Maimonides: A Radical Religious Philosopher (Judaism in Context) 9781463243913, 146324391X

Table of contents :
TABLE OF CONTENTS
NOTE FROM THE TRANSLATOR
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1. THE SECRET OF THE MULTIPLE SECRETS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED
CHAPTER 2. MAIMONIDES’ MECHANISM OF CHOICE
CHAPTER 3. DEFINING MAIMONIDES’ MASH’HURATH AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL SOURCES
CHAPTER 4. MAIMONIDES, THE LAW OF THE TORAH, AND THE QUESTION OF NATURAL LAW
CONCLUSION
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX

Citation preview

Maimonides

Judaism in Context

30 Series Editors Rivka Ulmer Phillip Ackerman-Lieberman Elisheva Carlebach Jonathan Jacobs Naomi Koltun-Fromm David Nelson Lieve Teugels

Judaism in Context provides a platform for scholarly research focusing on the relations between Jews, Judaism, and Jewish culture and other peoples, religions, and cultures among whom Jews have lived and flourished, from ancient times through the 21st century. The series includes monographs as well as edited collections.

Maimonides

A Radical Religious Philosopher

Shalom Sadik

gp 2023

Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA www.gorgiaspress.com Copyright © 2023 by Gorgias Press LLC

All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of Gorgias Press LLC. ‫ܐ‬

1

2023

ISBN 978-1-4632-4391-3

ISSN 1935-6978

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A Cataloging-in-Publication Record is available at the Library of Congress. Printed in the United States of America

For my dear grandfather Shalom Fredy Sadik

TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents ....................................................................... vii Note from the Translator ............................................................ xi Acknowledgments ..................................................................... xiii Introduction ................................................................................. 1 What is religious philosophy? .............................................. 4 Moderate religious philosophy and radical religious philosophy .................................................................... 8 Chapter 1. The Secret of the Multiple Secrets of the Guide of the Perplexed ....................................................................... 13 Esotericism in Maimonides’ halakhic compositions ........... 19 Speaking in “chapter headings” and subtle hints for scholars ....................................................................... 22 Philosophical concealment for educational reasons .......... 28 Esotericism in the Guide of the Perplexed ......................... 35 Similarities between the Guide of the Perplexed and Maimonides’ halakhic works ...................................... 36 Special instructions for reading the Guide of the Perplexed ..................................................................... 43 “Interpret each of its chapters in accordance with all the other chapters” ........................................................... 44 Favorable Interpretation .................................................... 47 The use of contradictions in the Guide of the Perplexed ..... 49 The purpose of the Guide of the Perplexed .......................... 56 The main target audience of the Guide: The perplexed thinker ........................................................................ 57 The secondary target audience of the Guide: the novice philosopher ................................................................. 64 vii

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Summary: The different methods of concealment in the writings of Maimonides – their purpose and intended outcomes ..................................................... 68 Methods of concealment in the various books of Maimonides ................................................................ 68 Between the purpose of the secret and the understanding of the secret ........................................ 71 Chapter 2. Maimonides’ Mechanism of Choice .......................... 77 The Eight Chapters ............................................................. 83 The Definition of Choice (‫ )אכ'תיאר‬in the Guide of the Perplexed ..................................................................... 94 The Role of Reflection in Adam’s Original Sin, as per Guide I:2 .................................................................... 112 Conclusion ........................................................................ 117 Chapter 3. Defining Maimonides’ Mash’hurath and its Philosophical Sources ....................................................... 119 ἔνδοξα in Aristotle’s Topics ................................................ 122 ‫ ﺷﮭﺮ‬in the writings of al-Farabi ........................................ 125 Mash’shurat in the Words of Logic ..................................... 131 Mash’hurath in the Guide of the Perplexed ......................... 135 Some possible implications of Maimonides’ unique position ..................................................................... 145 Conclusion ........................................................................ 147 Chapter 4. Maimonides, The Law of the Torah, and the Question of Natural Law .................................................. 149 A principled negation of natural law ............................... 153 The Torah as a vessel suited to natural law ..................... 166 Summary of intra-textual tension and possible solutions ................................................................... 172 The esoteric-solution option ............................................. 173 The rejection of the esoteric solution and the resolution of tension via general human history ....................... 175 Conclusion ................................................................................ 181 General chapter summary ................................................ 181 Conclusions: the naturalist opinion of Maimonides ......... 183 Between religion and philosophy ..................................... 187 Bibliography ............................................................................. 191 Ancient Sources ................................................................ 191

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Modern Sources ................................................................ 192 Index......................................................................................... 207

NOTE FROM THE TRANSLATOR The typical translator’s note naturally delves into the peculiar translation challenges of the work at hand, and to be sure, there were more than a few such challenges in translating Prof. Sadik’s book. Certainly, I would be remiss if I did not mention the issue of Maimonides’ use of the term ‫( ראשי פרקים‬rashei p’raqim, literally: “chapter headings”), which even in modern Hebrew is used in a similar vein as Maimonides used it to mean something along the lines of “main ideas”, “outline form”, or “broad terms” – or perhaps all these wrapped into one. Ultimately, it was decided to stick with the literal translation in quotation marks, and allow context to clue in the reader as to the precise meaning. However, it is not the translation challenges that motivated me to compose this note, but rather my sense of gratitude to Prof. Sadik for selecting me for this challenge and, thereby, allowing me to revisit the Guide of the Perplexed after a 3-decade hiatus – and more than that, to reach a deeper understanding of the book, to broaden my horizons regarding the range of interpretations, and ultimately to draw my own, new conclusions. Although, technically, I first encountered the Guide while majoring in philosophy at Duke University, I did not study it closely until I was an oleh chadash in Yeshivat Netzach Yisrael in Jerusalem, and even then, this was a relatively cursory reading, albeit from cover to cover. By contrast, the current undertaking both forced and encouraged me to read and reread the most obscure but significant passages in the Guide, and to do so within the framework of Prof. Sadik’s structured and rigorous discussion of how Maimonides presented key religious concepts from a philosophical perspective. xi

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If this were all I got out of the project, dayeinu – it would have been enough to instill a sense of indebtedness. But on top of this, it is my wont as a translator/editor to use my early-draft margin notes now and again to engage the author in a discussion of concepts which are either difficult to grasp or which I have a different view on. Given the complexity of the philosophical material along with my generally traditionalist positions, such margin notes were unsurprisingly far from rare, and to his great credit, Prof. Sadik always answered my queries thoroughly and with a level of respect fit for a colleague. Such regard is not a given, and for this I am deeply appreciative. Robert Klein, Be’er Sheva August 2022

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Firstly, I must thank the Master of the Universe for giving me the opportunity and creating the right conditions to spend my life learning philosophy, trying to understand His ways, and teaching others the conclusions of my research. The core basis of this book are four Hebrew articles of mine, two of which were published in AJS Review, and the other two in Jewish Law Annual and JSIJ. I am thankful to these journals for being the first to publish the articles, and I am also grateful to all the reviewers involved for all of their efforts. I completed this book as a faculty member of the Goren Goldstein Department of Jewish Thought at Ben Gurion University of the Negev, and I truly feel that this venue is the best place that I could possibly imagine for conducting research and teaching courses, given the friendly, intellectually stimulating environment here, and for this I wish to thank all the students and faculty members of the Department. But as thankful as I am to all in the Department, I wish to give a special, heartfelt thanks to my PhD advisor, Prof. Daniel Lasker, who was for me much more than a mere advisor – just as he was much more than a mere professor when I was his student. His lectures and especially our conversations over the years have had a profound influence on me, and Prof. Lasker continues to be of inestimable help despite so many years having passed since earning my PhD. I also wish to express my sincere gratitude to the people who worked on this book: my translator and editor, Robert Klein, who went beyond the technical aspect, analysing with me all the topics covered in the book; the team at Gorgias Press who accepted, xiii

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reviewed, and publicized the book, especially acquisitions editors Dr. Melonie Schmierer-Lee and Dr. Yael Landman; and the index assembler Mark Shapiro. Finally, I would like to give a special thanks to my family, starting with my parents: Jacques and Chantal Sadik, who raised me in an environment that guided me to an academic career; my children and daughter in law: Yaakov and Noa, Maayan, Ayal, Naama, Ilan, Nitsan, Eliyah, Hadar, Hadas, Tehilla, and Reut, who fill my house with love and joy, and who are intellectually and spiritually nourished in part by the home environment of lively discussions about Maimonides and his radical commentators; and especially my wife, the love of my life, Navit, who always encourages my studies even while disagreeing with my radical conclusions, and who challenges me by debating my unique understanding of Maimonides and of religion in general. Navit has truly made me a better philosopher.

INTRODUCTION Maimonides (b. Cordoba 1138 – d. Egypt 1204) is without a doubt the single most influential and significant Jewish thinker and philosopher. 1 His influence even transcends the boundaries of Judaism as he is considered one of the most important of all the philosophers of the Middle Ages. This short book does not purport to represent a comprehensive review of Maimonides’ achievements or even his thought, but rather it seeks to examine four central issues and to draw from them the necessary conclusions regarding one of the central questions of his philosophical enterprise: the relationship between religion and philosophy. This question has stood, and to some extent continues to stand, at the heart of many an emotion-laden debate. My key conclusion in the book will be support for a radical philosophical reading: Maimonides was a radical religious philosopher – that is, a philosopher who read the Torah for the philosophical content he saw as necessary, and who saw religion and its commandments as a social, moral, and educational necessity. Contrary to Leo Strauss’s position, 2 I do not claim with this reading that Maimonides was an atheist who maintained the religion only for social reasons. Strauss’s approach assumes that religion should be conservative, and that rejection of a personal god is tantamount 1 This point is amply demonstrated below in Chapter 1, in the section addressing the research literature dealing with Rambam, his philosophical approach, and his influence on Christian philosophy. 2 Specific criticisms of Strauss’s approach are discussed below in Chapter 1.

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to atheism. In my opinion, Maimonides’ goal was exactly the opposite: to show that true religion is identical with philosophy in precisely the same manner that true philosophy promotes leading a religious life. In the introduction to the book, I will briefly describe the essence of religious philosophy. I will note the difference between a more conservative religious philosophy and a radical religious philosophy. This distinction is of three-fold importance, for in its light we can: 1. better understand the essence of religious philosophy; 2. differentiate the conservative stream of philosophy from conservative streams in other areas of thought; and 3. demonstrate the existence of religious philosophy as a distinct philosophical current with its own unique philosophical claims regarding how to lead a moral life. In the first chapter I will analyze the esoteric writing method of Maimonides. We will present an original concept according to which Maimonides had two different goals when he wrote his famous Guide of the Perplexed: 1. To allow a perplexed philosopher, with solid philosophical positions, to remain religious and keep the commandments. Moreover, it will be argued that to this end, Maimonides developed a method of writing that allows every perplexed person to read out from the Guide their own true philosophical positions, and from there to likewise find these very same philosophical positions written esoterically into the text of the Bible. Through this method of reading, perplexed students will become convinced that the secrets of the Torah are identical to their own philosophical positions, thereby defining the most fundamental religious concepts (essence of God, providence, prophecy, etc.) in accordance with his general philosophical outlook. 2. To advance the student who as yet has no clear philosophical positions towards the philosophical truth that Maimonides saw as correct. But herein lies a danger that should Maimonides reveal too clearly his radical views, the uninitiated reader will find the text unsettling, and ultimately cause him to deny the conservative religious ideals well before he ever arrives at the deeper religious philosophical truth. Given the difficulty in achieving this lofty goal, the Guide must necessarily make for comfortable reading which allows each reader to acquaint himself

INTRODUCTION

3

with the text in a way that advances the student philosophically without harming him. At the end of the chapter, I draw conclusions about the way in which modern scholars should try to understand the true intent of Maimonides. In the second chapter I will deal with the analysis of Maimonides’ position on the issue of free choice. Here I will argue in favor of the position that Maimonides supported the free choice of man. In this chapter I will also analyze the composition of the human psyche and its powers as per Maimonides’ understanding. Along the way we will deal with the essence of human will and Maimonides’ interpretation of the sin of Adam. These two elements will prove to be extremely important for understanding Maimonides’ general approach, with which we shall deal in the conclusion to the book. In the third chapter we examine an important issue in Maimonides’ theory of cognition: what kind of evidence can be considered philosophically admissible. In this chapter I will try to prove that Maimonides makes a clear distinction between the realm of generally accepted notions – which for Maimonides deal only with issues of morality – and the realm of metaphysics, for which only demonstrated proofs can be brought. In the fourth chapter we will continue the study of the issue of morality and analyze Maimonides’ position on the question of natural morality. Here Maimonides seems to have a very basic natural morality that is tantamount to preventing the pursuit of lust. In addition to this natural morality, there are various moral teachings that have no difference in terms of human nature (relative morality). The advantage of the Jewish commandments, in relation to other religious laws, derives not from human nature but from shared human historical experience. According to Maimonides’ approach, the laws of the Torah are more appropriate for the reality of the human condition as it has expressed itself throughout human history than the laws of other religions. Finally, for the book’s conclusion, we will weave together the topics that the previous four chapters dealt with to argue for a radical philosophical reading of Maimonides according to which, on the one hand, the ideational content of the Torah is

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defined entirely according to philosophical proofs and, as such, is devoid of any meaning beyond its educational and social meaning, while on the other hand, religion retains its significance out of social and moral necessity.

WHAT IS RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY?

In order to properly define religious philosophy, we must first explicate each of its elements separately. We will embark on this task by asking two rarely asked questions that most people would probably find are surprisingly tricky to answer, to wit: What is religion? And what is philosophy? There is no doubt that these questions, despite their apparent simplicity, are actually extremely heavy and an analysis of the various positions given to each of them could have filled entire volumes. Therefore, I will confine myself here to a very brief summary, which is an answer that I think is both correct and useful for understanding Maimonides’ own take on religious philosophy, which is, after all, the main purpose of our book. What is philosophy? The essence of philosophy is to free man from his learned assumptions by espousing a willingness to analyze them, to understand their foundation and validity, and to validate them when they accord with reality. Every person, as a social creature, has been educated in a particular society and absorbs from early childhood beliefs and opinions as he becomes accustomed to doing certain acts and seeing certain social behaviors, learning which ones are to be considered normative, and which abnormal. Philosophy allows a person to question these beliefs (and the acts associated with them) and put them to the test. Rational (or exemplary) philosophical currents will mainly use factual analysis of the world to free a person from their prejudices. In contrast, more skeptical streams of thought will use the analysis of epistemology to cast doubt on humanity’s ability to reach any certainty. What every philosopher has in common, though, is the willingness to doubt everything and not take anything for granted, to demand proof or evidence for every position and every social convention. By this definition, philosophy will always be subversive since the philosopher casts doubt on the beliefs and mores that form the basis of society.

INTRODUCTION

5

The various philosophical streams differ from one another in accordance with the answers they give to several basic questions. For example, skeptical philosophers answer the basic question of the theory of cognition by stating that a person has no ability whatsoever to reach certainty on any subject (the issue of relative plausibility notwithstanding). In contrast, rational philosophers opine that man can rely on his senses as a dependable source of information, and based on sensory input and other sources of knowledge, try to develop their philosophical worldview. What is religion? As a working definition I submit that religion is the combination of obligatory acts, moral exhortations, prohibitions, texts, and stories that are considered sacred by a specific group. The sacred texts and stories create a common set of beliefs in a religion whose very maintenance is also considered a religious obligation. It is important to note that there is no authoritative body, with the power to dictate the ideational content of those beliefs or deeds, that is considered acceptable by all members of a given religion. 3 This definition of religion, which dismisses the essentiality of the ideational content of religion, is primarily based on two historical facts: 1. In the case of each of the monotheistic religions, 4 there have been innumerable controversies over the proper definition of that religion and its unique beliefs. These controversies took place among people who all saw themselves as religious people who were fully devout, whether they were Jews, Christians or Muslims. It follows then that without taking a highly judgmental intra-religious position on matters – which is as problematic as it is common – the researcher cannot reach any 2F

This generalization is true even regarding Christianity, though only if one takes Christianity as one religion, rather than as a set of related religions. However, some might argue that Catholicism is a distinct religion, and as such, the only religion that has developed, with some degree of success, a mechanism that oversees the opinions of its believers and leaders. Indeed, the controversy surrounding the pope’s authority is the central controversy that separates the other Christians from the Catholics. 4 I do not have enough knowledge about non-monotheistic religions and so it may be that the definition of the religion I bring here is only these religions because of what they have in common historically. 3

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substantive definition of a given religion that includes within it all the various currents that claim to be part of that religion. 2. Thinkers of the same philosophical stream who belong to different religions actually have much more in common ideationally than do co-religionists who come from different streams of thought. For example, Maimonides’ views on the essence of the God of Providence or Prophecy are much more similar to those of Aristotle, Al-Farabi, and even Thomas Aquinas, than to those of Rashi or Nachmanides. If we want to find a common camp for the three aforementioned Jewish thinkers, we can find it only in the religious deeds they share and in the books (which include pronouncements considered dogmatic) that they consider sacred. 5 It is important to emphasize that I do not deny that every religion has certain seminal beliefs that must be declared true in order to be part of the same religion (e.g. the Trinity in standard Christianity and the existence of God in all monotheistic religions). But in my opinion, verbal formulations of seminal beliefs lack well-defined ideational content. For example, take a person who says that God does not exist, meaning that he does not believe in a personal entity that is separate from the world. Notice that this “atheist” defines God as a personal entity that is separate from the world and thinks that there is no such entity. Yet in principle, in terms of metaphysical conception, this nonbeliever could agree with a person who says there is a God, but who defines God as an impersonal entity that sustains the world on a constant basis. The common ground is even firmer if the believer outright identifies God with nature. These two hypothetical thinkers agree in their metaphysical worldviews even though they disagree on whether there is a god or not. This example shows that the essential difference between thinkers who state that God exists and those who reject God’s existence is not necessarily a metaphysical difference – it could be purely social. The situation is similar in Islam and Christianity. It is very difficult to find a shared stream of thought bridging Ibn Rushd and the thinkers from the Ashariya, or such a bridge of thought spanning the extremist Franciscan thinkers (Joachin and his successors, for example) and the Christian Averroists. 5

INTRODUCTION

7

If philosophy is essentially a desire to discover the foundations of everything via critical thinking, and religion is a collection of deeds and holy writings, then there is no inherent contradiction between them. There only exists a contradiction between the two when religious thinkers demand the acceptance of certain specific religious beliefs and deeds as dogmas that cannot be challenged or criticized at all. Those same conservative thinkers define the character of religion in a harsh way that cannot be philosophically interpreted. 6 In contrast to conservative thinkers, religious philosophers can be defined as thinkers who adhere to two synergistic proposals simultaneously: 1. That there is a religious virtue if not an outright religious obligation in engaging in philosophy; and 2. That there is philosophical evidence if not outright proof supporting the need for religion. 7 This definition specifically excludes those religious thinkers who use philosophical arguments merely to clarify or justify the otherwise dogmatic foundations of religion, but who are not actually committed to the results of philosophical research. 8 There can be various reasons why religious philosophers consider it of value or even obligatory to engage in philosophy. What they all have in common is that, in their opinion, philosophy helps to distill religion from superstitions and enables a more correct understanding of religious beliefs (and also a more correct interpretation of the sacred religious books). According to

In an article from 2018 I argue that this position is common to both religious conservatives and atheists. Religious conservatives provide atheists with the inflexible definition of religion that atheists can reject, and vice-versa with conservative atheists’ definition of philosophy being inherently anti-religious, leading religious conservatives to reject philosophy. 7 This definition, as with any definition proffered for investigational purposes, will be examined according to its usefulness. Let it be noted that this type of explorational does not seek to establish the definition of any metaphysical idea (religious or philosophical), but is only put forth in order to provide a convenient division of the various thinkers. 8 Abarbanel may have been just such a thinker. Regarding the disputes surrounding Abarbanel’s position, see Cohen-Skalli. 6

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these thinkers, without philosophy, the religious believer cannot believe in the true God. The philosophical-religious stream of thought can be defined as that group of thinkers who have reached the same philosophical conclusion that religion is a human necessity. As such, this stream of thought is similar to the other philosophical streams defined by the answer they gave or currently give to one ideational question or another. That said, certainly any given religious philosopher may have their own philosophical reason for why they see religion as crucial for humanity. Indeed, some religious philosophers may offer more than one explanation. Given the above nuances within religious philosophy, it is worth reviewing the two main types of such explanations: the socio-moral explanation and the epistemological explanation. Determining which of the two explanations predominates within each religious philosopher’s own system of thought largely depends on establishing the distinction between what I define as moderate (or conservative) religious philosophy and what I define as radical religious philosophy.

MODERATE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY AND RADICAL RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY

Conservative religious philosophers accept the concept that their religion’s doctrine allows the laying of ideational foundations that no man could have discovered without divine revelation. These foundational beliefs, while not necessarily dogmas, nevertheless by definition cannot contradict whatever evidence one is exposed to or whatever proofs that come to one’s mind, but are rather beyond any scrutiny that would normally be engendered by such proofs and evidence. Most of these conservative philosophers support some degree of philosophical skepticism, and as such, conservative religious belief does not oppose philosophy, but nonetheless views itself as being decidedly above it, infusing its adherents with information that could not have been known without the religion’s canonical revelations. It is important to emphasize here that even conservative religious philosophers can adopt philosophical interpretations of their religion so long as the

INTRODUCTION

9

underlying philosophy is supported by what is in their eyes solid evidence. It behooves us to consider this last point in a little more detail. According to conservative religious thinkers, one of the central functions of religion is to convey doctrinal beliefs to the believer. In a considerable number of cases, these same thinkers also marshal intellectual and scientific evidence to buttress the correctness of these beliefs. This evidence is not considered sufficient to allow a person to arrive at the religious truth, but once such a truth is known, it can be verified as true through intellectual evidence. For example, Rabbi Yehuda Halevi shows how the Jewish religion explains the existence of true miracles, which Aristotelian philosophy does not have the power to explain. 9 Another example is the position of Rabbi Saadia Gaon that one can understand the rational reasons for the commandments, while the super-rational commandments can only be learned of via divine revelation through prophecy. 10 Contrary to the above position, the radical religious philosophers hold that religion cannot relay super-rational information to man. The source of their understanding is their working assumption that there is no such thing as super-rational information, and their definition of revelation as the product of a perfected human capacity, and not as an instance of a personal god literally addressing a human being. The negation of revelation as verbal contact made by a personal God with man derives from the fact that God is immutable, and as such the very concept of a moment of revelation with time-dependent speech contradicts divine immutability. For radical religious philosophers, God is absolutely static, and therefore man’s sudden, time-bound perception of the static god is experienced as revelation. This 9 Though couched in terms of arguments based on uniquely Jewish sources, it is worth noting that in Halevi’s opinion, there is only a relative advantage for the Jewish explanation over the explanations of the other religions (and especially Christianity). On this subject, see Kuzari I:1–78. On the attitude toward Christianity and the skeptical position of Halevi, see Malachi (2018). On Halevi as philosopher, see Lasker (2013). 10 On the attitude of Saadia Gaon regarding the commandments, see Beliefs and Opinions, Book III.

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understanding of revelation is in contrast to the conservative position of the personal relationship between God and man involving interactions and even communication. However, in the view of the radical religious thinkers, the prophet receives his true knowledge only during contemplation as a philosopher, with no new, external information entering him at the time of what he perceives as prophecy. 11 The uniqueness of the prophecy boils down to the elevated social role of the prophet as legislator and leader – a role that the prophet can fulfill because of the additional perfections over and beyond his intellectual perfection (which for Maimonides includes perfection of both the moral sense and the power of imagination). According to this position, the only possible rationale for having commandments is their moral and social benefit. Given the radical religious rejection of the personal god, thinkers who belong to this philosophical school of thought will marshal social arguments as proof that religion is needed by man. For them, religion is the best way of life for ensuring the integrity of both human society as a whole and of its individuals. That is, the radical religious philosophers bring moral and sociological explanations as evidence for the necessity for the existence of religion. Even conservative religious philosophers (and even nonphilosophical religious thinkers) often use moral explanations for religious precepts. But in contrast, the socio-moral explanations play a much more significant role for radical religious philosophers: for them, the socio-moral aspect is the main reason to live a religious life, to continue observing the religious precepts, and to continue to ascribe sacredness to the Scriptures. 12

For different approaches to prophecy i n the Middle Ages see Kreisel (2001). 12 According to radical religious philosophers, the Holy Scriptures do not convey super-intellectual information, and therefore their true purpose is to serve as pedagogical texts and to support the observance of the commandments – the latter’s fulfillment being an absolute moral and social necessity. 11

INTRODUCTION

11

In this book, I will try to argue that Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon is a prototype of just such radical religious thought. 13 Furthermore, I will attempt to make this claim relevant for the modern thinker, for in my view, radical religious philosophy offers a relevant approach based on the contention that the religious way of life is the best way to attain the happiness of both the individual and society. 14

I intend to devote a future paper to describing the thought of other radical religious thinkers from Jewish, Christian, and Muslim circles. 14 Frenkel (2012) explains the dissipation of religious philosophy as a consequence of the modern conception that every person can live their life in an independent way using just reason. In my opinion, the very framing of the question of human autonomy as central is incorrect. Every society is based on social norms, and as such there is no difference between religious and irreligious society. The desire of the religious philosophers to interpret religion as an educational tool did not stem the fact that they thought people could not reach rational conclusions on their own and therefore need religion, but rather they saw the religious life as a better way of life, morally speaking. I think the central question for philosophers should be what way of life one should lead, and not whether or not a person is autonomous. Frenkel focuses more on the information in the hermeneutic method, and ignores the moral question. I also disagree with Frenkel on many other points, inter alia on the place of Spinoza in the spectrum of philosophers and his attitude toward religion (on this see Sadik, 2018). 13

CHAPTER 1. THE SECRET OF THE MULTIPLE SECRETS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED From its writing to the present day, the Guide of the Perplexed has been a magnet for every philosophically perplexed Jew who attempts to cope with the tension between philosophy and religion – and not a few non-Jewish thinkers as well. 1 This popularity is probably due to the fact that the Guide allows different readers with various and sundry philosophical positions to integrate their philosophical opinions with their religious views. Other readers, who only seek to advance their philosophical research or deepen their religious perceptions in some cases experience a religious and philosophical upheaval because of their study of this powerful book. In this opening chapter, I will try to analyze how the book’s inimitable author, Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon, AKA Maimonides, wrote his book in such a way as to allow the experienced thinker and novice student alike, even many hundreds of years after Maimonides’ death, to see the Guide as a remedy for their religious perplexity, or as a challenging tract for their philosophical and religious inquiry, or both. 2 On the influence of Maimonides on the Christian thought in the Middle Ages see Hasselhoff 2004, Wohlman 1988, and Schwartz 2002. 2 An interesting testament to the relevance of the Guide for thought in the 21st century is a new translation into Hebrew with extensive commentary that has recently been published (Guide of the Perplexed, 1

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One of the core topics in the vast research dealing with the thought of Maimonides is the esoteric dimension of his Guide. 3 Maimonides’ statement that he deliberately included contradictions in his book, along with his statements about the Sages 4 and even the Bible itself 5 employing an esoteric approach, has led to a very wide variety of different interpretations of the Guide and Maimonides’ intention in writing this book. While some commentators and scholars have in fact ignored or greatly downplayed the subject of contradictions in the book, 6 other scholars and commentators, especially following the studies of

translated by H. Gershuni; Introduction by Editor-in-Chief Y. Makbili, Kedumim, 2018). In addition, researchers are engaged in a new translation into English as well as the first Chinese translation ever directly from the original Judeo-Arabic (the first translation into Chinese was a translation from an English edition). 3 On this topic there is much research, e.g. Strauss 1952 (pp. 38–94), Motzkin 1978, Ravitsky 1986, Hyman 1988, Fox 1990, Kasher 1996, Klein-Braslavy 1997, Faur 1998 (pp. 38–52), Lorberbaum 2000, Schwartz 2002 (esp. pp. 68–111), Davidson 2005 (esp. pp. 387–402), Kreisel 2008, Halbertal 2009 (pp. 49–68), Rudavsky 2010, Davis 2011, Goodman 2015, and Lemler 2015. Here I have mentioned some of the main studies dealing on a theoretical level with this field of research. Needless to say, the studies that analyze one or more issues with Maimonides’ interpretations are too numerous to enumerate. 4 On the commentary of Maimonides addressing rabbinic esotericism see Klein-Braslavy 1997 (pp. 39–105). 5 There are many studies on Maimonides’ biblical commentaries, e.g. Klein-Braslavy 1987, Diamond 2002, and Cohen 2011. 6 Along with these types of commentators we can also mention Wolfson and Guttman who, despite their many studies on the Guide, have hardly dealt with – if at all – the subject of contradictions and esotericism in the book. For a historical survey of interpretations of Maimonides from his times and until today see Motzkin 1978, Ravitsky 1986, Hyman 1988, Davidson 2005 (pp. 402–428), and Davis 2011 (pp. 5–21).

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Leo Strauss, 7 have strongly emphasized the subject of intern contradictions in the Guide and Maimonides’ political writing. 8 In the view of those scholars who saw deep significance in the intentionally hidden contradictions, Maimonides’ goal with this ruse was to protect the simple yet socially important faith of the masses while sufficiently suggesting at his true philosophical views in a way that would allow a person with the right capabilities to unravel and comprehend them. 9 These two level of philosophical discussion within the Guide contradict one another, with the less obvious and less common philosophical view being the true opinion of Maimonides, according to Strauss. Against this

On the significance of Maimonides within the approach of Strauss see Strauss 2013 (esp. the introduction on pp. 1–87), Green 1993, and Bernstein 2015. Strauss’s attitude toward Maimonides changed over time, in part due to his unwavering position that philosophy and religion – including Judaism – are fundamentally contradictory. Strauss initially thought that Maimonides was a religionist, but later claimed that Maimonides was in fact an atheistic philosopher who supported religion for social reasons only. This position of Strauss has been widely criticized, and in my opinion rightly so. See for example Kellner 2001, which mainly criticizes the position that Maimonides would admit to the irreconcilable gap between philosophy and religion. See also Harvey 2002, and Davidson 2005, pp. 393–402. 8 Inter alia: Pines, Harvey, Ravitsky, and Kasher. 9 There is a possibility in the eyes of some critics that there is only one known philosophical truth: that no other philosophical truths can be discovered, i.e. skepticism. For this reading see Pines 1960, Pines 1979, Stern 2013 (mainly pp. 249–97), and Goodman 2015 (esp. the last two chapters). This is also the position of Lorberbaum 2000, and this notwithstanding his dispute with Pines over how to read the Guide. However, many have criticized this position, such as Harvey 1990, Davidson 1992, Manekin 1990, Ravitsky 1986, and Schwartz 2002 (mainly pp. 103–104). For a review of the research controversies on the subject see also Stern 2013, fn. 66, pp. 132–133. Rudavsky’s position in her 2010 work takes an intermediate position. On the one hand, she does not accept the reading of Maimonides as a skeptic, but on the other hand she emphasizes that on very many issues he indeed expresses an ambivalent position. Later in this chapter (fn. 104) I note another criticism of mine regarding reading Maimonides as an adherent of skepticism. 7

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position, various critics 10 have argued that Strauss 11 had an errant understanding of the seven contradictions Maimonides explicitly discusses in the Guide’s introduction, and of the seventh contradiction in particular, which Maimonides explicitly claimed he used in his book. For the naysayers, the contradictions are not any sort of significant political tool in the Guide, but rather a didactic, and decidedly marginal tool at best. 12 Worth noting here is the position of Schwarz, Lemler, 13 and Faur, who insist that esoteric writing and the possibility of a multiplicity of contradictions allow virtually any reading of Maimonides, and furthermore, that Maimonides did not in any case provide us with the tools to decide between the various readings. For these and other modern thinkers, Maimonides can be equally interpreted in either a more conservative or a more radical philosophical way, and both directions to varying degrees. 14 This position – particularly in the case of Lemler – is reminiscent of the theories of post-modern writing, especially the so-called “death of the author” approach of Barthes. In this chapter I will try to approach this complicated subject from a slightly different angle than the usual, for rather than delving right into the Guide, I will first analyze the signs of

Mainly Fox 1990, Lorberbaum 2000, and Davis 2011. But also a considerable number of other commentators of the Guide, including the author of the main Hebrew translation, R. Shmuel Ibn Tibbon. 12 According to Lorberbaum (2000), the seventh type of contradiction reveals the Guide’s secret, which in this interpretation is philosophical skepticism. By contrast, according to Davis (2011), the seventh contradiction points to a rather different secret: contradictions within the secret layer of the Bible, especially regarding Ezekiel’s cosmological conception. 13 The subject that preoccupies Lemler is less the Guide’s contradictions and more the postmodernist reading of such texts, which essentially treat the author as wholly irrelevant, or as I like to put it, “the death of the author”, a la Barthes’s 1967 essay of the same title. I will return to this topic at the end of the chapter. 14 It is also worth noting Davidson’s position (2005) that Maimonides only spoke of contradictions in the Guide’s introduction in order to cover for himself in case readers discovered any unintentional contradictions. 10 11

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esotericism in Maimonides’ halakhic 15 works: the Commentary on the Mishnah and the Mishneh Torah, and then, after a thorough analysis of the Guide itself, I will compare the halakhic works to the Guide (especially the introduction, but not only) in order to identify the uniqueness of the Guide in the eyes of its author. Here I will address not only the subject of the aforementioned seventh contradiction, but also: the nature of the perplexed thinker as perceived by Maimonides, and his comparison to the novice student as well as other readers of the Guide; Maimonides’ definition of philosophy and what he saw as its truths and mysteries; and the way Maimonides defines the purpose of the Guide. It is my contention that although these issues have all been discussed separately by previous scholars, until now they have not been taken into account as a whole to create an overall picture of the purpose of the Guide, nor has there previously been a methodical attempt to explain how Maimonides envisioned that readers of the Guide would navigate its somewhat treacherous waters – in other words, unlike the naysayers, I believe Maimonides did provide us with the tools to unravel the Guide’s secrets. The key to the tool shed, so to speak, is the comparison between Maimonides’ two main halakhic works on the one hand, and the Guide on the other – a comparison that in my opinion reveals the Guide’s unique aspects, and allows us to identify and better understand what Maimonides intended with his esoteric writing. My conclusions in this analysis will be somewhat like those of Strauss in that I will argue that, in contrast to Maimonides’ halakhic works, there is a massive use of politically motivated 15 Although Maimonides’ treatise Words of Logic might seem like another worthy candidate for comparison to the Guide – and later I indeed consider its content – I do not find any hint of esotericism in it. For the same reason I did not include his Epistle to Yemen. For more on this epistle, see Hartmann 1994. I should note here that another reason for not devoting more space to Words of Logic is that its authorship is disputed. On that question see Davidson 2005, pp. 313–322, where the author claims that it was not penned by Maimonides. For the opposing position see Stroumsa 2014. I agree with the position of Stroumsa, and marshal more arguments supporting Maimonides’ authorship. See also the third chapter of this book.

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contradictions in the Guide. It also seems that, along with contradictions, there are other types of concealment in both the Guide and Maimonides’ halakhic books, and while I would also agree with Schwarz that the use of such esoteric writing and open declarations that the work includes contradictions 16 theoretically allows for virtually any reading of the Guide as per post-modernism, contrary to Schwarz’s position, I will argue that Maimonides used esoteric contradictions quite on purpose. Moreover, and as noted above, I will emphasize that we indeed have the tools to make it possible to see which reading is preferable and best concurs with the author’s intentions, and even which reading is not legitimate in his opinion. Finally, I will note that the uniqueness of the Guide’s writing stems from both philosophical and religious considerations that together make the Guide a thoroughly philosophical book whose main purpose is nevertheless decidedly religious. 17 These conclusions will strengthen the case for using modern tools (literary analysis, philosophical analysis, analysis of the author in relation to his sources, and social milieu, etc.) to work out Maimonides’ true intentions. I will try to argue that the use of these tools (which Maimonides himself did not know of) can help the modern reader and researcher extract Maimonides’ true views from his esoteric writings. It is appropriate to add here a more detailed explanation of why I reject the post-modern approach despite the Guide admittedly lending itself to a post-modern treatment given the many and varied ways it has been interpreted as well as Maimonides’ own statements that it contains contradictions. My position is that As openly stated by Maimonides in the Guide, especially in the introduction. 17 And as such, I firmly disagree with Strauss’s assertion of a supposedly inherent contradiction between religion and philosophy, both in general terms and specifically regarding the writings of Maimonides. But I’m hardly the first philosopher to see the Guide as having a religious agenda, and not just a philosophical one. Hyman (1988) has already pointed out the religious purpose of the Guide. However, there are still considerable differences between Hyman’s textual analysis and my own. Among other things, he does not deal at all with the issue of concealment and does not connect the unique role of the Guide as Maimonides perceived it with the unique methods of concealment that Maimonides employed in writing the Guide. 16

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modern literary tools must always be first applied to all texts in general and especially philosophical texts to see if it is possible to infer an author’s intent before going the post-modern route and exploring all interpretive paths as legitimate. I say this because while poets, fiction writers, and other artists may not have a specific agenda beyond tickling the imagination of their audiences, true philosophers (including those who are also artists) always have a specific agenda and belief system – which is, after all, integral to the definition of philosophy. So really, abandoning the search for an orderly belief system in a serious work of philosophy is never a valid option in my opinion. Moreover, it should also be noted that since it turns out – as I intend to prove in this book – that by using modern tools we can correctly identify the intent of a text even as abstruse in its purpose as is the Guide, then preferring the modern approach to the post-modern approach is doubly incumbent upon the reader with respect to other, less abstruse philosophical texts.

ESOTERICISM IN MAIMONIDES’ HALAKHIC COMPOSITIONS

In his halakhic writings, 18 Maimonides does not explicitly state that he employs esoteric writing. However, this fact does not mean that his halakhic writings do not have an esoteric layer. In fact, quite the opposite is true, for it is likely that a writer using esotericism will only hint in an esoteric way that this is his way of writing. A writer (or really any person) who wants to conceal something will also usually want to conceal the fact that he is hiding something. 19 We must therefore look for the way in which As we shall see, there is no significant difference between the Mishneh Torah and the Mishnah commentary regarding esotericism, and the two types of concealment that we will be examining have sources in both works. The main difference that can be pointed out is that in the Commentary on the Mishnah, Maimonides deals mainly with the description of the esoteric layer of rabbinic literature, while in the Mishneh Torah, there are more sources that deal with the description of the esoteric layer of the Bible. 19 This fact solves quite a bit of Lorberbaum’s (2000) questioning of Strauss’s position regarding how no thinkers ever admitted to contradictions except Maimonides. At the end of the chapter we will discuss the unique nature of the Guide and the role of Maimonides 18

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Maimonides could have hinted to the existence of an esoteric sublayer that is addressed to only certain gifted readers of his halakhic writings. It would seem that Maimonides used in these books a relatively straight-forward way of implying the existence of an esoteric layer: he simply stated that certain subjects should be spoken of in an esoteric manner, and that therefore the writings of the sages 20 and even the Bible 21 contain esoteric

announcement of his intention to write contradictory material, as per his introduction to his book. On esotericism in Greek and Arabic philosophical literature before Maimonides see Klein-Braslavy’s 1997 review, pp. 15–27. On the comparison with al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Aristotle’s theology see Guidi 2007. On the comparison with Avicenna, al-Farabi and al-Gazali see Michaelis 2018. This scholar deals with the discussion regarding the revealing of secrets in Islamic thought, which Maimonides was influenced by. On the difference between Maimonides and the esoteric writing before him, see also Halbertal 2009. It should be noted that while great thinkers such as Plato, al-Farabi (especially in the 17th chapter of his On the Perfect State), Avicenna, and al-Ghazali never explicitly state that they themselves employed esoteric writing via metaphor, they do say that this is what religious leaders, political leaders, and philosophers should do. Now Maimonides in his halakhic writings followed suit, writing according to the politically acceptable way with which he was familiar. However, in writing the Guide he deviated from this standard, which he had regularly applied to his halakhic works, such that what needs to be explained is not the methodology of his legal writings, but rather the deliberate deviation from that methodology in the Guide. As we shall see in all the aforementioned sources, there is no talk of intentional contradictions or requests for favorable interpretations as in the Guide. It should also be noted that contrary to the position of Lorberbaum (2000), Maimonides’ Jewish successors and the commentators of the Guide continued to employ esoteric writing in pretty much the same subtle style that Maimonides used in his halakhic writings. These thinkers did not state that they were using esoteric writing, but attributed this method to the Sages and to the Bible, and themselves wrote in the same style as the Sages and the Bible. 20 On Maimonides’ analysis of the esoterics of the Sages see KleinBraslavy 1997, pp. 39–105. 21 On Maimonides’ analysis of the esoterics of King Solomon see ibid., pp. 109–202.

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messages – without ever explicitly stating that he himself did the same. 22 The implication here is quite clear: if a writer claims that when dealing with a certain subject one should write esoterically and as his predecessors did, it is essentially a given that when he deals with the same subject, he will behave in the same way and will similarly embed his exoteric writing with esoteric elements. 23 This method has a clear advantage: it allows Maimonides to imply in a way that is not very difficult to discover – at least for the careful reader – that there exists an esoteric layer in his books without explicitly stating so. This moderate use of stealth regarding his relatively radical beliefs allowed Maimonides to achieve various educational goals (some of which are detailed below) with the help of the visible, exoteric layer of the book without confusing or undermining the faith of those readers who are unable to properly digest the esoteric layer. 24 22 It should be noted that Maimonides also uses the same approach in his Epistle to Yemen. He attributes to R. Saadia Gaon social reasons for calculating the end times (ibid., p. 42 in the edition of Rabbi Kapach’s translation, Jerusalem 1994). According to Maimonides, the reason why R. Saadia agreed to publish a date – and a near one at that – for the coming of the messiah is that he understood that if he did not do so, it could lead to the conversion of many of the Jews to other religions. It is debatable whether this was indeed the intention of R. Saadia, but it is clear that this is indeed the intention of Maimonides when a few pages later (p. 48) he himself brings a date for calculating the end, after his scathing criticism of those who calculate the coming of the messiah. 23 This of course was also the approach of some of Maimonides’ predecessors. In contrast, there are quite a few thinkers who do not attribute esoteric writing to the Sages or to the Bible, and in fact do not engage at all in describing the ways in which the Sages and the Biblical authors wrote. For example, Rabbi Levi ben Gershom (Gersonides) and Rabbi Hasdai Crescas do not dwell at all on esoteric writing by the Sages, and this can serve as good evidence that their own writing at least has no esoteric dimension. 24 I am not claiming that Maimonides necessarily said novel things on metaphysical or physical subjects. Quite the opposite: he believed he was revealing ancient ideas that had only been carefully guarded, and at times not even mentioned furtively in the Bible and rabbinic sources. What I am claiming is that when Maimonides deals with these issues in his halakhic writings, he still takes an esoteric approach (generally by

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We will divide our discussion of Maimonides’ halakhic works according to two main types of esotericism: 1) writing in “chapter headings” and subtle hints for scholars; 2) use of metaphorical language given to multiple interpretations.

SPEAKING IN “CHAPTER HEADINGS” AND SUBTLE HINTS FOR SCHOLARS

Most of Maimonides’ writings on the question of how best to study the Account of Creation and the Account of the Chariot focus on determining the preparation for such study, what its content areas are, and the proper way to teach the relevant material, and are found mostly in his interpretations of Tannaitic esotericism, i.e. the statements of the Tanna’im themselves 25 that relate to knowledge that is best not taught universally but only to those for whom it is appropriate, and then only in an esoteric way. 26 Klein-Breslavy has devoted extensive research to this subject, and I am in total agreement with her conclusions and

using “chapter headings”, i.e. highly terse language). This approach allows the reader who understands philosophy to better understand the secrets of the words of the Sages and of the Torah – including the same secret that Maimonides hints at as the secret of the Torah and the Sages, and which of course matches his personal philosophical position. Moreover, Maimonides believed that the mass of readers would not be able to understand this secret. An example of such a secret is the position found in both the seventh chapter of Yesodei HaTorah as well as the introduction to Perek Cheilek that prophecy is a completely natural process. Maimonides describes these passages in philosophical terms that the typical reader has little to no hope of understanding 25 Tractate Hagigah, Mishnah 2:1 and in the Gemara there. 26 Maimonides discusses this issue in many places, including in Yesodei HaTorah, chapters 2 and 4, and in his commentary on Tractate Hagigah 2:1. Maimonides mentions this issue also in the introduction to his Commentary on the Mishnah and indeed in many places in the Guide (especially in the introduction and chapters I:31–35). In the next part of the current chapter, we will discuss the sources of the Guide, and there show how there is no significant difference between Maimonides’ interpretations of this mishnah in his halakhic books versus his interpretation of the same mishnah in the Guide.

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have nothing to add on the subject. 27 I will therefore shorten the discussion on this subject and note only the main points that are important for our research on the differences between the Guide and Maimonides’ halakhic writings. 28 At the end of the fourth chapter of Yesodei HaTorah (Fundaments of the Torah) in the Mishneh Torah, Maimonides deals with the way in which it is best to teach those areas of knowledge addressed in those first four chapters of Yesodei HaTorah: God (Ch. 1 and the beginning of Ch. 2); the separate intellects, i.e. the Account of the Chariot 29 (Ch. 2); the Heavenly spheres (Ch. 3); and sub-lunar matter, along with its sub-products, including man and his soul, all of these being aspects of the Account of Creation (Ch. 3–4). Maimonides here states that: And, wherein is the difference between the subject of the Account of the Chariot 30 and the subject of Cosmogony? The subject of the Account of the Chariot shall not be imparted even to an individual unless he be a scholar endowed with a reasoning power of his own, and then only the epitomes of each chapter may be transmitted to him; whereas the subject of Cosmogony may be imparted to an individual, even though not endowed with a reasoning power of his own, and it is permissible to teach him all that he is capable of knowing concerning these matters. If so, why not give public instructions therein? Because not every man is endowed with

27 Klein-Braslavy did not attempt a comparison of the Guide and Maimonides’ halakhic writings, nor did she deal with the issue of esotericism in the Guide in general. 28 This being a topic that Klein-Braslavy did not focus on in her research. 29 In his commentary to Mishnah Hagigah 1:2 he includes as part of the Account of the Chariot the concept of life after death. By contrast, in the fourth chapter of the Mishneh Torah, what happens to a person after death is discussed as part of the Account of Creation. Klein-Braslavy has already noted that Maimonides sometimes hones and at other times obscures the distinction between the Account of Creation and the Account of the Chariot. 30 Maimonides also addresses the issue of the Account of the Chariot in the second chapter of Yesodei HaTorah.

