Lord Milner and the Empire : The Evolution of British Imperialism

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Lord Milner and the Empire : The Evolution of British Imperialism

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LORD

MILNER AND THE EMPIRE

.

First published in France by Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1950. First English translation published in Great Britain Odhams Press Limited, 1952, London.

Made and Printed in Great Britain by Odhams (Watford) Limited, Watford, Herts. Copyright T.652.L.

LORD MILNER IN

1 I) l 4

LORD MILNER AND THE EMPIRE THE EVOLUTION OF BRITISH IMPERIALISM Mby

,

i/ 11

Vladimir Halperin Docteur &s Lettres

WITH A FOREWORD BY

THE RT. HON. L. S. AMERY, P.C., C.H.

" TA

ODHAMS LONG

5/V5GG.3 - Ms H313

To Professor Paul Mantoux

CONTENTS Foreword

Page

25

Introduction

Chapter 1.

7

Alfred milner:

his background

AND EDUCATION

40

II. IN THE SERVICE OF THE EMPIRE: MILNER IN EGYPT

Part I. 1889-92

52

Part II. The Milner Mission to Egypt,

75 III. IN THE SERVICE OF THE EMPIRE: MILNER IN SOUTH AFRICA

Part I. 1897-1902

86

Part II. The Work of Reconstruction after the Boer War, 1902-5 IV. IN WHITEHALL V. LORD MILNER:

124 154

HIS DOCTRINE AND

HIS SCHOOL

Part I. Lord Milner’s Doctrine

177

Part II. Lord Milner’s School

198

Conclusion

221

Bibliography

233

Index

252

126609

FOREWORD

The true test of the greatness of a man of action is the difference which his personal intervention has made to the immediate course of events. In the case of a thinker the test is the more indirect effect of his thoughts and of his personality upon his contemporaries and upon subsequent generations. By both these tests history is likely' to put Alfred Milner in the very forefront of the statesmen who shaped the course of our Commonwealth in the opening years of the present century. In two turning points of its fate—the South African crisis and the First World War—his courage and his constructive power played their decisive part. Over the whole of that period the influence of his thought, and still more of his personality, upon his contemporaries and upon the rising generation, contributed powerfully to give to the evolution of the Commonwealth the direction which it has followed. The peaceful transformation of a centralized Empire into a free partnership of equal sovereign nations will have been the most remarkable phenomenon of the last half-century, even if it should prove the mere prelude to eventual dissolu¬ tion; still more remarkable if it is destined as a new type of unity to give a lead to the re-shaping of a shrinking world. No English writer has yet attempted to estimate the nature and the extent of the influence exercised by Lord Milner upon that evolution, or indeed to give any connected account of his life. It has been left to a French scholar, Mr. V. Halperin, to be the first to explore the field, and, one may hope, to stimulate others to follow up his study. In the result he has produced a work, not only based on a vast amount of research, but distinguished by an insight, unusual in a foreigner, into the nature of the problems which have con¬ fronted British statesmanship, and by a sympathetic under¬ standing of a statesman with whom he never had actual personal contact. Mr. Flalperin’s work is avowedly not so much a biography as a study of the evolution of the Commonwealth in the light

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FOREWORD

of Milner’s actual achievement, and even more of his ideas and of their influence upon others. Whatever part economic or technical factors may have played in shaping human history, the supreme creative and destructive forces have been ideas. Nor is there any kind of historical study more interesting, or more worth while, than that which traces the growth of an idea, its transmission from individual to individual or from nation to nation, and, above all, the shape and power given to it at some critical moment by the inspira¬ tion of some exceptional personality. Few tasks could be more worth undertaking for a historian with imagination than the history of the idea of the British Commonwealth from the days of Humphrey Gilbert with his scheme for creating overseas colonies whose settlers “and their heirs for ever should enjoy all the privileges of free denizenship of England,” or of Walter Ralegh’s dream of seeing “a new English nation arise across the Atlantic.” Enough to note here that in the inevitably recurring conflict—for Milner the key to the whole problem of Imperial unity—between the forces making for unity and those making for separation, the strength of the latter, combined with the lack of under¬ standing at home, wrecked a first Empire which might have become an earlier British Commonwealth. At home the bitterness of failure combined for the best part of a century with the dream of economic laisser-faire internationalism to turn men’s minds away from the idea of an Empire-Commonwealth. But it lived on in the hearts of those United Empire Loyalists, who, however much they deplored the mistakes of the Mother Country, never forsook the larger vision in the new homes, and eventually new national life, which they carved out for themselves in the forest wilderness of Canada. No history of the Common¬ wealth idea would be true which failed to put in the forefront the part played in the last century by the United Empire Loyalist tradition in Canada, by men like Joseph Howe, John A. Macdonald, George Parkin and George Dennison, or by men like Cecil Rhodes or Alfred Deakin from the whole outer Empire, in keeping the idea alive and eventually influencing their countrymen at home. It was, perhaps, easier for those who lived and worked in the periphery of Empire to envisage it as a whole, and realize its immense possibilities, than for those at home who dwelt absorbed in the self-centred

FOREWORD

9

stir of the intellectual and political movements of the Victorian age, well content with a prosperity and security that seemed to them a part of the permanent order of world affairs. Milner, too, came to the problem of Empire from the periphery, having spent most of the first fifteen years of his boyhood in Germany. It was the fashion, indeed, of his detractors at one time to suggest that he had brought with him from that impressionable age a Prussian or Bismarckian temper and outlook. As a matter of fact, academic circles at a place like Tubingen were in those days liberal and strongly anti-Bismarckian. The glamour of success had not then exercised its hypnotic influence on German intellectuals. What young Milner did start with when he came to England was the outside view which saw England and the Empire as a whole and not through party or class spectacles, as well as a patriotism which is nowhere so intense as in an English family living in a foreign country. To that broader outlook a new angle and a new intensity were added when at Oxford Milner came under the influence of a Canadian fellowstudent, George Parkin, even then a fervent advocate of that conception of Imperial Federation to which he was to devote so many years of his life.1 Imperial unity in some form or other was henceforth to be the cause to which Milner was to dedicate himself. At Oxford, too, there came another pro¬ found personal influence, that of Arnold Toynbee, and with it an abiding interest in social welfare. The circumstances of his career never afforded Milner the opportunity of translating that interest into legislative achievement. But all through his life. Imperial unity and social welfare were for him not competing aims, but essentially complementary and inseparable parts of a single comprehensive policy. All the same it is interesting to speculate what Milner’s career might have been if his one attempt in 1885 to stand for Parliament as a Liberal had been successful. He would 11 well remember the deep impression made on my own mind, as a boy at Harrow, by a lecture on Imperial Federation given by Parkin in, I think, 1889. Discussing it not long ago with another boy who had heard it, the latter reminded me of a phrase used in it by Parkin when he said that “the day may come when Nelson’s signal will flash, not down a line of battle¬ ships, but along a line of embattled nations round the world.” This is a striking instance of retentive verbal memory on the part of young Winston Churchill.

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FOREWORD

inevitably have broken with Gladstone over Home Rule: no one, indeed, played a more important, if inconspicuous, part in creating the Liberal Unionist party than young Milner, at that moment already closely associated with Goschen. But one may well imagine what a reinforcement he would have been to Chamberlain in his effort to regenerate the Tory party as a party of social reform. It is, indeed, as a great social reformer as well as an Imperial statesman that Milner might have made his mark upon history. Nor was there any inherent rigidity in his character which would have prevented him from adapting himself sufficiently to the necessities of politics once politics had become his life’s work. As it was he remained content to work with Goschen at the Treasury. Here he soon developed those outstanding gifts as a financial administrator which presently sent him to Egypt for his first great task of constructive practical states¬ manship, and, no less important, for his first essay in preaching the gospel of creative imperialism. For England in Egypt, nominally only a narrative of work done by English¬ men in Egypt over a few years, was essentially the preaching of a gospel, and it was as such, and coming at just the right moment, that it won an instant success and exercised a profound influence. It was the prelude to Chamberlain’s work in the Dependent Empire—in fact possibly even its inspiration—as well as to his own work of reconstruction in South Africa. But it had no immediate sequel for him in the Imperial field. It was as a highly competent financier that Milner was brought back to the control of the Inland Revenue, destined to spend the next few years in important “back-room” obscurity. South Africa found Milner, for the first time, in the fore¬ front. Technically still Chamberlain’s subordinate in matters of high Imperial policy, it fell to him, in fact, to shape that policy on his own considered judgment of the situation. It was only after prolonged study that he came to the conclusion that we were faced in the Transvaal with an aggressive racial irredentism which was determined by propaganda and, when the time came, by military force, to expel not only British power, but the British outlook and way of life from the whole of South Africa. The only thing that could save the peace of South Africa was a change of policy in the Transvaal itself. That would come of itself if once even a substantial

FOREWORD

11

fraction of the disfranchised “Outlander” majority of its inhabitants were allowed citizen rights, and could reinforce the more moderate elements in the older Afrikander popula¬ tion. So far from desiring to extend direct British control over the Republic, he was only too anxious that British subjects should be free to surrender their existing citizenship in order to become loyal Transvaal burghers, so long as the principle of equal rights for both races was accepted in place of the racial inequality which was poisoning the life of South Africa. But the acceptance of that principle meant the end both of Kruger’s personal rule and of the ambitions which he embodied. That was the issue from first to last, and sooner than give way on it Kruger declared war. War made inevitable a period of direct control over the conquered republics. There, in Milner’s eyes, was the oppor¬ tunity not only of establishing the principle of racial equality, but of creating a new way of life which would give to that principle general acceptance and permanence. Like Chamberlain, when he became Mayor of Birmingham and said “in twelve months the city will not know itself,” he hoped to obliterate the past by the creation of what was to be in outlook as well as in material civilization a new country. It was for him of the essence of that new way of life that it should bring about a substantial influx of British settlers. In no sense a racialist, he was yet profoundly convinced that contact with a sufficient element of men and women steeped in the British tradition of freedom and tolerance was essential to keep that tradition alive. From that point of view the “overspill” from the prosperity of the mines meant every¬ thing. That was why he was prepared to face the odium of importing Chinese indentured labour. That was why he wished for another year or two to be given for the founda¬ tions of the new life to be well and truly laid, before the inevitable grant of self-government. It has been the fashion to criticize Milner for the rigidity of mind which led him to express his frank misgivings over the earlier grant of selfgovernment, and to contrast his narrow attitude with Campbell-Bannerman’s warm-hearted generosity and with the response which it won from Botha and Smuts. But it may be said of that response that it was a response to more than the slight anticipation of political power afforded: a response to the generosity of the terms of peace at

12

FOREWORD

Vereeniging, to their faithful fulfilment and, not least, to the new environment in which those statesmen found themselves when they came into power. More than that. There has been a sufficient renascence of the Kruger temper in recent South African politics to suggest that Milner may have been more far-sighted than his critics realized. His own view of his work in South Africa and, indeed, of the whole problem of Empire could not be better expressed than in the moving farewell speech which he addressed to the citizens of Johannesburg: I shall live in the memories of men in this country, if I live at all, in connexion with the struggle to keep it within the limits of the British Empire. And certainly I engaged in that struggle with all my might, being, from head to foot, one mass of glowing conviction of the rightness of our cause. But, however inevitable, however just, a destructive conflict of that sort is a sad business to look back upon. What I should prefer to be remembered by is the tremendous effort subsequent to the war, not only to repair its ravages, but to restart these colonies on a higher plane of civilization than they had ever previously attained. . . . If you believe in me defend my works when I am gone. . . . I care for that much more than I do for eulogy, or, indeed, for any personal reward. . . . And this I care most about of all, because it is over all and embracing all. What I pray for hardest is that those in South Africa with whom my words may carry weight should remain faithful, faithful above all in times of reaction, to the great idea of Imperial unity. The goal of all our hopes, the solution of all our difficulties, is there. Shall we ever see the fulfilment of that idea? Whether we do or not, whether we succeed or fail, I for one shall always be steadfast in that faith, though I should prefer to work quietly and in the background, in the formation of opinion, rather than in the exercise of power. This question, as I see it—the future of the British Empire—is a race, a close race, between the numerous influences so manifestly making for disruption and the growth of a great but still very imperfectly realized political conception. Shall we ever get ourselves understood in time? The word Empire, the word Imperial, are, in some respects, unfortunate. They suggest domination, ascendancy, the rule of a superior state over vassal states. But as they are the only words available, all we can do is to make the best of them, and to raise them in the scale of language by a new

FOREWORD

J3

significance. When we, who call ourselves Imperialists, talk of the British Empire, we think of a group of states, independent of one another in their local affairs, but bound together for the defence of their common interests and the development of a common civilization, and so bound, not in an alliance—for alliances can be made and unmade, and are never more than merely nominally lasting—but in a per¬ manent organic union. Of such a union, we fully admit, the Dominions of our Sovereign, as they exist today, are only the raw material. Our ideal is still distant, but we are firmly convinced that it is not visionary nor unattainable. And see how such a consummation would solve, and, indeed, can alone solve, the most difficult and most persistent of the problems of South Africa, how it would unite its white races as nothing else can. The Dutch can never owe a perfect allegiance merely to Great Britain. The British can never, without moral injury, accept allegiance to any body politic which excludes their motherland. But British and Dutch alike could, without loss of dignity, without any sacrifice of their several traditions, unite in loyal devotion to an empirestate, in which Great Britain and South Africa would be partners, and could work cordially together for the good of South Africa as a member of that great whole. And so you see the true Imperialist is also the best South African. The road is long, the obstacles are many. The goal may not be reached in my lifetime, perhaps not in that of the youngest man in the room. You cannot hasten the slow growth of a great idea of that kind by any forcing process. But you can keep it steadily in view, lose no opportunity of working for it, resist like grim death any policy which draws you away from it. I know that to be faithful in this service requires the rarest of combinations, that of ceaseless effort with infinite patience. But then think of the greatness of the reward—the high privilege of having in any way contributed to the fulfilment of one of the noblest conceptions which have ever dawned on the political imagination of mankind. Never a strong man, Milner came home physically worn out by his tremendous labours, and in need of rest. Inevitably, too, obliged to earn a living. Above all, the experience of the bitter partisan attacks upon a policy in the justice of which he believed heart and soul, and later the grotesque travestying of Chinese labour as slavery, had filled him with an invincible detestation of party politics. It was in vain that friends tried to persuade him to take up the torch

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that fell from Chamberlain’s stricken hand, and to lead the public campaign for an Empire economic policy. The most he would do was to deliver an occasional thoughtful speech in its support. It was, indeed, to the broader issue of Imperial unity in its constitutional, and even more its spiritual, aspect that he preferred to devote much of his time during the next few years, in part by occasional public addresses, but even more as the guide, philosopher and friend of an eager group of younger men who gathered round him. Some of these had formed part of the devoted little band who had worked under him in South Africa and had stayed on there for a time to carry out his dream of South African unity. But there were others, like F. S. Oliver (the author of Alexander Hamilton), Arthur Steel-Maitland, Edward Grigg (Lord Altrincham), Waldorf Astor, and the present writer, who were closely joined with them. The success of the campaign for South African union had owed much to the State, a review of the South African problem conducted by two members of Milner’s Kindergarten, Lionel Curtis and Philip Kerr (Lord Lothian), as well as to Curtis’ own indefatigable exertions in travelling round South Africa creating small groups to study the question of South African unity. To apply the same procedure to the wider problem of Empire unity seemed a natural corollary. In 1910 the Round Table was launched as a quarterly review of Empire problems under Philip Kerr’s editorship, while at the same time Curtis started on a series of tours round all the Dominions, leaving everywhere behind him Round Table groups of students whom he had infected with his enthusiasm. The Round Table movement rendered a great service in the years immediately preceding the First World War by making leading citizens all over the Empire face the nature of the problem before it. But it failed to achieve any lasting effect for two reasons. One was that, in order to be able to claim that it was non-party, it deliberately kept the question of Empire economic co-operation out of its programme. This was staging Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark, and gave to the whole movement an academic and unreal air. The other was the conviction on the part of influential members of the group, and of Curtis in particular, that the problem of the Empire could only be solved by federation,

FOREWORD

15

at any rate so far as just foreign policy and defence were concerned. But it was no use preaching the dilemma, however logical at first sight, that the Empire must federate or break up, to people determined not to federate—at any rate in any foreseeable future—and at the same time equally determined to remain united. So far, at any rate, two world wars have shown the strength of the underlying sense of unity in an emergency. Whether the continuing danger of the present world situation, and the technical changes which have made true independence possible only for a very few of the largest political units, will lead to closer permanent working together, and so prove the Commonwealth method of free co-operation capable of holding its own without the more rigid structural defence of federation, remains to be seen. The final answer to the dilemma is not yet. Mr. Halperin has very rightly, in accordance with the whole purpose of his work, given much attention to this aspect of Milner’s influence on the evolution of the Commonwealth idea. He has touched upon the subsequent careers of the men who came under that influence, and raised the question how far they individually continued his line of thought or deviated from it. More particularly he has also attempted to answer the even more difficult question how far Milner him¬ self would have agreed with the developments that have taken place in more recent years. Up to the First World War he certainly hoped for the embodiment of Imperial unity in some formal constitutional machinery, not necessarily a federation, but at any rate some Council of Empire definitely entrusted with the general control of foreign policy and defence, and, if possible, also of the Dependent Empire. But I believe that the success of the Imperial Cabinet system in that war, which owed so much to his personal initiative and authority, convinced him that the method of intimate con¬ sultation would serve his purpose, provided always that the consultation were sufficiently continuous and conducted in that spirit of a real cabinet of governments which had shown itself during the war years. At any rate, I do not remember his ever recurring to his earlier conception in the years during which we worked together afterwards. In any case, the one fundamental principle which in his mind from the first overshadowed and overrode all others was that of the complete equality of the partner nations of the

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Commonwealth. I cannot think myself that he would have dissented from the famous definition of Dominion status which was agreed upon at the Imperial Conference of 1926, or from its subsequent legal embodiment in the Statute of Westminster. What he would indeed have felt, even more strongly than was expressed in Balfour’s admirable setting to that definition, was that only the positive spirit of free part¬ nership, effectively expressed in action, could avert the dangerous perversion of an essentially negative statement. What he might have felt about the extension of Dominion equality of independence to what in his time was still the Dependent Empire can only be conjectured. Judging by his sympathy for Egyptian nationalist aspirations, he would, I believe, have approached the Indian problem with sym¬ pathetic understanding. But his South African experience would certainly have led him to do all in his power to avert the partition of a sub-continent which geography and history have made essentially one. Nor can I imagine that he would not have regarded with grave misgivings the hasty concession of the outward forms of democratic political government to African communities barely removed by a generation from the most primitive barbarism. Not the least important of his private activities during those years, and indeed for the rest of his life, were those devoted to the carrying into practical effect of the great ideal to which Cecil Rhodes dedicated his fortune in his famous will. Here again, after a generation during which their careers had been widely sundered, he renewed his old spiritual partnership with George Parkin, who, as travelling organizer of the Rhodes Trust, was ideally fitted to expound Rhodes’ vision and purpose to university authorities in the Dominions and the United States. If the vision was Rhodes’, it was Milner who over some twenty years laid securely the foundations of a system whose power in shaping the outlook and spiritual kinship of an ever-growing body of men throughout the English-speaking world it would be difficult to exaggerate. There was, indeed, one activity of a public nature to which Milner did give much of his time and energy in the years after his return from South Africa. His experience there had burnt deep into his mind the weakness of a military system which had nothing beyond voluntary service to rely upon.

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The political and economic consequences of that weakness had been sufficiently appalling in the long-drawn-out war against two petty farmer republics. What might they not be in the greater danger already looming on the horizon of a European war? Enlisting that gallant veteran. Lord Roberts, as his chief military mouthpiece, he threw himself whole¬ heartedly into the campaign for universal citizen service. The event was to justify his prescience. He could not secure the political support which, carried into legislative effect, might have averted war altogether, or at least avoided the unneces¬ sary loss of blood and treasure and the weakening of our national life which our unpreparedness involved. But his work did at least help to create a national readiness to accept universal service even before its urgent necessity was admitted by a timid government. There was, lastly, one issue of passionate political con¬ troversy on which Milner might have found himself obliged to play the leading part, if war had not intervened. I have already touched upon his youthful activities in building up the resistance to Gladstone’s Home Rule project. When after 1910 a Liberal Government was once again prepared to break up the United Kingdom for the sake of office, Milner was naturally strongly opposed. But so long as the battle was fought on ordinary political lines he was prepared to leave its conduct mainly to others. A very different issue arose for him if the Government really contemplated to coerce Ulster by military force. Whether technically legal or not, that would in his eyes have been an act of revolutionary illegality which all good citizens were in duty bound to resist by every means in their power, not only in Ireland, but wherever the action of the Government could be frustrated. From that issue he was not prepared to shrink, and if the Government had been demented enough to precipitate civil war he would almost inevitably have found himself the real leader of the resistance. When war side-tracked the disruption of the United Kingdom it made at first little change in the character or half¬ hearted outlook of the politicians who found themselves charged with its conduct. Milner, with his insistence on National Service, was much too alarming a person to invite into their councils, even when the first coalition was formed under Asquith. The only contribution he was invited to

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make was to preside over an inquiry into agricultural pro¬ duction. As it happened this was one of the subjects in which he had long been keenly interested. In his eyes the restoration of the balance between industry and agriculture destroyed by laisser-faire free imports was an essential measure of social welfare as well as of national security. His recommendations, rejected by Asquith, were embodied in the Corn Production Act of 1917. Dropped by Lloyd George in 1922, to Milner’s bitter disappointment, its principles have long since become an integral part of our national economic policy. Of Milner’s part as a member of Lloyd George’s War Cabinet in the conduct of the war Mr. Halperin has dealt as fully as the scale and purpose of his work required. But only one who was privileged to see the working of things from inside knows the extent to which Milner was the pivot and linch-pin of the whole war machine. His was the steadying and, when necessary, restraining influence behind the daemonic but often erratic energy of the Prime Minister. His the constructive mind that in almost every department gave shape and coherence to the planning function of the small War Cabinet. His was the swift decision which in the hour of supreme crisis in March, 1918, in effect created the unified command and chose Foch as the commander. As Secretary of State for War he formed the indispensable link, previously lacking, between the Prime Minister and the Army and saw things through to victory. What is more directly related to Mr. Halperin’s purpose is the part he played in the creation and shaping of the Imperial War Cabinet, through his influence not only over Lloyd George, but over the Dominion representatives, and more particularly over the Canadian Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden, and over Smuts. With his old enemy his association became increasingly intimate, for their intellectual grasp of essentials was the same. The Imperial War Cabinet, as it worked in 1917 and 1918, represented in fact the high-water mark of effective Imperial unity yet achieved. Continued on the lines contemplated by those who took part in it as a body permanently in being, and meeting at least annually, it might well have sufficed to fulfil all that Milner himself hoped for in the nature of an organ of Imperial unity. It faded out in the reaction everywhere, and not least here, after the war. Happily there is nothing in the developments that

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19

have taken place since then to prevent its revival in sub¬ stance if not in name, if only the need for it is once again realized. It was with the greatest reluctance that Milner continued in the Government after the war, and that reluctance only increased with the course of events. It was unfortunate that he was not invited to take part in the peace negotiations. For there his essential moderation and immense personal authority with foreign statesmen might have done much to improve the settlement reached, both in its territorial and in its financial aspects. On the other hand, with his dislike of illusions and make-believe, he might have found it difficult to play the part played by others in humouring President Wilson over the League of Nations. For he had little faith in that institution, whether as a remedy for the defects of the peace itself or as a guarantee of peace against new sources of conflict in the future, and rightly feared its influence in diverting attention from the problems of the Empire and everywhere lessening the sense of real responsibility for national security and for world peace. Instead of that he was pushed off to deal in endless and exasperating negotiations with what was, after all, the side-issue of Egypt. Even there the settlement he achieved, over-generous as it seemed to most of his colleagues at the time, was soon to be accepted without any of the safeguards for the control of our communi¬ cations which he regarded as essential. Whether they could ever have been effectively enforced without directly taking those communications, and in particular the Suez Canal zone, entirely out of Egyptian jurisdiction raises a wider and still unsettled question. What with Egypt and with the many general issues con¬ fronting the Cabinet after the end of the war, Milner was never able to give to the work of the Colonial Office the kind of detailed personal supervision he had given to recon¬ struction in South Africa. But he would tell me, as his Under¬ secretary, what he wanted, leaving me a wide freedom in carrying matters up to the point where his final decision or his authority with the Cabinet were required. In this way a good start was made with migration, with the creation of a development council for the tropical Empire, with tropical medicine, with tropical agriculture and research generally, with the creation of the machinery for selecting candidates

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for the Colonial Service, as well as with incidental matters like finding a financial and constitutional solution of the problems of Malta or disposing of the Mad Mullah in Somali¬ land. Much else that we discussed together was left for me to carry a stage further in subsequent years. In February, 1921, he resigned. He had grown increasingly out of touch with Lloyd George and his colleagues. In the hurly-burly of the restored larger Cabinet he no longer exercised the old steadying influence over a Prime Minister whose erratic and devious ways both offended and alarmed him. He had consented to stay on in the Government with some hope that it might prove itself a government of bold constructive reform in both Imperial and social questions. He found it drifting more and more into a negative Whiggism, taking its cue in finance from the bankers with their policy of deflation and in social questions from big industry. There was nothing more that seemed to him worth the grind of staying on in office. For he was a tired man in need of peace and domestic happiness. A few days later he was quietly married to an old friend, Leo Maxse’s sister and widow of Lord Edward Cecil. His wise counsel still continued to be available for his friends. Visits to Egypt and Palestine and in 1924 to South Africa recalled old memories and interests. There was, indeed, one public appointment, more appropriate than any other, to mark the closing chapter of a life which had first flowered at Oxford. But his nomination to the Chancellorship of the University was followed within a few days by his death in May, 1925. I have ventured in the foregoing pages to touch upon the more salient points in a career which has been dealt with much more fully by Mr. Halperin in his well-documented and thoughtful study. I myself was privileged for many years to work in closest collaboration with the subject of this biography. I had got to know Lord Milner well during the first critical year of the South African War. A mere chance had prevented my going back with him in 1901 as one of his band of young fellow-workers in the task of reconstruction. But for more than twenty years after that he was for me the best and most generous of friends and counsellors. For the last two years of the First World War and during his time at the Colonial Office Milner was my official chief with whom I was in almost daily contact. It may be then that there is

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21

something that I might add in the light of personal recollection, coloured perhaps, but not, I believe, exaggerated by admiration and affection. From Oxford days all who knew him trusted him and went to him for counsel. It was a confidence inspired both by his character and by the quality of his intellect. There was in Milner’s character a simple sincerity and selflessness which marked alike his dedication to public service and his attitude towards those with whom he had to deal or who sought his advice. It is said that Sir F. Carruthers Gould, the famous cartoonist, was once asked who was the most difficult public personage to caricature. He replied: “Milner. You cannot caricature character.” Intellectually his approach to any prob¬ lem was marked by the same integrity and by an unequalled gift of going straight to the essential decisive point. The resulting conclusion had that simplicity, often almost obvious when uttered, which is the mark of genius. It was a simplicity stripped of all that was irrelevant, of all pose, all parade of knowledge. No one ever spoke of Milner as clever or even learned, though his store of learning of all kinds was far greater than he ever allowed to appear. Behind the complete sincerity of his intellectual contribution to the subject under discussion there was always a certain background of quiet reserve. It was not only intellectually that Milner was intensely reserved. His boyhood, whether as an English boy among German schoolfellows, or later at King’s College School, an orphan living with relations and with no associations to link him with his contemporaries, must have been lonely. It was only at Oxford that he first found himself truly at home. When he went out from that home into the world it was again with no other backing than that afforded by his own abilities. Marriage would, in the ordinary course, have furnished those roots which naturally spread out into one’s social soil. But marriage he deliberately excluded in order to be free to dedicate himself to public service. Thus, though there were few men whose friendship was more eagerly sought or extended more widely, there always remained something of himself which he kept withdrawn and apart. That was even more the case when he had to deal with men in the mass. I have suggested that if he had once become successfully immersed in active political life at an early stage

22

FOREWORD

in his career that inhibition might have been overcome. But the whole of his career, and above all his experience of the disastrous effect of party politics on his South African work, intensified his natural dislike of the crowd. Nor, in his devastating sincerity, could he bring himself to resort to even the slightest artifice to win it. In personal intercourse his simplicity, courtesy and instinctive sympathy gave him a natural charm which few could resist, and which, added to his gifts of character and intellect, won for him the devotion of all who worked with him or under him. But they were not qualities that could bridge the gap between a speaker, reluctantly obliged to take the platform, and an audience eager to be roused by the ordinary commonplaces of political controversy. Now and again, under the stress of strong emotion or on some informal occasion, he could make a speech of strangely moving eloquence. But as a rule his speeches read better than they sounded. Their thought was too direct and too concentrated to be taken in by the casual listener. Temperament and fate alike decided that Milner’s service to his country and to the Commonwealth should be given not in the field of politics, but in that of administration and policy. In all the many problems which there confronted him his strength lay in his unerring grasp of essentials and of the living reality behind statistical figures or economic or political arguments. He approached his conclusions cautiously. But few men have in the same degree had the intellectual courage to accept them unreservedly and follow them out with unflinching tenacity. He was thus at heart a radical, always ready for far-reaching changes of outlook and method. But a constructive radical, thinking in terms of concrete action and not of phrases, and with none of the ordinary radical’s optimism and gift of self-deception. On the contrary he was by temperament a pessimist, doing what he knew to be right, but far from sure whether he would succeed or had succeeded. His mind was essentially forward-looking. His imperialism was the radical imperialism of what we now call the Commonwealth, the conception of a partnership of nations associated in equal freedom. It was for that conception, and not for the assertion of what was then known as the Imperial factor, i.e., the authority of the United Kingdom, that he

FOREWORD

23

faced and forced the issue of equal rights for English and Afrikander in South Africa. It was as a contribution to that same ideal that he carried out his great work of reconstruction in the conquered republics. He was no less a forward-looking radical in his social outlook, and in his impatience with the conventional British orthodoxies in financial and economic policies. On many of these questions his conclusions are now accepted commonplaces. But it is well to remember the intellectual courage which upheld them in his day. Above all he was an idealist, a man with a vision to which he dedicated his life and in the light of which he shaped all his conclusions. It was that forward-looking idealism which naturally drew younger men to look to him as their leader. Mr. Halp^rin may well be right in suggesting that the imprint of Milner’s thought and purpose upon a whole generation who caught their inspiration from him has been as great a contribution to the shaping of the British Common¬ wealth of today as his actual achievement in South Africa or in the First World War. The judgment of history upon him may, indeed, be largely influenced by the course of events themselves. If, in the end, the British Commonwealth breaks up, or like the Holy Roman Empire fades into an unsub¬ stantial fiction, he may be remembered only as one who strove, valiantly but in vain, against a tide too strong for him. But if, in however modified a form, it proves itself capable of meeting the needs of the future, capable not only of holding together, but of helping to shape the future of the world, then his figure as that of a pioneer in thought and action may well stand out among the greatest in the long line of British statesmen. For my own part I shall always look back with affectionate veneration upon the tall, commanding figure, the massive head with its lofty brow and strong features, the kindly understanding scrutiny in the dark eyes of my old chief; one to whom for so many years I turned for guidance and support, a leader in whose footsteps I have followed and in whose spirit I have tried to work. L. S. Amery

*

. ■

INTRODUCTION No word has been so wrongly used or misinterpreted as the word “imperialism.” It might almost be said, with apologies to Paul Val6ry, that it is one of those hateful words which has far more sound than sense, a word that has been made to gratify or grate at the expense of its real meaning. Andre Siegfried defines the term “imperialism” as it is used today as “a word that has lost practically all of its original lustre and is even used in a disparaging sense.”1 It is important, therefore, not to forget certain basic truths. Between sheer jingoism and apathetic laisser-faire lies the conception of Commonwealth, a conception founded on democratic principles and racial equality, imbued with a missionary spirit for the furtherance of education and science, standing both for freedom and for the shouldering of responsibility, for the suppression of cruelty and tyranny. Commonwealth can be summed up in these three words: peace, order and justice. From the time of the Colonial Pact down to that of the founding of the Commonwealth of Nations the British Empire has passed through many widely-divergent phases; it has seen the development of colonial autonomy and colonial freedom; it has seen its Dominions attain equality and independence. If the word “imperialism” is pictured within the framework of the British Empire it becomes plain that it has two entirely different meanings: the first is that of the expansion of Great Britain, the second that of a distinct and self-justified organism: the Commonwealth. The former stands for that dynamic energy which created the British Empire; the latter for all that is lasting and fundamental within it. To put it in another way, imperialism, in the one sense, stands for development—development under arms, if need be; in the other it stands for the maintenance of order, justice and peace. The problem of imperialism is one of the most difficult 1 Andr6 Siegfried, in an editorial in Figaro, 29 April, 1947. *5

J

26

INTRODUCTION

in the field of historical study. Nationalism in a great State almost invariably leads up to imperialism, as it drives a country to expand its territories and spheres of influence either at the expense of its neighbours or at that of remote peoples whose soil has not yet been exploited. British Imperialism is commonly believed to be the product of the nineteenth century—even of the last fifty years of that century. Though the term “British Imperialism” may be comparatively modern, however, the spirit which it embodies is anything but new. Giovanni Ansaldo, a con¬ temporary Italian writer, sees Robinson Crusoe as the symbolical figure of the first British colonist. Much earlier, Adam Smith had pointed out that the navigators and adventurers of the late Middle Ages had laid unconsciously the foundations of mighty empires. We may even ask our¬ selves whether the pioneers of the Empire were aware of the magnitude of their work, whether in fact Seeley, the historian, was not right when he wrote that the British Empire had been built “in a fit of absence of mind.” Another writer, Leo Ferrero, asserts that “The British Empire was founded by a nation of Robinson Crusoes. ... It was founded by men who fretted at their confines, who dreamed of going to sea, and who started out on their travels for no other reason than a bold desire for excitement.” He then points these words with the salient question: “Would they other¬ wise have attempted the conquest of India before there was a Suez Canal?”1 According to Ferrero, British colonizers have always been, above all, men of an empirical outlook, bred in religious convictions, active, persevering, gifted with a genius for organization, unshakably convinced of their right to be masters of the earth. The great voyages of discovery, and later the channels of trade, laid the foundation of British colonization and of the development of the Empire. It was largely, indeed, the desire to find new opportunities for commerce that spurred on the pioneers of Empire. Albert Demangeon, in his great book on the British Empire, asserts that “the idea of colonization was the direct outcome of the trading spirit.”2 Be that as it may, not only economic but military reasons led to the develop1 L60 Ferrero: Le Secret de L’ Angleterre, pages 57-65. 2 A. Demangeon: L'Empire Britannique. Etude de gdographie coloniale, page 3.

INTRODUCTION

*7

ment of the Empire. Britain’s earliest colonies date back to the war with Spain; later, the Antilles and Canada were wrested from France. In 1655 the Dutch had been forced to surrender the island base of St. Helena, and in 1704, during the War of the Spanish Succession, Gibraltar passed to England. J. Magnan de Bornier, a particularly well-informed writer, has heavily underlined the profoundly utilitarian character of British colonization. “Great Britain did not undertake the development of the colonies in order to civilize the natives or enrich the colonist,” he says. “If the colonist happened to make his fortune so much the better, but this was a sideissue. Her one aim was to provide raw materials for British industry, find new outlets for British products, and full cargoes for the British Merchant Navy.”1 Here we find the explanation for the Colonial Pact, which considerably restricted the freedom of action of the colonists. It was not until relatively late—at the end of the sixteenth century, in fact, considerably after the Spanish and Portuguese, and even after the French—that Great Britain began her colonial career. She rapidly outstripped her rivals, however, and towards the middle of the seventeenth century all England’s trade with the Levant and India was entirely transacted by English companies. “All the capital which was derived from the plantations, from trade and from armaments became from that time on a basic element in the British economy; it was this new source of wealth that at a later date enabled factory after factory to be built, and so led to the industrial revolution. The industrial revolution, however, sprung from a world-wide trade, gave rise in its turn to fresh commercial relations and to the founding of new colonies.”2 At this point it should be noted that in matters of trade the British had nothing in common with the Phoenicians, to 1 J. Magnan de Bornier: L’Empire Britannique: sort Evolution politique et constitutionelle, page 19. 2 A. Demangeon: op. cit., page 12. See also Paul Mantoux: La Revolution Industrielle au XVIIIme Siicle, page 90, et seq. I have only space in this book for a brief summary of the origin, foundations and development of British Imperial power; the two books to which I have just referred are essential for a thorough study of the subject. Other works that should be consulted are: Elie Hal6vy, L’Histone du Peuple Anglais au XIXme Sidcle; H. Duncan Hall, The British Commonwealth of Nations; William S. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism (1890-1902), vol. I, which has a particularly excellent bibliography; J. A. Hobson, Imperialism, a Study, and The Cam¬ bridge History of the British Empire.

28

INTRODUCTION

whom the expansion of their commerce was the be-all and end-all; the British, like the Athenians of old, knew how to build up their markets into possessions. “This political structure, the work of merchants, is the greatest known to history,” says Demangeon.1 At the close of the eighteenth century both Pitt and Fox declared with one voice that the greatness of England was inseparably bound up with the greatness of her Empire. By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, apart from the views held by the Government, the British people were pacifist-minded and anti-chauvinist. They maintained that Great Britain owed her position as a first-class power to her economic development, and that her success in this field was largely due to her practice of Free Trade. Moreover, Great Britain’s liberal traditions gave her an immense prestige. While her foreign policy did not abate in vigour, she was convinced that Free Trade was enough in itself to ensure peaceful collaboration between the nations, and that there was no necessity for her to extend her colonial territories. Many politicians thought that the Colonies would inevitably break away from the Motherland as soon as they had reached a certain level of development. John Bright, one of the leaders of the Manchester School, declared outright that: “It would be a happy day for England when she no longer possessed a single acre of territory in Asia.” Rogers, who was Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies from 1860-71, wrote: “The destiny of the British Colonies is to become independent,” his one hope being that the separation would take place as amicably as possible. The chief exponent of this separatist (or pessimist) school of thought was Goldwin Smith, Professor of History at Oxford from 1858-66, and subsequently Professor of English History and Constitutional Law at Cornell University. In 1862 Goldwin Smith began writing a series of letters which first appeared in the Daily News, and which were published in book form under the title of The Empire in 1863. From the moment that these letters came out they created a sensation, for Goldwin Smith, a brilliant writer, asserted in no uncertain terms that a large number of British possessions overseas were “useless dependencies.” According to him the ‘Demangeon: L’Ernpire Britannique, page 18. See also Ernest Barker: The Ideas and Ideals of the British Empire, page 37, et seq.

INTRODUCTION

29

Colonial Empire was not only a superfluity but a danger; it was a liability to the mother country, and could not even be regarded as an asset from the commercial point of view. “We are emperors without revenues and without powers,” he averred. He was so extreme on the subject that when he was asked what he proposed to give the country in exchange for these “useless dependencies,” he retorted: “What would you give a man in return for relieving him of a crushing burden or a dangerous illness?” His conclusion was stark and uncompromising: “The Colonies must go.” The Times bitterly attacked Goldwin Smith and the school of thought that he represented. Disraeli himself criticized the professor, and announced in the House that Colonial politics were matters for statesmen, not for “professors, orators and pedants.”1 On 4 February, 1862, in answer to Goldwin Smith’s scintillating article, an editorial appeared in The Times which contained this statement: “We wish to point out, once and for all—and let Americans and Spaniards, Russians and Ionians, Sikhs and Sepoys take due note—that England has not the least intention of abandoning her over¬ seas possessions.” Goldwin Smith, however, had his supporters amongst the Press. The Daily News, the Daily Telegraph, Fraser’s Magazine and, to some extent, even the Westminster Review and the Saturday Review came out on his side. All the same, though Goldwin Smith’s The Empire was one of the most important publications of the separatist school, it was also one of the last. In one sense, paradoxical as it may seem, the separatists unwittingly contributed to the maintenance of imperial unity, simply because they appreciated to a far greater extent than many others the nationalist spirit of the Colonies. Had the British Government attempted to restrict the rights of Colonial parliaments or frustrate their desire for indepen¬ dence it is more than likely that certain Colonies would have rebelled. Actually the British Government did nothing of the kind; instead it actively impressed upon the Colonies that, when the time was ripe, they could always have their independence, with the result that the Colonies willingly accepted the ties with the mother country—ties which had never been forced on them.2 In this respect, the Durham 1 Hansard., Parliamentary Debates, III 169, page 96. 2 C. A. Bodelsen: Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism, page 52, et seq.

30

INTRODUCTION

Report of 1839 constitutes a document which is absolutely essential to an understanding of the development of the British Empire. In 1838 matters were not going well in Canada, the only major survivor of the North American Empire which had been shattered for ever by the secession of the Thirteen Colonies. The British Government, anxious not to lose Canada as it had lost the American Colonies, sent out Lord Durham to act as Governor-General with pleni¬ potentiary powers. Durham was the first to pose the great, the major problem of colonial administration: is it not desirable, even necessary, to grant Colonies where certain conditions exist and which have attained a certain degree of evolution, a government for which they are responsible; in other words, self-government instead of the mere right of representation?1 Lord Durham was convinced that, far from curbing the Colonies, they should be accorded a very large measure of freedom. He suggested, therefore, that the principle of parliamentary government should be introduced into the Colonies. But it should be noted that, while he was greatly in favour of self-government, he drew a clear line of demarcation between purely local and purely imperial affairs. In 1848 Lord Elgin, who had become Governor-General after his father-in-law. Lord Durham, succeeded in confirm¬ ing self-government for Canada. Undoubtedly this event marks the end of what might be called the Second British Empire, the First British Empire having been that which was destroyed for ever by the American War of Independence in 1783.2 The period 1869-70 must be regarded as the turning-point in the evolution of British Imperialism. By this time the separatists had definitely lost the battle. One of the first signs of the turn of the tide was unquestionably Charles Dilke’s Greater Britain, published in 1868. As its title implies, its author was convinced of the value of the Colonial Empire and its unlimited resources. Dilke, although he had been profoundly influenced by Goldwin Smith, based his concept of the Empire on community of race and civilization, and on the idea of “geopolitics,” which was at a later date to 1 Canada had enjoyed the right of representation since 1791. 2 The Third Empire lasted From 1840-1914; the Fourth saw the light of day after the First World War, with the recognition of the new Dominion status; the Fifth (and present) Empire came into being immediately after the war of 1939-45.

INTRODUCTION

31

become so fashionable. Greater Britain was written as a result of his voyage round the world; its full title is: Greater Britain, A Record of Travel in English Speaking Countries during 1866 and i86y. While Dilke made a few reservations with regard to certain parts of the Empire—such as Canada, for instance—far from sharing the cosmopolitan outlook of the Manchester School, he believed heart and soul in the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race, though “race,” for Dilke, seems to have denoted, primarily, civilization. As he saw it, Greater Britain included not only the Empire but America. Dilke’s vast range of subjects, his advanced views, and his confident omniscience, make Greater Britain almost com¬ parable to the writings of H. G. Wells. Carried away by his imagination, he wrote: “No possible combination of circum¬ stances can prevent the British race reaching a total of three hundred million souls by 1970, all speaking the same language, all having the same national character. Italy, Spain, France, Russia will all be pygmies in comparison with such a people.”1 While British policy remained faithful to Free Trade, the British Empire was steadily developing and increasing in magnitude day by day; imperialism was spreading, and profoundly inspired colonial policy. The delusion that the Empire was a costly and wholly unnecessary luxury soon faded out. Disraeli led the way to a new concept of Empire with his slogan: Imperium et Lihertas. On 24 June, 1872, in his celebrated speech in the Crystal Palace, he stated the problem of the Empire with masterly lucidity: “Gentlemen, if you look to the history of this country since the advent of liberalism forty years ago, you will find there has been no effort so continuous, so subtle, supported by so much energy, and carried on with so much ability and acumen as the attempts of liberalism to effect the disintegration of the Empire of England. And, gentlemen, of all its efforts this is the one which has been the nearest to success. Statesmen of the highest character, writers of the most distinguished ability, the most organized and efficient means have been employed in this endeavour. It has been proved to all of us that we have lost money by our Colonies. It has been shown with 1 Charles Dilke: Greater Britain, vol. I, page 406. Dilke's second book. Problems of Greater Britain, appeared in 1890; his third work, The British Empire, was published in 1899.

3*

INTRODUCTION

precise, with mathematical precision that there was never a jewel in the crown of England that was so truly costly as the possession of India. How often has it been suggested that we should at once emancipate ourselves from this incubus? Well, that result was nearly accomplished. . . . Those who advised that policy looked even upon our connexion with India as a burden on this country, viewing everything in a financial aspect, and totally passing by those moral and political con¬ siderations which make nations great, and by the influence of which alone men are distinguished from animals.”1 The capital importance of this speech requires no underlining. It stated the three chief aims of the Conservative party: the maintenance of British institutions, the security of the Empire, and social reform. Disraeli was fully aware of the immense value of the British Empire to British prestige in the eyes of the world at large, and to the strength of her position in Europe. His Crystal Palace speech associated imperialism more closely than ever with the policy of the Conservative party; an association somewhat obscured at times, but for all that a continuous feature in the history of party politics in England. There is a tendency to regard Disraeli as one of the founders of British Imperialism. This is a purely superficial view, and it is too often forgotten that Disraeli was never a true imperialist. His policy was only imperial in that it aimed at the protection of the sea-route to India, the safeguarding of all vital communications, and the maintenance of Great Britain’s prestige. He did, however, believe, as others after him have believed, that the political and commercial frame¬ work must be erected on an ideological basis. In the ten years between 1880 and 1890 the idea of imperialism made rapid progress. Like any other ideology, it will only flourish by criticism of its opponents. At the close of 1881, and at the beginning of 1882, John Robert Seeley, the Cambridge historian, gave a series of lectures in which he expounded his ideas on the development of the Empire. In 1884 Seeley’s book, The Expansion of England, which embodied these ideas, was published. This book, in the main of a popular rather than a creative character, put new life into the discussion of the Colonial problem, and drew a good deal of attention to the ideal of ‘‘a great England.” To Seeley, 1 Disraeli’s Speeches, edited by T. E. Kebbel, vol. II, page 530.

INTRODUCTION

33

race and civilization were of far less importance than the State. In his eyes, a little England—Great Britain without the Empire—spelt national ruin. He supported the federal idea, did his utmost to arouse enthusiasm for a British State, and vigorously denounced Turgot’s conclusion with regard to the destiny of colonies. He believed that the terms “metropolis” and “colonies” had become out of date, and were really only applicable to the period which had come to an end with the collapse of colonial monopoly. The advent of steam and electricity, the development of railways had conquered space, and it was now essential as well as tech¬ nically possible to create a confederation which would not only include the metropolis, but all those colonies which owed their existence to British settlers. He stressed the fact that Canada, for example, would be as much a part of this confederation as Kent. Seeley regarded the colonists, meaning the Australians and Canadians, as “merely Englishmen across the seas.” This, in fact, was the underlying idea of the move¬ ment for Imperial Federation that was initiated in 1884. Seeley, despite the title of his book, disliked jingoism and was opposed to the idea of an expansion with no fixed limits. “When a State goes beyond the limits of nationality, its power becomes precarious and artificial,” he wrote on page 46 of his book. Referring to Seeley, the historian, G. P. Gooch, has remarked not without reason that had he been living at the time of the Boer War he would most certainly have been accused of being a “Little Englander.”1 J. A. Froude, who was profoundly influenced by Carlyle, is another historian who played a very similar part to that of Seeley and Dilke in the evolution of imperialism in England. His most important book, Oceana, or England and Her Colonies,2 was published in 1886. In Oceana Froude describes his travels and places great weight on the importance of the Empire and its value to Great Britain. He was one of the first to stress the fact that the existing ties between Great Britain and the Colonies were dependent upon command of the sea and naval supremacy. Following Froude, Selborne declared at the Inter-Colonial Conference of 1905 that: “The British Empire owes its existence to the Ocean. It will only endure 1 G. P. Gooch: The Heart of the Empire, page 331. Froude took the title of his book from Sir James Harrington’s Oceana, written in 1656, the theme of which is the part that England must play as a great sea power.

2

LMB-B

INTRODUCTION

34

if all its members continue to regard the Ocean as the true source of their existence and their power.” Seeley with his logical and analytical mind considered the problem of Empire from a practical point of view; Froude, however, reasoned and wrote like a man of letters and a moralist. Seeley’s imperialism had been founded on the idea of the State, Dilke’s on that of race; Froude’s was based on his social theories which directly derived from Carlyle. The author of Oceana believed in the Colonies because he thought that a more dignified society could be set up, and a nobler life could be led there than in urban and industrial England. It is remarkable to find that Froude, in his Two Lectures on South Africa, drew a clear distinction between South Africa and the other Colonies; he even refused to acknowledge that South Africa was a British Colony; ‘‘It is not a Colony. It is a conquered country, which we have occupied in our own interest against the wishes of the people to whom it belongs. Some English colonists have settled there since then, but South Africa is Dutch.”1 The year 1864 saw the foundation of the Colonial Society in London. This was later to become known as the Royal Colonial Institute (now Royal Empire Society), whose charter of incorporation, dated 1882, defined its objects as the dissemination of information about the Colonies, British possessions and dependencies, as well as the Empire of India, and the maintenance of a permanent union between the Motherland and the various countries of the Empire. On 18 November, 1884, the Imperial Federation League came into being under the presidency of W. E. Forster. Largely idealistic and emotional in character, its aim was to introduce the federal principle into the relations between Great Britain and her Colonies. The League rapidly attracted wide atten¬ tion, and soon numbered amongst its members some of the most eminent statesmen in Great Britain and the Empire. Branches sprang up everywhere, particularly in Canada and Australia. In 1889 the League sent out G. R. Parkin on a lecture tour to Australia and New Zealand. Countless public meetings were organized throughout the Empire. In 1886 the monthly journal, Imperial Federation, was launched. All this enthusiasm and success, however, only lasted so long as the problem was stated in general terms and as an abstract

1

Froude: Two Lectures on South Africa, page 6.

INTRODUCTION

35

ideal. From the moment when it became necessary to clothe the proposals in a concrete form and work out a practical scheme for Imperial Federation, it lost driving power. In 1893 the League was dissolved. The words “Imperial Federa¬ tion” had connoted “Imperial Unity” to its founders rather than what is, strictly speaking, meant by a federal system.1 In a later chapter I shall be dealing with the Round Table group which was founded in 1910, and which, as will be seen, was largely inspired by the ideas and tendencies of “Imperial Federation.” The Imperial Federation League launched various publi¬ cations, staged a number of colonial exhibitions, and par¬ ticipated in the foundation of the Imperial Institute in 1888. One of its major successes, however, was the part it played in the inauguration of the First Colonial Conference which met in London in April, 1887, the year of Queen Victoria’s Jubilee. This Conference was attended by representatives from every part of the Empire, and had under consideration those two great problems of Empire which Disraeli himself had touched on: the questions of the possibility of a military union and of a customs union. The latter met with definitely less opposition from the Colonial delegates than the former. The proposal for Imperial Federation was deleted from the agenda of the Conference, and was never to appear again in this form.2 From that day forward, in fact, imperialists were mainly concerned with the establishment of a common commercial basis for Great Britain and her Empire; their efforts were to reach a climax with Joseph Chamberlain’s campaign for Tariff Reform. With regard to political union, the idea of federation gradually gave place to the practice of mutual consultation and co-operation by means of Colonial Conferences, later called Imperial Con¬ ferences, which were held at regular intervals. It was not until 1890 that the true imperialist movement began to develop. As we have already seen, the motives that lay behind this development were economic, strategic and sentimental, all three being very closely connected. The power and popularity of such a man as Joseph Chamberlain were due to his radical and utilitarian sense of Empire. Victor 1 Duncan Hall, The British Commonwealth of Nations, page 62, et seq. After Forster’s death in 1886, Lord Rosebery became president of the League. 2 See Proceedings of the Colonial Conference of i88y.

36

INTRODUCTION

B£rard, in his classic book on British Imperialism, puts it most forcefully. “Neither pride nor sympathy,” he says, “can suffice to account for the imperialist movement. The real driving force is always economic interest.” Joseph Chamberlain, he adds, “became an imperialist the moment he realized that the Empire was essential to the prosperity of his country.”1 On the other hand, as Elie Halevy quite rightly points out: “Had the imperialism of the Government been no more than the assertion of commercial greed, had it not contained a very large measure of idealism, it would never have succeeded in sweeping the people off their feet.”2 This leads us to note that British diplomacy as a whole is both generous and self-seeking in character, so that we often find instances where genuine altruism is combined, apparently without incompatibility, with the crudest form of opportunist utilitarianism and with vast material interests. This striking paradox corresponds perfectly with what has been described as “the mysterious blend of puritanism and mercantilism which is at the very root of British individual and social morality.”3 Colonial expansion is, after all, only one aspect of the struggle for existence. It is logical, therefore, that a people like the British, who have a particular aptitude for colonial policy, should triumph in this struggle. It undoubtedly involves certain evils at the outset, but it leads eventually to the progress of civilization and to increased prosperity for the world at large. This was the credo of the majority of British Imperialists. In addition there was the immense pride felt by the great builders of Empire themselves, which may be summed up in the words of Cecil Rhodes, who hoped that every schoolmaster in every school would, on one day of the year, impress on his pupils that “Britain is not just the British Isles, it is the whole world.” Rhodes further maintained that the more the world was peopled by British citizens, the better it would be for all mankind. Let me remark in parenthesis that Rhodes, since he believed that “Home Rule in every part of the Empire” was 1 Victor B^rard: L’Angleterre et L’Imperialisme, page 68. 2 Elie Hal£vy: L’Histoire du Peuple Anglais au XIXme Sitcle, Epilogue I, page 16. 3 Floris Delattre: La Psychologie de la Diplomatic Britannique depuis la Guerre in L’Annde politique Frangaise et Etrangtre, 1931, page 287. See also G. Mondaini: La Colonisation Anglaise, vol. I, page 67.

INTRODUCTION

37

the key to the federal system, was in one sense a forerunner of the Dominion conception. In the realm of literature, Kipling incarnated the very spirit of Empire; his work is a paean of praise to the expansionist energies of his fellow-countrymen.1 The imperialist credo was voiced by the greatest British statesmen of the day, and particularly by Joseph Chamberlain, who declared in 1895: “The British race is the greatest governing race the world has ever seen.” Some English politicians held that it was not only the mission but the moral duty of Great Britain to colonize the greater part of the world. Lord Curzon certainly thought so, and dedicated one of his books to: “all persons of both sexes who believe that the British Empire is, after Providence, the greatest force for good in the world today.” The business world shared this belief, and the British public was carried away by its enthusiasm for imperialism. The popular Press with its mass circulation never missed an opportunity of driving home to its readers that the possession of new colonies was indispens¬ able to the prosperity of Great Britain. It is impossible to follow with any degree of understanding the evolution of British policy at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, unless the way in which this spirit of imperialism was fostered and encouraged is taken into account. In the final chapter of this book the reader will find a brief sketch which indicates on broad lines the present status of the British Empire. I must emphasize here and now, however, that the decisive date in the evolution of this Empire and of the whole Imperial and imperialist policy of Britain was 1895, the year in which Joseph Chamberlain took over the Colonial Office and permanently altered the course of British colonial policy.2 In order to understand the magnetic spell which Chamberlain’s brand of imperialism cast on the British public, we must not only bear in mind the frantic applause that greeted his famous words: “I am a missionary of Empire,” we must also remember that his imperialism evoked the glories of the past, the splendour that was to be, and bore witness to his burning faith in the greatness of the Empire. Milner himself, as I shall make abundantly clear in the course of this book, represented at different periods in his life 1 V. Halp^rin: L’Angleterre il y a 50 ans, pages 52-4. 3 V. Halp^rin: Joseph Chamberlain.

