Logoi and Pathêmata: Aristotle and the Modal/Amodal Distinction in Modern Theories of Concepts 363170383X, 9783631703830

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Lars Inderelst

Lars Inderelst

Logoi and Pathêmata “Concept” is a central notion in philosophy that also influences other disciplines like psychology and linguistics. The author compares modern theories to the work of Aristotle as the first philosopher with an extensive corpus and one of the predecessors both of classical theory and of modal theories of concepts. It is surprising that there is apparently no equivalent term for “concept” in his work. Both pathêma and logos are central to his theory of language and thought. Therefore, this book describes which notion in Aristotle’s writing comes closest to “concept” and whether or not it generates a precise theory.

ISBN 978-3-631-67679-0

The Author Lars Inderelst studied philosophy and classics at the University of Düsseldorf and is specialized in ancient philosophy. As a researcher he was part of the interdisciplinary research center CRC 991 “The Structure of Representations in Language, Cognition, and Science” and compared positions from the history of philosophy to very recent trends in cognitive science such as frame-theory and embodied cognition.

Logoi and Pathêmata

Studia Philosophica et Historica 28

Studia Philosophica et Historica 28

Lars Inderelst

Logoi and Pathêmata Aristotle and the modal/amodal distinction in modern theories of concepts

Logoi and Pathêmata

STUDIA PHILOSOPHICA ET HISTORICA Begründet von Wolfram Hogrebe Herausgegeben von Christoph Kann

BAND 28

Lars Inderelst

Logoi and Pathêmata Aristotle and the modal/amodal distinction in modern theories of concepts

Bibliographic Information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available in the internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. Zugl.: Düsseldorf, Univ., Diss., 2016 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Inderelst, Lars, author. Title: Logoi and Pathêmata : Aristotle and the modal/amodal distinction in modern theories of concepts / Lars Inderelst. Description: Frankfurt am Main : Peter Lang, 2017. | Series: Studia philosophica et historica, ISSN 0721-5878 ; vol. 29 Identifiers: LCCN 2016054392| ISBN 9783631676790 (print) | ISBN 9783654071542 (e-pdf) | ISBN 9783631703830 (epub) | ISBN 9783631703847 (mobi) Subjects: LCSH: Concepts. | Philosophy, Modern. | Aristotle--Influence. | Modality (Theory of knowledge) Classification: LCC BD181 .I53 2017 | DDC 121/.4--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016054392 This dissertation was funded by the DFG as part of the Collaborative Research Centre 991 "The Structure of Representations in Language, Cognition, and Science” Printed by CPI books GmbH, Leck D 61 ISSN 0721-5878 ISBN 978-3-631-67679-0 (Print) E-ISBN 978-3-653-07154-2 (E-PDF) E-ISBN 978-3-631-70383-0 (EPUB) E-ISBN 978-3-631-70384-7 (MOBI) DOI 10.3726/b10798 © Peter Lang GmbH Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften Frankfurt am Main 2017 All rights reserved. Peter Lang Edition is an Imprint of Peter Lang GmbH. Peter Lang – Frankfurt am Main ∙ Bern ∙ Bruxelles ∙ New York ∙ Oxford ∙ Warszawa ∙ Wien All parts of this publication are protected by copyright. Any utilisation outside the strict limits of the copyright law, without the permission of the publisher, is forbidden and liable to prosecution. This applies in particular to reproductions, translations, microfilming, and storage and processing in electronic retrieval systems. This publication has been peer reviewed. www.peterlang.com

For my parents

Preface For a very long time, I have been fascinated by being able to read the thoughts and know about the lives of people who lived more than two thousand years ago. This was part of the reason why I developed an interest in ancient philosophy: Western Philosophy and some of the biggest philosophical questions have their origin in  the  Pre-socratics, Plato, and Aristotle. One question of particular interest  to me has always been  what has changed since then,  and equally important what stayed  the same, both in regards to philosophy and humanity in general. This fascination served as the basis for my research and I hope I was able to provide some answers for a very specific problem in this context. There are a lot of people that have contributed to my work in one way or another. First and foremost, I want to thank my advisor Christoph Kann, who believed in my work and always encouraged my interest in the history of philosophy and ancient philosophy since I was a student. He firmly believes that knowing the historical origin of philosophical problems and debates is very important to fully comprehending them and being able to relate them to each other. Secondly, I want to thank the DFG for financing my position and all members of the CRC 991 “The Structure of Representations in Language, Cognition, and Science” for supporting my research and for the interesting interdisciplinary discussions. Since I cannot thank all of them here individually I will just mention Sebastian Löbner and Gottfried Vosgerau,  who  were members of the defense committee. Then there are two people who encouraged my interest in philosophy and helped me to study it when I was still in school. The first is Rainer Brieden, my philosophy teacher, who passed away earlier this year  and  to whom I would have liked to have given a  copy of this book. The second is Ulrike HinkeDörnemann, who helped me organize my studies when I was still in school and always was a great help. Finally, I want to thank my friends who were always there for me when I got frustrated, or needed some time off from philosophy, or needed to discuss my work. I want to start with Sascha Aulich, with whom I could always discuss my work and philosophy in general. Michaela Felden and Detmer Wulf, with whom I shared an office. Christina Ringel who greatly supported me and without whom

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I might have given up. Last but not least I want to thank my parents, since they always encouraged me to follow my interests and supported me in every possible way. It is my firm belief that I would not have been able to write and finish this dissertation if these people (and many others) had not been part of my life.

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Contents I. Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������13 1. Logoi and pathêmata��������������������������������������������������������������������������������13 2. Theories of concepts���������������������������������������������������������������������������������15 3. Aristotle and the modal/amodal distinction����������������������������������������19 4. State of the art�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������22 5. Method�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������24 6. Structure����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������27

II.

The concept of ‘concept’��������������������������������������������������������������������������31 1. Theories of concepts and their presuppositions�����������������������������������33 1.1. Concepts and categories as representations��������������������������������� 33 1.2. Concepts and reference in philosophy and linguistics��������������� 39 1.3. Concept types and kinds of concepts������������������������������������������� 41 1.4. Monism, pluralism and eliminativism concerning conceptual formats�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 44 1.5. Concepts as functional kinds, abilities and vehicles������������������� 45 1.6. Categorization and higher-order thought processes������������������ 47 1.7. Theories of concepts – a preliminary sketch�������������������������������� 49 2. Towards a definition of “concept”����������������������������������������������������������51

III.

‘Concept’ in the history of philosophy����������������������������������������������59 1. Antiquity����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������59 1.1. Plato: Articulating the problem of universals������������������������������ 59 1.2. Stoics: Concept as lekton and phantasia kataleptikê������������������� 63 1.3. Augustine: Philosophy of language and concepts as verba mentis������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 66 2. Medieval philosophy��������������������������������������������������������������������������������68 2.1. Aristoteles Latinus: Conceptus as a technical term��������������������� 68 2.2. Aquinas: An Aristotelian account������������������������������������������������� 69 9

2.3. Ockham: Medieval nominalism���������������������������������������������������� 71 3. Modern philosophy����������������������������������������������������������������������������������72 3.1. Descartes: Concepts in a dualistic account���������������������������������� 72 3.2. Leibniz: Rationalism and concepts����������������������������������������������� 73 3.3. Locke: Concepts as abstract general ideas����������������������������������� 74 3.4. Hume: Criticism of abstract ideas������������������������������������������������� 78 3.5. Kant: Concepts in transcendental idealism.................................. 80 4. 19th and 20th century���������������������������������������������������������������������������������82 4.1. Frege: Sense and meaning�������������������������������������������������������������� 82 4.2. Wittgenstein: Concepts and family resemblance������������������������ 84 4.3. Causal theories of content�������������������������������������������������������������� 85 4.4. Fodor: Conceptual atomism���������������������������������������������������������� 87 4.5. Peacocke: A Neo-Fregean approach to concepts������������������������ 88 5. Summary and observations from the history of philosophy��������������90

IV.

Concepts in psychology��������������������������������������������������������������������������93 1. Psychological theories of concepts – a general account����������������������93 1.1. Early psychology������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 93 1.2. Classical theory�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 94 1.3. Prototype theory������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 97 1.4. Criticism of prototype theory and neoclassical theories���������� 100 1.5. Exemplar theory���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 103 1.6. Theory theory�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 104 1.7. Frame theory���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 106 1.8. Other theories of concepts����������������������������������������������������������� 108 1.8.1. Ideals������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 108 1.8.2. Conceptual networks and similarity networks�������������� 109 1.8.3. Connectionism������������������������������������������������������������������� 110 1.9. Recent developments�������������������������������������������������������������������� 111 1.9.1. Neuroscience of concepts������������������������������������������������� 111 1.9.2. Pluralism and eliminativism�������������������������������������������� 113 1.10. Conclusions������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 114

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2. The modal/amodal distinction������������������������������������������������������������ 115 2.1. Perceptual symbol systems: Barsalou on modal symbols�������� 116 2.2. Proxytypes: Jesse Prinz����������������������������������������������������������������� 122 2.3. Image schemas and conceptual metaphor��������������������������������� 124 2.4. The analogous/symbolic distinction������������������������������������������� 125 2.5. Criticism on modal theories of concepts����������������������������������� 126 2.6. Modality reconsidered������������������������������������������������������������������ 130

V.

Concept as logos�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 135 1. Disambiguating logos���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 135 1.1. General meanings of logos������������������������������������������������������������ 135 1.2. Logos in Plato��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 138 1.3. Logos in Aristotle��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 139 2. Logos in the logical writings����������������������������������������������������������������� 141 2.1. The context and function of logos����������������������������������������������� 141 2.1.1. Homonymy and synonymy���������������������������������������������� 141 2.1.2. Logos as meaning of words����������������������������������������������� 153 2.1.3. Logos as sentence/phrase�������������������������������������������������� 159 2.2. Logos and adjunct notions������������������������������������������������������������ 163 2.2.1. Logos and the Aristotelian Categories����������������������������� 163 2.2.2. Logos and substance���������������������������������������������������������� 170 2.2.3. Logos and definition���������������������������������������������������������� 178 2.3. Some conclusions�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 188

VI.

Concepts as pathêmata������������������������������������������������������������������������ 191 1. Pathêmata����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 191 1.1. De interpretatione 16a������������������������������������������������������������������ 191 1.2. Pathein, pathos, pathêma�������������������������������������������������������������� 197 1.3. Representation in Aristotle���������������������������������������������������������� 200 2. Aristotelian psychology������������������������������������������������������������������������ 203 2.1. Psychê���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 203 2.2. Perception��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 210 11

2.2.1. A general account of perception�������������������������������������� 210 2.2.2. The different senses����������������������������������������������������������� 219 2.2.3. The common sense������������������������������������������������������������ 221 2.3. Phantasia - jeweils������������������������������������������������������������������������� 226 2.3.1. General characteristics������������������������������������������������������ 226 2.3.2. Phantasia and memories��������������������������������������������������� 234 2.3.3. Phantasia and dreams������������������������������������������������������� 238 2.4. Higher-order thoughts������������������������������������������������������������������ 240 2.4.1. The notion of nous in Aristotle���������������������������������������� 240 2.4.2 Nous and phantasia������������������������������������������������������������ 249 3. Concluding remarks������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 258

VII. Aristotle on concepts and modality������������������������������������������������ 263 1. Aristotle and modal/amodal theories of concepts���������������������������� 263 1.1 Logoi and amodal theories of concepts�������������������������������������� 263 1.2 Pathêmata and modal theories of concepts������������������������������� 268 2. Logoi and pathêmata – connecting the dots�������������������������������������� 272 3. What are concepts in Aristotle?����������������������������������������������������������� 276 4. Applying the Aristotelian position to the modern debate��������������� 281

VIII. Conclusion and outlook���������������������������������������������������������������������� 285 Abbreviations������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 289 Editions������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 291 References�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 293

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I. Introduction 1.  Logoi and pathêmata First we must settle what a name (onoma) is and what a verb (rhêma) is, and then what a negation (apophasis), an affirmation (kataphasis), a statement (apophansis) and a sentence (logos) are. Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections (pathêmata) in the soul, and written marks symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of – affections of the soul – are the same for all; and what these affections are likenesses (homoiômata) of – actual things (pragmata) – are also the same. These matters have been discussed in the works on the soul and do not belong to the present subject. Just as some thoughts (noêma) in the soul are neither true nor false while some are necessarily one or the other, so also with spoken sounds. (De Int. 16a1–11)

This passage at the beginning of Aristotle’s De interpretatione has been labeled as “the most influential text in the history of semantics.”1 It seems to be the first time in the history of philosophy that someone has assumed a necessary third level of representations in-between language and reality which is languageindependent. This statement might be read as demanding a theory of concepts as mental representations.2 The proposed representations are said to be a subject matter of psychology as understood by Aristotle. They are closely tied to his theory of perception and imagination. Pathêma in this context might be equated with the notion of phantasma in the psychological writings.3 However, pathêmata/phantasmata seem to have a role in Aristotelian logic as well since Aristotle mentions them in this particular context before he starts to explain how complex linguistic representations can be true and false. Pathêmata have a different relation both to simple words (onomata) and the external things (pragmata) they represent. The words are symbols of the pathêmata. Their relation is accidental, mediated by convention. In contrast, pathêmata are signs of the external things by virtue of being their likenesses (homoiômata). Thus, the beginning of De interpretatione is the natural starting point for research on Aristotle’s notion of concept if he has such a notion. As a 1 See Kretzmann (1974) p. 3. 2 Ross (1923, p. 26) attributes a “representative view of knowledge” to Aristotle and describes pathêmata in this passage as “concepts.” 3 See, e.g., De Cuypere/Willems (2008) p. 321.

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next step, the psychological writings and the notion of pathêma (or phantasma) developed therein must be consulted. One central aim of this book is to reconstruct what Aristotle had to say about the kinds of entities that later became known under the labels “concept,” “conceptus,” “Begriff,” “idea,” etc. Hence, the theory presented in this few lines and its links to the psychological writings will be one important source and point of reference used for this purpose. However, there are some other contenders for “concept” in Aristotle. Horos from the logical writings has often been translated as “concept”4, as well as other expressions such as noêma.5 In this dissertation, the focus will be on yet another expression which has often been translated as “Begriff ” or “concept”: logos.6 This usage of logos (which is a highly ambiguous word) can be found foremost in the logical writings but also throughout the whole Corpus Aristotelicum. Logos is favored over the other possible candidates in this context since there are passages where it seems to have exactly the same function as pathêma, i.e., designating a representational level between language and reality. Nevertheless, the other contenders will also receive due attention in the later parts of this dissertation. Their relations to pathêma and logos will be clarified. The most prominent passage of this kind, in which logos is used to designate an intermediate level of representation comparable to a conceptual level, is located at the beginning of Categories: When things have only a name (onoma) in common and the logos7 of being (ousia) which corresponds to the name is different, they are called homonymous. Thus, for example, both a man and a picture are animals. These have only a name in common and the logos of being which corresponds to the name is different; for if one is asked what being an animal is for each of them, one will give two distinct logoi. When things have the name in common and the logos of being which corresponds to the name is the same, they are called synonymous. Thus, for example, both a man and an ox are animals. Each of these is called, by a common name, an animal, and the logos of being is also the same; for if one is to give the logos of each – what being an animal is for each of them – one will give the same logos. (Cat. 1a1–12)

Words (onomata) are said to have a corresponding logos, or more precisely a logos tês ousias. In the case of homonymy, the word is the same while the logos is 4 See Höffe (2005) p. 262. 5 See Marcal/Kisteumacher (2010) p. 109. 6 E.g., the German translation of Aristotle’s Categories by Rolfes – see Aristotle (1925) p. 43. 7 Logos is left untranslated here. Ackrill chooses “definition” in his translation, this interpretation will be discussed below.

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different. If one wants to adopt the parlance of concepts, one could say that the word is connected to two different concepts. Consequently, it has two different meanings. Logoi seem to play the same role here that pathêmata do in De interpretatione. They are independent of words and can remain the same while their corresponding words change. The Greek word logos is notoriously slippery and it should be noted that I am referring to logos as it is used in this passage of the Categories throughout unless stated otherwise. Logos in this passage has often been understood as ‘meaning.’ However, the notion of meaning is, in itself, not without ambiguity. In some uses, it seems to be equivalent to some meanings of the modern term “concept,” in others it is not, e.g., meaning as extension. Logos may rather be translated as “definition”8 in this and similar contexts. On the other hand, Aristotle has a separate technical term for definitions, i.e., horismos. In summary, neither pathêma nor logos can be easily defined taking solely these two passages into account, but both seem to be central notions to the Aristotelian theory of language, thought, and concepts. Because they are not clear notions in isolation, their relation to each other is even less clear. Thus, to answer whether Aristotle has a theory of concepts and what it amounts to it is necessary to answer the following three questions first: a) What are logoi? b) What are pathêmata? c) How are both related to each other?

2.  Theories of concepts It is very difficult and presumptuous to speak of theories of concepts in general. This cannot presuppose that these theories are homogenous in any way. The meaning of the word “concept” is highly ambiguous both in everyday use and scientific language.9 If one wants to speak of them as homogenous, the easiest approach would be to focus on the technical term “concept” and its relatives such as Latin “conceptus” and maybe also German “Begriff ” which is a direct terminological translation of “conceptus.”10 ‘Concept’ is a central notion in modern

8 See Ackrill (1963) p. 3. 9 See Peacocke (1992) p. 1: “We need to be clear about the subject matter of a theory of concepts. The term “concept” has by now come to be something of a term of art. In English, the word does not have a unique sense that is theoretically important.” Zalta (2001) p. 1: “And although the notion of a concept has been employed in various ways, there are not all that many precise theories of concepts.” Materna (1998) p. 59. 10 The Latin terms conceptio and conceptus for concepts go back to late antiquity and medieval time, namely to Boethius and William of Ockham (respectively) (see Helmig (2012) p. 15).

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philosophy.11 For this reason, it is surprising that there is no equivalent term for “concept” in Plato or Aristotle.12 It is not restricted to philosophy but can also be found in psychology, linguistics, and other disciplines. The usage of “concept” in the other disciplines builds to some degree on philosophical theories of concepts. In addition, more recently psychological theories of concepts have been the subject of discussion in the modern philosophy of mind. How “concept” is defined in psychology and linguistics depends mostly on demands imposed by the specific discipline. Nevertheless, it can be interesting to compare theories from linguistics and psychology to older philosophical theories of concepts.13 After all, there were no separate disciplines for these subject matters throughout most of the history of philosophy. Brewer (1993) states similar reasons for why it is important to consider philosophical theories of concepts in his typological account of psychological theories: My overall goal is to understand psychological theories of concepts […]. I discuss the literature from philosophy because for over 2,400 years the problem of concepts has been a core issue in philosophy, and most current theories of concepts derive directly or indirectly from the work in philosophy. (Brewer 1993: 498)

11 See Sokolowski e.g. (1987) p. 451/452: “Mental entities, as the significations of our words, have been postulated under many different titles in the history of thought: as concepts, mental words, interior words, intelligible species, ideas, notions, cognitive contents, and abstract entities. Under these and other names they have been accepted by Neo-Platonist philosophers and theologians, by various Scholastics, by Descartes, by the classical British empiricists, Kant and the Neokantians, as well as by many recent thinkers.” 12 See Salmieri (2008) p. 3: “[…] since “concept” does not translate any word in Aristotle’s Greek (at least not without controversy).” In fact, the terms “conceptio” and “conceptum” have been only introduced in late Antiquity and medieval times. Before that plenty of different terms were used to designate the constituents of thought. See Helmig (2012) p. 14/15. 13 Helmig (2012, p. 335) bases his research on the same methodological assumption: “I have argued that ancient theories of knowledge acquisition can be most adequately described if we have recourse to concepts for the following reasons. From several texts it emerges that the soul is seen as containing fairly stable mental entities which are more fundamental than memories and beliefs. These are termed, inter alia, ennoiai, katholou, or logoi and are most appropriately translated as ‘concepts’. […] The language of concepts allows for a more satisfactory description of the process of learning (concept attainment and development) […].”

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The philosophical problem of concepts is closely connected to the problem of universals.14 Plato can be considered the first philosopher to note that some things are said universally, e.g., generic terms or property terms. However, even though there is no corresponding entity in the world, these terms do make reference to something. We actually do speak as if general terms and property terms had real referents, e.g., as though justice was a real entity. Plato’s solution was to assume that universals actually exist as independent entities (ideai or eidê). There are three classical solutions to the problem of universals posed by Plato. These solutions have been canonized in medieval philosophy as universals existing either ante rem, in re, or post rem. Universals might be mind-independent higher-level entities like Platonic ideas. They might be present in particular things and real because they are the inherent forms of particulars. This solution to the problem of universals is sometimes described as Aristotelian. Finally, universals might only exist in human minds or in human language. The former of those two positions has been called conceptualism (i.e., universals are mental concepts) while the other has been called nominalism (i.e., universals only exist as general terms in language).15 Mental representations of universals have been called “concepts.” This is the most relevant usage of the term in the context of this dissertation. If pathêmata qualify as concepts, Aristotle can be described to have a theory of concepts as mental particulars. Additionally, it should be noted that the term “concept” has been used in different ways. For example, it stands for Platonic ideas, linguistic meanings, logical primitives, and many more. In contrast, modern philosophy is mainly concerned with questions about the ontological status and the epistemic role of concepts. For example, the question as to how concepts can be shared, if

14 See Salmieri (2008) p. 1: “The problem arose in Socrates’ search for definitions and motivated Plato’s Theory of Forms. In the Medieval period, it became a debate about the metaphysical status and location of “universals”. In the early Modern period, it was the debate over the existence and nature of “general ideas”. For Kant and his successors, the conviction that concepts spring from the mind prompted a radical reconceptualization of the relationship between mind and world. The problem remains current in the growing literature on concepts, in theories of reference, in continued debates about the ontological status of universals, in questions about the proper methods of scientific classification and about what makes these methods proper, and in debates about whether perception has the kind of “content” that can serve as a justification for propositional (i.e., conceptual) knowledge.” Bealer (1998) p. 261. 15 See Klima (2013) p. 3.

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they are conceived as mental particulars, as well as the question of how concepts can be “about” the world and, therefore, correctly represent it. Theories of concepts in modern psychology treat concepts as mental representations of real kinds16 (sometimes including mental representations of particulars, i.e., individual concepts). Psychology is not primarily interested in ontological or epistemological questions but rather in how concepts are able to fulfill specific cognitive tasks; e.g., how is one able to categorize something as belonging to one kind and not another? What information is included in conceptual representations? How are they structured? And how can higher-order cognitive operations (e.g., deduction, induction, plan-making) be described? Linguistics is interested in the study of language on all levels. Some of these levels are immanent to language as an empirical phenomenon, e.g., phonetics, morphology, and syntax. Semantics, on the other hand, discusses the phenomenon of linguistic meanings. Word meanings can be equated with concepts, i.e., if something qualifies as a word meaning, it also qualifies as a concept.17 Consequently, semantic research starts with observations on language use. Alternatively, accounts in linguistics can make reference to psychological theories of concepts, i.e., they propose that linguistic representations do have a meaning by virtue of their connection to language-independent mental representations which are used in categorization tasks and other higher-order mental operations and are the focus of research in psychology of concepts. This is roughly equivalent to what Aristotle seems to be saying in De interpretatione. Aristotle is an interesting candidate to compare to modern theories of concepts since he is the first philosopher with an extensive corpus and an elaborate and mostly coherent philosophical system. He is also the first that clearly states the necessity of a mental representational level in between the level of language

16 In the psychological literature of concepts, real kinds are often named “categories” to distinguish them from the Aristotelian set of ten Categories. I will use “categories” without a capital c when discussing the modern literature on concepts and “Categories” with a capital C for the Aristotelian Categories. 17 See Löbner (2014a) p. 19: “The meaning is therefore a mental description. For mental descriptions in general, the term concept will be used. A concept for a kind, or category, […] of entities is knowledge that allows us to discriminate entities of that kind from entities of other kinds. A concept should not be equated with a visual image. Many categories we have words for […] are not categories of visible things.” – Löbner seems to assume that having a word is a criterion for assigning concept possession to a cognitive agent. If a proposed conceptual format is not able to qualify as word meaning, it does not qualify for concepts either.

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and reality. Furthermore, he is said to be the predecessor both of classical theory (one of the earliest psychological theories of concepts) and of modal theories of concepts (one of the most recent developments in the psychology of concepts) at the same time. If Aristotle is to be compared to modern theories of concepts, as I propose, it is necessary to first answer the following questions: a) To which theory of concepts is Aristotle compared? b) Can Aristotle be said to have a theory of concepts? c) Which notion/technical term in Aristotle comes closest to “concept” in the modern debate? Possible answers for the last question have been mentioned above and will be discussed in more detail below.

3.  Aristotle and the modal/amodal distinction In the last decade, there has been a trend to see cognition not as symbolic manipulations in analogy to computer programs (which was the paradigm for early cognitive science) but rather as an embodied process which takes place in a biological body and makes use of the specific features of the cognitive agent’s body. This trend also includes embodiment theories of conceptual representations. One of the most influential proponents of concepts as perceptual representations, i.e., representations inherently connected to the perceptual brain systems, is the cognitive psychologist Lawrence Barsalou. His theory is inspired by experimental results measuring the brain’s activity during conceptual tasks. He proposes a systematic and general theory of how a purely perceptual system of cognitive representations that is strong enough to account for the variety of conceptual tasks can be conceived. One of these requirements is that conceptual representations resemble actual and concrete perceptions. Barsalou’s account has received a lot of attention in contemporary philosophy –both negative and positive.18 Concerning his predecessors in philosophy, Barsalou claims that actually most thinkers throughout the history of philosophy have been proponents of a perceptual theory of higher cognition, in contrast to commonly held beliefs. He cites Aristotle as one of the earliest proponents: Given how reasonable this perceptually based view of cognition might seem, why has it not enjoyed widespread acceptance? Why is it not in serious contention as a theory of representation? Actually, this view dominated theories of mind for most of recorded history. For more than 2,000 years, theorists viewed higher cognition as inherently perceptual. Since Aristotle (4th century BC/1961) and Epicurus (4th century BC/1994), theorists saw the representations that underlie cognition as imagistic. British empiricists such as Locke (1690/1959), Berkeley (1710/1982), and Hume (1739/1978) certainly viewed

18 Positive: Prinz (2002); Critical: Machery (2007), Weiskopf (2007).

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cognition in this manner. Images likewise played a central role in the theories of later nativists such as Kant (1787/1965) and Reid (1764/1970; 1785/1969). Even recent philosophers such as Russell (1919b) and Price (1953) have incorporated images centrally into their theories. Until the early twentieth century, nearly all theorists assumed that knowledge had a strong perceptual character. (Barsalou 1999: 578)

This historical remark seems to disregard the strong rationalist tradition in philosophy originating with Plato and continued by thinkers such as Descartes and Frege in later periods. Generally speaking, rationalists denied the epistemical value of perception. Barsalou’s historical evaluation is at least an oversimplification. However, it still cannot be ruled out without consideration that Barsalou might be right, e.g., about Kantian schemata and especially about the English Empiricists – in fact his own position has often been called “Neo-Empiricism” by philosophers. It might seem anachronistic to compare Aristotle to very recent theories of concepts, especially psychological theories. On the other hand, there was renewed systematic interest in Aristotle and his philosophy in the last century after he had been mostly rejected by philosophers in the centuries before. Höffe (1996) still sees a lot of potential for innovation in Aristotle’s works. He cites Brentano, Heidegger, Łukasiewicz, and, most prominently, modern virtue ethics (such as Anscombe) as being directly influenced by Aristotle. In addition, he suggests that there are strong parallels between Aristotle’s philosophical method and modern analytical philosophy. Furthermore, he connects Aristotelian biology to the epigenesis theory in modern biology, which states that phylogenetic development is mirrored by ontogenetic development.19 The Aristotelian notion of pathêma does have a lot in common with Barsalou’s account of perceptual symbols: conceptual representations are said to build on more primitive representations which originate in perception. Furthermore, pathêmata are said to bear likeness to external things. Barsalou, of course, would not agree to this. Pathêmata are likenesses of the pragmata by virtue of being likenesses of perceptions which, in the Aristotelian framework, can meaningfully be described as likenesses of the pragmata. It is only this second relation that Barsalou (and most modern psychologists) would deny. The similarity relation between perceptions and conceptual representations is a central and constitutive element both in Barsalou and in Aristotle. All that has been said up to this point might suggest that it is reasonable to accept Barsalou’s evaluation and attribute a perceptual theory of concepts to Aristotle.

19 See Höffe (1996) p. 284–286, 131/132.

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Barsalou’s perceptual symbols are conceived as modal, i.e., tied to modalityspecific systems of sense perception.20 This contrasts with amodal theories of concepts which assume concepts to have an independent representational format somewhat like a computer code. Those arbitrary symbols are embedded in language-like structures, e.g., in schemata or frames, which can be manipulated by a cognitive system. Thus, amodal theories of concepts are sometimes referred to as “propositional” theories of concepts.21 Those theories are presented as a clear-cut alternative to perceptual/modal theories of concepts. The most radical example of this kind of theories is a classical or feature list approach to concepts in which concepts are understood as an unstructured list of features, while the features themselves are arbitrary symbols. In addition, concepts are understood as definitional, i.e., the features contained in a concept are all necessary and jointly sufficient for something to be subsumed under a given concept. The two aspects do not always have to be connected; in other words, probabilistic and non-definitional theories of concepts might be symbolic and amodal. At first sight, this description of concepts seems to fit what Aristotle discusses under the labels of logoi and horismoi in the logical writings. Several authors see these similarities and mention Aristotle’s theory of definitions as the first example of a classical and amodal theory of concepts.22 Brewer (1993) even uses the term “Aristotelian concepts” to designate classical theories of concepts which are based on the belief that members of a category share necessary essential features.23 If both accounts are accepted, Aristotle seems to have both a modal and an amodal theory of concepts. This should be an inconsistency according to proponents of modal theories of concepts. Furthermore, in addition to the internal questions already imposed by Aristotelian philosophy, this comparative perspective brings up new questions: a) Can modal and amodal theories indeed both be linked to the Aristotelian notions of pathêma and logos respectively? If Aristotle has both a modal and an amodal theory of concepts in his philosophy: b) How are both related to each other? c) Is the distinction between modal and amodal representations perhaps not as clear-cut as proponents of modal theories seem to indicate? d) Can the relation between logoi and pathêmata in Aristotle be transferred 20 In the context of this dissertation “modal” is always used in relation with sense modalities. The more common technical meaning of “modal” in philosophy is associated with logical modalities of propositions such as necessary, possible, impossible, real, etc.; hence, the discipline “modal logic.” 21 See Barsalou (1999) p. 578, 595. 22 See Murphy (2004) p. 11. 23 See Brewer (1993) p. 505.

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to modern theories, i.e., is it possible, in a modern context, to be a proponent of a modal and an amodal theory of concepts at the same time in the same way Aristotle was? e) In addition and more generally, it can be asked, whether Barsalou’s historical evaluation is correct in regard to other philosophers. All of these questions are either prerequisites or part of a larger task. Ultimately this dissertation is aiming to reconstruct a) what theories of concepts in philosophy and psychology are and what their aims are, b) the relation between logos and pathêma in Aristotle himself, and c) to compare Aristotle to modern theories of concepts especially concerning the modal/amodal distinction.

4.  State of the art The amount of literature on Aristotle and his philosophy is immense and probably every possible position in interpreting him has been taken. Therefore, the questions immanent to Aristotelian philosophy have been discussed by various authors. Modrak’s Aristotle’s Theory of Language and Meaning (2001) might be mentioned as a very thorough account that discusses and evaluates the topics at stake. Modrak specifically discusses the relation between logos and pathêma in Categories and De interpretatione: Setting aside questions about the psychological nature of the pathêma, it seems reasonable to suppose that the internal state is constitutive to the logos and thus that the two passages are describing the same three items from different perspectives. (Modrak 2001: 28)24

Logos and pathêma are more or less equated with each other and said to be word meanings. I will come back to Modrak’s position on this issue in the final section of my dissertation. There are many other authors discussing the relation between Aristotelian logic and psychology, e.g., Zirin (1980), Wheeler (1999), Carson (2003), De Cuypere/Willems (2008). The overall consensus seems to be that there is no contradiction between the account of concepts as logoi and concepts as pathêmata and there is continuity in Aristotelian philosophy, albeit the connection between both is conceived in different ways by different authors. When it comes to comparing Aristotle to modern theories of concepts (both modal and amodal), there is less literature. No author explicitly discusses the relation between both aspects in Aristotle and in the modern discussion. As already indicated above, a short mention of Aristotle is quite common both in historical accounts of theories of concepts mostly in relation to the classical 24 The format of the original text, in terms of cursive writing, quotation marks etc., is retained in direct quotes.

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view – be it in philosophy or in psychology25 – but also in historical accounts of perceptual theories of representation and cognition.26 However, these references mostly remain superficial and do not provide a detailed account of how Aristotle relates to modern theories of concepts. I intend to provide such a detailed account here. Some authors mention that a thorough investigation comparing Aristotle to modern theories would be a desideratum; but they do not provide such an investigation themselves. For example, Modrak states: Aristotle emphasizes different issues than the issues emphasized today, and we cannot find answers to all of today’s quandaries in his theory of meaning. Nevertheless, Aristotle’s account of mental representation and reference and his conception of nested cognitive levels suggest directions that might still be fruitfully explored. (Modrak 2001: 277)

There are some exceptions worth mentioning. Johansen (2012) compares Aristotelian psychology to modern faculty psychology along the lines of Jerry Fodor and tries to present a new interpretation of De anima from this perspective. Helmig (2012) discusses theories of concepts in several ancient authors, Aristotle among them. He takes modern theories of concepts as a starting point. His main focus is on concept acquisition and the differences between a Platonic approach of concept attainment as recollection and the Aristotelian approach of concept attainment as induction. He is mainly interested in philosophical theories of concepts. The same is true for Salmieri’s dissertation on Aristotle and the Problem of Concepts (2008). An interesting, albeit short, comparison of an Aristotelian theory of concepts and modern psychological theories of concepts in general can be found in Spalding’s and Gagné’s Concepts in Aristotle and Aquinas: Implications for Current Theoretical Approaches (2013). Gregorić (2007) provides a very systematic, thorough and up-to-date discussion of the faculties of perception and imagination as well as their interrelations in Aristotle. His work will be drawn upon in the sections of this dissertation which discuss this faculty and ultimately the question as to what perceptual representations in Aristotle actually are, which is of central importance when comparing them to Barsalou’s notion of perceptual symbols. These are just a few authors treating issues which are at the focus of attention in parts of this dissertation.

25 See, e.g., Murphy (2004) p. 11, 39, Smith/Medin (1981) p. 22. 26 See, e.g., Prinz (2002) p. 25, Barsalou (1999) p. 578, Tye (1991) p. 3.

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5. Method Research in philosophy is often classified as being either historical or systematic. This distinction is useful but oversimplifying. Systematic research is supposed to be directed at a philosophical topic and to discuss this topic on an abstract and general level, e.g., how different ontologies can be conceived, what knowledge is, or whether certain medical practices are ethical. Historical research is like any other historical discipline concerned with reconstructing the philosophical position of authors from history, finding explanations for certain developments, and comparing different positions. This distinction seems clear-cut at first but it is not: to be able to discuss authors from the history of philosophy, one has to systematically reconstruct their positions. On the other hand, systematic research almost always draws on something that came before. One might conclude that classifying something as systematic or historical only provides a tendency and there might also be genuine hybrids which try to apply ancient authors to modern problems. The respective aim is the central issue, e.g., some research might draw on ancient authors but ultimately be interested in how they apply to the modern problem. In this case, giving a truthful interpretation of the ancient author is not necessarily required. The central questions of this book (i.e., clarifying the notions of pathêma and logos in Aristotle; comparing them to modern theories of concepts) are historical in nature to a high degree, both reconstructive and comparative. Obviously, none of these questions can be answered without systematic considerations. There is also the systematic question whether Aristotelian philosophy provides a solution for the dichotomy of modal/amodal theories of concepts. This question can only be answered once the other questions receive a proper historical and systematic treatment. Some aspects of this dissertation can be seen as research on the history of ideas, e.g., the history of the notion of concept. The history of a particular idea could be researched taking a conceptual or a terminological point of view. The first approach is more common to the history of ideas, yet the second approach should not be neglected. As is the case with any systematic and a historical approach, the two cannot be entirely separated. A conceptual approach assumes that there is a notion of ‘concept’27 which can be found in different authors and which remains constant to a certain degree throughout the history of philosophy. One 27 Throughout the dissertation ‘ ’ will be used to mark a concept or notion independent of its corresponding term/word and “ ” will denote terms/words. Greek and Latin terms are indicated by a cursive font.

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might be mainly interested in its development, its role in different philosophical systems. There has to be something common to all of them or at least something connecting them (one option would be family resemblance) that makes them all notions of concept independent of which terms are used, e.g., “noêma,” “logos,” “lekton,” “eidos,” “conceptus,” “notion,” “Begriff ” or “idea.” A terminological approach, on the other hand, focuses on a technical term or on a group of technical terms. These terms might change their meanings to a high degree, e.g., “logos” or “pathêma.” The general approach taken in this dissertation can be characterized as conceptual, i.e., it is assumed that there is one (or more than one) notion of concept that can be found in different authors, periods, and disciplines.28 However, at times, especially in the chapters concerning logos and pathêma, terminological considerations have to be taken into account to present a satisfying conceptual analysis. Without this terminological anchor, the positions that need to be considered would become limitless. There are countless technical terms and quasi-technical expressions in Aristotle that could be translated as “concept.”29 A lot of the research on Aristotle is built on the assumption that he goes through a certain development in his philosophical system. The first major accomplishment, on which the later research of this kind was based, was presented by Jaeger (1923) who saw Aristotle’s development as a movement away from Platonism. Different developmental accounts have been proposed and should be considered when giving an analysis of Aristotelian philosophy. On the other hand, some skepticism towards the developmental research program – especially when based on interpretations of the philosophical content of the Aristotelian writings – is appropriate.

28 See Gregorić (2007) for an example of a work which is both terminological and conceptual. He separately discusses the usage of the expression koinê aisthêsis in Aristotle (section II) and the way the common sense is to be conceived (section III) showing that koinê aisthêsis is not a technical term while there is a notion of common sense present in the Aristotelian writings. 29 Helmig (2012, p. 14/15) lists the following fourteen expressions: “axiôma, archê, eidos/ genos, ennoia, koinai einnoiai, epinoia, noêma, ennoêma, logos, katholou, katholou logoi, koinon, lekton, prolêpsis.” He also sees logos as one of the most important one of those together with ennoia and katholou. Ennoia stresses the mental characteristics of concepts while kathoulou stresses the general character of concepts. Logos might stress a connection of concepts to language or the rationalistic characters of concepts. All three are present in Aristotle but do not necessarily have the meaning ‘concept’ yet. Helmig (2012, p. 24) also poses the question whether there is enough in common to all those expressions that they could be translated with the modern term “concept.” On the other hand, that might be explained by the ambiguity of the modern term.

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Anagnostopoulos (2009) presents an overview and concludes that there is still no consent among proponents of developmental accounts.30 I do not want to focus on developmental questions here. It will be assumed that the notions I am discussing are relatively consistent throughout the Aristotelian writings if there are no strong reasons to assume otherwise. Two arguments can be provided for this: (a) There are authors who see no strong developments throughout Aristotelian philosophy, are critical about developmental hypothesis and do not see much value in this line of research.31 This is certainly too harsh and a lot of important results have been achieved to this day, especially concerning the early and fragmentary works. On the other hand, this approach is at least partly based on the assumption that there are no contradictions or different philosophical views in Aristotelian writings belonging to the same time period which would also explain inconsistencies. Therefore, skepticism and caution towards a definite distinction between different periods and layers of a given treatise are appropriate. Many authors accept developmental perspectives and at the same time agree that there is a great deal of continuity regarding several aspects of Aristotelian philosophy.32 There is no absolute chronology and it might not even be possible to establish one.33 (b) Both the central notions discussed herein (logoi and pathêmata) are either constant or referenced as being treated in the other writings; e.g., the notion of logos from Categories is presupposed in a lot of the methodological remarks throughout the Corpus Aristotetlicum; the referenced usage of logos is present in the psychological writings and all major philosophical writings;34 apart from the direct reference to the psychological writings in De interpretatione, pathêma and pathos are used therein in a similar way and equally connected to language and thought. Therefore, assuming a certain homogeneity is not such a big stretch. In addition, it is generally accepted respected that the treatises have been revised

30 31 32 33

See Anagnostopoulos (2009) p. 22. Matthen (1978) p. 232. See, e.g., Berti (1996), Brinkmann (1996). Höffe (1996, p. 25) only allows for some relative statements, i.e., Topics is earlier than the other logical writings, the notion of substance in Categories earlier than the same notion in Metaphysics, De generatione Animalium is later than the other biological writings, etc. 34 Berti (1996, p. 130) states that the Aristotelian notion of dialectic of which logos might be considered a part stays the same throughout all Aristotelian writings independently of other developmental questions.

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several times by Aristotle himself.35 Therefore, inconsistencies might have been already erased at that time and cross references might be newer than the remainder of a treatise. When passages from other works are discussed, the issue comes up again and is given its due treatment, e.g., the question of how the ontology of the Categories and Metaphysics is related. Developmental explanations will be considered and evaluated amongst other possible explanations for inconsistencies. Apart from those chronological and developmental questions, the style of Aristotle’s philosophy is a matter of debate. While it is classically assumed that he is aiming at a coherent philosophical system, some authors like Ackrill (1981) stress the openness of his philosophy, which is mostly concerned with describing problems and discussing possible solutions rather than providing a definite set of answers. This can be an alternative explanation of seeming inconsistencies which does not involve chronological development. Anagnostopoulos (2009) sees this aspect of Aristotle’s writings and stresses the risk of imposing a definite system where there is none. On the other hand, he also cautions against seeing no recurring systematic elements in Aristotle’s philosophy: It is doubtful that Aristotle’s works, as edited by Andronicus, constitute a comprehensive system of thought into which everything he says fits neatly. But there is systematic thinking in them about many things – the nature of the sciences, the faculties of the soul, the types and correctness of political constitutions, the nature of causes, the nature of physical bodies and that of heavenly ones and the relation between the two, to mention a few. (Anagnostopoulos 2009: 18)

The approach here will be to accept both systematic continuity and discontinuity when comparing different writings and when discussing a singular treatise. In consequence, one possible answer to the questions posed might be that there is no systematic connection between logos and pathêma at all. However, both being part of a unified philosophical system cannot be ruled out a priori either, especially given the often presumed systematical and chronological connection.

6. Structure This dissertation consists of six main sections in addition to this short introduction and a conclusion. Section II presents a general framework of theories of concepts to enable a comparison between the modern notion(s) of concept and Aristotle. Theories of concepts are understood in a broad fashion and theories from philosophy, psychology, and linguistics are all understood as theories

35 See Höffe (2006) p. 20.

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of concepts even though they might not necessarily have much in common. A basic characterization for different theories of concepts is developed and based on this, I present a definition for “concept” that corresponds to the way it is used in the modern theories that are relevant in this context (i.e., those in which the distinction between modal and amodal can be made) and will later be compared to Aristotle. Building on this, Section III gives a historical overview of theories of concepts in philosophy – starting with Plato and ending in the modern philosophy of mind. It illustrates parts of the scheme drawn in the previous chapter and shows that there has been a continuous tradition of theories of concepts in philosophy. It also presents a first and very general evaluation of Barsalou’s historical claim that perceptual theories of concepts and knowledge have been the norm throughout the history of philosophy. A general historical overview for psychological theories of concepts with a focus on the similarities and differences between psychological and philosophical theories is given in Section IV Chapter IV.1. Chapter IV.2 presents and analyses the distinction between modal and amodal theories of concepts which has recently been brought up in the psychological debate by Barsalou and others. In addition to a general account, I also present a discussion of the philosophical criticism that has been brought against the distinction and against modal approaches to concepts. This is necessary in order to give a clear definition of what Aristotle is actually being compared to. Sections II–IV form a kind of unity in the sense that they provide a general account of what theories of concepts, especially modal or perceptual theories in philosophy, psychology, and to a lesser degree linguistics, amount to. Section V is the first section to focus primarily on Aristotelian philosophy. It discusses the way logos is used in the logical writings and the question whether logos could be translated as “concept.” The first chapter (V.1) discusses logos as a word and technical term in general and, specifically, the different ways it is used in Plato and in Aristotle himself. This is an important backdrop for developing the particular meaning of logos in question. After that, the focus is shifted to the way logos is to be understood in the passages in question (primarily Categories 1a) including its role in explaining homonymy and synonymy (V.2.1.1), its relation to the notions of ‘word meaning’ on the one hand (V.2.1.2) and the linguistic category ‘sentence’ (V.2.1.3) on the other. The second part (V.2.2) compares logos to adjunct notions in Aristotelian philosophy. Starting with the notion of Category – because this usage of logos is introduced and is very prominent in a treatise of which the Categories are the main focus (V.2.2.1) – followed by the connected notion of substance/ousia/eidos, which is the most prominent of the Categories and also a constituent of the phrase logos tês ousias used in Categories 1a (V.2.2.2), 28

and finally the notion of definition/horismos which is possibly the same as logos tês ousias (V.2.2.3). The final part (III.3) tries to develop a general understanding of the relevant meaning of logos. Section VI treats the theory of mental representations developed in the psychological writings, which is referenced in De interpretatione 16a. The famous passage itself and its many interpretations are discussed and analyzed (VI.1.1) as well as the status of pathêma as a word or technical term in Aristotle (VI.1.2), and the way representation is characterized in general (VI.1.3). After the passage from De interpretatione is immanently discussed, it is connected the theory of representations developed in the psychological writings (both De anima and the Parva Naturalia) following the reference given by Aristotle himself. General aspects of Aristotelian psychology are introduced (VI.2.1) as a backdrop before perception (VI.2.2) and imagination (VI.2.3) are discussed separately and in more detail since it is highly plausible that phantasmata, i.e., impressions preserved by the faculty of imagination (phantasia) can be equated with pathêmata in De interpretatione. Their connection to higher cognitive faculties is also a topic in the psychological writings and is discussed (chapter VI.2.4) followed by some general concluding remarks (VI.3). Section VII brings all the aspects discussed in the previous sections together and tries to answer the central questions of this dissertation concerning the relation between logoi, pathêmata and modern modal/amodal theories of concepts. The first chapter treats the question whether logoi (VII.1.1) and pathêmata (VII.1.2) can be compared to their respective modern counterparts and in what regards. After that the connections between logoi and pathêmata immanent to Aristotelian philosophy are discussed (VII.2). The third chapter (VII.3) tries to answer whether Aristotle can be said to have a theory of concepts and whether either logoi or pathêmata qualify as the rightful equivalent to concepts in Aristotle. Ultimately, the relation of both aspects of Aristotle’s philosophy is transferred to the modern discussion and applied to the general question how modal theories and amodal theories can be related to each other including the question whether they should be understood as opposites or not (VII.4). This last section and the whole dissertation is rounded out with a short conclusion (VIII) emphasizing the main points and results and putting them in context.

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II.  The concept of ‘concept’ What a theory of concepts is about and what is understood as “concept” in a particular theory largely depends on the scientific discipline and its background assumptions: Asking a psychologist, philosopher, or a linguist what a concept is much like asking a physicist what mass is. An answer cannot be given in isolation. Rather, the term plays a certain role in a larger world-view that includes the nature of language, of meaning, and of mind. Hence the notion of a concept cannot be explicated without at the same time sketching the background against which it is set, and the ‘correctness’ of a particular notion of concept cannot be evaluated without at the same time evaluating the world-view in which it plays a role. (Jackendoff 1989: 689)

A distinction can easily be drawn between theories of concepts in philosophy and psychology. Psychology is a young discipline when compared to philosophy and, unlike philosophy, it is a mainly empirical discipline. Linguistics is foremost interested in concepts insofar as they are relevant for language production and comprehension. There is a huge overlap between psychology and linguistics, mainly because both are empirical sciences and are at least partially concerned with the same kind of empirical phenomena. The representations discussed as “concepts” in psychology have, in a certain regard, been discussed in philosophy for centuries. Earlier psychologists of concepts tie their research to philosophical theories, e.g., Rosch’s notion of prototype is influenced by Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance. Philosophers such as Fodor, Prinz, and Machery have defined certain criteria that concepts need to fulfill to qualify as concepts. ‘Concept’ itself is a theoretical construct that is used to explain certain behavioral phenomena in psychology and certain properties of language and thought in linguistics and philosophy. The psychological notion of concept is closely connected to the notion of categorization – i.e., the reason we can categorize objects as belonging to a certain category of real entities (such as cats) is that we have a concept corresponding to that category.1 Furthermore, ‘concept’ in psychology is connected to the notion of constituents of in higher-order thought processes such as induction, plan making, and problem solving.2 The two areas are not necessarily connected with each other. 1 See Murphy (2004) p. 1; Prinz (2002) p. 9. 2 See Machery (2009) p. 9–12.

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There are some theories discussed under the label “concept” which are of little interest for psychologists since they are simply not about psychological entities. A preliminary distinction can be drawn between ontological questions concerning concepts and qualitative questions concerning concepts. The first kind of question is concerned with the ontological status concepts have ranging from Fregean senses to functional kinds. Qualitative questions presuppose one specific answer to the ontological question, e.g., concepts are mental particulars, and research certain qualities of concepts conceived this way. What is of interest here is rather what properties concepts have, e.g., how they are structured and, especially, in which observable behavior these structures result. Beyond the ontological questions there are also epistemological concerns for philosophers: how can concepts be about something in the world if they are mental particulars? How are they related to entities and propositions? A theory of concepts must fulfill certain requirements to render the standard notion of truth as correspondence possible in philosophical epistemology.3 In summary, there are severe differences between philosophy and psychology and, to a lesser extent, linguistics. However, concepts as discussed in psychology are also an important topic of contemporary philosophy of mind. In this section, a systematic account of theories of concepts will be given, to show the differences and relations between theories of concepts across disciplines. This systematic account focuses on the notion of concepts in cognitive science and tries to come up with a minimal definition which can be used as a point of reference in the later discussion. In doing so, I will also incorporate considerations on what alternatives there are for defining concepts and in what way the core definition can be integrated in a more general sketch. This systematical sketch developed below starts from two perspectives. Concepts can be described as mental representations of universals. Therefore, both the notion of representation and the notion of universal are discussed. Secondly, the tasks that concepts are assigned in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics differ. It is important to ask how concepts have to be defined to fulfill those tasks. Starting from these two basic distinctions, I present and compare different ways of classifying theories of concepts and defining concepts.

3 Machery (2009) states this to be the main concern of philosophical theories of concepts. This is true when taking into consideration mainly those theories developed in relation to the psychological accounts he discusses, whereas it is questionable when having a look at more diverse philosophical positions and the whole history of philosophy.

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1.  Theories of concepts and their presuppositions 1.1.  Concepts and categories as representations What a concept and what a category are at an ontological level is sometimes ambiguous in the psychological literature. Mental representations are said to be representations of concepts by some authors4, in other texts concepts are said to be representations of categories5, in yet others categories are said to be representations themselves.6 Therefore, it is quite helpful to make some distinctions in order to clarify both notions. A representation is something that stands for something else. The relation “x stands for y” seems to be constitutive of being a representation, regardless of how it is interpreted and defined. For example, there are natural signs: like water flowing in a certain direction signifying a downward gradient or smoke signifying fire.7 However, it is arguable whether such natural signs qualify as representations.8 Then there are conventional signs which are made to stand for something by human beings, e.g., traffic signs.9 In philosophy of mind, this representational relation has been discussed under the label “intentionality” starting with Brentano. In the modern debate, it is famously associated with Dretske’s notion of informational semantics and Millikan’s notion of teleosemantics or biosemantics, among others. However, the notion of intentionality in its most general form has a very simple structure and necessary basic constituents, Representation is an “intentional” or “outerdirected” relation. If x represents y, then x has a part that “stands for,” “refers to,” or is otherwise “about” y. This is the admittedly vague but undeniable heart of the notion. (Jubien 2001: 54)

There is something that represents, something that is represented and a “standing for” relation between both.10 The Latin terms representans and representatum will be used to distinguish these two (Pl.: representantia and representata) for the purpose of this dissertation. The latter is often referred to as the content of a

4 See Barsalou (1992) p. 44. 5 See Barsalou et al. (1993), p. 1: “We shall assume that concepts are people’s psychological representations of categories (e.g., apple, chair) […].” 6 See Barsalou (1991). 7 See Dretske (1994) p. 298–300. 8 E.g., Cummins/Poirier (2004) distinguish between indications and proper representations which have to be non-arbitrary and suitable for structural processing. 9 See Dretske (2003) p. 68. 10 See Vosgerau (2008) p. 67.

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representation or the intentional content in the event that a distinction is made between intentional and cognitive content.11 This general notion of representation can utilized without making reference to the mental.12 It can be present in a purely biological system.13 Usually, in the case of concepts, the representans is conceived as something mental, while the representatum is conceived as something extramental (excluding those cases where the mind itself is the content of thoughts or the objects of thought are not real, e.g., fantasy creatures such as unicorns). There is also a more subjectivist reading of representation in the history of philosophy: in this case “being about” and “representing” are restricted to what is accessible to the subject through conscious experience, while the external objects are not accessible for human subjects and, in consequence, cannot be a part of a definition of representations and the way representations are understood as representations by human subjects. The first could be described as an objectivist definition of representations while the second is a subjectivist definition.14 In this context, we will be mostly concerned with the former yet the latter must also be mentioned.

11 See Prinz (2002) p. 3–8, Dretske (2003) p. 68: “There are representational vehicles—the objects, events, or conditions that represent—and representational contents—the conditions or situations the vehicle represents as being so. In speaking about representations, then, we must be clear whether we are talking about content or vehicle, about what is represented or the representation itself. It makes a big difference. In the case of mental representations, the vehicle (a belief or an experience) is in the head. […] Representations need not be about a particular object (spatio-temporal particular) in order to have a content. Following fairly standard causal thinking, I take the object(s) of a representation to be the object(s) that stand(s) in the right causal relation to it. If there is no object that stands in the right causal relation to R (the representational vehicle), then R is not about an object. R nonetheless still has a content—what it would be saying about an object if it had an object.” 12 It is debatable whether there has to be an interpretation in some way by an entity with some form of mind: i.e., whether something can be a sign of something else without being a sign interpreted by someone or something. It might well be that there is a huge inflation of the class of signs without this restrictive condition. These considerations would lead to some form of subjectivism, which will later be discussed. However, even if this is accepted, there can still be an extra-mental representans and representatum: The interpreting mind would have to be a third part of the definition of representation along the lines of “x stands for y as interpreted by z.” 13 See Millikan (1994). 14 See Kriegel (2013) for discussion.

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If concepts are conceived as representata, they can be considered something extra-mental; as representantia they are something mental.15 Theories of concepts as mental representations should not speak of concepts being represented but rather as representing something. Other theories of concepts related, e.g., to Fregean senses or Platonic ideas require concepts to be extra-mental entities and, therefore, can meaningfully speak of mental representations of concepts which are not concepts themselves. The Fregean position could be classified as ontological objectivism concerning concepts; the opposite position prevalent in cognitive science and the current philosophy of mind could be classified as ontological subjectivism accordingly.16 Both presuppose a general realism, in which both minds and external things are considered real entities. In the objectivist position, mind-independent concepts additionally have a status as real entities. This status is further specified and concepts are usually defined as abstract entities which are not temporal or spatial but yet mind-independent.17 Brewer (1993) proposes a similar basic approach for classifying theories of concepts according to the dimensions of ontology, i.e., the ontological status of universals and the dimension of representations; in other words, how mental representations for universals can be described.18 15 See Margolis/Laurence (2007) p. 561: “What is a concept? Philosophers have given many different answers to this question, reflecting a wide variety of approaches to the study of mind and language. Nonetheless, at the most general level, there are two dominant frameworks in contemporary philosophy. One proposes that concepts are mental representations, while the other proposes that they are abstract objects.” 16 There are some similarities between this distinction and the distinction Jackendoff (1989, p. 69 ff.) draws between E-concepts and I-concepts (external and internal) in analogy to E-languages and I-languages as proposed by Chomsky. I-concepts are subjective mental states and, therefore, are equal to what has been called an ontological subjectivism towards concepts. However, E-concepts seem to rather be social or cultural entities while ontological objectivism allows for several different descriptions of what concepts are which are only unified by denying that concepts are mental particulars. 17 See, e.g., Materna (1998) p. 60. 18 On the ontological level, he distinguishes between degrees of assigning a status as real entities to categories mentally represented to starting from a nominalism/conceptualism to assigning a real status to all kinds of categories such as natural kinds, artifacts, social institutions etc. On the level of representations, he includes formal objects, words and images. Formal objects such as Platonic ideas are included among the ontological classifications made in this chapter. Words are not included as a format of concepts since it is assumed that concepts as mental representations are independent of words and do not merely consist in words. This is discussed in the sections concerned with

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The question concerning the ontological status of categories is intrinsically linked to this discussion. Sometimes “categories” is used for sets of entities in the world, i.e., the set picked out or categorized by a concept, sometimes it is used to refer to the mental representation of this set.19 In the second case, it is mostly synonymous with concept as representans. This similarity is, for instance, attested in Machery (2009)20 who decides to use both terms interchangeably. Murphy (2004) uses “concept” for the representantia and “categories” for “the classes themselves,” i.e., the representata. However, he stresses that one should not be too worried about terminology if the context is clear.21 When categories are conceived as external representata they can be constituted by external factors, e.g., the category of dogs might be a category by virtue of being a natural kind. The alternative would be that categories are only categories in virtue of having a corresponding mental concept picking them out. The first position could be described as epistemological objectivism about categories, the second as epistemological subjectivism or as a conceptualism towards universals. Building on that, a theory of concepts can either be normative or descriptive: if concepts are mental particulars that are able to pick out a real existing category, e.g., a natural kind, they are mental representations which have to fulfill certain normative criteria to qualify as concepts.22 On the other hand, a theory of concepts might just describe what role mental representations play in cognitive processes and how they interact without presupposing any normative requirements they have to fulfill to be accepted as concepts. Another different way the term “concept” is used normatively can be found in philosophy when the linguistic understanding of concepts. What Brewer has to say about imagistic representations concerns the distinction between modal and amodal theories of concepts developed in chapter II.4. 19 See, e.g., Sloutsky (2010) p. 1245. In other cases, he seems to use category for the external representata, e.g., on p. 1248: “For example, some categories (e.g., most of natural kinds, such as cat or dog) have multiple intercorrelated features relevant for category membership.” 20 See Machery (2009) p. 8. 21 See Murphy (2004) p. 5. 22 Salmieri (2008, p. 47) analyzes Aristotle from a mostly normative perspective on concepts: “The formation and use of concepts is partially under our control and the Problem of Concepts is as much a problem about how we should form and use them as it is a problem about how we do form and use them. Because of this, we should take any theory of concepts as, in the first instance, a theory about proper or legitimate or healthy concepts. A theory can allow for the possibility of pseudo-concepts, which are not concepts at all and of defective concepts of various sorts.”

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one method of philosophical research is defined as “conceptual analysis.” This assumes that (a) that there is only one right way to analyze a concept and that (b) the analysis of a concept must answer to some formal standards. It is not assumed that all representations of categories available to cognitive subjects correspond to this one correct analysis or that they answer to the formal standards of philosophical analysis.23 Nevertheless, it is assumed that conceptual analysis is based on concepts already available to cognitive agents and the intuitions they are prompted to have in respect of these concepts. Nonetheless, there might still be contradictory intuitions and, in that case, conceptual analysis has to get rid of the contradictions. Another question is whether concepts only apply to categories or also to individuals. One possible solution would be to conceive individuals as categories with only one member, but for several reasons it is desirable to distinguish between those categories which contain only one member (e.g., ‘Pinta Island tortoise’) and the individual falling in this class (e.g., ‘lonesome George,’ who was considered to be the last Pinta Island tortoise). Individual concepts corresponding to proper names in language are sometimes conceived as another type of concept distinct from sortal concepts representing categories. If categories are not conceived as a set of entities but rather as a set of perceptual data, it is also possible to speak of individual concepts as representing perceptual categories

23 See Weiskopf (2009, p. 149): “The goal of conceptual analysis is to produce a certain kind of definition for a concept, but not any extensionally adequate definition is an analysis. Indeed, not even any definition that is extensionally adequate and modally adequate will do. An analysis is a definition that captures some essential and explanatorily significant property had by things falling under the concept. On this view, even if there are many ways of thinking of penguins, only the one that constitutes an analysis is genuinely the concept penguin.” Stich (1992, p. 247/248) describes conceptual analysis and its presuppositions in the following way: “This philosophical game of definition and counter-example makes little sense unless we make a pair of assumptions about the concepts it aims to analyze. The first of these is that the target concept can be characterized-or defined-by specifying necessary and sufficient conditions. To win a round, S can either produce an example which is an instance of the concept but is not captured by the definition, or he can produce an example which fits the definition but is not an instance of the concept. Moreover, it is generally assumed that the definition will be a Boolean concatenation of properties, or some relatively straightforward variation on that theme. The second assumption is that the players come equipped with enough information about the target concept to enable them to judge whether or not it applies in a wide range of cases, real and hypothetical, that they have never before imagined.”

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and categorizing perceptual impressions as belonging to the same singular entity. Historically, the term “concept” has been mainly used for representations of categories because it originated with the problem of universals, i.e., concepts of general kinds or categories. That is why some authors restrict the term to them, e.g., Smith and Medin (1981) stress the importance of concepts as representations of categories: Without concepts mental life would be chaotic. If we perceived each entity as unique, we would be overwhelmed by the sheer diversity of what we experience and unable to remember more than a minute fraction of what we encounter. And if each individual entity needed a distinct name, our language would be staggeringly complex and communication virtually impossible. Fortunately, though, we do not perceive, remember, and talk about each object and event as unique, but rather as an instance of a class or concept that we already know something about. (Smith/Medin 1981: 1)

Other authors also stress the economy of having concepts as representations of categories that help in determining how to interact with newly encountered objects.24 Most experiments on concepts are interested in representations of categories (in fact, mostly categories of objects, not of events25), representations of individuals as individuals are usually treated as something distinct. In general, the representata of concepts are considered to be categories rather than individuals. However, theories of mental representation do require an explanation of how the representation of individuals as individuals is achieved. Nevertheless, those representations might be significantly different from what is discussed under the label “concept” and, therefore, be excluded. Linguists, in contrast, seem to be more eager to include individual concepts in their considerations since they correlate individual concepts with word meanings of singular terms and proper names and the notion of concept in linguistics is closely tied to the notion of word meaning (which is in itself ambiguous).26 In the end it seems to be a terminological query. In the remainder of this chapter, “concept” will be used for mental representantia while “category” will be used for a set of external entities picked out by a concept. Concepts will be considered as either representations of categories or representations of individuals. The question whether a subjective or objective notion of categories in the abovementioned sense should be used is more of an ontological and epistemological question and is not important for defining concepts 24 See Murphy (2004) p. 1. 25 See Smith/Medin (1981) p. 175. 26 See Löbner (2014a) p. 20, Jackendoff (1989) p. 73: “The preceding section has used the expression ‘concept’ operationally to mean essentially ‘a mental representation that can serve as the meaning of a linguistic expression.’”

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as mental representations. Therefore, it will not be discussed any further here but it will come up again in the context of philosophical theories of concepts in general and in the context of Aristotelian philosophy. Because the comparison between Aristotle and modern theories concerns psychological theories of concepts, a descriptive account of concepts is favored.

1.2.  Concepts and reference in philosophy and linguistics The notion of concept in philosophy and linguistics basically goes back to some very simple observations: since there are (more or less) synonymous and homonymous words in one language and across languages, i.e., different words that can be used to express the same thought and a single word used to express different thoughts, there has to be some quality of words that goes beyond their linguistic form, both written or spoken. This “meaning” of words then is equated with a mental representation that might be or might not be equal to what psychologists call “concept.” The basic idea is that it is too simple to say that words are signs for things in the world but rather there has to be an additional layer of representations. This has, for example, been visualized by the semantic triangle, which also keeps the sign-relation between the world and words. Without this assumption, it seems quite hard to explain how words can refer to things and how homonymous or polysemous words can be distinguished. The genuine linguistic literature on concepts is mainly concerned with the questions how word meanings can be distinguished and what effects deep conceptual structures can have on the linguistic surface. Concepts are interesting insofar as they are needed as an assumption to explain language data. This presupposes that linguistic capacities are dependent on – or at least interacting with – conceptual capacities, which is not accepted by all theories of concepts.27 In logic it is very important for words to have the same meaning to be able to infer something from something else. If words have different meanings, they can be extensionally different (though they need not be). If they have the same extension and are used extensionally, then words with the same meaning can be substituted for each other. To individuate sentences by meaning it is necessary to assign truth values. This is necessary in traditional philosophical epistemology, in which truth (understood as correspondence) is a prerequisite for knowledge.

