 revolution: the people want to try the corrupt”). The explicit reference to ideology, mentioned above, is likewise crucial. The influence of a one-dimensional ideology, as argued in the preceding chapters, has experienced a global decline in importance in recent decades, with a resulting increase in cross-ideological thinking and political practice. This can be observed in the case of April 6, as explained by a co-founder: We as a movement integrate members with no single ideology. We now call that Aprilian ideology. We have Nasserist, Islamist members, supporters of ElBaradei, also people who say that they don’t have any ideology, such as somebody who as a citizen loves the country, without any reference, such as a youth willing to contribute to the country’s wellbeing and reform.20 We have already seen that this cross-ideological membership composition, while having the benefit of being more operational in a restrictive political context, can also be more prone to internal fragmentation. Thus, the decision to support Mursi in the presidential elections was, apart from furthering the movement’s investment in its future, in part a result of a politics based on principles and the search for a solution despite a cross-ideological context, which deemed the importance of the wellbeing of the country central to the revolution’s success – as explained by Hassan Maher, the member responsible for the Giza Governorate’s Media Committee: For instance, when we supported Mursi many people were surprised, because we don’t support political colors or political

Figure 6.1 “Correcting the path of the January 25 revolution: the people want to try the corrupt.”21 Tahrir Documents (Watha¯ʾiq al-Tahrı¯r), 3 April 2011. ˙

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MAKING REVOLUTION IN EGYPT [ideological] currents [tawagguha¯t], but the principles we agreed upon [. . .] And there was a principle at that point, the most important, namely the revolution, the preservation of the revolution.22

This is why relations between state and society should have a completely different framework. In this understanding, the people are the deciding and legitimizing force of power. The coordinator of a local group in Cairo, an architect, claims that the people: must be the owner of the country, they are the ones who live there, produce its culture, work and produce there, marry, bring children into the world and make families, and constitute society, amplify the State, and everything, the people are everything. So the relationship to the ruler or the regime must be that they serve the people. They are the people’s clerks, nothing more. Of course, here our epochs of monarchical and military rule were false. But now there is a new period, whereby the people rule. It is not possible anymore that a regime controls the people, steals their revolutions, obstructs their path and restricts their political orientations.23 Besides these values of democracy, social justice and dignity, the movement at the same time has been naturally influenced by the nationalist and essentialist discourse of post-colonial Egypt in being contentious. On its Arabic Facebook page, when declaring its vision, it emphazises the need to “preserve the people’s identity and the nation’s pureness/authenticity, as well as balancing values and heritage with the instruments of the necessary development and recovery.”24 It is thereby suggested that there is no dilemma in this issue of identity discussed emphatically in Arab thought (which will be referred to in Chapter 9). The moment of a global generation becomes manifest at this point. The interviewees are primarily well educated, living in an urban middleclass context but affected, as previously elaborated, by precarious working conditions and prospects for the future. At this point, it becomes evident how political engagement can be driven by personal narratives and aims for future life, which Diane Singerman so plausibly describes as reflecting the issues of later ages and marriage, and their socioeconomic and psychological implications.25 Also pertinent here are Singerman’s, Bayat’s and Sassen’s elaborations, introduced in Part I, on the political and socioeconomic marginalization processes in urban settings – particularly in global cities, like Cairo – and subsequent fears for the future. A betteroff, upper-middle-class interviewee delineated their own motivation to be

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politically active in a similar, but slightly more worried, way with regard to the next generation: Personally I am OK, I don’t have financial problems. But what I want is when I walk the streets that there is no one who is hungry, and nobody has to wait until he is 40 to marry. I want social justice. Social Justice will come when my children can do what they envision. We need social justice so that our children can have a good life, a good education system and a high level of health and support for youth.26 These demands are articulated – as will be seen in the following chapter – organizationally in “centralized and non-centralized” (markaziyya wa-la¯markaziyya) ways, giving local initiatives and networks opportunities to unfold to a certain degree independently from the central decisionmaking processes in Cairo while maintaining a mutually interactive operational flow.27 Accordingly, a local group can operate either: along centrally agreed upon aims, or with more limited aims such as, for instance, problems of citizens in neighborhoods, and organize political awareness campaigns (tawʿiyya) for them [citizens], in order to show how they can engage at the local neighborhood level or with the city council. How they can demand their right for clean streets, electricity, water, these general services. The same can be said of the governorates and the engagement with governmental institutions at that level.28 The beneficial implications that the movement itself can build on include a proximity to the citizen’s everyday life concerns, which is important in maintaining legitimacy on the street: Every neighborhood has a local group. So you have a systematic structure in every geographical unit, working and existing with the people, understanding their problems. So you have the solution, you have the contact with the authorities, and the repertoires of exerting political pressure so you can gain your popularity and success through the people to whom it is your aim, vision and dream to reach out to.29 In order to realize these demands, the members and the movement formulate specific steps that are necessary.

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Being a Pressure Group Recalling the structure of the Egyptian political system, with its formal and informal elements, April 6 emerged mainly in the informal sphere. The reasons for this were, in particular, the severely restricted structure of opportunity for opposition forces, the use of heavy repression and the distance that this created from the official political sphere. As a consequence, one could summarize the group’s emergence, in the words of Ahmed Maher, as motivated by the will of a new generation: To build Egypt we need to have a new generation and a new type of politics, not this behavior of the past. You know when Mubarak went, and then the SCAF used the same politics the same behavior. And now the Muslim Brotherhood, they have the same behavior and if Dr ElBaradei or anyone from the past has authority he will use the same behavior or rules of the past. So we must build our alternative for the future.30 However, how should change take place? When discussing the new elements of contentious politics another co-founder, in explaining their reason for joining April 6, stresses that the movement is characterized by young people working as a political pressure group.31 This self-conception, as a kind of controlling authority from outside the formal political system, becomes obvious in the following extract from an interview with the already-cited member responsible for the Media Committee in a Cairo group: Interviewee: We are the people’s voice [. . .] We say yes or no. We appoint the rulers. April 6 will never enter the People’s Assembly, no minister or anything. We control and say no to mistakes and yes to what’s right. Interviewer: And why don’t you want power? Interviewee: Because if we have power we couldn’t control it, not even ourselves. Control wouldn’t be possible anymore and our main principle is control, so we would abandon our principle. So the movement’s vision and demands are that we see if the government or ruler is on a right path. We encourage them. But if they deviate from that path we correct them with pressure and protests according to the street’s necessities. We correct the path that went astray.32

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Taking the fast-changing political developments in Egypt into account, the movement has often had to adapt to new situations. How it did this from the beginning with regard to framing its demands is explained in the following two accounts by the above-cited co-founder, who had been a Kifaya participant before joining April 6: Initially the demands were about constitutional amendments such as the suspension of the emergency law, the coupling of prices to wages; these were the demands in 2009. We worked for them and our activities focused on them. However, there are immediate activities you have to work on such as the electricity crisis in 2010, or the elections for the People’s Assembly [. . .] But this terminology does not appeal to the people all the time. It does not work for me to go out, for instance, and say that we want the constitution to represent us all, and that we want to represent us all and to stop the transfer of power [to Gamal Mubarak] or that we want a state of institutions. You would say to me “What are you talking about? What are we going to eat?” This is a difference in the way of addressing. But we still have the same vision and imagination, until now. But how to reach the people changes from period to period. Because we began with a workers’ strike, our focus at the beginning was on workers’ rights and social justice. After that it encompassed more than the workers, namely all Egyptians. We organized activities for Egyptians to encourage them, particularly in 2009, to speak up, to say this is a problem, to meet the responsibility.33 Many April 6 activists stated that their guiding demands continue to be relevant after Mubarak’s fall. This fact is framed by the following quote from Hassan Maher, the member responsible for the Giza Media Committee – hinting again at the importance of fighting corruption: I think the general vision has not changed significantly, just perhaps the repertoires, because the change I dream about concerning the country’s form necessitated a specific step, namely that the governing regime could not realize that. That is why before the revolution we considered ourselves as a resistance movement (harakat muqa¯wama), ˙ resisting a corrupt regime. After Mubarak we continue to fight corruption in order to realize the country’s reform [. . .] Our thinking is not political. That is why we have always rejected the transformation of the movement into a political party, because we want to have a broader approach – political, social, and economic – and the country also needs a certain cultural change.

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MAKING REVOLUTION IN EGYPT We need to create pressure regarding economic and political demands. First, of course, we have to focus on politics because that constitutes the State’s form and the general framework of the State. From there, social, cultural and economic change can be brought about.34

Mohamed Adel concurs that “only the tactics changed, the aims and goals did not.”35 The aspect of tactics (repertoires) will be dwelt on in Chapter 8. When asked about specific models – countries that had proved successful in implementing policies for the benefit of the entire society – many cited nations such as Turkey, Malaysia and Indonesia.36 However, experiences of the aforementioned “movements in Eastern Europe in the 1990s, in Ukraine and Georgia”37 also played a role, as they had succeeded in bringing down authoritarian rulers. Referring to other countries, Hassan Maher from the Giza Media Committee stated, We don’t have a definite paradigm for the State; we can get inspiration from some countries. Chile and Serbia were similar experiences. And countries where effective revivals happened, for example Mauritania, countries that managed to recover from failure to development. But there is no model we want to copy. But as a movement we learned a lot from the experiences of the Serbian movement Otpor. The conditions there were a bit different, but we were attracted by their method, particularly that the movement managed the change in Serbia alone. We were also inspired by their method of non-violence, and our logo is also derived from them.38 This connection to the global is also expressed in detail by other movement members and coordinators. Answering how they would understand their global embeddedness, two aspects are stressed: firstly, an awareness of being part of a worldwide struggle for social justice and human dignity; secondly, the fact that Egypt is not alone in facing oppression and corruption: There are regimes in the world much more fascist than the Egyptian regime, there are countries whose economies are more in decline than Egypt’s. Personally I think that there is a global generation of youth who have very similar ideas. It’s not that Egypt is an African country, or Greece European, or America; the idea is that there is more closeness. I think that there is a zeal for youth revolutions of their regimes.39

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I think that the single similar aim is the realization of justice, with whatever form, content or way of achieving it. People always search for justice, be it political, social or economic justice.40 I think not in general, but there are similar aims. What happened in Greece too was aimed at the economy. The citizen feels that his/her right is disregarded, feels that the regime (system) is failing, it cannot realize their simplest demands, and so I think there are a lot of similarities.41

Challenges A popular revolution was something not existent in Egyptian history, because the majority of the Egyptian revolutions began with an elite leadership. 1952 was a military coup, it wasn’t a revolution. Saʿd Zaghlu ¯ l just had popular support. But the revolution of 25 January was the first popular revolution in Egyptian history, in general. A revolution with people being in the square and protesting, demanding the fall of the regime without leadership or somebody directing, and without a war, nothing, a revolution literally.42 This statement by Amr Ali, April 6’s former general coordinator, expresses the perceived uniqueness of the events in January and February 2011. In the wake of these developments, the informal sphere created its own revolutionary legitimacy and thus temporarily took over the power to socially determine the legitimacy of the State, or rather the form of the State. The clearest sign of this was that everybody – including, importantly, the media and politicians – accepted these events as a revolution, so that something indeed had to change. There were high popular expectations, and with the onset of the formal process of a “transition to democracy,”43 the window of opportunity opened and allowed for the constitutional referendum, parliamentary and presidential elections and the writing of a new constitution. However, this formalization also created limits, within which the scope of movements such as April 6 to frame the narrative were restricted, while at the same moment the expectations of the population were quickly expanding. During my fieldwork, particularly in early 2013, I met many people longing to return to the more “stable” times of Mubarak. The consequences of this for April 6 are formulated by the coordinator for the Cairo neighborhood Muqattam: “unfortunately, the people cannot ˙˙ wait a week for the conditions to improve. The people want it better from

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tomorrow. Either that way, or if not, let us return to how it was before [the revolution].”44 In this context, I have often encountered the observation among media and political figures that the group’s demands are not concrete enough to be relevant for everyday issues. An academic explains this by referring to a politically fluid condition in the wake of the events of January 2011, which exacerbated political opportunities for political mobilization: All parties know that they are still weak parties [. . .] There is a lack of power because of the fluid and liminal situation. Who is powerful enough to manage the current transitory moment and knows how to make alliances according to the rules of the political game in Egypt? There is no one. That is why it is a very difficult time for Egypt. This will stay like that until we reach a point of a new balance so we can proceed to a new period. This is the context and April 6 is a part of this interactive liminal process. It does not have the power over the developments because the trajectory [. . .] unfolds along two visions, namely between a conservative religious state and a modern state.45 On the question of the movement’s vision and demands, the interviewee continues: When we [politicians and activists] set aims, these are aims in general. When you enter politics to realize them [the demands], then you see that you will be obstructed in reality, you will be obstructed by different understandings of social justice, of freedom. And this is one of the biggest problems in Egypt. There is no political actor in Egypt who is against such aims. If one were to ask him or her are they for freedom and democracy, of course, they will answer “yes, I am for freedom, democracy and social justice,” but when you enter into details of that understanding, there are differences.46 On this point, there was a further illuminating interview with a politicalscience professor from one of Cairo’s universities: Interviewee: It is disenchantment with formal politics, which comes from the growing critique of the neoliberal model without the ability to present an alternative social model; the welfare state is in crisis, we are not able to think about social justice in new terms and when it comes to new terms we end up adopting the neoliberal agenda. And here come the social

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movements and the contention politics as a step back from this kind of acculturation of that formal political sphere and its approach to social change. Interviewer: So you say they expect change from the institutions they confront? Interviewee: Or they work on pressure and not to build institutions because they think the institutional logic is bound to neoliberal hegemony, so the main focus is on pressure to achieve social change. I would say that April 6 is very symptomatic of these kinds of movements that don’t have a clear agenda about social transformation. Meanwhile, for instance, the demands of the workers’ movement are clear, such as minimum wage, trade unions. As long as we have that dichotomy of people working for social justice versus freedoms in the public sphere it will be difficult for the new version, which would be different from the third wave of democratization when democratization occurred within the neoliberal methods. So the question is what do we do with all the social and political consequences of the failure of neoliberal policies, not just in the Arab world but everywhere?47 Thus, the key contradictory moment – also evident in April 6’s organizational structure, as discussed in Chapter 7 – is the following: antagonizing, on the one hand, the hegemonic form of politics in its existent formalized and institutionalized framework and its socioeconomic consequences, while attempting, on the other hand, to avoid engaging in this politics. These factors and one’s own limitedness are indeed understood by many group members themselves. The following comment by an April 6 activist underscores this: Perhaps the revolution didn’t realize its aims [. . .] But it may also be that the revolution is prolonged. How can it be prolonged? By inheriting the revolutionary and cultural consciousness and the building of collectivity. And in what way will this come? It will come with future generations, generations which will be able to change and which will learn from our mistakes in order not to repeat them [. . .] As I said maybe we failed in exerting enough pressure. This does not mean that these aims are dead; no, the aims and ideas will persist as long as there is a continuation of the revolutionary idea among the generations to come. Maybe our

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MAKING REVOLUTION IN EGYPT generation has the power to mobilize but not the power to channel this mobilization to realize the demands. Now there is a revolutionary situation in reality [. . .] You see now youth in the Square, 17, 18, 19 years old. They didn’t participate in the events leading to 25 January, but they are the result of these events and they now believe in revolutionary Egypt. After five years they will reach the age when we began to be in politics. But they will have more experience in facing threats and breaking down fear.48

At the end of the introduction to Part III, a “new strategy” announced in April 2015 was referred to. This alludes to a reconsideration of the way in which contentious politics is organized and performed. What is interesting is that the demands and the strategies for their realization are indeed more concrete (see the original Arabic wording below). The organizational structure is also addressed. Initially, the text states that Egypt should become a “civil state, with citizenship being the basic principle determining rights and duties [. . .] within the framework of democracy,” (para. 2) thereby “realizing social justice and human dignity for everybody” (para. 3). The “confrontation with the regime’s forces, corruption, violence and fascism” (para. 11) remains center stage. The movement thereby expects the State to fight corruption in order to detect “any deviations inside public and private institutions” so that another demand can be realized – namely, that “the State would be able to meet all human needs for every citizen” (para. 5). What these needs particularly encompass, besides nourishment, are notions of a space of possibility for the individual, such as “corporeal security” and “the encouragement of creativity and self-fulfillment” (para. 6). The text then goes on to explain how these demands are to be realized. This concept of the State “derives its legitimacy from a conscious, educated and productive people” as well as a “civilized political regime (system) and a balanced economy” (para. 7). Thereby, “we aim at realizing these demands by empowering the citizens [. . .] and the youth will be the locomotive and vanguard of the citizens,” (para. 8) so that the movement “will realize these demands with peaceful and cooperative repertoires,” (para. 9) such as “through the development of the collective identity (consciousness) of the people in order to consolidate pluralist and democratic values and empower the citizen to use repertoires of collective action (work) and contribute to public work, so that change becomes a popular and not an elite decision. Concomitantly, we strive to build a civil alternative strong enough to construct and organize the new state through an alliance with political actors, reaching consensus with us about their vision and sympathizing with our message” (para. 12).

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The final paragraph focuses on the organizational structure, stating that another strategic step is to “develop the movement, refine its tools and rebuild its organizational structure [in the wake of the ban], so that it becomes more effective and strong in pursuing its principles of good internal governance, and promote it externally. In doing so the movement is able to create a favorable atmosphere to generate new cadres and new elites able to realize the revolution’s demands and participate in sustaining the new State; this orientation contributes [eventually] to the consolidation of the very meaning of revolutionary work” (para. 13).49

CHAPTER 7 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

As illustrated in the theoretical framework in Chapter 2, contentious politics depends on a certain structure that organizes and channels the articulation of collective wills in order to exert influence. We have also seen that opportunities for this articulation and, consequently, its organization have been severely restricted in Egypt’s recent history. Although, as illustrated, formal, and thus legal, oppositional parties and civil-society organizations were established, these were under the co-optation and surveillance mechanisms of the regime. In addition to this, the deep suspicion toward state institutions and formal politics in general has meant that informal political organizing has been a necessary element of social movements, as the student organizations or the MB and the new contentious wave since early 2000 have shown. The movements that have formed since the new millennium have been characterized by cross-ideological and loose membership (“weak identities”)1 and a countrywide network of local groups subdivided into thematic units, sustained by the gradually increasing role of new globally diffused digital technologies such as blogs and social media. April 6 was established in this context and on the basis of similar organizational rationales. This chapter illustrates the way in which the movement has organized itself from its inception. It thereby refers to the factors constituting the global context.

Movement Identity As delineated in the course of this study, the organizational structure of social-movement organizations is dependent – besides the political opportunity structures – to a great extent on the collective identity of its

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members. I have highlighted the fact that in recent decades rigid ideological discourses and modes of organization have been declining in influence globally, and have given way to the simultaneous mobilization of both individual and looser modes of collective identity. Adding to this are digital technologies, which are – as will be seen in this chapter – crucial to the process of constituting individual “personalized action frames,”2 which have particular consequences for the organizational structure. The establishment of the movement came at a time of intense regime surveillance. Consequently, its organizational structure had, from the beginning, certain rudimentary characteristics, such as very few active members and dependence on the communication facilities enabled by Facebook. For instance, whereas 2009 was a relatively calm year and protests were indeed possible, according to a co-founder policing became more severe in 2010 with the case of Khaled Said and the parliamentary elections, such that the majority of activities were organized and performed online.3 Examples will be presented in the next chapter, which focuses on the the forms of contentious political action. Ahmed Maher, the former general coordinator, outlines the organizational context in the beginning as follows: For the movement it was very hard. At that time it was very difficult to organize something in the street, but Facebook was our platform, our place, our office to have a meeting. The Facebook group had 70,000 members at the time. It was a very large number at the time, but when we said OK we will turn this Facebook group into a real life movement, just 50 to 100 persons came; it was not easy.4 Explaining the implications for constituting and organizing the movement with Cairo at its organizational center, but also in Egypt in general, he continues: Our structure was one group which had members mainly in Cairo, but also Alexandria, Mahalla, Mansoura and many governorates in the Delta, but one group and not a hierarchical structure, and it was non-centralized [. . .] In 2009 there were two committees, one for media the other for streets, and [. . .] before the revolution we had four groups in Cairo, for north, east, west, south.5 With the unfolding of the revolution and the opening up of the opportunity structure, the preconditions changed significantly. Many young people were attracted to the movement, which was thus confronted

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with an unfamiliar situation. Ahmed Maher explains the flexibility that was necessary to maintain the working of the organization: After that [the revolution] the number of members increased so we de-structured, and we needed to have districts, or have governorates, and that changed several times [. . .] And now we have another structure. We have a group and coordinators in each governorate, we have a group and coordinators in each neighborhood and we have the central group [. . .] Then we said, OK, now we need a group for social services, so we will create a group for that; we need to have a group inside each university, OK, a branch for students; now we have created a branch, a few weeks ago, for unions and syndicates, to be inside unions and syndicates. It is similar to the Muslim Brotherhood.6 Accordingly, with the opening up of structures of political opportunity and the organizational adjustments of the movement, Facebook’s function changed. Former general coordinator Amr Ali reflects on this change: The community on Facebook addresses those who follow Facebook, and it has been a principal tool and was representing us during the oppressive [Mubarak] regime, but after the opening of the political system in Egypt we are searching for other tools, so that we can speak to people directly. We are going to speak to the people and it is not that people enter Facebook to hear us.7 In this sense, the fact of the subjectification going hand in hand with articulating demands should be reflected in the organizational structure, because “our structure must depend on our mission, our vision, and demands. So we thought that we need to be an organization having grassroots elements inside each village and neighborhood.”8 To the question of when and why activists joined the movement, the majority answered that this was during the occupation of Tahrir Square or immediately after the revolution. Many of the interviewees had been – as already mentioned – previously active – for example, in the Kifaya movement,9 Youth for Change,10 the El-Ghad Party,11 socialist student groups12 or as independents.13 One of the main reasons initially given for joining the activists was that Tahrir’s atmosphere and the welcoming attitude of the movement’s members persuaded others to become members. The feeing of being part of a mutually supportive collectivity was underpinned by mutual help and a shared vision. The gender aspect was

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also an important dimension on the Square. A 21-year-old student and female coordinator of a local group in Cairo expresses the importance to her of socializing in an alternative community to her family, as well as the formation of a collective identity when being active in the movement: The atmosphere within the group is characterized by familiarity and harmony. For example, when I have problems at home but go to meet my comrades and friends [in the movement] it is like seeing my family. In addition, the girl within the Egyptian family is under subjugation a bit: Don’t say this, don’t do that. I didn’t have that in the movement. On the contrary, I can express my freedom, my voice and myself in a way that makes me feel better and I see the positive effects on me and my comrades [. . .] There is also full friendship among us. We stand together in very difficult moments beyond imagination. For instance, it is possible that one of our comrades next to us dies, or one of our female comrades is abused [. . .] These difficult situations we pass through bind us more strongly to each other and will stay forever in our minds.14 Others joined due to the movement’s presence and popularity in the wake of the revolution. Thus, in response to the question of whether and why individuals join April 6 rather than political parties, a 24-year-old coordinator of a local group in Cairo, who had, since 2008, been politicized by Kifaya and April 6 through the internet, as well as by the killing of Khaled Said, before joining April 6 after the revolution, explains: Why? Youth’s nature and enthusiasm is known and is life’s best time. Also, from an intellectual and physical perspective it is the most influential period in one’s life. Consequently, the movement as an idea and its activism depends very much on youth participation, because they are the ones articulating their ideas and opinions through the movement. They have absolute freedom in expressing their ideas, visions and aspirations. So the movement embraces them ideationally and organizationally.15 This moment of self-fulfillment and the expansion of the aforementioned ¨ glichkeitsraum”)16 as a main factor for joining “space of possibility” (“Mo the movement are underlined by the following observation by a political scientist in Cairo: The organizational structure was based on the idea of non-centralism [al-la¯ markaziyya], meaning that [local] groups organize themselves

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but in coordination with others. This allowed the youth to join. They feel that they participate in the decision making; they feel that they participate in the reform of their country; they feel that they play a role. This has been very attractive for sections of youth. The organizational structure, the programs [demands] presented, the method of mobilization and gathering and success contributed to the movement’s attractive power and an increased sense of belongingness. In addition, the movement is listened to in the political and social landscape, participates in meetings, is part of discussions and is present on television and in the media.17 This interviewee also said that he would classify the movement members – in accordance with my own observations – as coming mainly from the urban middle classes, being pupils, students and professional newcomers, and that they are indeed particularly “willing to participate and react to the country’s issues; they are angry, educated but suffer from unemployment and thus cannot marry, and face many other social problems [. . .] and problems originating from oppression and the lack of democracy.”18 It is because of this that the local group coordinator in Cairo, cited above, states with regard to the social background of members (particulalry the upper echelons) that: mostly they are from the middle class and below them; that is the majority [. . .] Moreover the educated class, students who study and have education, are open to the outside world, read a lot, open to the electronic world and social media sites like Facebook and Twitter, pages like these.19 Although diverse social segments could be attracted into the group, there were not many poor people. Nevertheless, it was possible for the involved middle classes to establish contact with poorer groups, so that this connection, in addition to the geographical extension of April 6, provided a moment of relief, hope and the discovery of spaces of opportunity for the poor too.20

Structure At this point, how are we to understand the organizational structure of this geographical extension? The number of April 6’s active members ranges between 3,00021 and 20,000.22 But these numbers depend on two factors. Firstly, they rely on the aforementioned fluidity of membership, as was characteristic of preceding organizations such as Tadamon.

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As explained by Basem Fathy, a co-founder (but an independent activist at the time) in touch with the movement in the period when the interview was conducted, [p]eople go and join and go out, like this. And at the same time, official numbers are kind of exaggerated. But I am planning a project so I need to know the numbers, because of the costs for people to train them. The biggest number they gave me was 3,000. Also I was planning a project to observe elections. I asked Ahmed Maher how many people can support me? And he said 3,000. And in regard to the protests, you might have five members in this local group and on the day of the protests perhaps 100, it is changing.23 A second factor is the interviewee’s position within the movement. The first respondent above, who cited the lower membership figure of 3,000,24 was the independent activist already mentioned whereas the second respondent,25 referring to 20,000 members, was the former general coordinator. It is a fact, however, that the movement saw a significant increase in its membership owing to its longstanding position of being one of the few contentious movements for youth during the Mubarak era, and one of the main initiators of the revolutionary developments in 2011. This was to change, as will be seen, with the opening up of the political field and the founding of other movements and parties. At this point, two related questions can be asked. Firstly, what is the nature and structure of April 6’s membership? Secondly, what is the movement’s legal status? With regard to the former, the process of becoming a member is as follows: If you want to be a member you must submit an application. And then there is an interview. Then training for three months and then an interview. Then, if OK, you will be at the second level for six months as an active member, then in six months another interview. Then [if] you are still OK as an active member you have the right to vote and be responsible.26 In addition to its members, the movement is composed of many so-called supporters, who are active on Facebook and participate in movement activities from time to time.27 Referring to the financial implications for members, Mohamed Adel from the movement’s Political Office (PO) adds,

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Every member has to pay 20 pounds and new members need training, and if you identify with April 6 you can join. The training is about how the movement works, its organization, what our tactics and goals are, the meaning of “non-violent war” and of a pressure group. You must go through these steps to be a member. And then you can join the group in your area.28 Despite these processes, which represent an institutionalized setting and focus very much on formal membership, there are also, as indicated, other more flexible forms of activist participation – for instance, the aforementioned temporary supporters – a fact that became apparent through my own observations. Thus, April 6 membership can be understood as containing “weak identities” within a cross-ideological environment, as explained by Rucht.29 Amr Ali explains, [W]e don’t restrict the members. There are many members, they are diverse, oscillating between more organized ones and others who are just there from time to time, and again others who participate in the bigger events and do not participate in meetings.30 This loose character of membership has also been used as a strategic mechanism of protection against state intimidation and surveillance. For example, it was possible to claim that Tarek El-Khouly, a leader of the April 6 Democratic Front group,31 the liaison person with Freedom House and Alia Al-Mahdi, who uploaded naked photos of herself in order to protest against sexism and violence in Egypt, were not registered as members.32 With regard to membership fees, Mohamed Adel explains that: the biggest proportion of this money stays at the local level, and some stays in the center, because some governorates do not have a lot of members and do not have money, so we share this with them. So some pay more, like 100 pounds as in Madı¯nat Nasr, and ˙ after collecting that we share it with these poorer local groups like Da¯r al-Sala¯m [both quarters in Cairo], where everybody is a student and doesn’t have money.33 In addition, donations from companies or political parties are accepted.34 One renowned donor was the industrialist Mamdouh Hamza – who had also been an important student movement leader in the 1960s and 1970s35 – for whom Ahmed Maher, himself an engineer, was working. Hamza also let the movement work in his headquarters,36 but in order to

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find a sustainable solution for this situation other strategies were sought. Basem Fathy told me, We are going to try to find funding from sources other than donations, like producing something. It is difficult as the people don’t have the budget in general. For example, cups, anything, or organizing events, but for that you again need permission from the Ministry of Social Affairs.37 In this context, the question of the movement’s legal status becomes the main concern. To recall, April 6 emerged from a history of informal, contentious politics that resulted from a restriction of political opportunity. Accordingly, its legal38 status has to be understood against the backdrop of these historical processes. However, as a result of the emergence of this interstitial space between formal and informal politics – as in the case of the MB – this issue is ambivalent. Thus, Ahmed Maher asked back in 2013, “what is the legal situation of the Muslim Brotherhood? Nothing! So it is still illegal.”39 With increasing numbers, the movement developed a “tree” (“haykal shagarı¯”)40 or “pyramid-shaped” (“haykal haramı¯”)41 organizational structure. Thus, on the one hand, the structure is centralized (markaziyya) with a general coordinator at the top of the movement. On the other hand, as was pointed out by many members, the organization is based on noncentralist processes (al-la¯ markaziyya).42 This organizational structure is illustrated in Figure 7.1. The Political Office (PO) (al-Maktab al-Siya¯sı¯) focuses more on the centralized processes while the non-central movement dynamics are mainly practiced in the Administrative Office (AO) (al-Maktab al-Ida¯rı¯). This system, resembling a tree or pyramid shape, refers specifically to the movement’s formation, based on a geographical (haykal gughra¯fı¯) and thematically specialized (haykal nawʿı¯) framework.43 Within this structure, the geographical framework is subdivided into governorates,44 which are in turn divided into “centers” (mara¯kiz) – such as the city of Cairo – and subsequently into “local groups” (magmu ¯ ʿa/pl.-a¯t) with just a few members, such as the neighborhood of al-Sayyida Zaynab.45 The movement is thereby particularly prevalent in the urban centers of Cairo, Alexandria and the cities in the Nile Delta, where the great majority of Egypt’s population lives.46 The governorates in the south are combined into one, and come under the name al-Saʿı¯d.47 ˙ The thematic framework is formed around specified committees (lagna/pl. liga¯n) represented both at the local and national level through the AO. Most of the interviewees mentioned a total of seven such bodies,

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but this should not be understood as a static figure. In parallel to the changing political circumstances and the need to accommodate these organizationally, there were discussions on constant adjustments. There are then seven committees, covering various areas (see Figure 7.1). These committees meet on a weekly basis in the local groups.48 The Media Committee is responsible for the movement’s visibility with regard to its activities, organized events and statements. Because of limited financial resources the committee works chiefly through socialmedia outlets. This aspect of operations could be described as an “offensive”49 strategy, focusing on mobilization and publicity. Likewise, there is a defensive strategy aimed at rejecting accusations that could delegitimize the movement.50 The Media Committee is highlighted further in Chapter 8. The Social Development Committee works to provide welfare services to poor areas – for instance, distributing food to street children during Ramadan or caring for older people in nursing homes – which is why it is classified as “nonpolitical.”51 Here, once again, the MB’s influence in organizing informal political activism is recognizable. The Students’ Committee organizes the movement’s presence in universities and secondary schools, so that groups are created within these institutions.52 The Mobilization Committee works on the organization of street activities.53 This type of committee is very important for a pressure group.54 The Organization and Communication Committee looks after the coordination of members in general, including information such as the names and numbers on membership cards.55 In this sense, it is important that the committees for Organization and Communication and Mobilization cooperate both in advance of protest marches to make them more secure for the participants,56 and to coordinate internal elections and voting.57 The Human Resources Committee organizes introductory courses for new members in order to prepare them for integration into the movement, so that they can internalize its mode of political articulation.58 Finally, the Finance Committee is responsible for maintaining a level of available financial resources – for example, by collecting the fees that members have to pay on a monthly basis.59 As a relatively new and informal movement, April 6 has been suffering from a lack of financial resources. A certain level of financial independence is one of the most important resources for social-movement organizations. Having outlined the basic features of the movement’s organizational structure, the analysis now turns to the functioning logic of the noncentral and central movement processes. The AO can be regarded as the entity encompassing the organizational functioning of the different

al-Maktab al-Siyāsī Political Office (PO)

General Coordinator

Co-founders

International Department

al-Maktab al-Idārī Administrative Office (AO)

Thematic Units

Geographical Units

Every local group has “committees” (ligān), organized according to seven thematic areas, each guided by an appointed or elected “responsible person” (mas ūl lagna). They are represented at the national level through the AO. The committees are: 1. Lagnat Māliyya (Finances) 2. Lagnat Mawārid Bashariyya (Human Resources) 3. Lagnat Tan īm wa-Itti āl (Organization and Communication) 4. Lagnat alaba (Students) 5. Lagnat I lāmiyya (Media) 6. Lagnat al- Amal al-Gamahīrī (Mobilization) 7. Lagna Tanmiyat al-Mugtama (Social Development)

Governorates are represented in the central AO by a coordinator (munassiq mu āfa a), who is appointed or elected by all members of the respective governorate.