38

INTRODUCTION

the two opposite tendencies of British Imperialism. It is one of those paradoxes for which the English have a genius that he should have been, in turn, one of the greatest exponents of militant, and one of the most skilled and devoted architects of pacific imperialism. At the end of the nineteenth century his authoritarian personality typified the spirit of British domination; later his character developed considerably, and through his innate realism he became a flexible and most able administrator. We may safely say that Milner occupies a place amongst the great builders of Empire: men such as Joseph Chamberlain, Cecil Rhodes, Cromer, Kipling, Lyautey, Jules Ferry and Leopold II. The importance of the personal factor in the history of the British Empire and in British Imperial policy is altogether unique. In one sense it constitutes a fresh paradox. The British people have remained faithful for centuries to the democratic system within the framework of the monarchy, and yet imperialism, varying in emphasis with current public opinion, has always been the policy of those who hold the reins of government in their hands. It would not be difficult to call to mind a glittering galaxy of explorers, soldiers and brilliant statesmen whose devotion brought success to the Empire. The names of many of them are for¬ ever graven in history; others have been forgotten or have not achieved equal celebrity. Milner, I feel, is amongst these last. A study of so outstanding a personality as his, how¬ ever, contributes greatly to an understanding of British Imperialism. Alfred Milner was a very great Englishman with an essentially individual manner of thought and action, but at the same time a worthy representative of his people. A typical Englishman and typical of his age, he devoted the whole of his life to working and planning for the Empire. He was the prototype of the British proconsul. His career was colourful and eventful; it was also unique, and yet it may serve as a classic example of the career of an Englishman of his class and of his day. Biographies are extremely popular in England, particu¬ larly those in which the central figure serves to illustrate historical fact. In France this type of biography has been regarded with disfavour. But it seems to me that it is a mistake to underestimate the personalities and work of great

INTRODUCTION

39

men, especially when they are bound up with the great move¬ ments of history in general or even world history; their lives, like searchlights, illuminate the period to which they belong. This being the case, I feel that the method of expounding history through biography has an undoubted value.1 The purpose of this book is a study of British Imperialism rather than a biography. If I have taken Milner as the central figure, it is because I am convinced that a very great deal of the Imperial history of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries can best be explained through the personality, the work and the teaching of the man of whom it has been said: “He was the best civilian soldier of the British Empire.”

1 Ch.-A. Julien: Les Techniciens de la Colonisation. “Colonial history is a triumphant justification of biography,’’ writes Julien. “In no other sphere has individual intervention been so decisive in so wide a field.” See also A. L. Rowse in introduction to Botha, Smuts and South Africa, by Basil Williams. “I am convinced,” writes Rowse, “that the most congenial, as well as the most concrete and practical, approach to history is the bio¬ graphical, through the lives of the great men whose activities have been so much part of history, and whose careers in turn have been so moulded and formed by events.”

CHAPTER I

ALFRED MILNER: HIS BACKGROUND AND EDUCATION object of this book is less a study of Lord Milner viewed from the angle of his imperialism than a study of British Imperialism in his day as seen in the light of his work—in other words, it does not purpose to be a mere biography of Milner. I feel, however, that it is essential to give a brief account of his background and education in order that the part he played in the development of British Imperial policy may be fully understood. It is equally necessary to consider the chief influences under which he came; when these have been taken into account, many of his actions and reactions will appear in a far clearer, more logical light.

The

Alfred Milner was born on 23 March, 1854, in Giessen, in the State of Hesse-Darmstadt. His mother was the daughter of Major-General John Ready, who had been Governor of Prince Edward Island and later Governor of the Isle of Man. Mary Ierne Ready’s first husband was Captain St. George Cromie; shortly after his death she went to Germany with her two children, and settled in Bonn; she was then forty years old. Mrs. Cromie engaged Charles Milner, a brilliant medical student of twenty, to act as tutor to her sons; in 1853 she married him, their wedding being solemnized at the British Consulate in Bonn. Mrs. Milner was the descendant of a long line of military men; Charles Milner’s forebears had chiefly been engaged in trade. In neither family had there ever been a scholar or a politician. It is interesting to find that certain writers, notably R. C. K. Ensor, the historian, use the German version of Charles Milner’s Christian name: Karl. He was born in Neuss in 1831, of an English father, James Richardson Milner, a native of Manchester who had settled in Germany in 1805, and a German mother, Sophie von Rappard. Ensor says that 40

BACKGROUND AND EDUCATION

41

Karl Milner was German by nationality, but that his son, Alfred, was free to opt for British nationality as both his grandfathers were English.1 The Milners remained for four years in Bonn; they then went to England, and Dr. Milner put up his plate in Chelsea. In 1864 he decided to give up medicine, and in 1866 he returned with his family to Ger¬ many to take up the post of Reader in English Literature at Tubingen University. When Alfred was twelve years old he became a pupil at the “gymnasium” (grammar school) in Tubingen, where he remained for the next three years. While undue stress should not be laid on the influence of this early education, it should be remembered that Milner always retained certain German characteristics. Mary Ierne Milner had a charming personality, and Alfred, the only son of her second marriage, seems to have been deeply devoted to her. “She was a woman of singularly beautiful character, dignified, reserved, courageous, devout!”* Right up to the end of his life Alfred Milner constantly referred to his mother in his letters, always in terms of the most touching filial affection. His father was a delightful person, humorous and kindly—“with twice my brains,” young Milner said later. A doctor by profession, he was a fine scholar, versed in Shakespeare and German literature, as well as a great admirer of the classics. In addition he loved all sport, and, indeed, was such an enthusiastic shot that he was apt to go out for the day and forget all about his practice. As his son remarked, a rabbit was far more attractive to him than a patient and a pheasant than a fee! When Alfred was only fifteen years old his beloved mother died. Her death was the turning-point in his life; it not only had a profound effect on his character, but it was the decisive factor in determining his career. From that time onwards, boy though he was, he had to rely more or less on himself and make his own plans for the future. In 1869 he said goodbye to his father, and left Germany to make his home in England; his mother’s brother brought him to London, and entered him at King’s College. Here he remained until 1872. These three years were unhappy and difficult for Alfred; he 1 See Hansard Papers, vol. LXXVII (Home Secretary’s statement), also The Star, 4 January, 1916; Daily Chronicle, 24 December, 1915; New Age, so May, 1901, and so June, 1901. See also R. C. K. Ensor: England, 18701914, page 217. * Milner Papers, vol. I, page 1.

42

BACKGROUND AND EDUCATION

was desperately lonely and out of his element in London, for he had always preferred the country to the town. His masters thought highly of him, and he was popular with the other boys; both the former and the latter have since stressed his love of hard work and his unusual gifts. Lord Ullswater, who had been in the same form as Milner, described him as “a grave, serious and thoughtful boy.” He was to become an equally grave, serious and thoughtful man, though no one could ever have accused him of being taciturn. In 1870 Alfred spent the summer holidays with his father in Ger¬ many, and during a walking-tour caught a distant glimpse of the siege of Strasbourg. What he saw made a life-long impression on him; never was he to forget the highly-geared military and political organization of the Germans, and its complete contrast with the unpreparedness of the French. When the time came for him to leave King’s College his masters urged him to go to Oxford. Milner made up his mind to do so, and has left an account of the conversation he had with Mr. Mayor, his favourite master. “Which is the best scholarship obtainable?” Alfred wanted to know. “The Balliol scholarship,” said Mr. Mayor. “So,” says Milner, “I made up my mind to go in for that.” No sooner said than done; all through the holidays Alfred worked like a slave for the coming examination. On 23 November, 1872, “Mr. Milner of King’s College” was publicly announced as the winner of the first scholarship. His letters to his cousin, Marianne Malcolm, show how excited he was at the prospect of going to Oxford. Four days before the results were announced he had written saying that he felt he had done himself justice in the essay. The subject set was: “Are wars more likely to diminish as nations become more civilized?” a theme in dealing with which he was helped by his recollec¬ tion of the siege of Strasbourg. On 24 November, Alfred, in a letter to Marianne telling her of his success, refers to his mother with touching sim¬ plicity. The eighteen-year-old boy, overjoyed that he has carried off the Balliol scholarship, goes on to say: “There is a sad side, of course, as there is to everything, and a longing that there is one missing to share the triumph. . . . But this is a selfish view. It is sad only for us, and if this success is for my good, she may be delighted with it now in a purer joy-”

BACKGROUND AND EDUCATION

43

The four years that he spent at Balliol, from 1872 to 1876, provided him with the intellectual equipment that he needed for his future life. This period was definitely formative; he was helped forward by distinguished professors and was one of a group of undergraduates many of whom were destined to make their names in the political, artistic and social life of the country. Balliol, indeed, was then at the height of its fame under the celebrated Dr. Jowett, with his catholic outlook and stimulating Socratic wit. Lord Samuel, who went up to Balliol in 1889, wrote in his memoirs: “Dr. Jowett was Master of Balliol for twenty years. ... By far the most eminent man in the University, to the young he was an awe-inspiring figure.” A little farther on he adds: “There have been Masters of Balliol (first termed Principals) for nearly seven centuries; with the exception of John Wycliffe, Jowett was probably the greatest of them all. So far as the College itself was concerned, through his wise and energetic administration, his reforming spirit and enter¬ prise, and, above all, his educational methods, he raised its efficiency and reputation to the highest point they have ever reached.”1 Jowett had a deep affection for Milner and foretold a brilliant career for him. He often invited Milner to spend the vacations with him at Malvern and in Scotland. Lord Rosebery’s biographer, the Marquess of Crewe, describes Milner as “Jowett’s friend,” and goes on to say that he was “just a typical product of Balliol” when Rosebery met him for the first time.2 Years later Lord Baldwin called Milner “one of Oxford’s greatest sons.”9 Amongst Milner’s friends at Balliol were H. H. Asquith, Herbert Warren, St. John Brodrick, Charles Gore, Sidney Hall, E. B. Iwan-Muller, J. M. Rendel, Leonard Montefiore and Arnold Toynbee. Though he felt lonely at first, Milner soon became very popular with his fellow-undergraduates, as well as with his tutors, who recognized his outstanding in¬ tellectual gifts, his incomparable strength of character, and his independent mind. He was successively awarded the Hertford, Craven, Eldon and Derby scholarships. Milner formed a particularly close friendship with Arnold 1 and 2 3

Lord Samuel: Memoirs, pages 9-10. See also Abbott and Campbell: Life Letters of Benjamin Jowett. The Marquess of Crewe: Lord Rosebery, vol. I, page 215. In a speech at Oxford in 1925.

44

BACKGROUND AND EDUCATION

Toynbee, who was two years his senior. In his brief biography of Toynbee in the National Dictionary of Biography, and again in Arnold Toynbee: A Reminiscence, Milner dwells on the influence Toynbee exerted over his contemporaries at Balliol and on the social aspirations of that great spirit in whom he recognized a master: “Eloquence, religious fervour, an intense zeal for the better organization of industrial society, a genuine but not uncritical sympathy with the aspirations of the working class were characteristic of him.’’ In a letter to Toynbee’s widow, Milner wrote: “I am a man of the world and of affairs, not pretending or seeking to be otherwise, but holding on, not with a relaxing grasp, to my own great link with the higher life to which he belonged and belongs altogether. . . .’” As we shall see, Milner always took an interest, a very marked interest, in social questions. It may be said, indeed, that all his life he was a socialist in the truest sense of the word, though never at any time connected with the Socialist Party. He himself made it quite clear that Arnold Toynbee had been largely responsible for the views he held.2 More than forty years later, Stanley Baldwin, in a lecture at Oxford, stressed the vital influence Toynbee had exerted in his undergraduate days, particularly on Milner: “Arnold Toynbee was a product of his generation, but he was more than that. ... It was that devotion, that unselfish devotion of Toynbee and his friends to social service that captivated Milner in his youth and that, in spite of all the vicissitudes, political and others, that attended his life, remained with him as an abiding inspiration.”3 The years that Milner spent at Oxford did him lasting good. The change that this happy period in his life wrought in him has been excellently and concisely described by Basil Williams: “At Oxford, by his scholarships and fellowships, Milner gained freedom from the grinding fear of poverty which had haunted him in the past; he lost his sense of loneliness, profited to the full from friendship and leisure for thought, and developed a saving sense of humour and enjoy¬ ment of life.”* 1 2 tion s

4

Letter written from Ramleh, dated 7 July, 1890. See Arnold Toynbee’s important book: Lectures on the Industrial Revolu¬ of the XVIIIth Century in England. The Times, 16 May, 1925. Dictionary of National Biography.

BACKGROUND AND EDUCATION

45

It was in 1873, while he was at Balliol, that Milner acquired a moral conviction from which he was not to waver. “Pray to God to be delivered from the fear of the opinions of those whose deeds have proved them worthless,” he wrote to his cousin. When the time comes to follow Milner’s career in South Africa, particularly during the years when he was ceaselessly and mercilessly attacked by his enemies, we shall have good cause to bear in mind these words of his set down thirty years earlier. Milner was an active member of The Union, of which he was unanimously elected president in 1875. Asquith, who had been President in 1874, later described The Union as one of Oxford’s most important institutions and the most famous debating club in the world. He and Milner led the Liberal opposition, and generally agreed with each other’s views. Only once did they differ radically; this was when a young Canadian, G. R. Parkin, intervened to move a resolu¬ tion in favour of Imperial Federation. This motion was approved by Milner, but opposed by Asquith. Parkin, about whom I shall have more to say later, ultimately became secre¬ tary of the Rhodes Trust. It is worth mentioning in passing that Milner, after he had heard Gladstone speak at a meeting of the Palmerston Club, rose up and violently attacked the great man for his Little Englander opinions—no mean feat of courage for a mere undergraduate! On leaving Oxford he went into rooms in London with three of his friends, Leonard Montehore, Michael Glazebrook and James Rendel, and in 1881 he was called to the Bar. The lot of a briefless barrister was not only trying, it was anything but immediately lucrative, and Milner, deciding that the law was not for him, gave it up at the end of the year. As he loved writing, for which he had a natural gift, and as he longed not only for a more active life but one that would bring him into increasingly close contact with politics, Milner turned his attention to journalism. In 1881 he became a regular contributor to the Pall Mall Gazette, which had a very large circulation. Its first editor was John Morley, a Liberal Little Englander; in 1883, when Morley retired, and his place was taken by the no less celebrated William Thomas Stead, Milner became assistant editor. Both Stead and Milner were united in preaching the new doctrine of liberal imperialism which was based on a belief that

46

BACKGROUND AND EDUCATION

amounted to religion in the mission of the British Empire throughout the whole world, and on rational socialism in their own country. Their collaboration proved extremely fruitful, and their daily articles greatly influenced the minds of an important section of the public. Some years later Stead gave this description of his “partnership” with Milner: “One of the things Milner did every day was to go through the proofs of my leading articles before they were printed and tone them down. He would squirm at an adjective here, reduce a superlative there, and generally strike out anything that seemed calculated needlessly to irritate or offend.”1 At a first glance the Milner-Stead combination seems utterly incongruous, for never were two men so completely different in character. Opposites as they were, however, they met on common ground. Both, as befitted disciples of Ruskin, had the same conception of the British Empire and its superiority; both had come under the influence of Toynbee and took a deep interest in social reform. Milner’s journalistic career was to last for ten years. During the whole of this period he was feeling his way; he had no intention of light-heartedly taking up a new profession; on the contrary, he was trying to find out where his real vocation lay. Journalism afforded him only a partial satisfaction, and he was more and more drawn towards a life that offered greater opportunities for activity within a political and social framework. As early as 16 December, 1881, he had entered in his diary: “Well, my mind is made up. Resolution fixed. Off I go upon the wide ocean ... as long as I keep my health, I have nothing to fear in a life, the first condition of which is celibacy. One cannot have everything. I am a poor man and must choose between public usefulness and private happiness. I choose the former, or rather I choose to strive for it.” How many young men of twenty-seven, or even older, would be capable of reasoning like this, of formulating their problems with such sober seriousness? fn these few lines the youthful Milner laid down his whole course of life with its self-imposed rules, and it may be said here that he did, in fact, remain single until the time came for him to retire. It was not until 1921, four years before his death, that he married Violet Georgina Cecil, widow of Lord Edward Cecil and daughter of Admiral Maxse. 1 Review of Reviews, July, 1890.

BACKGROUND AND EDUCATION

47

At the close of 1881 and the beginning of 1882 he gave a course of six lectures on socialism at the People’s Palace in Whitechapel.' It was also about this time that he began making a detailed plan of what he intended to do in the months to come. This included the study of political and social subjects, and the writing of a book on socialism, or, more particularly, a book on Ferdinand Lassalle. But what he hoped to do above all was to set his foot on the first rung of the political ladder. With this in mind, Milner thought it was essential to “learn French and practise public speak¬ ing.” He then adds—how typically English this is!—that he must keep himself physically fit. He records his intention to: “keep up my health and spirits. Exercise, Society, Good Literature.”1 2 In 1882, after his father’s death in Tubingen, Milner spent several months in Normandy, and was enchanted with life in the country. “Life among peasants and with peasants is one of the richest experiences I have ever encountered,” runs one entry in his diary. Gradually his career, or at least his activities, had begun to take on a more definite shape. He continued to contribute to the Pall Mall Gazette, although less frequently than before, and in 1884 became private secretary to George J. Goschen, one of the most eminent statesmen of the day. This marked the beginning of a lifelong friendship between the two men. After a few months had passed, Milner gave up the journalistic career for which he had only been half-suited. From this time on he was to have little to do with the Press, yet, thinking of Milner, Clemenceau’s witty remark comes instinctively into one’s mind: “It’s excellent to have been a journalist . . . always provided that it’s in the past tense! ” Goschen’s own diary affords ample proof of the rapidity with which link was added to link in the chain of affection and regard which bound the two men together, and of the influence which each exerted on the other. It is quite plain that, by the end of the first year of their collaboration, Goschen regarded Milner not merely as his secretary, but as his colleague, confidant and friend.3 An entry for 4 January, 1885, reads: “Milner and Lucy (Mrs. Goschen) are pitching 1 These lectures appeared in the National Review in 1931. 2 Diary, 24 February, 1882. 3 A. R. D. Elliott: Life of G. J. Goschen, vol. I, page 289.

48

BACKGROUND AND EDUCATION

into me tremendously to make a speech on foreign and colonial affairs, and I shall probably do so!”1 Milner and Goschen had intellectual affinities; both had an innate gift for dealing with economic and financial problems, both were steeped in liberal imperialism. Fifteen years later, when Goschen was on the point of retirement, Milner wrote, telling him how much he owed to him: “Of course, I can never feel towards any statesman of note who has played or may be playing a role in my life what I feel towards you. Politically, I owe everything to you. You not only opened the door for me into the public service, but have been my master in the difficult art of statecraft. . . .”2 3 Together, Goschen and Milner made preparations for the electoral campaign of 1885; Milner helped Goschen to write the speeches which assured his re-election for Edinburgh. At the insistence of his friends, Milner was induced to stand as Liberal candidate for Harrow. But he was not cut out for politics, at any rate not for electoral politics. Although he made some ninety speeches, he never once mentioned the name that was a “certain signal for a round of cheers”—that of Gladstone! His political orations were interesting and closely reasoned, it is true, but they lacked punch and popular appeal. His failure to get in at Harrow discouraged any inclination to put up for Parliament again. Milner now became increasingly absorbed in the problems of foreign and colonial policy. As far back as 5 October, 1880, he had written a long letter to Arnold Toynbee about the political situation, in the course of which he had said: “He (Gladstone) never told the people who cheered him, when he denounced the difficulties into which our selfish policy had brought us, that an unselfish policy wmuld have its difficulties too, that the only way to have an easy life of it was to be still more selfish than we have hitherto been. . . He deplored the hesitancy of British foreign policy, and in 1882 aired his views in an Essay on Foreign Policy. He became more and more convinced that Great Britain’s foreign policy was im¬ portant largely because of its interaction with her colonial and imperial policy. Toynbee’s celebrated book, The Duty 1 A. R. D. Elliott: Life of G. J. Goschen, vol. I, page 290. 2 Letter to Goschen dated 19 October, 1900. Milner Papers, vol. II, pages 129-30. 3 Letter to Goschen dated 5 October, 1881.

BACKGROUND AND EDUCATION

49

of Democracy to Subject Races, made such a deep impression on him that he wrote to Goschen that what was needed was “a greater moral force—resolution to be a greater nation, to take an interest in foreign affairs, to take pains and make sacrifices for national greatness.”1 Above all, Milner was in favour of a clear-cut and consistent policy that would only deviate within given limits: ‘‘Too much of the British Lion one year is sure to be followed by an extra-strong dose of Majuba and Angra Pequena the next. . . .”2 Although Milner had not as yet been called on to play the slightest part in the problem of South Africa, it is interest¬ ing to find that, as far back as 1885, he was displaying a particular interest in that troubled question. As can be seen from the following letter to Goschen, he had already formed very definite and realistic views on the subject: ‘‘There is the distinction to be firmly drawn between yourself and the jingoes. Of course, the doctrine of concentration does this, and so does the insistence upon a well-thought-out and clearly defined foreign policy upon the necessity of taking account of foreign powers and their combinations. After all, there is nothing more dangerous than the insular ubris in which Liberals are fond of indulging: ‘We in our tight little island need not trouble about foreigners. Friendship with all, alliance with none,’ and so on and so on. That might be all very well when the Continental Powers were confined to Europe. Now they touch us at every point in Africa, in Asia, in Australasia. Compare Bismarck’s policy, ‘Do ut des/ defending German colonial interests in the neighbourhood of Metz, etc. . . In 1886 the Liberal-Unionist committee4 was formed in London with F. Maud as secretary; its most active members were Albert Grey, A. Craig Sellar and Milner. One of the ‘‘patrons” of this Committee was Goschen himself. An entry from his diary reads: “An informal and general supervision (of the work of the Committee) was exercised by Mr. Milner, whose services in the early days of the Association it is im¬ possible to over-estimate.... Ultimately the Liberal-Unionists 1 Letter to Goschen dated 31 January, 1885. a Letter to Sir Clinton Dawkins dated 2 February, 1890. * Letter to Goschen dated 1 February, 1885. * Many Liberals had disagreed with Gladstone’s Irish Home Rule policy; these broke away from the main body of Liberals and formed the LiberalUnionist group.

50

BACKGROUND AND EDUCATION

became a very well-organized and efficient body.”1 Milner in the course of a conversation with J. L. Garvin gave this description of the campaign: ‘‘For the Liberal-Unionist propaganda we slaved ourselves to shreds. We poured out pamphlets and tracts. When we were all nearly dead, we used to say to each other: ‘Never mind; go on; Dagon must be thrown down! ’ ”2 Milner was equally active at the time when Lord Randolph Churchill’s sudden resignation threw the country into a state of white-hot excitement. He still remained in the back¬ ground, however, and had no desire to play a leading part. Churchill, who had been Chancellor of the Exchequer in Lord Salisbury’s Conservative Government, had calculated that his resignation would lead to the strengthening of his hand, and certainly there were many people in the country who believed that the young and brilliant statesman was irreplaceable. It was on Milner’s insistence that Goschen was finally persuaded to accept the Chancellorship. As Winston Churchill has said in his monumental biography of his father: ‘‘Mr. Goschen’s acceptance of office definitely put an end to the Cabinet’s crisis.” That vastly popular saying of the day: “Lord Randolph had forgotten Goschen,” has been attributed to Milner. Winston Churchill categorically denies that his father had “forgotten” Goschen: “However decisive, however disastrous to Lord Randolph, the inclusion of Mr. Goschen in the Government at this time may have been, it was no surprise, for he had always been his advocate.”3 The new Chancellor of the Exchequer invited Milner to become his official Private Secretary; Milner accepted, all the more eagerly because he had always had a particular interest in financial matters. After two years of intensive work at the Treasury with Goschen, during which time he was responsible, with others, for the conversion of the National Debt from three per cent to two and a half per cent in 1888, Milner was made Director-General of Accounts in Egypt. Six months later he became Under-Secretary of State to the Egyptian Ministry of Finance, a post which he was to hold for two years until 1892. Before I go on to discuss Milner’s work in Egypt I will 1 A. R. D. Elliott: Life of G. J. Goschen, vol. II, page 82. J. L. Garvin: Notes, Whitsuntide, 1921. 3 Winston S. Churchill: Lord Randolph Churchill, vol. II, pages 273-4.

2

BACKGROUND AND EDUCATION

51

deal briefly with his work in England between the years 1892 and 1897, when he was Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue.1 Stress must be laid on the important part played by Milner in the preparation of various budgets. Sir William Harcourt had succeeded Goschen as Chancellor of the Ex¬ chequer, and Milner became his principal adviser. Asquith had the highest opinion of Milner’s financial ability.2 Har¬ court and Milner were the first to introduce death duties; these appeared in the famous Death Duties Budget of 1894 which has become a landmark in fiscal history. The introduc¬ tion of death duties proved to be an unqualified success from the point of view of the Treasury; it increased the revenue to the tune of some fifty million pounds per annum. “Not¬ withstanding the increasingly shrill anathemas which it has wrung from a section of the rich, it is still a firm favourite with finance ministers of every party, one of the richest and most enduring jewels in our fiscal crown.”3 It will be seen from the foregoing that Milner had been thoroughly and widely schooled by great masters by the time that he embarked on his career in the service of the Empire. A Salisbury made his way through following, as is fairly common in England, family tradition; a Joseph Chamberlain, because of his upbringing in the world of business affairs; a Disraeli, through the exercise of his brilliant mind and great gifts. But Milner, unlike these, entered upon his career through a chance combination of circumstances and as a result of his outstanding achievements at Oxford. One of the men who knew him most closely, Mr. L. S. Amery, has insisted on the point: “I would emphasize the fact that he was essentially a classical and humanist scholar, making his way entirely by his brilliant success at the University. As such, and without means, he was the type that would naturally go into the Civil Service. As a matter of fact, he did not do so directly, but began in active politics as private secretary to Lord Goschen, and so by the chapter of accidents went to Egypt and thence into the British Civil Service, from which he was selected for South Africa.”4 1 Milner succeeded Sir Algernon West. 2 Lord Oxford and Asquith: Memories and Reflections, vol. I, page 180. 3 J. A. Spender and Cyril Asquith: Life of H. H. Asquith, vol. I, pages 92-3. 4 L. S. Amery in a letter to the author, dated 3 August, 1946.

CHAPTER II

IN THE SERVICE OF THE EMPIRE: MILNER IN EGYPT Part I, 1889-92

“Most men have roots in England, which would make them prefer a far lower salary at home. But this is not my case, and I shall feel ‘at home’ wherever I am serving, directly or indirectly, the interests of Great Britain.” So wrote Milner to Goschen on 10 October, 1889, telling him of his decision to accept the post he had been offered as Director-General of Accounts in Egypt. Six months later, in the spring of i8go, he became Under-Secretary of State for Finance in the Egyptian Government under Khedive Tewfik. In this capacity he succeeded Blum Pasha, an extremely able and intelligent Austrian financier, who had held the post for fourteen years with the singular distinction, according to Lord Cromer, of having served the Egyptian Government all through the corrupt regime of Ismail Pasha without giving even the most malicious critic grounds for “whispering the least suspicion of his honesty.”1 Milner’s post was par¬ ticularly important in that its holder was expected to work with the Government’s Financial Adviser and to replace him in his absence. No decision could be taken on financial matters without the knowledge and consent of the Financial Adviser, whose influence in the Egyptian administration was unparalleled. Milner’s new chief, Sir Edgar Vincent, the future Lord d’Abernon, was a most able man, who, at the age of twenty-six, had been appointed to the post in 1883 in succession to Sir Auckland Colvin. It was a post that made unlimited demands on his capacities in a situation of quite extraordinary difficulty. He was perfectly aware that the first requisite for any improvement in the state of the country was to make it solvent. After Cromer, he was the greatest figure in Egyptian affairs. 1 Lord Cromer: Modern Egypt, vol. II, page 291. 52

MILNER IN EGYPT

53

There is no monograph or other document which gives detailed information about Milner’s activities as Financial Under-Secretary. One of the few sources of information on the subject is a brief note compiled by the man who can justly be considered the greatest British Proconsul in Egypt, and one of the most brilliant servants of the Empire: Lord Cromer. The brevity of Cromer’s remarks about Milner, who seems to have been his favourite disciple, makes them all the more eloquent: “Of Lord Milner, all that need be said in this place is that he is one of the most able Englishmen who have served the Egyptian Government. Not only was he versed in all the technicalities of his Department, but he had a wide grasp of the larger aspects of Egyptian affairs.”1 Asquith, Milner’s old Balliol colleague, wrote in his Memoirs: “His (Milner’s) Administration there (in Egypt) was both efficient and successful.”2 Milner seems, in fact, to have applied in his own field the method favoured by Lord Cromer himself in dealing with Egyptian affairs: patient observation, a cautious avoidance of too hastily drawn con¬ clusions, a horror of rigid systems and an appreciation of facts. This is a characteristically English outlook and intellectual temper, not without a touch of the Cartesian. When Cromer arrived in Egypt he found the country virtually bankrupt and paralysed with debts, its natural prosperity having been compromised by an irresponsible and unscrupulous administration, a state of affairs for which European loan policies had also been partly to blame. To this was added the burden of an obsolete and complicated financial administration. There was also always present the latent conflict with France, who refused to recognize Cromer as the agent of the occupying Power. Milner’s immediate problem was to try to overcome this latter difficulty, and then to put the country on its feet, both financially and economically, as soon as possible. Two conditions, as Cromer pointed out, were essential before Egypt could even think of attempting to regain her independence: the first was an efficient army, the second a stabilized financial position. The interdependence between the economic, the social and the political was even more strikingly marked in Egypt than in any other country. It is impossible, therefore, to overestimate 'Lord Cromer: Modern Egypt, vol. II, pages 291-2. a Earl of Oxford and Asquith: Memories and, Reflections, vol. I, page 180.

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the consequences of Milner’s economic policy in the field of politics, social affairs, and even in that of morale. Nevertheless, despite the efforts he made and the results he obtained during his two years in Egypt, I find myself agreeing with Basil Williams when he says that: “Probably the greatest service that Milner rendered to his country’s task in Egypt was in his book, England in Egypt.” It is worth while examining in considerable detail the contents of this book which created an exceptional impression when it was first published in November, 1892. It provides not only a penetrating analysis of the situation in Egypt and of the work carried out by the British in that country, but it also gives an insight into Milner’s own views of colonization and the Empire, and indirectly explains the guiding lines of his policy in Egypt. It was the first time that an English writer had set out with absolute, and indeed one might almost say objective, clarity, the reasons that had brought his countrymen to Egypt and that would cause them to remain there until the task they had undertaken should be fulfilled. This four-hundred-page book formed “an Englishman’s manual on Egypt.” It was to provide not only for Milner’s contemporaries but for future generations, not only for English readers but for those of all nationalities, the key to the Egyptian problem. Incidentally, it is significant that there have been no less than thirteen editions of England in Egypt, the last of which appeared in 1926. It must be consulted by all those who are interested in the history and structure of modern Egypt, and especially in the influence exerted by the British in that country. More¬ over, Milner’s book had a profound, a decisive effect on the development of imperialist thought in England, an effect that was in a sense comparable to that produced by Rudyard Kipling’s most important writings. A by no means minor detail is the fact that England in Egypt is written in a prose which has earned it a place amongst some of the finest writing in English literature. I am not detracting from the book when I say that, while it sets out to be and is a serious social and economic study, it is as exciting to read as a good novel. The reader’s attention is held throughout by a charmingly unexpected point here, a subtlety there, and the interest never slackens. This may be due, partly at least, to the subject itself. “Egypt and dullness are incompatible ideas,” says

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Milner in his introduction. A detailed criticism of the book would in itself fill a volume; I have only sufficient space to give a brief outline of its most essential points. In the first chapter Milner indicates the range of his study. His object, he says, is to describe this land of paradoxes. He devotes the first three chapters to an analysis of the principal difficulties which were the background to the work of reform undertaken in 1882, the date of the English occupation, and carried on for the next ten years. (The difficulties referred to were the disorder in the country, the veiled protectorate and the question of international repercussions.) Then follow five chapters dealing with the most important aspects of reform: the fellah as soldier, the steps taken to avoid bank¬ ruptcy, the struggle for water, the administration of justice, etc. The three final chapters are given to a consideration of the influences, foreign or native, which were favourable or unfavourable to the work of reform, and to the prospect of the progress of this work in the future. Milner insists that he has no intention of advancing his own theories or personal opinions. “My aim,” he says, “is not to influence, but to inform—not polemical but didactic.” Milner then concludes his outline of the scope of his book with the following characteristically modest words: “Whether I shall succeed in rendering that problem clear and intelligible, the following chapters must show; but I hardly believe that any want of skill on my part can be sufficiently great to render it uninteresting. The Egyptian question of today has many sides, and can be viewed in many aspects. Perhaps there are hardly two people in the world who would entirely agree in their statement of it; but there are at least two things which may be asserted with regard to it without fear of contra¬ diction. It has one radical defect—that it is never simple; it has one ineradicable charm—that it is never commonplace.”1 He begins by quoting Herodotus to show the great interest the world has always taken, and will always take, in Egypt. “As in its physical singularity, so in the life and habits of its people, and in the form—yes, nowadays, above all, in the form of its government—Egypt is still, like the Egypt of Herodotus, the chosen name of what is strange and unexampled and paradoxical. . . . This genius for eccentricity is something that no change can exorcise. Paradox seems

1

Milner: England in Egypt, Thirteenth edition, pages 10-n.

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rooted in the soil'" He then goes on to describe numerous instances of real or apparent contradictions. First of all he makes the point that the situation has changed and been greatly improved in the ten years of occupation; the task had been and still remained extremely difficult, but the results, while far from being perfect, had greatly exceeded expecta¬ tions. “The difference between Egypt now and Egypt in the latter days of Ismail is as the difference between light and darkness . . . that seems a remarkable evolution to have taken place in ten years. It is doubtful whether, in any part of the world, the same period can show anything like the same tale of progress. The most absurd experiment in human govern¬ ment (Ismail Pasha) has been productive of one of the most remarkable harvests of human improvement.”2 It is important to bear in mind that this chapter in the history of British Imperialism is in no sense an isolated incident, one chapter amidst many in the political evolution of Egypt. On the contrary, it affords valuable testimony as well as a remarkable illustration of the development of British Imperial policy. British policy in Egypt, indeed, was characteristic of the whole organization of the “Second Empire.” This period was, first and foremost, one of political and economic as well as purely colonial evolution; it played a major part in Milner’s own life, as well as in a certain phase of imperial history, and thus symbolically unites the two. The phase in question, far from being an unrelated episode in Milner’s life and career, was, to be exact, the beginning of his true career; or, to put it even more strongly, the decisive moment of his life. In the first place, he was participating at close-quarters in one of the most complicated and vigorous as well as one of the most subtle manifestations of activity in the history of British Colonial administration, side by side with a man of exceptional quality who was to be for more than a quarter of a century the undisputed and undisputable master of Egypt. In the second place, Milner himself became extremely well known, not so much on account of his work in Egypt, but through the publication of his brilliant authoritative book on that country; it remains, indeed, one of the few really fundamental books on the subject of Egypt.2 1 Milner: England in Egypt, page 2. The italics are mine. V.H. Ibid., pages 5-6. Another fundamental book on Egypt is Lord Cromer’s Modern Egypt, first published in 1908, as is also Lord Lloyd’s Egypt Since Cromer.

2 2

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In 1928 Asquith, dealing with this period of Milner’s career, wrote: “Milner’s fame was made as a civil servant and administrator.”1 It is even clearer that the years which brought the ’eighties to a close constitute one of the decisive, if not the most decisive, moments In the history of the British Empire in general, and of the development of the British Empire in the continent of Africa in particular. Milner himself stressed the fact that the problem of Egypt was not only extraordinary, it was unique, and yet—this perhaps is a fresh paradox—the page of history which it occupies is in many respects typical of the system, the conception and the work of British Imperialism. It is necessary to touch very briefly on the events which led to the formation of the very unusual relationship that was to exist between Great Britain and Egypt in the future. This short retrospect will also serve to throw a great deal of light on the development of the British Empire at the close of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. The year 1882 marks the occupation of Egypt by the British. When the Treaty of Paris was signed in 1856, the Great Powers had guaranteed the independence of the Ottoman Empire; while France in particular, up to the date of the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, had been interested in Egypt. No sooner had the great Lesseps com¬ pleted his work, however, than the British realized that the Canal was a vital artery for their trade and for the route to India. Palmerston had already foreseen its significance. “If the Canal is constructed,” he had said, “England will be com¬ pelled, sooner or later, to annex Egypt.” Andre Siegfried, in his book Suez et Panama et les routes maritimes mondiales— although only published in 1940, it has already become a classic—provides the key to the situation when he says: “A weak State, if its geographical situation is of vital strategic importance, will find the greatest difficulty in preserving its independence.” Much earlier Milner himself had written: “The Canal, while a blessing to mankind, has been of doubt¬ ful advantage to Egypt.”3 When, on 1 December, 1875, the Khedive Ismail found himself on the verge of a hundred-million-franc bankruptcy, 1 Earl of Oxford and Asquith: Memories and Reflections, vol. I, page 23. a Milner: England in Egypt, page 340.

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Great Britain proceeded to turn his disastrous financial straits to her own account with the greatest possible skill. Disraeli’s master-stroke resulted in the purchase by the British Govern¬ ment of Ismail Pasha’s 177,000 shares in the Suez Canal Company, which meant that it now held nine-twentieths of the total of 400,000 shares. “So brilliant was this transaction that the French remained thunderstruck,” comments Andr6 Siegfried. A few years later, as the result of a further financial crisis, a Franco-British financial control was established in Egypt. The other Powers continued to enjoy a series of special privileges, both financial and judiciary. In 1882 a violent wave of xenophobia culminated in a revolution, instigated by Arabi Pasha, an officer who had become Minister. When the French, who had decided not to intervene, had with¬ drawn, the ships of the British Fleet bombarded Alexandria, and eventually restored order. On 13 September, 1882, British troops, under the command of Sir Garnet Wolseley, defeated Arabi Pasha at Tel-el-Kebir and marched into Cairo. Milner sums up these events in a few succinct words: “We had gone to Egypt with no other object than to restore order, nor can there be the smallest doubt of the absolute bona fides of our profession.”1 A few pages farther on he adds: “It is clear that this was not merely our professed but our true and only object.”2 And, forestalling criticism, he hastens to state emphatically: “It is not surprising if certain foreign critics, judging our inten¬ tions by our acts, regard our armed interference as the muchdesired result for which Great Britain has long been scheming and which her previous hesitations had been deliberately calculated to render necessary. Nor have subsequent events failed to add plausibility to this insinuation. The theory is ingenious, yet never was ingenious cynicism more utterly wide of the truth.”3 The fact remains, however, that whether the British occupation of Egypt was due to mere chance or to the inexorable determinism of history, it formed the first link of a long chain. L. A. C. Raphael, a contemporary historian who writes with a good deal of objectivity, is another writer to stress the fact that the British, although they had been quite unprepared to do so, did, as it turned 1 Milner: England in Egypt, pages 1-2. 1 Ibid., page 18. 3 Ibid., pages 12-13.

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out, lay the foundation stone of their African Empire in Suez and Alexandria, Tel-el-Kebir and Cairo.1 As the result of one of those evolutions so frequent in the history of British Imperialism, this “chance” event of 1882 was the starting-point for one of the greatest movements in colonization, and above all for the growth of British influence, that the world has ever known.2 For the next twenty years an unbroken hostility reigned in Egypt between Great Britain and France. In the eyes of French statesmen the British occupation was unpardonable; as a consequence they went to every length in order to hinder the work of the British in Egypt, and, making use of diversionary tactics, sought to stir up trouble for Great Britain in the Far East, Central Africa and the Mediterranean.3 These attempts, however, had their reper¬ cussions on France herself. It was not until 1904, in fact, that the chasm which yawned between the two countries was finally bridged by the “exchange” which counterbalanced Britain’s tenure of Egypt by “giving” Morocco to France. In the meantime, however, needless to say, grave differences between the two Great Powers coloured the international situation in Europe, and strengthened Bismarck’s hand. The occupation of the Sudan was the logical outcome of the occupation of Egypt; this led to Gordon’s tragic death on 28 January, 1885, to Sir Herbert Kitchener’s entry into Khartoum on 2 September, 1898; and so inexorably to the Fashoda Crisis. “Like the development of an egg,” writes L. A. C. Raphael in The Cape to Cairo Dream, “the move¬ ment was, in the main, almost organic in character. Each stage seemed to be the logical outgrowth of the previous advance. The British people were apparently led from one objective to the next.” A glance at the map of Africa makes it quite clear why British expansion developed along a certain line—a line corresponding remarkably with the route from Cairo to the Cape!4 The credit for the great work done by the British in Egypt 1 L. A. C. Raphael: The Cape to Cairo Dream. A Study in British Imperialism, page 282. 2 According to L. A. C. Raphael, the British entered Egypt with the greatest reluctance and purely to restore order; the evidence points to this and to the fact that they wished to limit, not extend, their responsibilities. 3 Paul Knaplund: The British Empire, 1815-1939, page 418. 1 Or rather, two lines: one coming from the north, the other from the south, both having different histories.

6o

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in the years 1883-92, while it is shared between a large body of British administrators, civil servants and engineers, must be given especially to Sir Evelyn Baring, afterwards Lord Cromer. In September, 1879, he succeeded de Blignieres as Controller of the Debt; at the conclusion of a year, however, he was appointed Financial Member of the Council of India, and his Egyptian office went to Sir Auckland Colvin, the author of an extremely interesting book, The Making of Modern Egypt. On 11 September, 1883, Baring returned to Egypt as British Agent and Consul-General. “The stars were indeed gracious when, at the beginning of our greatest troubles, it occurred to the British Government to entrust the conduct of its policy to the hands of Sir Evelyn Baring. It would be difficult to overestimate what the work of England in Egypt owes to the sagacity, fortitude and patience of the British Minister.”1 It can be said with truth that Cromer was one of the finest prototypes—and, in my opinion, the most characteristic—of British administrators. It is only natural that Milner should have had the greatest admiration for him; from the beginning he looked on Cromer as his leader, his model rather, and his subsequent career was to show how profoundly he had been influenced by the example which he had had before him in Cairo. Milner possessed many of Cromer’s qualities; these qualities are of particular interest to us, partly because Milner, possibly unconscious of the fact that they existed in himself, admired them so greatly in Cromer, and partly because he found in them a source of inspiration. “Perhaps the most striking feature about him has been a singular combination of strength and forbearance . . . slowly but surely he has carried all his main points. He has realized that the essence of our policy is to help the Egyptians to work out, as far as possible, their own salvation. And not only has he realized this himself, but he has taught others to realize it.2 By wise reserve he has led his countrymen in Egypt to rely upon patience, upon persuasion, upon personal influence, rather than upon rougher methods, to guide their native colleagues in the path of improved administration. Yet on the rare occasions when his intervention was abso¬ lutely necessary, he has intervened with an emphasis which has broken down all resistance.” Milner concludes his 1 Milner: England in Egypt, page 356. 2 As Milner was later to teach his Kindergarten.

MILNER IN EGYPT

6l

description of Lord Cromer with these words: “Criticize him as you will—and he has made mistakes like other statesmen— the record of his nine years of arduous labour is one of which all Englishmen may well feel proud. The contrast between Egypt today and Egypt as he found it, the enhanced reputa¬ tion of England in matters Egyptian are the measure of the signal services he has rendered alike to his own country and to the country where he has laid the foundations of a lasting fame.”1 As has already been said, British troops had entered Cairo ostensibly to “restore order,” and with the avowed intention of withdrawing as soon as possible. Mark this, however: the British idea of “restoring order” means more than enforcing police measures and sending an army of occupation; it certainly meant far more in, of all corners of the world, the Egypt of 1882. Milner, in words combining naivety, candour and commonsense, said as much himself: “It meant reforming the Egyptian administration root and branch.” In point of fact it would have caused no surprise had the British entered Egypt for the stated purpose of reforming the administrative and economic structure of the country from top to bottom, or if, on account of the alarming situation of the country, they had decided to proclaim a temporary or permanent Protectorate over Egypt. Actually, Lord Gran¬ ville’s proclamation to the Great Powers on 3 January, 1883, struck a very different note: “Although at present a British force remains in Egypt for the preservation of public tran¬ quillity, Her Majesty’s Government are desirous of with¬ drawing it as soon as the state of the country and the organization of proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive’s authority will admit of it. In the meantime, the position in which Her Majesty’s Government are placed towards His Highness imposes on them the duty of giving advice with the object of securing that the order of things to be established shall be of a satisfactory character, and possess the elements of stability and progress.”2 It is of the greatest importance to see what this proclamation really implies; quite plainly it contains the basic principle of that form of British Imperial policy which has so often been applied in the Middle East, in India, and indeed to a varying 1 Milner: England in Egypt, page 357. 2 Ibid., pages 26-7. The italics are mine. V.H.

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degree in nearly all those countries under British influence or hegemony. Milner, with a frankness which may strike some as cynicism, and which may amuse or shock a non-British reader, comments that the words “giving advice” are “a charming euphemism of the best Granvillian trend.”1 I admit that I am tempted to substitute “British” for “Granvillian.” Milner himself continues with this little piece of sound sense: “The advice of an armed man in possession of your property is apt to be something more than a mere recom¬ mendation; it is an order.”21 shall make no further comment, but let Lord Granville have the last word. One year after he had delivered his proclamation, he sent the following instructions to his consul-general: “I hardly need point out that in important questions, where the administration and safety of Egypt are at stake, it is indispensable that Her Majesty’s Government should, so long as the provisional occupation of the country by British troops continues, be assured that the advice which, after full consideration of the views of the Egyptian Government, they may feel it their duty to tender to the Khedive, should be followed. It should be made clear to the Egyptian ministers and Governors of provinces that the responsibility which for the time rests on England obliges Her Majesty’s Government to insist on the adoption of the policy which they recommend, and that it will be necessary that those Ministers and Governors who do not follow this course should cease to hold their offices.”3 Milner was not far wrong when he remarked: “That, at any rate, was plain speaking.”4 Actually, though Granville’s words sought to cloak the facts, the British themselves have never denied that their work in Egypt at the close of the nineteenth century was carried on by means of a regime that was nothing else than a “veiled protectorate.”5 We should be quite justifled if instead of veiled protectorate we were to say little short of direct administration. Milner himself appreciated to the full that the veiled protectorate was one of the principal causes 1 Milner: England in Egypt, page 27. 2 Ibid., page 27. The italics are mine. V.H. 3 Telegram from Lord Granville to Sir Evelyn Baring, 4 January, 1884. The italics are mine. V.H. 4 Milner: England in Egypt, page 27. 5 Lord Cromer: Modern Egypt, vol. I, page 29: see also chapters XL and XLIII. See also chapter III of Milner: England in Egypt. “The Veiled Protectorate.”

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of Egyptian hostility towards Great Britain and her repre¬ sentatives. The British, in fact, were dealing with an oriental people, a largely primitive people, who were either masters or slaves and who could admit of nothing in between. Here is Milner’s amusing imaginary dialogue between an Egyptian and a British Administrator: “The Egyptian: I am prepared to be your humble, obedient servant, or I am prepared, quite prepared, to do without you. But I don’t understand divided responsibility or limited freedom of action. Your kind consideration in letting me have my own way at times—just when it happens to suit you—does not make me feel a bit more free but only a great deal more uncomfortable. “The British Administrator: Had you the capacity and character to keep things straight, there would have been no insolvency or revolution, no necessity for our interference. But ... we English don’t want to stay in your country for ever. We don’t despair of your learning to manage decently your own affairs. If we were to go away tomorrow, you would not succeed in doing so because you have not yet shaken off the old traditions, you still require a deal of training in a better school. But, at the same time, if we were to take the government of the country entirely out of your hands, you would never learn to do better. You need to be shown what to do, but you also need to practise doing it. You need energy, initiative, self-reliance. How could you ever develop them if we were to keep you absolutely in leading-strings?”1 I have quoted this long extract from Milner’s book because, while it was written with no other country but Egypt in mind, it largely sums up the doctrine and practice of British Imperial policy. John Bull uses the traditional argument of all imperialists in his answer to the descendant of the Pharaohs; his words are clear, realistic and sincere. But it is doubtful, I think, whether they would carry conviction to an oriental mind. Be that as it may, despite all the difficulties that resulted from a situation which was equivocal, to say the least of it, the British, combining liberalism with authority, tolerance with contempt, kindness with severity, succeeded in working for the country’s good. The pen-portrait Milner draws of the average Egyptian is not unfavourable: as long as he is well treated, and the 1 Mikier: England in Egypt, pages 33-4.

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general level of his education raised, he is no worse than the citizen of any other country. “At bottom, the Egyptian is intelligent and adaptable. He is by nature no more inclined to be dishonest than other people. Of course, if you put a premium on dishonesty, as the old system did, you will get it, as you would anywhere else. But an exactly opposite policy will produce—and indeed is producing—an opposite result.”1 Broadly speaking, the instrument chosen by the British to carry out their policy of occupation in Egypt had three main elements. First, the importance of the relatively small army of occupation—it consisted of scarcely more than three thousand men—lay in the fact that it was the outward and visible sign of British domination. It must be remembered, however, that—officially—this army was not composed of soldiers of the protecting power because—officially—there was no protecting power! “In theory, their presence is an accident and their capacity that of simple visitors.”2 3 Secondly, the British Administration was headed by Her Majesty’s British Agent and Consul-General, who was the indisputable master of Egypt. Juridically, there was nothing abnormal or anomalous in his position. What was original were the functions and the influence which he in fact exercised. In theory he was no more important than the dozen or so Consuls-General of other powers in Egypt (he was not even the doyen). In reality he was the ultimate authority in that country, the fate of which rested entirely in his hands. Lastly we must keep in mind the preponderant role played by the able constellation of British officials. Outwardly their duties corresponded exactly with those of similar officials from other countries, but again in actual fact their powers, within the limits of their sphere, were analagous with those of Her Majesty’s Consul-General. Moreover, although strictly speaking they were ordinary members of the Egyptian administration, they received their directives from the British Consul-General and kept him fully informed of all their activities. Milner, referring to these officials, says: “Their advice is not like ordinary advice. Their dismissal is not to be lightly thought of; in fact, without exceptionally valid reasons, it is not to be thought of at all.”8 The ministries 1 Milner: England in Egypt, page 327. 3 Ibid., page 29. 3 Ibid., page 31.

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confided to British officials were those which were responsible for the reorganization and reconstruction of the country—in other words, the key ministries. All questions concerned with the army, finance, public works, the police, and to some extent the law, came within their scope. It should be noted at this point that the census returns for Egypt in 1882 showed population figures of 6,715,000 Egyptians as against 91,000 foreigners. Sixty-two per cent of the native population belonged to the agricultural class. One of the most important, as well as the most difficult, of these ministries was that of finance. As we have already seen, Milner’s specific role in Egypt was to support the financial adviser to the Government—an Englishman like himself—and to act in some measure as a guide to the Egyptian Minister of Finance. It is hardly surprising, there¬ fore, that the chapter in England in Egypt which deals with finance should be outstandingly brilliant and of exceptional interest; every line, practically every word, not only proves abundantly that Milner was a master of the subject, but that he carried out his work in this sphere with the maximum of intelligence. In the very first paragraphs of this chapter, with its topical title, “The Race Against Bankruptcy,” the prob¬ lem of finance in Egypt immediately takes shape. It is a very great pity that it cannot be quoted here in full, for its interest is certainly not confined to the financier or the economist. It compels us, in fact, to agree with Milner when he says: “Few people realize the fascination of finance.”1 The evolution of Egypt’s financial history during the last twenty-five years of the nineteenth century is classified by Milner under these three headings: Prodigality, Ruin, Recuperation. Each of the three acts of this drama was played out with an extraordinary intensity. For us the interest lies, not only in the wild and unparalleled fluctuations of Egyptian finance, but also in the fact that this same finance was so closely related to the lives of the Egyptian people. “Nowhere in the world is the bearing of public economy upon private welfare either more direct or more evident than in Egypt.”2 It is a point that must be remembered, firstly because of its important bearing on the situation in Egypt, but above all because it affords further proof that Milner’s 1 Milner: England in Egypt, page 172. 1 Ibid., page 173. lmb—c

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character was definitely formed in Egypt, and that he developed there certain valuable qualities which were to stand him in good stead in that country, and were to continue to bear fruit throughout his career; it was the integration of the arduous problems of Egyptian finance with those of public works, hygiene, internal economy and justice which it was his task as Financial Under-Secretary to achieve. “Prosperity—nay, decent existence—is impossible with a disordered Treasury.”1 The period when the financial situa¬ tion of Egypt simply meant the state of the Debt had come to an end, and had been succeeded by what was virtually a vast problem of economic policy. “For a political economist,” says Milner, “I can imagine no experience more interesting or instructive than that of practical contact with Egyptian affairs.” The essential aims of the work of reform undertaken by the British in Egypt were, firstly, to put an end to administrative negligence and waste, and apply a curb to recklessly extravagant expenditure; and, secondly, by a proper employment of methods to increase the productivity of the country. As soon as the first part of the task had been completed the way was made clear for the realization of the second. It immediately became possible to reduce certain taxes, to build up a reserve and to budget for a programme which envisaged the cutting of a new canal, the construction of a new railway, and so on—in other words, expenditure for purely productive purposes. “The value of a particular outlay upon irrigation may be calculated within a few years in terms of sugar or cotton.”2 It need only be said that the cotton crop, cotton being Egypt’s most important product—it represents nearly two-thirds of her total exports, and almost a third of her entire agricultural wealth—rose by fifty per cent between 1886 and 1891. How did Great Britain profit from the greatly improved situation? Some critics maintain that she exploited her strength in Egypt in order to obtain for herself special financial and commercial advantages. Milner, however, takes an entirely opposite view, and states categorically that whereas Britain’s share in the total trade of Egypt—taking 1 Milner: England in Egypt, page 174. 2 Ibid., page 176.

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exports and imports together—was fifty-seven per cent in the years immediately preceding the occupation, in 1891 it was only fifty-four per cent. In Great Britain, indeed, there was an outcry against the work that was being done in Egypt, the results of which seemed to be running counter to her own interests. Milner firmly silenced these dissentient voices by pointing out that the improved Egyptian administration was already leading to the development of trade, and that, since Great Britain participated in it up to fifty per cent, she was obviously a keenly interested party. He maintained, moreover, that while Great Britain profited, it was certainly not at the expense of Egypt’s prosperity; she gained in fact not at the expense of other powers, but with other powers, and if she happened to be the principal gainer it was simply because she held the largest stake. Milner concludes his chapter on finance with the problem of water. On the face of it water would seem to be quite unrelated to money, but in Egypt it is quite obvious that the two are inextricably bound up. “It is all a question of water. . . . Egypt is a country which cries aloud for the application of capital to elicit its great latent wealth. ... If the amount of summer water could be doubled, or even increased by fifty per cent, the effect on agriculture would be stupendous. The question of creating a vast reservoir, to collect the river water in the months of abundance, in order to give it out again in the months of drought, is therefore the most interesting problem which now confronts not only the engineers, but the financiers of Egypt.”1 Milner was right: the problem of water in Egypt directly concerned the Ministry of Finance. “Give me a good govern¬ ment and I will fill your Treasury,” said Baron Louis to Louis XVIII, words that have since become famous. With Egypt in mind I am tempted to paraphrase them and say: “Give me a full Treasury and I will give you good public works. Give me good public works and I will give you pros¬ perity in Egypt.” Egypt is a wealthy country, but her prosperity is dependent upon artificial means. Let there be no mistake: unless Egypt has an adequate system of canaliza¬ tion and irrigation she is inevitably doomed to disaster, for she will revert more or less to a desert. Egypt, in fact, requires public works on a vast scale; deprived of these, she could not 1

Milner: England in Egypt, page 220.