27 See Prinz (2002) p. 16–21.

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The question as to how words can be about something in the world is solved by referring to concepts.28 However, the intentionality of concepts is a separate problem. For example, there is a huge debate in philosophy of mind going back to Brentano on whether materialism is reconcilable with the intentional directedness of mental states. Thoughts are supposed to have the right kind of relationship to propositions to be about them. Hence, concepts functioning as constituents of thought have to have the right kind of relationship to the constituents of propositions. Analogous to synonyms and homonyms in language, two concepts can have the same referent, while one concept might have different referents. In Frege’s classical Hesperus/Phosphorus case there are two distinct mental representations of one real object, the planet Venus, and in both cases categorization is achieved by different properties of Venus (e.g., ‘the first and brightest star in the evening’ in one case and ‘the first and brightest star in the morning’ in the other). The sentence “Hesperus is Phosphorus” would not be evaluated as true by an individual having these concepts without any additional information provided. It is still possible to generate true sentences about Hesperus and Phosphorus which do not concern their identity. These concepts can be said to be identical concerning their external content but distinct concerning their internal or cognitive content. Actually this is the reason for Frege to assume externalized senses: if there were no externalized senses, expressions referring to the internal content of words could not be true. The other case, two concepts having the same internal content while having different external content, can be illustrated by the so-called Twin Earth scenario introduced by Putnam. In this scenario it is presupposed that there is a substance XYZ on a duplicate Earth which has the same overt properties as water on Earth One, e.g., it is a liquid, tasteless, and transparent substance. The idea is that statements about water on Earth One are about H2O and not about XYZ. The concept that an inhabitant of Twin Earth has would refer to XYZ and not to H2O, therefore, they have to be considered as different concepts. This has led to quite a big debate about causal theories of meaning and concepts, which thinkers such as Kripke, Fodor, and Putnam propose. In a causal story of 28 Stich (1992) differentiates between different projects that are pursued when the notion of mental representations and among them the notion of concepts is discussed in philosophy. One project is to reconstruct the implicit theory of mental representations that is present in ordinary language, e.g., if belief is attributed. Another project is to develop a notion of mental representations which is coherent with and explicates the newest psychological (or linguistic) findings.

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intentionality, x is the concept of y because it is caused by y where y is a thing or category in the world. This could mean that the acquisition of the concept stands in a causal relation to an instance of y. Another possible way to tie concepts to external entities is an account based on covariance. In that case, something would be a concept by virtue of being regularly caused by instances of y. A causal history tying it to the original acquisition is not necessary to account for reference in this case. The covariance could be either conceived as actual covariance or as counterfactual covariance, i.e., a concept x would be regularly caused by entities of kind y if the subject encountered entities of kind y on a regular basis. In the first case, the ‘water’ concept could become a concept of both H2O and XYZ once a subject encounters both substances but would be only about H2O if XYZ is never encountered. In the second case, the ‘water’ concept of Twin Earth inhabitants and Earth inhabitants could not be distinguished. A covariance account is not suited to lock a conceptual system up to real entities or natural kinds. Nevertheless, it can explain successful interaction between subjects and with the world just as well as an account based on causal history can. In addition, it gets rid of some of the absurdities resulting from separating the reference from the cognitive abilities of the subject, i.e., there are situations conceivable where a subject might apply a concept incorrectly for all his life in an account based on causal history. Both Frege and the Twin Earth case raise the question of how concepts should be individuated. They might either be individuated externally, internally, or in both ways. For an external individuation of concepts, there would be one concept in Frege cases and two in Twin Earth cases, while the exact opposite would be true for an internal individuation. When concepts are individuated both internally and externally, there are two concepts in both cases, albeit for different reasons. The external individuation renders a correspondence theory of truth possible and implies epistemological objectivism while an internal individuation implies epistemological subjectivism.

1.3.  Concept types and kinds of concepts In different theories of concepts, different ways to distinguish kinds of concepts have been used. “Concept type” is a technical term in its own right, which is why “concept type” will be reserved for this narrower meaning in the context of this dissertation and “kinds of concepts” will be used for all other distinctions made between varieties of concepts. Concept types designates logical types of concepts. Löbner (2011) distinguishes between sortal concepts, individual concepts,

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relational concepts, and functional concepts.29 These four concept types differ in two dimensions: uniqueness in reference and relationality. Sortal concepts are neither unique in reference nor relational (like ‘human’ or ‘chair’). Individual concepts are unique in reference (like ‘pope’30 or ‘Michael Jackson’). They are the abovementioned conceptual equivalents of proper names. Because there are individual concepts, a marker for individuality has to be assumed in formal theories of concepts.31 Relational concepts do require a relation of the referent to another entity but are not unique in reference, e.g., ‘brother of x’ or ‘arm of x.’ Functional concepts are both unique in reference and relational, e.g., ‘father of x’ or ‘head of x.’ In this case, there is a one-to-one relation between its referent and another individual entity. Löbner’s theory claims to be exhaustive in the nominal domain and makes empirical predictions for the realization of these concept types on the linguistic surface such as the usage of definite and indefinite articles to mark uniqueness in reference. However, other logical concept types might be assumed. The mass/count distinction could be applied to distinguish concept types (e.g. ‘water’ in contrast to ‘dog’: dogs are countable while uncontained water is not). Furthermore, Löbner’s theory only applies to concepts of entities but another theory of concept types might be required for concepts representing processes involving some form of temporal logic. A second way to distinguish kinds of concepts has been made use of in the paragraph above: concepts might be characterized by the ontological status of the entities they represent on a full range from basic ontological distinctions (e.g., substance concepts, individual concepts, and process concepts32) to less fine-grained categories (e.g., natural kind concepts and artifact concepts33) and even categories at a very low level (e.g., color concepts34). Depending on how one’s ontology relates to one’s logic, there is an apparent overlap between logical concept types and an ontological classification of concepts (e.g., individual concepts and substance/sortal concepts). This way of ordering concepts according to their representata on the one hand can be contrasted with classifying them via their linguistic representantia. This is a common practice in linguistics since linguistic research is concerned with the question how concepts are linguistically realized. Hence, in linguistics concepts 29 See Löbner (2011). 30 ‘Pope’ is only unique in reference when used for the current pope since there is only one at a time. When used diachronically for all popes it is a sortal concept. 31 See Petersen/Osswald (2012). 32 See Nichols (2010), Elbourne (2009), Raskin/Nirenburg (1999) p. 89. 33 See Bloom (1996). 34 See Textor (2009).

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are often classified according to their linguistic counterpart, e.g., as nominal concepts, verbal concepts, sentential concepts.35 Another important distinction in linguistics is made between lexical concepts36, i.e., concepts which are represented as word meanings in a mental lexicon and non-lexical concepts.37 There are other important ways in which kinds of concepts can be and have been distinguished:38 (1) Concepts can be classified according to the way they come about (e.g., observational concepts, theoretical concepts, and definitional concepts). In philosophy, the distinction between innate concepts and acquired concepts is very important. It is connected to a huge debate on whether there are innate concepts or not.39 (2) Additionally they can be classified according to their clarity (e.g., fuzzy concepts) or (3) to their degree of abstraction (e.g., concrete and abstract concepts). (4) Furthermore, they can be characterized by their format (e.g., modal and amodal concepts, prototype concepts and classical concepts).40 Roughly speaking, the format of a concept is its structure, which results in behaviorally distinguishable input-output behavior in conceptual tasks. For example, concepts according to classical theory consist of a list of necessary and jointly sufficient features, while concepts in prototype theory consist of weighted features and a threshold. Categorization tasks yield different results when applying a classical format in contrast to a prototype format. This is a functional notion of formats; a physiological notion of conceptual formats might be available as well.41

35 See Löbner (2011) p. 7, Brachman (1977) p. 130, Jackendoff (1989) p. 71. 36 See Daley (2010). 37 Sloutsky (2010, p. 1245) even defines concepts as “lexicalized groupings.” He instead uses the term “categories” to describe pre-lexical representantia of external categories. 38 Medin et al. (2000) try to account for different ways kinds of concepts have been distinguished. Their most basic distinction is drawn between kinds of concepts based on (a) structure, (b) processing, and (c) content domain. The major kinds of concepts such as noun concepts vs. verb concepts, relational concepts vs. non-relational concepts, or classically structures vs. prototype concepts are also present in their scheme. 39 Carey (2009) discusses innate concepts at length, which shows this is also an important factor for psychological theories of concepts. She defines them as concepts which are “not the output of learning processes.” Therefore, in contrast to much held beliefs, they must not necessarily be present at birth (p. 11/12). 40 Weiskopf (2009, p. 151) lists four ways in how concepts can be sorted into kinds which somewhat overlap with the distinctions drawn here: “(1) what category they represent; (2) how they represent that category; (3) how they are usually processed; and (4) how they are usually acquired.” 41 For a discussion whether the modal/amodal distinction presupposes a functional or a physiological notion of conceptual formats see section IV.2.6.

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These different ways to classify concepts do not generally exclude each other, e.g., there might be an abstract nominal property concept. However, some of these classifications come along with presuppositions. If concepts are classified according to their logical type, it has to be presupposed that the logical type is part of the conceptual representation and not a part of the processing of concepts. If concepts can be fuzzy, the classical theory of concepts has to be rejected. If concepts are classified according to their representata, an ontology of real entities and their status is required; e.g., speaking of natural kind concepts presupposes a notion of what natural kinds are.

1.4. Monism, pluralism and eliminativism concerning conceptual formats The classification of concepts according to their structural properties or format is a special case. The discussion about structures is very prominent in cognitive psychology. Chapter IV.1. presents the most prominent concept structures proposed in psychology, while IV.2. focusses on the classification of concepts as modal and amodal. If a format or formats of concepts are assumed, the first decision to be made is whether concepts are structured entities or unstructured atoms. For example, feature lists, prototypes, exemplars, theories, and frames have been proposed as structured formats for concepts. On the other hand, Fodor has proposed an informational atomism in which concepts are understood as mere symbols like words or letters. A theory of concepts which presupposes that there can only be one such format of concepts can be characterized as concept monism. Positions which state that there can be more than one format of concepts can be described as a form of pluralism.42 If a form of pluralism is accepted, then a subject can, for example, have both classically structured and prototypically structured concepts. In the case of monism, either all concepts have classical structure or all concepts have a prototypical structure (or whatever structure, as long as there is only one). There is, however, a third option available, which should be mentioned in this

42 See Weiskopf (2009, p. 146) for a pluralist account. He argues that different psychological kinds which fulfill the functional role assigned to concepts have enough in common to be a kind relevant for general scientific attributions: “Further, on this view there is no such unique thing as the concept of, for instance, object, living thing, tree, or elm. Many different psychological structures serve as concepts of those entities.”

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context. Eliminativism in contrast to pluralism (and monism) denies the existence of concepts.43 Machery (2009) pleads for one kind of eliminativism. His argument can be paraphrased in the following way: (1) If there can be no scientifically relevant inductive generalization regarding a class of entities, this class cannot be considered a natural kind. (2) The class of “concepts” allows no scientifically relevant inductive generalizations (since a plurality of different formats has to be assumed) and, in consequence, should not be considered as a natural kind. (3) If the inclusion of a theoretical term, which does not correspond to a natural kind, has negative consequences for scientific conduct it should be abandoned. (4) The usage of “concept” has negative consequences for scientific conduct, e.g., it might imply monism, and, therefore, should be abandoned. Machery’s position has been attacked by other philosophers and psychologists, who stress the positive effects ‘concept’ has for research as a theoretical construct.44 Another option might be to include features of several proposed conceptual formats in one singular format. This account could be labeled unificationism. For example, the conclusion reached by Murphy (2005), which tries to integrate a prototype, exemplar, and theory view of concepts, can be described in that way.45 Unificationism and pluralism share the assumption that features of several different theories of concepts have to be included in an adequate theory of concepts.46 Unificationism will not be treated as a different approach here since technically it is a monism proposing a new unified format of concepts.

1.5.  Concepts as functional kinds, abilities and vehicles In the previous sections, I have mentioned that concepts are characterized by certain tasks they have to fulfill, e.g., in higher-order thought processes or in linguistic processing. One way to define concepts is to restrict their definition to the cognitive tasks they have to fulfill, i.e., they can be described as functional kinds

43 In fact, eliminativism can be subdivided in a position which denies the existence of any entities fulfilling the functional role assigned to concepts and another which denies that there is anything that unifies the different entities fulfilling the functional role assigned to concept into a singular (natural) kind. See Weiskopf (2009) p. 162. 44 See, e.g., Couchman et al. (2010), Danks (2010), Edwards (2011), Hampton (2010) and Lalumera (2010). 45 See Murphy (2005) p. 488. 46 Weiskopf (2009) calls these unifactionist positions hybrid theories of concepts and stresses the differences to a pluralist theory of concepts.

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or abilities rather than as natural kinds. Concepts are often described as abilities47 following this kind of reasoning. A functional kind is a kind of entities that is not characterized by some intrinsic properties but rather by fulfilling a certain function. The classical examples for functional kinds are artifacts, e.g., ‘vehicle’ and ‘tool.’ Other examples are biological categories, e.g., organs fulfilling the same function while belonging to different natural kinds.48 In that way, for instance, a computer and a human brain might fulfill the same function and have representations of the same kind or a mechanical and a biological heart might be of the same functional kind. Functional kinds have to be distinguished from abilities. For example, tools are not abilities rather they are physical objects. The idea is that the physical objects falling under a functional kind cannot be physically (or biologically) delimited but only functionally. An ability is a dispositional property of an agent as a whole (or broadly conceived of an object) that enables it to do certain things. Understanding concepts as functional kinds, the concept of ‘cat’ would therefore be any representation that enables an entity to have thoughts about cats or pick out cats with a reasonable margin of error. There might be several concept tokens of ‘cat’ fulfilling this conceptual role for a single cognitive agent. Therefore, considering concepts as functional kinds can be accepted independently of the monism/pluralism distinction. Lalumera (2010) brings this point up against Machery’s eliminativism by stressing that concepts in psychology ought to be understood as functional kinds not as natural kind. Weiskopf (2009) argues for pluralism in the same way.49 If concepts are conceived as abilities, the ability to identify cats might be conceived too broadly since there might be several mental representations fulfilling this role available to one cognitive agent, in the same way that there might be several tools available to a worker to fulfill the same task. Vehicles acting as realizers of abilities (e.g., patterns of firing neurons) might be of one natural kind or of several natural kinds. They might be of a natural kind which does not only include concepts but also other kinds of entities. Kenny (2010) describes what vehicles and abilities are: A vehicle is something concrete, something that can be located and measured. An ability, on the other hand, has neither length nor breadth nor location. This does not mean

47 See Glock (2009). 48 Carrera/Vermaas (2009) discuss whether functional kinds are real kinds by comparing artificial and biological functional kinds. 49 Weiskopf (2009, p. 148): “This is just to say, then, that concepts are like many other entities posited in psychological theories: they are a functional kind.”

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that an ability is something ghostly: my front-door key’s ability to open my front door is not a concrete object, but it is not a spirit either. (Kenny 2010: 107)

Every ability needs a vehicle (possibly in some cases the cognitive agent as a whole) realizing it, at least in a naturalistic framework. However, no generalizations about vehicles corresponding to an ability might be possible. Each instance of an ability might be realized by a completely different kind of vehicle. Theories which make claims about the structure of concepts can either formulate their claims as claims about abilities or as claims about the structure of concepts as vehicles. For example, a prototype structure might be the ability that results in a certain statistical output or an actual structure that can be shown to exist on the level of vehicles. Theories speaking about neuronal realization treat concepts as vehicles. One argument for interpreting concepts as abilities is the argument of shareability: concepts need to be shared to render communication and talking about the same kind of entities possible. Since a vehicle is a mental particular it cannot be shared and, therefore, cannot be considered as a concept. Abilities, on the other hand, can be shared (two people can have the same ability) and, therefore, could qualify as concepts. On the other hand, vehicles realizing functional kinds can also explain the possibility of communication. Two individuals can have separate tokens of the same functional kind which enable them to make reference to the same entity or kind of entities. Speaking of vehicles and their nonfunctional properties, e.g., how they realize a specific function, generates more possible informative statements about concepts than speaking only of functional kinds or abilities and leaving the level of possible realizations completely aside. On the other hand, there is a larger risk of reifying concepts which might merely be functional kinds and, in consequence, cannot be individuated at the level of vehicles. Defining concepts as functional kinds enables one to describe them as mental particulars while they do not have to be described at the level of vehicles.

1.6.  Categorization and higher-order thought processes Most literature on concepts in psychology is concerned with categorization, i.e., the ability to decide whether a concept applies to a given entity. In philosophy, concepts are mostly seen as constituents of thoughts. This is why philosophers are much more concerned with establishing how reference is possible. That is not to say that psychologists are not interested in thought processes. Smith and Medin (1981) list four main tasks for concepts: (a) categorization, i.e., deciding that an entity belongs to a category, (b) conceptual combination, i.e., combining old concepts to generate new concepts, (c) constructing propositional relations, i.e., generating a representation of a proposition from the concepts associated with 47

words, and (d) interrogating propositional representations, i.e., drawing inferences from propositions.50 These aspects are somewhat similar to what is required by philosophical epistemology and logic. Some of the psychological definitions refer to higher-order thought processes and include categorization among those. Other examples would be plan-making, reasoning, and induction.51 Those processes are traditionally considered as higher, while it is not clear whether they have anything in common other than the assumption that they all make use of concepts. In some of these thought processes, information that is necessary in categorization is not needed at all. It might even slow them down. Hence, one cannot necessarily assume the same kind of representations are used in categorization and the other higher-order thought processes. It might be that the representations in tasks that require reasoning do not contain any information about the entities because the operations on them (e.g., in deductive reasoning) do not require this information. These representations could not be used for categorization; nevertheless, one could have thoughts which have the right intentional content and generate the predicted behavioral results. This is not true for induction, which uses some knowledge about the similarity between categories, or for any other process that requires this kind of information. It might also be experimentally proven that the representations used are of the same kind (which seems to be the case) but it must not be presupposed. The same is true for linguistic meanings. Traditionally the notion of concept is tied to the description of language and language comprehension. A lot of experiments on concepts in psychology use linguistic cues or demand a linguistic output from their subjects. However, categorization is a more general phenomenon than linguistic comprehension and production. Defining concepts as word meanings might equate them with an altogether different kind of mental representation. In one case, concepts would be the representations used by cognitive subjects in language comprehension and production in virtue of definition.52 In the other case, a psychological theory of concepts would be established focusing on the representations used in categorization and other higher-order thought

50 See Smith/Medin (1981) p. 7/8. 51 See Machery (2009) p. 12 ff. 52 For example, Elbourne (2009) starts his research on individual concepts from the observations about the grammatical category of demonstratives and states individual concepts to be their equivalent on the conceptual level.

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processes. Then the representations involved in these tasks might later be shown to be the same representations used for linguistic tasks.53 Both approaches are legitimate; providing that it is made clear which approach is taken. Confusing the two approaches results in significant methodological problems.

1.7.  Theories of concepts – a preliminary sketch The tableau on the following page tries to capture and structure the distinctions that have been made in the previous sections.54 A theory of concepts can either be about representata or about representantia at the ontological level because concepts are defined in the context of representation and representation requires both of those relata. This distinction is parallel to the question which ontological status is assigned to universals: if concepts are representata, they might either be embodied in real particulars (in re) or they can be independent entities like Platonic forms (ante rem). If universals exist only in the mind of human beings (post rem), one is restricted to describe them as representantia. It could also be further distinguished between a conceptualism, which assumes concepts as language-independent mental representations, and a nominalism, which assumes that universals only exist in language.55 All further distinctions are based on defining concepts as independent mental representations.

53 See Hespos/Spelke (2004). 54 Salmieri (2008, p. 54) states that it is better to develop a matrix of features in which theories of concepts differ and coincide instead of a simple hierarchy. A similar approach is taken here and later when classifying psychological theories of concepts on a finer grained level. 55 Salmieri (2008, p. 53) also distinguishes between conceptualism and nominalism, albeit in a slightly different way: “Conceptualism is the doctrine that the proper object of a concept is a mental construct, which is distinct from any of the concept’s instances and from anything that could exist in the world of perceptible objects. A paradigm case of this view would be Locke’s view of concepts like “triangle”. We have, he famously thought, a “general idea” of triangle that, unlike any particular triangle, is “neither isosceles, nor equilateral, not scalene”. Nominalism is the doctrine that, when we use a concept, we are always thinking of some particular, perceptible (or imaginable) object—typically either an instance of the concept or a word. The concept is an ability to utilize a cognition of a single particular object in a manner that renders thoughts of it applicable to a plurality of objects.”

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Fig. 1:  Levels of classification for theories of concepts. Black shading indicates dead ends where no further classification on levels below is possible. Light grey indicates that all these distinctions are based on the basic definition of concepts as representantia and post rem universals. Discursive font indicates that the choices on this level are disjunctive and not exclusive. (Only “G) Cognitive Tasks.”) The distinctions in area “IV. Specific formats of concepts” are disjunctive in concept pluralism/unificationism and exclusive in concept monism. I. ONTOLOGY A) Concepts as… B) Status of universals II. EPISTEMOLOGY C) Theories of concepts III. GENERAL FEATURES OF CONCEPTS D) Metatheories of concepts E) Status of concepts as mental representations F) Representations of individuals? G) Cognitive tasks H) Structured? IV. SPECIFIC FORMATS OF CONCEPTS I) Format J) Complexity K) Modality

  representantia post rem   descriptive  

  representata in re   normative  

    ante rem      

monism

pluralism

eliminativism

functional kinds +

vehicles

abilities

 

 

 

Categorization

 

Higher-order Language thought processes      

   

Classical Feature lists Modal

Prototype Exemplar Frames/schemata   Amodal  

Theory    

+

-

           

 

Stemming from the requirements of epistemology theories of concepts can either be normative or descriptive, i.e., they can either state criteria concepts have to fulfill, e.g., to enable knowledge or they can just describe actual mental representations. The following five distinctions are the general features that a psychological theory of concepts must settle on. The distinction concerning monism, pluralism and eliminativism is exclusive, i.e., one of those positions has to be taken. Monism restricts concepts to one format with a unified description while pluralism allows for several very different kinds of entities to be subsumed under the label concepts. Eliminativism proposes to remove the term “concept” from the psychological vocabulary. In consequence, any further distinctions are not required.

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Concepts (undestood as mental representations) can either be understood as abilities, functional kinds, or as vehicles which changes the empirical criteria a theory of concepts has to fulfill. The functional account seems to have an affinity to a pluralism concerning vehicles while the account of concepts as vehicles might favor a concept monism. Theories of concepts can vary according to whether they restrict concepts to representations of categories or also describe representations of individuals as concepts. This might depend on how similar the mental representations of categories and of individuals are and, therefore, may ultimately be an empirical question. Theories of concepts can assign concepts a role in different domains of cognitive tasks (including linguistic tasks) which might be combined in different ways and, therefore, are not exclusive. Furthermore, concepts can either be described as structured or as unstructured entities (conceptual atomism). Further distinctions of specific conceptual formats only make sense if concepts are structured. Hence, denying the structure is a dead end just like eliminativism. Theories like classical theory, prototype theory, exemplar theory, and theory theory presuppose a certain structure. Another distinction between formats draws on the complexity of conceptual structures, i.e., being simple feature lists or more complex (e.g., frames or schemata). The modal/amodal distinction can also be placed among those distinctions between specific formats. These three distinctions are parallel to each other. Monism only allows one format or modality while pluralism allows more than one format and might even allow all possible combinations. The specific formats will be introduced and discussed in more detail in section IV.1., which treats psychological theories of concepts in general. The distinction between modal and amodal accounts of concepts is the topic of section IV.2.

2.  Towards a definition of “concept” The aim of this chapter is to provide some characteristic definitions of concepts taken from the modern debate in cognitive science and philosophy to see how much they vary and what are the common defining criteria of concepts among the majority of authors. Fodor does not give a definition of concept in the strictest sense, but he does give a list of how concepts are seen by the majority of authors: (1) they are mental particulars having causal relations to other mental states, (2) they are categories (in the sense of representing kinds not individuals), (3) they are constituents of thoughts, i.e., they are compositional, (4) they are, in a lot of cases, learned, (5) they are public/sharable.56 56 See Fodor (1998) p. 23–28.

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The first criterion provides the ontological status of concepts; they have to be mental particulars because of their relations to other mental states. The second and the third criteria are standard psychological assumptions; the close connection between categories or categorization and concepts in particular is stressed in the psychological literature on concepts. When concepts are equated with categories, categories are understood as representantia not representata. The third criterion is mainly linked to the idea that concepts are compositional and constituents of language like structures. The fourth criterion takes a position in the old philosophical debate on whether ideas are innate or learned (in contrast to this list, Fodor himself is a proponent of innate concepts), while the fifth is mainly due to the need to explain successful communication and other forms of interactions with other cognitive subjects. All the criteria given by Fodor are pretty standard characterizations of what concepts are and can be applied both in psychological and philosophical discourse. There is an already-mentioned ongoing debate whether concepts can be characterized as being mental particulars and shareable at the same time. Prinz (2002) lists seven desiderata a theory of concepts should fulfill: (1) Concepts need to be able to represent a wide scope of entities from ‘democracy’ to ‘electron,’ (2) they need to have an intentional content, i.e., be about something in the world, (3) they need to have a cognitive content, (4) an account of concept acquisition is required, (5) they need to be mechanisms of categorization, (6) they need to be compositional, (7) they need to be public.57 Those desiderata supplement Fodor’s list in some aspects. Laurence and Margolis (1999) discuss some of the most common theories of concepts, i.e., classical theory, prototype theory, and exemplar theory and others. They also give definitions for these separate theories. All of their definitions, except the one for a conceptual atomism, define concepts as structured mental particulars.58 These theories only vary concerning the question as to what kind of structure concepts have and what kind of information is or can be included in concepts. If Laurence and Margolis are right, psychological theories of concepts are quite uniform (conceptual atomism is a mainly philosophical theory) and are restricted to the distinction between monism and pluralism, format and modality. Carey (2009) is mainly concerned with the way simple concepts develop in infants, which concepts are innate, and how more complex concepts come into existence. She defines her notion of concepts in the following way:

57 See Prinz (2002) p. 1–23. 58 See Laurence/Margolis (1999) p. 10, 31, 47, 54, 62.

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Concepts are units of thought, the constituents of beliefs and theories, and those concepts that interest me here are roughly the grain of single lexical items. Indeed, the representations of word meanings are paradigm examples of concepts. I take concepts to be mental representations – indeed, just a subset of the entire stock of a person’s mental representations. […] I assume that representations are states of the nervous system that have content, that refer to concrete or abstract entities (or even fictional entities), properties and events. (Carey 2009: 5)

The status of concepts as constituents of larger cognitive structures is invoked as well as the notions of content and reference which are mainly rooted in philosophy. This shows they can be combined with a psychological theory of concepts and might be implicitly present even though they are not mentioned. Also the connection to word meanings is quite strong. It seems to be implied that while not all concepts are word meanings, all lexical word meanings are concepts. Edouard Machery (2009) provides a definition for “concept” as it is used in psychology even though he denies concepts are a natural kind and thinks they should be erased from the theoretical vocabulary. A concept of x is a body of knowledge about x that is stored in long-term memory and that is used by default in the processes underlying most, if not all, higher cognitive competences when these processes result in judgments about x. (Machery 2009: 12)

Concepts are described as representations which are about something and are made use of in higher-order thought processes. There are three important specifications: (1) Concepts are stored in long-term memory. The other definitions of concepts are neutral when it comes to the relation between concepts and memory. Barsalou (1993) explicitly defines his notion of concept to be about representations in short-term memory59 and his notion of ad hoc concepts might be rendered impossible by restricting concepts to long-term memory. On the other hand, most theories of concepts require concepts to be steady and rather general representations. Most experiments either test previous conceptual knowledge or use time spans which do not qualify for short-term memory. (2) Concepts are used by default. They do not involve conscious processing. In consequence, there are different bodies of knowledge which are not used by default and do not qualify as concepts. (3) Only higher-order thought processes which result in judgments are relevant for concepts.

59 See Barsalou (1993).

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Machery’s definition is finer-grained than some of the others. His aim is to render as precisely as possible what psychologists have in mind when they speak of concepts. In philosophy, according to Machery, concepts are mainly required for epistemology. Since belief is a necessary (but not sufficient) requirement for knowledge (at least in some of the most common epistemological theories) and believing requires having beliefs about a certain x, concepts are required to explain the connection between the subject and the object of its belief. Hence, he asserts that philosophical theories of concepts are normative. This definition of concepts points towards seeing them as abilities. It is parallel to the other definitions if having propositional attitudes could be equated with higher-order thought processes. Weiskopf (2009) also provides an account of concepts which is worth discussing here: When I identify concepts here, it will be primarily by the content that they represent and by how they represent it; a cat concept is that concept because it represents cats in whatever way that it does. […] So concepts are psychological entities that play a central causal role in mediating inferential transitions and reasoning processes of this sort. (Weiskopf 2009: 147/148) So, to summarize the pluralist position: concepts are something like the representational tools deployed by a creature’s central systems to categorize and draw inferences about objects in the world. (Weiskopf 2009: 159)

Concepts are seen as psychological entities which realize abilities of subjects, i.e., a functional kind. They enable them to categorize and make inferences about entities in the world. Therefore, they can be described as representations. Newen and Bartel (2007) develop a notion of concepts that is intended to be applicable to animal cognition and yet not satisfied by mere perceptual recognition and reaction: Tokens of concepts are mental representations. Concepts as types of mental representations are individuated by their content. The content of a mental representation is determined by the mental capacities of the cognitive system having the representation, and can be spelled out in terms of functional roles. […] To avoid misunderstandings: We are not claiming that concepts are epistemic capacities but that they are individuated by them. Concepts are types of mental representations constituted by epistemic capacities. (Newen/Bartels 2007: 284)

Concepts are understood as functional kinds; they are individuated by enabling a cognitive subject to perform actions in a certain way. Conceptual representation systems must have at least three features: (1) the capacity to identify and reidentify objects and properties, (2) the (relative) independence of stimuli,

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and (3) the fact that an adequate level of abstraction is involved in the classification (a classification that is not only based on the simple stimulus generalization, which is characteristic of nonconceptual representations, but involves class formation). (Newen/ Bartels 2007: 295)

The first criterion established here can be equated with defining concepts as the mental representations which are responsible for categorization. The second and the third criterion want to distinguish concepts from less sophisticated mental processes of identifying and reacting to objects. Kenny, in contrast, defines concepts as mental abilities, not as a functional kind, which is quite common among philosophers. We may use ‘concept’ as a term for the specific abilities that are particular exercises of the universal capacity that is the mind. A sufficient, but not a necessary condition for a person to possess the concept of F is that she shall have mastered the use of a word for ‘F’ in some language. (Kenny 2010: 105/106)

He sees linguistic abilities as being sufficient for attributing a concept to a cognitive agent, i.e., there might be nonlinguistic concepts but the ability to correctly use content words (in contrast to function words such as connectives, markers, etc.) is by definition sufficient for having a concept and there might be merely linguistic concepts in consequence. The last definition of concepts I want to mention here is not taken from a discussion of psychological theories of concepts but rather an attempt by Helming (2012) to provide a useful definition of concepts to which ancient theories of concepts can be compared. This is close to what this chapter is trying to achieve. A concept (e.g. of tree, dog, justice) is a fairly stable mental entity that (a) allows us to recognize a range of individual entities / instances / actions that are to be categorized under this concept and that (b) determines the conditions under which we use a certain word corresponding to that concept. (Helmig 2012: 16)

In addition, he postulates that concepts have to be shareable and have to link up to reality.60 The basic components of Helmig’s definition are in line with the other definitions or lists of criteria. Concepts are said to be mental entities, i.e., representantia; they enable subjects to categorize; they can be shared by subjects; and have to have some kind of relationship to the world. This last component makes the definition normative: Helmig allows insufficiently developed representations only as preconceptions. In addition, the connection between language and world

60 See Helmig (2012) p. 17/18.

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is included as a necessary part of the definition of concepts, which is not done by most of the other definitions. In general, these definitions or catalogues of desiderata have much in common. Several of the aspects mentioned in the previous section can be shown to be present in them. To answer the question whether Aristotle has a theory of concepts at all and whether it is comparable either to modal or amodal theories in the modern debate, it is necessary to provide a definition of concepts that does justice to the modern debate and can be used both to explicate the distinction between modal and amodal symbols and to compare with whatever notions of concepts might be present in Aristotle. The following definition tries to capture many aspects of the definitions presented in the section above. It builds on the systematic distinctions introduced and summarized above: (C) A concept is a mental particular realizing a functional kind which enables a cognitive subject to successfully perform categorization tasks (both concerning categories and individuals) or other higher order thought processes.

Speaking about concepts as representata rather than representantia might be an equally interesting question for philosophers. However, it is of no concern for the debate in psychology and philosophy of mind dealing with concepts. Concepts as representata can be discussed without discussing the way they are represented. Since Aristotle is said to be connected to these modern theories of concepts (both classical and modal accounts) and is compared to them, there would be no point in defining concepts as mind-independent abstract entities in this context. Concepts have to be defined in relation to abilities in the psychological discussion since having a concept implies having an ability and only these abilities can be tested in the classical behavioral experiments characteristic for most of the psychological literature on concepts. However, defining the concept itself as ability does not seem to be in line with speaking of concepts as a natural kind and as something that has a singular format. This definition, therefore, states that concepts are mental particulars which are members of a functional kind. Mental particulars can be individuated in virtue of the abilities they realize but there might be a more fine-grained way to individuate them on other levels. Therefore, this definition is also more closely tied to the actual structures which realize the functional kind than defining them only on the level of abilities would be. The literature on the modal/amodal distinction in particular is increasingly concerned with the neuronal realization of concepts. Neither concept monism nor pluralism is precluded by this definition. There might be several different vehicles realizing a functional kind which are all different concepts of the same 56

representatum belonging to the same kind. For example, a prototype concept of ‘cat’ could be described as ‘a concept of cat’ not as ‘the concept of cat.’ Both categorization and other higher-order thought processes are mentioned. One of those is said to be sufficient for concepts, not both are necessarily required which is a concession to the observation that both might possibly be distinct, at least in some cases. A list or definition of higher-order thought processes is not given and maybe better left to psychologists. Language might be one of those higher-order thought processes but is not required to be. The notion of reference, i.e., having external content, is reduced to successful performances in tasks involving interaction. This renders causal stories about concept acquisition probable for most cases, but not necessary; because concepts might also just accidently covary with their representata. Questions about structuredness, different formats or modality are not included in this definition of concepts, because those are the kind of questions that theories of concepts ought to answer in psychology. Neither is a story on how concepts are acquired included, since the definition does allow such a variety of ways to acquire concepts. The most obvious derivation from the desiderata and definitions discussed in the previous section is that shareability or publicity is not included. This has two reasons: (1) Concepts are defined as mental particulars. (2) The reason why communication is successful can also be explained by causal accounts or by covariance of mental representations and their representata.

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III.  ‘Concept’ in the history of philosophy The title of this book includes two possible Greek equivalents for the modern term “concept”: logos and pathêma. Whether those two are adequate translations and to which aspects in the modern discussion they respond will be discussed in the remaining chapters. For now, the primary focus will be on how the concept of concept evolved in the history of philosophy before and after Aristotle from a conceptual and a terminological perspective. Both of them have advantages and disadvantages in isolation and can benefit from being combined. Using terms, historical developments can be researched without too many assumptions with the help of text corpora. For example, the first philosopher who introduced a technical term might be identified, while whoever first made use of a certain concept is a matter of interpretation to a higher degree. Weitz (1988) provides a comprehensive historical account of theories of concepts in philosophy. His assumption is that an author’s theory of concepts can be deduced from the concepts an author discusses and the way he makes use of them where it is not explicitly stated.1 This is based on the belief that philosophy is always concerned with concepts by its tasks and topics and all philosophers need to have some implicit understanding of how to use and develop philosophical concepts. I will refrain from such tendencies to deduce implicit theories of concepts and restrict myself to explicitly stated theories that can be seen as predecessors to what is discussed under the label “concept” in the modern discussion in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics.

1. Antiquity 1.1.  Plato: Articulating the problem of universals Laurence and Margolis (1999) begin their Core readings on the topic of concepts with a passage from Plato’s Euthyphro. Plato is also the first author discussed by Weitz (1988). There are several good reasons for starting a history of philosophical theories of concepts with Plato. Plato is the first philosophical author whose work is not only fragmentary and he had a huge influence on all his immediate philosophical successors. Whitehead famously claimed that the

1 See Weitz (1988) p. xvii/xviii.

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whole history of philosophy was nothing more than footnotes to Plato.2 As a matter of fact, the observation that there is a difference not only between language and reality but also between language and thought can be attributed to the Presocratics and Sophists, e.g., Gorgias developed a proof that a) there is nothing, b) if there is something, it is not thinkable, and c) if it is thinkable, it is not sayable, thus already distinguishing the three levels.3 Plato’s early dialogues usually present Socrates asking his interlocutors for the definition of a certain x such as justice or knowledge. It is assumed that someone who uses the word for x in his language is also able to provide a definition. These definitions have to fulfill certain requirements, e.g., they should not be just a list of examples or provide one single quality of x leaving out other qualities. Rather a definition should provide those qualities which are present in every x and are sufficient to identify an x as x.4 It is assumed such a definition exists for every word (at least if it is not used homonymously). This doctrine of unchangeable essences, which can be identified by definition, leads to Plato’s often-cited theory of forms. Since the Sophistic relativism about virtues like justice is inacceptable to Plato, he assumes they are independent entities in themselves. If this was described as Plato’s theory of concepts, he could be described as speaking about concepts as representata rather than representantia and taking an ante rem position in the debate on the ontological status of universals (which would be anachronistic, since it is historically based on the Platonic theory of ideas and Aristotle’s reaction to it). Plato uses mostly the terms eidos and idea to refer to forms; therefore, they could be described as the equivalents to “concept” in Plato. One reason to assume Platonic forms is the role they play in acquisition of knowledge. To explain the access of human souls to the forms, Plato introduces his theory of recollection: souls have access to the forms before being embodied. This knowledge of forms, however, is veiled and requires rediscovering, e.g., through Socratic questioning. Therefore, Platonic concepts could possibly also

2 See Whitehead (1978) p. 39: “The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. I do not mean the systematic scheme of thought which scholars have doubtfully extracted from his writings. I allude to the wealth of general ideas scattered throughout them.” 3 See DMXG. 4 See e.g. Lach. 190d ff.

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be described as innate mental representations.5 The Theory of Forms can, therefore, also be described as a theory of concepts in an epistemic regard.6 The same assumption of an independent existence is not only made for moral concepts but also for all general concepts, which leads to some kinds of paradoxes developed in the later dialogues but not ultimately solved. For example, there is the famous paradox of the third man: if particular entities belong to a category by virtue of partaking in an idea and the idea and the particular are similar to each other, a third entity (in which both the idea and the particular are similar) is required.7 If the Socratic search for definitions is read as a Platonic theory of concepts, a form of what is called classical theory in psychology is implied. Having “grasped” a concept implies having propositional knowledge about the concept in question being able to provide a definition (logon didonai).8 If they are shown not to be able to provide this account, they can no longer claim

5 Helmig (2012 p. 35) describes this as the main dichotomy between theories of concepts in antiquity with Aristotle on the other side: “The main dichotomy is between philosophers who hold that concepts ultimately originate from sense perception and philosophers who base their theory on innate knowledge (recollection). In the second group, sense perception is a mere instigator or trigger of the process of recollection. In the first group, we have a further subdivision between those who defend a thoroughly empirical theory (Stoics, Epicurus) and those authors who, as with Aristotle and Alexander, argue that intellect plays a crucial role in concept attainment.” – If this is true, Aristotle could be said to have a perceptual theory of concepts when compared to Plato. On the other hand, rationalistic/non-perceptual theories of concepts would predate perceptual ones, therefore, Barsalou’s general evaluation of the history of philosophy would not hold. 6 See Salmieri (2008) p. 31: “Heraclitean perceptible things are unfit to serve as objects of knowledge; therefore, the forms that are, according to Socrates, the proper object of a concept, must be separate from perceptible things. If this is Plato’s reason for positing separate Forms, then the Theory of Forms is a theory of concepts. It is an attempt to explain unitary cognition of indefinitely many differing objects—to explain how we can think about, e.g., “men” or “the fine” and have our thoughts apply to the many differing men or fine things.” 7 See Parm. 132 a. 8 See, e.g., Polit. 534b: “And do you not also give the name dialectician to the man who is able to exact an account of the essence of each thing? And will you not say that the one who is unable to do this, in so far as he is incapable of rendering an account to himself and others, does not possess full reason and intelligence about the matter?” ( Ἦ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἑκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας; καὶ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα, καθ’ ὅσον ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ λόγον αὑτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ διδόναι, κατὰ τοσοῦτον νοῦν περὶ τούτου οὐ φήσεις ἔχειν;)

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to have knowledge of the thing in question. This corresponds to the Aristotelian notion of logos. Helmig (2012) opposes the idea of equating concepts in Plato with Platonic forms and rather sees mental representations which are related to the forms as the equivalent to concepts in Plato.9 Another possible method of conceiving the relation between both would be to assume that Platonic forms are nothing more than mental concepts as was assumed by medieval conceptualists/nominalists. However, this option is discussed and rejected in the Platonic dialogue Parmenides.10 Weitz (1988) believes Plato to be the first author in the history of philosophy to have a dispositional theory of concepts rather than an entity theory which is usually attributed to him. For Plato, having a concept equals the ability to produce definitions and answer questions about a real entity. This presupposes having grasped the form.11 There is another passage in Plato that should be mentioned when discussing his historical role, especially in the context of Aristotle’s notion of pathêmata. In the Theaitetos, memory is described as a block of wax in which the objects of perception leave impressions which, in turn, are likenesses of these objects. When encountering the same entity or kind of entity the next time, this impression is used to recognize it. One might be mistaken when recognizing something as something else because the first thing bears a similarity to the other thing.12 In this passage, Plato tries to explain categorization in perception at a very naïve level. Concepts’ main explanatory task in the modern psychological debate is to explain categorization. Plato uses the word pathêma to describe these impressions. The model of memory is abandoned because it cannot explain mistakes which only involve internal reasoning, the second task which is attributed to concepts in almost all definitions.13 The alternative model Plato introduces does explain internal reasoning but does not give a new or better explanation of how we categorize. This discussion of impressions received through perception and used in other tasks is more closely connected to modern theories of concepts in psychology than the other aspects of Plato’s work discussed. Another aspect that can be found in Aristotle as well as in the modern discussion is the organization of concepts in hierarchies. In his later dialogues, Plato discusses the dihairesis as a philosophical method in which, starting from one 9 10 11 12 13

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See Helmig (2012) p. 41–45. See Parm. 132 b/c, Helmig (2012) p. 45–52. See Weitz (1988) p. 5. See Theait. 192a ff. See Theait. 186 c/d, 196 a/b.

superordinate concept, several subordinate concepts are divided from each other via the distinctive features they possess. Aristotle’s theory of definitions and Categories builds on this Platonic method by criticizing and revising it. The meaning of words, which is often but not always discussed in connection with concepts, is prominently discussed in Plato’s dialogue Kratylos. A debate between describing meanings of words as being mere conventions (kata synthêkên) and words being correct by nature (physei) is held with no clear winner in the end. Some authors have suggested that this debate could be solved by introducing concepts as an intermediate level of representations14 and that was in fact what Plato was hinting at in this dialogue.15 Concepts would be representations by nature and the same for all humans, while the words used to designate concepts were only representations by convention. The opening passage of De interpretatione has been tied to this debate. In conclusion, it is sufficient to say that several important aspects of later theories of concepts are present in Plato and some of them are elaborated in Aristotle. On the other hand, it is equally clear that there is no unified theory of concepts in Plato, thus Plato can hardly be said to have introduced the notion of concept into the philosophical discussion. Depending on which theories of concepts one makes reference to (e.g., concepts as extra-mental independent universals or concepts as definitions as part of philosophical methodology including normative criteria), one could say that a theory of concepts is implicitly included in Plato (like Weitz is trying to do). But because of the dialogic form and the informal terminology, Plato cannot be said to have an explicit or fully developed theory of concepts.

1.2.  Stoics: Concept as lekton and phantasia kataleptikê The Stoics, unlike Plato, have a much more elaborated theory of thought and language, which builds partly on Aristotle’s take on this topic. Further distinctions and new concepts are introduced. Thought is said to be connected to impres14 See Modrak (2001) p. 18: “Words are tools that enable us to distinguish between objects. All languages that carve up reality correctly will have the same deep structure (389d).” 15 Evans (2011, p. 347), on the other hand, sees Plato as tying thought very closely to language: “For his claim about the connection between speech and thought clearly seems to be that thought is a kind of speech, rather than that speech is a kind of thought. This suggests that, in his view, our best account of the use of concepts will be grounded in our best account of the use of names, and not the other way around. It would appear, then, that he arrives at a promising view about the norms of thought, but only by way of an unpromising view about the norms of speech.”

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sions in the soul, which in turn are interpreted as having an underlying material principle.16 The same wax-seal analogue that can already be found in Aristotle and Plato is used by the early Stoics to explain how these impressions are to be understood.17 Some kind of intentionality is assumed since these impressions are about something external to the soul that caused them.18 The mind is compared to an empty sheet on which one can write. Through perception more stable representations like memory (mnêmê) and experience (empeiria) originate and become concepts (ennoiai). Ennoiai can either be acquired by sense perception (in this case they can also be called prolêpseis (preconceptions)) or by pure thought. The concepts of a rational animal (zoon logikon) are called ennoêmata. However, those are still described as a kind of phantasmata ultimately originating in the senses.19 The impressions can have a different degree of clarity. A terminological distinction is introduced between phantasia, phantaston, phantastikon, and phantasma. Phantasia is an impression (pathos, which is closely related to pathêma in Aristotle)20 in the soul caused by perception. Phantaston is the cause, i.e., the independently existing intentional object of phantasia. Phantastikon is an image in the soul that corresponds to no real entity. It comes to be in the soul without an external cause and is the equivalent to the modern meaning of “fantasy” and “fantastic.” Phantasma is the nonexisting intentional object of a phantastikon, e.g., an imagined dragon.21 Assuming productive and internally generated representations does help to explain how new concepts can be created without having new perceptions, e.g., the concept of a unicorn. There is the notion of a phantasia katalêptikê which is a true and full apprehension of its intended object (phantaston). (1) It needs to be about what it is supposed to be about, (2) it needs to be about nothing else, and (3) it needs to capture all the features of its object. The phantasia katalêptikê has an important

16 See Lesses (1998) p. 1. 17 See Sextus Empiricus Adversos Mathematicos VII. 18 See Sedley (2002) p. 136: “Moreover, the theory of sense-perception in question is a causal one. Our direct sense-impressions, or rather a privileged subset of them, gain their infallible hold on the world because they are directly caused […] by the external things whose impressions they are.” 19 See Aetios IV 11. 20 Chrysippos disliked the image of the soul suffering and being compared to a block of wax. Instead he spoke of an alteration (alloiôsis) taking place in the soul. See Rubarth (2006). Aristotle also describes the suffering (pathos) of the soul as an alteration/alloiôsis. 21 See Aetios IV 12, Rubarth (2006).

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role to play in Stoic epistemology.22 The third condition is reminiscent of classical theories of concepts. The phantasia kataleptikê represents a normative and yet perceptual theory23 of concepts that has a strong connection to the notion of phantasma/pathêma in Aristotle. The Stoic notion of lekton is sometimes connected to the notion of concept. Caston (1999) describes the doctrine of lekta as an answer to the Platonic problem of universals. The lekta can be conceived as meanings which are independent of utterances on the one hand and independent of the real objects on the other. They are not mental states but they seem to covary with them.24 They are somewhat like propositions in the modern debate. Since word meanings and other nonpropositional sentences are included, lekton is at least a broader notion than ‘proposition.’25 Where lekta correspond to single uninflected words they might be considered as Fregean senses, i.e., concepts as representata and mind independent abstract entities. However, there is another interpretation which does not see lekta as external to the mind and the debate can probably not be fully decided.26 Lesses (1998) summarizes what he understands as the Stoic notion of concepts explaining the connection between lekton and phantasia: To outline the basic Stoic position, what agents assent to, at least in many cases, is a proposition (lekton) characterized by the impression. Genuinely conceptual thinking arises subsequently to the occurrence of impressions. The Stoics hold that concepts are a type of impression, which results from an agent, in effect, internalizing repeated, similar impressions. The act of thinking involves articulating or reflecting about the proposition to which one has assented. (Lesses 1998: 7)

In contrast, Caston (1999) attributes a theory of concepts to the Stoic in the context of the debate on the status of universals which is an answer to Platonic forms.27 He translates the Greek term ennoêma with “concept” and describes 22 See Rubarth (2006). 23 It is debatable whether the Stoics did not assume at least some nonperceptual phantasiai. For discussion, see Sedley (2002) p. 151/152. 24 See Caston (1999) p. 207. 25 Sorabji (1990, p. 310) also understands lekta as “roughly a proposition” since they not only include the equivalents of statements but also other kinds of utterings like questions and incomplete utterings. 26 See Kann (2012) p. 329/330. 27 See Caston (1999) p. 147: “On their view, there are no such things as Platonic Forms – they are literally nothing at all. Concepts, however, are something. They are precisely what replaces Forms; they actually perform functions that Forms were supposed to.”

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concepts as intentional objects and not mental states. They are explicitly described as nonperceptual.28 They are possible objects of thought, whose differences can be articulated and intelligently used in reasoning. By distinguishing concepts from each other and the objects each stands in relation to, the Stoics show their commitment to them. Concepts have a secure place within their ontological scheme. (Caston 1999: 177)

He sees a development in the Stoic philosophy from authors who assumed concepts as intentional objects and later authors who thought that the role assigned to concepts could equally well be fulfilled by lekta which are already necessary to assume because of our linguistic practices.29 Therefore, the Stoics can be said to have a theory of concepts as independent universals (representata) which is a subset of the lekta. Concepts in this sense, however, are closely tied to language since it is a necessary prerequisite that they are expressible. In addition to that, they have a normative theory of concepts as representantia in the form of the phantasia kataleptikê as well as a possibly descriptive theory of representations as physical entities which are not yet fulfilling the normative criteria. Since it is tied to phantasia, this theory might in some sense be described as a modal theory of concepts. This is interesting in our context since there seems to be a major evolvement from the very basic Platonic account of memories as impressions. Since, historically speaking, Aristotle is located after Plato and before the Stoics, it might be inferred that a more elaborate theory of perceptual representations possibly can be found in his philosophy.

1.3.  Augustine: Philosophy of language and concepts as verba mentis In a short dialogue entitled De magistro, Augustine discusses the status of words as signs and the different ways they can be used as signs, e.g., as signs for the things they signify or as signs for the words themselves. Words are said to be used to make the soul of somebody else grasp the thing they are signs for. They are divided into a sound component (sonus) and their signifying function (significatio).30 Nothing that could be interpreted as an explicit theory of concepts is present in the dialogue, but there are some discussions and passages that at least hint at something like concepts. The question whether something can be shown or indicated to somebody else without using a linguistic sign is discussed. It is argued that one might be able to show something by just doing it, e.g., ‘walking.’ 28 See Caston (1999) p. 172/173. 29 See Caston (1999) p. 206/207. 30 De Magistro 8,22–10,34.

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One problem is that somebody’s understanding of the indicated action might be too narrow or the broad, e.g., ‘moving fast’ or ‘going in circles.’ This is a general problem of categorization tasks. However, it is agreed upon by the participants of the discussion that the same is true when signs like words or pointing with one’s finger are used. The discussion also posits that the same word might be used with different meanings and, in consequence, might generate misunderstandings.31 The conclusion is that a name cannot be understood if the thing itself is not known prior to hearing the name.32 The knowledge of the meaning of a word can either come from perceiving the thing, if it is present, or as memorized pictures of the things in question. A third possible way is to grasp truth which is inherent to the mind and which is also described as some form of seeing (a common metaphor for knowledge also present in Plato).33 For a lot of the phenomena discussed, a theory of concepts would provide a valuable solution. If concept acquisition predates the acquisition of words, then word meanings can be explained using a theory of concepts. Different concepts can be associated with the same word and vice versa. People can understand what other people mean because they share the same concept. In his treatise De trinitate, Augustine developed the doctrine of a verbum mentis, mental words and mental speech which accompany spoken words and sentences. Mental words and language are common to all dissimilar spoken and written languages which differ between cultures. They are something different both from spoken words as well as the mental correlates of the sound of a given word. They deserve to be called “words” more than spoken words since spoken words without mental correlates would be devoid of their function. Verbum mentis is not an exact terminus in Augustine and only became one later. However, it is interchangeable with conceptus in some authors and might be Augustine’s closest equivalent to “concept” in the modern debate.34 Unlike the Stoic account of phantasia, the doctrine of mental words and speech is more equivalent to an amodal account. Thought is understood as language-like – just without the ambiguities and deficits of natural language. The notion of thought as interior speech is based on Plato.35 However, it is important to distinguish between descriptions of thought as linguistic (probably what Plato

31 32 33 34 35

De Magistro 10,30–13,34. De Magistro 10,32/33. De Magistro 12,39–13,41. See Meier-Oeser (1998). See Theait. 189e/190a.

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had in mind) or as language-like and assuming some kind of language of thought (what seems to be Augustine’s position).

2.  Medieval philosophy 2.1.  Aristoteles Latinus: Conceptus as a technical term Aristotle’s own position concerning concepts or concept-like representations will not be discussed in this historical overview since it is the main focus of the whole discussion. However, what Aristotle had to say about the problem of universals, language, and mental representation has been quite influential in medieval philosophy. Aristotle’s texts were not available in the Greek version, but rather Latin translations were the standard versions of Aristotle’s treatises. Since “concept” goes back to Latin conceptus (and conceptio) and has no direct equivalent in Greek, it can be interesting to have a look at the Latin versions of Aristotle to see a) whether conceptus/conceptio is used, b) whether it is used in passages that are related to aspects discussed in later theories of concepts, and c) which Greek word is translated with conceptus/conceptio. In Wilhelm of Moerbeke’s translation, conceptus occurs mainly in the context of biological conception and reproduction of animals.36 The same is true for conceptio.37 In this context it can be counted as a technical term. However, there is one very interesting passage from the Metaphysics, where conceptus is used: Amplius autem SECUNDUM existimationem quidem secundum quam esse dicimus ydeas, \ESSE non solum substantiarum\ species sed multorum et aliorum; et enim CONCEPTUS UNUS non solum circa substantias sed et de aliis est, et scientie non solum sunt ipsius substantie sed et aliorum, accidunt autem et mille talia alia.38 (Met. 990b23–28)39

Plato’s theory of forms and its implications are discussed in contrast with Aristotle’s substance ontology. The implication in this context is that there must be a conceptus and science of entities belonging to all Categories, not only of substances. The 36 See De Gen. An. 724b, 728b, 730b, 750b, 751b, 757b, 772a, 775a. 37 See Hist. An. 584b, 585a. 38 “Further, according to the assumption on which or belief in the Ideas rests, there will be Forms not only of substance but also of many other things (for the concept is single not only in the case of substances but also in the other cases, and there are sciences not only of substance but also of other things, and a thousand other such conclusions also follow).” 39 Guillelmus de Morbeka reuisor transl. Aristotelis - Metaphysica: libri I–X; XII–XIII.2 (transl. ‘mediae’ recensio) Clavis: 25.3.1 (M), liber: 1, cap.: 9, pag.: 36, linea: 662 (Bekker: 990b).

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word in the Greek text translated with conceptus is noêma, which can be translated as “thought.” There is also an instance where noêma is translated with conceptio which occurs in the opening passage of De interpretatione: De hiis quidem igitur dictum est in hiis que de anima - alterius enim negotii -; est autem, sicut in anima quandoque quidem conceptio sine hoc quod est verum dicere aut falsum, quandoque autem iam cui necesse horum alterum existere, sic et in voce; circa compositionem enim et divisionem veritas et falsitas.40 (De Int. 16a10–14)

Here the parallelism between thought and language is stressed as well as the notion that truth and falsehood is possible if there is combination or division of concepts and their corresponding linguistic signs, while the first constituents of thought and language cannot be either true or false. Noêma/conceptio is used here specifically for a thought that is uncombined and, therefore, neither true nor false. If conceptus and conceptio could be translated with “concept” in this context it would imply that concepts are a kind of thought. This account is coherent with defining concepts as the first constituents of thought. It would be too far reaching to say that conceptus/conceptio in this sense is a technical term in Moerbeke’s translation which picks out the Aristotelian theory of concepts. The occurrences of the term with this reading are simply too few, especially when compared to the biological reading. However, the word conceptus/conceptio occurs in contexts in which “concept” could be used according to later theories of concepts. Therefore, those occurrences are an important but not conclusive lead for those looking for a theory of concepts in Aristotle.

2.2.  Aquinas: An Aristotelian account Aquinas’ theory of concepts builds in huge parts on the Aristotelian philosophical system. Spalding/Gagné (2013) even do not distinguish between an Aristotelian and a Thomistic theory of concepts, but rather see it as a unified approach. Thomas uses the terms conceptus and conceptio and distinguishes the possibly extra-mental things which are represented (representata) from their representations in the intellect (representantia) and attributes this status to concept. Concepts are said to have the function to enable knowledge about their representata. Concepts have a natural relation to the entities they represent by virtue of being similar to them. They are tied to definitions insofar as they single out the essential properties of a species. He also identifies them as mental correlates of words. 40 “Just as some thoughts in the soul are neither true nor false while some are necessarily one or the other, so also with spoken sounds. For falsity and truth have to do with combination and separation.”

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As a prerequisite for having general knowledge, it is necessary to be able to abstract a species from its individual sensible matter. On the other hand, it is important that some species cannot be conceived without their common sensual matter, e.g., ‘man’ cannot be abstracted from ‘flesh’ and ‘bones.’ Aquinas describes concept acquisition as a process of abstraction. The basis for abstraction are images of actual individuals. The intellect is able to reduce these images to representations which only share the properties that are common to all members of a category. For example, the representation of an apple can be used to acquire the concept of color by abstracting from all the properties of an apple that are not essential to color. The right properties are picked out because of the intellect’s ability to do so.41 This goes back to the role of intellect in concept acquisition as presented by Aristotle in his Posterior Analytics and will be discussed in this context. There are two kinds of abstraction acknowledged in Thomas: a) abstraction of a universal from an individual and b) abstraction of form from matter.42 In the first case (e.g., abstracting ‘animal’ from ‘man’), essential properties are lost; in the second case, all essential properties remain since they are restricted to form while matter is accidental. Thomas uses species intelligibilis as a technical term for concepts, i.e., subpropositional units of thoughts that stand for real kinds. Since intelligible species are not the same as sensible species, it might be argued that Thomas has a strictly nonperceptual theory of concepts.43 He also has the technical term conceptus which is synonymous with intentio intellecta and verbum interius.44 One topic of great importance in medieval philosophy was the status of universals such as genera or qualities. This debate goes back to the dispute between Plato and Aristotle about what forms are. The main three options to assign an ontological status to universals are: 1) ante rem – Universals universals exist independently from the individuals of which they are predicated, they are Platonic ideas. 2) in re – Universals inhere in the things they are attributed of; they are Aristotelian forms. 3) post rem – Universals only exist as mental or linguistic representations. The third option can be seen as genuine to the medieval discussion (even though the ancient Sophists might be seen as less explicit predecessors and the option is mentioned but rejected in Plato) and has received the labels “nominalism” and 41 See Weitz (1988) p. 43–48. 42 Helmig (2012, p. 29) also discusses those forms of abstraction and states that the Aristotelian term aphairesis is only used for the latter. 43 See Brower/Brower-Toland (2008) p. 11: “Concepts: A form or property, F-ness, is a concept (i.e., an intelligible species) of an object O if and only if F-ness is an intentional likeness of O and it is present in an immaterial mind (or intellect).” 44 See Brower/Brower-Toland (2008) p. 10, fn. 20.

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“conceptualism.” Concerning the problem of universals, Thomas has been described as a trope nominalist, which can be equated with a post rem account of universals.45 Alternatively, Thomas has been described as uniting the opposing positions and assuming universals on all three levels.46

2.3.  Ockham: Medieval nominalism Just like Thomas Aquinas, William of Ockham stands in the Aristotelian tradition and reinterprets some of the classical Aristotelian doctrines. He discusses the Aristotelian account of words as signs for impressions in the soul from De interpretatione and opposes it. In his opinion, words have to be considered as signs for external things without mediation. The difference is that words are representations by convention while concepts are natural representations directly caused by their representata. They are common to all and subject of logical investigations.47 Ockham uses the term conceptus amongst others (e.g. intentio animae, notitia generalis, passio animae – the latter of which is the Latin equivalent to the Greek pathêma psychês) for those language-independent mental representations by virtue of which words signify entities in the world.48 He also has the term oratio mentalis, which is similar to “language of thought” or LOT as coined by Jerry Fodor.49 Panaccio (2004) ties Ockham’s theory of concepts closely to causal accounts from the modern tradition.50 Ockham is maybe the most famous proponent of a nominalism or conceptualism in the medieval debate on universals. Schierbach (2010) distinguishes between language-independent and languagedependent acquisition of mental terms. The process of forming language independent concepts is described in the following way by Ockham: Non quod isti conceptus praecedant notitiam intuitivam hominis, sed iste est processus quod primo homo cognoscitur aliquo sensu particulari, deinde ille idem homo cognoscitur ab intellectu, quo cognito habetur una notitia generalis et communis omni homini. Et ista cognitio vocatur conceptus, intentio, passio, qui conceptus communis est omni homini; […].51 (Ockham, Summa Logicae III- 2, 29)

45 46 47 48 49 50 51

See Brower/Brower-Toland (2008) p. 19. See Kann (2011) p. 331. See Kann (2011) p. 330. See Summae Logicae I, 1. See Panaccio (2004) p. 5. See Panaccio (2004) p. 2/3. Translation (Brown (2007) p. 140/141): “First a human is apprehended by some particular sense, then that same human is apprehended by the intellect and when (the human being) has been conceived a general notion common to all humans is formed.

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This kind of concept acquisition can be described in causal terms. It is initiated by encounters with individuals belonging to a category and then the intellect forms a general mental representation.52 However, the meaning of words is independent of concepts and can be learned without having a concept.53 For example, a subject might be able to provide the correct linguistic definition of a lion without ever having encountered or perceived a lion. The subject is only required to have some concepts that can be combined and on which the linguistic definition can draw. In consequence, according to Schierbach a subject must be able to have at least two different concepts of the same thing.54 In that case, Ockham would be a concept pluralist. This hugely depends on what is understood as concepts, e.g., one might only understand the former as concepts, which seems to be in line with the way Ockham uses conceptus. Ockham’s theory of concepts is very interesting for various reasons: (1)  it shows that a theory of concepts as representantia can be combined with an ontology that denies universals a status as real entities, (2) it shows that word meanings and concepts might be distinct and one might acquire a word meaning without acquiring a language independent representation, (3) if Schierbach is right, Ockham would have to be described as a concept pluralist.

3.  Modern philosophy 3.1.  Descartes: Concepts in a dualistic account “Conceptus,” “conceptio,” and “concipere” are part of Descartes’ technical vocabulary. He argues, when defending his proofs against critics, that his arguments are deduced from the concepts in question such as ‘god,’ ‘matter,’ and ‘mind.’ He discusses at length whether ‘existence’ is already implied by these concepts and concludes that ‘God’ implies necessary existence while other concepts only imply possible existence. Therefore, concepts in Descartes seem to include not only necessary and sufficient conditions but also possible attributes. His philosophical method, according to his own understanding not to modern standards, could be described as conceptual analysis.

This apprehension is called a concept, intention or passion which is a common concept to all humans […].” 52 See Schierbach (2010) p. 336 ff. 53 See Summa Logicae III 2, 29. 54 See Schierbach (2010) p. 341–347.