Figure 7.1

Every governorate is subdivided into districts as cities and their local groups (magmū a), organized by a coordinator (munassiq), who is also appointed or elected by the members of the local group.

The organizational structure of April 6.

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committees, beginning with the decentralized local groups in the various governorates. At the national level, the AO consists of the general coordinator, the coordinators (munassiqı¯n) of both the governorates and local groups, and representatives of the responsible persons (masʾu ¯ lı¯n) on the aforementioned committees.60 Accordingly, the central AO includes, in addition to the general coordinator, for instance, the coordinator of the Cairo Governorate as well as the responsible person on the Media Committee, representing at the same time the responsible persons on all Media Committees in the local groups of the Cairo Governorate. This pattern applied at the national level – with a coordinator and representatives for the committees – is likewise applied at the level of the governorates incorporating the various local groups there.61 The intention is that the committees act in concert and in accordance with the movement’s main aims and demands.62 The selection of the coordinators of the governorates and local groups as well as the responsible persons of the committees is done both by election and by the adoption of agreed-upon candidates, as Mohamed Adel explains: Maybe, in some small groups in the governorates the founders choose one, but in large groups sometimes they elect or choose a representative, because before the revolution we didn’t follow internal democracy and elections, because we see what these internal elections can do to parties. So the founders would choose a coordinator of the various committees. And if somebody failed there would be a replacement. And every governorate chose someone to be in Cairo in the Central group. We saw that internal elections, for instance in Otpor, meant internal clashes.63 When it comes to the decision making process, the various local, regional and national levels of the organization are in constant communication. Therefore, decision making has several layers. The movement’s characteristic of having a non-centralist dimension guarantees that there is “a bit of freedom for the members, which makes the movement so attractive in contrast to political parties,” and “the local groups don’t have to refer to the AO or PO for each event that is organized as long as they stick to the movement’s main framework.” 64 The more one looks at the local level of the organizational hierarchy, the more obvious it becomes that these groups have little ability to shape wide-ranging national issues and are, therefore, particularly engaged in exerting pressure with regard to

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local problems, as explained in Chapter 8.65 The movement exists in a setting where bottom-up and top-down processes meet, in the sense that the local groups are integrated into its organizational structure – notably through the thematic committees. The governorates and their interconnected committees are thus represented in the governorates’ and central AO, so that all important questions and imminent decisions are dealt with in a framework of “consultation and information sharing”66 from the local to the national level and vice versa. Accordingly, when a decision is pending, there are two procedural pathways. On the one hand, it depends on the opportunity structure in the sense that when there are revolutionary situations and time pressure, the decisive initiative is largely in the hands of the central organs in Cairo like the PO and the central AO, “whereas in calmer times local work and services prevail.”67 Basically, every decision that affects the movement as a whole is voted on in the local groups during weekly meetings. Decisions require a simple majority “even if it is just 50 plus one.”68 But usually decisions are voted for “with around 70 per cent” in favor.69 When an urgent decision must be taken, votes are collected by phone or in closed groups on the internet, such as on Facebook.70 In addition to the general coordinator, there is another influential group of individuals, denoted as the co-founders: [A]round 20 persons were involved in the creation of the movement and they have some kind of special position, the co-founders, as they can run everything and also keep their position doing whatever is required to make sure that the movement grows from big to bigger.71 The PO consists of the general coordinator, the co-founders and the elected or agreed-upon representatives of the AO, and is the organ wherein the final decisions for crucial issues are made.72 In addition, the PO is responsible for organizing negotiations and coordination efforts with other parties and movements – that is, to “play politics” in the sense explained in Chapter 6. The following elaboration by Ahmed Maher highlights this: Political decisions are dealt with by the Political Office. The Political Office meets other parties, they meet with NGOs to create alliances, projects or opposition. Then the Political Office meets with coordinators, they have a meeting every month. You have a

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meeting in your office every week, sometimes every three days, and the co-founders also have a meeting, not regularly but also every week or two weeks, and the coordinators meet every month. And we have the groups to have a daily meeting and daily discussions.73 The general coordinator (munassiq ʿa¯mm) has a mediating function within the movement and a representational function for the public, which follows on from the enhanced media focus on this office. The following highlights this duality: The general coordinator does not decide alone, but his major task it to negotiate with the Political Office. He intervenes to solve problems and mediates between certain groups and committees. He delivers the members’ opinions to the public and political and civil society actors. At the same time, he is empowered by the movement to hold negotiations in the movement’s name with other political actors.74 Ahmed Maher was the general coordinator during the time this fieldwork was conducted. The new general coordinator was elected in October 2013, in the first internal elections for the post since 2008. The winner was Amr Ali, one of the co-founders.75 Against the backdrop of the theoretical framework of this thesis – i.e. examining contemporary global contexts of discourses around contentious politics – it is important to note that April 6 has an International Department. It was established “unofficially in 2010, officially after the revolution” and is, in the words of its coordinator, “responsible for all that requires traveling abroad, doing international stuff and organizing with other movements, also our groups abroad, some of the media, international media and all the researchers doing research based on the movement.”76 In this way, the movement maintains contact with individuals and institutions via the internet or by attending international meetings with other political activists, thereby sharing experiences and arranging mutual visits – as, for instance, with Occupy Wall Street. 77 The tasks for which the department is responsible include translations of foreign newspapers into Arabic or English in order “to deliver our message in a much better way.”78 An additional task is maintaining contact with the April 6 groups that emerged abroad, such as those in “South America, and of course the USA, Australia [. . .] Germany, France, Switzerland, England, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Greece, Italy, Spain.”79 The function of

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these groups is twofold. Firstly, it is beneficial “to have a community of Egyptians there to talk about the problems in Egypt” so that they “will vote for any candidate we in Cairo say OK to. If we, April 6, support the Salvation Front, the followers of April 6 in Germany will vote for Salvation Front candidates.”80 Secondly, these groups can create political pressure inside these countries when there are problems “with immigration, with Arabs or Muslims living in Germany for example, if any right wing party takes the polity in Germany, it will sometimes be against Arabs and Muslims.”81 This organizational structure has, as already indicated in Chapter 6, operational challenges, which are important to bear in mind in order to understand the analyzed context surrounding April 6 and its outcomes. The following section will expand on these aspects.

Challenges This chapter has so far made it clear that the resources available to the movement – a key concept in SMT – both financial and legal, are significantly limited. As explained in Chapter 2, social movement organizations seek to build and maintain contact with international individuals and institutions – which is known as externalization – in order to gain the resources that they lack when focusing only on the local level.82 As already explained in the course of this study, foreign linkages, in particular financial ones, can have serious consequences for political actors, both legally and discursively. Consequently, April 6 has been regularly accused by politicians and military officers (e.g. the NDP, SCAF and MB), as well as related media outlets, of having contact with foreign institutions, implying that the movement lacks the legitimacy to be engaged in Egyptian politics. These allegations of “treason and funding” (takhwı¯n wa-tamwı¯l) could be used to accuse groups like April 6 of being responsible for instability in the country, in terms of both the economy and security.83 When the movement was asked for its response in these instances, there were official press releases of denial, the threat of taking legal action if the accusers had no evidence, and emphasis on the accusers themselves receiving foreign aid from the US.84 As a consequence, two parallel processes have been initiated since 2011. While more people joined the movement initially,85 these accusations gained increasing credibility within society, resulting in a gradual loss of legitimacy for April 6.86 Eventually, the ban was based exactly on this logic, the verdict referring to NGO Law No. 84 from 2002 regulating the proscription of “secret” – that is, informal – movements,87 and the restriction of foreign linkages.88

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As well as the movement’s embeddedness in international discourses, a second challenge concerns its position vis-a`-vis politics in general from an organizational standpoint. A crucial dilemma within the movement has been the increasing oscillation between formal and informal frames of reference, which has intensified since the official transition process in 2011, during which time actions based on revolutionary legitimacy gradually lost social influence. This is, of course, a stage that is eventually faced by many social movements all over the world, a point I made in Chapters 2 and 3. Thus, in contrast to the widespread self-understanding among many April 6 members of being a movement characterized by its critical distance from political procedures – a pressure group, rather than a political party – for individuals who climb up the pyramid-shaped organizational structure toward the PO and AO it becomes increasingly obvious that there is an organizational logic aimed at institutionalization and legalization. In this context, the establishment of a political party is indeed considered, but only under certain conditions, which the following statement by Ahmed Maher articulates: The political party will need you to play by the same rules; maybe OK we plan to have a political party, but not to be one. There is a difference between having and being a political party. We have a foundation now, we have but we are not a foundation. And we will have in the future a political party, but not now because the rules now are not good. We have to change the rules first.89 As a way out of this dilemma, members of the PO contemplated the establishment of the foundation mentioned in the quote above in the form of an NGO, hoping for legal institutionalization thanks to a new NGO law that was discussed in parliament in early 2013.90 In turning the movement into a foundation, it was hoped that it could integrate both the formal and informal dimensions of contentious politics, as articulated by a former member and still-affiliated journalist: The ideal situation would be a big umbrella, and this movement one day will have an NGO working here, a political party working there, it is something close to the structure of the Muslim Brotherhood. It’s going to be a part of it. Not all the movement will transform. Maybe it will be a chance for me and the leaders of the movement to select people. I mean if you are going to transform the whole movement into a foundation you’re going to have the movement with all its problems. We will keep the problems in the movement and elect people to be leaders in the future. This is tricky. How will

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we coordinate this, between both parts? [. . .] These are the challenges we have still not been able to solve.91 But the question of institutionalization is both an essential and challenging question for the movement as it contrasts with the principled, and thus more “authentic,” approach to politics and opposition to the regime, which many members share. A very informative interview was conducted on this issue with a political scientist in Cairo, from which the relevant passages are quoted here, indicating the fluidity of the processes described: Interviewee:

Interviewer: Interviewee:

You have to differentiate between the top and middle ranges of the movement. The more you go into the local coordination, like Muqattam, Madı¯nat Nasr, ˙˙ ˙ the more you will get the politicized parts. What is interesting about this part is their engagement in local politics and micro-politics, in getting things done for sidewalks, for schools, in playing a role in mobilizing young people for a candidate, and the mixing of the genders in a very segregated society. They are in politics while they are not. As in many networks of contentious politics they have been divided between engaging with politics or distancing themselves, and this is very present within the movement. The more you get involved with local activists you will see the ones who want a distance from politics and on the other side you will see globalized activists open to global trends, globalized activists exposed to influences from protests in Ukraine, Serbia, Gene Sharp, aiming more at transforming contentious politics into opposition politics and formal politics. How would you assess this difference? Regarding April 6 as a movement open to the globe, Ukraine, Serbia, yes every movement has these wings, working with outside actors. They are keeping themselves more or less as a hybrid movement that contends with politics but is not in politics. But in general you have to see them as part of a wider context of contentious politics, like ElBaradei, Khaled Said and movements against the military. Through this we can understand contentious politics in Egypt since 2008 and especially after the revolution more broadly.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE Interviewer: Interviewee:

115

A new development now is the planned April 6 Foundation, organizationally on the local level. Don’t take everything seriously right now; it is a trialand-error thing. And April 6 is not independent, in the sense that they do not have a clue on how to continue to be a contentious political actor. And this is the real challenge.92

This oscillation between formal and informal organization and the respective representation of both by different levels in the movement causes internal tensions.93 These tensions consequently become intertwined with a political context that, as noted, displays the same contradictory patterns, particularly during the decision making process, crystallizing once again the movement’s internal ideological and strategic fractions, which were responsible for splits in 2008 and 2011 (explained below). A further important difficulty in sustaining the cohesion of the movement has been the aforementioned intimidation by the security services, which led to widespread conspiracy theories and a loss of trust within the movement.94 This was another reason why coordinators and other responsible office holders were time and again replaced.95 On the one hand, the public visibility of the general coordinator and the co-founders makes the internal democracy of the movement vulnerable – a point expressed by Basem Fathy, explaining his motive to leave the movement: This was a clash on internal democracy within the movement. I was arguing the movement should be open, democratic and transparent because we were fighting for democracy. Ahmed Maher in turn said that if it were democratic we would be arrested and fail [. . .] and that is why the movement lived through all of this [. . .] Now [after 2011] it is kind of democratic, it seemed we came to a point in the middle, after time he [the general coordinator] started to make it more democratic. And I started to be convinced that he is right, that we should not be totally open, otherwise we would be infiltrated by the police.96 There has been a series of political events since 2011 in which the implications of the challenges described here can be observed. As a consequence of its stance toward formal politics, April 6 did not participate in the parliamentary elections in 2011/12, either as a movement in an alliance or in the form of individual members. Instead, it supported certain candidates who were regarded as being closely aligned with the revolution’s demands – for instance, Amr Hamzawy.97 The parliamentary elections

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illustrated to activists the fact that strong organizational structures in formal politics were necessary in order to have an effect on the country’s political trajectory.98 As a result, the first fragmentation occurred within the movement, resulting in the breakaway of the April 6: Democratic Front. Around 500 activists left the movement, a significantly smaller number than that of those remaining in the original entity.99 Consequently, this loss was not perceived as serious – a view expressed in the words of an April 6 activist: they are not founding members [. . .] they want to force their points of view on the movement. They want to have power for example. The most prominent of them was a candidate in the recent parliamentary elections; so their idea, ideology and aims are in total contradiction to the movement.100 The decision making process played a crucial role during these developments. Its contribution can be illustrated by comparing the movements’s position in both rounds of the presidential elections in 2012, resulting in its eventual support for Mursi. The presidential elections in 2012 saw a number of contenders, including Mohamed Mursi from the MB’s Freedom and Justice Party; Ahmad Shafiq, former prime minister under Mubarak; ʿAbd alMunʿim Abu al-Futu ¯ h, former member of the MB’s guidance bureau and ˙ founder of the Strong Egypt Party (Hizb Misr al-Qawiyya) in 2012; ˙ ˙ Hamdeen Sabahi from the Nasserist Dignity Party; and Khaled Ali, an influential, independent lawyer. April 6’s members were divided along ideological lines between the three last-named nominees, who were understood to be revolutionary candidates representing neither the old regime nor the MB. April 6’s primary aim was to form a united front with one of the potential contenders, like ʿAbd al-Munʿim Abu al-Futu ¯ h. But ˙ when that failed – as each nominee persisted in his candidacy, and all eventually took part – the movement found itself unable to support a specific candidate in the first round. It had to decide on its position regarding which of the final candidates101 to support, or whether to abstain from voting. As there was widespread disagreement in all ranks of the movement, a vote was held in each local group. There were lengthy discussions to clarify the results of all political talks, which were explained to the members of the movement, followed by a direct vote and a decision according to the opinion of the majority. The governorate coordinators collected the votes, sending them to the PO and the co-founders for the final decision, so the members could impose their will on the PO. In the first round of the elections, for instance, the PO preferred to abstain as

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the votes did not reveal a clear winner, so each member was free to support his/her favorite.102 In the final ballot between Mursi and Shafiq, the PO decided that there either had to be a definite decision on whom to support or a boycott.103 As the latter idea was not popular on the street, there was an eventual vote to support the MB candidate, Mursi, in order to defeat Shafiq, the representative of the old regime.104 The decision making process was thus equally dependent on the political context, popular sentiment on the streets and the internal power dynamics of the movement. As a result, dissenting members who could not support an MB candidate left and established, in October 2012, the April 6 Youth Movement: The Revolutionary Front (al-Gabha al-Thawriyya).105 This second splinter movement was much smaller than the previous one. As a consequence of these splits, April 6 was from then on referred to as the Ahmed Maher Front (Gabhat Ahmed Maher). Due to the cross-ideological composition of the movement, these fragmentations were seen as normal.106 In the course of Mursi’s election, Ahmed Maher was offered the position of presidential adviser, which he declined due to an internal vote on the question. April 6 activists mention this when referring to democratic procedures within the movement.107 A third consequence of the movement’s relationship with formal politics has been that members individually left the movement in order to participate in institutionalized politics, for example “in the Constitution Party108 [. . .] or NGOs.”109 With the mounting tension between the MB and the more “secular” forces in the wake of Mursi’s constitutional declaration in November 2012, and the subsequent clashes at the presidential palace in December 2012, April 6 gradually turned away from the president. Many members accused him of following the same politics as the old regime, so that the movement began to backtrack and support the emerging Tamarod campaign, culminating in the protests of 30 June and the military takeover of 3 July 2013.110 The repressive politics of the new regime since then, however, has prompted April 6 to be increasingly critical of the new incumbents, thereby calling for a broad social reconciliation process, including with the MB.111 Ahmed Maher also stated that the movement had made a mistake by participating in the 30 June protests.112 One statement from a member of April 6 reflects the relative novelty of these ups and downs for the politically engaged generation: “Our limits of understanding revolution’s nature and its organization resulted in our situation now, so that we are in a worse condition than the one we prevailed over.”113

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It is within this context that the movement’s new orientation in the face of the increasingly restricted opportunity structure since mid-2013 has to be understood. This and the previous chapter have illustrated how the demands and organizational structure of April 6 have entailed challenges, placing the movement under pressure in addition to its repression from the regime. This situation has rendered its mobilizing capabilities increasingly less effective over the course of the formal transition process since March 2011. A self-critical view in line with the attempt at a second beginning in 2015 is reflected in Mohamed Adel’s message from prison on 6 April 2015:

My message to you is that we, as the youth of both Egypt and the revolution, have to develop our tools [e.g. repertoires] and message [demands] in order to be again a main agent – the youth of Egypt – in that struggle. The main transitory issue is the ability to realize real change and a stable structure [organization]. I ask you altogether to refrain from subservience vis-a`-vis the poisonous despondency spread by the regime’s men. And don’t forget who sacrificed their days for Egypt and our noble aims. They are here in the cells of the 3/7 regime [the date of the military takeover, 3 July 2013] the obvious continuation of Mubarak and his cronies’ reign.114 Having illustrated the demands and the organizational structure of April 6, the next chapter will present the trajectory of the repertoire of contention used by the movement to mobilize its members and supporters, as well as the public in general.

CHAPTER 8 MOBILIZING AGAINST THE REGIME

Having outlined April 6’s demands and the movement’s interrelated organizational aspects, we now turn to the development of the repertoires of contention that aim at exerting the necessary pressure on the movement’s antagonists. Chapter 2 illustrated the significance of repertoires of contention in explaining protest cycles and the collectiveidentity processes of SMT dynamics. The movement’s early years, from its establishment in 2008 until 2011, were characterized by wide-ranging structural and legal restrictions on its existence. Accordingly, the actual potential for the movement to engage in political action was significantly limited. Nonetheless, April 6 did manage to engage in political opposition in various ways within the political landscape. In order to follow the movement’s development in this respect, this chapter is divided into pre-2011 and post-2011 sections.

Contentious Repertoires before 25 January 2011 The movement initially followed a strategy of becoming and operating as an informal pressure group, with a particular focus on having a presence on the streets. Here, it is important once more to recall that prior to 2011 the movement had few members and virtually no resources. I have illustrated how April 6 emerged from a context of contentious politics in Egypt, beginning in the 2000s. Groups such as anti-globalization body AGEG, Kifaya and Tadamon reflected a process of focusing gradually on political and socioeconomic issues within Egypt. Such issues were thereby increasingly understood and presented in a single framing process. The organizational strategies undertaken by these crossideological groups were short-lived, and characterized by pragmatic alliances with other movements and parties, with the aid of digital

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technologies. The following statement by an academic describes this process, referring to its shortcomings and also highlighting the implications for April 6: They [Kifaya] didn’t talk about neoliberal policies, or anything that I call the “internal social enemy.” We had to wait until the failure of Kifaya after the constitutional reform, which was a big victory, but since then they [haven’t had] new approaches. Besides, as you know the strike in Mahalla in 2008 did not work well. At this moment a new repertoire of action developed, encompassing until now non-politicized youth. The whole idea was that contentious politics went out of the old political sphere and started to recruit people from outside the political sphere, mainly urban and middle class. Of course April 6 was one of [its manifestations]. Many of the tools were new. Blogs or mobile phones were thereby very important and became central tools to connect people who did not know each other and were newcomers in the political street and sphere, who were disgusted by the political alliances of the former generation.1 The former general coordinator, Amr Ali, summarizes the basic strategy of how the repertoire applied by the movement developed initially by referring to two core pillars – namely, the mobilization of the people and of the media. The mobilization of the people is on the street, where we speak to the citizens about our aims, and ask them to cooperate with us and participate with us in demonstrations. The media mobilization concerns the presentation of our ideas and aims in different media outlets.2 With regard to the first pillar of mobilizing society, initial successful outcomes were difficult to achieve due to structural impediments and the resulting limited number of individuals engaging in contentious politics. As already stated with reference to other political organizations in Egypt, the members who were active at the time felt a sense of relief from internal repression when the regime came under “international pressure”3 for its human-rights record and repression of oppositional actors. But despite being a small group, “in the eyes of the regime, [they] were very influential, and had distinct and non-traditional initiatives [repertoires].”4 The movement’s second repertoire pillar has consisted of influencing the media in order to articulate its collective action frames. Thus, one of

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the movement’s first steps after its foundation was the strategy of building relations with various media outlets, such as newspapers and TV stations, while using international media – albeit to a lesser extent, due to the additional risks posed by foreign links.5 The importance attributed to the media is underlined by the fact that its Media Committee was one of the first to be constituted by the movement.6 Given the influence of Otpor during the initial phase of April 6’s emergence, one can detect the importance of neoliberal notions like the “branding” of contentious politics and the repertoires that it entails as a “lifestyle,” which points to aspects of the subjectification of political activism as well as its commodification (recalling, for instance, the suggestion of selling cups with the movement’s logo). Thus, Fathy explains the role of Otpor in changing the movement’s strategy and approach to its repertoire formation: We were more leftist at the beginning; we started by supporting the poor people and the farmers and workers, then after a few months we changed strategy to be an attractive young movement with a lifestyle. Here, we got some ideas from Otpor in Serbia. Our movement should represent a lifestyle, which will be an attraction for people to have that lifestyle. And we succeeded [. . .] I mean as a lifestyle for people standing against the regime. For years we had no protests in Egypt, the last was 1977, here the Islamists filled the gap, until in 2004 Kifaya came. But it was not youthful enough, it was very traditional. But we started to make it more delightful, with colors, balloons, and people singing [. . .] Yes, to make the time and present fun. And it worked for us, for our morale and psychology, and a lot of people joined us.7 The following statement by Ahmed Maher allow us to comprehend the way in which these decisions ultimately resulted in one of the main characteristics of the movement in relation to its mobilizing repertoire of contention – namely, the notion of non-violence (al-harb al-la¯ ʿunf) ˙ based on Otpor’s example. The role of Otpor as a successful model of orientation was put into perspective: First, we said we are the April 6 movement and we will bring down Mubarak after two years. We wanted to encourage the members to do that, so we started to watch movies and follow articles about what [had] happened in Eastern Europe, the revolution in the 90s,

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Poland, the Czech Republic, Georgia, Ukraine and Serbia. We have the same sign as the Otpor movement in Serbia, the fist, and we started to connect with them on Facebook. Mohamed Adel had already travelled to Serbia, so we also got ideas from books, Gene Sharp books. And we have an Arabic website called Academy of Change in Arabic, it’s very important. Our enemy now is the old mentality, the Muslim Brotherhood, anyone who has the old mentality. Yes, anyone who agrees with corruption agrees with this way to administer or govern Egypt.8 One example of this came after the general strike in Mahalla when April 6 intiated a spontaneous action on 4 May 2008, ironically “celebrating” Mubarak’s birthday with a cake and candles – and, next to every candle, pictures of corruption and poverty. Members were dressed for a birthday party and thereby attracted people on to the streets; however, this action was not as successful as the April 6 strike.9 This participation in the transnational diffusion process of SMT dynamics, and the experiences of mutual learning that it entails, is considered quite normal, as the point of view of this member – a representative of the PO and member since 2009 – indicates: Obviously the world as a whole is open now; they see, learn from and benefit from each other. So, all movements and [protest] waves in all regions resemble each other, as we saw in the revolutions of the Arab Spring; they were all simultaneous and consecutive.10 The symbolic meaning of the general strike in Mahalla in 2008, of heralding the start of a new contentious momentum, has been pointed out when explaining the movement’s contentious repertoire. When the issue of commemorating the Mahalla strike on 6 April 2009 came up, disagreement arose within the movement about whether to do so and in what form, remembering the challenges of the previous year. While one group emphasized mounting police pressure, thus foreshadowing possible failure, a second faction argued for a repeat of the Mahalla strike even if it failed.11 As already mentioned, April 6 inherited the crossideological composition of its members from its predecessors. A group of Nasserist and more Islamist-oriented members questioned the movement’s strategy for growth, referring to the allegations of it receiving foreign funding.12 An alternative Facebook page was created, but, due to the small number of participants, this venture remained unsuccessful.13 Interviewees also referred to individual members with self-promoting

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Figure 8.1 A photograph of graffiti, saying “Long live Egypt: 6 April General Strike.”14 intentions, and to the secret services’ deliberate strategies to infiltrate the movement and provoke fragmentations in order to obstruct a continuous protest wave.15 Indeed, the call for a general strike in 2009 was unable to have the same impact as it had a year before, both in terms of mobilization – the workers were not inclined to participate due to negotiations with government officials – and thus also media coverage. Members of the movement themselves also never brought up the 2009 strike in interviews. Figures 8.1 and 8.2 illustrate the tools that the movement used – graffiti and information on bank notes – in its attempt to mobilize people for the strike. The following year, 2010, became a decisive one in the movement’s framing process. This fact was reflected in the expressly stated aim of bringing down Mubarak as the head of the regime. It was named “the year of decision” (ʿa¯m al-hasm),16 thus giving the social mood signified ˙ by Kifaya’s “Enough” a more revolutionary and final momentum. This mobilization was characterized by an oscillation between online and street activism – the structural conditions for both dimensions, as has been pointed out, being more favorable than hitherto. In addition, there

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Figure 8.2 An image of a bank note with the message “6 April 2009 General Strike: It is our right and we will take it/make it our own.”17 has been an opening in the political opportunity structure since the 2010 parliamentary elections; ElBaradei’s return to Egypt; and, eventually, the murder of Khaled Said, so that, by 2010, an atmosphere had unfolded of “something had to happen.”18 The movement’s activities (faʿa¯liyya¯t) heralded the start of that year with a protest on 25 January 2010, which was the first time that the country’s official “Police Day” had been celebrated with a national holiday, but the movement renamed the day the “Celebration of the Thugs” (ʿı¯d al-baltagiyya).19 April 6 organized a sit-in ˙ outside the office of the prosecutor general, holding up pictures of torture 20 victims and the accused policemen. On 6 April 2010, a protest march was organized from Tahrir Square to the parliament’s People’s Assembly in order to demand an end to the emergency law and changes to the constitution. Many group activists were temporarily arrested. The movement held further protests and sit-ins in the wake of the parliamentary elections of December 2010, accusing the authorities of fraud.21 In terms of online activism, one campaign on Facebook was the “Corruption Award” (Fasa¯d Award, Figure 8.3), including an ironic vote for the most corrupt politician for that year, 2010. This campaign

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Figure 8.3 “Fasa¯d Award: April 6 expression competition, from the Occupied Lands of Egypt.”22 was also covered in diverse media outlets, such as that illustrated in Figure 8.4. Another Facebook campaign in 2009 and 2010 (Figure 8.5), the “al-Qilla al-Mundassa Conference” (Muʾtamar al-Qilla al-Mundassa), ironically referred to the movement’s “insignificance” (qilla almundassa), subverting the belittling claims made against the movement by the regime and affiliated media.23 The conference’s second round, in 2010, had a longer title: the “al-Qilla Mundassa Conference from the Occupied Lands of Egypt”, and was accompanied by the slogan “Because of you” (min aglak ant), referring to the personification of the regime by Mubarak and stating that “because of you we cannot eat, we cannot marry, and support our family.”24 April 6 held these alternative conferences on Facebook in parallel to the NDP’s party congresses, with the aim of subverting the party’s and regime’s narrative concerning Egypt’s political and socioeconomic trajectory, and revealing its falsehoods and inconsistencies. To this end, intellectuals, scholars and politicians from various thematic and institutional fields were interviewed and the respective videos posted on Facebook. Among them were the novelist Alaa al-Aswany, Ayman Nour and Hamdı¯ Qandı¯l, covering ˙

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Figure 8.4 “April 6 holds a competition to select the most corrupt individuals in 2010.”25 themes including corruption, the political crisis in Egypt and alternatives, as well as interviews with the MB representative ʿIssa¯m al˙˙ ʿArya¯n about health policies, and with Fahmı¯ Huwaydı¯, a moderate Islamist scholar and journalist, about foreign policy. The unusual names of these campaigns were designed to attract the media’s attention and, indeed, had the desired effect, as reported in the newspapers Al-Masry Al-Youm and al-Shorouk26 during the “Corruption Award”. In addition, many posts on Facebook referring to these activities were also written in English as a strategy for being more accessible to the English-speaking and international media in order to draw attention to the movement’s engagement and expand its support base as a resource.27 Furthermore, as has been shown, it was important for the movement to engage socially influential intellectuals and opinion leaders in these activities, who confirmed and encouraged the activists’ demands and tactics aimed at changing Egypt. As a co-founder puts it: For years there was an opposition just for the sake of it. There was no alternative. We asked ourselves always, what is after Mubarak? That

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Figure 8.5 Advertisement for “al-Qilla Mundassa Conference III: From the Occupied Lands of Egypt.”28 is why the Qilla al-Mundassa conferences were so important because that was a small pattern concerning the issues and solutions in the country, and because we also presented solutions. These were our possible resources.29 This optimistic atmosphere eventually contributed to the maintenance of this activism up to the revolutionary events on 25 January 2011. As has been illustrated, these strategies were perceived by many interviewees as innovative and the movement was very well-known before the events of 25 January, although repression hindered an increase in membership

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numbers. This, of course, changed with the new opportunity structure that has prevailed since January 2011.