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exploit her resources, and would remain poverty-stricken. It is significant that the Ministry of Public Works was the first to be mainly administered by the British, who immediately established a rigorous control over the water supply. In India, a country bearing in many ways a marked resemblance to Egypt, the salt tax had provoked widespread resentment; in Egypt the monopoly of the water supply by a foreign power began by arousing similar feelings. The Egyptians were not only humiliated, they were irritated and angered by this control, but so vast and so rapid was the progress achieved in the sphere of irrigation that their wounded pride was compelled to give way to admiration for the creative genius of the British; since they themselves were the first to benefit from it, they had every cause to be grateful. May one not say that water, like salt, pepper, coal, cotton and many similar commodities, can, in one sense, be looked upon as history personified? In a short and brilliant passage, Milner, the ex-Balliol scholar, stresses the vital part played by water in the history of Egypt. “The early Greek poet who declared that ‘water was the best of all things,’ the early Greek philosopher who saw in water the primal element in creation, must surely have drawn their thought, perhaps unconsciously, from Egyptian experience and sentiment. We know that Greece in her beginnings owed much to the influence of Egypt. May not the theory of Thales, and even the poetical hyperbole of Pindar, have been inspired by some contact, direct or indirect, with the land where a single great River is the lord and giver of life, the source and sustenance of all existence and all civilization?” A little farther on he adds this sentence which deserves to become historic: “Egypt, as a geographical expression, is two things—the desert and the Nile; as a habitable country it is only one: the Nile.”1 Not only does Egypt’s prosperity depend upon the course of the Nile, her very fate is bound up with it. At the end of the dry season every Egyptian, rich or poor, master or slave—we might almost say, man or beast—is obsessed by a single thought; tortured by anxiety, he asks himself: “Has the water risen? What is the news from Assouan?”3 1 Milner: England in Egypt, page 221. It will be remembered that Herodotus called Egypt “the gift of the Nile.” 2 In Modern Egypt which appeared fifteen years after Milner’s book, Lord Cromer has this to say on the all-important subject of water in that

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Milner appreciated to the full the magnificent achieve¬ ments of the engineers and technicians in the all-important sphere of irrigation. Not only did he regard them with the greatest admiration, but, as the following passage will show, he realized with what difficulties they were beset: “It is hard to imagine a more interesting life than that of an irrigation engineer in Egypt. But at the same time I can think of few lives more trying. He is for ever playing the most exciting of games, in which the stakes are the welfare, possibly the existence, of numbers of his fellow-creatures Milner then refers briefly to the pioneer work done by French engineers in the time of Mehemet Ali, “that barbaric genius,” and stresses the fact that it was the magnificent design of the great French engineer which led to the creation of one of the greatest irrigation systems in the world. In the course of his chapter on the struggle for water, Milner, who was no engineer, but a specialist in finance, pays this tribute to Sir Colin Scott Moncriff and his brilliant team of engineers: “The longer I remained in Egypt, and the more I saw of the country, the more clear it became to me that the work of these men has been the basis of all the material improvement of the past ten years. We at the Finance Office have, so to speak, registered that improvement in our easier budget and growing surpluses; but it is the engineers who have created it.”J Equal credit, however, must go to the administrators of finance, who, when they had succeeded in putting the country on a sound economic footing, allocated increasingly large sums for the construction of public works; but for them, indeed, the vast irrigation .”1

country: “This subject has already been treated by a highly qualified writer. The lassitude which pervades both man and beast in Egypt during the hot months when the land is baked by the fiery African sun and windswept by the scorching khamsin; the general relief experienced when the Nile begins to rise; the anxiety to know whether the water will pass the level of those ‘low cubits’ which, it is said, were designated by the Arabs ‘the angels of death’ (Mommsen: Provinces of the Roman Empire, vol. II, page 252); the fear lest Nature should be too prodigal of her gifts and destroy by excess what, it was hoped, she would have bestowed by moderation; the revival of the whole country when the waters retire and the earth begins to yield forth her increase; all these things have been admirably related by Lord Milner in a chapter of his work entitled ‘The Struggle for Water.’ He has also described the care, the watchfulness, and the untiring energy displayed by the British engineers in their endeavours to direct and bridle the forces of Nature.” Lord Cromer: Modern Egypt, vol. II, pages 458-9. 1 Milner: England in Egypt, page 227. 1 Ibid., pages 252-3.

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scheme constructed could never have been put into effect.1 As a result of their brilliantly successful irrigation work, British engineers and technicians soon occupied a unique position amongst the Egyptians; not only had they carried out their duties without arousing the discontent and criticism of the native population, they had even managed to earn its admiration and gratitude. They became immensely popular, and the people trusted them to a degree that was touching. Milner records a conversation he had with an Egyptian official who maintained that the British should clear out of Egypt without further delay. “How do you think the country would get on without the British engineers?” asked Milner, and received the unhesitating reply: “You do not suppose that if Great Britain were to retire from Egypt we should let the engineers go. I myself should be the first to do everything I could to retain them.”2 Milner explains that one of the reasons which contributed to the supreme and undisputed success of British engineers, and which accounted for the limited success of French technicians, was that the latter confined themselves to advising their Egyptian colleagues, while the former made no bones about directing them. “That is the root of the whole matter. European skill—in this as in other respects—is necessary for the regeneration of Egypt. But European skill is useless without European authority. Wherever you turn, that cardinal fact stares you in the face.”3 The stabilizing of Egypt’s economic situation not only paved the way for political action, but justified it and defined its limits. As the work of civilization expanded with these technical improvements, so all those difficulties to which the occupation had given rise inevitably increased. It would be impossible to leave the subject of Milner in Egypt without giving some idea of his views of, and the importance he placed on, the British army of occupation. The chapter of his book which deals with this army, apart from being an essential contribution to the history of British 1 It must be pointed out that the British were not the originators of public works in Egypt. It is recognized today that Ismail did not wantonly waste the country’s funds; he actually spent them on public works, but his inordinate expenditure was out of all proportion to the Debt. He can only be accused of over-ambition. 2 Milner: England in Egypt, page 254. 3 Ibid., page 233.

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colonial policy in Egypt, is of outstanding interest because it is written with a penetrating insight which gives a clear picture of certain fundamental aspects of British Imperial policy and British Imperial action. Milner begins by describing how radically the British reformed the Egyptian Army, how they reorganized and strengthened it; he emphasizes the all-important part played by British officers in this work of reform, and does not visualize the possibility of their being entirely withdrawn, thus leaving the Egyptian Army without a British cadre. It is in this connexion that he expounds what we might well call his credo—or at least part of it—as regards the part played by the British, and which, he maintained, must continue to be played by them in that country. “I am not one of those who hold that everything that has been done in Egypt since 1882 is due to Englishmen. I am the first to recognize the very important part which has been played in the revival of the country by natives and other Europeans. I do not believe that the indefinite continuance of British control in its present form is essential to the ultimate welfare of Egypt. I see great improvement in the self-governing capacity of its inhabitants, and I look forward to still greater improvement in the same direction. But optimist and Egyptian as I am, I cannot conceal from myself and my readers that the command of the Army is one of the last things it will be safe to hand over to native manage¬ ment.”1 There is no need to comment at length on the abovequoted passage; every sentence in it speaks for itself. I shall simply single out the phrase: “optimist and Egyptian as I am.” This is infinitely more than a profession of faith; the concept of duty and devotion that is enshrined in these words reveals the stature of the man who uttered them. They might be summed up thus: “Perseverance in the task once taken in hand; fidelity to the cause to the preaching of which he meant to devote his life.” Milner took a deep interest in Anglo-French relations in Egypt; his concise and outspoken account of the bitter antagonism which lasted for years between the two countries goes right to the root of the matter. We have only to read what he has to say on this subject to arrive at a clear under¬ standing of the reasons for the deep breach which existed 1 Milner: England in Egypt, page 167.

7*

MILNER IN EGYPT

between England and France for nearly a quarter of a century, and to appreciate the full effects of the decisive pact of May, 1904. This pact, which marked the Entente Cordiale, eliminated one of the major causes of the strained relations which existed between the future allies of 1914 and 1939. Milner begins by pointing out that towards the close of the nineteenth century most of the European Powers were interested in Egypt to a greater or lesser degree, and then proceeds to show, not without some bitterness, that the greatest difficulties encountered by the British Administra¬ tion were those for which France was responsible. France, indeed, more than any other power, seems to have been particularly jealous of the influence exerted by the British, and the fact that they were successful added fuel to the flames. Mixed with this feeling of envy was France’s regret that she had withdrawn from Egypt in the decisive year of 1882, and this, in its turn, gave rise to resentment—a resentment that is easily understandable even though France had only herself to blame. There was, however, amongst many of the French a far more deeply rooted motive for their antagonism towards the British in Egypt. At the end of the eighteenth century, long before the advent of the British, as far back as the time of Bonaparte, France had taken a special interest in Egypt, and, alone of the Powers, had supported her in her struggle for independence against Turkey. Moreover, it was to France that Mehemet Ali had turned for aid in his attempt to spread European culture in the Land of the Pharaohs. For the next fifty years French lawyers, engineers and professors did their utmost to propagate Western civilization, and while the results they achieved were not commensurate with their efforts they nevertheless succeeded in leaving their mark. French, like Arabic, became one of the official languages of the country. Indeed, at the time when Milner was writing his book, Englishmen in the Egyptian service were penning official letters to one another in halting French! Last, and certainly not least, the administration of the Suez Canal, which owed its origin to a great Frenchman, was and still is very much in French hands. Despite all this, however, as Milner points out with almost brutal frankness, the French were unpopular in Egypt for many reasons. “Cordial detesta¬ tion of French diplomacy, bitter resentment of the manner in which France took every possible advantage of the dependent

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73

position of Egypt—these are, perhaps, the only sentiments which men like Nubar and Riaz have in common.”1 Milner then goes on to pay tribute to the zeal and integrity of French officials, but criticizes vehemently the jealous and hostile attitude of the French residents, and above all of the French Press, towards the British in Egypt. Here, indeed, was a striking instance of the mischief that an unscrupulous Press can work; those newspapers which appeared in French in Egypt were filled with scurrilous accounts of what the British Administration was supposed to be doing, but while these tirades were not taken seriously on the spot, they were, most unfortunately, regularly reprinted in newspapers pub¬ lished in France. People of all classes, even highly intelligent people, read these reports with great interest and were con¬ vinced of their truth; the pity was that they did not realize that they were nothing more than the work of pamphleteers, inferior imitations of Rochefort’s equally unfounded articles in L’Intransigeant. Milner, the one-time journalist and assistant editor of the Pall Mall Gazette, makes this pertinent remark, which applies elsewhere as well as to Egypt: “Thus the good relations between two great countries may be materially impaired by the half-humorous extravagances of a handful of witty, needy and dare-devil penny-a-liners.”* Did not Napoleon himself say: “Four enemy newspapers can do more damage than an army of 100,000 soldiers”? In 1904, however, the danger of a definite break between France and Great Britain was averted once and for all. In Appendix 3 (“Egypt in 1904”) to Milner’s book, England in Egypt, we find the following words by Sir Eldon Gorst: “No one will rejoice more than Lord Milner himself that the ‘difficulty with France’ which formed the subject of Chapter XIII has finally disappeared without leaving a trace of illfeeling in either country. By the terms of the Anglo-French agreement, France has recognized the permanency of the British occupation, and has given us a free hand in Egypt.”3 The different political regimes which were applied in Egypt during the nineteenth century, particularly during its latter half, provided matter for so much criticism that Milner was led to ask himself whether some new system would not 1 Milner: England in Egypt, page 341. Ibid., page 343. 8 Ibid., page 404.

1

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MILNER IN EGYPT

be more advantageous for Egypt. In certain cases neutraliza¬ tion is a solution which has a particularly seductive ring, but in that of Egypt, a country whose people were incapable of self-government or of managing their internal and external affairs, it was quite obviously useless. The Egypt of those days had, in fact, nothing in common with such countries as Switzerland and Belgium. If, therefore, responsible statesmen had in mind the neutralization of Egypt, it simply meant that they were either unwilling or afraid to allow any one of the Powers to restore order and continue the work of recon¬ struction in that country, and had therefore decided that all the Powers should wash their hands of the problem. Briefly, neither neutralization nor internationalization was desirable for Egypt, the latter proposal being, perhaps, even less so than the former. Egypt had suffered too cruelly in the past from the intervention of different Powers. Milner believed that every intelligent Egyptian would agree that, so long as foreign control was indispensable, it was at least preferable that it should be exercised by one Power rather than by several. Some might prefer France, others Great Britain, others yet another country, but all would be unanimous in opting for a single control. As Milner points out, the evils to which Egypt had fallen heir had been caused precisely by an excess of internationalism. The “dual control” of France and Great Britain had been a step in the right direction, but to Milner the fact that the control had now passed entirely to the British constituted a vast change for the better. If everything is taken into account, and we judge this single control by the British on its achieve¬ ments—material, strategic, political, financial, administrative and cultural—we come to the conclusion that, no matter how it has been criticized, it was an almost complete success. Let me round off this first phase of Milner’s work in Egypt by paying tribute to the work of British officials in that country. They handled matters of the utmost complexity and delicacy with conspicuous success—matters that were even more complicated than those in India. The trump card of the British, in Egypt as elsewhere, has always been their ability to “fit in to the most incongruous situations and make the best of limited opportunities without troubling their heads about imperfections of system.”1 With other countries 1 Milner: England in Egypt, page 351.

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in mind, Milner asserts with justifiable pride that “in the art of governing, Englishmen have a particular gift which is very much to their advantage.”1 “In the art of govern¬ ment,” he continues, “the Englishman seems to be as handy and adaptable as he is clumsy and angular in society. There are other nations with equal and perhaps greater gifts for the creation of an ideally perfect administration. But I doubt,” he concludes, “whether any nation could have made anything at all of a system so imperfect, so incongruous and so irritating as that which we found in Egypt, and which we have not been permitted radically to alter. The logical Frenchman would have been maddened by its absurdities. The authoritative temper of the German would have revolted at its restrictions. It needed that incarnation of compromise, the average Briton, to accept the system with all its faults and to set to work quietly in his sensible, plodding way to do the best he could under the circumstances.”2

Part II, The Milner Mission to Egypt,

1919

'2°

At the beginning of 1892 Milner was recalled to London by Her Majesty’s Government, and appointed Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue. I shall deal later with the history of the next twenty-five years, and, disregarding the chronological order of events, come now to the year 1919 when Milner found himself back in Egypt at a time of exceptional gravity. The part he was called on to play was no longer that of an administrator; it was essentially that of a diplomat, or better still, a statesman. Undimmed by the passage of time, his work in Egypt during the years 1889-92, and his masterpiece, England in Egypt, were the luminous threads that led to the mission with which Milner was charged in 1919. During his absence from Egypt the work of reconstruction in that country had continued to develop and bear fruit under the leadership of Lord Cromer up till 1907, and sub¬ sequently under that of Sir Eldon Gorst and Kitchener. As 1 Milner: England in Egypt, page 356. 2 Ibid., page 356.

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has already been said, the treaties of 1904 had considerably simplified the situation, chiefly owing to the fact that the British occupation had at length been recognized by the Great Powers. The British, who had only entered Egypt for the purpose of “restoring order,” had been compelled willynilly to prolong their visit; no sooner had certain problems been resolved than others arose; consequently the British did not feel justified in leaving. As time went on they took their domination of the country for granted, and found such satis¬ faction in playing the part of “protectors” that they very naturally lost all desire to quit Egypt. Thus from a small initial point British influence had thrust upward and out¬ ward until it had gradually assumed the shape of a pyramid in reverse, and had become so powerful that on the eve of 1914, although there had been no formal declaration, Egypt was virtually regarded as part and parcel of the British Empire. The longer the veiled protectorate continued, the greater the danger in the political situation. As we have seen, as far back as 1892 Milner had stressed its harmful effects in England in Egypt. One of the main causes for the hostility of the Egyptians, indeed, lay in the obvious contradictions of British policy; in one breath—and how typical this is of imperial policy—the British claimed that the object of their work of reform was to make Egypt autonomous, in other words independent, at the earliest possible moment; in the next they declared that the occupation must continue for the present, since the country was plainly incapable of selfgovernment. Furthermore, Great Britain was willing to quit Egypt on condition that she retained certain footholds in the country which would safeguard her strategic and commercial interests. Lord Lloyd in his book, Egypt Since Cromer, says that it was precisely the clash between the two conflicting ideals—on the one hand a benevolent administration, and on the other the development of self-government—which gave rise to such countless difficulties for the British. Immediately after the Great War of 1914-18 certain nationalist groups in Egypt became more and more convinced that the time had come when their country could dispense with British tutelage. Matters came to a head in 1919, and so serious was the situation that the British Government decided to send a special Mission to Egypt. Its object was to make inquiries on the spot, and to suggest what steps should be

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taken in order to put a definite, satisfactory end to a situation which was daily and hourly increasing in tension. “Master the Difficult and you will surely be asked to per¬ form the Impossible,” wrote Milner in his great book. Possibly the British Government had these words of his in mind when they asked this “great statesman,” as Maurice Baumont has called him,1 to act as head of this Mission. It need hardly be said that a better choice could scarcely have been made. Milner knew Egypt through and through, had studied the history of the country and had administered its finances; during the long years of his absence he had never failed to maintain contact with the Land of the Pharaohs, a land to which he was sincerely attached. Had he not said of himself: “Optimist and Egyptian as I am”? Now, as never before, he needed to be “optimist and Egyptian” if he hoped to succeed in the critical and immensely difficult task that lay before him. When the Mission arrived in Cairo on 7 December, 1919, Egypt was seething with unrest. It was Milner’s ardent desire to find a lasting solution to the problem and put before the British Government a workable system for the administration of Egypt, a system which would not only conform to British Imperial policy, but which would be acceptable to Egyptian nationalists whose aim was autonomy.2 The names of those who were chosen for this Mission must be borne in mind. It has been said with justice that “it was a body well selected for its purposes.”3 It consisted of Lord Milner, the chairman, who was also Colonial Secretary; Sir Rennell Rodd, one of Cromer’s former colleagues, and at one time British Ambassador at Rome; General Sir John Maxwell, who had had a successful career in Egypt; Sir Cecil Hurst, Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office and an authority on international law; Brigadier-General Sir Owen Thomas, 1 Maurice Baumont: La Faillite de la Paix, page 246. 2 It was not until eight months after Milner had informed Lord Curzon of his readiness to accept this new responsibility that the Mission actually left for Egypt. Had the Cabinet made arrangements for this Mission to leave imme¬ diately after Milner’s nomination, or at the latest by the end of May, tgig, its task would have been considerably facilitated. Lord Allenby, the High Commissioner in Egypt, had repeatedly urged Lord Curzon to expedite the Mission—-see, in particular, his telegram dated 25 April, 1919—but in London, even those in the highest authority apparently failed to appreciate the full gravity of the situation or the harm that might be caused by every moment of delay. 3 Lord Lloyd: Egypt Since Cromer, vol. II, page 11.

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a Labour M.P. who had earned distinction during the Boer War; and J. A. Spender, the Liberal editor of the West¬ minster Gazette. The agitation in Egypt for independence was at its height when this Commission of Inquiry was sent out “to inquire into the causes of the late disorders in Egypt, and to report on the existing situation in that country and the form of the Constitution which, under the Protectorate, will be best calculated to promote its peace and prosperity, the progressive development of self-governing institutions, and the protection of foreign interests.”1 It is impossible for those who have not studied the contemporary newspaper reports and articles to form even an approximate idea of the extent of Egyptian hostility towards the Milner Mission and its members. Such an outcry arose on all sides, such a storm of protests and menaces broke out that even those Egyptians who wished to get in touch with the Mission dared not make any overtures. The picture emerged in all its stark reality; the Mission which had been sent out from England in order to outline “a form of Constitution which, under the Protectorate,” would be satisfactory to both parties, was faced with the fact that the overwhelming majority of Egyptians, led by Zaghlul Pasha, were clamouring for full independence. Three weeks after the arrival of the Mission, Milner, with a realism that calls for praise, issued the following com¬ munique: “The Mission has been sent out by the British Government, with the full approval of Parliament, to reconcile the aspirations of the Egyptian people with the special interests which Great Britain has in Egypt and with the maintenance of the legitimate rights of all foreign residents in the country.”2 We have only to re-read the text of the terms of reference and compare it with that of Milner’s communique in order to see how greatly they differ not in degree but in nature; the latter embodies a concession of capital importance, for the fundamental idea of a Protectorate seems to have been abandoned. Despite the publication of this communique, however, the situation in Egypt continued to deteriorate, and violent terrorist manifestations caused fresh and widespread havoc. 1 Report of the Special Mission to Egypt Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, 1921, page 2. The italics are mine. V.H. 2 Official Journal, 29 December, 1919.

MILNER IN EGYPT

7Q

Although Milner, whole-heartedly loyal to the British Imperial tradition, never for a single moment in his career wavered from his belief that all that was British was crushingly superior, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that he approached the problem of Egypt with so wide a measure of impartiality that it may even be said to have amounted to sympathy for Egyptian hopes. Lord Milner, in fact, possessed that attribute which is essential in a statesman: the power to act objectively; it is one of the reasons which explain why he became one of the Empire’s greatest servants. The Milner Mission made no attempt to deny that the British Adminis¬ tration had made mistakes in the past; in loyal and dignified terms, it stressed the invaluable help that Great Britain had received from Egypt during the Great War; and, while seeking for a permanent solution that would satisfy both parties, it resolutely took its stand between the two extremes: domination by force on the one hand, and the total evacuation of Egypt by the British on the other. What the Milner Mission had in mind was a bilateral agreement to which both sides would freely consent. “No grant to Egypt of a greater or less measure of self-government, even if it went to the length of what is known as ‘Dominion Home Rule,’ would meet the case, because Egyptians do not regard their country as a British Dominion or themselves as British subjects.”1 Milner then goes on to provide the key to the Egyptian set-up: “This wholly differentiates the problem of constitutional development in Egypt from the same problem in countries which have for years indubitably formed part of the British Empire, as, for instance, British India. We talk of such countries gradually attaining the state of nationhood. The Egyptians claim that they already have this status. No settlement of the future of Egypt which does not recognize this claim is ever likely to be accepted by—it can only be imposed on the Egyptian people.”2 From this it will be seen that the Milner Mission went to the very heart of the matter; and while not putting it in so many words, explicitly implied that Great Britain, bearing in mind the profound aspirations of the Egyptian people and their leaders, should, by every means within her power, pave the way for Egyptian independence. Failure to do so would not only be tantamount 1 Report of the Mission to Egypt, page 18. 2 Ibid. The italics are mine. V.H.

8o

MILNER IN EGYPT

to signing the death-warrant of any hope of settlement, but would prolong the crisis that had already dragged on for months. This being the case, it would be extremely dangerous, as well as being particularly unwise, to overlook that aspect of the problem which concerned Great Britain’s own interest. “Egypt, though not actually a part of the British Empire, is of vital importance to our whole Imperial system."1 As a corollary to this, the Report went on to state that every member of the Mission was convinced of the necessity of impressing on Egypt that, should she abandon British support, she would be incurring a grave risk of once more courting disaster. The Mission, then, was faced with the problem of finding a solution which would not only be acceptable to Egyptian nationalists, but would at the same time assure the preserva¬ tion and even lead to the consolidation of British interests in Egypt, while safeguarding what the British regarded as the true interests of Egypt herself. Difficult as this was, it was made even more complicated by the participation of so many other powers in the economic, juridical and political affairs of Egypt. Certain areas of Egypt, in fact, particularly large towns like Alexandria, had—and will always have—an inter¬ national character. In many respects the problem seemed to be insoluble. Historically, it was without precedent. A quarter of a century earlier Milner had written in the introduction to his book, under the heading of “The Land of Paradox”: “The Egyptian question of today has many sides and can be viewed in many aspects ... it has one radical defect—that it is never simple; it has one ineradicable charm—that it is never commonplace.”2 The recommendation of the Milner Mission was, there¬ fore, that: “It would be wiser to seek a solution by means of a bilateral agreement—a treaty—between the two countries. In no other way does it appear possible to release Egypt from the tutelage to which Egyptians so violently object, without endangering any of the vital interests which we are bound to safeguard.”3 The detailed Report stressed the vital part played by communications in Egypt, and laid down categorically that, whatever form of agreement was reached, 1 Report of the Mission to Egypt, page 18. The italics are mine. V.H. 3 Milner: England in Egypt, page n. 3 Report of the Mission to Egypt, page 19.

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it must make provision for the inclusion of the following indispensable conditions: the safeguarding of Imperial com¬ munications, the guarantee that order would be preserved, and the maintenance of armed forces of sufficient strength to guard vital communications in the country in peacetime as well as in wartime. In addition to the foregoing, it was essential to ensure that an independent Egypt would not pursue a foreign policy hostile or prejudicial to the interests of the British Empire. Finally, a renewal of the conflict between European powers on Egyptian soil must be averted at all costs. When, therefore, the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was eventually drawn up, it had to confer special prerogatives on the representative of His Majesty’s Government in Egypt in order to enable him to enforce strict adherence to the abovementioned conditions. The Report of the Milner Mission dated 9 December, 1920, concludes with the following words: “We make no attempt to conceal our conviction that Egypt is not yet in a position to dispense with British assistance in her internal administration. .. .* We strongly advise His Majesty’s Govern¬ ment to enter without undue delay into negotiations with the Egyptian Government for the conclusion of a treaty on the lines which we have ventured to recommend. It would, in our opinion, be a great misfortune if the present opportunity were lost.”1 As I am anxious to base myself on the original sources whenever possible, I will add to the bare bones of the Milner Report a few lines written by Milner himself. They are to be found in the second half of the preface which he revised on 15 October, 1920, for the thirteenth edition of his book, England in Egypt (first published in 1892). Milner begins by saying that he has not altered a word of the original text, and then proceeds to give a short summary of the evolution of the situation in Egypt. On the one hand, he says, the fact that it is now deemed possible to accord a large measure of

1 This reservation assured that the necessary provision would be made in the contemplated treaty to assure the closest possible co-operation between H.M. Government and an Egypt moving towards independence. This ten¬ dency, which will probably appear paradoxical to non-British eyes, recurs again and again in British Imperial -.history, particularly in the course of the nineteenth century. A recent most interesting example of it has been the attempt to solve the problem of India, a problem approximating in many ways to that of Egypt. 2 Report of the Mission to Egypt, page 39.

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independence to Egypt is the finest tribute that can be paid to Great Britain’s work of reform in that country; on the other, the recommendation of this independence in no way contradicts the traditional policy of Great Britain in Egypt —on the contrary, the independence of Egypt has always been the end towards which British statesmen have striven. It is possible, continues Milner, that Egypt is not yet strong enough for full self-government, but this does not alter the main line of action. “That we should attempt them [changes] at all, is evidence at once of our good faith and of our con¬ fidence in the soundness of the work which we have been doing in Egypt for the last eight and thirty years. If the attempt is successful, we shall have put the crown on one of the most remarkable enterprises ever undertaken by one nation for the regeneration of another.”1 We have seen that the recommendations of the Milner Report went far beyond the terms of reference on the basis of which the Mission had begun its inquiry. It was not sur¬ prising, therefore, that the British public, and particularly His Majesty’s Government, registered both surprise and perturbation when the terms were learnt. In Egypt the Report was, on the whole, sympathetically received, and there is every reason to believe that the treaty proposed by Milner and drafted under the title of the Milner-Zaghlul Memo¬ randum of 18 August, 1920, would have been ratified by the Egyptian National Assembly. The prospect of autonomy figured in it so largely that Egyptian statesmen would almost certainly have been willing to sign the treaty with its four fundamental conditions: the safeguarding of the British Empire’s communications in Egypt; the defence of Egypt against all aggression or foreign interference, direct or indirect; the protection of the minorities in Egypt, and the protection of foreign interests in that country; and, finally, the status of the Sudan to remain at the absolute discretion of His Majesty’s Government. Meanwhile the Cabinet in London was in a state of growing excitement. Lord Curzon, one of the most outstanding imperialists of the day, who as Minister for Foreign Affairs had the greatest weight, realized the full gravity of the situation; he more or less agreed with Milner that, sooner or later, Great Britain would be com¬ pelled to give Egypt her independence, and that in the

1

Milner: England in Egypt, page v.

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circumstances it would be better to do so at once. Curzon, indeed, appreciated that it was of vital urgency to conclude a treaty of alliance with Egypt. Milner, at the time, in the course of a conversation with L. S. Amery, referring to his mission in Egypt, said that he regarded that country as the Clapham Junction of the British Empire, and that so long as that station was, in fact, in British hands, he could see no objection to Clapham ruling itself! Unfortunately, the other Ministers either disagreed with this point of view or were unable to make up their minds as to the best thing to be done. Curzon himself was suffering from one of those fits of depression brought on by nervous strain, and was probably in no state to exert the authority that the situation demanded. However that may be, the fact remains that he was unable to convince his colleagues of the necessity for acting upon the recommendations of the Milner Report. No study of the evolution of British Imperial policy at the beginning of the twentieth century can be considered com¬ plete unless it devotes a word or two to Lord Curzon. He, Milner and Cromer formed the triumvirate of British Imperialism during the first twenty-five years of the twentieth century. Curzon, who owes his illustrious place in imperial history to his work in India, played an equally important part in the settling of the Egyptian question after the First World War; the following extract taken from a memorandum to his colleagues in the Cabinet shows that he was almost entirely in favour of Milner’s proposals: “The remarks which I have made in this paper must not be held to detract from the thanks which we all owe to Lord Milner and his colleagues for their immense and self-sacrificing labours in the solution of the Egyptian problem. They have rendered a great and national service. Nor do I dissent either from Lord Milner’s main proposition that the solution is to be found in a Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and the Egyptian Govern¬ ment, or from the major premise on which the principle is founded, namely, that if we are to advance it must be a large advance in the direction not merely of co-operation but of trust.” Earlier, in this same note, Curzon had dwelt on the gravity of the decision that the Cabinet was about to take, stressing the fact that not only was this decision important in itself, but it would lead to the establishment of a precedent.1 1 Memorandum dated 11 October, 1920.

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On 7 February, 1921, Milner handed in his resignation as Colonial Secretary and retired from public life. A year later, at Lord Allenby’s insistence and because the situation in Egypt had once again deteriorated, the British Government finally decided to enter into a treaty of alliance with Egypt and to grant her independence. This Treaty was based on the recommendations of the Milner Report and retained the four fundamental conditions which have already been indi¬ cated. Unfortunately, however, the Treaty had been brought about by the pressure of events, and Great Britain found it impossible to obtain from the Egyptian National Assembly the guarantee that these conditions would be observed. Nevertheless, the Treaty of 1922 undoubtedly represents a decisive date in the history of modern Egypt. It only remains to be said that for the next twenty years there was comparatively little change in Anglo-Egyptian relations. There were constant disagreements of varying degrees of importance, but the main causes of friction between the two countries were the presence of British troops in Egypt and the question of the administration of the Sudan. Directly after the Treaty of 1922 had been signed, the ruler of Egypt, who up till then had been known as the Sultan, took the title of King Fuad I. On 26 August, 1936, imme¬ diately after Italy had invaded Abyssinia, a new Treaty was signed between Great Britain and Egypt which re-afhrmed the independence of Egypt, assured her of Great Britain’s support if she, on her part, abolished the capitulations, and foreshadowed her entry into the League of Nations; British and Egyptian troops together would protect the Canal Zone, Great Britain was to be allowed the use of Egyptian air bases and the naval base of Alexandria, while the Sudan was to continue to be under the joint administration of Great Britain and Egypt. In April, 1936, Farouk I succeeded his father as King of Egypt, and although he followed a policy of closer alliance with other Arab countries, he kept Egypt within the sphere of British influence. “Though fn name independent, the Land of the Pharaohs remained within the orbit of the British Empire.”1 Present-day developments in Egypt and the steps taken in regard to them by the Labour Government do not come within the scope of this study. The one question I am 1 Paul Knaplund:

The British Empire, 1815-1939, page 566.

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tempted to ask, however, and to which unfortunately there can be no reply, is: what would have been the reactions of Lord Milner, the author of the Report of 1920, to the pro¬ posed withdrawal of British troops from the Canal Zone and to the fact that the British flag was to flutter no more above the citadel of Cairo? At two decisive moments in British imperial history, at two decisive dates in his own career (one at the beginning of it, the other at the end), Lord Milner was the central figure of the changing political scene, which was also the British colonial scene. He was on the critical spot at the critical hour. Through his ideals as well as through his work he did much to build up the British imperial structure in the Near East. Milner had wrestled with countless difficulties in Egypt; with that experience he was next called upon to play an even more arduous and decisive part in another corner of the immense Empire. South Africa, when he was sent out there in 1897, had become the new centre of gravity of British Imperial policy.

CHAPTER III

IN THE SERVICE OF THE EMPIRE: MILNER IN SOUTH AFRICA Part I, 1897-1902 will be recalled today chiefly for his out¬ standing part in keeping South Africa within the Empire.’’1 These words do not mean, of course, that his work else¬ where was negligible; what they do mean is that Lord Milner’s role in South Africa was of special importance. During the whole of the eight years that he spent there he dominated the South African scene; the success achieved, the mistakes made in that country, all, or almost all, bear his impress, his signature. He had been in Egypt when it had been the danger spot of the Empire and the most difficult problem for imperial policy; but while he had rendered notable service in Egypt, he had only been Cromer’s assistant and had never been responsible for the conduct of affairs. In South Africa, on the contrary, in the closing years of the nineteenth century, Milner found himself elevated to the rank of commander-in-chief on the political as well as the diplomatic plane, at a moment when it needed only a spark to start a conflagration. In order to arrive at a clear picture of the South African situation in 1897 it is necessary to go back at any rate for a couple of years. In 1895 a fresh page in the history of the Empire had been turned when Joseph Chamberlain became Colonial Secretary. As far back as 1888 he had written: “I mean some day to be Colonial Secretary and to deal with it [the South African problem].” While supporting Gladstone’s policy of the retrocession of the Transvaal in 1881, he had in 1885 taken a strong line in preventing the Boer annexation of Bechuanaland by the dispatch of General Warren’s expedition. His general policy everywhere and his character “Lord Milner

1 The Times, 14 May, 1925. 86

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made it certain that he would not pursue a policy of mere drift in South African affairs. In South Africa itself the outstanding personality was Cecil Rhodes, at that moment Prime Minister of Cape Colony. No one could have been a more convinced believer in the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race or a more ardent imperialist. But as he saw it imperial expansion could only be achieved through colonial expansion and by “getting rid of the imperial factor.” By “imperial factor” Rhodes did not mean, of course, the British Flag, but only Downing Street interference. It was his ambition—as it was, later, to be Milner’s—to encourage the growth of a colonial patriotism in which both Dutch and English should feel an equal pride. From 1887 onwards he had in fact been the leader of the Afrikander party in Cape Colony, enlisting it in the cause of the Empire as against Kruger’s narrower Afrikander ambitions. “The British Government, averse as ever to assuming responsibility, accepted the situation, and lent Rhodes constant diplomatic aid and sometimes armed support. It is hardly too much to say that for the next few years Rhodes was unofficially High Commissioner, sometimes with the ready help of, and sometimes in spite of, Her Majesty’s Government and High Commissioner at the Cape.”1 In the last days of 1895 Rhodes’ position was shaken by Dr. Jameson’s ill-fated raid into the Transvaal, and by revelation of the fact that, while the raid had taken place without his authority, he had been privy to the preparations for an armed insurrection by the Uitlander population of Johannesburg. His Afrikander supporters turned against him, and he was forced to resign the prime ministership. Though Chamberlain was cleared of complicity in these events by the subsequent parliamentary inquiry, yet his hands were weakened for the time being and British prestige in South Africa was lowered. At the same time he was at one with Cecil Rhodes in his desire to secure some measure of political rights for the Transvaal Uitlanders. These formed an actual majority of the Transvaal. But while they bore practically the whole burden of taxation, they were treated as an inferior race, and given no voice in the government of the country. Chamber* Eric Walker: Britain and South Africa, page 36.

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lain was determined to put an end to what seemed to him to be an intolerable situation. One may perhaps wonder whether, in addition to seeing justice done to the Uitlanders, the Colonial Secretary had not in his mind some ideas of avenging the defeat of Majuba or of annexing a rich country deliberately kept in a backward state by Boer misgovernment. Be this as it may, it certainly does not give us the right to assert that Chamberlain desired war with the Boers or did his utmost to make it inevitable. Most reliable historians, indeed, agree that, while he and his colleagues were determined to gain their objective, they hoped to do so by peaceful means, and had no intention of resorting to war unless they had absolutely no alternative. In a speech to the House of Commons on 8 May, 1896, Chamberlain said: “It will be a long war, a bitter war and a costly war, and as I have pointed out already it would leave behind it the embers of a strife which I believe generations would be hardly long enough to extinguish.”1 Meanwhile, on Chamberlain’s advice, the British Govern¬ ment steered a careful course. Unfortunately it could rely on very little support from its own High Commissioner at the Cape, Sir Hercules Robinson (afterwards Lord Rosmead), who was weak and vacillating. Chamberlain had begun looking about for a successor to him in the summer of 1896, and after several months his choice fell on Sir Alfred Milner. He had first made Milner’s acquaintance while travelling in Egypt in 1889, and had been immediately very much im¬ pressed in his favour. W. L. Courtney quotes the following dialogue which, as he says, “even if it is not true is at least well invented,” in order to show that Milner was the automatic choice for South Africa: Time: The close of 1896. Chamberlain: I have found the right man for South Africa. Lord Salisbury, the Prime Minister: So have I. Chamberlain: My man is Sir Alfred Milner. Salisbury: So is mine!8 Whether this conversation is fact or fiction this much is certain: when Chamberlain went to see Salisbury on 8 January, 1897, to ask him to agree to the appointment of 1 Hansard, House of Commons, 9 May, 1896. 2 W. L. and J. E. Courtney: Pillars of Empire, Studies and Impressions, page 149. See also E. B. Iwan-Muller: Lord Milner and South Africa, page 458: “Salisbury and Chamberlain chose Milner simultaneously.”

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Milner as High Commissioner of the Cape, the then Prime Minister replied: “Your choice of Milner for the Cape will, I think, be a success.’’1 On 18 January, 1897, Chamberlain, in the course of an interview with Milner, offered him the post of Under¬ secretary of State for the Colonies; this he declined. Chamberlain then asked him if he would be willing to become Governor of the Cape and High Commissioner for South Africa, whereupon Milner replied unhesitatingly: “I’ll do it.” This was an answer after Chamberlain’s own heart. The two men, indeed, were excellently matched; true, Chamberlain was over sixty, while Milner was only fortythree, but both were equally young in mind and excep¬ tionally dynamic. At this time Milner was Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue. He had been at Somerset House for nearly five years, and had succeeded in gaining the confidence of succes¬ sive Chancellors of the Exchequer and in winning the esteem of his colleagues and subordinates. It was Milner, it will be recalled, who caused Sir William Harcourt to introduce the Death Duties into his famous budget; Sir William had the liveliest appreciation of him, and on learning that Milner had been appointed High Commissioner he wrote: “I reckon that your secession from Somerset House will cost the Revenue some millions.”2 The man in the street knew little of Milner, but official circles had golden opinions of him, not only on account of his financial ability, but also because of his administrative quali¬ ties. His book, England in Egypt, by this time almost a classic, had made a very strong impression on all sides. The news that Milner had been made High Commissioner in South Africa was officially released about the middle of February, 1897, and met with general approval. “Never in living memory had any appointment been received with more applause ... all the newspapers were filled with a unison of eulogies seldom sounded.”3 Milner himself wrote: “Within a few days, I have had five or six hundred letters.”4 On 29 March, 1897, on the eve of his departure for South Africa, a dinner was given in London in his honour; Asquith 1 J. L. Garvin: The Life of Joseph Chamberlain. Letter dated 15 February, 1897. 3 J. L. Garvin: The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, vol. Ill, page 144. * Milner Papers, vol. I, page 32.

2

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presided over a brilliant assembly of some 140 guests, amongst whom were Lord Rosebery, Joseph Chamberlain, George Goschen and Lord Morley. “Asquith made an excellent speech and I had a tremendous reception.”1 In reply to Asquith and the other speakers, Milner recalled a debate in the Union twenty years previously, when Asquith, then as now, was in the chair; on that occasion he, Milner, had stated his conviction that should the colonies become selfgoverning communities, this accession to freedom, far from detaching them from the mother country, and from other communities within the Empire, would have precisely the opposite effect; it would henceforth strengthen those ties that bound them together. “I have the fatal habit of seeing that there is a great deal to be said on both sides and I am cursed with what is called a cross-bench mind. On one question, however, I have never been able to see the other side, and that is precisely this question of imperial union.”2 In his peroration Milner expressed his gratification at having been chosen to shoulder so tremendous a responsibility. “It is a great privilege to be allowed to fill any position of what I may be perhaps allowed to call a civilian soldier of the Empire,” he said.3 On 17 January, 1897, a few days before his departure for South Africa, Milner received a most warmly congratulatory letter from Sir Edward Grey. “The appointment is the greatest compliment the Government could pay you,” he wrote, “for the post is just now the most difficult and impor¬ tant at their disposal; and the work will be so interesting that it is not worth while for your friends to ask how far it will be agreeable . . . what I really want to say is that there are very few men indeed in whom I should feel so much, and no one in whom I should feel more confidence than in you in such a place. . . .”4 The letter Milner received from Sir Michael Hicks-Beach struck the gravest, and undoubtedly the right note: “You will have plenty of South African advice. I will add my mite. I believe the great thing necessary is patience. . . We shall

1 Milner Papers, vol. I, page 35. 2 J. L. Garvin: Life of Joseph Chamberlain, vol. Ill, page 144. 3 Milner: The Nation and the Empire, page 5. 4 Letter from Sir Edward Grey dated 17 April, 1897, and written from Jamaica, where he was on a mission to inquire into the sugar industry. 6 Letter dated 22 March, 1897. Milner Papers, vol. I, page 33.

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see in the pages which follow whether, in fact, Milner was able to exercise to the full that virtue of patience on which his friend had laid such stress. Before we come to Milner’s work in South Africa, a few words must be said about the spirit in which he undertook his new responsibility and the frame of mind in which he set sail for the Cape, since this has provided matter for con¬ siderable controversy. A number of writers belonging to the old liberal, anti-imperialist school, writers such as Professor Moon, for example, hold that Milner and Chamberlain were almost entirely to blame for the Boer War which broke out a little over two years after the arrival of the former in South Africa. Moon attributes Milner’s appointment as High Com¬ missioner to “that arch-imperialist, Chamberlain,” and with unconcealed dislike refers to Milner himself as “the man chiefly responsible for the break with the Transvaal.”1 IwanMuller, another liberal writer, describes Milner as “a ready and sympathetic instrument.”2 Neither of these statements is true. As for Joseph Chamberlain, I have already com¬ mented on his intentions. Milner was scarcely the man to allow himself to become the plaything or tool of any party or of any government, let alone of another man, no matter how powerful he might be. Furthermore, while it is possible to accuse Milner of having been too inflexible at a crucial moment in South Africa, and of so hastening on the outbreak of hostilities, no such accusation can be laid at Chamberlain’s door; the latter, determined as he was not to give ground, did all that lay in his power to avoid involving England in a costly and tragic war. It is true, of course, as Elie Hal^vy rightly points out, that Milner was certainly not sent out to South Africa merely to play the part of a patient diplomat. He was sent out to speak with the voice of authority, to act as a statesman and to stand as a symbol of British might.3 Unquestionably he went to South Africa as an imperialist, and had been chosen as much for his imperialist faith as for his other qualities and merits. In London the decision to replace the weakness of old Lord Rosmead by the dynamic energy of Sir Alfred Milner had been unanimous. The following extract from the 1 P. T. Moon: Imperialism, page 178. 2 E. B. Iwan-Muller: Lord Milner and South Africa, page 464. 3 Elie Hal£vy: Histoire du Peuple Anglais au XIXme Si&cle, Epilogue I, Les Imptrialistes au pouvoir, 1895-1905, page 66.

9*

MILNER IN SOUTH AFRICA

Cambridge History of the British Empire makes the matter abundantly clear: “Sir Alfred Milner, a man of forty-three, and a staunch believer in the value to humanity of the British Empire, had taken up his ‘terrible task’ with the full intention of upholding British supremacy much more firmly than it had been upheld of late years, and excluding foreign interference from the sphere of British influence in Southern Africa.’’1 It seems to me indisputable that Milner approached the task that lay ahead of him with absolute objectivity and good faith. “Milner’s intentions, no doubt, were excellent,” writes R. I. Lovell, the historian, who admits to having “a bias due to his birth and upbringing as a Gladstonian Liberal.”2 “A public servant,” said Milner, thinking of him¬ self, “must go where he is wanted. For myself, personally, no questions ever had all the same attractions as those relating to the position of this country in the outside world, and especially to the future of Greater Britain.”3 On 17 April, 1897, Milner sailed from England, and arrived at the Cape on 5 May. Prior to his departure, and even after he had been in South Africa for several months, he refused to commit himself to any policy; before doing so he had resolved to take careful stock of the situation. “I have no claims as yet to pose as an authority on these subjects,” he wrote to Lord Selborne. “My views are simply those of the man in the street, though I happen to be a deeply in¬ terested man in the street.”4 On the way out, and after his arrival at the Cape, he had begun to learn Dutch in order to read for himself the Boer and Afrikander newspapers. He also studied taal so that he might be able to speak freely with up-country villagers and farmers. For several months he devoted most of his time to paying a series of visits; he travelled from town to town, from hamlet to hamlet, asking questions, making observations. “In some places no Governor has ever been, in others they had not seen one for forty years. It gave me a good specimen of what the country population is like. ... I quite intend to be more mobile than my pre¬ decessors. . . .”s 1 The Cambridge History of the British Empire, vol. VIII, page 576. 3 R. I. Lovell: The Struggle for South Africa, 1875-1899, page 425. 3 Milner: Nation and Empire, page 3. 4 Letter dated 20 March, 1897. Milner Papers, vol. I, page 3g. 3 Letter to Lord Selborne dated 13 October, 1897. Milner Papers, vol. I, page 100.

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It is both interesting and pleasant to note that Milner’s first impressions of South Africa were largely favourable and that his earliest reports to London were markedly optimistic in character. The rejoicings for Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee had provided the local population with the oppor¬ tunity to manifest their love and loyalty towards the Queen Empress; Milner described the enthusiastic scenes in a report to Chamberlain dated 23 June, 1897, and in a letter to Goschen bearing the same date he wrote: “The Jubilee was an immense success.” During this period Milner was taking the utmost care to avoid giving Kruger and the other Boer leaders of the Transvaal the slightest cause for offence; his instructions to his staff in this respect are explicit to a degree. We have only to refer to the letters which passed between Milner and Chamberlain in 1897 to see for ourselves that both men were fully determined to pursue a policy of patience in regard to the Transvaal; in addition, it becomes more than plain that Milner made use of every pretext, no matter how small, which afforded him the opportunity of making a friendly gesture to President Kruger. In a confi¬ dential letter to Chamberlain, Milner indicates the line he proposes to take: “We should be very patient . . . very con¬ ciliatory, remembering how much excuse they [the leaders of the Transvaal] have for regarding us with suspicion. But we cannot afford to appear, or to be, weak. It is no use being conciliatory if people think you are only conciliatory because you are afraid.”1 By the beginning of 1898, however, Milner had become more and more convinced that war in the Trans¬ vaal was unavoidable; on 23 February, 1898, he wrote to Chamberlain: “I think there is a very great probability that things will get worse.”2 The fact that Kruger had been re-elected President struck him as extremely ominous, all the more so because the old man had become more despotic and reactionary than ever. Moreover, Milner feared that, if war were declared, the enemy would strike the first blow at the moment when it best suited them to attack. He recommended the Prime Minister and Her Majesty’s Government to pursue a firm and vigilant policy which need not necessarily be aggressive, stressing the fact that it was of supreme impor¬ tance that the Boers in general and Kruger in particular 1 Letter dated 2 August, 1887. Milner Papers, vol. I, page 73. 2 Ibid., vol. I, page 221.

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should be made to realize at long last the might of the British Lion. In answer to his gloomy and anxious reports, and to his request for formal instructions as to what course he should pursue, Milner received a secret telegram from Chamberlain on 19 March, impressing on him the need to be patient, and stressing the ardent desire of Her Majesty’s Government for the preservation of peace at all costs. “The principal object of Her Majesty’s Government in South Africa at present is peace. Nothing but a most flagrant offence would justify the use of force.”1 Three days earlier Chamberlain had written a long, confidential letter to Milner, in the course of which he had said: “A war with the Transvaal unless upon the utmost and clearest provocation would be extremely un¬ popular in this country. It would involve the dispatch of a very large force and the expenditure of many millions.”2 A few paragraphs later, he made it quite plain that a war in South Africa was particularly undesirable at a moment when France, Russia and Germany were all three causing Great Britain serious concern: “Accordingly, I wish to emphasize the fact that, for the present at any rate, our greatest interest in South Africa is peace and that all our policy must be directed to this object.” Milner’s relations with Chamberlain and Selborne, who was Chamberlain’s Under-Secretary of State, were cordial and friendly to a degree. “I cannot hear from you too often, so please never, never mar your welcome letters again with apologies for ‘troubling’ (!!!) me,” we find Selborne writing to Milner.3 As for Milner, he never failed, not even when he was in one of his worst moods, to pay tribute to Chamberlain. “It would be a real disaster to weaken or discredit Chamberlain,” runs a passage in a long letter to Cecil Rhodes, “for it will be a long time before we get another Colonial Minister who is so likely to back up big schemes of expansion and damn Treasury objections to them.”4 When Milner had been in South Africa for some eighteen months the situation was such that correspondence between Chamberlain and himself was not enough; it was vitally urgent for the two men to meet, not only for the purpose 1 Milner Papers, vol. I, page 226. 2 Letter dated 16 March, 1898. Milner Papers, vol. I, pages 227-9. 3 Letter dated 2 August, 1897. Milner Papers, vol. I, page 115. 4 Letter from Milner to Cecil Rhodes dated 6 March, 1898. Milner Papers, vol. I, page 154.

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of exchanging views, but in order that Milner might learn from Chamberlain’s own lips what policy he was to adopt in future. Milner and Chamberlain had maintained the closest possible contact, ably seconded by Lord Selborne, but it must be borne in mind that more than six thousand miles lie between London and the Cape; it was inevitable that the diplomatic tempo of South Africa should fail, from time to time, to keep pace with that of London. Periodical meetings were therefore indispensable. In November, 1898, Milner returned to London for the first time; an entry in his diary reads: “Home, happy.” The earliest interviews, particularly those with Chamberlain, con¬ firmed the impression he had received in South Africa. “As far as I can judge, the ‘no war’ policy is still in favour in the highest quarters,” he wrote to a friend on 25 November, 1898.1 These words must be given the most careful considera¬ tion: do they not indicate that Milner was already resolved on, or resigned to, war? He spent nearly two months in London, and made full use of his time, taking every oppor¬ tunity to meet his friends and colleagues. He was given a most cordial reception by the Queen and the Prince of Wales. On 28 January, 1899, he left England for South Africa. It should be noted at this point that during his absence from the Cape, Sir William Butler had deputized for him as High Commissioner. Butler, who was Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in South Africa, held political views that were the exact opposite of those of Chamberlain and Milner. I shall have more to say about him later, but mention should be made here of the fact that, shortly before Butler’s nomina¬ tion, Milner had written to London warning the Colonial Office against deciding too hastily on a High Commissioner per interim. This did not deter the War Office from appoint¬ ing Butler. Chamberlain had not even been consulted, and according to Milner he was thunderstruck. In a confidential letter to Chamberlain, Milner made no bones of his dis¬ approval: “It would be really disastrous if, because things are quiet for the moment, the War Office thought they could use the opportunity to provide for some worn-out LieutenantGeneral for whom they were anxious to find a billet.”2 This lack of co-ordination between the War Office and the Colonial 1 Letter to Mr. Fiddes, Milner Papers, vol. I, page 299. Letter dated 19 October, 1898. Milner Papers, vol. I, page 288.

2

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97

Office on the one hand and the High Commissionership of the Cape on the other was to render Milner’s task in particular, and that of Great Britain in general, even more complicated than before in South Africa. On his arrival at the Cape Milner found that the situation had grown far graver than it had been on the eve of his departure for England. In the course of a letter to Mr. Fiddes written on 1 April, 1899, he expressed the conviction that “they [the Boers] won’t yield an inch except under the severest pressure I quite believe.’’1 While in another letter, to Mrs. R. W. Chapin, every line of which proves that he had practically given up all idea of a peaceful Anglo-Boer settlement, he made it plain that what little hope he had left was centred in Jan Christian Smuts: “I still believe I could do something with him.”2 Earlier in the week he had written to Mrs. Chapin: “I shall be very anxious to hear what you make of Smuts. ... I am inclined to think him high-minded, as he is certainly able. . . .”3 Though he was only twenty-nine, Smuts was already a prominent figure in 1899, and was already being widely regarded as one of the leaders of the Boers. One of the major incidents which preceded the outbreak of the Boer War was the sending of Milner’s famous telegram of 4 May, 1899, to Chamberlain. This telegram was undoubtedly a turning-point in the development of events. Milner, who had been convinced for months that nothing but a show of armed force would bring the Boer leaders to a better frame of mind, had finally managed to persuade Chamberlain, Her Majesty’s Government in London and a section of the British public to see his point of view. He accordingly decided to send Chamberlain a long and detailed telegram which the Government could communicate to the Press. We have only to read Milner’s diary to discover what importance he attached to this telegram, and what infinite pains he lavished on its composition, weighing sentence after sentence, word after word, devoting long evenings, often entire nights, to its elaboration. The text of this telegram was published in London on 14 June, 1899, and it seems to have had the full effect for which its author had hoped. Sir 1 Letter dated 19 October, 1898. Milner Papers, vol. I, page 331. 2 Letter dated 28 March, 1899. Ibid., vol. I, page 336. 3 Ibid. LMB-D

1

98

MILNER IN SOUTH AFRICA

Charles Lucas described it as “broad and far-seeing to a degree,” while L. S. Amery, author of the History of the War in South Africa, praises it as “one of the most masterly state documents ever penned.”1 In an extraordinarily powerful manner, Milner drove home the full gravity of the situation, explained the origins and objectives of the second movement for reform, and made the vehement assertion that: “the case for intervention is overwhelming.”2 3 It is essential to quote at length from this telegram, while refraining from further comment: “As to the attempts to represent that movement as artificial, the work of scheming capitalists or professional agitators, I regard them as a wilful perversion of truth. The defenceless people who are clamour¬ ing for a redress of grievances are doing so at great personal risk ... a very large and constantly increasing proportion of the Uitlanders are not birds of passage: they contemplate a long residence in the country or to make it their permanent home. These people are the mainstay of the reform move¬ ment as they are of the prosperity of the country. Xbey would make excellent citizens if they had the chance. . . .” Further onTcontinuing his defence of the Uitlanders, Milner adds: “The two principal white races are everywhere inextricably mixed up; it is absurd for either to dream of subjugating the other. The only condition on which they can live in harmony and the country progress is equality all round. South Africa can prosper under two, three or six governments, though the fewer the better, but not under two absolutely conflicting social and political systems, perfect equality for Dutch and British in the British colonies side by side with permanent subjection of British to Dutch in one of the Republics. It is idle to talk of peace and unity under such a state of affairs. It is this which makes the internal condition of the Transvaal Republic a matter of vital interest to Her Majesty’s Govern¬ ment. No merely local question affects so deeply the welfare and peace of her own South African possessions. And the right of Great Britain to intervene to secure fair treatment of the Uitlanders is fully equal to her supreme interest in securing it. The majority of them are her subjects, whom she is bound to protect. . . 1 The Times History of the War in South Africa, vol. I. page 348. 2 Telegram from Milner to Chamberlain. Milner Papers, vol. 1, page 353. 3 Milner Papers, vol. I, pages 350-1.