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In the very next Halakha (i.e. 4:12), Maimonides states that it is precisely through the study of these sciences that man attains the love of God. 32 He then also adds that these areas of study are collectively referred to by the Sages as the ‘Orchard’ (Pardes), and mentions the story of the four sages who entered the Orchard to illustrate the dangers that these studies have even for these revered sages. 33 In this key section of the Mishneh Torah, Maimonides state that the Account of Creation and the Account of the Chariot should be taught in an esoteric way. He does not state that he himself heeded this exhortation of the rabbis in his own writing the Mishneh Torah and in his Commentary on the Mishnah. Despite this absence of prima facie evidence of use of esotericism, from his statement that it is incumbent on all teachers of Judaism to use esotericism when teaching these areas of religious inquiry, one can easily conclude that Maimonides certainly acted in kind himself, even in his halakhic works. The Account of the Chariot in particular cannot be taught to simply anyone, but should rather only be taught to a discerning student who can understand such things on his own through just the “chapter headings” that the teacher reveals to him. 34 In other words, these areas of inquiry Yesodei HaTorah 4:10–11. Translation by Simon Glazer, 1927. In Hilchot Avodah Zarah 1:3, Maimonides also asserts that Abraham “educated everyone he met according to that person’s intellectual ability”. Here Maimonides does not explicitly mention the use of metaphor in order to educate the nation, but he does apparently intend as much given that even in the days of Abraham, there were people who were incapable of comprehending and internalizing the truth except via metaphor, and even then, these latter they were not truly able to understand properly. 32 On the issue of love of God in Maimonides see Eran 2001, Schwartz 2016, Kreisel 1996, Even-Hen 2013, Lasker 2006, Lasker 2008, and Diamond 2004. 33 Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Hagigah 14b. On Maimonides commentary on this story see inter alia Stroumsa 1993 and KleinBraslavy 1997, pp. 53–54. 34 For an in-depth analysis of these expressions see Klein-Braslavy 1997, pp. 77–84. 31

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can only be taught to a person who already has sufficient knowledge in this field, or at least in the sciences that are provisional for delving into this field, and in addition, the potential student of the Account of the Chariot should also have the ability 35 to understand deep ideas and draw comparisons by himself – and even then he should be taught such lofty material only with “chapter headings”, using basic ideas and concise hints to the deeper ideas. 36 In his commentary on Tractate Hagigah 2a, Maimonides adds that only a person who refrains from diving straight into the Merkava material and rather prepares himself by studying the preliminary sciences and proceeding with caution can succeed in understanding the Account of the Chariot. By contrast, the Account of Creation, according to the passage from the Mishneh Torah, 37 can indeed be taught to even those who are not independent thinkers. 38 Still, even the Account of Creation should not be taught to everyone, but only to those who have the general ability to understand such things, and they should be taught only that specific material which they can truly grasp. Indeed, Maimonides emphasizes that there is danger in teaching the Account of Creation to those who do not have sufficient intellectual capacity. Klein-Breslavy 39 has already defined the conveying of just “chapter headings” of a given concept as a type of philosophical esotericism (or even philosophical-religious/socio-esotericism). According to Klein-Breslavy, the philosopher speaks in terms of “chapter headings” so that whoever in his opinion should not understand will not understand his words. The reason for the That is, innate ability, according to Klein-Braslavy. With these including a certain amount of information directly related to the Account of the Chariot (this being according to Yesodei HaTorah 2:12). 37 Klein-Braslavy rightly points out that there is a tension between this passage and other sources in which Maimonides deals with the Account of Creation. In any case, this particular issue is not of great importance to the discussion here. 38 Though such a potential student of the Account of Creation would seem to need to be a scholar of sorts, i.e. one who is at least familiar with the basic sciences. 39 Klein-Braslavy 1997, pp. 48–61. 35 36

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concealment is because the philosopher wants to keep the knowledge to a select group or because this understanding could harm the religious commitment of the person or lead to a disregard for philosophy. 40 Klein-Breslavy even adds, 41 as per Maimonides’ interpretation of Hagigah 2a, that there are topics, which are included in the Account of the Chariot, which cannot be expressed properly via human language but can be grasped only through personal experience. Such topics can only be passed on to students via hints only understood by independent thinkers, which is to say that it is via hints that exceptional students can arrive at or at least come close to having that same experience of the ineffable knowledge. 42 Maimonides himself makes extensive use of this kind of esotericism in his halakhic writings 43 (and as we shall see, in the Guide as well). For example, only a person with knowledge of philosophy and who is an independent thinker will understand that Maimonides’ proof of the existence of God and his immateriality, in Yesodei HaTorah, halachot 5–7, presupposes the eternity of the world (e.g. “for the Sphere always turns”). 44 And 40 On these distinctions between different kinds of esotericism see KleinBraslavy 1997, and in particular pp. 15–27, for a clarification of the sources that are the basis for the various types of esotericism. 41 Ibid. pp. 61–62. 42 The origin of this esotericism is found in the Seventh Letter, an epistle widely attributed to Plato. I disagree somewhat with Klein-Braslavy regarding which specific topics belong to this category of sublime knowledge. In my opinion, these topics can be expressed by language, but the content of language itself varies according to the level of the person listening to them. Thus, the philosopher must challenge his disciples to navigate the same path to knowledge that he went through before he can speak to them on the same plane. I will expand on this issue in the section dealing with the Guide since the passage from the commentary on Hagigah is exceedingly terse and obscure, while most of the debate revolves around understanding the lightning metaphor in the foreword to the Guide. 43 On the philosophy of Maimonides’ halakhic writings see Twersky 1980. 44 The fact that Maimonides, in a later edition of his Commentary on the Mishnah (in Perek Cheilek), added margin notes explaining that he believed in creation does not in itself indicate that many people reading his Commentary on the Mishnah precisely determined that he actually

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only a person of this kind will be able to understand that in the same chapter, in the first Halakha, there is a summarized version of the metaphysical proof put forth by Ibn Sina (Avicenna) that God alone is a necessity of existence. 45 Most of Maimonides’ readers, both today and in his day, did not understand his words in Yesodei HaTorah, Chapter 4, or in the Laws of Repentance, Chapter 8, as showing that only the person who knows eternal scientific knowledge survives the disintegration of his body. Similarly, only this type of reader will understand the implication of Maimonides’ assertions that God does not change (Yesodei HaTorah 1:11) and that all miracles were pre-ordained during the six days of Creation (commentary on Avot 5:6) – the implication being that providence on the individual level is not possible in the conventional sense of the word. 46 59F

believed in the eternity of the universe. Those margin notes were only added after the Guide’s writing, and they constitute Maimonides’ response not only to that understanding of his Commentary on the Mishnah, but also to that interpretation of the Guide. 45 On these proofs, on their development from Aristotle until the philosophers of the Middle Ages, and on the other medieval proofs for the existence of God see Davidson 1987. 46 Many examples – some more extreme, some less – of how Maimonides used “chapter headings” in his halakhic works can be easily marshaled. One of the more extreme expressions, for example, is his statement in Yesodei HaTorah 1:6 where he writes, “And whosoever shall even consider the possibility that there is another god there [in Heaven] besides Him violates a negative commandment, as it says, “Thou shalt have no other god before Me.” The typical reader simply takes this to mean the obvious, i.e. that it is inconceivable to serve another god such as Zeus or Baal. However, the more perceptive reader who notices that this sentence comes in the middle of Maimonides’ philosophical proofs of the existence of God can deduce that these proofs show (by way of contradiction, at the very least) who is the God we should be worshipping. According to this reading, Maimonides states here that whoever serves a deity with a definition that differs from the correct definition is guilty to some extent of idolatry, even if the offender calls their deity by “Jewish” names. On the existence of extreme Aristotelian philosophical positions in the Commentary on the Mishnah and especially in the Mishneh Torah, see Harvey 2001. See also Saxon 2016, in which the author claims that Rabbi

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We see the same phenomenon of disconnect between the subtleties of Maimonides’ writings and the popular perception of those same writings with regard to the subject of prophecy. Maimonides describes prophecy in the seventh and eighth chapters of Yesodei HaTorah and in the sixth fundament of the introduction to the first chapter as a process in which the prophet channels God through his human powers. Most readers have not understood these descriptions this way, and their perception of God’s turning to this or that prophet remains conservative while Maimonides’ too brief and obscure comments do not challenge that perception. 47 To sum up, in his halakhic books, Maimonides uses “chapter headings” to subtly convey his philosophical positions. These clues are understood only by the wise person who thinks independently, i.e. a person who already has sufficient philosophical knowledge and who also has the ability to infer Maimonides’ true positions from this combination of personal philosophical knowledge and Maimonides’ terse and obscure descriptions. In contrast, the run-of-the-mill reader does not understand these hints at all. They do not teach him anything and he does not even notice them, or at most he notices that there are notions in Maimonides’ words that he does properly understand. We shall now see that Maimonides has in these halakhic writings passages with even more educational significance.

PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEALMENT FOR EDUCATIONAL REASONS

In his halakhic writings, Maimonides states in a number of places that the Bible and Sages spoke in metaphorical language for educational purposes. For example, in the first chapter of Yesodei HaTorah, after proving that God is immaterial, and even after bringing evidence from the Scriptures, Maimonides explains why in the Torah, Moses nevertheless described God in physical terms:

Yosef Ibn Caspi was the first commentator of Maimonides to interpret both the Guide and the Mishneh Torah radically. 47 On Maimonides’ position regarding prophecy see Kreisel 2001, pp. 148–315 and Weiss 2007.

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If so, why is it written in the Torah, “And there was under his feet” (Ex. 24:10), “Written with the finger of God” (Ex. 31:18), “The hand of the Lord” (Ex. 9:3), “The eyes of the Lord” (Deut. 11:12), “The ears of the Lord” (Num. 11:18) and other similar expressions? All such terminology is in accordance with the conception of humans, who cannot recognize anything but corporeal things, and the Torah speaks in the language of humans, but they are all figurative terms. For example, it is said: “If I [God] whet My glittering sword,” (Deut. 32:41); Does He have a sword, or with a sword does He slay? But it is a metaphor, and all [such language] is metaphor. 48

In this passage, Maimonides states that Moses used metaphors in the writing of the Torah. The purpose of the metaphors 49 (or at least one of their purposes) was to address specifically those who would not understand that they were metaphors and who would instead understand the physical imagery on a literal level. Since these people did not think that there was any non-physical existence, Moses had to describe a physical deity so that they would believe that there is a divine being at all. Of course, there were also sages who understood that these physical descriptors were nothing but metaphor, but Moses deliberately misled the masses of the people when he spoke to them using these metaphors which he knew they would take literally. This deception was legitimate and even necessary in Maimonides’ opinion. The teacher must speak to his Yesodei HaTorah 1:9. Translation by S. Glazer, 1927 (reworded by this book’s editor, R. Klein). 49 The term Maimonides uses here for ‘metaphor’ in Hebrew is mashal. It should be noted that mashal can also mean a parable, and there are both Biblical and rabbinic stories that are widely considered to be parables, and Maimonides mentions some of these in his writings. Nevertheless, as a rule, Maimonides generally uses the term mashal in reference to metaphorical language (whether metaphor or simile), and certainly he himself used metaphors and similes, but not entire parables. Maimonides explicitly addresses this very distinction in the foreword to the Guide, explaining that helping the reader to understand Biblical metaphors is the first reason for writing the book, while aiding in the understanding of the allegorical stories of the Bible and the Sages is mentioned as the second reason. 48

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student in a way that will make him progress on his way to knowing the truth even if the student is unable to understand the truth presently (and even if most students might never understand it). For if Moses had described God to the Children of Israel as “the mover of the sphere” – and especially if Moses had described God as “necessary existence” – most of those listening at best would have simply failed to understand at all what he was saying, and at worst would have thought that such a deity does not even exist. Therefore, Moses had no choice but to deceive his audience and later readers of the Torah by employing crude physical images in order to advance them towards the knowledge of the existence of some deity – a deity most of whom would imagine as material. It is important to be precise that in this explanation of Maimonides, there is no concealment for purely social or political reasons. Indeed, such reasons are not mentioned at all. Maimonides never said that the Children of Israel would not have kept the commandments had Moses avoided physical descriptions of God. Moses’ purpose, according to Maimonides’ words here, was not socio-political but educational. Moses used metaphorical language to advance the knowledge of the masses, and not to advance their actions and social functions per se. Of course, belief in the existence of God also has social significance. People who do not believe in God at all will also not keep the commandments, and therefore it is quite possible that Moses also had political goals in making it sound like God has a body. However, Maimonides mentions neither here nor in his other halakhic writings any social or political purpose to the concealment of the full truth. It can therefore be concluded that the purposes of concealment in his halakhic books were primarily educational, even if it is quite probable that Maimonides considered 50 the In accordance with Plato’s position as cited in the Republic II:389b. Plato mentions metaphors regarding the gods as having educational purposes, as well as other types of metaphors whose purposes are purely political. About Plato on metaphors see Klein-Braslavy 1997, p. 17, note 31. Also worth reading is Ibn Tufail’s Hayy bin Yakzan. In the opinion of Ibn Tufail, and later Ibn Rushd in his Fasl al-Maqal, the main purpose of religion is the preservation of the social welfare of the masses since it is 50

CHAPTER 1. THE SECRET OF THE MULTIPLE SECRETS

31

social significance of those beliefs that promote theoretical knowledge in the masses. 51 Maimonides mentions several times in his halakhic writings that the Sages also adhered to a similar principle. In his foreword to his Commentary on the Mishnah, for example, Maimonides describes the importance of the hermeneutic passages of the Sages: 52

impossible to educate such non-intellectual people to a deeper level of understanding. In Maimonides’ terms as found in Guide III:27–28, there is a possibility only for “correcting the body” of the masses, but not for “correcting the soul” of the masses. For a different reading of Ibn Rushd see Klein-Braslavy 1997 pp. 26–27. It is especially important to consider the position of Ibn Tufail (which Klein-Braslavy did not mention) since there is no doubt that Maimonides knew Ibn Tufail’s work, while it is not at all clear that he knew Ibn Rushd’s books, especially at the time of his writing his halakhic works. It should be noted that even Davidson (2005, pp. 115–116), who most narrows down the scope of Maimonides’ knowledge of the philosophical literature, concedes that Maimonides was indeed familiar with Ibn Tufail’s essay. 51 In contrast, Maimonides mentions in Guide III:27–28 that the purpose of necessary beliefs is to bring about the correction of the body politic. That is, the Torah teaches things that are not entirely true to help ensure the masses keep the commandments. In his halakhic books, the emphasis is different and the whole purpose of saying inaccurate things is to improve the knowledge of the masses (i.e. to convince the people that there is a God through the use of physical descriptions). 52 Another source in which Maimonides describes the pedagogical methods by which the Sages educate the nation with the help of metaphors is found in the introduction to Perek Cheilek. There Maimonides asserts that people divide up into three groups vis a vis how they relate to the words of the Sages. The second group of people are those erstwhile intellectuals who display a lack of understanding by their viewing the words of the Sages as simplistic and foolish. Maimonides writes of this group: Were they to undergo training in order to know how divine matters are written of, and similarly the sciences for the masses and for scholars, and would adopt the practical aspect of philosophy, then they could understand whether the Sages were wise or not, and would understand their words. (Introduction to Perek Cheilek, Commentary on the Mishnah, p. 136)

32

MAIMONIDES: A RADICAL RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHER And from them are revealed theological matters and true things that the men of wisdom would keep away and did not want to reveal, and all that the philosophers attained over the generations. And if you glance at it according to its simple meaning, you will see matters about which nothing is farther from the intellect than them. And they did this thing for wondrous ends: One of them is to sharpen the ideas of their students and to draw their hearts. And also to blind the eyes of fools who will never illuminate their hearts. And if they had shown them the illumination of truths, they would have turned their faces [away] from them, according to the shortcomings of their natures. As it is stated about them and those similar to them, “We do not reveal the secret to them”

This passage shows that Maimonides felt that the Sages used metaphors to convey to laymen and scholars alike certain “divine matters”, indicating that the purpose of the Sages using metaphorical speech was educational and not social. In other words, when the Sages employed such metaphors in their sermons and stories, it was to change their listeners’ and readers’ way of thinking, and not necessarily their social habits. (For an analysis of this section of Perek Cheilek, see Sadik 2020.) We actually encounter Maimonides’ penchant for educational metaphors earlier in the introduction to Perek Cheilek where he discusses how focused most people are on the reward of the World to Come and wish to know the precise reasons for its existence and details of how it functions. But rather than giving a direct answer to those questions, Maimonides instead states that he will explain his answer via a metaphor. He then asks the reader to imagine a boy whose education through and into adulthood is done using age-appropriate study incentives, starting with sweets and later moving up to fine clothes, money, and eventually an honored position as head of a lower court. Strikingly, Maimonides does not come right out and explain to the reader of Perek Cheilek what analogy is intended by the metaphor, yet if one considers the context, one can only conclude that Maimonides is teaching his readers that rewards for doing the commandments, be they rewards in this world or the World to Come, are only there to encourage us to take the path that leads to a deeper understanding of God and our relationship with Him. So again, we see that for Maimonides, the role of metaphor is mainly educational and not sociopolitical. For more of Maimonides’ thoughts on this subject, see Laws of Repentance, chapter 5.

CHAPTER 1. THE SECRET OF THE MULTIPLE SECRETS

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– because their intellect is not complete in order to accept the truths with according clarity.53

In this passage we see that the purpose of the Sages in their hermeneutical passages was to reveal the divine matters and the philosophical truth. They did this via metaphor for two reasons, the first being to stimulate learners’ understanding. Here Maimonides apparently refers to those who can understand the philosophical content of the metaphor. The second reason deals with a different kind of audience: those who cannot and never will understand the truth. If the Sages brought the truth to these people, they would deny it. Therefore, it is necessary to offer them something untrue that they will understand in an inferior fashion. This understanding will nevertheless be better than a complete lack of understanding. It should be noted that here too, like what we have seen regarding the corporeal descriptions of God by Moses, that Maimonides is not talking about concealment for socio-political reasons, but only for educational reasons. Maimonides operated in the same manner he attributes to Moses and the Sages, i.e. he himself, in his halakhic books, says certain things that most of his listeners would understand on a simple level, while the discerning and educated reader would be able to understand that they were in fact alluding to something else deeper and more correct. With all his metaphors, Maimonides’ goal is indeed to advance the knowledge of the bulk of his listeners through images appropriate to their current worldview – a worldview that Maimonides also thought they deserved to be freed from as they progressed in their philosophical knowledge. Similarly, the Torah used popular though incorrect anthropomorphic descriptions of God in such a way that eventually the Children of Israel could understand God has no body. An excellent example of the above proposition that Maimonides himself adhered to the esoteric pedagogical model he attributed to Judaism’s holiest writings can be found in the Introduction to the Commentary on the Mishnah, translation by Friedlander, 1903. On this passage see Klein-Braslavy 1997, pp. 153– 155.

53

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fact that despite his firm determination in the first chapter of Yesodei HaTorah that God does not change, Maimonides often describes God in his halakhic books as overseeing what happens to human beings. For example, in Laws of Repentance 3:2, Maimonides rules that one whose iniquities in their severity outweigh the merit of his good deeds dies immediately. He also describes at the end of the first chapter of the Laws of Idolatry how God – at His initiative – sent Moses to bring the Torah to the children of Israel. In the eleventh fundament of the introduction to the tenth chapter of Mishnah Sanhedrin (Perek Cheilek, which deals with reward and punishment for observance or violation of the commandments), Maimonides also describes God as a punisher of the wicked and a rewarder of the righteous, all in a way that sounds supernatural to most of his readers. But here, too, the goal is not just social, for people need to believe that there is a supernatural reward in order to believe in reward from religious practice at all. This belief has clear, practical social significance, yet it is also theoretically correct. 54 Maimonides intentionally uses terms such as ‘providence’ and ‘prophecy’, and in so describing the actions of God, the average reader will understand such terms literally. However, discerning readers will notice that such an understanding contradicts both the truth and the words of Maimonides himself elsewhere. 55 Educated and precise readers will be able to understand these expressions non-literally – for example, ‘providence’ can be understood as the existence of the universe by the power of God, with the commandments benefitting man natur-

The metaphorical description of God as material to encourage the multitudes to believe in Him is similar to the metaphorical description of reward as being a supernatural reward in order to persuade the masses to believe in that as well. In the end, people who are willing to understand this all on a different level will comprehend that God is not material while the reward of the commandments is natural. 55 To wit, regarding the immutability of God (Yesodei HaTorah 1:11). It should be noted that according to Maimonides, Moses himself wrote things in the Torah that contradict divine anthropomorphisms (Yesodei HaTorah 1:8). 54

CHAPTER 1. THE SECRET OF THE MULTIPLE SECRETS

35

ally, while ‘prophecy’ can refer to man understanding God, and not God revealing Himself to man. To sum up, we saw in the Mishneh Torah and in the Commentary on the Mishnah that Maimonides uses esoteric writing in precisely the way that he ascribes to the Sages and the Bible. The two main mediums of this esoteric writing are:

A. Terse language and “chapter headings” that can be properly understood only by the educated who figure things out by themselves. 56 B. Metaphors that the masses will only roughly understand and ultimately incorrectly, but better understood amongst those who have the wherewithal.

In other words, the ultimate goal of Maimonides’ use of esoteric writing of this kind is to convey profound messages to the best thinkers who have done the preparatory work for such learning, but without the masses understanding the hidden messages. Yet at the same time, Maimonides does wish to educate the masses, and so his texts are worded in such a way as to provide worthy messages that are matched to both the simple reader and the sophisticated reader alike, each according to his or her own intellectual ability. In addition, certain profound philosophical messages that cannot be understood from a direct philosophical presentation are conveyed via the use of metaphors. 57

ESOTERICISM IN THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED

In the Guide, Maimonides utilizes a wide variety of methods to conceal his true beliefs. We will divide our discussion of this phenomenon in the Guide into three parts. First, we will see that the two methods of concealment that are apparent in Maimonides’ halakhic books also turn up in the Guide. Although 56 We see this as well in his commentary on Hagigah 2:1. There Maimonides notes that the use of “chapter headings” and other kinds of hints can help guide people towards the ineffable philosophical truth. 57 This is so whether the problem is with the indefinable secret content or the fact that the student would not have understood the content of the secret if it had been written as a plain definition or standard argument and not as a metaphor.

36

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Maimonides indeed expands the discussion of these methods in the Guide, emphasizing the various aspects of, and the motives behind the use of concealment, nevertheless, his words there only continue in the same vein as what he had already said in his halakhic books. But then we will see that there is a second type of method which can be seen in certain specific statements by Maimonides regarding his writing of the Guide that go beyond what we saw in his halakhic books. And finally, we will analyze Maimonides’ comments about the purpose of the Guide. The goal of this comparison will be to understand the connection between the unique purposes for writing the Guide and the special methods of concealment that Maimonides used in this key philosophical work of his.

SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED AND MAIMONIDES’ HALAKHIC WORKS

As discussed above, the Guide shares with the Mishneh Torah and the Mishnah commentary two methods of esoteric concealment: A. The use of terse descriptions and “chapter headings” B. Use of metaphors

Regarding use of “chapter headings”, Maimonides himself declares in the introduction to the Guide that he will write in this way in his book. Having stated that the second purpose of the book 58 is, “to clarify highly esoteric metaphors that appear in the books of the prophets, which do not make it explicit that they are metaphors,” 59 Maimonides quotes the mishnah in Hagigah 2a and states that he himself will write using “chapter headings”: Hence you should not ask of me here anything beyond the chapter headings. And even those are not set down in order or arranged in coherent fashion in this Treatise, but rather are scattered and entangled with other subjects that are to be clarified. For my purpose is that the truths be glimpsed and then again be concealed, so as not to oppose that divine We will discuss the first purpose below when we analyze the unique goals of the book. 59 Introduction to the Guide. The original Judeo-Arabic: .‫תביין אמת'אל כ'פיה ג'דא ג'את פי כתב אלאנביא ולם יצרח באנהא מת'ל‬ 58

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purpose which one cannot possibly oppose and which has concealed from the vulgar 60 among the people those truths especially requisite for His apprehension. As He has said: “The secret of the Lord is with them that fear Him.” (Ps 25:14) 61

Here Maimonides explicitly notes that he will indeed use “chapter headings” 62 in the Guide in order to conceal from the masses that content which it is unable to understand. According to Maimonides’ words here, concealing the truth from the masses is a part of the divine intention which cannot be acted against. He means here to say that it is impossible to explain such content ripe with these types of philosophical ideas via a standard lecture in such a way that he reader or listener will understand him. The use of “chapter headings” and metaphors is a necessity. 63 Maimonides also adds what we had already seen in his halakhic works, that the key ideas will not appear in one concentrated area of the book, but rather as hints mixed in amongst the discussions of various subjects, such that the deciphering of the secrets becomes all the more complicated inasmuch as the common reader will not notice at all that in a given place there is a Used here, of course, to denote commonfolk lacking education and intellectual sophistication, and not in the modern sense of people who use foul language. As an interesting side note, some etymologists speculate that the word ‘vulgar’ is a distant cognate of the word ‘folk’, though no direct connection has been found to date. 61 Ibid. The original Judeo-Arabic: ‫ ולו תלך אלבדאת ליסת הי פי הד'ה‬.‫פלא תטלבני הנא גיר בראשי הפרקים‬ ‫ בל מבדדה מכ'תלטה פי אגראץ' אכ'רי ממא‬,‫ ולא מטרדה‬,‫אלמקאלה מרתבה‬ ‫ חתי לא יקאום‬,‫ אד' גרצ'י אן תכון אלחקאיק תלוח מנהא ת'ם תכ'פי‬,‫יראם תביינה‬ ‫ אלד'י לא ימכן מקאומתה אלד'י ג'על אלחקאיק אלכ'ציצה‬,‫אלגרץ' אלאלאהי‬ .‫ קאל סוד י''י ליראיו‬,‫באדראכה כ'פיה ען ג'מהור אלנאס‬ 62 On the use of “chapter headings” in the Guide see I:34–35, the introduction to Part III, III:5, and III:7. 63 Immediately after the quoted passage, Maimonides points out that at least one of the reasons why it is impossible to oppose this divine purpose is that philosophical truths cannot be conveyed to the entire nation, which is to say that it is not only inappropriate or unworthy to convey these truths to everyone, but that is totally infeasible to do so. The divine intention here represents the nature of reality. The lightning metaphor and some of its various interpretations in the relevant research are briefly discussed below. 60

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philosophical issue being addressed which, were he aware of it, would be beyond his ken in any case. Maimonides admittedly did not expressly state that he would write in this way in his halakhic works, however the very attempt to deal with philosophical questions within a halakhic context led to a portion of the key ideas showing up in unrelated material. Here as well, the strewing about of key ideas has the object of attaining the same goal that we saw previously in his halakhic writings: that the masses, who are not supposed to understand the deeper level of the book will not understand anything from the hints. In the continuation of the foreword, Maimonides also states that in the Guide he uses writing embedded with metaphors. 64 In this particular instance, Maimonides’ way of presenting his intentions is more similar to what we saw in his halakhic books given that here, too, he does not explicitly state that he will use metaphorical language, 65 but states that this is how the Bible and the Sages 66 acted, and that this is how all should act when dealing On the use of metaphors by Maimonides see Lorberbaum 2002. Moreover, in presenting the various contradictions that exist in the Guide, Maimonides does not admit to inserting contradictions of the third type (“Not all the statements in question are to be taken in their external sense; some are to be taken in their external sense, while some others are parables and hence have an inner content…”). In my opinion, this is not evidence that Maimonides does not use metaphorical language, but only that his use of metaphor does not cause contradictions in the Guide. As he explicitly points out, when trying to teach some of the theoretical issues of the Account of the Creation and the Account of the Chariot, there is no choice but to use metaphors. Thus, Maimonides (like the Sages and the Biblical writers) had no choice but to use metaphorical language to try to convey concepts relating to the Accounts of the Creation and the Chariot. On this subject see Lorberbaum 2000, especially note 54. 66 Y. Lorberbaum 2009 and 2009 argued that Maimonides’ attitude to the Bible and the Sages changed greatly between the writing of the Mishnah commentary and the Guide. He argues that in his Mishnah commentary Maimonides expressed the same view towards the Bible as towards the Sages, believing that both used metaphors educationally. But with the writing of the Guide, Maimonides despaired of offering a philosophical interpretation of the rabbinic stories, and even became very critical of the aggadot and midrashim (thereby placing Maimonides in the same camp as the ge’onim, who preceded him.) According to Lorberbaum’s position, Maimonides’ critical attitude toward the Sages is one of the 64 65

CHAPTER 1. THE SECRET OF THE MULTIPLE SECRETS

39

main secrets of the Guide. In my opinion, Lorberbaum interpreted Maimonides’ statements in the Guide too radically, for while it is true that Maimonides’ attitude toward the Sages is sometimes highly critical in the Guide, it is also true that his attitude toward the Sages is different from his attitude toward the Bible. More importantly, there are also quite a few statements in the Guide that recapitulate statements he made in his Commentary on the Mishnah (including the letter to the student at the very beginning of the Guide). Furthermore, many of Maimonides’ critical remarks against the Talmud are mostly aimed at simplifying the words of Chazal, and do not actually contradict his position in his Commentary on the Mishnah, e.g. his letter to R. Pinchas that Lorberbaum specifically discusses on pp. 97–103 of his article. Lorberbaum explains these statements as part of the teacher’s underlying exoteric layer. Misuse and overuse of the exoteric-esoteric approach to Maimonides is discussed at the end of the chapter in a way that would make such an interpretation as offered by Lorberbaum most difficult. Lorberbaum’s main argument in his first article is with regard to Maimonides’ explanation for not writing a follow-up book specifically dealing with rabbinic hermeneutics. In that explanation, Maimonides clarifies that he did not write such a book because, among other things, if the rabbis understood the words of the earlier Sages according to their plain meaning, “this does not collapse the foundations of the faith”. Now for Lorberbaum, this demonstrates that Maimonides did not consider this position to be problematic, as he stated in the introduction to the first book of the Guide. However, in my opinion, Lorberbaum here has gone a bit too far: Maimonides’ main reason for not writing this book is pedagogical, for it would not have been possible to write such a book without filling it with metaphorical language. The mere fact that Maimonides conceded that literal readings of metaphorical passages in rabbinic literature does not in itself fundamentally overturn the foundations of the religion does not prove in any way that such literal readings of metaphorical language is desirable or correct in the eyes of Maimonides. Rather, this only shows that Maimonides did not see it as a purpose of the Guide to protect the Sages, and that in his opinion, harm to the dignity of a person who attributes such ideas to the Sages does not constitute a defect in the foundations of the faith. For a completely different position regarding Maimonides’ attitude to midrashim, see Diamond 2002. Diamond shows how Maimonides followed earlier generations in using the midrashic reading of the Bible. This approach seems to me much closer to Maimonides’ position, although I certainly disagree with Diamond regarding quite a few of his other uses of this method.

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with sublime topics. In the foreword to the Guide, Maimonides himself marshals the metaphor of lightning, from which one can learn in general about his use of metaphors in the Guide. Maimonides first states in the lightning metaphor 67 that there are great secrets that are not fully known to anyone, and that knowing about these secrets sheds light much like lightning or like the light reflected off an object that has been illuminated by a bolt of lightning. Maimonides then states that the sages should teach the truths they have attained in the same way, that is, by using metaphors. Know that whenever one of the perfect wishes to mention, either orally or in writing, something that he understands of Technically, this is a simile since Maimonides openly explains the symbolism, unlike in other cases where he employs metaphorical language. In any case, according to Klein-Braslavy (1997), this method of concealment is similar to that found in Plato’s Seventh Letter, i.e. the giving over of ideas that, due to the limitations of human language, cannot be conveyed in any other way than via metaphorical descriptions. According to Lorberbaum (2000), the reason is that there is no clear truth on these issues and the way to get as close to the truth as possible is by use of metaphor along with didactic presentation of the various sides of the problem. As we have seen, this way of concealment is also mentioned in the commentary of the Mishnah on Hagigah 2:1. Regarding the lightning metaphor, it should be noted that in my opinion, the positions of Lorberbaum 2000 and Klein-Braslavy 1997 are inaccurate. In my opinion, these are not totally ungraspable truths that evade all human description, but rather truths that, on the one hand, can be grasped to a limited extent but not fully understood (see Guide I:31– 32), and on the other hand, though given to description, it is exceedingly difficult to convey what can be acquired by the listener. In the paragraph quoted below, Maimonides explicitly states that the Sages pass on to their students’ knowledge that they have acquired in these areas. In other words, it is possible to attain a certain degree of truth even in the realms of the Account of Creation and the Account of the Chariot. The basic problem in the transmission of such information in my opinion occurs when the student is not able to understand the content of the teacher’s words properly unless he himself is going through a philosophical process similar to that of the teacher. Therefore, through metaphors the teacher encourages the student to go through the process the teacher himself went through and thus allows the student to be in a position where he can understand the message that the teacher is conveying to him.

67

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41

these secrets, according to the degree of his perfection, he is unable to explain with complete clarity and coherence even the portion that he has apprehended, as he could do with the other sciences whose teaching is generally recognized. Rather there will befall him when teaching another that which he had undergone when learning himself. I mean to say that the subject matter will appear, flash, and then be hidden again, as though this were the nature of this subject matter, be there much or little of it. For this reason, all the Sages possessing knowledge of God the Lord, knowers of the truth, when they aimed at teaching something of this subject matter, spoke of it only in parables and riddles. 68

Maimonides goes on 69 to elaborate on the ways in which the Bible and the Sages used metaphors to advance their students toward the philosophical truth. In this passage, Maimonides states that the use of metaphors was employed for educational purposes. With philosophical subjects (mostly metaphysical, but also some of the physical subjects), the fruit of the teacher’s research cannot be properly summarized for the student. When the teacher, who knows the truth in a fuller way, wants to pass it on to his disciple, he cannot sum it up. The student must go through the same journey that his teacher went through if he wishes to attain the things his teacher attained. The use of metaphors is necessary here to spur the student’s thinking and force him take the same path that his teacher took. The use of metaphors in this passage is mainly educational, similar to the Commentary on the Mishnah and Mishneh Torah. However, Maimonides’ educational emphasis changes. In his halakhic works, Maimonides mainly mentions the educational Translation by S. Pines, p. 8. The original Judeo-Arabic: ‫ואעלם אן מתי אראד אחד אלכאמלין בחסב דרג'ה' כמאלה אן יד'כר שיא ממא‬ ‫ פלא יסתטיע אן יוצ’ח אלקדר‬,‫פהם מן הד'ה אלסודות אמא בפמה או בקלמה‬ ‫אלד'י אדרכה איצ'אחא כאמלא בתרתיב כמא יפעל פי סאיר אלעלום אלמשהור‬ ‫ אעני מן כון‬,‫ בל ידרכה פי תעלים גירה מא אצאבה פי תעלמה נפסה‬,‫תעלימהא‬ .‫ כאן טביעה' הד'א אלאמר עט'ימה ונזרה הכד'א הי‬,‫אלאמר יבדו וילוח ת'ם יכ'פי‬ ,‫ולד'לך למא קצד כל חכים אלאהי רבאני ד'ו חקיקה לתעלים שי מן הד'א אלפן‬ .‫לם יתכלם פיה אלא באלאמת'אל ואלאלגאז‬ 69 Pp. 8–14 (Pines translation). 68

42

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role of the metaphor for the masses: metaphors educate the members of the public according to their individual abilities, hinting at more to those who are more perceptive. For example, a metaphorical phrase may refer to God in a material way so that the masses will understand that there is a supreme divine being, while the intellectual understands that the descriptions of divine materiality are not to be taken literally. In his Commentary on the Mishnah, where he refers to Hagigah 2a, Maimonides only very briefly mentions the role of metaphorical language as beneficial to a person who is during transitioning from the level of the masses to that of the intellectual thinkers. And in the Mishneh Torah, Maimonides doesn’t even mention the aspiring philosophers, limiting the educational value of metaphors to the masses. By contrast, in the foreword to the Guide, the emphasis is almost entirely reversed. 70 Here Maimonides mainly mentions those who are navigating their way through delicate and complex philosophical topics as the main beneficiaries of metaphorical language, while only briefly mentioning later in his comments the educational role of metaphors for the masses, where he discusses the metaphorical significance of the golden apples in silver filigree of Proverbs 25:11. 71 Maimonides even points out just before this discussion that the exoteric, plain meaning of metaphors are almost valueless, although they do constitute the necessary pathway to the deeper meaning, like the metaphorical almost-valueless candle that is nevertheless absolutely necessary for finding the true object of value – a metaphorical pearl – that sits lost in a dark room. Maimonides is saying here that the simple person is happy with just the candle (exoteric knowledge), while the one who knows there is a lost pearl uses the candle to locate and procure the pearl (esoteric knowledge). 72 70 In his halakhic works the emphasis is also on the benefit of the metaphor for the masses, and not on the benefit of the idea at hand for the educated. However, in the Guide, the situation is reversed. 71 Statements about such a role of metaphor in the Bible are also found in the Guide itself, for example, I:26 and I:46–47. There, Maimonides states that the Torah uses corporeal imagery that the masses see as an advantage and a type of perfection. 72 Introduction to Part I, p. 11.

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In summing up the above discussion, we can see that regarding the use of metaphors, the Guide contains the same types of concealment that exist in the Mishneh Torah and in his Commentary on the Mishnah, just that Maimonides emphasized different aspects of the role of metaphors depending on whether he was writing legalistically or philosophically. Specifically, we saw that in the Guide, Maimonides emphasizes the importance of metaphors as an educational tool for students trying to develop their philosophical knowledge (or for a student philosopher trying to properly understand the Bible), but much less important as a means of educating the masses. As we will see later in the chapter, this difference stems from Maimonides’ different purposes in these different types of writings. But to give an idea, we see in his halakhic works that Maimonides mostly addresses himself to the Jewish nation at large and tries to advance their philosophical level of understanding, 73 while his words to the sages remain obscure, and are intended for those who are able to comprehend them. By contrast, in the Guide Maimonides tries to talk to the perplexed person who knows philosophy to some extent but does not understand the philosophical strata of the Bible. Moreover, Maimonides also addresses the student who has not studied philosophy (or alternatively who has studied only preliminary sciences, such as mathematics, and has not yet seriously engaged in metaphysics) and begins his deeper study into this field by reading the Guide, from which he will also benefit even though this work was not intended for the general public like his halakhic works.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR READING THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED

After the foreword to the Guide, Maimonides writes about the ways an author conceals their intentions, i.e. via “chapter headings” and the use of metaphors, and so we find in the book’s dedication and in the introduction that he brings a series of instructions to the reader of the Guide. As we will see, some of Just as he advises in the Guide should be done. On this point see inter alia chapters I:35 and II:40.

73

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these instructions differ from what we find in Maimonides’ volumes on Halakha. These instructions can be divided into three different categories of requirements:

1. To connect the book’s chapters one with another. 2. To interpret Maimonides’ with a favorable eye even if the interpretation is farfetched. 3. To pay attention to the existence of contradictions of the fifth and seventh types. 74

We will look at each of these instructions separately and then summarize the conclusions that emerge from the synergy of all three together.

“INTERPRET EACH OF ITS CHAPTERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL THE OTHER CHAPTERS”

Maimonides labeled the last third of his foreword “Instruction with Respect to this Treatise”. It is here that he lays down how readers of the Guide should treat his work and explains how to derive the most benefit from it. He begins his directive by setting forth a singularly important instruction for understanding the Guide: If you wish to grasp the totality of what this Treatise contains, so that nothing of it will escape you, then you must connect its chapters one with another; and when reading a given chapter, your intention must be not only to understand the totality of the subject of that chapter, but also to grasp each word that occurs in it in the course of the speech, even if that word does not belong to the intention of the chapter. For the diction of this Treatise has not been chosen at haphazard, but with great exactness and exceeding precision, and with care to avoid failing to explain any obscure point. And nothing has been mentioned out of place, save with a view to explaining some matter in its proper place. You therefore should not let

One of the main problems with Davis’s (2011) interpretation (especially pp. 16–21) of the seventh contradiction is that he explains it as an imitation of the Sages’ methods. By contrast, Maimonides does not mention the existence of contradictions in the Sages’ words, nor does he say that he writes using educational contradictions in his halakhic books.

74

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45

your fantasies elaborate on what is said here, for that would hurt me and be of no use to yourself. 75

At the beginning of this adjuration, Maimonides requires the reader to interpret the book’s chapters with reference to all other chapters. That is, it is impossible to understand a chapter or even any section in the Guide without an understanding and internalization of the entire work. Certain chapters, isolated passages, and even entire sections may be misunderstood if the reader does not recall and refer to everything that is said in the book. For example, it is impossible to understand Maimonides’ position regarding providence or the creation of the world (topics that Maimonides discusses in relatively clear sections) without internalizing all that is stated in the book. This standard reduces interpretive wiggle-room on the one hand, since Maimonides demands to be interpreted according to his own words in the various parts of the book. But on the other hand, this injunction expands the interpretive space for the reader who has mastered the book. Such a reader can easily argue that a particular section or chapter should be understood as contradicting the plain meaning of the text of that section or chapter given evidence from another part of the Guide. Further on in this text, Maimonides adds that one should not only understand the essence of his intention in each and every chapter, but one should understand the meaning of each and every phrase. Maimonides declares that these expressions, even if Introduction with Respect to this Treatise: p. 15. The original JudeoArabic: ‫אד'א ארדת אן תחצל עלי ג'מלה' מא תצ'מנתה חתי לא יגאדרך מנהא שי פרדד‬ ,‫ ולא יכון גרצ'ך מן אלפצל פהם ג'מלה' מענאה פקט‬,'‫פצולהא בעצ'הא עלי בעץ‬ ,‫אלא ותחציל כל לפט'ה ג'את פיה פי מערץ' אלקול ואן לם תכן מן גרץ' אלפצל‬ ‫ אלא בתחריר כת'יר‬,‫לאן הד'ה אלמקאלה מא וקע אלכלאם פיהא כיף אתפק‬ ‫ ומא מן שי קיל פיהא פי גיר‬,‫וצ'בט זאיד ותחפט' מן אלאכ'לאל בתביין משכל‬ ‫ ולא תתבעהא באוהאמך פתאד'יני ולא‬,‫מוצ'עה אלא לתביין אמר מא פי מוצ'עה‬ .‫תנפע נפסך‬ In the continuation of this passage, Maimonides asserts that one needs to study “all that is fit to be learned” and to use his book in order to understand the difficult passages of the Torah. We will revisit this point in the section dealing with Maimonides description of the purpose of his treatise.

75

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they seem meaningless or otherwise unconnected to the subject of the chapter – and perhaps especially where such elements appear to be at best superfluous – are intended to lead to a better understanding of another subject elsewhere in the book. With this statement Maimonides is recapitulating to some extent what we have seen in the earlier statements concerning his speaking in “chapter headings” and the scattering of esoteric allusions throughout the book. It is important to note that Maimonides’ exhortation here to read the Guide holistically and not just sequentially also actually expands the reader’s interpretive space, for the careful reader of the Guide is thereby given the means to argue – based on a seemingly marginal and obscure statement appearing in this or that chapter – that an entire section of the Guide should be understood quite differently from its plain meaning. Maimonides’ last instruction in this passage 76 is to avoid following one’s vain imaginings. 77 Maimonides’ intention here is that readers of the Guide should rein in their instincts and inclination to fill out Maimonides’ arguments on the basis of unfounded intuitions. The reader must take his arguments to their intended logical conclusion purely on the basis of the reader’s scientific knowledge (as he says in the sentence after the quoted passage) and on the basis of Maimonides’ own words throughout Not counting the instruction to learn whatever is appropriate. We will address this particular instruction further on in the chapter. 77 On the Judeo-Arabic term ‫ והם‬and its translations into Hebrew in the Middle Ages, see Sadik 2013. R. Shmuel Ibn Tibbon translated the phrase “‫ ”ולא תתבעהא באוהאמך‬as “‫( ”ולא תרדפהו בזממיך‬Ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew can be translated as: “and do not persecute him by your scheming”), and thereby diverged quite a bit from the original Judeo-Arabic, which Maimonides actually intended as an admonition to take control of the tendency to read into his words what comes to mind by intuition –which he deems animalistic inasmuch as animals also have an intuition. In other words, Maimonides wants his readers to stick to what he actually writes, or more precisely, he wants his readers to interpret his writings according to the truth, and not to lazily if albeit unintentionally read the Guide according to one’s animalistic intuition (as we shall see later in the chapter). In contrast, R. Shmuel Ibn Tibbon turns the passage into more of a warning against the reader’s deliberately undermining Maimonides’ intended meaning. 76

CHAPTER 1. THE SECRET OF THE MULTIPLE SECRETS

47

the book, and not on the basis of the initial sense that arises in the reader’s imagination when he sees Maimonides’ words in a specific place in the book. For example, when Maimonides speaks of miracles or providence, the reader should let Maimonides himself, via other sections of the Guide, explain what he meant by these terms, and not attribute meanings based on a priori assumptions of what they mean.