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As a rationalist, Descartes stresses that we need to assume nonperceptual mental representations because there are complex geometrical figures like a chiliagon which cannot be imagined by the mind yet we can have the concept of a chiliagon and ultimately knowledge of a chiliagon. Like all rationalists, he has an aversion against perceptual representations and does not want to assign them the status of knowledge or as enablers of certain knowledge. This anti-perceptual stance goes back at least to Plato but probably to the Pre-Socratics. It puts Barsalou’s general historical evaluation in perspective. Ideas in Descartes can be said to be the basic constituents of thoughts, which do need other elements to be regarded as true or false. Some of them can be described as “images” or “likenesses” of things, which is in line with the passage in Aristotle and a perceptual theory of concepts. As the basic constituents of thoughts representing objects and categories they are quite similar to what is required in a modern theory of concepts. He distinguishes between three kinds of ideas: innate ideas, acquired ideas, and invented ideas. Innate ideas do not have to be acquired by contact with external entities, while other ideas are acquired by interaction with external entities. Innate ideas have the highest degree of clarity and certainty. On the other side of the spectrum are invented ideas which do not have any real correlates.55 Innate ideas are proposed by Plato and later Platonists as summarized by Helmig (2012) who, in contrast, relates acquired ideas to Aristotle and the Stoics among others. Invented ideas, i.e., ideas without corresponding real entities, were already mentioned in the context of the Stoic distinction between phantasia and phantastikon.

3.2.  Leibniz: Rationalism and concepts Leibniz’ philosophy can also be described as rationalist. He sees his position tied to Platonism whereas the empiristic position which he opposes is closer to an Aristotelian account of knowledge and thought. Like Plato, Leibniz believes in innate ideas rather than the soul being a tabula rasa receiving all ideas through induction from sense experience. The innate ideas and the rational faculty are seen as necessary to guarantee mathematics and logic as axiomatic sciences and generally judgments that are always true and not capable of being false.56 In consequence, Leibniz can be said to be opposed to a perceptual account of concept acquisition and possession. Whether his evaluation of Aristotle as being a pure empiricist like the British Empiricists is true remains to be seen in the later chapters. 55 See Smith (2014) p. 3 ff. 56 See Leibniz (1971) p. 2–7.

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His theory of concepts is mainly part of his logic. To him, concepts are constituents of thoughts and correspond to logical terms.57 He thinks that there is a common form of thought which is the same for all and unambiguous unlike natural languages which differ among cultures. He tries to develop an idealized language which is supposed to be related to the common form of thought and is able to get rid of the shortcomings of natural language. The idea is that there are some basic components of thought from which all other possible concepts can be derived.58 Leibniz uses the term conceptus for language-independent mental representations of categories. However, notio (which is related to the Aristotelian term noêma) is the more common term in Leibniz. One important aspect in rationalism is that concepts should be clear and explicit (clare et distincte). That means they should be separated from all other concepts and in all cases it must be clear whether a concept can be applied or not. In addition to that, the constituents of a concept, e.g., features must be evident in themselves.59 This can be read as normative criteria for concepts employed by philosopher. It is not implied that all representations necessarily fulfill those criteria, but the ones which do not should not be applied in a philosophical discourse. Perceptual representations do not qualify as concepts because they cannot fulfill those normative criteria. Leibniz believed that there can be complete concepts, i.e., concepts that contain all properties of an individual. In addition to that, he thought that no two individuals can have all the same properties (Leibniz’s Law). Therefore, complete concepts in Leibniz have to be individual concepts.60 At least the second assumption is debatable. It seems to be true once spatio-temporal properties are taken into account. In contrast, two qualitatively identical yet distinct objects are conceivable. The independence of individuation in concepts from the number of referents was established above and illustrated by the case of lonesome George, the last Pinta Island tortoise.

3.3.  Locke: Concepts as abstract general ideas British Empiricism stems from the idea that all our thoughts are shaped by the experiences of the world we have. It is mainly directed against the notion of innate ideas that was present in rationalist authors such as Descartes and Leibnitz. 57 58 59 60

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See Castañeda (1974) p. 348. See Kann (2011) p. 334. See Kann (2011) p. 335. See Kann (2011) p. 335.

Locke can be seen as the forerunner, who shaped the movement, while his famous predecessors Berkeley and Hume came to different conclusions and stressed different aspects. British Empiricism is possibly the most important predecessor of modern theories of concepts. At least, Barsalou und Prinz imply this.61 At the very beginning of his Essay concerning Human Understanding, Locke stresses that he is not interested in the physical organs that enable human understanding but rather in the human faculties described independently of these organs.62 Therefore, Locke’s theory can be said to be about abilities or functional kinds not vehicles.63 His enquiry is mainly epistemological, i.e., he wants to answer the question how a human being can have knowledge. The mind’s ability to distinguish concepts is described as a precondition for arriving at true judgments. In consequence, what Locke has to say about concepts is indebted to the role concepts have in acquiring knowledge, which is a general characteristic of many philosophical theories of concepts. Locke does not use the term “concept” (he uses “conception” in some instances64), instead he uses the word “ideas” for mental representations. He provides “phantasm,” “notion” and “species” as synonyms. Ideas are the representations “which the Mind can be employed about in thinking.” They can be found by self-conscious reflection and are attributed to other humans because of their actions and the things they say. “Idea” in Locke is more general than “concept” and should rather be equated with “mental representation.” It is not entirely clear whether all ideas need to be conscious. However, they are of necessity mental representations that are about something, i.e., intentional and are employed in several tasks, e.g., language production and comprehension. According to the empiricist doctrine, there are two sources of ideas: perception of external entities and internal reflection. Perception provides ideas of external qualities such as colors, temperatures, and tastes. Reflection provides ideas of mental operations like perceiving, thinking, and doubting. These two sources provide the basic stock of simple ideas. Simple ideas always correspond to sensible qualities, they are “uncompounded” and contain “nothing but one uniform appearance.” The mind has the capacity to combine simple ideas and generate 61 See Barsalou (1999) p. 578, Prinz (2002) p. 104. 62 See Locke (2008) p. 13. 63 The distinction between an implementational, similarity and functional account of modality in concepts is discussed below. Because of this statement it can be ruled out that Locke was a proponent of a modal theory of concepts as interpreted by the implementational account. (See section IV.2.6.) 64 See Locke (2008) p. 64.

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more complex ones by their combination, but it cannot form new simple ideas. To be able to do that the human mind is capable of storing ideas, both for a short time span, but also in long-term memory.65 Simple ideas of perceptions are restricted to the five known sense modalities. Locke distinguishes between ideas restricted to one sense, ideas received through more than one sense, ideas received only through reflection, and ideas received through all senses and reflection. Examples for ideas that are received through more than one sense are ‘figure,’ ‘extension’ and ‘motion’. For example, figure can both be perceived through vision and touch. Examples for ideas which are received both through senses and reflection are ‘pleasure,’ ‘existence,’ ‘succession’ and ‘unity.’66 Some of these distinctions concerning sense perception are prefigured in the Aristotelian account of sense perception and will be discussed below. Locke distinguishes between primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities are representations of quantities such as number, size, and shape. They are perceptions common to more than one sense in the Aristotelian model. The second kind are representations which are only qualitative, such as a certain shade of color. A third kind of quality is the power things have, e.g., the sun’s power to make things hot. Powers are not resemblances because they are only perceived indirectly through qualities of separate entities, e.g., the heat of a stone warmed by the sun.67 Those powers could be labeled as functional properties or theoretical knowledge in the modern discussion of concepts and as knowledge of causes (aitiai) in Aristotle. Locke describes several faculties of the mind which have a relation to ideas: a) the faculty to discriminate ideas, b) the faculty to compare ideas, c) the faculty to combine ideas, d) the faculty to name ideas, e) the faculty to abstract from ideas. These abilities can be described as some of the higher-order thought processes required for a theory of concepts. Locke himself stresses that these faculties are not present or at least present to a far lesser degree in nonhuman animals. There are three different ways to generate complex ideas, the first of which is just combining different ideas, the second is bringing ideas together without combining them, which creates relations, and the third one is abstraction. By combining ideas, the mind can generate new ideas which have no real correlates like ‘unicorn.’68 Locke describes the process of abstraction in the following way: “the Mind makes the particular Ideas, received from particular 65 66 67 68

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See Locke (2008) p. 54/55, 64, 87. See Locke (2008) p. 65, 69, 70. See Locke (2008) p. 77, 81/82. See Locke (2008) p. 91–98.

Objects, to become general […].”69 It seems like the same representations, which at first stand for particulars, are made to stand for categories. In another passage, abstraction is said to be separating ideas from others with which they naturally co-occur. Both of those accounts are not contradictory even though they stress different aspects of the process. The newly derived representations are said to sort newly encountered entities and denominate them, which is exactly the main function attributed to concepts (at least sortal concepts). They can fulfill these tasks since they “agree with these Patterns.”70 Hence, Locke’s account of categorization does involve similarity. Locke distinguishes between three different types of complex ideas: modes, substances, and relations. Modes are ideas that can be attributed to substances, while substance ideas are always taken as representations of subsisting particular things. Relations consist of comparisons between distinct ideas. The idea of a substance is generated by noticing several simple ideas as constantly co-occurring. Names are mostly given to those things considered substances. Locke notes that simple ideas seldom have corresponding names. Usually only more abstract ideas like genera of perceptible qualities have names. The notion of substance is empty apart from implying something that underlies the simple ideas that are related to it. There can be no answer to the question what substance is in itself.71 From a particular substance, a sort of substances is abstracted. Obviously this notion of substance has several parallels to the Aristotelian notion of substance. Conversely, the Aristotelian notion is generally considered to be about real entities, not about ideas as in Locke. Relations are separate ideas, which are created by comparison of two ideas concerning a certain regard, e.g., the idea of ‘fatherhood.’ It is also possible to have the idea of something as being related to another thing, e.g., ‘father.’ Relations are said to be simpler and more easily learnt in a lot of cases. They only concern one aspect or a small number of aspects. This partially corresponds to Löbner’s account of concept types; there are at least sortal, individual, and relational concepts in Locke. Functional concepts, however, are not explicitly distinguished from relational ones. Locke’s complex ideas of sorts of substances share a lot of similarities with what is discussed as concepts. Simple ideas are analogous to features in concepts. However, Locke – unlike some have stated – does not believe that all of those complex ideas are definitional, i.e., he states that different people can have the

69 See Locke (2008) p. 94. 70 See Locke (2008) p. 94. 71 See Locke (2008) p. 179.

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same complex ideas with different degrees of complexity. Experts tend to have more precise ideas. In general, ideas can be clear but they can also be obscure or confused. Therefore, Locke’s theory of ideas can be seen as descriptive rather than a normative theory of concepts unlike many of the philosophical theories discussed up to this point. Simple ideas can be obscure either by virtue of the perceptions being incorrect and insufficient or by fading in memory. A clear idea is as close as possible to an undisturbed perception. Complex ideas can be obscure by virtue of their simple ideas being obscure or by virtue of being undetermined concerning number and order. Ideas are confused by virtue of being indistinguishable from other ideas. Locke’s theory of general ideas cannot be said to be “classical” the way “classical” is used in the modern discussion since they are (a) partly obscure and confused, (b) structured, i.e., do not feature lists. Locke has a general representational view where perceptions can have a “foundation in nature” and a “conformity with the real being.” This can be compared to the notion of likeness to actual things. He distinguishes between primary qualities (such as magnitudes, solidity, and figures) and secondary qualities. While primary qualities are described as being real and present in external things, secondary qualities are only causes of real powers of things.72

3.4.  Hume: Criticism of abstract ideas Hume makes a basic distinction between impressions and ideas. Impressions are directly received through the senses, both outer and inner senses73, while ideas are those representations which remain in memory after direct perceptions and which are “less lively” than impressions. However, ideas in Hume are always related to impressions and have their origin in them. They resemble the impressions in every aspect. Ideas can be derived from other ideas, but at the end of the chain there are always impressions.74 In consequence, this notion of ideas is closer to the notion of concept than Locke’s since concepts are, according to most authors, defined as representations in long-term memory. According to Garret (2006), ideas represent because of (a) resemblance and (b) causal derivation, which also nicely relates to some aspects of the modern discussion of concepts on the one hand and Aristotle’s philosophy on the other.75 72 73 74 75

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See Locke (2008) p. 235/236. See Garret (2006) p. 303. See Hume (2003) p. 1–5. See Garret (2006) p. 309.

Hume has a distinction between “simple” and “complex” that pertains to both ideas and impressions. Single qualities are simple ideas or impressions (e.g., ‘red’) while bundles of qualities corresponding to objects (e.g., ‘apple’) are complex. Since we perceive objects as well as their qualities, their perceptions have to be classified as impressions. In a lot of cases, complex ideas cannot be described as going back to complete perceptions, e.g., a complete city cannot be perceptually represented, yet we do have a complex idea of it. On the other hand, there is a one-to-one correspondence between simple ideas and simple impressions.76 Hume argues a point that was made very strongly by Berkeley before him: How can general ideas77 be formed if all impressions are caused by particulars and are determined? Since it is both impossible to represent all possible configurations at once, e.g., ‘equilateral’ and ‘rectangular’ for ‘triangle,’ and to have undetermined perceptual representations (at least in conscious imagination), representations of general kinds also have to originate from impressions of particulars and to be determined in their quantity and quality.78 Abstract ideas are therefore in themselves individual, however they may become general in their representation. The image in the mind is only that of a particular object, tho’ the application of it in our reasoning be the same, as if it were universal. (Hume 2003: 14)

Even though it is the image of a particular, a general idea causes other members of the category to be recognized as such. This is possible because it is associated with the memories of other individuals previously encountered: The word raises up an individual idea, along with a certain custom; and that custom produces any other individual one, for which we may have occasion. But as the production of all the ideas, to which the name may be apply’d, is in most cases impossible, we abridge that work by a more partial consideration […]. (Hume 2003: 15)

Ideas would not be able to fulfill all their tasks (including word comprehension) if they did not make knowledge about different members of a category accessible. Only a subset of all possible representations is accessed in a particular task. This is not a contradiction to representations being always determined and images of particulars. It can be linked to the exemplar account in the modern debate and

76 See Hume (2003) p. 2/3. 77 Weitz (1988, p. 136) criticizes Hume for not distinguishing between abstract and general ideas. It is true he discusses both kinds of ideas under the same label of ‘abstract ideas.’ However, the very general problem that those ideas cannot be sufficiently represented by a single perceptual representation is common to both. 78 See Hume (2003) p. 12–14.

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Barsalou’s definition of concepts as ad-hoc constructions in short-term memory as well as his notion of situatedness.79 An important aspect of Hume’s work is his skepticism.80 While Locke holds a representationalist theory of ideas and assumes real objects as a standard for adequacy of ideas, Hume sees all connections between simple ideas as having their origin in the mind and not being caused or necessitated by external objects. Therefore, his epistemology cannot build on the notion of a correspondence between an external world and its mental representation. He can be classified as an epistemological subjectivist as well as an ontological subjectivist concerning objects. The common thread of British Empiricism is the idea that all elaborated and complex representations build on simpler and more direct ones that are received through perception (including introspection). Some of those more elaborated representations fulfill the task that is attributed to concepts in the modern debate. The major difference between Locke, on the one hand, and Berkeley and Hume, on the other, is the question whether perceptual representations can be undetermined regarding quality and quantity. This resembles the modern debate between those theories that see concepts as summary representations (e.g., classical theory and prototype theory) and those that see concepts as a collection of particular exemplars. It has an affinity to theories that distinguish between a conceptual core (which would be a particular image for Hume) and an identification procedure (which would be the knowledge of other individuals associated with a general idea), e.g., neoclassical theories. Since Hume’s notion of impressions includes the inner senses as well, it is quite close to Barsalou’s account of modality and his theory of ideas is quite close to a theory of perceptual symbols. The term “passion” which is the direct equivalent to the Aristotelian pathêma is restricted to affections of the inner sense, e.g., emotions. This is one possible meaning of pathos in Aristotle as well.

3.5.  Kant: Concepts in transcendental idealism Immanuel Kant can be considered as a turning point in the history of philosophy. According to his transcendental philosophy questions about things in themselves should be abandoned while questions concerning the necessary conditions of possible experience should be analyzed. In consequence, Kant has to be seen as 79 See Barsalou (2009). 80 Weitz (1988, p. 134) sees a fundamental dichotomy between Hume’s skepticism concerning connections of ideas and the way he makes use of his own philosophical concepts.

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an ontological subjectivist concerning concepts, even though this distinction might not entirely fit his philosophy. There are two very distinct classes of representations in Kant: intuitions (Anschauungen), on the one hand, and concepts (Begriffe), on the other hand. Intuitions are impressions received through the senses and are restricted by the a priori forms of intuition, i.e., space and time. Concepts are products of the mind’s spontaneity and are judgments or predicates that can be applied to other concepts or to intuitions.81 Concepts have features and stand in hierarchical relations. A concept can be applied if all its necessary and jointly sufficient features are present. Judgments which only rely on features already present in the concept – such as ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ – are called analytic while judgments going beyond the conceptual features are synthetic and can only be achieved through experience, i.e., the combination of intuitions and concepts. There are empirical and nonempirical concepts, like mathematical concepts and a priori concepts – the so-called Kantian categories (Kategorien). Since concepts have to be applied to intuitive contents, Kant needs a third kind of representation. As a consequence, he introduces schemata. Schemata are both likenesses of intuitions and share properties like being generally applicable with concepts. They are restricted by the a priori forms of sense, i.e., space and time. Kant uses the example of ‘dog’ for an empirical concept that requires an empirical schema.82 Since schemata are responsible for deciding whether intuitions can be subsumed under a given concept they are closer to the psychological notion of concept than what Kant calls “concept” (“Begriff ”). Kantian concepts might be characterized as amodal according to Barsalou’s distinction while his schemata are modal. In fact, Barsalou compares his perceptual symbols to the notion of Kantian schemata and uses the same examples (‘dog’ and ‘triangle’) to illustrate what they are supposed to be.83 Kant’s theory of concepts, on the other hand, is close to what is called classical theory in psychology. Concepts are understood as being defined by their features. This is especially illustrated by the strict analytic/synthetic distinction. Empirical concepts are said to be mostly identical to their application and, therefore, might be identified with their schemata. In a neoclassical account, Kantian concepts might be identified with a definitional conceptual core while the schemata are perceptual identification procedures.

81 See CPR A50/B74. 82 See CPR A140/B179 ff. 83 See Barsalou (1999) p. 586.

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A paper by Newton (2012) nicely develops the difference of perceptual categorization through schemata and the task concepts as functions of the intellect fulfill in Kantian philosophy. The difference between intuitions and concepts using modern terminology could be described as the former being perceptual and analogue while the latter are digital and amodal. Concepts have to provide the logical form, i.e., apply to a whole class, delineate this class from another class. Schemata could be associated with categorization tasks while concepts are useful for other higher-order thought processes especially conceptual combination and deduction. Newton describes the process of concept formation in the following way: For then the formation of the concept ‘tree’ from perceptions (conscious intuitions) of trees would require the latter to undergo an alteration or change, whereby they are replaced by (previously non-existing) conceptual representations. That is, the account of concept-formation would have to show ‘how concepts arise as representations’. But if the perceptions and the concept are not treated as heterogeneous representations, then concept-formation need not be treated as a coming to be of a concept that was not there previously. It generates merely the form of a representation, i.e., its ‘generality’, and not the representation itself, because it consists in the unfolding of a given representation through an inner act of reflection (an act whereby it becomes self-conscious). (Newton 2012: 14)

Following the description by Newton, Kantian concepts can be described as the symbolic labels that are applied to a class of entities, while the schemata are the empirically formed detectors or identification procedures. There are interesting parallels between Kant’s philosophy and Fodor’s informational atomism. Obviously the Kantian account does have an epistemological background. The foundations for knowledge are supposed to be described, which requires clear-cut representations that can enter into logical formulas on the one hand and have to apply to perceptual experiences on the other. The Kantian account, therefore, nicely illustrates that the combination of categorization tasks and a normative description of higher-order thought leads to a seemingly unbridgeable separation. However, Kant tried to bridge it by the introduction of schemata.

4. 19th and 20th century 4.1.  Frege: Sense and meaning Frege’s theory of concepts is immensely influenced by his background in mathematics and logic. Propositions and thoughts are regarded as truth-functional returning the value ‘true’ or ‘false.’ In consequence, extensions of concepts have to be clear-cut and it has to be decidable for each individual whether it is part 82

of the extension or not. What Frege calls “Begriff ” is narrower than what is discussed in philosophical theories of concepts before and after him. “Begriffe” are defined by containing argument places like ‘capital of x,’ which would be a functional concept according to Löbner.84 It is reserved for predicates and does not apply to names, therefore it excludes individual concepts. A collection of several predicates can form a new, more complex predicate and then be considered as features of this new predicate or concept. His most influential contribution to the discussion of concepts is his distinction between meaning and sense. Something can have a sense (Sinn) but not a meaning (Bedeutung) if it has no extension.85 The distinction is illustrated by the Hesperus/Phosphorus case. Both words have the same meaning (Bedeutung) since they refer to the same object, but they do have different senses (Sinn) since a different mode of presentation is used to refer to the same object. The consequence is that if somebody believes Hesperus to have property P, he does not necessarily believe Phosphorus to have property P, if he has not acquired the additional knowledge that both are the planet Venus. Most of the time, expressions are used to speak about external referents but sometimes they are also used to speak about senses, e.g., when attributing a belief to someone else. Used in this way the sense becomes the new meaning of an expression. Since sentences making reference to senses also have a truth value, senses have to be clear-cut as well. Mental ideas (Vorstellungen) disqualify in that regard since they are partly unclear and differ between individuals. Several individuals can use an expression sharing the same sense while they cannot share the ideas they have. Ideas are restricted to certain individuals and timeframes. Frege compares this to someone seeing the moon through a telescope. The sense is in-between the object, i.e., the meaning, and its subjective and individual representation in an individual mind. The picture in the telescope restricts the object to be seen from a single perspective but is still the same for different individuals looking through the telescope.86 Supposing that senses a) cannot be ideas and b) become the meaning of expressions that express thoughts or other intentional attitudes, they have to be granted an objective and independent status. Several later authors have used the term “concept” for the Fregean notion of sense. Zalta (2001, p. 13) uses abstract objects for Fregean modes of presentations, which he identifies with concepts

84 See Frege (1994) p. 29–31. 85 See Frege (1994) p. 42. 86 See Frege (1994) p. 43 ff.

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and describes them as mind independent and objectified cognitive contents in contrast to real objects which are the objective contents of representations. Fregean senses have a status that is somehow similar to Platonic ideas, the arguments against their status as mental particulars is also reminiscent of the Platonic arguments against universals as subjective representations brought forward in the dialogue Parmenides since those can vary amongst subjects.

4.2.  Wittgenstein: Concepts and family resemblance Wittgenstein’s philosophy has to be divided in an early period, for which the Tractatus Logicus Philosophicus is the central work (his view here can be described as representationalists and in that respect somewhat close to Frege) and a later period, of which his Philosophical Investigations are the most famous output. Wittgenstein is concerned with criticizing notions which are presupposed in a lot of his contemporary philosophy. One of these is the notion of mental representations as well as the so-called classical theory in philosophy. His criticism of a classical definitional theory of concepts is illustrated with his infamous example of the concept ‘game’ (German: Spiel). There are very different kinds of games, e.g., card games, sport games, children playing. There are several features which games share with other games like ‘having a winner,’ ‘being fun,’ or ‘involving good luck.’ All games can be identified as games by virtue of their sharing some features with some other games. However, none of those features are shared by all games. It is impossible to define games in a classical way. Wittgenstein calls this notion of a chain of features connecting the members of category “family resemblance” since the members of a biological family equally share some features while they do not share others.87 Wittgenstein’s philosophical criticism has been quite influential and was also picked up in psychology. However, it is important to note that Wittgenstein does not claim that all concepts have a family resemblance structure; he merely points out that there are concepts which cannot be accounted for by a classical structure.88 Therefore, Wittgenstein might be described as a pluralist concerning conceptual formats. Wittgenstein’s opposition against mental representations as an explanation for linguistic understanding is illustrated by an allegory. He compares the notion of ‘pain’ to a box everybody has containing what is called a “bug.” However, nobody

87 See Wittgenstein (2003) p. 56–58. 88 Glock (2010, p. 90) emphasizes this aspect of Wittgenstein’s account of family resemblance.

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is able to see what everybody else’s boxes contain.89 Since mental representations as particulars are not intersubjectively shareable they can play no role for language acquisition. Language is rather understood as being tied to overt behavior. Glock (2010) sees Wittgenstein’s theory of concepts mainly manifested in what he has to say about conceptual analysis understood as clarification of the way certain words and terms in natural and scientific language are used.90 Wittgenstein conceives language as a set of games following rules. The traditional view of language as a representation of a mind-independent reality is oversimplifying. Words can be used like tools for different kinds of games with different kinds of rules. For example, words can acquire their meaning through pointing at things; however, pointing is always ambiguous. This problem was already discussed by Augustine, to whom Wittgenstein refers to in his Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein’s approach is taken up in the modern discussion by philosophers who identify concepts with abilities. The argument of shareability is central and Frege’s dealing with the subject is often taken as a starting point for similar arguments. Glock (2010) sums this position up in the following way: To possess a concept is to know the meaning of a certain expression; by the same token concepts are neither mental occurrences nor entities beyond time and space, but abstractions from our use of words. (Glock 2010: 92)

Combined with his skepticism towards mental representations, it can be said that Wittgenstein’s theory of concepts is very language centered and mostly does not apply to the tasks associated with concepts in the modern psychological literature. Concepts can be described as linguistic abilities that can work in different ways, e.g., some have family resemblance structure.

4.3.  Causal theories of content In the second half of the twentieth century, the main focus of philosophical discussion was on the problem of how the notions of content and of reference could be defined. This debate was based on the observation that reference cannot always be sufficiently explained by the information contained in the representations (representantia). This is especially relevant in the case of natural kinds, where a cognitive subject cannot sufficiently explain what constitutes a natural kind and yet successfully represents them. Causal theories are often contrasted with “picture theories” of mental representations since they are thought to be a paradigmatic

89 See Wittgenstein (2003) p. 163/164. 90 See Glock (2010) p. 91/92.

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case of representations that do not sufficiently determine the external content of a representation, e.g., in the case of a picture of an identical twin.91 A classic example of this is the already-mentioned Twin Earth case from Putnam (1975). Water representations not only refere to H2O but would also refer to the perceptually equal substance XYZ on Twin Earth. If we still want to say that our water representations refer to H2O and not to XYZ, the notion of reference cannot sufficiently be explained by cognitive content, i.e., to put it in Putnam’s words “the psychological state of the individual speaker does not determine ‘what he means.’”92 The solution is to see a causal connection as a necessary component of establishing and maintaining reference. Water representations have their origin in and are regularly evoked by H2O and not by XYZ. Causal theories could either emphasize the first coming to be of a representation – Kripke (1972) speaks of baptism in the context of linguistic representations – or the regularity of a representation as the causal relation determining the reference of a representation. Another possibility is to externalize how reference is established, e.g., water representations refer to what can be identified as water by competent scientists. Putnam justifies the causal theory because picking out the right extension is necessary to establish truth.93 Therefore, causal theories of representations can be said to be normatively motivated. In this case, a theory of concepts cannot be restricted to mental representations and their structures but must also account for how reference is established by causal connections and by certain social practices. However, the problem might arise that there are other causes which also activate representations, i.e., one has to distinguish between relevant reference establishing causes and nonrelevant causes of a representation.94 This problem might be solved by a functional description of what representations are constituted to pick out, i.e., a definition of concepts as functional kinds in the way described above. Another approach is the Best Test Theory proposed by Robert Rupert. It is restricted to natural kinds and their representations and roughly states that a mental state is a representation of a natural kind if it is more regularly caused by this natural kind than by any other natural kind. Reference, therefore, is connected to co-occurrence.95

91 92 93 94 95

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See Adams/Aizawa (2010) p. 2/3. See Putnam (1975) p. 270. See Putnam (1975) p. 269. See Adams/Aizawa (2010) p. 3–5. See Adams/Aizawa (2010) 24 ff., Rupert (1999).

4.4.  Fodor: Conceptual atomism Fodor’s position can be described as conceptual atomism. It is motivated by the philosophical requirement that concepts successfully pick out a real category in the world. It stands in the tradition of causal theories of concepts insofar as the content of a concept is determined by objects and categories in the world rather than by a definable structure. Meaning is supposed to be explained in terms of “lawful mind-world correlations.”96 Fodor tries to solve the problem of nonrelevant causal factors by alluding to asymmetric dependence. The idea is that nonreferents cause activation of the representation in question, e.g., cows causing activation of ‘horse,’ as a consequence of the actual referents causing activation of the representations, which is not true in the other direction.97 Fodor argues that concepts are not compositional and theories that attribute a certain structure to concepts ultimately fail, e.g., a prototype theory of concepts fails because the prototype of ‘pet fish’ cannot be derived from the prototype of ‘pet’ and the prototype of ‘fish.’98 In addition, he argues against classical theory by showing that even examples thought to be prime examples for classical theory such as ‘bachelor’ are not easily defined.99 Theory theory does not sufficiently clarify the way it relates to other proposed theories of concepts and might not be a contender to answer the question how concepts can be individuated at all. Therefore, it is not regarded as an interesting alternative by Fodor either.100 These are the standard contenders in psychology which assume concepts to be structured representations. One argument for conceptual atomism is that the other alternatives are ruled out by conclusive evidence. Therefore, it is more of a negative than a positive view on what concepts are.101 Fodor argues that concepts should be restricted to the representations that do exactly what is required of them, i.e., picking out the right category. The content of concepts is not constituted by the relations a concept has to other concepts but only by this ability to pick out the right kind of entities. Concept possession is constituted by lawful mind-world relations and concept acquisition can be described as “getting nomologically locked to the property that the concept

96 97 98 99 100 101

See Fodor (1998) p. 78. See Adams/Aizawa (2010) 18 ff. See Fodor (1998) p. 105. See Fodor (1998) p. 48/49. See Fodor (1998) p. 112 ff. See Laurence/Margolis (1999) p. 60.

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expresses.”102 Being locked up is a binary feature, i.e., it either applies or does not apply, therefore, concepts in an informational atomism are clear-cut. He ties the theory of content to theories of knowledge, therefore, the argument he gives for conceptual atomism can be described as a normative argument: Unsurprisingly because there can be no epistemic access without semantic access; what you can’t think about you can’t know about. Informational semantics says that it’s because the mediation between dogs and DOG-tokens is reliable that there is a community of dog-thinkers, creatures whose mental processes fall under the intentional laws about dog-thoughts. (Fodor 1998: 75/76)

The mechanisms responsible for picking out the right kind of entities, which could be described as detectors, do not constitute the concept and do not matter for sharing the same concept with others. Being reliably connected to the content of a concept might be mediated through experts.103 One consequence of Fodor’s conceptual atomism is that he has to embrace a form of innate ideas. In fact, all concepts have to be described as innate, since they do not depend on the acquisition of any other concept. Innateness, however, is only required for the mental mechanisms that enable a cognitive subject to pick out an entity or a kind.104 It could be argued that, in the end, conceptual atomism is not relevant for a cognitive psychologist because psychologists are precisely interested in the question of how picking out certain entities and kinds work via detectors. Rather it is a theory that is suited to the philosophers’ normative demands on how thought and ultimately knowledge can be conceived.

4.5.  Peacocke: A Neo-Fregean approach to concepts The position that concepts should be described as externalized senses, i.e., abstract objects, has regained some backing in the more recent history of philosophy. This is mostly initiated by dissatisfaction with describing concepts as mental representations, which seems to contradict some intuitions about concepts (e.g., shareability, the existence of concepts not grasped by human beings105). Concepts

102 103 104 105

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See Fodor (1998) p. 125. See Fodor (1998) p. 77/78. See Fodor (1998) p. 142/143. Peacocke (2005) p. 4/5: “Mental representations that are concepts could even be typed by the corresponding possession condition of the sort I favour. This seems to me an entirely legitimate notion of a kind of mental representation; but it is not quite the notion of a concept. It can, for instance, be true that there are concepts human beings may never acquire, because of their intellectual limitations, or because the sun will expand

are seen rather as abstract objects along the lines of mathematical objects and logical objects. One main proponent of this Neo-Fregean approach to concepts is Christopher Peacocke.106 In defending his view that concepts cannot be satisfyingly described as mental representations, Peacocke refers to the role concepts have to play in attributing rational thought to cognitive subjects. In consequence, his theory of concepts can be described as normative. But to be a concept is simply to have a certain role in rational transitions in thought, in the mind of a rational thinker. There is nothing, at the constitutive level, to being a concept beyond that role, provided the role is correctly specified. (Peacocke 2005: 4)

In his 1992 book A study of concepts, he defines several criteria that concepts have to fulfill. Two concepts count as distinct if there are two informatively different propositional contents: one containing the first concept and the other containing the second. This shows the closeness to Fregean senses, e.g., ‘Descartes’ and ‘the author of the meditations’ are informatively different constituents of propositions. Unlike other authors, Peacocke allows individual concepts since they can be constituents of propositions.107 Concepts in Peacocke are not tied to linguistic expressions, since language only requires reference which can be established without concepts, e.g., in the case of deictic expressions. The way “concept” is used in cognitive science for mental representations is regarded as a distinct but related use of the word: “It is possible for one and the same concept to receive different mental representations in different individuals.”108 Concepts are individuated by possessing conditions which need to establish reference. Descriptions of concepts involve a functional description, i.e., how a cognitive and rational agent possessing a concept behaves (behavior being actual acts of reason in this case). However, they are not identified with a functional kind nor with an ability.109

106 107 108 109

to eradicate human life before humans reach a stage at which they can acquire these concepts. ‘There are concepts that will never be acquired’ cannot mean or imply ‘There are mental representations which are not mental representations in anyone’s mind’. If concepts are individuated by their possession conditions, on the other hand, there is no problem about the existence of concepts that will never be acquired. They are simply concepts whose possession conditions will never be satisfied by any thinkers.” See Margolis/Laurence (2014) p. 6–9. See Peacocke (1992) p. 2. See Peacocke (1992) p. 3. Concept pragmatism identifying concepts with abilities is another alternative for those dissatisfied with identifying concepts with mental representations. The position

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Under this approach, the cognitive and the semantic dimensions of concepts are inextricably intertwined. It is not right to regard either dimension as more fundamental than the other. For some purposes, our primary concern may be with the cognitive; but since the judgments fundamental to the epistemic dimension aim at truth, the level of reference remains in the picture. […] Requirements on concepts at the level of reference and truth are not an optional add-on, but are intrinsic to their cognitive character. (Peacocke 2005: 7/8)

Peacocke distinguishes between the cognitive and the semantic components of concepts. The latter enables the truth-functionality of thoughts which cannot be guaranteed, if only the cognitive level is taken into account. Concepts and thoughts can be defined in reference to each other, i.e., concepts as the constituents of thoughts and thoughts as conglomerates of concepts. This is not a problem from Peacocke’s view: he presents the analogy of words and sentences and of states and federal countries as other examples of interchangeably definable notions.110

5.  Summary and observations from the history of philosophy The previous sections illustrated some of the distinctions drawn above in a systematical fashion and reintroduced them in their historical context. It has been shown that the debate in philosophy starting from Plato is mostly influenced by the problem of universals and the interrelated problem of knowledge. Theories attributing the status of mind-independent entities to concepts, which is not relevant for psychology, are quite common in philosophy beginning with Plato all the way through the Neo-Fregean thinkers discussed just above. But there are also nominalist and conceptualist theories of universals in the history of philosophy and many philosophers discussing mental representations that enable cognitive processes and ultimately knowledge. A lot of different approaches to concepts and their respective problems are prefigured in Plato’s dialogues undermining his important status in the history of philosophy and justifying beginning a history of theories of concepts with Plato in a very convincing way. There is a strong trend towards normative theories of concepts, i.e., restricting the notion of concepts to a subclass of mental representations that successfully represent real categories without mistakes. In fact, the only philosophers who are not explicitly or implicitly normative in his approach to concepts are goes back to Wittgenstein and some main proponents are Dummett, Bennett and Kenny. See Margolis/Laurence (2014) p. 5/6. 110 See Peacocke (2015) p. 13–15.

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Wittgenstein and possibly Locke. On the other hand, descriptive theories, which allow for less perfect mental representations that still might be successful in picking out categories most of the time, are implicitly present in several of those philosophers described as holding normative theories above. This tendency to have normative theories of concepts cannot be combined with most of the psychological theories discussed in the next section. In consequence, there is not much overlap between both disciplines. In addition to these general observations, Barsalou’s historical evaluation of perceptual theories of concepts can be evaluated concerning the general trend in the history of philosophy. The discussion of knowledge has been tied to the discussion of perception since the beginning of philosophical discussions. In fact, Plato’s first proposal in the Theaitetos is to equate knowledge with perception. He also proposes a theory of pathêmata, i.e., remaining traces of perceptions that are used to categorize new percepts in this context. However, a perceptual theory of knowledge is rejected for normative reasons. Instead it is proposed that knowledge must always involve a logos. The connection between perception and knowledge is also a topic for later thinkers. Some of them like Plato rejecting perceptual representations as insufficient for knowledge (e.g., Descartes, Frege), others stressing a necessary link between both (e.g., British Empiricism, Kant). Having both a normative and perceptual theory of perception does not seem to be a contradiction to all authors (e.g., the Stoic notion of phantasia kataleptikê) and might also be an alternative for Aristotle that could explain why he is compared both to classical theory and perceptual theories of concepts. In summary, Barsalou stresses an important aspect of philosophical theories of concepts and knowledge present since Antiquity but he downplays the equally strong rationalist tradition. His historical evaluation being too general but not wrong increases the chances that he might be right about Aristotle as well.

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IV.  Concepts in psychology 1.  Psychological theories of concepts – a general account 1.1.  Early psychology The distinction between concepts in philosophy on the one hand and in psychology on the other hand is somewhat artificial. Both disciplines have influenced each other: the early debates in psychology build much on what has previously been discussed in philosophy. In addition to that, there are some influential philosophers later on like Wittgenstein who significantly changed the direction taken by the psychological approach on concepts. The modern debate about concepts in philosophy of mind is often concerned with what is defined as a concept in psychology and, therefore, influenced by developments in psychology. Probably the most notable difference between classical philosophy and psychology is that psychologists conduct experiments to verify or falsify their theories. Therefore, they must be testable, which cannot be said about a majority of philosophical theories of concepts. This criterion is a great advantage and disadvantage at the same time: (1) there can be overt scientific progress, false theories can be rejected, but (2) theories which do not generate different predictions cannot be distinguished from each other. Psychology only began to take shape as a separate discipline in the 19th century. It is associated with names like Helmholtz, Lotze, and Fechner. These early works are based on the belief that there can be a natural science of psychological phenomena. At this time, the first experimental methods were developed. The actual history of psychology can perhaps be said to begin with the opening of Wundt’s laboratory in 1879. There was a debate on whether thought and especially higher-order thought processes, e.g., reasoning could be explained by experiments or not.1 Some dualist intuitions were still quite influential. If this was not the case, the study of concepts would by definition not be a part of experimental psychology. However, psychology started to involve thought and concepts in their research early on: the technical term “concept” and its equivalents, e.g., German “Begriff,” were used in psychology. At this point in time, psychologists usually had a philosophical background and were aware of philosophical theories of concepts. Kant’s notion of concept and his whole philosophical system were still the most influential. 1 See Bruder (2005) p. 326/327.

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Two opposing schools developed in the early history of psychology. Introspectionists believed that the subject’s description of his or her conscious experience during the experiment was the key to explaining psychological phenomena. In stark contrast to this, behaviorists believed only the direct correlation between input and output behavior could be accounted for without any hypothesis about internal workings of the mind. Strict behaviorism was rejected by the emerging cognitive sciences in 1960s and 1970s. Some earlier thinkers like Bartlett (1932) assumed internal mental entities such as schemata to explain behavior. Both of the opposing schools used the term “concept,” albeit in different ways.2 For introspectionists, concepts necessarily need to be accessible by consciousness, a prejudice that might have been responsible for some of the later theories of concepts going astray. This belief influenced their experiment design to a certain degree.3 For example, Selz (1910) asked his subjects (who were colleagues of his) to describe the processes taking place when accessing a concept and took these accounts as trustworthy descriptions. For behaviorists, concepts can only be described as a subject’s ability to recognize certain entities. Concepts seen as abilities seem attractive to some philosophers for the reasons already mentioned above. Cognitivism assumes internal mental entities which cannot be described in purely behavioristic vocabulary but need not be consciously accessible. Early behavioral experiments on concepts mainly included two kinds of tasks: in the first, one word is presented and subjects are asked to come up with other words representing features of the concept in question (thus, they are called “word listing tasks”). The other kind of experiments included learning mostly arbitrary categories and then categorizing new items.4 Both kinds of experiments are not far removed from the experiments used in the more recent research on concepts. Another notable area of research was the study of conceptual relations. Otto Selz (1910) was a pioneer in that field. He assumed that concepts are related to each other by specific relations and these relations to other concepts might constitute the concept itself. Later theorists of conceptual networks often give reference to Selz as an important influence.

1.2.  Classical theory The so-called classical theory has only been labeled “classical” since it came in for severe criticism by alternative models. Classical theories were generally considered 2 See Machery (2009) p. 78. 3 See Barsalou (1999). 4 See Machery (2009) p. 77/78.

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to be the standard in the psychology of concepts up until 1970.5 A connection is drawn between the classical theory of concepts and the Aristotelian theory of definitions.6 The parallels to Aristotle will be discussed in more detail in the second part of this dissertation. The classical view is also sometimes described as the “feature list view,” which is due to the experiments asking subjects to list features of a given concept. It is characteristic for the classical view to see concepts as definitions, i.e., containing the knowledge of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions to apply a concept to a given entity. The standard example is ‘bachelor’ consisting of the features ‘male’ and ‘unmarried.’ Murphy describes this as the first of three main characteristics of a classical view. The second characteristic he gives is the belief that every entity either belongs to a category or does not belong to it. Therefore, category judgments are always true or false. And third, all category members are members to the same degree. There are no better or more representative members of a category.7 All these aspects Murphy stresses are related to the notion of concepts as definitions. Smith and Medin (1981) additionally note that classical theories assume a single summary representation that of necessity applies to all category members (which is required by their status as definitions) and that superordinate concepts have to have the same or fewer features than their subordinated concepts, i.e., the features are nested. Furthermore, classical theory excludes disjunctive concepts (e.g., having any two out of three listed features is sufficient for category membership), because in the case of disjunctive concepts there would be no summary representation true of all members of a category.8 Laurence and Margolis (1999) acknowledge that classical theory – like all other theories of concepts – has a vast diversity among the theories that are discussed under that label.9 In consequence, not all theories labeled as “classical” share all the assumptions described above: a) Concepts are definitions. b) Concepts are summary representations applying to all members. c) Concepts are feature lists.

5 6 7 8 9

See Murphy (2004) p. 12, Machery (2009) p. 77, Smith/Medin (1981) p. 25. See Murphy (2004) p. 11, Smith/Medin (1981) p. 22. See Murphy (2004) p. 15. See Smith/Medin (1981) p. 23–25. See Laurence/Margolis (1999) p. 9/10.

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d) Concepts are organized in nested hierarchies where subordinates contain all features contained in their superordinates.10 Nevertheless, these characteristics combined provide a good characterization for the classical view. The first assumption seems to be the most essential and maybe necessary for characterizing a theory as classical. Definitions are not inherently related to feature lists since definitions might be more structured, e.g., contain relations.11 Some of the authors seen as classical have admitted that not all representations have a definite degree of stability and have tried to incorporate conditionals and disjunctions in definitions.12 When those logical operators are allowed in definitions they become quite powerful, e.g., Wittgenstein’s example ‘game’ can be solved by a disjunctive description. All three conditions given by Murphy can still be fulfilled. In this case, however, there are no features which are necessarily features of all members of a category and the definition does include hypothetical features, which are not relevant for characterizing a specific individual. This might go at least against some intuitions concerning classical theory and definitions. A fourth characteristic which precludes those kinds of concepts might be added to Murphy’s three conditions. In this stronger rendering, concepts have to fulfill the same criteria as the Stoic phantasia katalêptikê. The classical view has been influential in linguistics. Generational grammar introduced by Chomsky and the predominant cognitivist linguistic theory of its time was mainly concerned with syntax and phonetics, therefore, requiring an additional semantic theory.13 Linguistic discussion of concepts, as pointed out above, is mainly concerned with word meanings. On the one hand, there are lexical units; on the other hand, there are contextualized readings. While Katz holds an objectivist view of concepts close to Frege he introduces the notion of semantic markers such as ‘object,’ ‘artifact,’ etc. which are components of readings. Semantic markers can include or imply certain markers and exclude other markers. They look like feature lists, but they indirectly include logical operators such as disjunctions, conditionals, and even some form of type hierarchy. Therefore, they are not purely classical either. The notion of binary features is also prominent in linguistics and taken from syntax and phonology. For example, ‘bachelor’ can be characterized by the features ‘+human,’ ‘+male,’ and ‘−married.’ By allowing binary features negative concepts are describable, i.e., concepts for 10 11 12 13

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All four characteristics are listed by Smith/Medin (1981) p. 162. See Smith/Medin (1981) p. 25/26. See Bruner et al. (1967). See Katz (1972).

categories whose members have nothing in common besides not having a certain feature such as ‘all things −red’. That might be restricted by only allowing entities which can potentially have the feature, e.g., humans in the case of ‘married’ and physical objects in the case of ‘red.’ The classical notion of concept is, of course, tied to the philosophical tradition. The connection to Plato and Aristotle has been mentioned. The connection to Kant’s theory and use of the term “Begriff ” is also particularly close, which comes as no surprise considering his importance for early psychologists. Katz explicates the Kantian notions of analytic and synthetic in his system of semantics.14 Concerning higher-order thought processes, it is especially suited for explaining deductive reasoning. It can only explain inductive reasoning when additional mechanisms or representations are assumed which contain statistical knowledge about categories, e.g., if it is not a necessary property of a raven to be black, the information cannot be included in the concept of raven and needs to be stored somewhere else.

1.3.  Prototype theory The classical view came under attack when experimental results showed that some of its basic assumptions to be wrong. This development is associated with the name Eleanor Rosch, who introduced the notion of prototypes. Her work was partly inspired by Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance.15 The results by Rosch and others indicate that concepts cannot be definitions. In human categorization, there are more and less typical members of category as well as borderline cases.16 There have been several philosophers apart from Wittgenstein throughout the ages who recognized that some concepts are undefinable. Laurence and Margolis cite Gettier cases as one example that shows that one of the most accepted definitions in philosophy at the time (‘knowledge’ as ‘true justified belief ’) is not sufficient.17 Gettier presented examples in which cases of true justified belief do not qualify as knowledge. As a result, he was able to show that 14 See Katz (1972) p. 144, 147. 15 See Rosch (1978) p. 11: “As Wittgenstein (1953) has pointed out, categorical judgments become a problem only if one is concerned with boundaries – in the normal course of life, two neighbors know on whose property they are standing without exact demarcation of the boundary line. Categories can be viewed in terms of their clear cases if the perceiver places emphasis on the correlational structure of perceived attributes such that the categories are represented by their most structured portions.” 16 See Rosch (1973), Rosch/Mervis (1975). 17 See Laurence/Margolis (1999) p. 15.

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the definition was not narrow enough.18 A lot of concepts that seem to be easily definable at first turn out to be more ambiguous than one expected. Smith/Medin (1981) list three conceptual and four experimental problems of the classical view. Obviously only some of them apply to all variants of the classical view: (1a) “the existence of disjunctive concepts,” (1b) “unclear cases” like something falling into two categories, (1c) the failure to specify defining features, (2a) effects of typicality of members on categorization performance, (2b) “correlation between typicality and family resemblance,” (2c) “the use of nonnecessary features in categorization,” and (2d) some concepts being categorized as more similar to their distant superordinates than their direct superordinates.19 Problems (1a–1c) go against different characteristics of classical theories. Problem (1a) is contradictory to concepts being summary representations applying to all members, (1b) to concepts being part of a nested hierarchy, and (1c) to concepts being definitions. The experimental results (2a–2d) show that categorization performances cannot be explained solely or primarily by assuming representations consisting of defining features. One strategy of classical theorists could be to assume that concepts are definitions but that categorization also involves other kinds of cognitive processes and representations. Such attempts will be discussed in the section below. One possible explanation for the findings by Rosch is to assume prototypes. The simplest form of a prototype theory is what Murphy calls the best example view. In this case, a concept would consist of the representation of a singular individual member of a category (not necessarily a real one) which is the most typical member.20 This view is mainly utilized by opponents to argue against a prototype view and is problematic because it has a hard time to explain how we are able to categorize a great variety of features in a single category.21 Most prototype theorists would not accept such a naïve variant but rather a more explanatory powerful format. In more elaborated theory variants, prototypes are seen as a collection of weighted features.22 Positive weights for features present 18 See Gettier (1963). 19 See Smith/Medin (1981) p. 162/163. 20 See Rosch (1978) p. 11: “By prototypes of categories we have generally meant the clearest cases of pry membership defined operationally by people’s judgments of goodness of membership in the category.” p. 12: “In short, prototypes appear to be just those members of a category that most reflect the redundancy structure of the category as a whole.” 21 See Murphy (2004) p. 42. 22 Machery (2009, p. 83, fn. 25) sees the term “prototype” as ambiguous referring both to the best example account and the statistical account. He only discusses the latter.

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in some category members and negative weights for absent features are combined23 and an entity is categorized as belonging to a certain category when a threshold is crossed. In addition to that it might be necessary to assume feature combinations and an additional structure. Murphy states that weighted feature lists are only sufficient for a limited number of tasks.24 Disjunctive concepts like Wittgenstein’s example of ‘game’ can be represented since a prototype for ‘game’ might include all the features that characterizes games which are not present in a single type of game.25 Smith and Medin (1981) draw a general distinction between a featural and a dimensional approach and discuss featural and dimensional prototype theories. Features are qualitative while dimensions are quantitative. There are properties which are either present or not present in an individual such as ‘having wings’ and other properties that can be present to a higher and lesser degree like ‘being sweet,’ ‘temperature,’ ‘height,’ etc. “Featural models” are concerned with the former while “dimensional models” concentrate on the latter kind of properties.26 This distinction is important because in the first case a probability value between zero and one can be assigned showing how predictive each dimension is. In the latter case, a mean value can be assigned and deviance from that in either direction can indicate that an individual is not a category member or at least an atypical member. This results in a more complex mathematical model.27 Smith and Medin arrive at the result that both dimensional and featural representations should be included in concepts based on the results making use of both notions.28 Prototype theories can concentrate on one of those models but they might as well include both. Another distinction can be drawn between typical properties and cue-valid properties. The first is about properties that are present in most of the members of a category while properties which are cue-valid are not or almost not present in members of other categories. Machery gives the example of ‘having four legs’ in contrast to ‘barking’ for the concept ‘dog.’29 Since definitions contain those 23 Most prototype theories are linear, i.e., the combined value is understood as the sum of all values. There are other possible ways values could be mathematically combined. See Machery (2009) p. 98. 24 See Murphy (2004) p. 48. 25 See Laurence/Margolis (1999) p. 28. 26 See Machery (2009) p. 84. 27 See Smith/Medin (1981) p. 102/103. 28 See Smith/Medin (1981) p. 129. 29 See Machery (2009) p. 84.

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properties which are sufficient for categorizing an individual as belonging to a category, from a prototype perspective those properties contained in definitions will be those with the highest cue-validity. There are prototype theories which assign probability values directly to monadic properties such as Hampton (1979) and others that give more structure to prototypes such as distinguishing between an attribute and a value level (e.g., Smith et al. 1988) or interactions between different values. The more complex the internal structure of prototypes becomes, the more complex calculating the overall probability value is.30 Nonetheless, prototype theories still assume one summary representation which is used in categorizing all members of a given category. However, in contrast to classical theory, this summary representation is no longer understood as a description containing features which necessarily apply to all category members. One big advantage is that prototypes can be used to explain inductive reasoning: if no other evidence is present, one can assume that the next member of a category will have the properties with the highest probability values.

1.4.  Criticism of prototype theory and neoclassical theories There was some criticism on prototype theory very shortly after it was introduced as a contender. Rey (1983) provides an extensive list of functions concepts should be able to fulfill that includes psychological, linguistic, and philosophical requirements.31 One of the main aims of Rey’s paper is to show that prototype theory cannot fulfill those requirements – which nicely illustrates that there are different approaches (normative and descriptive) taken in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics and demands from one discipline cannot be transferred to another discipline without providing justification. The metaphysical requirements in particular are a problem, because they imply that real entities do have an essence and concepts are, by definition, successful in picking out this essence. However, essences imply the existence of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions and those can be captured only in definitions as proposed in a classical theory of concepts and not by prototypes.32 Rey acknowledges that there might

30 See Machery (2009) p. 85–92. 31 See Rey (1983) p. 241. 32 Rey (1983, p. 254) discusses how classical theory might be a valuable theory of concepts even though psychological findings rule it out: “All of these latter facts are explainable on the plausible assumption that, while at least many such natural kind terms do in fact have definitions, competent users may simply be ignorant of what they might be.”

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not be any entities fulfilling all those requirements and criticizes psychologists (namely Smith/Medin (1981)) for not distinguishing between metaphysical and epistemological aspects of concepts.33 As a result, one has to be very careful to equate the functions that concepts are said to fulfill in philosophy with the functions they are said to fulfill in psychology and linguistics, even if the same descriptions and terms are used. Osherson and Smith (1981) try to show some shortcomings of prototype theory in comparison to classical theory. For example, they argue that there are word meanings of abstract concepts, especially mental concepts such as ‘belief ’ but also linguistic connectives, which cannot be accounted for.34 This is, of course, based on the assumption that every word meaning requires a corresponding concept. This implies that psychological theories of concepts and linguistic theories of concepts are, by definition, concerned with the same kind of mental entities. The second problem they note is conceptual combination, which seems also to be based on word compounds. The idea is that prototypes cannot explain the combination of concepts.35 Fodor used the same argument using the example ‘pet fish.’36 His solution is to get rid of conceptual structure and not to identify concepts with identification procedures, but rather to interpret concepts as atomic representations connected to the identification mechanisms that lock to the structures of the world in the right way. Therefore, one can have the concept of ‘pet fish’ without the concepts of ‘pet’ and ‘fish’ and the latter are not necessarily components of the former. In a way, this solution denies conceptual combination and, therefore, gets rid of the problem it poses for a prototype theory of concepts. The third problem noted is the question whether prototype theory can account for truth and falsity of thoughts and statements.37 This seems again to be

33 34 35 36 37

This illustrates why psychological theories might not be able to fulfill the normative requirements of philosophical theories. On the other hand, philosophical theories might not be interested in how cognitive agents standardly categorize and reason, if this is not in accordance with their normative requirements. See Rey (1983) p. 245/246. See Osherson/Smith (1981) p. 38. See Osherson/Smith (1981) p. 39 ff. See Fodor (1998) p. 107. See Osherson/Smith (1981) p. 48: “We take concepts to be the immediate constituents of thoughts. Given this, it seems reasonable to ask a prototype theory of concepts for principles that informatively characterize the circumstances under which thoughts are true, (when the thoughts correspond to declarative propositions).”

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based on a normative presupposition from philosophy and linguistics. A psychologist might be satisfied with a theory of concepts that cannot account for truth and falsity if it can successfully explain categorization behavior of cognitive subjects. Ultimately, Osherson and Smith try to establish that the problems of prototype theory do not exist in a classical approach. Their assumptions seem to be based on normative and linguistic presuppositions. However, there is also some empirical evidence that there are concepts which do have a classical structure. Keil (1989) tried to show that very general ontological concepts such as ‘object,’ ‘event,’ ‘artifact,’ and ‘organism’ are, in fact, classically structured.38 In the vein of arguments similar to those in Osherson/Smith (1981), some researchers tried to save the basic assumptions of the classical theory after typicality effects were discovered and prototype theory became the most prominent theory of concepts. These positions are known as neoclassical or as dual theories of concepts.39 Neoclassical theories can be described as a hybrid or unificationist theory of concepts that combines features of different formats in a singular conceptual representation.40 The main idea is that there are still classically structured concepts and typicality effects are based on another kind of (possibly nonconceptual) representations. For example, the classical component is said to be a conceptual core while the prototypical component is said to be merely part of an identification procedure used in categorization.41 The proponents of neoclassical theories are mainly found in linguistics, especially in lexical semantics.42 Since all evidence for prototype theory or other theories can be discounted using this strategy, it is very hard or impossible to provide negative evidence against neoclassical theories. Therefore, they should rely on positive evidence. There is not much positive evidence in psychology. Even in cases where subjects are explicitly taught definitional rules, the results show typicality effects.43 On the other hand neoclassical theorists like Jackendoff and Pinker base their arguments mainly on linguistic phenomena such as polysemy, syntactic alternations, and lexical acquisition. In philosophy, an argument for the definitional structure of concepts can be drawn from people’s intuitions about concepts. It is actually 38 See Smith/Medin (1981) p. 177–179 for discussion. 39 Laurence/Margolis (1999, p. 52) do not consider dual theories as neoclassical, here I intend to use “neoclassical” for all theories that hold some parts of classical theory to be true either for all concepts or some concepts or some applications of concepts. 40 See Weiskopf (2009) p. 168. 41 See Osherson/Smith (1981) p. 57, Rey (1983). 42 See Laurence/Margolis (1999) p. 53/53. 43 See Murphy (2004) p. 82.

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a basic presupposition of most methodological accounts of conceptual analysis in philosophy that the concepts discussed in philosophy can be defined and that definitions clarify intuitions about those concepts shared by a large number of people. Such an argument is not valid for psychology or linguistics.44 Laurence and Margolis (1999) list three problems of neoclassical theories: (a) if concepts are not full definitions, neoclassical theories need an additional reference fixing component, (b) neoclassical theories cannot guarantee that concepts do not pick out the wrong kind of entities, and (c) they cannot explain meaning transfer across semantic fields.45

1.5.  Exemplar theory Exemplar theory has more in common with prototype theory than with classical theory, yet there are some significant differences. It shares the assumption that new items are categorized using a similarity measure while, in contrast to both classical and prototype theories, it is denied that concepts consist of a singular summary representation of category members. This is the main difference and the one thing all exemplar views have in common.46 Machery adds that, in almost all cases, exemplar theories use nonlinear similarity measures, i.e., categorization is based on the product rather than the sum of the individual similarity values.47 Instead of one singular representation, exemplar theorists assume that there are several exemplars represented for of a given category. An exemplar might be an actual individual, a subject encountered in the past. It might as well be a summary of a subset of category members such as ‘terrier’ for ‘dog.’ In that regard, exemplar theory resembles the best example account of prototype theory. In contrast, several exemplars rather than one are assumed to constitute a concept. Exemplar theorists vary in the degree of abstractness they allow for exemplars.48 Exemplar theory is radically opposed to classical theory. In Plato’s dialogues, the interlocutor’s first strategy in defining the notion in question is to come up with examples. This strategy is always rejected by Socrates. The exemplars representing one concept theoretically might not have anything in common at all. Wittgenstein’s example of game is reminiscent of this but still has some common properties which connect one of the exemplars to one of the others. Exemplars

44 45 46 47 48

See Laurence/Margolis (1999) p. 53/54. See Laurence/Margolis (1999) p. 59. See Smith/Medin (1981) p. 209. See Machery (2009) p. 98. See Smith/Medin (1981) p. 207.

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might be a good strategy to learn categories where members do not have much in common with each other. For example, the concept ‘dog’ might be easier to learn via exemplars than ‘cat,’ because dogs in general have fewer common properties than cats in general. Smith/Medin (1981) list three important features that make exemplar theory suitable to account for the shortcomings of classical theory: Thus the exemplar view: (1) explains the use of nonnecessary properties, and the difficulty of specifying defining ones, by placing no requirements on properties other than that they characterize at least one exemplar; (2) allows for disjunctiveness by explicitly building it into each representation; and (3) explains some typicality effects by assuming that the exemplars in a concept representation are likely to be typical. (Smith/Medin 1981: 164)

Exemplar theory does make significantly different predictions about categorization from prototype theory. For example, something might be categorized as belonging to a category because it is very close to one of the exemplars, even though compared to an average of all exemplar’s properties, i.e., an idealized summary, it would not cross the threshold.49 Exemplar theories can explain several experimental findings which cannot be explained by prototype theory. However, there are other findings which are better explained by prototype theory. Both theories are still under discussion and no winner can be determined. Exemplar theory has a slight advantage in classical category learning experiments, but Murphy (2004) points out that this might result from the artificial stimuli used and the more elaborated mathematical models. Furthermore, exemplar theory does not do better when other areas such as experiments concerning conceptual hierarchies and induction are included as well as research in developmental psychology.50

1.6.  Theory theory The observation that concepts need to contain more contextual information, not just features belonging to category members, in order to be adequately described, led some researchers to compare them to scientific theories. Murphy dislikes the (otherwise quite common) term “theory theory” since it is not entirely clear what theories are supposed to be and, therefore, speaks of the “knowledge approach” for this group of theories instead.51 Some proponents of theory theory tie the notion of concepts to the notion of theory discussed in philosophy 49 See Machery (2009) p. 98. 50 See Murphy (2004) p. 488. 51 See Murphy (2004) p. 61.

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of science.52 Machery sees an ambiguity between referring to concepts themselves as mini-theories and referring to theories as background knowledge used in processing concepts.53 He notes that, unlike other theories of concepts, theory theory has been primarily a focus of research in developmental psychology.54 But there is equal evidence for knowledge effects of this kind in adults.55 One often cited experiment shows children believe that a cat is still a cat when it was surgically altered to look like a skunk.56 The child’s theory of animals seems to include something along the lines of a biological essence that cannot be changed by changing superficial properties even though these superficial properties are generally used in categorizing species members. This has a lot of similarities to an essentialist theory in philosophy as it is attributed to Aristotle. In consequence to these findings, categorization is thought to depend to a large extent on theoretical and background knowledge by theory theorists. Defining properties or properties with a high probability value are no longer important if their absence can be explained. Causal and functional knowledge in particular is assumed to be an integral part of concepts. Experiments have shown that features which are associated with functional knowledge, e.g., animal horns used in defense or a handle used to open a door, are more easily learned and are regarded as more indicative for something to be the member of a category than nonfunctional features, both in natural kinds and in artifacts.57 Interestingly the opposite is not true: when the background knowledge is contradictory, categories are learned equally as well as arbitrary categories.58 Therefore, functional features play a very important role in categorization and should not be disregarded when discussing concepts. Theory theory distinguishes between concepts belonging to different domains, e.g., the biological and artificial domain might be associated with two different ways of categorization. An item that is closer in size to a 25 cent coin than a pizza is thought more likely to be a pizza because quarter coins are known to always have the same size.59 There is some evidence that children have essentialist concepts for

52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59

See Laurence/Margolis (1999) p. 43. See also Laurence/Margolis (1999) p. 44. See Machery (2009) p. 100. See Murphy (2004) p. 487. See Keil (1989). See Murphy (2004) p. 150/151, 166/167. See Murphy (2004) p. 154. See Rips (1989).

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biological kinds while the same is not true for artifact concepts.60 Another important area of research is induction. In induction background knowledge plays an important role, e.g., tree experts asked to infer whether a specific kind of tree is going to be infected by a certain disease make their judgment based on background knowledge (like habitats and genetic features) rather than on similarity whereas the opposite is true for laymen.61 In contrast to the other theories of concepts, theory theory is mostly concerned with flaws and things not considered by other contenders. Much less is said about how concepts are structured and what kind of knowledge exactly is incorporated in them. Most work on background knowledge is not concerned with an elaborated mathematical model.62 Therefore, theory theory is not a real alternative to prototypes and exemplars but rather a challenge that any modern theory of concepts should address just like typicality effects have to be addressed since Rosch’s findings in the 1980s.

1.7.  Frame theory Frame theory is not originally a theory of concepts. It was first proposed by Marvin Minsky a researcher in artificial intelligence. A frame is supposed to be a specific structure of knowledge representation. It has a central node which represents the entity itself (e.g., ‘cube’ or ‘birthday’), in addition to that it contains slots (e.g., ‘COLOR’), that are restricted concerning the fillers they accept (e.g., ‘green,’ ‘red,’ etc. for ‘COLOR’). There are also constraints, e.g., if a slot is filled, another slot might be further restricted in terms of its possible fillers (e.g., if the attribute ‘color’ takes the value ‘green,’ the attribute ‘taste’ has to have the value ‘sour’). Minsky stresses the importance of procedural knowledge included in frames, e.g., frame A might include the instruction to change to frame B if a certain slot cannot be filled. Frames in Minsky fulfill a lot of functions associated with concepts, e.g., they are used in categorization tasks and language comprehension. However, Minsky does not tie them explicitly to theories of concepts. They are rather connected to very early psychological theories of schemata such as Bartlett.63 Frames are discussed as an alternative theory of concepts by Lawrence Barsalou in his 1992 seminal paper. Frames are interpreted as attribute-value structures

60 See Keil (1989) p. 47 ff. 61 See Proffit/Coley/Medin (2000). 62 There are some exceptions which mainly involve modeling causal relations (see Machery (2009) p. 106 ff.). 63 See Bartlett (1932).