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The sentiments expressed in this telegram are typical, not only of Milner himself, but of the attitude of the British people towards the Boers and of the fundamental policy of Great Britain in those countries which formed part of her Empire. Before I subject these sentiments to a closer analysis, let me quote the last few lines of the celebrated telegram: “The spectacle of thousands of British subjects kept perma¬ nently in the position of helots, constantly chafing under undoubted grievances, and calling vainly to her Majesty’s Government for redress, does steadily undermine the in¬ fluence and reputation of Great Britain and the respect for the British Government within its own dominions. ... I can see nothing which will put a stop to this mischievous propa¬ ganda but some striking proof of the intention, if it is the intention, of Her Majesty’s Government not to be ousted from its position in South Africa.”1 Once more the slogan, the order of the day, for British policy in South Africa was duty, it was Great Britain’s duty, as it was also her right, to intervene and protect the Uitlanders, the British colonists; at the same time, it was of vital interest to her, both politically and economically, to assume the protection of the Uitlanders. We have already had one instance of this chain of reasoning at the time when Milner had been in Egypt and the situation had been almost identical. The difference was that then the keywords had been Nile—imperial communications—Suez, while now they were the colonization of Africa—-the gold mines—the Cape— the route to India. Then the motive had been the “restoration of order”; now it was the protection of the Uitlanders and the insistence on their rights as citizens. Milner, the representa¬ tive of Her Majesty’s Government in the Cape, was fully as conscious of his authority and power as he had been in Egypt; he was determined to impose his will, by peaceful means if possible, by war if there were no alternative. In South Africa, just as in Egypt less than ten years earlier, it had now come to a question of “matters of vital interest to Her Majesty’s Government.” I have underlined these words, for they might well serve as the implicit sub-title to British Imperialism, and as such are the basis for any study of its policy and doctrine. Here we have the classic formula, in fact, and we need only modify it slightly to arrive at its 1 Milner Papers, vol. I, page 353.

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real meaning: “The right of Great Britain to intervene in order to secure fair treatment of the Uitlanders is fully equal to her supreme interest in securing it. The majority of them are her subjects, whom she is bound to protect.” The italics, of course, are mine. Lastly, economic and political elements, commercial in¬ terests, imperial prestige, the gold mines and the sense of the overwhelming superiority of the British race were so in¬ extricably bound up that it is no longer possible to disentangle them. On the surface, the matter in dispute between the Trans¬ vaal and Great Britain was the insistence of Lord Milner and the Government in London that the Uitlanders should be able to secure full burgher rights after five years’ residence (instead of fourteen). But the actual issues were far deeper,1 and the stage was rapidly being set for the last act in the drama. Chamberlain heard the ominous rumble of the approaching storm; he suggested to Milner that a final effort should be made to avert it, and that even at the eleventh hour it might still be possible to find some peaceful solution that would clear the sky.s In the weeks that followed the sending of the famous telegram of 4 May, the decision was to be taken, the decision that would mean war or peace. There is no need to go into the details, but I must repeat em¬ phatically that Her Majesty’s Government, which was almost unanimous in following the lead given by Chamberlain, at any rate as regards South Africa, continued to hope that an armed conflict could be avoided and that a settlement would be arrived at without bloodshed. But to Milner the outlook for peace had never seemed blacker; he remained convinced that the only way in which it could be preserved was by the mobilization of Great Britain and a display of her armed might. Possibly this might intimidate the Boers. In any case, Milner took an extremely firm stand at the Conference of Bloemfontein which opened on 30 May, 1899. The only issue he raised was that of full burgher rights for the Uitlanders after five years’ residence; this was his capital A, and he let the remaining letters of the alphabet go by the board. “The stage was set and the play began. No drama could be 1 E. A. Walker: Lord Milner in South Africa, page 13. 2 Sir Valentine Chirol: Cambridge History of Foreign Policy. Some writers assert that the Conference of Bloemfontein was due to Milner alone, and that Chamberlain had no part in convening it.

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more intense than the duel which ensued between these two strong, determined men.”1 On the British side was Milner, single-handed and iron-willed,” absolutely determined to succeed in his cause, not to make a single concession, and to go, if need be, to the last extreme—‘‘a proud, high-strung, impatient, ironclad man.”2 Milner was accompanied by his imperial secretary, G. V. Fiddes, his military secretary, Colonel Hanbury-Williams, and by a fairly large number of his most trusted personnel. But he made it quite clear that he himself would bear full responsibility for any decisions that might have to be made. On the Boer side was Kruger, every whit as resolute, obstinate and implacable as Milner, rigidly set on defending what he considered to be the interests of his people against British demands, and filled with the hope that he would best Milner as, a few years earlier, he had bested Sir Hercules Robinson. Kruger, “an aged man, desperate, overborne and struggling against a temper no less ironclad than his own,3 believed that God and the Liberal Party would always be on his side in his deter¬ mination to prevent foreigners from having a voice in the government of his country. Kruger had taken good care that State Attorney J. C. Smuts, one of his principal lieutenants, should be present at the conference.4 Smuts, who fully appreciated the danger of war with England, was able to convince the ageing President of the gravity of the situa¬ tion, and persuade him to make certain important concessions regarding the “franchise” of the Uitlanders. Yet Smuts him¬ self, like Kruger, would admit of no compromise when it came to a question of suzerainty/ 1 Cecil Headlam: Milner Papers, vol. I, page 404. 2 Sarah Gertrude Millin: General Smuts, vol. I, page 94. 3 Ibid. 4 At this time Smuts was second only to Reitz, the Secretary of State. See S. G. Millin, op. cit., pages 90-112. 5 For further details of the Conference of Bloemfontein, see Blue Book C.9404, pages 1-53, also Blue Book C.g345, pages 239-43, and C.9415, pages 1-5. Shortly after the Conference an anonymous pamphlet, A Century of Wrong, was published in England, with a preface by W. T. Stead. This was 'a translation from the Dutch, and the author was, in fact. Smuts himself. It was through Mrs. Smuts that En Eeuw van Onrecht appeared in English. A Century of Wrong began with an extremely violent attack on England, and then went on to exhort the Boers to “give the same answer to England that the almost defenceless Greeks gave to Xerxes, and resist Chamberlain as their ancestors had resisted Richelieu, Alva and Louis XIV.” “It is ordained that we, insignificant as we are, should be the first among the peoples to begin the struggle against the new world tyranny of capi¬ talism.” See S. G. Millin: op. cit., vol. I, page 117.

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As both sides were equally stubborn, the Conference of Bloemfontein broke up at the end of five days of heated discussion. It had achieved practically nothing. It is extremely interesting to learn from Milner’s own words what his feelings were on the morrow of this abortive conference.1 We realize that though he was intensely depressed and ex¬ hausted, he was not discouraged. “It was a failure—as I anticipated. ... I am fearfully tired and disappointed, but not beaten. . . .”2 Milner’s first letter to Chamberlain after the Bloemfontein talks deserves special attention, for not only does it give a particularly clear picture of the situation in South Africa and the state of popular feeling in this crucial hour, but it is revealing as to Milner’s own state of mind. It undoubtedly shows his intransigence, but above all every line bears witness to his sincerity, forthrightness and natural human weakness: “Though my hand can scarcely hold a pen and I have been and am more overworked than I can describe, I must send you a line today. ... I think I was wrong in breaking up the Conference as quickly as I did. Perhaps extreme fatigue had something to do with it ... of course, I should not have broken it off as I did had I had your telegram urging delay, in due time. That came the next morning.”3 While we cannot help asking ourselves whether it was normal, or even per¬ missible, for the “extreme fatigue” of Her Majesty’s High Commissioner to be the cause of the break-up of so vital a conference as that of Bloemfontein, we cannot but agree that, in making this admission, Milner showed a rare degree of nobility and greatness in that, rather than throw the blame for the failure of the Conference on others, he chose to shoulder it himself. 1 On 24 May, a few days before the Conference, Milner had written a letter to Selborne marked “Very Secret,” in which he had said: “I am not very hopeful of the result of the Conference.” Milner Papers, vol. I, page 400. 2 Letter dated 7 June, 1899, to Mrs. Chapin. Ibid., vol. I, page 423. In this connexion the following extract from a letter written by Paul Canibon, the French Ambassador to Great Britain, to his brother Jules, is interest¬ ing. This scathing and perfectly justified observation was made after he had been the guest at a party given by Sir Charles Dilke on 29 March, 1900: “. . . it’s difficult to negotiate with the English; only facts count with them, and one can never settle anything in advance so as to avoid a dispute. Not until the conflict has actually started will they consent to deal with the matter; they will then proceed to settle it in accordance with whether they hold the upper hand or not.” 3 Dated 14 June, 1899. Ibid., vol. I, page 423-4.

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IO3

Cecil Headlam, while tending to justify Milner’s attitude, has dealt with the Bloemfontein crisis from a rather original viewpoint. According to him, both sides were equally to blame for the failure of the Conference—both Milner and Kruger, both British and Boers. He then goes on to say that the Conference of Bloemfontein was more than a struggle, a bitter disagreement between two men and two opposing policies—it was the collision of two civilizations. “Conflict and tragedy were indeed inherent in the scene, created by the waves of the incoming tide of industrial, self-governing civilization, ever beating more strongly against the rigid barrier of a primitive, pastoral and oligarchic community, recently corrupted by the sudden acquisition of great wealth.”1 This point of view was shared by certain other writers, both English and Boer, notably by F. W. Reitz, the Boer Secretary of State.2 The immediate effect of the Bloemfontein Conference was to unite the Uitlanders even more closely than before. Confi¬ dent that Her Majesty’s Government in London was fully prepared to support their cause, they decided to back Milner up to the hilt. The result was that Milner was constantly forced to calm down their excitement and preach patience.3 In England, on the contrary, Chamberlain, Selborne and their following were doing their utmost to make the public “South Africa conscious,” and to focus attention on the critical situation, using every means in their power to shake stolid John Bull out of his usual phlegm. There was Chamberlain’s speech at Birmingham on 26 June, 1899, for instance, which concluded with these words: “We have tried waiting, patience and trusting to promises which were never kept. We can wait no more.” At the end of June, 1899, 1 Cecil Headlam: Milner Papers, vol. I, page 407. While I am on the subject of the Bloemfontein Conference, let me give the following anecdote which Milner himself entered in his diary, and which is a good illustration of typical British mentality and sense of humour. The arguments between Milner and Kruger had reached a particularly high pitch when a telegram was handed to the former’s aide-de-camp. He glanced at it, passed it to Milner, who read it with unconcealed satisfaction, and then circulated it amongst the members of his staff, all of whom appeared delighted. The Boers, who were extremely intrigued, wondered what political significance lay in this telegram. The words that it contained were these: “Flying Fox won the Derby. (Signed) Westminster.” 2 Denys Reitz: Commando, page 101. 2 See, in particular, Milner’s telegram to the British Vice-Consul in Johannesburg dated 21 July, 1899. Milner Papers, vol. I, page 469.

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Selborne wrote to Milner, describing the difficulties with which he and Chamberlain were confronted: “The warnings Mr. Chamberlain and I gave you about the state of public opinion here have been abundantly justified. The publica¬ tion of the Blue Book produced a great effect but not so great an effect as we had hoped. The idea of war with the South African Republic is very distasteful to most people . . . we simply cannot force the pace . . . the worst service we could do the Empire would be to outrun public opinion.”1 Pressed by the Uitlanders, Milner became increasingly anxious to take action and “burst the abscess.” From Selborne’s letter it is clear that by this time Milner was absolutely convinced that war was the only answer and that he now desired this war. Chamberlain, however, to whom public opinion was all-important (and, as we know, in England more than in any other country public opinion has invariably proved to be the decisive factor),2 wished above all to temporize and follow a course that would ensure the Boers, not the British, becoming the aggressors. He was so alarmed at the thought that Milner might lose patience that, on 6 July, 1899, he sent him a telegram marked “Urgent,” exhorting him to refrain from committing any irreparable action, and again reminding him that Her Majesty’s Govern¬ ment was not only anxious to give the most careful considera¬ tion to any proposal by President Kruger, but was even ready to accept a compromise if it were not too late. If, however, the telegram concluded, Kruger was playing a double game and bluffing the British; if he was going back on the con¬ cessions he had made at Bloemfontein; if, in fact, drastic measures had to be taken, Her Majesty’s Government would have the full support of the country, which would not take this sort of treachery lying down.3 There was another difficulty, purely technical in nature, which greatly impeded both Chamberlain and Milner. They were separated by thousands of miles, and could only com¬ municate with one another by means of letters and telegrams which resulted, naturally enough, in misunderstandings and delays. Their opponents, on the contrary, had to contend 1 Letter dated 25 June, 1899. Milner Papers, vol. I, page 445. 2 One instance of this is the Hoare-Laval Plan of 1935, at the time of the Abyssinian crisis; another—mutatis mutandis—the line taken by President Roosevelt right up to the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. 3 Milner Papers, vol. I, page 452.

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with no such difficulties. “If I could have had one half an hour’s talk at any stage, I could have better explained my difficulties and understood your line,” Milner wrote to Selborne in the summer of 1899.1 What was still more serious and should be particularly noted, since it has occurred in other crises, is the following fact: the directives and instructions which were issued by the War Office and the Colonial Office respectively too often failed to coincide, or even contradicted one another. Some of these blunders are almost incredible. Let me mention one to which allusion has already been made. “I am worn out with anxiety to do the best,” Milner wrote to a friend on 1 July, 1899, “and every turn of the game presents a new difficulty— some of them are really quite comical—for instance, the General is a violent Krugerite! 1 ! . . .”2 The general in question was, as we already know, Sir William Butler; Milner’s letters leave no room for doubt that Butler was convinced that the British should first treat with Kruger and then yield to his demands.3 Butler had been High Com¬ missioner per interim during Milner’s visit to England; Milner, in his desire not to add further complications to a situation already bristling with difficulties, had refrained from sending adverse reports about him. Nevertheless the obstacles put in his path by Butler almost defy description. That the Commander-in-Chief was convinced that Milner’s policy, carried out in concert with Her Majesty’s Govern¬ ment, was utterly wrong was bad enough; that he deliberately neglected to make adequate military preparations in the Transvaal was infinitely worse. “I doubt whether any man in a position like mine has ever before been more strangely surrounded,” wrote Milner in a confidential letter to his former chief, Goschen. “I knew I should have Ministers against me. But when the General went holus-bolus the same way, well, that was more than one could have bargained for.”4 Two months earlier, incidentally, he had wired to Chamberlain: “I feel that if I still enjoy the confidence of Her 1 Dated 22 August, 1899. Milner Papers, vol. I, page 518. Letter to Mr. Rendel, dated 21 July, 1899. Milner Papers, vol. I, page 473. 3 S. G. Millin: General Smuts, vol. I, page 80. “The truth of the matter was that Butler hated the Jameson Raiders, the Uitlanders, Chamberlain and Milner with one grand enveloping emotion.’’ * Letter dated 22 August, 1899. Milner Papers, vol. I, page 508.

1

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Majesty’s Government I ought to have a G.O.C. who is a support and not a weakness to me. I have long shrunk from this conclusion, but I feel it is my duty to face the situation now.”1 It was not until 9 August, 1899, that General Butler’s resignation and the appointment of his successor, General Forestier-Walker, were made known. The effects of the “Butler incident” were not confined to Milner himself, or even the South African crisis as a whole; they made them¬ selves felt later. One of the reasons for the initial defeats suffered by British troops in the Boer War was Butler’s failure to make the necessary military preparations. The general muddle and unpreparedness were in a sense typical; we find many instances of this in England, and in other countries, too. The following extract from a confidential letter from Chamberlain to Milner requires no comment: “The War Office is not an ideal institution. The other day” (this was written on 2 September, 1899) “they were ready to ‘the last button’—now they talk of four months before they can put an army corps to the front. Of the Treasury I will say nothing since you were yourself an ornament of that great department—but I think the more. When I reflect on all these things, I am really astonished at the progress we have made. ... I am glad that the Butler trouble is at last over. I recognize how greatly it has added to your anxieties. But what is to be said of those who, without consulting the Minister chiefly responsible, sent to South Africa the one man most unfitted by his history and character to occupy an important post there at the present time?”2 It is amazing that, beset as he was with difficulties of every kind, Milner never once lost heart, but carried out to the end the policy on which he and Chamberlain had decided. Not surprisingly, Milner’s popularity both in South Africa and England had greatly increased in the last few months. G. E. Buckle, Disraeli’s biographer, and chief editor of The Times, wrote to tell Milner how the pendulum had swung in his favour: “Perhaps you do not realize how completely public opinion here, which was very hesitating and almost hostile at first, has now veered round in favour of you and your policy. . . . Unless I am very much mistaken in the 1 Telegram dated 24 June, 1899. Milner Papers, vol. I, page 2 Letter dated 2 September, 1899' Ibid., vol. I, pages 525-6.

509.

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107

temper of the people of this country, you may now count on steady backing here till your policy is put through.”1 Philip Lyttelton Gell, another of Milner’s devoted friends, wrote: ‘‘You personally can rely upon a strong public backing. You have gained people’s confidence by appearing both moderate and firm ... in short, my dear friend, Tussaud has announced a ‘Portrait Model of Sir Alfred Milner’ as their last edition! Is not that popular fame?”2 After several stormy weeks the fatal hour drew near, and on 9 October, 1899, Kruger sent the Boer ultimatum demanding that British troops should be withdrawn from the frontiers of the Republic and that the reinforcements which had been dispatched to South Africa at Milner’s request should be immediately sent back to their embarkation ports. This ultimatum was, in fact, nothing less than a declaration of war. The reply of the High Commissioner, in accordance with instructions received from London on 10 October, was brief: it merely informed the Government of the South African Republic that: ‘‘Her Majesty’s Government have received with great regret the peremptory demands of the Government of the South African Republic. The conditions demanded by this Government are such as Her Majesty’s Government deem it impossible to discuss.”3 The war, which was to last for two and a half years, broke out on 11 October, 1899. On October the Boers took advantage of their temporary superiority to invade Natal, and in the first few months gained several major victories. Milner, with his innate objectivity, realized that the enemy had the best of it for the time being, but his certainty of the ultimate success of the British remained unshaken. A letter to Selborne, in which he alludes to the first defeats suffered by the British troops, contains this characteristic remark: “It begins rather unfortunately for us. After all, have not the great struggles of England mostly so begun?”4 Milner’s work during his eight years in South Africa can be described as a trilogy embracing three distinct and separate periods: first, the period from 1897 to 1899, up till the outbreak of the war; second, from 1899 to 1902, during the war and up to the signing of the Peace of Vereeniging; 1 2 3 4

Letter Letter Ibid., Letter

dated dated vol. I, dated

18 August, 1899. Milner Papers, vol. I, page 497. 25 August, 1899. Ibid., vol. I, page 497. page 558. 11 October, 1899. Ibid., vol. I, page 559.

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and last, from 1902 to 1905, the years of peace and recon¬ struction. Since it is my purpose to trace the evolution of British Imperialism through the light of Milner’s work, I shall confine myself to an examination of the points of interest in the policy which he pursued. I shall continue, therefore, to pass over such matters as merely concern Milner the man, and to omit, as I have already omitted in the chapter on Egypt, all that is not strictly relevant to the present study. As Milner had nothing to do with the actual conduct of the war, I shall devote very little space to it, and will only dwell on those aspects of it which were particularly characteristic of Milner’s work and of British methods. Conversely, when I come to the task of reconstruction which was undertaken by the High Commissioner I shall deal with it systematically and at length. The swift and startling progress made by the Boers during the first weeks of the war filled the British public with dismay. Even Milner himself, although he was fully aware of the gravity of the situation and had foreseen an initial advance by the enemy, had not anticipated such a crushing series of British defeats. He was forced to recognize the fact that: “the enemy were more numerous, far better armed as regards artillery and much better organized than we had any idea of.”1 So much for Milner’s summing-up of the strength and excellent equipment of the enemy; when it came to investigating the reasons for the weakness of the British troops and the defeats they were suffering, his words were far graver, far more outspoken. It is very rare indeed to find an Englishman in government service painting so black, so stark a picture.2 “What an awful show-up it has been! Granted we have all made mistakes, what would they really have mattered but for that avalanche of military incompetence which has nearly swept the Empire away? What is the disease really? Do you know? Splendid men, splendid officers—and so many things, mobilization, sea and railway transport, commissariat, admirably done. There is much that is excellent. But the central machinery and the chosen leaders . . . was there ever such a series of mis-selection? The extraordinary thing is that 1 Letter to Chamberlain, dated 9 November, 1899. Milner Papers, vol. II, page 25. 2 It calls to mind the even more terrible picture painted by Winston Churchill in the House some forty years later, after the tragedy of Dunkirk, in June, 1940.

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IO9

for frank criticism of one another, I know no set of men to equal our haute armee. And yet, when it comes to business, there is the most ridiculous fetish-worship of seniority and positive pusillanimity about the removal of admitted failures.”1 Some contemporary historians of the Boer War described at the time, or still remember today, the wave of anguish which overwhelmed Englishmen in all parts of the Empire, and particularly the people of London, when they learnt the bad news from South Africa.2 The “Black Week” of Colenso will go down to history as one of the most tragic episodes of the Boer War. Some idea of the consternation which filled all hearts is to be found in a letter to Milner dated 3 November, 1899: “The War Office is besieged—no one goes to the theatres—concert rooms are empty—new books fall flat— nothing is spoken of save the war.”3 Yet it is precisely in the darkest hour that the British people, as has been seen time and time again, suddenly pull themselves together and show themselves at their finest. They close their ranks and every single one of them does his bit, determined to turn disaster into triumph. Defeats, far from breaking the spirit of the British, act as a spur to their patriotism, and provide an opportunity for all within the British Empire to prove their loyalty and devotion to the Crown. The cause of the Uitlanders had become synonymous with the cause of British freedom overseas, and the crisis through which the British Empire was passing was the crisis of each country and nation within that Empire. So it came about that the Boer War afforded the first proof of the solidarity of the British Empire and effectually silenced those voices which had maintained that the moment Great Britain found herself in difficulties her Colonies would seize the opportunity to throw off their allegiance to the Crown. The reverse happened; not only did the Dominions help to preserve the unity of the Empire, they did more: they deliberately took a step forward in the evolution of the status of that Empire. Thus, paradoxical as it may seem, the South African crisis, the military disasters of 1899 and igoo, form a chapter of major importance in the history of the British 1 Letter to Selborne, dated 31 January, 1900. Milner Papers, vol. II, pages 61-2. 3 Paul Mantoux: A travers L’Angleterre contemporaine. 3 Letter from Miss Bertha Synge. Milner Papers, vol. II, page 44.

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Empire, since they contributed in an amazing manner to the development of that Empire. A few months later the military situation was stabilized, and when Mafeking was relieved in May, 1900, not only London but every corner of the Empire was swept by a wave of delirious joy. Mafeking was indeed a striking contrast to the Black Week of Colenso. “People were shouting, cheering and singing in the High Street for half the night and the scene at the Mansion House was, they say, most extraordinary.”1 I shall deal later with the work of reconstruction in the areas devastated by the war, but it should be noted at this juncture, since it is extremely characteristic, that at the close of 1899, when things were at their blackest, Milner, Chamberlain and Selborne were already discussing in the letters they exchanged the problems of post-war recon¬ struction and the civil administration of the new colonies. Milner himself appears to have been quite aware of the odd¬ ness of such deliberations at such an hour. “It seems illomened to talk of eventual settlement when things are in such an awful mess. . he wrote to a colleague. “Still it must have an end and that end must be our victory. So, though it may be premature, it is still necessary to think what to do with it.”2 It is amusing to recall to what an extent the fashion that sent society women rushing out to South Africa at the beginning of the Boer War infuriated Milner. The pleasure of their company and their charms were scarcely calculated to act as spurs to the serious pursuit of the war. Some certainly volunteered for secretarial duties in the various ministries or as nurses in the hospitals, but the majority occupied hotel and railway accommodation which would have been far more usefully filled by the military. The following anecdote is revealing of the mentality of these butterflies. One of them went into a shop to buy a nurse’s uniform. “I am looking for something that will be really striking on a battlefield,” she informed the assistant! The presence of these society women in South Africa soon became, as Milner said to a friend, “a nuisance and a scandal.” From the telegrams which were 1 Letter from Rendel, dated 19 May, 1900. Milner Papers, vol. II, page 75. 2 Letter to Sir Percy Fitzpatrick, dated s>8 November, 1899. Ibid., vol. II, page 35-

MILNER IN SOUTH AFRICA

1 1 1

exchanged on the subject by Milner and Chamberlain, we learn that Queen Victoria herself had been informed of this source of annoyance: “The Queen regrets to observe the large number of ladies now visiting and remaining in South Africa, often without imperative reasons, and strongly disapproves of the hysterical spirit which seems to have influenced some of them to go where they are not wanted. I conclude their presence interferes with the work of civil and military officers, and they must largely occupy best hotel accommodation required for wounded and invalid officers. . . Z’1 Milner’s reply to Chamberlain is couched in almost the same terms, and ends up: “The Field-Marshal Commander-in-Chief, to whom I have transmitted your tele¬ gram, authorizes me to say that he is in full agreement with the views expressed therein.’’2 This frivolous invasion of South Africa by society women was all the more out of place at a time when British troops were fighting heroically against no less heroic opponents. Milner gives both sides of the picture in a letter about the presence of these feminine sightseers: “Bah! How I hate it! What between the stupidity of our generals and the frivollings of our fashionable females, I often feel desperately ashamed of my country. One has to look at the other side, however, the amount of unassuming heroism and devotion, the wonderful fortitude and patience of the loyal Colonials and the splendid men they are sending us. They seem to be bigger and harder with each succeeding transport.’” Chamberlain’s popularity in London and Milner’s in South Africa increased day by day. It is safe to say, in fact, that in British eyes they were the idols of the age. Contemporary newspapers afford ample proof of the British public’s blind, unquestioning devotion to these two men whom they recog¬ nized as masters of the situation.4 Milner, in particular, who 1 Telegram from Chamberlain to Milner, dated 3 April, 1900. Milner Papers, vol. II, page 73. 2 Telegram from Milner to Chamberlain, dated 10 April, 1900. Ibid., vol. II, page 73. 3 Letter to Miss Bertha Synge, dated 25 April, 1900. Ibid., vol. II, page 74. 4 Note the extremely significant observation made by Paul Cambon in his letter dated 20 February, 1900, to his brother Jules: “. . . Chamberlain has never been more popular. When I compare his popularity with the un¬ popularity of Jules Ferry, when I compare the phlegmatic attitude of the British with the panic of our countrymen after Langson, I cannot envisage without acute anxiety the consequences of a war between England and France.”

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had been bitterly attacked after the Bloemfontein Conference by critics of all shades of opinion, but especially by those who had liberal ideals; Milner, who in after years was to be harshly dealt with by those historians who held him partly responsible for the Boer War, was now universally admired and esteemed. On 29 December, 1899, Lyttelton Gell wrote to him: “You are ‘the man who saved the situation.’ Even jealous Tories say in despair: ‘We want Chamberlain or Milner in the War Office.’ ”l “God forbid!” Milner scrawled in the margin! From Calcutta, Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, sent this message to Milner: “Let me write you one line, if I may, of sympathetic encouragement in the midst of all your anxieties. It was a cruel but splendid stroke of fortune that sent you to South Africa to be there through this terrible time, cruel because of the awful responsibilities that have been devolved on you, splendid because I believe that no other man was capable, in this emergency, of rendering so great a service to your country. . . . You will emerge from this war with an assured fame as a great and wise and Imperial statesman. . . .”2 From Cairo, Lord Cromer, Milner’s former chief, sent him an equally congratulatory letter: “You must be pleased to see how completely everyone has come round to your way of thinking, and how fully it is now recognized that your political forecast was correct. ... I am glad you like Kitchener. He is a very remarkable man. The stories of friction with me are all nonsense. . . Let me give one final instance of the esteem in which Milner was now held. On 7 March, 1901, J. A. R. Marriott, the eminent historian, wrote: “There is hardly a man in England who does not sincerely believe that you have done a service to the Empire comparable -to that rendered by Hastings and Wellesley in India. . . .”4 On 24 May, 1900, the Orange Free State was annexed by Lord Roberts, the new Commander-in-Chief, under the name of the Orange River Colony. On 1 September of the same year the Transvaal passed into the hands of the British. Chamberlain toyed with the idea of calling it Queen’s 1 Milner Papers, vol. II, page 45. 2 Letter dated 21 January, 1900. Ibid., vol. II, page 46. 3 Letter dated 6 March, 1900. Ibid., vol. II, page 69. * Ibid., vol. II, page 222.

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Colony, but on Milner’s insistence the original name was retained. “It is familiar, convenient, and as far as it has a political significance at all, it is British as contrasted with the term South African Republic, which Kruger has tried so hard to substitute for it, though he only succeeded in doing so officially, and which was a symbol of Afrikander inde¬ pendence. At the same time, it is not offensive to the Dutch as any brand-new name would be.”1 Lord Roberts, who had succeeded Wolseley as Commanderin-Chief at the War Office immediately after the annexation of the two republics, was succeeded on 29 November, igoo, by Lord Kitchener as Commander-in-Chief in South Africa. It will be remembered that Milner had had no great opinion of earlier Commanders-in-Chief, Sir William Butler in par¬ ticular, and since Kitchener was to become a world figure it is extremely interesting to learn what Milner thought of him: “Kitchener! It is fortunate that I admire him in many ways so much; and admiring, am prepared to stand a lot and never take offence. ... I am determined to get on with him, and I think he likes me and has some respect for me if he has for anybody. But shall I be able to manage this strong, self-willed man ‘in a hurry’ (for he is dying to be off in time to take India), and to turn his enormous power into the right channel . . . ?”2 Years later, on the outbreak of the First World War, it was Milner himself who urged Asquith to make use of Kitchener’s services, and who was indirectly responsible for his being appointed Secretary of State for War. The relations between Milner and Lord Roberts were cordial in every way; we have only to refer to some of the speeches made by one or the other of them and to the letters that passed between them to realize how harmoniously they worked together. It is plain that Roberts valued Milner as much as Milner admired him. “I have endeavoured to appreciate some of Sir Alfred’s difficulties,” Roberts said in the course of a speech. “He has done everything possible to smooth mine. By his kindness, his tact, his forbearance and his courage, he has immensely lightened my burden. I doubt if even those among you who see his daily work can realize 1 Telegram to Chamberlain, dated 11 June, 1900. Milner Papers, vol. II, pages 135-6. 1 Letter to Lady Edward Cecil, dated 29 October, 1900. Ibid., vol. II, page 166.

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how much he has done on behalf of you all, or what a deep debt of gratitude the country at large owes to him. History will show this.”1 Her Majesty’s Government, which had appointed Lord Roberts as temporary Governor of the newly-annexed Colonies, decided, having first sounded Sir Alfred Milner, to offer him, in addition to the High Commissionership, the Governorship of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. The appointment of Milner was as vitally necessary as had been the annexation of the two republics. Quite apart from the fact that Milner was experienced in financial matters, that he possessed a wide knowledge of South Africa, and was greatly looked up to by the British population in the Transvaal, he personified, far more than any other man, Britain’s determination to carry the war to a victorious con¬ clusion and to undertake at the first possible moment the plan for reconstruction which had already been sketched out. Milner’s nomination to these offices dated from 6 and 8 October, 1900. “Let me say how delighted I am that you are to be my successor here,” wrote Roberts. “There could not possibly be a more suitable arrangement and the country is to be con¬ gratulated on your being able to accept such an extremely important position. . . .”2 Shortly after this Chamberlain informed Milner that he had recommended him for dis¬ tinction among the New Year’s Honours in order to show not only the British public but the whole world that he had the complete confidence of the country—more, the gratitude and esteem of the Crown. Milner, however, made it clear that he "did not want” to be made a peer: “My feeling is that for a man not rich, or well connected, and by nature a Bohemian, a title would be an encumbrance. . . He has left it on record amongst his personal correspondence that he refused a peerage, and expressed his preference for the Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath. On 27 December, 1900, Chamberlain wrote to tell him that this honour had been bestowed upon him: “1 hope you will recognize in it the appreciation of Her Majesty’s Government of the ability and devotion that you have shown during the last few trying years, and of the ‘See The Times, 11 December, 1900. 2 Letter dated 4 July, 1900. 3 Milner Papers, vol. II, page 185.

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high estimate which they place on the value of your services to South Africa and the Empire.”1 At the close of 1900 and the beginning of 1901 the newlyconstituted civil administration began to take shape. Milner judged that the time had come to appoint a successor to himself as Governor of the Cape, and accordingly suggested Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson. On 28 February Milner left the Cape, and went to live at Sunnyside, near Johannesburg, in the Transvaal. The first chapter of his work in South Africa had come to an end; the second, bristling with difficulties but which was to contain many pages of promise and fulfilment, had begun. By this time the tempo of the war had, to some considerable extent, slowed down. The outcome was no longer in doubt, for reinforcements from England and the Dominions had been steadily flowing into South Africa, and the Boers, faced by a vastly superior enemy, had been compelled to yield more and more ground. The fighting had, in fact, degenerated into guerrilla warfare, which the British forces found particularly harassing against opponents who were fighting on their own familiar ground. At the beginning of the year Chamberlain had invited Milner to come to London, but the latter had not deemed it possible to leave South Africa at that moment, and accordingly the visit had been postponed. He was, however, badly in need of rest, and, in addition, it seemed to him essential to discuss matters with the Colonial Secretary and other members of the Government in person. On 5 May, therefore, he left the Cape, and reached London on 24 May. When his train arrived at Waterloo, Lord Salisbury, the Prime Minister, and nearly every member of the Cabinet were on the platform to welcome him—a signal honour. Milner, accompanied by Lord Salisbury and Chamberlain, was driven forthwith in an open landau through streets lined with cheering crowds to Marlborough House, where he was received by King Edward VII. At the conclusion of a long audience the King created him Baron Milner of St. James’s and Cape Town. Lord Milner remained in London for the whole of August, and took this opportunity of meeting his friends and seeking 1 Milner Papers, vol. II, page 185.

1 16

MILNER IN SOUTH AFRICA

the advice of his former chiefs and colleagues. During the month he was made Privy Councillor by the Royal favour, and was given the Freedom of the City of London: “one of the greatest, as it is one of the most coveted, distinctions that can be bestowed upon any public servant,” as Milner himself said in his reply to the Lord Mayor. Shortly after his arrival in England Milner had been invited by the King and Queen to spend a couple of days with them at Windsor. The entry in his diary for 29 May reads: “A long drive with the Royal Family. . . . Tea, and subsequently rowing and sailing on the lake at Virginia Water. Beautiful drive both ways. ... A game of bridge after dinner. . . .” Cromer wrote to congratulate Milner on the various honours that had been bestowed upon him in London; this passage in particular deserves to be quoted: “I must write a line to say how sorry I am not to be in England to join the many who will welcome you. . . . Few, as you may well imagine, have followed your course with greater interest, and, I may say, admiration. You were right from the first, though it took people in England some little while before they saw it.”1 From South Africa Kitchener wrote: “Many congratulations on your well-earned peerage. Everyone here is delighted that your work should have been recognized. Your children2 here are going on all right and giving no trouble. . . As for Haldane, one of the leaders of the Liberal Party, he ended his letters with the words: “Yours always gratefully, R. B. Haldane. I wrote gratefully because I think you of all men realize the one way of salvation for the Empire.”* At the beginning of 1901 certain circles in London started an anti-Milner campaign which even went so far as to demand his recall. It soon subsided, however, and on 3 March, 1901, Haldane wrote to Milner: “You may absolutely rely on Rosebery, Asquith and Grey—the only people who count with us—to carry through what has been begun, and however far the reaction may go I don’t think the majority of the constituents would tolerate anything else. . . . 1 Letter dated 26 May, 1901. Milner Papers, vol. II, pages 250-1. “Children”; i.e.. Lord Milner's staff, the members of his “Kinder¬ garten,” about which I shall have more to say later. 1 Letter dated 31 May, igoi. Milner Papers, vol. II, page 241. ‘Letter dated 6 July, 1901. Ibid., vol. II, page 265.

2

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1 17

You will be interested to know that at the National Liberal Federation meeting at Rugby last Friday a motion for your own recall was promptly squashed—even Lloyd George taking a part in doing so. . . When Milner returned to Johannesburg one of the prob¬ lems that caused him the most anxiety—not without good reason—was that of the internment or concentration camps for Boer refugees. These camps had originally been estab¬ lished in order to afford protection for civilians stranded in the military zone, for it was at that time part of the British plan of campaign to destroy the Boer homesteads and farm¬ lands without the slightest discrimination. In nine cases out of ten the Boer women and children were left without a roof over their heads and with nowhere to turn. The British, in order to protect them, decided to shelter them in a series of camps. I do not intend to inveigh against the evils of this system here, but it should be noted that the majority of English writers, down to this very day, still attempt to portray it in a favourable light by explaining that the British might well have left the helpless non-combatants to their fate, and that had they done so the resistance of the Boers would probably have broken down. Furthermore, they insist that the Boers themselves approved of the camps, since the knowledge that their families were being cared for in safety enabled them to go on fighting with easy minds. General Botha himself said: “One is only too thankful nowadays that our wives are under British protection.”2 There is some truth in these words, but there was another and darker side to the picture, as the following facts will show. The camps which had been constructed in hot haste rapidly became overcrowded with women and children. Many of these came from the poorest peasant class, were in a pitiful condition, and were naturally far more subject to every form of infectious disease than those who had come from the towns. In addition, many of the women had only the most rudi¬ mentary ideas of hygiene. Deadly epidemics of pneumonia and measles broke out in the camps, and the death-rate climbed more and more steeply. Over four thousand women and sixteen thousand children died in the laagers. Milner, who had himself insisted on having a blank cheque from the 1 Milner Papers, vol. II, page 187. * On 20 May, 1901. De Wet: Three Years of War, Appendix C.

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Chancellor of the Exchequer, did all in his power to remedy this state of affairs. On his orders the worst camps were closed down, and new hutments were erected. Speciallypicked teams of doctors and nurses were sent out to combat disease. During September, October, November and Decem¬ ber, 1901, Milner and his colleagues devoted almost all their time to the solution of this problem. The series of Blue Books dealing with the subject of the internment camps proves what efforts Milner made to better them and the success achieved.1 Little by little conditions in the camps began to mend and the death-rate to decrease. Steps had already been taken to ensure that the interned children should receive a more or less regular education. At Milner’s request Mr. E. B. Sargant had organized a series of schools; even the Boers, the bitterest critics of British administration, were compelled to admit that the educational facilities were excellent. The schools, in fact, were looked on as blessings, not only by the women and children in the camps, but by their menfolk in the field. By the end of 1901 more than eight thousand pupils in the Transvaal and nearly ten thousand in the Orange Free State were attending the camp schools. With the exception of religious instruction, which was given in Dutch, all the classes were held in English, no doubt with the idea of anglicizing the Afrikanders. The demand for teachers soon exceeded the supply; and in response to an appeal by Mr. Sargant to the Ministry of Education and the various Colonial departments in London, several hundred qualified men and women arrived in South Africa from all parts of the Empire. It is impossible to overestimate the importance of these camp schools. They not only helped to form the characters and develop the minds of the children, they also had a farreaching effect on the future of the new Colonies. In the first place, a very large number of highly-trained teachers who had come out to South Africa in answer to Mr. Sargant’s call decided to remain permanently in the country; their avail¬ ability was of immense importance when the time came for the general standard of education to be raised. In the second place, the Boer women who, prior to the institution of the schools, had been fanatical in their hatred of the British and British domination, now began to appreciate the work these same British were doing on their behalf. Lastly, through a 1 Blue Books, Cd. 608, 694, 789, 819, 853, 902, 934, 936, 939, 942, 1161.

MILNER IN SOUTH AFRICA

1 IQ

skilful piece of manoeuvring, Milner and his colleagues had brought about the following paradoxical situation which was greatly to the advantage of Britain: at the very moment when the Boers were fighting the British Imperial troops in South Africa, their children, the rising generation, were learning English and being taught in that language. The standard of English education, especially in primary and secondary schools, is, as we know, particularly high. It was certainly a revelation to the Boer children, who had been brought up in primitive conditions on isolated farms, to hear music for the first time in their lives, to play games and take part in sports, gymnastics and so on. On page 109 of Blue Book, Cd. 1551, we find the following statement: “The two main objects of the Education Department were: (i) to pro¬ vide a place in the camp where the children might be made happy; (ii) to impart instruction in English speech. In both these objects a high degree of success was achieved.” Let me underline in passing—there is no need to dwell on it at length—the anxiety to foster through education the idea of British Imperial expansion. To sum up, it must again be admitted that concentration camps are loathsome, no matter how necessary, how unavoid¬ able it may be to set them up. Yet Eric Walker was not altogether wrong when he wrote: “But it is an undeserved misfortune for the British that the South African and Nazi camps, so utterly different in spirit and conduct, should both be called Concentration Camps. There is much in a name when it comes to propaganda.”1 Notwithstanding, the analogy remains, and we know only too well that even refugee camps can have, and do have, terrible evils. Before we turn from this dark page of the history of the camps in South Africa the following extract from a letter which Milner wrote to Chamberlain on 7 December, 1901, must be quoted, for it furnishes yet one more proof of his sincerity and fundamental honesty. Milner's wretchedness at the sorry state of affairs is apparent, yet far from seeking to excuse it as any other man might have done, he gives a plain, straightforward explanation: “. . . the black spot— the one very black spot—in the picture is the frightful mortality in the concentration camps. I entirely agree with you in thinking that while a hundred explanations may be 1 Eric A. Walker: Britain and South Africa, page 47.

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offered, and a hundred excuses made, they do not really amount to an adequate defence. I should prefer to say at once, as far as the civil authorities are concerned, that we were suddenly confronted with a problem not of our making, with which it was beyond our power properly to grapple. And no doubt its vastness was not realized soon enough. . . At the end of October, 1901, Lord Milner paid an official, but unannounced visit to Natal, where he was greeted by cheering crowds. On 28 October, he visited Durban, and was given a similar ovation. On the day of his arrival, he made one of his most important speeches, of which I shall have much more to say in Chapter V of this book when I shall be dealing with Milner’s conception of the British Empire. Although guerrilla fighting continued during the first few months of 1902, the end of the war was now in sight. Various semi-official negotiations were begun with a view to an armistice and the signing of a peace treaty, and His Majesty’s Government gave Milner and Kitchener precise instructions on which they were to act as soon as the Boer leaders put out any feelers: “We are willing to be generous in both respects (amnesty and restoration of the farms), providing that we do not place our enemies, and especially rebels, in a better position than those who have been loyal.”2 Amongst the Boers, as amongst the British, two distinct groups of leaders now emerged. On the one hand. Burger, Smuts, Botha, de La Rey and others advocated moderation and seemed to grasp the fact that they must not demand too much of the British; opposed to these were Steyn, Kemp, Reitz and de Wet, who preached resistance to the bitter end. With regard to the British, the following letter from Lady Edward Cecil to Lord Milner gives an excellent idea of the two camps in England: “For a good settlement: the English nation, the Colonies, Loyal South Africa, Joe, Lords Salisbury and Selborne. Against: the rest of the Government, the party hacks, Mr. Campbell-Bannerman and K. [Kitchener].”2 What Lady Edward Cecil meant by “for a good settlement” was the imposing of certain conditions on the Boers; by “against,” the policy of peace at any price. We must own with regret that the stand taken by Milner during the course of these 1 Milner Papers, vol. II, page 229. 2 Telegram from Chamberlain to Milner, dated 16 April, 1902. Milner Papers, vol. II, page 335. 2 Letter dated 17 May, 1902. Ibid., vol. II, page 342.

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negotiations did not always redound to his credit. On more than one occasion he was far too stiff-necked. When the negotiations of April-May began Milner was all for an un¬ conditional surrender, but he was overruled by Kitchener. Bitter discussions set the various leaders of the Boers at loggerheads amongst themselves. At length, however, they were able to agree, and on 19 May, 1902, the Boer and British plenipotentiaries met at Pretoria. Botha, de La Rey, de Wet, Smuts and Hertzog represented the Boers; Milner and Kitchener, Great Britain. The whole story of these intensely difficult negotiations which took place, first in the heart of the Boer party itself, and afterwards amongst the Boer and British delegates, has been movingly described by de Wet in Three Years’ War. From his account it is plain that it was Generals Botha and Smuts who were most strongly in favour of acceptance of the British terms. Both men were convinced that it was useless to continue fighting, and realized that, now or never, the Boers had an opportunity of obtaining certain concessions from the British.1 As General Botha said in a speech: “Terms might now be secured which would save the language, customs and ideals of the people. The fatal thing would be to secure no terms at all and yet to be forced to surrender . . . we must save the nation by a permanent peace under which both Boer and Briton would be able to dwell here side by side.”2 It was not until 31 May, 1902, after a decisive discussion between the Boers and the British, that the conditions laid down by H.M. Government were accepted by the Boers by a majority of fifty-four votes to six. “The last meeting at Vereeniging was terrible and beautiful. The independence of the Boers was dead. They knew it, and their arguments were—consciously—funeral orations.”2 “The Peace of Vereeniging was a true British peace, con¬ ceived in the spirit of ‘let bygones be bygones.’ ”* Its principal •See S. G. Millin: General Smuts, vol. I, pages 172-8. 2 Quoted by E. V. Engelenberg in General Louis Botha, page 47. ’ S. G. Millin, op. cit., vol. I, page 183. * Elie Hatevy: Histoire du Peuple Anglais, Epilogue I, page 123. Hatevy emphasizes the decisive part played by Kitchener after the signing of the Treaty: “Kitchener was far more conciliatory than Milner, who was more of an administrator than a diplomat.”

12%

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clauses were: first, the Boers to renounce their independence in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State; second, the guarantee that all burghers would be brought back to their homes, and not deprived of their personal liberty or their property; third, the military administration to be succeeded by a civil government at the earliest possible date, and repre¬ sentative institutions leading up to self-government to be introduced; fourth, the Dutch language, as well as English, to be used in the schools and in the Courts of Law. His Majesty’s Government proposed to allot the sum of £3,000,000 sterling to the work of reconstruction and resettle¬ ment in South Africa, and, should this prove insufficient, a further sum would be made available. No special tax would be imposed either in the Transvaal or in the Orange Free State to pay for the cost of the war. Even G. P. Gooch, who as a Liberal had been bitterly opposed to the war in South Africa, conceded that “the Treaty of Vereeniging, while registering the loss of their independence, granted terms which brave men could accept without humiliation.”1 Gooch, like Halevy, stresses the fact that this relatively generous peace treaty was attributable to Kitchener rather than Milner. The moment that Kitchener had signed the Treaty of Vereeniging on 31 May, he gripped Botha’s hand and said: “We are good friends now.” Smuts concluded his speech to the Assembly of Boer delegates by pointing out to them that the sacrifices to which they had agreed must be regarded as a step forward on the road to a happier, more prosperous future: “Perhaps it is God’s will to lead the people of South Africa through defeat and humiliation to a better future and a brighter day.”2 On 31 May, Burger, the Vice-President, and Botha, the Commander-in-Chief, addressed an open letter to their people, in which they expressed their feelings with great dignity: “We are standing here at the grave of the two Republics. Much yet remains to be done. . . . Let us not draw our hands back from the work which it is our duty to accomplish. Let us ask God to guide us, and to show us how we shall be enabled to keep our nation together. We must be ready to forgive and to forget whenever we meet our 1 G. P. Gooch: A History of Our Time, 1885-1914, page 145. a Speech by Smuts at Vereeniging. quoted by J. D. Rested and D. Van Velden in Peace Negotiations between Boer and Briton.

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brethren.”1 It was Botha who, at a reunion of his staff officers, concluded his speech of thanks to them for their devotion with words that seem prophetic in the light of later events: “The sacrifices we had to make were terrific, but we are going to see a greater South Africa.”2 3 4 The war, which had lasted for thirty-one months, cost Great Britain the sum of £550,000,000. British losses, out of a total army of 448,755 men/ were 51,954 killed, or died of wounds or sickness. The Boer casualties totalled 3,700 killed; 31,000 Boers were taken prisoner, and a further 50,000 surrendered themselves when the Peace Treaty had been signed.* Many years later Milner and Botha were to meet again at the Conference of Versailles, where both were in favour of moderate terms for Germany. In addressing the British Empire Delegation at the Conference Botha said: ‘‘Seventeen years ago my friend [Milner] and I made peace at Vereeniging —it was a bitter peace for us, bitter hard. But we turned our thoughts and efforts then to saving our people; and they, the victors, helped us. It was a hard peace for us to accept, but as I know it now, when time has shown us the truth, it was not unjust—it was a generous peace that the British made with us, and that is why we stand with them today, side by side in the cause which has brought us all together.”5 6 Was this not indeed a noble tribute to Great Britain’s work and policy towards the defeated Boers? But then, again, what dignity and heroism are inherent in this declaration, that same dignity and heroism that characterized the Boer attitude and defence throughout the war in South Africa, often in striking contrast with the brutality shown by the British in the course of military operations. A few days after the signing of the Peace of Vereeniging, Lord Milner received a letter from Lord Selborne, certain 1 Milner Papers, vol. II, page 363. 2 E. V. Engelenberg: General Louis Botha, page 8g. 3 The British forces were made up thus: Regular Army, 256,340; Militia and Volunteers, 109,048; troops from various parts of the Empire, 30,333; raised in South Africa, 52,414. Of the total, 5,774 were killed outright, 16,168 died of wounds or illness, 22,829 were wounded. The Times History of the War in South Africa, vol. VI, page 279: Report of the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, page 35. 4 J. A. R. Marriott: Modern England (1885-1945), A History of My Own Times, page 154. 6 Milner Papers, vol. II, page 364.

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passages of which sum up to perfection the sentiments of the whole Empire towards him and Kitchener: “My dear Milner,” it begins, “or should I not rather call you Hercules? Your second labour [the war itself] is ended; the third [and last in South Africa] is about to commence; but is it not the biggest of all? . . . There never was any real danger of a bad peace, because the Prime Minister was as solid as a rock behind you and Chamberlain on this subject. Nevertheless, it is to you we owe Peace now without folly or dishonour.”1 On 28 June, 1902, Chamberlain informed Milner that the King had graciously bestowed on him the title of viscount in recognition of the services he had rendered the Empire, especially those in connexion with the close of hostilities. It has been aptly said that Milner, in the course of his task in South Africa, had adopted Cromer’s motto: “Achieve the Difficult and you will be asked to do the Impossible.” These words apply even more to his work during the period of peace and reconstruction; I shall now proceed to give a general survey of its main objectives and achievements.

Part II, The Work of Reconstruction after the Boer War, 1902-5

The importance of the efforts made by the British during the period of reconstruction in South Africa can never be sufficiently emphasized. The events of the next few years touch the peak of the work of British colonization, and occupy a unique place in the history of South Africa. Thanks to Milner’s tremendous drive, his unbounded enterprise, the British rapidly became, if not popular, at least indispensable to the Boers. True, the terms of the Peace of Vereeniging had been relatively moderate, but this fact alone would not have been enough to regain the good graces of the enemy of yester¬ day. It was entirely due to the work of reconstruction that a real reconciliation was reached and that the development of the new Colonies was made possible. This vast work of reconstruction, notwithstanding the grave mistakes that may have been made, far from being a 1 Letter dated 6 June, 1902. Milner Papers, vol. II, pages 365-6.

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page in local annals, remains, and will remain, one o£ the most illustrious in the history of British Imperialism. When¬ ever we consider the development of the Empire, the missionary work of colonization and pacification that was laid upon its innumerable colonial servants, it is precisely to such a page as this that we refer. If we say that Lord Milner was as great an empire builder in South Africa as Cromer in Egypt and Curzon in India, it is because we think of the tremendous task he set himself and which he carried out so tirelessly between 1900 and 1905. It was his fervent hope, moreover, that he would always be remembered by this par¬ ticular chapter in his imperial life-work. On the eve of his departure for England, in the course of one of the last speeches he made in Johannesburg, Lord Milner stood by all his actions and decisions, and made it clear that he had never regretted for a moment the fact that Great Britain had been compelled to take up arms against the Boers. But he added: “However inevitable, however just, a destructive conflict of that sort is a sad business to look back upon. What I should prefer to be remembered by is the tremendous effort sub¬ sequent to the war, not only to repair its ravages, but to restart these colonies on a higher plane of civilization than they had ever previously attained. . . We have seen what Milner achieved in Egypt when he was under Cromer. We have seen him in South Africa in 1899, on the eve of the war, entrusted with extremely delicate negotiations. We have been forced to admit that, both as a negotiator and a diplomat, he too frequently proved disappointing. From now onwards, he will stand out as a model for all administrators, all imperial colonizers, as “the best civilian soldier of the Empire” in the true and full meaning of the phrase. Let me stress yet once again that I am not merely con¬ cerned with Milner himself. This is a study of British Imperial achievement, and of methods of colonization adopted by the British, showing the reasons for their success, and their pride in that success. I repeat that Milner’s work and the evolution of British Imperialism are closely entwined, and while that work was, of course, typically “Milnerian,” it was also typical of British colonial policy at the end of the 1 Speech in Johannesburg, 31 March, 1905. War in South Africa, vol. VI, page 169.