January 2011 and its Aftermath As already explained, the date 25 January has had historical significance with regard to both national identity and contentious politics since the 1950s. After a first protest on that day in 2010, April 6 tried to repeat the protest on 25 January 2011 – this time, with the additional boost of the anger generated by manipulated parliamentary election results in December 2010 and Khaled Said’s death. Accordingly, talks were held with various other political groupings. Thus, the events of 25 January were made possible through the forging of alliances. April 6 coordinated with various political parties and youth groups such as the MB, but particularly with the “We are All Khaled Said” group on Facebook, which was engaged in organizing a similar event on the same date, specifically in the wake of the revolutionary events in Tunisia and the stepping down of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.30 Asmaa Mahfouz, a founding member of April 6, became particularly prominent during the preparations for the first protests when she posted a YouTube video calling on Egyptians to come to the streets on 25 January. The video was distributed widely and contributed significantly to the mobilization for the initial protest days. Mahfouz thus became very prominent, but was also targeted by the regime and kept a lower profile before finally leaving the movement soon afterward.31 It was therefore not possible to interview her. After the revolution, being “revolutionary” became the dominant self-ascription. Thus, a new configuration between the demands, the organizational structure and the repertoires of contention emerged. Whereas the repertoires before 2011 had been focused on online activism, the revolutionary mode – together with its gradual formalization and institutionalization – necessitated their reformulation, which entailed new challenges regarding the movement’s mobilizing capacities and influence on the Egyptian streets. April 6 reacted by joining forces with other activist groups and parties in order to be able to continue influencing the political decision making process in the post-revolutionary phase. The street remained the main locus of exerting pressure. The Revolutionary Youth Coalition (Iʾtila¯f Shaba¯b al-Thawra), which was established during the revolutionary events of January and February 2011, included youth groups such as members of the Dignity Party, the Democratic Front Party, the MB youth, Kifaya and supporters of ElBaradei.32 Indeed, continuous protests by the coalition members were able to force the dismissal of the prime minister, Ahmed Shafiq, who was

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appointed by Mubarak in March 2011.33 In addition, the SCAF was forced to declare a road map to hand over power to an elected government by the end of 2011.34 During this process, important April 6 figures such as Ahmed Maher regularly met ministers of the new government in order to coordinate the transition period.35 A process of fragmentation developed over the period of transition to a more formal type of politics, during which various movements left the coalition. Nadine Abdalla aptly analyzes the distinct trajectories and changing strategies of the youth movements to accommodate themselves to the new political context in order to be able to impact on the transition process.36 With the previously outlined increasing dissatisfaction with the hegemony of the military toward the onset of summer 2011, and the fact that some members of the coalition were negotiating with the SCAF, April 6 decided to leave the bloc due to its rejection of such negotiations.37 Mohamed Adel explains the consequences of alliances with other political actors: “The Revolutionary Youth Coalition has disappeared right now and we are only working with people like the Egyptian Current Party (Hizb al-Tayya¯r ˙ al-Misrı¯) established by ex-Muslim Brotherhood members, or the ˙ Constitution Party, the Justice Party (Hizb al-ʿAdl), small youth groups ˙ in cities in areas around Cairo.” 38 As already mentioned, the Revolutionary Socialists, the El-Ghad Party and the Democratic Front Party were regarded as being in the same camp, and April 6 cooperated with them during various protest marches and campaigns.39 For instance, until the months following the revolution, it occasionally used the headquarters of the El-Ghad Party, the Democratic Front Party and the MB when mutual relationships allowed.40 These networks led to another round of a considerable number of members leaving the movement in order to engage with newly established political parties set up by younger activists, particularly the Egyptian Current Party41 – as in the case of Asmaa Mahfouz42 – and the Constitution Party, established by ElBaradei.43 This fragility of alliances as a contentious strategy and source of internal sustenance also needs to be understood in a historical context. As delineated, April 6 has its origins in the historical background of (informal) Egyptian street politics, entailing notions of revolutionary politics and a cross-ideological pressure group that employs short-term alliances in order to control and influence politics from outside the formal framework. Chapters 6 and 7 have illustrated the challenges unfolding due to these conditions when intertwined with limited financial and legal resources. These are, in turn, intensified when the initial focus on informal activism is accompanied by a process of formalization and institutionalization promoted by different layers within the movement’s

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internal structure – and are detectable with regard to the movement’s contentious repertoire. The repertoire used by the movement has, in part, been indicated above. Street activism includes protest marches (ması¯ra), demonstrations (waqfa ihtiga¯giyya), and sit-ins (iʿtisa¯m). Both the committees for ˙ ˙ mobilization, and for organization and communication played important coordinating roles. Furthermore, a significant role was also played by a socalled “Operations Room” (ghurfat ʿamaliyya¯t), which has been set up since January 2011 – especially during important events such as protest marches, elections and referendums, collecting information, pictures and videos from members on the ground.44 This material was then published via the movement’s media outlets or distributed to other media. This process turned out to be relatively simple as media outlets were already interested in April 6’s activities, as pointed out by Ramy Elswissy, the coordinator of the movement’s International Department: They recorded our activity, they even call us every like two to three days to find out our news, what we are going to do. They are very interested in political movements like April 6 because we are making rules right now in the street, and that’s our point of power, that we can tell the street what to do and the street in one way or another will obey and be more active with us to do whatever it takes to bring the amount of corruption down, and also to stop the wrong that is going on in Egypt [. . .] When you make something so fabulous they will be more interested, that’s how things go [. . .] They are looking for us because we’re doing something crazy, so they are interested in seeing more creative stuff.45 The Media Committee thus had a crucial role in communicating the group’s activities and positioning.46 Importantly, the committee has an additional Facebook page focusing specifically on updated political and socioeconomic developments in general and integrating the role of the movement in these issues. The page’s name is “April 6 Live: Media Pulsing the Revolution” (Muba¯shar 6 Ibrı¯l: Iʿla¯m yanbad Thawra).47 ˙ But, as indicated, the movement was attempting to increase its foothold beyond digital technologies such as Facebook. That is why a print journal called the “Aprilian Voice” (al-Sawt al-Ibrı¯lı¯) was published and sold for the ˙ first time during the protest marches on 25 January 2013. The issue (illustrated in Figure 8.6) included articles about the definition of basic movement signifiers like non-violence and political-awareness campaigns, as well as a section introducing “Political Terms” (mustalaha¯t siya¯siyya), ˙ ˙˙ explaining on the left side the meaning of “Despotism” (istibda¯d).

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Figure 8.6 The Aprilian Voice, 25 January 2013, (left to right) “Political terms” and “The stuck revolutionaries.”48 A second article (reproduced on the right in Figure 8.6), entitled “The stuck revolutionaries” (al-thuwwa¯r fı¯ khandaq), describes revolutionary youth’s difficult position in early 2013, stranded between “parts of the [formal] opposition [referring to the National Salvation Front] coming together with the forces of the old regime” (baʿd al-muʿa¯rid¯ın al-ladhı¯na ˙ ˙ faqadu ¯ misda¯qiyathum [. . .] wa-zannu ¯ anna fulu ¯ l al-niza¯m al-sa¯biq qad ˙ ˙ ˙ yaku ¯ nu ghata¯ʾ lahum) and the MB, which “betrayed the Square and its ˙ legitimacy for a parliament in favor of their interest [. . .] and in cooperation with the military” (al-Ikhwa¯n al-ladhı¯ bana¯ ʿala¯ al-ba¯til wa-l˙ insiha¯b min al-mı¯da¯n wa-iha¯natihi wa-l-istiha¯nihi bi-shaba¯b wa-ilgha¯ʾ ˙ sharʿiyyatihi bi-barlama¯n yashbaʿ masa¯lihihim [. . .] bi-l-taha¯luf maʿa al˙ ˙ ˙ ʿaskar). As a consequence, both sides “defend political ignorance based on democratic norms and the lack of principles [. . .] to be hegemonic without having a clear vision to build and guarantee the impossibility of a renewed one-party rule” (bi-da¯fiʿ al-gahl al-siya¯sı¯ bi-qawa¯ʿid al-dimu ¯ qra¯tiyya wa-qilla al-maba¯diʾ [. . .] wa-l-raghba fı¯ al-saytara du ¯ na wugu ¯ d asa¯s aw ˙ ˙ ruʾya wa¯diha li-l-bina¯ʾ aw-wugu ¯ d ay da¯min li-ʿadam tikra¯r tagruba al-hizb ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙

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al-wa¯hid). In the words of a 26-year-old student member of the Media ˙ Committee in Giza – who joined the movement after meeting members during the revolution, in which he was participating as an individual – the aim of this journal was that: we reach the citizen on the street who does not use Facebook; who returns home after 16 hours of work and wants to rest a bit and sleep. We give [these people] this simple newspaper, with articles on the movement, covering its activities; what the movement is; who its members are; why are they currently mobilizing against the president [Mursi]? Why are they mobilizing against certain laws? Thus we reach the citizen who is not in the operating range of our media.49 Another example is the leaflet (reproduced in Figure 8.7) explaining “who we are” (ihna¯ mı¯n), “what we want” (ma¯dha¯ nurı¯d) and “how that will ˙ happen” (kayfa yahduthu dha¯lika), thereby pointing out the basic ˙ demands of the movement and its strategy for success according to diagnostic and prognostic frames. The Media Committee emphasized the benefits of framing its political activities in a vivid manner, such as through humor and music. Activities have mainly taken place in urban spaces, aimed at performatively incorporating the wider audience in the public sphere. This communicative element on the ground was – and this is indeed new in terms of velocity and the simultaneous involvement of multiple media – immediately disseminated through mobile phones, laptops, cameras and TV stations to the local and international media. As Nader Srage states, political slogans play a significant role in these communication processes because they aim at “persuading the people of a point of view or attitude” ([. . .] ila¯ iqna¯ʿ al-jumhu ¯ r bi-wijhat nazar aw bi-mawqif).50 In ˙ addition to well-known slogans such as “The people want the downfall of the regime” and “Bread, Freedom and Social Justice,” many slogans I encountered during my fieldwork in late 2012 and early 2013 targeted the SCAF and the MB as the hegemonic actors defining the formal transition at that time. Thus, there was “No field marshall and no Brothers. We will not be governed by the chief of the general staff” (La¯ mushı¯r wa-la¯ Ikhwa¯n, lan yahkumana¯ raʾı¯s al-arka¯n).51 Other protest slogans were also ˙ collected. Due to the time when the fieldwork was conducted, many slogans focused on the MB, saying “Down, down with the Supreme Guide” (Yasqut yasqut hukm al-murshid); “Stand up, don’t fear, Mursi ˙ ˙ ¯ m˙ matkhafshı has to go” (U ¯, Mursı¯ la¯zim yimshı¯); “Listen oh Dr Mursi, leave and get out of your chair [throne]” (Ismaʿ minnı¯ ya Dr Mursı¯, irhal ˙ wa-sh¯ıb al-kursı¯); “Egypt says to you enough, Egypt for all Egyptians” ˙

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Figure 8.7 “April 6th Youth Movement – Who Are We???” Tahrir Documents (Watha¯ʾiq al-Tahrı¯r), 20 September 2011.52 ˙ (Masr bit-ʾullak kifa¯ya; Masr li-kull al-Masriyyı¯n). The following song was ˙ ˙ ˙ recorded with the assistance of an April 6 member, and sung during protests: April 6, we are the voice when the world [everybody else] prefers to be silent.

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I have taken an oath to plead for the martyr’s rights; right and justice are the only way to the revolution. I am the people’s voice; I am the dream for the new generation, who do not like power and a slave’s life. And fear is afraid of me in the square, hear me, I don’t care about power. My parole is: I love my country. April 6, April 6.53

Other tactics included forming a circle within a protest march and calling out slogans (such as those listed above) to each other – a practice known as dagı¯g (“clamour”).54 There was also the wearing of palls (kafan), ˙ depicting readiness to make a sacrifice for the sake of Egypt, or carrying symbolic coffins as a way of remembering the martyrs – all that “attracts people to us.”55 Another example is the development of public screenings (ʿard ˙ projector). These were organized by a coalition of young activists – including those from April 6 – named “The Military Lies” (ʿAskar Ka¯dhibu ¯ n) in order to expose the perceived corrupt politics of the SCAF.56 The screening at al-Sayyida Zaynab Square in January 2013 displayed aspects of the mostly secret negotiations between the SCAF and the MB – in particular, those concerning the upcoming presidential elections. Furthermore, April 6 had maintained good relations with the ultras scene (Egypt’s organized soccer fans). Thus, it took part in the protest marches organized by the ultras of Cairene football club al-Ahly to demand justice for fans murdered in the Port Said massacre in February 2012. Many activists from both camps believed that this incident represented “a plot approved by the army and Ministry of Interior to get revenge for antiarmy chants at the preceding match”57 and the ultras’ role in defending the occupation of Tahrir Square during the revolution.

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During the first parliamentary elections after the revolution, April 6 followed one of its main aims – to remain an independent pressure group – and did not participate. However, in order to hinder a successful campaign by the remnants of the old regime (fulu ¯ l) it cooperated with the National Centre of Popular Committees (al-Markaz al-Qawmı¯ li-l-Liga¯n al-Shaʿbiyya). These committees had been established in the wake of the revolution and – in the sense described by Maha Abdelrahman58 and Cilja Harders59 – emerged out of local, flexible and informal citizen activism, demanding basic state services such as the improvement of pavements or garbage collection.60 Some of the committees were also engaged in pro-revolutionary activism “to expose corrupt local officials and identify policemen with records of human rights violations.”61 As has been illustrated, local April 6 groups were engaged in similar approaches and also in cooperation with the National Centre of Popular Committees. The campaign (depicted in Figure 8.8) with the heading “Grab the fulu ¯ l: the black list” (imsik fulu ¯ l: al-qa¯ʾima al-sawda¯ʾ), for instance, was designed jointly to highlight suspicious candidates, while representatives in favor of the revolution’s demands were included on a white list. It was indeed successful but, as mentioned by one interviewee, was not able to hinder the election of MB members.62 Another aspect of April 6’s repertoire is its use of artistic elements. The Media Committee had a subcommittee responsible for engaging in the production of banners, videos and graffiti.63 This intertwining of politics and art could be seen in the movement’s participation in the “Art is a Square” (al-Fann Mı¯da¯n) campaign.64 This initiative toured various squares across Egypt, and was based at the central ʿAbdı¯n Square in Cairo. NGOs and political groups were engaged in cultural work aimed at maintaining the awareness that politics and the arts are often interrelated, which had become specifically manifest during the revolution. Figure 8.9 illustrates the political turmoil of the transition process and the repression to which revolutionaries were subjected. It also depicts the April 6 member Ga¯bir Sa¯lih (with the nickname “Jika”), who ˙ ˙ was killed by security forces while protesting against the military. In this context, when evaluating the impact of this repertoire on the regime, activists refer to the accusations and charges of being funded from abroad, which indicate that the authorities felt an urgent need to act against the mobilization and discursive capabilities of April 6.65 With regard to the influence of this on the citizenry and its attitude towards contentious politics, which, as indicated, reversed to a certain degree in the course of the formal transition period, the Media Committee member from Giza concludes:

Figure 8.8 “Grab the fulu ¯ l: the black list,” Tahrir Documents (Watha¯ʾiq al-Tahrı¯r), 2 November 2011.66 ˙

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Figure 8.9 A depiction of Egypt’s volatile situation after the revolution between the police, military, the election procedure, protesters, and the killing of one April 6 member, “Jika.” Cairo, 5 January 2013 (author’s own image). At first there was not a significant interest in politics and participation in the revolution. Politics was mostly thought of indifferently, somebody [the president] came and left; what was important was [life] was continuing. Now it is thought that opposition is a means to stop people’s everyday life, and the country’s development. There is no transport, the country is facing bankruptcy, and there is no fuel and gas. Thus the people to a certain extent think that protests and opposition are the reasons. The street has become a bit congested by the idea of opposition and protests. Despite that, politically I think that there is scope for the notion of political pressure to increase in popularity.67 This view of citizens’ somehow passive interaction with politics might, as previously shown, be paternalistic, reflecting the gap between the middle and poorer classes described by Harders.68 In the following statement, a PO member narrates how April 6 members at the local level encouraged the population to take matters into their own hands and urge the authorities to rectify grievances: For instance, in ʿAin Shams [a district of Cairo], the problem was garbage. We ask the people why they don’t complain. The answers were that there is no trust between us and the authorities, or no answers if we go. OK, we asked, there is no trust in state authorities, how could we bring about that they go there and the authorities hear them? Then we arranged with some inhabitants to go to the quarter’s mayor. We said we are from April 6 and we are speaking to the media, and then they got scared. Then the garbage was taken away. And this indeed changed their attitude and they began to speak up on other issues. Because otherwise the corrupt will be more corrupt, when there is no opposition.69

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Recalling Harders’ notion of the “social contract of informality”70 and Abdelrahman’s “market-relations-based protests”71 – both unfolding mainly in local contexts, in which the delineated local strategies of April 6 are based – the coordinator of the International Department acknowledges these steps as positive, while adding, But this is still not enough. The percentage of this developmental work in the local areas is not significant. If you want to have the people on your side, it must be more. Instead of going to Downtown, and to the presidential palace, we have to go to the poor areas and the people will come to you; like we were doing before the revolution, in Shubra¯, in the slums. I believe it is extremely important to join the economic needs with your political demands.72 In this context, when considering what had been achieved by the movement, many activists understood it in a positive but realistic way: Regarding the resources available to us or our influence on everyday life and politics, I think this was the most possible outcome for us. As a consequence, we don’t fear any further experiences and this gives us the persistence to continue demanding the realization of our aims.73 Here, Dina Shehata aptly summarizes the political impact and trajectory of contentious (youth) politics in the wake of the January revolution: Thus while youth movements played an important role in fomenting the revolution and creating a space for democratic change, the fragmentation of youth activists and the inadequacy of their mobilizing strategies in the post-Mubarak era have significantly limited their power to shape Egypt’s future course. Confronted with a divided opposition, with its limited capacity to rally the population on key votes, the SCAF has been able to determine the course of the transition and has pitted different groups against one another quite effectively in order to consolidate its own power and inhibit a fully fledged restructuring of the political system.74 The discontent among many young activists often resulted in a radicalization of the contentious repertoires – a result that is empirically verified by many cases around the world, as initially

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illustrated by SMT. Accordingly, April 6 activists were affected by these dynamics. The following quote by the previously cited former member and then independent journalist with a critical eye on the movement, highlights the dilemma in which many activists found themselves and reiterates the will of decision makers in the movement to embed the demands and self-understanding – and thus the movement repertoire – in a formalized and institutionalized organizational structure. The quote is a response to the question of why activists do not want to establish a political party, and are angry with the outcome of the revolution: Yes, I mean they are right, because the constitution is not fair. But you know the difference between the revolutionaries and the State is people who can cope with the mechanism of the State. This is a problem. Especially the young and enthusiastic people, those who are like me or others working for years against the regime, it seems that we are feeling tired now and we have to start to work in a more political way and a more institutional way. However, the young people who are 17, 18, 19, they are very enthusiastic, what they know of politics is getting into clashes, which is fine. So I want to give them time, two years to transform them into political leaders, who can be politically competitive [. . .] Those at the top of the establishment are not helping us to cope with the establishment. They are keeping the same tools as before in the time of Mubarak. So we can understand when young people want to turn to violence, they are disappointed.75 The difficulty in articulating contentious politics, both discursively and also in its practical dimension on the street, intensified with the military intervention in July 2013, which also increased the prevalence of violence. As a reaction, April 6 engaged in new alliance-building negotiations with other revolutionary movements and activists and thus, in line with its revolutionary approach, was one of the initiators of the Front of the Revolutionary Path (Gabhat Tarı¯q al-Thawra). The ˙ Front’s main aims were to pressure the new power holders to preserve the 25 January revolution’s goals and embed them in the new constitution. The Front was established as a group of activists rather than a movement coalition; it included, besides April 6, members of the Revolutionary Socialists, the Strong Egypt Party, the Egyptian Current Party and activists such as Alaa Abdel Fattah and Ahdaf Soueif.76 In “challenging the regime’s red lines”77 the repertoire of contention remained focused on street demonstrations. At a demonstration

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organized at the end of November 2013 against the new protest law, Ahmed Maher and Mohamed Adel were arrested among many other activists. The Front’s mobilizing power was thus severely weakened. Its ability to reach out to the public was likewise increasingly hindered due to society’s longing for stability and a concentration on everyday life issues, in times marked by more difficult access to mainstream Egyptian media.78 The public had already had enough of protests, and blamed the youth for these latest developments. The Front of the Revolutionary Path’s demands, organizational structure and contentious repertoire are listed in more detail in the following press release: Thuwwar aims to refocus attention on the main aims of 25 January: † Bread (a viable, sustainable and non-corrupt economy) † Freedom (sovereignty and human rights) † Social Justice (the distribution of the wealth and resources of Egypt to the benefit of the majority of its people) † Thuwwar will be the home of every group and individual activist who believes in radical reform as the road to achieving the life with dignity demanded by the people. † Thuwwar will be the home of the people who have remained consistently on the road of the revolution and never departed from it into distracting or harmful alliances and activities. † Thuwwar rejects the imposition of a binary choice, a security state or a state of terror and insists on a civil democracy based on equality and true participation. † Thuwwar adopts a revolutionary structure that mirrors the successful products of the revolution: a modular, horizontal, organic network. † Thuwwar members assume only agreement on its ultimate aims. It assumes diversity on priorities and tactics. It seeks to empower and energise its members not to control them.

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† Thuwwar will work towards its goals by all peaceable means including protests and strikes and campaigns and lobbying. † Thuwwar, while always directed at its ultimate aims, is a space for dissent, debate and argument. It is a space to develop a new revolutionary discourse. † Thuwwar believes this discourse can only be born through a true attention to and facilitation of the demands, solutions and visions of the people on the ground. † Thuwwar will work with the people towards describing and effecting radical reforms: the redistribution of wealth to the benefit of the poor and those on a low income, and building a true democracy of popular participation. Our aims are: † The redistribution of wealth as a means to social justice. This includes reforming budget priorities, increasing revenue by way of a fair escalatory tax system, improving and broadening the reach of public services, and reforming the wage system. There can be no stability in Egypt without these measures. † Reformatting and rebuilding the institutions of the state on a democratic basis, deepening the democracy of the ballot box to become a true participatory democracy that allows citizens to share in decision making, and implement civilian watchdogs to monitor the institutions of state. At the heart of this [is] the need to reform the judiciary, restructure the police system, purge and broaden the remit of local government, liberate the will to organize and free the media. † To work towards equality by eradicating all forms of oppression and discrimination, to confront sectarian incitement and violence towards women, to mitigate the marginalization of communities on ethnic, religious, cultural, class or geographical bases. † To set a clear process of transitional justice, to call to account everyone implicated in crimes against the people. To reform the

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security apparatus and the institutions of justice to prevent the reemergence of repressive practices. † To adopt a foreign policy based on the interests of the people, that protects Egypt’s sovereignty and breaks the bonds of economic dependency and political subservience. To stretch the hand of friendship and support to all revolutionary movements seeking democracy and freedom. The Front sees Egypt at the forefront of a global revolutionary wave that seeks to create a more free and fair world for everyone. Thuwwar declares its commitment to these goals. It invites participation to promote them through protest and direct action, through research, through art and culture, and through political campaigns and lobbying.79 Naturally, the process of arresting key figures and ultimately banning April 6, which began after the establishment of the Front of the Revolutionary Path, significantly restricted the movement’s operational capacity. This led eventually to the vague formulation of a new organizational structure and set of repertoires in April 2015, which was followed by further repression thereafter. What becomes evident at this point is the way in which the configuration of resource-poor, contentious politics, articulated through various media outlets (new and old) and street activism, is inscribed into the political and socioeconomic processes of urban space – a common feature among contemporary social movements, as outlined in Chapter 2. Globality thereby concerns, on the one hand, the infrastructural embeddedness of members in global information flows of experience sharing, such as with Otpor and via the internet. On the other hand, it concerns the urban middle class – denoted as a “global generation” – which is particularly exposed to a converging process of contentious repertoires. Nevertheless, as stressed in previous chapters, it is, once again, mainly the local context that is at the center of the movement’s orientation. It is not about establishing transnational institutions but rather the fact that similar political discourses and practices are unfolding in different parts of the globe at the same time, while not necessarily being in direct contact. The concluding chapter will summarize the three categories that have been analyzed, before interpreting these contemporary manifestations of contentious politics in a more historical and global framework.

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Conclusion This analysis of the April 6 Youth Movement has provided important insights into the possibilities and limits of contemporary contentious politics in Egypt and beyond; it is a movement whose trajectory represents the periods before and after the revolutionary events of 2011. As an important political actor in Egypt’s recent turbulent history of political upheavals – and one of the most representative youth movements during this process – it has passed through three main phases: the period before January 2011, the phase between Mubarak’s fall and Mursi’s removal, and the period thereafter. The movement has consituted an inspiration and a hope for many young people since 2008, and particularly after January 2011, proving that change through contentious politics is possible. For many members, becoming active with April 6 was their first experience of political engagement. It has also illustrated the opportunities and constraints of employing social media. Learning from previous contentious experiences, the movement has also cooperated with other actors in trying to formulate an alternative narrative of challenging and critiquing power in order to achieve its aims regardless of ingrained ideological constraints. The following general conclusions can be drawn from this trajectory – each having influenced the development of the movement’s demands, organizational structure and repertoire of contention. Firstly, an informal political setting has been identified that, for the most part, restricted any formal political opposition to the expression of political and social concerns in Egypt. The origins of that environment can be traced back decades. April 6 was established as an outcome of a new generation of political activists at the beginning of the 2000s that was able to carve out a political opportunity structure for itself – increasingly using online technologies – by giving less importance to ideological considerations and preferring a certain distance from formal political parties while still benefiting from their networks and resources. As a consequence, the movement depended on informality in order to be regarded as a legitimate opponent of a system associated with corruption and oppression. At the same time, formal political processes like elections – particularly in the wake of the revolutionary events in 2011 – have meant that this new generation of political activists has been pushed towards more formal institutional structures in order to embed the movement in a legal and sustainable setting. In the course of these processes, different interpretations of an effective oppositional organizational structure have resulted in the movement’s fragmentation and often-shifting alliances with other movements and parties.

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This has also been facilitated by a second dilemma. One the one hand, since the 2000s youth movements have been characterized by a weaker collective identity and cross-ideological composition of members. This networking strategy contributed to a broader framing process of Egypt’s problems, with the suggested solutions also guaranteeing the activists additional public and discursive visibility, as well as resources. At the same time, however, I have shown that ideological differences and group formations have become amplified at times of crisis or of being forced to make strategic choices. Thirdly, cross-ideology resulted in a broader framing of the movement’s demands, which could be manipulated by the incumbents of the regime and the dependent media to label it as marginal. Similarly and finally, while using a global technological infrastructure with linkages to international media resulted in enhanced attention and visibility, the regime could successfully use these linkages as evidence for accusations that this was an inauthentic, and thus illegitimate, political movement. April 6’s trajectory and meaning for contemporary social movements will be further highlighted within this global context in the following, concluding chapter.

CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSION: MANIFESTATIONS OF CONTEMPORARY CONTENTIOUS POLITICS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT

This analysis has shown that, so far, April 6’s frame has reflected a struggle against despotism characterized by a broad understanding of corruption and the all-encompassing nature of the regime. The solutions put forward have been mainly the notions of realizing an Egypt of democracy, social justice and dignity by exerting non-violent pressure from outside on the formal political sphere, while prefiguring a merger of centralized and non-centralized organizational structures. These ideas have been characterized as being revolutionary and embodying controlling, formal politics. The broad nature of this approach has implied a gradual shrinking of the movement’s mobilizing power in the wake of the formalization of the post-25 January political trajectory, which saw the emergence of other movements and parties that articulated an equivalent revolutionary narrative. These processes have been analyzed by focusing on the Egyptian setting while embedding April 6’s demands and functioning in a global context of factors shaping contemporary social-movement dynamics. This concluding chapter summarizes these findings and interprets them, in a second step, along contemporary lines of political thought. This approach will contextualize the highlighted characteristics of contentious politics in a historicizing framework.

Demands The analysis of April 6’s emergence and continuation has shown that a global outlook for inspiration and strategy is characteristic of the

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movement. This globality can be observed in the movement’s demands as articulated by the interviewees, although each individual focused variously on the issues of social justice, democracy and the dignity required for oneself and future generations to lead a normal life. Besides the illustrated difficulties of sustaining a stable mobilization due to organizational uncertainties, its distance from formal politics and its entailed internal fragmentations, an oft-heard critique has been that the movement’s demands have been too broadly framed to be relevant to the Egyptian public for a prolonged revolutionary period. An example would be the trivialization, and thus delegitimization, of movements such as April 6 found in the regime’s representation of their demands as “marginal” (mata¯lib fiʾawiyya).1 ˙ The contentious dynamics of 2011 showed the articulation of overlapping demands on a global scale, in the face of similar dilemmas worldwide. The observation of a gap between societies and formal political procedures – seen also in the case of April 6 – hints at a contemporary condition of politics around the globe. Tahrir Square became a metaphor for global outreach in 2011.2 Thus, protests in the MENA region were followed by Occupy Wall Street, the Indignados (“The Indignants”) in Spain, and occupations in Athens and Istanbul’s Gezi Park.3 All these protesters were contesting established understandings and practices of political conduct, precarious working conditions and unemployment – thus forging political and socioeconomic demands and going beyond materialist and post-materialist rationales as postulated by SMT in reference to the post-materialist character of “new social movements” in the West.4 In this sense, and as shown above with April 6, they were critical of capitalism and its commodification but not necessarily opposed to it outright.5 Their interaction with formal politics can in most cases be traced to a point where the challengers have eventually fragmented due to discursive contradictions and diverging strategic choices. We have seen, as an example, both the context from which April 6 emerged and the trajectory of its decreasing street power. Consequently, fundamental questions concerning the contemporary essence of “politics,” “democracy,” “social justice” and “revolutions” have since been increasingly elaborated upon in political thought and public debates. Notions like “post-political”6 and “post-democracy”7 address the current condition of politics, and identify an increasing loss of meaning of inclusive political decision making processes. Each of these concepts describes a process of technocratization and procedural narrative, including that taking place in democracies, due to the requirements of cost- and time-effectiveness and shaped by a network of

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politicians, as well as representatives of business and media. According to the arguments put forward by those in power, this is why, in light of the complex social issues to be solved, there is no time for open discussion about the demands or the blockading of civic life by occupations/demonstrations in public space. Indeed, everyday life has to continue, above all for the many poor people, who in Egypt often depend on several jobs or rely, for instance, on tourism – all of which necessitates a stable and secure social and economic climate. The need to maintain stability, in turn, complicates the processes of political transformation, particularly when they are persistent and contentious. There are often references to the “silent majority”8 when it is deemed necessary to proceed despite protests’ disruptive consequences. This could be observed in Egypt most recently on 30 June 2013, shortly before the removal of Mursi, when the Egyptian media postulated that the biggest protest march in world history had just taken place, made possible by the thus-far “silent majority”. This served to legitimize the subsequent military intervention in the name of restoring democracy.