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containing constraints and invariant structural relations (e.g., DRIVE (DRIVER, CAR)). Barsalou’s main reason for assuming frames is to oppose feature lists that see the conceptual structure as a flat hierarchy.64 He cites some psychological evidence for his claim that representations in both animals and humans are structured as attribute-value pairs rather than simple features.65 The distinction between features and dimensions made by Smith and Medin was mentioned above. Frame theory states that all concepts are dimensional representations, however, the dimensions need not be quantitative (neither continuous nor ordered). Barsalou understands a concept as “the descriptive information that people represent cognitively for a category, including definitional information, prototype information, functionally important information, and probably other types of information as well.” In consequence, his frame theory of concepts includes a lot of features from other contending theories. He also notes that his use of “concept” resembles “intension and sense,” tying it to the philosophical and linguistic tradition.66 Concepts are understood as descriptions and in later papers he characterizes his own view as propositional.67 It is also clear that frames are supposed to be able to account for very different theories of concepts, e.g., prototypes, exemplars, and definitions. Frames are aimed against versions of those theories that organize the included information as flat hierarchies. Attributes and values can be concepts in themselves when they are not considered as aspects of another concept.68 Therefore, Barsalou frames are conceived as recursive. Another interesting aspect of Barsalou’s early work on concepts that is not made explicit in his 1992 paper is his restriction of concepts to short-term memory.69 This is quite unusual for theories of concepts in psychology, e.g., Machery defines them explicitly as structures in long-term memory.70 Additional to concepts defined in this way, Barsalou has to assume additional representations in long-term memory which are not concepts. Those might also have a frame structure or may be structured in a different way. Since Barsalou’s modal theory of concepts is to be discussed in more detail, frames have to be considered in the context of this dissertation. In addition to that, it should be noted that frame theory is still quite much a focus of debate. 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

See Barsalou (1992) p. 22. See Barsalou (1992) p. 26/27. See Barsalou (1992) p. 31. See Barsalou (1999) p. 590. See Barsalou (1992) p. 30. See Barsalou (1993) p. 29/30. See Machery (2009) p. 12.

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There is Fillmore’s approach of frame semantics and formal frame theory as a general theory of concepts. This approach is very closely connected to linguistic semantics and the hope that frames, as a format, will make it possible to model the interaction between different levels of representation in linguistics including the semantic or conceptual level.71

1.8.  Other theories of concepts 1.8.1. Ideals Another possible theory of concepts sometimes mentioned in the literature sees concepts as some kind of ideals. It was also introduced by Lawrence Barsalou in the 1980s. The difference between prototypes and ideals is that prototypes contain information on what category members are like statistically while ideals contain information about what they should be like. In the case of ideals, it might be that members fulfilling the conditions contained in ideals are very few and uncommon (which is impossible in prototype theory). Machery points out that ideals mostly come up with ad hoc or goal-derived categories.72 You might be able to fulfill a given task with a vast number of different things, e.g., ‘something to stand on when changing a light bulb.’ But there might yet be something that corresponds to the ideal for this task, e.g., a ladder, and other entities are compared to this ideal when deciding whether they also are suitable. Other examples might be from personality traits and representations of trees and other plants.73 Ideals have certain similarities to both prototype theory and exemplar theory: (1) they are individual representations which do not correspond to a statistical representation, something along the lines of the ideal exemplar. (2) On the other hand, they are a singular representation and not a set of several representations as in exemplar theory. Also, interestingly, it is somewhat like classical theory if the features contained in the description are not interpreted as defining for all category members. Platonic ideas are sometimes interpreted as ideals. In some way, ideals are close to theory theory, since in ideals, for example, knowledge about functions is included. Ideals are judged to be typical of a category especially in artifacts even though they are not statistically speaking.74 In

71 72 73 74

See Löbner (2014b), Petersen (2007) etc. See Machery (2009) p. 117. See Machery (2009) p. 117. See Murphy (2004) p. 62.

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the end, not much research has been done on ideals. In consequence, it cannot be decided how important their role is in conceptual representation.75

1.8.2.  Conceptual networks and similarity networks In the literature on the formal representation of concepts, especially in artificial intelligence, the notion of conceptual networks is quite prominent.76 It is partly based on the early work of psychologist Otto Selz.77 The idea is that concepts are (at least partially) constituted by their relations to other concepts. Those include hierarchical connections like ‘subordinate’ and ‘superordinate’ but also semantic relations such as ‘function.’ The entirety of all concepts forms big networks in which concepts are nodes and relations are arcs. The kind of relations allowed can be restricted, e.g., only hierarchical relations might be allowed. Barsalou frames are somewhat like semantic nets. The difference is that only attributive relations and constraints are allowed in frames. Furthermore, frames are thought of as descriptions of category members. The consequence of conceptual networks is that no concept can be known in isolation and a concept always changes when part of the network changes. Apart from that. the question must be asked: how do concepts allow interaction with the world and categorizing when there is nothing more to them than their internal connections? Another form of network is the so called similarity network. It is mainly used to represent word meanings. Texts are automatically analyzed and correlations among words are counted. The similarity between word meanings is calculated on the basis of their co-occurrence with other words. Doing this, has led to some very impressive results concerning automatized language production and comprehension. However, the similarity identified in the results is attributed to intuitively very distinct concepts. Unlike in conceptual networks, the relations are not labeled. For example, “jug” would be similar both to “vinegar” and “bottle,” where the first is filled into jugs while bottles and jugs are both containers for fluids. Furthermore, similarity networks have the same problems concerning the application of concepts to entities in the world.78 On the other hand, abstract concepts (e.g., ‘democracy’), which are very hard to account for in almost all

75 See Machery (2009) p. 118. 76 The idea of semantic nets was introduced in Quillian (1967). Its implications for a concept framework are discussed in Brachman (1977). 77 See Selz (1913). 78 See Murphy (2004) p. 426 ff.

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theories of concepts, might be explained in virtue of linguistic relations to other abstract concepts such as ‘freedom.’

1.8.3. Connectionism The idea behind connectionism is to understand mental representations not by means of syntactic and symbolic representations, e.g., as amodal symbols in a language of thought, but rather at the neuronal level, i.e., a set of neurons that have differently weighted prohibiting and inhibiting connections biologically realized by synapses. Those neuronal networks consisting of nodes and relations are remodeled on a computer (there are both hardware and software neuronal implementations). Those artificial neuronal networks learn an input-output behavior by receiving feedback. This corresponds to a very simple reconstruction of an interaction between mind and world. The difference to other models, e.g., nodes in frames or conceptual networks, is that these nodes are not previously designated to represent certain features of the world. The network itself rather learns and develops its configurations to align itself with the feedback it receives. The activation patterns that appear on the hidden units while NETtalk processes text serve as an example. Analysis reveals that the net learned to represent such categories as consonants and vowels, not by creating one unit active for consonants and another for vowels, but rather in developing two different characteristic patterns of activity across all the hidden units. (Garson 2012: 12)

These kinds of networks have proven very successful for certain applications in artificial intelligence, e.g., linguistic tasks where it is not possible to provide all significant information in advance.79 Since the connections between units in a neuronal network are weighted, there is a certain affinity to models of concepts that include weights and thresholds, e.g., prototype theory of concepts.80 However, the question remains as to whether connectionism is combinable with a symbolic approach of representation or rather has to be conceived as a radically different approach to cognition. It can be argued that connectionism is mainly concerned with the way representations are constituted on the neuronal level while symbolic approaches successfully describe representations on a more abstract level.81 On the other hand, symbolic theories might only be insufficient abstractions of the actual neuronal processes which are successfully modeled by artificial neuronal networks. Some 79 See Waskan (2010), Garson (2012). 80 See Garson (2012) p. 9. 81 See Garson (2012) p. 10/11.

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authors argue against a reconcilability of both approaches and see this as an advantage of symbolic approaches.82

1.9.  Recent developments 1.9.1.  Neuroscience of concepts In the last 20 years’ neurological research has become a more and more important part of cognitive science.83 Since the brain is the hardware, so to speak, for cognitive processes, all cognitive explanations have to be in accordance with neurological data. There are several different kinds of experiments and research paradigms in neurology, three of which will be discussed in this section: a) there are methods that can measure the changing activity of the brain or parts of the brain, b) there are neuroimaging methods that can show which regions of a subject’s brain are active at a given time, and c) patients with damage in certain brain regions can be tested concerning their performance in behavioral experiments, which then can be compared to the performances of subjects without neurological damage. There has also been some research that is concerned with concepts and word meanings involving all of these three paradigms. Methods like EEG can for example shed some light on how fast categorization is accomplished, whether there are differences between different kinds of categories, etc. On the other hand, experiments using imaging methods and subjects with lesions can provide an account of which regions of the brain are active in categorization. Since there are functional maps of the brain identifying which region is responsible for which tasks, inferences about how categorization works can be drawn. Extensive research on concepts has been conducted among others by Antonio Damasio and his colleagues. One of the main results is that neurological systems required for conceptual knowledge and semantic knowledge are widely distributed across the brain. For example, it is possible to be able to categorize artifacts correctly to a high degree while not being able to categorize animals. These kinds of concepts recruit representations in different brain areas which are damaged in one subject and intact in others. This is also true for faces and

82 See Fodor/Phylyshyn (1988), Davies (1991). 83 Block (1983, p. 499) already stated that classical cognitive science would probably be partly replaced by neurophysiology as a consequence of the success of imagistic theories of representations: “If cognitive science must postulate pictorial representations in the head, then cognitive science may be in serious trouble, for much of what it hopes to explain will probably be in the domain of a different discipline: neurophysiology.”

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for such seemingly similar categories as letters and numbers.84 The mental representation of action verbs has received a lot of attention and evidence has been found that the same areas of the brain are active that are responsible for movement of the corresponding limbs.85 This observation is discussed in philosophy under the (somewhat ambiguous) label of embodiment and will be discussed in more detail in the section pertaining to the distinction between modal and amodal representations. Concepts are not interpreted as static across contexts but as dynamic reenactments of past experiences. Since different aspects can be active in different contexts, both prototypical representations and exemplar effects can be accounted for. Damasio (1989) defines his notion of concept in the following way: In my perspective, the basis for a concept is a collection of simultaneous reconstructions of sensory and motor representations that have a high probability of being triggered by the same non-verbal or verbal stimulus and whose occurrence: (a) permits the natural assignment of a perceived or recalled entity to a variety of taxonomic classes to which it may belong, given the features and dimensions embodied in the coevoked representations; (b) permits a verbal narrative of the features and dimensions of the class in such a way that appropriate definitions of the entity can be generated. (Damasio 1989: 24/25)

Damasio sees concepts as being distributed over segregated areas of the brain. Representations which are required for other functions fulfilled by those brain regions are recruited by the brain’s conceptual system which consists of socalled convergence zones which “know” that certain patterns tend to co-occur. In accordance with this, Damasio and his colleagues also found that there are separate areas of the brain that are responsible for representation of categories, representations of individuals, and word meanings.86 This gives further support to the thesis that there is an independent conceptual system which is recruited by language but not identical to the system responsible for language processing and production. It also makes the distinction between individual and category concepts plausible. One thing that is of philosophical interest is the question as to whether only the representations residing in convergence areas are concepts or the distributed representations throughout the brain should be considered as concepts. This might be important for deciding whether concepts should be considered as modal or amodal and will be discussed in the corresponding sections. Neurological research on concepts is committed to concepts as vehicles. It

84 See Damasio (1990) p. 96797, Damasio/Damasio (1994) p. 63 ff. 85 See Aziz-Zadeh/Damasio (2008), Pulvermüller et al. (2005), Klepp et. al (2014). 86 See Damasio/Damasio (1994).

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is not the abilities themselves that are the subject of research but their physical realizers. However, it might be difficult to give identity conditions for concepts in this dynamical and distributed framework, since the same areas should be involved in the processing of very different and diverse concepts. In consequence, seeing convergence zones as concepts might be the preferred solution from a philosophical point of view since one might be able to correlate particular convergence zones with particular concepts. However, this is still not a scientific reality at this point in time and, therefore, highly speculative.

1.9.2.  Pluralism and eliminativism One recent trend in research on concepts is to cite the plurality of effects that can be shown as evidence against assuming just one of the theories available. According to this argument, none of the proposed theories can account for all the evidence and, therefore, concepts either have to be more complex (containing all different aspects required) or more diverse (some concepts being prototype representations others being exemplar representations) than previously thought. Carey (2009) who is mainly concerned with concepts in developmental psychology seems to take a pluralist stand when stressing that different conceptual domains demand different types of concepts: These questions must be answered case by case – there is no reason, at the outset, to expect answers for concepts of causality or human agency to be the same as the answers for mathematical or biological concepts, or for the concepts that articulate our knowledge of chess or baseball. (Carey 2009: 3)

Another theoretical option is to argue that concepts are far more complex than traditional theories allow or that they are less steady and more dynamic, which is in line with the neurological notion of concept discussed above, and thus they cannot be reduced to one of the three traditional theories. Murphy evaluates the three accepted standard theories of concepts (prototypes, exemplars, and theories) across a diverse area of experiments and research (such as induction tasks, taxonomies, concepts in infants, and word comprehension). He concludes that even though exemplar theory has a slight edge in category learning tasks it has some severe flaws in other areas. Therefore, he prefers a prototype theory where summary representations of categories are embedded in broader knowledge structures. He also allows for exemplar representations which might either be part of the episodic memory or required for diverse categories.87

87 See Murphy (2004) p. 488 ff.

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Murphy’s conclusion is some form of pluralism insofar as it allows different kinds of representations for tasks that are traditionally said to involve concepts and accepts all three big theories to a certain degree. It can more adequately be described as unificationism. Machery does present a more theoretical and more radical argument. He argues that there are prototype, exemplar, and theory representations for one singular category. These are either used in different kinds of tasks or simultaneously in the same task with some mechanism deciding the result. For example, the results from different processes might be weighted or they might be combined.88 Since there is no right theory of concepts when deciding between the traditional theories and since what is called “concept” does not correspond to one natural kind, Machery proposes to get rid of the theoretical term in order to prevent misleading trends in research. Like Murphy, Machery attributes a certain kind of truth to all three theories but unlike him he does not see them as combinable. His position can be characterized as eliminativism.

1.10. Conclusions The most common theories of concepts in psychology can be organized around certain features and through research history more and more features of a classical approach have been lost. Fig. 2:  Standard theories of concepts in psychology. Concepts are…

Definitions Summary representations

Object descriptions

Classical Theory

yes

yes

yes

Prototype Theory

no

yes

yes

Exemplar Theory

no

no

yes

Theory Theory

no

no

no

In a classical approach, concepts are summary representations applying to all category members and being definitions by virtue of only containing necessary and jointly sufficient features. In prototype theory, they are still summary representations (i.e., one description per concept), however, they do not apply of necessity to all members and, in consequence, contain nondefinitional features. In exemplar theory, concepts are still object descriptions but not a summary representation of all category members. Rather they are separate descriptions of several members 88 See Machery (2009) p. 121 ff.

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of the category. Finally, according to theory theory, concepts ought not to be described as descriptions at all but rather at theories. Other possible contenders cannot be as easily integrated in this schema, e.g., the distinction between frame structures and flat hierarchies is a parallel distinction. At least definitions, prototypes, and exemplars can be modeled as frames and as feature lists. Equally the alternatives such as ideals, semantic networks, linguistic similarity networks, and connectionist representations operate outside the established parameters. Neuropsychology approaches concepts on a totally different level and eliminativism/pluralism/unificationism concern the relations between different formats of concepts rather than establishing one format. Taking all this into account, it can be said that theoretical questions concerning concepts in psychology have not received a final answer. It is almost undisputed that a classical or neoclassical theory has been disproven in the context of psychology. Other theories of concepts in philosophy that are, for example, objectivist concerning the ontology of concepts or do regard them as methodological norms rather than actual mental representations might still find classical theory appealing and be right to do so for their normative purposes. The dispute between prototype, exemplar, and theory theory has not been fully decided. There is a slight empirical advantage for an exemplar model in the traditional category learning experiments, which might be biased by the kinds of tasks used in them. There is an overall trend to allow different kinds of conceptual representations. But this trend might still be overcome by new evidence favoring one of the alternatives. For example, theory theory might be developed into a more coherent model that can account for the results favoring the other two alternatives. Neurological research does provide a different perspective which has its own limitations but might shed light on some of the old debates and in the end be able to provide a unique and distinct account of what concepts are. However, it is too early to tell whether this will be the case at this stage. The next section will focus on the distinction between modal and amodal representations in concepts.

2.  The modal/amodal distinction The relevant distinction between modal and amodal representations is a fairly recent development but it has predecessors. It is connected to the neurological trend presented in the previous section and based on the work of Damasio. Theoretically, it was mainly developed by the psychologist Lawrence Barsalou in a seminal paper from 1999. Another voiced proponent of a modal theory of concepts is the philosopher Jesse Prinz. There has been some criticism directed 115

at these modal approaches – by philosophers such as Weiskopf and Machery as well as by psychologists such as Dove and Mahon/Caramaza. The first section of this chapter will discuss the account by Barsalou. The second section presents Prinz’s version because he provides a more philosophical perspective and contextualization. The next section (2.3.) discusses image schemas and conceptual metaphor as an alternative modal format for concepts which is opposed by Barsalou. Section 4.4. focuses on the connection between the distinction of modal and amodal symbols and the older distinctions between analogous and symbolic representations. Section 4.5. presents philosophical and psychological criticism on modal theories and section 4.6. answers how modality might be defined taking in regard the problems.

2.1.  Perceptual symbol systems: Barsalou on modal symbols Barsalou’s modal account of concepts stems primarily from his criticism of amodal theories. In his view, most theories of concepts in cognitive science since the cognitive revolution of the 1960s, including classical theory, prototype theory, the exemplar view, and theory theory, have proposed concepts constituted by amodal symbols.89 What modal symbols are can be mainly understood via their opposition to amodal symbols. It is essential to see that the symbols in these systems are amodal and arbitrary. They are amodal because their internal structures bear no correspondence to the perceptual states that produced them. The amodal symbols that represent the colors of objects in their absence reside in a different neural system from the representations of these colors during perception itself. In addition, these two systems use different representational schemes and operate according to different principles. Because the symbols in these symbol systems are amodal, they are linked arbitrarily to the perceptual states that produce them. Similarly to how words typically have arbitrary relations to entities in the world, amodal symbols have arbitrary relations to perceptual states. (Barsalou 1999: 578)

Amodal symbols are characterized by the neural systems they reside in which, by definition, are distinct from the perceptual systems. “System” is used both for neuronally distinguishable systems and cognitive systems that can be characterized by their operations. In addition, both amodal and modal representations are said to have an internal structure, which is different for amodal symbols. There is a similarity between amodal representations and words insofar that their nonrepresentational properties (the acoustic or graphic representation in 89 See Barsalou (1999) p. 578.

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case of words) are arbitrary in regard to what they represent. They represent their representata because they are assigned to them, not because they have any inherent properties connecting them to their representata. In accordance with this first analogy, larger structures of amodal symbols are understood as being sentence-like and symbol processing is understood as a merely syntactic process. In consequence, amodal theories of concepts can also be described as propositional (i.e., sentence-like) theories of concepts. Barsalou’s argument against amodal representations used in categorization and other thought processes is based on a number of not inherently connected premises and his conclusion to reject them is based on combining those different shortcomings of amodal theories90: (1) There is no positive evidence for amodal symbols. Although some attempts have been made, all of them have been ultimately unsuccessful. (2) The amodal account cannot be related to neurological findings. (3) There is no account of how perceptual representations are transduced to amodal symbols. No evidence for such a process has been found. Neither is there evidence or an account for the process translating them back to perceptual representations. (4) If it is necessary to assume additional perceptual representations that relate amodal symbols to the perceptual system, the assumption of amodal symbols is redundant. (5) Amodal theories are too powerful and can account for all results that are in line with perceptual representations post hoc. Theories need to be able to make strong a priori predictions, which is not the case with amodal theories. Premise one and two are empirical, three is partly empirical. Other than that the premises are conceptual and draw on assumptions taken from philosophy of science (especially four and five). The argument for modal symbols can be deduced from these premises: (1*) There is positive evidence for perceptual representations. (2*) There is a neurological account of perception available. (3*) No account of transduction and grounding is required since perceptual representations are conceptual representations. (4*) Modal theories are parsimonious since they need to assume fewer representations than amodal theories.

90 See Barsalou (1999) p. 579/580.

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(5*) Modal theories make strong a priori predictions and cannot account for all results post hoc. Following this argument, modal theories of concepts do not have the same shortcomings as amodal theories. If they can account for the same phenomena that amodal theories can account for, they are to be preferred for theoretical and empirical reasons. In consequence, a theoretical account of perceptual symbols has to show that they can fulfill the same tasks assigned to amodal representations and have no shortcomings in this regard. In order to accomplish this condition, Barsalou argues that perceptual symbols have to be (a) schematic, (b) componential, (c) symbolic, and (d) productive. One advantage of amodal symbols is that they are arbitrary and, therefore, do not inherently refer to individuals. It might be assumed that a perceptual representation is always concrete and has inherent perceptual properties that do not apply to all members of the category it represents (e.g., the representation of an apple has a certain color, the representation of a triangle specific angles, the perceptual representation of a dog might always resemble a particular dog or at least one race of dogs rather than another). This problem of perceptual representations being always determined has been discussed in the context of British Empiricism. If perceptual symbols were like that, they could be understood as imagelike recordings. Barsalou stresses that a simple recording system would not be a sufficient basis to build a theory of concepts.91 He cites theories from the history of philosophy such as Kantian schemata and Lockean dispositions in which being determined is not a requirement to qualify as a perceptual representation. Barsalou notes that abstract representations of perceptual properties such as ‘having three edges’ or ‘striped’ have been found to be neurologically plausible.92 A perceptual symbol is not the record of the entire brain state that underlies a perception. Instead, it is only a very small subset that represents a coherent aspect of the state. This is an assumption of many older theories (e.g., Locke 1690/1959), as well as many current ones (e.g., Langacker 1986; J. Mandler 1992; Talmy 1983). Rather than containing an entire holistic representation of a perceptual brain state, a perceptual symbol contains only a schematic aspect. (Barsalou 1999: 583)

To have a plausible account of perceptual symbols, they need to be schematic: Barsalou includes this as one of their defining characteristics. If they could not stand for a whole category, no sufficient theory of concepts could be built on them. If they were images that stand for a category but do not resemble more than 91 See Barsalou (2012) p. 239/240. 92 See Barsalou (1999) p. 584/585.

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one of its members, a lot of their explanatory value would be lost.93 They would be almost as arbitrary as amodal symbols. Arguments against schematic representations seem to rest mainly on the assumption that only concrete images can be produced by conscious imagination. In consequence, Barsalou sees perceptual symbols as mostly unconscious and ties them to unconscious neuronal activity. One further aspect stressed by Barsalou is the componential nature of perceptual symbols. They are not one holistic image of an entire entity, e.g., a dog, but rather an ensemble of different components that constitute the whole and need not to be integrated into a consistent and conscious image. For example, there might be components for shape, for orientation, and for color without the shape being necessarily represented as colorful or having a certain orientation.94 Combining shape with color and orientation might only be necessary in conscious imagining. These components in themselves would be schematic in the above mentioned sense. Apart from their being schematic and componential perceptual symbols also are a powerful representational format in virtue of being not restricted in what they represent as symbols: As we shall see later, the designation of a perceptual symbol determines whether it represents a specific individual or a kind – the resemblance of a symbol to its referent is not critical (sect. 3.2.8). Suffice it to say for now that the same perceptual symbol can represent a variety of referents, depending on how causal and contextual factors link it to referents in different contexts (e.g., Dretske 1995; Fodor 1975; Goodman 1976; Schwartz 1981). (Barsalou 1999: 584)

Perceptual symbols are symbolic insofar as they can represent a variety of entities and are not necessarily linked to only one representatum by a similarity relation. They are at least partly arbitrary in regard to their non-representational properties whereas amodal symbols, in contrast, are necessary and wholly arbitrary. In addition to those three features which highlight their expressiveness, perceptual symbols are productive because they can be combined with other perceptual symbols of different modalities and enter in larger structures such as frames. Perceptual symbols of different modalities are combined to create more complex perceptual symbols. Propositions can be represented by unconscious perceptual simulators, e.g., the perceptual symbol for ‘cloud’ and ‘airplane’ can enter the ‘above’ simulator to either represent ‘cloud above airplane’ or ‘airplane

93 The same point is made against their ability to explain how abstract concepts are possible by Dove (2009) p. 419. 94 See Barsalou (1999) p. 583/584.

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above cloud.’95 Simulators are defined as a combination of a frame structure which integrates multimodal perceptual symbols (e.g., one attribute would be the visual subset of the perceptual representation and another the acoustic subset, both would take perceptual symbols as their values), and the set of possible simulations. The frame structure is unconscious and only a specific simulation can be conscious.96 Categorization is explained as the application of perceptual simulators to new sense date and, therefore, simulators are equated with concepts: What is deemed a culturally competent grasp of a category may vary, but in general it can be viewed as the ability to simulate the range of multimodal experiences common to the majority of a culture’s members (cf. Romney et al. 1986). […] In this theory, a concept is equivalent to a simulator. It is the knowledge and accompanying processes that allow an individual to represent some kind of entity or event adequately. A given simulator can produce limitless simulations of a kind, with each simulation providing a different conceptualization of it. Whereas a concept represents a kind generally, a conceptualization provides one specific way of thinking about it. (Barsalou 1999: 587)

Since both productivity and categorization can be explained by simulators making use of perceptual symbols, Barsalou thinks they are theoretically as powerful as amodal theories of concepts. He pits them against the traditional theories of concepts, i.e., definitions, prototypes, exemplars, and theories, which he describes as amodal and static. If Barsalou is to be followed in his argumentation, perceptual symbols do not have the disadvantages of amodal theories and at the same time have at least the same explanatory virtue. They can be defined mainly by two characteristics: Perceptual symbols are modal and analogical. They are modal because they are represented in the same systems as the perceptual states that produced them. […] Because perceptual symbols are modal, they are also analogical. The structure of a perceptual symbol corresponds, at least somewhat, to the perceptual state that produced it. (Barsalou 1999: 578)

A definite set of modalities is assumed. It contains at least proprioception and introspection in addition to the classical sense modalities. Introspection consists of representational states, e.g., conscious imagination, cognitive operations, actively searching memory, and emotional states. Perceptual symbols are defined as being analogical to the original perceptions because they reside in the same systems and the correlating neuronal activity overlaps. The same systems 95 See Barsalou (1999) p. 592/593. 96 See Barsalou (1999) p. 586.

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are said to be used for perception, imagination, and conceptual operations – albeit in different ways. These two aspects are said to be the major differences to amodal theories of concepts. The modality of perceptual symbols prevents the redundancy of amodal theories and provides neurological evidence for concept processing. The homogeneity between perceptions and concepts explains how categorization works. The empirical evidence cited, therefore, consists mainly of neurological evidence and of evidence that suggests that the knowledge used in categorization tasks is perceptual, e.g., ‘red’ being a feature produced for ‘half a melon’ but not for ‘melon.’97 Following Barsalou, I will define “modal” and “analogical” in a very general fashion in the context of this dissertation: (M) A representation is modal if it is realized (at least partially) by the same organs that are responsible for perception and imagination. There is a predefined set of modalities. To be modal the components of a representation must belong to one or more than one of these modalities. (A) A representation is analogical when there is a similarity between the conceptual representation of a category or individual and perceptions of members of the category or of the corresponding individual. Reference is at least partially (but not fully) determined by similarity.

It can already be said at this stage that these two things need not necessarily both be true for a single representation, i.e., representations might be modal while being not analogical and analogical but not modal. This mainly depends on how similarity is defined. When comparing Barsalou’s neo-empiricism (as it was called by many authors in the philosophical discussion) to classical philosophical empiricism one can see that it takes the basic assumption of empiricism that all representations have their origin in perception and combines it with modern perspectives on how perception is achieved by the perceptual organs and neuronal systems. Concerning the much debated question whether all perceptual representations are determined, Barsalou allows for undetermined representations. On the other hand, he does not deny Hume’s and Berkeley’s solution that determinate representations can stand for indeterminate objects, e.g., categories or larger wholes, by designation.

97 See Barsalou et. al. (1999) p. 8.

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2.2.  Proxytypes: Jesse Prinz Jesse Prinz tries to develop and specify Barsalou’s modal theory of concepts. He considers both philosophical and psychological arguments. In some aspects, his proposal is clearer and more philosophically reflected than Barsalou’s. He defines concept empiricism as the thesis that “[a]ll (human) concepts are copies or combinations of copies of perceptual representations.”98 This precludes the possibility of nonperceptual components of concepts and requires him to define perceptual representations. Prinz stresses the multimodal character of conceptual representations. He defines them as proxytypes that bear a similarity with perceptions of their category members. To say that concepts are perceptually based is to say that they are made up from representations that are indigenous to the senses. Concepts are not couched in an amodal code. Their features are visual, auditory, olfactory, motoric, and so on. They are multimedia presentations. This tenet lies as the heart of classical British Empiricism. Hume (1739) says, “All our ideas are nothing but copies of our impressions.” I call it the modal specificity hypothesis. (Prinz 2005: 7)

The possibility to define perceptual representations in terms of their density is discussed, i.e., the possibility to insert further representations between given representations ad infinitum. However, this is found to be not satisfying since some perceptual representations might not be dense while representations in neural networks might count as dense. Another option is to define perceptual representations by virtue of their being not syntactically combinable the way that conceptual representations are. This is also rejected since one might want to assign exactly that property to perceptual representations (like Barsalou does), especially if perceptual representations are supposed to be used as concepts. Neither is it sufficient for representations to be spatial or isomorphic to count as perceptual since representations not connected to the senses can have these features. Defining perceptual representations as representations of perceptible qualities has the disadvantage of requiring a definition of perceptible qualities. Furthermore, for proponents of an amodal theory, there might be amodal representations representing perceptible qualities. According to Prinz, the favored option is, therefore, to define perceptual representations as representations that originate in the senses. In consequence, it is a necessary prerequisite to define the senses. They might be defined as being mere input systems. Prinz modifies this claim by defining them as “systems that respond to particular classes of inputs.”99 98 See Prinz (2002) p. 108. 99 See Prinz (2002) p. 111–115.

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Ultimately, he wants to tie the notion of perception to whatever is considered as perception in the psychology of perception. However, the additional assumption that there is no common (i.e., amodal) code present in perception of all modalities must be presupposed: “The major difference between empiricism and standard non-empiricist theories is that empiricists say concepts are implemented using modality-specific codes.”100 Prinz provides four central tenets of neo-empiricism. (1) Concepts are nomologically and etiologically causally connected to their content. This is based on Fodor’s atomistic theory and other causal theories of concepts. (2) They are constructions in working memory (not larger knowledge networks in long-term memory), which is proposed by Barsalou. (3) Their components are modality specific, this has been discussed above. (4) Concepts are learned and not innate.101 The last one is the classical empiricist position, e.g., held by Hume and Locke in contrast to the rationalist innatism held by Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, and others. Prinz thinks that Barsalou’s neo-empiricism comes closest of all theories of concepts in philosophy and psychology to meeting the desiderata he introduced. Concepts imply the ability to categorize perceived entities, therefore, a natural link between concepts and perception is presupposed in almost all psychological theories of concepts: Empiricism sounds radical at first, but it is actually consistent with the simple and obvious point that perception is needed to apply our concepts to things in the world. Every serious theory of concepts is committed to that. Empiricists take this universally accepted principle and run with it. If concepts are associated with perceptual representations, perhaps that’s all we need. Postulating a further class of representations (amodal symbols) is unnecessary. (Prinz 2005: 8)

For Prinz, a modal theory of concept acquisition is especially well suited, because it can identify the causal relation between things and their concepts that many modern theories of concepts in philosophy require. There is a direct causal link between things and their perceptions.102 Furthermore, a perceptual theory of concepts has an explanation at hand for the categorization process. New perceptions and simulations of old perceptions are compared to each other. No translation between a nonperceptual code and perceptual inputs is required.

100 See Prinz (2005) p. 12. 101 See Prinz (2005) p. 11. 102 See Prinz (2005) p. 4.

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2.3.  Image schemas and conceptual metaphor A pretty influential theory of modal representations proposes so-called image schemas. It is based on the works of linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson. The latter coined the technical term in his 1987 monograph The body in the mind and the notion is broadly discussed in Lakoff ’s Women, Fire and dangerous things of the same year. They build on some preliminary notions they developed together in their previous collaboration Metaphors we live by, which presents a theory of conceptual metaphor. The central idea is to assume that metaphors are not only and primarily used in figurative speech, as is assumed in other theories of metaphor, but rather constitute the literal meaning of abstract concepts.103 Concepts like ‘argument,’ ‘anger,’ and ‘idea’ are only understood with a complex system of metaphors as background. (For example, ‘argument’ is ‘war,’ ‘anger’ is ‘boiling,’ and ‘idea’ is ‘economical property’). The content of a concept that cannot be acquired via direct experience is metaphorically projected from concepts which can be acquired via direct experience. However, this leads to the question: which kind of concepts can be acquired by experience alone? The primary candidates for this kind of concepts are basal bodily and sense experiences. Examples are: “UP-DOWN, IN-OUT, FRONT-BACK, LIGHTDARK, WARM-COLD, MALE-FEMALE.”104 For at least some of these, the term “image schema” is introduced. They are said to have meaning instantly, i.e., without any interpretation or conceptual additions. All concepts are either acquired directly or via metaphor, e.g., the concept of ‘anger’ is metaphorically related to ‘boiling’ and ‘argument’ to ‘war.’ This proposal is made to counter theories of concepts which see concepts and their components as arbitrary symbols, i.e., what Barsalou criticizes as amodal theories of concepts. One advantage of a theory using image schemas and conceptual metaphor is its ability to explain how abstract concepts can also be modal. Barsalou does not think this approach is valid because, in his opinion, metaphors cannot account for the literal meaning of abstract terms. His own approach is to explain them via introspective simulation, e.g., something being represented as disappearing from consciousness to represent negation.105 Nevertheless, image schemas seem to introduce new levels of explanatory virtues to modal theories of concepts since they

103 See Johnson/Lakoff (1980) p. 3. 104 See Johnson/Lakoff (1980) p. 57. 105 See Barsalou (1999) p. 600.

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can account for the problem of abstract concepts which every modal theories of concepts has to address and have quite an amount of evidence on their side.

2.4.  The analogous/symbolic distinction Since the very early days of cognitive science, a distinction has been drawn between symbolic and analogous representation. This distinction builds on the computer metaphor, i.e., the mind being conceived as software whereas the brain is conceived as hardware. Both kinds of representation (analogous and symbolic) are present in computers. They are of a different format. This might be illustrated by the difference between gramophone records and CDs: in the first case the sound is translated to a physical structure which can be read off by the gramophone needle. The record’s physical structure resembles the music in a certain way, e.g., high notes correspond to a physically thicker layer. It is continuous. In the case of CDs, the musical information is translated into a binary code which can be used to represent very different kinds of information, e.g., also spatial information. The metaphor is not perfect but it is quite illustrative. In computers, an analogous representation, e.g., for a visual field, contains information for each of its units (pixels) such as whether it is filled and how it is filled, while a symbolic representation contains the information that is necessary to reconstruct the visual information, e.g., the length of a line and its direction.106 That kind of information will be processed differently in a given task. The analogous representation may be scanned pixel by pixel, while the symbolic representation is used to calculate the solution. This second example can be transferred to cognition: e.g., if spatial information in a map is encoded symbolically, comparing distances should not take longer for longer distances while scanning longer distances will take a longer time for analogous representations. There is evidence for this kind of effect but it has been disputed.107 It is important to distinguish mental images from phenomenal experience, i.e., conscious representations during imagination. Representations in perception might not be pictorial or imagistic at all.108 Early theories of mental images in the history of philosophy and psychology have been legitimated by introspective experience; this is not necessary and scientifically unjustified. One possible distinction between pictorial and descriptional representations might be that 106 See Block (1983) p. 514 for a similar account. He describes the symbolic representations as sentence-like and sees the main difference in different processing strategies. 107 See Kosslyn (1981), Phylyshyn (2002). 108 See Block (1983) p. 507.

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parts of pictorial representations always represent parts of their representata (which is not true, e.g., for linguistic representations) and the same is true for relations between parts. Block (1983) discusses this but rejects it as an insufficient definition.109 The distinction between symbolic and analogous representations is somewhat parallel to the distinction between amodal and modal representations. The former only concerns formats while the latter is tied closely to perception. In consequence, modal representations might be shown to be symbolic if perception itself were shown to involve symbolic, nonanalogous representations.

2.5.  Criticism on modal theories of concepts There has been quite vocal criticism against modal theories of concepts which seem to be one of the major trends in cognitive science and philosophy of mind in recent years. One problem of a modal approach has been discussed in the context of image schemas, i.e., the issue of abstract concepts. If modal representations are called upon to explain all conceptual representation, they need as well be able to explain abstract concepts, e.g., cultural ones like ‘diplomacy’ or ‘society,’ scientific ones like ‘electron’ or ‘evolution,’ and several others. Unlike earlier perceptual theories, their modern incarnations need not prove that these concepts are imaginable because perceptual representations are not restricted to consciousness. Still, Machery argues against the idea of tying abstract concepts to simulations of situations in which they are used. He supposes that those perceptual symbols are not fine-grained enough to pick out the referents of one abstract concept and not of another.110 However, his argument cannot refute Barsalou’s account. Barsalou endorses the idea that one perceptual symbol can be used for a variety of different referents and, therefore, be as flexible for representing abstract concepts as amodal representations are. Machery bases another argument against them on a methodological problem taken from Anderson (1978): modal and amodal theories are problematic from a scientific point of view because they make no direct predictions. Predictions are made by variants of both theories but not all modal or amodal theories make the same predictions. Results which cannot be predicted by the modal theory A might be predicted by the amodal theory B as well as the modal theory C. If this is the case, there can be no proof for amodal or for modal theories in general. However, there might be progress regarding this question if more specified modal 109 See Block (1983) p. 509–513. 110 See Machery (2006) p. 403/404.

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theories were pitted against more specified amodal theories that can explain the same results.111 Another problem he brings up is the so-called argument from imagery. The evidence cited for modal theories of concepts often tries to show that perceptual simulation is used when fulfilling conceptual tasks. However, amodal theories of concepts also acknowledge imagery as a cognitive phenomenon and do not deny imagery as a possible strategy in solving conceptual tasks. This can be accepted while concepts are not required to be conceived as modal. In consequence, amodal theories can explain such evidence almost equally well. Modal theories would need to prove that nothing else but perceptual simulation is involved in all conceptual tasks. Since tasks have to be constructed to be decidable concerning the involvement of perceptual simulations or amodal symbols, this seems almost impossible to show.112 Both Machery and Weiskopf criticize the fact that the scope of modal theories of concepts is not entirely clear and varies between different authors. Machery distinguishes between an exclusive amodal approach, a moderate amodal approach, narrow scope, and wide scope neo-empiricism. The first and the last only allow amodal or modal representations as concepts, respectively, while the other two are open to the opposite kind of representations in concepts.113 Weiskopf distinguishes between the following positions: Fig. 3:  Modal theories of concepts from strong to weak. Position

Quantity of modal concepts Modality of concepts

Strong global empiricism (SGE)

All

Wholly

Weak global empiricism (WGE)

All

Partially

Strong local empiricism (SLE)

Some

Wholly

Weak local empiricism (WLE)

Some

Partially

Concept rationalist thesis

None

-

Machery’s distinction is underspecified regarding the question whether concepts need to be wholly modal or are only required to be partially modal. Strong global empiricism seems to be identical with Machery’s wide scope empiricism, the concept rationalist thesis with an exclusive amodal approach. While Weiskopf ’s 111 See Machery (2007) p. 24 ff. 112 See Machery (2007) p. 32 ff. 113 See Machery (2007) p. 36.

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other distinctions can either be subsumed to narrow scope neo-empiricism or to a moderate amodal approach. Another problem brought forward by Weiskopf, but not mentioned by Machery, is that it is quite difficult to distinguish systems that are responsible for perception and cognition, which would be required to make an identity statement informative. He discusses endogenous control as one possible criterion to distinguish both114 and comes to the conclusion this is not satisfactory as a solution: We might try extending the endogenous control principle here to distinguish occurrent thoughts from occurrent perceptions. Actual causal etiology might distinguish thinking from perceiving. Perhaps occurrent thoughts are those perceptual states that are actually caused endogenously, and perceptions are states that are caused by external stimuli. This won’t quite work as a sufficient condition, though, since hallucinations are internally caused perceptual states. There is no dagger before me when I hallucinate one; the dagger appearance is caused by some state of my disordered brain. (Weiskopf 2007: 27)

Another problem is the notion of convergence zones which was developed by Damasio and his colleagues and is often brought up in conjunction with modal theories of concepts. Since convergence zones often coordinate different modalities and bind them together to form multimodal representations of individuals and categories, the representations in convergence zones could be described as concepts. But those representations cannot be described as modal because those systems are not used in perception and are not modality specific.115 Furthermore, the information whether an individual is represented or a category seems to be amodal in this sense and yet it is a very important part of the concept. Therefore, Weiskopf argues that strong global empiricism, at least, cannot be true. All concepts involve modal elements as well as amodal elements. It might even be the case that there is no conflict between modal and amodal theories since amodal theories might only be concerned with the information encoded in convergence zones while information in modal brain areas is not part of the concepts themselves. Mahon and Caramaza (2008) try to show from a psychological point of view that all evidence that is brought forward for an embodied and modal view of concepts is inconclusive and can at least be accounted for by a moderate view on amodal concepts if interactions between amodal conceptual representations and modal sensory-motor representations are not categorically denied: To clarify all of those issues and whether the criticism applies to modal theories of concepts, it is important to first have a clear notion of what modality is supposed to mean. Our

114 See Weiskopf (2007) p. 6. 115 See Weiskopf (2007) p. 9.

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intention is in no way to detract from the elegance and ingenuity of the above reviewed experiments. Our point is merely that those data, while interesting in their own right, do not provide the unequivocal support for the embodied cognition hypothesis that they have been argued to provide. Those findings do demonstrate that the motor and sensory systems are activated but they do not demonstrate that activation of motor or sensory information constitutes the semantic analysis of the sentence – and that is the critical issue at stake. (Mahon/Caramaza: 2008: 63)

They instead propose “grounding by interaction” which allows perceptual representations to be constituents of concepts and in the case of concepts of actions or real objects as very relevant constituents responsible for successful interaction with the world. However, they deny that all concepts necessarily have modal components and imply instead that there are amodal symbols associated as equally necessary components of all concepts. This could be classified as weak local empiricism according to the scheme introduced by Weiskopf. Dove (2009) criticizes modal approaches on roughly the same grounds as Mahon/Caramaza. In addition, he argues that the alleged advantages of modal theories of concepts, namely, being parsimonious and being able to account for intentionality better than amodal approaches are not rightly assumed: In other words, perceptual representations could be a consequence of thinking rather than the vehicles of thinking. Second, amodal systems exist that can mimic the behavior of any perceptually based system (Anderson, 1978; Pylyshyn, 1973). Although this flexibility does not provide sufficient reason to posit amodal symbols – indeed it can be seen as problematic – it remains a fact that amodal representational systems can exhibit the behaviors outlined above. If there are independent reasons to posit amodal symbols, then they remain a live possibility. (Dove 2009: 414)

He then establishes that there are domains in which there is positive evidence for amodal conceptual representations (e.g., in number estimation). He denies strong global empiricism and seems to endorse a weak local empiricism and allow for some wholly amodal concepts. In general, it can be said that most critics accept the findings which lead to the assumption of modal theories of concepts. They are important and need be accounted for. However, there are some theoretical and empirical problems and denying amodal representations in concepts altogether seems to be too radical and uncalled for. Rather approaches combining modal and amodal symbols and explaining their interactions seem to be the proper reaction to the empirical findings. This would imply some form of concept pluralism instead of a monism favoring a modal format for all concepts. Furthermore, the scope of such a theory and the notions it makes use of need to be clarified more to be able to properly distinguish modal and amodal symbols. 129

2.6.  Modality reconsidered The notion of “modality” is not clear on different levels. This results partly from Barsalou’s asymmetric definition of modal symbols in reference to modality specific brain systems. Their being analogous is treated as a different property and, on the other hand, amodal symbols are primarily defined in reference to their being not analogous to the perceptions that produced them. One possible solution would be to deem this a terminological issue where “perceptual” is the opposite of “amodal” while “modal” is only one aspect of “perceptual.” If modal symbols are not modal by virtue of being analogous but by virtue of being representations in modal brain areas, they can stand for any kind of referent just like arbitrary amodal symbols. Since the “resemblance of a symbol to its referent”116 is not deemed “critical” and the same perceptual symbol might stand for a variety of referents, this might just be what Barsalou is implying.117 However, this might be solved by assuming that a perceptual symbol that has more than one referent “resembles” all of those referents, albeit to different degrees. They would only be amodal if they do resemble them in no way at all. There is a third possible account of modality that seems to be present in the evidence cited by proponents of modal theories of concepts. Modality could concern the format of representations and in consequence result in a different input-output behavior. This corresponds to the distinction between analogous and symbolic representations discussed above. The distinction between analogous and symbolic representation is not the same as the distinction between perceptual and nonperceptual representations.118 Presupposing these observations, the following three accounts of modality can be distinguished: (1)  The similarity account: A representation is modal if it has the same format as the perceptions of entities which it represents and is at least partially similar to those perceptions.

116 This seems to be a lapse in Barsalou’s phrasing. In his view, the symbol should not resemble its referent, i.e., an external and independent entity, but rather percepts of its referent. If the resemblance was actually between referents and symbols, this would be a direct parallel to pathêmata in the Aristotelian writings which are also said to resemble the things they represent. In fact, the idea that there is a literal resemblance between reality and mental representations seems to be one of the major differences between the Aristotelian theory and modern perceptual theories of representation. 117 See Barsalou (1999) p. 584. 118 See Machery (2007) p. 23.

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(2) The implementational account: A representation is modal by virtue of being at least partially represented in modality specific brain areas. (3) The functional account: A representation is modal by resulting in an inputoutput behavior that can be explained by an analogous format. These three accounts do not preclude each other. In fact, the implementational account implies the other two but it does not necessitate them.119 There are some theories that conceive perception to contain symbolic representations in contrast to analogous representations. The similarity account can only be combined with the functional account if such representations are not accepted since perceptions in themselves would have to be considered amodal according to the functional account as a consequence. Each of them can be accepted separately. Barsalou himself seems to be holding a purely implementational account at times. In one passage, he declares linguistic symbols, which have been used as an analogy for amodal symbols elsewhere, as modal since they involve motor representations and acoustic representations: A linguistic symbol is not an amodal symbol, nor does an amodal symbol ever develop in conjunction with it. Instead, a linguistic symbol develops just like a perceptual symbol. As selective attention focuses on spoken and written words, schematic memories extracted from perceptual states become integrated into simulators that later produce simulations of these words in recognition, imagination, and production. (Barsalou 1999: 592)

Most of the time, Barsalou seems to propose the combination of an implementational and a similarity account while also citing evidence that could account mainly for a functional account and only indirectly for the other two. One important feature of his perceptual symbol systems fits best with the implementational account. They are conceived as symbolic. It is possible for one perceptual symbol to stand for several entities, e.g., for both a category and an individual. Reference is established by causal factors (possibly among other factors) not by the inherent features of the representans alone. This feature of his theory is considered necessary by Barsalou to establish perceptual symbol systems as a sufficiently strong theory of cognition. Barsalou’s account might still be combinable with the similarity account, if the additional requirement is added that a perceptual symbol needs to be homog119 E.g., Block (1983, p. 516) seems to hold a similarity and an implementational account: “Having the mental image is phenomenally similar to seeing an orange thing. And this is presumably because the neural entity (with which the materialist pictorialist identifies the mental image) has physiological properties of the typically produced by seeing an orange thing.”

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enous to a perceptual representation of the representata at least partially. Barsalou gives the example of a representation of the Empire State Building standing for the Empire State Building itself, New York City, and skyscrapers in general.120 One could argue that the Empire State Building is homogenous to the perceptual representations of all three: it is a part of New York City and shares perceptual similarities with other skyscrapers. On the other hand, a lot of perceptual representations of New York City might not contain the Empire State Building and a more schematic representation might be more efficient for representing skyscrapers. The example is not to be taken too literally but the general problem remains: the similarity account would require that there is no conceptual representation which is not to some degree homogenous with perceived instances of its category. This is quite problematic for abstract concepts such as ‘democracy’ or ‘electron.’ It is quite difficult to come up with perceptual representations for these concepts in the first place. The implementational account would not pose a problem for the theories Barsalou criticizes as amodal theories of concepts. In fact, proponents of symbolic representations that are amodal according to the functional account and the similarity account often stress that they are not interested in the question of how symbolic representations are implemented in the brain as hardware.121 It is assumed that there is a given set of modalities and brain regions responsible for processing these modalities which can be identified. They need not necessarily be distinct from each other as long as the regions can be identified as being clearly modality specific. There is also a problem because introspection is conceived as a separate modality by Barsalou but cannot be as easily attributed to certain brain regions as the other modalities. Barsalou does need introspection to explain a variety of different phenomena. Prinz’s account is most importantly a similarity account since he wants to tie what is defined as a perceptual symbol closely to the psychological definition of perception. The other two accounts are also present in his writings. Lakoff ’s and Johnson’s account of conceptual metaphor seems to be mostly a functional account since it stresses the behavioral differences mostly on the linguistic level. In summary, all three accounts of modality are somewhat parallel to the other distinctions made for concepts, e.g., somebody could hold a modal prototype theory of concepts or a modal exemplar theory. Classical theory and theory 120 See Barsalou (1999) p. 597. 121 The same point is made by Aydede (1999) in response to Barsalou’s theory of perceptual symbol systems. It is recognized by Barsalou (1999, p. 637) as the “the most compelling defense” of amodal theories of concepts.

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theory are little bit less likely since it is hard to conceive of modal representations as definitional or theories. But none of them is strictly ruled out, especially by an implementational account. For now, it is important to recognize that these three accounts exist in the authors discussed and that they must be separated and argued in isolation, even though they can be combined. To make this distinction is important since Aristotle is to be compared to modal and amodal theories of concepts in the following chapters and there might be parallels to one or more of the three accounts but not to the others. The question as to whether the plurality of accounts and the vagueness of defining concepts as modal and perceptual is an inherent problem for modern theories will be discussed in the final section when a possible reconcilability between modal and amodal approaches in Aristotle can also be taken into regard.

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V.  Concept as logos 1. Disambiguating logos1 1.1.  General meanings of logos The first notion in Aristotle that will be compared to modern theories of concepts, namely amodal theories, is the notion of ‘logos.’ Logos is a very common Greek word in texts from Greek philosophers and not surprisingly it is very ambiguous. There are plenty of meanings in ordinary language but also several technical meanings in philosophy. Liddell-Scott’s Greek English Lexicon lists ten core readings of logos: I) computation, reckoning, (II) relation, correspondence, proportion, (III) explanation, (IV) rule, principle, law, (V) continuous statement, narrative, (VI) verbal expression, utterance, (VII) a particular utterance, saying, (VIII) thing spoken of, subject matter, (IX) expression, utterance, speech.2 Most of those meanings are somehow connected to language. Logos stands primarily for different forms of speech or texts but also for the things spoken of. Peters (1967) lists “speech, account, reason, definition, rational faculty, proportion” as relevant meanings of logos in a philosophical context.3 “Speech” is connected to language and might be used for an elaborated rhetorical speech or simply for linguistic utterings in general. “Account” is also linguistic and can mainly be found in philosophical discussions. “Reason” and “rational faculty” are not restricted to language but rather pertain to thought. They are faculties rather than singular or complex instances of language or thoughts. “Definition” is a very specific form of sentence/speech act. “Proportion”, e.g., in a mathematical context seems to be entirely independent of the other meanings. In view of this high degree of ambiguity, it might be useful to briefly discuss the etymology – even though etymology is not necessarily relevant for the uses which will be discussed later in this section. Logos is a deverbal noun going back to the Indo-European root leg- which can be found, for example, in Greek legein.

1 This section of the dissertation is partly based on my master thesis Logon didonai – Der ambivalente Erkenntniswert der Sprache in Platon (Düsseldorf 2012) especially on the sections concerning the meaning of logos and instances of the Platonic notion of logon didonai. 2 See Liddell/Scott (1996) p. 1058. 3 See Peters (1967) p. 110.

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The original meaning of leg- was more along the lines of ‘to collect’ and reflexes of that can still be found in Greek prefixed verbs such as syllegein and eklegein.4 In Homer, legein is already used for ‘speaking’ or ‘telling stories.’ It is also used for ‘counting’ which might be connected to mathematical meanings such as ‘ratio.’5 For both meanings the product of legein is complex and structured, e.g., a narration or an enumeration. Boeder (1959) tries to tie these aspects of legein to the original meaning ‘to collect.’6 Logos itself is present both in the Iliad and the Odyssey: And Patroclus, so long as the Achaeans and Trojans were fighting about the wall aloof from the swift ships, even so long sat in the hut of kindly Eurypylus, and was making him glad with talk (logois), and on his grievous wound was spreading simples to assuage his dark pangs. (Iliad 15 390–394) His daughter it is that keeps back that wretched, sorrowing man; and ever with soft and wheedling words (logoisi) she beguiles him that he may forget Ithaca. (Odyssey 1 55–57)

In both instances, logos is used to describe collections of words that somehow have a positive influence on those who listen to them. This is reminiscent of the later uses in rhetoric but can also be compared to spells. Instances of logos can be found in Hesiod and it is used there in a similar way to Homer, however, often with a negative connotation.7 In philosophy, early authors tend to describe their own texts or teachings as logoi.8 As a result, a strict distinction has been drawn between logos standing for rational scientific conduct and mythos standing for old religious and irrational beliefs. In Hesiod, mythos, in contrast to logos, seems to still have a positive connotation. The mathematical meaning can be found in some pre-Socratic philosophers; mostly in naturalistic and atomistic conceptions such as Democritus but also in Heraclitus.9 The first technical meaning of logos in philosophy can also be found in Heraclitus. He uses the term to denominate a general principle responsible for all phenomena of change in the universe. Logos in the sense of proportion is a starting point for him because his world view implies a balance of opposites. Logos as a universal principle can be identified with fire. The ordinary meaning

4 5 6 7 8

See Frisk (1970) p. 94/95. See Meyer (1999) p. 40/41. See Boeder (1959) p. 84/85. See Boeder (1959) p. 82. See Hippias Frg. 4,8; Parmenides Frg. 8,50. For more examples see Diels-Kranz III p. 258/259. 9 See Heraclitus Frg. 31,10; Democritus Frg. 5,97;

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of logos is present in Heraclitus, e.g., he calls his own treatises logoi.10 His main opponent, Parmenides, distinguishes between logos and noema (thought) as well as legein and noein. Logos is also contrasted with doxa, i.e., mere opinion. Logos is the faculty which can solve contradictions.11 In general, logos has a positive connotation and is associated with rational conduct. On the other hand, it is restricted to the level of language and separated from the level of pure thought. Gorgias the Sophist, as already discussed above, mocks the Eleatic tradition (i.e., Parmenides and his successors) in his treatise on not being (mê on). He provides separate proofs for the impossibility to think and to speak of being.12 This shows that even amongst earlier philosophical authors there was an awareness that thought and speech must be separated and a discussion of how far thought and speech are able to convey truth. Some took a skeptical and some an optimistic position in that regard towards language. Another option would be to be optimistic towards thought but not towards language. In the Stoic philosophy, logos is used for speech that is produced by a rational mind and is meaningful by virtue of this. Purely graphic or phonetic linguistic signs are not considered logoi. The notion of interior speech without a particular articulation, reminiscent of Augustine’s later doctrine of the verbum mentis, is also plausibly labeled as logos. Logos is not tied to language but can also stand for thought without linguistic signs accompanying it. In addition to that, logos is used by the Stoics to describe the rational force that is present in all natural processes, which is close to the Heraclitean notion of logos.13 Presupposing these two historical examples, one can see that the notion of logos has broadened. It remains open whether in Aristotle it still is mostly tied to language or is already conceived as language-independent. Apart from the few authors already mentioned, there are plenty of possible readings of logos available in Greek philosophy. Some of them are important for interpreting the Aristotelian usage of logos while others are not.14 Of particular importance is the philosophy of Plato, which will be discussed below.

10 11 12 13 14

See Horn/Rapp (2008) p. 255, Peters (1967) p. 110/111. See Parmenides Frg. B 6; 8,50; 7,5. See DMXG. See Horn/Rapp (2008) p. 259. In later philosophers, logos can more clearly be identified with “concept.” For an account of how logos is used in Neo-Platonist philosophy see Helmig (2012).

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1.2.  Logos in Plato Logos cannot be described as a technical term in Plato, at least not in general. It is used for every form of linguistic expression from ‘word,’ ‘sentence,’ to ‘speech,’ or ‘treatise’15 with a slight preference for philosophical speeches or texts. However, there are also many instances where logos is used for ‘speech’ in a rhetorical context or for written language.16 There are some passages where logos stands for the meaning of a linguistic utterance rather than for the utterance itself.17 The most relevant uses of logos in Plato, in comparison with Aristotle, are ‘sentence’ and ‘definition’ (both will be discussed as possible translations for the relevant notion of logos in the sections below). They can mostly be found in the later dialogues such as Theaitetos and Sophistes. As a ‘definition’ logos means the answer to the ti-esti question and marks a level of knowledge which is beyond the mere knowledge that is achieved by knowing a name and being able to apply it.18 For example, in the Theaitetos, the question whether knowledge should be defined as true opinion combined with a logos (meta logou alethê doxan) is discussed.19 In this context, Plato provides three possible definitions for logos. The first defines logos merely as any form of meaningful statement. This definition is ruled out immediately. The second answer sees logos as a list of parts or features which constitute the entity in question. In contrast, the third answer requires a logos to provide the one feature that distinguishes the given entity form all other entities, e.g., the sun being the brightest body in the sky.20 All of the three possible definitions of logos are important for Aristotle and will be discussed in greater detail below. In the Sophistes, logos is defined as symplokê tôn eidôn21 which might be read as an objectivist account of logos, i.e., logos is conceived as something not linguistic and extra-mental. Logos here refers to lists of features which can be found by dividing genera (dihairesis). Analogous to this, as a linguistic unit logos is defined as symplokê tôn ononmatôn and more precisely as a combination of onoma (noun) and rhema (verb) which can be used to express a thought (dianoia)/ opinion (doxa).22 15 See Rijlaarsdam (1978) p. 64. 16 See, e.g., Soph. 218a, Gorg. 504d, Phaidr. 228e. 17 See, e.g., Ion 534d, Men. 74d, Phaid. 63a, Krat. 425e: ἡμῖν κράτιστος οὗτος τῶν λόγων; Soph. 237b, 256c, Phaid. 62a etc. 18 See Soph. 218b-d; Theait. 148d: πέρι καὶ ἐπιστήμης λαβεῖν λόγον τί ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν. 19 See Theait. 201c. 20 See Theait. 206e, 208c. 21 See Soph. 259e. 22 See Theait. 202b–206d.

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Stranger: And again, when “lion,” “stag,” “horse,” and all other names (onomata) of those who perform these actions are uttered, such a succession of words does not yet make discourse (logos); for in neither case do the words uttered indicate action or inaction or existence of anything that exists or does not exist, until the verbs (rhêmata) are mingled with the nouns; then the words fit, and their first combination (protê symplokê) is a sentence (logos), about the first and shortest form of discourse (logos). (Sophistes 262 b/c)

Onoma and rhema are distinct grammatical categories and only signify something once they are combined and in union form a logos. This is pretty much in line with the Aristotelian usage of onoma and rhema and with his definition of apophasis (statement). In Aristotle, apophasis and logos have to be distinguished. The relation between the first and the second definition of logos can be put aside if logos is not understood as the actual compound of forms but rather as the linguistic expression making the forms and their connection explicit. Another important usage of logos in Plato is the formula logon didonai which occurs quite often in the Platonic writings.23 The interlocutors of Socrates are required to define a given notion, e.g., justice, piety, or knowledge. This is based on the assumption that someone who has knowledge about something is also able to provide an account/explanation/definition of the thing in question.24 This assumption forms the very core of Platonic philosophy and enables the dialogues to develop. In most cases, the interlocutors are not able to sufficiently define the concept in question. Alternatively, logon apodidonai, logon lambanein or logon hypechein can be used.25 In general, it can be said that Plato had a great influence on Aristotle both concerning content and terminology. Logos and its different meanings and usages are just one of many examples.

1.3.  Logos in Aristotle All of the common nontechnical meanings of logos listed above are present in Aristotle. In most instances, Aristotle uses logos in a way that is more or less connected to linguistic signs. Logos is used for speech in Rhetorics, for argument in the logical writings, for scientific arguments or discussions, and more generally for sentences. Sometimes some other thinkers are said to be only interested in the logos and not in the underlying implications and some argumentations are said to be according to the logos not to actual entities.26 The mathematical meaning

23 24 25 26

See, e.g., Gorg. 501a, Theait. 177b, Polit. 531e., Phaid. 78d etc. See Phaid. 76b. See Theait. 175c, Soph. 246c, Euth. 285e. See Met. 986b15 ff., 986b15 ff.

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‘proportion’ is also present.27 In Aristotle, logos is often used to denominate the general kind or genus which is superordinate to other linguistic notions. It is not discussed in much detail but rather more specific kinds of logoi such as syllogismos, horismos, kataphasis/apophasis/phasis, euchê, or protasis28 are discussed in detail. Logos or logistikon are both used to describe a faculty of the soul. Human beings can be distinguished from other animals because they have logos. Logos might either be conceived as the ability to produce meaningful linguistic signs or more general as the faculty of rational thought.29 Logos seems to mean language as a system in general in some contexts. For example, in the Poetics, language is discussed as one form of mimesis among others.30 It might as well mean any form of linguistic uttering. Lexis seems to be used as an alternative to denote language as a faculty in many passages.31 Another word for language, insofar it is a meaningful sound produced by living and ensouled beings, is phônê. Logos itself is sometimes described as a sound which has a meaning (phônê semantikê). Phônê is distinguished from mere sounds (psophos) but also includes nonlinguistic sounds produced by animals.32 Phônê in turn can be contrasted to dialektos which is more complex and allows for complex recombination of its basic phonetic components.33 Zirin (1980) notes that these four notions might be positioned on a scale: psophos – phônê – dialektos – logos. Logos is language as a complex meaningful sound that can express abstract subject matters. Logos is exclusive to human beings while dialektos represents complex meaningful sounds that can be achieved by animals, e.g., some birds like parrots. The possibility to recombine meaningful parts to generate new meaningful units in particular can be seen as distinctive for logos (also the ability to express temporality) and, therefore, for human beings.34 This productivity is often described as a defining mark for higher-order thought in the modern debate, i.e., conceptual representations and abilities.

27 See e.g. Met. 991b10 ff.: logoi arithmôn is used to distinguish those logoi from other logoi; Met. 1001b30, De An. 426b2–4. 28 See An. Pr. 47b8., See Top. 100a25, An. Pr. 24b18, An. Pr. 42a36–40 (logos syllogistikos), Met. 1037b25. Cat. 12b6/7, De Int. 16b26–28, De Int. 17a4, An. Pr. 24a16. 29 See Höffe (2005) p. 332. 30 See Poet. 1447a22, 29, 1449b28, De Part. An. 660a2, Pol. 1253a8. 31 See Poet. 1450b13, Rhet. 1404a8. 32 See De An. 420b5–6. 33 See Hist. An. 535a27–535b3. 34 See Zirin (1980) p. 344–346.