The Times History of the

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nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century. I shall begin by giving a brief account of the purely economic work of reconstruction, the foundation on which the political and administrative structure was built up. I shall deal with this structure in due course, but it must be borne in mind from the outset that such a policy cannot be entirely divorced from economics, and that, in their Empire, the British invariably made use of their economic policy to screen their political objective, although one presupposed the other. At the beginning of 1900 Milner had mapped out a scheme for reconstruction in the devastated areas, the broad outlines of which he had laid before the Government during his visit to London in the summer of 1901. He had made it clear at the time that it was his intention to start the mines in the Transvaal working again at the earliest possible moment, and to extend them. With this end in view he had deemed it necessary to make special efforts towards the resumption of agriculture in those regions where it could be carried on even during the war. For the success of these plans it was essential that, right from the outset, the largest possible number of British colonists should settle in South Africa and mingle with the Boers, so that the two races might make more and more contacts and strike common roots in the soil of the country. The underlying aim of this programme for settling the land was the ultimate reduction of the racial factor by bridging the gap which lay between a British urban popula¬ tion on the one side and a Dutch agricultural community on the other. It further aimed at the introduction of a more highly skilled class of farmer, which would help to raise the general level of agriculture in the new Colonies, thereby benefiting the Dutch as well as the British. In spite of what has since been said to the contrary, the main concern of the British was not so much to establish their political supremacy in South Africa by increasing their numbers as to build up the new Colonies on an entirely different social foundation and on a far higher plane of civilization than had been known in the days of the old Republics. The evolution was achieved, the chain of events was forged in the most logical manner. The actual economic objective was to raise the standard of civilization in the new Colonies. But the truth was that this was only a means to an end, that

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end being the Union of South Africa in the first place and the consolidation of the union of the British Empire in the second. As a result of the work thus undertaken, the Transvaal would cease to be a source of discord and would become, on the contrary, the principal factor in the Union of South Africa, to which it would impart a British and progressive character. On the higher level, South Africa, which had been for so many years the weakest point in the Empire, would henceforth buttress it and hold it more closely together. “A great Johannesburg—great in intelligence, in cultivation, in public spirit—means a British Transvaal. A British Transvaal will turn the scale in a British South Africa, and a British South Africa may go a long way to con¬ solidate the Empire.”1 Milner, like Chamberlain, whose great work in Birming¬ ham will be recalled, recognized the prime importance of well-organized, well-governed municipalities, and well-built towns that were not allowed to deteriorate or become over¬ crowded. In his great speech in Johannesburg on 8 January, 1902, he gave enthusiastic expression to his social and civic ideas: “The making of a great municipality is enough to attract any ambition. . . . Don’t be content with anything less than making this a model city—a city built for per¬ manence, fully equipped with all the essentials of health, comfort and of culture, not only for the few, but for the great bulk of its inhabitants. . . .” When the time came for the rebuilding of the farms and houses that had been destroyed in the war, Milner insisted that no shoddy erections should be run up. With Chamberlain and Cecil Rhodes he held the view that good housing and comfortable homes would engender love of one’s country. This municipal socialism of Milner’s is essentially British in character. It was obvious that, even with the best intentions in the world, it had not been possible to begin on the real work of reconstruction during the war or while guerrilla warfare was still in progress. It was not until the Peace Treaty had been signed that any systematic progress could be made. The first task that confronted the British was the repatriation of the prisoners of war. When it is taken into account that more than 200,000 men, women and children had to be resettled, 1 Speech by Lord Milner in Johannesburg, 8 January, 1902, reported in The Times of 9 January.

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the difficulties with which the British administration was faced, the magnitude of its task, can well be imagined. More than half this number were in concentration camps, and these, for once, served a useful purpose; they were assembly points for the formalities which preceded repatriation. Special repatriation committees had to be set up, certain members of which, both in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, were Boers. On the whole the work of repatriation was very well done and was almost completed by the beginning of 1903. In conformity with the Treaty of Vereeniging the sum of three million pounds had been put at the disposal of the Department for Repatriation in order to help the resettled Boers to start again. In addition to this gift, non-interest-bearing loans repayable in two years were made, and yet further loans were granted by the War Office and the various Colonial Governments. In all, sixteen and a half millions were raised to set the country on its feet. The indisputable generosity of Great Britain and the extremely skilful measures taken by Lord Milner resulted in a very close co-operation between the adversaries of yesterday. This greatly facilitated the work of Milner and his colleagues. Nevertheless, the Boer leaders had come to the conclusion that the sum of three million pounds, which Great Britain had allocated for relief, fell far short of the amount actually required. Three of them, Botha, de La Rey and de Wet, were given permission to go to Europe in order to raise funds for the Boer war-widows and orphans. In the summer of 1902 the Boer Mission left South Africa and reached London in August. “Cheering crowds welcomed them in the streets, wffiile shoals of enthusiastic callers besieged them at their hotels.”1 This, coming as it does from a typical English source, speaks for itself, and reveals the state of feeling of the British public of the day. The Mission’s reception by King Edward VII was no less warm. As a number of Boer leaders had left South Africa in the last weeks of the war and had taken refuge in Holland—the aged Kruger was living in Utrecht—the Mission visited the Low Countries, and returned to London in September for a conference with Chamberlain. They had previously written to him from Holland, setting forth their claims in full. Chamberlain, however, made it quite clear that there could 1 The Times History of the War in South Africa, vol. VI, page 74.

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li>9

be no question of any revision or modification of the Peace Treaty which had only been signed a few months back—a Treaty which had, moreover, been dictated by a generosity unparalleled in history. They were plainly told that if they persisted in pressing these new claims His Majesty’s Govern¬ ment would refuse to treat with them. On 5 September, in Kitchener’s presence, the talks between the Boers and Chamberlain began. At this point I must refer to a some¬ what characteristic blunder on the part of the Boers, as the result of which they were given to understand in no uncertain fashion that if they desired a lasting peace they must appeal to British sympathy, base their hopes for the future on it, and refrain from taking independent action of their own outside the British Empire. According to a violently anti-Boer writer, the feeling in England at this moment was such that, had the Boer Mission appealed on its arrival in August for con¬ tributions to the Relief Fund for Boer war-widows and orphans, the country would have made a most generous response. The Boers, however, no doubt at the instigation of the aged Kruger, had decided to launch their appeal “to the civilized world” from Holland, and had, in fact, done so, omitting all reference to the help they had already received from Great Britain. The consequence was that the Mission had a very cool reception on its return to England, and raised far less money than had been anticipated: the total amount from all sources came to £105,000, a considerable part of which had been subscribed prior to the actual launching of the appeal. On their return to South Africa, in December, 1902, the Boer generals were able to take stock of their position. They had learnt for themselves that all that they could expect from the great European powers was a certain amount of sympathy and so slender a measure of support that it was almost non-existent. They had discovered that in England people in every walk of life held them in respect. Above all, their talks with Chamberlain had convinced them that he was determined to help their people in every possible way, and his magnanimity and manifest goodwill had deeply impressed them. They had come to realize, in short, that Chamberlain’s conception of a free, united and prosperous South Africa under the British flag was no idle dream, but the objective which he had set himself in all sincerity to attain—an LMB—E

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objective to which they themselves could give their approval, knowing that it did not involve the sacrifice of the particular ambitions and interests of the Dutch people. As for Chamberlain himself, he had been in consultation with Milner while the Boer Mission was still in Europe, and had decided that it was imperative for him to go to South Africa in order to try and solve at first-hand the exceedingly complex problems of organization, economy and finance. He had originally in¬ tended his trip to be of a semi-private nature, but as soon as the news leaked out that the Colonial Secretary had arrived in South Africa, Chamberlain had to resign himself to an official visit. He was given an extremely warm welcome when he arrived in Durban on 26 December, and there were scenes of enthusiasm in the streets. He went from town to town, where he spoke on the two themes he had particularly at heart: the reconciliation and unity of all South Africans, liberty under the British flag, and the duty of the Colonies to shoulder their fair share of the burden of the Empire. Chamberlain, with Milner’s help, elaborated a plan for reconstruction, and gave his approval to most of the measures which had been envisaged by Milner and his colleagues. At Milner’s request he obtained the sanction of His Majesty’s Government for a loan of thirty-five million pounds. Part of this was to be used for relief work; the rest was to be devoted to the financing of the policy of reconstruction. Certain moneys were to be allocated to the paying-off: of the out¬ standing debts of the Transvaal, nearly a third being ear¬ marked for the repurchase of the railways, and five millions to cover loans to farmers and disbursements on resettlement. Ten million pounds were to be spent on the actual work of reconstruction, viz., five millions for new railways, two millions on public works of every kind (the building of bridges, the making of roads, waterworks, etc.), and three millions on the purchase of suitable land for settlers. Milner had hoped for a considerably larger sum, and, had he been empowered, would have asked for a much more generous loan. Nevertheless he was convinced that as soon as the spade¬ work had been done the prosperity of the country would rapidly increase, and he would find himself in possession of fresh funds. The work of reconstruction, financed by the loan, met with an immediate check; the snag lay in apportioning the moneys

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fairly between the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Milner was opposed to any method of expenditure which stopped dead at political frontiers, and considered that, from an economic point of view at least, it was essential to treat the two Colonies as one. Obviously this necessitated their having a common revenue. This led, in May, 1903, to the creation of the Inter-Colonial Council, which, as has rightly been said, was “one of Milner’s most original and most fruitful conceptions.”1 It is interesting to note that the Inter-Colonial Council, which owed its being to Milner’s initiative, had been inspired by purely economic motives with a view to facilitating and financing the work of reconstruction by the raising of loans; it had, as we shall see, excellent results. The Inter-Colonial Council was outstanding for another reason— a reason far above and beyond the sphere of economics: it contained the germ of the Union of South Africa which was to be an even greater political success. There is a constant parallelism between the economic and political theories and actions of Milner and his colleagues.2 One of the first tasks undertaken by the Inter-Colonial Council was the amalgamation of the railway systems of the two Colonies. With his experience in Egypt at the back of him, Milner, like all great empire builders, realized to the full that one of the decisive factors, if not the decisive factor, in successful colonization and social, economic and political progress was a first-class network of communications.3 For that matter, no nation has made more use of the railway than the British. They have always appreciated, as Sir Charles Lucas has remarked, that the railway is “a nation-making factor.”4 An extensive system of railways was particularly important in South Africa, where, above all, it was required for the full exploitation of the country’s mineral resources. Unless sufficient branch lines were constructed, neither the Transvaal nor the Orange Free State would ever attain the 1 L. S. Amery in The Times History of the War in South Africa, vol. VI, page 86. 2 “The whole Inter-Colonial arrangement is my child. ...” Milner in a letter written to Selborne dated 14 April, 1905. Milner Papers, vol. II, page 556. 3 "The railwaymen are the pioneers of European settlement.” Milner in a lecture at Church House, 9 March, 1907. See Milner: The Nation and. the Empire, page 163. 1 The Oxford Survey of the British Empire, vol. VI, page 25.

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requisite degree of development. Agriculture would remain in a backward state, and it would be impossible for the different communities in the country regions to establish contact or set up permanent markets for the exchange of their produce. Once new railroads had been constructed, however, the standard of living could be raised, its cost reduced and new industries rapidly developed. Of all the work that Milner was called upon to carry out it was to the development of the railways that he applied himself with the most enthusiasm. The funds at his disposal proved inadequate, but he used all his ingenuity in order to raise further sums, and was successful in persuading the powerful de Beers group to finance the construction of various important lines, notably that from Kimberley to Johannesburg. The Government of Natal and various public bodies in the Transvaal also con¬ tributed a large amount for the extension of the railways. So it came about that, in the course of the next few years, some two thousand miles of new lines were laid, doubling those already in existence. The full results of this work did not make themselves felt until 1910, but we may affirm, with Amery, that: “the central South African railway system remains as one of the chief monuments of Milner’s practical genius, and as one of the most effective and enduring instruments of his constructive policy.”1 Let me conclude this very sketchy picture by emphasizing the fact that, in addition to the money spent on the con¬ struction of new railroads, several millions were disbursed on improving and repairing those already in existence and on completing and bringing up to date the old rolling-stock. While the war was still in progress Sir Percy Girouard had been appointed Director of Railways, a post he retained until 1904, when, through the intervention of the Inter-Colonial Council, the Railway Commissariat was replaced by the Railway Commission. In both Colonies several thousand miles of railway were put into repair and some forty bridges were constructed, greatly extending and facilitating communications and transport. New administrative buildings, schools, hospitals, private houses, etc., were built in all the principal towns, entirely changing their aspect. The drainage system in most of the villages and towns was brought up to date. In addition,

1

The Times History of the War in South Africa, vol. VI, page 137.

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the new administration was making every effort to increase the network of telephonic and telegraphic communications throughout the country. Later on, when Milner was speaking of the work of recon¬ struction in South Africa, he emphasized the exceptional importance of the railways. In Ottawa, in 1908, he said: “One of the points of similarity which strike one at once between Canada and South Africa is the problem of distance. . . . Hence it is that the question of communication or transport looms so large in the development of either country. South African prosperity, the connexion between different parts of South Africa which will shortly result in a con¬ federation such as yours, would have been absolutely impossible without the enterprise of the people who first pushed forward the great lines of transcontinental communi¬ cation. ... It is impossible to overestimate the part which a vigorous policy of railway construction has played and is playing in South Africa, not only in respect of the material development of the country, but in making its political unification possible.”1 He went on to demonstrate that rail¬ ways were even more vital in South Africa than in Canada owing to the lack of navigable rivers and lakes. “It is the railway or nothing—nothing but the mule-cart or the oxwagon. It is impossible to overestimate the change, the trans¬ formation which is wrought in the conditions of South African life by the advent of the railroad. Those portions of the country which, like the far north-west of Cape Colony, are still devoid of the only effective means of communication, continue to present that character of arrested development, the sparsity of population, the backwardness and isolation, which, till recently, kept almost the whole of the country so cut off from the general progress of the world.”2 Tribute must also be paid to the achievements of Milner and his colleagues in the sphere of agriculture. Civil servants from the various agricultural departments and specialists in agricultural matters were sent to South Africa from England and every part of the Empire. Experimental stations were set up in various centres. The period 1903-4 was a turning 1 “South Ottawa, 31 Autumn of 2 “South Ottawa, on

Africa Development,” a October, 1908. Milner: 1908, page 44. Africa Development,” a 31 October, 1908. Ibid.,

lecture given to the Canadian Club, Speeches delivered in Canada in the lecture given to the Canadian Club, page 45.

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point in the agricultural development of South Africa, largely owing to the work of W. J. Palmer, of Canada, who had been appointed head of the Department of Agriculture. It is interesting to note that the resources of Canada and South Africa formed the greatest possible contrast. Canada’s principal source of prosperity was then agricultural wealth, whereas South Africa, which had comparatively few agri¬ cultural products, derived almost all her prosperity from her vast mineral resources. (The situation, of course, is not the same today as it was at the beginning of the twentieth century; Canada has become industrial as well as agricultural, while South Africa, thanks to cold storage, now exports fruit and vegetables.) Milner believed that South Africa should seek to develop her agriculture in order to avoid being left at the mercy of a prosperity due entirely to mineral wealth. It was essential for her to increase her existing agricultural resources by the introduction of scientific methods: “We looked round the world to find the men who might be com¬ petent to run a thoroughly scientific and agricultural depart¬ ment in both the new Colonies. And we found them in different parts of the world, but . . . especially in Canada.”1 By the use of similar methods, Milner, with whirlwind speed and energy, tackled the problems of irrigation and afforestation. Experts were summoned from India and Egypt, and the appropriate departments were set up. But Milner’s plan for the afforestation of vast expanses of veldt was barely outlined; it was left to others, after him, to continue the work he had envisaged. From the bare facts given above it will be seen that, from a practical point of view, the work of reconstruction carried out by the Inter-Colonial Council, directed or inspired by Milner, was a complete success. Furthermore, the Council must be credited with having widened the outlook of the various civil servants and municipal officers, thus enabling them to deal with matters from other aspects than that of the interests of a particular colony. Milner had always been anxious that the people of South Africa should take this larger view, since what he had permanently in mind was the not so distant day when there would no longer be individual colonies, but a Union of South Africa, and, over and above 1 In a speech at Ottawa on 31 January, 1908. Milner: Speeches delivered in Canada in the Autumn of iqoS, pages 53-4.

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this Union, the vast British Empire. “To open a wider political horizon, to create a South African habit of mind as distinct from a colonial one, was ever Milner’s guiding thought, and in this new body [the Inter-Colonial Council] he saw an effective instrument towards his purpose.”1 It was precisely because Milner did not wish to localize his activities that he concentrated his attention on working out a scheme for a customs union of South Africa; sub¬ sequently, with the active assistance of Chamberlain, he devised a plan for Imperial Preference. It was with this in mind that, on 10 March, 1903, he took advantage of Chamberlain’s presence in South Africa to invite all the delegates of the Colonies to a general conference at Bloemfontein in order that they might discuss matters of common interest, and in particular a Customs Union. The Conference succeeded in framing a tariff, and for the first time all internal tariff barriers in South Africa were abolished. Apart from the obvious advantages of this economic unification, the new tariff had yet another attraction: it tightened the bonds between London and South Africa by granting an Imperial Preference to Great Britain which amounted to twenty-five per cent in most cases and total remission of the duty in others. Thus a South African Customs Union comprising all those British terri¬ tories south of the Zambezi came into being, and one of Cecil Rhodes’ great dreams was realized at last. As Milner and Chamberlain saw it, if Great Britain, for her part, had made a gesture in favour of the Dominions and had also adopted a system of reciprocity, the complete success of the Customs Union would have been assured.2 The British Empire accounts for a quarter of the total population of the world and its products are too numerous and varied to name. A Customs Union whereby the Colonies were given the same reciprocal treatment by Great Britain as that which they had accorded her—a twenty-five per cent Preference or a complete free entry—would have had the double advantage of stimulating markets within the Empire and checking foreign competition and the far too pro¬ tectionist policy of certain countries. The whole question had 1 L. S. Amery: The Times History of the War in South Africa, vol. VI, pages 86-7. 2 Milner: The Nation and the Empire, pages 267 et seq., 300 et seq., 341 et seq.

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already been laboriously thrashed out during the Colonial Conference of 1902. In its international aspect, no doubt, Britain’s policy of Free Trade forbade the granting of Preference to the Colonies, since this would be nothing more than a thinly disguised form of Protection. But in its imperial aspect the Colonies urged London to give reciprocal preference to their products, while the mother country, for her part, demanded that the Colonies should contribute a larger sum for the military and naval defence of the Empire. One passage from the resolution voted by the Colonial delegates to the Conference in London in 1902 must be borne in mind: “The Colonial Prime Ministers respectfully call the attention of H.M. Government to the great benefit which would accrue from a preference in favour of the products and industries of the Colonies, either by suppression or diminutions of the existing rights or to those that might be set up.” Chamberlain realized that it was hardly possible to shelve indefinitely the demand by the Colonies for reciprocity. In addition, it was quite clear to him that the great union of trade of which he dreamed would continue to be a dream without some measure of Protection in Britain. It becomes apparent, therefore, that the doctrine of Imperial Preference had, as its corollary, Chamberlain’s programme of Tariff Reform leading up, as was its author’s intention, to Imperial Union, or even to Imperial Federation. At this point, before we continue with the subject of Milner’s work in South Africa within the framework of the development of British Imperialism, a brief digression is necessary. Some account must be given of the broad outlines of Chamberlain’s programme for Tariff Reform, since it was also Milner’s. During the Boer War a small tax had been imposed on imported cereals, and at the end of 1902, before he left for South Africa, Chamberlain proposed that this tax should remain, but be remitted in favour of colonial cereals. During his absence in South Africa, however, his colleagues withdrew their support, and went over to Ritchie, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who abolished the whole duty. The budget introduced in 1903 was a Free Trade budget. A few days earlier Milner had sent a confidential telegram to Chamberlain, the substance of which was: “I am rather alarmed at the apparent complete indifference at home to the proposed adoption by South Africa of preference on

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British goods. . . . England seems absolutely indifferent . . . any reciprocal advantage, however small, or even the hope of it some day would encourage the sentiment here, which is very strong, but will not live permanently on nothing. At present there are no South African exports to Great Britain which are taxed, therefore reciprocity is impossible. But I believe it would be quite sufficient if something, however slight, were done for Canada. This would recognize the principle of reciprocity and South Africa might hope to benefit one day. But it is not really the small and hypothetical mercantile advantages which anybody worries about, but proof that England cares.”1 2 In his famous and extremely important speech of 15 May, 1903, in Birmingham, Chamberlain openly pleaded for some measure of Imperial Preference. On 28 May he expounded his views in the House. Balfour’s attempts to temporize came to nothing, and on 17 September, 1903, Chamberlain resigned from the Government in order that he might be free to carry on his campaign. While originally still claiming to be a Free Trader, he now definitely advocated a general ten per cent tariff on manufactures as well as duties on imported wheat and meat, the effect of these latter on the cost of living to be offset by reductions in the duties on tea, coffee, cocoa and sugar. The doctrine which Chamberlain preached, and which Milner was to play an active part in defending, bore many resemblances to that of the Fair Traders of 1880. It was not until many years later that Chamberlain became an ardent Protectionist under the pressure of circumstances that had not been in existence before the beginning of the century. He then did his utmost to drive home the fact that England’s best customers were the Colonies, and that consequently, if the need arose, it was in every way to her advantage to pass over foreign clients in their favour. As Halevy has said, it was on Chamberlain’s genius that the new movement had to rely for its ultimate success.3 Had the Empire been completely organized on the principle of Imperial Preference it would easily have become self-supporting. Chamberlain, not without a measure of 1 Telegram dated 27 March, 1903. Milner Papers, vol. II, pages 451-2. 2 Elie Haldvy: L’Histoire du Peuple Anglais au XIXme Siicle, Epilogue I (1895-1905), page 311.

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prophetic insight, stated categorically that it might be the only means of avoiding the dissolution of the Empire: no Preference, no Empire. I shall have more to say on this subject in a later chapter, but let me state here and now that the institution of Preference certainly bore fruit and must rightly be considered as a factor in imperial unity. The task that confronted the Tariff Reformers was all the more formidable because Free Trade, at this particular time, was almost a religion in England. Chamberlain and his supporters were convinced that there was no other way of giving the Colonies complete satisfaction. Actually it came to this: that Chamberlain, and subsequently Milner, became protection¬ ists for the sake of their imperialism. Their form of Protection, however, if I may say so, was a pseudo-Protection which sacrificed Free Trade only for the sake of imperialism. This is not the place to discuss the campaign of the Tariff Reform League, of which Chamberlain is the symbol, so I will merely mention the fact that its activities suffered a severe set-back when the Unionists were heavily defeated at the General Election of 1906. Eventually, however, the greater part of Chamberlain’s programme was realized. In the meantime Milner was faced with serious political and economic problems in South Africa. During the first few months of peace the prosperity of the country had seemed assured, but the shortage of labour gave rise to a considerable amount of anxiety. Chamberlain had already been asked to take suitable action in this matter at the time of his visit to South Africa. Some people insisted that white labour should be imported without delay, while others were strongly in favour of Chinese immigrants, since they were hard-working, made few demands, and were satisfied with a very low wage. Chamberlain, who was aware that the importation of Chinese labour might prove unpopular and might lead to trouble in England, in Africa itself and in various parts of the Empire, considered that on the whole a large-scale recruitment of white labour would be the better solution. In a report addressed to His Majesty’s Government on 20 January, 1903, he said: “Lord Milner would be inclined to favour an experiment in the importation of Chinese labour. ... I con¬ sider that such action would be extremely unpopular and would raise a storm at home and that such a step could not safely be taken unless the Transvaal were previously or at

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the same time to adopt a similar course . . . the feeling at present all over South Africa is against such a policy, and as long as this continues it is not likely that the home Govern¬ ment would give its assent.”1 On top of the labour problem, the extremely poor harvest in South Africa in 1903, caused by a disastrous drought in March of that year, not only fell far short of the country’s needs but led to an economic crisis. The problem of manual labour had always been par¬ ticularly complex in South Africa. There had been periodic recruitments: first of coolies from India, then of African labourers from Portuguese Mozambique, and from other African territories. But the situation grew steadily worse, and the supply of labour for the mines, agriculture and the various industries fell very far short of the demands. At the Conference of Bloemfontein in 1903 it had been agreed that, as the local labour force was totally inadequate, everything possible must be done to encourage immigrants from the British territories of Central and East Africa. If the number thus raised still proved unequal to requirements, Asiatic labourers might be introduced, with the proviso that, when their contracts expired, they should be repatriated. At first Milner, like Chamberlain, had been opposed to the importa¬ tion of Chinese labour, since he had continued to hope that sufficient white workers would be available to close the gap. But immediately after the Bloemfontein Conference he had become convinced that it was essential to import labour from any country that had a surplus.2 3 ‘‘For the moment the labour question was the key of the whole imperial position in South Africa. For without labour there could be no rapid expansion of the mining industry.’” In other words, unless there was a vast influx of unskilled labour to the mines, British immigrants would not be attracted in sufficient numbers to South Africa; this meant not only that it would be impossible to stabilize the political situation of the country, but that funds would fall far short of the amount needed for agricultural and industrial development. ‘‘To the capitalists the labour question was a matter of profit or loss. To Milner it meant the success or failure of 1 Milner Papers, vol. II, page 438. 2 Cd. 1683 and Cd. 1895. 3 The Times History of the War in South Africa, vol. VI, page 111.

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British policy.”1 It is entirely untrue that Milner, as some of his political opponents have asserted, was determined to import Chinese labour at all costs, even at the eventual expense of the white population, in order to increase the wealth of the mining companies. Milner, more than any man, attached extreme importance to the substantial increase of the white British population. But it must be understood that, from his point of view, the mines had to be developed in order to stimulate, in as short a time as possible, the whole economic life of the country. The mines were not an end in themselves, but a means to an end. Consequently he regarded the importation of Chinese labour as a necessary measure, particularly as the cost of white labour was too dear. The report of the Labour Commission published on 19 November, 1903, brought matters to a head. Two of the figures it gave were highly significant: the mines alone required an additional 129,000 workers, and would require, according to expert statisticians, at least another 196,000 in the course of the next five years. On every side the demand for Chinese labour arose.2 Numerous petitions were addressed to Milner, including that from the Transvaal which contained 47,000 signatures.3 On 10 March, 1904, a deputation several hundred strong, representing some thirty public bodies and associations and about forty mines in the Witwatersrand district, handed Milner a telegram which was addressed to the Colonial Secre¬ tary. This message was to the effect that: “(a) it is the interests of the whole community that are at stake, more especially of the British population engaged in commerce and industry, which are dependent on an adequate supply of coloured labour; (b) that so far from the importation of un¬ skilled labour diminishing the employment of the whites, it must necessarily augment it; (c) that failing the immediate giving effect to the ordinance, an increasing number of white workers will find themselves without the means of livelihood, and the present acute financial and industrial depression will be intensely aggravated.”4 1 The Times History of the War in South Africa, vol. VI, page 112. 2 In particular, the resolutions unanimously voted by the Chamber of Commerce of the Transvaal, the Syndical Chamber of Mines, etc. 3 Cd. 1899. 4 Quoted in telegram, dated 10 March, 1904, from Milner to Lyttelton. Milner Papers, vol. II, page 483.

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On the following day Milner wrote to his Minister about this telegram, pointing out that the deputation was really remarkable since at least half its members were workmen. One of these had declared: “It has been said that this is a capitalistic question, but I consider that it is a working man’s question.”1 Besides the Transvaal, both Natal and Rhodesia were definitely in favour of the importation of Chinese labour. Cape Colony, on the contrary, was strongly against the proposed immigration. It was symptomatic of the feeling in Australia and New Zealand that when people there learnt that Chinese labour was shortly to be imported into South Africa they were stunned and indignant. They had very little idea of prevalent social and economic conditions in South Africa; what they were chiefly conscious of was that the immigration of Asiatics had always been banned in Australia and New Zealand, where the warding-off of the Yellow Peril had always been a vital principle of social defence. Various newspapers shrieked in headlines that it was not for the purpose of importing Chinese into South Africa that Australian and New Zealand troops had fought the Boers! It is worth noticing that Canada, where the Asiatic problem had never arisen, hardly registered any interest in the question, the Government remaining more or less indifferent. The problem of Chinese labour occupies a very important place, on both the economic and social levels, in British imperial history. It forms a major chapter in the development of the Transvaal and the expansion of the South African mines; but its effects were not confined to South Africa alone. It became the centre of an ideological struggle whose issues even absorbed those at home in England; it led to an acute crisis in 1904, and to another in 1905, and was one of the principal reasons for the defeat of Balfour’s Conservative Government in the General Election of 1906. The slogan of the Liberals had, in fact, been: “Down with Chinese labour!”2 At length, on 10 February, 1904, the importation of Chinese labour was sanctioned by the Colonial Office and 1 Milner Papers, vol. II, footnote 2, page 483. 2 There is a whole series of Blue Books on the subject of Chinese labour: Cd. 1895, 1898, 1899, 1941, 1945- 195°> 1956* 2025> and 2026. See also Han¬ sard, 16 February to 24 March, 1904, and contemporary newspaper accounts of the electoral campaign of 1905.

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passed by the Council of the Transvaal. The first batch of 1,000 Chinese labourers arrived in South Africa in June, and by the end of the year 23,000 were employed in the mines. In London, political agitation was increasing in violence, but in the Transvaal itself the immediate results seemed favourable. By June, 1905, the number of Chinese in the mines approximated to 50,000. The financial and economic situation was rapidly restored, and the corner safely turned. In 1906 the number of skilled white workers employed in the mines totalled 18,000, as against 13,000 in 1904. The output of gold had risen enormously from £12,000,000 in 1903 to £20,800,000 in 1905 and £24,500,000 in 1906. The male white population of the Rand, which had totalled 43,000 in April, 1904, numbered 56,000 by the end of 1905. All Milner’s calculations had been surpassed. Milner and his colleagues took active steps to improve conditions in the mines, one of the most important being the setting up of a panel of medical and welfare workers who would make periodical visits of inspection. In May, 1902, Dr. Sansom had been asked to make an inquiry, and his report showed that housing, food, medical treatment, etc., were all more than inadequate. Shocked by these revelations, Milner insisted that the mine owners should carry out extensive reforms in all that related to the material needs of the workers. The death-rate was swiftly reduced; it dropped from the appalling figure of fifty-four per 1,000 in 1903 to thirty-six in the first few months of 1904, and subsequently to thirty. Thanks to the fact that the economic situation had been stabilized, the work of reconstruction and agricultural development, which had been broken off or slowed down for a certain time, was now resumed at a quickened pace. New roads were made, new railways constructed. L. S. Amery, who has rightly been called “Milner’s most competent interpreter,’’1 has emphasized that the whole population of the Transvaal, the Boers included, had every cause to congratulate themselves on the employment of Chinese labour. Even in England the agitation began to die down in the latter half of 1904, only to flare up again in 1905, isolated cases of criminal conduct amongst the Chinese having proved sufficient to add fuel to the flames. Amery gives us his 'Cecil Headlam:

Milner Papers, vol. II, page 440.

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explanation of what really motivated these outbursts of indignation in England: “The best excuse that can be made is the one given in Swift’s Essay on Arbuthnot’s Art of Political Lying. It happens very often that there are no other means left to the good people of England to pull down a ministry and government they are weary of but by exercising this, their undoubted right: that abundance of political lying is a sure sign of true British liberty.”1 Alfred Lyttelton, the Colonial Secretary, staunchly supported Milner, and in a speech in the House vigorously defended the employment of Chinese labour. Replying to the question of a member of his own party during a sitting on 22 March, 1904, on the eve of the great debate in the Commons, Lyttelton said straight out: “I am aware that the Government’s decision will probably cost the party many votes; but a Government which flinched from what it knew to be necessary in the interests of another part of the Empire, in order to avoid losing some supporters at home, would not deserve to retain the possession of power.”2 Before we close this particular chapter of Milner’s work in South Africa he must be allowed to speak for himself. On 23 March, 1904, he had received a letter from the Right Reverend A. Hamilton-Baynes, the Bishop of Natal, a passage from which ran: “You have our entire confidence and respect. . . . We resent very deeply such an attack as seems to have been made upon you personally by the Bishop of Hereford, for we know the grounds upon which the attack was made are absolutely without foundation. . . .”3 To this Milner replied: Don’t be anxious about the Chinese question. I will not admit as much as that Chinese labour is in itself undesirable. There is an immense amount of cant about the “moral” evils attending Chinese immigration. The men who know them best assure me that the Chinese are not, as a race, at all particularly immoral. As for “slavery,” there is no more

1 The Times History of the War in South Africa, vol. VI, page 125. Refer¬ ence should also be made to Modern England, by J. A. R. Marriott, page 263. Marriott states that the misdeeds of the Chinese were greatly exaggerated for reasons of electoral propaganda, but he also gives the information that the Chinese were responsible for a good deal of trouble in the way of strikes, acts of violence, etc., and that some 1,000 out of a total of 47,000 in 1905 had served prison sentences. 2 See The Times, 14 May, 1925. 3 Milner Papers, vol. II, page 487.

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slavery in this than in a hundred forms of service based upon free contract—certainly not as much as in ordinary enlistment in the Army. It is true, mining is not a healthy trade, but it will be carried on under conditions as favour¬ able as science can make them, and in all other respects the Chinese will be well cared for. They can earn here in a few years as much as they could at home in a lifetime, and will return to their own country with what to them appears a competency, and even wealth. And this country absolutely requires some extraneous help to get along. Without it, there will be a white exodus, and that, of course, means, a British exodus. And this, I am perfectly certain, is the reason why Chinese labour is so much opposed. It is the pro-Boers and Little Englanders who are really at the bottom of the whole business, though they are leading the bulk of their wellmeaning ignorant countrymen by the nose. To say that Chinese labour is a substitution for white labour is, quite simply, a lie. The exact opposite is the truth. Without a substratum of coloured people, white labour cannot exist here, and when the very rich mines are worked out the country will return to its primitive barrenness—and to the Boer. And that is the true inwardness of the whole business.' The lucidity of the above passage fully justifies this lengthy quotation. It faithfully reflects Milner’s personal opinion and answers his antagonists in no uncertain terms. To sum up, here is what E. A. Walker has to say on the subject: “Be that as it may, the Chinese developed the mines marvellously from 1904 onwards; their labour made openings for Europeans, and in due time the returning Bantus gave shareholders confidence; called forth something of the rush of immigrants Milner had hoped for; provided the adminis¬ tration with an ‘overspill,’ and, before their final departure in 1910, had presented the self-governing Transvaal with the surplus which helped it to dominate the National Convention that made the Union. On the other hand, the cry of ‘Chinese slavery’ did more than any other single thing to bring down the Balfour Ministry.”2 Because of the relatively restricted number of the white population there has always been a colour problem in South Africa. Out of a total population of eleven millions in the Union of South Africa, twenty per cent are white, seventy per cent natives or blacks, while the remaining ten per cent 1 Letter dated 28 March, 1904. Milner Papers, vol. II, pages 487-8. 2 E. A. Walker: Lord Milner in South Africa, page 23.

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is made up of the Indians in Durban and the half-caste or coloured people in Cape Colony. Cecil Rhodes had always been in favour of “equal rights for every civilized man,” and Milner, after him, held the view that the only criterion for the enjoyment of full civic rights should be not the colour of a man’s skin but “his degree of civilization.” In the early days, however, no one bothered his head about the blacks or gave a thought to the conditions under which they worked in the mines. The whites were all alike when it came to the blacks, in fact; they were filled with an unreasoning fear that amounted to an obsession that the blacks might attain a higher status, the Boers being, if possible, even more extremist than the rest. In a speech to the Municipal Congress of Johannesburg on 18 May, 1903, Milner made a passionate appeal for a more liberal outlook, and in particular pleaded that the coloured and native population should be given a larger voice in municipal affairs. The colour question, however, though it was amongst the other grave problems of the day, does not seem to have excited such high feelings in South Africa at the close of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, as it was to provoke later. At the present moment, it un¬ doubtedly presents the major problem for the white popula¬ tion of the Union of South Africa, and is the most serious aspect of internal policy with which the Government of the country has to deal.1 In 1903 Milner and Kitchener had formulated a scheme for a military training centre in Cape Colony, a South African Aldershot, which would be capable of accommodating thirty thousand men. Their aim had been twofold: (a) to maintain a fairly substantial army in South Africa, as an excellent natural training ground on the way to India; and (b) to make available British and Imperial troops fully acquainted with the terrain and local conditions should hostilities break out in the future. The original idea had been Milner’s, but it received Kitchener’s immediate approbation and en¬ couragement, and L. S. Amery and General Ian Hamilton did their utmost to gain support for it in London. It was at 1 For a full understanding of the colour problem, see Andr£ Siegfried’s extremely important survey: “Une grande EnquSte en Afrique” in Le Figaro, July-October, 1948. See also J. C. Smuts: Africa and Some World Problems.

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first turned down by the Government, for, as Milner remarked with bitter irony: “It is too original on the one hand, and on the other hand too obviously appropriate to local conditions to commend itself to the slaves of tradition at the War Office.”1 Chamberlain himself was very much in favour of the project, which was adopted in 1903 on a some¬ what smaller scale, but gradually reduced over the next few years. Milner put forward another scheme which envisaged the setting up in South Africa of a technical military college on the model of Kingston in Canada, but nothing came of this. In September, 1903, on his return from a holiday in Carls¬ bad, Lord Milner was suddenly offered the Colonial Secre¬ taryship, from which Chamberlain had recently resigned. “I cannot conceive a worthier successor at the Colonial Office than yourself,” wrote Balfour. “I am sure you could do invaluable service to the Empire at the head of a Department under which you have served with such conspicuous dis¬ tinction. ... I know that you are fully aware of the great pleasure it would be to me to have you as a colleague; or what confidence it would give the country that the Office would still be administered by a big man on big lines. . . .”2 This letter was the more complimentary in view of the fact that the retiring Colonial Secretary had been not only excep¬ tionally brilliant, but one of the most popular figures of the day. A special message from King Edward made the offer even more flattering and tempting. Did this not represent a first-class chance to leave South Africa and all its difficulties, all its pitfalls? Was there not fine work to be done as Colonial Secretary in London, replacing “the greatest Colonial Secretary our country has ever had”?3 Any other man would almost certainly have argued on these lines, but not so Milner. He had made up his mind to stay in South Africa and see things through—to stay until he was certain that the work which had been begun would be carried through to the end. He felt that to leave his post at such a moment, even though it was in response to the call of his king and country, would be utterly incom1 Letter dated 13 July, 1902, to Sir H. McCallum. Milner Papers, vol. II.

page 3952 Letter dated 17 September, 1903, Ibid., page 472. 3 Milner in a letter to Balfour dated 20 September, 1903. Milner Papers, vol. II, page 473.

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H7

patible with any public servant worthy of the name. Rightly or wrongly, he judged that: “at the present juncture, I can render the Government and the country better service in the position I actually hold than in the higher office which you offer me. ... I think that, in a situation which, though im¬ proving, is still full of difficulty, my personal influence on the spot has a somewhat special value, and that what the Govern¬ ment might lose by its withdrawal would not be compensated by my bringing a somewhat weary mind to bear on a number of new questions, of which I have no previous experience. . . .' At present, I should retire with an uneasy feeling that I was leaving things at a loose end, and not giving quite a fair chance to my successor.”2 Further letters and telegrams from Balfour did not weaken his resolve. He was convinced that “the man on the spot is for the moment of much more vital importance than the man in Downing Street.”5 At Balfour’s request, however, Milner went to London to discuss the matter personally with him and some of the members of the Cabinet, but he persisted in his refusal not because he was stubborn, but because he remained faithful to the cause 1 Note once again Milner’s excessive modesty. A few days after Milner’s death, Baldwin, in a speech at Oxford on 16 May, 1925, said: “Let me tell you one story of Lord Milner, which I expect will be new to most of you. I tell it you, not only to show you, if you have any doubt, what manner of man he was, but to show you what the finest type of Englishman at his best can be; the type that all of us would wish to emulate. Twenty-two years ago. Lord Milner had completed about two years of work in the restoration of South Africa, one of the most difficult tasks to which any man had ever been called upon to devote himself, and by confession on all hands he had accomplished a work which it is doubtful if anyone else could have accom¬ plished. His praise was in all men’s mouths. He was a man who loved his own home in his own country, never so happy as when in England, and there came to him at that moment an offer from Lord Balfour to come home as Secretary of State for the Colonies, a task for which he was peculiarly fitted, and in every way he would have delighted in the work. He declined— and why? He declined it because he knew that, in spite of the success he had achieved, there were coming years of the utmost difficulty in South Africa, years in which he would probably lose all the popularity he had won, years in which possibly his success might be turned into failure, and he said: ‘No, no, I am not going to go away from here and take the credit of accomplishments up to this point, and leave someone else to come out now to face what must be years of difficulty and distress. I am going to see them through myself.’ That shows the finest temper, the finest spirit in which an Englishman could possibly do and face his work. ... I make no apology . . . for putting before an Oxford audience the inspiring example of one of her greatest sons.” (See The Times, 17 May, 1925.) 2 Letter to Balfour, dated 20 September, 1903. Milner Fapers, vol. II, page 473. 3 Letter to Lyttelton Gell, dated 21 September, 1903. Milner Papers, vol. II, page 474.

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which he had made his own. “The one great reason for my not coming in is that I do not think I ought to abandon the work to which I have devoted so many years, at its present necessarily very incomplete stage. . . As L. S. Amery wrote later: “It was a splendid decision, and unquestionably the right decision.”1 2 Milner, indeed, made the utmost use of the last eighteen months of his proconsulate; he was able to write “finis” to certain parts of his programme, and make a beginning in many other essential directions. Apart from the appallingly difficult problem of manual labour, Milner had to secure the financial stability of the country, reorganize the system of railway administration, supervise the distribution of the Imperial forces, set on foot a vast scheme for British immigra¬ tion and settlement in South Africa, encourage and extend education, etc.3 He was in a hurry to settle all these questions, for he felt that the time was growing short. At the beginning of 1904 Milner wrote to the Government in London to say that his state of health would not allow him to remain in South Africa and that his doctors had insisted on his having a complete rest. In his letters to Lyttelton he raised the question of his successor, and named as candidates Lyttelton himself and Selborne, the Colonial Under¬ secretary. He considered that it was of the utmost importance for the future relations between the South African Republics and the rest of the Empire that the new High Commissioner should be an outstanding public figure. It is impossible to overestimate the far-sightedness of the following sentence from a letter Milner wrote to Balfour on 10 February, 1904: “I hope the time is coming when at least two of the great outside posts, i.e., India and South Africa, will come to be regarded as interchangeable with high office at home. That would be of appreciable assistance in drawing closer the ties which unite different parts of the Empire.”4 At the end of 1904 Milner informed the Government that 1 Letter to Balfour, dated 30 September, 1903. Milner Papers vol II page 475. 3 The Times History of the War in South Africa, vol. VI, page 116. 5 "Twenty-nine thousand children in the schools of the Transvaal as compared with fourteen thousand under the old Government, and that with those parsons working hard against us the whole time." Letter dated 16 May, 1904, from Milner to Lyttelton. Milner Papers, vol. II naee rus 4 Ibid.,, vol. II, page 537. > F s 5 3-

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he had decided to retire. The Prime Minister and the Colonial Secretary did their utmost to prevail upon him to change his mind, and on 5 February, 1905, the former wired to him: “The more I think of South African affairs, the more convinced I become that the interests of the Empire will be best served by your continuance in your office like Cromer for an indefinite period. . . Finally the Government asked the King to approve the nomination of Lord Selborne. On 23 February, 1905, Balfour wrote to tell Milner that Selborne had been appointed as his successor, and, at the same time, expressed his profound regret at Milner’s retirement: “It is impossible for me not to lament the great loss which South Africa and the Empire will sustain by your withdrawal from the stage where you have won ‘name and fame.’ M:i In March, 1905, Milner made a trilogy of farewell speeches, and so closed the chapter of his work in South Africa.1 2 3 On 2 April he left Johannesburg, and was given a great send-off by the crowds who demonstrated their affection for him. When he reached London he was besieged on all sides, but he decided that he must take a complete rest. It may be noted in passing, since the loss is ours, that he turned down an offer from a publisher to write a life of Disraeli; had not that founder of the British Empire predicted in one of his last letters that some twenty or so years later Great Britain would be engaged in a life-or-death struggle in South Africa? Amongst the many invitations that Lord Milner received was that from Sir Clinton Dawkins, asking him to become the leader of the campaign for Imperial Federation and Defence. Lord Roberts, who had been Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Forces in South Africa, and who was now President of the National Service League, wrote begging him for his help; a few years later, Milner became, with Roberts, the head of this movement. The General Election was a sweeping victory for the Liberals; they had fought tooth and nail to get in, one of their main slogans having been the anti-Conservative taunt of “Slavery under the British Flag.” Balfour and his party handed in their resignations to the King, and Campbell1 Milner Papers, vol. II, page 539. 2 Ibid. 3 In Germiston, Pretoria and Johannesburg, on 15, 22, 31 March.

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Bannerman became Prime Minister. Shortly before its defeat the Government had voted in favour of the Lyttelton Consti¬ tution for the South African Republics; Lyttelton had embodied in it many of Milner’s ideas. This Constitution, which was never put into effect, was based on the funda¬ mental clauses of the Peace of Vereeniging, and provided for the introduction of representative institutions and a Legis¬ lative Assembly, the latter to consist of an important majority of elected members. The final control was to remain in the hands of an imperial executive. Directly CampbellBannerman came into office, however, he conceded to the Transvaal full self-government. At the first election to be held in the Transvaal, Het Volk (People’s Party), created and led by Generals Botha and Smuts, obtained a large majority; in February, 1907, Botha became Prime Minister, with Smuts as his right-hand man.1 Thus it came about that, despite all Milner’s efforts, the power had returned to the hands of the Afrikanders. Selborne and those members of the “Kindergarten” who were still in South Africa realized that they must act without delay and do their utmost to bring about a federation of South Africa. The economic federation, the foundation of which had been laid by Milner, was still lacking in strength. Both the Customs Union and the amalgamation of the railways required to be consolidated and their scope was not yet clearly enough defined. In the Transvaal, Gandhi, who was practising law, was inciting the Indians to passive resistance against the authorities. Finally, as the result of a Zulu rising, Natal was forced to ask for Imperial aid. Selborne, attended by more fortune than a predecessor of his, Carnarvon, succeeded in summoning a National Convention which was attended by all the representatives of the various South African Republics. The Convention, which was dominated by the delegates from the Transvaal, who had been thoroughly schooled and supported by the High Commissioner and the ex-members of the Kindergarten, drew up the South Africa Act. This Act went even beyond federation, and made provision for the closest possible legislative union between Natal, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal under a Governor-General. Both

1 History will decide in favour of Campbell-Bannerman rather than Milner. It is unfortunate that Milner’s name cannot be associated with this wise and courageous decision to confer self-government on the Boers, but on the contrary he opposed it.

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English and Dutch were to be recognized as the official languages of the country and each of the colonies was to be given the status of a province. Railways and Customs were to remain a common system within the Union. The South Africa Act also provided for the ultimate inclusion of Rhodesia, Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland. As soon as the South Africa Act had been approved by the three Colonial Parliaments of the Cape, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, and a referendum had been taken in Natal, it was submitted to, and sanctioned by, the British Government. On 31 May, 1910, exactly eight years to the day from the signing of the Peace of Vereeniging, the Union of South Africa came into being, with Botha as Prime Minister and Smuts as his deputy. While a lengthy consideration of this new British Dominion will not fit into the framework of this study, it must be said that Milner had never foreseen so rapid a political evolution. Not only had he not envisaged it, so far at least as immediate self-government for the late Republics was concerned, but he had strongly criticized it in debates in the House of Lords. Even so, in the long run, and looking back, we can see, paradoxical though it may appear, that what ultimately came to pass owed its beginnings to the work of Milner and his colleagues. The changes which took place in the political set-up and in local administration took place in spite of Milner, but in the economic and social field his work of reconstruction had taken lasting root. “He had even built for Union better than he knew. War and Crown Colony rule in their own country had awakened and fortified a Dominion-like spirit—a South African spirit, in men of British stock. It was men like these who, with the willing aid of the Imperial authorities, were to co-operate with the moderates of Het Volk and the Bond in the making of the Union, well within Milner’s lifetime after all, though on lines which he had repeatedly condemned in advance. In a very real sense, the greatest of the High Commissioners can claim to be one of the fathers (or was it the stepfather?) of the Union of South Africa.”1 Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, who had granted selfgovernment to the Transvaal, simultaneously decided to put an end to Chinese labour. Noblesse oblige: had not “Slavery 1 E. A. Walker: Lord Milner in South Africa, page 26.

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under the British Flag” been the war-cry which had carried him to power? In 1910 the employment of Chinese labour came to an end, and the Liberal Party erased the word “slavery” from its political vocabulary. Certain Radical leaders began to wage a more or less violent anti-Milner campaign; they even went so far as to ask that a vote of censure should be passed on a particular aspect of his administration in South Africa which had involved the infliction of light corporal punishment on some Chinese offenders.1 The youthful Winston Churchill moved an amendment, and the vote was passed in a milder form by a majority of 355 to 135. By contrast, a week later the House of Lords recorded its appreciation of: “the services rendered by Lord Milner to South Africa and the Empire.”2 CampbellBannerman, who had been acutely embarrassed by the vote of censure in the Commons, made an attempt to attribute it to a recent speech made by Lord Milner which he described as tactless. This moved King Edward to assert: “I cannot consider Lord Milner’s speech in the House of Lords was intemperate. If it was, what were Mr. Winston Churchill’s speeches in the House of Commons?”2 A couple of days later, in a letter to Lady Londonderry, the King again voiced his displeasure: “I admit I quite share your views concerning certain proceedings in the House of Commons, and the con¬ duct of a certain relation of yours [Winston Churchill] is simply scandalous. It is indeed hard on Lord Milner to be treated in such a manner. Alas, nowadays, party comes before country.” The words in italics were penned by the King’s own hand.4 All these political intrigues left Milner unmoved. They merely strengthened his deep-rooted mistrust of politics and vulgar parliamentarianism. The following passage from a letter to his friend, Sir Clinton Dawkins, is, in addition to being pointed, significant and important to a degree: “. . . I will not go on with political life in the ordinary sense of the word, when I am freed from this dungeon. I will not ... I am too far, too increasingly far, as the years go on, out of 1 “Milner suffered in calumny and misrepresentation the common lot of the greatest of our proconsuls.’' J. A. R. Marriott, Modern England (i88y 1945). A History of My Own Times, page 264. 2 Sir Sidney Lee: A't'ng Edward VII, vol. II, page 481. 2 Ibid. 4 Ibid., vol. II, page 482.

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sympathy with our political system and with the political attitude of the bulk of my countrymen, to be a successful politician in the ordinary sense. I am an anachronism. It may be I was born too late, it may be I was born too soon. . . . Every man can afford to hold some unpopular ideas, but I have amassed all the most unpopular. I hold, with real conviction, a whole posse of them, and I mean to allow myself the luxury of holding, perhaps even of occasionally expressing, them. . . At all events, Milner never wavered from the con¬ viction that the policy he had adopted and carried out in South Africa had been the best policy. I shall leave the last word to Punch.1 2 A cartoon by Linley Sambourne bears the caption: “The Stain of Censure,” and shows the Muse of History holding out her arms to Milner, whose hand rests upon a “stained scutcheon.” History (to Lord Milner): Leave your shield in my keeping. I shall make it bright again. 1 Letter dated 21 April, 1904. Milner Papers, vol. II, page 550. 2 28 March, 1906. It is extremely interesting to find that amongst Milner’s personal correspondence there were thirty-one volumes containing the signatures of over 370,000 men of all sorts and conditions who paid homage in an Address to the services he had rendered to the British Empire. The man responsible for this testimonial of admiration and affection was Sir Bartle Frere, son of the man who, as Milner himself said, “is honoured in the annals of South Africa and the Empire. . . and who was exposed to much undeserved, though transient, obloquy.” Milner Papers, vol. II, page 562. See also J. A. R. Marriott, Modern England (1885-1945). A History of My Own Times, pages 264-5.

CHAPTER

IN

IV

WHITEHALL

Milner returned to London in 1905 there is no hiding the fact that he was extremely unpopular with p. certain section of the British public. According to some of his con¬ temporaries indeed. Viscount Cecil of Chelwood in particular, Milner was “the most unpopular figure of the day.”1 A glance at the correspondence and at the newspapers of the period will be enough to show that Viscount Cecil exaggerated. All the same, shortly before Milner left South Africa, the electoral propaganda of the Liberal Party had excited such feelings that the mere mention of his name and policy was enough to arouse a storm of criticism. The defeat of the Unionists in the General Election of 1906 was largely due to Chinese labour, or, to put it in another way, the sweeping suc¬ cess of the Liberals was facilitated by the “Chinese scandal.” Such was the general set-up when Milner returned to London, delighted to be home once more. He was tired out, both physically and morally, and no wonder after eight years of arduous and unremitting work. It was a cruel disappoint¬ ment to find himself the target for the campaign that was being waged. He was none too well off, for the style he had been obliged to keep up in South Africa had eaten into his capital, and “he came back poorer than he went.”2 Never¬ theless it was typical of Milner that, despite the insistence of his closest friends, he firmly refused to ask the Government for a pension. He went into the City and became director and chairman of the Rio Tinto Company. Let me run over very briefly Milner’s main activities in this interlude in his career. For several years he remained entirely outside the orbit of British politics, refusing uncompromisingly to commit himself to any party programme. Much of his time was taken up by the Rhodes Trust—he had been nominated by Cecil Rhodes himself—of which he was for many years the most When

1 During a conversation with me at Geneva in July, 1946. 2 The Times, 14 May, 1925.

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active trustee. Milner and Sir George Parkin, who had been a friend of his at Balliol, did their utmost to secure the best candidates for the Rhodes Scholarships.1 Up to the end of his life Milner played the leading part in administering the Fund, and in deciding what causes should benefit by the surplus money at the disposal of the Rhodes Trust. It was due to him that large sums were allocated for forestry, the School for Tropical Medicine, English education in Egypt. Above all he seemed bent on remaining an apostle of the Empire, content merely to expound his creed. It was through Milner and some of his friends and followers that the Round Table group came into being. The first number of the Rowid Table, an important review devoted to all those questions which concerned the British Empire, was published in 1910; it was the earliest sign of the activity of its founders, an activity that was to increase steadily. The Round Table, it should be said, is an authority to this day on all Common¬ wealth matters. Milner also consented to join another group, the “Co¬ efficients,” amongst whose members were such eminent men as H. G. Wells, L. S. Amery, Haldane, Sir Edward Grey, Sir Michael Sadler, Sidney Webb, Leo Maxse, Clinton Dawkins, to name but a few.2 “Of all the members, I found Milner the most satisfactory intelligence amongst us. He knew we had to make a new world. . . . He fell into imperialist monarchical forms . . . but upon many minor issues we were apt to agree.”3 One of the chief aims of the “Coefficients” was to encourage discussion amongst men of all parties and widely-differing tendencies of all those subjects relating to the development and organization of the Empire, and at the same time to widen their knowledge of such matters.4 It was a rule of the 1 The details of Cecil Rhodes’ famous will are of great interest. See The Last Will and Testament of Cecil John Rhodes, with elucidatory notes to which are added some chapters describing the political and religious ideas of the testator. Edited by W. T. Stead. 2 Later, Lord Robert Cecil, J. Birchenough, Josiah Wedgwood, and other notabilities became members. “The queerest diversity of brains,’’ as H. G. Wells put it, in Experiment in Autobiography, vol. II, page 761. It would appear that the Webbs were responsible for the creation of the “Co¬ efficients.” 3 H. G. Wells: op. cit., vol. II, page 765. 4 The theme for one of the earliest debates was: “Can the British Empire be made autonomous within the framework of a Zollverein?” Some of the members were violently opposed to such a conception; H. G. Wells, for instance, maintained that the British Empire must either be the precursor of a World State or cease to exist.

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Club that each of its members must speak at the monthly debates.1 L. S. Amery, who was one of the original members, recently gave me a most vivid description of it; he evoked its atmosphere, its setting, and impressed on me what an important part it played. The Coefficients’ Club, he said, while it did not figure prominently in the eyes of the public, was a meeting place for leading men of goodwill who were anxious to see the best possible use made of the British Empire and help on its development. The names I have already given are enough to show the wide range of ideas covered by the “Coefficients.” Some time about 1908 two memberships fell vacant, and it was decided that J. L. Garvin should be co-opted and that Bernard Shaw should be invited to the meetings. But, as Mr. Amery told me, Shaw and Garvin invariably talked at such length that the old rule which required that every member should speak went by the board!2 It was not long before the “Coefficients” ceased to exist. If I have dwelt upon this apparently insignificant subject in some detail it is because I wish to lay emphasis yet once again on Milner’s constant pursuit of intellectual con¬ tacts and the very considerable influence that he exerted on his colleagues and friends. On more than one occasion, as will appear, the fact that Milner could never bring himself to bow to the decrees of party politics made it impossible for him to become a leading figure on the Opposition benches. On the other hand, it may be said that it was this very independence, this determination not to be chained within the rigid limits of party politics that constituted Milner’s strength and added to the interest, as well as to the value, of his ideas and beliefs. Nevertheless he inspired, and subsequently actively supported, Lord Roberts’ campaign for National Service, which Milner regarded as necessary, if not essential, for the defence of the Empire.3 When Milner was sounded as to whether he would be willing to accept office in a future Unionist Government he 1 H. G. Wells: The New Machiavelli, page 337 et seq. Lord Gane is, of course, Lord Milner. With regard to the debates, Wells said: “These talks played an important part in my education.’’ H. G. Wells: Experiment in Autobiography, page 761. 2 “We had Fred Neal (i.e., G.B.S.), that wild Irish journalist, among us towards the end, and his stupendous flow of words materially prolonged our closing discussions and made our continuance impossible.’’ H. G. Wells: The New Machiavelli, page 338. s See Milner’s speeches on 15 March, 1907, and 19 April, 1909.