Movement Infrastructures The infrastructure available for social movements has accelerated and extended in recent years, primarily due to the proliferation of digital technologies, the education levels of the middle classes and the spread of English-language skills. These factors facilitate the diffusion of information, practices and innovations relevant to social movements. The emerging networks comprise mainly connections within and across (global) cities, although direct connections are not necessarily mandatory owing to the mediatization of simultaneity. April 6’s learning process with the help of the Serbian movement, Otpor, and the Academy for Change in Qatar – as well as the knowledge of other contentious movements – had an important impact on the movement. The initial establishment of the movement as an online platform has contributed to its global orientation, particularly as an actor with limited resources and structural access to power. This orientation toward infrastructures and practices that have global resonance in order to gain additional resources and global media attention is symbolized by the movement’s International Department which was established in the wake of the revolution in 2011. Networking on the ground with Arab and international activists and journalists, translating movement communique´s and being present at international conferences have been the key responsibilities of that office. On the other hand, these

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strategies have also entailed dilemmas. While the movement has been able to secure certain benefits in this respect, these linkages have at the same time been used by the regime as evidence for its accusations that the movement is inauthentic, and thus illegitimate. The role and prospects of social media, and digital technologies in general, can also be put into perspective at this point. Indeed, as has been shown, during the initial phase of the movement’s history and until shortly after Mubarak’s fall, these systems and technologies had a significant influence on bringing people together online and thereby creating a space of socially engaged communication. However, as social media has limited penetration in contemporary Egyptian society this strategy needed to be balanced with an increased presence on the street. This global infrastructural integration has been described by Arab intellectuals since the 1970s. A transforming configuration of the State and its embeddedness in global economic processes have been identified. ¯ lim,9 Samir Amin and Sadiq Marxist scholars such as Mahmu ¯ d Amı¯n al-ʿA ˙ Jalal al-Azm refer to specific characteristics of contemporary Arab societies. They link their explanations of these characteristics to underlying global factors, authoritarianism, elite integration into the world economy and the consequent “expansion of poverty, wherein the poor and newly-impoverished (the middle class of yesteryear) share one thing in common: poverty and alienation from the state.”10 In line with the general framework of this study, al-Azm expands by describing a transformation of the global capitalist system in the course of globalization, which has reordered the relationship between center (core) and periphery. According to al-Azm, “in the old model of globalization [. . .] capitalism accumulated wealth on a world scale by creating unequal conditions of exchange between the Center and the Periphery, while maintaining the means of industrial production at home,” whereas now the center has globalized production processes to its advantage “based on the commodification of everything” so that “globalization’s epicenter has gone global.”11 Thus, a new relationship between politics and the economy is assumed, based on extensive commodification; consequently, the borders between center and periphery have become more porous. The Egyptian anti-globalization movement AGEG organized seminars with intellectuals from various backgrounds, including Samir Amin. 12 These seminars were, as illustrated, also influential for movements similar to and in contact with April 6, such as Kifaya and the Revolutionary Socialists. Al-Azm’s observation of a shifting configuration between center and periphery, and its implications for Egypt, have been illustrated

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throughout this study with reference to socioeconomic and technological transformation processes – particularly in urban contexts, such as global cities. Hamid Dabashi similarly argues that, in an age of globalized capital, it is no longer possible to uphold a clear-cut binary of a West and the rest of world vis-a`-vis the current multiplicity of mediatized realities.13 With regard to the protest wave in 2011, Amy Austin Holmes, sociologist at the American University in Cairo observes: Now for the first time I think you have social movements [. . .] that are inspired by protest in the periphery [. . .] that would be something fairly new or another example of the shifting dynamics between the center and the periphery. Because the model is always that things happen first in the center and the periphery sort of follows behind. And that is because the capitalist dynamics originate in the center and drive social change.14

Global Generations As in other parts of the world, the narratives of April 6 activists illustrate that fundamental improvements in personal opportunities and the everyday life conditions of individuals are essential. They come from a global generation mainly comprising well-educated middle-class youth facing precarious prospects. The cross-ideological nature of the contentious expressions that have been illustrated are understandable from an individualized perspective. Individuals tend to face a number of personal challenges on their own, coming together in often loose, contentious networks, of which April 6 is one example. This is why Abdelrahman aptly concludes that “in this new world, the left is no longer the only force resisting neoliberalism; groups with different, and often conflicting ideological leanings, including liberals, are now finding themselves fighting in the same camp.”15 The consequences for the working classes and (global) middle classes – characterized by similar material conditions, aspirations, expectations and anxieties – are thus important to consider. The world financial crisis in 2008 has made these developments specifically apparent. Its socioeconomic and political ramifications have led to popular upheavals, mainly questioning authoritarian tendencies and the interaction between formal politics and the economy, based on profit maximization and the commodification16 of everyday life. It must be emphasized in this respect that the accompanying distrust of politics creates contentious dynamics, struggling with a discursive context that manifests the same

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neoliberal approach embedded in society in an effective, functioning and profitable framework. In the same way that this context – while continuing, of course, to display local specificities – increasingly blurs the boundaries between the center and periphery, contentious practices can diffuse and influence each other on a global scale. The approaches to formal politics, political participation and demands thus display – each local context being distinct – overlapping characteristics across democracies or authoritarian settings.

Ideology These considerations indicate a transformation of collectivist and ideological mobilizations in Egypt and a critique of the entailed essentialism. The ‘cultural awakening’ (nahda) in the liberal age, as mentioned in Chapter 3, ˙ was based initially on an attitude of mutual learning in order to accommodate modernity (hada¯tha). Drawing on the explanation by ˙ Christoph Schumann, I have illustrated the gradual intensification of the feeling of decline and crisis that began in the 1930s – in, for instance, the student movement – due to the failure of many MENA countries to realize real independence and self-rule. In light of the obvious European dominance at the time in science, economics and sheer political power over the world’s periphery, from an Arab point of view the “West” was perceived with ambivalence. As a result of disenchantment in the course of attempting to realize these ideas, intellectuals and scholars increasingly turned to questions of identity, selfhood and dignity, as well as the question of how it would be possible to regain in modernity the position that the Arab world had once held.17 These discourses “have often been confusing mixtures of descriptive and normative statements about what one ‘ought’ to be on the basis of what one in essence ‘is’ and ‘has always been.’”18 Tarik Sabry concurs: Dominant discourses in contemporary Arab thought are more concerned with structuring and orchestrating narratives of becoming than with the kind of being they are anxious to deliver from wretchedness and ahistoricity. This gap – the ontological/ ontologising/ontic gap – is, I argue, at the heart of the Arab intellectual impasse. Arab philosophers/thinkers have forgotten about the world and matters concerning being.19 This situation was particularly evident in the post-colonial period. As the Egyptian student movement has illustrated, the struggle was

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“aimed at liberating lands from foreign occupation and exploitative hegemony, but also at recovering an empowering sense of self after having been defined, denigrated, and defeated by others.”20 Movements were characterized by markedly strong ideological and utopian narratives fragmented into different camps. Importantly, Elizabeth Suzanne Kassab hints at the global diffusion of these characteristics in order to avoid an exceptionalist explanatory model of the Arab world, referring to the cultural, political, and socioeconomic parallels in other parts of the colonized world: More than any other regional debate, the Arab one has remained relatively unknown, misrepresented, isolated, and stigmatized with exceptionalism. It has generally been approached in an essentialist way that reduces its discourses to a certain literate Islamic heritage, with little attention paid to the context and historicity both of the discourses and of the heritage. This essentialist approach has confined the understanding of these discourses to an immanent, ahistorical tradition and has isolated them from other regional discourses. Yet the reading of Arab debates in conjunction with other debates such as the African, the Latin American, South Asian, the Caribbean, the African American, and the Native American reveals important commonalities and shows that the concerns and patterns of these debates go beyond immanent traditions. Among these commonalities are the search for a thought of one’s own, which implies the search for ways of defining such a thought as well as the need to link ideas to concrete local realities and histories; the importance of contextualizing Western thought and of determining the parameters of the universal and the particular [. . .] the caution against a culturalist-idealist understanding of the cultural malaise, oblivious of the global political and economic aspects of the dependency problematic [. . .] and the call to rethink authenticity.21 Nonetheless, without falling into essentialism, Kassab also highlights certain specific problems that pertain to the Arab context: Compared to the cases of Latin America and Africa, the Arab world has fared relatively well in terms of its physical and cultural integrity: its population has been less violated by genocide, slavery, and colonial settlement than the Latin American and African populations, which is probably why modernity in Arab discourses is not strongly associated with these phenomena [. . .] In contrast to Africa and Latin America, the Arab world forcefully challenged

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Europe in the past and imposed itself as a leading civilizational power. How do these differences affect the Arab approach to postcolonial cultural malaise, though? They appear in the relation to heritage in general and to religious heritage in particular, in the relation to systematic thought in heritage, in the sense of rivalry with the West and the pronounced claim to power, and in a mobilization of religion geared toward power more than toward ethical empowerment.22 Here, it is important to take into account the far-reaching implications of the Arab defeat in the June War of 1967, which constituted a break in “popular and intellectual consciousness.”23 The importance of 1967 lies in, a political and intellectual crisis that called for a reassessment and a revisiting of the modes of thinking that had prevailed as well as of the political and intellectual struggles that had hitherto been adopted. It necessitated an urgent reflection on the liberalization and decolonization movements that had failed to achieve their goals. It led to the radicalization and polarization of two major trends: on the one hand, the search for totalizing doctrines, especially religious doctrines after the demise of the Left and of secular nationalism, and, on the other hand, the radicalization of critique. The first trend was the result of a deep yearning for a holistic vision that could offer an indigenous, non-alienating worldview and mobilize the necessary forces toward a way out of the humiliation and the oppression. The second was the outcome of a painful confrontation with the limitations and dangers of holistic views as well as of the growing realization of the vital need for critique in the face of multiple forms of oppression.24 The former trend has prevailed discursively in subsequent decades until the present. But, in the meantime, the latter has also been in the making,25 eventually unfolding during the 2011 revolution in the Egyptian case. These articulations of constant critique specifically signify different ideological trajectories, which, as illustrated, occupy a crucial position in April 6’s framing. This idea recalls the notion of post-modernity expressed by theorists such as Jean-Francois Lyotard, Herbert Marcuse and Paul Ricœur, which implies a decline in the importance of the grand and holistic metanarratives, explained in Chapter 3. The diagnosis of the crisis since 1967 became increasingly framed by certain essentialist traits characterized by a “positive sense of self [. . .] in

CONCLUSION

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which the essentialized definition of self, given by the colonial Other is very often simply reversed and given a positive valence instead of the colonial, negative one.”26 This attitude resulted in a dialectic relationship between concepts such as “heritage” (tura¯th) and “modernity” (hada¯tha), ˙ and “authenticity” (asa¯la).27 This configuration of notions has evolved ˙ along a binary path, and is polarized between models of Western and Arab-Islamic heritage.28 Sabry identifies four main discourses, around which the interrelationship between authenticity and modernity has been evolving in current Arab thought. The first is “historicist/Marxist,”29 the second “rationalist/structuralist,”30 the third “cultural salafist/turatheya,”31 and the fourth the “anti-essentialist position.”32 The anti-essentialist position differs significantly in one respect from the other three discourses. It undoes the essentialist binary construction of authenticity and modernity, leading Sabry to claim that “this group may hold the key to the Arab intellectual impasse.”33 Representatives of this position include, for instance, Edward Said, as well as the Moroccan intellectuals Abdelkebir Khatibi34 and Fatima Mernissi.35 This line of thought struggles to occupy a more influential discursive position, but is still too weak to challenge the cultural and political hegemony of the binary pair, modernity and authenticity, which, as shown, has proliferated especially in times of external and internal crisis. This moment of “double-critique” – being critical vis-a`-vis both modernity and tradition36 – can be observed in contemporary trends of Arab and post-colonial thought and political practice. Firstly, in terms of ideology, there has been a transition from “ideology to critical thinking.”37 Times of crisis and waves of social unrest – for example, that experienced since the beginning of the 2000s, and in the wake of the events of January 2011 – can imply a polarization and “radicalization of both ideology and critique.”38 In a nutshell, Kassab infers that “what we witness at present is a ‘critical’ race between critique and increasingly extremist ideologies. On the critical side, authentic thinking has been proposed instead of a ‘thought of authenticity’.”39 This shift can also be observed in April 6, in the articulation of its demands, and its forms and modes of organization and mobilization. While claiming that it is not a movement driven by ideology, many interviewees introduced the selfascription of having an “Aprilian ideology” (ı¯diyu ¯ lu ¯ jiya¯ ibrı¯lı¯) as a mechanism of collective identity, encompassing all ideological orientations within the movement, which is united in criticizing and antagonizing the perceived injustice of the regime. However, the cross-ideological nature of the movement has indeed led to internal dynamics of competition and fragmentation.

154

MAKING REVOLUTION IN EGYPT

Secondly, conceptions of the “self” following the shift away “from essentialism to agency” can be observed by which “taken-for-granted descriptions of tradition, romanticized forms of nativism, and cults of difference are strongly criticized and abandoned for a more critical appropriation of values and ideas, whether native or not.”40 This process can also be seen in April 6, particularly in the engagement of members in active street politics, entailing a critical distance from formal politics, which expresses the importance of agency for both collective identity and self-understanding (in this case as a pressure group). In addition, this takes place without overt essentialist evaluation, as seen in the case of ideology but also in the flexible orientation and usage of political concepts and metaphors, unfolding in a global public sphere of mutual influences – like the notions of non-violence, pressure group and non-hierarchy. Finally, a transition can be observed from discourses on identity to democracy and everyday life issues – particularly social justice as a prerequisite for individual self-realization, but also for future generations. As already illustrated, modes of internal critique have intensified since the 2000s and have entailed a shift from ideological references – including Kifaya and its focus on “political” demands – to “socioeconomic and political issues,”41 considered as belonging together and eventually forming the basis for political action by movements such as April 6: Democracy and individual liberties have become immanently vital for the very preservation and promotion of life, rather than being a question of imitation, whether one is like or not like the West, as was the predominant concern during the first half of the twentieth century. Democracy and freedom have become essential for the revitalization of culture and the empowerment of people in facing their predicaments.42 The utopian character of revolutions since the French Revolution, which demanded an entirely new normative order for society, was absent in Egypt in 2011. Indeed, movements like April 6 reject the exercise of formal power in the first place. In keeping with the decline in the socially binding power of utopian and collectivistic ideologies, what developed instead43 – and this is exemplified by the empirical findings presented in this study – was the process of Mubarak’s hegemony being challenged in its final years by diverse social forces representing a particularization and individualization of “lifeworlds” [Lebenswelten] and values, as Reinhard Schulze has noted.44 This does not require that these articulations and

CONCLUSION

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opposition to the neoliberal processes necessitate a specific leftist orientation per se; Schulze goes on to add, The protesters in the Arab cities aimed to redefine society as a space ¨ glichkeitsraum] and to liberate it from the state’s of possibility [Mo control. It was thus about appreciating45 one’s own life and not about creating a “new human being.”46 In this sense, these manifestations of critiquing essentialist and utopian understandings of ideology and society, exemplified by April 6, could be framed as an example of contemporary opportunities and the limitations of a “post-colonial”47 overcoming of modern grand narratives adopted in the course of colonial influence. This is happening – although unique in its local context – in a space of globally evolving material and ideational forces, demanding essentially a new conceptualization of a participatory citizenship in dignity.48 In this sense, the cross-ideological context of 2011 is comparable to that of the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe, although their main difference pertains to the fact that 2011 “expressed the crisis of the economic world order, rather than reinforcing it.”49 The societal presence and institutional entrenchment of these contemporary social-movement dynamics are, however, fragile. Besides factors like continuing repression, socioeconomic pressures and lack of sustainable resources, the major dilemma faced concerns the approach to political practice. As we have seen, the cross-ideological orientations, organizationally flexible and informal understandings of politics indicate that these dynamics themselves are shaped in such a way as to often expect change from the hegemonic powers that they antagonize in a selfascribed revolutionary way, resulting in internal fragmentations; difficulties in constructing alliances; and, thus, in a diminished capacity to influence politics. Ultimately, this study provides only a snapshot of very recent developments. In line with the broader framework employed, it is important to foster transnational and interdisciplinary approaches in order to further decipher the complexities raised here by comparing fieldwork data from across the globe. This will contribute to additional and comparable insights reflecting possible discursive reconfigurations within the illustrated contexts of contention, and the way in which the elucidated contradictory moments emerge and are dealt with within social-movement dynamics in the twenty-first century – such as those represented by April 6. It is this research, its theorization and dissemination upon which, to a considerable degree, contemporary and future conceptualizations of politics and its socioeconomic implications will rest.

APPENDIX: LIST OF INTERVIEWS

This list contains all 40 interviews conducted with a total of 42 interviewees. Interviews 7, 15, and 26 are group interviews. (M) stands for male, (F) for female. In line with the employed principle of anonymity, as little identifying information as possible is given. As stated, activists from all levels of the organizational movement were interviewed. While the movement affiliation is listed, the exact geographical location – in terms of neighborhoods or local groups – is not indicated. Likewise, research institutions and media outlets are not named.

Cairo, 6 January 2013 Cairo, 7 January 2013 Cairo, 7 January 2013 Giza, 10 January 2013 Cairo, 13 January 2013 Cairo, 13 January 2013

Cairo, 13 January 2013

Cairo, 14 Cairo, 16 Cairo, 16 Cairo, 17 Cairo, 17

Cairo, 19 January 2013 Cairo, 19 January 2013

2 3 4 5 6 7

8

9 10 11 12 13

14 15

2013 2013 2013 2013 2013

Cairo, 6 January 2013

1

January January January January January

Interview Location and Date

Interview Number

(M) April 6 member, Cairo (local group, Social Development Committee). (M) April 6 member, Cairo (local group, Media Committee). (F) April 6 member, Cairo (local group coordinator). (M) April 6 Member, Cairo (local group coordinator). (M) April 6 member, Giza (local group). (M) April 6 member, Cairo (local group coordinator). A: (M) April 6 member, Cairo (local group, Media Committee). B: (M) April 6 member, Cairo (local group, Media Committee). (M) April 6 member, Cairo (local group, Mobilization Committee). (M) Kifaya member. (F) April 6 member, Cairo (local group). (M) April 6 member, Cairo (local group, Media Committee). (M) April 6 member, Cairo (local group). (M) April 6 Member, Cairo (local group, responsible for the Media Committee). (M) Independent activist. A: (M) April 6 member, Cairo (local group coordinator). B: (F) April 6 member, Cairo (local group, responsible for the Media Committee).

Interviewee

Cairo, 21 January 2013

Cairo, 21 January 2013 Cairo, 31 January 2013 Cairo, 2 February 2013 Cairo, 2 February 2013 Cairo, 5 February 2013 Cairo, 6 February 2013 Cairo, 10 February 2013 Cairo, 11 February 2013 Cairo, 14 February 2013 Giza, 14 February 2013

Cairo, 18 February 2013

Cairo, 18 February 2013

Cairo, 19 February 2013 Cairo, 20 February 2013 Cairo, 23 February 2013

Cairo, 24 February 2013

16

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

27

28

29 30 31

32

(M) Amr Ali (co-founder, Political Office member and former General Coordinator of April 6). (M) April 6 member (Political Office). (F) Professor of Public Administration. (M) Muslim Brotherhood member, Cairo. (M) Muslim Brotherhood member, Cairo. (M) Professor of Political Science. (M) Egyptian Current Party member, Cairo. (M) Professor of Political Science. (M) Assistant Professor of Political Science. (M) Journalist. A: (M) Hassan Maher, April 6 member, Giza (local group, responsible for the Media Committee). Later April 6 Media Committee Responsible, see interview 40. B: (M) April 6 member, Giza (local group, Media Committee). (F) Amy Austin Holmes, sociologist at the American University in Cairo. (M) April 6 member (Administration Office of Cairo Governorate for the Organization and Communication Committee). (M) Mohamed Adel (April 6 co-founder, Political Office member). (M) Basem Fathy (April 6 co-founder, later independent activist). (M) Ahmed Maher (Political Office member and former General Coordinator of April 6) (F) April 6 member (co-founder and Political Office member).

Interview Location and Date

Luxor, 27 February 2013

Cairo, 10 March 2013

Cairo, 12 March 2013 Cairo, 12 March 2013 Cairo, 15 March 2013 Alexandria, 4 April 2013

Cairo, 7 April 2013 Facebook interviews November – December 2016

Interview Number

33

34

35 36 37 38

39 40

Continued

(M) April 6 member, Luxor (Upper Egypt Coordinator, Administration Office). (M) Ramy Elswissy (co-founder and Political Office member); Coordinator of the movement’s International Department. (M) Journalist. (F) Journalist. (F) Professor of Political Science. (F) April 6 member, Alexandria (responsible for the Organization and Communication Committee). (M) April 6 Member (Political Office). (M) Hassan Maher, former April 6 Media Committee Responsible.

Interviewee

NOTES

Note on Translation and Transliteration 1. El-Said Badawi and Martin Hinds, A Dictionary of Modern Egyptian Arabic: Arabic – English (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1986). 2. University of Chicago Press, The Chicago Manual of Style, 16th edn (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2010), p. 807.

Chapter 1

Introduction

1. Ibn Khaldu ¯ n, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, translated from the Arabic by Franz Rosenthal (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 240. 2. April 6, “6th of April Youth Movement” Facebook page, 4 November 2014. Available at www.facebook.com/shabab6april/photos/a. 379736183293.203343.32847763293/10153288557043294/?type¼ 3&theater (accessed 13 February 2017). 3. Adham Youssef, “Tahrir Square closed in anticipation of protests,” Daily News Egypt, 25 January 2015. Available at www.dailynews egypt.com/2015/01/25/tahrir-square-closed-anticipation-protests (accessed 13 February 2017). 4. Pers. comm. #16. 5. Ahram Online, “Egypt’s Maher, Adel and Douma sentenced to 3 years in jail,” 22 December 2013. Available at english.ahram.org.eg/ NewsContent/1/0/89748/Egypt/0/Egypts-Maher,-Adel-and-Doumasentenced-to--years-i.aspx (accessed 13 February 2017). 6. Egyptian Streets, “April 6’s Ahmed Maher Released from Prison,” 5 January 2017. Available at egyptianstreets.com/2017/01/05/april6s-ahmed-maher-released-from-prison (accessed 13 February 2017).

162

NOTES TO PAGES 4 – 9

7. Hadeer El-Mahdawy, “April 6 Movement co-founder Mohamed Adel is released on 3-year probation,” Ahram Online, 22 January 2017. Available at english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/256633/ Egypt/Politics-/April – Movement-cofounder-Mohamed-Adel-isreleased.aspx (accessed 13 February 2017). 8. Mada Masr, “Court bans April 6 activities,” 28 April 2014. Available at www.madamasr.com/news/court-bans-april-6-activities (accesssed 13 February 2017). 9. April 6, “6th of April Youth Movement” Facebook page, 23 January 2015. Available at www.facebook.com/m6april?fref¼ts until 17 October 2016 (the image has recently been removed by the movement). Bold text corresponds to the red in the original (Figure 1.1). 10. For a detailed analysis of such exceptionalism, see, in particular, Edward Said’s seminal work Orientalism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978). 11. Mark Israel and Iain Hay, Research Ethics for Social Scientists: Between Ethical Conduct and Regulatory Compliance (London: Sage, 2009), pp. 23 – 9. 12. “Informed consent” means that “participants need first to comprehend and second to agree voluntarily to the nature of their research and their role within it” (Israel and Hay, Research Ethics, p. 61). For more, see American Sociological Association (ASA), Code of Ethics and Policies and Procedures of the ASA Committee on Professional Ethics (Washington, DC: American Sociological Association, 2008). Available at www.asanet.org/images/asa/docs/pdf/ CodeofEthics.pdf (accessed 13 February 2017). The ASA’s Code of Ethics puts it in the following terms: Informed consent is a basic ethical tenet of scientific research on human populations. Sociologists do not involve a human being as a subject in research without the informed consent of the subject or the subject’s legally authorized representative, except as otherwise specified in this Code. Sociologists recognize the possibility of undue influence or subtle pressures on subjects that may derive from researchers’ expertise or authority, and they take this into account in designing informed consent procedures. (ASA, Code of Ethics, 12) Youth are thereby particularly exposed to risks. The ASA’s Code specifies: “In undertaking research with vulnerable populations (e.g., youth, recent immigrant populations, the mentally ill), sociologists take special care to ensure that the voluntary nature of the research is understood and that consent is not coerced” (Ibid., 12.01/(d)).

NOTES TO PAGES 9 – 14

163

13. Israel and Hay, Research Ethics, pp. 77 – 94. After data was collected, studied and archived, a number of issues emerged regarding how to proceed using these materials. Israel and Hay explain: When people allow researchers to undertake research that involves them, they often negotiate terms for the agreement. Participants in research may, for example, consent on the basis that the information obtained about them will be used only by the researchers and only in particular ways. The information is private and is offered voluntarily to the researcher in confidence. (Ibid., p. 77). Thus, in order to have methodological integrity, “[r]esearchers have acted to protect the confidentiality of research participants and their activities by either not recording names and other data at all, or by removing names and identifying details from confidential data at the earliest possible stage” (Ibid., p. 82). However, [c]onfidentiality is not required with respect to observations in public places, activities conducted in public, or other settings where no rules of privacy are provided by law or custom. Similarly, confidentiality is not required in the case of information available from public records. (ASA, Code of Ethics, 11.02/(c)) 14. See Mark D. Johns, Jon G. Hall and Shing-Ling Sarina Chen (eds), Online Social Research: Methods, Issues, and Ethics (New York, NY: Peter Lang, 2004). 15. Annette N. Markham, “Internet research,” in David Silverman (ed.), Qualitative Research: Issues of Theory, Method and Practice, pp. 111 – 27 (London: Sage, 2011), pp. 122 – 3. 16. Asef Bayat, Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010); Linda Herrera and Asef Bayat (eds), Being Young and Muslim: New Cultural Politics in the Global South and North (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

Chapter 2

Conceptualizing Contentious Politics in a Global Context

1. See Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, Social Movements: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006); David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi, “Mapping the terrain,” in David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi (eds), The Blackwell

164

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

19. 20. 21. 22.

23.

NOTES TO PAGES 14 – 16 Companion to Social Movements, pp. 3– 16 (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004). Snow, Soule and Kriesi, “Mapping the terrain,” p. 11. Ahmed Abdalla, The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt: 1923–1973 (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2008), pp. 165–6. Della Porta and Diani, Social Movements, p. 1; Snow, Soule and Kriesi, “Mapping the terrain,” p. 4. Graeme Chesters and Ian Welsh, Social Movements: The Key Concepts (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 122. Ibid. Ibid., p. 14. See also Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). Chesters and Welsh, Social Movements, pp. 12 – 15; Stuart Hall, Resistance through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-War Britain (London: Hutchinson, 1977). ¨rgen Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action (Cambridge: Ju Polity, 1981), p. 33. See Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1974). Chesters and Welsh, Social Movements, p. 81. David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Ideology, frame resonance, and participant mobilization,” International Social Movement Research 1 (1988), pp. 197 – 217, p. 198. See also William A. Gamson, “Bystanders, public opinion, and the media,” in Snow, Soule and Kriesi (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, pp. 242 – 61 (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004). Chesters and Welsh, Social Movements, pp. 81 – 2. Della Porta and Diani, Social Movements, p. 74. Ibid., p. 75. Ibid., p. 76. Ibid., p. 77. Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor, “Introducing global civil society,” in Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor (eds), Global Civil Society, pp. 3–22 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Della Porta and Diani, Social Movements, p. 78. Ibid., p. 79. Ibid. Bob Edwards and John D. McCarthy, “Resources and social movement mobilization,” in Snow, Soule and Kriesi (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, pp. 116 – 52 (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004). Elisabeth S. Clemens and Debra C. Minkoff, ‘Beyond the iron law: rethinking the place of organizations in social movement research,”

NOTES TO PAGES 16 – 18

24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

30. 31. 32.

33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

43. 44.

165

in Snow, Soule and Kriesi (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, pp. 155– 70, p. 155. Ibid., p. 156. John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization (Morristown, NJ: General Learning, 1973). Clemens and Minkoff, “Beyond the iron law,” p. 158. Ibid., p. 163. Ibid., p. 164. Aldon D. Morris and Suzanne Staggenborg, “Leadership in social movements,” in Snow, Soule and Kriesi (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, pp. 171– 96 (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004). David Graeber, “The new anarchists,” New Left Review 13, January– February 2002. Available at newleftreview.org/II/13/david-graeberthe-new-anarchists (accessed 14 February 2017). Dieter Rucht, “The strength of weak identities,” Forschungsjournal Soziale Bewegungen 24/4 (2011), pp. 73–84. Available at http://forschungs journal.de/jahrgaenge/2011heft4 (accessed 31 March 2017). Mark S. Granovetter, “The strength of weak ties,” American Journal of Sociology 78/6 (1973), pp. 1,360 – 80. Available at sociology.stanford. edu/sites/default/files/publications/the_strength_of_weak_ties_and_ exch_w-gans.pdf (accessed 14 February 2017). Rucht, “The strength of weak identities,” p. 73. Ibid., p. 74. Ibid. Ibid., p. 82. Ibid., pp. 73 – 4. Verta Taylor and Nella Van Dyke, “‘Get up, stand up’: tactical repertoires of social movements,” in Snow, Soule and Kriesi (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, pp. 262 – 93, p. 263. Charles Tilly, Contentious Performances (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Taylor and Van Dyke, “‘Get up, stand up’,” p. 267. Ibid., p. 272. See Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture: The Rise of the Network Society, vol. 1 (Oxford: WileyBlackwell, 2010); Manuel Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age (Cambridge: Polity, 2012); Joss Hands, @ is for Activism: Dissent, Resistance and Rebellion in a Digital Culture (London: Pluto Press, 2011). Taylor and Van Dyke, “‘Get up, stand up’,” p. 274. Dieter Rucht, “Themes, logics and arenas of social movements: a structural approach,” International Social Movement Research 1 (1988), pp. 305–28.

166

NOTES TO PAGES 18 – 19

45. Taylor and Van Dyke, “‘Get up, stand up’,” p. 275. 46. See David A. Snow, “Framing processes, ideology, and discursive fields,” in Snow, Soule and Kriesi (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, pp. 380– 412 (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004); Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing processes and social movements: an overview and assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000), pp. 611 – 39, DOI: 10.1146/annurev. soc.26.1.611; William A. Gamson, Talking Politics (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 47. Taylor and Van Dyke, “‘Get up, stand up’,” p. 276. 48. This refers to Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of “habitus” in his seminal work Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, translated by Richard Nice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984). 49. Taylor and Van Dyke, “‘Get up, stand up’,” p. 277. 50. See McCarthy and Zald, The Trend of Social Movements in America; David A. Snow, Louis A. Zurcher Jr. and Sheldon Ekland-Olson, “Social networks and social movements: a microstructural approach to differential recruitment,” American Sociological Review 45 (1980), pp. 787– 801, available at www.jstor.org/stable/2094895 (accessed 14 February 2017). 51. Taylor and Van Dyke, ‘“Get up, stand up”’, p. 277. 52. Ibid., pp. 268 – 70. 53. Hanspeter Kriesi, “Political context and opportunity,” in Snow, Soule and Kriesi (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, pp. 67 – 90. 54. Ruud Koopmans, “Protest in time and space: the evolution of waves of contention,” in Snow, Soule and Kriesi (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, pp. 19 – 46, p. 21. 55. Ibid., p. 29. 56. Donatella Della Porta and Olivier Fillieule, “Policing social protests,” in Snow, Soule and Kriesi (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, pp. 217 – 41, p. 233. 57. Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 66. 58. Ruud Koopmans, “The dynamics of protest waves: West Germany, 1965 to 1989,” American Sociological Review 58/5 (1993), pp. 637 – 58. Available at www.jstor.org/stable/2096279 (accessed 14 February 2017). 59. Koopmans, “Protest in time and space,” pp. 36 –7; Kriesi, “Political context and opportunity,” p. 81. 60. Guilain Denoeux, Urban Unrest in the Middle East: A Comparative Study of Informal Networks in Egypt, Iran, and Lebanon (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1993), p. 24; Steven Pfaff, “Collective identity and informal groups in revolutionary mobilization: East Germany in 1989,” Social Forces 75/1 (1996), pp. 91 – 117,

NOTES TO PAGES 19 – 21

61.

62.

63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80.

167

p. 99, available at www.jstor.org/stable/2580758 (accessed 14 February 2017). Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, “The bureaucratic mode of governance and practical norms in West Africa and beyond,” in Malika Bouziane, Cilja Harders and Anja Hoffmann (eds), Local Politics and Contemporary Transformations in the Arab World: Governance beyond the Center, pp. 43 – 64 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). Cilja Harders, “Bringing the local back in: local politics between informalization and mobilization in an age of transformation in Egypt,” in Bouziane, Harders and Hoffmann, Local Politics and Contemporary Transformations, pp. 113 – 36 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 117 – 19. Denoeux, Urban Unrest in the Middle East. Ibid., pp. 13 – 14. Ibid., p. 14. Ibid., p. 16. Ibid., p. 24. Bayat, Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010). Ibid., p. 14. Ibid. Henri Lefebvre, Le droit a` la ville (Paris: Ed. Anthropus, 1973). Bayat, Life as Politics, p. 20. Ibid., p. 13. Ibid., p. 22. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso Books, 2006). Bayat, Life as Politics; Linda Herrera and Asef Bayat (eds), Being Young and Muslim: New Cultural Politics in the Global South and North (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Ibid., p. 21. Bayat, Life as Politics, p. 22. Ibid., pp. 22 – 3. See Holger Albrecht (ed.), Contentious Politics in the Middle East: Political Opposition under Authoritarianism (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2010); Holger Albrecht, Raging against the Machine: Political Opposition under Authoritarianism in Egypt (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2013); Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Peter Pawelka, Der Vordere Orient und die Internationale Politik (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1993); Oliver Schlumberger (ed.), Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007).