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2.  Logos in the logical writings 2.1.  The context and function of logos 2.1.1.  Homonymy and synonymy The usage of logos that makes it a possible candidate for “concept” in Aristotle is very prominent in the logical writings which are often given the collective name Organon. The opening passage of the Categories, which is the first of the logical writings in their canonical order (which does not go back to Aristotle but rather to his editors), uses this notion of logos to explain certain relations among words and entities. The phenomena it is supposed to explain could also be explained by making use of the notion of pathêma as the opening of De interpretatione implies. Categories 1a introduces three possible relations between entities: homonymy, synonymy, and paronymy. Entities not words are classified as homonyms, synonyms, and paronyms by Aristotle. However, these relations are relations concerning the words that are used to make reference to the entities related. There are some passages where words and not the entities referred to by words seem to be called homonyms.35 In general, in Greek it is difficult to distinguish between cases where the words are referred to as words and the cases where they are used to refer to external things. Still, the Aristotelian notion of homonymy and synonymy should not be equated with the modern use. Furthermore, the modern notion of synonyms implies different words with the same meaning unlike the Aristotelian notion of synonymy. Before going into details of interpreting the definition provided by Aristotle, the passage in question should be cited once more: When things have only a name (onoma) in common and the logos36 of being (ousia) which corresponds to the name is different, they are called homonymous. Thus, for example, both a man and a picture are animals. These have only a name in common and the logos of being which corresponds to the name is different; for if one is asked what being an animal is for each of them, one will give two distinct logoi. When things have the name in common and the logos of being which corresponds to the name is the same, they are called synonymous. Thus, for example, both a man and an ox are animals. Each of these is called, by a common name, an animal, and the logos of being is also the same; for if one is to give the logos of each – what being an animal is for each of them – one will give the same logos.

35 See, e.g., Top. 106b4, 107a5. 36 Logos is left untranslated here. Ackrill choses “definition” in his translation, this interpretation will be discussed below.

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When things get their name from something, with a difference of ending (ptôsei), they are called paronymous. Thus, for example, the grammarian gets his name from grammar, the brave get theirs from bravery. Of things that are said (legomena), some involve combination (kata symplokên) while others are said without combination. Examples of those involving combinations are: man runs, man wins; and of those without combination: man, ox, runs, wins. (Cat. 1a1–12)

There are two important observations about this central passage at the opening of Categories which will be noted here and discussed in more detail below, but must be kept in mind: (1) The expression logos tês ousias37, not simply logos, is used to explain homonymy and synonymy which might imply that (a) homonymy and synonymy are phenomena that only concern entities which are to be located in the primary category of substance and (b) logos in the relevant sense should be restricted to ousiai. (2) The notion of homonymy and synonymy is based on an account somebody could give of what is for y to be x, e.g., for a human to be an animal. Both the expressions used and the background assumptions bear a certain resemblance to the Platonic notion of logon didonai.38 Homonyms are those entities that have only a name in common but the corresponding logos tês ousias is different.39 Aristotle provides one example for this: both a painting and a human being can be described as zoon (animal). It is not entirely clear whether Aristotle speaks about painted animals or about zoon as a word for paintings in general. Both readings are possible.40 The result remains the same: if somebody had to say what it is for both of these to be a zoon, he would give different accounts (logoi).41 For example, a painted animal is not alive, neither is a painting in general.

37 The addition can be seen to make logos more precise and distinguishing it from other kind of logoi. However, its authenticity has been doubted by some authors. See Oehler (1984) p. 201/202. 38 In both cases, the phrase logon apodôsei is used. Logon apodidonai is an alternative to logon didonai in Plato. Aristotle also makes use of logon didonai. See, e.g., De Soph. Elen. 165a27. 39 See Irwin (1981) p. 524. In this account, x and y are homonymously F if and only if the name “F” applies to both x and y, but a different definition (“account of being”) must replace “F” in “x is F” and in “y is F.” 40 See Oehler (1984) p. 189/Höffe (2005) p. 259, Ackrill (1963) p. 71. 41 See Cat. 1a4–6.

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Irwin (1981) notes that the way Aristotle phrases the definition of homonyms and synonyms does allow for a moderate and an extreme interpretation. According to the latter, homonyms by definition have nothing in common but the name, i.e., connected homonyms such as “Washington” for ‘US government’ (metonyms in modern linguistic terminology) are not allowed. According to the former, the definition can apply to connected homonyms if the logos for them is not the same but only connected.42 Ferejohn (1980) states that only unconnected chance homonyms count as real homonyms for Aristotle.43 The distinction between both interpretations presented by Irwin is important because, in a moderate view, synonyms and homonyms apply exhaustively to cases where the same expression F is used for two entities. In an extreme view, cases in which the meaning is connected but not the same are neither homonyms nor synonyms and would require a third category which is not presented in this passage. Irwin convincingly establishes that the moderate view dominates throughout the Aristotelian writings.44 Aristotle himself acknowledges in a different treatise (Physics) that in the case of homonymy, the differences between logoi can be significant or rather small.45 In the case of connected homonyms, there is a reason for both entities having the same name assigned to them. In the example, ‘animal’ and ‘painting of an animal’ would be a connected homonymy, while ‘animal’ and ‘painting’ would only be a chance homonym.46 The modern distinction between homonymy and polysemy is sometimes defined in this way. In contrast to homonyms, synonyms are entities which have both a name and a logos tês ousias in common. The example for homonyms is modified: the word zoon can be used for a human being and for a bull. In both cases, somebody who is asked what it is for both of these to be a zoon would give the same answer.47 Almost the same example is used in Metaphysics Z, which shows that the Aristotelian usage of logos as a term to explain this phenomenon is basically consistent between those instances of occurrence.48

42 43 44 45 46

See Irwin (1981), p. 524, EN 1096b26. See Ferejohn (1980) p. 117. See Irwin (1981) p. 547. See Phys. 246a23–5. Wedin (2000, p. 13/14) sees the stronger reading as far more likely and bases his further argument on this assumption. 47 See Cat. 1a10–12. 48 See Met. 1039a26 ff.: “For if the Forms exist and animal is present in men and horse, it is either one and the same in number, or different. (In formula it is clearly one; for he who states the formula unfolds the same formula in either case.) If there is a man-in-himself

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Paronymy, unlike the other two relations, is only defined concerning the level of words that are used.49 In this case, the words are not the same but are related to each other by some form of derivation, e.g., “grammar” and “grammarian.” The relation between the logoi of both words, the semantic relation, modernly speaking, is not specified in this case.50 In contrast, Topics seem to imply that a relation between the logoi, i.e., a semantic or conceptual relation, is also required in the case of paronyms.51 For example, two things that are linguistically related can be the subject of a singular science if their logoi are connected but have to be subjects of different sciences if their logoi are not connected. A distinction is drawn between having a relation on the level of thought like ‘being the cause of ’ and the words being also related by linguistic derivations (ptôseis).52 Even though a lot of things having a conceptual relation are named after that thing in relation to which they

49 50 51 52

who is a ‘this’ and exists apart, the parts of which he consists, e.g. animal and two-footed, must indicate a ‘this’ and be things existing apart and substances; therefore, animal too must be of this sort.” (εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τὰ εἴδη, καὶ τὸ ζῷον ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἵππῳ, ἤτοι ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐστὶν ἢ ἕτερον· τῷ μὲν γὰρ λόγῳ δῆλον ὅτι ἕν· τὸν γὰρ αὐτὸν διέξεισι λόγον ὁ λέγων ἐν ἑκατέρῳ. εἰ οὖν ἐστί τις ἄνθρωπος αὐτὸς καθ’ αὑτὸν τόδε (30) τι καὶ κεχωρισμένον, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐξ ὧν, οἷον τὸ ζῷον καὶ τὸ δίπουν, τόδε τι σημαίνειν καὶ εἶναι χωριστὰ καὶ οὐσίας· ὥστε καὶ τὸ ζῷον.) See Cat. 1a 11–15. See Ackrill (1963) p. 72. See Top. 111a33–111b4. Ptôsis is sometimes translated as cases, i.e., the other cases excluding nominative. Thorp (1989) discusses the meaning of ptôsis at length. See, e.g., p. 327/328: “From the evidence thus far, then, we can say that Aristotle distinguished between the noun or verb on the one hand, and its cases on the other; the noun, for these purposes, is what we should call the nominative (masculine) […] singular form, and the cases appear to be all the other forms: what we call cases as well as adverbs and adjectives and other derivatives of nouns; when we come to verbs, the verb as such seems to be the first person singular present indicative active form, and the cases are the tenses. […] For here we have what we should call the nominative singular of a noun presented as an example of a case: ‘man’. This directly contradicts the famous passage from the de Interpretatione which has it that the nominative singular is the noun, and the other forms are cases. The text from the Poetics suggests that all those generations of philosophers and grammarians who thought that Aristotle held that the nominative was not a case may have been wrong.” He concludes that the nominative is a case as well which only has the same form as the isolated name by accident. (p. 328/329) This solution is not fully convincing since the examples Aristotle provides for verbs which are not ptôseis are inflected verbs of the present tense and should be a more neutral form, e.g., the infinitive if Thorp’s interpretation is right. It might be noted that the usage of ptôsis in Aristotle is not fully consistent.

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are conceived, this is not actually necessary. They can have an entirely separated name. Aristotle seems to imply that there are similar derivations on the level of logos to those which can be found at the linguistic surface.53 In Categories 10b1–9, he remarks that sometimes related notions are paronyms; sometimes there is no paronymous form available but they are nevertheless connected.54 A fourth class that can be mentioned in this context, although not present in Categories 1a, are anônyma, i.e., entities which do not have a name.55 In contrast to the other three classes, this is a one-place predicate not a two-place relation. His fine-grained distinctions show that Aristotle has a clear understanding that the linguistic level has to be distinguished from a more general representational level on which those distinctions sometimes realized in language by derivation can be drawn – even if the corresponding word forms are not available. It is important to note once again that the relations indicating homonymy and synonymy are specified as relations between entities insofar as the same name is used for both.56 In consequence, homonymy and synonymy must be described as three-place relations. A lot of other names might be used to make reference to homonymous/synonymous entities but in relation to them they are not homonyms/synonyms. Two entities might even be homonyms in relation to one word and synonyms in relation to another57, e.g., if “physical object” is said of paintings and human beings they are synonyms not homonyms.58 However,

53 See Top. 114a26, 148a10–13. 54 For a discussion of the relation between paronymy and pros hen structure see Rapp (1992). Rapp states that it is important for paronyms that there is one thing that is prior and the other can only be defined in relation to it. 55 See, e.g., De An. 419a4, Hist. An. 490a13. 56 Barnes (1971, p 65) discusses whether this is a difference between Speusippus and Aristotle. In Speusippus, homonymy has been interpreted as a property of words not of things. Aristotle was said, by earlier scholars such as Hambruch (1904), to use the Speusippan notion of homonymy with which he was probably familiar instead of his own in some contexts. Barnes himself states that the entities referred to as homonyms are not necessarily non-linguistic (p. 66). In his opinion, Speusippan and Aristotelian homonymy are “in substance identical” (p. 75). 57 See Oehler (1984) p. 191/192; Barnes (1971) p. 74; Ackrill (1963) p. 71. This might not be the case if the criteria for what qualifies as logos is restricted, e.g., if only logoi expressing an essence do qualify. In that case, there is only one logos proper to each entity. See Irwin (1981) p. 543. 58 Obviously this is only possible in the Aristotelian ontology if they are subordinated to each other, i.e., both ‘painting’ and ‘animal’ are subordinated to the very general genus of ‘physical object.’

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they cannot be both homonyms and synonyms in relation to the same word. The criterion whether they are homonyms or synonyms is the corresponding logos.59 Logos is distinct both from the word and from the external thing itself. As a consequence, Ackrill (1981) ties the notion of logos in Aristotle to the Fregean notion of sense and sees it as motivated by the same kind of problems like Frege cases.60 Homonymy and synonymy are possible because one word can be connected to different senses. Tying logos to sense might be regarded as anachronistic on the one hand and on the other hand as not fitting for Aristotle since he rejects Platonic ideas which are an early equivalent of Fregean senses. Is it still an adequate understanding of logos as an explanation for Aristotelian homonymy and synonymy? How must logos be conceived to be able to do what it is supposed to do in this context? To answer these central questions, it is important to discuss the reasons why Aristotle makes these distinctions at this particular place of this treatise. It is not entirely clear why Aristotle makes this distinction in the beginning of the Categories since it is not a central theme of the chapters following and the treatise as a whole, at least at first sight. It might just be a methodological prerequisite.61 Some, however, have argued that homonymy is a central thread that ties the three unconnected parts of Categories together and, therefore, can explain the unity as a treatise.62 The first part (antepraedicamenta and praedicamenta) deals with different meanings of “being” while the second part (postpradicamenta) deals with the homonymy of other central philosophical terms like “contrary,” “change,” etc. The expression homônyma and its variants do not occur a second time in the Categories. On the other hand, for synônyma and parônyma and their variants several further occurrences can be found in the remainder. Even though the term homônyma is not used, the distinction is utilized to make a very important distinction between the Category of substance and the other Categories. If a predicate corresponding to a substance (i.e., it is predicated of more than one entity, e.g., “human”) is used, both the name and the logos are predicated of the subject. For example, in the sentence “Socrates is (a) human.” A sentence containing another category as predicate, e.g., “Socrates is white,” has

59 Oehler (1984, p. 208) lists two other possible kinds of relations which are distinguished in the commentaries: heteronyms have neither words nor logoi in common and polyonyms do have a common logos while the words used are different. The latter case would correspond to the modern notion of synonyms. 60 See Ackrill (1981) p. 38. 61 See Oehler (1984) p. 90/91. 62 See Frede (1983) p. 22.

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the same form and cannot be distinguished using linguistic features.63 Yet the answer to the question “What is (a) human?” – e.g., “a rational animal” – can be predicated of Socrates while the answer to “What is white?” – e.g., “a certain shade of color” – cannot. Therefore, names of substances are synonymously predicated of individuals while names of qualities are homonymously predicated. This is true both for species (eidos) and genera (genos). Different genera are said to have corresponding different logoi.64 Genera are always predicated synonymously of species because both their onoma and their logos apply to them.65 Speaking of concepts, one could say that the kinds of conceptual relations differ between different Categories. A substance concept is a superordinate concept to the things it is predicated of while a quality concept specifies the thing it is predicated of on the level of features. Since this criterion distinguishes the substance Category from all other Categories, it is a very important aspect of the Aristotelian account of Categories and would definitely justify the introduction of the homonymy/synonymy distinction at the beginning of the treatise. Wedin (2000) rejects this interpretation because it is based on weak, not on strong homonymy. To replace it, he develops his own account. He sees the three relations as “grouping principles.” If two entities can be shown to be part of a synonymy group, they belong to the same Category, which is not true for the other two relations. Therefore, for Wedin, finding synonyms is Aristotle’s method for arriving at the Categories.66 While it must be admitted that this interpretation is exciting since it sheds light on how exactly Aristotle arrived at his Categorial Scheme, it does not have direct textual evidence, unlike the interpretation presented above. In general, the treatment of homonymy by Aristotle, which is mostly discussed in Topics and Sophistical Refutations, has to be seen in the context

63 There are no indefinite articles in Greek which enable one to distinguish both cases in English and other Germanic and Romanic languages. This connection is discussed in more detail in Ackrill (1963 p. 87/88): “However, an easy revision of the account in Chapter 1 would enable one to say that ‘synonymously’ in the present passage contrasts with both ‘homonymously’ and ‘paronymously’: most non-substances (like generosity) generate paronymy, a few (like the quality white) generate homonymy; no substance generates either.” – A human being is not said to be “generosity” but rather to be “generous”, therefore, it is a case of paronymy unlike the homonymy in the case of “white.” Substances are always said synonymously of something else. 64 See Cat. 3a, Top. 107a28. 65 See Top. 109b5–7. 66 See Wedin (2000) p. 21–27.

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of philosophical methodology67: Aristotle’s motivation to discriminate between homonyms and synonyms stems from his belief that it is important to distinguish different usages of a word, especially in a philosophical context. He can distinguish cases where a word is used in a synonymous way, in which a common definition can be given, and homonymous cases, where two different definitions have to be assumed. Clarifying whether two things are homonymous or synonymous is a necessary prerequisite for the philosophical task of definition.68 For example, if two people try to come up with a common definition of a term this venture is confused from the start if both use the term in a different way. However, if it is clarified and one of the participants in a philosophical discussion tries to argue against a different meaning of the term (mê poiein pros to auton ton logon) from the one agreed upon, he makes a fool of himself.69 Aristotle advises that one should not accept a statement containing homonymously used terms, even though it might as well be true for both cases because it might become relevant later.70 The dialectician should, however, only concern himself with the words (pros tounoma dialegesthai) where it is necessary to distinguish them in order to discuss the real entities in question (peri tou prokeimenou dialegesthai) while arguing only against words is philosophical misconduct.71 If a statement contains an ambiguous term, e.g., a term that signifies both human beings and horses, it might either amount to two separate statements, one about human beings and one about horses, or it might be about entities which are both human and horse (an empty class). Since this is in no way conclusive, statements in a scientific context must not include homonymy.72 Proofs also are not valid if a term is used with different meanings in different places of a syllogism.73 Clarifying ambiguous terms helps to show that a syllogism not only proves its conclusion in relation to the words (onoma) used but also to the real 67 Bobzien (2007, p. 309) states that in ordinary language homonymy is not much of a problem since homonymous terms are disambiguated just enough in most contexts. However, in dialectic where one of the disputants wants to win the argument and the topic is much more abstract and complicated, homonymy becomes a decisive tool to refute one’s opponent. 68 See De Soph. Elen. 169a. 69 See Top. 108a22–26. 70 See De Soph. Elen. 176a4–6. 71 See Top. 108a34–37. 72 See De Int. 18a19–27, Bobzien (2007) discusses this example at length and provides a convincing argument that it in fact concerns homonymy even though there are some other interpretations available. 73 See De Soph. Elen. 175a37/38.

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things (pragma) signified by the words, which is the intention of philosophical reasoning. Definitions themselves have to be as clear as possible and should, therefore, not include homonymously used words. If homonyms are defined without acknowledging their homonymy as if they were synonyms, the definition is mistaken and does not apply to all entities in question.74 This shows how important it was for Aristotle to identify homonymy in philosophical discourse. Irwin (1981) states that the Aristotelian doctrine of homonymy is directed against the belief that a common definition can be found for a single word, which is the starting point of many Platonic dialogues. According to him Plato was not aware of homonymy.75 In contrast to that, Anton (1968) notes that there are already observations concerning homonymy in Plato and there are verbal similarities in the way homonymy is described in both Plato and Aristotle.76 Blackson (1991) discusses the role of Plato and Aristotle as the first to be aware and discuss homonymy in philosophically relevant contexts. He notes that while Plato’s ti-esti question does not logically exclude the possibility of homonymy, there is no explicit discussion of homonymy and no conclusive proof for Plato’s awareness of homonymy. Therefore, Aristotle can be seen as the first person in the history of philosophy who was aware of the philosophical significance of homonymy.77 Aristotle claims that not only some expressions from common language but also some very important philosophical notions are ambiguous, e.g., “one,” “being,” “good,” “contingency”78 and “identity.”79 Therefore, it is of the utmost importance for him as a philosopher to distinguish their meanings. In this context, Aristotle’s discusses so-called pros hen structures. They are a subclass of connected homonymy. In a pros hen structure, a word is used to refer to different entities but there is one central thing or focal meaning from which all others are derived.80 For example, ‘healthy’ may be said about someone being actually of good health, someone being disposed to be in that condition, something which generates health

74 See Top. 108a21/22, 130a, 139b19/20, 148a23–36. 75 See Irwin (1981) p. 523. 76 See Anton (1968) p. 316/317; Salmieri (2008, p. 26) also states that Plato was already well aware of the phenomenon of homonymy. 77 See Blackson (1991) p. 175–182. 78 See An. Pr. 32a20. 79 See De Soph. Elen. 169a24/25. 80 Ferejohn (1980) p. 120 defines pros hen ambiguity in the following way making use of the notion of logos in Aristotle: “(FM) A term T has focal meaning iff (i) T is “said in many ways”, and (ii) one of T’s many logoi is non-reciprocally contained in T’s remaining logoi (i.e. its significata are logically prior to theirs).”

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in a subject, etc. Actualized health would be the focal meaning in this example. ‘Being’ is said pros hen of the other Categories in relation to substances; i.e., quality exists because it inheres in substance.81 In modern linguistic terminology, those cases would receive the label “metonyms,” i.e., ambiguity where several meanings of one word are conceptually connected such as “school” as ‘intuition’ or ‘building,’ “Washington” as ‘city’ and ‘US government.’ Because of pros hen structure, these philosophical notions can still be the subject matter of one scientific branch, e.g., metaphysics or first philosophy in the case of “being.” Pros hen structures might be a notion that Aristotle only came up with in Metaphysics and was not aware of in the Categories from a developmental perspective.82 Apart from Categories, homonymy is prominently discussed in Topics and Sophistical Refutations, mainly in the already-mentioned context of forming good philosophical arguments and the faults inherent in bad arguments. One important question in this regard is how the relation between the different writings in the Organon is conceived as well as the function of the Organon as a whole. For example, Aristotelian Logic might only be a methodological prerequisite which is not a philosophical theory of its own right. In consequence, the notion of logos as a methodological tool or construct should not be compared to the notion of pathêma, which is a proper object of philosophical discussion. In addition, the dialectical logic of Topics could be independent of the strict syllogisms of First Analytics. Therefore, the notion of logos should not be compared throughout the logical writings but only in isolation in a single treatise. Both of these remarks are valid. The logical writings are definitely not a uniform block and have been conceived, written down, and revised at different points in time. Nevertheless, it is possible to see them as part of the same general philosophical approach which takes philosophical discussion, i.e., coming up with and revising of definitions as well as weighting of arguments in a competition with other disputants, as the starting point of philosophical discourse. The syllogism is a particular form of argument which requires a sufficient definition and clarification of its constituents. Therefore, syllogisms build on dialectic. Since philosophical discourse is part of human conduct it can also be a subject matter of philosophy. Therefore, comparing logoi to pathêmata is not a futile undertaking per se. This approach to Aristotle’s philosophy is an assumption at this point

81 See Ferejohn (1980) p. 123, Met. 1003b5–9. 82 See Code (1996) p. 311 ff.

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in time. It will be shown that it is coherent with the evidence. Apart from that, it has backing from influential scholars.83 Topics 106a states that, in the case of ambiguous terms (pollachôs legetai), it is not only necessary to note their ambiguity but also to provide an account (tous logous […] apodidonai) for it. There is no difference in the word (onoma) but in the real kinds (eidos) corresponding to the word.84 Ambiguity and homonymy seem to be exchangeable notions in this context, the examples he uses are called homonyms.85 In Sophistical Refutations, homonymy is one of the reasons an argument may be faulty. The sophists are said to consciously make use of homonymy to build up their faulty arguments.86 One example is the Greek word manthanein which means both ‘acquiring knowledge’ and ‘applying/practicing knowledge,’ therefore, those who already have knowledge can be said to be still learning based on the homonymous use of manthanein.87 The criterion for homonymy is the same that can be found in Categories: the account corresponding to the name (ho kata tounoma logos) has to be different.88 Logos is used here in isolation and not as part of the phrase logos tês ousias as in the passage cited above. The example Aristotle gives is his standard example “healthy,” which is used elsewhere to illustrate the pros hen structure. Therefore, this can be seen as another indication that his notion of homonymy in the Organon, if it is accepted as being unified, includes connected homonymy and that Aristotle did not distinguish pros hen structure from other homonyms in his early works. The Topics provide tests for homonymy which are quite plausible in the context of a methodological treatise. If some name has two different real opposites (which might have the same or different names), it has to be ambiguous itself because each thing can only have one opposite. One example for this is kalon (‘beautiful’) which has aischron (‘ugly’) as its opposite for humans and mochthêron (‘in a bad condition’) for man-made structures such as houses. This example also illustrates that homonymy is language specific, a lot of the examples only work in Greek. If something is judged by different senses, e.g., hearing and vision, or has to be included in more than one category, or is included in more than one non-inclusive genus, it is necessarily said homonymously. Furthermore, if

83 84 85 86 87 88

See Höffe (1996) p. 37–58. See Top. 106a 26/27. See Top. 106a21, 106b8, 107a5. See Rhet. 1404b37/38. See De Soph. Elen. 165b26–34. See Top. 107a20.

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something is said to have an opposite in some cases and not to have one in others, it is as well.89 These are just some of the tests for homonymy and ambiguity. A sharp distinction is drawn between universals being in more than one thing as real entities and only homonymously. Two things can have the same unified logos because a universal inheres in them or they can only be described by the same name accidentally.90 Words in themselves seem to be insufficient to decide whether something is a case of homonymy or synonymy, whereas logoi seem to be sufficient. This seems to imply that they are a) unambiguous and b) in some way unique. This uniqueness might either result from the entities or it might result from the usage of a word in a given context. This application of homonymy in Categories and other writings in the Organon seems to be very consistent and there is no reason at first sight why they should not be seen as the same. Throughout, there are two important aspects that logos seems to require in order to be able to explain the phenomena of homonymy and synonymy: (1) It needs to be reference-fixing to be able to clarify ambiguities. Therefore, it has to be unambiguous in itself. There is only one logos corresponding to a word in a particular linguistic utterance. This is also vouched for by tying logos to the central Category of ousia which constitutes the ultimate reality in the Aristotelian ontology and, therefore, might be the cause of the referencefixing properties of logos. (2) On the other hand, logos is mainly discussed in the context of philosophical discourse and might, therefore, be seen as a definition that can be provided in discourse. In that case, logos would itself be a linguistic unit consisting of words. It might be an attractive solution to see the first requirement as part of a stricter approach to logic in Categories and Prior Analytics and the latter tied to the more dialectical approach in Topics and Sophistical Refutations. However, the task of reference-fixing has to be fulfilled by logoi in a dialectical context and the way it is introduced in Categories using the formula logon didonai ties it very prominently to philosophical discourse and dialectic. How those two aspects can be explicated and whether they are contradictory or can be unified in a single account of what logos is supposed to be in Aristotle in order to fulfill the functions attributed to it will be the subject of the following sections.

89 See Top. 106a10–107a20. 90 See An. Post. 77a9, 85b10–17.

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Firstly, “word meaning” and “sentence” are discussed as possible translations, then related notions, namely Category, substance and definition, are compared and connected to logos as it is used to explain the notion of homonymy.

2.1.2. Logos as meaning of words The Aristotelian account of homonymy and synonymy might be described, using modern language, by stating that in homonymy the words are the same while their meaning is different and in synonymy the words as well as their meaning are the same. As is the case for “concept,” there is no term corresponding precisely to “meaning” in Aristotle. The notion of word meaning in itself is somewhat ambiguous. Words are more than mere sounds. They enable two subjects to interact and communicate. They make them think of the same kind of entities. Therefore, words are intentional. They are about entities in the world. “Meaning” might be read extensionally, i.e., the meaning of a word is an actual entity (“Bedeutung” in Frege). It might be read intentionally, i.e., about an intention or sense that is independent from specific external entities. This intentional aspect might be objectified (Fregean senses and his example of Hesperus/Phosphorus come to mind as well as one interpretation of the Stoic notion of lekton) or it might be described as a mental representation. The term “concept” is sometimes used for objectified senses, sometimes for mental representations. The meanings of words understood as mental representations are described as concepts in linguistics and equated with psychological accounts of concepts such as prototypes, exemplars, theories, and frames. All of these meanings of “meaning” might be possible explications of what logoi in Aristotle are supposed to be, maybe apart from the extensional reading since they are clearly distinguished from the external entities (pragmata). In addition to that, the distinction between lexical and contextual meaning is quite important for modern linguistics. The idea is that mental representations of word meanings are stored in a mental lexicon. If a word is processed, these representations are retrieved and fitted to the particular context of uttering. In that process, the contextual meaning is generated. If logos is equated with meaning as mental representation, one can ask whether logos should be understood as lexical or as contextual meaning. These categories, of course, are not common to Aristotle and can only be applied to a certain degree. It might be more plausible to see logos as an equivalent of contextual meanings, because it is something that is provided in a particular context to explain a particular use of a word. In addition to that, “animal” for ‘painting of an animal’ (if this is the right reading) in the well-known example might rather depend on the context and not be a separate lexical meaning. 153

Modrak (2001) tries to answer the general question whether Aristotle has a theory of word meanings: First, it should be noted that Aristotle does not have a theory of meaning, if by ‘theory’ is meant the specification of necessary and sufficient conditions for a sound to have significance for persons sharing a common language. […] If by ‘theory’ is meant a general account of this phenomenon then Aristotle does, or so I shall argue, have a theory of meaning. (Modrak 2001: 23)

This amounts to saying that Aristotle was aware that there are phenomena that require the assumption of word meanings and he also had some understanding required. Conversely, he does not have a fully spelled out explicit theory of meaning that would be required in the modern discussion. She stresses how the Aristotelian account of meaning is closely tied to his account on how sentences and thoughts can be true or false, which is basically a correspondence theoretical account with some aspects lend from a coherence theory of truth.91 She equates logos with meaning.92 This seems to imply that logos, for Aristotle, is to be equated with word meaning in the sense of intentions as mental descriptions determining reference. For example, ‘one’ and ‘being’ are said to be the same insofar as they are always attributed of all things together (i.e., extensionally they cannot be differentiated) but they are not the same in regard to their logos.93 Modrak’s interpretation of Aristotle’s use of logos, especially the normative implications of the mediation of truth and falsehood, will be discussed in more detail below. It should be noted that she also describes pathêmata as word meanings in the sense of mental content.94 De Cuypere/Willems (2008) stress that the Aristotelian theory of word meanings is connected to the so-called physei-thesei debate. This debate was prevalent in the philosophical discussion of language before Aristotle and is the focus of Plato’s dialogue Kratylos.95 The way in which words can have meaning at all is at the focus of the debate. According to the physei thesis, words have meaning by nature, i.e., a specific word can only have one specific meaning. If a word is 91 See Modrak (2001) p. 52/53. 92 See Modrak (2001) p. 178: “The form (logos) as cognitive content is a meaning. Speakers of different natural languages will use different sounds to express the logos, but the logos will be the same – at least for all speakers who have gotten the essence right.” 93 See Met. 1003b24. 94 See Modrak (2001) p. 23: “Meaning identified with an intention or mental content is consistent with Aristotle’s conception of a pathêma that is common to speakers and is the content of which the sound is a sign.” 95 See also chapter 1.1 “Plato’s challenge” in Modrak (2001) and Ackrill (1963) p. 113/114.

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used in another way, that usage is wrong. According to the thesei thesis words only have a meaning by convention and their meaning can be changed at will. De Cuypere/Willems see Aristotle as the first to resolve this debate by assuming that word meanings are concepts, i.e., language-independent mental representations. We argued that even though Plato recognised that the phýsei-thései problem could not be resolved the way it was traditionally dealt with, he was unable to solve the problem at hand. No longer explicitly concerned with the phýsei-thései problem, Aristotle resolved the matter by adding an extra ‘conceptual’ level to the prevailing sign concept. (De Cuypere/Willems 2008: 322)

Words as phonetic signs are arbitrary (thesei) and differ, while their mental equivalents, i.e., concepts are representations by nature (physei) and are shared by all human beings. This notion of word meaning is tied to the passage in De interpretatione that makes reference to pathêmata. The notion of logos in Aristotle is not mentioned by the authors in this context as a possible contender for a theory of meaning in Aristotle. It might still be the case that logos and pathêma can be equated. Hudry (2011) rules out a propositional and amodal theory of meaning (a possible way to interpret logos in the beginning of Categories) as anachronistic and rather speaks of “Aristotle’s mental conception of meaning.”96 He distinguishes between conventional linguistic meanings and nonarbitrary mental contents. On the one hand, linguistic meanings are conventional, in the sense that the names, verbs, and sentences of language are meaningful by convention; and this prevents linguistic meanings from being shared by everyone. On the other hand, mental contents, as derived from an activity of thinking in relation to actual things, are the same for all; and these non-linguistic thoughts provide non-conventional meanings, distinct from the linguistic meanings of a conventional language. We shall conclude that Aristotle relies on a mental conception of meaning, and does not assume that non-linguistic thoughts constitute an abstract semantics for a syntactic language. (Hudry 2011: 257)

If Hudry is right in assuming that Aristotle has a different theory of meaning for language and for language independent mental representations, it is necessary to answer the question whether logos is subject to the linguistic theory of meaning or whether logoi have to be conceived as language-independent mental representations like Modrak seems to assume. Hudry himself translates logos as “sentence” and sees logoi as purely linguistic entities.97 His definition of sentence does not require verbs to be included in sentences. However, he conceives linguistic 96 See Hudry (2011) p. 275/276. 97 See Hudry (2011) p. 260, 270.

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entities as always meaningful by convention. In consequence, syllables are not linguistic entities since they do not have a meaning. The mentalistic account of meaning is part of the explanation of how linguistic symbols can be meaningful; therefore, both accounts are related, but linguistic meaning cannot be reduced to mental meaning. He also rules out an amodal and propositional theory of concepts as word meaning in the modern sense. Ferejohn (1980) sees no theory of intentions (especially not of objective Fregean senses) and meanings in this sense in Aristotle and states that the Aristotelian theory of meaning must rather be conceived as being about a direct connection between language and physical entities. But this is to import an alien ontology into a philosophical system where it has no place. Aristotle’s usual manner of theorizing about language proceeds without reference to such intensional entities as meanings and senses. Instead, his style of analysis characteristically makes do with a relatively lean ontology containing nothing more than pieces of language (words and phrases) and the extra-linguistic entities they signify […] (i.e., stand for, or denote). (Ferejohn 1980: 118)

If Ferejohn is correct, neither logos nor pathêma can be understood as “word meaning.” Logos must be conceived as a linguistic entity in itself.98 Each of the four authors discussed takes a different stance on the questions as to whether there is a theory of meaning in Aristotle and how it is related to the notion of logos. This shows that these issues are highly controversial. According to Modrak, Aristotle has a theory of meaning and logos is to be equated with meaning; according to De Cuypere/Willems, there is a theory of meaning but it is not related to logos; according to Hudry, there are two separate theories of meaning and only the purely linguistic one is related to logos (and logos is not meaning but rather has a meaning); and last but not least, Ferejohn sees no theory of intentional meanings in Aristotle at all. It is quite obvious that those different interpretations cannot all be accurate (although one might argue that they are concerned with different usages of logos and, therefore, at least are not inconsistent in that regard). There are some problems with Hudry’s account which contradict what has been developed in the previous section on homonymy. Hudry tries to show that there is no distinction drawn between syntax and semantics in Aristotle. A linguistic sign is always conceived as a meaningful unit, i.e., directed at real objects. In consequence, “[…] truth and falsehood of a sentence exclusively depend on actual things […]”.99 Hudry’s interpretation is doubtful, at least in parts. It 98 See Ferejohn (1980) p. 118/119. 99 See Hudry (2011) p. 264.

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might be true that onoma and rhêma (noun and verb) are not purely syntactical categories but rather a combination of syntax and semantics. Nevertheless, Aristotle seems to be aware of different syntactical categories even though he has no elaborated concept of syntax.100 He is not merely aware of these categories, but also states that the same meaning can be expressed using different linguistic categories. This might be sufficient to attribute at least a basic understanding of the distinction between syntax and semantics to Aristotle. In the Sophistical refutations, Aristotle discusses at length that the meaning of words is independent from the grammatical form (even though some of his own Categories might be arrived at by abstracting from grammatical categories, e.g., substance from nouns, qualities from adjectives, location and time from adverbs). That is why arguments based on grammatical gender or on the genus verbi are faulty if they are not in accordance with the meaning of the word.101 On similar note, concerning verbs it is stated that it is not important whether they require a form of “to be” (einai) or can stand on their own because ‘being’ is always implied. The meaning does not change if a finite form of a verb is replaced by a participle and a form of einai.102 These examples show that Aristotle was quite aware that there is no unmediated one-to-one correspondence between linguistic forms and reality. The same observation can be made in cases of homonymy which are solved by Aristotle by using the notion of logos; although there are some purely linguistic symbols which have no objects of reference, e.g., terms introduced via nominal definition are possible. Even though this is not the standard case, Aristotle states that linguistic signs without a corresponding object, e.g., “goat-stag,” still have a meaning (sêmainein): however, it is not possible to have knowledge about their objects which would imply an intensional theory of meaning.103 Ordinary language in general is meaningful by virtue of holding a symbolic relation to real objects mediated by language-independent mental representations.104

100 Höffe (1996, p. 181/182) states that Aristotle’s philosophy of language is not naïve but rather elaborated. He sees all important modern linguistic disciplines prefigured in Aristotle. 101 See De Soph. Elen. 166b10–19. 102 See De Int. 20a3–5, 21b9/10, Met. 1017a28–30. 103 See De Int. 16a16, An. Post. 92b6–8. 104 See De Int. 16a, De Soph. Elen. 165a6, Gyeke (1974) p. 72, De Cuypere/Willems (2008, p. 317) critically state that the relation between linguistic symbols and real entities is not explicitly discussed in this passage by Aristotle and, therefore, has to be considered as an imposed interpretation by later authors.

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In the first chapter of Sophistical Refutations, Aristotle discusses the relationship between things (pragmata), words (onomata), and their corresponding logoi. The words are symbols for the things themselves which are used as indications for them because the things themselves cannot be used in most contexts. And because there are an infinite number of (individual) entities, words and logoi have to subsume more than just one entity.105 Words are said to be used instead of the things themselves like symbols. The argument is an economical one: there are more things than there are words.106 That is why words (and also logoi) have to stand for more than one thing. The same argument is used by Smith and Medin for why concepts have to be assumed as mental representations of categories.107 This clearly shows that Aristotle assumed a semantic relation between words and real entities. Unfortunately, the relationship between logoi and onomata is not discussed in more detail. However, both seem to be closely associated.108 For every word in a given context there is only one corresponding logos. Knowing the logos provides a deeper understanding of the thing in question than merely knowing the onoma.109 It might be that logos is in some way connected to word meanings, rather than being describable as word meaning itself. Taking only the opening passage of Categories into account, it is not possible to ascertain whether “meaning” is a satisfying translation for logos. Both words and logoi are separately said to mean something (sêmainein).110 Therefore, even if logoi were to account for meanings, a different account for the meanings of logoi would be required. Alternatively, it might be argued that logos is used ambiguously in these passages. It might be possible to distinguish what it means for both words and logoi to have a meaning according to the distinctions drawn above. A word might have a meaning by virtue of having a corresponding logos, while logoi have a meaning by virtue of corresponding to real entities. There also is a semantic relation between words and things that is mediated through logoi as mental representations of meaning or cognitive content. This would make this account analogous to the one given for pathêmata in the opening passage of De interpretatione. There seems to be only one logos per name, i.e., different accounts that can be given for a name do not qualify as logoi. On the other hand, a 105 106 107 108 109 110

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See De Soph. Elen. 165a6–13. See De Soph. Elen. 165a6–13. See Smith/Medin (1981) p. 1. See De Soph. Elen. 165b29/30. See Phys. 184b10. See An. Post. 92b6/7; it might be argued that logos here has to be read as distinct from logos in Categories.

logos can be provided by a disputant. Therefore, it seems to be a linguistic entity not a language independent mental entity. It is possible to provide new names for a logos if a word has several meanings.111

2.1.3. Logos as sentence/phrase In the previous section, it remained open whether logos should be interpreted as a linguistic entity or as a mental but prelinguistic entity. In the majority of passages in which logos is used in Aristotle, he is speaking about linguistic entities. Generally speaking, the majority of readings of logos in Aristotle are also tied to language. A well-known and important definition of logos can be found in De interpretatione: A logos is a significant spoken sound (phônê semantikê) some part of which is significant (sêmantikon) in separation – as an expression (phasis), not as an affirmation (kataphasis). (De Int. 16b26–28)

Logos is defined as a meaningful vocal sound consisting of meaningful parts.112 In Poetics, Aristotle provides another, basically identical definition113 for logos which provides some insights and can be compared to the way logos is used and defined in the logical writings: A logos is a composite significant sound (phônê sunthetê sêmantikê), some of the parts of which have a significance (sêmainei ti) by themselves. It may be observed that a logos is not always made up of noun (onoma) and verb (rhêma); it may be without a verb, like the definition (horismos) of man; but it will always have some part with a certain significance by itself. (Poet. 1457a23–27)

Logos is defined as a meaningful (sêmantikê) linguistic unit which has components which are meaningful in themselves (not necessarily all its components). This definition is given in contrast to words.114 A word has parts because it consists 111 See Met. 1006a34 ff. 112 For a discussion of some of the problems and ambiguities of this definition, especially if compound words must not also qualify as logoi, see Ackrill (1963, p. 116/117). 113 Zirin (1980) p. 330/331 describes the difference between the passages in the Poetics and De interpretatione. In the former, the composite nature of logos and onoma are stressed since the more basic units, i.e., phonemes and syllables are discussed as well. In De interpretatione, the focus is rather on onoma and logos as conventional signs, since the way a statement relates to entities and facts is the subject matter of the treatise as a whole. Hudry (2011, p. 261) sees the accounts from both treatises as basically the same. 114 See De Int. 16b26–30.

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of different syllables. It is meaningful in itself but its parts are not.115 Some authors like Coseriu (2003) have interpreted this to mean that a word is a combination of a sound component and a meaning component in the same way that linguistic signs in Saussure are combinations of signifiant and signifié.116 A logos in itself is not necessarily a statement about the world. It has to be combined with a form of “to be” (einai) or another verb to form a statement about the world.117 For example, the logos “rational animals” for human beings only becomes a statement once “exist” is added.118 In other text passages, Aristotle seems to use logos for statements and defines it like Plato in Theaitetos as a combination of onoma (noun) and rhema (verb).119 The context of this passage from Poetics can be read as a general account of language and how it is to be described. At the beginning, there is a list of elements of languages (tês lexeôs ta merê). Lexis seems to be preferred here for ‘language’ over logos which is used to refer to a certain subcategory of linguistic units. There are other passages in Aristotle in which logos is used for ‘language’ as a general faculty. The elements discussed as parts of lexis are phoneme, syllable, conjunction, noun, verb, article, inflection, and logos. Only letters/phonemes are not compounds of smaller units. However, not all sounds are phonemes; only those that can be found as elements in larger linguistic units. Syllables are meaningless compounds of vowels (or half-vowels) and consonants. Conjunctions are words which do not have a meaning of their own but might generate a different meaning when compounded with meaningful words. Rhemata are defined in contrast to onomata as signifying time in addition to their simple meaning. They always include time and the implication of “being” or “not being” at a certain time. Inflections are all other forms (declination and conjugation) of nouns and verbs.120 It might be concluded that logoi are larger units than words but do not have to fulfill all the criteria that statements (logos apophantikos, apophasis) have to fulfill while a statement – as the more complex unit – can also described as a

115 There are words which consist of several meaningful components but they are still regarded as having a unified meaning which is not determined by its meaningful parts. 116 For a discussion and rejection see De Cuypere/Willems (2008) p. 315. 117 Ackrill (1963) p. 114: “Of course, not every kind of combination in an expression ensures it a truth-value: prayers are not true or false (17a3) nor are mere phrases (17a11).” 118 See De Int. 16b1–5. 119 See Rhet. 1404b26. 120 See Poet. 1456b20–1457a23.

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logos, i.e., as phônê sêmantikê because logos is the higher genus. Not all logoi are statements but all statements are logoi. In Poetics 1456b, Aristotle also lists different forms of linguistic units that might be classified as different speech acts or sentence types such as command (entolê), wish (euchê), thread (apeilê), and question (erôtêsis).121 Not all of these are statements and yet can still be classified as logoi. In general, Aristotelian logic and philosophy of language has a focus on statements and how they are possible: A possible explanation for their [i.e., other sentence types] exclusion is that assertions are paramount in Aristotle’s theory of language; they serve as a paradigm of how language functions, in contrast to other forms of speech, which are accidental phenomena, and, as this passage suggests, do not have a meaning. (Bolonyai 2005: 150)

Little discussion of the other sentence types can be found in Aristotle. In De interpretatione, he refers to rhetoric and poetic as the right disciplines for these discussions. Neither Poetics nor Rhetorics contain many new aspects either. Bolonyai concludes that Aristotle thought (wrongly) that sentence types/ speech acts are mainly restricted to questions of intonation and, therefore, are only relevant in regard to the performance of language.122 Based on all of this, a plausible reading of logos would be “linguistic entity above word level” or “linguistic phrase.” Bolonyai (2005) states: “[…] the notion of a logoi in turn, is widened to such an extent that it can be identified with any meaningful unit of a text or verbal utterance, from one sentence to a whole epic poem.”123 I agree when it comes to the upper bounds, but it should be noted that logos is also used for linguistic units between the word- and sentence-level. This basic meaning of logos might also account for the reason why logos can be used for human language in general: As discussed above, the combination and recombination of meaningful units might just be the distinctive feature of human 121 See Poet. 1456b10–15. 122 See Bolonyai (2005) p. 148, p. 150: “Since, however, these two kinds of “forms of speech” (i.e. in our case a normal command and a figurative command that equals to an indirect request) are not contrasted to each other, this undifferentiated notion does not allow for making a conceptual distinction between the speaker’s intention and the grammatical forms by which it is uttered. Instead, Aristotle appears to be satisfied with pointing to the element that solves ambiguities in practice. And he takes this element, that is, the intonation of a sentence, in sharp contrast to modern linguistics, as something external to language. It is quite characteristic that assertions do not appear on the list of these forms, despite the fact that they can be used figuratively the same way as non-assertions can.” 123 See Bolonyai (2005) p. 150.

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language as developed in Zirin (1980). But does this linguistic definition of logos as ‘a linguistic unit above the word level’ apply to the context of Categories 1a and the discussion of homonyms? Or is logos used with a different nonlinguistic meaning in that context? One indication is the repeated usage of the Platonic formula logon didonai in the passage. This seems to imply that Aristotle is thinking mainly of philosophic discourses when defining homonymy. A logos can be created on purpose in a philosophical discussion and then be tested by different means. The logos given in a philosophical discussion is said to consist of words itself which in turn can be replaced by their logoi until one arrives at a more understandable definition. One strategy for those who want to win a philosophical discussion, e.g., sophists, is to give a logos that contradicts the common understanding of a word.124 This seems to imply or at least not to contradict the assertion that the linguistic definition of logos from the Poetics – which is the same as in De interpretatione, only more detailed – also applies in the other logical writings. Aristotle states in Topics that a logos can be subject to homonymy in itself: it might include an expression that is in itself ambiguous. This suggests that, in Topics at least, logos is used to explain the same phenomena as it is in the Categories and is conceived as a linguistic entity.125 On the other hand, the passage from the Categories seems to imply that logoi are unambiguous, unlike the words they are supposed to clarify, which is a direct contradiction to Topics. Apart from that, there seem to be few reasons to assume that Categories 1a requires a nonlinguistic interpretation of logos and the way logos is used, both in general and in the context of homonymy, seems to be consistent in both treatises. The uniqueness of logoi in this context might be explained by logos being part of the expression logos tês ousias. Thus, additional normative criteria must be applied to the logoi referred to in this context. The next three sections, therefore, discuss the relation of logos to Categories in general, to the category of substance, and to horismos, i.e., definitions as a subtype of logos. Possibly the double nature of logos, which is required in the Aristotelian definition of homonymy, can be explained in this manner.

124 See Top. 109b30, 110a4–9, 112a32/33. 125 See Top. 107b7–12, Top. 129b31–32.

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2.2.  Logos and adjunct notions 2.2.1. Logos and the Aristotelian Categories The relevant use of logos that this section focuses on has been shown to be present in the opening passage of Categories. Here, it is obviously tied to the notion of ousia, i.e., substance, which is one of the Aristotelian Categories. The Aristotelian doctrine of Categories is one of the centrepieces of Aristotelian logic and his philosophy in general. But how are the notion of Category and the notion of logos connected? And which role do Categories have if a theory of concepts based on the notion of logos is ascribed to Aristotle? The treatise Categories has often been interpreted as being based on the main assumption that “being” (einai) is polysemous.126 Different kinds of being are distinguished.127 There is a fourfold distinction and a tenfold distinction, i.e., the actual ten Categories. The fourfold distinction takes the two features “being in” and “being said of ” and combines them in all four possible ways, i.e., (i) “not being in” and “not being said of,” (ii) “not being in” and “being said of ” (iii) “being in” and “being said of ” (iv) “being in” and “not being said of.” There has been much debate on how to understand these distinctions. It has been pretty much accepted that (i) corresponds to particulars, i.e., primary ousiai such as ‘Socrates’ and (ii) corresponds to species and genera, i.e., secondary ousiai such as ‘human.’ The third and the fourth kinds of entities are not as easily defined. They seem to be properties, i.e., (iii) general properties like ‘green’ or ‘educated’ and (iv) particular properties, i.e., ‘this green’ and ‘this educatedness.’ All are to be understood primarily as ontological distinctions.128

126 This is a later explanation based on the Aristotelian ontology in the Metaphysics. There are some authors who would doubt that it can be transferred to the Categories while others stress the unity of the Aristotelian ontology (Case (1910), Brinkmann (1996)). Even though there might have been significant changes and additions, there are enough reasons in the treatise itself to understand the Categories as an ontological scheme of classification. 127 Ackrill (1963, p. 71/72) argues that the ambiguity of “being” is not yet part of Aristotelian philosophy as presented in the Categories. He is right about this not being explicitly stated; however, Aristotle obviously distinguished important ontological classes, therefore, the distinctions drawn here are deeply tied to his later accounts on the polysemy of being. 128 See Ackrill (1963) p. 74 ff.

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Allen (1969)129 describes a possible interpretation of the fourfold distinction: Then if there are two pieces of chalk, A and B, and if they are of the same determinate shade of color, say, white, there will be a particular instance of white in A and a particular instance of white in B. Call those instances respectively s and t. Then s and t are the same in that they are instances of the same shade of color. But they are different in that they are themselves numerically different individuals, and this difference is to be explained by the fact that they are present in numerically different subjects: s is the white of A, and t is the white of B. Thus s and t are different members of the same species, the given shade of white, in a way precisely analogous to the way in in which A and B are members of the same species, chalk. This situation will obtain generally in categories other than substance; that is, it will obtain, not only for qualities such as colors, but for sizes, shapes, places, times, and so on for any items present in but not predicable of a subject. (Allen 1969: 31/32)

It seems quite reasonable to interpret the individual properties in Aristotle in this way analogous to individual substances. However, there are also interprets who rather think they are the last individuable classes of properties, e.g., ‘this shade of white.’ The fourfold distinction can be interpreted as being primarily introduced to distinguish the substance Category from the other nine Categories, i.e., substances are those entities which are not “in something” and exist independently of other substances. The distinction between those substances which are not said of others and those which are said of others is explicitly made. It is

129 Allen (1969, p. 37/38) argues against Owen (1965) who declared this standard interpretation of the passage as paradoxical: “Professor Owen’s assumption that the same universal can be present in many subjects makes the scheme of the Categories fall prey to an Academic argument that Aristotle knew well. That argument is the Dilemma of Participation, first formulated by Plato in the Parmenides (131a–c), and mentioned again in the Philebus (15b–c) as a notorious crux. In outline, the Dilemma is this: suppose that one characteristic is in many things. Then it will either be in each of those things as a whole, or parts of it will be in each. […] Aristotle’s account in the Categories is so formulated as to provide a solution to this dilemma, a dilemma which his choice of vocabulary proves that he had clearly in mind […].” There is a huge debate in the secondary literature concerning the question whether individual properties can or cannot occur in more than one individual substance. The one side sees individual properties as “the green of this human being” while the other side sees them as “this (not more distinguishable) shade of green.” Corkum (2009) gives a thorough account of the discussion since Owen’s and Allen’s time and comes to the conclusion that the answer cannot be determined in the context of the Categories since Aristotle is concerned with defining what individuals are and not with providing means to identify individuals.

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the distinction between primary and secondary substances.130 The distinction between general properties and individual properties is not explicitly discussed in the sections pertaining to the other Categories. These distinctions are of the utmost importance for Aristotelian ontology but they are not of much concern for the present cause because they are not inherently connected to the notion of logos or any of its adjunct notions and do not primarily concern representations but rather mind-independent entities. One task the notion of concepts has to fulfil in cognition is to sort individuals (both sortals and properties) into classes and thus enable subjects to successfully interact with the world when encountering new individuals. In consequence, theories of concepts are mainly concerned with those entities which can “be said of ” others. There is a connection between the Aristotelian Categories and the modern notions of “category” and “categorization.” Different usages of “category” in the modern debate where discussed above in a systematic context. In Aristotle, katêgoria is only reserved for the highest kinds or highest classes of predicates, while it applies to all kinds in modern psychology. Over the course of the history of philosophy, a lot of thinkers have only allowed the correlates of general terms both for substances and properties as concepts. Others allow the notion of individual concepts which explicitly determine their referents as individuals, e.g., ‘Socrates’ or ‘pope.’ Some psychological and linguistic theories are also interested in individual concepts. Löbner’s theory of concept types has been discussed above. More integral to the present cause is the way the Categories in themselves are introduced. The Categories are the highest classes of linguistic expressions (legomena) or the entities referred to without combination. This also includes verbs which are not combined with a subject.131 It is not a distinction of grammatical/syntactical categories but rather of the highest semantic categories.132 Because of this, Aristotelian Categories have a certain resemblance to concepts. Modrak (2001) describes the Categories as part of the “conceptual scheme common to all sciences and ordinary discourse”133 and concepts as the basic units of meaning in contrast to the basic truth-functional entity, i.e., the statement.134 130 See Cat. 2a11–26. 131 See Cat. 1b–2a10. 132 Ackrill (1963, p. 78/79) discusses possible ways Aristotle could have come up with these ten Categories starting from Greek interrogatives that can be asked about an entity, e.g., about a human being. 133 See Modrak (2001) p. 148. 134 See Modrak (2001) p. 71.

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Concepts also are the basic units of higher-order thought. They are not tied to the linguistic surface but rather to the level of semantics. It is important to note that Aristotle distinguished between knowledge of unities corresponding to words and, therefore, to Categories and knowledge of facts that can be expressed in statements. The knowledge of primary units has to be reached before complex states can be known through some form of grasping that is described in Posterior Analytics. The representations of unities seem to be also true because they correctly represent real entities.135 Since this account involves induction starting from individual perceptions, it will be discussed in more detail below. Modrak stresses that the unity of what falls under one of the Categories is not provided by the unity of words (e.g. “in ” signifies unity) but rather by the unity and completeness of the entities referred too.136 This might be described as a conceptual unity that is separated from the unity of expressions on the linguistic surface.137 Matthen (1978) also thinks that Aristotle tries to caution his readers not to mistake structures on the linguistic surface as having necessary ontological correspondents.138 Categories in Aristotle are parallel to a very general notion of concept both in being primary units of categorization and in subsuming the nonreducible constituents of more complex thought. In consequence, Aristotelian Categories might be equated with concept types, i.e., the highest classes of concepts distinguishable from each other because of their logical form. They resemble Löbner’s notion of concept types and other semantic classifications schemes of concepts in linguistics. Nevertheless, if the Categories are interpreted as concept types, they can be classified as concepts in correspondence to word types as is often done in contemporary linguistics. Substance and relatives would roughly correspond to noun concepts, namely sortal and relational concepts139; quality and posture to adjective concepts, quantity to numeral concepts; place and time to adverb concepts; doing, suffering and having to verbal concepts. In contrast, the Aristotelian Categories could also be read as the highest classes of entities. Legomena is ambiguous and might either stand for the expressions 135 See Modrak (2001) p. 65. 136 See Modrak (2001) p. 35. 137 See Met. 1045a12–14: “Definition is not a unity in virtue of being continuous like the Iliad but rather in virtue of being related to a real unity.” (ὁ δ’ ὁρισμὸς λόγος ἐστὶν εἷς οὐ συνδέσμῳ καθάπερ ἡ Ἰλιὰς ἀλλὰ τῷ ἑνὸς εἶναι.) 138 See Matthen (1978) p. 235. 139 Aristotle does not distinguish between functional and relational concepts, however, a lot of the examples discussed, e.g., ‘father,’ are functional.

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or for what the expressions refer to.140 This ambiguity has been the subject of much debate among Aristotle scholars. Ultimately this distinction might not be as important as some might think since “Aristotle assumes throughout the Categories that the conceptual structure of language mirrors the structure of reality […]”.141 Three particular structural features common to both reality and thought are pointed out by Modrak (2001): The analysis that Aristotle offers of essence and definition in Metaphysics VII 4–6 reaffirms a number of theses about language and ontology found in the Categories. Central to both works are the following: (a) linguistic categories of simple significant terms have ontological correlates; (b) the ontological relation of inherence has a linguistic analogue in predication; (c) substance is primary both ontologically and conceptually. (Modrak 2001: 163)

Modrak discusses the relation between language and reality and comes to the conclusion that Aristotle might derive his ontology from language, but his account presupposes that ontology explains how language can have a meaning. The analysis of language can expose ontological structure.142 Thus, his aim in ontology is not satisfied with merely studying language. This must not be a disadvantage or shortsightedness since Aristotle believed that common sense judgments were mostly true including the most basic presuppositions of language usage.143 This can be described as Aristotle’s epistemical optimism and is an important characteristic of his overall philosophical approach. It has to be distinguished from an analytical approach in modern ontological discussion which is satisfied with a mere investigation of ontologies presupposed by linguistic practice. The function logos and the notion of homonymy fulfill in distinguishing the substance Category from the other Categories has already been pointed out above. In the following paragraphs, a short overview will be provided of how the “big” Categories (Aristotle only treats four of the categories in detail) are defined and distinguished from one another before the very central notion of substance is discussed independently in the next section. Primary substances, i.e., entities in the most genuine sense of the word, are concrete individuals. Terms denoting species and genera apply to more than one individual. They are said of primary substances but are not in them and identify an individual as a determined

140 See Ackrill (1963) p. 71: “Aristotle relies greatly on linguistic facts and tests, but his aim is to discover truth about non-linguistic items.” 141 Modrak (2001) p. 33, see also Carson (2003), Modrak (2001) p. 23/24. 142 See Höffe (1996) p. 168, 179. 143 See Modrak (2001) p. 48/49.

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something or as a what-it-is (hence, ti esti is an alternative term for ousia in Aristotle). Substance predicates refer to qualities to denote a species or genus and identify an individual as belonging to this kind but not as only having the qualities in question. The same is true for concepts: features (be it weighted features in prototypes or feature structures such as frames) are used to categorize individuals as falling under a concept. It is primarily reminiscent of sortal concepts which are the standard concept type researched in psychology and discussed in philosophy. Unlike some of the other Categories, substance predicates cannot be graded, e.g., something cannot be more or less human while it can be more or less green. This requirement is one of the basic assumptions of the “classical theory” of concepts in psychology as discussed above and is not accepted in prototype and exemplar theory. Other features of substances are that they have no contraries but do admit contrary qualities to inhere in them albeit not at the same time.144 Quantities are either countable and discrete or continuous. This resembles the distinction between count nouns and mass nouns in modern linguistics. Only entities like numbers, lines, and bodies are genuine quantities. Entities in other Categories are said to be large, small, and so on because they have a certain quantity.145 Again, some things are called quantities in virtue of their own nature (kath’hauta), others accidentally (kata symbebêkos), e.g. the line is a quantity by its own nature, the musical is one accidentally. Of the things that are quantities by their own nature some are so as substances (kat’ousia), e.g. the line is a quantity (for a certain kind of quantity is present (hyparchei) in the formula (logos) which states what it is) […]. (Met. 1020a15–19)

Quantities in this passage are said to be genuine quantities by virtue of the logos of their essence (ti esti) including quantity as a genus. It seems to show that the notion of logos used in the opening passage of the Categories is not restricted to substances and there are also logoi for the members of other Categories. On the other hand, logos tou ti esti is an interesting expression in this context: it might be equivalent to logos tês ousias from Categories since both ousia and ti esti are used for substances in Aristotle. Here it is used for a nonsubstance Category. Having a quantity might, therefore, be interpreted as part of the concept of a line. Relative predicates are only predicated in relation to another entity, e.g., ‘father’ in relation to ‘child’ or ‘bigger’ in relation to something smaller. They have to be distinguished from the relations themselves, e.g., ‘fatherhood.’ A relative and its correlatum always demand the other, e.g., if there is a slave, there has to be a master. Sometimes there is no word designating the genuine correlatum, e.g., ‘wing’ 144 See Cat. 3b24–4a11. 145 See Cat. 5a38–5b3.

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requires ‘winged thing’ rather than ‘bird’ since there are insects and other winged animals. One interesting aspect that should be mentioned is a discussion ending the chapter on relatives. The new definition for the relatives Aristotle develops makes reference to knowledge: relatives are those entities of which knowledge also implies knowledge of their correlatum.146 This is a further indication that Categories should be understood as classes of representations that have different logical properties, i.e., as concept types. The Category of the qualitative is introduced by listing several different classes of qualities, e.g., habitus, disposition, and passion. Qualities have contraries, they are gradable and can be described as more or less similar when compared to other instances of quality. Quantities, in contrast, do not have similarity but are either the same amount or a different amount.147 The Categories are clearly distinguished by their formal or logical properties. The notion of Categories and the notion of logos are not inherently connected. There are some instances pointed out above in which Aristotle uses logos to explain certain aspects of different Categories, but the connection between both notions is not stressed or made explicit. However, there is a strong connection. Logoi are associated with words spoken without a connection while Categories also correspond to highest classes of word spoken without combination. In consequence, different Categories should correspond to different types of logoi. It has already been shown that the notion of homonymy and, by virtue thereof, the notion of logos is used to differentiate the Categories of substance and quality. The same might also, for example, be done for the Category of relatives by defining the relative things as those entities whose corresponding logoi make reference to another independent entity. If Categories can be parallelized with concept types in the way sketched above, then types of logoi could be identified with concept types which would strengthen the claim that logos is an equivalent for “concept” in Aristotle, at least for some modern theories of concepts. The Categories explicate basic types of semantic classifications and conceptual relations analogous to distinctions drawn mainly in linguistics. This parallel is further strengthened by the correspondence between linguistic classes and Categories. However, the notion of concept types might in itself rather correspond to types of Fregean senses than to mental representations which are possibly not fully determined and fuzzy. The ontological ambiguity of Aristotelian Categories, therefore, would be mirrored in modern theories of concepts. Both “concept” in the modern debate and katêgoria in Aristotle can be read objectively and subjectively on the ontological level. The

146 See Cat. 7a18–8b3. 147 See Cat. 11a15/16.

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question remains, whether this is also true for logos. Logos might be restricted to one of the available options. This can be clarified by comparing the ontological notion of substance to the notion of logos. If this interpretation of logoi as concepts or word meanings is accepted, the relation to the linguistic interpretation of logos remains an open issue.

2.2.2. Logos and substance The Category of substance has a special role in the Aristotelian ontology and logic. A substance in general is something that exists independently and of which other Categories are predicated.148 In Categories, Aristotle distinguishes between primary substances, i.e., individuals existing independently of other substances (e.g., Socrates) and secondary substances, i.e., what a primary substance is said to be (e.g., Socrates is said to be a human being and a human being is said to be an animal at the level of genera). It seems to be the case that species (eidos) and genus (genos) are relatively applied terms, to say the least, in Categories and Topics, i.e., a genus can be regarded as a species in relation to a higher genus until one arrives at the highest genera which are the Categories themselves.149 The species shares the logos of the genus while the genus does not share the logos of the species since it contains more information distinguishing a particular species from other species falling under the same genus. Entities belonging to the same species always belong to the same genus as well. This can be applied to show that a species does not belong to the genus in question if one of its members cannot be said to be in the genus. If something belongs to a certain genus, it also has to belong to one of its species.150 Nested hierarchies like this are said to be a distinctive feature for a classical approach in theories of concepts by Smith and Medin (1981). The ‘subordinate’ or ‘is a’ relation is an important relation in conceptual nets. More recently, frame accounts of concepts have also used similar type hierarchies as part of their formal model.151 These trees have been explicitly developed by Porphyry in his commentary of the Aristotelian Categories and have been a part of the discussion on concepts ever since. Substances seem to be primarily ontological units which demand representations corresponding to them, i.e., representing something as a substance rather than a quality or one of the other Categories. In this context, a developmental 148 149 150 151

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See Met. 1017b13–16. See Berg (1982) p. 19 ff. See Top. 121a10–122b10. See Petersen (2007).

question has to be taken into account, namely, whether Aristotle’s conception of substance changes significantly between Categories and Metaphysics. This change has often been postulated and has become common knowledge to some degree.152 It is connected to the introduction of the notions of matter and form, i.e., the Aristotelian doctrine of hylemorphism, which is not yet referenced in the Categories. The distinction is introduced in the analysis of the phenomenon of change in Physics.153 Matter is what remains constant but, as prime matter, is not qualifiable in any way. Matter and form are relative notions just like species and genus, e.g., the body can be interpreted as matter in relation to the soul as form, while there is still a prior form of matter underlying the body. Prime matter is a limiting notion which only makes sense in relation to form and cannot be defined any further than being the last unqualified matter. Neither matter nor form occurs in isolation (at least in nature as directly experienced by human beings). Concrete objects are interpreted as always consisting of matter and form while substance in a primary sense is identified with form. It seems the notion of primary substance of the Categories has been dropped in favor of eidos in the sense of essential form as primary substance. This might have an influence for the usage and meaning of logos as well: logos as sentence might be the predominant meaning in the Categories and other logical writings while logos as a synonym of eidos (which is favored by some interpreters) is the common usage in Metaphysics and other writings of this time frame. Matthen (1978) is very critical about the general aspects of the developmental thesis and develops his own account regarding how both works are related: On my account Aristotle expresses no fully worked out ontology in the Categories and may, when he wrote it, have had none. Rather the question should be understood: ‘When Aristotle comes to develop a view of the underlying ontological configurations, a view which evidently has a lot to do with matter, does he adequately account for the intuitively characterised distinctions of the Categories?’ (Matthen 1978: 237)

152 See Matthen (1978, p. 232/233) for an overview of the vast literature on this issue and a general but critical account of the developmental argument up to his time. Graham (1987) strongly opposes accounts which see both doctrines as compatible and rather speaks of two different ontological systems present in Aristotle. Owen interprets the doctrine of Metaphysics as inconsistent with the way primary substances are introduced in Categories (see, e.g., Owen (1978)) and sees Metaphysics as a development back to some form of Platonism. Another alternative is to interpret ousia in Metaphysics as an individual form which is unique to one particular entity. This approach was first proposed by Sellars (1957). 153 See Graham (1987) p. 153.