FAVORABLE INTERPRETATION

In the continuation of the directive section, Maimonides adjures the reader (‫ )ואנא אחלף באללה תעאלי‬not to explain his words to other people differently from what accords with “what is clear and explained in the words of the well-known sages of our religion who preceded me.” 78 According to the simple meaning of this statement, Maimonides is saying it is likely that readers have misunderstood him wherever their understanding of a passage in the Guide contradicts the words of the Sages. However, Lorberbaum has determined 79 that Maimonides here did not rule out the possibility of a reader correctly understanding that a particular intended message of the Guide is in fact at odds with the Sages, just that Maimonides asks the reader to keep such occurrences to himself. 80 It should be noted that Maimonides 91F

92F

93F

The original Judeo-Arabic: .‫אלא מא הו בין משרוח פי כלאם מן תקדמני מן עלמא שריעתנא אלמשאהר‬ 79 Lorberbaum 2009, pp. 219–221. 80 Contrary to Lorberbaum’s position (2009 and 2009), in my opinion this passage does not point to criticism of the aggadah literature. Rather, Maimonides asks that it be interpreted in accordance with “what is clear and explicit in the words of the sages of our Torah,” that is, to simplify the words of our sages. In his explanation on p. 219 of his book, Lorberbaum did not quote the words “what is clear and explicit” in the passage he quoted on the previous page. These words are indeed significant and indicate that Maimonides asked not to be quoted as opposing the simple meaning of the Sages’ words even when he does indeed disagree philosophically with the simple meaning. But this disagreement in no way means that Maimonides rejected the deeper esoteric meaning of the words of the Sages. Quite the opposite is the case: in emphasizing the fact of there being an implicit critique of “what is clear and explicit in the words of our sages” the implication is that Maimonides agreed with the esoteric layer of the rabbinic aggadot. 78

48

MAIMONIDES: A RADICAL RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHER

tacks on here a call to the reader to feel satisfied with whatever benefit he has derived from the Guide and not dwell on the book at all if he sees in it no benefit. This is an intriguing addendum, but will not be addressed here but only later in this section. Moving on, Maimonides now asks the reader to interpret the book in a favorable light: If anything in it, according to his way of thinking, appears to be defective in some way, 81 he should interpret it, even if in a far-fetched way, in order to pass a favorable judgment. For as we are enjoined to act in this way toward our vulgar ones, all the more should this be so with respect to our erudite ones and Sages of our Law who are trying to help us to the truth as they apprehend it. 82

Here Maimonides makes a rather puzzling request. He asks the reader to make as much effort as possible to interpret his words in the Guide according to the truth. That is, if the reader determines that Maimonides has erred in light of his own previous instructions (i.e. to look for metaphors, “chapter headings”, and clues from other chapters), that reader should still make an effort to interpret Maimonides in such a way that his words are still 81 In my opinion, ‘defective’ is a better translation than Pines’s choice of ‘harmful’ for the Judeo-Arabic ‫פסאד‬. Indeed, regarding this particular passage, I prefer the earlier translation of Friedlander (1904): “Should he notice any opinions with which he does not agree, let him endeavour to find a suitable explanation, even if it seem far-fetched, in order that he may judge me charitably”. The French translation of Munk has for the underlined phrase: “provoquer un dommage”. It should be noted that this translation is a more conservative interpretation of the Guide, and it likely influenced Pines in his translation of this passage. Both medieval Hebrew translators, Ibn Tibbon and Alharizi, translate the phrase as ‫שום‬ ‫הפסד‬. R. Kapah uses ‫שבוש‬, while the new Hebrew translations of Schwarz and of Makbili both translate the term as ‫פגם‬. My interpretation is more similar to Friedlander and the Hebrew translations than to Munk and Pines. 82 Instruction with Respect to this Treatise: pp. 15–16. The original Judeo-Arabic: ‫ ולו באבעד‬,‫ואן ט'הר לה פיהא פסאד מא בחסב ט'נונה פיתאולה וידין לכף זכות‬ ‫ כמא פרץ' עלינא פי חק ג'מהורנא פכיף פי חק עלמאינא וחמלה' שריעתנא‬,‫תאויל‬ .‫אלמג'תהדין פי אפאדתנא אלחק חסב אדראכהם‬

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true. This is definitely puzzling, because how can one ask the reader to understand Maimonides in a different way from what he actually understood, and interpret his words according to the philosophical truth? Is it completely out-of-bounds for the reader to think that Maimonides was wrong? The answer to this lies in Maimonides’ next instruction: to pay close attention to his use of contradictions in the Guide. 83

THE USE OF CONTRADICTIONS IN THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED

In the introduction section of the Guide, Maimonides lists the seven types of contradictions that can exist in various types of writings. Then in nearing the end of the introduction, he expressly points out that the Guide contains contradictions of the fifth and seventh type. 84 Maimonides’ declaration that his essay includes I do not think there is any possibility of understanding this paragraph as a direct continuation of the previous paragraph as Maimonides makes two very different statements here: 1. That the reader should not publish in public a commentary of his words that is contrary to what is clear and explicit in the texts of the Sages. 2. That the reader should interpret Maimonides in accordance with the truth. There seems to be a missing step here, and the only possible way to fill in that gap is to assert that the truth for Maimonides is ultimately tantamount to what is clear and explicit in the texts of the Sages (i.e. their plain meaning), and this contradicts Maimonides’ words that the Sages themselves must be understood according to philosophical truth. In the latter paragraph, the word for ‘interpret’ (tawil) here refers to a philosophical interpretation of the words of Maimonides, as the word is used extensively in philosophical writings to interpret not according to the plain or literal meaning of a text, but according to the truth. 84 Most studies dealing with the esoteric aspect of the Guide deal with the interpretation of the various contradictions. On this topic see above in the comments at the beginning of the chapter. I will mention here that Lorberbaum devoted an extensive article to the claim that the seventh type of contradiction is in fact concerned with a didactic description of unattainable truths. His position rests on the positions of scholars (led by Pines and Stern) who maintain that the Guide’s secret is that Maimonides was a philosophical skeptic. A comprehensive critique of this position is beyond the purview of this chapter, and in any case the position has already been duly analyzed by many, including Ravitsky 1986, Harvey 1990, Schwartz 2002, and Davidson 2005. 83

50

MAIMONIDES: A RADICAL RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHER

contradictions, albeit intentional ones, is fascinating and unusual – even among the philosophers who write in an esoteric style. As we noted at the beginning of the chapter, these thinkers usually indicated the presence of esotericism in an esoteric fashion, and do not openly state that their treatises include contradictions. The reason for the fifth type of contradiction is less important for our purposes and therefore we will summarize it briefly. This type of contradiction derives from the educator’s need to leave aside certain beliefs of the student regarding deeper matters (“‫ )”מעני מא גאמצ‬when teaching about more basic matters. This is done because were the teacher to explain the deeper matters that underlie the basic matters at the beginning of the course of study, then the student would just wind up entangled in the deeper matters and would never understand the basic and really more immediately relevant matters – and this lost educational moment would not at all further the student’s understanding of the deeper and more complex matters either. Therefore, the teacher must first teach the basic material, even this means he has to temporarily assume the student’s current superstitious or otherwise errant beliefs about the deeper things. After learning enough of the basics, the student will eventually be prepared to understand the deeper ideas, and thus the teacher will be able to convey these deeper ideas to the student as the truth. What is important to us regarding this reason for contradictions in the Guide is in its being contextualized with Maimonides’ instruction to his readers to “connect its chapters one with another”. It is quite possible that a deep matter will be found perfectly stated at the very beginning of the book while when Maimonides discusses a simpler thing in the middle or at the end of the book he will assume the deeper thing as being one of the untrained reader’s beliefs. 85 Therefore, the fact that Maimonides explicitly states this reason for contradictions invites For example, it is only considering what is said about generally accepted notions and intelligible things at the beginning of the Guide (I:2) that one can properly understand Maimonides’ statement that the last eight of the Ten Commandments are examples of accepted notions (and traditional beliefs), while the first two are intelligible ideas (II:33).

85

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51

the reader to judge Maimonides’ words in a certain place and see if they are true or not. If he concludes that they are not true, he should suspect that Maimonides may have, for educational reasons, intentionally written something untrue. In this case the reader is invited to look elsewhere in the Guide for Maimonides’ true position – this approach being in accord with Maimonides’ insistence that his book be interpreted favorably. The aforementioned invitation to the careful reader of the Guide to use their judgment to pro-actively identify false statements becomes amplified as we encounter the seventh reason for the existence of contradictions in texts. 86 Maimonides explains that: The seventh cause. In speaking about very obscure matters, it is necessary to conceal some parts and to disclose others. Sometimes in the case of certain dicta, this necessity requires that the discussion proceed on the basis of a certain premise, whereas in another place necessity requires that the discussion proceed on the basis of another premise contradicting the first one. In such cases, the vulgar must in no way be aware of the contradiction; the author accordingly uses some device to conceal it by all means. 87

We see here that contradictions of the seventh kind deal with “very deep” matters that must be partly hidden and partly It is interesting to note that Maimonides says that the fifth type of contradiction appears “in the books of the philosophers, or rather of those who know the truth”. Then, after stating that in the aggadot of the Sages one finds contradictions of the sixth and seventh types, Maimonides informs us that in the body of the Guide he will be employing contradictions of the fifth and seventh types. This fact in my opinion demonstrates well Maimonides’ attitude towards the Sages in the Guide. He did not deny the existence of problematic rabbinic tales, but alongside this awareness he advocated an esoteric interpretation of the words of the Sages, implying that he saw hidden philosophical truths in these ostensibly purely religious texts. 87 Introduction to the Guide, p. 18. '‫ צ'רורה' אלכלאם פי אמור גאמצ'ה ג'דא ינבגי אכ'פא בעץ‬.‫ואלסבב אלסאבע‬ ‫ פקד תדעו אלצ'רורה בחסב קולה' מא ליג'רי אלכלאם‬,'‫מעאניהא ואט'האר בעץ‬ ‫ ותדעו אלצ'רורה פי מוצ'ע אכ'ר ליג'רי אלכלאם‬,‫פיהא עלי תקרירמקדמה' מא‬ ‫ וינבגי אן לא ישער אלג'מהור בוג'ה‬,‫פיהא עלי תקריר מקדמה מנאקצ'ה לתלך‬ .‫ וקד יתחיל אלמולף פי אכ'פא ד'לך בכל וג'ה‬,‫במוצ'ע אלתנאקץ' בינהמא‬ 86

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MAIMONIDES: A RADICAL RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHER

revealed. Maimonides’ intention in these words is probably that some of the truth about these matters should be revealed but part of the truth must remain hidden. 88 In detailing the reasons for the contradiction, Maimonides explains that there are situations where the writer must discuss the complicated subject based on a certain assumption, yet elsewhere there is a necessity to discuss it based on a different assumption. The key to understanding Maimonides’ words here is the precise nature of necessity (cherora / ‫)צ'רורה‬. Lorberbaum argues that the necessity stems from the didactic issue, while R. Shmuel Ibn Tibbon and quite a number of later medieval commentators on the Guide, and even a significant number of modern researchers, especially after Strauss, argued that this was a social necessity. By contrast, Lorberbaum marshaled linguistic evidence for his position, 89 arguing that the Judeo-Arabic word cherora indicates a natural necessity in Maimonides’ writings. This is indeed the situation in the opening to the Guide, where Maimonides described the cherora (necessity) to use metaphors. For Lorberbaum, this word “is used to describe the necessary states of affairs (and sometimes also actions) inherent in the nature of things”, and not specifically a social necessity. I am not saying that the word for ‘necessity’ always refers to the social context, and indeed Maimonides used this very word when describing the natural necessity of certain subjects to be taught with the help of metaphors in the foreword to the Guide. But Maimonides also uses this word later in the Guide to describe a clear political necessity. In chapter III:28, for example, Maimonides says that the Torah “makes a call to adopt certain beliefs, belief in which is necessary for the sake of political welfare” (‫)לאעתקאד את מא אעתקאדהא צ'רורי פי צלאח אלאחואל אלמדניה‬. 90 Here it is quite clear that this is a political and not a natural 102F

103F

This explanation contradicts Lorberbaum’s view. Lorberbaum 2000, pp. 223–224. 90 He also uses this same word at the end of the chapter: “In other cases, the belief is necessary for the abolition of reciprocal wrongdoing or for the acquisition of a noble, moral quality.” In the original Judeo-Arabic: .‫וקד יכון ד'לך אלאעתקאד צ'רוריא פי רפע אלתט'אלם או אכסאב כ'לק כרים‬ 88 89

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necessity, 91 and therefore there is nothing to be learned from the use of the word cherora given its ambiguous usage in the Guide. Moreover, since Maimonides states immediately afterwards that it is appropriate to conceal such contradictions from the masses – which is a social reason – Ibn Tibbon’s and Strauss’s understanding of the essence of the seventh contradiction as a social necessity seems stronger. 92 Unless one turns every political necessity into a natural necessity since it is appropriate for the masses, which completely negates the distinction between the two terms as well as Lorberbaum’s argument. 92 I do not claim based on the discussion here that Lorberbaum’s reading is implausible. It is certainly plausible if one proceeds from the premise that the Guide’s secret is Maimonides’ skepticism; I simply do not accept this position. My only intention is to demonstrate that, contrary to Lorberbaum’s reading of the Guide, the social-benefit reading aligns much better with the text as a whole than the didactic position he espoused. As we shall see later in the book, Maimonides certainly did intend to allow readings that he did not advocate, and also probably ones that he did not even contemplate himself, and therefore the skeptical readings of Pines, Stern and Lorberbaum are probably a good example of readings by this kind of a modern perplexed philosophers. And indeed, my rejection of the picture of a skeptical Maimonides deserves a little more clarification. I do not claim that according to Maimonides’ position, human beings can discover the whole truth on any subject. However, in my opinion, the main sources underpinning the skeptical reading – to wit, the lightning metaphor, a few other passages in the introduction, and chapter I:31 – deal mainly with just the secrets of metaphysics, and not with the field in its entirety. In my opinion, these sources mostly indicate that, according to Maimonides, it is not possible to understand the essence of God as we might understand the essence of things in our environment, but nevertheless we can understand His essence indirectly via proofs of negative attributes and by studying His known actions. Pines refers to these as “attributes of negation” and “attributes of action”, which together form the basis of Maimonides’ theory of divine attributes (regarding which see Kaufman 1872, and Wolfson 1938, 1938, and 1953). There are, of course, certain physical phenomena that cannot be understood, but the very fact that Maimonides lays down the limits of knowledge shows that he also very much believed that there are many things that are within those limits and can be known. So, for example, in the case of the lightning metaphor, it is important to distinguish, in 91

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Maimonides’ intention here is where there are profound issues where there is a social necessity to hide the whole truth from the masses. That is, the revelation of the whole truth to the masses would likely lead to socially negative results. For example, the understanding that providence is essentially natural providence and not miraculous may cause the common people to observe fewer commandments and thus harm society. This would indeed seem to be Maimonides’ intention regarding the concept of necessary beliefs in chapters III:27–28. This is not to say that it is impossible to reveal the truth to someone who is capable of perceiving and understanding it. Indeed, such revelation to the apt student is certainly one of the main goals of the Guide. However, difficult truths need to be hidden from the masses. As Maimonides says at the end of the passage, with such material the writer should use every possible ploy to hide his true position. With the above observations we have ostensibly returned to the position of Strauss and the like-minded medieval commentators, to wit, that the Guide makes critical use of the seventh type of contradiction to hide from the masses true but unconventional beliefs that if revealed might harm societal health. As Maimonides says in the foreword to the Guide, 93 the Torah tries to correct a person’s social functioning via the commandments, and dedication – at least among the masses – to keeping the commandments requires certain beliefs, some of which are socially necessary while others are philosophically correct in a more general sense. But even beliefs that seem Maimonides’ thinking, between complete ignorance and vague and undefined knowledge. The fact that Maimonides denies complete knowledge of physical and metaphysical matters does not necessarily mean that he also denies vague knowledge based on negative attributes. 93 Maimonides states there: Do you not see the following fact? God, may His mention be exalted, wished us to be perfected and the state of our societies to be improved by His laws regarding actions. Now this can come about only after the adoption of intellectual beliefs, the first of which being His apprehension, may He be exalted, according to our capacity. Further on in the Guide he reiterates that the Torah is trying to advance the social skills of the individual towards perfection. For example, see III:27–28.

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objectively correct need to be understood by different people according to the different states of their level of knowledge. That is why the Guide wants on the one hand to enlighten the sages, but on the other hand to only say things that are appropriate for the level of knowledge of the masses. It should be noted that there is a certain divergence here between the Guide and Maimonides’ halakhic books, in the latter of which socially motivated concealment is not conspicuous. In those halakhic works, the use of wording that contains different layers of meaning is primarily intended to enable the masses to be philosophically advanced, this being more similar to the fifthtype reason for contradictions. In other words, in order to advance a person philosophically, we sometimes have to tell him something that improves the state of his knowledge without it necessarily being the entire truth. By contrast, in the Guide, the emphasis is on a different kind of concealment – one in which the philosopher must teach the common people beliefs that are not true at all in order to improve their social functioning. Moreover, even when the Guide is specifically addressing the perplexed philosopher regarding the full truth, Maimonides felt it incumbent on himself to take extreme care that no such teaching accidentally incites the typical reader who might peruse the book to reject the socially necessary beliefs taught elsewhere in the book, however objectively false those beliefs may be. 94 But this conclusion is correct only if one addresses the seventh reason isolated from the other instructions of Maimonides about how to read the Guide. However, as we have seen, Maimonides issued two other instructions regarding how to read the Guide, chief among them the requirement that the book be interpreted “favorably”. If one connects the three points we have examined, the attentive reader of the Guide should always interpret the book according to the philosophical truth – which is how I understand “favorably”. In order to do this, one has to Of course, the perplexed philosopher and the common reader represent two ends of a spectrum of understanding, while most readers are somewhere in-between. Therefore, the Guide had to be written in such a way as to allow every reader to understand from the book what is appropriate for a person on that particular level to understand.

94

56

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determine when Maimonides contradicts himself. In light of the instruction “connect its chapters one with another” and in light of the explanation of the seventh contradiction, it is certainly possible that whole passages of the Guide discuss a given subject from a particular point of view that is ultimately false, and at the same time one can discern subtle hints in the nooks and crannies of the text that reveal Maimonides’ true beliefs. In Schwarz’s words, we indeed come to the conclusion that the Guide can be interpreted, as per Maimonides’ own instructions, in almost every possible way, provided the reader is convinced that his personally understanding is indeed philosophically correct. 95 If so, is the book not downright useless, philosophically speaking? After all, Maimonides knew that some readers espouse errant philosophical positions. Why did he also command these readers to interpret his book according to their philosophical understanding if he knew that some would necessarily remain in error? In general, why did Maimonides write such a book that, in a sense, does not say anything of substance to its readers given its uber-flexible interpretive space? To answer these questions, we must think carefully about to whom Maimonides intended the book and what the difference is between its purpose and the purpose of his halakhic books.

THE PURPOSE OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED

Maimonides notes in the foreword to the Guide that the book has two target audiences. We will first define and analyze the primary target audience of the book before doing likewise with the secondary target audience. Then, with both targeted audiences It should be emphasized that this method of reading insisted upon by Maimonides is the opposite of the usual way in which we solve difficulties in understanding treatises, including philosophical treatises. The usual method is to try to understand unclear or obscure passages according to related, longer passages that are clearer and more coherent. But here, Maimonides requires us to do precisely the opposite: when necessary, to interpret otherwise clear and unambiguous sections of text according to terse passages that are unclear or obscure. Naturally, this method required by Maimonides necessarily allows the active reader to interpret the Guide in almost any way possible.

95

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57

and their pedagogical needs well defined, we will examine how Maimonides’ differing methods of concealment stem from the respective reasons for concealment in the context of his pedagogical goals. Specifically, we will see that certain kinds of esoteric passages are bound up with the metaphysical material that Maimonides wished to convey, and therefore when dealing with such material this type of concealment crops up in both his halakhic works and the Guide, while other ways of concealment stem from the unique purpose of the Guide and therefore are encountered only there, and not at all in his halakhic works. The main target audience of the Guide: The perplexed thinker

At the beginning of the foreword to the Guide, Maimonides notes that the initial purpose of his book is to explain the meanings of various ambiguous terms in the prophetic books. He then introduces the main reader to whom he is directing his book. Although these passages are very well known, relatively little use has been made of them in the modern research discussion of the Guide’s secretive dimension. 96 Here Maimonides writes: It is not the purpose of this Treatise to make its totality understandable to the vulgar or to beginners in speculation, nor to teach those who have not engaged in any study other than the science of the Law – I mean the legalistic study of the Law. For the purpose of this Treatise and of all those like it is the science of Law in its true sense. Or rather, its purpose is to give indications to a religious man for whom the validity of our Law has become established in his soul and has become actual in his belief – such a man being perfect in his religion and character, and having studied the sciences of the philosophers and come to know what they signify. The human

Maimonides repeats several times in the Guide this point of his main intended audience, e.g. in the letter to his student R. Yosef, later in the foreword in the so-called “instruction with respect to this treatise”, in the introduction to the third book where it is stated that the reader is the perplexed thinker, and to some extent in chapter I:68, in the introduction to the second book, and in II:14 where Maimonides points out that the reader must have previous philosophical knowledge. 96

58

MAIMONIDES: A RADICAL RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHER intellect having drawn him in and led him to dwell within its province, he must have felt distressed by the externals of the Law and by the meanings of the above-mentioned equivocal, derivative, or ambiguous 97 terms, as he continued to understand them by himself or was made to understand them by others. Hence, he would remain in a state of perplexity and confusion as to whether he should follow his intellect, renounce what he knew concerning the terms in question, and consequently consider that he has renounced the foundations of the Law. Or he should hold fast to his understanding of these terms and not let himself be drawn in together with his intellect, rather turning his back on it and moving away from it, while at the same time perceiving that he had brought loss to himself and harm to his religion. He would be left with those imaginary beliefs to which he owes his fear and difficulty, and would not cease to suffer from heartache and great perplexity. 98 1F

In the continuation of this passage, Maimonides informs the reader that the second purpose of the book, for that same perplexed reader, is to explain to him that in addition to the aforementioned ambiguous terms, there are also passages in the Bible that are to be taken as metaphorical despite the Bible’s not expressly stating that metaphor is being used. Now at the beginning of the paragraph quoted above, Maimonides indicates to whom the book is not intended: people who have not studied 97 98

In the original Pines has the archaic “amphibolous”. Introduction to the first book: pp. 4–5. The original Judeo-Arabic: ‫וליס אלגרץ' בהד'ה אלמקאלה תפהים ג'מלתהא ללג'מהור ולא ללמבתדיין‬ '‫ אד' גרץ‬,‫ ולא תעלים מן לם ינט'ר גיר פי עלם אלשריעה אעני פקההא‬,‫באלנט'ר‬ ,‫הד'ה אלמקאלה כלהא וכל מא הו מן נמטהא הו עלם אלשריעה עלי אלחקיקה‬ ‫בל גרץ' הד'ה אלמקאלה תנביה רג'ל דין קד אתצ'ע פי נפסה וחצל פי אעתקאדה‬ ‫ ונט'ר פי עלום אלפלאספה ועלם‬,‫צחה' שריעתנא והו כאמל פי דינה וכ'לקה‬ ‫ ועאקתה ט'ואהר‬,‫ וג'ד'בה אלעקל אלאנסאני וקאדה ליחלה פי מחלה‬,‫מעאניהא‬ ‫אלשריעה ומא לם יזל יפהמה או יפהם איאה מן מעאני תלך אלאסמא אלמשתרכה‬ ‫ אמא אן ינקאד מע עקלה‬,‫ פיבקי פי חירה ודהשה‬,‫או אלמסתעארה או אלמשככה‬ ‫ או יבקי מע‬,‫ויטרח מא עלמה מן תלך אלאסמא פיט'ן אנה אטרח קואעד אלשרע‬ ‫ וירי‬,‫מא פהמה מנהא ולא ינג'ד'ב מע עקלה פיכון קד אסתדבר עקלה ויערץ' ענה‬ ‫ ויבקי מע תלך אלאעתקאדאת‬,‫מע ד'לך אנה ג'לב עליה אד'יה ופסאד פי דינה‬ .‫ פלא יזאל פי אלם קלב וחירה שדידה‬,‫אלכ'יאליה והו מנהא עלי וג'ל ווכ'אמה‬

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philosophy at all (i.e. the general public), neither for beginners nor for those who have studied only the wisdom of the Halakha but neglected all but the most basic philosophy. This is because the Guide deals with the true wisdom of the Torah (‫עלם אלשריעה‬ ‫)עלי אלחקיק‬. For Maimonides, in order to access this wisdom, the reader must already be very knowledgeable in philosophy, and certainly not a complete ignoramus in this area, but also neither a person beginning his philosophical study, even if he be well versed in Jewish law. 99 Maimonides then offers a description of the level of the reader of the Guide as determined by three parameters: religiosity, philosophical knowledge, and confusion arising from the tension between the first two issues. The first description of the reader is as a religious person (‫)רג'ל דין‬, apparently meaning that this person observes the commandments. The reader’s definition as one “for whom the validity of our Law has become established in his soul and has become actual in his belief” (‫ )אתצ'ע פי נפסה וחצל פי אעתקאדה צחה' שריעתנא‬is more complex than first appears since the meaning of the word “belief” (‫ )אעתקאדה‬in the Guide is complicated. Indeed, several academic articles have been written about its significance. 100 On the one hand, Maimonides defines faith at the beginning of chapter I:50 as “the notion that is represented in the soul when it has been averred of it that it is in fact just as it has been represented.” 101 12F

14F

As stated earlier, Maimonides repeats this requirement several times in the Guide. This understanding is consistent with Maimonides’ statement that the Torah was given by prophets who were philosophers (see, for example, Yesodei HaTorah 7 and Guide II:32). To understand the true depths of the words of the prophets, the student must also have a philosophical education, just like the prophets themselves. 100 For example, Nouriel 1983 (pp. 43–47), Rosenberg 1988, and Manekin 1990. See also Schwarz’s note on this passage in his translation of the Guide. 101 The original Judeo-Arabic: .‫אלמעני אלמתצור פי אלנפס אד'א צדק בה אנה כד'לך עלי מא תצור‬ I do not think it is possible to read here that the believer accepts, subjectively, that his faith corresponds to reality. In my opinion, when Maimonides says that “belief is…the notion that is represented in the soul when it [the soul] has been averred of it [the notion] that it [the notion] 99

60

MAIMONIDES: A RADICAL RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHER

According to this definition, the essence of faith is a correct knowledge that corresponds with reality. However, Maimonides himself uses the same Judeo-Arabic word (‫ )אעתקאדה‬elsewhere to describe a belief that is based on imagination, and even beliefs that are demonstrably false. 102 Because of this contradictory usage, we need to look more closely at the definition Maimonides provided in Guide I:50, which apparently is not speaking of belief in the metaphysical truth of the Torah inasmuch as we see later in the paragraph that the perplexed reader does not actually understand the metaphysical content of the Torah. Therefore, the established belief Maimonides speaks of in I:50 is probably the reader’s deep appreciation for the social benefit of the Torah (‫)תיקון הגוף‬. 103 Another possibility is that the reader’s belief is not based on any philosophical education and knowledge but rather on the reader’s religious upbringing. 104 The difference between these two possibilities does not really matter for the purposes of this book. Be that as it may, Maimonides concludes this passage by emphasizing that the reader of the Guide should always be steadfast in his virtues and religion, or, as per his admonition in the Eight Chapters (his introduction to Ethics of the Fathers), the believer should not only keep the commandments of the religion, but also love to keep them. 105 In terms of the second parameter that Maimonides uses to describe the ideal reader of the Guide – philosophical knowledge – Maimonides states that this reader has “studied the sciences of the philosophers and come to know what they signify.” (‫ונט'ר פי‬ ‫)עלום אלפלאספה ועלם מעאניהא‬. Maimonides’ intention here is that 16F

17 F

18F

is in fact just as it has been represented”, he means to say that man receives in his soul the truth as it exists in the reality external to his soul. 102 On this see especially Manekin 1990, pp. 117–129. 103 This may be why Maimonides uses the word ‫ צחה‬here to describe the truth of the Torah, and not the word ‫חק‬, which in chapter I:2 he associates with the metaphysical truth (intelligible things), which is different from the practical and social good (generally accepted notions). 104 In other words, this faith is based on the senses and the imagination, which do not arrive at knowledge via true scientific inquiry. 105 On the perfection of character traits in Maimonides there are many studies. Some of these include: Davidson 1977, Fox 1979, Frank 1989, Weiss 1991, Frank 2000, and Jacobs 2002.

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the reader has extensive knowledge of philosophy (as we saw above). This knowledge should be deep and not limited to superficial proficiency. It is important to note that Maimonides does not insist that the reader has already understood all the words of the philosophers correctly, or to have arrived at a fully correct philosophical position. The insistence is only on a broad, deep, and significant knowledge of philosophy. 106 Having addressed the first two parameters that define the ideal reader, Maimonides then describes the mental state of the reader: his natural human intelligence has attracted him to take his rightful place – that is, this inquisitive person is naturally attracted to philosophy and wants to define his positions on existential questions according to his philosophical study. However, his relatively shallow understanding of the simple meaning of Scripture (whether this understanding stems from his personal studies or whether he received from those with religious authority the meaning of the Bible) does not allow him to determine his positions according to the conclusions of his philosophical studies. Therefore, the same refined reader is left perplexed: he feels that he must decide between his faith (whatever the meaning of this word may be) and his religious lifestyle on the one hand, and his education and philosophical knowledge on the other. Maimonides describes this conflicted thinker as being unable to make a final choice because of the true importance of each of these components. He rightly does not want to choose between the Torah and philosophy since both are important and good, and therefore the apparent contrast that exists between them brings the reader into a state of sickness, fear, and heartache. Maimonides’ solution in the Guide is to resolve this tension through a proper philosophical interpretation of the Bible. The words of the Bible have multiple meanings, and the way to clarify the correct interpretation is through proper philosophical study. It is important to emphasize that the meaning of the word ‘philosophy’ in Arabic relates mainly to the Aristotelian context, though there were also not a few neo-Platonists amongst the Arab philosophers. Similarly, the different Aristotelian philosophers disagreed with one another on a wide variety of issues.

106

62

MAIMONIDES: A RADICAL RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHER

Moreover, more than a few of the Biblical stories are allegorical in nature – even when their plain meaning does not seem to lend itself to an allegorical reading. Therefore, whenever the Guide’s reader sees something that opposes his philosophical approach, he will not interpret it according to the plain meaning, thus resolving his distress. The philosophical interpretation of religious texts and seeing philosophy as the esoteric secret of religion is the way to solve the plight of the perplexed reader. We will now try to see how Maimonides’ unique writing style in the Guide assists in fulfilling the purpose of the book: relieving the mental distress of the perplexed reader. As we have seen, Maimonides’ goal in the book is not to write a philosophical book, that is, a book that argues for a clear philosophical position that it tries to justify and convince its readers to adopt. According to Maimonides, philosophy can be studied in books that were the focus of this subject in Maimonides’ time. So, although the Guide indeed deals with the Account of Creation and the Account of the Chariot (i.e. the natural sciences and metaphysics), these important philosophical subjects are not the main purpose of the book. Rather, the analysis of the natural sciences and metaphysics fulfills a secondary purpose: showing the perplexed student how to interpret the Scriptures according to the results of philosophical research. However, due to the pedagogical concerns discussed earlier, it was necessary to employ various methods of concealment when dealing with these sciences, 107 which in any case Maimonides assumed were already familiar to the Guide’s readers from their previous study of philosophy, 108 such that Maimonides could summarize the main points, important for the book’s interpretive purpose, without expanding on them – a helpful feature when concealing information. Now as mentioned earlier, Maimonides calls upon his readers to interpret his book according to what they see as truth. If the purpose of the book was primarily philosophical – that is, to As we shall see further on, a secondary purpose of the Guide is to improve the philosophical mindset of the reader who is just beginning his study of philosophy. 108 As Maimonides explicitly notes in the introduction to the second book of the Guide. 107

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advance the reader towards the metaphysical truth – then one could justifiably wonder what the point of this insistence is, for it is difficult if not downright impossible to advance a person towards a specific metaphysical position that differs from the one that person espouses when that same person is essentially ordered to interpret the book according to his own position, no matter how outlandish the interpretation turns out in light of that philosophical position. However, if Maimonides’ main goal is religiousinterpretive, the Guide’s unique instructions (especially “favorable” interpretation by identifying contradictions and comparing chapters to each other) become much more understandable. Again, Maimonides’ stated main goal in the Guide is to resolve the plight of any philosophically minded person who is torn between philosophy and their faith-based religious lifestyle, regardless of the correctness of that person’s philosophical conclusions. Maimonides wanted every religious philosopher to be able to see in the Guide how their personal philosophical positions can be read into Scripture as the underlying secret message of the prophets. This is why Maimonides instructed his readers to look for hints and sub-hints to various philosophical positions (and he himself scattered such clues to positions he knew of and wished to guide readers to), and why he established interpretive rules of his book that allow any reader – and even the reader who espouses positions that Maimonides did not even know of at all – to see their positions as the Guide’s positions, and their philosophical lines of thought as the secret message of the prophets. Ultimately, the extreme multiplicity of radical positions to which Maimonides’ instructions can lead was necessary to fulfill the Guide’s main goal of helping the perplexed reader to not feel torn between philosophy and religion, for a reduction of the interpretive space to the one philosophical truth that Maimonides indeed believed in would have resulted in a very large reduction of this benefit. In other words, were the Guide a book with a clearly stated philosophical position, it would have been suitable solely for those few readers who have already reached the same philosophical conclusions as Maimonides – something he was not at all interested in. It is important to emphasize that what we are talking about here does not mean that Maimonides supported the idea of

64

MAIMONIDES: A RADICAL RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHER

multiple and equally valid truths, or the insignificance of attaining philosophical truth. As we will see in the next section, advancing the reader philosophically towards the unique position that Maimonides believed in is an important secondary goal of the Guide. So, the fact that this was not his main goal and not the reason for all the ways he concealed what I argue was his true position does not in any way imply a sort of philosophical relativism where there is no ultimate truth. Maimonides certainly believed in an objective, ultimate truth. However, he simply felt that, already in his day, there were enough books around dealing with philosophy that one could find in them the philosophical truth. What was lacking, in his opinion, was a book that explains how the use of philosophy as a general intellectual approach – as opposed to this or that specific philosophical position – can and should be applied to the words of the prophets and to justifying and motivating the leading of a religious way of life. Maimonides chose not to reveal the purpose of deliberately opening the Guide up to multiple interpretations in order for the purpose of the book to be fulfilled: that every perplexed reader feeling a profound conflict between religion and philosophy would be able to find an antidote for his state of perplexity. In other words, Maimonides wanted each sincere reader to feel fully confident that the Guide secretly confirms the reader’s own personal philosophical position while simultaneously strengthening that reader’s commitment to the religion and its commandments. The secondary target audience of the Guide: the novice philosopher

In the Guide’s instructive portion of the introduction, Maimonides presents us with another reader of his book, one who is probably a much more common type of reader. Maimonides writes there: I know that, among men generally, every beginner will derive benefit from some of the chapters of this Treatise though he lacks even an inkling of what is involved in speculation. A perfect man, on the other hand, devoted to Law and, as I have mentioned, perplexed, will benefit from all its chapters. How

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65

greatly will he rejoice in them and how pleasant will it be to hear them! 109 12F

Here Maimonides states that not only the superior reader – knowledgeable and profound in philosophy – will benefit from the study of the Guide. True, such a seasoned thinker will derive the maximum benefit from his reading of the book, but at the same time the reader who is not at all familiar with philosophy 110

The Guide, p. 16. The original Judeo-Arabic: ‫ואנא אעלם אן כל מבתד מן אלנאס ליס ענדה שי מן אלנט'ר פאנה סיסתנפע‬ ‫ פאמא אלכאמל מן אלנאס אלמתשרע אלמתחיר‬.‫בבעץ' פצול הד'ה אלמקאלה‬ ‫ ומא אשד אגתבאטה בהא ומא אלד'הא‬,‫כמא ד'כרת פיסתנפע בג'מיע פצולהא‬ .‫עלי סמעה‬ Later in the passage, Maimonides notes that there is a third type of reader who will not like the Guide at all: …those who are confused and whose brains have been polluted by false opinions and deemed by them to be true sciences, and who hold themselves to be men of speculation without having any knowledge of anything that can truly be called science. Maimonides is saying here that the type of people who will be put off by the Guide are the kind of people who believe that they have philosophically correct positions when in point of fact they have no theoretical knowledge at all. In other words, they indeed have philosophically relevant positions as well as religious teachings that address the typical existential questions that all people have, but these positions and teachings are wrong and completely foreign to philosophy. The errors these people make are not the result of earnest mistakes made while conducting careful philosophical study, but rather arise out of ignorance and philosophical apathy. Maimonides, towards the end of the Guide, in chapter III:51, compares these same problematic people to the recalcitrant subjects of a metaphorical king. These particular subjects live in the royal city, but choose to turn their backs on the palace, and over time wander farther and farther away from it. These are the type of people who, upon reading the Guide, will understand that Maimonides’ words contradict their false beliefs and will get angry at his book. These two passages well demonstrate that while Maimonides was amenable to a variety of interpretations that are all legitimately philosophical, he did not tolerate an infinite interpretive space that suffers interpretations based on any and all vacuous ideas. 110 Maimonides uses here the Arabic word ‫מבתד‬, a word he already used at the beginning of the foreword to indicate one of the groups for which the book was not written (‫)ולא ללמבתדיין באלנט'ר‬. 109

66

MAIMONIDES: A RADICAL RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHER

will also benefit, at least in part, though Maimonides does not specify precisely how. Nonetheless, it is clear that the benefit that the novice philosopher receives is different from the benefit enjoyed by the advanced, perplexed philosopher. The novice does not have any solid philosophical knowledge that he should strive to read into the books of the prophets. The main thing that Maimonides can offer to such a reader is to help him construct a more correct philosophical outlook (which will also be a religious outlook) and thereby bring him closer to the correct philosophical position. It may even be added that should a student begin his philosophical studies with the Guide, even though the book was not a priori intended with this goal in mind, it will nevertheless grant the student of philosophy a distinct advantage: since he will be exposed to philosophy in tandem with Maimonides’ religious interpretations of Scripture, this fortunate student will be able to avoid, at least in part, the perplexity of the superior reader and will even be more open to Maimonides’ philosophical positions. But even with this advantage, the superior reader can assimilate the hints, metaphors, and terse explanations found in all of Maimonides’ writings, which are really only intended for the experienced reader in any case. In fact, given the relative intellectual weakness of the novice, explanations that are intended for him must necessarily be much more detailed and far less esoteric. 111 Given his word choice here, Maimonides apparently wants to point out that addressing this group of beginning learners is not the main purpose of the book. Nevertheless, unlike the other groups he enumerated earlier (the masses and the scholars of Halakha), the beginners are indeed a secondary target audience of the Guide. 111 I do not think it can be said that the book was not intended at all for students who are unfamiliar with philosophy because, first of all, beginners in philosophy are much more numerous than the narrow and select group of perplexed philosophers. Indeed, the vast majority of any given population is quite unfamiliar with advanced philosophical notions, and so it is only natural that they make up the majority of the Guide’s readers. As Maimonides states, the Guide is designed to benefit such people as well, and therefore it is unlikely that their reading of the book is merely a by-product of the book falling into their hands. Therefore, it is much more reasonable to assert that the book was a priori

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It can therefore be concluded that the Guide has two different goals for two different target audiences. The superior reader, who is knowledgeable and immersed in philosophy, approaches the book with a long and in-depth background of philosophical study that has allowed him to work out a clear position as to what he believes to be the philosophically correct conclusions. The main problem faced by such mature thinkers is that they perceive there to be a contradiction between their philosophical positions and their faith-based religious lifestyle. Maimonides addresses these perplexed thinkers in the Guide not to change their philosophical positions per se, but to give them the tools to overcome their perplexity by seeing how philosophical conclusions are embedded in the words of the prophets, and thus to strengthen their commitment to their faith and religious practice without compromising on their philosophical beliefs. As explained earlier, Maimonides also wrote his book for those who are at the beginning of their philosophical studies. Such readers will derive some benefit from the Guide, though much less than the expert philosophers, given the novices’ unfamiliarity with philosophy, which necessarily impedes their ability to understand much of Maimonides’ explanations. The main benefit for the novices is an enrichment of their philosophical positions, but also of their religious views, which will become more philosophical. Of course, there may well be an intermediate type of person who has some philosophical knowledge in certain subjects, albeit lacking in depth. Such a person will firstly benefit from the book by learning from it how to see in the Torah the philosophical positions they have already delved into, and at the same time this intermediate student will be able to enhance their thinking on other positions through reading and understanding the other sections of the Guide that contain material with which they are less familiar. Reflecting for a moment on the above paragraphs, it is indeed impressive that for all of the above-described readers – be written to solve the religious dilemmas of the perplexed religious philosophers, but nonetheless was also written with a mind to helping the beginner student who is not a seasoned philosopher.

68

MAIMONIDES: A RADICAL RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHER

they advanced, intermediate, or beginner, and regardless of the degree to which their philosophical views concur with Maimonides’ views – the Guide manages to serve as a vital pedagogical tool to explore Scripture with a philosophical eye and overcome any perceived conflict between philosophy and religion. Maimonides achieved this goal he had for the Guide by requiring his readers to interpret the book according to the truth 112 by looking for certain unmarked contradictions spread throughout its pages, and especially contradictions of the seventh kind, i.e. contradictions that would only be noticed by seasoned philosophers. 113

SUMMARY: THE DIFFERENT METHODS OF CONCEALMENT IN THE WRITINGS OF MAIMONIDES – THEIR PURPOSE AND INTENDED OUTCOMES

In this chapter summary, we will first summarize the ways in which Maimonides concealed certain philosophical ideas and what the purpose was in doing so. We will then see how what we covered in the chapter can contribute to the modern scholarly search for Maimonides’ secret positions, which lie hidden within the outward text of the Guide. Methods of concealment in the various books of Maimonides

In this chapter we have seen that Maimonides uses different methods of concealment in both his halakhic writings and the

Maimonides is in my opinion intentionally ambiguous with his use of the term ‘truth’ so that each reader has the leeway to impute to Maimonides known philosophical ideas that he himself did not necessarily espouse. I discuss this point elsewhere in the book and in more depth as this aspect of Maimonides’ writing is fairly central to my analysis. 113 As stated earlier, this does not mean that there is no concealment whatsoever in Maimonides’ other books, or that Maimonides does not address multiple audiences in his halakhic works. But his statement that he is composing a treatise that contains contradictions is unique in his writings and is therefore related to the unique purpose of the Guide. 112

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Guide. The use of such methods, according to Maimonides, is necessary when dealing with metaphysics (the Account of the of Chariot) and even when dealing with certain secrets of physics (the Account of the Creation). The need for secrecy, Maimonides asserts, is why esotericism exists in the Bible and in the writings of the Sages, and it is reasonable to assume that Maimonides felt obliged to employ esoteric methods in his own works when dealing with the same type of material that the biblical authors and later sages saw fit to obscure esoterically. The main methods used in the both the Guide and Maimonides’ halakhic writings are “chapter headings” and metaphor. However, these methods are used to a greater or lesser degree by Maimonides depending on his target audience. In his halakhic works, Maimonides’ emphasis is twofold: 1. Writing that contains “chapter headings” so that only the savvy reader will understand the underlying secret; 2. Using metaphors to guide the masses towards correct philosophical positions. By contrast, in the Guide, Maimonides’ emphasis is mainly on the use of metaphors to allow the student philosopher (i.e. every philosopher from beginner to those who know the whole truth) to deepen their knowledge and philosophical understanding. Such a novice philosopher can understand some of the philosophical allusions in Maimonides’ halakhic books, but he won’t get much philosophical benefit from them. Again, the Guide differs from the halakhic books in that it tries much harder to advance such a person towards a more correct philosophicalreligious understanding. In addition to the two methods mentioned above, there are three other ways of concealment found in Maimonides’ instructions to the readers of the Guide: spreading out information between chapters, no explicit laying down of a philosophical outlook – but which one must figure out in order to judge the book “favorably”, and the openly declared existence of contradictions, especially of the seventh type. Maimonides explicitly wrote that he deliberately contradicted himself in the book and used disorder to conceal his true intention. Moreover, the key to understanding the Guide’s secrets is not in the book itself, but lies in the knowledge of the reader, who is required to

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interpret Maimonides’ words favorably, i.e. in accordance with the philosophical truth, even though this truth is nowhere to be found in the book in any explicit form. We have seen that Maimonides’ main purpose in the guidelines stated in the introduction is to allow any perplexed reader to understand the book in a way that resolves the tension he feels between religion and philosophy. It is important to note that even the second-tier reader of the book, i.e. any student of philosophy who has not yet reached a completely cohesive philosophical position, will also benefit from following Maimonides’ guidelines closely. The combination of simply being aware that the Guide contains intentional contradictions, and that Maimonides wants the reader to compare chapters to get his full intention and to read his words in light of whatever philosophical truth the reader previously attained will prevent the serious reader of the Guide from automatically accepting Maimonides’ words at face value, and furthermore will spur his thought, and cause him to deepen his philosophical knowledge. Through strenuous thinking, with the help of the Guide, the student reader will be able to go through a deep philosophical process that will allow him to understand Maimonides’ position and to ultimately agree with it. Those who are likely to be harmed by the direct and extended philosophical study of the Guide are the common people who aren’t prepared to invest themselves in proper philosophical study (unlike the reader who has begun to study philosophy in earnest). To solve this problem, Maimonides employs the seventh type of contradiction, which is to say that he frequently cites philosophical positions that coincide with the common beliefs of the non-philosophical readers who can then continue to maintain their simplistic and actually errant beliefs, and even think that Maimonides also held by such ideas. The emphasis that one finds in the Guide, in contrast to Maimonides’ halakhic books, that philosophers should help maintain the incorrect but necessary views of the masses, is intended to reveal to his philosophical readers the social purpose of the conservative views he expresses in the Guide. This is precisely why conservative statements occur in the Guide more frequently than in Maimonides’ halakhic books:

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the thorough and profound study of philosophy, which necessarily goes beyond just “chapter headings” (i.e. key points), requires over-concealment to protect the masses.