168

NOTES TO PAGES 22 – 23

81. See Asef Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007); Asef Bayat (ed.), Post-Islamism: The Many Faces of Political Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, translated by Carol Volk (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994). 82. Edmund Burke III and Ira M. Lapidus (eds), Islam, Politics, and Social Movements (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990); Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004). 83. Denoeux, Urban Unrest in the Middle East; Roel Meijer (ed.), Alienation or Integration of Arab Youth: Between Family, State and Street (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2000). 84. Zachary Lockman, Workers and Working Classes in the Middle East: Struggles, Histories, Historiographies (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994); Joel Beinin, Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 85. Dina Shehata, “Youth movements and the 25 January revolution,” in Bahgat Korany and Rabab El-Mahdi (eds), Arab Spring in Egypt: Revolution and Beyond, pp. 105 – 24 (Cairo and New York, NY: American University in Cairo Press, 2014). 86. Maha Abdelrahman, Egypt’s Long Revolution: Protest Movements and Uprisings (Abingdon and New York, NY: Routledge, 2015). 87. Ahmed Tohamy, Youth Activism in Egypt: Islamism, Political Protest and Revolution (London: I.B.Tauris, 2016). 88. Bayat, Life as Politics, p. 116. 89. Ibid., p. 118. 90. Ibid., p. 116. 91. Ibid., p. 118. 92. Ibid., p. 120. 93. Meijer, Alienation or Integration, p. 1. 94. See Diane Singerman, Avenues of Participation: Family, Politics, and Networks in Urban Quarters of Cairo (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). 95. Meijer, Alienation or Integration, pp. 1 – 2. 96. As with the Hittistes in Algeria. The term means those “leaning against walls,” expressing a lifestyle caused by unemployment and lack of perspective. It comes from the Arabic “Hit” for wall (Luis Martinez, “Youth, the street and violence in Algeria,” in Meijer, Alienation or Integration, pp. 83–106, p. 102). See also Kamel Rarrbo, L’Algerie et sa jeunesse: Marginalisations sociales et de´sarroi culturel (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1995). For the attraction of youth to Islamist discourse, see Bayat, Life as Politics; Meijer, Alienation or Integration, pp. 8–9. 97. Meijer, Alienation or Integration, p. 2; see also Ahmed Abdalla, “The Egyptian generation of 1967: reaction of the young to national

NOTES TO PAGES 23 – 24

98. 99.

100. 101.

102.

103. 104. 105. 106.

169

defeat,” in Roel Meijer (ed.), Alienation or Integration of Arab Youth: Between Family, State and Street, pp. 71–81 (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2000); Nadine Sika, “Youth political engagement in Egypt: from abstention to uprising,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 39/2 (2012), pp. 181–99, DOI: 10.1080/13530194.2012.709700; Dina El-Sharnouby, “From state exclusionary politics to youth inclusionary practices: the Tahrir Square experience,” International Journal of Sociology, 45/3 (2015), pp. 176 – 89, DOI: 10.1080/00207659.2015. 1049506. Meijer, Alienation or Integration, p. 12. Herrera and Bayat, Being Young and Muslim, p. 4; Emma C. Murphy, “Problematizing Arab youth: generational narratives of systemic failure,” Mediterranean Politics 17/1 (2012), pp. 5 – 22, DOI: 10.1080/ 13629395.2012.655043. Mayssoun Sukarieh and Stuart Tannock, Youth Rising? The Politics of Youth in the Global Economy (London: Routledge, 2015), p. 105. Navtej Dhillon and Tarik Yousef (eds), Generation in Waiting: The Unfilfilled Promise of Young People in the Middle East (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009); Bayat, Life as Politics; Samir Khalaf and Roseanne Saad Khalaf, “Introduction: on the marginalization and mobilization of Arab youth,” in Samir Khalaf and Roseanne Saad Khalaf (eds), Arab Youth: Social Mobilization in Times of Risk, pp. 7 – 32 (London: Saqi Books, 2012); Diane Singerman, Cairo Contested: Governance, Urban Space, and Global Modernity (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2009); ASDA’A BursonMarsteller, A White Paper on the Findings of the Third Annual ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey 2010 (Dubai: ASDA’A BursonMarsteller, 2010), available at http://arabyouthsurvey.com/pdf/2010AYS-White-Paper-EN_09042016132107.pdf (accessed 14 February 2017); ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller, After the Spring: A White Paper on the Findings of the ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey 2012 (Dubai: ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller, 2012), available at http:// arabyouthsurvey.com/pdf/2012-AYS-White-Paper-EN_09042 016132037.pdf (accessed 14 February 2017). Institute of National Planning, Egypt Human Development Report 2010: Youth in Egypt: Building our Future, 2010. Available at hdr.undp. org/en/content/2010-egypt-human-development-report-youthegypt (accessed 14 February 2017). Vera King, Die Entstehung des Neuen in der Adoleszenz: Individuation, Generativita¨t und Geschlecht in Modernisierten Gesellschaften (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2013), pp. 10–13. Ibid., p. 15. Ibid., p. 39. Ibid.

170

NOTES TO PAGES 24 – 25

107. Meijer, Alienation or Integration; Herrera and Bayat, Being Young and Muslim; Khalaf and Khalaf, “Introduction”; Farhad Khosrokhavar, The New Arab Revolutions that Shook the World (Boulder, CO and London: Paradigm Publishers, 2012); Murphy, “Problematizing Arab youth”; Ahmed Abdalla, al-Shaba¯b al-Misrı¯ bayna al-Intima¯ʾ ˙ ¯ sa¯t al-Shaba¯biyya wa-l-Musha¯raka (Cairo: Markaz al-Gı¯l li-l-Dira wa-l-Igtima¯ʿiyya [Al-Jeel Center for Youth and Social Studies], n.d.), published by Muba¯dara Tauthı¯q Aʿma¯l Dr. Ahmad ʿAbdallah ˙ Ruzza on 13 July 2012, available at de.scribd.com/doc/99980441/ ‫ﺍﻟﻤﺸﺎﺭﻛﺔ‬-‫ﻭ‬-‫ﺍﻹﻧﺘﻤﺎﺀ‬-‫ﺑﻴﻦ‬-‫ﺍﻟﻤﺼﺮﻱ‬-‫( ﺍﻟﺸﺒﺎﺏ‬accessed 14 February 2017); Gema ˜oz, “Arab youth today: the generation gap, identity Martin Mun crisis and democratic deficit,” in Roel Meijer (ed.), Alienation or Integration of Arab Youth: Between Family, State and Street, pp. 17 – 26 (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2000). 108. King, Die Entstehung des Neuen in der Adoleszenz, pp. 31 – 2. The German wording used by King is “verla¨ngerte Jugend.” 109. Diane Singerman, “Youth, gender, and dignity in the Egyptian uprising,” Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 9/3 (2013), pp. 1–27, p. 9, available at muse.jhu.edu/article/517380 (accessed 20 March 2017). 110. Ibid. 111. In this context, one could also take into account Moghaddam’s observations of the psychological implications of authoritarian rule and dictatorship. Fathali M. Moghaddam, The Psychology of Dictatorship (Washington, DC: American Psychological Foundation, 2013). 112. Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 75. 113. Singerman, Cairo Contested. 114. Omnia El Shakry, “Cairo as capital of socialist revolution?” in Diane Singerman and Paul Amar (eds), Cairo Cosmopolitan: Politics, Culture, and Urban Space in the New Globalized Middle East, pp. 73 – 98 (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2006); Philippe Droz-Vincent, “The security sector in Egypt: management, coercion and external alliance under the dynamics of change,” in Laura Guazzone and Daniela Pioppi (eds), The Arab State and Neo-Liberal Globalization: The Restructuring of State Power in the Middle East, pp. 219 – 45 (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2009). 115. See Galal A. Amin, The Modernization of Poverty: A Study in the Political Economy of Growth in 9 Arab Countries, 1945 – 1970 (Leiden: Brill, 1974); Denoeux, Urban Unrest in the Middle East; Fouad N. Ibrahim and Barbara Ibrahim, Egypt: An Economic Geography (London: I.B.Tauris, 2003), pp. 202– 46; Singerman, Cairo Contested; David Sims, Understanding Cairo: The Logic of a City Out of Control (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2011).

NOTES TO PAGES 25 – 26

171

116. Noureddine Jebnoun, “Introduction: rethinking the paradigm of ‘durable’ and ‘stable’ authoritariansim in the Middle East,” in Noureddine Jebnoun, Mehrdad Kia, and Mimi Kirk (eds), Modern Middle East Authoritarianism: Roots, Ramifications, and Crisis, pp. 1–24 (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 15. 117. Samer Soliman, The Autumn of Dictatorship, Fiscal Crisis and Political Change in Egypt under Mubarak (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), pp. 154– 7. 118. See Rachel Heiman, Mark Liechty and Carla Freeman, “Introduction: charting an anthropology of the middle classes,” in Rachel Heiman, Mark Liechty and Carla Freeman (eds), The Global Middle Classes: Theorizing Through Ethnography, pp. 3–29 (Santa Fe, NM: School for Advanced Research Press, 2012), pp. 13–14; Karolin Sengebusch and Ali Sonay, “Caught in the middle? On the middle class and its relevance in the contemporary Middle East,” Middle East – Topics & Arguments 2 (2014), pp. 4–10, available at meta-journal.net/article/ view/2154/2096 (accessed 14 February 2017). 119. Heiman, Liechty and Freeman, “Introduction,” p. 14. 120. Diane Singerman and Paul Amar, Cairo Cosmopolitan: Politics, Culture, and Urban Space in the New Globalized Middle East (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2006); Singerman, Cairo Contested; Anouk De Koning, Global Dreams: Class, Gender, and Public Space in Cosmopolitan Cairo (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2009); Mark Allen Peterson, Connected in Cairo: Growing up Cosmopolitan in the Modern Middle East (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2011); Farha Ghannam, Remaking the Modern: Space, Relocation, and the Politics of Identity in a Global Cairo (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002); Samuli Schielke, “Living in the future tense: aspiring for world and class in provincial Egypt,” in Heiman, Freeman and Liechty, The Global Middle Classes, pp. 31 – 56. 121. Heiman, Liechty and Freeman, “Introduction,” pp. 18 – 19. 122. Ibid., p. 20. 123. Joel Beinin and Fre´de´ric Vairel, “Introduction: the Middle East and North Africa beyond classical social movement theory,” in Joel Beinin and Fre´de´ric Vairel (eds), Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa, 2nd edn (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), pp. 1 – 26, p. 2. 124. Beinin and Vairel, “Introduction.” 125. John Boli and Frank J. Lechner, “Globalization theory,” in Bryan S. Turner (ed.), The New Blackwell Companion to Social Theory, pp. 321 –40 (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), p. 321. 126. Ibid.; David Held and Anthony McGrew, Globalization/AntiGlobalization: Beyond the Great Divide, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), p. 9.

172

NOTES TO PAGES 26 – 28

127. Castells, The Information Age. 128. Boli and Lechner, “Globalization theory,” p. 321. 129. David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1989), p. 260. 130. Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), Chapter 3. 131. Ibid. 132. Immanuel Wallerstein, “New revolts against the system,” New Left Review 18 (2002), p. 29. Available at newleftreview.org/II/18/ immanuel-wallerstein-new-revolts-against-the-system (accessed 14 February 2017). 133. Samir Amin et al., Transforming the Revolution: Social Movements and the World-System (New York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 1990), pp. 96 – 7. 134. Wallerstein, “New revolts,” p. 35. 135. Ibid. 136. Valentine Moghadam, Globalization and Social Movements: Islamism, Feminism and the Global Justice Movement (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), p. 6. 137. Sarah A. Soule, “Diffusion processes within and across movements,” in Snow, Soule and Kriesi (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, pp. 294 – 310, p. 294. 138. Ibid., p. 295. 139. Ibid., p. 296. 140. Donatella Della Porta and Sidney Tarrow, “Transnational processes and social activism: an introduction,” in Donatella Della Porta and Sidney Tarrow (eds), Transnational Protest and Global Activism: People, Passions and Power, pp. 1– 17 (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), p. 4. 141. Della Porta and Diani, Social Movements, pp. 186– 8; Jackie Smith, “Transnational processes and movements,” in Snow, Soule and Kriesi (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, pp. 311– 35; Soule, “Diffusion processes,” p. 294. 142. Doug McAdam and Dieter Rucht, “The cross-national diffusion of movement ideas,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 528 (1993): Citizens, Protest, and Democracy, pp. 56 – 74. Available at www.jstor.org/stable/1047791 (accessed 15 February 2017), p. 58. 143. Della Porta and Diani, Social Movements, p. 187. 144. Della Porta and Tarrow, Transnational Protest, pp. 5 – 6. 145. Maha Abdelrahman, “The transnational and the local: Egyptian activists and transnational protest networks,” British Journal of Middle East Studies 38/3 (2011), pp. 407–24, DOI: 10.1080/13530194.2011. 621701. 146. Della Porta and Tarrow, Transnational Protest, p. 7.

NOTES TO PAGES 28 – 30 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167.

173

Ibid. Ibid., pp. 8– 14. Smith, “Transnational processes,” pp. 321– 2. Ibid., p. 324. Ibid. Ibid., p. 325. Ibid., pp. 326– 7. Ibid., p. 313. Ibid. Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). Ibid., p. 3. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 338– 9. Ibid., p. 340. Ibid., p. 377. Ibid., p. 376. Ibid., p. 328. Singerman, Cairo Contested, pp. 3– 4. Ibid., p. 19. Ibid., p. 30. See Khosrokhavar, The New Arab Revolutions; Saskia Sassen, “The global street: making the political,” Globalizations 8/5 (2011), pp. 573– 9, DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2011.622458; Paul Mason, Why it’s Kicking off Everywhere: The New Global Revolutions (London: Verso Books, 2012); Christopher Pawling, Critical Theory and Political Engagement: From May ’68 to the Arab Spring (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Saskia Sassen, “Das minimalistische Facebook. Netzwerkfa¨hig¨ ßeren o ¨ kologien,” in Oliver Leistert and Theo Ro ¨ hle (eds), keit in gro ¨ ber das Leben im Social Net, pp. 249–52 Generation Facebook: U (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2011); David Harvey, Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution (London and Brooklyn, NY: ˜ eda, “The Indignados of Spain: Verso Books, 2012); Ernesto Castan a precedent to Occupy Wall Street,” Social Movement Studies: Journal of Social, Cultural and Political Protest 11/3–4 (2012), pp. 309–19, DOI: 10.1080/14742837.2012.708830; Carlos Taibo, “The Spanish indignados: a movement with two souls,” European Urban and Regional Studies 20/1 (2012), pp. 155–8, DOI: 10.1177/0969776412459846; Castells, Networks of Outrage; Puneet Dhaliwal, “Public squares and resistance: the politics of space in the Indignados movement,” Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements 4/1 (2012), pp. 251– 73, available at www.interfacejournal.net/wordpress/wp-content/ uploads/2012/05/Interface-4-1-Dhaliwal.pdf (accessed 15 February 2017); Vittorio Sergi and Markos Vogiatzoglou, “Think globally, act locally? Symbolic memory and global repertoires in the Tunisian

174

NOTES TO PAGES 30 – 35

uprising and the Greek anti-austerity mobilizations,” in Cristina Flesher Fominaya and Laurence Cox (eds), Understanding European Movements: New Social Movements, Global Justice Struggles, Anti-Austerity Protest (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 220–35; Maria Kousis, “The transnational dimension of the Greek protest campaign against Troika memoranda and austerity policies 2011–2012,” in Donatella Della Porta and Alice Mattoni (eds), Spreading Protest: Social Movements in Times of Crisis, pp. 137–70 (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2014); Wolfgang ¨ dig and Georgios Karyotis, “Who protests in Greece? Mass Ru opposition to austerity,” British Journal of Political Science 44/03 (2014), pp. 487–513, DOI: 10.1017/S0007123413000112; Lance W. Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg, “The logic of connective action,” Information, Communication & Society 15/5 (2012), pp. 739– 68, DOI: 10.1080/1369118X.2012.670661; Jackie Smith, Social Movements for Global Democracy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008); David Graeber, The Democracy Project: A History, a Crisis, a Movement (London: Allen Lane, 2013). 168. Marlies Glasius and Geoffrey Pleyers, “The global moment of 2011: democracy, social justice and dignity,” Development and Change 44/3 (2013), pp. 547–67. 169. Ibid., p. 547.

Part II The Road to 25 January 2011 1. Ahmed Khaled Towfik, Utopia (Doha: Bloomsbury Qatar Foundation Publishing, 2011), pp. 108 – 9.

Chapter 3 Contentious Politics in Egypt: A Historical Reflection 1. See Halil Inalcik, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire 1300 – 1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Timur Kuran, The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East (Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011); Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty (New York, NY: Crown Business, 2012). 2. See Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798 – 1939 (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); Kemal Karpat, Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East (New York, NY: Praeger, 1982). 3. Christoph Schumann (ed.), Liberal Thought in the Eastern Mediterranean: Late 19th Century until the 1960s (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2008), p. 3. 4. Ibid., pp. 239– 66.

NOTES TO PAGES 35 – 36

175

5. Hourani, Arabic Thought. 6. See Abdeslam Maghraoui, Liberalism without Democracy: Nationhood and Citizenship in Egypt, 1922 – 1936 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006); Christoph Schumann (ed.), Nationalism and Liberal Thought in the Arab East: Ideology and Practice (London: Routledge, 2010). 7. Hourani, Arabic Thought, pp. 103 – 29. 8. Ibid., pp. 130– 60. 9. Gerhard Bowering (ed.), The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), pp. 5– 7. 10. Hourani, Arabic Thought, pp. 222– 44. 11. See ibid.; Elizabeth Suzanne Kassab, Contemporary Arab Thought: Cultural Critique in Comparative Perspective (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2010); Karpat, Political and Social Thought. 12. Panayiotis J. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991), p. 127. 13. Ibid., pp. 70 – 4. 14. Ibid., pp. 137 – 40. ¨ gyptischen Fallahin 1919: Zum 15. Reinhard Schulze, Die Rebellion der A Konflikt zwischen der Agrarisch-Orientalischen Gesellschaft und dem ¨ gypten 1820 – 1919 (Berlin: Baalbek, 1981), Kolonialen Staat in A p. 210. 16. The term “middle class” has diverse conceptualizations, and in the literature it is used as both “as an analytic category, and as a descriptive term without analytic substance” including subcategories such as the old or new middle classes with a respective habitus usually correlating with certain professions and levels of income (Karolin Sengebusch and Ali Sonay, “Caught in the middle? On the middle class and its relevance in the contemporary Middle East,” Middle East – Topics & Arguments 2, 2014, pp. 4 – 10, p. 4, available at meta-journal.net/article/view/2154/2096, accessed 14 February 2017). In this study, middle class denotes a social segment that is indeed well educated and cosmopolitan, aspiring to an idealized way of life, propagated as middle class particularly since the ascendancy of neoliberal discourse in the 1970s. For more on the meaning of middle class in the course of the establishment of the modern nation state in the MENA region, see Keith David Watenpaugh, Being Modern in the Middle East: Revolution, Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Arab Middle Class (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). For contemporary global discourses around middle classes and their role in the MENA region, see Rachel Heiman, Mark Liechty and Carla Freeman, The Global Middle Classes: Theorizing Through Ethnography (Santa Fe, NM: School for Advanced Research Press, 2012); Rachid Ouaissa, Die Rolle der Mittelschichten im ¨ berblick (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2014); Arabischen Fru¨hling: Ein U

176

17.

18. 19.

20.

21. 22. 23.

24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

NOTES TO PAGES 36 – 37 Rachid Ouaissa, “The misunderstandings about the role of the middle classes,” Middle East – Topics & Arguments 2 (2014), pp. 12 – 16, available at meta-journal.net/article/view/1423/2091 (accessed 15 February 2017). For the etymological origin of the title Efendi in Egypt and the Arab world via Greek and Ottoman Turkish, see Bernard Lewis, s.v. “Efendi” in Bernard Lewis, Charles Pellat and Joseph Schacht (eds), Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edn (Leiden: Brill, 1965), p. 687. Joel Beinin, Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 71. See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso Books, 2006); George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement (Beirut: Libraire du Liban, 1955); Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005). See Selma Botman, The Rise of Egyptian Communism, 1939–1970 (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1988); Rami Ginat, A History of Egyptian Communism: Jews and their Compatriots in Quest of Revolution (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2011). Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 1930 – 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. xii. Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, The Eastern Mediterranean and the Making of Global Radicalism, 1860–1914 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010). “Radicalism” in this context refers to leftist circles displaying a set of “selective adaptations of socialist and anarchist principles,” encompassing “specific calls for social justice, workers’ rights, mass higher education, and anti-clericalism, and more broadly a general challenge to the existing social and political order at home and abroad” (Ibid., p. 1). Ibid., p. 3. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt, pp. 266– 7. Ibid., p. 271. ¨ nf Reinhard Schulze, “Vom anfang und ende der revolution – fu bemerkungen mit blick auf die arabische welt,” Journal of Modern European History 11/2 (2013): On Revolution, pp. 220 – 42, pp. 225– 6. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt, pp. 273– 86. Gershoni and Jankowski, Redefining the Egyptian Nation, p. 4. Ibid., p. 18. For analogous modern conceptualizations of youth elsewhere, see Karl Mannheim, “The problem of generations,” in Paul Kecskemeti (ed.), Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, pp. 276– 320 (London: ¨ egg, Kulturkritik und Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952); Walter Ru

NOTES TO PAGES 37 – 39

32. 33. 34. 35.

36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43.

44. 45. 46. 47.

48. 49. 50. 51. 52.

177

Jugendkult (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1974); Philipp Lee Utley, “Radical youth: generational conflict in the Anfang Movement, 1912 – January 1914,” History of Education Quarterly 19/2 (1979), pp. 207 – 28. Gershoni and Jankowski, Redefining the Egyptian Nation, pp. 20 –1. Lucie Ryzova, The Age of the Efendiyya: Passages to Modernity in National-Colonial Egypt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 190 – 4. Ahmed Abdalla, The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt: 1923 – 1973 (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2008), pp. 51 – 61. See Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013); Husa¯m Tamma¯m, Tahawwula¯t al-Ikhwa¯n al-Muslimı¯n: Tafak˙ ¯ lu¯jiyya wa-Niha¯yat˙ al-Tanz¯ım (Cairo: Maktabat Madbu kuk al-I¯diu ¯ lı¯, ˙ 2010). Mohammed Zahid, The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s Succession Crisis: The Politics of Liberalisation and Reform in the Middle East (London: I.B.Tauris, 2010), pp. 72 – 83. Gershoni and Jankowski, Redefining the Egyptian Nation, p. 15. Abdalla, The Student Movement, pp. 39 – 43. Ibid., p. 21. Ibid., pp. 41 – 3. Ibid., pp. 212 – 19. Ibid., p. 42. Established in 1920 as a nationalist bank with the “intention of breaking the monopoly of foreign financial capital in Egypt and providing capital to establish Egyptian-owned, large-scale, industrial enterprises” (Beinin, Workers and Peasants, p. 102). Ibid., p. 103. Abdalla, The Student Movement, p. 42. Beinin, Workers and Peasants, pp. 107– 8. Prominent among workers was the Democratic Movement for National Liberation (al-Haraka al-Dı¯muqra¯tiyya li-l-Tahrı¯r al˙ Nile: Watanı¯). Joel Beinin and ˙Zachary Lockman, ˙Workers on the ˙ Nationalism, Communism, Islam, and the Egyptian Working Class, 1882 – 1954 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 340 – 4. Abdalla, The Student Movement, pp. 62 – 8. Beinin and Lockman, Workers on the Nile, p. 344. Abdalla, The Student Movement, pp. 74 – 5. Hazem Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen: Egypt’s Road to Revolt (London: Verso Books, 2012), pp. 7– 15. Ta¯riq Al-Bishrı¯, al-Haraka al-Siya¯siyya fı¯ Misr 1945 – 1952: Mura¯gaʿa ˙ ˙ ˙ wa-Taqdı Da¯r al-Shuru p. 579. ¯m gadı¯d (Beirut: ¯ q, 1983),

178

NOTES TO PAGES 39 – 40

53. Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen, p. 13. 54. Ahmed Tohamy, Youth Activism in Egypt: Islamism, Political Protest and Revolution (London: I.B.Tauris, 2016), p. 46. 55. Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen, pp. 2 – 3. 56. After the takeover by the Free Officers a Revolutionary Council (RCC) dissolved all political parties in January 1953, abolished the monarchy and declared a republic in June. A new constitution was introduced in January 1956, reserving wide-ranging powers for the president who was analogous to the king, and Nasser was elected president in June 1956 in a referendum (Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt, pp. 380 – 8). 57. Anouar Abdel-Malek, Egypte: Socie´te´ Militaire (Paris: Ed. du Seuil, 1962), p. 18ff. 58. Panayiotis J. Vatikiotis, Nasser and his Generation (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1978), p. 157; Robert Bianchi, Unruly Corporatism: Association Life in Twentieth-Century Egypt (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). 59. Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen, pp. 18 – 22. 60. Ibid., p. 18. 61. Vatikiotis, Nasser and his Generation, pp. 281 –2. 62. Ibid., pp. 67 – 8. 63. Beinin, Workers and Peasants, p. 131. 64. Vatikiotis, Nasser and his Generation, pp. 282 –3. 65. Gershoni and Jankowski, Redefining the Egyptian Nation, p. 219. 66. This refers to Jean-Francois Lyotard’s concept as set out in his seminal work The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). Lyotard elaborates on the loss of meaning construction by collectivistic, normative understandings of organizing societies, and ideologies like nationalism and socialism. These notions, which signified modernity’s one-dimensional orientation, were increasingly overlaid by the individual’s new posture in pluralist post-modernist discourse. This discussion will be resumed in the conclusion and reevaluated with respect to Egypt and the research question analyzed in this book. Ideology, in turn, is understood here in the sense of Michael Freeden’s conceptualization as “distinctive configurations of political concepts,” which “create specific conceptual patterns from a pool of indeterminate and unlimited combinations” (Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 4). The emergence of modern ideologies was accompanied by a collectivistic, utopian moment as reflected by a number of studies (see, for example: Karl Mannheim Ideologie und Utopie, Frankfurt am Main: Schulte-Bulmke, 1952; Paul Ricœur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, edited and translated by George H. Taylor, New York, NY:

NOTES TO PAGE 40

67.

68. 69. 70. 71. 72.

179

Columbia University Press, 1985). In his lectures on “The end of Utopia” in the 1960s, Herbert Marcuse pointed out a reconfiguration of ideological thinking in the sense that the utopian element began to be accompanied by an individualistic self-positioning, surfacing later with the global protests in 1968 (Herbert Marcuse, Das Ende der Utopie: Vortra¨ge und Diskussionen in Berlin 1967, Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Neue Kritik, 1980). With regard to the MENA region, a series of publications understood the defeat of 1967 as a turning point in Arab political thought and ideological orientation. See, for example: Sadiq Al-Azm, al-Naqd al-Dha¯tı¯ baʿda al-Hazı¯ma (Beirut: Da¯r al-Talı¯ʿa, 1980); Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabiʿ, Contemporary Arab Thought: Studies in Post-1967 Arab Intellectual History (London and Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2004); Kassab, Contemporary Arab Thought. Whereas a turn toward Islamist ideology has been observable, a process such as that identified by Lyotard and Marcuse can be seen in Paul Salem’s Bitter Legacy: Ideology and Politics in the Arab World (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1994), in which Salem postulates that “an age of ideology is gradually coming to an end” (p. 276), and in Reinhard Schulze’s A Modern History of the Islamic World (translated by Azizeh Azodi, London and New York, NY: I.B.Tauris, 2002, pp. xiii; 278 – 80), with the consequence of more flexible and pragmatic understandings of politics. Cross-ideological thinking and practice was already prevalent in the 1980s, and became a feature in the new wave of contentious politics in the 2000s. See, for example, Michaelle Browers, Political Ideology in the Arab World: Accommodation and Transformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Sune Haugbolle, “Reflections on ideology after the Arab uprisings,” Jadaliyya, 21 March 2012, available at www.jadaliyya. com/pages/index/4764/reflections-on-ideology-after-the-arabuprisings (accessed 15 February 2017). Vatikiotis, Nasser and his Generation, pp. 233 – 4. The Suez War, which followed nationalization under Nasser, was fought against a coalition of Britain, France and Israel that aimed to reverse this move and depose Nasser. The war ended with the intervention of the new superpowers, the USA and the Soviet Union, aimed at putting the old powers in their place. Nasser could thus claim a political victory while having suffered a military defeat. See Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen, pp. 45 – 51. Tohamy, Youth Activism in Egypt, p. 52. Vatikiotis, Nasser and his Generation, p. 211. See ibid.; Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen, pp. 61 – 9. Vatikiotis, Nasser and his Generation, pp. 205 –11. Hazem Kandil, “Why did the Egyptian middle class march to Tahrir Square?” Mediterranean Politics 17/2 (2012), pp. 197– 215,

180

73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86.

87.

NOTES TO PAGES 40 – 41 pp. 203– 4. Available at dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2012.694044 (accessed 15 February 2017). Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen, p. 55. Ibid., pp. 22 – 3. Samer Soliman, al-Niza¯m al-Qawı¯ wa-l-Dawla al-Daʿ¯ıfa: Ida¯ra _ ˙ al-Azma al-Ma¯liyya wa-l-Taghyı ¯r al-Siya¯sı¯ fi ʿAhd Muba¯rak (Cairo: Da¯r li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzı¯ʿ, 2006), p. 269. Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen, p. 56. The ASU’s youth wing. See ibid., p. 57. Ibid., p. 56. Ibid., p. 63. Ibid., p. 64. Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 23. Raymond A. Hinnebusch Jr, Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The PostPopulist Development of an Authoritarian-Modernizing State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 243–4. Tohamy, Youth Activism in Egypt, p. 47. Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen, p. 58. For example, by guards on campuses controlling political activities and restricting the functioning of elected student unions. See Abdalla, The Student Movement, pp. 124 –37. Professional syndicates (niqa¯ba¯t mihniyya) had existed before 1952, but were increasingly absorbed into the orbit of the ASU (Eberhard Kienle, A Grand Delusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt, London and New York, NY: I.B.Tauris, 2001, p. 38). As will be explained below, they gradually developed into sites of struggle with the regime. Ibid., pp. 37 – 8; Beinin and Lockman, in Workers on the Nile, pp. 344 and 431 – 47, describe the process of attempts at unification by the trade unions (niqa¯ba¯t ʿumma¯liyya) until the early days of the 1952 Revolution, and its realization under the state-controlled Egyptian Trade Union Federation (al-Ittiha¯d al˙ the ¯ mm li-Niqa¯ba¯t ʿUmma¯l Misr) in 1957, which would hold ʿA ˙ workers in its grip until the early 2000s. See Francoise Cle´ment, “Worker protests under economic liberalization in Egypt,” in Nicholas S. Hopkins (ed.), Political and Social Protest in Egypt: Cairo Papers in Social Science 29 2/3 (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2009), pp. 100 – 16, p. 103; Joel Beinin and Marie Duboc, “A workers’ social movement on the margin of the global neoliberal order, Egypt 2004 – 2012,” in Joel Beinin and Fre´de´ric Vairel (eds), Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa, 2nd edn (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), pp. 205 – 27.