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Even though one does not have to agree fully with Matthen, it is generally plausible to assume no general difference between the ontology of the Metaphysics and the Categories. There are a lot of parallel passages and the most important distinctions remain in place while new ones are introduced, e.g., hylemorphism. In Metaphysics, Aristotle is able to describe the ontological system of the Categories in more detail by applying the distinction between form and matter as well as potentiality and actuality.154 In his ontology developed in the Metaphysics and other writings considered to be later than the Organon, Aristotle distinguishes between substance as matter (hylê), substance as form (morphê, eidos) and substance as a particular entity which is a combination of both. The latter roughly corresponds to primary substances in Categories. Matter individuates temporally and spatially distinct individuals, while their forms make them belong to a certain kind as a specific something which is qualitatively different from other entities belonging to other species. Matter, therefore, is the potential to realize forms while forms are actualities realized in matter. Both are dependent on the other to exist as an individual and specific entity. The notion of essence (to ti ên einai) gains importance. This has been described as Aristotle’s essentialism.155 The idea is that there is exactly one essential form shared by all members of a species that is responsible for their being what they are. ‘Human being’ is such an essential form and can explain why all human beings are human and produce human offspring.156 This form is not arbitrarily chosen, each individual has necessarily one and only one essential form (at least for natural entities; artifacts might receive a different treatment). In Categories, species and genus sometimes have the air of being arbitrarily chosen or being mind-dependent unlike the notion of form in Metaphysics. Modernly speaking, one could describe essential forms as natural kinds, e.g., the natural kind ‘human being’ is constituted by human DNA, which explains how humans are able to produce human offspring. This essentialism is not nearly as

154 In a similar vein, Rapp (1996, p. 19/20) describes the ontology of Metaphysics as a continuation of the one developed in Categories rather than an alternative account (albeit differing in some important ways). A very strong proponent of this position is Wedin (2000). See also Wedin (1996b, p. 41): “In effect, it [= Metaphysics Z] asks in virtue of what do c-substances have the formal features attributed to them in Categories.” 155 See Brinkmann (1996) p. 299: “From the quasi-nominalist position of Categories, which, it should be pointed out, remains valid for all purposes of cataloguing and describing the world, we have now moved to a genuinely essentialist position.” 156 See Met. 1032a25, 1070a8, 1092a16.

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pronounced in Categories as it is in Metaphysics. On the other hand, neither is it a stark contrast to the program introduced therein.157 This kind of essentialism is connected to psychological research on essentialism and theory theory as a format in the modern discussion on concepts. Logoi, with the meaning introduced in the Organon and elaborated on in the latter works, refer to the essences or forms and not to individual entities. Unlike other representations pertaining to individuals, this kind of logoi are the most relevant for science since science is always concerned with general truth and not with particulars. However, these logoi can also include a reference to a certain kind of matter.158 For example, ‘snub-nosed’ can only occur in noses, therefore, its logos must make reference to noses.159 In contradiction to that, it is sometimes assumed that the notion of substance as eidos and the notion of logos should be equated, which might prompt one to read logos also as language- and ultimately mind-independent. Modrak (2001, chapter 6) sees a strong analogy between logos as form inherent in individuals, i.e., secondary substance or eidos, and the way logos is used throughout the logical writings to describe the meanings of words. Merely because a word is able to pick out the right objective form (logos) it is sufficiently meaningful, i.e., it has the right kind of relation to the world.160 The real logos and the mental logos are said to be the same, i.e., a form that can both be realized by mind-independent matter and by thought. And because of this, speakers from different language communities can share the same logos. Because the logos (form) is the same in the substantial individual as in the composite universal, the (composite) natural kind, that serves as the meaning of the name of the natural kind under which the individual falls, the linguistic meaning is a function of reference to the concrete substances. (Modrak 2001: 177)

Aristotle himself parallelizes eidos and logos in several passages – especially in Physics and Metaphysics. These need to be discussed in detail if an objectivist reading of logos as ‘form’ is to be ruled out or affirmed. Logoi could still be 157 158 159 160

See Brinkmann (1996) p. 297. See Met. 1025b25 ff., Met. 1033a1–5. See Met. 1030b/1031a. See Modrak (2001) p. 175: “The term logos is used by Aristotle in many contexts and for many things, from strings of symbols to forms, from speech to definition. In Metaphysics VII, Aristotle exploits the ambiguity of logos to display the common feature of a thought and its referent in the world. The logos actualized in matter is a composite substance, and the same logos realized in thought is a meaning.” Ross (1923, p. 76) also notes that logos is used as a synonym of eidos several times.

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concepts in both cases albeit concepts according to vastly different theories of concepts (i.e., ontological objectivist and subjectivist). Since substance is of two kinds, the concrete thing (synholon) and the formula (logos) (I mean that one kind of substance is the formula taken with the matter (hylê), while another kind is the formula in its generality) […]. (Met. 1039b20–22)

In this passage, logos seems to be clearly used in the way eidos is usually used, i.e., not on a linguistic but rather on an ontological level.161 The logos is said to be an ousia which can either be regarded as enmattered or by virtue of itself. However, a few passages below logoi are said to consist of onomata.162 There are three possible ways this can be explained: (1) two different meanings could be assumed; (2) the usage in this passage could be regarded as inconsistent (maybe due to interpolation); (3) a unified interpretation that can accommodate both for an ontological and a linguistic usage of logos could be developed. These distinctions drawn, one can gather from surveying the various cases of becoming in the way we are describing that there must be always an underlying something, namely that which becomes, and that this, though always one numerically, in form (eidos) at least is not one. (By ‘in form’ I mean the same as ‘in logos’.) (Physics 190a13–17)

161 The same usage can be found in Met. 1042a25 ff.: “The sensible substances all have matter. The substratum is substance, and this is in one sense the matter (and by matter I mean that which, not being a ‘this’ actually, is potentially a ‘this’), and in another sense the formula or form (which being a ‘this’ can be separately formulated) […].” (αἱ δ’ αἰσθηταὶ οὐσίαι πᾶσαι ὕλην ἔχουσιν. ἔστι δ’ οὐσία τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἄλλως μὲν ἡ ὕλη (ὕλην δὲ λέγω ἣ μὴ τόδε τι οὖσα ἐνεργείᾳ δυνάμει ἐστὶ τόδε τι), ἄλλως δ’ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ μορφή, ὃ τόδε τι ὂν τῷ λόγῳ χωριστόν ἐστιν·) – In this passage only morphê not eidos is used. The usage of logos might also be explained in the following statement: forms are separable from the concrete substance only by logos, therefore they are logoi in a way while logos can still keep its linguistic meaning. Another example in which logos is used for ‘form’ is Met. 1058a37: “And since one element is formula and one is matter, contraries which are in the formula make a difference in species, but those which are in the compound material thing do not make one.” (καὶ ἐπειδή ἐστι τὸ μὲν λόγος τὸ δ’ ὕλη, ὅσαι μὲν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ εἰσὶν ἐναντιότητες εἴδει ποιοῦσι διαφοράν, ὅσαι δ’ ἐν τῷ συνειλημμένῳ τῇ ὕλῃ οὐ ποιοῦσιν. διὸ ἀνθρώπου λευκότης οὐ ποιεῖ οὐδὲ μελανία, οὐδὲ τοῦ λευκοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔστι διαφορὰ κατ’ εἶδος πρὸς μέλανα ἄνθρωπον, οὐδ’ ἂν ὄνομα ἓν τεθῇ.) – This once again stresses that the species is not determined by the number of expressions available in a particular language. Eidos is used for species not form here, which might be the explanation for this particular usage of logos. Eidos and logos are also parallelized and contrasted with matter at Met. 1069b34. 162 See Met. 1040a9/10.

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Here “being human” and “being not musical” are said to be different by virtue of their logoi and being different in species (eidos) is said to be the same (tauton). This might be taken literally. In this case, logos receives the same ontological status as eidos. It might as well only be the same because for every species there is (exactly) one corresponding logos. However, when taken in isolation the literal reading seems preferable. Or is it because harmony is a ratio (logos) of numbers and so is man and everything else? […] Evidently the numbers are not the substance nor the causes (aitia) of the form (morphê); for the ratio (logos) is the substance, while the number is the matter. […] Number, then, whether number in general or number which consists of abstract units, is neither the cause as agent, nor the matter, nor the formula (logos) and form (eidos) of things. (Met. 1092b13–25)

In this passage, logos might be ambiguous. In the first context, it is used for numeric proportions which might be equated with forms. Logos is said to be ousia and is parallelized with eidos in contrast to hylê. This might either be interpreted as another usage of logos with the same meaning as eidos or be consistently interpreted as proportions which belong to form rather than to matter. Therefore, Aristotle might just be using logos with its mathematical rather than its linguistic meaning throughout. It might even be the case that the mathematical meaning explains the usage of logos instead of eidos shown to be present in some parts of Physics and Metaphysics as indicated above. For the earliest philosophy is, on all subjects, like one who lisps, since in its beginnings it is but a child. For even Empedocles says bone exists by virtue of the ratio (logos) in it. Now this is the essence (to ti ên einai) and substance of the thing (pragma). But it is similarly necessary that the ratio should be the substance of flesh and of everything else […]. (Met. 993a15–20)

In these passages, the logos is equated with essence (to ti ên einai) and ousia. As in the previous passage, logos could be understood as a quantitative proportion between different materials in this context. In addition, the position presented is attributed to Empedocles and therefore need not be applied to Aristotle’s own position and understanding and terminological use of logos. Of the four passages discussed, one (Met. 1039b20) seems to be using logos instead of eidos without any doubt or possible explanation. In the other cases, other interpretative options are available to explain the usage of logos. In Met. 1039b20, where this is not the case, logos is used for linguistic entities in close proximity. There are several other passages from the same treatises which clearly imply that logos should be understood as distinct from eidos/ousia/to ti ên einai and rather as a linguistic entity. 175

Two things are called one, when the formula which states the essence (ho logos ho to ti ên einai legôn) of one is indivisible from another formula which shows the essence of the other (though in itself every logos is divisible). (Met. 1016a33–35)

In this passage, the phrase ho logos ho to ti ên einai legôn is used which seems to imply those logoi which are directed at a particular essence. They are said to be indivisible but only in a certain regard. Logoi as logoi are always divisible which, in addition to the way it is phrased, implies understanding logoi in this passage as linguistic entities subsumed by the general definition as meaningful sounds with meaningful parts. The unity is achieved in regard to other logoi that also reveal the thing in question because all logoi that successfully pick out an essence have to amount to the same in terms of the unity of the essence. Essence is always unique and a unity in Aristotle. The essence (to ti ên einai), the logos of which is a definition, is also called the substance (ousia) of each thing (hekastou). (Met. 1017b21/22)

To ti ên einai, or essence, is one of the meanings of substance and the logos of to ti ên einai is said to be a definition (horismos). Therefore, logos tês ousias and logos tou ti ên einai are synonyms and can be used interchangeably, at least in the cases where essence is the meaning of “substance.” Once again, logos is not equated with substance but is rather said to be something that is related to substance. The definition is a specific logos, i.e., the logos that has a particular relation to substance as essence. In Metaphysics XIII, Aristotle contrasts being prior concerning logos with being prior concerning ousia: Grant they are prior in formula (logos). Still not all things which are prior in formula are prior in substance (ousia). For those things are prior in substance which when separated from other thing continue to exist, but those are prior in formula out of whose formulae the formulae of other things are compounded; and these two properties are not co-extensive. For if attributes, such as moving or white, do not exist apart from their substances, the white is prior to the white man in formula but not in substance. (Met. 1077b1–7)

The constituents of a logos as sentence have to be seen as prior to the logos. On the ontological level, qualities are always qualities of a substance, therefore, they cannot be said to be prior in relation to substance. This is equivalent to the notion of primary substance in Categories and the way logos is conceived in the logical writings. The false formula (logos) is the formula of non-existent objects (mê onta), in so far as it is false. Hence every formula is false when applied to something other than that of which it is true, e.g. the formula of a circle is false when applied to a triangle. In a sense there is one formula of each thing, i.e. the formula of its essence (logos tou ti ên einai), but in a sense there are many, since the thing itself and the thing itself modified in a certain way

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are somehow the same, e.g. Socrates and musical Socrates. […] But it is possible to describe each thing not only by its own formula, but also by that of something else. This may be done altogether falsely indeed, but in some ways it may be done truly, e.g. eight may be described as a double number by the use of the formula of two. (Met. 1024b26–1025a1)

A logos is false insofar as it is used to refer to an entity to which it does not apply to. In one regard, there is only one logos of each entity which is the logos of its essence (to ti ên einai) just as there is only one essence. The unity of the logos is guaranteed by the unity of substances in that case.163 In another regard, there is more than one logos which can be applied to a particular, e.g., logoi containing some of its accidents. This clarifies why Aristotle sometimes seems to imply that there is only one logos for an entity, e.g., in the opening passage of Categories that explicitly refers to the (one possible) logos tês ousias, and at other times seems to imply there are several logoi that successfully describe an entity. There are at least three radically different options for interpreting logos in Aristotle presented in the previous sections: Fig. 4:  Different interpretations of logos.  

Mind-dependent

Language-dependent

logos as sentence

X

X

Pathêma

X

-

logos as form/eidos/objective meaning -

-

Logos might either be understood as a sentence used in discourse to pick out an essence. It might be the same as pathêma. In that case, it is mind-dependent but not language dependent. Furthermore, it might be conceived as a mind-independent form, i.e., essence, or it might be a form shared both by real entities and mental representations. The general tendency in Metaphysics seems to be not to equate logos with ousia or eidos but rather to see it as connected. Although, admittedly, there are few passages that do not fully fit this interpretation; however, they can be explained as glitches that are motivated by the strong connection both notions have. The basic notion of logos seems to be the same in the logical writings and Metaphysics. The same might be said about the notion of substance. But can this notion of logos fulfill the methodological requirements it needs to fulfill to explain the phenomenon of homonymy? The shareability of concepts and the reference fixing through the right kinds of relations to real entities is a very huge and important point in philosophical de163 This explains how it can be a unity and have parts.

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bates about concepts as representations – especially in causal accounts of content and reference. The Aristotelian theory of logoi and of substances might just be able to solve this problem in a way that resembles modern accounts: proper logoi describing the essence have the right referential properties which are vouched for not by the unity of the logos but by the unity of the essence and the logos having the right kind of relation to the essence. This also is coherent with the assumption that every word corresponds to exactly one logos, which is implied in Categories. The next section asks whether the notion of logos as definition can fulfill all these requirements.

2.2.3. Logos and definition Sometimes logos is translated as “definition” and some contexts, e.g., the ones involving homonymy/synonymy, imply that “definition” is a good translation for this specific technical meaning of logos. Aristotle proposes an elaborate theory of definitions that specifies what elements definitions should have. The Greek word for definition in Aristotle is horismos, which is more specific than logos and said to be a subspecies of logos.164 It has a specified form and consists of the genus and the specific difference. The remainder of this section will focus on horismos and its relation to logos, but first another technical term must be considered briefly. In some passages, horos seems to be used interchangeably with horismos.165 In Topics and Posterior Analytics, horos is defined as the constituent of a statement which is either a predicate or the subject of predication. Therefore, horos – in addition to horismos – is another contender for “concept” in Aristotle. Horoi can be predicated (kategorein) of each other.166 Maybe it is possible to use both expressions interchangeably since horos regards the constituents of statements as units of a larger structure while horismos regards the same units in isolation insofar as they can be defined by a logos fulfilling the requirements of a theory of definition.167 In a syllogism, three horoi are present. The middle term has a connection both to the minor and the major term. The major premise and the minor premise both include the middle term while the conclusion only includes the other two. The 164 165 166 167

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See Met. 1017b21/22, cited above. Ludlam (2000) argues that the usage of horos instead of horismos is a later addition. See An. Pr. 25b37–39. Definitions formed by Aristotelian dihairesis are the starting point of syllogisms and are always required. See Ferejohn (1982) p. 384: “Aristotle is making the strong claim that the breakdown of a genus into its infimae species by Platonic division (or something much like it) is not simply a useful aid (as b25 might suggest), but an indispensable prerequisite to the construction of demonstrative syllogisms concerning that genus.”

relation between all three horoi is described by a spatial analogy also often used when describing concepts as subsuming their members. The middle term includes one of the others and is included in the third horos.168 It is possible to form incomplete syllogisms which are still valid since the missing information is included in the horoi and inferred from them. It is important to form a proper definition to be able to generate syllogisms and draw the right conclusions. Horoi can be chosen unwisely because of the linguistic form (lexis) in which they are presented. In consequence, they generate misjudgments.169 All of this seems to imply that either horos can be equated with horismos/definition or at least is related to it in the way described above. Both horismos and horos can be said to be related to different aspects of modern psychological and philosophical theories of concepts. Concepts are horismoi insofar as they are structured and contain information that are used to categorize individuals as members of a certain class. Concepts are horoi insofar as they are the simple constituents of thoughts, i.e., representations used in higher-order thought processes such as induction, plan-making, problem-solving. In Metaphysics 987a, Aristotle provides a historical account of how definitions were introduced in philosophy. He states that the Pythagoreans were the first who tried to come up with definitions by trying to define what each thing is, i.e., what is the proper answer to the ti-esti question. He criticizes these early approaches for being satisfied too easily and just equating the first thing to which the definition applies with the definition, e.g., ‘double’ and ‘two.’ The next philosophers to focus on definitions were Socrates and Plato. Plato mistook the observation that the definition and what it applies to are different and used this as a starting point to justify his theory of independent forms.170 This is attributed to his focus on logoi which is not present in the earlier philosophers.171 Aristotle himself has a far more elaborated theory of definitions. In the context of Posterior Analytics, he discusses different types of definitions relevant for scientific discourse. It is important in science to discuss problems on the level of species via definitions since it is not possible to take every single individual into regard.172 The same thing that an economical argument can be and has been made (both in Aristotle and the modern debate) in relation to words and 168 169 170 171

See An. Pr. 25b32–37. See An. Pr. 24b22–26, 43b, 48a1–12. See Met. 987b1–10. See Met. 987b30–33: This shows that even in the Metaphysics logoi are associated with dialectic for Aristotle, see also Met. 995b20–24. 172 See Top. 109b 13/14.

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in relation to concepts. A definition is, in itself, a thesis, i.e., something which is assumed without further proof. Unlike a hypothesis, a definition does not assume the existence of something but rather describes what something is.173 A definition is a specific type of logos that has a function, i.e., revealing an ousia, and has a certain form. It is directed at the thing (pragma) itself.174 It is intentional according to the distinctions drawn in the modern discussion. Definitions cannot be proven: therefore, they are prior to science and have to be acquired or formed before any scientific conduct is possible. Definitions and demonstrations have to be distinguished. They do not pertain to the same domains of knowledge.175 In the logical writings, the notion of definition is most thoroughly presented in Topics. They generally consist of a genus and the specific difference, e.g., ‘rational animal’ for ‘human.’176 Definitions are introduced in addition to a number of other notions such as proprium, genus, and accident. All of these notions are related to what could be called categorization in the modern debate. They can be predicated of more than one entity. Definitions are once again said to be logoi if they signify the essence of an entity. They should express this essence and nothing else and are, therefore, described as a logos tês ousias.177 However, in Topics 106/107b logos is also used to describe the part of a definition which is generated by subtracting the difference (idion). This indicates once more that logoi are conceived more broadly than horismoi. Aristotle uses the expression horismon/ horon apodidonai, which is close to logon (apo-) didonai used in the opening passage of Categories. This illustrates the close connection between both notions and the linguistic status of definitions.178 In Topics 108b, differences are said to be decisive for gaining knowledge of real entities since their unique features donate the logos tês ousias.179 This might indicate that the expressions horismos and logos tês ousias are interchangeable and both denote definitions according to the Aristotelian scheme of genus proximum et differentia specifica. One word cannot be defined using only one other word (which would be a nominal definition in the most literal sense) even 173 174 175 176 177

See An. Post. 72a14–24. See An. Pr. 97b13. See An. Post. 90b/91a. See Top. 103a15/16. See Top. 130b25/26: “The logos revealing the substance.” (τὸν δηλοῦντα λόγον τὴν οὐσίαν.) 178 See Top. 102a4, 108b9, 108b19/20, 148a26/26, 149a30, 150b38, 158b24. 179 See Top. 108b4–6.

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though this might as well be informative, e.g., if only the second word is known to one of the disputants or the first word can be disambiguated. The defeniendum and the defeniens are stated to be the same in a definition. By demonstrating that the two are not identical, a definition can be shown to be false, e.g., by showing that some As are not B, B can be ruled out as a definition for A. But a logos applying to all members of a kind is not sufficient to qualify as a definition. It might only be part of the definition or include accidental properties. A given logos can either be a horismos or not be a horismos.180 Closely related to definitions – but not quite the same – is the characteristic feature or proprium. A characteristic feature can only be found in the signified kind and, therefore, can be exchanged from an extensional perspective for the names just like the definition. Both identify a given kind without any margin of error. However, it is not a full definition since it does not specify the essence of a thing. In the formula ‘All As are Bs’ A and B can be exchanged without consequence both for propria and definitions, which is not the case for genera and accidents.181 There are essential features that are not identical with the definition but can be deduced from it.182 The characteristic feature was considered as one possible way to understand a logos required to attribute knowledge to a subject in the Platonic Theaitetos. In probabilistic theories of concepts, such as prototype theory, the characteristic feature in Aristotle would correspond to features that are highly diagnostic. Since the genus applies to more than one species, it is not a full definition. Species and difference always need to be “smaller,” i.e., have a smaller extension than genus. Different genera can only be rightfully predicated of the same species if they are subordinated to each other.183 The genera are said to be archai of the definitions insofar as they are the first constituents of definitions.184 Accidents are neither definitions nor propria nor genera. They cannot be used to identify species because they apply to several different species in disparate genera. They do not necessarily apply either to a kind nor to an individual. Accidents seem to be both nonessential properties that inherently belong to an individual and cannot change over time as well as properties that change over time. This is not entirely clear since the examples mentioned only concern properties that can change over time but the definition of accidents does not exclude permanent properties. Species have accidents 180 181 182 183 184

See Top. 101b/102a, 153a1. See Top. 103b9/10. See An. Post. 74a/b. See Top. 102a/b, 121b11–30. See Met. 998b5.

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as well, i.e., properties that are not part of their definition and are not exclusive to them. In contrast to the other three classes, accidents can be graduated. Accidents can be propria in a specified and narrow situation and in relation to other entities in a given context, e.g., being the only sitting person in a room or the only person with white hair in a group.185 Aristotle distinguishes between properties that are conceptually necessary and those that are present because of a thing’s nature. For example, ‘having two legs’ is a property human beings have by nature, but since there are human beings without two legs it is not conceptually necessary.186 Definitions can be wrong in the same vein as propria if they apply to more than the defeniendum. Therefore, Aristotle calls all four classes definition-like (horika) even though neither proprium, genus, nor accident are proper definitions.187 There are several tests for whether a provided definition is proper. If the onoma and the given logos do not refer to the same kind of entities, the logos cannot possibly qualify as a definition. In the next step, in order to form a definition it is important that the given logos does not apply to anything else, e.g., it might be too broadly conceived. On the other hand, it might be too narrow and only apply to a subset of the entities intended. Definitions also are not proper if they contain more information than necessary even though they apply to all members and do not apply to nonmembers.188 Definitions need to contain the right amount of information. They may neither include features which are not necessary to express the essence nor can they lack any part that constitutes the essence, i.e., genus and difference.189 Good definitions make use of more common and better known terms when compared to their defeniendum. The aim of a good definition is to further one’s knowledge.190 Definitions require prior knowledge. One can only produce a definition once the constituents of a definition are already known. Aristotle distinguishes between definitions which are formed by referring to the genus and those which are formed by listing the parts or features of a thing.191 The latter are not proper definitions in the sense of horismos. This is interesting because it shows that the Aristotelian notion of definition cannot be combined with a feature list account, which seems to be implied by modern authors tying Aristotle to the classical theory of concepts. 185 186 187 188 189 190 191

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See Top. 102b17–26. See Top. 134a5–11. See Top. 102b29–35. See Top. 139a25–140b26, 152b38–153a5. See An. Pr. 97b1–3. See Top. 141a26–31. See Met. 992b30 ff., 998b13/14.

Bayer (1998) tries to show that scientific definitions require the differentia to be suitable to explain all other properties of a species, e.g., human beings having hands can be explained by virtue of their using a variety of different instruments which can be explained by virtue of their intellect, the one defining feature distinguishing humans from other animals (according to Aristotle). There is only supposed to be one well-formed definition for each species.192 However, it is possible to replace a genus in a definition with its own genus and difference. In this case, not an onoma but a logos is used to provide the genus.193 It is also possible to replace the difference by its logos.194 In these cases, it is still the same definition since it is not the words used to express it but the essence referred to that is the source of its unity. This should also apply across language, i.e., “zôon logon echon” and “rational animal” would be the same definition (horismos) and not two distinct ones. This is not made explicit by Aristotle. In some cases, definitions imply other definitions, e.g., in the case of relata and opposites. In this case, it is important that all definitions which belong to the same “family,” so to speak, are coherent with each other. It is not possible to define two opposites in respect to each other, since if ‘bad’ is defined as ‘the opposite of good’ and ‘good’ as ‘the opposite of bad’ one can replace ‘bad’ by its logos and get a definition for good which includes the defeniendum itself.195 It is debatable what entities have definitions and which do not in Aristotle. Substances can be defined; infinite entities such as ‘things which are not red’ cannot be defined.196 On the other hand, it seems that not only substance but also accidents can be defined.197 The case of quantities has been discussed above. There seems to be a logos of an individual, e.g., a logos of Kallias which contains the genus of his species, i.e., zoon.198 On the other hand, the logos of Kallias might just be the

192 193 194 195 196 197

See Top. 142a8/9, 143b35, Berg (1982) p. 28. See Top. 143a22–28. See Top. 146a33–35, 149a. See Top. 147b20–25. See An. Post. 83b5–9, 84a26/27. See Top. 120b30; Salmieri (2008) p. 91: “As soon as we step beyond the category of οὐσία, we stop being able to make sense of the idea that the matter out of which something is made is somehow its kind. Since beings in the other categories are not supposed to be definable in the strict sense that οὐσίαι are, they might not fall into kinds in the strictest sense, but they are supposed to be definable in some analogous sense, and Aristotle often defines non-οὐσίαι by giving their kinds and differences.” 198 See Met. 1022a26–29.

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general logos of ‘human being.’199 There can be a definition, at least in a derivative sense, for particulars and it is easier to define a particular than a universal.200 However, those examples might all not be definitions or horismoi in the stricter sense. In fact, in Metaphysics it is said there are only horismoi for substances which might be a change in regard to Topics.201 But surely all the attributes in the definition (horismos) must be one; for the definition is a single logos and a logos of substance (ousia), so it must be a logos of some one thing; for substance means (sêmainei) a ‘one’ and a ‘this’, as we maintain. We must first inquire about definitions arising out of divisions (dihairesis). There is nothing in the definition except the first named genus and the differentiae. (Met. 1037b24–30)

In the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss the notion of definitions as presented in Metaphysics and the question of whether there are fundamental differences to the one established in Topics. The identification of definitions as a form of logos is also present in Metaphysics which is supposed to be a later treatise in comparison with Posterior Analytics. The relation between a mere logos and a horismos is described in the following way: Therefore, there is an essence (to ti ên einai) only of those things whose logos is a definition (horismos). But we have a definition not where we have a word and a logos identical in meaning (for in that case all logoi would be definitions […]), but where there is a logos of something primary; and primary things are those which do not involve one thing’s being said of another. Nothing, then, which is not a species of a genus will have an essence […]. (Met. 1030a6–12)

A definition cannot simply be defined as a logos which has the same meaning as the name (logos onomati to auton sêmainon) since everything can be given a name. If definitions were defined merely in this way, all logoi would be definitions. However, only some logoi qualify as horismoi. Instead, the horismos is a logos which 199 Marcos (2004) discusses the question whether there can be a science of particulars and states that Aristotle at least saw the problem and tried to establish the possibility of a science of particulars in Metaphysics M which is different from universal science but also necessary since human beings are always concerned with and interact with particulars. Modrak (2001, p. 211) sees Aristotle as restricting at least definitions to universals: “Individuals are indefinable. Were Aristotle to posit individual forms, these would be indefinable ex hypothesi. […] The logos that is the essence of the individual would not be the same logos as the logos grasped in thought which is a universal. The individual logos would at best be an instance of the universal logos.” 200 See An. Pr. 97b28. 201 See Met. 1031a1/2: “Clearly then only substance is definable.” (δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι μόνης τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρισμός.)

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signifies the essence of an entity (logos tou ti esti, logos tês ousias).202 The same issue is discussed in Plato’s Theaitetos when a definition for logos is needed. Horismos is primarily a unity that is constituted by an essence. There are logoi of other unities such as the unity of the Iliad which are not a definition. On the other hand, there will be logoi and horismoi of other entities such as qualities which are horismoi/logoi to a lesser degree in the same way the nonsubstance entities are entities only by virtue of their relation to substances. They are not horismoi in the most genuine meaning of the term but they are horismoi in a derivational kind of way.203 There will be logoi corresponding to all words not depending on whether they signify an essence or not. Those logoi can be more and less precise but they can never become definitions.204 Logos tês ousias seems to be almost a technical term in its own right. The logos tou ti ên einai (another variant) is that which signifies the thing in itself without referring to the thing, i.e., the definiendum cannot be included in the defeniens.205 It might just be a particular form of definition, maybe the most genuine form of definition, while there are other less genuine forms, e.g., the enumeration of parts.206 Modrak (2001) stresses this distinction between definitions and mere logoi when explaining the relation between definitions and logoi for compound concepts: ‘Pale man’ contains one term (man) that has a definition (horismos) in the strict sense and another (pale) that has a definition in a secondary sense; taken together those two definitions give us a logos of ‘pale man’; this logos is not a horismos but is perfectly adequate to the task of explicating the meaning of the phrase. (Modrak 2001: 159)

And a few pages later: The compound term refers to any concrete individual satisfying the logos of ‘pale human’; it may be used in a definite description to pick out a particular human, for instance, the pale man in the corner. (Modrak 2001: 163)

It is clear from this that not only horismoi fulfil the same tasks that are assigned to concepts in the modern discussion, i.e., to identify individuals as members of a category, but also mere logoi can fulfill these tasks. Therefore, it is adequate to compare logos and not only horismos to “concept.”207 Horismoi and horoi are 202 203 204 205 206 207

See An. Post. 92b, 93b30, 97a19. See Met. 1030b4–13, 1031a5 ff. See Met. 1030a 14–18. See Met. 1029b19–21. See Met. 998b11–14. See Modrak (2001) p. 213: “There are proper names and descriptions of the concrete individual as an individual substance or an accidental unity; these refer to the

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restricted to sortal concepts. Mere logoi could be described as nominal definitions.208 Nominal definitions require the existence of their referents and being true of them, but they need not be complete like real and scientific definitions.209 Therefore, there would be a scale going from logoi wrongly presumed to mean the same as an expression to logoi actually applying, nominal definitions, and ultimately real definitions (successful in picking out the essence).210 A further class to be distinguished are logoi which also reveal causes (logos ho dêlôn dia ti estin).211 This kind of definition is more valuable for science than any other. There are different normative criteria that are applicable, some required to qualify as a definition at all and some required to qualify as a scientific definition. In some cases, the term horismos is restricted to the latter kind of definitions while other passages suggest it is a broader class. The formal principle (eidos) is the logos, but this is obscure if it does not include the cause. E.g. what is eclipse? Deprivation of light. But if we ad ‘by interposition of the earth’, this is the logos which includes the cause. (Met. 1044b12–15)

This shows that definitions as conceived in Metaphysics can either contain causes or not contain causes. If they contain causes, they are more precise. Definitions not containing causes aim only at the form (eidos) and are incomplete. In

208

209 210 211

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concrete individual. There are at the next level of description common nouns and general descriptions of the kind to which the individual belongs; these refer to the individuals exemplifying the kind. There are on the next level of description proper definitions of essence (primary substance) and qualified definitions of property essences (of qualities, quantities, etc.) the latter definitions are inferior, because, unlike definitions of substance, they contain added determinants (cf. 1031a1–4).” Demoss/Devereux (1988) p. 135/136 describe nominal definitions in Aristotle in the following way: “They are accounts of what such terms as “thunder” and “eclipse” mean insofar as they capture those features that ordinary speakers have in mind when they use and understand the terms. They do not include reference to explanatory features discovered through scientific investigation, features that are not the “common property” of ordinary speakers of the language.” The relation between word meanings and nominal definitions is stressed (p. 137): “This should not surprise us if we remember that a nominal definition gives an account of what something is by giving us the meaning of its name; for the definition of triangle which is posited in geometry would also seem to be a straightforward account of what is meant by the term.” See Demoss/Devereux (1988) p. 141. Höffe (1996, p. 79–81) describes a similar scale starting with nominal definitions, then scientific definitions stating the cause, and ultimately real definitions picking out the essences. See An. Post. 93b39.

Metaphysics, Aristotle also discusses different ways ‘house’ could be defined. It could be defined by virtue of its materials, e.g., as something being made of stones and wood. Alternatively, it might be defined by virtue of its function, e.g., as a shelter for human beings. The logos created by finding the difference is more like a functional definition according to Aristotle.212 In Metaphysics VII, the relation between definitions, their parts and entities and their parts is discussed: Since a definition is a logos, and every logos has parts, and as the logos is to the thing (pragma), so is the part of the logos to the part of the thing, we are already faced by the question whether the logos of the parts must be present in the logos of the whole or not. The logos of the circle does not include that of the segments, but that of the syllable includes that of the letters; yet the circle is divided into segments as the syllable is into letters. (Met. 1034b20–27)

For some definitions, it is true that their parts correspond to parts of the entities while it is not true for others, e.g., segments of a circle. This can be explained by virtue of the ambiguity of “part.” Definitions which signify the form or essence (eidos) need not make reference to material parts of the entities to which they apply.213 A logos always applies to what is common to more than one thing never to particulars. Particulars are known through their kinds because knowledge is always knowledge of universals and never knowledge of particulars. Nevertheless, particulars are cognitively accessible through perception and thought, but also only as an individual belonging to a certain species.214 In conclusion, it can be said that definitions are significant for scientific discourse. A line is drawn between nominal and real definitions, i.e., definitions which only signify the same as a name (e.g., enumerate some features) and definitions that successfully pick out an essence by virtue of providing the proper genus and difference. The first kind of definition is only discussed in a descriptive account, while the second kind is part of a normative account of what kind of definitions are required to pick out real entities. If they are unsuccessful in this regard, they do not qualify as definitions in a stricter sense. There is a tendency to use logos in general for the former class and horismos or logos tês ousias and its variants for the latter class. This explains why there can be only one logos tês ousias in the case of homonymy discussed in the Categories: its uniqueness is fixed because there is exactly one adequate definition for each substance. The unity of the definition is

212 See Met. 1043a14 ff. 213 See Met. 1035a1 ff., 1036a25 ff., 1037a1 ff. 214 See Met. 1036a1–11.

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fixed by the unity of substance. In some cases, horismos seems to be used for both classes (maybe even sometimes only for nominal definitions)215 and logos can regularly be used instead of horismos since it is its superordinated genus.

2.3.  Some conclusions The previous sections tried to show that logos should be seen as a technical term with a specific meaning – at least when it comes to the logical writings – which is also present throughout the other writings, even though there might be other meanings of logos that are predominant. In its first meaning (L1), logos has to be seen as a genus that subsumes a lot of other important notions in Aristotle, e.g., statements, syllogisms, speeches, definitions and many more. Since the genus can always be used to designate its species, logos is often used to denote one of its species. The technical term logos (L2) that is paradigmatically used in Topics and in Categories 1a as part of the composite logos tês ousias is one of the species of (L1). It can be distinguished from (L1) and from more specialized meanings like definition/horismos (L3) and has no other distinct term corresponding to it. The most general common meaning of logos can be defined the following way: (L1) Logos is a linguistic unit above the word level constiting of parts which have a meaning in separation.

Therefore, logos in the contexts in question should be interpreted as a linguistic entity. Other meanings, e.g., logos as a faculty or logoi enhyloi for the forms corresponding to logoi are not the same but conceptually related to (L1). The relevant use of logos that this section of the dissertation has been aiming at can be described in the following way: (L2) Logos is the account (a logos according to (L1)) given for a word W to state its meaning in a given context. Greek: logos onomati to auton sêmainon.216

Logos (L2) is understood in the environment of philosophical discourses and the requirement that a correspondent is able to provide an explanation of the words he uses (logon didonai). Logoi (L2) can qualify as definitions (horismoi) if they successfully pick out the essence of the entity in question and adhere to

215 See Ferejohn (1982) for a discussion of whether horismos might be used in different ways in different Aristotelic writings. He speaks against assigning technical meanings to Aristotelian terms at will but admits that there are systematic ambiguities alike to the ones proposed here. 216 See An. Post. 92b.

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the formal requirements of definitions (genus proximum et differentia specifica). However, this does not have to be the case to qualify as a logos according to (L2): Even though linguistic meaning depends upon the relation between mental content and its referent, the mental content expressible as the linguistic meaning may be confused or lack specifity. (Modrak 2001: 93)

A logos (L2) is of the more general type (L1) and fulfills a specific function, i.e., expressing the meaning of a word. Just as the section pertaining to meanings elaborated, logos is not to be understood as word meaning itself but is related to word meaning because it is the explication of a word meaning by linguistic means. It need not be successful in this task and is not a normative notion (unlike a real definition). Therefore, it could be described as a nominal definition.217 Not every logos that signifies the same as a name does qualify as definition but only those that successfully state the essence. The first is equivalent to (L2) the second equivalent to (L3). (L3) Horismos is a logos (L2) that is successful in picking out the essence of the entity a word W is referring to by providing its genus and specific difference.

(L3) and (L2) are both based on (L1) and each is more specific. The term logos is used both for (L1) and (L2). In general, horismos (and sometimes horos) is used for (L3). In some passages, logos is used for (L3).218 The usage is not fully consistent but the most relevant passages can be explained using this scheme. It should also be noted that it is parallel to but not the same as Plato’s three definitions of logos in the Theaitetos as mentioned above. The first of which describes logos as any linguistic uttering, the second as a list of features which do not necessarily pick out the right category, and the third as providing the unique feature that distinguishes the category in question from all others. The last is equivalent to the Aristotelian notion of idion whose similarities and differences have already been discussed. If this scheme to understand the relevant usage of logos in Aristotle is accepted, it must be concluded that logos cannot be equated with “concept” in the modern debate – neither in the sense of mental representations nor in the sense of mind-independent word meanings. The notion is, however, related to classical theories of concepts as well as to theory theory in psychology and the categorial scheme has been shown to be a conceptual scheme. These results might or might not be compatible with the notion of pathêmata as word meanings and mental representations. 217 See Ferejohn (1982) p. 389. 218 See Mesch (1997) p. 136–139.

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VI.  Concepts as pathêmata 1.  Pathêmata 1.1.  De interpretatione 16a First we must settle what a name (onoma) is and what a verb (rhêma) is, and then what a negation (apophasis), an affirmation (kataphasis), a statement (apophansis) and a sentence (logos) are. Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections (pathêmata) in the soul, and written marks symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of ­– affections of the soul – are the same for all; and what these affections are likenesses (homoiômata) of – actual things (pragmata) – are also the same. These matters have been discussed in the works on the soul and do not belong to the present subject. Just as some thoughts (noêma) in the soul are neither true nor false while some are necessarily one or the other, so also with spoken sounds. For falsity and truth have to do with combination and separation. Thus names and verbs by themselves – for instance ‘man’ or ‘white’ when nothing further is added – are like the thoughts that are without combination and separation; for so far they are neither true nor false. A sign of this is that even ‘goat-stag’ signifies something (sêmainei ti) but not, as yet, anything true or false – unless ‘is’ or ‘is not’ is added (either simply of with reference to time). A name is a spoken sound (phônê sêmantikê) significant by convention (kata synthêkên) without time, none of whose parts is significant in separation. (De Int. 16a1–21)

This famous passage has already been cited in the introduction. It has received much attention in the literature because it forms the essential link between the logical and the psychological writings. While it is included in the logical writings, it also makes reference to the psychological writings. At first, some general features will be pointed out. Then several interpretations will be discussed. Arens (1984)1 stresses that the passage in fact should not be understood as an introduction to the treatise but rather as a thematic beginning that introduces some, but not all, important topics. The text should be considered as a manuscript associated with academic lectures. It includes ambiguities but does leave important issues unaddressed. This should be kept in mind when an interpretation is attempted. Aristotle’s intention is to clarify some central notions that the treatment of sentences as truth functional entities requires, i.e., noun, verb, statement, negation, 1 Arens (1984) p. 17 f.

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and logos. In the next section, Aristotle speaks about vocal symbols and the way they are related to other representations. Written symbols stand for vocal symbols. However, vocal signs are not direct symbols of actual things but rather of pathêmata in the soul. Vocal signs and written signs can vary between human beings while pathêmata cannot. The pathêmata stand for actual things (pragmata) by virtue of being their likenesses (homoiômata).2 Both noêmata in the soul and spoken sounds are said to occur as either undetermined concerning truth and falsehood or determined to be either true or false. Truth and falsehood only apply to combinations or divisions of nouns and verbs; bare nouns correspond to bare thoughts. In addition, Aristotle defines onoma as unconnected, conventional, and meaningful sounds not containing information concerning time. This definition distinguishes onoma from logoi on the one hand and from rhemata on the other hand. All of this has already been discussed in the above sections, but here the linguistic dimension is defined in relation to the psychological dimension. The passage contains several ambiguities and brings up questions: (1) what is its function and intention? (2) How are the different ontological and representational levels related to each other? (3) How are pathêma and noêma related? (4) What other writings or parts of other writings does Aristotle make reference to? And of course (5): what are pathêmata supposed to be? The last one will be discussed in more detail in the sections below, the first two will be the focus of this section. (1) What is the passage’s function and intention? The main intention seems to be providing an explanation of how simple sounds can have a meaning, which is a prelude to a treatise that establishes how the meaning of combined sounds can be explained. It appears that Aristotle’s principal purpose in this passage is to set the stage for his definitions of name and verb, which are important for his treatment of propositions. Yet he does briefly trace the relationships involved in signification so that his coming remarks about assertions and denials may be properly connected with thought and the facts. (Polansky/Kuczewski 1990: 63)

The intention to clarify what different forms of articulated sounds both uncombined and combined are is stated in the beginning. Consequently, an account of

2 See Salmieri (2008) p. 127: “The description of the psychological items as “likenesses” (ὁμοιώματα) of the objects implies that likeness is the relationship in virtue of which thoughts signify objects. Likeness plays a pronounced role in the De Anima and in Aristotle’s natural philosophy generally, where efficient causation is often analyzed as a process of “likening” or form-transference.”

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uncombined signs is presented next, which leads into the definition of onoma as the simplest form of uncombined sound, followed by a definition of rhêma, and ultimately logos. This presupposes that logos at the beginning of the passage should be understood as (L1) according to the scheme developed in the previous section, i.e., as a form of combined meaningful sounds in contrast to kataphasis and apophasis.3 On the other hand, logos could be understood as the meaning of simple sounds (either according to (L2) or another account of logos as meaning). The following passage could already be understood as an explication of logos in that case. This is not highly plausible and has been argued against in the sections above. In the following passages, logos is used both for (L2)4 and (L1)5. Aristotle starts with the definitions of onoma and rhêma but then, unlike the order in the beginning of the passage, logos is defined followed up by statement (apophansis), affirmation (kataphasis), and negation (apophasis). This is plausible, since this order starts from a more general perspective. Still, the distinction between uncompounded linguistic symbols and compounded ones seems to be in place, which speaks for this interpretation of logos as (L1) and provides further proof that logos and pathêma should not be equated. In contrast, Walz (2006) interprets this passage to not be about simple unconnected sounds but rather about all linguistic categories mentioned in the first sentence, i.e., both connected and unconnected, truth-functional, and non-truth-functional. This can be justified by the statement that there are truthfunctional and non-truth-functional representations both in thought and in language (16a10/11). Also in the final passage of De interpretatione (24b), Aristotle refers back to the beginning and here true and false spoken sounds are said to be symbols of representations in the soul, which at least proves that the account is not restricted to unconnected linguistic symbols. In this case, pragma would also have to mean facts as well.6 There are problems with this interpretation as a general account of all linguistic symbols. For example, Aristotle was quite aware that there are functional words which in themselves do not signify entities and, therefore, could not be subsumed by this account of linguistic symbols. Walz justifies this discrepancy by assuming that Aristotle provides a general account before providing a specialized account for the separate linguistic categories such as onoma. If this account is not just an account of word meaning 3 Walz (2006) p. 231/232 fn. 5 discusses different possible meanings of logos and goes with “articulation” to encompass as many of them as possible. 4 See De Int. 16b1. 5 See De Int. 16b26 ff. 6 See Walz (2006) p. 232–234.

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but an account of meaning for all linguistic symbols, it nevertheless still has the same implication that there are simple not reducible constituents of thought that are pathêmata and represent in virtue of being likenesses of actual things. The notion of pathêma would have to be conceived more broadly. (2) Is there a difference between the relation between sounds and pathêmata on the one hand and pathêmata and pragmata on the other? How can this difference be described? It seems to be pretty intuitive to say that there is. Pathêmata represent in virtue of being likenesses. It should be noted that sounds are not explicitly said not to be likenesses; however, the conventional nature (kata synthêkên) of sound symbols might be seen as the feature that distinguishes both kinds of representations. This leaves open what likenesses are and how representations in the soul can be likenesses of real entities. Ackrill (1963) criticizes Aristotle, because in his opinion describing pathêmata as likenesses is based on a simplistic analogy to physical and conventional images.7 Different accounts of likeness are available to both Aristotle and modern interpreters. The question as to what likenesses are is also discussed by Polansky/ Kuczewski (1990). They reject the possibility that pathêma could simply be understood as mental images (phantasmata) because it is to be considered naïve. Instead, they propose that “[p]erhaps the choice of homoiomata is meant to emphasize the dependence of thought on its object and its peculiar sort of likeness.”8 It can be debated in which way pathêmata can be the same for all human beings. Mental particulars cannot be the same for all human beings, which led thinkers like Frege to assume concepts as nonmental entities and is also used as an argument for a pragmatist position in the modern debate. […] I assume that Aristotle is not asserting that every human being actually possesses the same affections in the soul. His point is, rather, that while people can adopt different linguistic signs for the affections in the soul, people in relevantly similar circumstances with properly functioning souls will derive the same affections from the same real things […]. (Wheeler 1999: 196)

Wheeler does not see a contradiction and allows mental images and only them as pathêmata in this context.9 This justification of how shareability should be

7 See Ackrill (1963) p. 113. 8 See Polansky/Kuczewski (1990) p. 53–55. 9 See Wheeler (1999) p. 202.

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understood in the case of mental representations is also used by proponents of concepts as mental particulars in the modern debate.10 Walz (2006, p. 235 ff.) sees the difference between symbols and signs as extremely important: “A full understanding of the distinction between symbol and sign is key to unpacking the opening lines of On Interpretation.” He makes reference to the etymologically original meaning of symbolon as a two-part token standing for a (social or juristic) contract between two parties.11 This meaning of symbolon is present in other works of Aristotle, e.g., when he describes friendship in the Eudemian Ethics.12 He sees the difference mainly in the conventional aspects of symbols.13 Ones in vocal-sounds – names, verbs, affirmations, denials, and articulations – are, therefore, both symbols and signs. It does not seem right, however, to think of a linguistic entity as having a symbol-part and a sign part that together constitute a whole. Rather, by calling the same linguistic entity both a symbol and a sign, Aristotle focuses our attention on the fact that such an entity is conventional, in that it is an accidental, quasiartificial composite whose parts, though complementary, do not need to be together, and natural, in that lettered vocal-sounds regularly accompany determinate thoughts. For Aristotle, then, human language is at the intersection of the natural and conventional. It is where nature and intelligence meet so that the innate social inclinations of human beings can be fulfilled. (Walz 2006: 249)

This distinction between the conventional and the natural aspect of linguistic symbols is clearly present in Aristotle. However, it is not necessarily embodied in the distinction between symbolon and sêmeion14, which might both just signify

10 Salmieri (2008, p. 127) explains how the shareability of pathêmata in Aristotle could be explained: “The psychological items are soon identified with thoughts; and, when Aristotle says they are the same for everyone, he cannot mean that if one person thinks a certain thought everyone else must also do so. His point must be that, as objects exist independently of anyone’s thought or language, so what it is to think a certain object is determined by the nature of that object and (perhaps) by general psychological facts, rather than by idiosyncrasies or decisions of any particular person or community.” – This could be transferred to a modern account of concepts as mental particulars without any loss and modification. 11 See Walz (2006) p. 235. 12 See Höffe (2005) p. 551 ff. 13 See Walz (2006) p. 248. 14 Modrak (2001, p. 20) thinks that there are no sufficient reasons to treat both as distinct in this passage and in Aristotle in general. This is directed against Kretzmann (1974) who thinks that the difference between both is an overlooked feature of the text which is decisive for a fitting interpretation.

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the ‘standing-for’ relation, which constitutes both conventional and natural symbols. De intepretatione 24b uses both next to each other in the same context as the opening passage, seemingly without any difference in meaning. In contrast to Walz, Polansky/Kuczewski (1990) see symbols as a subclass of signs. They stress the connection between the noun sêmeion and the verb sêmainein, which is often used for linguistic representations.15 Wheeler (1999, p. 192) does not distinguish between the two: Given the preceding, it is reasonable to assume that mental images are likenesses of real things insofar as mental images have some perceptible or intelligible quality that is had by some real thing. On this interpretation, every mental image signified by a spoken sound represents (by means of having it) a perceptible or intelligible quality had by some real thing. According to this view, Aristotle embraces a strong representational theory of mind whereby affections in the soul actually have some of the qualities possessed by the things in the world of which they are likenesses. (Wheeler 1999: 206)

This is a rather strong interpretation of how likenesses have to be conceived. In general, there seems to be a difference in the way pathêmata and linguistic symbols represent things, which does not mean they do not represent at all. The exact way their representational role is defined will be the subject of subsequent sections. (3) What is the relation between pathêma and noêma? Walz (2006) equates both forms of representations.16 In the first passage, Aristotle speaks of pathêmata in the soul; in the next paragraph, he speaks of noêmata in the soul. Are both to be understood as the same representations or is there a difference? If there is a difference, what is the relation between them? Pathêma might only be used for simple representations or only for those related to perception/imagination while noêma might be the broader term which either includes or excludes pathêmata. The relation between “concept” in the modern debate and noêma in Aristotle, which is also a terminological relation in the sense of the medieval Latin translations, was mentioned above and will be a subject again when discussing the higher faculties of the soul in Aristotle’s psychological writing. (4) Does Aristotle make reference to psychology as a discipline in general or to a particular part of his psychological writings? If the latter is the case, to which part of his psychological writings is he making reference to? This, of course, involves questions of chronology. Which came first? De interpretatione or De anima? Are there maybe psychological writings by Aristotle not known to us?

15 Polansky/Kuczewski (1990) p. 59. 16 See Walz (2006) p. 234.

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Even if De interpretatione is the earlier work, which is commonly believed, the reference might be a later insertion made by Aristotle himself. But also to comparative questions: does this account fit the Aristotelian psychology we are familiar with or not? Are we maybe understanding this reference completely wrongly? For example, protôn in line 6 (if the reading is correct at all) might be read as a reference to De anima III 432a12, which discusses prota noêmata.17 Polansky/ Kuczewski (1990) see the reference pertaining not to the Aristotelian theory of perception and imagery but rather to the more general theory of thought. Our alternative view of what Aristotle means by ομοιώματα (likenesses) and the significance of the allusion to the De Anima is this. Aristotle is linking his remarks to his basic doctrine of cognition and not to the specific part about φαντάσματα. That doctrine exemplifies the widespread Greek view of cognition as grounded in ‘like by like’. For Aristotle, cognition involves a ‘passion or affection’, a being acted upon, of the soul in which it becomes likened or assimilated to what it cognizes. (Polansky/Kuczewski 1990: 54)

This might be plausible when taking only the passage itself into account. However, there are a number of reasons to tie the passage more closely to his theory of perception. The strong point of their argument is that an account of perceptual representations might have severe problems in accounting for the fact that these representations are the same for all humans.18 However, there might be evidence that Aristotle would assert this thesis at least when a specific reading of ‘being the same for all humans’ is applied. This discussion will be continued below, after Aristotelian psychology and his theory of perception, imagination, and thought is introduced. In what follows, the general aspects related to De interpretatione 16a will be discussed, namely the status of pathêma as a philosophical term and more general aspects of a theory of representation in Aristotle.

1.2.  Pathein, pathos, pathêma Pathêma comes from the verb pathein, which is also connected to the more common word pathos. All three are relevant terms in Aristotelian philosophy and should, therefore, be taken into regard when analyzing what pathêma is supposed to mean in this passage. Pathein basically means ‘suffering.’ Aristotle uses pathein for one of the verbal Categories. Every ‘doing’ has a corresponding ‘suffering.’ Pathein is one of the Categories that receive almost no treatment in the Aristotelian writings. Pathos is usually used for the result of ‘suffering’ and is 17 See Walz (2006) p. 234 18 See Polansky/Kuczewski (1990) p. 56.

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distinguished from ‘suffering’ as a process, but not in all cases. It has several distinct meanings. It is used for (a) a subcategory of the Category of quality, (b) for emotional affects, and (c) for mental representations like pathêmata.19 The emotional meaning has received most attention in literature. It is partly associated with negative emotions or affects but not as a necessary component of meaning.20 In this context, it seems to be irrelevant since the passage in De interpretatione is clearly not speaking of emotions or words referring to emotions. It is also noteworthy that there is a strict dichotomy between pathos in this meaning and logos as a rational argument in the rhetorical writings.21 Pathos as a quality is said in more than one regard: (a) qualities which are only temporarily present in a subject, e.g., a person going red because of embarrassment, (b) qualities that are either related to perception or to emotion, and (c) more generally unnecessary qualities.22 There is a definition of pathos in the philosophical dictionary from Metaphysics: We call an affection (pathos) a quality (poiotês) in respect of which a thing can be altered, e.g. white and black, sweet and bitter, heaviness and lightness, and all others of the kind. – The already actualized alterations (alloiôseis). – Especially injurious alterations and movements (kinêseis), and, above all, painful injuries. – Experiences pleasant or painful when on a large scale are called affections. (Met. 1022b15–12)

Pathos is discussed as a subspecies of qualities. It is essential that pathê are easily or at least potentially changeable qualities. It is used both for the qualities qua qualities and their realizations. Many authors imply that pathos as mental representation and pathêma are virtually the same and are used interchangeably by Aristotle.23 Like pathê in its most general meaning, they seem to be the result of ‘suffering’ and are mainly associated with perception. Since they are a result and not a process they do not require the perceived object to be present or the sense organs to actively perceive. In De interpretatione, the status of pathêmata as representations which result from a suffering is not of particular importance; their status as intermediates between words and things is the primary focus of attention. However, their connection to perception on the one hand and thought on the other hand is 19 20 21 22 23

See Horn/Rapp (2008) p. 332/333. See Höffe (2005) p. 427, Bonitz (1867) p. 346/347. See Bonitz (1867) p. 353. See Höffe (2005) p. 428/429. See Bonitz (1867) p. 321–323: Bonitz states that both can be used for the ‘result’ reading while pathos is also sometimes used for the ‘process’ reading which is not possible for pathêma.

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established and the status as a result of a suffering plays a role in explaining how pathêmata can be likenesses of actual things. The word pathêma in its different meanings and grammatical forms occurs about fifty times in the Aristotelian writings considered to be genuine and about seventy times in the whole Corpus Aristotelicum.24 All occurrences in the genuine writings are plural forms with a huge majority25 being genitive plural (pathêmatôn) as in the opening section of De interpretatione. In general, the same meanings which have been stated for pathos can also be found for pathêma, i.e., (a) emotions26, (b) qualities27, and (c) suffering of different forms28. The first two seem to be the most prominent ones, which is also true for pathos. There are several passages where pathos and pathêmata occur in very close proximity.29 In these cases, there seems to be no clear distinction between pathos and pathêma. In addition to that, pathêma also co-occurs with forms of the verb pathein30 which is the root from which pathêma is formed. This all seems to point to the general judgment that both are only alternative ways to phrase the same meaning. A possible explanation for the Aristotelian use of pathêmatôn, i.e., the genitive plural, might be that the genitive plural of pathos, i.e., pathôn is identical to the present participle of pathein and, therefore, ambiguous.31 This might be a possible explanation for a lot of cases where pathêma is used instead of pathos. However, this is in no way conclusive.

24 The search function of Thesaurus Linguae Graecae yields 68 occurrences of which 53 can be placed in writings generally considered to be genuine. 25 Altogether 51 of 68 occurrences are genitive plural as well as 43 of 53 genuine occurrences. 26 E.g., Eth. Nic. 1108a31, An. Pr. 70b9, Eth. Eud. 1220b8, Poet. 1449b28, Rhet. 1396b32. 27 E.g., De Gen. 778a17, An. Post. 76b13, De caelo 299a23, Eth. Eud. 1221b10, De Gen. An. 778a16, Hist. An. 486b5, Met. 1020b19. 28 E.g., De Part. An. 667b5, De An. 403a20, De Div. 463a19. 29 E.g., Eth. Nic. 1108a31, Meteor. 382a32, An. Pr. 70b9, Eth. Eud. 1220b8, Eth. Eud. 1234a26, De Gen. 326a21, Met. 120b19. 30 See De An. 403a20, Eth. Eud. 1228b36. 31 Pathôn, including both grammatical forms, occurs only 43 times in the Corpus Aristotelicum while the singular pathos occurs 343 times and the plural pathê 246 times. Of all the occurrences of pathôn, 10 of those occurring in the genuine writings seem to be the plural genitive of pathos, which is less than the occurrences of pathêmatôn. The dominance of the plural genitive is discussed in Bonitz (1867) and Lehrs (1874).

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Often pathêma is associated with the soul, e.g., pathêmata tês psychês32, peri tên psychên pathêmata33, or as in De interpretatione 16a (en tê psychê pathêmata). This association of pathêmata with the soul results from pathêma standing for ‘emotion’ in a lot of cases. It also is quite obvious that pathêma is often associated with perception. In its meaning ‘quality’ it often designates perceptible qualities.34 This is one of the reasons Aristotle provides in the Categories why he is using pathos as a term for qualities.35 From a general point of view, it can be said that pathos and pathêma cannot be distinguished in Aristotle. They are too ambiguous to be considered fully formed technical terms with the described subclass of qualities being the most technical meaning. Pathêma is used in the context of affections of the soul and particularly perception because it can be described as a form of suffering. This barely technical meaning is the background for the usage of pathêma in the context of De interpretatione.36

1.3.  Representation in Aristotle Since the major part of Aristotle’s psychological writings is not concerned with language it is important to have a more general look at the Aristotelian theory of representation before diving into the question of how perceptual representations are related to other forms of representation, particularly linguistic representations. To do this, it is important to have a more in-depth look at the meaning of symbolon and sêmeion. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal who has the gift of speech (logos). And whereas mere voice (phônê) is but an indication (sêmeion) of pleasure and pain, and is therefore found in other animals (for their nature attains to the perception (aisthêsis) of pleasure and pain and the intimation (sêmainein) of them to one another, and no further), the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and unjust. (Pol. 1253a10–15)

In this famous passage from the Politics, Aristotle discusses the uniqueness of logos to human beings. Animals have the ability to produce signifying sounds to signal to each other their being in pain or their pleasures. The signifying function of this sound is determined by nature not convention and sêmeion is used to describe this simple form of communication and representation. Sêmainein 32 33 34 35 36

E.g., De An. 403a, Hist. An. 608a14, E.g., Eth. eud. 1229b21. E.g., De Sen. 445b4, Meteor. 388a10, Hist. An. 486b. See Cat. 9a/b. See Johansen (2012) p. 148/149.

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seems to indicate signs as a tool of communication which is possible for animals. From this and other observations, the conclusion could be drawn that Aristotle knew two forms of signification, natural signification (sêmeion) and conventional signification (symbolon), which is the view of Walz (2006). The higher cognitive abilities of human beings seem to stem from humankind’s ability to form conventional, i.e., symbolic representations. If this is the case, and the higher cognitive abilities are in fact defined in terms of symbolic representations, this shows a connection between Aristotle and amodal theories of concepts. On the other hand, those passages all deal with language as being symbolic, which is independent of a theory of concepts. Some authors have criticized the Aristotelian theory of representation as naïve because he asserts that spoken sounds are symbols of pathêmata rather than symbols of the things in themselves. Whether this criticism is valid and whether it is really a weakness of the Aristotelian theory depends on a number of issues. What does “being a symbol” mean? This touches on the systematical issue of how to conceive intentionality, i.e., the “standing for” relation. In an account in which intentionality is always conceived as being accessible for the subject, i.e., conscious in a very broad sense of the term, seeing spoken sounds as standing for mental representations rather than actual things is problematic. The relation between words and things is consciously accessible while the relation of mental representations and words generally seems not to be a subject of reflection, at least in a nonphilosophic discourse. On the other hand, if intentionality is interpreted in causal terms, there is no systematic problem in saying that words stand for mental representations the same way concepts are said to stand for real entities in causal theories of reference. Caston (1998) discusses whether Aristotle can be said to have a notion of intentionality or not. He denies that perception in Aristotle could be understood as intentional since “receiving form without matter” is not enough to account for aboutness.37 Instead, Caston believes that the Aristotelian account of phantasia should be read as a solution to the problem of intentionality as it was formulated by Brentano and others. Is the Aristotelian account naïve insofar as he does not see that the word stands for the thing in itself? It has already been mentioned that there are other passages where Aristotle clearly states that words stand for the things not only for pathêmata. Further answers can be found in a very interesting passage in his treatise on memory in which the way mental images (pathêmata, phantasmata) are representations is discussed. 37 See Caston (1998) p. 256.

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A picture painted on a panel is at once a picture and a likeness (eikôn), that is, while one and the same, it is both of these, although the being (einai) of both is not the same, and one might contemplate it either as a picture, or as a likeness. Just in the same way we have to conceive the phantasma within is both something in itself and relative to something else. In so far as it is regarded in itself, it is only an object of contemplation (theôrêma) or phantasma; but when considered as relative to something else, e.g., as its lankness, it is also a reminder (mnêmoneuma). (De Mem. 450b20–29)

The way memories are about past occurrences is compared to the way a painting is about what is depicted. It is possible to think of the painting in itself as a painting or to think of it as something that is about something else, e.g., an animal. The same is true of pathêmata: They can be interpreted as mere images present to the mind or they can be interpreted as images of something that has happened in the past. The relation of “standing for” is not determined by the image itself but by the way the mind makes use of it. This does not necessarily need to be a conscious process. Aristotle refers to cases where memories are mistaken for mere mental images or where mental images are mistaken for memories.38 Furthermore, he explains the nature of dreams in reference to images that are taken by the dreamer to stand for entities actually present while they are just combinations of past impressions.39 Hence, for Aristotle the same representation can stand for more than one thing and, in the case of mental images (if this is an adequate description for pathêmata), the reference is not solely determined by likeness to objects. This is parallel to Barsalou’s requirement that perceptual symbols have to be symbolic, i.e., their reference does not have to be determined solely by their perceptual content. These examples concern how pathêmata as representations are conceived. If the same account applies to words, this might refute the criticism. If words like pathêmata can stand for more than one thing, they could stand: (a) for themselves, (b) for pathêmata, (c) for the things themselves. The way the ‘standing for’ relation is conceived would differ as well as the way words are used as representations. (The distinction between (a) and (c) was one of the primary focuses of theories of supposition in medieval logic.) Taking all this evidence into account it seems reasonable to see Aristotle’s theory of representation not as naïve but rather as having striking similarities to some models of representation which are proposed in the modern debate. Categorizing him as naïve is rather based on some prefixed but not necessary assumptions on the way representation has to be described such as seeing it as necessarily consciously accessible. 38 See De Mem. 451a. 39 See De Ins. 461b.