BETWEEN THE PURPOSE OF THE SECRET AND THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE SECRET

According to what we saw in this chapter, Maimonides had two main aims in writing the Guide: 1. to resolve the confusion of the perplexed reader; and 2. to benefit the reader who is beginning to study philosophy. The instructions at the beginning of the book, which allow for every possible philosophical reading of the Guide, are primarily intended for the perplexed thinker, regardless of the accuracy of their own philosophical positions. But in addition, the same instructions were designed to spur the novice reader’s philosophical study. We must now ask a more modern question: What about a modern scholar trying to understand Maimonides’ true intention, that is, Maimonides’ religious and philosophical views, independently of his own philosophical views? Here we need to distinguish between different types of modern readers. Most modern readers are similar to either the perplexed thinkers or to the novice and mid-tier students of philosophy. Some turn to the Guide to resolve the tension they see between religion and their philosophy, much like the perplexed thinker, though their philosophy may be quite different from that of Maimonides. However, thanks to his esoteric writing, Maimonides allows these readers to read their modern attitudes into the Guide and ultimately into the Bible as well via the Guide’s insights. 114 For some of these readers, the Guide is one of their first books, if not the very first book in philosophy, and they try to learn from Maimonides what the philosophical and religious truth is. Maimonides directed the Guide towards these very kinds of readers, though regarding these readers’ philosophical background, he probably had in mind the types of philosophy popular in the Middle Ages. Nevertheless, the book continues today as A nice example of this kind of reading can be found in Goodman 2015, especially the last chapter of the book. 114

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then to be used for these same two types of readers with great success. In contrast to these two readers, whom Maimonides anticipated would find his book to be of value, the modern scholar wants to know what Maimonides himself actually thought. He is not interested in either religious or philosophical truth, but rather historical truth. 115 First of all, such a reader must understand that he is not a member of the historical target audience of the Guide as such. Maimonides did not know of the existence of the humanities and Jewish studies, which began hundreds of years after his death in a completely different cultural context. The modern scholar must keep aware of this in order to avoid reading the book qua the perplexed thinker, i.e. one must avoid reading one’s positions into Maimonides’ book. This task is particularly challenging since many of Maimonides scholars are themselves philosophers (secular and religious) who are indeed perplexed by the tension between philosophy and religion to one degree or another. 116 Contrary to the common post-modernist position that such objectivity is beyond reach, in my opinion sufficient awareness makes rising to this challenge quite possible. The modern scholar can, through a careful analysis of Maimonides’ sources, understand the philosophical positions embedded in the Guide that Maimonides hoped his readers would attain as they progressed in their study of philosophy. One advantage that modern researchers have in this endeavor is that Maimonides did not know of the analytical methods of modern research and therefore he did not resort to any ploy aimed at confusing the researcher who might use them. Maimonides’ perplexed readers, unlike modern scholars, groped in the dim light of ancient This truth, of course, can still be used by the modern scholar and by others for philosophical or religious purposes, just that any such religious or philosophical usage should not in any way affect the proper conduct of the historical research. 116 In my opinion, among the more prominent examples of such readings by modern scholars are Strauss’s reading of Maimonides as a thinker coming to grips with a supposedly irreconcilable tension between religion and philosophy, and Pines’s reading of Maimonides as a skeptic (though as already noted, many after Pines have written on this as well). 115

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methodology for any possibility of the Guide resolving their state of perplexity, and as such, Maimonides only had to provide them the opportunity to perceive their own philosophical positions in the text of the Guide and from there in the books of the prophets as well for such readers to fulfill the book’s main purpose for them of attaining a measure of philosophical serenity vis a vis religion. By contrast, the researcher who manages to detach himself from his personal positions while reading the Guide will be able to understand it through cold historical research – something which was completely foreign to Maimonides’ spirit and purpose. So, it turns out that the purpose of the secret, i.e. resolution of philosophical confusion for any and all perplexed readers, actually stands in the way of the researcher who is trying to actually understand the Guide’s secret, i.e. Maimonides’ true philosophical positions. It should be noted that for researchers trying to understand these esoterically presented positions of Maimonides, his halakhic books, the Mishneh Torah and his Commentary on the Mishnah are of great help, however surprising that may sound. As we have seen in these books, Maimonides does not use contradictions to hide his positions in these works, but only presentation of material in “chapter headings” and metaphors. In these books there are also no metaphors whose purpose is purely social. The use of metaphors in his halakhic books is primarily intended to educate the masses to philosophically correct positions. Thus, deciphering Maimonides’ positions in his halakhic books is much easier than in the Guide, and as such can be used to help the researcher with the kind of analysis that reveals the actual beliefs of the historical Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon. 117

Of course, it is theoretically possible that between the writing of his halakhic books and the writing of the Guide, Maimonides changed his position. Such a possibility must of course be taken into account. Nevertheless, since Maimonides never declared that he had retracted any of his assertions, the burden of proof that Maimonides changed his position should be on the claimant. 117

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Some modern scholars, such as Lemler 118 and Faur, have used the tools of post-modernist literary criticism to read and analyze the Guide. These readings are quite interesting and seemingly have a clear viewpoint: Maimonides deliberately allowed, or so it would seem, a very wide range of different and even contradictory readings, such that every reader of his book can find within it the truth they were looking for. These positions are very suitable for post-modern readings of texts. 119 As such, one would imagine that the conclusions of this chapter would lead in the same direction; after all, I concede to the post-modernists (whose approach I usually find to be completely errant when applied to philosophy) that Maimonides indeed deliberately allows any perplexed person to see how in his book the reader’s opinions about philosophical truth squares with both the Guide and the Bible. But this well-substantiated conclusion must be qualified in two different directions. First, Maimonides certainly set clear demarcation boundaries as to what constitutes a legitimate interpretation of the Guide, and these are the boundaries of the biblical religion. The perplexed reader should see how their understanding of philosophical truth manifests in the Guide and the Bible, and not act against the decrees of the Bible. Second, we have seen that Maimonides’ ways of writing in the Guide are unique. A philosophical text is usually meant to express an idea. Maimonides in the Guide operates in an unusual way because his purpose is primarily not philosophical but religious: to resolve any sense of dissonance perceived between philosophy and Judaism by allowing the perplexed reader to be able to reasonably interpret all passages in the Guide and the Bible in accordance with that reader’s personal philosophical beliefs. From the above insights, one can infer that other texts written by Maimonides differ from the Guide in this regard and can help the scholar to understand the true opinion of Lemler in particular used the tools of postmodernist textual analysis more than other scholars, though such an approach also exists in Halbertal. 119 Such as, famously, “The Death of the Author”, by R. Barthes, 1967. Cf. footnote 27. 118

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Maimonides. Moreover, Maimonides also had another intention that one can find both in the Guide and even in his other books: to advance the beginner in philosophy towards the truth. Therefore, as I argued during the chapter, the contemporary researcher can fully utilize the modern way of researching texts (meticulous historical research, analysis of terminology, analysis of literature used as a source for the author, and more) and thereby discover the other broadcast frequency, so to speak, of the Guide – the frequency being broadcast to the student. Using such an analysis, even a multi-layered book like the Guide can reveal its author’s intent. Of course, this is true not only of the Guide but really of any philosophical text – even if the layers of meaning are esoteric. Through a careful analysis of the author’s instructions and his open description of his use of esoteric writing, the reader can decipher his intention and understand what the encrypted secrets of his writings are. For the remainder of the book, I will offer several prime examples of just such an analysis of some of the central ideas in the thought of Maimonides: free choice, the place of dialectical evidence, and the question of natural morality. After analyzing these key concepts, I will summarize the conclusions that I think can be deduced from all the analysis regarding Maimonides’ philosophical and religious positions. In addition, I will suggest how these insights might impact how one studies philosophy as well as how one relates to religion and religious matters as a philosopher.

CHAPTER 2. MAIMONIDES’ MECHANISM OF CHOICE Like many topics in Maimonides’ philosophy, the question of choice 1 is subject to extensive scholarly debate. 2 While scholars generally agree that Maimonides supports free will in his Jewish legal writings (especially in his Commentary on the Mishnah and

1 On the question of the existence of contingence and its essence in Maimonides, see also Guttmann 1939. There, the scholar primarily discusses the question of the existence of possibility in nature and the creation of the world, and not concerning the choice of man. In his opinion, Maimonides presents an intermediate position between determinism (which arises from the neo-platonic approach to divine emanation) and the approach of the Kalam, in which there is no causality at all in nature and everything occurs directly as a result of God’s will. Concerning other indirectly related topics to the subject of choice, see for example Ivry 1982, Nuriel 2000, and Rosenberg 1978. These studies mainly discuss the question of the possible existence of the world, and do not discuss the matter of real possibility in the process of human choice. 2 It must be noted that in medieval times, Maimonides was generally considered a supporter of free will. Nevertheless, even then there were those who claimed he was a determinist. For example, Abner of Burgos Ofrenda de zelos Chapter 7:41–43, a claim which is summarized by Baer 1941. This philosopher interprets Maimonides as a determinist, and his statements in favor of choice as directed towards the masses. On Abner’s interpretation of Maimonides see Gershenzon 1986. There the scholar also conducts a comparison between Abner’s deterministic interpretation and those of Pines and Altmann.

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Mishneh Torah 3), they disagree on Maimonides’ position as presented in the Guide. Pines, 4 Altmann, 5 and Sokol claim that Maimonides’ formulations in the Guide are best understood esoterically. 6 According to their interpretation, in contrast to his explicit words in his Commentary on the Mishnah and the Mishneh Torah, Maimonides in the Guide actually teaches determinism. Pines bases this conclusion on two chapters in the Guide (II:48 and III:17) in which Maimonides connects human choice together with animal choice and said that the two are determined from their cause. Since animal choice is determined, the implication of the connection is that Maimonides considers human choice to be determined as well. Altmann 7 adds that in Guide II:6, Maimonides appears to attribute all actions executed by man, whether as a result of his intellect or due to his imaginative power (both called angels), as originating from a chain of causes, at the head of which stands God. Additionally, according to Altmann, Maimonides uses (in II:7) the same word for “choice” (‫)אכ'תיאר‬ to describe both the choice of man and the choice of the spheres. Just as the spheres lack any real possibility of altering their See for instance, Altmann 1981 and Gellman 1989. On this topic see also Gellman 1983, Stern 1997 (especially 242–247), Sokol 1998, and Freudenthal 2004. Elucidated in this latter article, among other things, are the changes that Maimonides inserted into his description of the scientific world of his time in order to preserve as much as possible the possibility of free will and to defy astral or causative determinism. 4 Pines 1960. For a summary of Pines’s viewpoint see Altmann 1981; Stern 1997, pp. 221–229; and Gellman 1989, pp. 145–146. It must be noted that Pines is the first to have come out against the approach accepted by modern scholars prior to his time. On this approach, which interprets the Guide literally, there is a simple commentary which agrees with Maimonides’s words in his Jewish legal writings: Knoller 1884, pp. 68–95. 5 Altmann 1981, pp. 47–64. 6 In addition to Pines, Altmann, and Sokol, Harvey also claims that there exists a deterministic undercurrent in Maimonides’s Jewish legal writings. See Harvey, 1984. 7 Altmann accepts Pines’s interpretation with regard to Guide II:48, but disagrees concerning III:17. This is because Pines’s claims do not take into consideration the distinction between the will of animals and the choice of man. 3

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course, the implication is that man does not have this possibility either. To support these claims, Sokol applies a deterministic interpretation of Guide I:34, and of Maimonides’s words in the Laws of Divorce 2:20–22. 8 In summary, according to their approach, man does not have real free will. (It must be noted that in contrast to Pines, Altmann and Sokol assert that Maimonides believes man does possess choice, however, that choice is determined by the intensity of the circumstances that affect man). 9 Gellman, followed by Stern, 10 critique both Pines’s and Altmann’s approaches, but from different directions. Gellman first emphasizes that Maimonides in his other writings unequivocally supports free will. 11 In addition, he attempts to refute Pines’s and Altmann’s interpretation of Guide II:48 with two main arguments: 1. The implication of the chapter is that God bestows upon man the ability to choose freely, and not that God dictates the outcomes of man’s choice; 2. The Scriptural verses Maimonides cites in that chapter demonstrate unequivocal support for real

As it seems, Sokol also responds to Gellman’s critique directed against Altmann and Pines. With regard to the laws of Jewish divorce, it must be noted that Maimonides was interested in keeping open a loophole for dissolving a marriage in certain cases, a point which Sokol pays no attention to. 9 Concerning this divide see Gellman 1989, pp. 139–141, and Stern 1997, p. 222. Regarding the disagreement between those who support real choice and those who support free will and the deterministic chain of causes which determine how man uses this freedom (the Compatibilism approach) in modern philosophy, see The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Ed. R. Kane, Part 4, pp. 181–277 (which explores the articles of B. Berofsky, I. Haji, P. Russel, C. Taylor, and D. Dennett, who support the Compatibilism approach), and Part 6, pp. 337–437 (which examines the articles of T. O’Connor, R. Clark, C. Ginet, and R. Kane, who support real choice). 10 Stern 1997, pp. 223–224. 11 Gellman 1989, pp. 141–144. 8

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choice. 12 Finally, Gellman concludes that Maimonides supports free will in its absolute sense (strong libertarianism). 13 Stern refutes the determinist position on philosophical grounds. 14 His critique emphasizes that in the Aristotelian tradition, cause and necessity are not identical. 15 Cause is a necessary factor for the creation of the effect, but is not a sufficient condition. Hence, the meaning of Maimonides’s words in Guide I:69 and 72 and II:4, 12, and 48, is that God is the cause of all the occurrences in the world by being the first cause in the Ibid., pp. 145–150; and Sokol 1998, pp. 30–31, responds to Gellman’s interpretation with two claims: 1. Maimonides establishes in the beginning of the chapter that there is significance to this chapter, something which is not acceptable according to Gellman’s interpretation. 2. In Guide I:34 Maimonides states that there are people whose material quality of life does not permit them to achieve perfection. In my opinion, these answers do not suffice. 1. The reason why the chapter is important in the eyes of Maimonides is that, as far as it seems, this chapter is vital for understanding Scripture (based on Gellman’s interpretation): Everything that is attributed to God in Scripture does not imply a new divine action, but rather that God created the chain of causes that eventually elicited the same thing to happen. From here arises a naturalistic picture of the world which views God as the creator of nature without a new act of will for every single new event, and from here stems the great importance of this chapter. Concerning God’s will see Nuriel 2000, pp. 41–63; Manekin 2008; and Ivry 1991. Ivry asserts that specifically in the Guide (and in his other later writings) Maimonides adopts a more conservative approach, according to which God has a new act of will for every new event. Moreover, he explains that in chapter I:34, Maimonides discusses an extreme case and not the norm (later on we will see how an analysis of the different powers at play regarding the choice of man explains this chapter in a non-deterministic manner). 13 The signification of the real meaning of free will is that free will is not determined through an external chain of causes. 14 Stern’s critique of Gellman’s interpretation can be found in Stern 1997, pp. 222–223, note 13. 15 A comprehensive discussion on this topic can be found in Sorabji 1980, pp. 3–88. This scholar dedicates his whole book to a detailed discussion regarding the question of whether Aristotle was a determinist or not, and comes to a similar conclusion. Concerning the application of Sorabji’s approach to the interpretation of Jewish philosophy in the Middle Ages in general and of Maimonides in particular, see Hyman 1997. 12

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chain of causes – and hence the distant cause for their creation – but this chain of causes is not necessarily deterministic. 16 According to Stern’s approach, 17 Maimonides discusses two types of choice. One type of choice, to which Maimonides refers in other writings, is the choice between good and evil (solely regarding generally accepted things). 18 Man has control (or authority) over his actions not only because he is not compelled by external stimuli, but also because he is able to choose a different act in the situation he is given. 19 In contrast, the choice discussed in the Guide 20 is the choice made by the theoretical intellect, which constitutes the true essence of man. The true free choice of this intellect is to continuously attempt to apprehend the separate intellects. The remaining actions of man stem from the necessities of the material world, and the position of the intellect towards them is “shame”, a term which Maimonides used somewhat in passing, but which for Stern is crucial for understanding Maimonides take on the soul. Stern sees shame as essentially a person’s internal protest against the very existence of man’s material aspect, which necessitates the execution of material actions. Now according to Stern’s approach, what he calls “the true person” (meaning the intellect) does not have real choice in the material world, and he is entirely involved in trying to free himself from a situation from which he has no actual possibility of release. We may summarize that according to Stern, Maimonides believed that humans have some kind of psychological freedom, but no real freedom to act in any given situation differently from what is determined by the physical Stern 1997, 223–232. Ibid., pp. 233–264, bases this opinion on the comparison between the meaning of the word “authority” in the Mishneh Torah – in the meaning of choice between good and evil – and the meaning of “choice” in the Guide. Maimonides adopts the same word (‫ )אכ'תיאר‬in relation to the choice of the spheres’ intellects and the choice of man. 18 Stern does not seem to have delineated which part of the soul is responsible for choosing between good and evil as he did with regard to intellectual apprehension. 19 Ibid., pp. 232–247. There, Stern also discusses Alexander’s de facto influence on Maimonides. 20 Ibid., pp. 247–266. 16 17

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internal and external factors of the situation, which are wholly outside human control. 21 All these scholars discuss the matter of human choice primarily from the view point of causative determinism, 22 which is to say, their working assumption was that there exists a chain of causes that necessarily determines everything that occurs in the world, including what happens to each and every individual human being. However, their research does not discuss the processes of choice and decision within the human soul. 23 In this chapter we attempt to look at the issue of choice for Maimonides from a slightly different angle, analyzing the mechanism of man’s control over the various powers of his soul. The objective of this analysis is to see precisely what, according to Maimonides, the method is by which man perceives and reacts to outside influences. In addition, for the sake of clarity, we will also compare the choice of man to the will of animals. This will enable us understand whether or not man’s internal process leaves him any room for real 21 What confirms this viewpoint is that the intellect, in order to free itself from the body and subvert it, must use the imagination, which itself is a tool dependent on the body. See Stern 1997, p. 266. 22 A different angle that many scholars have explored is the relationship between the knowledge of God and man’s choice in Maimonides’s writings. On this topic, see for example, Stein 1882, pp. 22–34; Touati 1979; Kreisel 1987, pp. 25–26, note 31; Schwarz 1992; Krygier 1998, pp. 63–135; and Manekin 2002. 23 However, numerous articles have been written on the different powers in man’s soul, primarily Wolfson 1934, which discusses the senses (in the broad meaning of the word) as understood by Maimonides. For the comprehensive context of this topic (beyond Wolfson 1934) see also Wolfson 1935, pp. 69–133. Also noteworthy are: Klein-Braslavy 1986, pp. 139–233, especially pp. 146–148, where she analyzes Maimonides’s interpretation of Adam’s original sin in Guide II:30; Kreisel 1999, pp. 63– 92, which discusses the practical intellect and the connection between it and the theoretical intellect; A. Nuriel, 2000, pp. 142–146, and Pessin 2002. It is also only proper to make special mention of Horovitz’s excellent research (1970). However, this scholar did not succeed in finishing his entire research on the soul, and moreover, the last chapter of his book discusses Ibn Daud and not Maimonides. But much more important to note is the fact that none of the aforementioned scholars discussed the connection between man’s mechanism of choice and the question of whether or not man functions in a deterministic manner.

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choice. In the first part of this article, we will analyze the mechanism of choice as it is presented in his Eight Chapters. In the second part, we will attempt to see if the viewpoint that arises from the Eight Chapters differs from what is written in the Guide. In the third part, we will briefly touch upon the role of reflection in Adam’s original sin and its relevance to the problem of free will. The Eight Chapters

The primary source for Maimonides’ description of the different powers active in the human soul is the Eight Chapters, which is the common name for his introduction to his commentary on the Mishnaic tractate Avot. 24 In the beginning of the chapter, Maimonides describes the soul of man as a single unit having five distinct powers. 25 He then continues his description by noting that despite sharing a common name (‫)אלאסם פקט אשתראך‬, the soul of man is distinct from the soul of animals by dint of these vary powers , which are: the nutritive power, the sentient power (which includes the five senses), the imaginative power, the appetitive power, and the rational power. For the purposes of our study, we will expand a bit upon the secondary powers which rely on the appetitive and rational powers. The appetitive part is the power by which a man desires, or is repulsed by, a certain thing. From this power originate such actions as seeking something or fleeing from it, as well as being attracted to something or avoiding it; rage and agreeableness, 26

Tractate Avot is often called Pirqei Avot (Ethics of the Fathers), and is mostly a collection of rabbinic aphorisms and ethical insights, which is why it is apt for a lengthy discourse on ethics such as Maimonides composed. On the Eight Chapters and the influence of Alfarabi on Maimonides, see Davidson 1977, pp. 116–133, and Weiss 1991, pp. 9– 32. 25 On this topic and for the differences between Maimonides and Aristotle on this matter see Fox 1979, Frank 2000, and Jacobs 2002. 26 The exact translation of this word (‫ )אלרצ'א‬is not will, as accepted in Hebrew, rather agreeableness, meaning, that it causes man to be happy – the opposite of anger. Concerning this observation see Klein-Braslavy 1986, p. 221, and Blau 2006. 24

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MAIMONIDES: A RADICAL RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHER fear and boldness, cruelty and compassion, love and hatred, and many such disturbances of the soul. 27

Here we see that the appetitive power is responsible for two highly important areas with regard to the subject of human choice. 1. Man’s motivation to arrive at the place that he desires. 2. The emotional responses of the human soul to different stimuli. The second topic is most important for understanding man’s choice. The fact that man is attracted to a certain thing (for example a delicious food) or flees from something else (like a wolf) is contingent upon the actions of the appetitive power. Not only the actions of seeking and fleeing, but also the emotions behind them, are dependent on the appetitive power. The action of this power, in contrast to the rational power, is common to both man and animals. In other words, just as a lamb feels fear from a wolf and instinctively runs away, or wants to advance towards the delicious grass when it is hungry, so man is afraid of the wolf and desires to draw near to his food when he is hungry. The rational power of the soul is defined by Maimonides in the following way: The rational (‫ )אלנטאק‬part is the power found in man by which he perceives intelligible things (‫)יעקל‬, deliberates 28 160F

All quotes from the Eight Chapters are taken from Ethical Writings of Maimonides, Weiss and Butterworth (eds.), New York, 1975. This quote is from page p. 63: ‫ וען הד'ה‬,‫ואלג'ז אלנזועי הי אלקוה אלתי בהא יתשוק אלאנסאן לשי מא או יכרהה‬ ‫ ואלאית'אר לאמר מא או אלתג'נב‬,‫אלקוה יצדר מן אלאפעאל אלטלב ואלהרב‬ ‫ ואלמחבה‬,‫ ואלקסאוה ואלרחמה‬,‫ ואלכ'וף ואלאקדאם‬,‫ ולאגצ'ב ואלרצ'א‬,‫לה‬ .‫ וכת'יר מן הד'ה אלעוארץ' אלנפסאניה‬,‫ואלבגצ'ה‬ Further on, Maimonides explains which parts of the body are used as instruments of the appetitive part of the soul. For example, the legs are the tools used for walking and the hands and heart is where strength is found. 28 On the two key words “reflection” and deliberation” which appear many times together, see A. Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed (note 1 above), pp. 142–146. Nuriel comes to the ultimate conclusion that the meaning of reflection is the power which presents before man the immediate and remote purposes, whereas deliberation investigates the ways to arrive at a given purpose. I am not sure whether Maimonides himself clearly and consistently differentiated between these two terms, 27

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(‫)תכון אלרויה‬, acquires the sciences, and distinguishes between base and noble actions. Some of these activities are practical (‫ )עמלי‬and some are theoretical (‫)נט'רי‬. Of the practical, some are productive and some are reflective 29 (‫…)פכרי‬ The reflective is that by which one deliberates about the thing he wishes (‫ )יריד‬to do at the time he wishes to do it – whether it is possible to do it or not and, if it is possible, how it ought to be done… 30 162F

In the first part of the paragraph, Maimonides distinguishes twice between the different actions of the rational power. The first time he describes four things that man does with which he uses his rational power. 1. Perceives the intelligible things (‫)יעקל‬ 2. Deliberates (‫ )תכון אלרויה‬3. Acquires the sciences (‫)יקתני אלעלום‬. 4. Distinguishes between base and noble actions (‫ימיז בין אלקביח‬ ‫)ואלג'מיל מן אלאפעאל‬. After that, Maimonides describes two sub-categories of rational power, with the second sub-category consisting itself of two types of actions, such that Maimonides describes three different actions that are all attributed to the same rational power. The two sub-categories are: I. Theoretical (‫ )נט'רי‬and II. Practical (‫)עמלי‬. Practical actions are divided into two distinct powers 1. Productive (‫ )מהני‬and 2. Reflective (‫)פכרי‬. 31 If we compare the 163F

so much so that in the text cited here twice he talks of them both together. The first time (before the pause in the citation), deliberation seems more inclusive than reflection, while the second time (after the break in the citation), reflection seems more inclusive. 29 Here Maimonides explains the theoretical as the attainment of the unalterable things (which he calls the true sciences) and the productive as the power with which we learn the different arts. 30 The Eight Chapters, pp. 63–64. Original text: ‫ ובהא תכון‬,‫ואלג'ז אלנטאק הי אלקוה אלמוג'ודה לאלאנסאן אלתי בהא יעקל‬ ‫ והד'ה‬.‫ ובהא ימיז בין אלקביה ואלג'מיל מן אלאפעל‬,‫ ובהא יקתני אלעלום‬,‫אלרויה‬ ‫ ואלפכרי‬...‫ ואלעמלי מנה מהני ומנה פכרי‬,‫אלאפעאל מנהא עמלי ומנהא נט'רי‬ ‫הו אלד'י בה ירוי פי אלשי אלד'י יריד אן יעמלה חין מא יריד אן יעמלה הל ימכן‬ .‫ ואן כאן ימכן פכיף ינבגי אן יעמל‬,‫עמלה או לא‬ In the continuation of the text, Maimonides’s gives some examples of the productive action of the soul (carpentry, agriculture, etc.). 31 On the concept of ‫ פכר‬in Maimonides’s writings, see Wolfson 1934, especially pp. 354–360. Wolfson connects this characteristic to a type of intelligible imagination. One must note that the difference between the

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MAIMONIDES: A RADICAL RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHER

two major sub-categories of rational actions, it appears that theoretical action includes the perception of intelligible things and the acquiring of the sciences. 32 It is highly reasonable to assume that, at least in this passage, reflection and deliberation are equivalent. 33 Hence, it seems that the ability to distinguish between good and evil belongs (at least partially) to the productive power, this being because that same part of the soul which differentiates between the good and effective aspect and the bad, ineffective aspect concerning some particular action from a practical standpoint is the same part of the soul which discerns between moral good and evil. 34 If so, there exist two types of actions performed with the help of the practical part of the rational power: theoretical, practical, and productive actions of the soul was taken from Aristotle’s De Anima III 4–7 (which Maimonides was familiar with via AlFarabi). 32 Or at least the true sciences. 33 Evidence of this, as aforementioned, is that he uses the word reflection to describe deliberation and vice versa. 34 There is a possibility that the productive part also employs deliberation, or that the distinction between good and evil makes use of reflection. However, because of the clear parallel between the remaining powers, it seems to me more logical to include the differentiation between good and evil among the productive actions. This inclusion also corresponds to Maimonides’s approach, which describes the discernment between good and evil as something in which it is undesirable for man to engage (see Guide I:2). On the distinction between good and evil see Harvey 1978; Klein-Braslavy 1986, pp. 141–149; H. Kreisel 1999, pp. 93–124; and Kasher 2000, pp. 81–106. Kasher claims, based on Maimonides’s definitions, that not only do the words of the Torah have many meanings, but also in Maimonides’s writings we can see the same word assumes many meanings, such that there is a clear delineation between term and concept. The inclusion of distinguishing good and evil as part of the productive actions also suits the fact that Maimonides notes that the leaders of the different countries are engaged in both good and evil (Guide I:2). From here, too, we see that the distinction between good and evil belongs to the productive part of the soul, for leaders of countries are involved in the art of governing the country. Additionally, it is possible to define the productive as part of the differentiation between good and evil, as outlined above. An additional proof touches upon the state of man before sin: he did not need to engage in art and did not know the difference between good and evil; once he did know

CHAPTER 2. MAIMONIDES’ MECHANISM OF CHOICE

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1. Actions dependent on reflection (or deliberation). 2. Productive actions, which also includes the distinction between good and evil. 35

In the second part of the paragraph, Maimonides defines the reflective action. Reflection starts functioning when one wishes to do something. Consequently, it both follows and, to a certain extent, is dependent on one’s wish. After a person wants to do something, he deliberates whether it is possible to realize this desire, and if so, when and how to fulfill it. Based on this definition, we can understand that the distinction between good and evil is not part of the reflective power. The distinction between good and evil involves a conceptual differentiation between various actions even before man desires to do them, whereas the reflective power begins to work after man has a desire to perform a certain action. To make this distinction more concrete, consider the fact that no good person would ever contemplate the feasibility of some action that they consider to be morally reprehensible, much less when and how to carry out the reprehensible action, so obviously moral awareness precedes deliberation of actions. In the beginning of the second chapter of the Eight Chapters, Maimonides assigns the observance of the commandments of the Torah to particular parts of the soul. Know that disobedience and obedience of the Law are found only in two parts of the soul, namely, the sentient part and the appetitive part. All the transgressions and the commandments involve these two parts. There is no obedience or disobedience in the nutritive or imaginative parts, since

the difference, it was demanded of him to work the land (one of the examples of the arts cited by Maimonides). 35 On the division of the different sciences in Maimonides see “Introduction to Logic”, chapter 14. It is interesting to note that also there Maimonides employs a differentiation between the perfection of human character traits, which is part of “man’s governing of his soul”, versus the knowledge of good and evil, which is part of “governing a country.”

88

MAIMONIDES: A RADICAL RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHER thought 36 (‫ )לאלראי‬and choice 37 (‫ )ואלאכ'תיאר‬do not act upon them at all. By his thought man is not able to suspend their action or limit them to a certain action… 38 170F

In this paragraph Maimonides clarifies that the commandments were given only to the sentient and appetitive powers of the soul. The reason for this is that only these powers of the soul are affected by choice (‫ )אלאכ'תיאר‬and thought (‫)אלראי‬. A significant part of the influence of choice and thought is man’s ability to suspend or limit the actions taken by these powers. The question to consider here is as follows: Which of those powers mentioned in the first chapter do thought and choice employ in order to control the appetitive and sentient parts of the soul? The different jobs of the theoretical intellect are centered in theoretical knowledge alone, and the different powers connected to the productive action of the practical intellect are manifest in acquiring skills. The only power whose actions have influence within the soul is thus reflection and deliberation. From this analysis, we learn a number of important points regarding the matter of the mechanism of choice in humans. First, choice (at least as meant here: in possession of control and with 36 On this term see Nuriel 2000, pp. 78–79 and 129 (there he discusses the term in the Guide in relation to knowledge, an understanding which does not suit the context here of control over the soul’s power). On the various meanings of this term in Judeo-Arabic see J. Blau 2006, pp. 233– 234. 37 On the possible differences between the words “will” and “desire”, see Nuriel 2000, pp. 41–63. 38 The Eight Chapters, p. 64. Original Judeo-Arabic: ,‫אעלם אן אלמעאצי ואלטאעאת אלשרעיה אנמא תוג'ד לג'זאין מן אג'זא אלנפס‬ ‫ ובהד'ין אלג'זאן תכון ג'מיע אלעבירות‬,‫והו אלג'ז אלחאס ואלג'ז אלנזועי פקט‬ '‫ אד‬,‫ אמא אלג'ז אלגאד'י ואלמתכ'יל פלא טאעה פיהמא ולא מעציה‬.‫ואלמצות‬ ‫ ולא יקדר אלאנסאן בחסב ראיה אן‬,‫ליס לאלראי ואלאכ'תיאר פיהמא עמל בוג'ה‬ .‫יעטל פעלהמא או יקצרהמא עלי פעל מא‬ Further, Maimonides notes that with regard to commands given to the rational power, there is confusion. However, despite this, it is possible that commands will limit the actions of the rational power. It should be noted that from Maimonides’s other writings we can clearly see that he believes that it is possible to command regarding concepts. For example, see all of Yesodei HaTorah from his Mishne Torah; The Book of the Commandments, positive commandment no. 1; and Guide III:27.

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the ability to motivate man’s powers) operates via deliberation and reflection. Second, choice, by means of reflection and deliberation, can limit the actions of the other powers (the sentient and the appetitive). Deliberation does not create actions, rather, together with choice, only has influence and can limit on command the actions stemming from the other powers. If we connect what Maimonides has written here in this paragraph to the end of his previous paragraph, which discusses the way that reflection and deliberation operate, it is possible to understand better how deliberation can limit the appetitive power. The previous paragraph states that deliberation (and reflection) is the part which deals with the possibility of performing a certain act desired by man and deciding on the most appropriate way and time to do it. It is known that the tension surrounding the choice of man may exist in a situation in which he has different desires. For example, there may exist no inner dilemma at all in man when he is faced with the choice of receiving a raise in salary without having to accept any additional responsibilities. By contrast, in a case in which there are conflicts, the circumstances are more complex – for instance, when a sleepy-headed person ponders whether to get up to study or to catch some more sleep. In this example, the tension exists in the soul between the influence of the theoretical intellect, which determines what is proper (to wake up to study) and the influences of the appetitive power (which longs to sleep as a result of fatigue) and of the sentient, which also desires slumber. Another example is the tension between one’s feeling of fatigue, and one’s feeling of hunger for which he would have to stay awake and be in motion. In this case, both causes of tension exist in the soul through the variegated influence of the appetitive power. When a person has a certain desire, his deliberation power begins to work. It weighs how this desire can be fulfilled and considers the price that must be paid in order to fulfill his desire. For example, the person who wants to continue sleeping will consider in his mind the cost of his sleep (missing prayer or prolonging hunger) and if it is possible to delay his sleep to another time. Via this deliberation man can limit or even negate

90

MAIMONIDES: A RADICAL RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHER

the desire which stems from the appetitive power or from the sentient power. For instance, he can deliberate that sleep right now is not worth the loss of prayer or the continuation of hunger and therefore it is not currently advisable. He thereby suspends the action that stems from the appetitive power or limits it for a certain period of time. 39 Therefore, the act performed by choice and the observance of the commandments are dependent upon man’s deliberation. Via deliberation, man focuses his various desires (and needs), and due to this work of deliberation, he is able to limit or suspend the actions which stem from the appetitive power. That is the uniqueness of human choice. Only man, due to his rational power and by means of his deliberation, can control and limit the actions which stem from the sentient and appetitive elements within him. Because of his power to deliberate and reflect, man is free; although he cannot create new desires by deliberating and reflecting, deliberation and reflection enable him to control his already existing desires and to choose one of them over the other. 40 This is the essence of the uniqueness of human choice. 41 39 The way a person regularly acts and the way in which he utilizes his deliberation builds his character and develops the habits that influence his future actions. But through deliberation and effort a human can change his habits in the same way that he can control his various desires. See the Eight Chapters, chapter 4. 40 The fundamental nature of this assertion is the reason why this definition of deliberation, as described in the opening chapter of the Eight Chapters precedes the later unequivocal assertion that man is unrestricted in his actions. Indeed, this ultimate conclusion is addressed by Maimonides primarily in the final chapter of the Eight Chapters. Additionally, the assumption of the remaining chapters is that man controls his acts. 41 The comparison between Maimonides’s and Aristotle’s approaches to the essence of choice is very interesting. In the third book of “Nicomachean Ethics”, Aristotle asserts that choice is dependent upon deliberation which only humans (adults) possess, as opposed to animals and babies (chapters 2 and 3). Deliberation for Aristotle is not equivalent to the reflection and deliberation of Maimonides. For Maimonides, reflection and deliberation are not conditions for choice, rather, as it seems in the subsequent analysis in the Guide, they are solely a condition for free choice to exist in a real way. Animals, spheres, and God have

CHAPTER 2. MAIMONIDES’ MECHANISM OF CHOICE

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In order to strengthen and sharpen this understanding of the mechanism of human choice, we will now examine another important passage in the Eight Chapters in which Maimonides discusses the hierarchy of man’s different powers. In the beginning of the fifth chapter in the Eight Chapters Maimonides discusses the question of the proper order of preference between the theoretical power and man’s other powers: Man needs to subordinate all his soul’s powers to thought (‫)אלראי‬, in the way we set forth in the previous chapter, 42 and to set his sight on a single goal: the perception of God (may He be glorified and magnified)… 43 174F

175F

Here we see what role the theoretical intellect plays in the mechanism of man’s choice. It is up to man to channel all of his power towards the one purpose which lies at the height of theoretical perception: the knowledge of God. 44 The means by choice, but do not possess reflection and deliberation. Moreover, it is logical that children possess reflection according to Maimonides, since they, too, have practical intellect, but they do not possess deliberation in Aristotle’s opinion. Therefore, even if Maimonides was very influenced (and undoubtedly he was very influenced) by Aristotle regarding all that concerns the various powers of the soul, he did not accept Aristotle’s opinion unquestioningly, and indeed, Maimonides made far-reaching adjustments to Aristotle’s theory of the soul, at least with all that concerns the definition of choice. On Aristotle’s approach see inter alia Sorabji 1980 and Kenny 1979, in which Sorabji comes to the conclusion that Aristotle favors real free will, while Kenny maintains that he supports a type of causative determinism. 42 In the previous chapter (i.e. the fourth chapter of the Eight Chapters) Maimonides discusses the golden mean and the ways to attain it. 43 Original Judeo-Arabic: ‫ינבגי לאלאנסאן אן יסתכ'דם קוי נפסה כלהא בחסב אלראי עלי מא קדמנא פי‬ ‫ ויג'על חד'א עיניה גאיה ואחדה והי אדראך אללה עז‬,‫אלפצל אלד'י קבל הד'א‬ .‫וג'ל‬ In the continuation of the chapter there (pp. 388–389), Maimonides asserts that an action in accordance with reflection ‫בסחב אלראי‬ (presumably good reflection) is an action whose purpose is to develop the rational power within it, even if that purpose is a distant, secondary purpose of that action. 44 How precisely Maimonides determined that knowledge of God is the greatest achievement of the rational power within the context of the

92

MAIMONIDES: A RADICAL RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHER

which man subordinates the entire power of his soul to this loftiest of goals is here posited to be, as in the previous section, the power of thought, which would seem to be part of the reflective power of man. Therefore, this is a calling to man, that when he thinks about his different desires, he should prefer the theoretical part of his rational power. When there is a conflict between fulfilling one’s rationally determined needs versus fulfilling one’s needs as determined by the appetitive power (for example, choosing to go to learn, eat or rest), his deliberation must prefer to fulfill the need of the theoretical intellect. This is not to say that man does not also need to eat or sleep. 45 However, when a person deliberates whether he needs to eat or sleep, the correct deliberation involves doing these acts not to satisfy the wishes of the appetitive part, but solely to satisfy the requests of the theoretical part (which will provide better learning conditions in the future). It is therefore possible to conclude which powers constitute the mechanism of the action of man’s choice. The roles of the sentient and imaginative powers are quite limited: the imaginative part remembers and assembles the impressions perceived by the sentient part, whose primary purpose is to bring to man’s awareness what exists in the surrounding world. The more important tasks are assumed by the appetitive part and the different elements of the rational power. When man senses something external, the appetitive part presents before him emotional responses of rejection, attraction, love, or hate (for example, he is attracted to eating or scared of the wolf). Simultaneously, there can be contradictory desires of the appetitive part, whether they stem from the person himself, or from the encounter with an external factor. Parallel to that, the non-thinking 46 parts of the rational power are at work; the theoretical part is involved in understanding that which is theoretical power is a worthy subject and bears some relevance to the discussion here, but it is not as such the focus of this paper. 45 On Maimonides’s approach to asceticism in particular and to ethics in general there is much research. See among others: Harvey 1986; Frank, 1989; Kreisel 1999, pp. 159–188; Leaman 2002; and Frank 2002. 46 In the sense of practical thinking.

CHAPTER 2. MAIMONIDES’ MECHANISM OF CHOICE

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intelligible and sets for man his exalted mission: perception of God. The productive power is also at work discerning whether these actions are good or evil, practically and morally speaking. All these factors arrive at deliberation. Via deliberation, reflection, and thought, man considers all these influences along with the anticipated results of acting upon all his different desires and needs, how to satisfy the inherent demands of these desires and needs, and the appropriate time to provide that gratification. By means of this deliberation, man controls the external influences, which is to say he strengthens, suspends, limits, or intensifies his impulses and desires in accordance with the conclusions of his deliberations. Eventually, man chooses, with the help of his deliberation, what course of action to take. 47 Upon deciding what to do, he again activates the various powers of his soul: the appetitive part motivates him to his goal, and the productive part provides him with the skills necessary to perform the different actions he desires. 48

However, there can be a situation in which one of the factors is so strong that it suspends deliberation and loses the humanness of man. This is what occurred to Pharaoh on the one hand (as explained in Chapter 6 of the Eight Chapters, the Mishneh Torah, The Laws of Repentance, Chapter 6) and to Moses on the other (inter alia, III:51). In addition, it is clear that the nature of man’s physical composition and the remaining physical characteristics with which he is born effect the strength of his different inclinations, as described in Guide I:34 (and the Mishneh Torah, Laws of Repentance, Chapters 5–6). For example, a person with excessive warmth will be more aroused towards his lusts. However, for most people these lusts and inclinations are to a greater or lesser degree controllable via proper deliberation. One must also pay attention to the fact that in chapter I:34, Maimonides discusses people who cannot attain perfection, which is a supreme virtue. Although people such as these are many, it is clear from his words that these people are capable of reducing their lusts via self-training. This means that they are possessors of free will, albeit in a limited form. This explanation solves Sokol’s problem with Gellman. For more on the issue of the interplay between physical make-up and variable passion vis a vis the inclinations, see Freudenthal, “La détermination partielle” (cf. footnote 136). 48 In our discussion about the Guide we will see in detail the role that reflection plays in the context of bad actions. 47

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MAIMONIDES: A RADICAL RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHER

Man’s deliberation is therefore at the center of the soul’s process and is responsible for ensuring that man has free will and control over his actions.

THE DEFINITION OF CHOICE (‫ )אכ'תיאר‬IN THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED

Regarding the Guide, the most relevant question to consider for our purposes is whether Maimonides formulates the same position about the powers that determine human choice as he did in the Eight Chapters. As we previously mentioned, Pines, Altmann, and Sokol claim that the Guide contains a hidden message of causative determinism. By contrast, Stern asserts that the true signification of choice in the Guide is a non-deterministic choice made by the theoretical intellect, albeit one that is seriously limited as it does not extend to physical actions, as previously noted. Moreover, Stern asserts that for Maimonides, shame plays a key role in human psychology and hence in what Stern perceives is the Maimonidean mechanism of choice. For Stern, the sense of shame is caused to the theoretical intellect by the awareness of its existence in the physical world and the consequent need to make decisions regarding material needs and desires. In our juxtaposition and examination of the Guide and the Eight Chapters on human will, we will initially study the significance of the term for choice (‫ )אכ'תיאר‬in the Guide, following which we will see what distinguishes human choice from divine choice (or the choice made by one of the spheres) and that of animals. During this discussion we will suggest a different interpretation for the primary sources provided by Pines, Altmann, and Sokol. In addition, we will examine Stern’s approach, which is intermediate between the interpretation of these three and my own view. One of the most important chapters in the Guide regarding Maimonides’ definition of choice is II:48. 49 We will first examine As mentioned previously, this chapter serves as the primary source for Pines’, Altmann’s, and Sokol’s interpretation, which supports causative determinism. See Pines 1960, pp. 197–198; Altmann 1981, pp. 55–56; and Sokol 1998, pp. 30–31. On the other hand, Gellman 1989, pp. 145–

49

CHAPTER 2. MAIMONIDES’ MECHANISM OF CHOICE

95

the beginning of this chapter to see what the different factors are for those actions that are described as choice: It is very clear that everything that is produced in time must necessarily have a proximate cause 50 which has produced it. In its turn, that cause has a cause, and so forth until finally one comes to the First Cause of all things; I mean God’s will and choice (‫ )ואכ'תיארה‬51…. Know that all proximate causes through which is produced in time that which is produced in time, regardless of whether these causes are essential and natural, or by choice 52 (‫)'אכ'תיאריה‬, or accidental and fortuitous – I mean by the choice 53 (‫ )'באלאכ'תיאריה‬that causes that particular thing produced in time, the choice 54 of 186F

150, and Stern 1997, pp. 223–228, have a different take, interpreting the chapter as not supporting determinism, with Gellman arguing for real free choice, while Stern remains neutral on the issue. I will not review the various interpretations of these scholars, but rather, I will concentrate on the passages important to understanding the essence of choice. (Cf. footnote 136.) 50 Regarding the differentiation between the word ‫ סבב‬in Arabic which Maimonides uses here and the word ‫עלה‬, see Nuriel 2000, pp. 131–141. There, Nuriel determines that the word ‫ סבב‬is a broad term which refers to any chain of causes (including what is represented in the word ‫)עלה‬, whereas the word ‫ עלה‬signifies specifically necessary causes. This conclusion is another proof for Gellman’s and Stern’s approach that the chain of causes described in the chapter is not deterministic in essence. 51 Here Pines translates ‫ אכ'תיאר‬as free choice. I have taken out the “free” so as to render the translation more flexible as per the original JudeoArabic. In general, one of the key problems with the Pines translation is his penchant for using a number of very different words to translate ‫אכ'תיאר‬, which I firmly believe should always be “choice”. See also the next footnote for the adjectival form of ‫אכ'תיאר‬. 52 Here Pines translates ‫ אכ'תיאריה‬as voluntary. I have changed this term to “by choice” to avoid the prejudicial term “voluntary”, which limits the interpretation of the passage. 53 Ut supra. Note also that in the original English text, Pines has here “cause of” following “voluntary”, and not “that causes” as in the excerpt. This was only edited out of grammatical necessity due to the change in wording to “choice” just before. 54 Ut supra.

96

MAIMONIDES: A RADICAL RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHER a man – and even if the cause consists in the volition (‫)'אראדה‬ of an animal other than man… 55 187F

In this paragraph we see that Maimonides uses the word “choice”

(‫ )אכ'תיאר‬to describe the actions of three different actors: 1.