NOTES TO PAGES 41 – 42

181

88. As will be seen, this law was updated in a similar manner in 2002 by NGO Law No. 84. 89. Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, p. 99. 90. Rabab El-Mahdi, “Enough!: Egypt’s quest for democracy,” Comparative Political Studies 42/8 (2009), pp. 1,011 – 39, p. 1,021, DOI: 10.1177/0010414009331719. 91. Communist organizations, which had similar aims to Nasser’s circle – such as independence and one-party rule – joined the governing apparatus in the wake of the co-optation policies of the 1950s and 1960s (Ginat, A History of Egyptian Communism, pp. 374 – 5). 92. See Rachid Ouaissa, Staatsklasse als Entscheidungsakteur in den La¨ndern der Dritten Welt: Struktur, Entwicklung und Aufbau der Staatsklasse am Beispiel Algerien. Schriftenreihe von Stipendiatinnen ¨ nster: LIT und Stipendiaten der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, vol. 28 (Mu Verlag, 2005); Larbi Sadiki, “The void of power and the power of the void: Arab societies’ negotiation of democratic faragh,” in Larbi Sadiki, Heiko Wimmen and Layla al-Zubaidi (eds), Democratic Transition in the Middle East: Unmaking Power (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 1– 21. 93. Vatikiotis, Nasser and his Generation, p. 218. 94. U. Akhter Ahmed et al., The Egyptian Food Subsidy System: Structure, Performance, and Options for Reform, International Food Policy Research Institute, Research Report 119 (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2001), pp. 5– 12. 95. Soliman, al-Niza¯m al-Qawı¯ wa-l-Dawla al-Daʿ¯ıfa, p. 18. _ 96. Peter Pawelka,˙ Der Vordere Orient und die Internationale Politik (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1993); Rachid Ouaissa, “Arabische revolution und rente,” Periplus – Jahrbuch fu¨r außereuropa¨ische Geschichte 22 (2012): Wandel in der Arabischen Welt, pp. 57 – 77. 97. Soliman, al-Niza¯m al-Qawı¯ wa-l-Dawla al-Daʿ¯ıfa, p. 25. _ 98. The term niza¯˙m in Arabic political language specifically denotes a ˙ “system.” It derives from the Arabic root n-z-m, meaning “order; ˙ arrangement; system, institutions, organization.” See Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, 3rd edn, edited by J. Milton Cowman (Ithaca, NY: Spoken Language Services, 1976), pp. 977 – 8. As well as certain governing systems, which had kept order since medieval times (see, for example, Anthony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought From the Prophet to the Present, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011, p. 154), Winslow William Clifford, in State Formation and the Structure of Politics in Mamluk ¨ ttingen: Bonn UniverSyro-Egypt 648 – 741 A.H./1250 – 1340 C.E (Go sity Press, 2013), explains this search for niza¯m in Mamluk Egypt and Syria. In parallel, there were also ˙ early ninth-century elaborations on a circle of power (which comes close to the terminology of Samer Soliman in The Autumn of Dictatorship, Fiscal

182

NOTES TO PAGES 42 – 43 Crisis and Political Change in Egypt under Mubarak, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), containing several social groups in government as theorized, for instance, by al-Mawardi (Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought, pp. 47, 86). With regard to the interconnectedness of the circle of power and niza¯m, Ibn ˙ Khaldu ¯ n comments: The world is a garden the fence of which is the dynasty (al-dawla). The dynasty is an authority (sultan) through which life is given to good conduct (al-sunna). Good conduct is a policy (siya¯sa) directed by the ruler (al-malik). The ruler is an institution (niza¯m) supported by the soldiers. The soldiers are helpers who are maintained by money. (Quoted in Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought, p. 176).

99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109.

110. 111. 112. 113. 114.

In Morocco, an equivalent to niza¯m is al-Makhzan, which describes ˙ the power circle around the king (see Mark LeVine, Heavy Metal Islam: Rock, Resistance, and the Struggle for the Soul of Islam, New York, NY: Three Rivers Press, 2008). The term’s original meaning is “department store” or “storehouse”, and it formerly denoted the Moroccan “governmental finance department” (Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, p. 237). Soliman, The Autumn of Dictatorship, pp. 23 – 5. Abdalla, The Student Movement, p. 119. Marilyn Booth, “Exploding into the seventies: Ahmad Fuʾad Nigm, Shaykh Imam, and the aesthetics of a new youth politics,” in Hopkins, Political and Social Protest in Egypt, pp. 19 – 44, p. 28. Tohamy, Youth Activism in Egypt, p. 54. Abdalla, The Student Movement, p. 149. Ibid., p. 150. Ibid., p. 152. Ibid., p. 158. Ibid., pp. 158– 9. Ibid. An International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan was received in May 1962. See John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of two Regimes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 95. Ibid. Raymond William Baker, Sadat and After: Struggles for Egypt’s Political Soul (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). Abdalla, The Student Movement, pp. 176 – 90. Ibid., pp. 183– 4. Ibid., p. 176ff.

NOTES TO PAGES 43 – 44

183

115. Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen, p. 156. 116. After initial success in crossing over to Sinai and pushing Israeli forces further east, Sadat’s strategy required passivity and was successful despite army protests. Thus, Israel was able to recover and eventually prevailed. See ibid., pp. 140 – 8. 117. Ibid., pp. 118– 40. 118. Ibid., p. 156. 119. Officially introduced in the wake of the October War by Law No. 43, 1974 (ibid., pp. 159 – 60). 120. Soliman, al-Niza¯m al-Qawı¯ wa-l-Dawla al-Daʿ¯ıfa, p. 15. _ ˙ 121. Economic difficulties caused budget shortages in the wake of the 1967 defeat, and consequently grievances among this segment. Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen, p. 159. 122. Ibid. 123. Ibid., p.160. 124. Egypt’s changing corporatist strategy had ambivalent consequences. In addition to the aim of controlling associational life and its oppositional implications, a side-effect of the liberalizations was the increasing propensity of social actors – such as the Islamists, the Muslim Brothers, or the 1970s’ student movement – toward voluntary organization, thereby constituting a significant factor as seen in the 1977 protests and afterwards in the elections of the 1990s and in 2005. This process is comprehensively described in Bianchi, Unruly Corporatism. Finally, Robert Bianchi embeds his analysis in a world-system framework, using Egypt as a case study to question the viewpoint of classifying all states on the semi-periphery according to an identical model of corporatist state–society relations, brought about mainly by the accumulation of rent. Rachid Ouaissa convincingly illustrates this detachment and its reproduction in the case of Algeria, in Staatsklasse als Entscheidungsakteur, and “Algeria’s Islamists in times of political change – an exceptional case?” in Hartmut Elsenhans et al. (eds), The Transformation of Politicised Religion: From Zealots into Leaders, pp. 15–32 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015). 125. Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen, pp. 164 –5. 126. Ibid., pp. 160– 2. 127. On the left the National Progressive Unionist Party (Hizb al˙ Tagammu ¯ ʿ al-Watanı¯ al-Taqaddumı¯ al-Wahdawı¯, or just Tagammu ¯ ʿ) emerged. For insight into the party in˙ Arabic, see the party newspaper’s website: Garı¯da al-Aha¯lı¯ al-Misriyya. Available at alahalygate.com (accessed 30 April 2017). ˙ In having a leftist orientation, the party has displayed a loyal stance toward the regime (see further below, and Holger Albrecht, Raging against the Machine: Political Opposition under Authoritarianism in Egypt, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2013, pp. 40 – 8). 128. The Liberal Party (Hizb al-Ahra¯r). See ibid., pp. 40 – 50. ˙ ˙

184 129. 130. 131. 132. 133.

134. 135. 136. 137.

138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144.

145. 146. 147. 148.

149.

NOTES TO PAGES 44 – 46 Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen, p. 165. Ibid. Albrecht, Raging against the Machine, pp. 39 – 40. Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen, pp. 165 –6. Joel Beinin, “Neo-Liberal structural adjustment, political demobilization and neo-authoritarianism in Egypt,” in Laura Guazzone and Daniela Pioppi (eds), The Arab State and Neo-Liberal Globalization: The Restructuring of State Power in the Middle East, pp. 19 – 46 (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2009), p. 25. Beinin, “Neo-Liberal structural adjustment,” p. 19. Beinin, Workers and Peasants, p. 146. Ibid. Hiba ʿAbd al-Satta¯r, “‘Bawwa¯ba al-Ahra¯m’ Tarsudu Dhikra¯ Intifa¯dat ˙ al-Khubz 18 wa-19 Yana¯yir 1977 bi-ʿUyu ¯ n ˙ Thuwwa¯r 2011..waTahdhı¯r min Thawra Muqbila,” Bawwa¯ba al-Ahra¯m, 18 January ˙ Available at gate.ahram.org.eg/News/297077.aspx (accessed 2013. 15 February 2017). Beinin, Workers and Peasants, p. 157. Larbi Sadiki, “Popular uprisings and Arab democratization,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 32 (2000), pp. 71 – 95, p. 82. Tohamy, Youth Activism in Egypt, p. 65. Ahmed et al., The Egyptian Food Subsidy System, p. 7. Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen, pp. 167 –8. Beinin, Workers and Peasants, pp. 163 – 4. Thousands of Brotherhood prisoners were released in 1971 and 1975. The movement was not formally recognized but tolerated. See Barbara H. E. Zollner, The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudaybi and Ideology (London: Routledge, 2009); Zahid, The Muslim Brotherhood, p. 89. Zollner, The Muslim Brotherhood, pp. 36 – 49. John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 173 – 91. Kienle, A Grand Delusion, p. 38. Denoted as the “Islamic revival” (al-Sahwa al-Isla¯miyya), see Browers, ˙ ˙ Political Ideology, p. 48. Nazih Ayubi interprets the persuasive power of that discourse, referring to a narrative of an “[a]lternative system of meaning and power to the hegemonic system represented by the existing socio-political order, which inevitably marginalizes and/or alienates certain individuals and certain social groups” (Nazih Ayubi, The State and Public Policies in Egypt since Sadat, Oxford: Ithaca Press, 1991, p. 175). See Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, translated by Carol Volk (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994); Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, p. 35.

NOTES TO PAGES 46 – 47

185

150. Next to it were the Islamic Jihad (al-Giha¯d al-Isla¯mı¯) and the alGama¯ʿa al-Isla¯miyya, both engaging in terrorist activities. For the diversification of Islamic fundamentalisms in the 1960s, see Ahmad S. Moussali, Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb (Beirut: American University of ˙ Beirut Press, 1995). For the evolution of Islamic fundamentalism and its violent manifestations, see John L. Esposito (ed.), Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 1997); Asef Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the PostIslamist Turn (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007); Roel Meijer “The Egyptian Jamaʿa Islamiyya as a social movement,” in Beinin and Vairel, Social Movements, pp. 143 – 62. 151. Bayat, Making Islam Democratic, pp. 32 – 6. 152. Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, p. 35. 153. Tohamy, Youth Activism in Egypt, p. 65. 154. Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat, p. 384. 155. For the debate on authenticity among the Islamic left in Egypt, see Browers, Political Ideology, pp. 23 – 9. 156. Ibid., p. 19. 157. Ibid.; Haugbolle, “Reflections on ideology.” 158. Steven A. Cook, The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 156 – 7. 159. Philippe Droz-Vincent, “The security sector in Egypt: management, coercion and external alliance under the dynamics of change,” in Laura Guazzone and Daniela Pioppi (eds), The Arab State and NeoLiberal Globalization: The Restructuring of State Power in the Middle East, (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2009), pp. 219–45. 160. Beinin, “Neo-Liberal structural adjustment,” p. 21. 161. Ibid. 162. Ibid. 163. Abdalla, The Student Movement, pp. 228 – 9. 164. Ibid., pp. 231– 2. 165. Beinin, Workers and Peasants, pp. 157 – 8. 166. Ibid., p. 166. 167. Ibid. 168. (i) In the wake of Sadat’s assassination in 1981, Islamist intellectuals began arguing for “moderate Islamist” attitudes described as Wasatiyya (see Browers, Political Ideology, p. 48; Hartmut Elsenhans, et al. (eds), The Transformation of Politicised Religion: From Zealots into Leaders, Farnham: Ashgate, 2015). Consequently, the al-Wasat Party (Hizb al-Wasat) was established in 1996 by younger members of the ˙ but belonged ˙ MB, to a “middle generation” very much involved in the student activism of the 1970s (Browers, Political Ideology, p. 118). Having a more open attitude to cooperation with other social forces across certain ideologies (the middle generation was the driving

186

169.

170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182.

NOTES TO PAGES 47 – 48 force behind the election alliances of the MB in 1984 and 1987), a counteraction by the older guard was used to form the new party (ibid., pp. 117 – 24). (ii) Another generational conflict developed within the Nasserist camp. A younger group from the 1992 established Arab Democratic Nasserist Party (al-Hizb al-ʿArabı¯ al-Dı¯muqra¯t¯ı al-Na¯sirı¯) broke away ˙ ˙ in 1996 (see to join the Dignity ˙Party (Hizb al-Kara¯ma), established ˙ Albrecht, Raging against the Machine, p. 52). Furthermore, two liberal parties were formed, El-Ghad (Tomorrow) in 2004 and the Democratic Front Party in 2007 (ibid, pp. 54 –7). (iii) The Revolutionary Socialists (al-Ishtira¯kiyyu ¯ n al-Thawriyyu ¯ n) emerged in 1995 out of Trotskyist student circles active since the last influential student protests in the mid-1980s (see Hossam ElHamalawy, “Comrades and brothers,” Middle East Report, 37/242, 2007. Available at www.merip.org/mer/mer242/comrades-brothers, accessed 15 February 2017). Later, particularly in the 2000s, the Revolutionary Socialists would also cooperate with the MB, specifically its younger generation (See ibid.; Browers, Political Ideology, pp. 125– 33). Tohamy, Youth Activism in Egypt, p. 67. See also Dina El Khawaga, “La ge´ne´ration seventies en E´gypte: la societe´ civile comme re´peretoire dʾaction alernatif,” in Mounia Bennani-Chraı¨bi and Olivier Fillieule (eds), Re´sistance et protestations dans le socie´te´s musulmanes (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2003), pp. 271 – 92; Maha Abdelrahman, Civil Society Exposed: The Politics of NGOs in Egypt (London and New York, NY: I.B.Tauris, 2004); Michaelle Browers, Democracy and Civil Society in Arab Political Thought: Transcultural Possibilities (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2006); El-Mahdi, “Enough!”. El Khawaga, “La ge´ne´ration seventies,” p. 271. Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen, pp. 201 –8. Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), p. 275. Ibid., p. 276. Soliman, The Autumn of Dictatorship, pp. 104– 9. Ibid., p. 144. Ibid., p. 148. The original Arabic is “al-Hizb al-Watanı¯ ‘yatabargaz’” ˙ ˙ p. 247). (see Soliman, al-Niza¯m al-Qawı¯ wa-l-Dawla al-Daʿ¯ıfa, _ ˙ Soliman, The Autumn of Dictatorship, pp. 148– 50. Ibid. Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen, pp. 211 –2. Soliman, The Autumn of Dictatorship, p. 105. Ibid., pp. 101– 4; Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen, pp. 201 – 8. Soliman, The Autumn of Dictatorship, p. 97. The original Arabic wording for this transformation process is “Min al-Dawla al-Rayʿiyya

NOTES TO PAGES 48 – 51

183.

184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190.

191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205.

206. 207.

187

ila¯ Dawlat al-Giba¯ya” (see Soliman, al-Niza¯m al-Qawı¯ wa-l-Dawla ˙ al-Daʿ¯ıfa, p. 179). _ A tax on inflation is levied when the government prints additional money to increase its revenues. This leads to a consequent loss in value of existing circulating money, which outcome can be regarded as a tax (see Soliman, The Autumn of Dictatorship, p. 98). Ibid., pp. 98 – 125. Ibid. Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen, p. 159. Ibid., pp. 204– 8. Ibid. Maha Abdelrahman, Egypt’s Long Revolution: Protest Movements and Uprisings (Abingdon and New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), p. 132. See Rachid Ouaissa, “Blocked middle classes as an engine of change in ¨ nemann and Delf Rothe the Arab world?” in Jakob Horst, Annette Ju (eds), Euro-Mediterranean Relations after the Arab Spring: Persistence in Times of Change, pp. 123–42 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013); Ouaissa, Die Rolle der Mittelschichten; Ouaissa, “The misunderstandings about the role of the middle classes;” Kandil, “Why did the Egyptian middle class march to Tahrir Square?”. Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen, p. 219. Ibid., p. 217. Soliman, The Autumn of Dictatorship, pp. 25 – 30; Ibra¯hı¯m, alTahawwul al-Dı¯muqra¯t¯ı wa-l-Mugtamaʿ al-Madanı¯ fı¯ Misr, pp. 81 – 2. ˙ ˙ ˙ Mitchell, Rule of Experts, p. 277. Ibid., p. 282. Soliman, The Autumn of Dictatorship, pp. 29 –30. Ibid., pp. 163– 70. Soliman, al-Niza¯m al-Qawı¯ wa-l-Dawla al-Daʿ¯ıfa, p. 270. _ ˙ Ibid. Ouaissa, “The misunderstandings about the role of the middle classes;” Soliman, The Autumn of Dictatorship, pp. 154– 7. Soliman, The Autumn of Dictatorship, pp. 154– 7. Ibid., pp. 155 – 6; Kandil, “Why did the Egyptian middle class march to Tahrir Square?”. Larbi Sadiki, Rethinking Arab Democratization: Elections without Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 211. Ibid. ʿAysh, as a synonym for the aforementioned khubz, means “bread”, “life”, or “way of living” in colloquial Egyptian, derived by the radicals from the Arabic root ʿa-y-sh meaning “to live” (see Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, pp. 661 –2). Soliman, The Autumn of Dictatorship, p. 166. Ibid., pp. 168– 9.

188

NOTES TO PAGES 51 – 52

208. See Abdelrahman, Egypt’s Long Revolution, p. 70; Ann M. Lesch, “Concentrated power breeds corruption, repression, and resistance,” in Bahgat Korany and Rabab El-Mahdi (eds), Arab Spring in Egypt: Revolution and Beyond, pp. 17 – 42 (Cairo and New York, NY: American University in Cairo Press, 2012), pp. 24 –5. 209. See Albrecht, Raging against the Machine, p. xxii; Holger Albrecht, “How can opposition support authoritarianism? Lessons from Egypt,” Democratization 12/3 (2005), pp. 378 – 97. Available at dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510340500126798 (accessed 20 March 2017). 210. Albrecht, Raging against the Machine, p. xviii. 211. Referring to the representation of social groups (ibid, pp. 23 – 5). 212. Referring to the legitimizing effect of the opposition for the State and the regime (ibid., pp. 23 – 7). 213. Referring to the ability to control the opposition (ibid., pp. 23 – 8). 214. The effect of discouraging opposition actors from radicalizing and using violence (ibid., pp. 28 – 30). 215. Ibid., p. xxv. 216. Parties that have accepted the hegemony of the NDP, such as the Tagammu ¯ ʿ-Party (ibid., pp. 38 – 40), El-Ghad and the Democratic Front Party (ibid., pp. 54 – 7). 217. Groups and movements such as NGOs, the workers’ movement or Kifaya, which were independent from the regime but under some type of control (ibid., pp. 60 – 1). 218. Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and various offshoots, being anti-systemic because of “their alternative project to organize society” (ibid., pp. 10 – 11). 219. See Kienle, A Grand Delusion, pp. 177– 83; Albrecht, Raging against the Machine. 220. Albrecht, Raging against the Machine, p. 7; Kienle, A Grand Delusion, pp. 12 – 4. 221. Ann M. Lesch, “Democracy in doses: Mubarak launches his second term as president,” Arab Studies Quarterly 11/4 (1989), pp. 87 – 107. Available at www.jstor.org/stable/41858924 (accessed 15 February 2017). 222. Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat, pp. 366 – 71. 223. Kienle, A Grand Delusion, p. 14. 224. Albrecht, Raging against the Machine, pp. 35 –40; Hesham Al-Awadi, In Pursuit of Legitimacy: The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982 – 2000 (London: I.B.Tauris, 2004). 225. Mona Makram-Ebeid, “The role of the official opposition,” in Charles Tripp and Roger Owen (eds), Egypt under Mubarak, pp. 21 – 52 (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 29 – 34. 226. For example, buying votes, bribing the representatives of the bureaucracy responsible and using paid thugs (baltagiyya) (Kienle, ˙ A Grand Delusion, p. 56).

NOTES TO PAGES 52 – 56

189

227. Kienle, A Grand Delusion, p. 51. 228. Zahid, The Muslim Brotherhood, pp. 101– 3. 229. The centralized organizational setting of the trade unions contributed to the further loss of influence of workers due to privatizations that shifted management operations abroad (see Asef Bayat, “The ‘street’ and the politics of dissent in the Arab world,” Middle East Report 33/226 (2003), Dissent. Available at www.merip.org/mer/mer226/streetpolitics-dissent-arab-world, accessed 15 February 2017). 230. Kienle, A Grand Delusion, pp. 76 –87. 231. Ibid., p. 200. 232. Ibid., p. 195. 233. Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen, p. 159. 234. Ibid., p. 201. 235. Albrecht, Raging against the Machine, p. 7.

Chapter 4 Contentious Politics since the 2000s: A Turning Point 1. Asef Bayat, “The ‘street’ and the politics of dissent in the Arab world,” Middle East Report 33/226 (2003) Dissent. Available at www.merip. org/mer/mer226/street-politics-dissent-arab-world (accessed 15 February 2017). 2. Dina El Khawaga, “La ge´ne´ration seventies en E´gypte: la societe´ civile comme re´peretoire dʾaction alernatif,” in Mounia BennaniChraı¨bi and Olivier Fillieule (eds), Re´sistance et protestations dans le socie´te´s musulmanes (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2003), pp. 271 – 92; Maha Abdelrahman, “The politics of ‘uncivil’ society in Egypt,” Review of African Political Economy 29/91 (2002), pp. 21 – 35, DOI: 10.1080/03056240208704582. 3. Bayat, “The ‘street’.” See also Asef Bayat, Street Politics: Poor People’s Movements in Iran (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1997); Sha¯kir al-Na¯blusı¯, al-Sha¯riʿ al-ʿArabı¯: Misr wa¯-Bila¯d al-Sha¯m –Dira¯sa ˙ Ta¯rikhiyya Siya¯siyya (Beirut: Al-Muʾassasa al-ʿArabiyya li-l-Dira¯sa¯t wa-l-Nashr, 2003). 4. Bayat, “The ‘street’.” See also Samer Soliman, The Autumn of Dictatorship, Fiscal Crisis and Political Change in Egypt under Mubarak (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011). 5. Asef Bayat, Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010); Guilain Denoeux, Urban Unrest in the Middle East: A Comparative Study of Informal Networks in Egypt, Iran, and Lebanon (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1993). 6. Maha Abdelrahman, “A hierarchy of struggles? The ‘economic’ and the ‘political’ in Egypt’s revolution,” Review of African Political

190

7.

8. 9.

10.

11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

NOTES TO PAGES 56 – 58 Economy 39/134 (2012), pp. 614–28, p. 617, DOI: 10.1080/03056244. 2012.738419. Joel Beinin and Marie Duboc, “A workers’ social movement on the margin of the global neoliberal order, Egypt 2004 – 2012,” in Joel Beinin and Fre´de´ric Vairel (eds), Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa, 2nd edn (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), pp. 205 – 27. Michaelle Browers, Political Ideology in the Arab World: Accommodation and Transformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 77. Ahmad Shokr, “Reflections on two revolutions,” Middle East Report 42/265 (2012): Egypt: The Uprising Two Years On. Available at www.merip.org/mer/mer265/reflections-two-revolutions (accessed 16 February 2017). Dina Shehata, “Youth movements and the 25 January revolution,” in Bahgat Korany and Rabab El-Mahdi (eds), Arab Spring in Egypt: Revolution and Beyond (Cairo and New York, NY: American University in Cairo Press, 2014), pp. 105–24; Abdelrahman, “A hierarchy of struggles?”. Abdelrahman, “A hierarchy of struggles?” p. 616. Beinin and Duboc, “A workers’ social movement,” p. 205. Ibid., p. 208. Joel Beinin and Hossam El-Hamalawy, “Egyptian textile workers confront the new economic order,” Middle East Report Online, 25 March 2007, available at www.merip.org/mero/mero032507; Joel Beinin and Hossam El-Hamalawy, “Strikes in Egypt spread from center of gravity,” Middle East Report Online, 9 May 2007, available at www.merip.org/mero/mero050907. (Both accessed 16 February 2017). Abdelrahman, “A hierarchy of struggles?” p. 617. Shehata, “Youth movements,” p. 109. Rabab El-Mahdi, “Enough!: Egypt’s quest for democracy,” Comparative Political Studies 42/8 (2009), pp. 1,011 – 39, pp. 1,021 – 2, DOI: 10.1177/0010414009331719. Browers, Political Ideology, pp. 111 – 7. Maha Abdelrahman, “The transnational and the local: Egyptian activists and transnational protest networks,” British Journal of Middle East Studies 38/3 (2011), pp. 407 – 24, p. 407, DOI: 10.1080/ 13530194.2011.621701. Ibid., p. 410. The group’s website (www.ageg.net) is no longer accessible. Abdelrahman, “The transnational and the local,” pp. 408 – 10. Ibid., p. 410. Ibid., pp. 410 – 11. Ibid., pp. 415-8. Ibid., p. 416.

NOTES TO PAGES 58 – 61

191

27. Dieter Rucht, “The strength of weak identities,” Forschungsjournal Soziale Bewegungen 24/4 (2011), pp. 73 – 84. Available at http://fors chungsjournal.de/jahrgaenge/2011heft4 (accessed 31 March 2017). 28. Abdelrahman, “The transnational and the local,” p. 416. 29. Ibid., p. 418. 30. Ibid., p. 419. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid., pp. 421 – 4. 33. Hossam El-Hamalawy, “Comrades and brothers,” Middle East Report, 37/242 (2007), available at www.merip.org/mer/mer242/comradesbrothers (accessed 15 February 2017); Browers, Political Ideology, p. 113; El-Mahdi, “Enough!,” p. 1,020. 34. Beinin and Duboc, “A workers’ social movement,” p. 209. 35. El-Mahdi, “Enough!,” p. 1,019. 36. Browers, Political Ideology, p. 112. 37. Amr Adly, “The problematic continuity of Nasserism,” Jadaliyya, 31 March 2014. Available at www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/ 17135/the-problematic-continuity-of-nasserism (accessed 16 February 2017); Meir Hatina, “History, politics, and collective memory: the Nasserist legacy in Mubarak’s Egypt,” in Eli Podeh and Onn Winckler (eds), Rethinking Nasserism: Revolution and Historical Memory in Modern Egypt, pp. 100–26 (Gainesville, FL: Florida University Press, 2004). 38. Pers. comm. #12. 39. Browers, Political Ideology, pp. 109 – 10. 40. Ibid., p. 112. 41. Ibid. 42. Shehata, “Youth movements,” p. 110. See also Maha Abdelrahman, Egypt’s Long Revolution: Protest Movements and Uprisings (Abingdon and New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), p. 38; Al-Jazeera.net, “Haraka ˙ Kifa¯ya al-Mis¸riyya,” 7 February 2011, available at www.aljazeera.net/ news/arabic/2011/2/7/‫ﺍﻟﻤﺼﺮﻳﺔ‬-‫ﻛﻔﺎﻳﺔ‬-‫( ﺣﺮﻛﺔ‬accessed 16 February 2017). 43. Shehata, “Youth movements,” p. 111. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid. 46. El-Mahdi, “Enough!,” p. 1,013. 47. Ibid., pp. 1,026 –9. 48. Ibid., pp. 1,031 –3. 49. Abdelrahman, “A hierarchy of struggles?” p. 618. 50. Ibid., pp. 614 – 15. 51. See Shayfeencom website, www.shayfeencom.org/Default.aspx (accessed 16 February 2017). 52. Abdelrahman, Egypt’s Long Revolution, pp. 48 – 9. 53. Ibid., p. 39 – 41. 54. Ibid., p. 42.

192

NOTES TO PAGE 61

55. Albrecht Hofheinz, “Arab internet use: popular trends and public impact,” in Naomi Sakr (ed.), Arab Media and Political Renewal: Community, Legitimacy and Public Life (London: I.B.Tauris, 2007), pp. 56–79; Albrecht Hofheinz, “Nextopia? Beyond revolution 2.0.,” International Journal of Communication 5 (2011), pp. 1,417–34, available at ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/1186/629 (accessed 16 February 2017); Mohammed El-Nawawy and Sahar Khamis, Egyptian Revolution 2.0: Political Blogging, Civic Engagement, and Citizen Journalism (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 56. CAPMAS (Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics ¯ mma wa-l-Ihsa¯ʾ al-Misrı¯]), Internet [al-Giha¯z al-Marakzı¯ li-l-Taʿbiʾa al-ʿA ˙˙ ˙ user statistics, n.d. Available at www.capmas.gov.eg/Pages/Indicators Page.aspx?page_id¼ 6134&ind_id¼2262 (accessed 16 February 2017). 57. MCIT (Ministry of Communications and Information Technology), ICT Indicators Report 2009 – 2013 (2014), p. 2. Available at www. mcit.gov.eg/Upcont/Documents/Publications_2362014000_ICT_ Indicators_Report_EN.pdf (accessed 16 February 2017). 58. Linda Herrera, “Egypt’s revolution 2.0: the Facebook factor,” in Bassam Haddad, Rosie Bsheer, and Ziad Abu-Rish (eds), The Dawn of the Arab Uprisings: End of an Old Order? (London: Pluto Press, 2012), pp. 91 – 6, p. 92. 59. Ahram Online, “Internet users in Egypt reach 31 million,” 4 February 2013. Available at english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/63999/ Business/Economy/Internet-users-in-Egypt-reach--million.aspx (accessed 16 February 2017). 60. Arab Social Media Report, “Facebook in the Arab Region” (n.d.). Available at http://www.arabsocialmediareport.com/Facebook/ LineChart.aspx?&PriMenuID¼18&CatID¼24&mnu¼Cat (accessed 16 February 2017). 61. Shehata, “Youth movements,” p. 112; Linda Herrera, Revolution in the Age of Social Media: The Egyptian Popular Insurrection and the Internet (London: Verso Books, 2014); Linda Herrera (ed.), with Rehab Sakr, Wired Citizenship: Youth Learning and Activism in the Middle East (New York, NY: Routledge, 2014); Amro Ali and Dina El-Sharnouby, “Distorting digital citizenship: Khaled Said, Facebook, and Egypt’s streets,” in Linda Herrera (ed.) with Rehab Sakr, Wired Citizenship: Youth Learning and Activism in the Middle East, pp. 89 – 101, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2014); Merlyna Lim, “Clicks, cabs, and coffee houses: social media and oppositional movements in Egypt, 2004 – 2011,” Journal of Communication 62/2 (2012), pp. 231 – 48, DOI: 10.1111/j.14602466.2012.01628.x. 62. Shehata, “Youth movements,” pp. 112 – 14. 63. Ibid., pp. 112 – 13.

NOTES TO PAGES 62 – 66

193

64. Tadamon blog, “al-Baya¯n al-Taʾsı¯sı¯/al-Na¯s hiyya al-Tarı¯q.” Available at tadamonmasr.wordpress.com/about (accessed 16 ˙February 2017). 65. Tadamon blog, “Ihna¯ mı¯n/Sha¯rik maʿna¯.” Available at tadamon˙ ‫ﻣﻌﻨﺎ‬-‫ﺷﺎﺭﻙ‬/ (accessed 16 February 2017). masr.wordpress.com/ 66. Shehata, “Youth movements,” p. 114. 67. Ibid., pp. 112 – 15. 68. Ahmed Tohamy, Youth Activism in Egypt: Islamism, Political Protest and Revolution (London: I.B.Tauris, 2016), pp. 188 – 9. 69. Abdelrahman, Egypt’s Long Revolution, pp. 44 – 9. 70. Ibid., pp. 45 – 6. 71. Wael Ghonim, Revolution 2.0: The Power of the People is Greater than the People in Power (London: Fourth Estate, 2012), pp. 122 – 87; Shehata, “Youth movements,” p. 117. 72. Shehata, “Youth movements,” p. 117. 73. Ibid. 74. Ibid. 75. Ibid., p. 118. 76. Ibid. 77. Abdelrahman, Egypt’s Long Revolution, pp. 68 – 71. 78. Ibid., p. 69. 79. Ibid., p. 71. 80. Ibid., p. 4.