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made it quite clear that he would not be a member of any government that would not undertake to introduce a bill for National Service. In any case, he was wholeheartedly in favour of Imperial Preference, agreeing with Chamberlain that it was the surest and possibly the only way to weld the various parts of the Empire more solidly together. We have already seen what Milner achieved in this direction in South Africa, by bringing about the Customs Union and obtaining an Imperial Preference for Great Britain. At Westminster, Milner rarely allowed himself to be more than an observer. He spoke in criticism, as I have already mentioned, of the terms of what he regarded as the premature grant of self-government to the former Republics. He also intervened on two important topics. The first was the dis¬ cussion, in 1909, of Lloyd George’s Budget, which Milner denounced most strongly in a speech which became famous because of his use of the phrase: “Do right and damn the consequences.” The second was the proposal for Irish Home Rule; Milner opposed this policy consistently now, as he had done twenty-five years before, and even went to the length of organizing a league of Covenanters. When the First World War broke out Milner was called upon to play a more active, a more official, part in the affairs of the country. When the first Coalition Government was formed in the spring of 1915 he was asked to preside over a special committee set up by Lord Selborne to increase the output of food. At the end of a month the committee pro¬ duced a plan under which more than one million acres could be put under wheat. This plan was rejected by the Asquith Government, but was carried out with complete success in 1917. Milner had also, in 1915, been appointed chairman of a committee set up to inquire into coal production. It was not, however, until 7 December, 1916, that Lloyd George asked him to accept office in the Coalition Govern¬ ment. Lloyd George has left on record in his War Memoirs the manner in which he obtained Conservative support. “I have already told the story of how we secured the powerful adhesion of Mr. Balfour, who undertook to fill the position of Foreign Secretary. There were two other able men of great influence in the Party who were also ready to assist the new Administration—Sir Edward Carson and Lord Milner. As soon as I was assured of this support, I felt confident that my

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task would be accomplished. In most governments there are four or five outstanding figures who by exceptional talent, experience and personality constitute the council which gives direction to the Ministry.”1 Lloyd George decided to form a small War Cabinet, able to meet practically every day in order to direct military operations and discuss the general conduct of the war. He appointed five Ministers without portfolio: himself, Milner, Curzon, Henderson and Bonar Law; it was understood that Balfour, or his assistant, Lord Robert Cecil, should be called in whenever any question arose that affected the Foreign Office. On various occasions, in the course of special talks, as well as in his War Memoirs, Lloyd George emphasized Milner’s predominant role in the War Cabinet. In the preface to volume VI of his War Memoirs, are the names of the very few military and political leaders to whom he considered the victory of the Allies was really due; that of Milner heads the list. “Without the help such men rendered, victory would have been unattainable.”2 Farther on we find these words: “I had been one of his [Milner’s] most vigorous critics during the Boer War, but that did not prevent his placing his ser¬ vices at the disposal of the State in a national emergency, although his old assailant was at the head of the Govern¬ ment.”3 Milner once described himself as “the only synoptic person in the Cabinet.” As such he was specially fitted to be one of the small team whose role was to “supervise” and co-ordinate the work of the other Ministers.4 It is no exaggeration to say that, with the exception of Lloyd George, from the end of 1916 until 1918, Milner was the most important personality in the Government. That few people realized it was once more due to Milner’s obstinate avoidance of the limelight. He was both the moving spirit and the brain of the War Cabinet; he also acted as a brake, having frequent occasion to restrain the ebullient and dynamic Lloyd George. “The original members of the War Cabinet, relieved of the 1 Lloyd George: War Memoirs, vol. Ill, page 1042. 3 Ibid., vol. VI, page xii. 9 Ibid., vol. Ill, page 1076. “As before with General Smuts, so then with Lloyd George, Milner's serene disposition enabled him to wipe the slate clean of past disagreements.” (The Times, 14 May, 1925.) * Sir William Beveridge: The Pillars of Security, page 16.

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day-to-day preoccupations of administrative work and whose time is, therefore, available for initiating policy and for the work of co-ordinating the great Department of State . . . the only exception being Bonar Law, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and chief representative of the Government in the House of Commons. . . .M1 The structure of the British Government during the second half of the First World War is of particular interest for such a study as the present because it reflects with the utmost clarity the structure of the British Empire, and bears witness to its extremely marked development in the course of the twentieth century. For the first time in the history of this Empire, London was the seat of an Imperial War Cabinet which consisted of members of the British War Cabinet and representatives from the Dominions.2 It was the business of the Imperial War Cabinet to deal with the most important problems of the war. Besides the Imperial War Cabinet there was the Imperial War Conference, presided over by the Colonial Secretary, and composed of various Ministers of His Majesty’s Government3 and Representatives from the several Governments of the Empire. This Conference dealt with matters not directly related to the war, and with some of the minor problems to which it gave rise. The Imperial War Cabinet and the Imperial War Con¬ ference were due to Milner’s initiative.1 Inspired by Milner’s ideas, Lloyd George was subsequently to say in the House: “We hope the holding of an annual Imperial Cabinet to discuss foreign affairs and other aspects of imperial policy will become an accepted convention of the British Constitution. . . . I ought to add that the institution in its present form is extremely elastic. It grew, not by design, but out of the necessity of war.”5 The satisfaction manifested by the Empire with these two innovations emphasized what a happy idea it had been to set them up and how greatly they strengthened the ties which bound the Dominions and India to the Mother Country and to each other. It must be clearly understood

1 The War Cabinet, Report for the Year 1917. Blue Book, Cd. 9005, 1918, page 1. - Lloyd George: War Memoirs, page 1747 et seq. The Imperial War Cabinet only sat for a little more than a month (at the time of the Imperial Conference). 3 Lloyd George, Curzon, Milner, Bonar Law, Henderson. 1 "Lloyd George took up the idea enthusiastically, and the Cabinet gate it their unanimous approval.” See The Times of 14 May, 1925. 5 The War Cabinet, Report for the Year 1917, page 7.

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within the framework of this study of British Imperialism that this development took place almost imperceptibly— instinctively as it were—in a manner that was typically . . . British. “It may be that in the shadow of war we do not clearly realize the measure of recent constitutional develop¬ ment. . . .”l No historian has ever given a clearer definition of the capital importance of the constitutional transformation of the British Empire than Sir Robert Borden, the then Prime Minister of Canada. In the course of a speech he said: The British Constitution is the most flexible instrument of Government ever devised. . . . For the first time in the Empire’s history, there are sitting in London two Cabinets, both properly constituted and both exercising well-defined powers. Over each of them the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom presides. One of them is designated as the “War Cabinet,” which chiefly devotes itself to such questions touching the prosecution of the war as primarily concern the United Kingdom. The other is designated as the “Imperial War Cabinet,” which has a wider purpose, jurisdiction and personnel. . . . We meet there on terms of equality under the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom; we meet there as equals; he is primus inter pares. . . . . . . For many years the thought of statesmen and students in every part of the Empire had centred round the question of future constitutional relations; it may be that now, as in the past, the necessity imposed by great events has given the answer. . . . With the constitution of the Cabinet, a new era has dawned and a new page of history has been written. It is not for me to prophesy as to the future significance of these pregnant events; but those who have given thought and energy to every effort for full constitutional development of the overseas nations may be pardoned for believing that they discern therein the birth of a new and greater Imperial Commonwealth.2 We shall see in due course whether these words of one of Canada’s greatest, one of the Empire’s greatest, Prime Ministers were not premature. Be that as it may, they reflect with crystal clarity the trend of the day, and help us to form a true idea of the value of the Imperial War Cabinet.3 1 The War Cabinet, Report for the Year 1917, page 8. 2 Declaration to the Empire Parliamentary Association on 3 April, 1917. See also B. K. Long: In Smuts’s Camp, page 52 et seq. 3 “The Imperial War Cabinet was an outstanding success.” L. S. Amery: Thoughts on the Constitution, page 120.

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In May, 1917, a month after Sir Robert Borden had made the speech from which I have just quoted, a banquet was given in the Royal Gallery of the House of Lords in honour of General Smuts. Lord French, his old adversary of the Boer War, was in the chair, and amongst those present were Asquith, Haldane, Milner, Bryce, Harcourt, Selborne, Churchill, Bonar Law and Crewe. Milner was seated on Smuts’s right. Smuts made a highly important speech, in the course of which he deliberately avoided the word “Empire,” and used for the first time the term: the British Common¬ wealth of Nations.1 “We are not an Empire,” he said. “Ger¬ many is an Empire, and so was Rome, and so is India; but we are a system of nations, a community of states and of nations far greater than any Empire that has ever existed. . . . We are a whole world by ourselves, consisting of many nations and states and all sorts of communities under one flag. We are a system of states—not only a static system, a stationary system, but a dynamic system, growing, evolving, all the time towards new destinies.”2 He stressed the character sui generis of this Empire which encompassed such widely differing elements, and stated his conviction that the two best means of maintaining the unity of the Commonwealth on the one hand, and preserving the autonomy of the Dominions on the other, were the hereditary monarchy and the regular holding of Imperial Conferences. The conception of the status of a Dominion such as it is today really dates from this occasion. The two men who did most to outline it were Milner and Smuts, sworn antagonists during the Boer War. Two years later, in 1919, Smuts made a speech in which he declared that: “The British Empire which went into the war is not the same which came out of the war. That Empire is today an alliance of free peoples, of which the Union is one, in the great League of Nations.” And three days later he added: “The British Empire is an alliance of free states in which we have one King, and that is the bond which keeps us together. The British Government is not the bond, the King is the bond. He is the King of England, King of India, and King of South Africa and other parts. Under the alliance 1 The term “Commonwealth” seems to owe its origin to the Round Table Group, but Smuts was the first to make use of it in public. a S. G. Millin: General Smuts, vol. II, pages 44-5. LMB-F

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we keep together and protect each other, and help each other financially, with advice, and otherwise, each according to his light. That is my conception of the British Empire.”1 What made the Imperial War Cabinet and the Imperial War Conference all the more momentous was the fact that for the first time delegates from India were included in each. India was, in future, to be represented on the same footing as the other Dominions at all Imperial Conferences. In spite of the war, or perhaps because of it and the problems to which it gave rise, the Imperial War Conference also considered various problems of trade, and approved the following highly important resolution: ‘‘The time has arrived when all possible encouragement should be given to the development of imperial resources, and especially to making the Empire independent of other countries in respect of food supplies, raw materials and essential industries. With these objects in view, the Conference expresses itself in favour of: ‘‘(1) The principle that each part of the Empire, having due regard to the interests of our Allies, shall give specially favourable treatment to the produce and manufacture of other parts of the Empire: “(2) arrangements by which intending emigrants from the United Kingdom may be induced to settle in countries under the British Flag.”2 All these highly significant changes and resolutions were the work of His Majesty’s Government of 1917. But one of the principal, though anonymous, authors of this work, if not the principal author, was once again Lord Milner, who was able, at the decisive moment, to make the necessities of war contribute to the closer union of the Empire. As a member of the War Cabinet in 1917 he acted in exactly the same way as he had acted in South Africa; far from confining himself to dealing with the urgent preoccupations of the war on the various fronts, on the seas and at home, he looked to the future. Just as he had turned his mind to reconstruction amidst scenes of destruction in South Africa, so now he succeeded in using the opportunity for strengthening the immediate military power of the Empire in order to con¬ solidate its foundations so that it might become even more 1 S. G. Millin: General Smuts, vol. II. pages 299-301. 2 War Cabinet, Report for the Year 79/7, page 10.

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powerful, more united in future. Here in the midst of the war we find yet one more proof of Milner’s major contribu¬ tion to the development of the Empire. This was only part of his work, but it is the part which, while it was com¬ paratively unnoticed, is of the most significance to us in the present study. The name of Lord Milner, in fact, is chiefly mentioned by historians of the First World War in connexion with questions directly related to its actual conduct. Still, while this aspect of Milner’s work is only remotely related to the evolution of the Empire, a summary of it is indispensable. In January, 1917, Lord Milner was invited by Lloyd George to attend the Rome Conference.1 The members of the British delegation were Lloyd George, Milner, Sir William Robertson and Sir Maurice Hankey; the French were repre¬ sented by Aristide Briand, their Premier, Albert Thomas, Philippe Berthelot and General Lyautey, the War Minister. The aim of this Conference was twofold: to reach a mutual agreement on the conduct of the war in Salonika, and to consider what steps should be taken to arrest the disastrous landslide on all sections of the various Italian fronts. Without going into details, it need only be recalled here that Milner was one of the most active members of this Conference. It was while he was in Rome that Lloyd George decided to nominate him as head of the British Delegation which was to go almost immediately to Russia. In February, 1917, Milner, accompanied by Sir Henry Wilson, Lord Revelstoke and Sir Walter Clayton, left for Petrograd. Lloyd George emphasized in his War Memoirs that it had been considered essential to secure an “authori¬ tative and impressive British delegation . . . which would command respectful attention in Russia.”2 The French had also sent a delegation, headed by Gaston Doumergue and General Castelnau, to take part in the discussions which had the double objective of restoring the position on the Russian fronts, and, above all, of co-ordinating the military efforts of the Allies on the Eastern and Western fronts. In various documents, Lloyd George affirmed that, had a similar delegation been sent to Russia in 1915, matters might have turned out very differently, and even the very course of the war might have been changed. At this point, it is of 1 Held on 5, 6, 7 January, 1917. Lloyd George: War Memoirs, vol. III.

2

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interest to quote the text of the message sent by Milner from Petrograd to the British War Cabinet: “I think we have done two things: (1) We have worked out a practical scheme for the supply of war material, based on the principle of using the available tonnage to give the Russians the largest possible quantity of the types of which they stand much in need. “(2) We have done what lay in our power to assure this material being turned to the best possible account.”1 Milner took an extremely pessimistic view of Russia’s internal affairs at the beginning of 1917, but curiously enough he was convinced that there would be no revolution —at least not until after the war. Perhaps this can be explained by the fact that he was, both by temperament and training, a bureaucrat. He never came into contact with the man in the street, the masses; this was not because he despised them, but simply because the life he led isolated him from the people and kept him completely out of the range of popular movements. This aspect of Milner was duly noted by Lloyd George. To some extent it marks the limitations of this great mind: Milner thought like a Richelieu. By the spring, and particularly by the summer of 1917, the position of the Allies in the various theatres of war had grown increasingly grave, and measures of every description had to be taken by the respective governments. On 8 June, 1917, a Committee of the Cabinet was appointed to examine the situation on all fronts, at sea and on land; the members of this Committee were Lord Milner, Lord Curzon and General Smuts, with Lloyd George in the chair. The first session of the Inter-Allied Supreme War Council, of which Milner was also a member and which was presided over by Clemenceau and Lloyd George alternately, was that which took place in the Hotel Trianon, Versailles, on 1 December, 1917, with Clemenceau in the chair; the British representatives were Lloyd George, Milner, Sir William Robertson and Sir Henry Wilson. It was on 23 March, 1918, that the war reached its most tragic, its most critical moment. The situation on the Western Front seemed desperate. ‘‘That same evening, the reports from France not improving, I decided that either Milner or myself must go over at once to see why and where 1 Lloyd George:

War Memoirs, vol. Ill, pages 1578-9.

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the arrangements for material help had failed to operate and whether things could not be set right before public disaster intervened. I sent for Milner and discussed the whole situation with him. We both felt that there was only one effective thing to do and that was to put Foch in control of both armies. . . .We agreed that Milner should at once leave for Paris to see Clemenceau. We thought it better that I should remain in London to direct the plans I made for the rapid dispatch of reinforcements to France so that there should be no delay in that essential respect. I authorized Milner to do what he could to restore the broken Versailles front by conferring upon Foch the necessary authority to organize a reserve and to control its disposition. Flow well Milner carried out this arrangement will appear when I tell the story of the Doullens Conference.”1 This long extract from Lloyd George’s War Memoirs speaks for itself. It is eloquent of the high opinion he had of Milner, an opinion that was shared by the entire British Government. It furnishes incontrovertible proof that Milner, as I have repeatedly said, was second only in importance to Lloyd George himself in the Government during the critical months between 1917 and 1918. A first Conference was held at Petain’s headquarters on 25 March, 1918, and consultations began between Milner, Petain, Clemenceau, Loucheur and Foch. Petain took an extremely gloomy view of the situation. Foch, on the con¬ trary, refused to accept this view. Milner, and subsequently Lloyd George (in his War Memoirs), severely criticized Plain’s attitude on this occasion, and denounced him as weak and pessimistic—in other words, as defeatist. On Tuesday, 26 March, 1918, the second and decisive Conference was held at Doullens. At this meeting Lord Milner, Haig and General Wilson represented the British, and Poincare, Clemenceau, Petain and Foch the French. At the end of the Conference the following official communique was pub¬ lished: “General Foch is charged by the British and French Governments to co-ordinate the action of the allied armies on the Western Front. He will work to this end with the Commanders-in-Chief who are asked to furnish him with all necessary information.”2 1 Lloyd George: War Memoirs, vol. V, pages 2892-4. 3 Ibid., vol. V, page 2910.

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The decision taken by the Conference of Doullens did not mean supreme inter-allied command, it meant co-ordination. From his War Memoirs it would appear that it was really at Lloyd George’s instance that Foch was appointed Commander-in-Chief of all the allied forces. In fact, however, most of the credit belongs to Milner. L. S. Amery, for one, speaking with first-hand knowledge of the events of March, 1918, recently assured me that Milner, although in no way empowered to do so by the British Government, had insisted that Foch, and not Petain, should be made generalissimo. Amery reminded me how hostile Clemenceau was to Foch at the time and how obstinately he at first upheld Petain, till Milner convinced him that Petain lacked the courage and energy needed to save so desperate a situation and lead the allied armies to victory. Even Clemenceau himself came round to this view. Poincare has recorded in his Memoirs that, after the Conference of Doullens, Clemenceau drew him to one side and said: “Petain’s pessimism is irritating. Don’t let this go any further, but just listen to this: ‘The Germans are going to wipe out the British—our turn will come next.’ Has a general any right to talk, or even think, of such things?”1 On wy—Aprils 1917, Lloyd George appointed Milner Secretary for War. He not only concentrated all his energy on the conduct of the war and the co-ordination of the allied forces, but, as the war drew to a close, began to consider what would have to be done for the Army under peacetime conditions. Faithful to the policy he had pursued in South Africa, Milner did not wait for the cessation of hostilities to plan for reconstruction. In 1918 he inaugurated the Army Education Branch, whose aim was to give the fighting men, both at the front and at the base, a training which would fit them for better positions in civilian life. In the last months of the war, and immediately after the victory, the relations between Milner and Lloyd George became somewhat less cordial, and this is one of the reasons why the former played only a secondary part at the Con¬ ference of Versailles. In a recent conversation I had with L. S. Amery, he remarked what a pity it was that Milner had not figured more prominently at the Versailles Conference. 1 R. Poincar6: Au Service de la France. See also P. Renouvin: La Crise Europienne (1904-19T4) et la Grande Guerre, pages 518-20.

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If only he had played a larger part in the peace negotia¬ tions, he said, “many mistakes would have been avoided.” Another reason was that Milner was not the type of man who craved for publicity and hankered for the limelight at all costs: “Milner never wanted to push himself forward, and he simply shrugged his shoulders,” said Mr. Amery in the course of a conversation with me in Geneva on 22 July, 1946. We know that Milner was in favour of relatively generous peace terms for Germany, for he was amongst those who believed that two separate Germanies existed. It has even been said that Milner advocated moderation because he himself was partly German. “When he did appear [at Versailles], his influence and great weight were all for a fair and generous peace, a peace of understanding which might be lasting, and which would heal the dreadful wounds the war had caused.” The man who uttered these words was equally in favour of a generous peace: General Smuts, Milner’s former enemy, co-signatory of the Treaty of Vereeniging.1 The peace talks have no connexion with the present study, and it need only be remarked that, bearing in mind what Milner said and wrote in the course of his career, we can be quite certain that he would have adopted a firm and resolute attitude to Nazi Germany, both on the eve of the last war and immediately after the Armistice. In December, 1918, Milner left the War Office. He had worked so arduously for the last two years that he was completely exhausted, and wished to resign from the Government. Neither Lloyd George nor Bonar Law, however, could afford to dispense with his valuable services; Milner was finally persuaded to accept the Colonial Secretaryship, and from this time on he devoted all his energy to the problems of his Ministry, with the able assistance of L. S. Amery, his Under-Secretary.2 3 While he was at the Colonial Office, Milner succeeded in 1 “At Versailles, Botha used to sit next to Milner, since his South African days much mellowed as a statesman and one of the most helpful ministers in Lloyd George’s Cabinet.” B. Williams: Botha, Smuts and South Africa, page 121. 3 At this time all the overseas territories which formed part of the British Empire except India were dealt with by the Colonial Office. The post of Secretary of State to the Dominions was not created until 1925, the first holder being L. S. Amery. See Sir George V. Fiddes: The Dominions and Colonial Offices. Fiddes was one of Milner’s colleagues in South Africa; from 1916-21 he was Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies.

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realizing some of his most cherished projects. The practical knowledge he had acquired in the past and his determination to develop not only the Empire of the Dominions, but over and above all the “Dependent” Empire, spurred Milner on to do all that was possible to expand imperial resources in Africa and the West Indies. As far back as 1903, Balfour had urged Milner to accept the Colonial Secretaryship, but he had declined, having made up his mind to complete his task in South Africa. When he finally became Colonial Secretary it was at an unpropitious moment; the minds of the Govern¬ ment and the general public were preoccupied with matters that had no concern with the Empire. Furthermore, a great part of his two years in office was spent in Egypt, where, as we have already seen, he headed the Mission bearing his name from 19 November, 1919, to 20 March, 1920. Nevertheless, in the course of these two years, Milner made a permanent impression on the Colonial Office and on the various territories that came under his department. He took an active interest in inter-imperial migration and in inter¬ imperial communications.1 The whole problem of African development received a fresh impetus. A new dyarchic Constitution was drawn up for Malta. An Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture2 was set up in Trinidad; similar colleges were envisaged in various parts of the Empire provided that the experiment proved a success. Milner insisted that every possible opportunity should be taken to develop the relations between the Dominions and the Colonies; it was on his initiative, for instance, that the appropriate steps were taken to encourage and increase the flow of trade between Canada and the West Indies.3 Of all the governmental posts that Milner held that of 1 The following extract from a letter by Sir Charles Bright, which ap¬ peared in The Times of 16 May, 1923, deserves to be quoted here: “Perhaps you will allow me to quote a single—though, of course, a minor—instance of Lord Milner’s ‘swift decisions’ which happens to be familiar to me. Over a number of years I had striven for the establishment of an Inter-Depart¬ mental Imperial Communication Committee for Government control of cable and wireless—and afterwards air-communication with the rest of the Empire. Though considerable attention had been given to the matter by other ministers, it was only when Lord Milner became Colonial Secretary that such a committee—on round-table principles—was at once appointed, with such useful results.’’ , * First known as the West Indian Agricultural College; in 1923 it was renamed the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture. * G. V. Fiddes: The Dominions and Colonial Offices, page 274.

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Colonial Secretary was undoubtedly best suited to him; it enabled him to give free rein to his varied and constructive ideas, and to display to the fullest advantage his genius for organization and administration. Has it not been said of him that: “He was perhaps too perfect an administrator to be a perfect diplomatist. ... As an administrator, he was unequalled.”1 On 7 February, 1921, Milner, worn out, handed in his resignation, and withdrew, once and for all, from the political scene. His work was crowned when King George V bestowed upon him the great honour of the Order of the Garter. This account of Milner’s career as a statesman has neces¬ sarily been brief, but before I conclude it it is interesting, in the light of recent events, to examine Milner’s attitude towards the Jewish question in general, and towards the problem of Palestine and Zionist hopes in particular. Amongst Milner’s private correspondence is a letter written by him as far back as 11 July, 1902, to the President of the Zionist Federation of South Africa, in which he expressed his feelings about the Jews: “It can be taken for granted that whatever laws are passed in regard to the naturalization of immigrants in the Transvaal, no discrimination will be made against the Jews, no matter from what country they may have come. It is equally certain that, in any Franchise Law which may be passed, no distinction based on race or creed will be made between one white man and another.”2 In the same letter, written at a time when rumours were rife in the Transvaal that Milner intended to limit Jewish immigration, he added: “Some of the best people I have ever known, some of my closest friends, are Jews, and Jews intensely devoted to their race and religion. I have known the Jews as excellent colonists at the Cape—industrious, law-abiding and thoroughly loyal. Why should I expect the Jews of the Transvaal to be different?” Of the English, Smuts said: “They are the best politicians and business men in the world. No one has ever understood the art of government as they do. We need their business and political instincts.” And of the Jews, he said: “They have energy and capacity for taking chances. We need those . . . still, the English don’t like us. They don’t like the Jews ‘Lord Elton: Imperial Evolution, page 445. 2 Milner Papers, vol. II, page 378.

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either. The Boers and the Jews are not easy peoples. They are small, resistant, bitter peoples, and the English find the manner of peoples like the Arabs more agreeable.”1 In 1903 Theodore Herzl, the leader of modern Zionism, seeking to enlist public sympathy and obtain the support of the British Government for a Jewish National Home in Palestine, wrote in the first place to Lord Milner. “All the freedom and equality of rights of the British Jews, the happy situation even of foreign Jews in the British Colonies, and the humane protection which England’s Government grants, by their protests against the persecution of our brethren, all this is a bond which unites us all closely to your nation.”2 A note in Herzl’s diary records the warm reception he was given by Lord Milner. Milner, however, did not stop at mere expressions of sympathy; some ten years later he played an all-important part in the drafting of the famous Balfour Declaration of 1917, as well as in its drawing up.3 While we have no documentary proof of his fundamental contribution to this proclamation of a Jewish National Home, it is a fact that, with Balfour, he was its co-author; we know this because the final text was revised by L. S. Amery, who was working in the closest collaboration with Lloyd George and Lord Milner at the time. As far back as 1915, Milner had realized the need for a Jewish National Home, and had never ceased to be warmly in favour of its creation. Balfour was mainly actuated by humanitarian reasons and his profound sympathy for the Jewish people, but Milner, like Lloyd George, Amery and many others, saw that the Jewish National Home could also contribute to the security of the British Empire in the Near East. Milner anticipated that the Jews would bring about great social and economic developments in Palestine.4 When 1 S. G. Millin: General Smuts, vol. I, page 223. See also vol. II, page 114 et seq. 2 Theodore Herzl: Letters. 3 “His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish People, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. . . .” (2 November, 1917.) ‘See B. E. C. Dugdale: Arthur James Balfour, vols. I and II, and also the personal recollections of Chaiin Weizmann. recalled in private talks with me. V.H.

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the division of Palestine and the setting-up of a Jewish State was being considered in 1946, Professor Coupland calculated that, should this State come into being, the Jews would be able to: “call their home their own and make it what they will, to open its doors to all who can find a living in it, to do their best to prove to the world that Zionism is not, as its enemies aver, a calamitous dream, but the practical, saving idea which Balfour and Milner believed it to be, and thus to obtain perhaps some little moral compensation for the appalling sufferings of their race.”1 At this point it is essential to give an exact idea of the scope of the Balfour Declaration. According to the report of the Peel Commission, which was submitted to the Government by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in July, 1937, it appears that the words “the establishment in Palestine of a National Home” which figured in the Declaration of 1917 were the result of a compromise between those Ministers who envisaged the setting up of a future Jewish State and those who opposed the idea. In his statement to the Peel Com¬ mission in 1936, Lloyd George, who had been Prime Minister in 1917, said: “The idea was, and this was the interpretation put upon it at the time, that a Jewish State was not to be set up immediately by the Peace Treaty without reference to the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants. On the other hand, it was contemplated that when the time arrived for according representative institutions to Palestine, if the Jews had meanwhile responded to the opportunity afforded them by the idea of a national home and had become a definite majority of the inhabitants, then Palestine would thus become a Jewish Commonwealth.”2 3 The British Government, in fact, contemplated the possibility that in course of time a Jewish State might come into being. Smuts, who had been a member of the Imperial War Cabinet at the time of the Balfour Declaration, in the course of a speech in Johannes1 Professor R. Coupland: “The Jew and the Arab, Conditions of Settle¬ ment in Palestine,” The Times, 13 July, 1946. See also: The Jewish National Home, 1917-42, edited by Paul Goodman, with a foreword by Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, page 31. “With David Lloyd George, Arthur J. Balfour, Lord Robert Cecil and Lord Milner in the War Cabinet, with its secretaries, L. S. Amery and W. Ormsby-Gore (both of whose services to the Jewish National Home later on, too, were of outstanding importance), the Zionist sympathies of those responsible for the ultimate decision relating to the future of Palestine in the event of an allied victory appeared assured.” 3 Report of the Peel Commission on Palestine, July, 1937.

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burg on 3 November, 1919, envisaged an ever-increasing flow of immigrants to Palestine and “the renascence of a great Jewish State in Palestine within a few generations.” Lord Robert Cecil in 1917, Sir Herbert Samuel in 1919, Lord Balfour1 and Winston Churchill in 1920, made it abundantly plain that they foresaw the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine. On 27 June, 1923, in the course of one of the last debates in the House of Lords in which he took part, Lord Milner spoke on the situation in Palestine and the future of that country whose importance, he said, must be plain to all. When we re-read his words today we cannot fail to be impressed by the depth of his thought, imbued with that mixture of objectivity and simplicity which was its particular charm. Part of this speech merits quotation. Milner’s tactful approach to the subject should be noted. He began by apologizing for his lack of preparation, explaining that he was reluctant to speak: “It is dangerous to speak without prepara¬ tion because one might unwittingly utter words on the spur of the moment which would have a bad effect, perhaps a seriously bad effect, on the country about which we are speaking.” He informed the House that he was in full agree¬ ment with one point only in the speech which Lord Islington had just made, and went on: “I think it would be a very grave matter indeed, and would have a very disastrous effect on our prestige throughout the East, if we were to adopt what I believe the noble Marquis, the Deputy Leader of the House, has called a zigzag policy on this question, still worse if the Government were to allow itself to be hostile and commit itself to a total reversal of the policy. . . .”2 In 1920, at the conclusion of his mission to Egypt, Milner had visited Palestine; in 1922 he had paid a second visit to the country and had stayed there for several months. As a result of what he had seen, he was amazed at the persistence of gloomy reports as to the situation in Palestine. Progress had taken such rapid strides, said Lord Milner, that he had been amazed by the contrast which the Palestine of 1922 1 In a speech on 12 July, 1920, Balfour said: “I Arabs] will not grudge that small notch—for it is whatever it may be historically—that small notch territories being given to the people who for all have been separated from it.” % Hansard, 27 June, 1923.

hope that . . . they [the no more geographically, in what are now Arab these hundreds of years

IN WHITEHALL

17 3

presented to the Palestine of 1920. He did not agree with Lord Islington that matters were as serious as rumour would have it or that it was necessary to reinforce the British troops in Palestine. Milner was right: at that time the police were quite sufficient to guarantee order in the country. He then proceeded to correct Lord Islington’s statement that Palestine represented an ever-increasing financial burden on Great Britain. The burden had actually been considerably lightened. In 1920 the English taxpayer had paid four million pounds to Palestine. In 1921 the annual expenditure had been two and a half millions; in 1923, one and a half millions. There was every reason to believe, he said, that in a year or two the annual amount expended by Great Britain would be reduced to less than one million pounds. “My personal con¬ viction is that before long Palestine will cease to be a financial burden upon this country at all.”1 Lord Milner next dealt with the policy to which Great Britain had been committed by the Balfour Declaration. “I was a party to the Balfour Declaration,” he said. “I do not believe that the Balfour Declaration is inconsistent with any pledges which have been given to King Hussein or to anybody else. It is my conviction that when all the documents are published it will be clearly established that in the promises which we made to King Hussein a distinct reserva¬ tion was made of the country about which we are now speaking. . . . Personally I believe the policy is a sound one, and that steadily persisted in, it will lead to good results.”2 3 Milner went on to say that, as the result of what he had seen for himself during his two visits to Palestine, it afforded him great pleasure to put on record the fact that Sir Herbert Samuel, the High Commissioner, behaved with the strictest impartiality and protected alike the interests of both Jews and Arabs. “I believe that we have only to go on steadily with the policy of the Balfour Declaration as we have our¬ selves interpreted it in order to see great material progress in Palestine and a gradual subsidence of the present agitation which I believe to be largely due to artificial stimulus, and, to a very great extent, to be excited from without. It seemed to him difficult to detect any genuine symptoms of discontent 1 Hansard, 27 June, 1923. a Ibid. 3 Ibid.

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amongst the Arab population in regard to their situation in Palestine, and, furthermore, he could not see that the Arabs had been adversely affected by the influx of Jewish immigrants during the last few years. “There is plenty of room in that country for a considerable immigrant popula¬ tion without injuring in any way the resident Arab popula¬ tion, and, indeed, in many ways it will tend to their extreme benefit.”1 At the same time, he proclaimed himself in favour of a strongly pro-Arab policy in the Middle East, and said that he believed in independence for Arab countries and states, an independence that they could not achieve or maintain without British aid. He hoped that an Arab League would come into existence. But: “If the Arabs go to the length of claiming Palestine as one of their countries, in the same sense as Mesopotamia or Arabia proper is an Arab country, then I think they are flying in the face of facts, of all history, of all tradition, and of associations of the most important character—I had almost said the most sacred character. Palestine can never be regarded as a country on the same footing as the other Arab countries. You cannot ignore all history and tradition in the matter. You cannot ignore the fact that this is the cradle of two of the great religions of the world. It is a sacred land to the Arabs, but it is also a sacred land to the Jew and the Christian. It is impossible, therefore, to leave it to the Arab majority which at present inhabits that country to decide on what shall be the future of Palestine. . . .”2 In 1923 Palestine had a population of some 700,000, and according to Milner: “There is room for several millions.” He was convinced that by far the best solution would be a Mandate by an impartial Power which, while it would safe¬ guard the interests of the Arabs, would also permit the Jews to return to the land of their fathers. He considered that Palestine should be given international status, and believed that a Mandatory Power would always be necessary. He ended his speech with these words: “It is a high trust which has been committed to this country, and it is a matter of honour, I think, for us to discharge it in such a way as will make the world recognize that the trust has been well placed. I think 1 Hansard, 27 June, 1923. 3 Ibid.

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we have only to go on with the policy of establishing, not a Jewish government in Palestine, but a Jewish Home there which will receive as many Jews as the country can reasonably support, while at the same time taking care that the interests of the Arab population do not suffer. We have only to go on steadily with that policy which has already been laid down, and I think it will not be many years before Palestine, instead of being, as we are told it is going to be, a great burden to this country, will become a source of strength and credit to us.”1 It is not for a historian to predict the future, or to ask himself what part Milner would have played in the historic event which came about after his death: the creation of the Jewish State. I think we may safely say that he would have persevered to the end with the policy for which he had been responsible in 1917, the policy which he defined once more in 1923. He would certainly have been filled with admiration for the immense progress in colonization and administration accomplished by the Jews, and, had he lived to see the day when a Jewish State was set up in Palestine, he would have greeted it as warmly as did the most ardent of his disciples— L. S. Amery. On 26 February, 1921, Lord Milner married Lady Edward Cecil, the daughter of Admiral F. A. Maxse and the widow of Lord Edward Herbert Gascoyne Cecil. He devoted his years of retirement to writing articles on the social and economic policy applied in the British Empire. These articles appeared in book form, under the title of Questions of the Hour, in 1923; a second edition came out in 1925. I shall have more to say about this book in the next chapter. In the autumn of 1924, Lord Milner, accompanied by his wife, went to South Africa, and made what was for him a kind of pilgrimage through the country. It caused him con¬ siderable disappointment, for while he was delighted to see what had been done in the way of economic reconstruction, the political set-up and the situation that existed in the country were not at all to his liking. It was during this visit to South Africa that he contracted sleeping-sickness, an illness from which he never recovered. The Milners returned to London, and on 13 May, 1925, the death of Lord Milner was announced. A few days previously he had been made 1 Hansard, 27 June, 1923.

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Chancellor of Oxford University; it was in a speech on this occasion that H. A. L. Fisher, the Warden of New College, said: “Lord Milner is not in any ordinary sense a party man. All through his life he has been the servant of an ideal of the Empire and the State which far transcended the ordinary party distinctions. He has gone his way utterly dis¬ interested, far above sordid or material interests, devoting his large heart and great intelligence to the service of the causes in which he believed.”1 1

The Times, 6 May, 1925.

CHAPTER

LORD HIS

DOCTRINE

V

MILNER: AND

HIS

SCHOOL

Part I, Lord Milner’s Doctrine course of this study we have seen that Lord Milner was, above all, a man of action, a man who spoke with authority and who was determined to practise what he preached. Wherever his work took him he left a lasting trace, and his name, his achievements, have remained deeply graven in the minds of his contemporaries. Wherever he was, whether it was Egypt, South Africa or London, during war or in peace, Milner devoted himself tirelessly to the task in hand and his reputation was quickly established. It remains to be seen whether, for the historian, the value and undoubted interest of Lord Milner’s work resides entirely in his practical achievement. He was not a prolific writer, and the speeches he made were comparatively few, yet those of his writings which remain form an essential basis for the study and explanation of British Imperialism. Two of his books in particular, certain of the speeches he made, and some of the reports he drew up in South Africa, will enable us to follow the broad lines of Lord Milner’s imperial programme and grasp the main points of his doctrine. With the help of the works referred to I shall now attempt to show what these were. In the first place, what is so striking about Lord Milner’s doctrine is an independence and a precision; even more marked than in his actions. Never by so much as a single word does it convey any feeling that he was conforming to a political party or to a political programme. Did he not remark of himself that he was an exception? “Separated from one political party by my advanced views on social questions, still more widely separated from others by my faith in the Empire and my attachment to national, rather than cosmoIn the

177

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politan ideals, I often seem to myself to be ploughing a lonely furrow.”1 In the course of a speech made in 1907 Milner pointed out: “My opinions are too strong to fit well into any recognized programme. I suffer from an inveterate habit, which is partly congenital, but which has been developed by years spent in the service of the Crown, of looking at public questions from other than party points of view.”2 This political independence may have been prejudicial to his career, but it constituted Milner’s power and helped to make him one of the greatest servants, as well as one of the greatest thinkers, of the British Empire; it made him, not the leader of a party, but a leader in his own right. Throughout his career Milner refused to accept important posts for the one reason that his free spirit would have chafed at party restrictions. His only platform was imperialism; his standard bore no other emblem than that of the might and grandeur of the British Empire. Imperialism stood for Milner, as it had stood for Chamberlain, not so much for acquisition as for organization, prosperity and unity within those vast domains that were already beneath the British flag.’ In 1897, on board the Nor ham Castle on his way to South Africa, Milner wrote to his great friend, Sir George Parkin:4 “. . . My life has been greatly influenced by your ideas, and in my new post I shall feel more than ever the need of your enthusiasm and broad helpful view of the Imperial future. . . . South Africa is just now the weakest link in the Imperial chain, and I am conscious of the tremendous responsibility which rests upon the man who is called to try and preserve it from snapping. Any elation I might otherwise have felt at being elected for so big a post is quite swallowed up in my solemn sense of the great national interests at stake. . . .’” Four years later, at the end of a leave spent in London, Milner was more than ever convinced that a party govern¬ ment was not strong enough to cope with all those problems to which so mighty an Empire gave rise. He looked upon the Empire, not as a British possession, but as a union of free nations which ought to be administered by an Imperial 1 2 5 1

5

Milner: Questions of the Hour, page vii. Milner: Constructive Imperialism, page 34. Lord Elton: Imperial Commonwealth, page 398. Then Principal of Upper Canada College, Toronto. Milner Papers, vol. I, page 42.

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Council. On 13 September, 1901, he wrote to Sir George Parkin: . I am strongly impressed by two things: one, that the heart of the nation is sound, as I believe is also that of British Colonials everywhere, and, secondly, that our Con¬ stitution and methods are antiquated and bad, and that the real sound feeling of the nation does not get a chance of making itself effective. I would rather not say what I think of the House of Commons as an Imperial Council or of the effect of our wretched party system on national affairs. The experience of life has only confirmed my belief in the doctrine which we both held and preached as young men. Only I am more radical and revolutionary than I then was, and less inclined to trust in the growth of Federal Union from small beginnings.”1 Milner held the view that the Parliaments of the day, both British and Colonial, were built more or less on sand, and that with a few exceptions, such as Joseph Chamberlain, for instance, none of the coming statesmen had sufficient breadth of visions Milner was looking for the kind of man who would be capable of leading the great movement of Federal Union, a movement in which both he and Sir George Parkin were ready to play their part, a very valuable part, since they possessed “an amount of illustration and argument to bring to bear on the subject, drawn from experience, which would logically smash the opposition.’/2 Alas, there seemed no one fitted to assume the role of leader; possible candidates were either too old, or too timid, or too imbued with purely local patriotism: not one of them possessed the requisite gifts which would raise him head and shoulders above the rest, and enable him to take command of the situation on the imperial plane. All things come to him who waits, according to the proverb, but Milner thought in terms of another: “Opportunity only knocks at the door once, and we always let it go by.” This, in fact, was exactly what was happening in connexion with South Africa at the time. The hour was propitious, but the Empire governments of the day, though pleased to lay emphasis on Imperial loyalty and co-operation on the battlefield, went no further; sentiment was all very well, but an Imperial organization could not be erected on a wave of feeling! No, the crying need was for a solid foundation on which statesmen could and should build 1 Milner Papers, vol. I, page 267. 3 Ibid., vol. I, page 267.

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up a towering structure. The cement was there, but where were the masons? This was what Milner asked himself with an impatience that grew to despair. Milner repeatedly stressed the incompatibility between party politics and imperial politics. In an important letter to E. B. Iwan-Muller, written on 4 January, 1902, he reiterated this conviction: “. . . The influence of party on national affairs is more poisonous than ever. We really must get an Imperial Council to take things that matter out of the hands of that mob at Westminster. ... I think the journalists at home ought really to organize something like a regular campaign in favour of the decent organization of the British Empire.”1 Milner’s independent attitude to politics is reminiscent of Ibsen’s celebrated words: “I belong to no party: I have within me both the Right and the Left. I am pleased to find my new views influencing Liberals, Con¬ servatives, Socialists, and especially workmen and women; but I will not label myself Liberal or Conservative or Labour or Suffragist. Party rules are not golden rules: there are no golden rules.”2 Before I go any further let me give Milner’s own definition of the British Empire—the definition that he formulated on 28 October, 1901, when he was in South Africa. It is an excellent definition, clear, concise and comprehensive; it reflects its author’s ideas to perfection, and ought to be included in every good encyclopaedia: ‘‘A group of sister nations spread throughout the world, unitecTand not divided by the ocean, each independent in its own concerns, all indissolubly allied for a common purpose, all free and willing subjects of the most ancient and august monarchy in the world—what we mean, in short, by the great term, the British Empire.’” 1 Milner Papers, vol. I, page 291. 2 See Bernard Shaw: Everybody’s Political What’s What, page 162. 3 Conclusion of a speech made in Durban on 28 October, 1901. Milner Papers, vol. II, page 287. Every term used by Milner in the above defini¬ tion deserves to be commented on at length, but I have limited myself to italicizing the most important. We shall see later on the similarity of this text to the Statute of Westminster. Compare Milner’s definition with this passage by Demangeon: “The British Empire, which had its origin in an island and was founded on trade, draws its strength from the sea, the great highway of the world which joins all parts of it together. The sea is the universal link, and the matrix of all that is British; without the sea the British Empire would crumble into isolated fragments of land. Just as the sea is the familiar horizon of every Briton in his private life, so in his

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A few years later Milner once more made it plain that the word British applied to the Empire does not mean English, nor yet English, Scottish and Irish all together. The Empire is not something belonging to the United Kingdom any more than to Canada, Australia or to any other single portion of the Empire.1 The British Empire is the greatest political entity in the world today; properly organized, it must be by far the greatest power. ... In all soberness and sincerity, the British Empire, with all its defects and weak¬ nesses, is yet an influence, without an equal, on the side of humanity, civilization and peace.”2 To Milner’s definition of the Empire must be added some lines written in his own hand which were found amongst the notes he had made in 1923, a little less than two years before his death. Dated 27 June, they are preceded by a quotation from Andre Chevrillon: ‘‘It is not a question of British hegemony, but of British fraternity in the world.”3 Milner, agreeing in substance, commented as follows: We can only fraternize with those with whom we have something in common, morally or spiritually speaking—in other words, a community of race, language, civilization, history, tradition and ideals which form the basis of the link between Great Britain and the Dominions. It is not the same when we are dealing with the other, the Dependent Empire. Therefore, argued Milner, it would probably be quite wrong to give India Dominion status. There were not the same natural affinities between Great Britain and India as there were between Great Britain and Canada, for example. What was more, the most important members of the Dependent Empire would certainly not consent to remain dependent for ever. If, then, they could not be given Dominion status and must not be allowed to become foreign nations, it was obvious that a new form sui generis must be found which would embrace all the countries of the two Empires and which would make public life it represents the national well-being round which are ranged all the other interests of his country. The idea of no longer having the freedom of the seas troubles the Briton; the thought that Britannia may no longer rule the waves fills him with dread, for the ship is the symbolic vehicle of all that lives in the Empire, of all that makes it live.” A. Demangeon: L’Empire Britannique, Etude de geographie coloniale, pages 87-8. 1 Speech in Winnipeg, 15 October, 1908. 2 Speech on 3 November, 1908. See Milner: Speeches delivered in Canada, page 93. 5 Andr6 Chevrillon: Trois Etudes de Literature Anglaise, page 35.

182

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the necessary allowances for their irreconcilable differences. Milner was fully aware of what might result if a uniform Empire were insisted upon at all costs: “We have given up the idea of a hierarchic organization, of a central government, of the supremacy of Great Britain.” What the future demanded was a British Alliance; if there were no organic or formal ties, this permanent alliance, and the co-operation to which it would give rise, would be held together by the ineradicable sense of family, the ties of relationship, and would be still further consolidated by economic relations and the development of common material interests. But it would be idle to pretend that the ties which bound the peoples of the Dependent Empire to Great Britain were, or ever could be, as strong as those which united the peoples of the Dominions to the Motherland. Milner was the first British statesman to conceive of an Empire transcending the countries or races of which it was composed. He himself had two nationalities; he was as much an Imperial citizen as he was a British citizen, and owed allegiance to two Motherlands: Great Britain and the Empire. “I am an imperialist out and out.”1 But for Milner, imperialism did not stand for domination by Great Britain of any part of the Empire. He regarded himself, as I have just said, as an Englishman, but he was even more conscious of being an imperialist, and clearly envisaged, as George Parkin envisaged and Winston Churchill was to envisage in future, a Council of the Empire sitting alternately at Ottawa, Sydney and the Cape.2 Milner and his school regarded the Empire as “a circle whose centre is everywhere and which has no circumference,’” Andr£ Siegfried, in his masterly study on Canada, put it brilliantly when he said that the concept of Empire no longer implied “the grouping of young Colonies round the Metropolis, like so many children round their mother, but stood for an imperial unity in which all parts of the whole were equal.” It was because Milner thought 1 Speech to the Navy League, 28 May, 1904. Milner Papers, vol. II, page 5032 On 22 April, 1944, Winston Churchill said in the House: ‘‘It is not necessary that these meetings [Imperial Conferences] should always take place in London. They may take place at other great centres of our United Empire. Although I am still old-fashioned enough to consider cockney London as the heart of the Empire, I am quite ready that we should take wing in future.” 3 Andr6 Siegfried: Le Canada, Puissance Internationale, pages 158-9.

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on these lines that, in his speech to the Navy League from which I have already quoted, he expressed his sincere hope that all of the Colonies should come forward with a contribu¬ tion for a fleet in which they would have a controlling voice. The mere handing over of a sum of money for the upkeep of a common fleet was not enough; that fleet must be as much the Navy of South Africa, of Australia, of Canada, as the Navy of Great Britain. The Dominions must have their own warships which would co-operate with the British Navy. Psychologically, Milner was not in favour of an Imperial Fleet, since he feared that the various parts of the Empire would not regard it with an equal degree of interest and pride. The system of contributions was, at best, no more than an expedient. It was essential that all those countries within the Empire should accustom themselves to playing an active part in the realization of a common programme. Hence, went on Milner, these same countries should have a larger share in imperial policy, in peacetime as well as in wartime, and should be given a voice, not only in questions of defence, but in all matters of interest to the Empire. Every step must be taken to develop the common life of the Empire and maintain permanent co-operation between the countries of which it was composed; this co-operation must not be confined to naval and military affairs, but must provide for a constant interchange of civil servants, professors, adminis¬ trators, diplomats, etc. Milner refuted the oft-repeated assertion that imperialists are only concerned with the material and external aspect of national life. He challenged anyone to produce a political organism, great or small, which afforded its members a better chance of self-development and a more varied, a healthier life. He illustrated the strength and the benefits of imperial unity by pointing out that British citizens were able to settle anywhere within the Empire with the full knowledge that, by so doing, they were not giving up the land of their birth, but would still remain British citizens. In his credo Milner professed himself no cosmopolitan but a nationalist, a British nationalist, and, at the same time, an imperialist. “My patriotism had no geographical limits.”1 Here he approaches Charles Dilke, Cecil Rhodes and Chamberlain, whose patriotism was rather similar. A little 1 Milner: Questions of the Horn, “Key to my position.”

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farther on we find: “I am a patriot of British nationality, I am a citizen of the Empire.”1 Milner had a perfect concept of the “Imperial Family.’) His admiration for the greatness of the Empire was un¬ failing—an admiration which he never ceased to voice. But even in this connexion he remained unprejudiced. British people are proud, often justifiably so, of their work of empire¬ building and colonization; no other country in the world has sent out so many explorers, conquerors, colonizers and peace¬ makers to such widely differing territories, often the homes of savage and primitive races. In Milner’s day “Greater Great Britain,” thanks to the brilliance of her public servants and favoured to a large extent by luck, had covered a very large portion of the earth’s surface; to the vast territories, contain¬ ing a population of some 400,000,000, which came under her direct control, she had brought the blessings of civilization. Regarded as a whole, her work had been wonderfully successful. But a closer scrutiny of what she had done for the Dependent Empire afforded a far less satisfactory picture. There were far too many cases of economic backwardness, both in the oldest overseas possessions, such as the West Indies, and in the most recently acquired colonies, such as British East Africa (Kenya). No wonder that Milner spoke with bitterness of the “undeveloped states,” as Joseph Chamberlain had called them.2 “What have we to show,” he asked, “comparable to the wonderful development of Morocco under the brilliant and energetic guidance of General Lyautey?”3 His regret, tinged with understandable national, or rather imperial, envy, is eloquent of his ambitions for, his concept of, the Empire; at the same time it establishes an affinity between Lyautey and himself. Milner knew that it was useless to think of spreading civilization, encouraging social development and planting the British Flag until a material basis had been established, and the initial work was accompanied or followed by economic progress. Milner deplored the indifference and lack of enthusiasm of the majority of the British public towards imperial prob¬ lems and colonial questions. Only the raking up of some

(

1 Milner: Questions of the Hour, “Key to my position.” 2 In 1895 Joseph Chamberlain said: “I regard many of our colonies as being in the condition of undeveloped states—states which never can be developed without imperial assistance.” 3 Milner: Questions of the Hour, page 147.

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scandal in connexion with British administration succeeded in quickening their interest. Even the best minds in the country failed to respond to the life of the Empire. It needed a dynamic personality like Chamberlain’s to rouse the country from its apathy and awaken it to the vast, the almost unlimited possibilities of the Empire. “More was done during Chamberlain’s eight years at the Colonial Office to put life into colonial administration, to make a good start with our latest, and restore some of the lost prosperity of our oldest possessions, than in all the eighty years preceding his accession to power. Since his day that impetus has died down, though it has not altogether died out.”1 Twenty years later, during the Second World War, John Dugdale, M.P., wrote to The Times'. “With the exception of question-time—and I admit that it is a big exception— there are scarcely more than a couple of days in the year devoted to a discussion of colonial affairs. ... I have not got a Hansard beside me as I write, but I would hazard a guess that the affairs of such colonies as Fiji, Mauritius, British Guiana, and Gambia—to pick out a few at random—have not been discussed by the House during the past five years.”2 3 Lionel Curtis has noted the fact that when the Colonial Budget is presented to Parliament the House is invariably empty, for members know perfectly well that, even were they to show an interest in the wellbeing of the Empire, it would carry no weight whatever with the electorate on a future polling-day.’ The Spectator recorded that only eight M.P.s were present when Mr. Harold Macmillan presented the Colonial Budget in 1942. Milner pointed out that the development of the Empire was essentially due to a few isolated men who were tolerated, rather than supported and encouraged, by the various governments and the general public. Thanks to these remark¬ able men, certain parts of the British Empire prospered so greatly, progressed so amazingly that they attracted the attention of the whole world and gained for Great Britain’s colonial and imperial policy a unique reputation. Milner maintained that this reputation was very far from being deserved, for it was in no way the outcome of a sound and 1 Milner: Questions of the Hour, page 149. * The Times, 31 August, 1942. 3 Lionel Curtis: World War. Its Cause and Cure, page 191.

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systematic policy; the fact was that it was due, in nine cases out of ten, to an exceptional servant of Empire: “A Cromer, a Rhodes, a Kitchener.” To these three names I am tempted to add that of Milner himself. This brings me back to a theme I touched on at the beginning of this book: the exact part played by the leading figures, relatively few in number, on the stage of that Empire to which they gave of their best. At no time was there any permanent and continuous policy; the development of the British Empire was due to the individual efforts of its great proconsuls. All the same, a certain tradition did grow up and created a permanent interest. Milner took a particular interest in the Dependent Empire which consisted of the Crown Colonies and Protectorates. He realized that, while they were potentially rich, their slow and insufficient progress, their poverty, was due to the fact that they lacked capital. “The Colonial Office is the Cinderella of the great public departments,”1 said Milner. What is more, at that time it was a Cinderella with no fairy godmother. Those who interceded in its favour did so in vain; they never held enough trumps to win the game for it. The political weak¬ ness of the Colonial Office within the Government and in Parliament was caustically summed up by Milner: ‘‘No angry crowds threatening to march on Downing Street, no warning from the Whips that seats are in danger, no fears of a bad division in the House of Commons, are ever likely to cause perturbation in the breasts of Ministers where only Colonial interests are concerned.”2 Milner then proceeded to compare the situation of the Crown Colonies and the Protectorates with that of the Dominions; so long as the latter had depended upon Downing Street and the Treasury they were in as poor a case as the former, but no sooner had they obtained self-government than they undertook a vast pro¬ gramme of economic development, in which they invested all the capital at their disposal. At first those at home had looked on with a sceptical eye, and had prophesied certain bankruptcy. The ultimate results are known to all. There was only a mere trickle of British capital for a time, but the Dominions made a complete success of their experiment, thus proving that their own people had been better judges 1 Milner: Questions of the Hour, page 152. 3 Ibid., page 153.