God; 56 2. Man; 3. Animals. 57 However, these three actors operate in completely different ways. In reference to God, Maimonides notes that all causes stem from His will and His choice. 58 Maimonides mentions man’s choice and animals’ will as a part of the essential causes (in addition to the random incidents that arise in nature). It is important to note that the fact that animals are included in the category of possessors of choice 59 poses a 18F

189F

190 F

19F

Pines translation, pp. 409–410. I clarify the differences between the translations of Pines and the excerpts cited from the Guide. Original Judeo-Arabic: ‫בין הו ג'דא אן כל שי חאדת' פלא בד לה מן סבב קריב אחדת'ה ולד'לך אלסבב‬ ‫סבב והכד'א אלי אן ינתהי ד'לך ללסבב אלאול לכל שי אעני משיה' אללה‬ '‫ אעלם אן אלאסבאב אלקרב'ה' כלהא אלתי ענהא חדת' מה חדת‬...‫ואכ'תיארה‬ '‫לא פרק בין אן תכון תלך אלאסבאב ד'אתיה' טביעיה' או אכ'תיאריה' או ערצ'יה‬ ‫אתפאקיה' ואעני באלאכ'תיאריה' אן יכון סבב ד'לך אלחאדת' אכ'תיאר אנסאן‬ .‫חתי ולו כאן אלסבב אראדה' חיואן מן סאיר אלחיואנאת‬ The citations of the original Arabic text of the Guide are all taken from Munk’s edition, Paris, 1856–1866. 56 Regarding the use of the word “choice” to describe a divine action, see inter alia, I:74 and II:32. In both these places Maimonides uses the word “choice” for God when discussing the approach the Kalam and the Jewish masses, which he later criticizes. However, his critique does not mention the subject of applying the word “choice” to God per se. 57 Though it needs to be pointed out that at the end of the citation, where Maimonides distinguishes between the choice of man and the will of animals, he has both belonging to the same broader category of choice. 58 On the subject of God as the head of the chain of causes, see also Guide I:69. 59 It must be noted that by using the word choice (‫ )אכ'תיאר‬in reference to animals, Maimonides opposes Al-Farabi’s approach, which asserts that reflection (‫ )פכר‬is a necessary condition for choice. Indeed, there is a general consensus among the Arabic philosophers in general regarding the fact that only man possesses reflection. On this topic see al-Farabi’s On the Perfect State, chapter 13, pp. 208–209. By contrast, Maimonides agrees with Ibn Sina, who asserts that animals, too, possess choice. On that topic see Landauer 1875, pp. 335–418, and especially Chapter 5, pp. 352–353 (Arabic text), and also p. 390 (the German translation). 55

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tremendous problem for Stern’s approach, which claims that the term “choice” in the Guide denotes the choice made by the theoretical intellect (which is obviously lacking in animals). Further on, we will attempt to answer the following important question: from the fact that the word “choice” is used in regard to animals (whose behavior can be viewed as deterministic), can a conclusion be derived regarding the question of determinism? In order to answer this question, we must verify that the actions of the spheres are also described as occurring due to “choice”; however this choice differs from ours, as Maimonides states (II:7): 60 Do not think, however that the spheres or the intellects have the same rank as the other corporeal forces, which are a thing of nature and do not apprehend their acts. For the spheres and the intellects apprehend their acts, choose (‫)'מכ'תארה‬, 61 and govern but in a way that is not like (our) choice (‫ )אכ'תיארנא‬62 and our governance, which deal wholly with things that are produced anew… 63 All this indicates to you that they apprehend their acts and have will (‫ )'אראדה‬and choice (‫ )ואכ'תיאר‬64 with regard to the governance committed to them, just as we have will (‫ )'אראדה‬with regard to that which from the foundation of our existence has been committed to us and given over to our power. Only we sometimes do things that are more defective than other things, and our governance and our action are preceded by privations; whereas the

For different interpretations of this section, see Altmann 1981, pp. 57– 58, and Stern 1987, pp. 248–249 (cf. footnote 136). Altmann cites this chapter as an example of the fact that Maimonides uses the term ‘choice’ with regard to intelligent actors that nonetheless lack real choice. By contrast, Stern cites this chapter in order to indicate that choice in the Guide is a term that represents the theoretical intellect. 61 Regarding the English translation of this term see footnotes 51 and 52 in the present chapter. 62 Regarding the English translation of this term see footnotes 51 and 52 in the present chapter. 63 Here Maimonides cites verses which support his opinion. 64 Regarding the English translation of this term see footnotes 51 and 52 in the present chapter. 60

98

MAIMONIDES: A RADICAL RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHER intellects and the spheres are not like that, but always do that which is good, and only that which is good is with them… 65

Maimonides here distinguishes between three different classes of beings: 1. Corporeal powers (‫ – )אלקוי אלג'סמאניה‬these powers are part of nature and they function without apprehending their acts. For example, a stone that falls does not know that it falls, and the force of gravity does not know that it is what causes the stone to fall. Rather, both operate without any awareness whatsoever; 2. The spheres and intellects (‫ ;)אלאפלאך או אלעקול‬3. Humans. 66 The two latter categories apprehend their acts and have capabilities, and thus Maimonides uses the words ‘will’ and ‘choice’ (‫ ואכ'תיאר‬/ ‫ )אראדה‬to describe their acts. Nevertheless, two differences exist between them: 1. The spheres and intellects always do good (‫)אלכ'יר‬, whereas humans can sometimes do defective acts; 2. The spheres and intellects always exist in a state of action, whereas human beings live in a state of potential towards action. Therefore, unlike the spheres and intellects, human governance and action are preceded by privations, and thus perforce humans function in a world of constant innovation. We see here that one of the fundamental differences between the spheres and human beings is that humans sometimes do Translation of Pines, Guide II:7 (p. 266). Here Maimonides adds that the spheres are constantly in action. Original Judeo-Arabic: ‫לכן לא תט'ן אן אלאפלאך או אלעקול במנזלה' סאיר אלקוי אלג'סמאניה' אלתי‬ ‫הי טביעה' ולא תדרך פעלהא בל אלאפלאך ואלעקול מדרכה' אפעאלהא‬ ‫ומכ'תארה' ומדברה' לכן ליס מת'ל אכ'תיארנא ולא תדבירנא אלד'י הו כלה באמר‬ '‫ פהד'ה כלהא תדלך עלי אדראכהם לאפעאלהם וכונהם להם אראדה‬...‫מתג'דדה‬ ‫ואכ'תיאר פי מה פוץ' להם מן אלתדביר כמא לנא אראדה' פי מה פוץ' לנא‬ ‫ואקדרנא עליה פי אצל כוננה גיא אן נחן קד נפעל אלאנקץ ויתקדם תדבירנא‬ ‫ופעלנא אלאעדאם אמא אלעקול ואלאפלאך פליסת כד'לך בל תפעל אלכ'יר‬ ....‫אבדא וליס ענדהא אלא אלכ'יר‬ 66 It is unclear where animals stand in this division of beings; however, it is reasonable that they do not belong in the group of natural powers. This is because even if the actions of the dog are guided one hundred percent by deterministic forces, there is a fundamental difference between a dog and, say, a rock in that a dog possesses an inner power which drives him, while the rock does not. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that animals have some awareness of their actions. On this difference see the introduction and first chapter of Guide II. 65

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defective acts and the spheres do just benevolent actions. 67 Despite this difference, Maimonides uses the word choice in both cases in order to describe their acts. In my opinion, Altmann and Stern are correct in asserting that there is no doubt that the spheres’ (and God’s) actions are completely deterministic, for if indeed they do only good, then it follows that the only thing that guides them is their theoretical intellect, which has complete control over them. However, in my opinion, the unavoidable conclusion which arises from this chapter is that Maimonides’ definition of the term ‘choice’ is contrary to that of Altmann’s and Stern’s. Maimonides delineates here that the performance of defective deeds from time to time and the involvement in renewal is part of the nature of man’s actions (these actions are characterized by the word ‘choice’ like the action of the spheres). Doing good and evil does not negate the possibility of determinism, 68 but assumes, at the very least, that man sometimes chooses to do evil (in other words, chooses not to function based on the command of his theoretical intellect). In addition, being involved with things produced anew (with which, based on Maimonides’s words, every choice of man and his governance deals) is the legacy of the practical intellect, yet to the theoretical intellect it is totally foreign. 69 On the additional differences between the cause of the motivation of the spheres and that of the animals (including man) see II:4. 68 It is possible that different powers (theoretical intellect versus appetitive and imaginative powers) constitute factors which influence the actions of man. Sometimes one overpowers the others, while other times another prevails, with each case turning out as is necessitated by the nature of the person and the nature of the external influences. Therefore this chapter does not contradict the approaches of Altmann, Pines, and Sokol. 69 Furthermore, it is possible to critique Stern’s approach (that the term “choice” in the Guide means the choice of the theoretical intellect) from three additional directions: 1. Although it is true that the definition of the true man in Maimonides is (generally) equivalent to his rational power, and that there are many chapters in which the perfection of the rational power is presented as the final purpose of man (for example I:2, III:8, III:51, III:54), nonetheless, it is necessary to note that there are also scholars who see political perfection and 67

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MAIMONIDES: A RADICAL RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHER

Summarizing what we have learned until now, we note that Maimonides uses the word ‘choice’ with reference to four types of actors: 1. Animals; 70 2. Man; 3. The spheres and the separate intellects; and 4. God. The spheres, separate intellects, and God are completely uniform in their choices as they choose only good and truth. Therefore, their choices are in a certain sense deterministic. 71 An animal’s choice is also completely determinisleadership of society as the greater purpose, for it adds perfection to man, who is already a knowledgeable being. See for example, Kreisel 1999, pp. 187–188. These scholars base this, among other things, on chapter III:53. Due to insufficient room in this paper, I will not go into the subject of whether the theoretical intellect opposes all bodily actions in Maimonides’ writings (as Stern claims) or, if, on the other hand, there are corporeal forces that the theoretical intellect commands and then is blessed by upon their fulfillment. On this see: Pines 1979, Berman 1981, Pines 1981, Harvey 1990, Kellner 1990, Novak 1993, Stroumsa 1998, and Kellner 2002. In this latter book, Kellner conducts a survey of the various opinions regarding the perfection of man (intellectually, politically, and morally), and ultimately presents the perfection of man as a “legal” perfection. 2. There exists another more fundamental point of critique which can be raised against Stern’s opinion. Even if it is assumed that the true man in the Guide is represented by the theoretical intellect, it is completely unclear if man is he who chooses. Perhaps specifically in the Guide (as in the Eight Chapters), the part which chooses is part of the practical intellect, and his basic choice is between his appetitive power (and other parts of his practical intellect) and the theoretical intellect. In addition to what we have seen in chapter II:7, this is what appears in III:51 as well. 3. In the third section of this article, I discuss Adam’s sin and I attempt to prove that in I:2 the term intellect (‫ )עקל‬is at times used to describe the theoretical intellect, while in other places it describes part of the practical intellect. Additionally, it is important to emphasize that there are other places in the Guide in which Maimonides discusses the practical intellect and not only the theoretical. On that topic see Kreisel 1999, pp. 63–92. 70 On the approach of Maimonides to animals and the development of his thoughts on this matter see Kasher 2002. 71 I will not enter into a discussion of the complex topic of divine choice, neither determining what constitutes divine desire nor determining how

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tic, although there is a difference in that their mode of choice evinces a determinism of a different category. Animals choose between the various urges that stem from the appetitive power, and the strongest force prevails. 72 As stated in Guide I:72:

possible it is or is not that God created the world, or when it was created. Nor will I attempt to offer any description of God’s essence. On the subject of the descriptions of God in Maimonides see inter alia: Wolfson 1916, 1938, 1945, and 1953, Loeb 2002, Seeskin 2002, and Even-Chen 2008. Loeb and Seeskin in particular discuss the tension between the negative doctrine of attributes of Maimonides and religious experience. On the issue of God’s desire, see also Nuriel 2000, pp. 41–63. On the subject of the possibility of the creation of the world, see Fackenheim 1946 and Manekin 2008, pp. 210–221. The central question here is not, in my understanding, whether God does good and acts truthfully or not, but rather whether there were circumstances “before” the creation of the world which were good and true on equal levels such that God could choose between them in a completely unrestricted way and create the world. That is precisely what emerges from the literal text of the Guide, for example, in II:22 and II:24. Still, the question remains: Is there not a contradiction here that must be explained with the help of a different esoteric plane? Such a situation differs entirely, all would agree, from the state of man’s choice, for according to Maimonides’ approach concerning attributes, there is no connection between the choice of God and the choice of man beyond the common terminology. 72 Regarding the fact that animals function in a totally deterministic manner, see Pines 1960, pp. 196–197. We will see further that it also emerges from the introduction and first chapter of Guide II that animals do not have real choice. In Guide II:6, Maimonides establishes that the desire of animals, who do not possess intellect, is also called “angel”. It is necessary to note that in my understanding, his intention is not that God creates the animal’s action, rather that he created within the animal the driving force behind the action.

102

MAIMONIDES: A RADICAL RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHER … 73 None of the individual animals requires for its continued existence reflection (‫)פכר‬, deliberation 74 (‫)רויה‬, and governance of conduct. For it goes about and runs in accordance with its nature, eating what it finds from among the things suitable to it, inhabiting any place to which it has happened to come, and copulating with any female it finds during its heat… 75 Because of this, one finds in man the rational (‫ )אלקו'ה אלנאטקה‬power in virtue of which he reflects 76 (‫)יפכר‬, deliberates (‫)וירוי‬, 77 works, and prepares by means of various arts his food, his habi209F

In the sentences just prior to this passage, Maimonides notes that some thinkers might misidentify man as merely an intelligent animal that falls short of being a microcosm of the divine, in that what he explained in the earlier parts of the chapter (i.e. that the arrangement of the powers in this world is similar to the arrangement of forces in man) is insufficient for proving the divine microcosmic aspect of human existence. But then Maimonides asserts that man is indeed a microcosm of the divine in the merit of the rational power, which he identifies with the hylic intellect. 74 Here Pines translates ‫ רויה‬as perspicacity (acumen, keenness). 75 Here Maimonides expands on this thought and notes that animals can continue to live and sustain their species even without the rational power. By contrast, humans need the rational power for performing productive activities which are necessary for their existence (building homes, preparing food…). Maimonides links the performance of these actions with man’s reflection and deliberation. In my opinion, there is no contradiction between that and the distinction we saw in the Eight Chapters between the productive and the reflective parts. Maimonides’s intention here is to note that with deliberation and reflection man controls his body (as mentioned later on), and can cause his body to do acts that he wants to do, even if he has other lusts which tantalize him (for example, man, with his deliberation, can decide to go build a house for himself in the summer, despite the fact that his lusts, which stem from the appetitive power, “want” him to be idle). In addition, deliberation and reflection play an important role in the preservation of the social structure, which is necessary for the existence of man. For example, a man can decide not to steal from his neighbor despite the temptation, which emanates from his appetitive power. Instead, he deliberates and concludes that this action is improper. Deliberation is even involved in decisions regarding the prioritization of actions, which is made by the productive part of the soul, which is responsible, for example, for deciding on such things as the manner in which a house is to be built, when and where it is best to build, etc. 76 Here Pines translates ‫ יפכר‬as “think”. 77 On this term see footnote 161. 73

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tation, and his clothing. Through it he rules all the parts of his body in such a way that the ruling part acts in the way it does and the ruled part is governed the way is ruled… 78

In the beginning of this paragraph we see clearly that animals do not possess any real choice. They only follow nature, 79 lacking all reflection and without the ability of selection. Presumably, the conclusions we have raised until now with regard to the essence of choice support the deterministic approach of Altmann, Pines, and Sokol. Their position is that all classes of beings whose actions Maimonides describes with the term ‘choice’ – despite the free-will connotation of the term – function in a fundamentally deterministic way. However, in my opinion the situation is more complex. We saw in the Eight Chapters that Maimonides describes man’s ability to (unlike animals) selectively emphasize or de-emphasize the various forces that have an influence via his reflection and deliberation (‫)פכרה ורויה‬. In the Guide, Maimonides explicitly states that animals 80 do not possess these powers of reflection and deliberation. In fact, also with regard to God, Maimonides asserts that the usage of the terms reflection and deliberation is incorrect. 81 By contrast, we see in this section that these powers are an essential part of the human powers. Additionally, there can certainly exist a situation in which the term choice (‫ )אכ'תיאר‬also includes the possessors of real choice as well as classes of beings that operate in some sort of deterministic way. In other words, Pines translation, pp. 190–191. Original Judeo-Arabic: ‫הד'א אלמעני לא יוג'ד פי שי מן אנועא אלחיואן גירה וביאן ד'לך אן כל שכ'ץ מן‬ ‫השכ'אץ אלחיואן לא יפתקר פי אסתמראד וג'ודה אלי פכר ורויה ותדביר בל ימשי‬ ‫ויסעי בחסב טביעתה ויאכל מה יג'ד ממא יואפקה ויאוי לאי מוצ'ע אתפק וינזו עלי‬ ‫וג'דת פיה הד'ה אלקו'ה אלנאטקה אלתי בהא יפכר‬... ‫אי אנתי וג'ד ענד היג'אנה‬ ‫וירוי ויעמל ויהיי באנואע מן אלצנאעאת אג'דיתה וכנה ולבאסה ובהא ידבר ג'מיע‬ ...‫אעצ'א ג'סמה חתי יפעל מנהא אלראיס מא יפעל ויתדבר אלמרוום במא יתדבר‬ 79 Concerning the fact that one of the definitions of nature is that it does not possess reflection and deliberation, see III:43. 80 As per the excerpt from Guide I:70 above (we will continue to analyze this citation later). 81 On this see Guide I:47. It must be noted that Maimonides does not use the term reflection or deliberation in reference to spheres or the separate intellects. 78

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the mere fact that the same language of choice is used both for humans as well as for beings that seem to lack real choice does not in itself prove that all these beings’ choices are made using identical mechanisms, and consequently, one cannot assume based on the common language of “choice” for all beings that all choice is deterministic. Thus, there remains room for free choice for humans. Now given this distinction of determinist vs. non-determinist choice, one may wonder why any scholars assume Maimonides to be a determinist, and the answer would appear to be an issue of how comprehensive one’s analysis of Maimonides is. The determinist scholars who discuss choice 82 primarily analyze chapters II:48, and III:17 (the fifth opinion), this being Maimonides’ understanding of the view of the Torah. In these two chapters, Maimonides mentions choice without any context of reflection and deliberation, and therefore these chapters are indeed open to a deterministic interpretation, though the non-deterministic option remains quite viable. By contrast, it would seem incontrovertible that passages on choice that explicitly mention the context of reflection and deliberation clearly imply the real capability of man to control his actions. Therefore in the Guide, while there do exist chapters that can be interpreted either deterministically or non-deterministically, there are other chapters which can only be understood in a non-deterministic way. Given this observation, it seems to me that using a deterministic approach with those chapters that are admittedly open to interpretation in order to assert an internal contradiction which would compel us to ascertain Maimonides’ true opinion through external texts, seems to me incorrect. Rather, in my opinion such an approach must be reserved for cases in which there exist truly irreconcilable contradictions between the different chapters. But in cases in which it is possible to understand Maimonides’s approach as unified and not as self-contradictory, it is much preferable to interpret the chapters that have an ambiguous meaning according to the unambiguous chapters, and thereby not increase contradictions. 82

In particular, Pines and Altmann.

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From the above discussion it becomes clear that to avoid the pitfall of reading into Maimonides a determinism that is not there, it is crucial to have a sophisticated definition of choice that is in consonance with all of Maimonides’ pronouncements on choice. To this end I propose the following definition: Choice is the internal decision towards any direction while the chooser has the ability to do other actions. The key word is ability. God and the separate intellects are capable in principle of performing all the possible actions that differ from those that they end up always doing (as Maimonides precisely notes with regard to the separate intellects in the passage we saw from chapter II:7). However, because they know what is good and have total control over themselves, they do only good, and hence only the best actions, and not the alternative defective actions, despite their having the power to do these defective actions. Animals, too, have the ability to do other actions (a dog, can at a given time, go to sleep or chase after a cat). However, practically speaking, the tension between their nature and external influences causes one urge to overpower its counterpart, and not that they make a reasoned choice. 83 Therefore, we see that the use of the word ‘choice’ in a philosophical discussion does not actually demonstrate that the philosopher accepts the existence of real choice (i.e. the real possibility of acting upon either of two options when a decisive action is required – what we call the freedom to do A or B), but rather we can only assume that the philosopher in question accepts that intelligent beings are aware of their operational options on an intellectual level (i.e. the theoretical ability to do A or B). So while it could be that a philosopher who speaks of In Guide III:18, Maimonides discusses the fact that the ignorant are on the level of animals regarding providence. Two things must be noted. First, that here he is talking about the problem of providence and not about free will. Second, even in light of the observation that people who are ignorant are similar to animals, this does not mean that they do not have freedom of choice. So while it may be true that animals lack free choice, humans – even when acting similar to animals by deliberating only on corporeal lusts – do not lose their ability to act differently. Thus, animalistic people are nonetheless owners of free will and remain morally culpable and are really only like animals in terms of their not being beneficiaries of divine providence.

83

106

MAIMONIDES: A RADICAL RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHER

intelligent choice also believes in real choice that affects actions in the physical world, it could also be just as easily the case that the philosopher who speaks of choice only means this in a limited sense, such that if the determinism of the physical world is to be broken, the source of this hard type of free will must come from some other source other than the presence of choice. And I would humbly submit here that there is such a source for the substantiation of free will, and it lies in the realm of thought. With the above observation in mind, we will now examine what meanings the words reflection 84 and deliberation have in the Guide in order to see if they are indeed the same terms we saw in the Eight Chapters. 85 First, from the above excerpt, it appears that In the Arabic philosophy before Maimonides we can distinguish between two kinds of utilization of the word ‘reflection’ (‫) ﻓﻜﺮ‬: I. The first utilization is as a part of the practical intellect in a role that is similar to what we saw in the Eight Chapters. A good example of this utilization is in Al-Farabi on the perfect state, a revised text, chapter II:23. The second utilization is as a part of the process of learning (including theoretical things). About this utilization see Al-Farabi on the perfect state, a revised text chapter 20. In Āl-Fārābī Aphorisms of the Statesman, we see how Al-Farabi utilizes this term only in the first kind of utilization. In this book, AlFarabi defines reflection as something practical (see passage VI, Arabs 106, English, pp. 30–31; passage XXX, Arabs 124, English p. 42; and passage XC, Arabs 168, English p. 75). On the contrary, generally Ibn Sina utilizes the term reflection in accordance with the second kind of utilization. For example, every time he utilizes the term “reflection” in “Die Psychologi” (Landauer 1875), it is of this second kind (as a learning process). It is also more common in the other writings of Ibn Sina, although there is at least one time that he utilizes the term with the first kind of utilization, namely in his Kitab al-Shifa’, p. 40). Maimonides utilizes only the first kind of utilization (practical intellect) in the Eight Chapters (as with the utilization of Al-Farabi in Aphorisms of the Statesman). In the Guide, the first kind is the most common, but there are some utilizations of the second kind (example in I, 47). In this article we concentrate our analysis on the first kind of utilization, which is the important one for the problem of choice. 85 On this see footnote 161. Also worth noting is Nuriel 2000, pp. 142– 146. To summarize, Nuriel determined that there are four characteristics of the term “reflection” in the Guide: 1. It is the special unique quality of man (based on III:8, I:2, and I:72); 2. It is indifferent to good and evil 84

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the power of reflection and deliberation is the power with which man controls his other powers. Maimonides establishes that one of the roles of reflection is to provide the foundation by means of which man controls the parts of his body, and according to Maimonides the different powers are associated with the different parts of the body. 86 Reflection is therefore the power man uses to place his intellect in control over his other powers (which lie in the different parts of his body). 87 Still, there can certainly be a situation in which with this human power does exactly the opposite, meaning, that reflection actually neutralizes the influence of the intellect and the contemplative person turns to other powers (and therefore there is no definitive statement in Maimonides as to which part of the body rules over the others; only that man controls the other parts of his body via reflection). This is what Maimonides writes as well, for example, in III:8: 88

(based on I:7, III:54); 3. It is one of the mediators that take part in man’s direction, be it towards good or evil (based on I:10, III:8). 4. It can be commanded (based on III:22). In the analysis to follow, we will reinforce the conclusions of Nuriel, and link them to the matter of choice of which Nuriel is silent. 86 On this see the Eight Chapters, chapter 1. 87 For another explanation of the connection between reflection and deliberation and their governance over other powers, see also Guide III:17 (in the description of Aristotle’s opinion, second opinion). 88 For more regarding the fact that it is possible to use reflection for good or for evil, see also I:7; I:10; II:36 – where it is also noticeable that man must focus his reflection towards the dealings of the theoretical intellect, while nullifying his reflection – ‫ – בתעטיל אלפכרה‬in relation to notions that emerge from the appetitive power, the sentient power, and perhaps even the productive intellect, such as the notion of honor; III:51 – where Maimonides emphasizes that it is upon man to strictly focus his reflection towards a thorough examination of the intelligible things, even after attainment of the knowledge of their existence (for certainly there is no value in the concentration of reflection on, for example, coming up with an imaginary picture of God; and III:54 – where Maimonides maintains that operating one’s reflection can lead to many achievements: the attainment of intellectual virtues, the attainment of character values, the attainment of practical arts, but also the “attainment” of evils and abominations.

108

MAIMONIDES: A RADICAL RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHER … 89 In this respect the ranks of the Adamites differ. Among men, there are individuals who aspire always to prefer that which is most noble and to seek a state of perpetual permanence according to what is required by their noble form. They only reflect (‫ )יפכר‬on the mental representation of an intelligible, on the grasp of a true opinion regarding everything, and on union with the divine intellect, which lets overflow toward them that through which that form exists … 90 As far as the others are concerned – those who are separated from God by a veil, being the multitude of the ignorant – the opposite is true: They refrain from all reflection (‫ )פכר‬and deliberation (‫ )'ורויה‬91 about any intelligible thing and take as their end the sense that is our greatest shame, I mean the sense of touch. Accordingly they have no reflection (‫ )פכר‬92 and deliberation (‫ )'ורויה‬except only in relation to eating and copulation… 93 25F

Here Maimonides distinguishes between two types of people. In the first category are the people who desire union with God. These people focus their reflection upon anything intelligible and flee as much as possible from the material. By contrast, there are the ignorant, for whom all reflection is used for the sense of touch Previously, Maimonides opines that reflection upon what is proper to do and what is proper to refrain from doing, control over one’s lusts and anger, the apprehension of the Creator, and the comprehension of anything intelligible stem from the form of man. 90 Here Maimonides explains that a person like this distances himself as much as he can from the material and all that is connected with it. He also cites the simile concerning the man who must carry garbage in order to describe the different ways that a man who reflects upon intellect and a man who reflects upon the material relate to the necessity of existing in matter. 91 Here Pines translates ‘‫ ’פכר ורויה‬as thought and perception. 92 See footnote 164. 93 Pines, Guide III:8, pp. 432–433. Original Judeo-Arabic: ‫ומן הנא תקסמת מראתב אלאדמיין פמן אלנאס אלאשכ'אץ אלד'ין רומהם דאימא‬ ‫אית'אר אלאשרף וטלב אלבקא אלדאים עלי מקתצ'י צורתה אלשריפה' פלא יפכר‬ ‫אלא פי תצור מעקול ואדראך ראי צחיח פי כל שי ואתצאל באלעקל אלאלאהי‬ '‫ואמא אלאכ'רון אלמהג'ובון ען אללה והם זמר'ה' אלג'אהלה‬...‫אלפאיץ' עליה‬ '‫פבעכס הד'א עטלוא כל פכר ורויה' פי מעקול וג'עלוא גאיתהם תלך אלחאסה‬ ‫אלתי הי עארנא אלאכבר אעני חאסה' אללמם פלא פכר להם ולא רויה' אלא פי‬ ...‫אכל ונכאח ולא גיר‬ 89

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and corporeal pleasures of eating and copulation. These people refrain from (‫ )עטלוא‬all reflection and deliberation about anything intelligible. We see here the two kinds of reflection. The same power that man uses to focus and come closer to God is the same power with which he can concentrate on the sensual pleasures. Moreover, from this passage it seems that one of the major differences between the wise and the ignorant is that the one concentrates his reflection on God while the other on experiencing pleasurable sensations. 94 Therefore, the same power which governs the other powers is also the power with which man can concentrate on a single one of these powers (on the theoretical intellect, meaning apprehension of God, or on the sense of touch, meaning, the sentient power). From here it is possible to conclude that on the one hand, a person who concentrates on God will lead his life in accordance with His commands and distance himself from the material world virtue of his subduing all his other powers, as opposed to the person who concentrates on the sense of touch (or on the apprehension of any other non-spiritual goal like honor, wealth, etc.) will neutralize his urge for acquiring intellect (he will refrain from reflection and deliberation upon the nonspiritual goals). From this passage it is clear also that reflection, though sharing in the domain of the theoretical intellect, is not exclusively part of the theoretical intellect, for the theoretical intellect never deals with sensual experience. Additionally, we see that in Guide as well, the biblical commands are central to the deliberation and reflection of man, as Maimonides establishes in chapter III:33: … 95 Therefore God, may His name be held sublime, employed a gracious ruse through giving us certain laws that destroy

Therefore, the ignorant person, who focuses on his senses, and whose entire purpose is the pleasures of this world, is called “corrupt of reflection” (Pines: “thinks worthless thoughts”) – “‫( ”פאסד אלפכרה‬Guide III:12). 95 In the beginning of the chapter, Maimonides indicates that one of the objectives of the Torah is to distance man from the lusts which corrupt him, corrupt his house, and indeed corrupt the entire society. 94

110

MAIMONIDES: A RADICAL RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHER this end and turn reflection (‫ )אלפכרה‬96 away from it in every way. He forbids everything that leads to lusts [sic] and to mere pleasure… 97 28 F

29F

Here we see that the objective of the commandments is to influence one’s reflection so that it will distance itself from lust and concentrate on the intelligible things. 98 We see therefore complete compatibility between the Eight Chapters and the Guide with regard to the role of reflection and deliberation, and this despite the fact that the themes of each book are different, and hence there exists a contrast in emphases and in the topics of discussion in which the two matters are mentioned. 99 In both books, one of the roles of reflection is to differentiate between the different powers: via this selection process man governs his body over his various powers and the parts of his body. In other words, he decides which power to give preference to. A mutual result of the proper use of these powers is that the biblical commands become engaged in influencing man’s reflection to reflect in an intellectual direction and not in the direction of his lusts and imagination. In addition, in both books, it appears that while reflection, being responsible for contemplating sensual experiences, is not restricted to the Pines translates this as “thought”. Pines, Guide III:32, p. 532. Original Judeo-Arabic: ‫ולדלך תלטף אללה גל הסמה פי תשריענא בשראיע תעטל הדה אלגאיה ותצרף‬ ...‫אלפכרה ענהא בכל וגה ומנע מן כל מא יודי לשרה ולמגרד לדה‬ 98 Regarding the idea that commands are involved in influencing reflection, see chapters III:22, 24, and 49. In these chapters it is stressed that in the sacrifice of Isaac upon the altar, that it was only after reflection and deliberation that Abraham decided to begin walking in order to execute the divine command to sacrifice his son (and not immediately following the command). See III:32 where Maimonides notes that the abandonment of sacrificial offerings in Biblical times would be comparable to the forsaking of places of worship and fast days, in his own time, and to worship God in reflection alone. For most people even today, this would certainly still be a revolutionary suggestion. 99 For example, in the Guide, great emphasis is placed on the fact that reflection must engage in the intelligible things of the theoretical intellect, while in the Eight Chapters, this topic is mentioned only as an aside. 96 97

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theoretical intellect, nevertheless, human reflection is not what animals possess, despite their obvious penchant for sensuality. 100 In this role as controller of the parts of the body it is therefore part of the practical intellect whose practical job is to plan man’s steps so that he can fulfill his will. During this planning, reflection is also responsible for deciding to which of the many callings and desires the reflecting person will respond, including the calling of the theoretical intellect. 101 Before we begin the commentary on Guide I:2, we must turn our attention to two chapters that can easily be interpreted as supporting determinism. In the introduction to the second part and in chapter one of that same section, Maimonides cites an explanation about the source of intentional movement that presumably supports the deterministic viewpoint: every movement of a living creature stems from external influences which produce changes in temperament that necessarily leads to desire, imagination, and/or the acquisition of knowledge. According to this framework, man is not sui generis, for just like the animals he does not produce his own movement, but is motivated by external forces. However, in my opinion, the analysis of the powers of man as we have outlined it in the Eight Chapters and in the Guide solves this problem as well. According to the model we have seen here, man is free from determinism not merely because he has the theoretical intellectual ability to make choices, but because he is capable of reflecting on the factors that are external to his thought process, and then selecting which course of action he wishes to follow. Man is not free to do something unpredictable and perform an act that is somehow not completely contingent upon external circumstances. Rather, he can navigate the external forces he encounters in whichever direction he decides via his powers of reflection and deliberation. With this understanding we

In the third part of this article I claim that, just as is delineated in the Eight Chapters, we see that reflection is not responsible for the distinction between good and evil in the Guide as well. 101 In the Eight Chapters it is also emphasized that one of the roles of the theoretical intellect includes reflecting upon the manner in which a person achieves his goals. 100

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can harmonize Maimonides statements in these chapters with our proposed model of free will.

THE ROLE OF REFLECTION IN ADAM’S ORIGINAL SIN, AS PER GUIDE I:2

While there is much research on the topic of Adam’s original sin, and much to be gleaned from analyzing Maimonides’ peculiar take on the Fall of Adam, 102 it is not my intention nor is it particularly relevant to our discussion to offer an additional interpretation of the entire chapter, but only to address the role that reflection plays in Adam’s sin. 103 It must be noted that the scholars who discuss the problem of Adam’s sin, like the scholars who discuss the topic of choice and determinism with regard to Maimonides, 104 do not devote much attention to the connection between the two subjects. That is to say, they do not discuss in depth the question: To what extent was Adam free in committing his sin? 105 In that analysis that follows, I will attempt to briefly For Maimonides’s approach to the original sin see Berman 1980, Harvey, 1984, Klein-Braslavy 1986, and Stern 2009. Regarding Maimonides’ influence on subsequent Jewish thought, see also Schechterman 1988. Also worthy of mention are the comprehensive studies on the subject of the history of original sin in Christianity by Gross, and in particular the two volumes discussing this history, first in the milieu of the Church fathers and later in the context of the era of the Middle Ages, which Gross put out in 1960 and 1971, respectively. 103 Therefore, I will not discuss the whole chapter, rather only the passages that are pertinent to understanding the role of reflection in Adam’s sin. 104 With the exception of Harvey, who often addresses this issue in his writings. 105 One of the reasons for this lacuna in the analysis of the story, as far as it seems, is the widespread consensus that Maimonides’s interpretation regarding Adam’s sin does not come to describe the historical incident (a viewpoint I share). However, despite this, there exists, in my opinion, a certain importance for understanding the role that reflection plays in Adam’s sin, even if the story is treated strictly as allegory. I say this because the processes of the soul that caused the sin are described at great length in II:30. That said, it would seem there is also an allusion in I:2 to a solution to the questions of defining Adam’s precise sin and explaining the underlying psychological pathology of the sin. For an 102

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point out the solution indicated by the analysis of the different parts of the soul as we saw in the other sections of this article. In this chapter, Maimonides reviews the answer he gave to a question he had received years earlier from an unnamed “learned man” who attempted to raise an objection to Maimonides’ position. It is edifying to note the learned man’s understanding of Adam’s state before the sin, in light of the learned man’s prefatory statement to his question: It is manifest from the clear sense of the biblical text that the primary purpose with regard to man was that he should be, as the other animals are, devoid of intellect (‫)עקל‬, of reflection (‫)פכרה‬, 106 and of the capacity to distinguish between good and evil… 107 238F

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Here, the learned man essentially claims that from the literal explanation of Scripture it seems that Adam was lacking three different powers before the sin and was therefore akin to the animals. He was: 1. devoid of intellect (‫ ;)עקל‬108 2. lacking reflection (‫ ;)פכרה‬and 3. bereft of the ability to distinguish between good and evil (‫)יפרק בין אלכיר ואלשר‬. 109 Maimonides’ learned man combines all the power of the practical and theoretical intellect into one package, and subsequently wonders how and why – specifically as a consequence of his sin – man received this package of powers which collectively seem to be a tremendous blessing, and not a curse as described in Scripture. Maimonides’ refutation of the learned man’s objection is lengthy, but to summarize, Maimonides explains that he 241F

intensive analysis of Adam and Eve’s sin in this chapter, see KleinBraslavy 1986 as well as footnote 156 above. 106 Here Pines also translates ‫ פכרה‬as “thought”. 107 Pines, Guide I:2, p. 23. Later, the one asking claims that the sin caused man all these perfections and hence he wonders why the punishment for the rebellion is the bestowing of the greatest perfection given to man. Original Judeo-Arabic: ‫יבדו מן ט'אהר אלנץ אן אלקצר אלאול באלאנסאן אן יכון כסאיר אלחיואן לא עקל‬ ‫לה ולא פכרה' ולא יפרק בין אלכ'יר ואלשר‬ 108 About this term and Ibn Tibbon’s translation of it see Fraenkel 2007. 109 In regard to the various studies discussing the distinction between good and evil in Maimonides see footnote 167.

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distinguishes between the different powers which the learned man had essentially lumped all together as a package deal. Maimonides does not accept the learned man’s assumption that all three powers – intellect, reflection, and moral discernment – are interdependent. Thus, Maimonides asserts that Adam did in fact comprehend the concepts of truth and falsehood before the Fall, meaning he did indeed possess a theoretical intellect (‫)עקל‬. However, Maimonides concedes that Adam did not possess the third power of being able to differentiate between good and evil. As such, he was only capable of engaging in apprehending generally accepted truths, most relevantly the fact that God had commanded him not to eat of the fruit of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, this inability being an intellectual weakness. But what of the third power: Did or did not Adam possess the power of reflection? Although Maimonides does not answer this question explicitly, my opinion is that he alludes to an affirmative answer in his description of the intellect that Adam possessed even before he sinned: For the intellect (‫ )אלעקל‬that God made overflow unto man and that is the latter’s ultimate perfection, was that which Adam had been provided with before he disobeyed. It was because of this that it was said to him that he was created in the image of God and in His likeness. 110 It was likewise on account of it that he was addressed by God and given commandments…111 For commandments are not given to beasts and beings devoid of intellect (‫)עקל‬. Through the intellect (‫ )ובאלעקל‬one distinguishes between truth and falsehood and that was found in (Adam) in its perfection and integrity…112 However, when he disobeyed and inclined toward his desires of the imagination and the pleasures of his corporeal senses… He therefore disobeyed the commandment that was imposed 24F

Concerning the terms “image” and “likeness” see Guide I:1. Here Maimonides cites Genesis 2:15–17. 112 Here Maimonides emphasizes the difference between truth and falsehood – between the attainment of the intelligible things, which man possessed before the sin, and good and evil – the attainment of generally accepted things, which man did not possess before the sin. 110 111

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upon him on account of his intellect (‫ )עקלה‬and, becoming endowed with the faculty of apprehending generally accepted things… 113 245F

Here Maimonides describes man’s intellect before the sin with two characterizations: 1. The intellect is the ultimate perfection of man with which he acquires awareness of truth and falsehood. 2. In the merit of man’s intellect, he may be commanded. 114 If we compare these two attributes to what we have seen in the Eight Chapters and the Guide, it appears that two different powers of the rational man are discussed. One power apprehends the intelligible things. This power pulls man in the direction of a thorough examination of the intelligible things and distances him from the dealings of the physical world. The second power is reflection, which, as we have seen, is responsible for appropriately navigating man towards the theoretical intellect. Moreover, we have learned that there is no possibility of commanding those things upon which he has no control. However, concealed in this power is also the ability to rebel, and it is this power that gave Adam the freedom to obey or disobey God’s commandments. 115 Given the ability to reflect and even rebel, Adam was “Guide for the Perplexed” I:2. Original Judeo-Arabic: ‫ אן אלעקל אלד'י אפאצ'ה אללה עלי אלאנסאן והו כמאלה אלאכ'יר הו אלד'י‬: ‫חצל לאדם קבל מעציתה ובה קיל פיה אנה בצלם אלהים ובדמותו ומן אג'לה כאן‬ ‫ולא תכון אלוציה' ללבהאים ולא למן לא עקל לה ובאלעקל יפרק‬...‫מכאטבא ווצי‬ ‫ פלמא עצא‬...‫בין אלחק ואלבאטל והד’א כאן מוג'ודא פיה עלי כמאלה ותמאמה‬ ‫ ולד'לך עצא‬...‫ומאל נחו שהואתה אלכ'יאליה' ולד’את חואסה אלג'סמאניה‬ ...‫אלאמר אלד'י מן אג'ל עקלה וצי בה וחצל לה אדראך אלמשהוראת‬ 114 For references on Maimonides view of the original sin, see footnote 102 of this chapter. Berman (1980) noted the fact that in Maimonides’s opinion, the command given to Adam illustrates that he also possessed practical intellect before the sin. 115 According to Harvey approach as found on page 18 of Harvey 1984, the fact that Maimonides in the Laws of Repentance (5:1) relies on Harvey’s eponymous verse, i.e. “Man has now become like one of us in knowing good and evil”, as a basis for the existence of moral autonomy for man, demonstrates that “Mishneh Torah” also takes a certain deterministic direction. This is because the choice between good and evil came after the sin, such that if knowledge of good and evil is the source of moral autonomy, this autonomy itself could not have existed in man before Adam’s sin. The distinction between the ability to reflect (which 113

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therefore in a similar situation to that of the prophets, which Maimonides describes in III:51 – complete in his apprehension and thus quite able to direct his reflection towards his own exalted knowledge of God at any time. In the response to the learned man, however, Maimonides chose not to go this route, and does not spell out what is surely his position, i.e. that Adam also possessed the power of reflection (‫)פכרה‬. Rather, Maimonides takes a simpler line of reasoning and just urges the wise person to focus on Adam’s intelligence, and not to consider other factors. Even with this more limited explanation, Maimonides succeeds in demonstrating how Adam sinned despite having an intellect by pointing out that even reaching the highest level of intellectual attainment cannot ensure that a human– will always deliberate upon doing what he knows is right. In other words, even with the power of reflection and deliberation, one still has in his hands the ability to rebel against the command of his intellect and follow the desires of his imagination and the pleasures of his senses. 116 Thus, for 248F

gives man freedom), and the actual knowledge of good and evil, allows for an explanation of Maimonides’s reliance on that verse in a different light. Maimonides here talks about man after the sin, a situation in which most of his choice (or moral autonomy) involves the distinction between good and evil; however, even so, he does not ascribe the autonomy itself to the distinction between good and evil. 116 It is also possible, as some have done, to interpret the story of Adam’s sin in a deterministic way: Man without intellect cannot be commanded because he cannot deduce the truth (and therefore cannot turn to it). According to this explanation, the entire paragraph in Maimonides refers to the theoretical intellect. As per Guide II:30 (about this chapter see Klein-Braslavy 1986, pp. 193–233), man rebelled against God’s word since his imaginative and appetitive powers (as metaphorically represented in the midrash by the serpent and Satan) enticed the material within him, which lured his intellect towards the direction of the sin. In this case, the sin was unavoidable. Eve did not have any choice but to respond to the temptations set forth by the serpent (and in turn, it was impossible for Adam to resist responding to Eve’s enticements). This interpretation seems to me less than convincing for a number of reasons: 1. We saw that Maimonides (both in the Guide and the Eight Chapters) does not link the command to the theoretical intellect, rather to reflection. 2. In a case such as this, there was no reason for

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Maimonides, the Fall of Adam does not prove that he was a mere animal lacking any intellectual faculties, and indeed, a correct reading of the story using a proper philosophical understanding reveals that Adam was only lacking in the raw ability to discern between good and evil. The relevant upshot of Maimonides’ assertion here is that Adam was held accountable because, despite the limitation of not being able to discern good and evil, he still made a free choice, and therefore truly sinned.

CONCLUSION

Throughout this chapter we have seen that it is possible to formulate both the essence of man’s ability to choose as well as the roles assumed by each of the powers that allow him to execute his choices. Man experiences urges from a number of different causes: from his imaginative and sentient powers he has urges for his physical needs; from the productive part of the practical intellect he has urges for social perfections (be it the differentiation between good and evil or urges for honor, wealth, etc.); and from the theoretical intellect, an urge for a life of indepth understanding. In contrast to animals, which deterministically choose the strongest urge, and also in contrast to God and the separate intellects, which have no urges at all save the theoretical intellect, man has the ability to navigate, negate, and intensify his urges. This ability lies within deliberation, reflection, and thought, through which man controls his body and forces, thereby exiting the deterministic framework of the rest of the universe. And as the article demonstrates, this ability even existed Maimonides to mention the reflection in the question. He could have talked about the practical intellect in general; it was unnecessary to distinguish between the knowledge of good and evil and reflection. 3. According to this interpretation, even a man in a state of supremely refined intellect is necessarily attracted to sin. All this, in addition to the fact that in his other books, Maimonides does not favor a deterministic approach. According to the first explanation I brought, Eve, too, possessed reflection, which is part of the practical intellect, such that she had the choice not to respond to the serpent and mislead Adam, rather follow the command of her “husband” (i.e. her intellect) which she received from God.

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in Adam before the Fall, which justifies how he could be held accountable for disobeying God’s command. The key finding of this whole analysis is the conclusion that man is the only creature that operates freely outside of the general deterministic framework which envelops the universe. This freedom, which is dependent on part of the rational power of man, 117 is not the ability to produce movements independently in a stand-alone, sui generis fashion, rather it is solely an ability to navigate the choices presented by the dynamic interplay of external forces and internal powers. Maimonides therefore believes in the existence of real freedom of choice in humans and in humanity’s freedom from determinism. However, the definition of this freedom for Maimonides is limited by the following two aforementioned conditions: 1. That humans choose between the different possibilities available to them; and 2. That there exists a connection to the rational intellect. It is therefore possible to conclude that humanity’s freedom of choice on the one hand is real and exists for most people, yet, on the other hand, it is limited in scope and location, for in scope this freedom does not generate human action, and in location it exists solely in the rational power of man’s soul. 118 250F

In contrast to the approach which asserts that the source of man’s choice lies in his animalistic part. On this topic see my article “The choice of man and the will of animals in Jewish Philosophy at the end of the Middle Ages”. 118 Regarding the ramifications of these conditions concerning the teachings of morality I intend to devote a different article. 117

CHAPTER 3. DEFINING MAIMONIDES’ MASH’HURATH AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL SOURCES A key term that appears frequently in the original text of the Guide of the Perplexed is the Judeo-Arabic word mash’hurath (‫)משהוראת‬, 1 which is generally translated into Hebrew as m’fursamot, and which I translate into English as “generally accepted notions” or just “accepted notions”. Understanding the exact meaning of this term as it is used in the Guide is absolutely crucial for properly understanding Maimonides’ positions on a number of key issues in his thinking, especially those that have attracted a relatively large amount of interest from scholars in recent years, to wit: 251F

1 On this term in the thought of Maimonides see Klatskin 1926, pp. 390– 391; Efros 1929, p. 77; Ravitsky 2010, esp. pp. 52–68; and Klein-Braslavy 1987, esp. pp. 75–79. On the various usages in the Guide of words with the root ‫שהור‬, and on the various translations to Hebrew and later to Latin see Sadik 2016. In a comprehensive study, Michaelis 2017 examined the meaning of the term taklid. Michaelis’s conclusions regarding reliance on tradition largely support the contentions in this article regarding the term ‘generally accepted notions’. The main thing our positions have in common is that Maimonides was strongly opposed to philosophical study that relies on the authority of tradition or that relies on those with professional knowledge, even if they are scientists. In contrast, the implications of my and Michaelis’s conclusions regarding the great controversy surrounding the creation of the world are completely different.