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2.  Aristotelian psychology 2.1.  Psychê To understand the context of the Aristotelian theory of perception and cognition, it is important to first take into account their systematic place in his philosophy. They are discussed in his writings about the soul, i.e., De anima and the collection of treatises called Parva naturalia. Both are part of the Corpus Aristotelicum and considered genuine Aristotelian writings. The Aristotelian conception of soul should neither be mistaken for a mystical or religious concept (there are many religious concepts of soul present in antiquity, e.g., Plato’s conception might be said to be religious in parts) nor should it be taken for a modern psychological concept, e.g., soul as cognition or as the subject matter of modern psychology in general.40 Aristotle builds his conception on the intuitions present in the Greek usage of the word. Psychê is associated with being alive, being self-sustained, and the ability of spatial motion by one’s own free will.41 It is also associated with higher cognition and the notion of immortality. The equation of soul in general with its highest faculty, i.e., nous or intellect, is criticized by Aristotle.42 The word “life” (zên) is ambiguous and subsumes bodily movement, perception, mind, nutrition, procreation, etc.43 It can generally be defined as having the starting point of movement and rest (kinêsis kai stasis) in oneself (perhaps with the exception of thought; however, there are some authors who think that endogenous control is also a criterion for assigning something the status of a conceptual representation44). In consequence, the specific tasks that are associated with soul are to be understood as movements. In fact, all activities of the soul – like emotions, perception, etc. – are described as movement. Albeit one has to keep in mind that the Greek word kinêsis also stands for other forms of change.45 The specific functions of living beings of interest in this context such as perception, imagination, and cognition can, therefore, be understood as movements or changes which are realized in a biological body. In the first book of De anima, Aristotle collects intuitions about the soul and statements by his philosophical predecessors while in the second book he comes 40 See Caston (2009) p. 316. 41 See Ackrill (1981) p. 55/56; Gregorić (2007) p. 21/22; Johansen (2012) p. 37/38, Patzig (2009) p. 249. 42 See De An. 404a25–30. 43 See De An. 413a20. 44 See Machery (2009) p. 24–26. 45 See De An. 408b.

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up with his own definition. He provides five definitions of soul in the first few paragraphs of the second book.46 The soul is said to be a substance, not like a compound or like matter but rather like form (eidos, to ti ên einai), which is in line with the later Aristotelian essentialism as presented above. The matter of a living being is its body, which would not be alive if it were not for the soul. The compound of matter and soul is a particular living being, e.g., ‘this human’ or ‘Socrates.’ Socrates is said to do things, e.g., to perceive or to think, not the soul and neither the body of Socrates in isolation.47 Soul is the actuality (protê entelecheia) not potentiality and it is first actuality48 in analogy to knowledge, i.e., as something that does not need to be exercised all the time to sustain itself. This is not justified by all bodily functions being realized all the time, e.g., during sleep several important functions such as perception are not active (at least not fully active). Once a living being dies, the body does not potentially have life and the life functions cannot be realized anymore. In terms of these definitions, the Aristotelian notion of soul is inherently related to the notion of body, or at least so it seems at first glance. This connection between body and soul has often been compared to the modern mind-body problem, which has its origin mostly in dualistic philosophy such as the writings of Descartes. Ackrill (1981) stresses that the modern mind-body problem has a strong relation to the Aristotelian problem with the main difference being that in the modern debate consciousness is often used as a designating mark of the mental which is not the case in Aristotle.49 In the context of comparing Aristotle 46 See De An. 412 a/b: (1) By necessity, the soul is substance as the form of a physical body which potentially has life. (ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι ὡς εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος.) (2) The soul is the first entelechy of a physical body which potentially has life. (διὸ ἡ ψυχή ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος.) (3) The first entelechy of a physical and organical body. (ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ.) (4) The essence of a body of that quality, as if a tool was a natural body, e.g. an axe. (τοῦτο δὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοιῳδὶ σώματι, καθάπερ εἴ τι τῶν ὀργάνων φυσικὸν ἦν σῶμα, οἷον πέλεκυς) (5) Not of such a body is the soul the essence and logos but of a physical one that has the origin of movement and rest in itself. (οὐ γὰρ τοιούτου σώματος τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ ὁ λόγος ἡ ψυχή, ἀλλὰ φυσικοῦ τοιουδί, ἔχοντος ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως ἐν ἑαυτῷ.) 47 See De An. 408b13/14. 48 The alternative would be describing it as second actuality, i.e., something that is always actively exercised. The example for this case is seeing (theôrein – De An. 412a 23) which is only actual when it is actively exercised, while one has actual knowledge even when not actively exercising it. 49 See Ackrill (1981) p. 7, 55–59, 73–78.

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to modern theories of concepts, the strong connection between body and soul in Aristotle is particularly interesting and worth some attention since modal theories of concepts form a subclass of the more general trend of embodiment theories of mind. These stress that cognition can only be understood with reference to the body of the cognitive agent and the way cognitive operations are enabled by the specific properties of the body (including the whole body on a macro-level and the brain as a part of the body). The relation between body and soul receives a great deal of attention in Aristotle. One reason for this is the urge by some of his predecessors to reduce the soul to mere bodily phenomena like the atomists, on the one hand50, and the urge of others such as Plato and the Pythagoreans to see soul entirely separated from bodies and able to enter into bodies of very different kinds, e.g., the soul of a human being reborn in an animal body. [The soul] is not a body but something relative to a body. That is why it is in a body, and a body of a specific kind. It was a mistake, therefore, to do as former thinkers did, merely to fit it into a body without adding a definite specification of the kind of character of that body, although evidently one chance thing will not receive another. (De an. 414a20–25)

Aristotle acknowledges and emphasizes a strong link between body and soul. Soul is not to be equated with body but is something that is always related to a specific body (e.g., a human soul to a human body and a plant soul to a plant body). Many activities that are associated with having a soul, especially emotions, are not conceivable and definable without underlying bodily activities.51 These processes go hand in hand with changes in the body, e.g., being angry and feeling heat. Often, bodily and psychological states occur at the same time, which is a further indication that they might be the same or at least necessarily connected.52 Emotions like anger have a component describable in physiological vocabulary (e.g., boiling blood) and a component which cannot be described in physiological vocabulary (e.g., desire for revenge). These observations on emotions are quite interesting from the modern perspective’s strong tendency to describe mental processes as embodied and, in consequence, to interpret concepts of emotions as metaphors derived from bodily processes, e.g., ‘anger’ from ‘boiling’ which is done by proponents of image schemas and conceptual metaphor.53

50 51 52 53

See De An. 427a26/27. See De An. 403a5–7. See De An. 403a17. See, e.g., the modal theory of conceptual metaphors first developed in Lakoff/Johnson (1980).

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Another important question is whether the body belonging to a soul has to be a specific body or just a body. Aristotle states that soul cannot be realized in just any body but requires a specific body for the specific tasks at hand; in the same way that not every kind of matter is suited to become a hammer. For example, to enable the faculty of vision, a body has to have eyes as the organs of vision. Caston (2009) discusses the way Aristotle conceives the relation between soul and body using concepts and terminology from the modern mind-body problem: We might say that Aristotle rejects “type identity,” while accepting a certain “token identity.” Soul and body constitute distinct types: what it is to be animate is different from what it is to be embodied, since one consists in being organized in a certain way, the other in being composed of certain kinds of material and parts. Nevertheless, an individual living thing is both animate and embodied – each of these is rightly said to be something the living individual is (and thus its being or ousia) – and so the same token instantiates both types. Aristotle extends the same analysis to psychological phenomena. My anger on a particular occasion is both a desire for reprisal and a boiling of my blood, even though what it is to desire reprisal differs from what it is to have one’s blood boil. (Caston 2009: 319)

The level of description for the soul is different and more general than the level of description for bodily phenomena. Ultimately, however, the bodily basis of the different faculties correlates with the faculties themselves and is required for a proper explanation of how the different faculties come to be in an organic body. The Aristotelian model of souls is a model of stages which build on each other. The lower functions need to be realized first for higher functions to be potentially present. The function of nutrition, i.e., ingesting and growing, is present in all living beings and can be realized without any of the other faculties being present.54 The faculties of bodily movement and of perceiving the environment are the defining features for animals. They are interdependent (because perception makes it possible to perceive objects of interest such as food for directed movement, which would not be necessary for life forms which are not able to perform directed movements). Human beings are distinguished by having higher cognitive abilities such as language and thought.55 Once Aristotle has established these formal definitions of soul, he goes on to distinguish between definitions that only provide an answer to the question what something is and those which also include an explanation (also discussed in the

54 See De An. 413a30. 55 See De An. 415a.

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chapter on definitions above). Aristotle provides a kind of scheme of how faculties of the soul could be defined: Consequently their definitions (horoi) ought to correspond, e.g. anger should be defined as a certain mode of movement (kinêsis tis) of such and such a body (or part or faculty (dynamis) of a body) by this or that cause and for this or that end. That is precisely why the study of the soul – either every soul or souls of this sort – must fall within the science of nature. (De An. 403a25–28)

The genus is kinêsis and the specific differences concern the four causes as is demanded from a proper scientific definition. The material cause, which is either the physical body or part of the physical body, is a required part of the definition. For those explanatory and scientific definitions, therefore, the singular faculties cannot be defined without making reference to the body which would imply that the soul in Aristotle is strictly conceived as embodied. However, some doubt remains concerning the higher faculties. Also in book two, he gives another definition of life that seems to be disjunctive at first sight: Now this word [living (zên)] has more than one sense, and provided any alone of these is found in a thing we say that thing is living – viz. thinking (nous) or perception (aisthêsis), movement and rest, or movement in sense of nutrition, decay and growth. (De An. 413a23–25)

It is stressed that having just one of these faculties is enough to be characterized as being alive, i.e., a being having nous without the nutritive faculty could still be characterized as alive and having a soul.56 Aristotle leaves this possibility open for nonmortal beings. But if it can be proven that this is not the case, if all the lower faculties are required for the higher faculties, as is the case with the nutritive faculty for bodily movement and perception, the definition is no longer simple disjunction but additive.57 Whether this definition is really disjunctive and what follows from the disjunctiveness is discussed below, in particular as regards the faculty of intellect (nous). If Aristotle gives an account of a faculty in his psychological writings, he usually gives a general description of the task that is fulfilled but not a detailed physiological account of bodily processes that accompany the functional definition.58 56 Barnes (1972, p. 103) paraphrases the definition in the following way: “x has a soul = df. X can nourish itself OR x can perceive OR x can think OR x can move itself.” 57 See Barnes (1972) p. 105. 58 According to Johansen (2012, p. 2) Aristotle can be described as the first faculty psychologist in the history of philosophy. In that regard, he is a precursor of authors like Fodor.

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Therefore, perception cannot be defined as what ears, eyes, etc. do but must receive an independent definition. The advantage of this is that the Aristotelian account of cognition can still be of value today even if his physiological accounts are outdated.59 Scheiter (2012) discusses the question of whether Aristotelian psychology can be satisfactory and interesting from a modern perspective since his physiology has been shown to be false in almost every aspect: Generally, Aristotle’s physiological account of our cognitive capacities has been underplayed and undervalued by interpreters because we now know it to be empirically incorrect, and so it might appear to be less philosophically interesting. But it is a mistake to separate Aristotle’s physiology from his psychology, since his psychology is almost always deeply informed by his physiology. (Scheiter 2012: 254)

This criticism might be accepted and yet supplemented: it might be that the physiological theory of Aristotle is not interesting from the perspective of modern science but, on the other hand, the way he conceives the relation between physiological and psychological processes might still be philosophically valuable. The bodies belonging to souls are defined as organic (organikos). This could be understood to mean that they consist of several parts with separate functions, i.e., organs in the modern sense. On the other hand, Aristotle might just stress that these bodies have to be understood as tools that have specific functions and are only tools in the proper sense as long as they can fulfill this function.60 The former hypothesis is plausible because Aristotle stresses that the parts of plants can be understood as organs immediately after providing the definition including the expression organikos. However, later on the soul is compared to the function of an actual tool like an axe and the eye’s ability to see is said to be analogous to what the soul is for a living body. This makes it possible to understand organikos simply as “like a tool.” For example, the eyes conceived as a tool whose task it is to 59 Burnyeat (1992, p. 16), however, states that Aristotle’s philosophy of mind stands and falls with his physiological account and, therefore, cannot be modernized. It is true that Aristotle’s definitions of several faculties include specific physiological realizations. In consequence, a modern account cannot simply accept Aristotelian definitions without modification. On the other hand, a modern account can keep the functionalist part of an Aristotelian definition and exchange the physiological part with the current scientific standard, e.g., the brain as central organ of perception instead of the heart. 60 Bos (2000, p. 25) points out that organikos should not be translated as “having organs” since it does not have this meaning elsewhere in the Corpus Aristotelicum. He also draws the strange conclusion that the human body does not qualify as an instrumental body in this sense. If organikos is translated as “being like a tool,” I do not see what should preclude the human body from being described in this way.

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enable a subject to see, the legs as tools whose task it is to enable a subject to walk, and so on. All these tasks contribute to the nature of the living being as a whole. They are the tasks associated with life.61 The question comes up how parts of the soul, i.e., specific functions like the five senses, bodily movement, etc. relate to parts of the body.62 Certain parts of a living being might fulfill the same tasks (erga) across species – for example, the head’s task in humans and root’s task in plants is to intake nutrients even though their very distinct physical realization makes it necessary to have separate names not only for the organs but for the functions as well.63 One organ might fulfill more than one task, e.g., the tongue is for tasting food and the articulation of sounds. Some faculties like speech64 can only be defined in reference to the organs involved, while others are not tied to specific body parts and can be realized by different body parts or an ensemble of body parts.65 There has been a quite lively debate on whether the Aristotelian conception of soul in light of all this should be compared to functionalism in modern philosophy of mind or not. Cohen (1992) defines functionalism the following way: Functionalism is the theory that mental states are defined in terms of their relations to causal inputs, behavioral outputs, and other mental states. It holds that the same mental state may be realized by several different physical states or processes. Mental states cannot, therefore, be reduced to physical states. They are, rather, functional states of the physical systems that realize them. (Cohen 1992: 2/3)

He then goes on to discuss possible arguments against interpreting Aristotle as a functionalist. It has to be clarified that Aristotle does not really have a distinctive category of the mental since his notion of soul is tied to the notion of life in general. The predicate mental might apply to the noetic faculty and some parts

61 See De An. 412b1–19. 62 Gregorić (2007, p. 24/25) states that it is important that the different capacities are only parts of the soul insofar as they are conceptually distinguishable. Therefore, these parts do not contradict the functional unity of the soul as a whole. Parts cannot exist separately from the whole, i.e., without constituting a complete soul. This is particularly important for how Gregorić conceives the unity of the perceptual capacities. The separated senses are also seen as only conceptually distinguishable but still constituting a larger unity. 63 See De An. 416a4–6. 64 This is obviously only true insofar as the definition of speech includes it being tied to sound, e.g., sign languages can be described as proper languages making use of a different part of the body to enable communication. 65 See De An. 420b5 ff.

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(but not all) of the aesthetic faculty.66 However, there is no clear distinction or notion of the mental. This does not, of course, preclude the fact that Aristotle is a functionalist in regard to all functions associated with life including those which would be described as mental. It is quite tempting to understand Aristotle in this way. A definite answer to this question should be withheld at this stage of the dissertation but it is definitely a point worthy of attention, given the way concepts were defined in section II. This aspect will be revisited after some faculties of the soul have received more detailed attention.

2.2. Perception 2.2.1.  A general account of perception How perception is conceived in Aristotle as part of his philosophy is quite central to this dissertation since it sheds light on the question what would be required for concepts, or symbols more generally, to be described as perceptual according to an Aristotelian framework. Perception in Aristotle is treated as a part of what it means for a certain kind of living beings (i.e., animals) to be alive. It operates only in concert with other life functions and, therefore, is required to constitute the well-being of animals. The ability to discriminate relevant features from each other leads to practical and ultimately theoretical understanding (in intelligent animals, i.e., human beings) which enables those beings to interact with the world. Therefore, bodily movement (i.e., searching for food and avoiding dangers) is associated with having a distal sense and desires.67 It can be conceptually differentiated from these but ultimately does not exist in separation.68 The faculty of phantasia, which will be the focus of the next chapter, is also closely tied to perception.69 A distinction has to be drawn between the objects of perception, the organs of perception, percepts as results, and perception itself as an act. The objects are required to exist independently of a perceiving subject. They cause a particular

66 67 68 69

See Cohen (1992) p. 2. See Beare (1906) p. 88. See Gregorić (2007) p. 22, 34. See Ackrill (1981) p. 63: “With sense perception come imagination (decayed perception), desire (stimulated by perception and imagination) and movement (caused by desire). These faculties are connected with one another, and the connection is conceptual. You could not, for example, explain what desire is without bringing in the idea of an object of desire, something perceived or a least envisaged, and also the idea of going after that object.” Gregorić’s (2007) account of how both faculties are related to each other will receive a good deal of attention in the sections below.

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perception. In consequence, the Aristotelian theory of perception can be described as causal.70 In the beginning of the discussion of aisthêsis, Aristotle links it to being moved (kineisthai) and being affected (pathein).71 This establishes both the relation to the definition of soul as something that is the principle of change and to the notion of singular percepts being pathêmata in the soul. In the final paragraphs of the second book of De anima, Aristotle provides a general definition of perception making reference to perceiving as suffering (pathein): Generally about all perception (aisthêseis), we can say that a sense (aisthêsis) is what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter (dektikon tôn aisthêtôn eidôn aneu tês hylê), in the way in which a piece of wax takes on the impress (sêmeion) of a signet-ring without the iron or gold; what produces the impression is a signet of bronze or gold, but not qua bronze or gold: in a similar way the sense is affected (paschei) by what is coloured or flavoured or sounding not insofar as each is what it is, but insofar as it is such and such a sort and according to its definition/form. (kata ton logon). (De anima 424a17–24)

Perception is the faculty to take in the perceptible forms. It is important that perception is not related to all forms in general but only to a specific subset of forms, i.e., the perceptible forms such as color, sound, and shape. These are forms of physical objects and in themselves the proper objects of perceptions. Percepts are described as having certain qualities in reference to those perceptible qualities of external objects, e.g., as colorful insofar as they are related to color, not insofar as they have a color in the way a physical object has a color. To describe this relation Aristotle uses the phrase kata ton logon because the way perceptions of colors are described as colorful is included in their definition. An alternative interpretation would be to understand logos as ‘form’ or ‘ratio’ in this context. In accordance with his general theory of the soul, perception is described as a kinêsis. Kinêsis for Aristotle is not to be understood exclusively as spatial movement. Perception is a kinêsis in the sense of alteration (alloiôsis).72 Aristotle derives his theory of movement from the Categories, i.e., the ways being is predicated. There is a coming to be and perishing in the case of substances (genesis, phthora), growing and shrinking in the case of quantities (auxêsis, phthisis), movement in 70 See Modrak (2001) p. 223, Gregorić (2007) p. 29. 71 See De An. 416b33/34. 72 See De An. 415b24: “Perception seems to be some form of alteration in a way.” (ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις ἀλλοίωσίς τις εἶναι δοκεῖ.) Bowin (2012) discusses the question whether perception can be understood as genuine form of alternation and comes to the conclusion that it can be.

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space (phora), and change concerning quality (alloiôsis).73 In De anima 417b, he further distinguishes between different forms of alteration. When Aristotle defines perception as alteration, he always uses some linguistic means to relativize this equation, e.g., describing it as alteration “in some way.” Alteration in the most ordinary sense involves destruction, i.e., the coming into being of a certain quality by virtue of another quality ceasing to exist. Change of quality can only involve nonessential properties of an object. The alteration the senses undergo cannot be described in this way because they only take on the qualities they are disposed to take by their very nature.74 This in no way means that an alteration of this form cannot be conceived as physical.75 Conversely, it enables Aristotle to distinguish between the change organs of perception undergo because of perceptible qualities and the change other parts of the body undergo because of the same perceptual qualities, e.g., suffering injuries because of coldness is different from feeling coldness through its proper sense organ (e.g., skin). It is also possible for a perceiving being to suffer (pathein) something from a perceptible entity in other ways than perception. Perception is a specific kind of suffering of specific organs caused by perceptible qualities, not every interaction and suffering from perceptible entities. It is the function of these organs to suffer in this exact way while other organs only suffer from perceptible qualities by accident.76 Some predecessors of Aristotle state that perception has to be described as ‘something like

73 See Phys. 200b33–201a15. 74 See Phys. 226a26–29, 246a–247b. 75 There are some authors who do not agree. Burnyeat (1992) is one of the main proponents of this position. He concludes that since perception cannot be described as an ordinary physical change it has to be understood as altogether independent of material change. Since there is no detailed physiological account of the processes in the inner organs of perceptions going beyond the peripheral organs, he does not believe Aristotle thought such an account to be possible. Rather he describes perception as nonphysical awareness that is enabled by Aristotle’s account of nature and totally alien to our physical and naturalist worldview. His arguments make several assumptions. Other interpretations which are closer to the text are available. For further discussion, see Magee (2000) p. 312 ff. 76 There are several authors which allow those changes to be described as material. See, e.g., Johansen (2012) p. 168: “To conclude, Aristotle seems committed in DA I.1 to find some hypothetically necessary material changes for those affections considered common to body and soul, including therefore perception. Viewing perception as a perfective alternation leaves it quite open what those material changes should be, what category the change may be in and what kind of attribute within a given category it should be.”

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perceived by something like.’ Aristotle specifies this as perceiving something like by something potentially like but actually unlike, i.e., it only becomes a likeness of the perceived object by the act of perception. However, it is its very nature to be changed in this way. This has to be distinguished from other forms of suffering.77 The analogy in De anima 424a makes reference to a tableau of wax suffering impressions through a seal is already present in Plato. It should also be noted that the marks left in the wax are described as sêmeia here which is another indication that sêmeia might be used for natural or direct representations. Magee (2000) discusses the wax metaphor and the way Thomas Aquinas understood it. It is important to note that the image in the wax is actually not the same image as that of the sigil but a reverse or negative image. In the same way, the images in the soul might be very different from the objects of perceptions. There only needs to be a relation between them that is the same for all perceptibles and connects them lawfully to reality. The structures of reality have to be translated in some kind of signal like they are in a modern electro-physiological account.78 Owens (1976) compares the taking of forms without matter to the way colors in a video signal are represented in digital code.79 The same analogy is used for amodal representations in cognitive science. In this case, perceptions in Aristotle could possibly be understood as amodal, namely as symbolic in contrast to analogous representations. In consequence, the same would also be true of the more constant representations, i.e., pathêmata/phantasmata. If this was the case, Aristotle would have only an amodal theory of concepts provided that modality is understood according to the functionalist account. On the other hand, one might argue that in case of the analogy of the block of wax it is accepted that it only follows that some qualities of the perceptible objects (in this case shape) are taken over while others (in this case: color, material, etc.) are lost. Perception might be described the same way, i.e., some features of perceptible objects are preserved but they are adapted to the medium of representation. Following this reasoning, Caston (1998) describes perceptual representations in Aristotle as being nonpropositional: In Aristotle’s day, tones were widely analyzed in terms of certain proportions; and Aristotle extends this analysis to colors, flavors and temperatures. He seems to have in mind an analog form of representation, whose parts represent the parts of the object, and whose content is decidedly non-propositional: complex four-dimensional scenarios are represented, rather than states-of-affairs. Internal changes represent such scenes by

77 See De An. 415b, 417a20/21. 78 See Patzig (2009) p. 260. 79 See Owens (1976) p. 8.

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modeling or simulating them, that is, by preserving the relation-structure that holds between the various objects in the scene over time. (Caston 1998: 262)

Both the notion of analogous four-dimensional representation and the notion of simulation are closely connected to Barsalou’s account of perceptual symbols. Caston stresses that Aristotle is not committed to describing mental representations of this kind as picture-like, i.e., as representing spatial magnitudes as spatial magnitudes; they might be represented by any other means inherent in the representational medium as long as there is a correspondence and features of the world are translatable in features of the medium.80 However, it must be noted that the distinction between being perceptual and being symbolic in this sense is not necessarily a strict one, as was pointed out above. Aristotle very generally states that an analysis of the faculty of perception should start from the perceptible features of the world since its function is to transfer these forms of which percepts are likenesses into the soul. Aristotle distinguishes between three kinds of perceptibles. Some things are sense-specific perceptibles (idion). They are directly perceived by the different senses, such as color for vision and sound for the auditive sense. They are restricted to one particular sense and involve no interferences, only direct perception. Every sense is able to discriminate between different kinds of its specific perceptibles, e.g., between different colors in the case of vision or different pitches in the case of the auditive sense. Perception of this kind can only fail in rare cases, e.g., in the case of severe damage to the sense organs.81 Then there are common perceptions (koinon), which are directly perceived but can be perceived by more than one sense. Those are motion, rest, number, shape, and size. All of them can be perceived by at least two of the separate senses.82 For example, beating a bell three times (number) is both heard and seen. The shape of a cube can be apprehended both through touching and vision. Aristotle states that the different senses enable us to perceive the common perceptibles more clearly because we can abstract them from different proper perceptibles. If this 80 See Caston (1998) p. 263, also p. 268: “The proportional models Aristotle speaks of, for example, do not share all of the properties represented, only a certain abstract structure—at the very least, they will differ in absolute size and presumably in the dimensions along which these proportions are exhibited as well. Aristotle accepts what we might call an information transmission view, where certain abstract features of the objects represented are preserved in the representations themselves, in virtue of which they are about those objects, without having to literally replicate all that is represented.” 81 See De An. 418a6–18, Gregorić (2007) p. 30. 82 See De Sen. 442a7.

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was not the case, humans might not be able to abstract, e.g., shape from color.83 According to Gregorić (2007) common perceptibles always are present together with the specific perceptibles and in virtue of this can be described as “objects perceived in themselves.”84 The third form of perceptibles is only perceived by accident and it is here that perceptual error can occur. For example, ‘something white’ is perceived as ‘the son of Diares,’ i.e., a substance is perceived through its qualities. However, this is not a direct perception but rather like an inference from a direct perception. It cannot be described as a suffering of the sense organs through the accidentally perceptible unlike the other two kinds of perceptibles since it cannot be perceived without mediation through directly perceptible qualities which are either sense-specific or common to more than one sense.85 It is not the percept that is judged to be a certain individual, e.g., Korsikos (which would be false), but rather the object of perception is judged to be the real Korsikos.86 This form of perception might as well be described as being already conceptual categorization rather than genuine and simple perception. When speaking of the objects of perception, which are the causes of the suffering of the organs of perception, Aristotle compares perception and knowledge (epistême). They can be distinguished on two levels: the cause of perception is always external to the living being and it is always directed at individual entities. Knowledge and thought, on the other hand, are internal to the soul and are directed at a universal, which can be said to be in the soul in some way. General entities cannot be perceived, they are rather the subject of thought.87 Endogenous control over representations is one of the possible criteria for defining concepts discussed in the modern debate.88 This might point to perceptual representations being not sufficient to qualify as a theory of concepts in Aristotle and assigning the status of concepts in Aristotle only to noetic representations. Once the perceptible objects are established as the main causal basis of perception, it is important to define the organs of perception and their relation to perception itself: Thus we say that a thing is altered (alloiousthai) by becoming hot or sweet or thick or dry or white; and we make these assertions alike of what is inanimate and of what is

83 84 85 86 87 88

See De An. 418a19–21, 425a15 ff. See Gregorić (2007) p. 32. See De An. 418a22–25. De Ins. 461b. See De An. 417b16–24. See, e.g., Machery (2009) p. 24–26.

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animate, and further, where animate things are in question, we make them both of the parts that have no power of sense-perception and of the senses themselves. For in a way even the senses undergo alternation, since actual perception is a motion through the body (kinêsis dia tou sômatos) in the course of which the sense is affected (paschousês) in a certain way. (Phys. 244b7–12)

This passage from the Physics stresses (a) that perception is a form of change and movement, (b) that it is necessary connected to a body. There is a huge debate in the secondary literature on whether perception should be understood as a physical change of the organs of perception or not. One extreme position is taken by Sorabji (1974) who thinks that the organs of perception actually take on the quality they perceive, i.e., seeing green means becoming green. Burnyeat takes the opposing position and sees the process of perception as entirely immaterial and to be described as some form of awareness instead. Cohen (1992) correctly notes that Aristotle’s statement that taking up a form without matter only means that no matter of the object is taken in by the subject but not that there is no matter involved in the process at all.89 Gregorić (2007) also lists several passages from Aristotle which leave little doubt that perception should be understood as a physical process or at least necessarily accompanied by a physical process. Most notably, Aristotle holds that one of the distinctive features of nous when compared to perceptions is that, unlike perception, it cannot be destroyed by its proper object’s high intensity.90 Gregorić’s case is quite convincing and the physical basis of perception will be accepted as a given in the remainder of this book. Perception itself has to be something different both from its objects and its organs. It can be further conceptually distinguished into the faculty of perception and concrete acts of perception. The organs realize the faculty which is only a potentiality until it is realized in concrete acts of perception. Unlike the organs, the faculties are not physical and not describable in quantitative terms. Without both the objects and organs, perception would not be possible. The faculty needs to be conceptually distinguished from the organs which realize it. The same distinction can be drawn for the objects of perception: they can either be potential perceptibles or they can be actually perceived entities.91 The organs are constructed to realize the faculties, i.e., it is not possible to have a faculty without also having the organ or at least an organ suitable to realize the faculty. However, they can be distinguished from each other conceptually.92 It is 89 90 91 92

See Cohen (1992) p. 8. See Gregorić (2007) p. 35/36. See De An. 417a, 425b25 ff. See De An. 424a23 ff.

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important to note that, for Aristotle, the organs of perception are not only the external organs like eyes or ears but he states at several occasions that the organs of perception extend into the inner part of the body.93 For example, in De sensu et sensibilibus he gives this as a reason for the inner part of the eye being transparent (to be able to transfer visual signals into the inner part of the body)94 and the inability to see after severe head injuries (because the canals transporting the signals to the inner organs of vision are destroyed).95 As in the general cases discussed above, the same organ (e.g., the heart in Aristotle or the brain in modern accounts) might contribute to realizing different senses. Aristotle argues for the heart being the center of sensation as well as the motor faculty and the nutritive faculty. This is by virtue of his belief that the organs of perception have to be homogenous to be able the intake the forms of the specific perceptibles while the organs of motion have to be heterogeneous to be able to generate movement. The heart can be described as containing both homogenous and heterogenous parts. Apart from that, it is also the center of the blood circulation which permeates the whole body and reaches all other organs.96 The latter argument in particular is feasible from a modern point of view provided that Aristotle and his contemporaries were not aware of the nervous system also permeating the whole body.97 The blood is seen as a carrier of percepts and, therefore, also of phantasmata. The possibility of intelligence (phronêsis/dianoia) is tied to the quality of blood or analogous fluids in other animals such as insects, especially bees.98 The brain is conceived as a counterpart to the heart whose main task it is to cool the body down while the heart and the blood circulation are associated with warmth.99 Another much debated notion connected to the physiological realization of perception and other faculties of the soul is the so-called pneuma, which can be interpreted as a warm air inherent in blood.100 There are some passages

93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

See De Int. 459b5–7. See Beare (1906) p. 79 ff. See De Sen. 438b8–22. See De Part. An. 674a13–674b9, 665b27–666a36. See Patzig (2009) p. 259. See De Part. An. 648a1–11, 650b15–651a17, De Ins. 461a. See De Part. An. 452b20–27. See De Gen. An. 736a1; possibly it could be understood as hot exhaled air, which Aristotle considers to be a different kind of matter from external air. The notion of pneuma as some kind of spiritual substratum is important in the Pre-Socratics, in Plato, and later in the Stoics. See Jaeger (1913).

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where it seems to be equitable with breath101 while others imply a central role in animal cognition, especially motor faculties,102 and compare pneuma to the element stars are made of.103 The first meaning of pneuma seems to be prevalent in the psychological writings, while both meanings are present in the biological writings. Some authors see pneuma and not blood as the carrier of perceptual information in Aristotle.104 There is even a passage which seems to equate pneuma with soul and to imply some kind of panpsychism since pneuma is also present in external air.105 Bos (2000, 2003, 2011) develops a theory according to which only pneuma can be interpreted as the instrumental body. His theory is questionable to a high degree.106 Since the notion of pneuma has generated a huge debate with many insecurities and is not essential to the main topics of this dissertation, it will not be further discussed here. In De sensu et sensibilis, Aristotle discusses whether several subjects can have the same perception or not. This is connected to the notion of shareability in the modern debate and, therefore, must be taken into account. Some, indeed, raise a question also on these very points; they declare it impossible that one person should hear, or see, or smell, the same object as another, urging the impossibility of several persons in different places hearing or smelling the same object; for the

101 See De An. 420b20, 421b15, De Gen. An. 732b30, 735b19, 737b36, 788a21, De Part. An. 664a18, 669a16, De Resp. 472a35. 102 See De Part. An. 659b17, De Gen. An. 789b7–11, De Mot. An. 703a6–16. 103 See De Gen. An. 736b37/737a1. 104 Gregorić (2007, p. 43–45) discusses this position and sees pneuma as hot air present in the blood stream which is able to keep percepts while not denying the same ability for blood itself. It does not really make a difference since information flow is taking part in the blood either way and can be understood as a material transformation of form. The different qualities of the blood belonging to different individuals are used to explain differences in the performances of their perceptual system. Gregorić argues that blood can be seen as a universal carrier of perceptual forms since it contains a watery element for the distal senses and an earthy element for the contact senses, i.e., touch and taste. 105 See De Gen. An. 762a20/21. 106 See King (2007) p. 323: “Pneuma, i.e. breath, has a crucial place in this work, namely in those parts (sometimes known as De Respiratione) dealing with breathing as the mechanism for cooling and so preserving the heat of the hotter animals. But nowhere is there a suggestion that innate breath is the ‘vehicle’ of soul: rather heat is necessary for life because it performs concoction. This is quite clear from Juv. 14 which B. cites as support for his view (p. 80), but we find there no mention of a body possessing life within the organism (a view which anyway attributes the homunculus fallacy to Aristotle of all people; see De An. 408b12ff.).”

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one same thing would thus be divided from itself. The answer is that, in perceiving the object which first set up the motion – e.g. a bell, or frankincense, or fire – all perceive an object numerically one and the same; while, of course, in the special object perceived they perceive an object numerically different for each, though specifically the same for all […]. (De Sen. 446b17–24)

The external cause of the perception is the same for all who perceive it; the percept itself as an actualization of the faculty of perception is distinct for every individual although it is the same kind of perception. In that way, different subjects can be said to share an experience and perceptions can be described as particulars for each perceiver. This corresponds to the way concepts have been defined as mental particulars. This observation and passage is very important since this can be transferred to phantasmata: As employed in the theory of meaning, the pathema does double duty it is an internal state, a psychic state of an individual. It is also the vehicle of meaning shared by speakers of a common language. In the latter capacity the pathema is an intentional state. (Modrak 2001: 221/222)

Having these properties seems to make pathêmata an ideal contender for a theory of concepts in Aristotle since they fulfill some of the most important desiderata of a theory of concepts in the modern debate. They do so because of their tight connection with perception and the shareability of perceptual states. This is the main argument Prinz uses to show that perceptual symbols are superior to other theories of conceptual formats. This connection will be discussed in more detail below. After this general outline of what perception is in Aristotle, the question remains whether perceptions are already to be considered as mental representations and how they are related to more complex kinds of representations. Before the notion of pathêmata as remaining mental images is discussed in more detail, the different senses and the equally important notion of a common sense are accounted for to establish what the sense modalities are in an Aristotelian framework, how they are defined and whether there are multimodal or amodal representations involved in his account of perception. This is important since Barsalou’s account of concepts as modal and perceptual symbols is based hugely on connecting the definition of concepts to the definition of percepts, at least in a similarity account of modality.

2.2.2.  The different senses The five sense modalities for Aristotle are: visual, auditive, smell, taste, and touch. There can be no more senses than these five. Among the senses, there is a similar 219

hierarchy to that which exists among the more general faculties of soul. The tactile sense is said to be prior to the others and can be present in an animal without the others, just like nutrition can be present without perception. The other senses are only present in a subject if the tactile sense is also present. As already mentioned, different senses can be characterized by their specific objects and by their specific organs; most senses, namely the distal ones, also require a medium. Senses and the faculty of bodily movement together define the nature of animal souls: perception is required to coordinate movements. Without perceptions of any form, a goal-directed movement would be impossible.107 Vision is characterized by color as its proper object. Since vision is a distal sense, it requires a medium which Aristotle defines as the “transparent” (diaphanes) inherent in air, water, and other transparent materials such as glass. Seeing also requires the presence of light. Light is the realization of the potential of the transparent as transparent. Seeing is described as a suffering (pathein) like all sense perception.108 The colors of objects cause movements in the transparent medium which reach the eyes. Sound is the proper object of hearing. It is defined as something beating against something, either against another physical body or directly against air, which, in both cases, causes a movement of air. Therefore, air is the medium of hearing. The ear itself contains air which is moved through the external air and initiates the process of hearing. Smell requires a medium which can be air or water. Though human beings only smell through air, there are other animals that can smell underwater. The sense organs (at least in the case of distal senses) are assumed to contain the media of the different perceptibles, i.e., transparent water for seeing, air for hearing etc., to be able to intake the perceptible forms in a neutral and homoeomerous medium.109 Taste is closely associated with touch since both require direct contact and do not have an external medium unlike the other three senses. In De sensu, Aristotle explicitly distinguishes between the external and the internal senses. For taste, wetness is required – not as a medium but rather as a property of the object emitting the taste. Actually, taste can be described as a kind of touch since it involves direct bodily contact with its perceptibles and, therefore, needs no external medium at all. The main function of taste is to distinguish healthy from harmful food; this is why taste has to be present in all animals.110 Touch is the most diverse of the senses accounting for different phenomena such as hardness, 107 108 109 110

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See De An. 414b15. See De An. 419a17/18. See Gregorić (2007) p. 41/42. See De Sen. 436b15–18.

wetness, temperature, and possibly others. Aristotle thinks that the whole body is the sense organ for touch and the outer layers of flesh are in some way the (internal) medium of touch. The unity of touch can be justified because the distinct perceptible qualities are perceived at the same time by the same organ, while the sense of taste perceives distinct perceptible qualities (tastes, which cannot be perceived by the rest of the body) by a different organ.111 However, the medium is perceived as well. He compares this to being hit through a shield in combat.112 The heart, which is the central organ involved in all senses, can be said to be the direct organ of taste and touch if flesh is regarded as a medium, which is not true for the other senses.113 The five senses can not only perceive their proper perceptibles but also perceive the absence of their proper perceptibles. Whether this can be meaningfully described as different modalities that are comparable to the modern notion of modal representations depends a huge deal on how modality is conceived. As pointed out above, one way to individuate modalities could be through their associated brain areas (implementational account). Individuating senses by organs is analogous to this since Aristotle is aware of inner sense organs even though he localizes them not in the brain but rather in the heart. However, the individuation of modalities in Aristotle is largely done by their proper objects and the corresponding medium which do not play a significant role from a cognitive perspective (though they do from a physiological perspective). The notion of internal formats, on the other hand, e.g., the distinction between analogous and digital formats, cannot be satisfactorily compared to the Aristotelian conception of sense modalities. Because of this, a lot of important discussions in modern psychology including this definition of perceptual formats have no parallel in the Aristotelian account of perception and cognition. It is important to keep this in mind when comparing the Aristotelian theory of cognition to modern theories of perceptual representations and concepts in general.

2.2.3.  The common sense Aristotle seems to assume that there is a common sense. He uses the phrase koinê aisthêsis on a few occasions.114 Gregorić (2007) tries to determine (a) whether Aristotle has a notion of common sense, (b) whether koinê aisthêsis is a technical 111 112 113 114

See Beare (1906) p. 188 ff. See De An. 423b15. See De Part. An. 656a29–33. See Hamlyn (1968).

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term designating this faculty, and (c) what tasks the common sense is said to fulfill in Aristotle. He sets out by distinguishing different faculties: the separate senses together constitute the perceptual capacity115 of the soul. The capacity of imagination (which will be the main focus of the next section) has to be distinguished from the perceptual capacity in this sense. To designate the capacity which is constituted by both the perceptual and the imaginative capacity he coins the term “sensory capacity.” There are some reasons to believe Aristotle actually and explicitly made these distinctions; however, Gregorić sees it also as a framework to make better sense of a lot of remarks by Aristotle on that matter, even if this stronger case cannot be made.116 Concerning terminology, Gregorić ultimately arrives at the conclusion that koinê aisthêsis is used in a number of different ways in its few occurrences.117 Even though it is sometimes used for the sensory capacity, it can in no way be considered a technical term.118 Leaving the terminological issue behind, Gregorić instead intends to explain perceptual capacities which are not enabled by the separate senses but rather by the unity of the perceptual capacity of the soul. In his opinion, this is what has been understood as the Aristotelian notion of common sense by most commentators. In general, he lists an impressive number of candidates for tasks which are said to be fulfilled by the common sense, compiling references from previous authors: (1) perception of common perceptibles, (2) perception of accidental perceptibles, (3) metaperception, i.e., perceiving that one perceives, (4) discrimination between the proper objects of different senses, (5) perception of the inactivity of senses, (6) perception of time, (7) imagination, (8) memory, (9) dreaming, (10) simultaneous perception of more than one object, (11) perceiving different properties as belonging to one object, (12) perceiving specific objects of another sense, (13) providing objective reference.119 Several of these, such as memory and dreaming, clearly belong to the imaginative faculty and, therefore, not to the common sense as understood by Gregorić. This chapter will

115 “Capacity” is used instead of “faculty” in this section since Gregorić uses this terminology. Both are used interchangeably. 116 See Gregorić (2007) p. 57–61. 117 Meanings of the term koinê aisthêsis according to Gregorić: (i) a sense common to a number of subjects e.g. touch being common to all animals, (ii) capacities common to more than one sense such as perceiving shape, (iii) the sensory capacity of the soul consisting of the imaginative and the perceptual capacity. 118 See Gregorić (2007) p. 124/125. 119 See Gregorić (2007) p. 14/15.

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follow his general framework since imagination receives a separate and detailed treatment in the next section. Maybe a discussion of the common sense should start with its relation to the common perceptibles, since at least terminologically a connection is implied. For example, Hamlyn (1968) argues that the common sense is realized by the sense organs corresponding to the separate senses and is responsible for perceiving the common perceptibles.120 The koine aisthesis is a sense, it is the one concerned with the koina, and is to be defined in terms of them. It is common in the sense that it is a potentiality shared by more than one sense-organ, and concerned with objects which are perceptible through more than one sense-organ. (Hamlyn 1968: 205)

Gregorić also discusses the status of the koina. In his opinion, there is little reason to believe that the perception of them is a genuine task of the perceptual faculty as a whole.121 Rather their perception is achieved by the individual senses, e.g., colored shapes are perceived by the faculty of vision. We would still perceive shape, number, etc. if we only had the sense of vision even though we might be less aware of their independence of colors. In contrast to those interpreters who tie the notion of common sense closely to common perceptibles, Gregorić himself sees simultaneous perception as one of the chief tasks of the common sense. Since the perceptual faculty is not restricted to just one sense, it is possible that more than one sense is active at the same time and, therefore, specific perceptibles are perceived at the same time. Simultaneous perception is the reason perceptibles of different modalities can be integrated into the perception of one unified object. This perception of objects rather than properties is the basis of but not identical to the perception of accidental perceptibles. Both the perception of an object as something and the indirect perception of specific perceptibles (e.g., accidently perceiving something sweet due to a visual perception of honey) seem to involve some form of images or memory.122 A further question is how distinctions between qualities of different modalities can be established, e.g., that ‘sweet’ and ‘white’ are not the same. This requires a separate sense that can judge both taste and color. But it seems to be implied by Aristotle’s account that this is not harder than discrimination between special perceptibles in a singular domain and can generally be provided

120 See Hamlyn (1968) p. 204. 121 See Gregorić (2007) p. 193–199. 122 See Gregorić (2007) p. 199–201.

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by the separated senses. Since it involves intermodal comparison and, therefore, more than one sense, it can be attributed to the common sense.123 The question comes up as to if and how we can perceive that we perceive something. If there was a separate sense directed at sense perception itself, this might lead to an infinite regress because another sense directed at these first metaperceptions would be needed, etc.124 Gregorić insists that these secondorder perceptions or monitoring of perceptions always co-occurs with first order perceptions. It is not part of a distinct capacity but rather inheres in first-order perception. In his opinion, there are no first-order perceptions without secondorder perceptions (i.e., perception already implies that we perceive ourselves as perceiving even if this is not made conscious or explicit), but there are second-order perceptions without first-order perceptions (e.g., when the absence of perception is perceived).125 Consciousness and other higher-order cognitive phenomena might build on this faculty but a conscious state is not yet necessarily achieved by this monitoring. Since the monitoring can take place in the absence of activity of the special senses it has to be attributed to the common sense as the unified perceptual capacity. The absence of this monitoring is one important difference between being awake and being asleep.126 In De anima, Aristotle denies that there can be a single organ for the common perceptibles.127 However, there are some passages in the Parva naturalia like the one cited above that indicate the heart as the organ of common perception. There are at least two ways to explain this: (1) Aristotle is not speaking about an organ but rather about a faculty in the Parva naturalia. (2) The heart has to be involved in the perception of the proper perceptibles as well (like the brain is involved in all modal specific perceptions according to modern neuroscience).128 In both cases, there would be no separate organ which is only responsible for

123 124 125 126 127 128

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See Gregorić (2007) p. 162. See De An. 425b11 ff. See Gregorić (2007) p. 211/212. See Gregorić (2007) p. 173, 189 ff. See De An. 425a14. See Gregorić (2007) p. 49: “The role of the peripheral sense organs is to receive perceptibles from the external media and to transduce them to the central organ through a network of channels filled with pneuma and blood. Although Aristotle seems to think that there is a significant gap between the reception of perceptibles by the peripheral and by the central sense organs, he nevertheless seems correct to say that perception occurs only when perceptibles mediated by the peripheral sense organs are received by the central sense organ.”

realizing the common sense, which is in line with Gregorić’s interpretation of the common sense being constituted by the unity of the perceptual faculty and what it is able to do by virtue of this unity.129 The common sense is a genuine perceiving, not an accidental perceiving. It is realized by the separate organs of perception. It is possible to relate perceptions to each other through common perception, i.e., perceive white as different from sweet and the visual shape of an entity as the same as the tactual shape. In fact, latter philosophers like Locke doubted this inherent comparability between modalities.130 Gregorić’s account of the common sense is quite convincing. It allows one to distinguish between the perceptual and the imaginative capacity of the soul and to discuss their genuine tasks separately, which is important for understanding what perception is in Aristotle. It might also enable one to identify the imaginative capacity with the notion of perceptual symbols in Barsalou and contrast it with the tasks which belong only to perception and are not yet conceptual. Gregorić generally stresses that the Aristotelian notion of common sense has to be seen as a criticism of Plato’s theory of perception in which perception can only account for the direct perception of specific perceptibles. All tasks that go beyond that have to be attributed to thought. The Aristotelian account, on the other hand, can explain the behavior of animals and large aspects of human cognition without making reference to thought. Aristotle integrates the different senses on the level of perception whereas Plato integrated them at the level of thought.131 Therefore, nous can be saved for human souls and there is no reason to attribute it to animals.132 This is in line with Barsalou’s description of perceptual capacities as sufficiently strong as a basis for higher cognitive capacities. For example, the metaperceptive capacity of the common sense might be equated with introspection as part of the perceptive system. Higher cognitive competences, e.g. abstract

129 Johansen (2012, p. 185) comes to a similar conclusion: “[…] we should see the common sense as an aspect of the special senses, an ability they have to perceive a range of perceptibles other than those, that define them, insofar as they are unified.” 130 This problem goes back to William Molyneux and is cited by Locke (2008, p. 84): “Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one and the other, which is the cube, which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere placed on a table, and the blind man be made to see: quaere, whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish and tell which is the globe, which the cube?” 131 See Gregorić (2007) p. 48. 132 See Gregorić (2007) p. 5–8.

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concepts, can build on that and the perceptual groundwork for this awareness is laid by each and every perception.

2.3.  Phantasia - jeweils 2.3.1.  General characteristics The faculty of phantasia, which will be the main focus of this and the subsequent chapters, is to be distinguished from mere perception, even though it is defined in reference to perception and closely associated with perception. White (1985) stresses that phantasia, unlike perception, is not treated for its own sake as a separate faculty but rather because Aristotle needs an account of phantasia to develop his account of thought (noein) which is indicated by the position and the manner of discussion phantasia receives in De anima.133 Independent of whether this is true or not, it is definitely true that an important part of the Aristotelian theory of cognition builds on the faculty of phantasia. This might seem a surprise, if phantasia could be reduced to imagination in the modern sense, i.e., the faculty to produce images without external stimuli. It should not be simply translated as “imagination” without careful examination. Imagination in this sense is only a part of what Aristotle calls phantasia.134 For example, Caston (1998) argues that it would be too narrow to understand phantasmata as simple images: Thus phantasmata are not tiny pictures that look like objects in the world or require interpretation. They are changes in the perceptual system which represent in virtue of their causal powers. Phantasmata can correctly be described as “imagistic” or “pictorial,” therefore, only in the sense that they are capable of producing quasi-perceptual experiences, experiences which are phenomenally similar to perceptual experiences. (Caston 1998: 283)

It cannot be denied that there are passages where Aristotle describes phantasia as the faculty of imagination, i.e., the faculty to generate images at will.135

133 See White (1985) p. 483/484, 488 ff. 134 For the same reason, White (1985, p. 484) and Ferrarin (2006, p. 89) decide to leave phantasia untranslated. Ferrarin argues that mental images have a pictorial and visual connotation which is not compatible with the way Aristotle uses the notion. Johansen (2012, p. 199) argues that there is a certain tendency in Aristotle to prefer visual contents of phantasia and “image” could, therefore, be described as a “core case” or “core example.” Nevertheless, he ultimately choses to transliterate phantasia rather than translate it. 135 See De An. 427b18–21, Caston (1998, p. 281): “But this is atypical, and he certainly does not define phantasia in imagistic terms. Every imagistic experience will involve

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Because of this, some authors see the notion of phantasia in Aristotle as highly ambiguous.136 Taking the opposite position to Caston, Ferrarin (2006) stresses the risks of reading too much into the Aristotelian theory of phantasia by combining it with the productive aspects assigned to imagination by later philosophers such as Kant and Descartes or the notion of a conscious ego in modern philosophy of mind, which are not yet present in Aristotle.137 A middle ground between those two extremes, which is historically well founded, seems to be advisable and will be developed in this section. The word phantasia is used first by Plato, but Aristotle is the one who gave it a technical meaning.138 Aristotle connects it etymologically to the Greek word for light (phaos) and, therefore, to vision but explains that phantasia is not restricted to the modality of vision. There are phantasmata of the other sense modalities; visual phantasmata are only the most prominent and apparent. Phantasia is a faculty distinct from both perception and higher thought (dianoia). It can be present in animals which do not have a rational soul.139 Having the faculty of phantasia requires having the faculty of perception. It is not necessary to have both faculties and it is at least conceivable for an animal to have perception without having phantasia. Nevertheless, all actual kinds of known animals seem to have at least very basic forms of phantasia.140 There are several definitions of phantasia to be found in the psychological writings which all share some basic aspects. Phantasia is described as a faculty that enables human beings to acquire phantasmata141, which in itself is not a full definition without further specifying what phantasmata are. The definition of phantasmata should not, in turn, depend on the definition of phantasia to avoid circularity. A phantasma can be described as an impression (pathos) which remains in the organs of perception

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137 138 139 140 141

phantasmata. But the converse doesn’t follow: not every state involving a phantasma is an imagistic experience. To translate ‘phantasma’ as ‘image’ simply begs the question.” E.g., Busche (1997, p. 567/566) stresses that Aristotle uses the word phantasia metaphorically for appearances of real entities, for the faculty to acquire remaining images, for the process of acquiring those images (also phantazesthai) as well as for the results (phantasmata). However, this ambiguity seems to be mostly a terminological issue and it might be best to see phantasia as applying mainly to the faculty since there is no other term available. See Ferrarin (2006) p. 90 ff. See White (1985) p. 485. See De An. 427b14/15. 428a10/11, 434a1–15. For discussion see Scheiter (2012) p. 259. See De An. 428a1.

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(aisthêtêrion)142 or as a kinêsis which comes into being because of the realization of the faculty of perception.143 Ackrill (1981) provides a very interesting interpretation of what phantasmata are and how their role and relation to the central organ should be understood: To explain imagination, memory and dreams, Aristotle supposes that the movements that reach the heart in sense perception persist in that region. They are physical traces which usually remain submerged, ineffective, unnoticed, but which under suitable circumstances get reactivated (or come to surface to use the Aristotelian metaphor); then they appear to us as images. It will depend on other factors – the nature of the stimulus, the condition and beliefs of the person – whether the having of such an image is (also) a case of memory or of dreaming. The key point is that imagination and memory cannot be explained without some assumptions about physical traces. Exactly what this maybe like (electrical? chemical?) and where they may be (in the heart or in the brain), are important but secondary questions. (Ackrill 1981: 67)

If Ackrill is right, phantasmata are to be conceived as physical traces in the central organ of perception caused by former perceptions. In line with this, perception and memory are described as bodily phenomena. The phenomena discussed in the Parva Naturalia, such as sleep, death, dreams, memory are said to be bodily phenomena by virtue of being connected to perception (e.g., sleep as the temporary and death as the permanent absence of perceptions).144 Phantasmata have to be assumed to explain cognitive tasks (broadly conceived) such as memory tasks. Their definition is more functionally motivated than physiologically specified (also Aristotle has a physiological theory of his own that is applied to the notion of phantasma at times). This notion has a lot in common with the notion of concepts as defined in section II of this dissertation and especially with modal theories of concepts. It remains to be seen, whether Ackrill’s account can actually be applied to Aristotle. Phantasia is discussed by Aristotle as a possible candidate for a faculty that enables subjects to discriminate and to have true or false thoughts (unlike faculties

142 See De Ins. 459a26/27, De Mem. 450a10/11: “A phantasma is an impression belonging to the common sense.” (καὶ τὸ φάντασμα τῆς κοινῆς αἰσθήσεως πάθος ἐστίν), Modrak (2001, p. 227): “Phantasmata, on Aristotle’s account are sensuous contents (431a15, 432a12); at baseline they are the residual traces of things seen, heard, smelled, tasted, or touched that remain in our perceptual organs and are subsequently brought to consciousness.” 143 De An. 429a1/2: “Phantasia is a movement which starts from the realization of the senses.” (ἡ φαντασία ἂν εἴη κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ’ ἐνέργειαν γιγνομένη.) 144 See De Sen. 436b1 ff.

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which are restricted to true representations such as epistême and nous, but also unlike opinion (doxa) which requires commitment to its representations).145 Therefore, it could be understood as a faculty of categorization in the sense of the modern literature of concepts but is also related to the philosophical requirements of a normative theory of concepts in epistemology. On the other hand, perception is also listed as one of these faculties. As a matter of fact, perception also involves categorization in some meaning of the word, e.g., categorizing something as a particular color. In particular, what Aristotle calls accidental perception, i.e., perceiving something as an individual or a kind, is closely linked to what is understood as categorization in contemporary literature. However, accidental perception, as Gregorić (2007) indicated, might involve imagination. But since one thing has been set in motion another thing may be moved by it, and imagination (phantasia) is held to be a movement and to be impossible without sensation, i.e. to occur in beings that are percipient and to have for its content what can be perceived, and since movement may be produced by actual sensation and that movement is necessarily similar (homoian) in character to sensation itself, this movement cannot exist apart from sensation or in creatures that do not perceive, and its possessor does (poiein) and undergoes (paschein) many things in virtue of it, and it is true and false. (De An. 428b10–17)

This is the most elaborate definition of phantasia to be found in Aristotle. Phantasia as a faculty is again defined in relation to perception. It is a kinêsis that comes into existence because of a percept and is similar (homoian) to that percept. It can be understood as a secondary motion that is caused by perception (which is the primary motion) and, therefore, just like perception it is an organic process that requires a body and specific perceptual organs.146 It is directed at the same objects as perception, i.e., the proper, common, and accidental perceptibles. In consequence, even though (as has been mentioned above) Aristotle does not discuss or have an explicit notion of internal formats it can be said that perceptions and phantasmata do have the same format. This is reminiscent of the similarity account of modality of concepts in the modern debate. Aristotle states that phantasia enables the soul to do and suffer several other things. However, it is clear that phantasmata/pathêmata are not sufficient when it comes to explaining higher faculties like knowledge. Defining phantasia as a kinêsis is in line with the general definition of soul as the cause of kinêsis. Being similar to the entities perceived by virtue of being similar to the percepts is

145 See De An. 427b5–428a20. 146 See White (1985) p. 496.

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something the pathêmata mentioned in De interpretatione 16a and the phantasmata mentioned here have in common. Since pathêma and pathos have been shown to be basically interchangeable and pathos is used to describe phantasmata this is strong evidence for De interpretatione 16a referring to phantasmata. The same definition of phantasia can be found in the Aristotelian treatise De insomniis and the relation between phantasia and aisthêsis is discussed in some detail including a reference to De anima.147 Both faculties are realized by the same organs, they do not exist apart from each other, but they can be and have to be defined separately. Aisthêsis is the faculty to receive sense impressions of actual entities while they are present, phantasia is the faculty to keep these impressions once the objects of perception are not present anymore. The simplest form of a phantasma is something like an afterimage, e.g., if one has looked long at the sun and then looks elsewhere.148 Of course, in a modern account these afterimages have to be considered as a distinct phenomenon; but from the Aristotelian view, defining phantasmata as remaining sense impressions it is quite reasonable to include them. Unlike beliefs, phantasmata do not generate emotions like fear: we can be neutral towards them like we can be towards physical images.149 Phantasia is sufficient to explain goal-directed actions, e.g., the behavior of some animals can be explained only in virtue of phantasia and desire. It is in no way necessary to attribute thought to animals showing goal-directed behavior. Even humans can be in a condition, e.g., under the influence of substances or when sick, where they only act according to phantasia and do not use their intellect.150 Unlike genuine and direct percepts (being always true), phantasmata can be both true and false when applied in cognitive operations. However, they are not true or false in isolation, it depends on how they are applied, i.e., how other faculties make use of them. They are compared to pictures in that regard, which has been discussed as part of the Aristotelian theory of representation. Caston (1998) describes the relation phantasmata as representations have to the objects of perception in this vein: For what determines the content of a phantasma is not its causal antecedents, but the causal powers it happens to have at a particular moment. So long as those powers remain the same as the powers of the stimulation that caused it, a phantasma will be about the kind of sensory object from which it ultimately arose. But a phantasma is sometimes modified en route to the central organ in a way that alters its causal powers and so the type of experience it can produce. (Caston 1998: 275)

147 148 149 150

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See De Ins. 459a. See De Ins. 459b13–18. See De An. 427b22–24. See De An. 429a4–7.

If this interpretation is valid, phantasmata can be understood as representations according to a causal account at least regarding the output side. It has already been established that there is a causal connection from the objects of perception to the phantasmata mediated by the perceptions on the input side. Similar causal connections of concepts to their representata are seen as one of the main advantages of modal theories of concepts by Prinz. The ability to use perceptual representations as signs independently of their causal history is one prerequisite Barsalou mentions in establishing perceptual symbols as a powerful representational format. Apart from the debate as to which role phantasmata have to play for higherorder cognitive powers, there is also a debate whether phantasmata are involved in perception as well. To establish this connection, Scheiter (2012) stresses the fact that phantasia not only include direct perceptions of the separate senses but also combined perceptions of the common sense, i.e., combinations of several perceptible features into objects.151 She provides an account of how the emergence of a unified image can be understood: At some point, according to Aristotle, these individual impressions of oak trees combine to form a single image. When these impressions combine to form a new ‘unified’ image, the particulars (e.g. height, width, color) that differentiated our oak tree from our neighbor’s oak tree disappear, and all that remains are the features every oak tree we have ever experienced has, such as leaves that bud and change color in the Fall, acorns that hang off the branches, and so on. The unified image cannot be traced back to a single perceptual experience, and so we now have an image that we never directly experienced, but that is a conglomeration of several independent perceptions, and so still originates in perception. (Scheiter 2012: 263)

This is strongly reminiscent of how modern theories of concepts and particularly perceptual theories of concepts would describe the process of concept acquisition. They can be described as schematic, which is one of the criteria perceptual symbols have to fulfill to be sufficiently expressive, according to Barsalou. Furthermore, it also is reminiscent of the account of abstract ideas in Locke. Scheiter concludes that accidental perception, i.e., perceiving something as something, requires experience and, in turn, phantasia because this kind of perception involves categorization (or discrimination (krinein) according to Aristotle). This kind of categorization in a modern account involves concepts. According to Scheiter, Aristotle believes that only direct perceptions, i.e., the specific and common perceptibles, do not require phantasia. Phantasmata are conglomerates of a number of percepts belonging to the same kind of objects. She attributes an important role to them

151 See Scheiter (2012) p. 261 ff.

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in explaining how the perception of accidental perceptibles is to be explained.152 In references to the wax block analogy from Plato’s Theaitetos, she thinks that the passages in Aristotle are an addition to the account found there and, therefore, must be supplemented by this additional information. For example, the account of categorization by comparison should be transferred to Aristotle. There is a very interesting statement on this issue to be found in the treatise On Dreams. Aristotle states that the organs of perception are not merely passive but also active. Perception of something as something, i.e., the categorization of perceptual stimuli, is said to be guided by similarity and can be influenced by emotional and other physiological states. For example, when a stranger is mistaken for a loved one or a good friend it is because of outward similarities (homoiotês) and strong emotional associations.153 This is a further indication that Scheiter’s position might be right. Moreover, Aristotle explains illusions in this way, they consist of mistaking an actual mental image either a perception or an imagination of something else. If this is the case, phantasmata would qualify as concepts, i.e., as units of categorization. Her account of perception in Aristotle and its connection to phantasia is highly plausible; however, it should be noted that Aristotle does not establish this connection himself. Busche (1997) argues against the involvement of phantasmata in perception. He thinks this only applies in cases where anticipation is involved, e.g., for objects which are still far away or are distorted for another reason. Clear and direct perception – including accidental perception – does not involve phantasmata. Ferrarin (2006) takes a similar position.154 It is plausible, at least, that there are cases of accidental perception which do not involve phantasmata or object categorization: If Gregorić is right to assume that object recognition, i.e., the binding together of several perceptual features into the perception of a unified object, is sufficiently explained by perception alone, there might be cases of accidental perception, e.g., cases of deictic identification, where no image or concept is involved. Ultimately, the case cannot sufficiently be made for either position. It 152 See Scheiter (2012) p. 272: “For one thing, the images involved in perceptual appearance are not mere copies of past perceptual experiences; they are accumulations of numerous past experiences that have combined to make a single unified image that cannot be traced back to any one particular perception. Secondly, when we have a perceptual experience that resembles this unified image, the perception automatically sets our perceptual system in motion, calling up the image and then combining with that image.” 153 See De Ins. 460b3 ff. 154 See Ferrarin (2006) p. 99.