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of the situation than those in London, and amply justifying their optimism, or, to put it still better, their complete faith in the future of their vast and wealthy domains. The result was that gradually the flow of capital from other countries began to increase until, finally, loans to the Dominions were regarded by the City of London, amongst others, as the most interesting and profitable forms of overseas investment. Milner emphasized the benefit which Great Britain derived from her assistance in the development of an important part of her Empire. In the first place she gained financially, since her investment in the Dominions yielded substantial regular interest, but over and above all her economic situation was greatly improved by the increase of her trade which found new openings for home products. Bearing in mind in addition to all this the obvious political advantages, on which there is no need to dwell, it was plain that the investment of British capital in the Dominions in particular, and in any part of the Empire in general, was infinitely more profitable and more useful than its investment in foreign countries. In a survey of the economic situation of Great Britain immediately after the First World War, Milner said: “The increased demand for British goods from the British Dominions and Dependencies compensates, and more than compensates, for the loss of certain foreign markets even if that loss were permanent.’’1 He urged his fellow-countrymen, and particularly the members of the Government, to pursue a policy of vigorous development in the Dependent Empire, the Crown Colonies and Protectorates, supporting his argument with the results achieved by such a policy in the Dominions. It was incumbent on Great Britain to do for the Dependent Empire what the self-governing Dominions had already done for themselves: in other words, Great Britain must furnish the requisite amount of capital. The logical outcome of the foregoing was Milner’s scheme '' for an Imperial Development Fund2 with the idea of placing 1 Milner: Questions of the Hour, page 33. 2 A few years before Milner had put forward the idea, Joseph Chamberlain had suggested that the income from the shares of the Suez Canal might be earmarked for loans to and investments in the Crown Colonies. Effective redirection was given to Milner's conception by the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts of 1940 and 1945 under which £120,000,000 is being pro¬ vided over ten years to assist colonial governments to carry out schemes of economic and local development.

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at the disposal of the more backward territories under the British Flag sufficient capital to give them an initial fillip, and start them off on the road to social and economic progress. While there is no need to go into detail, let me simply say that this involved in the first place the problem of transport: the development of communications, both internal and external, was as it were the keystone, the first stage in the work of construction, expansion and progress. Bear in mind once more at this point that transport has always played one of the most important parts, if not the most important part, in the history of the various countries and territories of the British Empire; we find, time and time again, that com¬ munications have actually preceded the colonization of the country they traversed. We have only to think of the history of Canada and her railways, that of tropical West Africa, and that of the famous Cape to Cairo project. Great Britain has always concentrated her efforts on the construction of lines of communication. “To cut new roads, to thrust them through desert, prairie, bush, forest, is to conquer distance, and so remove one of the greatest obstacles to trade. It is the engineer rather than the soldier who blazes the trail to colonization.”1 Wherever they went, the British had won their way to success by means of the railroad. As Sir Charles Lucas said: “The railway is a nation-making factor.’” In Milner’s opinion science played an equally important, an equally essential part, in development, particularly in the sphere of agriculture and in the war against disease— the diseases of mankind, as well as those of animals and plants. Special mention must be made of such scientists as Manson and Ross, such institutions as the School of Tropical Medicine in London and Liverpool.3 Milner believed that nothing would do more to aid the material progress of the Dependent Empire than the establishment in every part of 1 “The railway line is not only a factor in economic export, it is an as¬ pect of imperial unification; as such it completed the conquest of Canada with extraordinary rapidity.” A. Demangeon: L’Empire Britannique, Etude de gdographie coloniale, page 95. * The Oxford Survey of the British Empire, vol. VI, page 25. 3 With regard to research in this field, I would particularly draw the reader’s attention to the recent study made by Andre Siegfried who, after having given a series of lectures in 1944 on the economic world routes—sea, land and air—concentrated more especially on the geography of the routes followed by such infectious diseases as cholera, plague, yellow fever, sleep¬ ing-sickness, etc., clearly showing what importance he attached to these questions.

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it of a first-class medical service and a staff of scientists to cope with geological, botanical, entomological problems, etc. This meant that further capital had to be found—no easy matter, although the Treasury was less to blame than British public opinion. “The value of science, like the value of the Dependent Empire, is amongst the things about which public opinion has most to learn.”1 Dwelling on the strictly economic point of view, Milner stressed the almost inexhaustible wealth of the Empire—a wealth that could be turned to national account. “The economic potentialities of the vast territories, either belong¬ ing to the free nations which owe allegiance to the British Crown, or still under the direct control of Great Britain, are almost immeasurable.”2 He demonstrated that other Great Powers would become valuable customers of the British Empire provided it could furnish the goods and products they needed, and pointed out that these customers would ulti¬ mately include even the United States of America, Germany and Japan. Milner then broke off from his main theme to discuss in parenthesis the economic relations between the United States and Great Britain—his digression on this sub¬ ject is of vital interest to us today. He pointed out the disparity in value between Great Britain’s imports from, and her exports to, America, and proceeded to show, using the illustration of the triangle of trade, that Great Britain’s debt to America could, in greater or less measure, be met by the Dependent Empire creating a market for its products in the United States. Lastly he analysed the purely commercial aspect of the usefulness of exchanges between the United Kingdom and the Dependent Empire. While the products of the Crown Colonies were almost all of a tropical character unobtainable elsewhere, conversely they had practically no manufactured goods. There was, therefore, a natural balance, and it was possible to generalize and say that Great Britain was always in the market for tropical products and the Dependent Empire was always a buyer of manufactured goods. Lord Milner even went so far as to assert that, from the strictly commercial point of view, the Dependent Empire was of more value to Great Britain than all the Dominions put 1 Milner: Questions of the Hour, page 148. Ibid., page 33.

3

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together. He explained this quite logically: Great Britain’s trade with the Dominions was highly developed and remunerative, but neither side could completely make good the other’s deficiencies. Moreover, it contained a competitive element which gave rise to legislative restrictions. Originally —vide the Colonial Pact—all the various parts of the British Empire were expected to send to Great Britain those products and raw materials which she lacked, receiving in return manufactured goods. The situation had changed, however, and the Dominions were no longer content to be, and would certainly not continue to be, passive suppliers; they were anxious to increase their own industrial production. Milner thought that this tendency of the Dominions, or, rather, this spirit of emulation, ought to be encouraged, not restrained, since it was entirely wrong that trade relations between nations, and especially between nations belonging to one and the same family, should be allowed to deteriorate into destructive competition. Each nation had the right, it was even its duty, to develop its productivity to the highest possible peak. “The revival will only come when we get out of the doldrums about our poverty, and think less about mere saving and more about reproductive expenditure, for which there are, both in this country and the Empire, so many opportunities and such crying need.”1 Plainly, it was not always easy to reconcile the interests of Great Britain with those of the Empire. It was to Great Britain’s advantage to increase her own agricultural productivity, while the Dominions, for their part, were equally anxious to intensify theirs, but this was not as unfavourable as might appear, and for the following reason. The Dominions had no desire to swamp the British market with their products; all that they hoped for was to be given priority over foreign competitors. The people of the Dominions had two articles of faith: in the first place, they believed that every state in the Empire should develop its productivity to the utmost, without taking into account the interests of the other states within this Empire, and, in the second place, they upheld the principle that each Imperial state should try to make good its deficiencies through trade with the remaining states, rather than buying from foreign countries. 1 Milner:

Questions of the Hour, pages 42-3.

LORD MILNER’S DOCTRINE

1Q1

Home trade first, imperial trade second, foreign trade third—that is, in their view, the order of choice.”1 Milner was convinced that tariffs would greatly facilitate this principle which was both simple and logical; under a tariff, even if it was not a protective tariff, it was easy to grant a preference to certain categories of goods coming from one country while maintaining the duty on similar goods coming from another. The existence of a tariff, however, was not, in his view, indispensable, for home production and imperial trade were often favourably affected in other ways: homo oeconomicus, to be sure, is swayed by no other considerations when buying and selling than prices; human beings, however, are creatures of habit and sentiment, they like the things they are used to, they prefer to do business with friends. Milner believed that this was one of the chief reasons why British trade with the Dominions was on a far more extensive scale than her trade with other countries which had more or less similar goods to offer. This observation is extremely important, for it shows us once again the exceptional value of sentiment in the basic structure of British imperialism; British Imperial policy did not rest, as it happened, upon preferential tariffs, but these tariffs were only possible and conceivable because the general tendency, the ‘‘imperial atmosphere” brought them into being and encouraged their growth; to put it even more exactly, the whole system of Preference was concerned with a view to consolidating still further the unity of the Empire. And here we come to the real keystone of this amazing edifice. ‘‘The root idea of that policy is the conception of the free states of the Empire as something more than a group of nations owing allegiance to a common sovereign—the con¬ ception of them as a co-operative Commonwealth, in which each member state, while developing independently on its own lines, is yet bound to contribute whatever it can to the development of the rest.”2 As we have already seen, Milner was one of the leaders of the Tariff Reform movement; in Chamberlain’s absence he was the most eloquent, as well as the most authoritative, advocate for Protection. Milner told a French journalist3 that as a young man he had been a disciple of Cobden’s and had 1 Milner: Questions of the Hour, page 168. 2 Ibid., pages 169-70. 3 In 1908 or igog. See Raymond Recouly: En Angleterre.

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believed in Free Trade.1 The years he had spent abroad, in various parts of the Empire, however, his study of the German economists and, above all, the concrete example of a pros¬ perous Germany, had radically altered his views and had converted him to Protection. In Cobden’s day Free Trade had been all very well; British industry had then been a giant amongst the pygmies, and had had no competitors to fear. But times had changed, reasoned Milner, and it was no longer possible for Great Britain to allow herself the luxury of Free Trade. But Milner put the imperial before the economic factor. In a most important speech which he made in Edin¬ burgh in November, 1907, he laid particular insistence on the fact that the fundamental principle of Tariff Reform was the national principle; Britons throughout the world, he said, should think of themselves as citizens of a mighty Empire, and should realize that their interests were common interests. Furthermore, Britons at home should accord preferential treatment, even in matters of trade, to Britons in the Empire, and should consider them before foreigners; Milner pointed out that this was where the Tariff Reformers differed widely from the Cobdenites, who only looked on the commercial side and whose views were cosmopolitan. Although foreign trade must not be neglected, what mattered most to Milner, Chamberlain and their adherents was the unity of the Empire, the development of imperial possessions, and British industry. According to Milner, Imperial Preference and Tariff Reform were the key of the position: “I have been a Cobdenite myself—I am not ashamed of it. But I have come to see that the doctrine of free imports—the religion of free imports, I ought to say—as it is practised in this country today, is inconsistent with social reform, inconsistent with fair play to British industry, and inconsistent with the develop¬ ment and consolidation of the Empire.”2 To sum up, Milner believed that it was impossible to treat the Empire as an economic entity with no internal barriers. Conversely, he thought that it was wrong, politically as well as commercially, for the various states within the Empire to deal with one another as if they were foreign countries. The policy of Imperial Preference was an expedient, advantageous from 1 Cromer, Milner’s former chief, was a Cobdenite to the end of his life. 2 Speech in Edinburgh on 15 November, 1907. See Milner: Constructive Imperialism, page 50 et seq.

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every point of view. Milner also maintained that Tariff Reform was really vital and that every measure should be taken to bring it into force.1 If Tariff Reform were not brought in he was certain that it would be impossible to put a limit to foreign competition, to conclude arrangements with the states of the Empire and obtain funds for social reform. Milner gave a great deal of consideration to the question of social reform. I have dwelt upon his hopes in this direction more than once in the course of this study, and I must touch upon them again at this point. In several of his speeches2 he said emphatically that power, greatness, a fine army and an up-to-date navy, financial stability, solid credit and an en¬ lightened policy were not enough; in the final analysis, power and greatness depended upon the wellbeing of the masses. What did this imply? Clearly that it was vital to ensure the health of the people, both young and old, and to this end overcrowding must be avoided, sanitary services must be maintained, housing must be really well planned, there must be fine parks and wide, well-kept streets, an excellent educa¬ tional system on all levels, good conditions for workers, pensions for old people, etc. To sum up, the welfare of the nation was all-important. “The true antidote to revolutionary socialism is practical social reform.”3 4 Milner asserted—and here again he makes common cause with Disraeli, Chamberlain and his friend and monitor, Toynbee—that social reform is a national concern, and that no effort in this direction can be too great. Because of his social programme, we may say that Milner was truly a socialist.'1 We know that he owed his social outlook very largely to Toynbee; when it came to practical work in this field, however, the influence exerted on him by Joseph Chamberlain was even more remarkable—according to Laski, it was “fascinating.” Milner’s social ideas rounded off his imperial ideas, and he regarded the Empire as a major factor in social and economic progress. Lord Milner devoted one of his essays in Questions of the 1 Refer also to speeches made by Milner at Tunbridge Wells on 24 October, 1907; at Rugby on 19 November, 1907, and in Canada in 1908. 2 Speeches at Montreal, 2 November, 1908; Manchester, 14 December, 1906; Guildford, 29 October, 1907. 5 Speech at Guildford, 29 October, 1907. 4 In a talk I had with the late Professor Laski on 16 April, 1947, he said: “Milner was a fanatical imperialist, but above all, he was a radical, and maybe a socialist.” LMB-G

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Hour to the Labour Party and its policy. In this essay he surveyed its position immediately after the First World War, attempted to assess its programme and dwelt particularly on those questions related to imperialism. He took the Labour leaders to task for their indifference—even their hostility— towards the Empire, and maintained that they would never become a great national party unless they changed their out¬ look in this respect. He realized that even the idea of Empire might repel men of democratic sympathies, but pointed out that it was both childish and dangerous to take this one-sided view, and ignore the true meaning of Empire. At this stage of its evolution the Empire no longer conjured up visions of violence, conquest and domination. Furthermore, those who looked upon it as a burden and insisted that the sums expended by Great Britain on her overseas possessions would have been put to better use at home, were hopelessly in the wrong. He utterly rejected the argument that the Empire, if profitable to Great Britain, spelt cruelty and injustice to others, declaring: “I am ready to admit that, imperialist as I am, this idea, if it could be proved to be true, would shake the foundations of my faith.”1 Milner went on to say that the question could not arise with regard to the Dominions, whose nations were free and self-governing. As to the Dependent Empire, its conquest had been achieved in a relatively peaceful manner, far more peacefully, in fact, than the conquest of other Empires by other countries. Professor Wilhelm Ropke has indirectly admitted as much in his recent book, Internationale Ordnung: ‘‘It has sometimes been said, with extremely unfriendly intent, that British Imperialists in the nineteenth century preached Christ and thought Cotton. Here we have one of those unfair generalizations which have done so much to poison the relations between one nation and another, and which are all the more out of place when they are made in a spirit of self-justification. This particular generalization refers to a period when the Great Powers were all, more or less, equally subject to reproach, and to a country which, in all events, was this much better than the rest, in that it instanced very plainly and in the most exemplary way that it was capable of self-criticism.”2 Milner cut the controversy short, 1 Milner: Questions of the Hour, page 98. 2 Wilhelm Ropke: Internationale Ordnung, page 120. Note that yarious

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for that matter, by saying that, after all, the present genera¬ tion was not responsible for the sins of the past, and that what counted was to ensure that the authority which had been won in days gone by was exercised for good. He then quoted part of Prince Henry’s speech to his father about his crown: . . . My gracious liege. You won it, wore it, kept it, gave it me; Then plain right must my possession be; Which I, with more than with a common pain, ’Gainst all the world will rightfully maintain. and asseverated that Great Britain had gone even further than this, for not only had she maintained that authority which had been entrusted to her, but she had exercised it for the good of the subject races. Even so, the “Ultra-democrats” were not satisfied, but continued to demand complete free¬ dom and self-government for every nation, every people. But, as Milner stressed, they must beware of confusing ideology with actual facts; if all men had been created equal and all peoples were equally capable of self-government, then it would be extremely difficult to justify British domination in Malaya or the Sudan, for example. But the fact was that all men were not equal, all peoples were not equally capable of self-government, and therefore Britain’s exercise of her authority was not only her right, it was her duty. The follow¬ ing sentence contains what we might call the credo of Lord Milner and his school: “For that authority is the only one capable, under present circumstances, of ensuring to the peoples of these countries the primary blessings of order and justice. Its withdrawal would be a disaster for them, and on our part a dereliction of duty.”1 Professor Rdpke, however, disagrees with this statement of Milner’s, which seems to him to be based on a fallacy. Political expansion has always been accompanied by a screen of lies designed to hide its true objectives—lies, moreover, that are sugar-coated to suit the prevailing taste, and shaped in such a way that they take on the appearance of the legitimate right to pursue such and such a course. Those days must be considered at an end when the European colonizer or conqueror thought it necesother historians adopt a totally different view-point; W. Sombart and L. Hennebicq, for example, couple the history of British Imperialism with that of the rise and growth of capitalism, and stress the violence and unscrupu¬ lousness of the methods employed. 1 Milner: Questions of the Hour, page 101.

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sary to justify his policy of expansion to himself and to others, by calling it a crusade for the spreading of civilization. In the past every effort had been made to disguise the real aims of expansion beneath a heavy layer of cultural veneer, but nowadays it is economic progress which is chosen for purposes of camouflage and self-justification.1 Milner wrote particularly scathingly of the complex which caused certain sections of the British public to decry their own Empire. It astounded him that the Labour leaders were such fervent supporters of the League of Nations, considering that the already existent League of British Nations found no favour whatsoever in their sight. Milner was aware that this bizarre attitude was not of recent origin, but dated back to the French Revolution when the Whigs voiced their antipatriotic feelings. His one consolation was that it was confined to a minority, the “new elite”; the great mass of the people, especially the working-classes, were proud of their country; the British working-man, in fact, though he was neither a xenophobe nor a chauvinist, instinctively displayed a marked preference for his fellow-Britons, whether those at home or those in the far-flung Empire. If it was the intention of the Labour leaders to root out patriotism and sow the seeds of class-consciousness in its place, their efforts were foredoomed. *“You cannot have prosperity without power,” said Lord Milner, addressing the Conservative Club in Manchester in 1906. “You, of all peoples, dependent for your very life not on the product of these islands alone, but on a world-wide enter¬ prise and commerce. This country must remain a Great Power or she will become a poor country; and those who in seeking, as they are most right to seek, social improvement, are tempted to neglect national strength, and are simply building their house upon sand.”2 3 This small detail is signifi¬ cant : the extract I have just given was quoted by Sidney and Beatrice Webb in The Decay of Capitalist Civilization. The socialism professed by the Webbs was, it will be remembered, fundamentally anti-Liberal. Elie Halevy, in his interesting book, L’Ere des Tyrannies, observed that the Webbs and their friend, Bernard Shaw, were a party unto themselves: “They were ostentatiously imperialist.”* 1 Wilhelm Ropke: Internationale Ordnung, pages 120-1. 2 Milner: The Nation and the Empire, page 140. 3 Elie Halevy: L’Ere des Tyrannies, page 217.

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Reverting to the “burden of Empire,” Milner proceeded to distinguish between the “cost of its acquisition” and the “cost of its maintenance,” and said that it was a simple matter to prove that it was in no way a financial drag on Great Britain. The Dominions and India cost her nothing whatever, since they were entirely self-supporting. As for the Crown Colonies and Protectorates, while they entailed a certain amount of expenditure, this was relatively small and out of all propor¬ tion to the enormous advantages which the mother country derived from their possession. Great Britain’s trade with the Empire was such that, far from the Empire being a burden on her or absorbing funds which would have been better expended at home, it constituted for the homeland a source of inexhaustible revenue and wealth. Milner foresaw another question that would be put to him and answered it in advance. That question was: did not the upkeep of the Army and Navy add a grievous burden to the Budget? No, was his reply, for the British Army was already smaller in proportion to the population of Great Britain than that of other European countries, and even if there were no Empire it could not be reduced with any margin of safety. As for the Navy, it was essential for the protection of Great Britain’s world trade, and but for the naval bases she pos¬ sessed in the Empire she would have been forced to expand her present Fleet. Milner reminded his readers that they had only to think of the 1914-18 War to realize how invaluable had been the support and strength of the Empire. We ourselves realized this far more recently—during the 1939'45 War. “In view of all these considerations,” concluded Milner, “how can we talk, or think, of the Empire as a burden?”1 Here the military and strategic motive rears its head. Perhaps it underlay every brand of imperialism, even that professed by Milner. Be that as it may, Milner was inspired and guided, from the beginning of his career to the end of his life, by a burning faith in the civilizing influence of the British Empire. It was a faith which he never ceased to profess, to the service of which he dedicated his every thought and deed. “The ideal for which he lived and worked, and which his inspiration has so greatly quickened, was that of the British Empire united in free co-operation as a great instrument for wellbeing. . . . 1 Milner: Questions of the Hour, page 98.

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If he had to fight, and fight with iron determination, against the disruption of the Empire, his heart was far more in the work of construction, political and economic. The full oppor¬ tunity to do all he hoped was never given him. But there are many who will work, here and overseas, inspired by his spirit. He wished no more.”1

Part II, Lord Milner’s School Lord Milner’s claim to greatness does not rest on his achieve¬ ments alone. In the course of his long and fruitful career he faithfully practised the doctrine he preached, and embodied his imperial creed in many speeches and a few books which have since become classics, but this was not all: his intrinsic merit lay in his ability to influence others. From his early days at Oxford, right up to the end of his life, he was a source of inspiration, a counsellor and guide to hundreds of men and women belonging to widely-differing circles, both in England and the Empire; that he was regarded thus was largely owing to the clarity of his views, his clear-cut objectives, but the decisive factor was his personality. It was due to his character, his entire make-up, to the fact that those who came into contact with him instinctively trusted him and were drawn to him that a real school sprang up around him. It is impossible to speak too highly of Milner’s personality, so attractive in every way, so sincere, so lacking in conceit. A famous cartoonist was once asked which of the great men of the day was the most difficult to caricature. “Milner,” he answered. “You cannot caricature character.” Even in his comparatively early days in Egypt, Milner had been surrounded by a loyal staff, but it was during his years in South Africa that he gathered about him a congenial group of brilliant young men who devoted themselves to the cause he had made his own. “His personality was so impressive that he founded a school of able young men who, during his lifetime and since, have acknowledged him as their prin¬ cipal political teacher.”2 This little group, because of the youth of its members, was labelled, ironically and affectionately, “Milner’s Kinder1 L. S. Amery, The Times, 16 May, 1925^ • 2 Lord Oxford: Memories and Reflections, 1852-1927, page 181.

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garten.” Milner always had a weakness for youth. As Bruce Lockhart said with fine perception: “His nobility of mind, his entirely natural charm of manner, his lofty idealism, the complete absence of ambitious scheming or of anything approaching self-conceit in his character, and his broad and vigorous patriotism, made him the ideal inspirer of youth. With young men, too, he was at his best. He liked to surround himself with them. He believed that they should be given their chance.”1 It is the mark of a great man to surround himself with a staff that is worthy of him; it is the major attribute of an administrator to imbue those who are working in conjunction with him with a sense of authority and responsibility. Too often, however, we find that the man at the top, because of some weakness in his character, has failed to choose a staff with sufficient ability to do him justice. It was entirely due to his innate modesty, his almost invariable self-effacement, that Lord Milner succeeded where so many had failed. For this reason, and also because the most active members of Milner’s Kindergarten were destined to play so notable a part in the affairs of Great Britain and the Empire, a few pages must be devoted to the most outstanding of the group. Their doyen was Patrick Duncan, who had been Milner’s Private Secre¬ tary at the Board of Inland Revenue, and who became the first Colonial Secretary of the Transvaal and one of the leaders in the National Government, and subsequently Governor-General of the Union of South Africa. There was Lord Basil Blackwood, who was killed while still compara¬ tively young in the First World War; F. Perry, who had been Imperial Secretary in the Capetown days, and was later Chairman of the Rand Native Labour Association; Basil Williams, the historian, one of the greatest authorities on imperial questions and the author of a number of standard books on South Africa, Cecil Rhodes, etc.; Geoffrey Dawson, Milner’s principal Private Secretary, who became editor of The Times; John Buchan (Lord Tweedsmuir), the writer, future Governor-General of Canada; John Dove, for many years Editor of the Round Table-, R. H. (Lord) Brand, who specialized in the work of the Inter-Colonial Council, an authority on railways, the author of an important book. The Union of South Africa, and later an eminent financier; Philip

1

R. H. Bruce Lockhart: Memoirs of a British Agent.

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Kerr, later Lord Lothian, a leader with Brand of the Inter¬ colonial Council, of whose career I shall have more to say; Lionel Curtis, who played a leading part in the movement for South African Union, and of whom it has justly been said that “his philosophy of the Empire was the power behind the scenes for two generations.”1 All of these participated in Milner’s work in South Africa. Later on in this chapter, I shall have a good deal to say about those who shared his activities at other stages of his career. Milner was at one time criticized in South Africa on the ground that he surrounded himself almost entirely with young men—too young, said the critics, more or less straight from Oxford. But Milner believed in youth; he set a particu¬ lar store on its freshness of outlook, unstaled by routine, and so his choice fell on young, enthusiastic, clever, active and ambitious young men, for he thought that what they had to bring was as valuable as years of experience in the service. Incidentally, the critics exaggerated: side by side with these young men, and often in authority over them, was a consider¬ able number of veteran civil servants. “The result abundantly justified Milner’s faith in youth and brains. The Kinder¬ garten often made mistakes. Their ideas about money were sometimes over-generous. Their manner was occasionally too cocksure. But their sheer ability, their enthusiasm, their unselfish devotion to duty, far outweighed all minor defects. They achieved a gigantic task under Milner’s guidance.”2 They were of immense help to Lord Milner while he was in South Africa, and were also in some sort the guarantee that his work there would be carried on. Most of them remained in South Africa for a considerable time after he had left, and it was principally through their efforts that the Union of South Africa came into being. To the service of Lord Selborne, as well as of General Smuts, they devoted all the experience they had gained under the former’s predecessor, all their burning faith in the Empire and South Africa. Can we, however, looking back, say that, apart from the purely South African Kindergarten, Milner founded a “school” in the real sense of the word? This is a leading question—a question which has led to a great deal of controversy and 1 Lord Elton: Imperial Commonwealth, page 445. 2 L. S. Amery: The Times History of the War in South Africa, vol. VI, page 147.

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provoked various replies. As I see it, we are still entitled to talk of his school, even though some of its members now think and act on lines which differ very considerably from those laid down by Milner himself. In a letter that Lady Milner wrote to me on 2 May, 1946, she put the matter squarely: “The younger men he had worked with, Curtis, Lothian, Brand, all became internationalists and supported the League of Nations. My husband greatly regretted this. He thought they dropped the substance for the shadow,” True, it is possible that Curtis and Lothian had a greater faith in the League of Nations than Lord Milner had, and they may have allowed problems of a purely imperial nature to be a little overshadowed by the world plan. But the views they held had merely developed to meet the needs of the day, and while they differed in degree from Milner’s they were, in essence, the same. As this study is not confined to the evolution of British Imperialism in South Africa, it would necessarily be incom¬ plete without some survey, however brief, of the political ideas of the principal representatives of what I am tempted to call Lord Milner’s school. Before I go on to consider the work of Lothian, Amery and Curtis, therefore, I must return to the fountain-head, and recall the fact that Milner himself owed a great deal to Lord Cromer, his former chief in Egypt, on the one hand and to Sir George Parkin on the other. Parkin was originally Milner’s master, but at different times in his life he was also Milner’s disciple. “My life has been greatly influenced by your ideas, and in my new post I shall feel more than ever the need of your enthusiasm and broad, hopeful view of the imperial future,” Milner wrote to Parkin when he was on his way to South Africa in 1897.1 The following extract must also be quoted: “Parkin was, I believe, mainly instrumental in first interest¬ ing in Empire problems a great statesman who was recently lost to us. Lord Milner, one who has played as great a part as any man in the actual conduct of imperial affairs and in the shaping of our ideas on imperial problems.”2 George Robert Parkin was the son of a farmer, and was born in Canada in 1846. He is described in the Dictionary of 1 Letter dated 24 April, 1897, written on board the Norham Castle. Milner Papers, vol. I, page 42. s L. S. Amery: The Empire in the New Era, page 240.

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National Biography as an educationalist and imperialist. He taught for a time in a primary school, but in 1873, after he had graduated at the University of New Brunswick in Fredericton, he came to England on a year’s leave, and en¬ rolled as a non-collegiate student at Oxford. The speech he made on Imperial Federation created a stir, and as a result he was made Secretary of the Union, a most unusual distinc¬ tion for a freshman. In this way he came into contact with the Balliol group, and became particularly friendly with Asquith, Milner and Thomas Raleigh. In 1874 he returned to Canada, and was appointed Principal of the University of New Brunswick. In 1889 he gave up this post in order to devote his whole time to the Imperial Federation League which had come into being in Canada in 1885, a year after its inauguration in England. During 1889 he toured Australia as a delegate of the League, and made a series of important speeches on imperial questions.1 He returned to England where he remained until 1895, and during this period made a great impression with his various lectures, speeches and articles. “He has shifted the mind of England.”2 In 1892 his Imperial Federation, or the Problem of National Unity and Round the Empire were published. That same year he went to Canada as The Times’ special correspondent, and his articles were subsequently published in book form under the title of The Great Dominion. While he was in Canada, Parkin became Principal of Upper Canada College, Toronto, but at the end of seven years he retired from this post and returned to England, this time for good, having been appointed Chief Executive Secretary of the Rhodes Scholarship Trust in 1902. Cecil Rhodes’ idea of transforming the English University of Oxford into an Imperial University was enthusiastically taken up by Parkin. Right up to 1920 his Goring-on-Thames home was the meeting place for all Rhodes Scholars. Parkin, unlike Milner, never entered the imperial service; it is particularly important to remember that he was Canadian. Let me add one more tribute to him taken from his biography: “He was singularly unworldly, and looked on all questions rather from the moral than the political 1 From Andr£ Siegfried I gleaned the following fact. “Parkin told me,” he said, “that he was hissed because his listeners inferred from his speeches that the Colonial Pact would be reinforced.” a See The Times, 26 June, 1922.

lord milner’s school

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point of view.” In this he resembled the other Milnerites, all of whom were intellectuals and philosophers to a far greater degree than they were politicians. Philip Henry Kerr was twenty-eight years younger than Milner. One of the favourite “pupils” of the Kindergarten, he became, in the course of time, Milner’s devoted friend and most able ally. Like Milner, Kerr had been at Oxford—New College—and, like Milner, he had turned his thoughts very early on in his career towards the Empire. Unlike Milner, however, he came from a wealthy family. Kerr was barely twenty when he went out to the Transvaal to work, first under Sir Arthur Lawley and then under Milner himself. In 1905, Milner appointed him Joint Secretary of the Inter¬ colonial Council of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, and Secretary of the Railway Committee of the Central South African Railways. Kerr was undoubtedly one of the most brilliant members of the Kindergarten, and the reports he wrote on the problems of manual labour, trans¬ port, and on the racial question very soon became classics in South Africa. For several years he edited a review called The State, the aim of which was to win support for the proposed union of the four South African Republics. Kerr returned to London in 1910, where he was instru¬ mental with Milner and others in originating the Round Table Group; he became Chief Editor of its review, the first number of which appeared that same year. The career of Philip Kerr resembles Milner’s in more ways than one. While its focal point was the Empire, it was never¬ theless extremely varied. From 1916 until 1920 he was Private Secretary to Lloyd George. “Mr. Kerr gave me the assistance of a fine mind in all the work arising out of Imperial and Inter-Allied Conferences.”1 The tribute that Lloyd George paid at a later date to Kerr is strongly reminiscent of Goschen’s appreciation of Milner’s worth: “Mr. Philip Kerr was my constant comrade through the whole of that very dark, anxious period, and I wished for no better comrade or more stout-hearted. . . .”J Kerr, like Milner, took up journalism for a time. Milner had been co-editor of the Pall Mall Gazette; Kerr edited the ‘Lloyd George: War Memoirs, vol. Ill, page 1081. 2 Edward Grigg: “Philip Kerr, Marquess of Lothian: The American Speeches of Lord Lothian, page xxiii.

a Memoir.” In

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Daily Chronicle for a few months, and subsequently collabor¬ ated with Lionel Curtis, one of his Kindergarten friends, in editing The Prevention of War. In 1925 he became Executive Secretary of the Rhodes Trust; for the next four¬ teen years he acted in this capacity, which necessitated his making frequent visits to the Dominions and the United States. Kerr also had occasion to go to India on various occasions, notably in 1932, when he was chairman of a committee of inquiry into the problem of the Indian franchise. In Novem¬ ber, 1931, when Ramsay MacDonald’s Coalition Government was in power, Kerr became Under-Secretary of State for India. He, with others, played his part in the framing of the Government of India Act of 1935; under this Act, India was to become a Federal State and was to be given selfgovernment, with the proviso that the Viceroy’s authority should be absolute in the spheres of foreign policy and defence. Had the Act come into force India would shortly have acquired Dominion status; Congress rejected it, how¬ ever, and the Government of India Act remained a dead letter. For all that, the part played by Philip Kerr with regard to India was considerable, and his efforts certainly paved the way towards the ultimate solution. Incidentally it is worth noting that Kerr’s approach to certain constitutional ques¬ tions which arose in India was strongly influenced by his experience of analogous problems in South Africa. Shortly after the First World War Kerr paid several visits to Germany; although he himself had been one of the first to focus the red light on the German menace in 1910, he was now, like Milner, inclined to believe that it was still possible for Great Britain to make a lasting peace with her defeated enemy. But before long he was forced to change his mind; Kerr, who had become the Marquess of Lothian, had no illusions left about Nazi Germany when he went to Washington in 1939 as British Ambassador. In 1940, only one year later, utterly exhausted by the toll that his work had taken of him, Lothian died. Kerr, like Milner, always thought of himself as a citizen of the Empire as well as of Great Britain. He had never ceased to hope that the different parts of the Empire would draw still closer together, and had strongly favoured some form of federation. Kerr, however, went beyond the doctrine

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of his former chief; Milner, that out-and-out imperialist, had found no difficulty in conceiving of the Empire as an entity, independent of the rest of the world, but Kerr, particularly in the last years of his life, was increasingly absorbed by the world outside the Empire, by the United States and the 'Western European countries. In a speech he made in Oxford in 1935 he said: “The League, the Kellogg Pact and all the expedients of pacifism cannot end war or the evils which spring from the anarchy of statehoods . . . none of these methods can end war or create the conditions in which it is possible for mankind to live a free and civilized life. These will only be established when enough citizens of national states, while retaining their full autonomy in national affairs, are willing to form themselves into a world nation for common purposes, to enter into that organic and indissoluble bond which is the foundation, not of a League but of a Commonwealth of Nations.”1 Lothian thought that the British Empire no longer sufficed to guarantee the peace of Europe and that the only way in which that peace could be preserved was by forming a federal union comprising as many states as possible, with the AngloSaxon peoples as its pivotal point. His political ideas were deeply coloured by his religious convictions, and he believed that mankind, led by the people of his own race, should never cease from striving to create a heaven on earth. Yet he must not be regarded as a visionary, utterly lacking in commonsense. Nothing could be further from the truth, for as one of those who knew him best has said: “In the world of affairs his major interest was in politics. Though he was in spirit a visionary, he was in practice a statesman bent upon the service of mankind, and in this role, for all his inborn idealism, his instinct for the practical never deserted him.”2 Lionel Curtis, at one time Beit Lecturer on Colonial history at Oxford, resembles Lothian in many respects. As a thinker, an intellectual, he towers above all the erstwhile members of the Kindergarten. But he also played a highly important practical part between the years 1902 and 1910; he did a very great deal towards advancing the programme of reconstruction in the devastated areas of South Africa, 1 Lord Lothian: Pacifism is not enough, nor Patriotism either, the Burge Lecture, Oxford, 1935, page 46. 2 Edward Grigg: The American Speeches of Lord Lothian, page xxxi.

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and helped to lay the foundations of the Union of South Africa. He had a very large share in the development of Johannesburg, and in the institution of an organized system of municipal government in the Transvaal. In 1906 he resigned from the Civil Service, but remained in South Africa where he devoted himself entirely to the cause of the Union. In the Cambridge History of the British Empire, the work of Lionel Curtis is described as “prophetic inspiration.’’1 Curtis, too, was one of the originators of the Round Table; with Kerr he was one of the leaders of the movement for imperial reform at the beginning of the present century. He helped to draw up the Montagu-Chelmsford Report on India, and also collaborated in the establishment of the Irish Free State, but further than this he has had nothing whatever to do with politics proper. Unlike Milner and Kerr, he has never occupied any post in the Government. For many years he has had a decisive influence on British statesmen. Curtis and Milner held very many views in common. In all Curtis’s books the impression made on him by his experience in South Africa and by Lord Milner’s personality is plainly discernible. Amongst these books, The Problem of the Commonwealth, The Commonwealth of Nations and Civitas Dei rank high in imperial English literature. In 1919 Curtis was one of a varied staff who collaborated in The Idea of a League of Nations, for which H. G. Wells was responsible; others connected with it were Lord Grey, H. Wickham Steed, J. A. Spender, James Bryce, Gilbert Murray, A. E. Zimmern, and William Archer. One of the principal ideas of this interesting and valuable book is that of a Universal League of Nations—an idea that was taken up again at a later date and is under discussion today. “The Welshman is perhaps the best instance of all to show how completely participation in a great political synthesis is compatible with intense national peculiarity and self-respect.”2 The concluding sentence must also be quoted without comment: “The League of Nations cannot be a little thing; it is either to be a great thing in the world, an over-riding idea of a greater state, or nothing.”3 The only guarantee for the preservation of world peace is the creation of a truly powerful League of Nations set up on the concept of a Super-State. 1 Cambridge History of the British Empire, vol. VIII, page 630 2 The Idea of a League of Nations, page 35. 3 Ibid* page 44.

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Curtis, the apostle, has gone far beyond Milner’s ideas and has extended those of Lothian. According to him, the actual world situation in the last century was temporarily lost sight of because of Great Britain’s command of the seas. The author of Civitas Dei does not believe that “even the sovereign might of Great Britain, not even that of the United States, could ever create that sentiment of security which the free nations of the nineteenth century enjoyed.”1 He hopes fervently that an international Government will come into being whose authority derives directly from the peoples themselves. What is of the greatest interest to us is that Lord Milner’s essential aim-—-I might even say his one aim—was a close union of the British Empire rounded off at most by a closer entente with the United States of America, and excluding all countries foreign to the Empire. He had always believed that such an Imperial Union would be strong enough to preserve the peace of the Empire and the peace of the world. Lothian and Curtis entirely agreed with Milner so far as the ^ Empire was concerned. But they did not see eye to eye with Milner—Curtis even less so than Lothian—on the inter¬ national, or even the world plane.2 Curtis believes with Clarence Streit that the only hope for world peace lies in a World Federation, embracing the British Empire, the United States of America, Belgium, Holland, France, Scandi¬ navia, etc. Great Britain, having become too weak in a world grown too powerful, must try to consolidate her Empire by seeking the support of foreign allies, in addition to her own allies, and, thus strengthened, go on to assure the peace of the world. “It is from the Federation of the Empire that Curtis seeks consolidation. And it is from the extension of this con¬ solidation that he asks peace for all.”3 Here is a significant detail: Curtis suggested that Quebec should be the seat of this federated Super-State, modelled to some extent on the United States of America, which would have its own legal system, its own diplomatic and political personnel, its own army, navy and air force. Quoting from a speech of Milner’s in the House of Lords 1 Lionel Curtis: World War. Its Cause and Cure. 2 See in particular Lionel Curtis’s World War. Its Cause and Cure. 3 W. E. Rappard, in the Preface to Lionel Curtis’s Federation ou Guerre, page 11.

*08

LORD MILNER S SCHOOL

the words: “Nothing sharpens the mind so much as the naked truth,” Curds urges his fellow-countrymen to wake to the fact, amply proved by the last two wars, that their country is no longer powerful enough to carry out the tasks she has assumed. Fifty years earlier Joseph Chamberlain had hoped for an Anglo-American alliance, but the idea had been given little serious consideration. It had been left to Winston Churchill in our own time to turn Great Britain’s mind towards such an alliance. This question is still so red-hot that it cannot be touched on yet. We may well wonder whether future historians will not see in Joseph Chamberlain, Milner, Lothian and Curtis the forerunners of a new order of British Imperial or World Federation. However that may be, what makes such men as Lionel Curtis outstanding is, to quote Rappard: “idealism and realism, knowledge and faith, a deep and exact understanding of the past, and imaginative, almost apocalyptic visions of the future, practical experience and creative intuition.”1 Before I conclude this chapter I must say a few words about yet another of Milner’s disciples, the most faithful of them all, the man who has done the most to translate his master’s thoughts into action. L. S. Amery, the son of a civil servant, was born in India. He cannot be called a member of Milner’s Kindergarten in the same sense that Curtis, Lothian and the rest were members, but as quite a young man he was sent out to the Cape by The Times as war correspondent;2 he was thus brought into contact with Milner, and a friendship between the two men rapidly matured. In 1901 Milner asked young Amery to accompany him to the Transvaal as his personal secretary. As it happened, Amery had started on his monu¬ mental The Times History of the War in South Africa, the first volume of which came out in 1900, the seventh and last in 1909. He felt that he could not very well relinquish this work, and suggested to Milner that Buchan be chosen in his stead. The Times History of the War in South Africa is still regarded as the standard work on this subject. While Amery was its Chief Editor, and a number of authors contributed to it, he was actually responsible for the greater part of its 1 W. E. Rappard: Preface to Lionel Curtis’s Federation ou Guerre, page 13. a Amery’s school friend, Winston Churchill, was The Morning Post’s War Correspondent.

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subject matter, and the most important chapters are those written by Amery himself. It is impossible to make even a superficial study of the causes of the Boer War, the sequence of its military operations, the subsequent work of reconstruc¬ tion and the march towards the Union of South Africa, without referring to these seven volumes. It is true that, reading The Times History, we sense that its author weighted the scales in favour of Chamberlain and Milner, and dealt with events from the English point of view, yet I do not think I am going too far when I say that, with certain reservations, this massive work is, on the whole, impartial. During a recent interview which it was my privilege to enjoy with Mr. Amery I was able to form an idea of his profound admiration and affection for Lord Milner. He talked of that galaxy of great imperial statesmen who were Milner’s contemporaries, and unhesitatingly described him as “the greatest brain of them all.” He told me that he con¬ sidered it entirely logical that Milner should serve as the central figure for a study of the evolution of British Imperialism during the latter part of the nineteenth, up to and for the earlier years of the twentieth, century. He did not fail to draw my particular attention to Milner’s amazing modesty and utter absence of demagogy, and gave it as his opinion that it was due to this reserve, this self-effacement of his that he was not better known. In the years which preceded the First World War Amery took part with Milner in the campaign for the National Service League led by Lord Roberts. He was also actively connected with the Round Table, and I learnt from him that although Milner had written comparatively little for the review he had contributed greatly to its development and had presided at most of the editorial committees. Just before the First World War broke out Milner was asked by Joseph Chamberlain’s family to write his biography, and agreed to do so provided that Amery would collaborate with him. Amery consented, but unfortunately war was declared, and he pointed out to Milner that as, in all prob¬ ability, it would last for at least three years, and as they would both have their hands full, it was hazardous to begin on a book that might not be finished for a very long time to come.1 1 J. L. Garvin became Joseph Chamberlain’s biographer; the first three volumes of the Authorized Biography covering the years up to 1900 duly

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Amery, who was still comparatively young, saw active service during the first two years of the war in Flanders, France, and the Near East. Subsequently, while on the staff of the War Council at Versailles, he was in closest touch with the memorable occasion in March, 1918, when Milner proposed that Foch should be appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies. I have already described the Conference of Doullens, but it is interesting to recall at this juncture that Amery wrote of it as Milner’s greatest contribution to the final issue of the war. “It only became known owing to the accident that a very confidential report of his on the events of those days became public property. But even that report itself, written as it was only for the eyes of colleagues, was very far from doing justice to the extent of his achievement, for what he did was not only to establish unity of command, but also to select the Allied Commander.”1 Amery has made it plain that, on the eve of the Conference, Foch was practically out of the picture because of the unfortunate relations between Clemenceau and himself, and that it was entirely due to Milner’s insistence that his nomination as Commanderin-Chief of the Allied Forces was finally approved by the French. “The whole business was decided in half an hour’s conversation with M. Clemenceau. The Conference at Doullens next day only confirmed a conclusion which had already been reached by the two principals.”2 It was Amery who, as Assistant Secretary of the Imperial War Cabinet, drafted, under Lord Milner’s direction, the Balfour Declaration of 1917. Like Milner, Amery had always been sympathetic to the idea of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, and in one of his books he stressed the fact that the introduction in that particular part of the world of a con¬ siderable source of Western energy, allied to Great Britain, was an imperial necessity.3 In 1918, when Lord Milner was Colonial Secretary, he invited Amery to take office as his appeared, but Garvin died before he had completed his task. The fourth volume of Joseph Chamberlain’s biography, from 1900-6, has recently been published; it is the work of Julian Amery, L. S. Amery's son. Julian Amery is in process of writing a fifth volume. 1 The Times, 16 May, 1925: L. S. Amery: “Lord Milner, an apprecia¬ tion.” 2 The Times, 16 May, 1925. We have already seen that Milner was violently opposed to the nomination of P6tain, in whom he lacked all confi¬ dence, as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies. 3 The Forward View.

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Under-Secretary. Amery remained at the Colonial Office until February, 1921, the date of Milner’s resignation. Before I proceed to give a brief description of the broad outlines of Amery’s political doctrine and the extent to which it links up with that of Milner I must go back to my inter¬ view with him, and devote a few words to his opinion of the great proconsul’s concept of Empire. According to Amery, the present structure of the British Commonwealth of Nations was inherent in Milner’s conception of equal partnership. He would undoubtedly have preferred a more clearly-defined structure, a real federation for choice, or at least a fully effective development of the Imperial Cabinet system which he had done so much to develop during the First World War. But he would not have quarrelled with the definition of Dominion status as embodied in the conclusions of the 1926 Conference or in the Statute of Westminster, always on the assumption that the positive aspects of the conception of equal partnership predominated over the negative. “The ideal for which he lived and worked, and which his inspira¬ tion has so greatly quickened, was that of the British Empire united in free co-operation as a great instrument for human wellbeing.”1 Amery was, for many years. Secretary of State for the Colonies and Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.3 He was responsible for the inauguration and organization of the Imperial Conference over which Balfour presided in 1926.5 The limits of this critical survey do not permit me to dwell on the details of Amery’s work, and I must confine myself to what is essential to a study of the evolution of British Imperialism; I shall therefore turn to certain books which he has written and to certain of his speeches in which he has discussed the problem of the status and structure of the British Empire. Amery toured the Dominions in 1927 and 1928, and subsequently published in book form the most important of the speeches he had delivered overseas. This book, The Empire in the New Era, appeared in 1928, with a preface by Balfour; it clearly reflects the political doctrine and, if I may say so, the ideology of its author. Amery, like Milner, Lothian, Parkin and many others, was originally a 1 L. S. Amery: “Lord Milner, an appreciation,” The Times, 16 May, 1925. 2 He was Secretary of State for the Colonies from 1924-9, and Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs from 1925-9. 3 Blanche E. C. Dugdale: A. J. Balfour, vol. II, page 376.

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believer in Federation, but his federalism underwent a very considerable change and was ultimately transformed into “imperial co-operation.” But was not Amery following in Milner’s footsteps when he advocated the form of Empire defined by Balfour in his preface to The Empire in the New Era? “It may perhaps be supposed that complex loyalties are likely to be weakened loyalties. But this is surely a very great mistake. It may be just the other way. The undergraduate’s liking for his university is increased by his liking for his college. Imperial patriotism may be supported and enriched by Dominion patriotism, but never need impair it. We must all of us gain by feeling that we are citizens of a greater world than that which occupies our ordinary moments.” Amery, like Parkin and Milner, visualized the British Empire as a circle whose centre was everywhere, or, better still perhaps, nowhere: for the Londoner, the centre of the Empire, the British Empire, is in London and in the United Kingdom. But at the same time, the centre of this Empire, which is also the South African Empire for the South Africans, is in South Africa; it is in Canada for the Canadians, in Australia for the Australians, and so on. It is the equal responsibdity of each of its members. “It is in that sense that I ventured to say the other day that the Empire, like the Kingdom of Heaven, is something within us.”1 This con¬ ception of Amery’s is parallel in every respect with Milner’s and rounds off what Milner said in Johannesburg in 1905: “The true imperialist is also the best South African.” For the purpose of this book Amery’s doctrine is of even greater interest than that of Lothian or Curtis, for it leads to an understanding of Milner's. Furthermore, by studying Amery’s imperial policy it is possible to form an idea of what Milner’s point of view might have been in the ’thirties. Amery, like Milner, thought of the British Commonwealth of Nations as one vast family, all of whose members, while closely bound each to each by ties of mutual sentiment and common material interest, symbolized in a common Crown, none the less enjoyed independence and complete freedom. Going beyond Joseph Chamberlain and, in a measure, beyond Milner, Amery has definitely rejected any tendency towards centralization in the British Empire, and has for that 1 L. S. Amery: The Empire in the New Era, page 43. See also his Thoughts on the Constitution.

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reason placed all the more reliance on a fairly elastic form of union. Anything in the nature of actual federalism has seemed dangerous to him: “My own belief is that in our tentative, instinctive way we have discovered, in the con¬ ception of a freely co-operative Commonwealth, a new consti¬ tutional principle of immense hopefulness, not only for ourselves, but for the world.”1 Both when he held the posts of Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies after the First World War, and later on when he was Secretary of State for the Colonies and Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Amery realized the special importance of developing the Crown Colonies, and took every possible step to increase their prosperity and to improve their social and hygienic conditions. Here again he carried on and extended the work of Joseph Chamberlain and Lord Milner. As has already been said, Curtis, Lothian and others, not content with a union in the heart of the British Empire, looked further, aiming, in the first place, at a European federation, and ultimately at a world federation. Amery, far more practical, far less visionary, has always been sceptical as to the possibility of such a federal union; he is convinced that the nations would “never agree to pool their sovereignty” simply in order to assure world peace. If the American colonies decided to federate themselves, it was not in his view because they feared their quarrels would end in provoking a war, but essentially because they had such affinities with one another that they felt like one nation. The political unity of Germany or of the British Dominions was equally the result of a pre-existent national sentiment, while conversely the examples of Sweden and Norway, Great Britain and Ireland, and more recently of India, plainly showed that the existence of clashing national sentiments resulted in the break-up of a constitutional union, even though it reposed on an apparently solid democratic base. Amery pushed this point further still when he said that even had France accepted the offer made to her by Great Britain in 1940 when both countries were in the gravest danger, the Franco-Britannic Union that it tended towards could not possibly have lasted. What seemed to him of paramount importance was to consolidate British Imperial Union and to strengthen as much as possible Anglo-American understanding and co-operation. Amery’s basic double 1 L. S. Amery:

The Framework of the Future, page 16.

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objective was precisely that at which Milner himself had always aimed. In a speech in the House of Commons on 4 October, 1938, just after the Munich Agreement, Amery dwelt on the impli¬ cations of this event, and what he said, as well as the manner in which he said it, was typically Milnerian: “We cannot afford any longer to be a weak, unorganized, go-as-you-please nation in face of the organized and disciplined adversaries with whom we shall have to deal. If our freedom means any¬ thing to us, we must make sacrifices to preserve it during the breathing space which has been secured for us. The first sacrifice, I suggest—and I confess I do it with diffidence and in all humility—is that we should make some sacrifice of our party differences.”1 Just as Milner had appealed for con¬ scription on the eve of 1914, so now Amery pleaded passionately for compulsory national service.2 The social aspect seemed extremely important to him, and in addition to the speeding-up of military preparations he demanded that the necessary measures should be taken without delay to improve the living and working conditions of the people. His peroration is worth recording: “Are we to sink back once again into the complacent lethargy and futile domestic wrangling of the last few years and months, only to awaken when it is too late to avert irrevocable disaster?”3 Amery has always been one of the most ardent supporters of Imperial Preference, maintaining that it was a decisive factor in a close and fruitful co-operation between the various parts of the Empire. Lastly, during the critical years between 1940-5, Amery was Secretary of State for India in Winston Churchill’s Coalition Government. Mutatis mutandis, Amery’s work in this capacity calls to mind Milner’s anxieties and achievements in Egypt, as well as in South Africa, but with this difference: that Milner found himself in situ as the representative of the British Government, while Amery was not called upon, in sum, to intervene in local affairs, his role being to ensure liaison between the British Government and India, and to be 1 Debate on Munich Agreement, 4 October, 1938. Hansard Papers. See also J. Benda: Discours d la Nation Europienne. a Amery had been an active member, with Milner, of the National Service League led in the years that preceded the 1914-18 War by Lord Roberts. * Debate on Munich Agreement, op. cit.

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India’s advocate in the heart of the British Cabinet. These five years were amongst the gravest in the history of India; during the whole of this period India was in fact one of the most delicate points in the British Empire. To the problems of administration and economic progress were added excep¬ tionally grave questions of political and military import. In Nehru, Jinnah, the different princes, and above all in Gandhi, Amery had “partners” who taxed his powers of diplomacy, resourcefulness and skill to the utmost. It was he who so aptly described the remarkable mixture in Gandhi of “saintly asceticism and political astuteness.” In articles of comparatively recent date Amery has em¬ phasized that the work accomplished by the British in India is one of the greatest romances in history. Milner himself had said the same of the achievements of his fellow-countrymen in Egypt. It was not by right of conquest that England had established herself in India, she owed her original footing to the British East India Company, which was regarded with little favour by those at home in its earlier years. The dissolution of the Moghul Empire a couple of cen¬ turies ago had forced the British East India Company to organize itself on a military basis in order to protect itself against the anarchy that was rife, and the misery of the country led it to extend the sphere of its jurisdiction. After almost a hundred years of rivalry between France and Eng¬ land, the British East India Company ended up supreme, thanks to England’s naval superiority and her infinitely greater talent for economic and commercial penetration. By about the middle of the nineteenth century the whole of India, today containing a population of some 400,000,000, was under British control. “In the sheer anarchy and unspeak¬ able misery of the time, and subsequently also under the menace of French aggression, the local agents of a British company found themselves compelled progressively to take over an ever-widening field of authority.”1 The British inter¬ vention in India and Amery’s explanation of it are strongly reminiscent of British intervention in Egypt and the presence in that country, during several decades, of British troops whose purpose was to “restore” and subsequently maintain order. It must be recognized that it was to the British that India 1 L. S. Amery: India, Present and Future, Address to the American Outpost, 6 May, 1943.

2l6

lord milner’s school

owed her internal peace, a good administration, the roads that are of such valuable aid in the periodic struggles against famine and that are arteries for men and merchandise, and the superb system of irrigation even more extensive than that in Egypt. Apart from these material gains, it is from the British that India has acquired her advanced ideas of political govern¬ ment and of the rights of the individual and of democracy. Fully conscious of the part played by the British and of the superiority of British administration, Amery, Milner’s disciple, declared during the time that he was Secretary of State for India: “We have no reason to be ashamed of our past record in India. Never, if I may venture to echo certain great words used by the Prime Minister in a different context, never have so few done so much for the wellbeing of so many, so much to dispel fear and alleviate want, as was done for the toiling millions of India by a handful of British adminis¬ trators in the last century. The work was done, it is true, within the limitations of the outlook of the age and of the local conditions of the India of that time, but it was good and enduring work for all that. It succeeded because those who did it believed in their task and believed in themselves, because we who sent them out believed in ourselves and had faith in our mission in the world.”1 The above passage speaks for itself; it was in a sense Amery’s credo with regard to the duty of the British in India and their Imperial mission. Through this concept Amery takes his place with the great British imperialists, thinkers or men of action, who preceded him: Milner, Curzon, Chamberlain, Kipling. Milner, as we have seen, was never called upon to play any special part in the settlement of the India problem. It seems worth while, however, to say a word or two, while we are on the subject, of the way in which Amery dealt with it, since it seems that we can see Lord Milner's ideas developing through his. In 1935 the British Government had drawn up the Government of India Act which, as we know, was repudiated by Congress. When Amery became Secretary of State for India in 1940 he declared that the sooner India awoke to the idea of her freedom, the more likely it was that she would desire to maintain close relations with the British Commonwealth. India had made a vast contribution to the 1 Speech in the House of Commons. See Hansard, 3 March, 1943.