119

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Maimonides’ attitude to dialectics (‫)ג'דל‬, 2 the difference between dialectics and the issue of irrefutable proof (‫ – )ברהאן‬which is itself a topic that is of great importance for understanding Maimonides’ epistemological views – the relationship between good 3 and truth, and the question of natural morality. 4 The various scholars 5 who have discussed the definition of mash’hurath as used by Maimonides feel that its origin is to be found in two sources: the first chapter of the first book of Aristotle’s Topics 6 and in the thought of the Arab philosopher alFarabi. Accordingly, these same scholars interpret Maimonides through the lens of Aristotle and al-Farabi, as if Maimonides is mostly a recapitulation of these two foundational thinkers. And while it should be acknowledged that Aviram Ravitsky did note differences in emphasis between Maimonides and his sources, he too found no significant divergence in thought. In this chapter I will try to show that despite their indeed being his main sources, Maimonides deviated from the discussions found in the works of Aristotle and Al Farabi when it came to his understanding of widely accepted ethical principles or notions. I intend to demonstrate that Maimonides apparently infused into the term mash’hurat philosophical content, such that the correct definition of the term is fundamentally different from its definition in Aristotle, and even from that of the chronologically and philosophically closer al-Farabi. 7 253F

254F

256F

257F

On Maimonides’ view of dialectics see inter alia Hyman 1989, Kraemer 2000, and Stern 2008. 3 On Maimonides’ definition of good and evil see Harvey 1979; KleinBraslavy 1987, pp. 141–149; Kreisel 1999, pp. 93–124; and Kasher 2000. 4 I will discuss more broadly the subject of natural morality in the next chapter. 5 See especially the analyses in Klein-Braslavy 1987 and Ravitsky 2010. 6 This being the fifth of the six works comprising the Organon – Aristotle’s collective work on logic. 7 A more comprehensive study covering all uses of the root ‫ ﺷﮭﻮر‬in the other Arab philosophers who preceded Maimonides, such as Ibn Sina, alGhazali and Ibn Baja, or who were contemporaries, such as Ibn Rushd, would go far beyond the scope of this chapter, the main point of which is to analyze Maimonides’ approach and show the difference between him and Aristotle. 2

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At the beginning of this chapter, we shall briefly examine the accepted source of the term for accepted notions in Aristotle. In the same section we will also examine the Arabic translation of Aristotle where we will find that the word for accepted notions (‫ )ﻣﺸﮭﻮرون‬is not a translation of the Greek word ἔνδοξα (éndoxa, beliefs or doctrines), which scholars have pointed to as the source for Maimonides’ mash’hurath, but rather of another word in Greek. We will then review al-Farabi’s position in his various books, and here we will see that the Muslim philosopher used the term mash’shurat to describe, inter alia, the dialectician’s ability to persuade the ignorant masses. We will also see that in alFarabi, we find for the first time the same distinction between accepted notions and intelligible things that we find later in Maimonides. But despite this novel distinction, al-Farabi on the whole remains true to Aristotle’s positions. He sees in the existence of accepted notions a source of understanding theoretical areas as well. Later in the chapter I will try to argue that Maimonides on some points continues the same direction of thought as did al-Farabi, and even goes well beyond al-Farabi’s position by asserting that accepted notions have no theoretical validity whatsoever, with their entire usefulness being solely within the realm of relative and practical morality. At the end of the chapter, we will briefly point out some of the implications that the definition of ‘accepted notions’ may have regarding the use of dialectics in the Guide. 8 258F

The reasons for my focus on the comparison to al-Farabi are because in modern research, Maimonides’ approach to the generally accepted notions is usually attributed to al-Farabi as Maimonides’ source (and as we shall see, rightly so), and also because of al-Farabi’s general influence on Maimonides on a wide range of topics. 8 We will analyze Maimonides’ words in the Words of Logic and the Guide. On the research controversy regarding the attribution of this book to Maimonides, see Davidson 2001, which criticizes the attribution of the book to Maimonides. Opposing Davidson’s position is Stroumsa 2014. As noted earlier in footnote 29, the philosophical analysis we propose supports Stroumsa’s position in showing a philosophical consistency between Words of Logic and the Guide – a philosophical consistency that actual differs from Maimonides’ other works. For further criticisms of

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ἔνδοξα IN ARISTOTLE’S TOPICS

At the beginning of the Topics, Aristotle notes that there are several different types of syllogisms (συλλογισμὸς). 9 A distinction between the different types of syllogisms depends on the validity of the premises on which the syllogism is based. The syllogism attains the level of an irrefutable proof (Ἀπόδειξις) if all its premises are correct and fundamental (ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων) or what is derived from them. By contrast, a syllogism is dialectical (διαλεκτικὸς) when it is built on reasonable premises, the validity of which derives from their being recognized and accepted by the majority of people (ἔνδοξα). 10 It is important to emphasize that Aristotle does not limit the dialectical syllogism to a particular field of knowledge. Moreover, several chapters later in the Topica, it is clearly implied that he thought that such inferences were also valid with regard to theoretical knowledge. For example, in the second chapter of the first book he mentions the benefits of dialectics. The third benefit is the role of dialectics in the search for truth in philosophical research (φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας), i.e. the dialectician’s ability to marshal evidence on behalf of each of the two possible positions – a process that is crucial for helping clarify what the truth is. In Davidson’s position see Cohen 2004, pp. 420–421, note 15, and Hasnawi 2004. 9 On Aristotle’s Topics see Slomkowsky 1997. 10 For a list of the qualifying people upon whom ἔνδοξα can be established, see Rhetoric, chapter 15. The translation of the Greek term ἔνδοξα is complex and has caused nothing short of intellectual upheavals in modern research. On the term’s precise meaning, see the English translation by W. A. Pickard, who translates the term as “opinions that are generally accepted”. The French translator J. Tricot translates it as “probable”, which is quite a vague rendering. Yvan Pelletier’s alternative French translation resolved the problem by essentially using the Greek word slightly modified: ‘endoxes’ – in other words, some sort of belief, but with an entirely ambiguous origin. I myself have translated the term here similar to Pines’ English translation, which is the closest to the definition Aristotle brings himself later in the chapter. On the implications of ἔνδοξα in Aristotle and for a summary of the various studies on the subject see Haskins 2004. On the controversy in modern philosophy specifically around the moral implications of ἔνδοξα see Klein 1992.

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the 11th chapter of the same book Aristotle notes that dialectics is directed towards various problems. The first type he mentions deals with philosophical questions with practical implications (e.g. knowing whether to choose pleasure). But the example he gives to the second subject deals explicitly with questions whose whole purpose is knowledge itself (εἰδέναι μόνον), that is, in distinct theoretical subjects. 11 It can therefore be concluded here that in Aristotle, there is no special connection between a given dialectic (including the premises on which it is constructed, i.e. the ἔνδοξα) and a particular field of knowledge. The dialectic is effective both in the area of morality and in the areas of pure theoretical studies, and this holds true for its premises as well. Of course, this fact does not mean that in every situation one should turn to dialectics, for if there are cases in which an irrefutable syllogism can be constructed, it is clear to Aristotle that such a syllogism is preferable. But even in theoretical matters, when it is not possible to In the 14th chapter of the first book of Topics, Aristotle distinguishes between three subjects: logic, physics, and ethics. He does not associate this division with the division between the various types of syllogisms, and from this chapter it is also implied that the dialectic (like irrefutable proof) is valid for all types of knowledge. The nature of this book does now allow me to offer an analysis of all of Aristotle’s statements regarding ἔνδοξα. Given this limitation, it is appropriate to at least focus on the Topics since it is probably the main source of al-Farabi and Maimonides. However, Aristotle also discusses the endoxa at length in the Rhetoric. There is a certain known problem in learning about Aristotle’s philosophy from the Rhetoric, in which Aristotle deals with the art of persuasion, which is that Aristotle himself did not view rhetoric as being philosophically proper. It is therefore possible that he says there that a certain inference can be made, not because it is true, but because it is convincing. It is therefore quite problematic to determine what Aristotle saw as a philosophically correct form of syllogism. On the use of ἔνδοξα as particularly convincing proofs see for example Rhetoric I:2. Towards the end of that chapter, Aristotle points out that ἔνδοξα also serve as a source for syllogisms in the field of physics (alongside politics, morality, and law). It is important to note that in this section it is clear that the use of irrefutable proofs, built on more stable foundations, is superior to the use of ἔνδοξα.

11

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construct an irrefutable proof, one can certainly rely on the syllogisms that are constructed upon the commonly held beliefs of the masses. The translation of the Topics into Arabic 12 quite accurately captured Aristotle’s position. However, there is one point to take notice of: The Arabic translation does not translate the word ἔνδοξα at the beginning of the first chapter using words with the root ‫ ﺷﮭﺮ‬. Instead, it translates ἔνδοξα with the word ‫ذاﺋﻊﺔ‬, 13 while using the word ‫ ﻣﺸﮭﻮرون‬to translate the Greek word γνωρίμοις (gnorímois). 14 This suggests that acceptance by the most famous scholars (γνωρίμοις) is one of the ways to create accepted notions, alongside other ways, such as acceptance by the public. In contrast, later in the chapter, the Arabic translator uses the word ‫ ﻣﺸﮭﻮرون‬to translate the word ἐνδοξοτάτοις – though here there is no reference to the premises of the dialectic, but rather a description of the prestige of the scholars who create the ἔνδοξα. 15 It can therefore be concluded that in Arabic version of Aristotle, the words from the root ‫ ﺷﮭﺮ‬do not indicate the premises of the dialectic but rather the publicizing of the stature of certain members of the intelligentsia in the eyes of the public. The opinions of those people may be ἔνδοξα, but not necessarily. One thinker who did in fact associate to some extent ἔνδοξα with words from the root ‫ ﺷﮭﺮ‬is the Arabic philosopher al-Farabi. 264F

The translation I am referring to here is by Abu Uthman. For a modern edition of this 9th-century translation I used Badawi 1948. There was actually another ancient Arabic translation of the Topics done several decades earlier by the Nestorian patriarch Timothy I. 13 The same word is found in Topics I:10. 14 The same word is found in Topics I:11. And another parallel is that one finds there Aristotle’s description of the prestige of certain types of philosophers. 15 In this later passage, the description negates any dialectical aspect, with Aristotle describing the professional syllogism in a way that is not dialectical. 12

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‫ ﺷﮭﺮ‬IN THE WRITINGS OF AL-FARABI

In his various writings, 16 al-Farabi uses words that have the root ‫ ﺷﮭﺮ‬in various senses. One of the common usages exists in certain contexts related to the definition of the role of dialectics about which al-Farabi states that generally accepted notions provide the premises of dialectical learning. 17 In this case, al-Farabi, like Aristotle, does not make any distinction between the various fields of knowledge, suggesting that accepted notions also deal with theoretical knowledge. 18 In this context he also deals with the definition of the accepted notions and the comparison between them and other sources of information (the senses and axiomatic knowledge). 19 Al-Farabi also points out that there are 267F

268F

269F

For the purpose of this research, I have reviewed the following writings of al-Farabi: Kitab al-Jadal (which uses words from the root ‫ ﺷﮭﺮ‬more than in any of his other works), On the Perfect State, Introduction to Logic, An Enumeration of the Sciences, Dialectics, Politics; Religion, and On the Perfect State. It should be noted that in some of the translations, especially in Sharani’s French translations, the words from the root ‫ ﺷﮭﻮر‬are translated using an assortment of different words. 17 For example, see Kitab al-Jadal, pp. 13–15. In this context, he distinguishes between verified accepted notions (‫ )ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺔ‬and those that are unverified. Inferences and proofs made on the basis of generally accepted notions that are themselves unverified will of course be problematic. Later (ibid., pp. 26–29) he reiterates that there are sophistical syllogisms that are based on accepted notions and which accord with reason (‫)اﻟﻈﻦ‬ but which are not based on actual evidence. On the use of generally accepted notions as a basis for dialectics, see Kitab al-Jadal, pp. 41, 46, 51, 69, 72–76, 77–78 (where he deals with the doubtful aspects of various accepted notions), and pp. 80–81. Also see his An Enumeration of the Sciences, p. 105. 18 On the Perfect State, chapter 80. Moreover, on page 13 of Kitab al-Jadal. al-Farabi claims the backing of Aristotle regarding the assertion that accepted notions can serve as premises of syllogisms regarding any question (‫)ﻣﻘﺪﻣﺎت ﻣﺸﮭﻮرة ﻗﯿﺎﺳﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻛﻞ ﻣﺴﺎﻟﺔ ﺗﻘﺼﺪ‬. 19 Kitab al-Jadal, pp. 17–20. In the middle of this passage (p. 18), alFarabi draws a distinction between generally accepted notions, which are agreed upon by all human beings (‫)ﺟﻤﯿﻊ اﻟﻨﺲ‬, and traditional beliefs, which are accepted by only one sect or ethnic group (‫)طﺎﺋﻔﺔ‬. Al-Farabi is inconsistent in this distinction. Later in the book (pp. 65–67) he records a long list of sources of accepted notions. The first is indeed the notions common to all people, but then there are also notions common to 16

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accepted notions that deal with theoretical (‫)ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺔ‬, practical (‫)ﻋﻤﻠﯿﺔ‬, and even logical (‫ )ﻣﻨﻄﻘﯿﺔ‬issues. 20 He even goes on to state that the dialectic, built upon generally accepted premises, also deals with the natural and divine sciences (‫= اﻟﻌﻠﻮم اﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﯿﺔ واﻻﻟﮭﻠﯿﺔ‬ physics and metaphysics). 21 It can therefore be concluded that the dialectic constructed from generally accepted premises includes all realms of knowledge. It is important to note that al-Farabi also takes into account that generally accepted notions can lead to faulty syllogisms in these areas and explains how to avoid such syllogisms. 22 Later in the first chapter of his translation of the Dialectics (Jadal) 23 as well as in his own short book on dialectics, 24 al-Farabi adds that the generally accepted notions are considered evidence 271F

27F

scholars, philosophers, and keen thinkers. Such notions can be the basis of dialectical arguments. And later in the book (pp. 72–73), al-Farabi presents another albeit partial list while discussing the topic of accepted notions. 20 Ibid., p. 20. He even states here that theoretical matters do not depend on the will of human beings, while practical matters do depend on human will. Generally accepted notions broach both domains, the theoretical and the practical. This distinction is similar to the distinction made by Maimonides in Guide I:2 between intelligible things and accepted notions, though of course there is a significant difference in that for al-Farabi, accepted notions include those things not affected by human will or needing the consent of human beings (such as facts of the physical world like the existence of atoms, as opposed to notions like modesty, the very nature of which changes depending on what society agrees upon). 21 Ibid. pp. 29–33. Al-Farabi explicitly asserts that the premises that are the basis of the dialectics used to clarify physics and metaphysics are themselves generally accepted notions. Alongside these sciences (which are mentioned twice) he also mentions political science. Later, on page 51, he reiterates that there are generally accepted premises pertaining to physics. 22 Ibid. pp. 20–29. Later (pp. 48–52), al-Farabi addresses other errors that lead to incorrect dialectical syllogisms. 23 Ibid. pp. 35–37. On page 52, al-Farabi states that generally accepted notions serve as evidence only for the ignorant (‫)ﺟﮭﻼ‬, and he distinguishes between evidence that is based on accepted notions versus sound evidence (‫)ﯾﻘﯿﻨﯿﺔ‬. On this subject see also pp. 59–62. 24 Dialectics, p. 43, paragraph 3.

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and even irrefutable proof (‫ )ﺑﺮھﺎﻧﮫ‬in the eyes of the ignorant masses (‫)ﺟﻤﮭﻮر‬, but not for the people with wisdom (‫)اﺻﺤﺎب اﻟﻌﻠﻮم‬. Even in these passages it is implied that there is no distinction between different fields of knowledge but rather between different sources of knowledge. General public acceptance is sufficient for the ignorant, while the sages demand better evidence. 25 One of the commonly encountered meanings of the root ‫ﺷﮭﺮ‬ is to indicate a situation where positions, people, or other things are very well known among many people. 26 In most of these cases, the use of the term “generally accepted” (‫ )מפורסם‬is not as per scientific terminology, such as where this term is used in distinction to intelligible things (‫)מושכלות‬, but is rather a simpler expression indicating that a given thing is publicly known. In some cases, 27 al-Farabi explicitly states that the type of people who are aware of accepted notions are the masses of the ignorant people (‫ )ﺟﻤﮭﻮر‬and not the sages, this contrasting with what we had seen in Aristotle, namely that the approval of the sages can also be a source of ἔνδοξα, something al-Farabi himself repeated in other sources. It is possible that the intention of al-Farabi is that in the case of the jamhor (ignorant masses), the generally accepted notions are considered a reliable source of epistemological truth, while in the case of the sages, accepted notions are an inferior source of knowledge worthy of critical review. In a different source, 28 al-Farabi goes further and points out that accepted notions can be ideas (‫ )راى‬that come from the active 275F

It should be noted that Aristotle, in Topics I:2, himself mentions success in persuading the masses (πολλῶν) as an advantage of dialectics. But for Aristotle, this advantage goes hand in hand with the fact that dialectics also help in discovering philosophical truth. Al-Farabi also agrees that dialectics can help in the study of philosophy, but nowhere does he link philosophically useful dialectics with generally accepted notions, which in his eyes necessarily ruin the philosophical validity of dialectical arguments. 26 On the various meanings of‫ ﺷﮭﺮ‬see for example An Enumeration of the Sciences, pp. 49, 61, and 63; Politics, pp. 85 and 193; On the Perfect State, chapters 20 and 29; and Kitab al-Jadal, pp. 71–72, 85, 91, and 101–102. 27 Introduction to Logic, chapter 1, p. 266. 28 On the Perfect State, chapters 41–45 and 80. 25

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intellect (‫)ﺗﻌﻘﻞ‬, though the Arabic term here does not indicate a separate area of knowledge, but rather a different method of intellection that is exempt from proofs or evidence (‫)ﺣﺠﺔ ودﻟﯿﻞ‬. Here the accepted notions thus come about from a kind of intuition that al-Farabi connects with the active intellect, without reference to any sort of separate and distinct type of knowledge. In his book on religion, 29 al-Farabi also points out that dialectics are very useful because they make it possible to correct the opinions of even those who do not understand the accepted notions (‫)ﻻ ﯾﻔﮭﻢ اﻟﻤﺸﻮرات‬. From this we see that such norms can be understood and philosophically grounded. 30 Dialectics help people who are unable to comprehend more subtle philosophical proofs, but they do not constitute in themselves a particular area of knowledge but rather are just a simplification of knowledge for people who are incapable of making theoretical philosophical inferences and thus cannot understand in depth the philosophical basis of accepted notions. Alongside the above shades of meaning in al-Farabi’s terminology, which are not fundamentally different from what we find in Aristotle’s Topics, there is also another use with which Al Farabi moves further away from Aristotle’s position in the Topics. In some sources, al-Farabi points out that the generally accepted notions (‫ )ﻣﺸﮭﻮرات‬are different from physical perceptions (‫ )ﻣﺤﺴﻮﺳﺎت‬and from intellectual knowledge (‫)ﻣﻌﻘﻮﻻت‬, and sometimes also from traditional beliefs (‫)ﻣﻘﺒﻮﻻت‬. 31 In one source, he also distinguishes between generally accepted notions and 280F

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Religion, pp. 59–61. See also pp. 69–71 where he explains that the second leader, who came after the founder of the religion, should be proficient in various fields like the knowledge of generally accepted notions. 30 A few lines before the section noted in the previous footnote, al-Farabi remarks that religion was not given to philosophers only. Reading between the lines, al-Farabi seems to be saying that there is a synergy between those who are not just philosophers and those who cannot understand generally accepted notions. 31 On this see An Enumeration of the Sciences, p. 217, and Introduction to Logic, chapter 2, p. 267. Traditional beliefs are not to be found in this tome. On the comparison to traditional beliefs alone see Kitab al-Jadal, p. 18. 29

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insights (‫)ﻣﻌﻠﻮمات‬. 32 The source of having such a division between generally accepted notions and all the other types of knowledge is as stated in the first chapter of the first book of the Topics, though there the distinction is between the sources of knowledge, and not between the areas of knowledge. There is a possible connection between the difference reflected in knowledge source and the difference reflected in knowledge type. Perception arises of course from the senses, and offers only pure physical information (e.g. I see and feel a wall), while generally accepted notions arise from mutual human agreement, and as a rule deal with information about history or about non-theoretical things (such as moral norms). 33 As for intellectual knowledge, the domain is pure theoretical concepts. As we will see later in these sources, one can see the beginning of a change that al-Farabi makes from Aristotle’s position – albeit a change that al-Farabi is inconsistent with – for in other sources, he merely recapitulates the position of Aristotle. But even when he does clearly depart from Aristotle, the difference is still less pronounced than what we encounter in Maimonides. Later in the book, we will see that Maimonides’ position is very much related to this change and in fact complements it. But it is important to note that al-Farabi not only does not emphasize the connection between fields and sources of knowledge, but rather obscures it. For example, in his discussion of the classification 34 of sciences, while he does point out that there can be a contradiction between accepted notions and 283 F

In Kitab al-Jadal, on p. 19., al-Farabi’s conclusion is that accepted notions only hit upon the truth as manifested by accidental attributes, but not in terms of essence (‫)ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺮض ﻻ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات‬, while true knowledge hits upon the truth at its core, and not superficially. Al-Farabi makes a similar distinction on p. 21. 33 Regarding the fact that different religions can have different practices that do not differ in terms of their proximity to the absolute truth, see On the Perfect State, chapter 33. Here al-Farabi asserts that social norms are indeed not absolute. For a different, more conservative position in the works of Al Farabi, see Politics pp. 181–183. 34 Ibid., p. 217. Al-Farabi notes that one ought to select for sensory knowledge or accepted notions that accord with the dictates of one’s religion. 32

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physical perceptions, al-Farabi nevertheless leaves the relationship unexplicit by not pointing out that the very fact that there can even be a contradiction between them necessarily implies that they are not describing entirely different fields of knowledge. In a passage in the second chapter of Encyclopedia of the Sciences, which is actually the source for Maimonides in the eighth chapter of Words of Logic, al-Farabi mentions the origin of physical perceptions, accepted notions, traditional beliefs, and intellectual knowledge, repeating Aristotle’s definition of ἔνδοξα and then stating that the source of accepted notions is the common positions 35 found among all or most human beings, or among the wisest or a majority of the wisest, provided no one strongly opposes the common position. He also adds that an additional possible source for accepted notions is the agreement of all (or at least the best) skilled craftsmen, and cites medicine as an example of just such a craft. 36 To complete this review, it is important to note another topic in al-Farabi’s writings in which words with the root ‫ ﺷﮭﺮ‬do not appear: al-Farabi’s theory of the ideal government. The famed Arab philosopher does not use words from this root to describe the social norms created by the superior prophet, 37 nor for those created by inferior-type governments. It is very difficult to learn from mere lack of mention, but the absence of any words with the root ‫ ﺷﮭﺮ‬in his discussions on politics points to the lack of importance that alFarabi saw in the distinction between accepted notions and intellectual knowledge vis a vis his political theory. We will see that on this point Maimonides differs markedly from al-Farabi. From all the above it can be concluded that al-Farabi employs the root ‫ ﺷﮭﻮر‬for a variety of terms, each with a different meaning. On the one hand, in most sources it remains close to the meaning of ἔνδοξα as used by Aristotle in that he associates accepted notions with the dialectic thereby implying that the main difference between the dialectic and irrefutable proofs is in It is interesting to note that al-Farabi uses a term that is the opposite of that found in the Arabic translation of Aristotle. For the general category he uses the word ‫ﻣﺸﮭﻮرات‬, and for its description the word ‫ذاﺋﻌﮫ‬. 36 On reiterates this point in the Dialectics, paragraph 3, p. 43. 37 This is in contrast to what we will see with Maimonides in Guide II:33. 35

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the source of knowledge and certainly the conclusions, but not regarding fields of knowledge. Al-Farabi even maintains Aristotle’s philosophical leanings when he explicitly states that the ‫ ﻣﺸﮭﻮ رات‬can also be used as a source for those involved in the sciences, including physics and metaphysics. Despite this, one can see in some places a shift towards a different direction in his thought where al-Farabi connects the generally accepted notions with the masses of the ignorant people, who see them as proven facts. There he emphasizes that proofs based on accepted notions are unacceptable to the wise. This position stands in contrast to that of Aristotle, who, while noting the importance of dialectics in order to converse with and persuade the common folk, 38 never actually stated that dialectical evidence is unacceptable to men of wisdom. But al-Farabi’s main shift away from Aristotle is to be found in the distinction he makes between accepted notions and intellectual knowledge, for here one can certainly discern a step towards the emergence of a consistent difference regarding which fields of knowledge are considered suited to accepted notions, and which to intellectual knowledge. This difference, however, was not fleshed out by al-Farabi, and would only become fully developed in the thought of Maimonides. 28F

MASH’SHURAT IN THE WORDS OF LOGIC

Having reviewed the positions of Aristotle and al-Farabi regarding ἔνδοξα and ‫ﻣﺸﮭﻮرات‬, we can now turn to an analysis of Maimonides’ position. 39 We will first look at the Words of Logic 40 289 F

290F

Topics I:2. Though I will be looking at Maimonides’ interpretation of how Aristotle and al-Farabi understood generally accepted notions, not all medieval thinkers understood them as did Maimonides. One example of a different reading is to be found in Rabbi Avraham Ibn Daoud’s book Ha-Emunah Ha-Ramah, ma’amar 2, chapter 2, principle 5, where he categorizes accepted notions as intelligible things (as opposed to traditional beliefs). In his opinion, what logicians identify as accepted notions are for rhetoricians tantamount to intelligible things. On this see Efrat 1965, pp. 138–140. 40 This book is often referred to in English as Treatise on Logic. However, its Hebrew name, Milot Higayon, literally means “words of logic”, and indeed, the book is primarily a lexicon of terminology used by logicians, 38 39

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and then at the Guide. Apart from the issue of lack of esotericism in Words of Logic, the main reason why we will not discuss the two works in tandem is the issue of disputed authorship, for there are those who claim that the Words of Logic is not in fact a composition of Maimonides. 41 But even according to the scholars who are willing to attribute both works to Maimonides, they perceive significant differences in style and thought which they ascribe to a proposed half-century-long gap between the two works, with the Words having been written in Maimonides’ teens, while the Guide only towards the end of his life. However, as we shall see, the in-depth analysis that we will present regarding the issue of accepted notions in the Words and the Guide will strengthen the position that Maimonides was indeed the author of the Words, and that there is nothing to suggest any immaturity of thought within the work, regardless of precisely when Maimonides wrote it. The section in Words of Logic that deals with accepted notions is found at the beginning of the eighth chapter. 42 The propositions which are known to be true and require no proof for their truthfulness are of four kinds: perceptions, as when we know that this is black, this is white, this is sweet, and this is hot; first ideas, as when we know that the whole is greater than the part, that two is an even number, and that things equal to the very same thing equal each other; conventions, as when we know that uncovering the privy part is ugly, that compensating a benefactor generously is beautiful; and traditional, i.e., whatever is received from a chosen person or from a chosen assembly.... 43

though it also includes an extended treatise on how logicians formulate proofs and apply concepts of logic. 41 On this see footnote 8 of this chapter. 42 On the sources of the Words of Logic see: ‫מקאלה פי צנאעת אלמנטק‬, Efrat 1938, introduction and pp. 19–21. On the comparison between Rambam and his main source, al-Farabi, see Ravitsky 2010, pp. 52–58 (esp. 56– 58). Later on, I will offer a different explanation for the changes that Ravitsky noted. 43 Words of Logic, I. Efros translation, chapter 8, p. 47. Judeo-Arabic original:

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Further along in the passage, Maimonides points out that with regard to physical perceptions and intellectual knowledge, there is no difference between perfected and inferior items of knowledge. Their validity is universal and does not depend on authority or even wisdom. In contrast, generally accepted notions do indeed depend on the agreement of human beings, and thus their degree of validity varies according to the number of people who espouse them: the more the agreement, the more reliable they are to be considered. This is true on the cultural level as well: the more nations that agree with a given notion, the higher the degree of correctness (‫ )תצדיק‬that notion attains. 44 In this passage, Maimonides asserts the existence of four types of knowledge sources the truth of which can be assumed without need of proofs. That is to say, the information provided by these four sources can serve as a source for the existence of other things without having to examine any underlying premises that establish the correctness of this basic knowledge. First he notes the information that we receive from the senses, then information 294F

.‫אלקצ'איא אלתי תערף ולא תחתאג אלי דליל עלי צחתהא ארבעה אצנאף‬ ‫אלמחסוסאת כמערפתנא אן הד'א אסור והד'א אביץ' והד'א חלו והד'א חאר‬ ‫ואלמעקולאת אלאול כמערפתנא אן אלכל אעצ'ם מן אלגז ואן אלאת'נאן עדד זוג‬ ‫ואן אלאשיא אלמסאוייה לשי ואחד בעינה כלהא מתסאוייה )כנ''ל( ואלמשהוראת‬ .‫כמערפתנא באן כשף אלעורה קביח ומגאזאת אלמחסאן באלאפצ'אל גמיל‬ .‫ואלמקבולאת והו כל מא יקבל ען ואחד מרתצ'י או גמאעה מרתצ'אן‬ (From the Lesch edition, p.17.) 44 It is important to note that in describing the degree of truthfulness or correctness of accepted notions, Maimonides uses the term ‫תצדיק‬, and not ‫ חק‬or even ‫צח‬, while at the beginning of the passage, the word used to refer to the accuracy of the four sources of knowledge collectively is ‫צח‬. This change in terminology is certainly not caprice on the part of Maimonides, and indeed, we can see a sensitivity to this careful word choice in some of the modern Hebrew translations, notably that of Ahituv and that of Bibash, who were both precise in their translations of this passage, using ‫ הצדקה‬at the end of the passage, but ‫ אמת‬at the beginning in order to create a distinction between the two – a distinction that is missing in the earlier Hebrew translation of Ibn Tibbon. But regardless of the destination language of the translators, this distinction in Maimonides’ terminology is important because it can indicate a different degree of truth for all four types together (‫ )צח‬versus accepted notions and traditional beliefs as a subset (‫)תצדיק‬.

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which is intuited, and finally information we receive from reliable persons. 45 Then, after mentioning intellectual knowledge, but before describing traditional beliefs, Maimonides describes generally accepted notions (‫)'אלמשהוראת‬, which are those social norms that deal with that which is fine or bad (‫)גמיל וקביח‬. The examples he provides for this category are the covering of private parts (i.e. norms of dress) and the appreciation and recompense of benefactors (i.e. behavioral norms). As described here, the way in which one should dress, and the way in which one should return favors, are related to the accepted notions of the society that serves as the source of those social norms. A comparison of Maimonides’ use of the eighth chapter of alFarabi’s Encyclopedia of Logic with the base text is quite interesting. 46 Regarding accepted notions, Maimonides cites the We see a similar distinction already in chapter two, where Maimonides, following al-Farabi, breaks down Aristotle’s ἔνδοξα into two types based on Aristotle’s statement in the first chapter of his Topics that the sources of ἔνδοξα are the consensus of the many and the consensus of the wise and well-known from among the many. Al-Farabi and Maimonides both see in this statement a distinction in acquired knowledge based on whether the source is general public consensus – which produces generally accepted notions – or whether the source is the consensus of people who are widely trusted because of their wisdom and renown, which produces traditional beliefs. Thus, this difference is not just one of source but of realm of knowledge: an accepted notion is a social norm and therefore relates to morality, while traditional beliefs relate more to scholarly knowledge and therefore can more easily have theoretical content. On the differences between the Torah commandments that relate to traditional beliefs and those that relate to generally accepted notions see Haddad 2011, pp. 285–323. 46 Ravitsky (2010, pp. 56–58) already pointed out this difference, but explained it in a different way. In his opinion, Maimonides rejected the example of the consensus of craftsmen, which al-Farabi had asserted can also generate accepted notions, because in Maimonides’ opinion, morality as a whole is a body of accepted notions, while the consensus opinions of craftsmen are not limited to accepted notions, and can include traditional beliefs and even intelligible things. Nevertheless, according to Ravitsky, it cannot be said that Maimonides limited the realm of generally accepted notions solely to the realm of morality, because there are examples in the Guide where he uses the term ‘accepted notions’ in reference to the acquisition of theoretical knowledge. We will 45

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same examples as did al-Farabi but erases from the words of his Muslim predecessor the example of the agreement of experts from one particular trade: medicine. According to al-Farabi, the fact that all doctors (or at least the best of them) believe in a particular medical concept makes that concept an accepted notion vis a vis medical matter. Since it is quite possible that members of a particular profession will agree on issues that do not relate to morality but rather to theoretical areas related to their craft, this example of al-Farabi expands the scope of accepted notions to beyond the moral sphere. In my opinion, this is the first clear sign that Maimonides, already in Words of Logic, had decided to limit the domain of accepted notions to that of relative morality only 47 – a limitation he would continue with in the Guide.

MASH’HURATH IN THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED

In the Guide, Maimonides quite often uses words with the root ‫ר‬-‫ה‬-‫ש‬. 48 In three specific instances that happen to be very important for our purposes, Maimonides contrasts accepted notions with intellectual knowledge. 49 As we will see in Guide I:2, he even offers a definition of accepted notions. In all the other cases where words with this root appear, they are used to describe variously: people, stories, sayings or well-known books, 50 298F

29F

30 F

devote the next section to addressing this problematic claim, which is also the claim of Klein-Braslavy 1987, pp. 73–79, and especially note 16 on page 77. 47 Such that he was, as noted above, more consistent in limiting accepted notions to morality than was al-Farabi, who only took some steps in this direction. 48 Regarding the whole array of words with this root that appear in the Guide, on their various translations to Hebrew and Latin in the Middle Ages, and on the impact of these translations on the philosophical meaning of these words, see Sadik 2016. 49 Guide I:2, 2:33, and 3:8. 50 Cases in the Guide where the term for accepted notions refers to wellknown books include: the Instruction; I:34, 59, 61, 65, 68, 73, and 74; II:3, 9 (twice), 15, 26, and 29; and III:22, 23, 50, 52, and 54.

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actions, 51 speculative positions, 52 opinions 53 that are common and accepted by the public, and even well-known historical events. 54 Cases in the Guide where the term for accepted notions refers to actions (with specific context in parentheses) include: III:32 (the most widespread and accepted core service of God in the world at the time of the Exodus from Egypt was animal sacrifice); III:39 (the well-known fact that people who grow up with excessive prosperity tend to be arrogant and conceited); and III:42 (the prohibition of fraud). 52 Cases in the Guide where the term for accepted notions refers to philosophical positions (with specific context in parentheses) include: the Introduction (beliefs of popular science); 1:1 (the popular definition of form – a definition that Maimonides says does not apply to God); 1:4 (that the word ‘see’ can refer to intellectual achievement); I:25 (interpretation of the word ‘dwell’ [.‫נ‬.‫כ‬.‫ ;)]ש‬I:52 (the fact that God cannot be defined); I:59 (the many levels of comprehending God); I:65 (that the meaning of the word ‘say’ [.‫ר‬.‫מ‬.‫ ]א‬in the context of the Creation is want [.‫ה‬.‫צ‬.‫ ]ר‬or desire [.‫צ‬.‫פ‬.‫ ;)]ח‬I:69 (the position of the philosophers that the universe always existed), II:10 (the position of the philosophers that control of the lower, physical world resides with forces that emanate from the heavenly spheres); III:4 (that the color of the sky is described as being like that of the gemstone aquamarine [‫ ;)]תרשיש‬III:17 (the uncompromising position of the Muslim Ashcariyya sect regarding divine providence over every single event in nature and human history); III:22 (the fact that man more readily accepts the urges of the evil inclination than those of the good inclination); III:24 (that God tests people by allowing harm to befall them, not due to sin but just so their reward in this life and the next will increase – a position Maimonides rejects along with the position that the sustenance for those who dedicate themselves to the service of God will come from an unexpected source); III:29 (belief in the reality of God); and finally III:43 (that the main reason for the commandment of keeping the Sabbath is the value of rest from the workweek). In all these cases, Maimonides does not point out that the very publication of these positions is the source of their authority, but rather that these positions are indeed held by the masses, though some of them are untrue. 53 Cases in the Guide where the term for accepted notions refers to widespread opinions (with specific context in parentheses) include: I:63 (the Sabian teachings in general); II:14 (that Aristotle marshaled evidence for his positions from generally accepted notions, in contrast to the earlier evidence that Maimonides mentioned in the chapter, which were from intelligible things); two cases in III:50 (that practicing idolatry can improve agriculture); III:37 (various opinions of the Sabians regarding agriculture and idolatry; III:45 (the spread of Pe’or worship); 51

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Klein-Breslavy, 55 commenting on the three chapters (II:14, III:30, and III:46) in which Maimonides uses words with the root ‫ר‬-‫ה‬-‫ש‬, asserts that the subject seems to be “accepted views of most people on the theoretical level”, and therefore concludes that Maimonides did not limit accepted notions to the moral realm only. However, while I do not disagree that Maimonides does in fact use the root ‫ר‬-‫ה‬-‫ ש‬to point out theoretical views in these three chapters, 56 it is important to note that these are theoretical views that Maimonides sees as completely wrong and derived from idolatry. 57 Indeed, nowhere in the Guide does Maimonides state that the source of authority for any of his beliefs is the popularity of said beliefs amongst the masses or the sages. Admittedly, he does note at several points in his analysis that various opinions are indeed generally accepted by the broader public, 58 the most prominent of these being of course belief in the reality of God (III:29). However, even in these instances, Maimonides in no way attempts to assert that these opinions are correct specifically due to their status as generally accepted notions, but only acknowledges that opinions proven by other sources of knowledge are sometimes accepted by the general public. An example of use is found in the beginning of Guide I:68: 306F

307F

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You already know that the following dictum of the philosophers with reference to God, may He be exalted, is generally admitted: the dictum being that He is the intellect as well as

III:46 (belief in demons and other forms of idolatry); and III:47 (the Sabian version of ritual impurity and menstrual impurity). 54 Guide I:46, II:19, and chapters III:9, 12, 26, and 39. 55 Which is also quoted by Ravitsky. 56 In addition, chapters I:63, III:37, and III:47. 57 The well-known positions of Aristotle also have their source in popular idolatrous beliefs, such as the concept of God’s abode being in the heavens. 58 On this see some of the sources cited in footnote 52 of this chapter. It should be noted that Maimonides contends that popular opinions are frequently incorrect.

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We see here that Maimonides does not base the truth of the unity of the three phenomena of divine intellect, upon that unity being public knowledge, but only acknowledges that the unity is indeed well known. The fact that Maimonides acknowledges that various opinions, both true and false, are widely accepted does not in my opinion indicate that Maimonides thought that generally accepted notions are a legitimate source for adopting opinions. Rather, this practice only indicates that Maimonides was well aware that in the real world, human beings often adopt theoretical positions precisely because they are so popular – a phenomenon that opens the door to being misled into adopting false beliefs. Moreover, Maimonides points out that completely errant beliefs related to idolatry were very widespread in ancient times. From this one can learn that even a very widely accepted position can be absolutely wrong. There is no doubt that Maimonides thought that these beliefs (such as the influence of idolatry on agriculture) were wrong, and that human beings from that period very much needed to be disabused of their false ideas. Maimonides certainly did not think that Abraham should have assumed that this or that idolatrous form of worship was beneficial simply because belief in idolatry was popular in his day. 60 And when teaching the Torah to the Children of Israel, Moses had no choice but to take into account the fact that the practice of sacrifices was the common form of worshipping God (or idols) in public, such that – quite ironically – the heavy emphasis in the Torah on sacrifices was intended precisely to gut the practice of the entire erroneous pagan theoretical framework that was heretofore associated with it. 61 So although common practices cannot easily be changed (nor is there any need to), Guide I:68. The original Judeo-Arabic: ‫קד עלמת שהרה' הד'ה אלקולה אלתי קאלתהא אלפלאספה פי אללה תעאלי והו‬ .‫קולהם אנה אלעקל ואלעאקל ואלמעקול‬ 60 On this see Laws of Idolatry, chapter 1. 61 Guide III:32. 59

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nonetheless, it is critical that any popular, underlying false concepts be replaced with true beliefs. It is clear to me that scholars 62 who insist that Maimonides acknowledged the theoretical validity of some of generally accepted notions, necessarily accept that the theoretical field is divided. For them, similar to Aristotle’s position, there are theoretical issues for which there is irrefutable proof, while for other theoretical issues there is no such proof, and therefore it is legitimate and even necessary to turn to the accepted notions in these areas as the basis for dialectical discussion. As I have argued in the previous paragraphs, one cannot conclude from the mere fact that Maimonides reported certain theoretical views as being generally accepted notions that he actually thought that relying on such notions in the theoretical field is legitimate (similar to Aristotle). What I intend to prove is that Maimonides cited opinions or beliefs as being generally accepted only in order to note his awareness of the popularity of those ideas – without passing judgment on their veracity, for whether these beliefs are true or false is not at all related to the degree of their popularity but can only be determined via philosophical study built upon intellectual knowledge, and not accepted notions. This is the position that I believe emerges from the passages in the Guide in which Maimonides distinguishes between intellectual knowledge and generally accepted notions. Arguably the most important and detailed section for proving this point is the well-known chapter I:2, where Maimonides responds to the challenge of an anecdotal learned man, who had claimed that Adam benefited from the original sin inasmuch as his intellect became much improved, and that therefore it is odd to assert that Adam was punished when in fact he was granted – specifically via his rebelliousness – that which is most noble and distinctive in the human race: the intellectual recognition of good and evil. In his response, Maimonides asserts that Adam already had an intellect (‫ )עקל‬before the sin, and that this already-extant intellect was the ultimate perfection of mankind. Having rejected the assumption of the learned man that 62

Heinemann, Kraemer, and Klein-Braslavy, inter alia.

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Adam only acquired an intellect after having eaten the forbidden fruit, Maimonides then adds that what was gained by virtue of the sin of eating from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil was specifically the ability to discern generally accepted notions. In this context, Maimonides explains the nature of the distinction between intellectual knowledge and accepted notions: Through the intellect one distinguishes between truth and falsehood, and that was found in [Adam] in its perfection and integrity. Fine and bad, on the other hand, belong to the things generally accepted as known, not to those cognized by the intellect. For one does not say: it is fine that heaven is spherical, and it is bad that the earth is flat; rather one says ‘true’ and ‘false’ with regard to these assertions. Similarly, one expresses in our language the notions of truth and falsehood by means of the terms emeth and sheqer, and those of fine and bad by means of the terms tov and ra. Now man, in virtue of his intellect, knows truth from falsehood; and this holds good for all intelligible things. 63

In the continuation of the passage, Maimonides explains that before the sin, man did not know the most obvious of all the generally accepted notions: the repulsiveness of exposing oneself. From the quoted passage and the continuation, we see that Maimonides establishes a clear distinction between intellectual knowledge and accepted notions, which is not determined by the source of the knowledge, as in the case of Aristotle’s ἔνδοξα, but rather by the field of knowledge at hand. 64 Intellectual knowledge Guide I:2. Preface to the M. Schwarz translation. The original JudeoArabic: ‫ והד'א כאן מוג'ודא פיה עלי כמאלה‬,‫ובאלעקל יפרק בין אלחק ואלבאטל‬ ‫ לאנה‬,‫ אמא אלקביח ואלחסן פהו פי אלמשהוראת לא פי אלמעקולאת‬.‫ותמאמה‬ ‫ וכד'לך‬,‫ בל יקאל חק ובאטל‬,‫לא יקאל אלסמא כריה חסן ואלארץ' בסיטה קביח‬ ,‫ וען חסן וקביח טוב ורע‬,‫פי לסאננא יקאל ען אלחק ואלבאטל אמת ושקר‬ ‫ והד'א יכון פי אלאמור אלמעקולה‬,‫פבאלעקל יערף אלאנסאן אלאמת מן אלשקר‬ .‫כלהא‬ 64 For a different position on how to read this passage see Ravitsky (2016) who claims that intelligible things and generally accepted notions address similar realms of knowledge but in different ways. In my opinion, Ravitsky’s reading does not fit Maimonides’ example. I do not think that contemplating morality is a sin according to Maimonides, but rather that 63

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deals with absolute truth, the attainment of which is the ultimate perfection of man. 65 Intellectual knowledge is about truth and falsehood, and not good and evil. In such a context, veracity is not measured by the amount of people who believe in a certain thing, a simple example of this being that the earth is spherical even if no one knows it. The sole source for obtaining this kind of truth is in the mind and not in the consent of human beings, of which there is no validity in such matters. By contrast, generally accepted notions relate to social norms for which there are no categories of true and false, but only good and evil. 66 For Maimonides, there is no intellectual syllogism that can determine that people must cover their private parts, and therefore the knowledge that one should dress is relevant to people as social animals, and not as intelligent creatures. 67 From here we can the need to engage in such contemplation stems from the existence of sin. The original sin was eating the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil (i.e. preferring lust over the dictates of reason) and not acting according to social norms, which arise as a result of considering the effects of sin, and even in my opinion the opportunity to eat the forbidden fruit was intended to improve the condition of the person living according to that person’s society’s norms (including all the practical commandments) which are designed to help him control his lusts. 65 Regarding the fact that this is the way to reach eternal life in the Maimonides’ opinion see inter alia the Yesodei HaTorah, Chapter 4; Laws of Repentance, Chapter 8; and Guide I:1 and III:54. From these sources it turns out that it is knowledge of eternal truths that transcend the material world that enables the existence of the soul after death. 66 Apparently, the position that Maimonides presents here supports moral relativism, which stands in contrast to his position elsewhere, such as in Guide II:39. I will address this issue in the next chapter. 67 It is possible to argue against this division based on what Maimonides writes in Laws of Repentance 10:2 where he states: It is possible to argue against this division from the Rambam’s words in the Laws of Repentance, Chapter 10, Law 2: He who serves [God] out of love, studies the Torah and performs its commandments, and walks in the paths of wisdom, not because of anything in the world, nor because of the fear of evil, nor to derive any personal benefit, but rather does the truth because He [i.e. God] is truth – [so for such a person,] ultimately, benefit comes along in a general way.

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generalize that for Maimonides, intellectual knowledge covers all theoretical attempts to describe reality without any reference to human beliefs, while in contrast, accepted notions refer to subjective realms wherein the more common a social norm is, the more it is considered to be good. That the above was indeed Maimonides’ position is confirmed by the two other passages in the Guide in which Maimonides compares intellectual knowledge with specific examples of accepted notions. The first such passage is found in chapter II:33, where Maimonides states that knowledge of the first two commandments is indeed of the intellectual type inasmuch as they arise from irrefutable proofs, while the rest of the commandments deal with accepted or traditional notions. 68 With this assertion, Maimonides is actually taking the position that all social norms, even the most basic ones such as the prevention of murder, are not part of intellectual knowledge but are merely accepted notions. These notions are probably accepted by all of Seemingly, according to the Rambam’s words, truth also includes a practical dimension, for Maimonides states that the wise person “does the truth”. Nevertheless, in my opinion this passage does not negate the firm limitation of the realm of truth to absolute theoretical truth. Here Maimonides refers to a person who fulfills the commandments out of the love of God. For Maimonides, love of God derives from man’s theoretical knowledge only (Yesodei HaTorah, chapter 2). That is why Rambam states at the end of the Laws of Repentance that a person must always fulfill the commandments out of love for God, that is, from knowledge of the truth and not from fear of punishment or a desire to receive a reward. From the knowledge of a universal theoretical truth can come an understanding that in certain situations certain practices must be followed and not others. I will comment further on this observation in the next chapter. 68 In this chapter, Maimonides states that the prophet’s unique role is to inculcate their audiences with notions of proper behavior which, through their efforts and over time, eventually become generally accepted notions. The prophet is the only kind of person who can reveal behaviors that are destined to become generally accepted notions, while both scholars and prophets can reveal intelligible things. So, we see here that prophecy demonstrates the connection that is created between the imaginative faculty, which distinguishes the prophet from the philosopher, and generally accepted notions. It should be noted that the role of the prophet in al-Farabi is not defined by generally accepted notions.