Chapter 5

The Emergence of the April 6 Youth Movement

1. Joel Beinin and Marie Duboc, “A workers’ social movement on the margin of the global neoliberal order, Egypt 2004 – 2012,” in Joel Beinin and Fre´de´ric Vairel (eds), Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa, 2nd edn (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), pp. 205 – 27, p. 220. 2. Maha Abdelrahman, Egypt’s Long Revolution: Protest Movements and Uprisings (Abingdon and New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), p. 126. 3. Ahmed Tohamy, Youth Activism in Egypt: Islamism, Political Protest and Revolution (London: I.B.Tauris, 2016), p. 189. 4. Pers. comm. #31. 5. Ali Sonay, “Das recht auf Kairo: die jugendbewegung des 6. April,” ¨ rg Gertel and Rachid Ouaissa, Jugendbewegungen: Sta¨dtischer in Jo Widerstand und Umbru¨che in der arabischen Welt, pp. 204 – 16 (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2014). 6. Pers. comm. #32. 7. Abdelrahman, Egypt’s Long Revolution, p. 126. 8. Beinin and Duboc, “A workers’ social movement,” p. 220. 9. Ibid., p. 221.

194

NOTES TO PAGES 66 – 71

10. After being subjected to a smear campaign in the media, Esraa Abdel Fattah abandoned political activism with April 6 (pers. comm. #40). 11. Tohamy, Youth Activism in Egypt, p. 193. 12. Aaron Reese, “Framing April 6: discursive dominance in the Egyptian print media,” Arab Media & Society 8 (Spring 2009). Available at www.arabmediasociety.com/index.php?article¼715&p¼0 (accessed 16 February 2017). 13. Pers. comm. #32. 14. Al-Masry Al-Youm (7 April 2008), “Idra¯b. . .Yurda¯ Gamı¯ʿ al-Atra¯f,” ˙ ˙ ˙ ¼ Available at today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID 100375 (accessed 8 April 2017). 15. Posted on April 6’s Facebook page, 21 March 2009. Available at https:// www.facebook.com/shabab6april/photos/a.73651698293.98032. 32847763293/73652838293/?type¼3&theater (accessed 27 April 2017). 16. Pers. comm. #16. 17. Pers. comm. #32. 18. Pers. comm. #31. 19. Pers. comm. #3. 20. Pers. comm. #32. 21. Pers. comm. #26B. 22. Pers. comm. #31. 23. Thomas Carothers, “Ousting foreign strongmen: lessons from Serbia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief 1/5 (2001), pp. 1 – 8. Available at carnegieendowment.org/pdf/files/ demPolBrief5.pdf (accessed 16 February 2017). 24. Gene Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation (Boston, MA: Albert Einstein Institution, 2010); Philipp Kuntz, “Unlikely revolutions: popular uprisings against electoral authoritarian rule in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine,” PhD, dissertation, University of Erlangen – Nuremberg, 2010, p. 186. 25. Timothy Garton Ash, “A century of civil resistance: some lessons and questions,” in Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash (eds), Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-Violent Action from Gandhi to the Present, pp. 371 –90 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 371. 26. Ibid., p. 372. 27. Ibid., p. 379. 28. Ibid., p. 386. 29. Ivan Vejvoda, “Civil society versus Slobodan Milosevic: Serbia, 1991– 2000,” in Roberts and Garton Ash, Civil Resistance, pp. 295–316, p. 298. 30. Ibid., p. 300. 31. Ibid., pp. 303 – 7. 32. Ibid., p. 306. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid., p. 307.

NOTES TO PAGES 71 – 72 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

40.

41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

50.

51. 52. 53. 54.

195

Ibid., p. 308. Ibid. Ibid., p. 309. Carothers, “Ousting foreign strongmen,” p. 3. The US administration’s new policy of promoting democracy in the MENA region in the wake of 11 September 2001 has largely been executed by NGOs such as Freedom House, which receives financial backing from the US Government (Diego Giannone, “Political and ideological aspects in the measurement of democracy: the Freedom House case,” Democratization 17/1, 2010, pp. 68–97, pp. 74–5, DOI: 10.1080/13510340903453716). See also Freedom House, “Our supporters.” Available at freedomhouse.org/content/ our-supporters#.VWeN5ag98hc (accessed 16 February 2017). Gerald Sussman, “Systemic propaganda and state branding in postSoviet Eastern Europe,” in Nadia Kaneva (ed.), Branding PostCommunist Nations: Marketizing National Identities in the “New” Europe, pp. 23 – 48 (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 35 – 7. Pers. comm. #23. Stephen Jones, “Georgia’s ‘Rose Revolution’ of 2003: enforcing peaceful change,” in Roberts and Garton Ash, Civil Resistance, pp. 317–34, p. 324. Ibid. Andrew Wilson, “Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution’ of 2004: the paradoxes of negotiation,” in ibid., pp. 335– 53, p. 348. Ibid. Sussman, “Systemic propaganda,” p. 38. Garton Ash, “A century of civil resistance,” p. 387. See CANVAS “Who we are.” Available at http://canvasopedia.org/ about-us/ (accessed 16 February 2017). Srdja Popovic, Andrej Milivojevic and Slobodan Djinovic, Nonviolent Struggle: 50 Crucial Points: A Strategic Approach to Everyday Tactics (Belgrade: Centre for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies, 2006). Available at canvasopedia.org/project/50-crucial-points (accessed 16 February 2017). Srdja Popovic et al., CANVAS Core Curriculum: A Guide to Effective Nonviolent Struggle (Students Book) (Belgrade: Centre for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies, 2007). Available at canvasopedia. org/project/canvas-core-curriculum/? (accessed 16 February 2017). CANVAS, “Library.” Available at www.canvasopedia.org/index.php/ library (accessed 16 February 2017). See Academy of Change website, http://aoc.fm/en/2006/01/29/ about-aoc/ (accessed 18 March 2017). Ibid. Gene Sharp and his thoughts on non-violence were mentioned frequently in media accounts of the origins of the Arab uprisings.

NOTES TO PAGES 72 – 76

196

55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64.

Sharp’s institution is dedicated to the promotion of non-violent action. For further information, see the Albert Einstein Institution website, www.aeinstein.org (accessed 16 February 2017). Pers. comm. #13. Linda Herrera, Revolution in the Age of Social Media: The Egyptian Popular Insurrection and the Internet (London: Verso Books, 2014), p. 23. Ibid., p. 24. Ibid., pp. 25 – 46. Ibid., p. 32. Ibid., pp. 33 – 5. Ibid., pp. 33 – 9. Ibid., p. 148. Maha Abdelrahman, Civil Society Exposed: The Politics of NGOs in Egypt (London and New York, NY: I.B.Tauris, 2004), pp. 182 – 5. Pers. comm. #16.

Part III

The April 6 Youth Movement and its Contentious Context

1. Khaled Al Khamissi, Taxi, translated by Jonathan Wright (Laverstock, Wiltshire: Aflame Books, 2008), p. 183. 2. See Wael Ghonim, Revolution 2.0: The Power of the People is Greater than the People in Power (London: Fourth Estate, 2012); Jeannie Sowers, The Journey to Tahrir: Revolution, Protest and Social Change in Egypt (London: Verso Books 2012); Gennaro Gervasio and Andrea Teti, “When informal powers surface: civic activism and the 2011 Egyptian Revolution,” in Luca Anceschi, Gennaro Gervasio and Andrea Teti (eds), Informal Power in the Greater Middle East: Hidden Geographies, pp. 55–70 (London: Routledge, 2014); Steven A. Cook, The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square (New York, NY: Oxford University Press 2012). 3. Ahmad Shokr, “Reflections on two revolutions,” Middle East Report 42/265 (2012): Egypt: The Uprising Two Years On. Available at www.merip.org/mer/mer265/reflections-two-revolutions (accessed 16 February 2017). 4. Maha Abdelrahman, Egypt’s Long Revolution: Protest Movements and Uprisings (Abingdon and New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), p. 139. 5. Cook, The Struggle for Egypt, pp. 299– 300. 6. Ann M. Lesch, “Troubled political transitions: Tunisia, Egypt and Libya,” Middle East Policy 21/1 (2014), pp. 62–74, p. 67, DOI: 10.1111/ mepo.12057. 7. Cook, The Struggle for Egypt, p. 299. 8. Ekram Ibrahim, “Mohamed Mahmoud clashes, one year on: ‘a battle for dignity’,” Jadaliyya, 19 November 2012. Available at www.jadali

NOTES TO PAGES 76 – 78

9. 10.

11. 12. 13.

14.

15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

21. 22.

23.

197

yya.com/pages/index/8499/mohamed-mahmoud-clashes-one-yearon_a-battle-for-d (accessed 16 February 2017). Lesch, “Troubled political transitions, ” p. 66. Egypt Independent, “Court verdict will dissolve People’s Assembly, says elections official,” 14 June 2012. Available at www.egyptindependent. com/news/court-verdict-will-dissolve-peoples-assembly-says-electionsofficial (accessed 16 February 2017). Mursi also dismissed the General Prosecutor, who had been appointed by Mubarak. Lesch, “Troubled political transitions,” p. 68. Nadine Abdalla, “Youth movements in the Egyptian transformation: strategies and repertoires of political participation.” Mediterranean Politics 21:1 (2016), pp. 44 –63, pp. 47 – 8. Available at dx.doi. org/10.1080/13629395.2015.1081445 (accessed 23 March 2017). The secularist camp comprised, in large part, the National Salvation Front (Gabhat al-Inqa¯dh al-Watanı¯), which included mainly parties ˙ from the liberal and leftist spectrum, and figures like ElBaradei. See Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “2012 Egyptian parliamentary elections,” 22 January 2015. Available at carnegieendowment.org/2015/01/22/2012-egyptian-parliamentary-elections (accessed 18 February 2017). Adel Iskandar, “Tamarod: Egypt’s revolution hones its skills,” Jadaliyya, 30 June 2013. Available at www.jadaliyya.com/pages/ index/12516/tamarod_egypts-revolution-hones-its-skills (accessed 18 February 2017). Pers. comm. #40. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Amr Adly, “The problematic continuity of Nasserism,” Jadaliyya, 31 March 2014. Available at www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/ 17135/the-problematic-continuity-of-nasserism (accessed 16 February 2017). Lesch, “Troubled political transitions,” p. 68. Sherif Elashmawy, “Between support & discord: Gulf–Egypt relations after June 30,” Muftah, 24 December 2013. Available at muftah.org/ between-support-and-discord-the-complexity-of-gulf-egypt-relationsafter-june-30/#.VXiQ7ho98hc (accessed 18 February 2017). Of greatest importance, Article 8 states: “Anyone wanting to organise a public meeting, march or protest must notify in writing the police station whose jurisdiction includes the public meeting’s location or the starting point of a march or protest, the notification must be given in a minimum of three working days prior to the public meeting, march or protest, and a maximum of 15 days, and this period is reduced to 24 hours if the meeting was an electoral

198

24.

25. 26.

27.

28. 29.

30. 31.

32.

NOTES TO PAGES 78 – 79 meeting, on the condition that the notification be given firsthand or through a marshal, and must include the following statements and information: (1) The place of the public meeting or route of the march or protest; (2) The start and end time of the public meeting, march or protest; (3) The subject of the public meeting or march or protest, its aim and the demands and slogans adopted by the participants in them; (4) The names of the individuals or organizing organization of the public meeting or march or protest, their description, place of residence and communication information,” Ahram Online, “Full English translation of Egypt’s new protest law,” 25 November 2013. Available at english.ahram.org.eg/News/87375. aspx (accessed 15 February 2017). Ahram Online, “Egypt’s Maher, Adel and Douma sentenced to 3 years in jail,” 22 December 2013. Available at english.ahram.org.eg/ NewsContent/1/0/89748/Egypt/0/Egypts-Maher,-Adel-and-Doumasentenced-to--years-i.aspx (accessed 13 February 2017); Mada Masr, “April 6’s Maher to stand trial for protest law offenses,” 5 December 2013. Available at http://www.madamasr.com/en/2013/12/05/ news/u/april-6s-maher-to-stand-trial-for-protest-law-offenses/ (accessed 17 March 2017). Egyptian Streets, “April 6 revolutionary group banned in Egypt,” 28 April 2014. Available at egyptianstreets.com/2014/04/28/april-6revolutionary-group-banned-in-egypt (accessed 18 February 2017). Ahram Online, “Egypt’s April 6 youth movement to appeal ban,” 29 April 2014. Available at english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/ 1/64/100124/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-April--Youth-Movement-toappeal-ban.aspx (accessed 12 February 2017). Egypt Independent, “Court upholds verdict banning 6 April movement,” 31 March 2015. Available at www.egyptindependent.com/ news/court-upholds-verdict-banning-6-april-movement (accessed 11 February 2017). Lesch, “Troubled political transitions,” p. 67. April 6, “al-Intila¯qa al-Tha¯mina,” 6 April 2015. Available at www. ˙ facebook.com/shabab6april/photos/a.379736183293.203343. 32847763293/10153734909373294/?type¼ 3&size¼640%2C960& fbid¼10153734909373294 (accessed 18 February 2017). Pers. comm. #40. Mahmoud Mostafa, “6 April movement hold anniversary conference in the desert,” Daily News Egypt, 6 April 2015. Available at www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/04/06/6-april-movement-holdanniversary-conference-in-the-desert (accessed 18 February 2017). Ibid; O-News Agency, “Bi-l-Video wa-l-Suwar..6 Ibrı¯l taʿqudu Muʾta˙ maraha¯ al-Sahafı¯ bi-Sahra¯ 6 Uktu ¯ bir fı¯ Dhikra ¯ Taʾsı¯s al-Haraka,” 6 April ˙ ˙ ˙ 18 February ˙ ˙ 2015. Available at onaeg.com/?p¼2233000 (accessed 2017).

NOTES TO PAGES 79 – 85

199

33. Ibid. 34. April 6, “al-Intila¯qa al-Tha¯mina,” 6 April 2015. Available at www. ˙ facebook.com/shabab6april/photos/a.379736183293.203343. 32847763293/10153734909373294/?type¼ 3&size¼640%2C960& fbid¼10153734909373294 (accessed 18 February 2017). 35. Pers. comm. #40; Masr al-Arabia, “Ra¯fidan Tarashshuh al-Sı¯sı¯ li-l-Riʾa¯sa.. ˙ October 2013. Ahmad Ma¯hir: Ma¯ yahduth fı¯ Misr˙ ‘Fa¯shiyya’,” 24 ˙ ˙ ˙ Available at www.masralarabia.com/-‫ﻓـﺎﺷـﻴـﺔ‬-‫ﻣـﺼـﺮ‬-‫ﻓـﻲ‬-‫ﻳـﺤـﺪﺙ‬-‫ﻣـﺎ‬-‫ﻣـﺎﻫـﺮ‬-‫ﺍﺣـﻤـﺪ‬ 123907/‫ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ‬-‫( ﺍﻟﺤﻴﺎﺓ‬accessed 26 April 2017). 36. Tom Stevenson, “The disappearance of Amr Ali,” Middle East Eye, 21 October 2015. Available at www.middleeasteye.net/news/ disappearance-amr-ali-1845747677 (accessed 18 February 2017). 37. Pers. comm. #40. 38. Hamza Hendawi, “Egypt activist out of prison but still only half free,” Associated Press – The Big Story, 22 February 2017. Available at bigstory.ap.org/article/a7c35b93fa1949b99a1ce9e3256fa69f/egyptactivist-out-prison-still-only-half-free (accessed 11 March 2017). 39. Ibid. 40. Vivienne Matthies-Boon, “Shattered worlds: political trauma amongst young activists in post-revolutionary Egypt.” The Journal of North African Studies (2017), p. 20. Available at www.tandfonline.com/doi/ full/10.1080/13629387.2017.1295855 (accessed 26 March 2017). 41. Ibid., p. 19.

Chapter 6

Demanding Change

1. Alaa Al-Aswany, The Yacoubian Building, translated by Humphrey Davies (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2004), p. 59. 2. Pers. comm. #15A. 3. Pers. comm. #26A. 4. Ibid. 5. Pers. comm. #12. 6. April 6, @april6youth Twitter page, available at twitter.com/april6youth (accessed 30 April 2017). 7. Al-Sawt al-Ibrı¯lı¯, “al-ʿAdad al-Tagrı¯bı¯,” 25 January 2013. ˙ comm. #33. 8. Pers. 9. Pers. comm. #13. 10. Pers. comm. #12. 11. Ibid. 12. Pers. comm. #13. 13. Pers. comm. #15A. 14. Pers. comm. #7A. 15. Pers. comm. #7B. 16. Pers. comm. #7A/B.

200 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

NOTES TO PAGES 86 – 98 Pers. comm. #16. Pers. comm. #31. Pers. comm. #26B. Pers. comm. #32. Tahrir Documents (Watha¯ʾiq al-Tahrı¯r), “April 6th Youth: ‘Cor˙ 3 April 2011. Available at recting the Path of the Revolution’,” https://wayback.archive-it.org/2358/20110407104111/http://www. tahrirdocuments.org/2011/04/april-6th-youth-correcting-the-pathof-the-revolution/ (accessed 17 April 2017). Pers. comm. #26A. Pers. comm. #6. April 6, “6th of April Youth Movement” Facebook page. Available at www.facebook.com/pg/shabab6april/about/?ref¼ page_internal (accessed 18 February 2017). Diane Singerman, Avenues of Participation: Family, Politics, and Networks in Urban Quarters of Cairo (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). Pers. comm. #15A. Pers. comm. #32. Pers. comm. #16. Pers. comm. #12. Pers. comm. #31. Pers. comm. #17. Pers. comm. #13. Pers. comm. #32. Pers. comm. #26A. Pers. comm. #29. Pers. comm. #16. Pers. comm. #31. Pers. comm. #26A. Pers. comm., #15A. Pers. comm., #16. Pers. comm., #26A. Pers. comm., #16. Maha Abdelrahman, Egypt’s Long Revolution: Protest Movements and Uprisings (Abingdon and New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), p. 139. Pers. comm., #15A. Pers. comm. #21. Ibid. Pers. comm., #37. Pers. comm. #12. April 6, “al-Intila¯qa al-Tha¯mina,” 6 April 2015. Available at www. ˙ facebook.com/shabab6april/photos/a.379736183293.203343. 32847763293/10153734909373294/?type¼ 3&size¼640%2C960& fbid¼10153734909373294 (accessed 18 February 2017).

NOTES TO PAGES 99 – 105

Chapter 7

201

Organizational Structure

1. Dieter Rucht, “The strength of weak identities,” Forschungsjournal Soziale Bewegungen 24/4 (2011), pp. 73 – 84. Available at http:// forschungsjournal.de/jahrgaenge/2011heft4 (accessed 31 March 2017). 2. Lance W. Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg, “The logic of connective action,” Information, Communication & Society 15/5 (2012), pp. 739–68, p. 742, DOI: 10.1080/1369118X.2012.670661. 3. Pers. comm. #32. 4. Pers. comm. #31. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid., Indeed, there are some organizational similarities with the MB. See Ashraf El-Sherif, “The Muslim Brotherhood and the future of political Islam in Egypt,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Part 2 of a series on Political Islam in Egypt), 21 October 2014. Available at carnegieendowment.org/2014/10/21/muslimbrotherhood-and-future-of-political-islam-in-egypt/hse8 (accessed 18 February 2017). 7. Pers. comm. #16. 8. Pers. comm. #31. 9. Ibid. 10. Pers. comm. #32. 11. Ibid. 12. Pers. comm. #15B. 13. Pers. comm. #15A; #4. 14. Pers. comm. #3. 15. Pers. comm. #6. 16. Vera King, Die Entstehung des Neuen in der Adoleszenz: Individuation, Generativita¨t und Geschlecht in Modernisierten Gesellschaften (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2013). 17. Pers. comm. #21. 18. Ibid. 19. Pers. comm. #6. 20. Pers. comm. #21. 21. Pers. comm. #30. 22. Pers. comm. #31. 23. Pers. comm. #30. 24. Ibid. 25. Pers. comm. #31. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid. 28. Pers. comm. #29. 29. Rucht, “The strength of weak identities.” 30. Pers. comm. #16.

202

NOTES TO PAGES 105 – 109

31. Nancy Elshami, “Internal April 6 dynamics, Egyptian politics, and outlooks for the future: an interview with Ahmed Maher,” Jadaliyya, 7 December 2011. Available at www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/ 3429/internal-april-6-dynamics-egyptian-politics-and-ou (accessed 18 February 2017). 32. Ahmed Tohamy, Youth Activism in Egypt: Islamism, Political Protest and Revolution (London I.B.Tauris, 2016), p. 211; Marwan M. Kraidy, The Naked Blogger of Cairo: Creative Insurgency in the Arab World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), p. 159. 33. Pers. comm. #29. 34. Ibid. 35. Ahram Online, “Mamdouh Hamza,” 19 November 2011. Available at english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/33/102/24941/Elections-/Whoswho/Mamdouh-Hamza.aspx (accessed 18 February 2017). 36. Elshami, “Internal April 6 dynamics”; Tohamy, Youth Activism in Egypt, pp. 213– 14. 37. Pers. comm., #30. 38. As mentioned earlier, there have been a number of successive laws regulating associational life by placing it under close regime control – for instance, by requiring registration with the Ministry of Social Affairs. 39. Pers. comm. #31. 40. Pers. comm. #16. 41. Pers. comm. #12. 42. Pers. comm. #32. 43. Pers. comm. #16. 44. There are 27 governorates in Egypt. 45. Ibid. 46. Pers. comm. #31. 47. Pers. comm. #33. The term al-Saʿı¯d refers to Upper Egypt, beginning ˙ just south of Cairo and extending to the Sudanese border. 48. Pers. comm. #3; #31. 49. Pers. comm. #26A. 50. Ibid. 51. Pers. comm. #3. 52. Ibid. 53. Pers. comm. #12. 54. Pers. comm. #6. 55. Pers. comm. #38. 56. Pers. comm. #3. 57. Pers. comm. #6. 58. Pers. comm. #3. 59. Ibid. 60. Pers. comm. #16. 61. Ibid.

NOTES TO PAGES 109 – 115 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75.

76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82.

83. 84. 85. 86. 87.

88.

89. 90. 91. 92.

203

Pers. comm. #12. Pers. comm. #29. Pers. comm. #32. Pers. comm. #16. Pers. comm. #26A. Ibid. Pers. comm. #13. Pers. comm. #15A. Pers. comm. #6. Pers. comm. #34. Pers. comm. #12. Pers. comm. #31. Pers. comm. #12. Ahram Online, “Egypt’s 6 April movement elects Amr Ali as new head,” 28 October 2013. Available at english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/84964/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts--April-Movement-electsAmr-Ali-as-new-head.aspx (accessed 18 February 2017). Pers. comm. #34. Ibid. Ibid. Pers. comm. #31. Ibid. Ibid. Donatella Della Porta and Sidney Tarrow, “Transnational processes and social activism: an introduction,” in Donatella Della Porta and Sidney Tarrow (eds), Transnational Protest and Global Activism: People, Passions and Power, pp. 1–17 (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), pp. 5–6. Pers. comm. #12. Pers. comm. #15A. Pers. comm. #32. Pers. comm. #12. Ibra¯hı¯m Qira¯ʿa, “Hukm bi-waqf wa-Hazr Anshita Haraka ‘6 Ibrı¯l’ ˙ a¯t,” Al-Masry Al-Youm, ˙ ˙ 28 April˙ 2014. ˙ bi-Gamı¯ʿ al-Muha¯faz Available at ˙ ˙ www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/436714 (accessed 18 February 2017). Sasa-Post, “Fi Dhikra¯ al-Sa¯biʿa li-Taʾsı¯siha¯: Haraka Shaba¯b 6 Ibrı¯l.. ˙ Al-Masa¯r, wa-l-Hasa¯d wa-Tahaddiya¯t al-Mustaqbal,” 6 April 2015. ˙ ˙ ˙ Available at www.sasapost.com/6-april-movment (accessed 18 February 2017). Pers. comm. #31. Pers. comm. #30. Ibid. Pers. comm. #37.

204

NOTES TO PAGES 115 – 118

93. Maha Abdelrahman, “In praise of organisation: Egypt between activism and revolution,” Development and Change 44/3 (2013), pp. 569 – 85, DOI: 10.1111/dech.12028. 94. Pers. comm. #40. 95. Ibid. 96. Pers. comm. #30. 97. Pers. comm. #32. 98. Nadine Abdalla, “Youth movements in the Egyptian transformation: strategies and repertoires of political participation.” Mediterranean Politics 21:1 (2016), pp. 44 – 63, p. 51. Available at dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2015.1081445 (accessed 23 March 2017). 99. Ziya¯d Faraj, “6Ibrı¯l min al-Taʾsı¯s ila¯-l-Hazr!..al-Nashʾa – al-Inshiqa¯qa¯t – ˙ ˙for Studies, 7 May 2014. Availal-Hazr wa-l-Mas¯ır,” Al Arabiya Institute ˙ studies.alarabiya.net/hot-issues/6˙ able˙ at ‫ﻭﺍﻟﻤﺼﻴﺮ‬-‫ﺍﻟﺤﻈﺮ‬-‫ﺍﻻﻧﺸﻘﺎﻗﺎﺕ‬-‫ﺍﻟﺤﻈﺮﺍﻟﻨﺸﺄﺓ‬‫ﺍﻟﻰ‬-‫ﺍﻟﺘﺄﺳﻴﺲ‬-‫ﻣﻦ‬-‫( ﺃﺑﺮﻳﻞ‬accessed 18 February 2017). 100. Pers. comm. #6. 101. Pers. comm. #32. 102. Ibid. 103. Ibid. 104. Ibid. 105. Faraj, “6Ibrı¯l min al-Taʾsı¯s ila¯-l-Hazr!” ˙ ˙ 106. Pers. comm. #12. 107. Pers. comm. #15A. 108. The Constitution Party (Hizb al-Dustu ¯ r) is a liberal-left party, founded ˙ 2011. by Mohamed ElBaradei in 109. Pers. comm. #31. 110. Faraj, “6Ibrı¯l min al-Taʾsı¯s ila¯-l-Hazr!” ˙ ˙ ¯la’ Yurahhib bi-Daʿwa¯ ‘6 Ibrı¯l’ 111. Al-Jazeera.net, “‘Al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAda ˙ ˙ ˙ li-Wahdat Quwa¯ al-Thawra,” 4 January 2015. Available at www.aljazeera. ˙ net/news/arabic/2015/1/4/-‫ﺍﻟـﺜـﻮﺭﺓ‬-‫ﻗـﻮﻯ‬-‫ﻟـﻮﺣـﺪﺓ‬-‫ﺃﺑـﺮﻳـﻞ‬-6-‫ﺑـﺪﻋـﻮﺓ‬-‫ﻳـﺮﺣـﺐ‬-‫ﻭﺍﻟـﻌـﺪﺍﻟـﺔ‬-‫ﺍﻟـﺤـﺮﻳـﺔ‬ (accessed 18 February 2017). 112. Middle East Monitor, “Ahmed Maher of 6 April movement: we made a mistake on 30/6. The brutal regime is back,” 5 February 2014. Available at https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20140205-ahmedmaher-of-6-april-movement-we-made-a-mistake-on-30-6-the-brutalregime-is-back/ (accessed 18 February 2017). 113. Pers. comm. #12. 114. April 6, “6th of April Youth Movement” Facebook page, 6 April 2015. Available at www.facebook.com/shabab6april/photos/pb. 32847763293.-2207520000.1434235217./10153734681133294/? type¼3&theater (accessed 18 February 2017).

NOTES TO PAGES 120 – 126

Chapter 8 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

23. 24. 25.

26.

205

Mobilizing against the Regime

Pers. comm. #37. Pers. comm. #16. Pers. comm. #32. Ibid. Pers. comm. #34. Pers. comm. #31. Pers. comm. #30. Pers. comm. #31. Pers. comm. #32. Pers. comm. #17. Ziya¯d Faraj, “6Ibrı¯l min al-Taʾsı¯s ila¯-l-Hazr!..al-Nashʾa – al-Inshiqa¯qa¯t – ˙ ˙ al-Hazr wa-l-Mas¯ır,” Al Arabiya Institute for Studies, 7 May 2014. ˙ ˙ ˙ Available at studies.alarabiya.net/hot-issues/6-‫ﻭﺍﻟﻤﺼﻴﺮ‬-‫ﺍﻟﺤﻈﺮ‬-‫ﺍﻻﻧﺸﻘﺎﻗﺎﺕ‬-‫ﺍﻟﻨﺸﺄﺓ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﺤﻈﺮ‬-‫ﺍﻟﻰ‬-‫ﺍﻟﺘﺄﺳﻴﺲ‬-‫ﻣﻦ‬-‫( ﺃﺑﺮﻳﻞ‬accessed 18 February 2017). Ahmed Tohamy, Youth Activism in Egypt: Islamism, Political Protest and Revolution (London: I.B.Tauris, 2016), p. 195; pers. comm. #26A. Tohamy, Youth Activism in Egypt, p. 195. Posted on April 6’s Facebook page, 29 March 2009. Available at www.facebook.com/shabab6april/photos/a.73651698293.98032. 32847763293/76523393293/?type¼ 3&theater (accessed 27 April 2017). Pers. comm. #40. Pers. comm. #32. Posted on April 6’s Facebook page, 24 March 2009. Available at www. facebook.com/shabab6april/photos/a.73651698293.98032.32847 763293/74415213293/?type¼3&theater (accessed 27 April 2017). Ibid. Ibid. Pers. comm. #32; Wael Ghonim, Revolution 2.0: The Power of the People is Greater than the People in Power (London: Fourth Estate, 2012), p. 121. Pers. comm. #32. Posted on April 6’s Facebook page, 19 December 2010. Available at www.facebook.com/shabab6april/photos/a.10150136023818294. 336090.32847763293/10150136270448294/?type¼ 3&theater (accessed 27 April 2017). Pers. comm. #32. Ibid. Posted on April 6’s Facebook page, 19 December 2010. Available at https://www.facebook.com/shabab6april/photos/a.101501360238 18294.336090.32847763293/10150136023883294/?type ¼ 3& theater (accessed 27 April 2017). Pers. comm. #32.

206

NOTES TO PAGES 126 – 133

27. Pers. comm. #34. 28. Posted on April 6’s Facebook page, 23 December 2010. Available at www.facebook.com/shabab6april/photos/a.10150138239458294. 338510.32847763293/10150138974048294/?type¼ 3&theater (accessed 27 April 2017). 29. Pers. comm. #32. 30. Ibid. 31. Pers. comm. #40. 32. Pers. comm. #32; Nadine Abdalla, “Youth movements in the Egyptian transformation: strategies and repertoires of political participation.” Mediterranean Politics 21:1 (2016), pp. 44 – 63, p. 47. Available at dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2015.1081445 (accessed 23 March 2017). 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. Tohamy, Youth Activism in Egypt, p. 202. 36. Abdalla, “Youth movements in the Egyptian transformation,” p. 46. 37. Pers. comm. #15B. 38. Pers. comm. #29. 39. Pers. comm. #40. 40. Tohamy, Youth Activism in Egypt, p. 215. 41. Dina Shehata, “Youth movements and the 25 January Revolution,” in Bahgat Korany and Rabab El-Mahdi (eds), Arab Spring in Egypt: Revolution and Beyond, pp. 105 – 24 (Cairo and New York, NY: American University in Cairo Press, 2014), p. 121. 42. Jadaliyya, “Egyptian Current Party,” 18 November 2011. Available at www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/3156/egyptian-current-party (accessed 20 February 2017). 43. Pers. comm. #31. 44. Pers. comm. #26B. 45. Pers. comm. #34. 46. Pers. comm. #26B. 47. April 6, “Muba¯shar 6 Ibrı¯l” Facebook page. Available at https://www. facebook.com/m6april.world/ (accessed 30 April 2017). 48. Al-Sawt al-Ibrı¯lı¯, “al-ʿAdad al-Tagrı¯bı¯,” 25 January 2013. ˙ comm. #26B. 49. Pers. 50. Nader Srage, Misr al-Thawra wa-Shiʿa¯ra¯t Shaba¯biha¯: Dira¯sa Lisa¯niyya fı¯ ʿAfawiyyat al-Ta˙ ʿbı¯r (Beirut: al-Markaz al-ʿArabı¯ li-l-Abha¯th wa-Dira¯sat ˙ al-Siya¯sa¯t, 2014), p. 46. 51. Ibid., p. 85. 52. Tahrir Documents (Watha¯ʾiq al-Tahrı¯r), “April 6th Youth Move˙ ment – Who Are We???,” 20 September 2011. Available at https:// wayback.archive-it.org/2358/20111121191429/http://www.tahrir documents.org/2011/09/april-6th-youth-movement- – -who-are-we/ (accessed 31 March 2017).