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war effort, both in men and materials, far vaster in fact than is generally known. Amery realized that an Anglo-Indian entente could only be of lasting value if it were voluntarily accepted by all the parties concerned, in particular by the Moslem minority. In 1942, on his initiative, His Majesty’s Government sent out a special mission to India led by Sir Stafford Cripps; Sir Stafford made it clear that, once the war was over, India could, under a constitution of her own devising, achieve the same complete independence as the other Dominions, even to the extent of leaving the Common¬ wealth if she so wished. Meanwhile he proposed that even while the war was in progress the leaders of the various Indian political parties should be represented on the Vice¬ roy’s Executive, and should have full control of all the Ministerial Departments, except that of the Commander-inChief. These proposals, which Nehru was disposed to accept, were rejected by Congress at Gandhi’s instigation. Gandhi, indeed, regarded this offer from the British as nothing more than a post-dated cheque drawn on a bank about to close its doors. We know what happened next. In March, 1946, a fresh Mission was sent to India by the Labour Government with the object of dispelling the suspicions that were being sedulously nurtured in that country as to Great Britain’s true purpose. It was the Mission’s task once again to assure India that England wished to accord her the greatest possible measure of liberty and to induce the various Indian leaders to agree amongst themselves as to the best means of approaching the problem. But the proposals of the Mission failed in the end to overcome the suspicion which the policy of Congress had created in the minds of the Moslem minority. In the sequel the partition of the sub-continent into two separate states, India and Pakistan, became inevitable. Of these India has become a republic. But her desire to remain within the Commonwealth, accepting the King as the symbol of its unity, though not as India’s actual sovereign, was agreed to by the rest of the Commonwealth. While he was at the head of the India Office, and more especially in 1943, Amery hoped that the Indian leaders would ultimately reach agreement amongst themselves, and that, in the final analysis, it should be left to them to decide what political system should be adopted for India. He

2i8

lord milner’s school

thought, not without reason, that no solution could meet with success unless it came from the Indians themselves. In a speech in the House of Commons he stressed the fact that no problem affected the future peace of Asia, the future peace of the world, as greatly as that of India, and went on: “We cannot solve it by shrinking from our responsibilities to the people of India and to the allied cause while the enemy is at India’s gates. We can help to solve it only by our continuing goodwill to India, by our active interest in India, by our encouragement of every effort Indians must make to find their own way out of their present deadlock; above all, it may be, by imparting to them some measure of our own faith in our common future.”1 In 1947 Amery gave it as his opinion that practically the whole country was in agreement as to the manner in which the Indian question should be settled. “A vital problem, full of incalculable consequences, for good or ill, not only for the British Empire, but for the peace of the world.”2 To those who thought that India would withdraw farther and farther from the British Empire, he retorted that a free India would be a far better “partner” to Great Britain than an India who considered herself “occupied.” His idea was that a free association of this “continent” with the British Common¬ wealth would be the best possible solution for the British Empire as well as for India herself. He believed that, for reasons of sentiment as well as of expediency, India would remain under one form or another within the British Commonwealth of Nations. The chief factors were the influence of the British on the political and legal systems in India, the use of the English language amongst the Indians of the different provinces, and the practical difficulties involved in severing existing ties binding the British and Indians together. In Amery’s view, in order to avoid shattering the unity of the Commonwealth, the best plan was to allow the Indians to decide their own future. We have already seen that he, like so many of his fellow-countrymen, never doubted for a single moment the superiority of the British and the British Empire. To an unprejudiced observer it seems plain that when he suggested that it should be left to the Indians 1 House of Commons, 3 March, 1943. See Hansard. 3 L. S. Amery: “La Question de l’lnde,” in Le Monde Frangais, March,

1947-

lord milner’s school

219

to solve their own problem he was convinced—how could he be otherwise?—that sooner or later India would not be able to, or would not wish to, remain outside the circle of the great British family. A hundred years earlier Macaulay, that eminent statesman and historian, had declared in the House of Commons that the day when India became free would be the proudest day in the annals of the country; Amery awaited that day with equal confidence. He believed that it would represent a vital stage in the progress of India on the road to real independence in her relations with the outside world and to her internal freedom; he thought with the utmost sincerity that India “may come to understand that, in future years, not only the defence of her material interests, but also her own spiritual aspirations will tend to keep her, in one shape or another, within the association which has behind it three centuries of a common history.”1 We may allow ourselves to suppose that if the French Government found itself confronted with a similar problem and decided to give a hypothetical country within its Empire self-government, it would immediately take the appropriate steps for the withdrawal of all French civil servants, administrators and troops and for the winding-up of all business concerns, etc., in that country. In the case of the British, the British Empire and His Majesty’s Government, what happened was a very different story. It was decided to withdraw from India. The date for this withdrawal was even fixed, but during the period of transition British civil servants, with the help of their Indian colleagues, continued to deal with the building-up of India’s food reserves; the construction of important public works, especially hydro-electric dams and irrigation works, was kept under consideration, and plans for the vigorous industrialization of the country were discussed. Baldev Singh, the new Minister of Defence, a Sikh, voiced his appreciation of the valuable work done by British officers in the Indian Army, and said he trusted that they would con¬ tinue to help with the work of “Indianization.” Great Britain presented India with three cruisers, and it was expected that the two navies would work together in harmony. The fervent wish expressed by Amery explains no small part of the success of the British in colonial affairs. He hoped during the period 1 L. S. Amery: “La Question de l’lnde,” in Le Monde Frangais, March, 1947-

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of transition to see, he said: “the European members of the various assemblies, and, more generally, the members of the British business community, by their constant helpfulness, their self-effacing attitude and their sympathy, exercising a happy influence on the outlook of their Indian colleagues and so paving the way to fruitful collaboration.”' Balfour described Amery as an impassioned advocate of Imperial co-operation.1 2 The proof is to be found in his approach to the Indian question. It only remains for me to conclude this book by surveying broadly the evolution of the British Empire after Milner’s death and to see to what an extent the words uttered by Amery in 1928 hold good today: “Today we are only at the beginning of the British Empire, and wonderful as its history has been in the past, the most splendid chapters of that history are still to be written. All we need is vision, faith and will; the broad view, the forward view, the courage to act.”3 1 L. S. Amery: “La Question de l’lnde,” in Le Monde Frangais, March, 19472 Lord Balfour in L. S. Amery’s The Empire in the New Era, page xi. 3 L. S. Amery: The Empire in the New Era, page 12.

CONCLUSION I conclude this study I must try to show how matters stand today. In the few pages that follow my aim has been to complete the pattern which I began to shape in the Intro¬ duction, and to sketch the evolution of British Imperialism and the Commonwealth after Milner’s death. I shall not dwell in detail on the relations between Great Britain and the various members of the Commonwealth, nor on the internal structure and regime of the Commonwealth’s component countries. What I shall attempt to do is to give a picture of the whole, a picture of the structure and status of the British Commonwealth of Nations. It is a difficult task that I have set myself. Sir Charles Lucas, one of the greatest authorities on imperial affairs, reviewing Basil Worsfold’s important book, The Empire on the Anvil, wrote: “The book would not be so good as it is if it were not so clear and so logical. But the more clear and logical reasoning and writing on these Empire problems is, the less it approximates to actual facts, because the Empire, if it has not organic unity, has in the most extraordinary degree unity of another kind, a unity of contradictions.”1 What is amazing, in fact, is that, despite its unusual structure, this Empire should hold together and develop. Milner liked to speak of “two Empires”: the Colonial Empire, consisting of the Crown Colonies, and the Common¬ wealth, consisting of the Dominions. That distinction is still valid: perhaps it is even more apt today than it was then. Andr£ Siegfried has hit on a new formula, that of external association, which goes beyond Milner’s two Empires, and does not apply either to the Colonies or the Dominions, properly speaking. After considering the special position of Ireland and India—the position which may be that of the Union of South Africa later on—he thinks that certain members of the British Commonwealth, while they are not part, and will not form part, of the family, may wish to Before

1 Sir Charles Lucas in The Nineteenth Century and After, 1916.

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CONCLUSION

remain within the system, either for economic reasons or reasons of security because of their need to be supported in their foreign policy by such a power as the British Empire. This external association might lead to excellent results, par¬ ticularly in the cases of Ireland and India. Sentiment, says Siegfried, does not come into the picture; what does come in is commonsense, or, better still, necessity.1 There is nothing without historical precedent in the Crown Colony group, since it is strictly subordinated to London. On the other hand, the self-governing Dominions, which sign treaties in their own right, which have their own ambassadors and plenipotentiaries, and which consider them¬ selves to be, not without reason, on a par with Great Britain, constitute a unique and unprecedented structure. As I said in the Introduction, the origin of this structure goes back to the famous Durham Report of 1839. The Durham Report, indeed, is the key to the whole system. At the other end of the scale is the Balfour Report, which, almost a hundred years later, was the normal and logical outcome of the Durham Report. It is essential to bear in mind at this juncture the basic text of the Balfour Report, since it contains a definition of the true status of the British Empire which still holds good today. Dealing with the relations between the Dominions, including in that description the United Kingdom itself. Lord Balfour described the Dominions as: “autonomous com¬ munities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or internal affairs, although united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.” This is the only italicized paragraph in the Report.2 In this passage Balfour made it plain that it was the duty of the members of the Commonwealth, who were one under the Crown, to co-operate with and consult one another. But what emerges most clearly is the idea of equality. Before going any further it is interesting to set down two 1 See Andr6 Siegfried’s recent study on South Africa in Figaro, JulyOctober, 1948. 1 But the italics, Mr. Amery told me, were unintentional I The passage had been underlined simply in order to mark the place and for no other reason; the printer took it that italics were indicated, and it was not thought necessary to make a last-minute alteration in the proofs.

CONCLUSION

223

conflicting ideas regarding the origin of the Balfour Report. In answer to a question of mine, Lady Milner wrote me a letter in which she categorically denied that it had been inspired by her husband’s ideas, and asserted that, had he been alive at the time when it was drawn up, he would have opposed it heart and soul.1 On the other hand, that most reliable writer, B. K. Long, who had been in close touch with Milner, particularly after the First World War, maintained that Milner was one of the “fathers” of the Report of 1926. Long, who was Dominions Editor of The Times from 1913-21, and who subsequently became Chief Editor of the Cape Times, a member of the South African Parliament, and a friend and disciple of Smuts, recorded the conversations he had had in London in 1917 with Sir Robert Borden, then Prime Minister of Canada. Borden thought that the time was ripe for the Dominions to become independent and to cease to be regarded as “Colonies of Great Britain.” “They have proved their right to full nationhood,” he had said. Borden had asked Long to support this idea in The Times. In 1917 John Dafoe, Chief Editor of the Winnipeg Free Press and an extremely influential publicist, had at Borden’s request col¬ laborated with Long, and possibly with Smuts, in roughing out a statute for the Dominions, the chief clauses of which were to be taken up again in 1926. “Lord Milner was from the first one of the most enthusiastic and constructive champions of the new idea,” wrote Long. A little farther on, he added: “Milner, with his far-ranging and always precise intelligence, his realism and his courage, would not, I am sure, have agreed that any limit could be placed on Dominion autonomy. Geoffrey Dawson was willingly guided by Milner, and had plenty of courage and realism on his own account. . . . Balfour was more in Milner’s confidence than any other British Cabinet Minister at that time. He may quite well have then had planted in his mind the roots of what was to emerge, nine years later, as his supremely wise and subtle draft of the Imperial Conference Declaration of 1926.”2 Although Milner, when he had first begun to put his policy into effect and for a fairly long time afterwards, had been opposed to complete autonomy for the Dominions, and had been a keen supporter of federalism within the Empire, he

1 Letter dated 2 May, 1946. 2 B. K. Long: In Smuts’s Camp, pages 52-3.

224

CONCLUSION

had considerably modified his views. He and his school had originally been in favour of the centralization for which Joseph Chamberlain had hoped, but later on they had deliberately discarded this system in favour of one that was far more elastic, involving free co-operation and Imperial Conferences; this seemed to them the best and possibly the only solution for a powerful and viable Empire.1 One other passage from the Balfour Report must be quoted: “The principles of equality and similarity, appro¬ priate to status, do not universally extend to function. Here we require something more than immutable dogmas. For example, to deal with questions of diplomacy and questions of defence we require also flexible machinery—machinery which can, from time to time, be adapted to the changing circumstances of the world.” The Balfour Report, second to none in importance, laid its emphasis, not on the Colonial Empire, but on the British Commonwealth of Nations, and so gave a kind of charter to this Commonwealth. The various Dominions welcomed the Report with the utmost warmth, and Mackenzie King, then Prime Minister of Canada, who had said when the Con¬ ference opened in 1926 that it was difficult even for British statesmen to determine the exact juridical structure of the Empire, declared in the Canadian Parliament on 29 March, 1927, that: “The transition from a relationship within the Empire of Imperial control and Colonial subordination to one of equality of status, with free co-operation between the different parts, is the greatest political transition that possibly the world has witnessed, the most momentous and the most unprecedented development of modern times.”2 The actual Charter of the Commonwealth was given its legal shape five years after the publication of the Balfour Report. Today the structure of the British Empire rests upon the Statute of Westminster which was passed on its third reading in the Commons by three hundred and fifty votes to fifty on 24 November, 1931, and which received the royal sanction on 11 December of that year. Article 12 stipulated that this Act should be known as “The Statute of West¬ minster, 1931,” and its sub-title made it clear that the object 1 See also L. S. Amery: “Empire and Commonwealth” in Framework of the Future, pages 4-18. * Quoted by H. Duncan Hall in The Balfour Report and its Historical Background, World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, page 587.

CONCLUSION

225

of the Act was to put into effect certain resolutions voted at the Imperial Conferences in 1926 and 1930.1 The Statute of Westminster lays down that: “The Crown is the symbol of the Free Association of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.” It represents the peak of the progressive ascent of the Dominions towards equality. From then onwards the term “British Empire” was no longer used in official texts and documents, and a distinction was made between the British Commonwealth of Nations and the Colonial Empire,2 the very distinction used for the first time by Lord Milner in 1908. The term Dominion defined in Article 1 was applied to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, the Irish Free State3 and Newfound¬ land. The Parliaments of the Dominions had the right to modify or abrogate Acts passed by the Parliament of Great Britain.4 The Statute of Westminster further stated that henceforth the term “Colony” could not apply to any province or State that formed part of a Dominion. I must repeat that allegiance to the King was the essential factor in the unity of the British Commonwealth. The supreme executive power is the King, but he is a parlia¬ mentary King. The memorandum prepared by Sir Robert Borden and submitted to the British Government by the Prime Ministers of the Dominions in 1919 contained the words: “The Crown is the supreme power in the United Kingdom and in all the Dominions, but it acts on the recom¬ mendations of the different Cabinets established in the different constitutional units.” The Government in London was no longer the Imperial Government. Governmental and legislative unity no longer existed, and the British Govern¬ ment could only pass an Act applying to a Dominion after consultation and with the approval of the Dominion Govern¬ ment. The British Government represented England, Scot¬ land, Wales and Northern Ireland, but not the Empire. There could no longer be any question of a Federal State. The structure of the British Commonwealth is founded on a Statute sui generis, which has no precedent in history. Even as I write I feel I am being overtaken by the rapid

1 2 3

K. C. Wheare: The Statute of Westminster. Crown Colonies plus Protectorates plus Mandated Territories. Since then Eire has voluntarily withdrawn, and India, Pakistan and Ceylon have in their turn become Dominions. 4 Article 2. LMB-H

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CONCLUSION

march of events. From n to 22 October, 1948, a Conference of the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth was held in London. Some were already embarrassed by the term “Com¬ monwealth.” And why British Commonwealth? Neither Pakistan nor Ceylon was British; Canada and the Union of South Africa were only partly so; only Australia and New Zealand were entirely British. In his speech the King made use of an expression which most happily applied to all: “Our brotherhood of Nations. . . Let it be said that, while constitutionally the Dominions and Great Britain are equal, they are not on a par in the practical sense. Andre Siegfried, with great insight, put the matter wittily when, speaking of the Dominions in relation to London, he described the former as sons who had attained their majority, but who were only too glad to apply to their father for help and pocket-money! He has since corrected his own definition: now, says Siegfried, it is paterfamilias who has fallen on hard times and is compelled to beg from his sons who are flourishing exceedingly! The case has altered with a vengeance! The office of Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs (now called Commonwealth Relations), which was created in 1925, assures liaison between the Governments of the Empire and the British Government. A British statesman defined it as “a Foreign Office with a family feeling,” and that is exactly what it is. One of the strongest ties which unites the members of the Commonwealth under the Crown is family feeling. The High Commissionerships of the various Dominions in London are continually widening their scope. There is more and more resort to personal contact when the need for con¬ sultation between the Dominions and Great Britain arises. In every Dominion there is both a Minister for External Affairs and a United Kingdom High Commissioner. Here we have a substitution for diplomacy, according to Andre Siegfried—a rejuvenated political liaison. Blanche Dugdale, Balfour’s niece and biographer, com¬ menting on the work of the great statesman, adds cautiously: “The New Empire has yet to be tested. The last piece of work to which Balfour put his hand is still in the looms of current history.’” Today it seems as though the New Empire has survived the test. In 1939 every member of the 1 Blanche E. C. Dugdale: Arthur James Balfour, vol. II, page 384.

CONCLUSION

227

Dominions cried "Adsum!” when Great Britain called the roll; their response was as prompt, and even more effective perhaps, than it had been on the eve of 1914. Dominion forces fought with the utmost gallantry.1 And when hostilities ended, the Dominions resumed their place in the world scheme with their own hopes and fears—hopes and fears that turned nevertheless on Great Britain, and sometimes on the United States. They continued to stand shoulder to shoulder with Great Britain, just as children stand, whether they will or no, beside their big brother. If any changes take place in the heart of the Commonwealth they occur within the frame¬ work of the normal—we might say the spontaneous—evolution of this political structure; the fact that it is subject to evolution, that it is flexible, accounts for its strength, and at the same time guarantees its solidarity. We have quite clearly seen that the tendency of the Dominions is away from the Metropolis; but even those of them who are loudest in proclaiming their equality of international status with Great Britain realize how greatly it is to their advantage to remain members of the British Commonwealth—an advantage which nothing would induce them to relinquish. We have only to think of the threat that came—and may come again—from the Far East, for instance, to appreciate the fact that the best guarantee of the liberty of Australia and New Zealand is the British Navy. As for the other Dominions, they too are aware that, while they are not threatened from that quarter, their greatest hope of security is to remain within the Commonwealth. Economic, financial and commercial considerations are not as important as they were in the past. The City of London has lost something of its pomp and pride, and the Sterling Area, while it still exists, is not as powerful as it was fifteen years ago. But the Colonial Empire—the Crown Colonies plus the Protectorates plus the Mandated Territories—still requires British capital. It is not, however, the mere need for

1 Recently published statistics enable us to appreciate to the full the contribution made by the Dominions to the war effort. The Union of South Africa, with a white population of 2,200,000, sent over more than 100,000 fighting men; Australia, whose population numbers 7,000,000, raised an army of 900,000 men; while New Zealand, with a population of barely 1,700,000, mustered almost 200,000 men. As for Canada, out of her population of some 11,500,000 she contributed 250,000 men to the Air Force, 500,000 to the Army, 74,000 to the Navy, and 54,000 to the Merchant Ser¬ vice_a very generous effort. We must not forget the 2,500,000 recruits from India, the Jewish Brigade from Palestine, etc.

228

CONCLUSION

money that forms the connecting link. The British Empire was founded on the basis of a common origin, a common language, and the members of the British Commonwealth have, broadly speaking, the same scale of values, the same standards of good and evil, the same conceptions of public life and private life. Andre Siegfried, the greatest living foreign authority on the British Empire, has pronounced it to be a civilization, a way of life. In developing this almost classic line of thought, he means us to understand that it is precisely this which makes for the unity of the Common¬ wealth. Thus within a network of strong interests, mutual hopes and the feeling of kinship, the Commonwealth is held fast in unity. This very network, as I see it, is of the essence of the Constitution of the Fourth British Empire. All these ties, constitutional, feudal, international, political; the bonds of religion and affection, even sometimes those arising from financial and economic interests, undoubtedly contribute towards the unity of the Commonwealth. There is actually no discrepancy between this unity and the independence of the members of the Commonwealth; the two ideas are com¬ plementary. Here we have one of the most outstanding characteristics of this Empire — “the Empire of the Dominions.” By and large, the system of Imperial Preference regulates trade relations between the various members of the Common¬ wealth. From the beginning of the twentieth century, as I have shown, the Dominions had been in favour of Tariff Reform and Imperial Preference, but the British Government had made comparatively few concessions. It was not until the Ottawa Conference, after the world economic depression of 1931, that a fresh series of preferences was set up. These tariffs, however, had to be constantly altered and brought up to date. While it can be said that the system of Imperial Preference, so ardently advocated by Joseph Chamberlain in the first place and subsequently by Lord Milner, was one of the basic factors in the structure of the Commonwealth, the tariffs instituted in 1932 were considerably relaxed, especially from 1939 onwards. This time the Dominions insisted that trade with all countries should be developed more fully. As it happened, the economic agreements reached at Ottawa were never universally popular in the Dominions, and today it seems as if Canada at least would like to withdraw from

CONCLUSION

22 9

them. Because of the financial and economic crisis in Great Britain, the Dominions rely on her less and less. Lord Milner had always been particularly set on the development of the Colonies. Winston Churchill’s wartime Coalition Government attached great importance to the economic expansion of these territories; the subsequent Labour Government was equally anxious to attain this goal. In February, 1940, the Government had submitted a State¬ ment of Policy on Colonial Development and Welfare to Parliament, which drew attention to the fact that a great many Colonies lacked the capital to finance survey and research work and large-scale schemes of expansion, and were not in a position to acquire the services of the administrative and technical personnel indispensable to their full develop¬ ment. Under the Colonial Resources Development Act of 1948 there have since also been set up a Colonial Development Corporation with a capital of approximately £100,000,000 and an Overseas Food Corporation with an available capital of £50,000,000. The object was, not to cut out private enterprise, but to facilitate the economic develop¬ ment of the Colonies to the utmost and on the largest possible scale. These Corporations were instituted, in fact, to comple¬ ment the work that was already being done in the sphere of Colonial expansion. Their capital of one hundred and fifty millions, which is actually nominal and has no ceiling, is considerable, particularly when we remember that, thanks to the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945, there already existed a fund of £120,000,000 for the development of land and river communications, the improvement of agriculture, the extension of medical and sanitary services in the Colonies, etc. Amongst the activities of the Colonial Development Corporation mention must be made of the now abandoned ground-nut scheme for the semi-arid wastes of Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia and Kenya, by which it was hoped to make good the world shortage of oils and fats; the cultivation of thousands more acres of rice in Sarawak, Borneo and Sierra Leone; the extension of the cocoa plantations in West Africa; the large-scale planting of cotton in East Africa, and of tobacco and tea in Rhodesia and other parts of Africa; sugar-cane in other territories, etc. The aim has been first and foremost to raise the economic and social standards of certain Colonial territories, working in close collaboration

230

CONCLUSION

with the Colonial Office and the various Colonial Govern¬ ments. Apart from this the object was to furnish Great Britain, and also the world markets, with key-products by the introduction into the Colonies of modern machinery and modern methods. The Times of 26 June, 1947, emphasized the warm reception given by the House to Mr. Creech-Jones, who was then Secretary of State for the Colonies. The programme that he laid before the Commons—a programme whose importance was obvious—included most of the measures that Lord Milner had been in favour of at the time of the work of reconstruction in South Africa, some fifty years earlier. The steps recently taken by the British Government in this field show that the continuity of British Imperial policy remains unbroken from the first years of the twentieth century down to the present day. Here once again Milner proved himself a forerunner; he had always seen that the economic development of the Colonies was both a pledge of imperial unity and a condition of the prosperity of the Mother Country. Colonial problems, however, are not always in the foreground, and the Briton of today takes little more interest in them than the Briton of 1900. For all this, the fact must not be allowed to go unnoticed that, although the Left has always been by tradition anti-imperialist, the Labour party has realized in the last few years the extreme importance of the Commonwealth. In April, 1944, during a notable debate in the House of Commons, Arthur Green¬ wood, referring to the Empire, said: “We were the last and greatest of the freebooters, and we got most out of it,” Another Labour M.P. asserted that if the imperial armies were to be amalgamated, it would constitute the first step towards the ideal of an armed international force. Whether he was right or not, the fact that the Left, formerly so anti¬ imperial both in feeling and on principle, now possesses an “Imperial conscience” is a sign that times have indeed changed. Another sign, no less remarkable, is the new attitude now being adopted towards Imperial policy in relation to European policy. Before the war the partisans of a powerful British Empire were mostly to be found amongst those groups tending towards an isolationist policy with regard to Europe. They claimed that Great Britain’s mission lay in the British

CONCLUSION

231

Empire, and that European affairs were no concern of hers. This attitude has been equally reversed, however, and nowadays those who support the policy of close collaboration with the Dominions have, on more than one occasion, been the very ones to advocate a strategic and economic liaison between Great Britain and Western Europe. Today such men as Amery, Churchill and Curtis would like to see a political bloc under British control which would re-unite the overseas Empire and the continent of Europe to London. Neither the Labour party nor the Conservative party has any intention of abolishing Imperial Preference to please America. Far from entertaining any such idea, indeed, they go so far as to hope for a closer economic union between Great Britain and the Commonwealth; round such a core the other nations of Europe would group themselves. The belief is prevalent in London that Great Britain and her Empire will not be able to remain on the same level as the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. unless such a union comes into being. It must not be forgotten at this point that, while the menace of the “Russian Colossus” and the might of America had not yet come into the picture, Joseph Chamberlain, and sub¬ sequently Milner and his school, had always been ardent supporters of a similar economic Imperial policy. But, as readers will have noticed for themselves, it is purely because of the economic crisis—and how suggestive this is of the Ottawa Agreements of 1932 that were only arrived at after the world economic depression in 1931—that the idea of an Imperial Economic Union has recently been taken up again. Too often it is the statesman’s lot to be the voice crying in the wilderness. When everything is taken into consideration, therefore, I think it may be fairly said that, both with regard to the political structure of the British Empire and the economic development, the economic unity of the Commonwealth, Lord Milner helped to prepare the way, and was foremost amongst those who pointed out the road which is still being followed today towards the evolution of the Empire. And this takes me back to what I have said in the course of this study: that Lord Milner, by virtue of his work in Egypt, South Africa and, lastly, in London, by virtue of what he said and what he wrote, can truly be called one of the greatest servants of the British Empire, and what is more, one of the fathers of

232

CONCLUSION

the British Commonwealth as it exists today.1 His work helps us to arrive at an understanding of British Imperial evolution and will continue to serve as a guide for generations to come. Paul Valery, in one of his happiest definitions, remarked that: “those who were neither executed nor executioners have disappeared completely from the pages of history,” adding: “Unless you are the victim or the headsman you are entirely negligible!”2 Rare, indeed, were the occasions when Lord Milner courted publicity. His one preoccupation was to carry out the task entrusted to him with absolute integrity, discretion and sincerity. There is a tendency to think of him as a half-forgotten, matter-of-fact figure. But do not his name and his achievement deserve, on the contrary, a high and, indeed, the highest place in the history of British Imperialism? 1 Nevertheless, as I have already said about Egypt, it seems to me more than doubtful that Milner anticipated or would have approved of the withdrawal of the British from that country and from India. 2 Paul Valery: Mauvaises Pensees et autres, page 97.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1 he bibliography of British Imperialism is very large and the

short bibliography included here does not pretend to exhaustive. I have been concerned merely to indicate documents and works I have consulted, and to reveal what the principal sources and most interesting publications further study of the questions treated in the book. Where certain books, mentioned below, themselves contain bibliographies, this has been indicated in brackets.

be the are for full

I have had the opportunity of collecting material from some very important witnesses, and from the letters of several persons who have taken part in the events related or who knew Lord Milner and saw him at work. I should like to mention particularly the following, whom I take this opportunity of thanking for their most valuable assistance and advice. Lady Milner, Mr. L. S. Amery, Lord Robert Cecil, Mr. Lionel Curtis, Dr. G. P. Gooch, Professors H. Laski, P. Mantoux, A. Siegfried and President C. Weizmann. I should like to add that this book was written before the publication of Julian Amery’s The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, vol. IV (1901-1903), and Viscountess Milner’s My Picture Gallery (1886-1901). V. H. 7.—Writings and Speeches of Lord Milner Milner (The) Papers. Ed. by Cecil Headlam, 2 vol. 1897-1905. London. Cassell Sc Co. 1931 and 1933, ix-591 pages and xii-592 pages. Milner, A. England in Egypt. London, E. Arnold, 1892, viii-448 pages. Milner, Lord. Imperial Unity. Two Speeches (Dec. 1906). London. The National Review Office, 1907, 63 pages. Milner, Lord. Constructive Imperialism. Five Speeches (Oct.-Dec., ipoy). London. The National Review Office, 1908, 110 pages. Milner, Lord. Speeches delivered in Canada in the Autumn of 1908. Toronto. W. Tyrrell Sc Co., 1909. Milner, Lord. The Nation and the Empire. Being a Collection of Speeches and Addresses with an Introduction. London, Constable Sc Co., 1913, xlviii-515 pages. Milner, Lord. Questions of the Hour. New Edition with a preface by Lady Milner. London. T. Nelson Sc Sons, 1925, 214 pages. 233

234

BI BLIOGRAPH Y

Milner, Lord. Fighting for our Lives. London, Constable &: Co., 1918, 16 pages. Milner, Lord. The British Commonwealth. London, Constable & Co., 1919• 20 pages. Milner, A. Never Again—Sir A. Milner’s Reply to Ministers' Address. Le Cap, 1900, 8 pages. Milner, Lord. Transvaal Constitution. Speech at the House of Lords (31.7.1906), 14 pages. Milner, Lord. Great Britain’s Special Mission to Egypt (1920). Report. London, His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1921, 40 pages. Cmd. 1131. Milner, Lord. Wireless Telegraphy Communications Report. London, 1922, 18 pages. Cmd. 1572—2nd Report, 1926, 7 pages. Cmd. 2781. Milner, A. Arnold Toynbee; A Reminiscence. London, 1895, 25 pages (see Toynbee).

II.—General Sources and Documents Annual Register (The). British Documents on the origins of the War 1889-1914. Ed. by G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley. London, His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 11 vol. 1926-38. British (The) and Foreign State Papers, vol. 77-140 (1895-1929). British Empire Study. 2nd Draft. Confidential. London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1936. Documents diplomatiques fran^ais (1871-1914) (1929, etc.). Durham. The Report of the Earl of D., H.M.’s High Commissioner and Governor General of British North America. London, 1905, xxviii-246 pages. Durham (The) Report. An Abridged Version with an Introduction and Notes by Sir Reginald Coupland. London, Oxford University Press, 1945. Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette 1871-1914. Ed. by J. Lepsius, A. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy and F. Thimmes. Berlin. 1922-1927. Hansard Parliamentary Debates and Papers. Keith, A. B. Speeches and Documents on the British Dominions from SelfGovernment to National Sovereignty 1918-1931. London. Oxford Uni¬ versity Press, 1932, xlvii-501 pages. Keith, A. B. Selected Speeches and Documents on British Colonial Policy 1763-1917, 2 vol. London, Oxford University Press, 1918 and 1933, viii-424 pages and xvi-381 pages. Lucas, Sir C. Lord Durham’s Report on the Affairs of British North America. Oxford, 1912, 3 vol. Parliamentary Papers (Catalogue of). Ed. by P. S. King & Co. Proceedings of Various Colonial (and Imperial) Conferences, particularly: Conference of 1887, CC. 5091. Ottawa Conference of 1894. C. 7553. Conference of 1897, C. 8596. Conference of 1902, Cd. 1597, 1723. Conference of 1911, Cd. 5741, 5745, 5746. Conference of 1917, Cd. 8566. Conference of 1918, Cd. 9177. Conference of 1926, Cmd. 2768, 2769. Ottawa Conference of 1932, Cmd. 4174, 4175, 4178. Conference of 1937, Cmd. 5482.

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J. A. The Life of the Right Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. London, 1923, 2 vol. Spender, J. A. Great Britain—Empire and Commonwealth, 1886-1935. Lon¬ don, Cassell 8c Co., 1936, xxv-906 pages. Staline, J. Le Marxisme et la question nationale et coloniale. Paris, Ed. sociales, 1950, 340 pages. Sternberg, F. Der Imperialisms. Berlin, Malik Verlag, 1926, 614 pages. Stokes, R. New Imperial Ideals. Introduction by Lord Lloyd. London, J. Murray, 1930, xix-314 pages. Stoye, J. The British Empire. Its Structure and its Problems. London, Lane, 1936, xiii-344 pages. Toynbee, A. Lectures on the Industrial Revolution of the XVIIIth Century in England. Together with a Reminiscence by Lord Milner, 6th ed. London, Longmans, Green 8c Co., 1920, xxv-282 pages. Toynbee, A. J. The Conduct of British Empire. Foreign Relations since the Peace Settlement. London, Oxford University Press, 1928, xii-126 pages. Toynbee, A. J. British Commonwealth Relations. London, Oxford Univer¬ sity Press, 1934, xiv-235 pages. Tyler, J. E. The Struggle for Imperial Unity, 1868-1895. London, Long¬ mans, Green 8c Co., 1938, viii-219 pages. Unwin, G. Studies in Economic History—Collected Papers. With an Intro¬ ductory Memoir by R. H. Tawney. London, Macmillan 8c Co., 1927, 490 pages. Vansittart, Lord. Lessons of my Life. London, Hutchinson 8c Co., 1940, 236 pages. Varga, E. and Mendelsohn, L. Donnees complementaires al’ “Imptrialisme” de Linine. Paris, Ed. sociales, 1950, 392 pages. Viallate, A. L’lmpdrialisme economique et les relations internationales pendant le dernier demi-siecle (1870-1920). Paris, A. Colin, 1923, x-316 pages. Wakely, A. V. T. Some Aspects of Imperial Communications. London, Sifton, Praed 8c Co., 1924, iv-160 pages. Walker, E. A. Colonies. Cambridge University Press, 1944, viii-168 pages. Walker, E. A. The Study of British Imperial Policy. New York, 47 pages. Walker, E. A. The British Empire: Its Structure and its Spirit. London, Oxford University Press, 1943, 250 pages. Webb, S. and B. Industrial Democracy. London, Longmans, Green 8c Co., 1902, lxi-929 pages. Webb, B. Our Partnership. Ed by B. Drake and M. I. Cole. London, Long¬ mans, Green & Co., 1948. Wells, H. G. Experiment in Autobiography. Discoveries and Conclusions of a very ordinary Brain. London, V. Gollancz, 1934, 840 pages. Wheare, K. C. Federal Government. London, Oxford University Press, 1946, vi-278 pages. Wheare, K. C. The Statute of Westminster and Dominion Status. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1938, xvi-328 pages. Williamson, J. A. The Evolution of England. A Commentary on the Facts. Oxford, Clarendon Press, London, 1945, xii-493 pages. Wiluamson, J. A. A Short History of the British Expansion. London, Mac¬ millan 8c Co., 1922, xxvii-647 pages. Wingfield-Stratford, E. The History of British Civilization. London, G. Routledge 8c Sons, 1928, 2 vol., 1332 pages. Spender.

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E. M. The Pattern of Imperialism. A Study in the Theories of Power. New York, Columbia University Press, 1948, xii-278 pages. Woolf, L. S. Economic Imperialism. London, The Swarthmore Press, 1920, iii-111 pages. Woolf, L. S. Empire and Commerce in Africa. London, G. Allen & Unwin, 1919, viii-374 pages. Woolf, L. S. Imperialism and Civilization. London, The Hogarth Press, 1928, v-134 pages. Worsfold, B. The Empire on the Anvil. London, 1916. Zimmermann, A. Die koloniale Politik Grossbritaniens. Berlin, Mittler, 1898 and 1899, 2 vol., xv-479 pages, xiv-407 pages (see bibliography). Zimmern, A. The Third British Empire. London, Oxford University Press, 1926, v-148 pages, 3rd ed., 1934, 192 pages. Zimmern, A. The British Commonwealth in the Post-War World. London, Oxford University Press, 1926, 32 pages. Winslow,

VI.—Periodicals Annie politique frangaise et itrangere

(L1). Contemporary Review (The). Economist (The). Economist (The) 1843-1943. A Cen¬ tenary Volume, London, Oxford University Press, 1943, 178 pages. Edinburgh Review (The). Foreign Affairs. Fortnightly Review (The). Morning Post (The). National Review (The). Nineteenth Century (The). Nineteenth Century and After (The).

Punch. Quarterly Review (The). Revue of Reviews (The). Revue des Deux-Mondes. Revue de Paris. Round Table (The). A Quarterly Review of the Politics of the British Commonwealth. Sciences politiques. Spectator (The). Statesman and Nation (The). Temps (Le). Times (The). Times (The). Fifty Years (18821932), London, 1932.

INDEX Abyssinia, 84 Africa, South; see South Africa Agriculture, in South Africa, 133-4 Alexandria, 58, 60 Allenby, Lord, 77 n., 84 Altrincham, Lord, 14 America; see United States Amery, Julian, 210 n. Amery, L. S., 51, 83, 98, 132, 142-3, 145, 148, 155, 156, 166-7, l1°> 175, 208-15 Ansaldo, Giovanni, 26 Antilles, 27 Arabi Pasha, 58 Arabs, 173-4 Archer, William, 206 Army Education Branch, 166 Asquith, Herbert Henry (Lord Ox¬ ford and Asquith), 17-18, 43, 45, 5L 53. 57- 89-90. 113, 116, 161, 202 Astor, W. Waldorf, 14 Australia, 141 Baldev Singh, 219 Baldwin, Earl (Stanley Baldwin), 43, 44, 147 n. Balfour, Arthur James (Earl Balfour), 16, 137, 146-8, 149, 157, 158, 168, 170, 172 n., 211, 223 Balfour Declaration, 170-1, 173, 210 Balfour Report, 222, 224 Balliol College; see Oxford Baring, Sir Evelyn; see Cromer, Lord Barker, Ernest, 28 n. Baumont, Maurice, 77 Bechuanaland, 86 B6rard, Victor, 36 Berthelot, Philippe, 63 Bichenough, J., 155 n. Bismarck, 49, 58 Blachford, Lord; see Rogers, F. Blackwood, Lord Basil, 199 Bligniferes, de, 60 Bloemfontein Conference (1899), 100-3 (1903), 135, 139 Blum Pasha, 52 Boer War, 91, 107 ff. Bonar Law, Andrew, 158, 159, 161, 167

Borden, Sir Robert, 18, 160, 223 Botha, General Louis, 11, 117, 120, 121, 122-3, 128, 150, 151, 167 n. Brand, R. H. (Lord), 199 Briand, Aristide, 163 Bright, Sir Charles, 168 n. Bright, John, 27 British Empire, Development, 25 Milner’s definition of, 180 Brodrick, St. John, 43 Bryce, James A. (Viscount), 161, 206 Buchan, John; see Tweedsmuir, Lord Buckle, G. E., 106 Burger, 120, 122 Butler, Gen. Sir W., 96, 105-6, 113 Cambon, Paul, 102 n., 111 n. Campbell-Bannerman, Sir H., 11, 120, 149-51, !52 Canada, 8, 27, 30, 31, 133-4, 137, 141, 182 Carlyle, Thomas, 33 Carnarvon, Lord, 150 Carson, Sir Edward, 157 Castelnau, Gen., 163 Cecil of Chelwood, Viscount, 154, 155 n., 158, 172 Cecil, Lord Robert; see Cecil of Chelwood, Lord Cecil, Violet Georgina (Lady Edward Cecil, Milner's wife), 46, 120, 175 Century of Wrong, A, 101 n. Chamberlain, Joseph, 10, 11, 35-8, 51, 86, 87 ff., 91, 93 ff., 100, 103-4, 106, 110-11, 112, 114, 115, 124, 127-30, 135, 136-8, 146, 157, 184-5, 187 n., 193, 208, 209, 224. 228 Chapin, Mrs. R. W., 97 Character, Milner’s, 21-3, 198 Chevrillon, Andre, 181 Chinese Labour, 11, 13, 138 ff.,

149-5U 152. 154 Churchill, Lord Randolph, 50 Churchill, Winston S., 9 n., 50, 152, 161, 172, 182 Clayton, Sir Walter, 163 Clemenceau, G., 47, 164, 165-6, 210 Cobden, Richard, 191-2

252

INDEX “Coefficients,” The, 155-6 Colenso, 109 Colonial Conference, First, 35 Conference (1903), 136 Development and Welfare Acts, 187 n., 229 Development Corporation, 229 Office, Milner and, 19-20, 146 ff., 167 ff. Pact, 25, 27, 190 Resources Development Act, 229 Society; see Royal Empire Society Colour problem, in South Africa,

253

East India Company, 215 Edinburgh, 192 Edward VII, 115-16, 128, 146, 152 Egypt, Milner in, 10, 19-20, 50 ff., 168 Elgin, Lord, 30 England in Egypt, 10, 54-6, 65, 81-2,

89 Ensor, R. C. K., 40 Entente Cordiale, 72 Essay on Foreign Policy, 48 Europe, Imperial Policy and, 230-1 Expansion of England, The, 32-3

144-5

Colvin, Sir Auckland, 52, 60 Commonwealth, 25, 161, 222 ff. Commonwealth Relations Office, 226 Communications, 188 Concentration Camps, 117-ig, 128 Corn Production Act (1917), 17 Coupland, Prof., 171 Courtney, W. L., 88 Creech Jones, A., 230 Crewe, Marquess of 43, 161 Cripps, Sir Stafford, 217 Cromer, Lord, 52, 53, 60-1, 68-9 n., 75, 83, 112, 116, 201 Cromie, Capt. St. George, 40 Crown, The, 225 Curtis, Lionel, 14, 185, 200-1, 204-8 Curzon, Marquess, 37, 82-3, 112, 158, 164 Customs Union, South African, 135-6 d’Abernon, Lord, 52 Dafoe, John, 223 Dawkins, Sir Clinton, 149, 152, 155 Dawson, Geoffrey, igg, 223 Deakin, Alfred, 8 Death, Milner’s, 175 Death Duties, 51, 89 Defence, Imperial, 197 de la Rey, Gen., 120, 121, 128 Demangeon, Albert, 26, 27 n., 28, 180 n., 188 n. Dennison, George, 8 de Wet, Gen., 120, 121, 128 Diike, Sir Charles, 30, 102 n., 183 Disraeli, 29, 31-2, 51, 58, 193 Dominion status, 16, 161, 226 Doullens Conference, 165, 166, 210 Doumergue, Gaston, 162 Dove, John, 199 Dugdale, Blanche, 226 Dugdale, John, 185 Duncan, (Sir) Patrick, 199 Durban, 120, 130 Durham Report, 30, 222

Farouk I, 84 Fashoda Crisis, 59 Federation, Imperial, 15, 33 ff., 178 ff. World, 207 Ferrero, L., 26 Ferry, Jules, 111 n. Fiddes, Sir G. V., 97, 101, 167 n. Fisher, H. A. L., 176 Fleet, Imperial, 183 Foch, Marshal, 18, 165, 166, 210 Forestier-Walker, Gen., 106 Forster, W. E., 34 Fox, Charles James, 28 France and Egypt, 58-g, 71-3 Free Trade, 27, 31, 136, 138, 192 French, Lord, 161 Frere, Sir Bartle, 153 n. Froude, J. A., 33-4 Fuad I, 84 Gandhi, M. K., 150, 215, 217 Garter, Milner receives, 169 Garvin, J. L., 50, 156, 209-10 n. Gell, Philip L., 107, 112 General Election (iqo6), 149, 134 Geopolitics, 30 Germany, Milner in, 9, 41 Gibraltar, 27 Gilbert, Humphrey, 8 Girouard, Sir Percy, 132 Gladstone, W. E., 10, 17, 45, 48, 86 Glazebrook, Michael, 45 Gooch, G. P., 33, 122 Gordon, Gen., 59 Gore, Charles, 43 Gorst, Sir Eldon, 73, 75 Goschen, G. J., 10, 47 ff., 90 Gould, Sir F. Carruthers, 21 Granville, Lord, 61-2 Greater Britain (Diike), 31 Greenwood, Arthur, 230 Grey, Albert, 49 Grey, Sir Edward, 90, 116, 155, 206

INDEX

254

Grigg, Edward; see Altrincham, Lord Haig, Earl, 165 Haldane, R. B. (Lord), 116, 155, Halevy, Elie, 27 n., 36, 91, 121 137, 196 Hall, H. Duncan, 27 n. Hall, Sidney, 43 Hamilton, Gen. Sir Ian, 145 Hamilton, Baynes, Rt. Rev. A., Hanbury-Williams, Col., 101 Hankey, Sir Maurice, 163 Harcourt, L. V. (Viscount), 161 Harcourt, Sir W., 51, 89 Harrington, Sir J., 33 n. Headlam, Cecil, 103 Hely-Hutchinson, Sir W., 115 Henderson, Arthur, 158 Hennebicq, L., 195 n. Herodotus, 55 Hertzog, Gen., 121 Herzl, Theodore, 170 Hicks-Beach, Sir Michael, 90 Hoare-Laval plan, 104 n. Hobson, J. A., 27 n. Holland, 128 Home Rule, Irish, 10, 17, 49, Howe, Joseph, 8 Hurst, Sir Cecil, 77 Hussein, King, 173

161 n.,

143

145

157

75- 89 Inter-Allied Supreme War Council, 164 Inter-Colonial Council, 131, 134-5 Ireland, Milner and, 17; see also Home Rule, Irish Islington, Lord, 172-3 Ismail Pasha, 52, 56, 57-8, 70 n. Iwan-Muller, E. B., 43, 88 n., 91, 180 Jameson raid, 87 Jewish question, Milner and, 169 Jinnah, M. A., 215 Johannesburg, 87, 127, 145 Milner’s farewell speech at, 12-13, 125

Kemp, Gen., 120 Kenya, 184 Kerr, Philip; see Lothian, Lord Khartoum, 59 “Kindergarten,” Milner’s, 14, 116 n., 150, 199 ff. King, Mackenzie, 224 King’s College, Milner at, 41-2 Kingston (Canada), 146 Kipling, 37 Kitchener, Sir Herbert (Lord), 59, 75, 112-13, 116, 120-2, 124, 129, Kruger, Paul, 11, 87, g3, 101, 104-5, 107, 128

Ibsen, 180 Imperial Development Fund, 187 Federation League, 34-5, 202 Institute, 35 War Conference, 159, 162 Imperialism, 25 ff., 182 ff. India, 16, 68, 162, 204, 214 ff. Indians in South Africa, 150 Inland Revenue, Milner and, 10, 51,

Journalist, Milner as, 45-6

Jowett, Benjamin, 43 Julien, Ch.-A., 39 n.

Labour Party, 194 Langer, W. S., 27 n. Laski, H. J., 193 Lassalle, Ferdinand, 47 Lawley, Sir Arthur, 203 League of Nations, 19, 196, 206 Liberal Unionist Party, 10, 49-50 Lloyd George, 17, 20, 117, 157 ff., 163 ff., 170, 203 Lloyd, Lord, 76 Lockhart, R. H. Bruce, 199 Londonderry-, Lady, 152 Long, B. K., 223 Lothian, Lord, 14, 200, 201, 203-5 Loucheur, 165 Louis, Baron, 67 Lovell, R. I., 92 Lucas, Sir Charles, 98, 131, 188, 221 Lyautey, Gen., 163, 184 Lyttelton, Alfred, 143, 148, 150 Macaulay, 219 Macdonald, John A., 8 Macmillan, Harold, 185 Mafeking, 110 Magnan de Bornier, J., 27 Majuba, 88 Malcolm, Marianne, 42 Malta, 20, 168 Manchester, 196 Manson, 188 Mantoux, Paul, 27 n. Marriage, Milner’s, 20, 46, 175 Marriott, Sir J. A. R., 112, 143 n., 152 n. Maud, F., 49 Maxse, Leo, 155 Maxwell, Sir John, 77 Mayor, Mr., 42

INDEX Mehemet Ali, 72 Milner, Charles (Karl) (Milner’s father), 40-1 Milner, James Richardson, 40 Milner, Mary Ierne, 40-1 Moncrieff, Sir Colin Scott, 69 Montefiore, Leonard, 43, 45 Moon, P. T., 91 Morley, John (Lord), 45, 90 Morocco, 58, 184 Mougel Bey, 69 Mullah, Mad, 20 Murray, Gilbert, 206 Natal, 107, 120, 141, 150 National Service League, 149, 209 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 215, 217 New Zealand, 141 Normandy, Milner in, 47 Oceana, 33-4 Oliver, F. S., 14 Orange Free State, 112 Ormsby-Gore, W., 171 n. Ottawa, 133 Conference, 228, 231 Outlanders; see Uitlanders Overseas Food Corporation, 229 Oxford, Milner at, 9, 42-5 University, Milner as Chancellor, 20, 176 Oxford and Asquith, Lord; see Asquith, H. H. Palestine, Milner and, 20, 169 B. Pall Mall Gazette, 45, 47 Palmer, W. J., 134 Palmerston, Lord, 57 Paris, Treaty of (1856), 57 Parkin, Sir George, 8, 9, 16, 34, 45, 155, 178, 179, 182, 201-3 Parliament, Milner and, g, 48 Pearl Harbour, 104 n. Peel Commission, 171 Peerage, Milner’s, 115 Perry, F., 199 P6tain, 165, 166, 210 n. Pitt, William, 28 Poincare, 165, 166 Preference, Imperial, 135-8, 157, 191, 228 Pretoria, 121 Prisoners of War, 127-8 Quebec, 207 Questions of the Hour, 175, 193 Railways in South Africa, 131-2

25b

Ralegh, S11 Walter, 8 Raleigh, Thomas, 202 Raphael, L. A. C., 58, 59 Rappard, Sophie von, 40 Rappard, W. E., 208 Ready, Major-Gen. John, 40 Ready, Mary Ierne; see Milner, M. I. Reitz, F. W., 103, 120 Rendel, J. M., 43, 45 Resignation, Milner’s, 169 Revelstoke, Lord, 163 Rhodes, Cecil, 8, 16, 36, 87, 94, 127, 145, 154, 183 Scholarships, 155 Trust, 154-5, 204 Rhodesia, 141 Rio Tinto Co., 154 Ritchie, 136 Roberts, Lord, 17, 112, 113, 114, 149, 156, 209 Robertson, Sir W., 163-4 Robinson, Sir Hercules; see Rosmead. Lord Rochefort, 73 Rodd, Sir Rennell, 77 Rogers, F. (Lord Blachford), 28 Rome Conference (1917), 163 Roosevelt, F. D., 104 n. Ropke, Wilhelm, 194, 195 Rosebery, Lord, 35 n., 43, 90, 116 Rosmead, Lord, 88, 91, 101 Ross, Sir Ronald, 188 Round Table, the, 14, 155, 203 Rowse, A. L., 39 n. Royal Empire Society, 34 Ruskin, John, 46 Russia, Milner in, 163-4 St. Helena, 27 Sadler, Sir Michael, 155 Salisbury, Lord, 51, 88, 115 Salonika, 163 Sambourne, Linley, 153 Samuel, Lord (Sir Herbert), 43, 172, 173 Sansom, Dr., 142 Sargant, E. B., 118 Schools, Camp, 118-19 Science, 188-g Seeley, J. R., 26, 32-4 Selborne, Lord, 33, 94, 96, 103-5, no, 123, 148, 149-50, 157, 161 Sellar, A. Craig, 49 Shaw, Bernard, 156, 196 Siegfried, Andre, 25, 57, 58, 182, 188 n., 221, 226, 228 Smith, Adam, 26 Smith, Goldwin, 28-g, 30

628048 256

INDEX

Smuts, Marshal J. C., 11, 18, 97, 101, 120, 121-2, 150-1, 161, 164, 167, 169, 171 Social reform, Milner and, 10, 193 Socialism, Milner and, 43, 47, 127 Somaliland, 20 Sombart, W., 195 n. South Africa, Froude on, 34 South Africa, Milner in, 10 ff., 20, 49, 86 ff., 175-6 South Africa Act, 150-1 South African War; see Boer War Spender, J. A., 78, 206 State, The, 14, 203 Stead, W. T., 45-6, 101 n. Steed, H. Wickham, 206 Steel-Maitland, Arthur, 14 Sterling Area, 227 Steyn, 120 Strasbourg, Siege of, 42 Streit, Clarence, 207 Sudan, 59, 82, 84 Suez Canal, 57, 187 n. Tariff Reform, 35, 136-8, 191-3 Reform League, 138 Tel-el-Kebir, 58 Thomas, Albert, 163 Thomas, Brig.-Gen. Sir Owen, 77 Times History of the War in South Africa, The, 208-9 Toynbee, Arnold, 9, 43-4, 48, 193 Trade, Imperial, 190-1 Transvaal, 10-11, 86, 112, 126-7, 15°»‘ see also South Africa, Boer War Jews in, 169 Treasury, Milner at, 10, 50 Trinidad, 168 Tropical Agriculture, Imperial Col¬ lege of, 168 Medicine, School of, 188 Tubingen, 9, 41 Turgot, 33 Tussaud’s, Madame, 107

Tweedsmuir, Lord, 199, 208 Uitlanders, 11, 87, 98-100, 103-4 Ullswater, Lord, 42 Union, Oxford, 45 of South Africa, 151, 200 United Empire Loyalists, 8 States of America, 189, 207 Universal Service, Milner and, 16-17 Valdry, Paul, 25, 232 Vereeniging, Peace of, 12, 121-3, 124, 128, 150 Versailles Conference, 123, 166-7 Victoria, Queen, 111 Vincent, Sir Edgar; see d’Abemon, Lord Volk, Het, 150, 151 Walker, Eric A., 119, 144 War Cabinet, Milner and, 18-19, 158 ff. Secretary, Milner as, 18, 166 ff. Warren, Gen., 86 Warren, Herbert, 43 Webb, Sidney and Beatrice, 155, 196 Wedgwood, josiah, 155 n. Wells, H. G., 31, 155, 206 West Indian Agricultural College, 168 n. West Indies, 184 Westminster, Statute of 16, 180 n., 224-5

Williams, Basil, 43, 54, 199 Wilson, Sir Henry, 163-4 Wolseley, Sir Garnet (Lord), 58, 113 World War, Milner and the First, 17 ff., 157 ff. World War, the Second, 227 Worsfold, Basil, 221 Zaghlul Pasha, 78 Zimmern, A. E., 206 Zionism, Milner and, 169 ff.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The publishers wish to thank Lady Milner for the loan of the photograph of Lord Milner reproduced as a frontispiece. They wish to thank Messrs. Turner &: Drinkwater, Regent House, Hull, for permission to reproduce this photograph.

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