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humanity, but that still does not make them intellectual knowledge, for in Maimonides’ opinion, there is no irrefutable proof that one should not murder, but only evidence based on social norms and mores – which, though necessary for the maintenance of society, are not always correct for every situation or set of circumstances. 69 The other relevant passage is found in Chapter 3:8. Here, Maimonides points out that prevention of intoxication by alcohol is actually part of intellectual knowledge, while avoidance of nudity is merely an accepted notion, and therefore less important. This is a surprising assertion by Maimonides as drunkenness is ostensibly a matter of acceptable human behavior. So the question arises: How can Maimonides define the rule of not getting drunk as a type of intellectual knowledge? In my opinion, the answer to this is that intoxication harms the mind in a scientific and absolute way. A person who is in a state of intoxication loses his ability to control themselves and is unable to engage in theoretical study. Since these deficits are scientific and absolute and stem from the chemical effect of wine on a person, there is a contradiction between drunkenness and human reason. Even if a person were completely alone and not part of any community or society, a state of intoxication would impair his mental capacity. Thus, this harm is not dependent on society and its conventions, but natural and absolute, and therefore it is quite similar in nature to having an opinion regarding the diameter of the earth, and not like opinions regarding proper dress. 70 This is a position that can be attributed to Plato, and specifically to the first book of the Republic where he raises the hypothetical moral dilemma of returning a borrowed sword to a mentally unstable owner. Although this dilemma opens up a reading of Plato as a moral relativist, in the rest of the book he ultimately advocates a position of natural morality, albeit one measured by the amount of good accomplished, which changes according to the context, such that there is no single action that is always moral regardless of context. 70 I don’t think it is feasible to claim that Maimonides thought that walking around unclothed is harmful specifically because it is sexually stimulating. According to my understanding of Maimonides, he believed that what people find to be sexually stimulating is actually dependent on what society defines as sexual. Therefore, in a society in which wearing 69

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The passages analyzed above show that the Guide not only continues in the same direction of thought as the Words of Logic, but it actually takes the issue of intellectual knowledge vs. popular accepted norms a step further, for in the Words of Logic, Maimonides only removed from his source in the introduction to al-Farabi’s work – albeit deliberately – the examples that do not deal with social norms, while in the Guide, Maimonides is much more upfront on this point, explicitly asserting that absolute things (i.e. intellectual knowledge) can be discovered only through logical syllogisms, while generally accepted notions only deal with non-absolute, relative things, which depend on human attitudes towards them. Incidentally, it is precisely the overlap on this point between the two books that reinforces the attribution of Words of Logic to Maimonides. It should be noted that, at least as of the current state of the research, there is no third source for determining Maimonides’ position, which probably was influenced by al-Farabi, though Maimonides veered away from the Muslim thinker’s position in that Maimonides limited the realm of accepted notions to the social sphere. To sum up this section of the analysis, in Aristotle the ἔνδοξα is a different and legitimate source of information that serves as a source for a dialectic that also deals with theoretical fields. In al-Farabi there are passages that begin to herald the limitation of words from the root ‫ ﺷﮭﺮ‬to the social sphere only. Yet al-Farabi was not set on this point and occasionally treats the popularity of certain notions as an acceptable and authoritative source of information – even with regards to theoretical issues. In contrast, Maimonides, in both the Words of Logic and the Guide consistently minimal clothing is acceptable, such immodest behavior will not necessarily lead to sexual stimulation. On Maimonides’ view of laws as generally accepted notions see also Ravitsky 2010 pp. 63–65. Ravitsky’s position differs from mine because he draws a distinction between the prophet with moral sensitivities and the citizen who accepts the law as a social convention. In my opinion, even at the level of the prophet, the legal system as a whole is a generally accepted notion (as was the case with the last eight of the Ten Commandments given by Moses). This is necessarily so inasmuch as the entire realm of social norms and laws contains no intelligible things.

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reduces the authority of accepted notions to the social and relative sphere only. Moreover, we have seen that in Maimonides’ opinion, the field of accepted notions can only help us to understand what are the good and bad human behaviors in any given society. This contrasts with what exists in his primary sources (al-Farabi) as well as in Aristotle, in whom the consent of the masses can also be used as evidence of the theoretical correctness of a position. This point may have important implications for a range of issues, with each requiring its own comprehensive research. In the next section I will briefly address two such issues.

SOME POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF MAIMONIDES’ UNIQUE POSITION

Not a few scholars 71 have argued that the use of dialectics has an important role in Maimonides’ thinking. For them, the dialectic approach allows a person to determine what is the most reasonable position even when it is not possible to produce an irrefutable proof in a given matter. I am not arguing that there is necessarily no room for dialectics in Maimonides’ writings. But according to the analysis we herein proffer, it is not possible that the basis of a dialectical syllogism could be accepted notions, and this differs from the situation with Aristotle, and to some extent even with that of al-Farabi. In chapters II:22–23 of the Guide, having conclude that irrefutable proof cannot be mustered for either the creation or the eternity of the world, 72 Maimonides determines how to decide on questions of this kind. For him, in these cases, a person should decide according to the position that raises as few doubts as possible (‫)שכוך‬. Maimonides points out that in order to reach this state of confidence, the person must “abandon what [they] are accustomed to and rely on mere intellectual reflection” See footnote 253. Of course, I will not be able to address here with the seriousness it deserves the question of the creation of the world – a question dealt with by many of Maimonides’ commentators, both in modern times and in the Middle Ages. Here I will only briefly point out certain consequences of our discussion of the issue of generally accepted notions.

71 72

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(‫)ותטרח אלמעתאד ותעתמד עלי מג'רד אלנט'ר‬. He goes on to clarify that such confidence depends on the philosopher attaining a high level of self-awareness combined with the specific study of logic, math, physics, and virtues. Here, Maimonides does not mention at all accepted notions (or for that matter anything else considered public knowledge) as a legitimate source for drawing conclusions – even in areas where there is no irrefutable proof available or even theoretically possible. Moreover, he asks the seeker of truth to be prepared to abandon what they are accustomed to, which is very likely similar to the generally accepted notions of the same public in which the person grew up. 73 In short, according to Maimonides, the key role of dialectics is to determine the truth even in cases where there is no possibility whatsoever of coming up with irrefutable proofs. Now, given that even in these cases there is an imperative to discover the theoretical truth – which exists despite the lack of certitude regarding its underlying proof 74 – it is not possible for there to be a role for accepted notions and public opinion (even that of the intellectual elite) regarding its reality. This approach leaves the realm of intelligible things as the source of effective dialectics when there is no recourse to irrefutable proofs.

There is an inherent tension between Maimonides’ words at the beginning of Guide II:23 and what is said at the end. At the beginning of the chapter, he states that in order to rule on questions that do not have demonstrative proofs, one must be strive for complete objectivity and thus be able to judge the things that a person has grown up with and heretofore assumed to be true. By contrast, at the end of the chapter, he claims that his whole purpose is to strengthen man lest he be tempted to doubt the creation of the world – an opinion that was supported by Moses and Abraham – and to recognize that the idea of a universe with no beginning leads to the destruction of the Torah and harm to belief in divinity. 74 For example, although Maimonides would concede that the question of the creation of the world cannot be proven beyond a shadow of a doubt, nevertheless he would also insist that the world is either created or else has always existed, and that the answer is not related at all to the consent of human beings, just as scientific truths are not based on human consent. 73

CHAPTER 3. DEFINING MAIMONIDES’ MASH’HURATH

CONCLUSION

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In this chapter we have analyzed Maimonides’ position on generally accepted notions and their proper role in philosophy. The perplexed reader, who may well agree with Aristotle and alFarabi, can certainly read Maimonides’ words according to their own positions, and indeed thus did a considerable number of scholars. In contrast, in my opinion, a study of the words of Maimonides himself leads the student to the conclusion that accepted notions have no theoretical validity. Of course, any reader who is very familiar with the words of Aristotle and alFarabi can understand that Maimonides differs from them, but only provided that this reader has a philosophical position that predisposes them to interpret the Guide in a favorable way, e.g. if their opinions are identical to those of Aristotle rather than to those of Maimonides. Please note that in the summary of the book we discuss the theoretical implications of Maimonides’ position regarding the inadmissibility of generally accepted notions when expressing philosophical positions, and in particular the problem of the authority of the Bible, which we posit is itself a type of accepted notion requiring interpretation and which cannot serve as the basis for determining philosophical truth. Indeed, we shall see that Maimonides’ true position is that the Bible must be interpreted according to philosophical truths discovered outside its framework, and not vice versa.

CHAPTER 4. MAIMONIDES, THE LAW OF THE TORAH, AND THE QUESTION OF NATURAL LAW The question of natural law and its relation to the laws of the Torah is a central question in the study of Jewish thought. Because of Maimonides’ importance, a significant portion of the discussion on the question of Judaism’s attitude to natural law actually deals specifically with his approach to the matter. 1 This

1 On the position of Maimonides regarding natural law see inter alia: Faur 1969, Fox 1972, Leaman 1987, Kreisel 1989 (esp. pp. 201–206), Kraemer 2001, Rynhold 2002, David 2010, and Goodman 2017. On Maimonides’ concept of morality see Harvey 1978 and 1986; Galston 1978; Fox 1979 and 1990 (pp. 93–226); Frank 1989, 2000, and 2002; Kellner 1990 (esp. pp. 47–61); Schwarzschild 1990; Weiss 1991; Schwartz 1994, Bruckstein 1997; Kreisel 1999 (pp. 93–124); Jacobs 2002; Shatz 2005; and Ravitsky 2011 and 2016. On the parallel between the Torah and nature in the opinion of Maimonides see Haddad 2011, esp. pp. 1–15. Haddad deals with parallels between the Torah and nature more than with the question of natural law (i.e. the question of whether there is an innate universal morality in humans). He addresses the issue of the classification of the commandments and their meaning in the last chapter of the book (pp. 283–325). I decided not to list here all the many studies that deal with topics related to morality (the nature of good and evil being the prime example) as obviously such a bibliography would be excessive in length, but even more importantly, they would not be especially pertinent since, as a rule, these studies do not link their discussions of

149

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is the case whether one looks at scholars dealing with a few thinkers in order to describe the position of Judaism as a whole, 2 or whether they are specifically examining Maimonides’ approach. 3 Studies dealing with the relationship between the Torah and natural law in Maimonides’ teaching are doing a grave injustice, in my opinion, mainly regarding two aspects. First, most scholars advocate a one-dimensional approach to Maimonides’ position. 4 They focus on marshaling sources and arguments that support their own understanding, while ignoring the logic of opposing readings of Maimonides. 5 This practice does harm to understanding Maimonides’ complex and multifaceted approach. 6 Second, morality to the issue of natural law in a clear and unambiguous way. I will mention some of the relevant issues later in this chapter. 2 For example, in the research of Novak 1998, Newman 1998, and Jacobs 2010. Sagi, also starting in 1998, has gathered many original sources from the Middle Ages, but has not conducted a thorough analysis of Maimonides’ approach (nor that of any other medieval thinkers). 3 For example, Fox 1972 and Faur 1969. These researchers, who reject the claim of any natural law in Judaism, focus their attention on Maimonides and assert that if even he who is the pre-eminent Jewish philosopher – and a bold one, at that – does not subscribe to the concept of natural law, we can only conclude that such a concept is most likely foreign to the very spirit of Judaism. 4 Which usually just happens to align perfectly with their own view of natural law in Judaism as a whole (cf. Fox and Faur, who reject the idea of Judaism having natural law, or Sagi and Novak, who advocate that position). 5 An example of this is the lack of any mention of Guide II:39 in Fox’s otherwise thorough 1990 study. As we will demonstrate, this chapter is one of the most central in supporting the claim of natural law in the Guide. 6 Exceptions are the studies by David 2010 and Rynhold 2002, who do a good job of briefly presenting the two sides of Maimonides’ methodology. The solution that Rynhold proposes – a legislator who designs the laws of the Torah to mimic universal science (i.e. the natural sciences, such as physics) – is in my opinion unsatisfactory. One of the main problems with this explanation is that it is difficult to see how he can explain Maimonides’ words in Guide II:39 regarding the inherent superiority of the Torah (neither Rynhold nor David include this chapter in their studies). In addition, it is apparent that I interpret the Guide’s key chapter

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there are some scholars who fail to draw a clear distinction between generic rational reasons for the commandments and those that are universal and derive from an understanding of the nature of man. 7 Maimonides devoted a large section of Guide III 8 to providing reasons for the commandments, 9 leaving no doubt as to his belief in there being such reasons. 10 On the other hand, a I:2 in a very different way than Rynhold. David offers yet another explanation stating (similar to Haddad 2011) that there is a certain similitude between the law of the Torah and natural law. Here I will offer another explanation that tries to explain the universal superiority of Torah law despite its fundamental lack of natural law. Kraemer 2001 also discusses chapter II:39 in depth, as well as the historical context of Maimonides’ teachings in general, but addresses neither the specific implications of this chapter nor Maimonides’ historical approach to the issue of natural law. 7 This is one of the central problems of Goodman’s research (2017). 8 Chapters III:25–49. 9 On the subject of the reasons for the commandments in Maimonides see inter alia: Heinemann 1942 and 1954, pp. 79–97; Ben-Sasson 1960; and Twersky 1980, pp. 374–384. The first two scholars pull Maimonides in a conservative direction, claiming that Maimonides saw in the very divinity of the commandment the whole reason for observing them, a position similar to that of Faur 1969, and Fox 1972 and 1990. Heinemann actually went a step further, adding at the end of his discussion of Maimonides approach in the Guide (pp. 94–97) that Maimonides did not express his own position in the Guide, but rather constructed a purely intellectual discussion in order to convince those who follow only reason to not abandon the Torah, while according to Heinemann the real purpose of the commandments is the emotional love of God that they instill in a person. It should be noted that while BenSasson had criticism for Heinemann (found at the beginning of the article), he does agree that the true reason for observing the commandments is God’s love. One of the lacunae in the two scholars’ approach is that they did not consider the fact that Maimonides defined emotional love for God as being dependent on attaining a certain level of intellectual development. For Maimonides’ concept of love for God see Yesodei HaTorah, chapters 2 and 4, and Laws of Repentance, chapter 10. For analyses see Kreisel 1996, Eran 2001, Lasker 2008 and 2013, Even-Chen 2013, and Schwartz 2016. 10 Even Fox, a researcher who rejects the position that Maimonides believed in natural law, does not argue that the commandments have no rational basis according Maimonides. Fox tries to draw Maimonides

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significant number of these are related to the unique history of the Jewish nation, and thus indicate a kind of particularistic logic and ethics system that is history dependent and not universalistic in nature. 11 In this chapter I will try to describe Maimonides’ position in its full complexity. At the beginning of the chapter, I will present and summarize the main passages in his writings 12 that oppose universal natural law and support relative morality. I will then present the passages that support the existence of a universal human morality. At the end of the chapter, I will present a complex position that connects the principled negation of natural law in the full sense of the word alongside the practical existence of universal human morality – this being identical to the commandments of the Torah. I will argue that such a synthesis is made possible for Maimonides by virtue of his position that there is a common human history that allows for both a relativistic point of view on the one hand and a generalistic human viewpoint on the other. 13

towards Saadia Gaon’s position, according to which the purpose of each commandment can be discovered retroactively following its revelation, while the source of its authority derives from its divine source, and not from their rational reasons. One of the main problems in Fox’s detailed research is the assumption that if Maimonides opposed natural law, then Maimonides held that the divine origin of the commandments is the source of their authority. While there is certainly a possibility that there is no universal natural law, there is a specific and relative morality whose source of authority is the rational benefit that will accrue to that unique nation that abides by this relative morality due to the existence of that unique moral code. 11 On this see for instance Guide III:29–30. 12 And in the footnotes throughout that explanation, I will address the attempts of some researchers to interpret the relevant passages differently from my explanation. 13 Alongside this explanation I will also present other possibilities, such as various uses of esoteric writing.

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A PRINCIPLED NEGATION OF NATURAL LAW

One of the main sources cited 14 to negate the position that Maimonides supported universal natural law is his words in the Mishneh Torah, Laws of Kings 8:11: Everyone who accepts the Seven [Noahide] Commandments and is careful to do them is considered as being from the Righteous Among the Nations, and has a share in the Next World. This means: He will accept them and do them [specifically] because God commanded these things in the Torah, and we have been informed by Our Teacher Moses that the descendants of Noah were originally commanded regarding these things, but if one does them out of an intellectual decision, such a one is not a resident [fit for the Holy Land] and is not a Righteous Among the Nations but is rather considered to be one of their sages. 15

In this passage, Maimonides quotes the words of The Teachings of Rabbi Eliezer, 16 that Gentiles who accept the seven commandments of the sons of Noah receive a share in the World to Come. There is nevertheless a significant difference between this source and the words of Maimonides. In the original text of the The Teachings of Rabbi Eliezer it is stated that in order to be one of the so-called “Righteous Among the Nations”, the gentile in question must specifically say that they keep the seven commandments of the sons of Noah “by virtue of the fact that our father Noah commanded us via the [divine line of transmission called] Gevurah as we do.” In contrast, Maimonides adds that they should

Especially in Faur 1969 and Fox 1972 and 1990. Leaman 1987 offers some counterpoint. 15 Laws of Kings 8:11. In some manuscripts, the concluding phrase is negative (“and not of their sages”), which renders this pronouncement less tolerant towards the scholars of other nations. Nevertheless, as I will try to argue later, even this version, which is more problematic, does not unequivocally show that Maimonides did not support natural law because the passage is exoteric and political in nature. On this topic see Dienstag 1987. 16 Mishnat Rabbi Eliezer, parasha 6 (p. 121). 14

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accept the testimony of Moses, thanks to whom they know that Noah commanded the observance of these commandments. 17 In Fox’s opinion, this paragraph states unequivocally that Maimonides did not advocate a position of natural law but held that the commandments should be kept solely due to the authority of their divine source. He maintains that given that even regarding the most basic of commandments, one must observe them, not due to logic, but out of deference to their being commanded by God or otherwise lose one’s place in the World to Come, how much more so regarding the rest of the commandments. Nevertheless, in my opinion, this passage cannot be deemed a sufficient source for asserting that Maimonides repudiated natural law, and this for two main reasons. First, Maimonides in this passage does not at all deny gentiles who act according to knowable truths a place in the World to Come. Rather, the passage deals with the technical definition of who can be considered the Righteous Among the Nations, while it is still quite possible that the sages of the nations (i.e. who do the commandments intuitively or who actually know the metaphysical truth) will still receive a share in the World to Come even if they do not accept the traditions of the Jews. According to this explanation, there is no statement here that the sages of the nations of the world are inferior to the Righteous Among the Nations, and therefore nothing can be deduced from it about Maimonides’ attitude to natural law. 18 The other reason that the passage regarding the Righteous Among the Nations does not prove that Maimonides rejected natural law is due to esoteric considerations inasmuch as one can see how the passage subtly contradicts Maimonides’ esoteric theoretical position. The first problem lies in the subject of the On the gap between Maimonides and his source for ruling on the status of righteous gentiles see Nuriel 2000 (pp. 165–171), and Nehorai 2003. 18 For such an interpretation, see Nehorai 2003. He states that the followers of the nations of the world receive a share in the World to Come (albeit a smaller one) in the merit of their declaration of faith, while the sages of the nations of the world receive a larger share in this world due to their high level of knowledge of philosophical truth. 17

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World to Come. Maimonides asserts in several places in his writings, 19 including in the Mishneh Torah, that the way to attain life after death is to apprehend eternal abstract intelligible truths. This position contradicts the claim here that since the seven commandments of the sons of Noah were commanded by Moses, they are sufficient for attaining a place in the World to Come. 20 After all, acknowledging a prophecy of Moses does not constitute eternal knowledge but rather only acknowledgment of either authority or a historical event in the past, and therefore such a profession cannot be considered the kind of knowledge that is sufficient to transition a person’s mind from a potential state to a practical one and thereby gain eternal life. 21 By contrast, these same passages suggest that every person – even one who is unaware of Moses’ prophecy – can attain everlasting life if they properly attain eternal knowledge. An additional problem is the context of this paragraph within the eighth chapter of the Laws of Kings, which is clearly political. The immediate context is the demand that the people of a city who surrender to the Children of Israel accept the seven commandments of the sons of Noah. 22 The purpose of this paragraph can be understood as conveying the message that in order for a gentile to be considered righteous, they must adopt

For example, the first and last chapters of the Guide (I:1 and III:54) It should be noted that even in Laws of Repentance 3:5, Maimonides mentions that righteous gentiles attain a place in the World to Come. There he does not explicitly state what they must do or what they must believe in order to be considered to be in this category. 21 Regarding the interpretation of this passage, I agree with the reading of Kasher 1998. On the concept that a statement of faith made without proper knowledge is insufficient for attaining a place in the World to Come see Kreisel 2019. Reiser and Rosin (2014, pp. 7–23) distinguish between life in the World to Come (a lower level) and having a portion in the World to Come (a higher layer), but this suggestion is unsatisfactory, for if a person lacks proper spiritual knowledge, their soul is supposed to disappear after death, i.e. that soul is not supposed to have any continuity with the after world. Nehorai 2003 also supports a solution similar to that of Reiser and Rosin. 22 Laws of Kings 8:9. 19 20

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not only the seven commandments of the sons of Noah, but also acknowledge the prophetic status of Moses. 23 In Maimonides’ view, the reason why idolaters cannot live among the Jews is because they may adversely affect their Israelite neighbors. 24 Maimonides in the noted passage adds that in order to be considered one of the Righteous Among the Nations, the practical aspect of keeping the seven commandments of Noah is insufficient, and that a gentile must also display a historical-intellectual aspect by acknowledging the prophecy of Moses. 25 According to this interpretation, the promise of receiving a place in the World to Come is brought here only to spur the Gentiles (and the Jews who read the Mishneh Torah) to keep the seven commandments of the sons of Noah and to acknowledge the prophecy of Moses. Therefore, one can only learn from this passage what Maimonides thought politically: that in order to live among the Jews, one must keep the seven commandments of Noah, and that in order to be considered a Righteous Among the Nations, one must acknowledge the prophecy of Moses. In addition, one can understand that for Maimonides, it is worthwhile promising the World to Come on account of these two merits, even if such a position is philosophically incorrect. However, the opposite holds true as well: nothing can be learned from the paragraph with regard to Maimonides’ true philosophical position regarding the validity of natural law. 26 On the classification of righteous gentiles versus gentile dwellers of the Land of Israel see Issurei Bi’ah 14:7. 24 See for example Guide 1:54. 25 This being what Maimonides adds to his source for this topic, The Teachings of Rabbi Eliezer, which, as mentioned above, only demands gentiles recognize the authority of God and Noah, but not necessarily Moses. 26 About divine causality and its relevance for natural law, see Fox 1990, pp. 229–250. Here we see another problematic aspect of Fox’s position regarding prophecy in that he argues that it is not reasonable to say that Moses determined the commandments based on their practical value. In Fox’s view, the sources of the commandments are to be found solely in God’s prophetic providence. Such an approach contradicts what I argue is Maimonides’ esoteric position that prophecy is the prophet’s revelation of God’s ideals, and not God’s supernatural revelation of His ideals to the 23

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The distinction between these two explanations relates to the broader question of whether the World to Come can be accepted by proclamation only. 27 In any case, nothing can be learned from this Halakha regarding Maimonides’ position on the question of natural law. However, there are other sources from which it is quite possible, in my opinion, to conclude that Maimonides did not support natural law but rather relative morality, or at least did not see the commandments of the Torah as deriving from natural law. 28 These are the sources that deal with the distinction between intelligible truths and generally accepted notions in the Guide and Words of Logic. 29 One of the most important passages for my case is Guide I:2. In the same well-known chapter, Maimonides answers the question of the literary foil he created whom he calls “the learned man”. This erudite character claims that Adam benefited from the original sin since he gained an improvement in his intelligence. 30 In his answer, Maimonides states that Adam in any case had intelligence (‘akal) before he sinned, and specifically a finalized form of intelligence such that the only new thing gained via the sin was about generally accepted notions only. In writing his commentary here, Maimonides explains in detail the distinction between intelligible truths and accepted notions: prophet. This is an important topic, but unfortunately a thorough analysis of Maimonides’ approach to prophecy is not within the scope of this book. For more on this topic see Kreisel 2001 pp. 148–315. On the nature of Moses’s prophecy see Even-Chen 2011 and Weiss 2015. 27 Nehorai 2003 and Reiser & Rosin 2014 assert that this is so, while Kasher 1998 and Kreisel 2019 reject the assertion. The scope of this book does not allow for a proper review and bibliography of the relevant sources on this topic. 28 I will only briefly address these sources as they have already been analyzed along the same lines by Fox 1972 and Kreisel 1989. 29 The main sources that address this distinction are: Guide I:2, III:8, III:33, and Words of Logic, chapter 8. 30 For Maimonides’ approach to original sin see Berman 1981, Harvey 1984, Klein-Braslavy 1986, Pines 1990, Fox 1990 (pp. 152–198), Stern 2009, and Sadik 2014. For an analysis of Maimonides’ early drafts of this chapter see Sirat 2011, pp. 204–210.

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MAIMONIDES: A RADICAL RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHER Through the intellect one distinguishes between truth and falsehood, and that was found in [Adam] in its perfection and integrity. Fine and bad, on the other hand, belong to the things generally accepted as known, not to those cognized by the intellect. For one does not say: it is fine that heaven is spherical, and it is bad that the earth is flat; rather one says true and false with regard to these assertions. Similarly, one expresses in our language the notions of truth and falsehood by means of the terms emeth and sheqer, and those of fine and bad by means of the terms tov and ra’. Now man in virtue of his intellect knows truth from falsehood; and this holds good for all intelligible things. 31

Maimonides goes on to explain that before the sin, man did not know the most obvious of all the accepted notions: avoiding the exposure of one’s private parts. Here Maimonides unequivocally distinguishes between the realm of truth, which includes absolute truths unrelated to human consensus (such as, for example, the sphericity of the Earth), and good and evil, which are not known via the intellect but are accepted notions, i.e. derive from human consensus. 32 The intelligible truths, knowledge of which is acquired by the intellect, were known to Adam before the sin. The example that Maimonides brings to illustrate the realm of generally accepted notions is the norms of attire. Adam and Eve before the sin did not know the most well-known of all accepted notions, i.e. not exposing their private parts. The taboo on exposing oneself (like all the more-detailed norms of modesty) is not any sort of absolute scientific truth but a society-dependent norm. It is also relevant here that in chapter II:33, Maimonides states that the last eight of the Ten Commandments are from the Guide I:2. The original Judeo-Arabic: ‫ והד'א כאן מוג'ודא פיה עלי כמאלה‬,‫ובאלעקל יפרק בין אלחק ואלבאטל‬ ‫ לאנה‬,‫ אמא אלקביח ואלחסן פהו פי אלמשהוראת לא פי אלמעקולאת‬.‫ותמאמה‬ ‫ וכד'לך‬,‫ בל יקאל חק ובאטל‬,‫לא יקאל אלסמא כריה חסן ואלארץ' בסיטה קביח‬ ,‫ וען חסן וקביח טוב ורע‬,‫פי לסאננא יקאל ען אלחק ואלבאטל אמת ושקר‬ ‫ והד'א יכון פי אלאמור אלמעקולה‬,‫פבאלעקל יערף אלאנסאן אלאמת מן אלשקר‬ .‫כלהא‬ 32 This accords with the following sources: Words of Logic, chapter 8, Aristotle’s Topics I:1, and al-Farabi’s Introduction to Logic, chapter 2. 31

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realm of generally accepted notions and traditional beliefs – and only the first two commandments are intelligible truths. Accepted notions and traditional beliefs are both tied to the consensus of human beings. 33 Traditional beliefs are more related to knowledge of history, while accepted notions are related to social norms, which can vary. Regarding the discussion of the question of natural law, this distinction is not important since both accepted notions and traditional beliefs are completely unrelated to nature. The combination of the two statements we have just analyzed – the earlier one from Guide I:2 regarding Adam’s intellectual awareness of truth and falsehood (but not good and evil), and the latter one from II:33 regarding the nature of the last eight of the Ten Commandments as accepted notions – together indicate quite convincingly that Maimonides sees the entire realm of practical commandments as reflecting generally accepted opinion, and not as constituting intellectual knowledge, i.e. the kind of knowledge that in his opinion secures a person a place in the World to Come. 34 In so doing, Maimonides ostensibly abolishes the absolute scientific validity of the commandments, and in fact contradicts the position that sees the commandments as the realization of a universal human morality. 35 On the subject of the distinction between traditional beliefs and generally accepted notions see Haddad 2011, pp. 283–296, and Kasher 1985. 34 Although here we are speaking of how commonly accepted the notions behind the last eight of the Ten Commandments were among the Jews, we will see at the end of the book that this does not mean that the same things were not, at least in part if not in total, also commonly accepted among other nations. 35 For a completely different analysis of this passage, see Goodman 2017. Goodman’s main claims are: (1) Man was moral before Adam’s sin and therefore even then God commanded him regarding certain actions; (2) In Words of Logic there is a difference between widely accepted notions whose reliability is high and less common notions whose reliability is decidedly lower. From this, Goodman concludes that there is an aspect of humanity’s development that naturally leads to the internalization of the more correct notions (and the weeding out of incorrect notions) over the course of time; and (3) In the chapters dealing with the reasons for the commandments (especially III:26), Maimonides repeatedly under33

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Now a possible objection can be raised to the position that Maimonides believed in relative morality based on the passage in Guide III:8 where he states that the value of avoiding drunkenness is an intelligible truth and not a mere social norm, such as not relieving oneself in public. Ostensibly, in this passage, Maimonides points to a basis for a purely scientific natural law: there are deeds, and not just theoretical positions, which can be rejected on a consistent, scientific basis, and not just avoided because of following this or that social norm. But though there is certainly some truth to this objection, one must nevertheless pay attention to its limitations within the framework of Maimonides’ overall methodology. scores his assertion that the commandments indeed have reasons behind them. In my opinion, the above observations do not demonstrate that Maimonides believed in the absolute morality of the Torah’s commandments, and this for three reasons: (1) According to Guide I:2, only one commandment was given on account of Adam’s intelligence: to not lust (specifically after the fruit of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil), and, as we shall see, this is also the reason why the avoiding drunkenness is defined as an intelligible matter and not an accepted notion (Guide III:8). That is to say, the fact that there are actions that can intellectually be determined to be counterproductive does not eliminate the distinction between intelligible things and generally accepted notions, and does not render all of morality an intelligible thing. On the contrary, because Maimonides distinguishes between actions that can be judged by the intellect as counterproductive (such actions being relatively rare) and generally accepted notions (which the intellect cannot easily determine to be inherently counterproductive), we can see that Maimonides saw a sharp distinction between the two types of actions; (2) The entire concept of collective ethical and intellectual progress on the societal level does not exist in the writings of Maimonides. Despite Goodman’s solid knowledge of Arabic, he does not sufficiently specify the difference between descriptive truth (‫ )חק‬and correctness that results from reasons that are clear but not absolute (‫ ;)תצדיק‬and (3) The reasons given by Maimonides for the commandments tie the commandments to the unique history of the Jews. In other words, the fact that the commandments have reasons does not in any way prove that Maimonides believed in absolute morality, but rather that he thought that the Jewish people’s unique history requires certain actions and behaviors.

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The reason why the avoidance of intoxication is an intelligible truth according to Maimonides is that intoxication mitigates against the person’s ability to engage in the acquisition of knowledge and even to maintain his intellect’s control over the rest of his spirit and body inasmuch as intoxication hampers the development of the intellect, which is to say that the ability to attain intelligible truths is suspended. 36 Since these effects are due to the biological effects of alcohol on the person, repudiating intoxication is an intelligible truth and not a mere norm. Every person in every society and in every time who gets drunk will display the same biological characteristics. Hence, the detrimental effect of drunkenness is the same in every society, such that its rejection is indeed an intelligible truth, and not simply a generally accepted norm. It is quite possible that Maimonides would have put into this category of scientific natural law other acts whose effect on man is completely biological: drug use, extremely unhealthy eating habits, and perhaps even complete sexual promiscuity, along with other addictions to bodily lusts. These lusts are symbolized in the parable of the fruit of the tree in Guide I:2. Adam knew from his intellect alone that such things are forbidden, even before he knew of the generally accepted norms, and from this it is certainly possible to learn that for Maimonides, the prohibition of such malevolent deeds is, after all, an intelligible truth. However, between this general natural law – which certainly exists in Maimonides – and the commandments of the Torah, there exists a tremendous gap. In Chapter II:33, Maimonides puts even the clearest of the social commandments – Thou shalt not kill – into the category of accepted notions. It can be concluded that, for Maimonides, the exact definition of murder (as well as theft, adultery, etc.) is entirely related to social norms that vary from society to society. Thus, what is considered murder in one society will not be considered as such in another society (e.g. self-defense or blood revenge; indeed, both can be not only a luxury in this other It is suspended because, in Maimonides’s view, the purpose of every individual is to develop their intellect. 36

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society, but even necessary for its continued existence). 37 In Maimonides’ opinion, no objective scientific core concept underlying the act of murder that can serve as a general measure of the morality of all societies can be established via an analysis of the essence of man or society. Rather, each society defines its various accepted moral notions out of a broad consensus of the members of society – a consensus that stems from historical and social forces, and not from a scientific and objective natural law that is derived from the study of human nature or society. 38 We see then that when it comes to the limits of natural law, Maimonides puts murder into a common category of accepted notions alongside norms of modesty, outside of natural law, and not alongside the prohibition of drunkenness. Given this surprising move by Maimonides, it can be concluded that the natural law of Maimonides is supremely basic and subsumes within its borders many societies with very different sets of laws than that of the Torah and its commandments – though it should be noted that not every social norm is considered legitimate in In other words, according to this position, in a society where the legality of revenge for murder is what serves as the main deterrent to deadly feuds, killing out of revenge will not only be permitted but also necessary for the continued existence of that society, such that blood revenge in that society would be a moral obligation. In contrast to this, in a society where blood revenge is forbidden and it is customary to turn to the law authorities, killing out of revenge would be considered immoral, even if the motivation evokes a certain amount of sympathy. 38 Such a position is mentioned in Cicero, De Republica III, 9–12. Cicero himself ultimately rejects this position and supports natural law. There are several places where Maimonides talks about certain commandments that are applicable to the entire human race, e.g. Laws of Kings 9:1 regarding the intuitive seven Noahide laws, and Guide III:17 (and to a certain extent also II:3) regarding oppression and injustice. In the Eight Chapters, chapter 6, Maimonides points out that there are accepted notions that are known to all people. These passages therefore do not suggest that Maimonides thinks the entire Torah corresponds to natural law, but rather that there are certain accepted notions that are accepted by all mankind, and this in no way renders them intelligible things that are part of the morality that is connected to human nature as such. When I present my suggested solution for resolving the various tensions in the thought of Maimonides, I will address these passages. 37

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Maimonides’ opinion. Indeed, there can be societies in which drunkenness and addiction to various lusts are accepted norms. Maimonides would define such decadent societies as collections of wild people simply living together, and he would therefore deny the legitimacy of their social norms. Another reason for the removal of the Torah’s commandments from the realm of natural law in Maimonides’ thinking is the historical reasons for some of the commandments. 39 Over the course of a series of chapters in the Guide, 40 Maimonides explains a considerable part of the commandments of the Torah with the help of a comparison with the customs and rituals of the Sabians: 41 For Maimonides, the Torah, on the one hand, prohibited the customs of these idolaters – such as shaving of the entire head or the wearing of an admixture of wool and linen – in order to differentiate between the Jews and those particular gentiles. But on the other hand, the Torah also adopted certain customs of the Sabians while modifying them to encourage monotheism and its values, with the best-known example of this category being the sacrifices. 42

On the historical explanations for the commandments, see Twersky 1980, in which he points out that these explanations were composed especially for the Guide and compares them with the ‫ מצוין‬explanations Maimonides provides in the Mishneh Torah. See also Funkenstein, 1970. 40 In particular: Guide III:9 (in which Maimonides discusses the customs of the Sabians as a background to the later chapters dealing with the reasons for the commandments), III:32 (which deals with the reasons for the sacrifices), and III:16, 30, and 33 (which deal with an assortment of commandments, most of which are explained by comparing them to the customs of the Sabians). To these chapters should be added chapter III:30, which explains the promised benefits of the Torah through a juxtaposition with the promised benefits of Sabian idolatry (i.e. the Torah promises similar benefits but also threatens losing those benefits if the nation should fall into idolatry). 41 On the use of the example of the Sabians by Maimonides, see Stroumsa 2004. On the historical research into the Sabians in light of Maimonides’ statements see Elukin 2002. 42 On this subject see Stern 1989. According to both Stern and Haddad 2011, as a rule, the commandments that are connected to their historical context are those related to traditional beliefs. 39

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From these historical contentions it follows that not a few commandments 43 are rooted, according to Maimonides, in the unique Jewish historical context. These commandments cannot come from any natural human morality or law that derives from human nature or the world. For example, in Maimonides’ opinion, had the Jews not been ensconced in a society latent with an idolatry wherein the priests wore garments of wool and linen, the wearing of this admixture would not have been forbidden at all. 44 From the above analysis we can see that it is precisely from the fact that Maimonides offers rational reasons for all the commandments that there ipso facto arises an approach that opposes natural law, and this more than as evidenced in some of the Jewish philosophers who preceded Maimonides.

43 It should be noted that Maimonides generally uses historical and social explanations for the commandments that were viewed by the thinkers before him as super-rational (e.g. Saadia Gaon and R. Avraham ibn Daud) or both instructive and super-rational (e.g. R. Yehuda Halevi), i.e. where the reason or at least main reason for a given commandment stems from the very fact that it is a divine command or where normative human reasoning cannot justify the need for the commandment. 44 I will not delve into the question of how and to what extent these commandments continue to be necessary even after their historical conditions have dissipated. In the opinion of Funkenstein (1970), these commandments do indeed continue to be necessary because a return to idolatry can never be ruled out. He explains that Maimonides feared that the same process that allowed the monotheistic deity to be forgotten (which he theorized happened in the days of Enosh; see Laws of Idolatry, chapter 1), could repeat itself in the future as well. Another explanation that can be put forward in favor of the continued relevance of the historybased commandments is the influence of the past on the present. For example, even today, a person who shaves off the so-called corners of his head (pe’ot) or gets a tattoo thereby declares his lack of commitment to the Torah and a social affiliation different from those who observe it. This situation is similar to the situation of a person who in biblical times imitated the norms of clothing or haircuts of the local ancient priests of pagan idolatry. It should be noted that a number of Jewish converts actually used Maimonides’ reasons for the history-based commandments in order to refute the claim of the eternal validity of the commandments in general. On this see Sadik 2016. On the use of the claim of natural law in the Jewish-Christian polemic see Schwartz 2010.

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For example, according to Rabbis Yehuda Halevi, Avraham ben David, and, at least to a certain extent, Saadya Gaon, there is a group of rational commandments (as per R. Saadya) or rational and political commandments (as per R. HaLevy), which comprises a significant portion of the commandments, and which all people in every society must observe. These include many social commandments, such as not to kill or steal, and which are applicable to the nature of all mankind in all times. Contrary to these positions, Maimonides states that almost all commandments are either traditional beliefs or accepted norms – and again, these include those social commandments such as not killing or stealing. Defining the commandments as accepted notions and tradition allowed Maimonides to assign to them rational explanations – unlike earlier Jewish thinkers, who at best saw any rationality as being only after the fact of their revelation (as per R. Saadya) or as merely subsidiary to their religious meaning (as per R. Avraham ben David). 45 But it is important to note that in assigning rational, historical explanations to all the commandments, Maimonides thereby relegated quite a number of the commandments that previous Jewish philosophers saw as part of natural law, such as not murdering, to the status of relative precepts that depend on the unique history of each and every nation, or on the norms accepted by them. But this latter point is secondary to the main observation here that Maimonides’ On this see especially chapter III:20. On Maimonides’ reasons for the commandments, see footnote 334. On Maimonides’ implicit criticism of Sa’adia Gaon’s approach, see the Eight Chapters, chapter 6. There, Maimonides appears to acknowledge that there are super-rational commandments that are beyond human ken. The explanation for the well-known tension between what he writes in the Eight Chapters and what he writes in the Guide is probably related to the fact that in the former he is addressing people bothered by the fact that they cannot understand the meaning of some of the commandments – whom he placates by explaining that the greater their inclination to violate the super-rational commandments, the higher their reward for overcoming their natural inclination and observing those very commandments. In contrast, in the Guide, Maimonides presents his true position that all the commandments have an intellectual purpose.

45

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position that morality is relative is what allowed him to famously explain all the commandments in a rational way, 46 and in doing so, to put on a par the commandments that Maimonides’ predecessors conceded had a strong rational basis (such as the prohibition of murder) with those heretofore considered to be purely super-rational commandments (such as sacrifices). 47 This equalization, so to speak, of the entirety of the commandments created a situation wherein they are not only rational, but also inherently tied to historical circumstances and societal norms, or in a word: relative. Having summarized the main sources from which one can infer that Maimonides supported relative morality (or the reduction of natural law to the negation of extreme physical addictions), we now need to turn to sources that indicate that Maimonides supported the opposite position: a position that sees the Torah as the realization of a universal human morality and law.

THE TORAH AS A VESSEL SUITED TO NATURAL LAW

One of the most prominent passages in the Guide supporting natural law, but which surprisingly has not been taken into account by most scholars who have dealt with this question, is found in Chapter II:39, this being where Maimonides explains the uniqueness of the Torah of Moses. At the beginning of the chapter, It should be noted that one can find thinkers who lived after Maimonides advocating the position that every commandment in the Torah has a rational explanation while also being in consonance with natural law, such as Rabbi Yitzhak Pulgar. However, regarding the specific reason of historical issues in biblical times, it is important to mention that R. Pulgar almost never invokes such reasons. Therefore, we also see with him that historical reasons contradict the position of natural law. 47 Maimonides reserves the category of the intellectual commandments for things that in his opinion can be proven completely scientifically, such as the existence of God and the damage that drunkenness causes. The existence of God can be proven by metaphysical proofs, while the harms of alcohol abuse by biological proofs. All these proofs will be the same and equal everywhere and in every society. In contrast to these two cases, laws of sacrifices and murder depend on changing social definitions. 46

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Maimonides notes that Moses was the only (Jewishly recognized) prophet to proclaim the Torah as the law. Maimonides then explains why the other prophets only preached the observance of the Torah of Moses, but never sought to proclaim any alternative law code. After this clarification, Maimonides praises the practical laws: 48 …when a thing is as perfect as it is possible to be within its species, it is impossible that within that species there should be found another thing that does not fall short of that perfection either because of excess or deficiency. Thus in comparison with a temperament whose composition is of the greatest equibalance possible in the species in question, all other temperaments are not composed in accordance with this equibalance because of either deficiency or excess. Things are similar with regard to this Law, as is clear from its equibalance. For it says: Just statutes and judgments – now you know that the meaning of just is equibalanced. For these are manners of worship in which there is no burden and excess – such as monastic life and pilgrimage and similar things – nor a deficiency necessarily leading to greed and being engrossed in the indulgence of appetites, so that in consequence the perfection of man is diminished with respect to his moral habits and to his speculation – this being the case with regard to all the other nomoi [legal systems] of the religious communities of the past. When we shall speak in this Treatise about the reasons accounting for the commandments, their equibalance and wisdom will be made clear to you in so far

Maimonides believed in the superiority of the Law of Moses because it is the only legal system that was instituted specifically to correct the souls of its believers, that is, to instill in them correct truths. Maimonides continues this discussion in the next chapter (II:40), but here one also can find an implicit criticism of Islam, which in terms of its overall outlook is, in Maimonides’ opinion, fairly close to Judaism. According to Maimonides, the prophet of Islam, Muhammad, copied many correct ideas from the Jews and put them into the Quran. However, one can tell he was not a true prophet because, as Maimonides surely knew from his reading of the hadith literature, Muhammad pursued his passions, especially regarding sex. On the moral code of the prophets see Yesodei HaTorah 7:7.

48

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MAIMONIDES: A RADICAL RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHER as this is necessary. For this reason it is said with reference to them: “The Law of the Lord is perfect.” (Psalms 19:8) 49

In the continuation of the passage, Maimonides explains that critics of the Torah attack its laws because these opponents are addicted to their lusts, such that the Torah specifically deprives them of what they wish to pursue in their lives. From Maimonides above observations, we seemingly see an unequivocal statement in favor of natural law. Maimonides states that there is a ranking among all the existing laws (nomis). Just as every species has an individual that is the most complete possible within the same species, so too in the laws and regulations of different peoples and religions, which taken together reflect the totality of the various types of legal systems, there exists just one set of laws that constitutes the best possible one: the Law of Moses (Al-Sharia). 50 The Law of Moses is the best since it is the perfect mean between excessive abstinence and excessive permissiveness, and unlike all the other legal systems, which tend to excessiveness or permissiveness. 51 Maimonides’ opinion as implied in this passage is tenable only if there is one common morality which is the best morality for all mankind. If morality varies according to the history, geography, and culture of each people, there may well be different peoples with equal but Guide II:39. Original Judeo-Arabic: ‫ לאן אלשי אלכאמל עלי גאיה' מא ימכן פי נועה לא ימכן אן‬,‫והכד'א ילזם אן יכון‬ ,‫יוג'ד גירה פי נועה אלא נאקצא ען ד'לך אלכמאל אמא באפראט או בתפריט‬ '‫כאלמזאג' אלמעתדל אלד'י הו גאיה' אעתדאל ד'לך אלנוע פאן כל מזאג' כ'ארג‬ ‫ כד'לך אלאמר פי הד'ה אלשריעה‬,‫ען ד'לך אלאעתדאל יכון פיה תפריט או אפראט‬ ‫ וקד עלמת אן מעני צדיקים‬,‫כמא בין מן אעתדאלהא וקאל חקים ומשפטים צדיקים‬ ‫ וד'לך אנהא עבאדאת לא כלפה פיהא ולא אפראט כאלרהבאניה‬,‫מעתדלה‬ ‫ ולא תפריט יוג'ב אלשרה ואלאנהמאך חתי ינקץ כמאל‬,‫ואלסיאחה ונחוהמא‬ ‫ ואד'א‬.‫אלאנסאן פי אכ'לאקה ונט'רה כמת'ל סאיר נואמיס אלמלל אלסאלפה‬ ‫תכלמנא פי הד'ה אלמקאלה פי תעליל אלשראיע תבין לך מן אעתדאלהא‬ .‫ ולד'לך קיל פיהא תורת י''י תמימה‬,‫וחכמתהא מא ינבגי אן יתבין‬ 50 On the distinction between ‫ נואמיס‬and ‫ אלשריעה‬see Kraemer 2001. 51 On the debates surrounding the position of Maimonides regarding the golden mean see Schwartz 1994 and Ravitsky 2008 and 2011. This paragraph of the Guide supports the position of Ravitsky 2011 as he argues that Maimonides consistently and forcefully advocated the implementation of the golden mean. 49

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different morals. In this case, each nation’s moral code would constitute a unique kind unto itself, as each nation is shaped according to different historical and cultural conditions, such that no nation’s system could be compared to any other moral system, for another nation necessarily has a different history and culture and hence source for its system of ethics. Taking an example from the animal world, we will address the abstract question of whether there is a general species of bear that includes all sub-types of bears. In this case, it is clear that white bears, which generally live in the North Pole, will be better or worse than the brown bears, since one of the types of bears will be closer to the ideal of the whole species. In contrast, if each type of bear is a species in itself, then it is not really possible to compare the ideal of bears of different types as each is adapted to the unique geographical and historical context in which it evolved. The same is true of the various legal systems, for, assuming each system evolves from the historical and cultural context of each nation, there is then no possibility of comparing them and seeing which is superior. For example, indivisible marriage may be appropriate for Catholics, while the Jewish and Muslim forms of divorce are appropriate given the historical and cultural context of these religions. Therefore, since Maimonides defines all legal systems as being of the same type, and of this type the Torah is the supreme example, he is ostensibly arguing that there is a common denominator that allows comparison between the various legal systems. In other words, and by way of example, for Maimonides, both the Catholic ban on divorce as well as the ease of divorce in Islam deviate towards the extreme, while Jewish divorce-law represents the perfect mean. 52 It is very likely that the common denominator is the essence of humans or, alternatively, the essence of human society, 53 and hence one can sense from this passage clear support for the existence of a universal natural law. Even if we say that accepted norms among Christians or Muslims suit their cultural and On this see Guide III:49. In the continuation of this chapter, we will see that it is likely that there is another common denominator.