NOTES TO PAGES 134 – 138

207

53. “‫ ﺇﺑﺮﻳﻞ‬6 ‫ﺇﺣﻨﺎ ﺍﻟﺼﻮﺕ ﻟﻤﺎ ﺗﺤﺒﻮﺍ ﺍﻟﺪﻧﻴﺎ ﺳﻜﻮﺕ‬,” YouTube video, posted 21 June 2012. Available at www.youtube.com/watch?v¼sbu4KtKts3Y (accessed 20 February 2017). 54. Pers. comm. #3. 55. Ibid. 56. Pers. comm. #32. 57. Dalia Abd El-Hameed, “The battle of Egyptian football fans against dullness,” Middle East Research and Information Project, 3 December 2014. Available at www.merip.org/battle-egyptian-football-fansagainst-dullness (accessed 18 March 2017). 58. Maha Abdelrahman, “A hierarchy of struggles? The ‘economic’ and the ‘political’ in Egypt’s revolution,” Review of African Political Economy 39/134 (2012), pp. 614 – 28, p. 616, DOI: 10.1080/03056244. 2012.738419. 59. Cilja Harders, “Bringing the local back in: local politics between informalization and mobilization in an age of transformation in Egypt,” in Malika Bouziane, Cilja Harders and Anja Hoffmann (eds), Local Politics and Contemporary Transformations in the Arab World: Governance beyond the Center (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 113– 36; Cilja Harders, Staatsanalyse von Unten: Urbane ¨ gypten; mikro- und mesopolitische Armut und politische Partizipation in A Analysen unterschiedlicher Kairoer Stadtteile (Hamburg: Schriftenreihe des Deutschen Orient-Instituts, 2002). 60. Ibid.; Asya El-Meehy, “Egypt’s popular committees: from moments of madness to NGO dilemmas,” Middle East Report, 42/265 (2012): Egypt: The Uprising Two Years On. Available at www.merip.org/mer/mer265/egypts-popular-committees (accessed 20 February 2017). 61. Ibid. 62. Pers. comm. #32. 63. Pers. comm. #3; #26B. 64. Farah Montasser, “A year of El-Fan Midan in Egypt,” Ahram Online, 10 April 2012. Available at english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/ 5/0/38785/Arts- -Culture/0/A-year-of-ElFan-Midan-in-Egypt.aspx (accessed 20 February 2017). 65. Pers. comm. #26B. 66. Tahrir Documents (Watha¯ʾiq al-Tahrı¯r), “Capture the Remnants! The Black List,” 2 November 2011.˙ Available at https://wayback. archive-it.org/2358/20111121180052/http://www.tahrirdocuments. org/2011/11/capture-the-remnants-the-black-list/ (accessed 31 March 2017). 67. Ibid. 68. Harders, “Bringing the local back in,” p. 130. 69. Pers. comm. #32. 70. Harders, “Bringing the local back in,” p. 113.

208

NOTES TO PAGES 138 – 146

71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76.

Abdelrahman, “A hierarchy of struggles?” p. 616. Pers. comm. #34. Pers. comm. #26A. Shehata, “Youth movements,” p. 123. Pers. comm. #30. Abdalla, “Youth movements in the Egyptian transformation,” p. 48; Fady Ashraf, “‘We will not ally with the Brotherhood or the Army’: the way of the Revolution Front,” Daily News Egypt, 24 September 2013. Available at www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/09/ 24/we-will-not-ally-with-the-brotherhood-or-the-army-the-wayof-the-revolution-front (accessed 20 February 2017). 77. Abdalla, “Youth movements in the Egyptian transformation,” p. 49. 78. Ibid., pp. 49 – 50. 79. Muftah, “The launch of ‘Thuwwar’: a new Egyptian organization devoted to reviving the revolution,” 30 September 2013. Available at muftah.org/the-launch-of-thuwwar-a-new-egyptian-organizationdevoted-to-reviving-the-revolution/#.VXlywrY98hd (accessed 20 February 2017).

Chapter 9 Conclusion: Manifestations of Contemporary Contentious Politics in a Global Context 1. Maha Abdelrahman, Egypt’s Long Revolution: Protest Movements and Uprisings (Abingdon and New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), p. 132. 2. Hamid Dabashi, The Arab Spring: The End of Postcolonialism (London: Zed Books, 2012), p. 251; Sarah Hawas, “Global translations and translating the global: discursive regimes of revolt,” in Samia Mehrez (ed.), Translating Egypt’s Revolution: The Language of Tahrir, pp. 277– 305 (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2012). 3. Blockupy, formed in 2012, is a network of leftist organizations and individuals that has organized protest days against European austerity policies following the 2009 Euro crisis. The European Central Bank has been a regular symbolic locus of protest (see blockupy.org, accessed 20 February 2017). 4. Marlies Glasius and Geoffrey Pleyers, “The global moment of 2011: democracy, social justice and dignity,” Development and Change 44/3 (2013), pp. 547– 67, pp. 561– 62. ˘al, The Fall of the Turkish Model: How the Arab Uprisings 5. Cihan Tug brought down Islamic Liberalism (London: Verso, 2016), p. 272. 6. The term “post-politics” describes the contemporary, uncritical viewpoint of some Western policy makers and civil-society organizations that the utmost level of democratization has been reached – what Chantal Mouffe expresses thus: “Thanks to globalization and the universalization of liberal democracy, we can

NOTES TO PAGES 146 – 149

209

expect a cosmopolitan future bringing peace, prosperity and the implementation of human rights worldwide” (Chantal Mouffe, On the Political, Abingdon: Routledge, 2005, p. 1). 7. Colin Crouch’s monograph presents the observation of a postdemocratic age, which he defines as a model under which: while elections certainly exist and can change governments, public electoral debate is a tightly controlled spectacle, managed by rival teams of professional experts in the techniques of persuasion, and considering a small range of issues selected by those teams. The mass of citizens plays a passive, quiescent, even apathetic part, responding only to the signals given them. Behind this spectacle of the electoral game, politics is really shaped in private by interaction between elected governments and elites that overwhelmingly represent business interests (Colin Crouch, Post-Democracy, Cambridge: Polity, 2004, p. 4). 8. Kristin Ross, “Democracy for sale,” in Amy Allen (ed.), Democracy in What State? New Directions in Critical Theory, translated from French by William McCuaig (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2011), pp. 82 – 99, pp. 86 – 87. ¯ lim was the editor of Qada¯ya¯ Fikriyya, a journal that has focused 9. Al-ʿA on issues of globalization˙ since the early 1980s (Abu-Rabiʿ, Contemporary Arab Thought: Studies in Post-1967 Arab Intellectual History, London and Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2004, p. 187). See, for instance, the issue on “al-Fikr al-ʿArabı¯ bayna al-ʿAwlama wa-lHada¯tha wa-ma¯ baʿda al-Hada¯ha” (“Arab thought between globali˙ zation and modernity and˙ postmodernity”), vol. 19 – 20, 1999. This ¯ lim issue includes, among others, articles by Mahmu ¯ d Amı¯n al-ʿA and Samir Amin (Abu-Rabiʿ, Contemporary Arab˙ Thought, p. 423). 10. Abu-Rabiʿ, Contemporary Arab Thought, pp. 18 – 19. 11. Ibid., p. 190. 12. Maha Abdelrahman, “The transnational and the local: Egyptian activists and transnational protest networks,” British Journal of Middle East Studies 38/3 (2011), pp. 407 – 24, p. 411, DOI: 10.1080/ 13530194.2011.621701. 13. Dabashi, The Arab Spring, pp. 160– 1. 14. Pers. comm. #27. 15. Abdelrahman, “The transnational and the local,” p. 417. 16. Karl Polanyi’s seminal work The Great Transformation (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1957) analyzes the hegemonization of society by the market economy. Polanyi notes that whereas the capitalist market expanded and came to dominate and structure society in the nineteenth century, that same society reacted to this dislocation with popular revolt, ultimately resulting in the welfare state (Cihan ˘al, “‘Resistance everywhere’: the Gezi revolt in global perspecTug tive,” New Perspectives on Turkey 49, 2013, pp. 157 – 72, p. 158).

210

NOTES TO PAGES 150 – 153

17. Elizabeth Suzanne Kassab, Contemporary Arab Thought: Cultural Critique in Comparative Perspective (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2010); Tarik Sabry, Cultural Encounters in the Arab World: On Media, the Modern and the Everyday (London and New York, NY: I.B.Tauris, 2010), Chapter 2. 18. Kassab, Contemporary Arab Thought, pp. 3– 4. 19. Sabry, Cultural Encounters, p. 25. 20. Kassab, Contemporary Arab Thought, p. 7. 21. Ibid., p. 11. 22. Ibid., p. 340. 23. Ibid., p. 2. 24. Ibid. 25. The questioning of the normative self had already begun in the 1950s, particularly in leftist spheres. Embracing Jean-Paul Sartre’s existential notion of intellectual engagement (iltiza¯m) as a responsibility toward society (Yoav Di-Capua, “Arab existentialism: an invisible chapter in the intellectual history of decolonization,” American Historical Review, October 2012, pp. 1,061–91, pp. 1,070–1), the Lebanese literary critic Husayn Muruwwah applied Iltiza ¯ m to the ˙ logic of historical materialism in order to make tura¯th (heritage) applicable to a new generation “so that cultural authenticity could be reclaimed” (Yoav Di-Capua, “Homeward bound: Husayn Muruwwah’s integrative quest for authenticity,” Journal of ˙Arabic Literature 44, 2013, pp. 21–52, pp. 47–8). 26. Kassab, Contemporary Arab Thought, p. 8. 27. Sabry, Cultural Encounters, pp. 28–9; Roel Meijer (ed.), Cosmopolitanism, Identity and Authenticity in the Middle East (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1999); Roel Meijer (ed.), Alienation or Integration of Arab Youth: Between Family, State and Street (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2000). 28. Sabry, Cultural Encounters, p. 28. 29. The historicist/Marxist position is, above all, represented by the Moroccan historian Abdallah Laroui. Laroui argues for a de-essentialized and ahistorical thinking about the self, thereby freeing authenticity from its dependency on heritage (Kassab, Contemporary Arab Thought, pp. 83 – 5) and thus also from an integration of Arab culture in Western culture. His works La crise des intellectuels arabes; traditionalisme ou historicisme? (Paris: F. Maspero 1974) and L’ide´ologie arabe contemporaine (Paris: F. Maspero, 1982) also identify authenticity as a central issue in the Arab world resulting from the predominant self-positioning in relation to the West (Abu-Rabiʿ, Contemporary Arab Thought, p. 347). Laroui introduces two main reasons for the Arab world’s crisis, illustrating them through the Egyptian case: firstly, the field of politics and economy, and secondly the relationship of culture and intellectuality (ibid., p. 349). In relation to politics, Laroui places the role of

NOTES TO PAGE 153

30.

31.

32. 33. 34.

35. 36.

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the State at the center of his analysis as the reason for the lack of “political unity and economic independence,” noting that the State focuses too much on its own heritage (ibid.). It thereby attempts to gain legitimacy and normative hegemony via a discursive reliance on nationalism and “cultural authenticity” (ibid., p. 350). Instead, he infers that the most certain way to modernity is by appropriating the universality of “historical materialism and its revolutionary politics [. . .] to get away from cultural salafism, the superficialities of liberalism and technocracy” (Sabry, Cultural Encounters, p. 30). The rationalist/structuralist position is represented in particular by the Moroccan philosopher Mohammed Abed al-Jabri. Al-Jabri’s starting point is also marked by his locating an ideological confusion “due to the overlapping of the old and the new in ‘Arab culture’,” (Sabry, Cultural Encounters, p. 26) which he develops in his seminal work Naqd al-ʿAql al-ʿArabı¯ (1): Takwı¯n al-ʿAql al-ʿArabı¯ (Beirut: Markaz Dira¯sa¯t al-Wahda al-ʿArabiyya, 1991). He criticizes Arab ˙ past and seeking within it ready-made thought for glorifying the solutions to contemporary problems, specifically when faced with historical turning points such as the series of wars and defeats against Israel since 1948 (Sabry, Cultural Encounters, pp. 31–2). Al-Jabri’s project “is to deconstruct tura¯th (Arab-Islamic cultural heritage), reorganize it from within, then modernize it using Western methodology so it can inform questions of the present, forming a linear and orderly structure of thought” (ibid., p. 26). Taking this approach, Arab intellectuals could revitalize and integrate rationalist dimensions, already existent in Arab philosophy – based, for instance, on Ibn Rushd and Ibn Khaldu ¯ n – into present Arab thought (Abu-Rabiʿ, Contemporary Arab Thought, p. 263). The salafist/turatheya discourse defines itself by focusing on ArabIslamic heritage. Consequently, authenticity is the dominant notion, allowing “no room for otherness, tolerance or double-identity in this position” (Sabry Cultural Encounters, p. 32). Discursively, the utopian imagination makes it likely that this position can become hegemonic, as it is based mainly on the re-emergence of a pre-existing condition (ibid., pp. 32–3). The decades since the 1970s, when Islamic normativity became increasingly hegemonic but failed to entrench itself on the state level, bear out this assumption. Ibid., p. 30. Ibid., p. 33. See Abdelkebir Khatibi, “Double criticism: the decolonization of Arab sociology,” in Halim Barakat (ed.), Contemporary North Africa: Issues of Development and Integration (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 9 – 19. Sabry Cultural Encounters, p. 33. Khatibi, “Double criticism”.

212 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43.

NOTES TO PAGES 153 – 155

Kassab, Contemporary Arab Thought, p. 345. Ibid., p. 346. Ibid. Ibid., p. 345. Ibid., p. 344. Ibid., p. 345. See also, for instance, neologisms like “Revelections,” indicating revolutions in the wake of elections such as in Serbia in 2000 and Ukraine in 2004 (Ivan Vejvoda, “Civil society versus Slobodan Milosevic: Serbia, 1991 – 2000,” in Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash, eds, Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-Violent Action from Gandhi to the Present, pp. 295 –316, p. 296, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); or “re-folutions,” referring to democratic transitions in countries like Brazil or Mexico, which evolved from the context of pressure from below forcing reform policies by the incumbents. According to Bayat, this could also be an option for the Arab world (Asef Bayat, “Paradoxes of Arab refolutions,” in Bassam Haddad, Rosie Bsheer and Ziad Abu-Rish eds, The Dawn of the Arab Uprisings: End of an Old Order? London: Pluto Press, 2012, pp. 28 – 32). ¨ nf 44. Reinhard Schulze, “Vom anfang und ende der revolution – fu bemerkungen mit blick auf die arabische Welt,” Journal of Modern European History 11/2 (2013): On Revolution, pp. 220 – 42, pp. 236– 7. 45. The illustrated general distrust of formal political procedures can also be explained by focusing on the repertoires employed by April 6 and movements worldwide. In this context of recognition, Judith Butler and Athena Athanasiou approach contemporary protest dynamics through the notion of the performative being induced by a feeling of dispossession, which unfolds due to socioeconomic conditions related to precarious work and welfare and ubiquitous commodification (Judith Butler and Athena Athanasiou, Dispossession: The Performative in the Political, Cambridge: Polity, 2013, p. 11). This is so because neoliberalism functions exactly by a “performative bio-productivity in capacitating modes of living subjectivity as well as in inculcating normative fantasies and truth-effects of the ‘good life’” (ibid., pp. 30 – 1), which then, if not arrived at, result in the feeling of abandonment. This recalls the analysis of the global middle class, particularly in cities, longing to achieve these individual aspirations. Consequently, the resistance entailed can be understood as performative in the sense of an intertwinement of body and space appropriating the ownership of one’s body vis-a`-vis precarity and oppression (ibid., pp. 10 – 28). The difficulties for Egyptians and Egyptian youth in everyday life, obstructs the individual’s realization of future life stages. Thus, performativity arises when a collectiion of bodies comes together to call for

NOTES TO PAGE 155

46.

47. 48. 49.

213

recognition. These articulations are increasingly documented by the media, and thus gain global significance and become interconnected (ibid., p. 196). Schulze, “Vom anfang und ende der revolution,” p. 238. The original German wording is: “Thematisch ging es den Demonstranten in den arabischen Sta¨dten vor allem darum, die Gesellschaft als ¨ glichkeitsraum neu zu definieren und aus den Setzungen des Mo Staates zu befreien. Es ging also darum, die eigene Lebenswirklichkeit in Wert zu setzen, nicht mehr um die Schaffung eines ‘neuen Menschen.’” Dabashi, The Arab Spring, pp. 157– 67. Donatella Della Porta, Mobilizing for Democracy: Comparing 1989 and 2011 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 302. ˘al, The Fall of the Turkish Model, p. 273. Tug

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INDEX

Italics are for figures. 6 April 2010 protest march, 124

al-Ahly football club, 134

21 February 1968 uprising, 42

Ahmed Maher Front (Gabhat Ahmed

25 January 2010 protest march, 124 25 January 2011, 63, 76, 93, 128

Maher), 117 Albrecht, Holger, 51, 52 Ali, Amr, 3, 73– 4, 79, 85–6, 93, 101,

Abdalla, Ahmed, 14, 42, 47

105, 111, 120

Abdel Fattah, Esraa, 65, 66

Ali, Khaled, 116 ¯ lim, Mahmu al-ʿA ¯ d Amı¯n, 148 ˙ Amin, Samir, 27, 148

Abdelrahman, Maha, 22, 56 –7, 58,

Anheier, Helmut, 15 –16

60–1, 64, 73, 135, 138, 149 Abu al-Futu ¯ h, ʿAbd al-Munʿim, 45, 116 ˙ Academy of Change (Aka¯dimı¯yya

April 6 Youth Movement, 65–74, 75–80 Administrative Office (AO)

Abdalla, Nadine, 129 Abdel Fattah, Alaa, 140

al-Taghyı¯r), 72 activities (faʿa¯liyya¯t) see repertoires of contention Adel, Mohamed,

(al-Maktab al-Ida¯rı¯), 106–9, 110 Aprilian ideology (ı¯diyu ¯ lu ¯ jiya¯ ibrı¯lı¯), 153 co-founders, 110 committees (liga¯n), 106– 7

and 6 April 2008 strike, 65

court ban, 4, 78, 112, 142

on April 6, 92, 104– 5, 109, 129 arrest and imprisonment, 4, 78, 140

demands, 69, 81–98, 138–9, 146–7 Facebook use

message from prison, 118 AGEG (Egyptian Anti-Globalization Group) (al-Magmu ¯ ʿa al-Misriyya ˙ li-Muna¯hadat al-ʿAwlama), 58 –9, ˙ 119– 20, 148

campaigns, 4 –5, 6, 122, 124–7, 125, 126 decision making, 110 establishment and structure of the movement, 9, 21, 66–7, 100, 101

238

MAKING REVOLUTION IN EGYPT identity and vision, 88

Bayat, Asef, 20 –1, 23

Media Committee page, 130

Beinin, Joel, 26, 44, 47, 57

foreign links, 70–4, 92– 3, 111–12, 135, 147–8 formation, 66– 9

Bourdieu, Pierre, 18 Bread Riots (intifa¯dat al-khubz), ˙ 45, 50

funding, 73, 104–6, 107, 135 general coordinator (munassiq

Browers, Michaelle, 56, 59

ʿa¯mm), 111 International Department, 111–12,

Cairo

147–8 introduction, 3–5, 10 –12 legal status, 106, 113–14 Media Committee, 107, 130,

al-Ahly football club, 134 as global city, 30, 88 –9 Tahrir Square, 76, 83, 101–2 CANVAS (Centre for Applied Nonviolent Action and

132, 135 membership, 25, 66 –9, 86, 101–5

Strategies), 72 Celebration of the Thugs

organizational structure, 89, 98,

(ʿı¯d al-baltagiyya), 124 ˙ Centre for Applied Nonviolent

99 –118, 108, 139, 147–8 Political Office (PO) (al-Maktab al-Siya¯sı¯), 106, 110–11 and politics, 81 –3, 86 –8, 90 –3, 113–18, 139 repertoires of contention, before 25 January 2011, 72, 73 –4, 119– 28 from 25 January 2011, 128– 43 slogans, 4, 69, 82, 84, 132–4

Action and Strategies (CANVAS), 72 class, 14, 25, 38, 40 –1, 43 –4, 48, 49–50, 61 –2, 103, 137 Clemens, Elisabeth, 16 collective identity, 16 –17, 99– 103, 153 communist groups, 38

social media, 148 see also Facebook use

Constitution Party (Hizb al-Dustu ¯ r), ˙ 117, 129

see also Adel, Mohamed; Ali, Amr;

corruption, 46 –9, 84–6

Maher, Ahmed April 6 Youth Movement: Democratic Front (6 Ibrı¯l: al-Gabha al-Dı¯muqra¯tiyya), 76, 105, 116 ˙ April 6 Youth Movement:

Corruption Award (Fasa¯d Award), 124– 5, 125, 126 Dabashi, Hamid, 149 Della Porta, Donatella, 18 –19

The Revolutionary Front

Democratic Front Party, 65, 129

(al-Gabha al-Thawriyya), 117

demonstrations, 39, 43, 77, 130, 140

Aprilian Voice (al-Sawt al-Ibrı¯lı¯), ˙ 130– 2, 131

diffusion approach to transnational

Arab Socialist Union (ASU), 40–1, 42, 43, 44

movements, 27–8, 122 digital technologies, 21, 61,

art(s), 135 al-Aswany, Alaa, 81, 125– 6 al-Azm, Sadiq Jalal, 148–9

Denoeux, Guilain, 19–20

119– 20, 128, 132, 148 see also Facebook Duboc, Marie, 57

INDEX Egyptian Anti-Globalization Group (AGEG) (al-Magmu ¯ ʿa al-Misriyya ˙ li-Muna¯hadat al-ʿAwlama), 58 –9, ˙ 119– 20, 148 Egyptian Current Party (Hizb al-Tayya¯r ˙ al-Misrı¯) 129, 140 ˙ Egyptian Movement for Change see Kifaya movement ElBaradei, Mohamed, 63, 68, 129 elections parliamentary, 51 –2, 56, 76, 115–16, 135, 136 presidential, 63, 76 –7, 78, 86 –8, 116–17 Elswissy, Ramy, 130

239

Freeman, Carla, 25 Front of the Revolutionary Path (Gabhat Tarı¯q al-Thawra), 139–42 ˙ funding, 73, 104– 6, 107, 135 Garton Ash, Timothy, 70 –1 gender, 101–2 Georgia, 71 El-Ghad Party, 62, 65, 129 Ghonim, Wael, 63 Glasius, Marlies, 15 –16, 30 –1 Glassmann, James K., 72 –3 global cities, 30, 88 –9 globalization, 26–31, 92–3, 122, 146–50 graffiti, 67, 123, 135

externalization, 28, 112 ¨ rgen, 15 Habermas, Ju Facebook

Hamza, Mamdouh, 105–6

and 6 April 2008 strike, 65

Harders, Cilja, 19, 135, 137, 138

as source for research, 9

Hay, Iain, 9

statistics for Egypt, 61

Heiman, Rachel, 25

use by April 6 campaigns, 4 –5, 6, 122, 124–7,

Helwa¯n, 42 ˙ Herrera, Linda, 21, 72 –3

125, 126 decision making, 110 establishment and structure

historical background, 35 –53, 55 –64, 75–80 Holmes, Amy Austin, 149

of the movement, 9, 21, 66 –7, 100, 101 identity and vision, 88 Media Committee page, 130 “We are all Khaled Said” group, 63, 128 Fathy, Basem, 104, 106, 115, 121 Fillieule, Olivier, 18 –19 foreign links, 70 –4, 92 –3, 111– 12, 135, 147– 8 see also transnational movements frame analysis, 15 –16 Free Officer Movement (Harakat ˙ al-Dubba¯t al-Ahra¯r), 39 ˙ ˙ ˙ Freedom and Justice Party (Hizb ˙ al-Hurriyya wa-l-ʿAda¯la), 76, 116 ˙

identity, collective, 16–17, 99–103, 153 IMF (International Monetary Fund), 44, 47, 48 informal networks, 19 –21 international links, 70 –4, 92 –3, 111– 12, 135, 147–8 see also transnational movements International Monetary Fund (IMF), 44, 47, 48 internet, 21, 61, 119–20, 128, 132, 148 see also Facebook Islamists, 38, 45 –6, 47, 51– 2, 55, 76–8 see also Muslim Brotherhood Israel, Mark, 9

240

MAKING REVOLUTION IN EGYPT

Jika (Ga¯bir Sa¯lih), 135, 137 ˙ ˙ Kaldor, Mary, 15 –16

“The Military Lies” (ʿAskar Ka¯dhibu ¯ n), 134 Milosˇevic´, Slobodan, 71

Kandil, Hazem, 39, 40– 1

Minkoff, Debra, 16

Kassab, Elizabeth Suzanne,

Mitchell, Timothy, 49

151– 2, 153 El-Khouly, Tarek, 105

mobilization, waves of, 18– 19 Mubarak, Hosni, 46 –9, 51–2, 60, 84,

Khuri-Makdisi, Ilham, 37 Kienle, Eberhard, 51 Kifaya movement, 59 –61, 63, 65, 119– 20

85–6, 122 Mursi, Mohamed, 76 –7, 86 –8, 116– 17 Muslim Brotherhood (MB), 38, 45, 46,

King, Vera, 23– 4

47, 51 –2, 56, 76 –7, 84, 106, 117,

Koopmans, Ruud, 18

132– 3, 134 see also Mursi,

Kriesi, Hanspeter, 14

Mohamed

labor strikes, 38 –9, 47, 56 –7, 65 –6, 67, 122– 3, 123, 124 land reform, 40 Lesch, Ann, 51, 79

Napoleon Bonaparte, 36 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 39 –42, 49 National Centre of Popular Committees (al-Markaz al-Qawmı¯ li-l-

Liechty, Mark, 25

Liga¯n al-Shaʿbiyya), 135 National Committee of Workers and

Mahalla al-Kubra, 38, 47, 57, 65–6, 122 Maher, Ahmed

Students (al-Lagna al-Wataniyya ˙ li-l-ʿUmma¯l wa-l-Talaba), 38– 9 ˙ National Democratic Party (NDP), 44,

on April 6, 86, 100– 1, 106, 110–11, 113, 121–2 arrest and imprisonment, 4, 66, 78, 79, 140 founding of April 6, 65, 66, 68, 70

45, 52, 125 Nazif, Ahmed, 48, 66 new social movements, 14–15, 146 newspapers, 66, 126

involvement in 2011–12

non-violent action, 70 –1, 72, 73– 4

transition period, 117, 129 on need for alternative politics,

non-violent war (al-harb al-la¯ ʿunf), ˙ 72, 105

90, 113 Maher, Hassan, 79, 81 –2, 86 –8, 91–2 Mahfouz, Asmaa, 128, 129 Matthies-Boon, Vivienne, 80 MB see Muslim Brotherhood McAdam, Doug, 19, 28 media, 66, 120–1, 126, 130–2 Meijer, Roel, 23 MENA region analyses, 5–7, 19, 21 –2, 26, 150–5

Occupy Wall Street movement, 7, 73, 146 online activism, 21, 61, 128, 148 see also Facebook organizational structures, 16 –17, 60, 61, 71, 139 see also April 6 Youth Movement, organizational structure Otpor, 70, 71, 72, 73–4, 92, 121– 2 Ouaissa, Rachid, 49

INDEX parliamentary elections, 51 –2, 56, 76, 115– 16, 135, 136 Pleyers, Geoffrey, 30 –1 presidential elections, 63, 76 –7, 78, 86–8, 116–17

241

Shafiq, Ahmed, 116, 117, 128–9 Sharp, Gene, 70, 72, 74 Shehata, Dina, 22, 56–7, 58, 59, 63, 138– 9 Singerman, Diane, 23, 30, 88

pro-democracy movement, 57 –8

al-Sisi, Abdel Fattah, 78 Six-Day War (1967), 42, 152

al-Qilla al-Mundassa Conference

slogans, 4, 50, 69, 82, 84, 132–4

(Muʾtamar al-Qilla al-Mundassa),

Smith, Jackie, 28–9

125– 7, 127

Snow, David, 14 social media, 21, 61, 128, 148 see also

Reese, Aaron, 66 regime, distinguished from State, 42 repertoires of contention, 17–19 before 25 January 2011, 72, 73 –4, 119–28 from 25 January 2011, 128–43

Facebook social movements, 10, 13 –19 framing of demands, 15 –16, 28 organizational structures, 16 –17 repertoires of contention, 17– 19 transnational movements, 26 –31

revolution of 1919 (Thawra, 1919), 37

social nonmovements, 20–1

revolution of 2011, 63, 76, 93, 128

socioeconomic issues, 24 –5, 40–2,

Revolutionary Socialists, 58 –9, 62,

43–5, 47, 48 –9, 55–6, 57,

129, 140

60, 83 –4, 88 –9, 103, 137,

Revolutionary Youth Coalition (Iʾtila¯f Shaba¯b al-Thawra), 128– 9

146– 55 Soliman, Samer, 25, 42, 43, 49, 50 –1

Rucht, Dieter, 16–17, 18, 28, 105

Soueif, Ahdaf, 140

Ryzova, Lucie, 37

Soule, Sarah, 14 State, distinguished from regime, 42

Sabahi, Hamdeen, 45, 78, 116

street politics, 55 –6, 69 –70, 130, 140

Sabry, Tarik, 150, 153

strikes, 38 –9, 47, 57, 65 –6, 67,

Sadat, Anwar, 43 –6, 51

122– 3, 123, 124

Sadiki, Larbi, 45 Said, Khaled, 63, 67–8, 128

Strong Egypt Party (Hizb Misr ˙ ˙ al-Qawiyya), 140

Sa¯lih, Ga¯bir (“Jika”) 135, 137 ˙ ˙ Sassen, Saskia, 29 –30

students, 37 –9, 41, 42, 43, 45, 47, 55

SCAF (Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) (al-Maglis al-Aʿla¯ li-l-Quwwa¯t al-Musallaha), 76, ˙ 129, 132, 134, 138

see also universities; youth and youth movements Supreme Council of the Armed Forces see SCAF

Schulze, Reinhard, 154–5 Schumann, Christoph, 35, 150

tactics see repertoires of contention Tadamon, 61 –3, 65, 119–20

screenings, public (ʿard projector), 134 ˙ Serbia (Otpor), 70 –1, 72, 73 –4, 92,

Tahrir Square, 76, 83, 101–2

121– 2

Tamarod, 77, 117 Tarrow, Sidney, 19

242

MAKING REVOLUTION IN EGYPT

Tilly, Charles, 17, 19

women, 101–2

timeframe of protests, 18 –19

workers, 37, 38 –9, 42, 56 –7, 65 –6

Tohamy, Ahmed, 22 transnational movements, 26 –31, 122

see also strikes world-systems theory, 26– 7, 28

see also international links; waves of mobilization Ukraine, 72, 92, 114, 121–2 ultras movement, 134 universities, 41, 42, 43, 47, 107 see also students

Young Egypt (Misr al-Fata¯t), 37 –8 ˙ youth and youth movements, 23–5, 37–9, 41, 42, 43, 47, 61 –3, 138– 9 Eastern Europe, 71 –2 Revolutionary Youth Coalition

USA, 72 –3

(Iʾtila¯f Shaba¯b al-Thawra), 128–9 Tadamon, 61 –3, 65, 119–20

Vairel, Fre´de´ric, 26

Youth for Change (Harakat Shaba¯b ˙ min agl al-Taghyı¯r), 59 –60

uprising of 21 February 1968, 42

see also April 6 Youth Movement; Wallerstein, Immanuel, 26 –7 waves of mobilization, 18 –19

students YouTube, 128

weak identities, 16–17, 105 Wickham, Carrie, 41, 46

Zaghlu ¯ l, Saʿd, 37