52 53

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historical condition, according to this passage, Maimonides would say that the historical and social condition of the Jews made them better than the other religions and therefore they can observe those laws that are most appropriate for natural human morality, while other peoples cannot. Support for this interpretation can be seen in Maimonides’ words just before the passage quoted above, where he states that the Torah is eternal (daima), 54 and moreover, that the Law of Moses is the ultimate perfection of all laws – a position that jibes well with his claim regarding the Torah’s eternity. Indeed, if the Torah depended at all on historical and cultural context, it should in principle change according to historical and cultural changes, and yet in many places, 55 Maimonides clearly states that the Eternity is one of the more prominent characteristics of natural law according to some thinkers. On this see Cicero’s De Republica, Book III; De Legibus, Books I–III. For his position on Eternity see Asmis 2008. 55 Inter alia: Yesodei HaTorah 9:1–2 (where he says things very close to Guide II:39), Laws of Repentance 3:8, and Laws of Kings 12:1–2. On the equating of the laws of the Torah with the laws of nature, both of which are based on God’s wisdom, see Guide III:49, where Maimonides states that it is impossible to understand all of the reasons for the Torah’s commandments, just as it is impossible to understand the full wisdom of God in the creation of nature. In this chapter, Maimonides does not explicitly assert the eternity of the Torah, but it can certainly be inferred from the comparison with the laws of nature. For example, near the beginning of the chapter, we see that Maimonides connects the fact that it is impossible to understand all the reasons for the laws of nature to the power of God’s wisdom. Then, at the end of the chapter, he connects this natural limitation to our understanding to the fact that he – and by extension, all people – do not know the entirety of the historical circumstances that existed at the time of the giving of the Torah, and hence we cannot understand the necessity of every single commandment. Guide II:28 can also be understood as implying that Maimonides equates the laws of the Torah with the laws of nature in that he states there that both will never change. On this see Haddad 2011, which notes that this chapter can also be understood as dealing exclusively with the laws of nature. On the eternity of the Torah versus the need for courts to issue injunctions and accommodations in accordance with changing circumstances see Guide III:41. In this chapter you can see that for Maimonides, the Torah remains eternal, apparently because it is 54

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Torah will not ever change, even in the days of the Messiah. One can certainly understand from these statements of Maimonides that the eternity of the Torah stems from his opinion that it is perfectly matched to the essence of human society, and not to one fleeting historical period or another. To the list of passages that support the contention that the Torah’s laws are part of natural law, certain passages can be added in which Maimonides speaks of the practical commandments of the Torah as ‘truth’. According to the division we saw above, the truth is eternal and deals only with the sciences, while most of the practical laws of the Torah deal with accepted notions which can only be classified as good, but never as true per se. From this division we learned about the relativity of Torah laws and their dependence on human consensus and culture. By contrast, we see that in some places Maimonides uses the word ‘truth’ to describe the practical commandments of the Torah, and not just its beliefs. 56 Now at the end of the Laws of Repentance in perfectly suited to the human condition. However, Maimonides, just as the Sages of the Talmud, recognized the need to add and even temporarily suspend some of the laws of the Torah in accordance with historical circumstances. Support for this position can also be seen in III:54 where, after stating that Torah law must be suitable for society at large, but not for every individual, Maimonides notes that: For this reason, matters that are primarily intended in the Law ought not to be dependent on time or place; but the decrees ought to be absolute and universal, according to what He, may He be exalted, says: “As for the congregation, there shall be one statute (huqqah) for you.” (Num. 15:15) This is how Ross (1980) understood this chapter. In my opinion, this passage cannot be used as evidence for the eternity of the Torah because, according to its context (and especially the sentence that follows it), Maimonides’ intention is to point out that the laws of the Torah do not address specific times or individuals, but rather the common good. In other words, the Torah relates to the times and places of its adherents as a whole, but not to individual adherents. 56 There are also many more passages in which Maimonides describes the Jewish religion as truth, without specifying whether its truth is related to its actions or beliefs. For examples, see Epistle to Yemen, p. 19 and the following five halakhot from the Mishneh Torah: Laws of Hametz and

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his Mishneh Torah, Maimonides describes the person who keeps the commandments out of love: He who serves [God] out of love studies the Torah and performs its commandments and walks in the paths of wisdom – not because of anything in the world, nor because of the fear of evil, nor to derive any personal benefit – but rather he [i.e. the servant of G-d] does the truth because He [i.e. God Himself] is truth; and ultimately benefit comes along in a general way. 57

From this proposition one can learn that in Maimonides’ opinion, doing the commandments is somehow implementing the truth and not simply doing something good. The practical benefit that arises from the commandments exists, however one who serves God out of love does not keep the commandments because of this benefit, but rather solely due to this love. In Maimonides’ opinion, the love of God emerges as a consequence of having scientific information that causes a person to know God and immediately feel love for Him. If these acquired bits of knowledge cause a person to do the commandments as well, one can learn from this that following the commandments is also a kind of exact science. 58

SUMMARY OF INTRA-TEXTUAL TENSION AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

So far, we have seen that there are passages in the Guide that pull in opposite directions as to Maimonides’ position on the question of natural law. On the one hand, the definition of most of the practical commandments as accepted notions along with Maimonides providing reasons for these commandments both point to the dependence of the Torah’s commandments on the unique history of the Jews and thus support the view that Maimonides did not believe in natural law but rather a relative morality determined Matzah 7:4; Laws of Gifts to the Poor 10:1; Hilkhot Hagigah 3:1 and 3:6; and Laws of Kings and Wars 4:10. 57 Laws of Repentance 10:2 (10:3 in some editions). 58 It should be noted that this reading is diametrically opposed to that of Heinemann and Ben-Sasson.

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by social norms that themselves depend on local historical circumstances. On the other hand, Maimonides’ statements that the laws of the Torah are the best of all existing laws indicate that there is an ability to compare different laws on the basis of some common denominator; this common basis eliminates their relativity and dependence on changing historical conditions. To this must also be added Maimonides’ repeated statements about the eternity of the Torah and his determination that the observance of its commandments is in the nature of “doing the truth.” All of these latter aspects of Maimonides’ writing point to the universal and super-temporal validity of the commandments.

THE ESOTERIC-SOLUTION OPTION

One of the options available in resolving this type of apparent contradiction in the Guide is to assume that we’ve encountered the seventh type of contradiction described towards the end of the Guide’s preface, 59 which is where Maimonides declares his intention to use contradictions in his work – contradictions whose purpose is, among other things, to conceal certain truths, presumably to prevent confusion or even disbelief for those who are unable to grasp one or more of these truths. According to this approach to reading Maimonides, where one perceives contradictions in his words, the reader or researcher should try to see which of the contradictory positions is correct and which was written for political and educational reasons only. Given the controversial nature of proposing that the Torah’s ethics are only relative and also how confusing such an approach would be for the non-philosophically minded student, it’s reasonable to For different ways of interpreting this particular contradiction, see the first chapter of this book. Here I will mainly refer to the positions of Strauss and those of his ilk, who see the purpose of this contradiction being concealment out of political reasons, while I will refer less to the positions of Lorberbaum and Fox, who see the contradiction as serving as a dialectical mechanism whose main purpose is to point out various implications of philosophical problems that cannot be resolved. However, this uneven treatment notwithstanding, what I write in opposition to the first position is equally valid regarding the latter position.

59

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MAIMONIDES: A RADICAL RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHER

presume that Maimonides’ statements that the Torah contains an eternal law that is also the best law reflect the exoteric politicaleducational aspect of his writings, while those statements in favor of relative morality better reflect Maimonides’ true intention. One can easily understand why Maimonides would choose to conceal a position that supports relative morality and the dependence of the commandments on history and the time of their giving. This position can be dangerous for the political and social integrity of the masses in that it abolishes the absolute supremacy of the commandments, thereby undermining the motivation of the masses to remain observant, for if the common person should come to think that the commandments depend on the consensus of human beings, they might be tempted to change the norms according to the whims of each individual or of various communities, or even to convert to another religion that seems more attractive and/or less burdensome. Since the masses, and even many of the sages by their own admission, tend to follow their lusts, open moral relativism would invite the wholesale changing of the commandments according to their passions, and in so doing eliminate one of the main purposes of the practical laws of the Torah: 60 fighting lusts and controlling them. Thus, according to this explanation of the political-educational reasons for needing to conceal certain problematic truths, Maimonides overtly and unequivocally declared the eternity and absolute truth of the Torah, while in other places he issued more complex statements that if read closely support what I argue is his true relativist position. It would thus seem that his goal in mostly but not entirely concealing his true position was to get the masses to continue to keep the commandments for the sake of political integrity on the one hand, while on the other hand hinting to the educated reader what his true position was. 61

60 61

Guide III:33 For a different solution in the same spirit see Levinger 1990.

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THE REJECTION OF THE ESOTERIC SOLUTION AND THE RESOLUTION OF TENSION VIA GENERAL HUMAN HISTORY

Although the esoteric solution is certainly possible, in my humble opinion it should not be used frivolously. 62 The esoteric solution should be preserved for cases where there is an essential contradiction between two opinions written or arising from the words of Maimonides. Examples of contradictions of this kind, which certainly justify the use of the esoteric solution, are the creation of the world vs. its eternity, the attainment of the World to Come, or various passages of Maimonides treating the miraculous providence of God. 63 In contrast, the contradiction in our case is different. Maimonides never clearly states his support for natural law but does declare the eternity of the Torah while stating that the laws of the Torah of Moses are superior to all other nations’ laws. Do these two things necessarily contradict his opinion regarding the dependence of moral laws on history and the conditions existing at the time of the establishment of those laws? As we have seen, it is common to answer the above question in the affirmative. How can a morality that modulates itself in accordance with historical conditions also be absolutely good and eternal? But in the case of general world history it is certainly possible, for the principled negation of natural law and the dependence of all social norms on historical and cultural The danger of excessive application of the esoteric solution without a palpable reason is that doing so will obviously lead to every so-inclined researcher reading his own peculiar ideas into the text of Maimonides, and indeed this happens all too often in my opinion. That said, it is always possible to harmonize Maimonides’ “chapter headings” and other hints with what one understands to be the philosophical truth and assert that any statements of Maimonides that seem to support a different position (even if they are much more numerous and much clearer than the hints) were written only in order to mislead the uneducated reader in a reassuring manner vis a vis the religious tradition. As we saw in the first chapter of this book, this is the manner of reading the Guide that Maimonides intentionally made possible. Nevertheless, the goal of the Maimonides researcher is to try to understand what Maimonides’ actual opinion was based on the totality of his words, and not to impose any external philosophical positions on him. 63 We will return to this point in the book’s conclusion. 62

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conditions does not necessarily negate the supremacy of Torah over the legal systems of other peoples, nor do they disprove the Torah’s eternal nature – and this is precisely Maimonides’ historical position. 64 Here is how Maimonides describes the situation at the time, following Abraham’s monotheistic propaganda against the opinion of the Sabians: No one is antagonistic to him [Abraham] or ignorant of his greatness except the remnants of this religious community that has perished, remnants that survive in the extremities of the earth, as for instance the infidels among the Turks in the extreme North and the Hindus in the extreme South. These are the remnants of the religious community of the Sabians, for this was a religious community that extended over the whole earth. 65

For him, the Sabians 66 were a worldwide religion of idolaters whose customs were followed in all parts of the known world at that time. After thousands of years of evolution of monotheistic religions starting from the time of Abraham, the Sabians remained isolated at the furthest reaches of civilization. This worldwide history allows Maimonides to bridge the gap between morality that depends on history on the one hand, and the supremacy of the Torah over the laws of the other religions on the other. In the context of a universal human condition of Sabian idolatry that dominated the whole world, Abraham, 67 by the power of his mind, 68 arose and discovered the truth about the essence of On Maimonides’ historical conception see Baron 1935, Funkenstein 1970, Ross 1980, and Ben-Sasson 1980. 65 Guide III:29. The original Judeo-Arabic: ‫ולא מכ'אלף עליה ולא ג'אהל בעט'מתה אלא בקאיא תלך אלמל אלמתדמרה‬ ‫אלד'ין בקוא פי אקאצי אלארץ' מת'ל כאפר תרך פי אקצי אלשמל ואלהנוד פי‬ ‫ לאנהא כאנת מלה אעמת‬,‫אקצי אלג'נוב פאן האולא הם בקאיא מלה' אלצאבה‬ .'‫אלארץ‬ 66 See especially Guide III:29. 67 For Maimonides’ explanation of the development of idolatry and the discovery of philosophical truth by Abraham see Laws of Idolatry, chapter 1, and Guide III:29. 68 Here I will describe a naturalistic picture of Maimonides’ conception of prophecy. Unfortunately, the parameters of this book do not allow for 64

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God. He formed a group of believers who espoused the philosophical truth, but this group was nearly irradicated in Egypt. Then arose Moses and realized that in order to overcome the mistake of the Sabians, the philosophical truth is not enough, and that there must also be practical commandments to supplement philosophy. The purpose of these practical commandments is to provide social integrity without compromising on the philosophical war on the Sabians’ beliefs. Since Sabian idolatry was common to the whole world, it followed that the laws of the Torah of Moses should address the cultural and historical background of all mankind. 69 Thus, the Torah can at once be dependent on history yet at the same time be superior to all the laws of all other peoples. Regarding the eternity of the Torah, I agree with Funkenstein 70 that in Maimonides’ opinion, the human race is not either a proper analysis of Maimonides’ position on prophecy or a careful refutation of the opposing positions. On Maimonides’ approach to prophecy see Kreisel 2001. 69 This observation sheds much light on those places where Maimonides points out laws of the Torah that subsume all nations, such as in Laws of Kings 9:1 (the seven Noahide laws) and Guide III:17 (general oppression and injustice). These commandments are relevant for all of humanity because of the historical background common to all nations, and not because of the common nature of all human beings. This can be parsed from Maimonides’ words in Laws of Kings 9:1, where he asserts that these laws are “intuitive” (‫ )הדעת נוטה להן‬yet he does not assert that people’s intuition obligates them in any way. Such an interpretation also fits with Words of Logic, chapter 8, where Maimonides writes that the correctness of generally accepted notions becomes stronger the more common these notions are. But though it is certainly possible for accepted notions to be common to all people, nevertheless, this does not of course turn them into intelligible things. In the same way we can interpret Maimonides’ words in the Eight Chapters, chapter 6, regarding commandments that are universally accepted notions. Nowadays, these notions of proper behavior exist in every human society. However, this does not mean that they arise from the nature of man, but rather that historical conditions caused their spread throughout every society. 70 This is also the position that emerges from the analysis in Ross 1980. For more on the lack of progress in the moral and philosophical state of man as a basis for the continued existence of the laws of the Torah, see Strauss 1965. For a somewhat different take that explains the eternity of

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advanced and therefore, because of the danger of returning to idolatry as it was in pre-Abrahamic times, one should continue to keep the commandments even though some may seem outdated. 71 Moreover, Maimonides’ statement that the observance of the commandments is true can be explained according to the position we have proposed: if one takes into account the historical situation of all peoples, one can come to the conclusion that observance of commandments is for him a scientific truth. This is so, not because of a natural law that stems from the essence of man, but because the Jewish religion is best suited to meet the common historical needs of all human beings due to their having a common historical background. 72 Other religions, such as Islam and Christianity, are less suited to universal human history than Judaism, and as such are less good. One can certainly argue against this position by noting that Maimonides knew that the Sabians did not really exist throughout the whole world, and that he only used them as another kind of exoteric screen to conceal deeper truths. According to this claim, the wise reader should understand that Maimonides did not really believe in the worldwide rule of the Sabians, and therefore did not really support the supremacy of the Torah. However, in my opinion, this claim lacks any textual basis in the words of Maimonides and therefore constitutes a serious infraction of reading into Maimonides one’s own opinion. From all the above it can be concluded that, in principle, Maimonides advocated a very basic natural law, limited to the biological consequences of certain acts, and that most laws of religions and peoples (including to not kill or steal) are relative and dependent on history and culture. Despite this, on a practical level, Maimonides thought that all of humanity shares a common historical background and that therefore it is certainly possible to the laws of the Torah in the Guide as referring to the need to study the Torah even if one chooses not to observe its commandments (where they are deemed to lack modern historical relevance) see Lemler 2010. 71 To this can be added the influence of history on human awareness. 72 Of course, it is certainly also possible to use the esoteric solution in this case and say that Rambam states that keeping the commandments is a form of truth because he wants the masses of the people to think so.

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level laws of different peoples and religions according to their pertinence to historical circumstances and suitability to social needs. The supremacy of the laws of the Torah does not therefore stem from their adaptation to natural law, but from their adaptation to the historical common background to all human beings.

CONCLUSION GENERAL CHAPTER SUMMARY

In the first chapter of the book, I set out to analyze Maimonides’ esoteric methods as found in his various writings, and to present his unique goals in writing the Guide. In this chapter we saw that Maimonides uses the Guide to address two different audiences: His foremost audience was of course the perplexed philosophers, who have a clear philosophical position. These philosophers want to continue to practice Judaism but think there is a contradiction between religion and philosophy. For these readers, Maimonides makes it possible to view their own philosophical positions within the Guide – including even what Maimonides considered to be erroneous views – and ultimately to learn Maimonides’ method of plumbing the depths of the Torah. Maimonides’ main goal for these philosophers is to enable them to maintain the correction of the body politic – that is, to maintain the religious system that is a necessary condition for the existence of a moral society, 1 without having to decide between their metaphysical views and their moral position. Thus, the Guide is written in such a way as to allow every philosopher to see in the secrets it contains as well as in the secrets of the Torah Maimonides’ true philosophical positions. To these kinds of thinkers who can understand esoteric ideas, Maimonides does not wish to teach more philosophy because they have sufficient philosophical knowledge and, 397F

This observation appeared in Chapter 4 as well. Also, and as noted earlier in the book, Maimonides’ phrase “‫ ”תיקון הגוף‬refers to improving society at large, not one’s body. In light of this, the word ‘‫ ’גוף‬is here translated as “body politic”. 1

181

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moreover, in his opinion there are enough books dealing with philosophy. The main innovation of the Guide is in the interpretive tools offered by Maimonides through which philosophy and religion become one. Maimonides’ other intended audience in the Guide was the student seeking the philosophical truth. This type of student lacks a cohesive philosophical position, and therefore the Guide needs to accompany him in his search for that truth, which for Maimonides is identical with the religious truth. To fulfill this mission, Maimonides had to cautiously allude to the philosophical truth without causing other, less advanced students to outright deny the fundamental religious beliefs before he is philosophically prepared to do so in coherent manner that replaces the simplistic religious beliefs with more sophisticated ones rather than with irreligious ones. Put more simply, Maimonides did not wish to risk having any student misunderstand him and consequently deny the Torah on all levels and abandon observance of its commandments. The main innovation of the Guide for these students is in the philosophical and religious positions that Maimonides takes. Writing intentional contradictions into the Guide was, in my view, necessary for properly communicating with both types of readers via a unitary text that would be made public for all to read. For the perplexed philosopher, being alerted to the contradictions in the book is necessary so that this reader will be able to discern his own philosophical positions in the Guide. By contrast, for the students of philosophy, the contradictions are necessary so that each student can understand the Guide according to his or her philosophical level. In order to determine the true positions of Maimonides, the modern researcher has to trace the clues that are intended for the student philosopher, even though in terms of his or her philosophical knowledge and positions, the same researcher is often more akin to a perplexed philosopher. In the final three chapters of the book, I provided examples of the method I described in the first chapter, and analyzed three major relevant issues in the Guide. Here is the breakdown of that:

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In the second chapter we dealt with the issue of human choice. I tried to show that an analysis of Maimonides’ words reveals a position that supports real free choice in humans, with the freedom stemming from the power on thought (‫)פכר‬, which is a unique power in humans, and not on will or the mere power to choose, which are powers common to both man and God, and even to the heavenly spheres. The third chapter dealt with determining to what extent theoretical opinions could be learned from the generally accepted notions. There I argued that in Maimonides’ opinion, there is a clear distinction in both the Treatise on Logic and the Guide between the realm of generally accepted notions and the realm of sensations and intellectual apprehension. In his opinion, it is impossible to learn out the correctness or even partial correctness of any given theoretical position simply because it is well received by one group or another; only theoretical proofs can be used as a bellwether of factual truth. In contrast, morality by definition depends on the changing norms of each and every society. Therefore, in Maimonides, the division of sources of information (evidence versus ideas publicized among one group or another of human beings) overlaps with the division of topics with which that very same information deals (scientific inquiry versus morality). In the fourth chapter, we dealt with the question of natural morality. I tried to show that Maimonides advocates a very basic natural morality, repudiating both the pursuit of lust as a goal as well as the committing of acts that physically harm a person’s body or mind. Within these broad fixed boundaries, Maimonides advocates a relative morality where there is no connection between the nature of humans or society and their preference for one set of norms or another. At the end of the chapter, I also argued that the Torah still retains a certain pre-eminence, not because of human nature, but because of the history common to the entire human species.

CONCLUSIONS: THE NATURALIST OPINION OF MAIMONIDES

In terms of the well-known controversy between the radical reading, which interprets Maimonides as a naturalist who sup-

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ports an eternal universe in which there are no miracles, and the conservative reading, which interprets Maimonides’ explanations as supporting creation ex nihilo 2 and the existence of literal miracles, 3 the conclusion of this book supports the radical reading. 4 In summarizing how we reached this conclusion, we will first note some important points dealing with the implications of what we saw in the book regarding the relationship between God and the world and the sources of authority of theoretical knowledge, and then we will look at the implications concerning the essence of religion and its connection to philosophy. One of the most prominent controversies between these two readings surrounds the question of the creation of the world. The controversy surrounding the creation of the world also focuses within it the bulk of the controversy regarding miracles, providence, and prophecy. According to the positions of those who believe that the universe was created, the will of God is active and changing – for if He changed at the moment of creation (from ‘No, I do not want to create the world’ to ‘Yes, I want to create the world’), it follows that He can change in general – thereby making possible providence, miracles, and active participation of God in prophecy. 5 By contrast, if the activity of God is constant, uniform, and stems from His essence, then this would indicate an eternal universe, with no possibility of 401F

Mainly Guide II:13–31. An excellent summary of the dispute regarding the creation of the world in particular, as well as various readings of Maimonides in general, see Lemler 2015. 3 For example, Guide II:29 4 It should be noted that for the purposes of keeping the book focused, I did not review all of the possible ramifications of the radical reading versus the conservative reading of the Guide. Accordingly, I only review here the implications of the issues we have raised in the book regarding the dispute between the radical and conservative readings of Maimonides. A detailed summary, or even just a partial one, of all the various radical and conservative positions and their underlying proofs would require several volumes. 5 Or at the very least, the right of veto regarding who may acquire the ability of prophecy (as per the apparent meaning of the relevant passage in Guide II:32. 2

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changing His will to implement divine providence or to perform miracles. 6 One of the secondary arguments for the position that Maimonides believed in creation is his explicit and clear words in the chapters dealing with creation that the will of God can motivate itself without any external cause (see especially II:18), such that the act of creation does not inherently negate God’s immutable essence. There in II:18, Maimonides states that “the true reality and the quiddity of the will means: to will and not to will.” 7 Now according to what we saw in the second chapter’s indepth analysis of the human psychic forces as per Maimonides’ view, the will is not the source of human freedom. The will of the heavenly bodies and of animals is in fact only the end of a process that is decided by an internal, deterministic mechanism (in the case of the heavenly bodies: their wisdom; in that of animals: their instincts). This position of Maimonides proves that he did not believe that the existence of a will in an intelligent being ensures freedom of choice. Maimonides therefore rightly concluded that what makes man free is not his will but his thought (‫)פכר‬. As such, man’s will is also only an executive force. However, there is a difference in that human will is part of a 6 Maimonides in Guide II:25 clearly annunciates the philosophical ramifications of believing in the eternity of the universe vis a vis providence and miracles. On the one hand, there in II:25 he explicitly teaches (though I would argue with many intentional internal contradictions) that the universe was created ex nihilo. On the other hand, those who read this chapter with the esoteric understanding that Maimonides did not really believe in creation (as the apparent contradictions would seem to indicate) also note how Maimonides explains how miracles and providence operate without any change in God (inasmuch as these phenomena are actually part of God’s eternal nature). According to the radical researchers and commentators, these examples of apparently emergent phenomenon that are nonetheless the work of an immutable Being are supposed to hint to the insightful reader that Maimonides did not espouse the ideas that he presented in simplistic, conservative form in the chapter, but rather that he believed in the eternity of the universe. 7 According to the plain meaning of the Guide in II:18, this is the only explanation of the creation ex nihilo of the various heavenly bodies that does not entail a change in the divine essence.

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process in man’s soul that is not as deterministic as that of the animals or the Spheres, precisely because intellectual reflection is involved. The conclusion that follows from the above observations is that a close analysis of Maimonides’ discussion of the forces of the soul reveals that he did not mean literally what he wrote about the freedom of God’s will. If Maimonides really wanted to attribute to God freedom, he would attribute to him thought and not will – something which he completely refrained from doing in every single one of his books. The careful reader of Maimonides’ words should come away with the understanding that the will is not of itself free, and therefore Maimonides does not actually believe in his words that ‘the will is His nature to want or not to want’. 8 These words were written only for educational purposes to enable a student who is not yet mature enough to understand that God acts only in a regular natural way to continue thinking that God watches over every action and performs miracles – a traditional belief which is probably psychologically necessary for the uninitiated to continue keeping the commandments of the religion. Another significant point regarding the tension between the conservative reading and the radical reading is the question of the theory of cognition, which we discussed in the third chapter. Conservative readers claim that Maimonides held a series of positions stemming from the plain meaning of the Scriptures. They rely on Maimonides himself unequivocally stating that the simple meaning of the Scriptures should be accepted as truth provided there are no contradictions between the simple meaning and demonstrative proofs (Guide II:25). Maimonides relied heavily – particularly regarding the question of the creation of the world – on the Scriptures and on the prophetic tradition (see for example Guide II:23). However, despite the explicitly conservative statements of Maimonides, we saw in the third chapter that the in-depth reader of Maimonides’ words will necessarily conclude that he did not Regarding the essence of God, in general I agree with the understanding of Nuriel 2000, pp. 41–63. 8

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consider it defensible to determine from the popular beliefs of this or that group of people what the truth is regarding theoretical questions. These popular beliefs depend on social agreements and not on the actual nature of the world. Therefore, one might argue that in Maimonides’ opinion, a person must acknowledge the creation of the world because of the social and moral consequences of openly preaching eternity of the universe. Whatever the precise reason for Maimonides exoteric support of creation, nevertheless one must take into account that fact that in his own opinion, it is impossible to learn correct philosophical ideas at all from tradition or from the promulgation of various concepts among one group or another. Such an appreciation of Maimonides’ theory of cognition effectively nullifies the central argument of the conservative readers of the Guide of the Perplexed.

BETWEEN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

In the first chapter we saw that the purpose of Maimonides in his addressing the perplexed philosophers is to allow them to remain committed to their religion despite those philosophical views of theirs that contradict the simple meaning of Scripture. In addition, Maimonides also tries to guide the student readers of the Guide to general philosophical truth in accordance with the level of each reader. One can learn from these two goals two important things about the relationship between religion and philosophy according to Maimonides. First of all, Maimonides knows that it is of paramount importance that every person (or at least every Jew) keep the commandments of the religion regardless of their philosophical views, which is why he wants to allow all the perplexed thinkers to read their views into his book, and from reading the Guide to learn how to see their philosophical views in the Torah as well. It is clear that there is a religious truth – identical with the philosophical truth – which he tried to instill in the student readers, each according to their philosophical level. The significance of the above observations becomes clear from what we saw in the third and fourth chapters. In the fourth chapter we saw that in Maimonides’ view, the well-known notions, i.e. social norms, which for religious Jews are identical with the commandments, rein in a person’s passions and are

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therefore a moral necessity. Without those social norms, the majority of people would likely choose to give in to their physical desires and consciously give up the directives of the intellect, much as Adam ignored his intellect when he ate from the fruit of the tree. Thus, the limits of natural morality are the pursuit of the passions, such that all social and religious norms are legitimate as long as they help a person control their passions. By contrast, norms that legitimize the pursuit or glorification of lust are themselves illegitimate and cannot be considered part of true morality. The practical dimension of religion lies in the realm of wellknown notions, where natural relative morality exists and is legitimate so long as its norms rein in human lust. Maimonides’ goal is to leave the perplexed philosopher within the boundaries of religion since morality is important even if it is devoid of any philosophical truth. The integrity of the body politic is important even if it does not lead to the perfection of the individual soul. 9 It is important to emphasize that all of the above does not negate the importance of the individual knowing the philosophical truth. For Maimonides, the religious truth is the same as the philosophical truth, which leads to the love of God and to life in the World to Come. 10 This is why Maimonides wanted to guide the student to philosophical truth. However, as we have noted at several points throughout this book, Maimonides was well aware that he had essentially two different kinds of readers to address, and it is the contention of this author that Maimonides therefore simultaneously maintained two approaches that could keep both types of reader within the religious fold without undermining the basic assumptions of the readers regarding the nature of the Torah and its revelation. For the novice religious philosopher, Maimonides exoterically wrote a relatively standard conservative message in the Guide, albeit with some variations. The novice would from the start be able to understand Maimonides’ words according to their literal meaning, as per the conservative approach. At first he gains an 9

About this see Guide II:27–28 As per Mishne Torah, Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 4.

10

CONCLUSION

189

understanding of the importance of philosophy for the refinement of religious beliefs, while continuing to think that Maimonides believed in creation, miracles, and providence in the usual senses of those terms. Only after much philosophical study, complex analysis, and use of subtle inference could the once novice reader of the Guide become ready to receive what I argue is Maimonides’ esoteric and truer message. This advanced student of philosophy is the second audience Maimonides wished to address, and this probing thinker, after a close and meticulous reading of the Guide can use Maimonides’ general approach to the issues of God’s will, the source of the universe’s existence, and cognition, in order to conclude that Maimonides’ explicit words in favor of the creation of the world, miracles, and providence actually stand in contradiction to his philosophical method. This esoteric approach I believe was Maimonides’ way of developing deep thinkers without having any student’s observance of the commandments be adversely affected because the Guide of the Perplexed consistently and across all contexts and readings maintains the vital social and moral importance of the religious commandments. And yet along with this uncompromising devotion to the commandments of the Torah, I argue that Maimonides simultaneously maintained beliefs that were in line with what is called the radical position.

BIBLIOGRAPHY ANCIENT SOURCES

Abner, Ofrenda de Zelos = Abner of Burgos, Ofrenda de zelos, W. Mettman (ed.), Opladen, 1990. Abraham Ibn-Daoud, Ha-Emunah ha-Ramah, Frankfurt am Main Weil, S. (ed.), 1852. Al-Farabi, An Enumeration of the Sciences = Abū Nasr al-Fārābī, Le recensement des sciences, A. Cherni (commentary and transl.), Beyrout, 2015. Al-Farabi, Aphorisms of the Statesman = Al-Farabi, Fusul al-madani; Aphorisms of the statesman. Edited with an English translation, introduction and notes by D. M. Dunlop, New York, 1961. Al-Farabi, Dialectics = ‫ اﺑﻮ ﻧﺼﺮ اﻟﻔﺎراﺑﻲ ﻛﺘﺎب اﻻﻟﻔﺎظ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻌﻤﻠﺔ ﻓﻰ اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻖ ؛‬, ‫ ﺣﻘﻘﮫ وﻗﺪم ﻟﮫ‬A.M. Mahdi, Beirut, 1982. Al-Farabi, Introduction to Logic = D. M. Dunlop, ‘Al-Farabi’s Introductory Sections on Logic,’ Islamic Quarterly 2 (1955): 264–82. Al-Farabi, Kitab al-Jadal = ‫ ﻛﺘﺎب اﻟﺠﺪل‬: In ‫ ﺗﺄﻟﯿﻒ أﺑﻲ‬/ ‫اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻖ ﻋﻨﺪ اﻟﻔﺎراﺑﻲ‬

‫ﻧﺼﺮ ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﺑﻦ ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﺑﻦ طﺮﺧﺎن اﺑﻦ اوزﻟﻎ اﻟﻤﻌﺮوف ﺑﺎﻟﻔﺎراﺑﻲ ؛ ﺗﺤﻘﯿﻖ وﺗﻘﺪرﯾﻢ‬ ‫ ﺑﯿﺮوت‬,‫ ’وﺗﻌﻠﯿﻖ رﻓﯿﻖ اﻟﻌﺠﻢ‬Volume III (1985), pp.13-107.

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Aristotle. Nichomachean Ethics = Aristotle, Ethique a nicomaque, J. Barthelemy (transl.), Paris, 1992. Ibn Sina, Kitab al Shifa’ = Avicenna’s De Anima: Being the Psychological Part of Kitâb Al-Shifâ’, F. Rahman, London, 1959. Maimonides, Commentary on the Mishnah, R. J. Qafih (Heb. transl. and ed.), Jerusalem, 1965. Maimonides, Eight Chapters, in: Ethical Writings of Maimonides, R. L. Weiss with C. E. Butterworth (eds.), New York, 1975. Maimonides, Epistle to Yemen, R. J. Qafih (Heb. transl.), Jerusalem, 1994. Maimonides, Guide = The Guide of the Perplexed, S. Pines (Eng. transl.), Chicago, 1963. Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, 12 vols., S. Frankel (ed.), Jerusalem, 2000. Maimonides, Words of Logic, I. Efros (Eng.transl), New York, 1938. Saadya, Amânât wal-i’tiqâdât (The Book of Doctrines and Beliefs) in Three Jewish Philosophers, A. Altmann (Eng. transl. and ed.), H. Lewy and I. Heinemann (eds.), New York, 1985. Yehuda Halevi, ‫כתאב אלרד ואלדליל פי אלדין אלד'ליל )אלכתאב‬ (‫ אלכ'זרי( – ספר המענה והראיה על אודות הדת המושפלת‬The Kuzari), Ben-Shammai (ed.), Jerusalem, 1977

MODERN SOURCES

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Faur 1998 = J. Faur, Homo Mysticus – A Guide to Maimonides’s Guide of the Perplexed, Syracuse, 1998. Fox 1972 = M. Fox, “Maimonides and Aquinas on Natural Law”, Dine Israel III (1972): v–xxxvi. Fox 1979 = M. Fox, “The Doctrine of the Mean in Aristotle and Maimonides: A Comparative Study”, in: Studies in Jewish Religious and Intellectual History, S. Stein and R. Loewe (ed.), London, 1979, pp. 93–120. Fox 1990 = M. Fox, “A New View of Maimonides’ Method of Contradiction”, in: Interpreting Maimonides: Studies in Methodology, Metaphysic and Moral Philosophy, idem (ed.), Chicago and London, 1990, pp. 67–90. Fraenkel 2007 = C. Fraenkel, From Maimonides to Samuel ibn Tibbon. The Transformation of the Dalālat al-Hā’irīn into the Moreh ha-Nevukhim, Jerusalem, 2007, pp. 186–202. (Heb.) Frank 1989 = D. H. Frank, “Humility as a Virtue: A Maimonidean Critique of Aristotle’s Ethics”, in: Moses Maimonides and his Time, E. L. Ormsby (ed.), Washington 1989, pp. 89–99. Frank 2000 = D. H. Frank. ‘“With all your Heart and with all your Soul…’: The Moral Psychology of the Shemonah Peraqim”, in: Maimonides and the Sciences, H. Levine and R. S. Cohen (eds.), Dordrecht, Netherlands, 2000, pp. 25–33. Frank 2002 = D. H. Frank, “The Development of Maimonides’ Moral Psychology”, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 76 (2002): 89–106. Freudenthal 2004 = G. Freudenthal, “La déterminationpartielle, biologique etclimatologique, de la félicitéhumaine: Maimonide versus al-Färäbī a propos des influences célestes”, in: Maimonide philosophe et savant (1138–1204), T. Levy and R. Rashed (eds.), Leuven, Belgium, 2004, pp. 79–129. (Fr.) Fraenkel 2012 = C. Fraenkel, Philosophical Religions from Plato to Spinoza: Reason, Religion, and Autonomy, Cambridge, UK, 2012. Galston 1978 = M. Galston, “The Purpose of the Law According to Maimonides”, Jewish Quarterly Review 69 (1978): 27–51. Gellman 1989 = J. Gellman, “Freedom and Determinism in Maimonides’ Philosophy”, in: Moses Maimonides and His Time, E. L. Ormsby (ed.), Washington 1989: 139–150.

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INDEX in Maimonides’ halakhic works 22, 24–25, 27– 28, 35–36, 69, 73 Maimonides’ use of the term xi (translator’s note) Choice animal’s 78, 96, 101, 105, see also will, animal divine 94, 96, 100 human 77–78, 82–84, 88– 89, 94–99, 104–105, 112, 116, 118, 183, 185 mechanism of choice 77, 82–83, 88–92, 94 Christian 1, 6, 11, 13, 164 Christianity 5, 6, 112, 177 Christians 5, 169 commandment/s [of Judaism] 2–3, 9–10, 30–32, 34, 54, 59–60, 64, 87–88, 90, 110, 134, 141–142, 149, 151–152, 157, 159–161, 163–166, 171–172, 174, 177–178, 181, 186–187, 189, see also Torah, law/s of Commentary on the Mishnah 17, 19, 22, 24, 26–27, 31, 33, 35, 39, 41–43, 73, 77–78

Abraham 14, 110, 138, 146, 176 Account of Creation 22–25, 38, 40, 62 Account of the Chariot 22–26, 38, 40, 62 Adam, original sin of 82–83, 100, 112–117, 141, 157, 159–161, 188 Al-Farabi 6, 20, 83, 87, 96, 106, 120–121, 124–132, 134–135, 142, 145, 147 Altmann, A. 77–79, 94, 97, 99 Aristotle 6, 9, 27, 80, 83, 86, 90–91, 120–124, 127–128, 130–131, 134, 136–137, 145, 147 Avicenna (Ibn Sina) 20, 27, 96, 106, 120 Catholicism 5 Catholic 169 Catholics 5, 169 “chapter headings” (rashei p’raqim) 175 in Guide of the Perplexed 36– 37, 43, 46, 69

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contradictions 175, 186 in Guide of the Perplexed 14– 18, 38, 44, 49–52, 54–55, 67–70, 73, 173, 181 creation (of the world) 45, 77, 101, 119, 145–146, 175, 184–187, 189 deliberation 84–90, 92–94, 102–104, 106–107, 109–111, 117 determinism 77–82, 91, 97–99, 100–102, 104, 106, 111–112, 115–118, 186 causative 82, 91, 94–95 dialectic/s, (‫ )ג'דל‬120, 122– 128, 130–131, 145–146, 173 (divine) providence 2, 6, 27, 34, 45, 47, 54, 105, 136, 156, 175, 184–185, 189 Eight Chapters 60, 83–94, 96, 110–112, 115–116, 162, 165 esoteric concealment 25–26, 28, 30, 33, 51–52, 173–179, 181 in Guide of the Perplexed 18, 35–37, 43, 54, 57, 68–69, 71, 181, 189 in Maimonides’ halakhic works 18–22, 24–26, 28, 30, 33, 35–38, 43, 54, 68 esotericism, see esoteric concealment eternal universe [as opposed to creation of the world] 184 eternity of universe [as opposed to creation of the world] 27, 185, 187

Ethics of the Fathers, introduction to, see Eight Chapters Eve 116–117, 158 existence of God 6, 26–27, 30 Fox, M. 150–151, 156, 173 free will 3, 77–83, 91, 93–95, 105–106 Fraenkel, C. 11 Gellman, J. 78–80, 93, 94–95 (generally) accepted notions (mash'hurath) (‫ )משהוראת‬3, 50, 60, 119–147, 157–162, 165, 171, 177, 183 in Eight Chapters 162 in Guide of the Perplexed 135–145, 157, 183 in Words of Logic 131–135, 157, 183 God’s will 96 Guide of the Perplexed and modern scholar 72–75 instructions to reader 43– 48, 50–51, 54, 62–64, 69– 71 mash’hurath in, see mash’hurath not for certain readers 65 on intellectual purpose of commandments 165 popularity for Jewish and non-Jewish thinkers 13 purpose of Guide 2, 13, 36, 54, 56–58, 62–75 target audiences main: perplexed thinker 57–67, 72–74, 181– 182, 187–188

INDEX secondary: novice philosopher 64–67, 69–72, 182, 187–189 third category: intermediate reader 67–68 Ibn Tibbon, Shmuel 46, 48, 52 immateriality of God 26 intellect 32–33, 58, 81–82, 88, 113–114, 188 practical 82, 88, 91, 99– 100, 115, 117 theoretical 81–82, 88–89, 91–92, 94, 97, 99–100, 107, 109–111, 116–117 intelligible truth 161 irrefutable proof (‫ )ברהאן‬120, 122–123, 127, 130, 145–146 Islam 6, 167, 169, 177 Klein-Braslavy, S. 22–23, 25– 26, 30, 40, 82 knowledge of God 82, 91–93, 116 Law/s of (the Torah of) Moses 167–168, 170, 175, 177, 179, see also commandments [of Judaism] laws of nature 170 Lorberbaum, Y. 15–16, 20, 38– 40, 47, 49, 52–53, 173 love of God 24, 142, 151, 172, 188 metaphor in Guide of the Perplexed 26, 36–38, 40–41, 43, 52, 69 in Maimonides’ halakhic works 22, 24, 28–37, 41–43, 69, 73

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lightning metaphor in Guide of the Perplexed 37, 40, 53–54 miracles 9, 27, 47, 184–186, 189 Mishneh Torah 17, 19, 23–25, 27–28, 35–36, 41–43, 73, 78, 81 Moses 28–30, 33–34, 93, 138, 144, 146, 153–156, 166–167, 177 Muhammad 167 Muslim 11, 121, 135–136, 144, 169 Muslims 5, 169 Nachmanides 6 natural law 149–154, 157, 160–164, 166, 168–172, 175, 177–179 natural morality 3, 120, 183, 188 neo-platonic approach to divine emanation 77 neo-Platonists 61 Noah 153–156 Noahide Commandments (seven commandments of the sons of Noah) 153-156, 162, 177 Nuriel, A. 80, 84, 88, 95, 106– 107 Perek Cheilek 22, 26, 31–32, 34 Pharaoh 93 philosophical-religious stream of thought definition 8 religion as crucial for humanity 8

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MAIMONIDES: A RADICAL RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHER

philosophy basic definition 4 relationship with religion 7 streams in philosophy 5 subversive character of 4 Pines, S. 15, 48–49, 53, 58, 72, 77–79, 94 Plato 20, 26, 30, 143 and esoteric concealment 20, 26 and metaphors 20, 30 Quran 167 Rashi 6 Ravitsky, A. 120, 132, 134, 140, 144, 168 reflection 83–90, 92–93, 96, 102–104, 106–117, 145, 186 relationship between good and truth 120 relative morality 3, 135, 152, 157, 160, 166, 172, 174, 183, 188 religion working definition 5–6 religious conservatives 7 religious philosophers definition 7 religious philosophy definition 4 difference between conservative and radical religious philosophy 2 moderate religious versus radical religious 8–11 Righteous among the Nations 153–154, 156 Saadia Gaon 9, 152, 164–165 Sabian 136–137, 163, 177

Sabians 136, 163, 176–178 Schwarz, D. 16, 18, 48, 56, 59 Senses 5, 60, 82–83 shame 81, 94 Sokol, M. 78–80, 93–94 soul animal 83 human 23, 57, 59, 60, 81– 82 five powers active in 83–84 appetitive power 83–84, 88–90, 92, 99–102, 116 imaginative power 78, 83, 87, 92, 99, 116– 117 nutritive power 83, 87 rational power 83–87, 90, 92, 99–100, 102 two sub-categories 85 practical actions 85– 86 theoretical actions 85–86, 91–92 sentient power 83, 89– 90, 92, 117 spheres, Heavenly 25, 78, 81, 90, 94, 97–99 Spinoza 11 Stern, J. 49, 53, 79–82, 94–97, 99–100 Strauss, L. 1, 14–19, 52–54, 72, 173 syllogism/s 122–126, 145 Ten Commandments 50, 144, 158–159, 161 terse language, see “chapter headings”

INDEX theory of cognition Maimonides’ approach 3, 5, 186–187 Torah, eternity of 170–171, 173–175, 177 Torah, law/s of 148, 150–151, 170–171, see also Law/s (of the Torah) of Moses and commandments [of Judaism] truth/s 24, 30, 33–34, 37, 4041, 46, 48–55, 60, 62, 69, 74–75, 100, 114–116, 120, 122, 129, 133, 138, 140–142, 146, 158–159, 171–174, 186 absolute 129, 141–142, 158, 174 absolute intelligible 155 absolute scientific 158 absolute theoretical 142 correct 167 descriptive 160 epistemological 127 eternal 141, 171 historical 72 intelligible 155, 157–161 knowable 154

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Maimonides’ ambiguous use of term 68 metaphysical 60, 63, 154 philosophical 2, 15, 33, 35, 41, 49, 55, 63–64, 70–72, 74, 127, 147, 154, 176– 177, 182, 187–188 religious 9, 71–72, 182, 187 scientific 146, 158, 178 theoretical 142, 146 ultimate 64 universal theoretical 142 whole 69 universal human morality 152, 159, 166 will animals’ 78, 82, 96, 185 heavenly bodies 185 human 83, 94, 126, 185 Words of Logic (aka Treatise on Logic) 17, 121, 130–135, 183 World to Come 32, 153–157, 188 Yehuda Halevi 9, 164–165 Yesodei HaTorah 22–29, 34, 59