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seems (a) there are cases where phantasmata interfere with and change perception, but there also seem to be cases where (b) perception is self-sufficient in explaining object recognition. Human beings are not always able to successfully distinguish between phantasia and aisthêsis since the distinction depends on external factors. The way we perceive things is influenced by processes in the sense organs – including remaining phantasmata.155 All of this supports Gregorić’s scheme: there are some functions that perception and imagination can fulfill without interacting and others which require an interaction of both. Perceptual categorization of objects falling under a concept would have to be counted among the latter class while perception of objects as unified wholes is sufficiently achieved by the perceptive faculty. Other tasks, such as proper imagination, memory, and possibly thought, can be subsumed under the imaginative faculty in separation. In addition, it is also very important to stress that the faculty of phantasia does not require conscious access: neither to the phantasmata itself, which are stored in the organs of perception, nor of their effects on cognition. In consequence, one might not be aware, whether one is merely perceiving an object or mixing actual perceptions with independent images. Together with their multimodal characteristics percepts and their remaining images, the mostly (but necessary) subconscious status of phantasmata is what distinguishes them from a standard understanding of images and imagination. Cognitive processes such as categorization are also described as not conscious or at least not necessarily accessible by consciousness. These are also characteristics they share with perceptual symbols in Barsalou’s account. Barsalou also describes concepts as constituted by stored and coordinated impressions on the one hand and generative simulators on the other hand. In one passage, Aristotle distinguishes between a mere receptive phantasia aisthêtikê, which could be described as a storehouse of impressions, and an active phantasia logistikê, which can bring up and change impressions at will, and is, therefore, accompanied by conscious access.156 Only the former is present in nonrational animals while the latter is reserved for human beings. It is also described as phantasia bouleutikê, i.e., the faculty to rationally compare alternative actions and make a decision. It is only this form of phantasia that is able to make a new phantasma out of several distinct phantasmata.157 However, it is debatable whether this applies only to generating new phantasmata willfully or also to abstracting

155 See De Ins. 460b22–27. 156 See De An. 433b29/30. 157 See De An. 434a6–11.

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a general phantasma from several specific phantasmata. This phantasia logistikê/ bouleutikê is clearly more familiar to the modern notion of imagination than the general Aristotelian notion of phantasia, which only implies the storage of former perceptions and can be modified and used by different cognitive operations. Barsalou would speak of a mere recording system in this context if these representations cannot be shown to fulfill other functions and have the four properties required for expressiveness. To try and clarify their respective relations, the following sections will have a look at distinct cognitive abilities that are said to be tied to phantasia by Aristotle. The faculty of nous, in particular, as a paradigm case for higher-order thought will receive a chapter of its own. Before that, I will discuss memory and dreams as conceived by Aristotle.

2.3.2. Phantasia and memories Aristotle discusses memory (mnêmê) in a separate treatise, which is part of Parva naturalia. Perception is said to be about the present, while other attitudes like hope or expectation can be directed at the future. Memory is necessarily directed at the past. Being conscious of something as something that has happened in the past is a requirement for something to be a part of memory. One can remember things that one has learned and things that one has experienced. This might be parallelized with the modern distinction between a declarative and an episodic memory. Memory of thoughts (noêta) is also stated to be possible. Memory is not restricted to human beings since it is primary a faculty realized by the general organs of perception that is present in other animals as well.158 The analogy of a tableau of wax and the impressions left in it is once again used to explain how images can remain in the soul after the perceived entity is not present. The phantasma underlying memory is like an impression (typon) left by the aisthêma and has a signifying function (ensêmainein).159 Aristotle speaks of memories here in analogy to images (zôgraphêma) which has led some to criticize Aristotle for seeing mental representations as mere images which, due to their restrictions, are not powerful enough to account for a lot of cognitive phenomena. Following Scheiter (2012), it can be said that Aristotle starts from the Platonic dialogue Theaitetos in which memory is described as the storage of past sense impressions and modifies this notion of memory to be the representation of past experiences as past experiences, i.e., including the awareness of time.160 158 See De Mem. 449b10–450a16. 159 See De Mem. 450a27–32. 160 See Scheiter (2012) p. 269.

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In contrast to memory, Aristotle discusses remembering (anamnêsis) as a process which is described as mainly associative. It is clearly distinguished from memory and said to be neither the acquisition nor the activation of memory. Impressions are said to have certain orders of appearance which are either necessary or conventional. In remembering, one tries to actively go through this order to call up the memory one is searching for. It is possible to remember falsely, e.g., to reach something that is similar but not the same as what one wanted to remember. Remembering is conceived as a bodily process, i.e., an active search of phantasmata that has to take place in the organs of sense perception. There are different kinds of connections like ‘opposite,’ ‘related to,’ ‘similar,’ ‘co-occurrence,’ ‘being a part of.’161 This resembles the idea of conceptual nets and the frame approach to concepts to some degree. In both approaches, concepts are understood as being embedded in larger structures and understood only in the context of these structures. Remembering in Aristotle seems not to be restricted to past occurrences but might also apply to general concepts abstracted from experience. Aristotle uses the example ‘milk’ – ‘white’ – ‘fog’ – ‘wet’ – ‘autumn’ to explain associative chains. It cannot be said for sure whether general concepts are also subject to the faculty of memory (mnêmê). If this was the case, they could, however, only be so to the extent that they are remembered as something encountered in the past, e.g., a species of animals. Remembering is faster if what is remembered is more common.162 Reaction time is a very important criterion in some experiments on concepts in modern research. It is quite amazing that ideas like that are prefigured in Aristotle. The process of remembering cannot be controlled once it is started and might, therefore, be described as partly subconscious.163 There are several passages from De memoria et reminiscentia which discuss the relation between memory, phantasia, and other capacities of the soul. Memory is not possible without at least having a phantasma. This is also true of memories of thought since thinking is said to always involve phantasmata. In addition to that, a perception of time is required.164 Nous seems to be conceived as something supervening on phantasia and depending on the central organ in this context. However, this seems to be a contradiction to the account of nous given in De anima. Memory is defined as having an impression of something past and experiencing this in combination with time by means of the primary faculty of perception 161 162 163 164

See De Mem. 451b10–453a19. See De Mem. 452a13–29. See De Mem. 453a20–26. See De Mem. 450a1–452a17.

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which realizes both perception and phantasia. Therefore, it should be counted as part of the sensory capacity according to Gregorić’s terminology and distinctions. It not only involves the storage of images but also the conscious attribution of past tense which demarks it, e.g., from perception. This could be described as a metaperceptive faculty and, therefore, cannot be restricted to the imaginative faculty. Since memory as based in phantasia has its beginning in perception, it is realized in the same organs as perception. Because of the close ties to these organs, Aristotle allows for physiological explanations of phenomena like bad memory and different abilities to remember at different ages.165 The phantasma generated by a perception can be understood as an independent entity but can also be described as being dependent on what caused the perception it originated from. Caston (1998) argues that this “aboutness” of memories can be compared to modern theories of intentionality.166 In Metaphysics, Aristotle also discusses memory. He states that it is connected to perception and is only present in some animals which are more intelligent as a result. Experience (empeiria) is introduced as a further level above phantasia and memory (which seem to be cognates here). It is said to be the result of memory and enables logismos and technê.167 And from memory experience is produced in men; for many memories (mnêmai) of the same thing (pragma) produce finally the capacity for a single experience (empeiria). Experience seems to be very similar to science and art (epistêmê kai technê), but really science and art come to men through experience […]. And art arises, when from many notions (ennoêmata) gained by experience one universal (katholou) judgment (hypolêpsis) about similar objects is produced. (Met. 980b27–981a7)

Experience is the result from many memories of the same thing (pragma). Pragma might be conceived as an individual or as a kind here. In the latter case, memory would always concern individuals just like perception, but individuals from past encounters, while experience involves a transfer from past individuals to newly encountered ones. Technê is a further step which involves judgments and the grasping of a general kind (katholou) by nous. It is not entirely clear whether there is already a summary representation at the level of empeiria since it is stressed that it is a single experience in contrast to the memories being many. It is possible to acquire a scientific understanding by virtue of logos without having the experience first. In this case, the application, e.g., in medicine, is often worse

165 See De Mem. 450a32–550b10. 166 See Caston (1998) p. 258/259. 167 See Met. 980a27–980b29.

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than for those who only have experience without a logos. The reason for this is that application always concerns individuals which might have accidental properties relevant to the application while logos is only concerned with general features. This can be parallelized to the information that can be included in a prototype or exemplar representation of a concept while it cannot be included in a definition as proposed by classical theory. Experience, in contrast to mere logoi, is always directed at individuals and, therefore, can yield better results in application.168 In the final paragraphs of the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle discusses how the simple elements of judgments can be known. He once again starts his account from perception, which is understood as a faculty of discrimination (kritikê). The familiar distinction is drawn between the animals that can retainsense impressions and those which cannot (the term phantasia is not used here).169 The remaining sense impressions are described as belonging to mnêmê. So from perception (aisthêsis) there comes memory (mnêmê), as we call it, and from memory (when it occurs often in connection with the same thing), experience (empeiria); for memories that are many in number form a single experience. And from experience, or from the whole universal (katholou) that has come to rest in the soul (the one apart from the many, whatever is one and the same in all those things), there comes a principle of skill (technê) and of understanding (epistêmê) – of skill if it deals with how things come about (genesis), of understanding if it deals with what is the case (to on). (An. Post. 100a3–9)

The process of forming a representation of a universal is compared to a phalanx which consists of individual hoplites but still behaves like one unified entity or “functional whole” that can carry out tasks that would be impossible for a single hoplite.170 The combination of several remaining sense impressions is called a logos here. This is the only passage where such a direct connection between logos and phantasia is established.171 Helmig (2012) favors translating logos as “reason” in this passage because the difference between animals and humans is stressed and having reason seems to be a prerequisite of having language.172 Later on, nous is said to be the faculty which is responsible for forming these first constituents

168 169 170 171

See Met. 981a12–17. See An. Post. 99b35–37. See Salmieri (2008) p. 216. See An. Post. 100a2, De An. 403a20 also establishes a connection stating that pathê are nothing but logoi enhyloi. The implications of those two passages have to be discussed in the next section. 172 See Helmig (2012) p. 133.

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of judgments which are always true.173 This indicates that nous and logos should be differentiated here, even though they might be cognates elsewhere. Technê and epistêmê are differentiated concerning their application, while technê is directed at change and causing change, epistêmê is directed at being and investigating the world as it is. The latter is said to always involve logos (in contrast to nous). Once again, empeiria is introduced as a level in-between memory and knowledge. The process by which the soul forms general and abstract representations is described as pathein of the soul. Perception is clearly said to be involved in forming mental representations of general kinds (katholou) through induction (epagogê).174 Memory might be conceived differently in these two passages. This difference might be explained by developmental theories, i.e., the ultimate definition and terminology of memory and phantasia was only developed in a late period of Aristotle’s philosophizing in which he wrote the psychological writings.175 This might also explain why Aristotle uses the more general pathêmata in De interpretatione 16a instead of the more precise phantasmata in the event that both are indeed to be equated. Alternatively, it might be explained by a different focus and the greater generality of those passages. However, it seems to be important to distinguish between memory in the strict sense, i.e., representations intentionally directed at something past, and the more general notion of remaining sense impressions, which are described as phantasmata in the psychological writings. The passages in the nonpsychological writings seem to use mnêmê in this second sense as something in-between particular perceptions and more general representations which ultimately enable knowledge.

2.3.3. Phantasia and dreams In addition to memories, there is another important psychological phenomenon connected to phantasia which receives a separate treatise in the Parva Naturalia. Aristotle describes dreams as phantasmata that come to the surface during sleep. Unlike memories, dreams are phantasmata from the past taken as objects currently present. However, not all phantasmata occurring during sleep are dreams since, while perception is impossible at least when fully asleep, one can have thoughts and acts of imagination during sleep which are not part of the dream.176

173 See An. Post. 100b9–16. 174 See An. Post. 100a15–100b5. 175 In fact, Jaeger (1923) counts Metaphysics Alpha to be the earliest conserved writings of Aristotle while he counts the psychological writings to his late period. 176 See De Ins. 428a25/26.

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But since we have, in our work on the soul, treated of imagination (phantasia), and the faculty of imagination (phantastikon) is identical with that of sense-perception (aisthêtikon), though the being of a faculty of imagination is different from that of a faculty of sense-perception; and since imagination is movement (kinêsis) set up by a sensory faculty when actually discharging its function, while a dream (enhypnion) appears to be an image (phantasma) (for which occurs in sleep – whether simply or in some peculiar way – is what we call a dream): it manifestly follows that dreaming is an activity of senseperception, but belongs to this faculty qua imaginative. (De Ins. 459a14–22)

Phantasia and aisthêsis are said to be different from each other on the level of defining their being, i.e., it is something different to perceive something and to keep the impressions received by perception; however, they exist together as a unity and inhere in the same organs. Therefore, the psychological constitution has an influence on whether a cognitive subject has dreams during sleep and also on the degree of clarity of dreams. The treatment of dreams delves into some more general and very interesting aspects of how Aristotle conceives phantasia and phantasmata. The images functioning as dreams are present in the organs of perception all the time, they might be described as subconscious and are suppressed throughout the day. In the daytime, one is able to distinguish the real object, its perception, and its phantasma; when asleep the phantasma is mistaken to be the real object.177 The intentionality of phantasmata is ultimately not inherent in them but can change. They are made to stand for different things by different faculties (as has already been indicated by the treatment of memory). The central organ, when awake, is described as making different perceptual experiences coherent. The ability to distinguish between a mere image and an actual perception can be lost. Perceptions are accepted as true if the higher faculty does not interfere. Illusions result from the inability of the higher faculty to infer. It is also possible that the perceptions of two different modalities are contradictory: in that case, the higher faculty judges.178 This highest faculty would be on the level of sensory capacity in Gregorić’s scheme since it is concerned both with images and perceptions. The inactivity of the common-sense-fulfilling metaperceptual duties during sleep as discussed by Gregorić has been cited above. Phantasmata coming up in sleep are not identical to the original percepts but are distorted. Hence, they are compared to mirror images in the water.179 They either can be unrecognizable or at least appear very different from the original percept. While this description is not very elaborate, it shows that the images retained 177 See De Ins. 461b22–30. 178 See De Ins. 460b16–27. 179 See De Ins. 461a14.

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through perception and stored by the faculty of phantasia undergo changes and can be manipulated to differ from their original form. Separate images can be recombined; therefore, it is possible to have phantasmata of entities of which there are no percepts and real correlates such as centaurs and other fictive creatures from mythology.180 Being schematic, i.e., not completely preserved perceptual states, is one of the conditions Barsalou’s perceptual symbols have to fulfill to be sufficiently expressive. Admittedly, the remarks in Aristotle are very superficial and general, but at least he allows for phantasmata to lose information contained in the original percepts, which is an important precondition for schematic representations. Before the next section starts to discuss the relation between nous and phantasia, i.e., whether phantasmata indeed play a decisive role in thought and language, some features of phantasmata which tie them to perceptual symbols should be summed up. They are (a) remaining percepts, (b) closely tied to the perceptual faculty and organs of perception, (c) similar (homoios) to percepts (and, therefore, ultimately to entities themselves), (d) they can fulfill a representational function, i.e., stand for something else than themselves, (e) they are not determined in their designation but can stand for different things in different contexts, (f) they are not identical to the original percepts but can undergo changes, be distorted, modified, recombined, or refined, (g) they can be made use of by very different faculties such as memory, dreaming, and imagination in the more literal sense of the word, (h) they can be used to categorize newly encountered entities (even though it is not entirely clear whether this is something that generally happens or only in exceptional cases). They have all of these features in common with how Barsalou conceives perceptual symbols.181

2.4.  Higher-order thoughts 2.4.1.  The notion of nous in Aristotle In the third book of De anima, nous, which is the highest faculty of the soul and can only be attributed to human beings, is discussed at some length. Partly due to the heritage from his predecessors such as Plato and Anaxagoras, Aristotle 180 See De Ins. 461b19–21, De Div. 464b5–18. 181 See Spalding/Gagné (2003) p. 84: “This highly flexible use of the phantasms for all conceptual activities seems very similar to the role of perceptual simulation using sensory symbols in Barsalou (1999) and to other recent work investigating the role of sensory (or embodied) information in concepts. However, the A-T view does not collapse to such an embodied view, as nothing like the intelligible species in included in the embodied view.”

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spends a lot of energy on discussing whether it is separable from the body. Nous is the only part of the soul for which this possibility is at least debatable. However, there are several other faculties that seem to be associated or connected in some way to nous. Alternatively, some might just be different faculties, while they actually can be explained as alternative terms for nous. In book 2, Aristotle lists the different faculties and states that logismos and dianoia are the highest faculties, which are separate from all others including phantasia. It is not clear whether logismos and dianoia are supposed to be the same and in what relation they stand to nous since he also states that theorêtikos nous will be discussed in what follows. There is some evidence that nous and logistikon (possibly dianoia as well) are supposed to be the same faculty.182 In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes the rational part of the soul (logon echon) in the part which is concerned with things which are always true (epistêmonikon) and the part which is concerned with those entities which can either be true or false and are, as a consequence, disputable (logistikon).183 Another alternative to nous seems to be phronesis/phronein.184 Dianoia can be true or false – unlike phronêsis, epistêmê, and alêthês doxa which are true by definition.185 Maybe nous should be conceived as a general term for the rational faculty of which the other terms signify different aspects, e.g., phronêsis for the practical intellect, dianoia (possibly synonymous with theorêtikos nous) for the theoretical intellect, and logismos for the linguistic application of the intellect. The linguistic and the rational faculty seem to be very closely associated, which causes the translation of the Greek zoon logon echon into the Latin equivalent aminal rationale in later epochs.186 Language seems to presuppose intellect, but since it also requires the production of meaningful sounds (or possibly other signs) it cannot be fully equated. In De sensu et sensibilis, Aristotle discusses the relation between nous187 and perception asking which of the different senses

182 183 184 185 186

See De An. 415a7–13, 432b25, Eth. Nic. 1139a33. See Eth. Nic. 1139a4–15. See De An. 427a16–19; Eth. Nic. 1080a22. See De An. 427b8–11. Johansen (2012, p. 222) discusses the connection between logos and nous. He sees nous as a faculty directed at logoi understood in an objectivist way. 187 He also uses phronêsis, which might indicate that both are synonyms in this context. There is also a developmental explanation available for the seeming ambiguity of phronêsis: Jaeger (1923, p. 82–86) states that Aristotle used phronêsis for the highest cognitive abilities in his early writing in the same way that it was used by the later Plato and other Platonists of this period. In this regard, it is synonymous with nous.

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is the most important for the intellect. While vision is the most important in general because it reveals the most of the world, especially in regard to common perceptibles, audition is more important for the intellect since it enables language.188 Nous could be defined in relation to its function or in relation to its objects. Just as perception is defined starting from the perceptibles, Aristotle defines nous starting from the thinkable objects (noêta). Since humans only have access to perceptible forms Aristotle concludes that the thinkable forms have to inhere in the perceptible ones and be abstracted from them, e.g., the mathematical form of triangle inheres in a physical triangle. Unlike the perceptible forms, the intelligible forms cannot interact directly with physical bodies. The causation of thoughts cannot be interpreted as a physical act by intelligible forms. One piece of evidence for this is the fact that very intense perceptible qualities, e.g., bright light or loud sound, damage the organs of perception and prevent a correct perception while objects of the intellect that are intelligible to a higher degree do not damage the intellect but rather strengthen it.189 Nous is said to become its objects. That can be explained in terms of abstract objects of thought having no reality apart from their being thought and their being realized in physical objects. Thus, unlike perception which only takes on the forms of its objects, thought can actually acquire its objects directly and in that way said to be and to think its objects at the same time without contradiction. The thinking soul does not change. It can be compared to a builder who is building a house, i.e., it is realizing its genuine potential.190 Concerning its function, nous is defined as the unifying principle that brings together simple thoughts, which cannot be false in themselves without combination.191 The thinking (noêsis) of indivisibles is found in those cases where falsehood is impossible: where the alternative of true or false applies, there we always find a sort of combining of objects of thought (noêmata) in a quasi-unity. […] if the combination be of objects of past or future the combination of thought includes in its content the date. (De An. 430a26–430b1)

188 189 190 191

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After developing his own philosophical theories, Aristotle used phronêsis rather for the practical application of nous, i.e., deciding which action is in accordance with reason. Passages in which both are synonyms might, therefore, either be from an early period or a more general use of the term as a reminiscence of the older and Platonic usage. See De Sen. 437a3–15. See De An. 429b2–7. See De An. 417b5–10. See De An. 430b1–9.

This passage is reminiscent of the opening passage of De interpretatione and similar passages from Categories. It states that the simple elements of language/ thought are not yet true or false, only their combinations are. Time is something that is added. The components as well as their combinations are described as belonging to the domain of nous. The already-mentioned passage from Second Analytics, which ties knowledge of universals to inductive processes, also sees nous as the faculty to form these simple but general representations out of sense impressions.192 This includes both first constituents of larger units of thought and axioms like the principle of excluded middle. The first constituents of higher-order thought might be described as concepts, at least in some sense of the word. Therefore, it is reasonable to describe nous as the faculty of concepts (even though it is not restricted to concepts). Aristotle presents two possible ways nous could be separable: it could either be only conceptually separable (kata logon), i.e., it is possible to define or describe nous without reference to a body (e.g., perception and phantasia are also conceptually separable from each other, although they do not exist in separation) or it could be numerically separable (kata arithmon), i.e., it would be possible that there is nous which is not related to a body. Consequently, there would 192 See An. Post. 100b5 ff.: “Since of the intellectual states by which we grasp the truth some are always true and some admit falsehood (e.g. opinion and reasoning – whereas understanding and comprehension are always true), and no kind other than comprehension is more precise than understanding, and the principles of understanding are more familiar, and all understanding involves an account – there will not be understanding of the principles; and since it is not possible for anything to be truer than understanding except comprehension, there will be comprehension of the principles – both if we inquire from these facts and because demonstration is not a principle of demonstration so that understanding is not a principle of understanding either – so if we have no other true kind apart from understanding, comprehension will be the principle of understanding.” (Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὴν (5) διάνοιαν ἕξεων αἷς ἀληθεύομεν αἱ μὲν ἀεὶ ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἐπιδέχονται τὸ ψεῦδος, οἷον δόξα καὶ λογισμός, ἀληθῆ δ’ ἀεὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπιστήμης ἀκριβέστερον ἄλλο γένος ἢ νοῦς, αἱ δ’ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων γνωριμώτεραι, ἐπιστήμη δ’ ἅπασα μετὰ λόγου ἐστί, τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπιστήμη (10) μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ἐπεὶ δ’ οὐδὲν ἀληθέστερον ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἐπιστήμης ἢ νοῦν, νοῦς ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἔκ τε τούτων σκοποῦσι καὶ ὅτι ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἀπόδειξις, ὥστ’ οὐδ’ ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη.) – Note that logismos is here used to describe a faculty which unlike epistêmê and nous is not always true, which seems to be in line with interpreting it as the linguistic faculty as suggested above. Logos seems to be used for arguments or complex definitions in this passage, which are said not to be equal with the simple constituents of thought and also always present in scientific discourse.

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not be a body for every nous to which it is related. One argument Aristotle has against nous being corporal is that it seems absurd to combine it with physical qualities such as ‘cold’ or ‘warm.’193 This is not really convincing since the same applies to perception, even though it is possible to apply these predicates to the organs of perception. If there was an organ of thought, it could also receive those qualities without attributing them to thought itself. If nous is assumed to be separable from bodies in human beings and an individual nous can outlive its human body, this seems to contradict a large part of Aristotelian psychology. However, there are some other ways to explain his statements.194 A little earlier he discusses whether old age can be said to negatively affect nous. He admits that it is possible that thought can be diminished in an old person due to organic failures, just as the failure of an eye makes it impossible to see. However, he states that nous itself stays unaffected.195 To understand what Aristotle means when he speaks of separability and what the implications are it is important to also consider other passage concerned with separability but not with nous. The issue of separability is first discussed when the common definitions of soul are developed: From this it is clear that the soul is inseparable from the body, or at any rate that certain parts of it are (if it has parts) – for the actuality of some of them is the actuality (entelecheia) of the part themselves. Yet some may be separable because they are not the actualities of any body at all. Further, we have no light on the problem whether the soul may not be the actuality of its body in the sense in which the sailor is the actuality of the ship. (De An. 413a3–9)

If parts of the soul are no more than the realization of functions of bodily parts, by definition they cannot be separable from a body. But those which are not the entelecheia of a body or body part might be separable. It is not specified whether they are not the entelecheia of a specific body but still of some body, whether they do not necessarily belong to a body or whether they cannot be realized by a body at all. To distinguish these cases, it would be necessary to achieve a more thorough understanding of the Aristotelian notion of separability. The comparison to the steersman of a ship is also subject to interpretation. The steersman cannot be a steersman without a ship; however, he is a separated entity and is not connected to a specific ship. Basing an interpretation only on this passage as evidence a lot of speculation is required.

193 See De An. 429a25/26. 194 See Caston (2009) p. 338 ff. 195 See De An. 408b18–29.

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In addition to a possible separability of nous discussed in De anima, there are also passages from De generatione Animalium that should be mentioned here and be considered when interpreting the notion of nous in Aristotle. The process of fertilization and the development of embryos is the subject matter of the treatise. In this context, nous is said to be the only part that is not already potentially present in the embryo but rather is divine and enters at a later point. The activity of nous does not share (koinônein) in a bodily activity and is separated.196 This is a strong indication that nous is an exception when compared with all the other faculties of the soul. In earlier parts of De anima, the notion of separability is applied to the nutritive faculty in relation to the senses and to the sense of touch in relation to the other senses.197 They are separable insofar as (a) they can be defined without reference to the other and (b) there are cases where they exist without the other. The first one is less interesting; it probably amounts to the conceptual separability also discussed as one option for nous. The second one might be related to numerical separability and ultimately imply that the general possibility of a separated nous (e.g., the unmoved mover) is not denied. One single independently existing nous in that case would be enough to describe nous as numerically separable, even though it is not actually separated in human beings. This shows that possibly the separability of nous is combinable with the body-oriented description of the soul in the rest of De anima.198 The statements from De generatione Animalium, however, seem to contradict such an interpretation. Cohoe (2014) distinguishes between two main strands of interpretations in Aristotelian scholarship: (1) the human separability approach, in which there is a separable intellect as part of an individual human soul (this interpretation is held by Thomas Aquinas, among others, partly due to his Christian background; more recently Gerson (2004) has argued that individual immortality is assumed in Aristotle); (2) the naturalist approach, according to which (2a) either intellect as a whole can be explained as form of a physical body or (2b) active intellect is nonphysical but also is not part of the human soul and rather to be equated with divine intellect introduced in Metaphysics. This interpretation goes back to Alexander of Aphrodisias (2nd/3rd century A.D.).199 In book 2 of De anima, Aristotle discusses the possibility that nous might be a different kind (genos) of soul which speaks for the second variant of a naturalist 196 197 198 199

See De Gen. An. 736b5–737a10. See De An. 413b5–7. Johansen (2012, p. 53 ff.) discusses the notion of separability at length. See Gerson (2004) p. 348.

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interpretation of human intellect. In that case, all definitions of soul which pertain to the body might not apply to nous in isolation.200 This can be connected to the possibly disjunctive definition201 of soul, i.e., having nous would be enough to attribute soul. Nous itself might not require a body and an entity which has nous without a physical body would still qualify to be characterized as having soul and, therefore, life as well. In the third book, Aristotle distinguishes between a passive and an active intellect and attributes the status of separability only to the active intellect. He starts with a general discussion of nature and the distinction between matter and formal causes which has to be drawn for all entities. From this he infers that there have to be equivalents to matter and cause for the intellect. He compares the active intellect to light, whose presence is necessary for colors to be realized.202 It is described as unable to suffer (apathês) which shows that it cannot be connected to pathêmata and perception in any way. In contrast to the active nous, the passive nous is mortal like every other part of the soul.203 Caston (1999) builds his interpretation on this line of reasoning and the interpretation of active nous as nonhuman: In De anima 3.5, then, Aristotle is simply putting human psychology in a cosmic perspective. It is not crucial for psychology as we understand it. But it is essential, he would insist, for appreciating who we are and what our place is in the world. (Caston 1999: 200)

One disadvantage of interpreting the text of De anima in this way is that an unannounced jump between disciplines has to be assumed, which is quite uncommon for Aristotle.204 The main advantage of this interpretation is that it ties an otherwise hard to explain part of Aristotelian psychology to a more or less established part of his metaphysical system.205 The agent intellect seems to be a contradiction to the approach taken in the remainder of De anima and the Parva naturalia and can perhaps be easiest explained if it is not seen as a part 200 See De An. 413b24–27. 201 See De An. 413a21–27, as well as section IV.2.1 of this dissertation. 202 See Gerson (2004) p. 364: “Light actualizes the colors that are already present in potency as the agent intellect actualizes the forms already present in the passive intellect.” 203 See De An. 430a10–25. 204 See Cohoe (2014) p. 598; in addition, active nous is said to be in the soul (en tê psychê) which, according to Cohoe, is another argument against this interpretation. It is definitely a problem but can be explained because according to the disjunctive definition the divine intellect qualifies as soul and, therefore, this intellect is also in a soul as much as the human intellect is. 205 Johansen (2012, p. 237–244) prefers a similar interpretation of the agent intellect.

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of human psychology. The way nous as an unmoved mover is described in Metaphysics is reminiscent of the way the active intellect is described in De anima. It is described as pure activity and thinking of the thought itself.206 If this nous is the final cause of the world as a whole, it is of necessity also the cause of the human passive intellect’s activity. If the disjunctive definition of the soul from book 2 of De anima is accepted and the attribution of thinking is enough to attribute soul the ‘divine,’ intellect would qualify as soul (as pointed out above). Consequently, its treatment in this treatise would be justified even though it is not the actuality of a specific physical body. Another alternative interpretation can be found in Corkum (2010): he proposes reading the passive intellect as potentiality and the active intellect as first actuality207 and interprets both the divine nous and the active nous of human beings as being different instances of active nous. In consequence, active nous does not have to be eternal in all cases but, unlike passive nous, it can and – at least in one instance – does exist separately, i.e., the divine nous as the unmoved mover.208 Ross (1923) also strongly opposes interpreting active intellect as divine and thinks that it must be understood as an immortal part of the human soul, since both kinds of intellect are explicitly said to be in the soul.209 Nous in humans is said to be separable by Aristotle in the same way that entities are separable from matter.210 This opens the possibility of saying that there can be no nous without a material realization (maybe apart from the unmoved mover of Metaphysics) but it is still independent of matter and can be described as pure form. Comparable to mathematical forms, intellect is not bound to a specific body of any form. It requires a physical basis to be realized but it does not matter what this physical basis is.211 Consequently, it is possible for intellect to exist without a specific physical body while other functions of soul such as perception require a specific physical body. Theoretically there might be other nonbiological physical bodies realizing nous, which is, therefore, separable from a specific type of body. This explanation is close to the software analogy 206 207 208 209 210 211

See Met. 1074b30 ff. See Corkum (2010) p. 210. See Corkum (2010) p. 214. See Ross (1923) p. 151–157. See De An. 429b22/23. See Johansen (2012) p. 231: “So the capacity of intellect escapes the specific kind of hylomorphic explanation, whereby the capacity is to be understood as the form of its own proper organ. However, it does not follow that theoretical thinking eludes any hylomorphic explanation […].”

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from early cognitive science, i.e., cognitive activity can be formally described like a computer program without reference to the hardware that embodies the program. On the other hand, this kind of separability might just amount to the first kind of separability, i.e., separability kata logon. A more thorough distinction between kinds of separability might distinguish between (a) being conceptually separable, but not actually able to exist without a specific body (i.e., we can form a nominal definition which does not make reference to a specific body but the essence of the phenomenon we aim to describe is tied to a specific body and matter); (b) being conceivable as existing independent of a specific body but not without matter; (c) being conceivable as existing as pure form without any matter; (d) actually existing separated from biological bodies; (e) actually existing as pure form without matter. Furthermore, the scope can be disambiguated as either applying to (i) all instances of nous (including nous in human beings) or (ii) only to some instances of nous (e.g., the unmoved mover and other nonhuman cases of nous). This leaves a lot of options of how to interpret Aristotle and how to explain his comments on nous. One problem that remains is the treatment of nous in De generatione Animalium. This section has tried to show that there are readings which are reconcilable with the remainder of his psychology, which describes soul as the form of specific biological bodies. Another alternative might be to read it from a developmental perspective as an unnecessary and unmotivated remainder from the early Platonic stages of Aristotle’s philosophy.212 Apart from that, there might be immanent reasons to Aristotelian psychology and especially epistemology for this seeming hiatus between nous and the other faculties of the soul. Some of these possible explanations will play a role in the next sections when discussing the connection of intellect and phantasia. In the end, it may be necessary to admit that there is no final and satisfying conclusion of how nous in the final book of De anima should be conceived and relates to the other parts of Aristotelian philosophy.213 However, it should be noted that it is at least not contradictory to combine the account of intellect with the account of an embodied soul. 212 See, e.g., Jaeger (1923) p. 355. 213 See White (2004) p. 739: “My ultimate conclusion, while perhaps rather disappointingly deflationary, might have been anticipated from even a cursory consideration of the long history of the problem. A resolution that is both textually adequate and philosophically satisfying is difficult to find; difficult, I suspect, to the point of being impossible.” Barnes (1972) p. 112: “The adequacy of Aristotle’s solution depends on the nature of the distinction he is making; but that, despite two millennia of discussion, remains quite obscure.” […] The distinction between creative and passive

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2.4.2 Nous and phantasia There are many indicators in De anima that Aristotle sees nous in human beings strongly connected to the faculty of phantasia. […] for images (phantasmata) are like sensuous contents (aisthêmata) except in that they contain no matter (hylê). Imagination (phantasia) is different from assertion and denial; for what is true and false involves a synthesis of thoughts (symplokê noêmatôn). In what will the primary thought differ from images? Must we not say that neither these nor even other thoughts are images, though they necessarily involve them? (De An. 432a9–14)

This passage has received a great deal of attention. It can be read as Aristotle affirming a perceptual theory of thoughts and concepts. It is said that the first elements of thought (prôta noêmata) seem to be at least necessarily always connected to phantasmata. The first alternative could be read as a strict perceptual account of concepts (i.e., all noêmata are phantasmata) while the latter would be a modest account in which concepts are of necessity related to perceptual representations but are not constituted by them. White (1985) lists similarities between both faculties, because of which phantasia might be mistaken for thought: (1) both are internal operations of the soul which do not require an external stimulus (unlike perception); (2) both thought and phantasia can be the cause of physical actions of a living being without a direct external cause.214 The question how thought and phantasia are related is of central importance to the treatise as a whole since, if thought was equated with phantasia or at least could not exist without phantasia, thought without a body would be rendered impossible.215 The question whether noein can be described as a suffering (pathein) in analogy to perception is discussed and denied. Still the nous must be able to take the form of the noêta but without suffering from them.216 This of course is interesting, since it seems to rule out describing thoughts as the pathêma from De interpretatione 16a. On the other hand, they seem to be equated with noêmata. Either one has to see both as distinct and, in consequence, deny the terminological implications of pathêma or find a way to reconcile both statements. There are other passages in which it seems to be noncontradictory to speak of a pathos of

intellect appears nowhere else in Aristotle; Γ 5 is a sketch - faint, careless, suggestive. Its suggestions were never worked out.” 214 See White (1985) p. 493. 215 See De An. 403a8–16. 216 See De An. 429a13–18.

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the noetic part of the soul.217 Even if thinking itself is not a suffering from the objects of thought, nothing prevents it from taking mental representations, which are the result of a suffering from perceptible objects, as its matter. In this case, thought would be the form which is realized by phantasmata (i.e., physical traces in the organs of perception) as its matter. Form itself cannot suffer: it can either be present or not present in matter. There is another remark from the third book of De anima in which Aristotle states that the dianoetic part of the soul uses the phantasmata as a foundation and like aisthêmata.218 In a similar vein, in a later passage, Aristotle claims that the nous makes use of the phantasmata to think the thinkable forms.219 At least a description of how this relation between noêmata and phantasmata is to be understood seems to be required. This has also implications for whether thought is tied to bodily organs or not. Corkum (2010) proposes that phantasia is involved in concept acquisition but not in conceptual combination and thought.220 Thinking is described as involving attention focused on the previously acquired concepts. This might seem like a satisfying compromise at first; however, it is difficult to describe what attention is in an Aristotelian framework using only disembodied terms. The processes of the central organ selecting and suppressing certain impressions described in De insomniis seem to be the closest Aristotle comes to describing consciousness and attention. This account is clearly articulated in a physiologically based model. Another proposal comes from Ferrarin (2006). He denies the possibility of interpreting phantasmata as concepts. He uses “concept” as a translation for noêma instead. The idea is that phantasmata cannot be concepts since they are 217 See De Ins. 458b1/2. 218 See De An. 413a14/15. 219 See De An. 431b2: “The faculty of thinking then thinks the forms in the images […].” (τὰ μὲν οὖν εἴδη τὸ νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ.) 220 See Corkum (2010) p. 213/214: “For its passage from a first potentiality to a second, the intellect depends on the bodily sense organs so to receive the perceptual information which leads to concept acquisition. For its passage from the first actuality to the second actuality, however, the intellect does not depend on the bodily sense organs. Although concept acquisition requires a body, the further actualization of a concept, the characteristic activity of the intellect, requires only attention. […] There is a process of concept acquisition, by which the intellect acquires a repository of forms retained as imaginative representations, and attention, by which the intellect, in attending to one of the forms among its conceptual resources, thereby engages in the activity of thought. So there is a sense in which the intellect depends upon the body and a sense in which it does not.”

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determined and have features which do not apply to all members of the concept. Rather he sees them as examples used to illustrate concepts in analogy to geometry.221 This is the same argument used by Hume and Berkeley against Locke’s notion of abstract general ideas. There are three issues here. (1) It is debatable whether all phantasmata are determined. For example, the way they are described in De insomniis seems to indicate they at least can be distorted and, thus, schematic. (2) Phantasmata still remain the representations used to stand for a universal, i.e., they are not concepts in themselves but they can be used for conceptual tasks and might be required for conceptual tasks. (3) Ferrarin seems to imply a normative theory of concepts here, where concepts are those entities that successfully pick out the essence of an entity. This might be in line with the Aristotelian notion of nous but it might not rule out regarding phantasmata as the equivalent to concepts for a descriptive theory of concepts. In fact, the problem that determined perceptual representations have to stand for a general class is acknowledged by Barsalou and part of his definition of perceptual symbols as being symbolic. Ferrarin himself has to acknowledge that there are several passages in Aristotle (some of which have been cited above) that seem to imply a closer tie between phantasmata and noêmata than the one he is willing to admit: By treating image, sign and name as continuous and homogeneous, as he often does, Aristotle cannot satisfactorily take into account the gap between image and concept, between intuitive and abstract, which is deeper than he thought. (Ferrarin 2006: 107)

Ferrarin starts from a modern normative philosophical notion of concepts and tries to harmonize Aristotle with his prefixed notions of what a concept is supposed to be. Aristotle’s account might just be more radical than he assumes and actually qualify as a perceptual theory of concepts. At least for external entities,

221 See Ferrarin (2006) p. 106/107: “[An] image can help me understand or remember aspects of the thing; but for Aristotle I do not simply translate into concepts what is present in an image, for there is nothing universal about an image as image. It is only when I regard it as the particular occurrence of an abstract form that it acquires for my intellect the value of an index and reference to an intelligible essence. And that is because, once again, an image is not an unchangeable content, but can vary according to the mode of consideration, so that the same content, say the visual image of my brother, may represent a fleeting image of him I entertain now, my memory of him, or give a concrete exhibition to my abstract consideration of “man.” In the last case, the image is a vehicle and an index.”

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Aristotle states in De sensu et sensibilis that nous cannot possibly think them without aisthêsis.222 The subject of imagination (phantasia) has been already considered in our work on the soul. Without an image (phantasma) thinking (noein) is impossible. For there is in such activity an affection (pathos) identical with one in geometrical demonstrations. For in the latter case, though we do not make any use of the fact that the quantity in the triangle is determinate, we nevertheless draw it determinate in quantity. So likewise when one thinks, although the object may not be quantitative, one envisages (tithetai pro ommatôn) it as quantitative, though he thinks of it in abstraction from quantity; while, on the other hand, if it is something by nature quantitative but indeterminate, one envisages it as if it had determinate quantity. Why we cannot think of anything without a continuum or think of non-temporal things without time, is another question. (De Mem. 449b30–450a9)

This passage is highly interesting for several reasons. First, it clearly states that there is no thought without phantasia. Depending on how the temporal relation of De anima and Parva Naturalia is conceived223, this might be seen as Aristotle’s definite answer to a question he posed in De anima, however, the text seems to indicate that this point was already made clear in De anima. Another valid way to explain the different focus is to assume that De anima is only concerned with soul as form while the Parva Naturalia are not restricted to form and also discuss the material basis for the realization of the forms.224 In De anima, the noetic forms are said to inhere in the perceptual forms and, therefore, thinking (theôrein) is tied to phantasmata.225 Aristotle explains how

222 See De Sen. 445b16/17: “But they are not objects of thought; nor does thought think of objects in space, except when it acts in conjunction with sense-perception.” (ἀλλ’ οὐ νοητά, οὐδὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς τὰ ἐκτὸς μὴ μετ’ αἰσθήσεως.) 223 It is generally assumed that the Parva Naturalia are later works when compared to De anima since they provide a more specialized treatment of certain topics and De anima seems to be referenced in them (De Sen. 436a1–5): “Having now considered the soul, by itself, and its several faculties, we must next make a survey of animals and all living things, in order to ascertain what functions are peculiar, and what functions are common to them.” (Ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς καθ’ αὑτὴν διώρισται πρότερον καὶ περὶ (1) τῶν δυνάμεων ἑκάστης κατὰ μόριον αὐτῆς, ἐχόμενόν ἐστι ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν περὶ τῶν ζῴων καὶ τῶν ζωὴν ἐχόντων ἁπάντων, τίνες εἰσὶν ἴδιαι καὶ τίνες κοιναὶ πράξεις αὐτῶν.) 224 See Gregorić (2007) p. 40. 225 See De An. 432a1–9: “It follows that the soul is analogous to the hand; for as the hand is the tool of tools, so thought is the form of forms and sense the form of sensible things. Since it seems that there is nothing outside and separate in existence from

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the intellect uses phantasmata to think: in the same way that physical figures are used in geometry to illustrate pure mathematical objects and abstracts from unimportant features such as a concrete size, the intellect uses concrete pathêmata abstracting from them. This is in line with Barsalou’s account of perceptual symbols and the Humean account of general ideas. Memory of previous thoughts is said to be concerned with the primary aesthetical faculty (i.e., the sensory capacity according to Gregorić) and only accidentally with nous since thoughts are embodied in phantasmata. The subject of knowledge is said to undergo no physical change but rather gaining knowledge of the universal through the singular experiences and by virtue of something else changing.226 In a way, the Aristotelian doctrine of nous might be compared to an epiphenomenalism in the modern debate: the nous comes to be in the physically embodied cognitive subject once it reaches a certain level of perfection. It supervenes on the other faculties and is, therefore, not causally connected to the external world or the body. A further distinction has to be drawn between tasks that are possible to fulfill for a cognitive agent applying only phantasia and that are enabled by also applying nous. Statements that identify something as something are always true or false. However, the activity of nous is not always subject to one of these. The grasping of an essence, if successful, is always true just like the perception of a proper perceptible.227 Epistême is said to always involve logos. Faculties like epistême, phronêsis, and technê build on the more basic knowledge acquired through nous. They develop proofs, demonstrations, etc. drawing on the concepts which are acquired through nous. The truth of the concepts, i.e., their always successfully picking out substances, is vouched for because nous as a faculty by definition can never produce false judgments.228 It necessarily locks up to the world and real essences in the right way. sensible spatial magnitudes, the objects of thought are in the sensible forms; viz. both the abstract objects and all the states and affections of sensible things. Hence no one can learn and understand anything in the absence of sense, and when the mind is actively aware of anything it is necessarily aware of it along with an image […].” (ὥστε ἡ ψυχὴ ὥσπερ ἡ χείρ ἐστιν• καὶ γὰρ ἡ χεὶρ ὄργανόν ἐστιν ὀργάνων, καὶ ὁ νοῦς εἶδος εἰδῶν καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις εἶδος αἰσθητῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐδὲ πρᾶγμα οὐθὲν ἔστι παρὰ τὰ μεγέθη, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ αἰσθητὰ κεχωρισμένον, ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητά ἐστι, τά τε ἐν ἀφαιρέσει λεγόμενα καὶ ὅσα τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἕξεις καὶ πάθη. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανόμενος μηθὲν οὐθὲν ἂν μάθοι οὐδὲ ξυνείη, ὅταν τε θεωρῇ, ἀνάγκη ἅμα φάντασμά τι θεωρεῖν•) 226 See Phys. 247b4–7. 227 See De An. 430b25–30. 228 See Eth. Nic. 1140b31–1141a8.

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This grasping of an essence is one of the primary functions nous has to fulfill and cannot be achieved by any of the other faculties of the soul. Nous is the faculty forming the first constituents of knowledge. They have their origin in the individuals encountered by human beings in perception (aisthêsis) which gives rise to the representation of a universal (katholou). These processes can be described as natural processes (physika) and it seems to be reasonable to say that nous is enabled through nature.229 Perception is only concerned with individual properties, never with essence. Phantasia is derived from perception. Several perceptions of individuals can be combined but they can never be sufficient to acquire the real essence without nous. Taking all this into account, it seems like there is a strong connection between nous and phantasmata; however, nous has a domain of its own that is, in principle, not achievable for animals that have only phantasia: What stands out is his insistence that all such representations are ultimately rooted in phantasia and thus in naturalistic representations of our perceptual world. By making phantasmata the basis for higher mental states, rather than a propositional attitude such as belief, Aristotle emphasizes a form of intentionality which is more basic than the conceptual. Aristotle’s account thus becomes plausible for the mental economy and behavior of lower animals (On the Soul 3.3, 428b16–17, 429a5–6), as well as much that occurs in humans below the conceptual threshold (429a7–8). By itself, phantasia cannot provide a fully general solution to the problem of intentionality. Propositional attitudes pose important difficulties, which require conceptual abilities that go beyond phantasia. But the roots of intentionality lie at this deeper level. (Caston 1998: 286/287)

Just like Ferrarin, Caston interprets concepts in Aristotle as something above phantasmata. However, he ties the notion of intentionality of mental representations closely to phantasia and its causal relation to the extramental world mediated by perception. This is very similar to how Prinz conceives intentionality in a modal theory of concepts. Therefore, it seems that having concepts requires having perceptual representations but ultimately goes beyond that. Another author describing concepts as based on phantasia, memory, and experience but going beyond them is Helmig (2012).230

229 See Eth. Nic. 1143a35–1143b7. 230 See Helmig (2012) p. 135: “Aristotle is very clear that sense perception alone cannot yield a universal concept (An. Post. I 31). For him, concept acquisition is a concerted process of sense perception, memory, experience, and intellect. Crucial for the acquisition of a concept is a persistence of a ‘remaining’ (monê) of identical or similar sense impressions and a transformation of these into memory and experience, until eventually a universal concept originates in the soul.”

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From this observation, the question arises as to why Aristotle needs something beyond phantasia to account for concepts. Maybe the role of forming the principles in the second Analytics is attributed to the intellect because it is the faculty that is supposed to form general judgments and not to be mistaken.231 Mere phantasmata are vague both concerning their internal and external content, they can in no way guarantee to pick out real essences. This is a problem since Aristotelian logic and theory of truth depends on clear-cut representations and terms. Helmig (2012) discusses the notion of induction in Aristotle at length and whether it can yield clear-cut representations of universals. There seem to be different kinds of induction that have to be distinguished. There is the method of induction described in the dialectical and rhetorical writings as well as induction in the ethical and natural sciences. Both operate under different requirements, e.g., in a dialectic context a counter example refutes an inductive argument, whereas in biology it can be explained as an abnormality.232 The “induction of first principles” (this expression is used by Helmig in his treatment of the passage in question) of a syllogism which starts from perception cannot “be a method that one employs, but rather a natural process, something that the soul undergoes” and which is almost automatic.233 Consequently, this process can be described as concept acquisition according to modern theories of concepts. Furthermore, if

231 See Helmig (2012, p. 134): “Aristotle concludes (8) by arguing that only intellect (nous) can grasp the first principles, because it is more certain and truer than understanding (epistêmê). The first principles cannot be demonstrated; they are immediate (ameisai). Otherwise demonstration would be circular.” Helmig sees the role of intellect in Aristotle’s account of concept acquisition as problematic (p. 138): “It seems plain that Aristotle’s account of concept formation in An. Post. II 19 raises certain difficulties for which no sufficient answers can be deduced from the Posterior Analytics or elsewhere.” However, it can at least be justified by the Aristotelian notion of forms inhering in the sensibles, as Helmig attests, as well on the way the nature of the soul is conceived (p. 139): “For it implies that the mind is somehow naturally disposed to form concepts. One might even go so far to ascribe to Aristotle a so-called ‘dispositional innatism’. […] On this view, concept attainment can be considered something that happens naturally. […] The simile of the rout even suggests that universal concepts originate in the soul in a quasi-automatic or natural way.” 232 See Helmig (2012) p. 116–122. 233 See Helmig (2012) p. 127–140; Höffe (1996, p. 89) speaks of intuitive induction in a similar vein.

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this automatic process arrives at representations picking out the natural kinds234 it suits causal theories of content well. These first principles could be seen as conceptual atoms which lock up to the world and only require perceptual detectors, while more complex propositional representations can be formed from them.235 That is almost identical to what Fodor proposed and on what Prinz builds in his perceptual theory of concept acquisition. Helmig (2012) describes this process, i.e., the formation of concepts and their connection to sense perception: A universal concept is acquired by means of induction (epagôgê) which ultimately depends upon sense perception. Hence it can be said that sense perception instills the universal. (Helmig 2012: 134)

The structures of the world are mirrored by the structures of perception and the structures on the level of phantasia. However, on those levels it is possible to misrepresent reality. This suggests the notions of nous and noêmata are parts of a normative theory of concepts that ensures that mental representations lock up to reality without any margin of error. In this case, the notions of phantasia, phantasmata, and pathêmata would be the right place to look for an equivalent to a descriptive theory of concepts in Aristotle while the doctrine of nous is the equivalent of a normative theory of concepts that requires representations to necessarily lock up to reality. However, the noetic forms are not separate from the phantasmata but rather inhere in them. Nous and noêmata are only actualized as pure form in the soul if this level of representation is achieved. This is comparable to causal theories of concepts, in which a representation can only be said to be a concept if it locks up to reality in the right way. Nous as form can be realized both by biological bodies and not enmattered form; therefore, the different attributes of nous assigned by Aristotle are not contradictory. Nous cannot be influenced because it is pure form and, therefore, remains uninfluenced by bodily processes. Once the intellect fails because of organic reasons, nous is no longer present in the individual human being since its form is no longer realized. This might also explain the passages from De generatione Animalium: nous comes to be realized only at a later point in time and remains unaffected from

234 See Helmig (2012, p. 128): “Hence induction, as it is presented here, seems to be the most exact form of induction for Aristotle. It yields universal knowledge and this knowledge is always true. 235 See Helmig (2012) p. 137: “The fact that concept formation is based on the structure of reality (essences) ensures that concepts are objective, shareable and link up with reality […].”

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matter. Human beings are unique among animals in being able to realize nous through their complex perceptual faculty. Conceptual thought without perceptual representations is not possible for human beings; however, not all perceptual symbols used in categorization tasks, induction etc. are already noêmata. Before some general conclusions are drawn, something should also be said about the relation between language and phantasia since this was the starting point of this section and of the dissertation in general. The relation between logismos/logos and nous has been discussed above. In addition to the often mentioned opening passage of De interpretatione, there is a very interesting passage in De anima which refers to the connection between language and phantasia: Voice (phônê) then is the impact of the inbreathed air against the windpipe, and the agent that produces the impact is the soul resident in these parts of the body. Not every sound (psophos), as we said, made by an animal is voice (even with the tongue we may merely make a sound which is not voice, or without the tongue as in coughing); what produces the sound must have soul in it (empsychon) and must be accompanied by an act of imagination (phantasia), for voice is a sound with a meaning (sêmantikos) […]. (De An. 420a27–33)

Vocal sounds (phônai) are distinguished from nonvocal sounds.236 They can be defined by virtue of the organs that produce them (tongue, breath, etc.), however, this definition is not enough since these organs have other functions and can produce sounds which are nonlinguistic. There are two aspects that distinguish them from nonvocal sounds: (a) they are meaningful (sêmantikos) and (b) they are accompanied by phantasia. The interesting question from a philosophical point of view is whether their being meaningful consists of their being accompanied by phantasia or is a result of being accompanied by phantasia. In the first case, Aristotle would have a conception of internal cognitive content where meaning is equated with sense or mental representation. In the second case, he would have a conception of external content in which meaning requires reference. Since terms like ‘goat-stag’ without a referent are said to be meaningful, it is justifiable to ascribe a theory of word meanings as mental content to Aristotle, i.e., phantasmata or concepts. Following from what has been discussed above, this passage can be supplemented by the opening passage from De interpretatione: in the case of successful reference, vocal sounds are meaningful, i.e., stand for real entities by

236 In Historia Animalium, Aristotle distinguishes between psophos, phônê, and dialektos only on the level of organs and the complexity of sounds they are able to produce. See Hist. An. 535a27 ff.

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virtue of being arbitrary symbols associated with mental representations that are likenesses of actual entities because they originate from perceptions of those entities.237 Read this way, the passage is a confirmation that pathêmata in De interpretatione should be understood as phantasmata. It might even be the passage in the psychological writings that Aristotle makes reference to. Since the linguistic faculty seems to be closely connected to nous and noêmata are tied to phantasia, this close connection between both is a necessary consequence of the already discussed normative aspects of Aristotle’s psychology and can explain the shift between both notions in the opening of De interpretatione.

3.  Concluding remarks Aristotelian psychology can be compared to modern functionalism in several regards because it individuates the soul by means of certain faculties of life.238 In this way, Aristotle is able to distinguish the soul from the body and yet establish a clear connection to the body as the thing that is necessary to realize these functions. His theory of perception and imagination builds on this notion of soul and, therefore, requires specific organs as a basis.239 A lot of higher cognitive functions, like memory and language, are explained in reference to imagination and there seems to be no reference to nonbodily functions. His conception of soul is quite different from a modern conception of cognition or the mental. Some of the parts of the soul might be equated with the mind, but there is no direct counterpart. Since Aristotle starts his considerations with the bodily life functions, he is not, for the most part, really concerned with the mind-body problem that has haunted philosophy of mind – at least since Descartes tried to clearly separate both realms.240 It can be argued that the modern 237 See Johansen (2012) p. 210: “Correspondingly, the content of phantasia need not resemble or be taken to represent a current sense-object, though its content will, given its origin in a perception bear some resemblance to a sense-object.” 238 See Patzig (2009) p. 258. 239 Burnyeat (1992, p. 17) denies that Aristotle can be described as a functionalist since his account is tied to specific organs. In contrast, Wedin (1996a) argues that compositional plasticity (i.e., the independence of mental state from a particular form of physical realization), which is one prerequisite of a strong functionalist account, is at least not contradicted by Aristotle’s account of the faculties of the soul. Furthermore, a modern embodiment account which is the background for modal theories of concepts rather stresses the physiological realization and is, therefore, not compatible with compositional plasticity. 240 See Ackrill (1981) p. 56/57.

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solutions are only a response to Cartesian dualism.241 However, Plato’s philosophy of soul can also be meaningfully described as dualism. In contrast to the modern mind-body problem, Aristotle discusses whether it might be possible that there is an immaterial part of the soul rather than trying to argue how mind, as something genuinely different, can be combined with a body. For this reason, Aristotle is closer to modern naturalism than to a Cartesian and post-Cartesian mentalism in some ways. On the other hand, important differences like Aristotle’s teleological view of nature must be kept in mind when comparing him to modern naturalism. In contrast to modern science, Aristotle believed that an end (telos) can be a sufficient natural explanation.242 Genuine ends as causes are only allowed where intentions and human conduct are concerned. Apart from that, the notion of functions is feasible in biology243, but teleological causation on the same level as efficient causation is not reconcilable with a modern conception of nature and physics. The unmoved mover is the ultimate explanation of all movements in the world and it causes this movement as telos. The movement of all things is compared to a longing for the perfection inherent in the unmoved mover.244 The human mind achieves this perfection to the highest degree of all natural entities in the sublunar sphere. It has to be noted that the Aristotelian terminology concerning the faculties that build on perception is to a certain degree ambiguous, which might be attributed to different chronological layers of his writings. For example, in his treatise On memory, mnêmê seems to be restricted to a conscious representation of something past as something past while in other treatises it seems to be more general, i.e., the capacity to store sense impressions, which is called phantasia in De anima and Parva naturalia. The notion of empeireia is not introduced in the psychological writings. That may be due to its different intentions and context or it might not have been elaborated at that point. It also might be the same to what Aristotle calls phantasia theoretikê in De anima. Aside from these ambiguities, Aristotle clearly states that the human soul is capable of: (a) keeping perceptual images of different modalities after the object of perception is gone, (b) integrate proper perceptions of different sense modalities to a unified object of perception and phantasia, (c) using perceptual representations as symbols for something beyond their perceptual content, (d) having distorted perceptual representations, (e) combining representations 241 242 243 244

See Burnyeat (1992) p. 16. See Ross (1923) p. 80. See Höffe (1996) p. 130. See Met. 1072a26.

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of individuals to generate the representation of a universal, (f) categorizing percepts because of similarity to older perceptual representation, (g) apply knowledge from previously encountered individuals to newly encountered individuals, (h) use perceptual representations in memory, thought, language, etc. This shows that there is a huge role for representations stemming from perceptions to play in the Aristotelian account of the human mental abilities. His notion of pathêmata, or more precisely phantasmata, definitely qualifies as concepts in some regards although it has to be acknowledged that there is no direct equivalent to “concept” to be found in the psychological writings as has already been stated for the logical writings above. The notion of phantasma does include mere mental images without a conceptual use and also enables nonconceptual functions such as episodic memory. They are very close to what Barsalou calls “perceptual symbols” but the notion is still broader. It should also be noted that Aristotle puts forward only one kind of representation underlying both thought and language, which is in line with a great number of theories of concepts. They see the representations discussed under the label “concept” in psychology as underlying language comprehension and production. Thought is not understood as being restricted to language, e.g., as inner speech. Nevertheless, a close connection between higher-order thought and language is established. This goes as far as describing the presence of linguistic capabilities as the specific difference of human beings. The account of intellect puts this general evaluation of Aristotelian psychology in question to some degree. It seems to be implied that there is an eternal and immaterial part of the human soul that is necessary to explain the higher cognitive abilities of human beings. As it has been shown above, there is one way of dealing with this problem, e.g., by seeing nous as only potentially separated from a body, that allows one to keep the mostly naturalistic account of soul intact. On the other hand, this might be seen as the shortcoming of the Aristotelian account that is made necessary by normative requirements of his epistemology. This interpretation of Aristotelian philosophy as almost naturalistic might seem controversial but it is not without a strong backing from other scholars.245 245 See, e.g., Depew (2002) entitled “Aristotle, naturalist.” (a review of Lennox (2001)); Ackrill’s interpretation of pathêmata as physical traces presented above; Höffe (1996, p. 134) says that the treatment of soul as a part of a philosophy of nature is one of Aristotle’s greatest philosophical accomplishments; Ross (1923, p. 117) describes Aristotelian biology and psychology as a unified science; Barnes (1972) discusses whether Aristotle’s account of soul in general and of intellect could be described as physicalism. According to him, most faculties of the soul – including passive

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Maybe the reception of Aristotle has been clouded especially because of his importance in medieval philosophy. The important differences between Aristotelian ontology and understanding of nature seem to have no significant bearing when comparing Aristotle to modern theories of concepts, be it modal or amodal theories.

intellect – can be described at least in a weak physicalist account. Active intellect has to be described as nonphysicalist but this might be explained if it is a nonhuman intellect like the ones assumed in Metaphysics and De Caelo. However, there are faculties like desire (orexis) and active intellect (when seen as a faculty of the soul) which cannot be described in physicalist vocabulary even though they might have a physical basis.

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VII.  Aristotle on concepts and modality 1.  Aristotle and modal/amodal theories of concepts 1.1  Logoi and amodal theories of concepts In the introduction, it was suggested that logos might be the equivalent of an amodal theory of conceptual representation in Aristotle. After having discussed both the notion of modality and the notion of logos, this claim can be reevaluated. Amodal theories of concepts are best described in contrast to modal theories of concepts (see section IV.2). Modal theories of concepts state that conceptual representations always involve modality-specific perceptual representations. In contrast to that, amodal representations are not necessarily related to perception and can be described as representations without making reference to perception. On the one hand, perceptual representations can be distinguished from nonperceptual representations by virtue of perceptual brain regions being involved in conceptual processing (implementational account). An alternative is to describe both as being functionally distinguishable, i.e., processing perceptual and nonperceptual representations generates behaviorally distinguishable outputs (one illustrative example being reaction time in scanning maps). This behavioral distinction is often described as a distinction between analogous and symbolic representations (functional account). A third account claims that what matters is the similarity of perceptual and conceptual representations independently of how perceptual representations should be described (similarity account), e.g., according to the functional definition, symbolic representations could be involved in perception and, therefore, be classified as perceptual. These different accounts result in different ways of understanding amodal representations and, therefore, result in different prerequisites for attributing a theory of amodal representation to Aristotle. When trying to define amodal representations independently of modal representations it is best done in reference to the hardware-software analogy used in early cognitive science and philosophy of mind. Mental processes are understood as software in relation to the brain/nervous system which is understood as hardware. The idea is that mental processes and mental representations can be described on an abstract level independent of the way they are embodied or implemented. Mental processes can be described as manipulations of structured symbolic representations that are language-like. Symbols of these mental languages refer arbitrarily and can be compared to the way words refer. In a merely implementational account of modality, modal representations and symbolic 263

representations understood in this way do not exclude each other since a symbolic account of cognition does not care much about implementation. In an amodal and propositional account, concepts consist of arbitrary symbols signifying certain features of the world, which are embedded in some kind of structure and are used to categorize objects, make judgments about objects and categories, etc. In an atomist account, concepts themselves would be equated with simple arbitrary symbols. In a feature list account, the structure of concepts only allows for one dimension and the relation “is a feature of.” Alternatives include more complex feature structures such as frames, conceptual nets, or weighted models such as prototypes. A mechanism translating percepts to these amodal symbols is required for perceptual features, e.g., once a red object is perceived, the symbol ‘red’ has to be triggered; in an imagination task, once the symbol ‘red’ is triggered a perceptual simulator for red objects has to be activated. All of the definitions of amodal theories of concepts seem to be unrelated to Aristotelian philosophy and especially to the notion of logos discussed above. However, the question how the notion of logos is related to amodal theories of concepts not only requires a concrete definition of what amodal symbols are but also heavily depends on how logos is interpreted. Several options to understand logos have been discussed, possibly even all of them legitimate interpretations bearing in mind its ambiguity. Once logos is interpreted in an objectivist way as a mind-independent form or meaning, it is not relevant for amodal theories of concepts (as well as all representational theories of concepts) and vice versa. If it is interpreted as being equivalent to pathêma and pathêmata are shown to be related to modal theories of concepts, a separate discussion of logoi is not necessary. The alternative favored above is to interpret logos as linguistic. Nevertheless, this is also not in line with amodal theories of concepts either since they understand symbols and syntactic structures as language-like in some regards but also as language independent and, thus, prior to language and rather constituting linguistic capabilities as an underlying semantic module. In contrast to this seeming unconnectedness between both notions, amodal theories of concepts allow a comparison of conceptual representations and linguistic representations by understanding concepts as language-like insofar as they consist of arbitrary symbols and have predicative structures (this is why they are sometimes described as propositional theories of concepts). Insofar the notion of logos is more closely related to amodal theories of concepts than to modal theories of concepts since logoi are language-like and not perception-like. If logoi are to be understood as syntactically structured but independent of a single language, they would qualify as amodal conceptual representations. The 264

categorial scheme, in particular, which is closely associated with the notion of logos, does seem to qualify as a very basic classification scheme – which is in line with the classification of basic logical concept types in linguistics and philosophy. However, I argued against this symbolic interpretation of logos above because it is constantly used in the context of linguistic (mainly philosophical) discourse and defined by virtue of its linguistic constituents (such as words) and features. The categorial scheme is rather induced by the structure of reality and every successful representational scheme needs to adhere with it as a consequence. With the categorial scheme, Aristotle has an elaborate theory of representational and ultimately conceptual structures. The functions logos has to fulfill amount to some of the functions concepts are associated with: they are used to classify entities as belonging to a certain category, they function as explications of word meanings which is shown by the role they play in the Aristotelian account of homonymy and synonymy, they constitute the basic units of reasoning, e.g., the basis of syllogisms. Horoi can be replaced by logoi defining the classes the syllogisms make reference to. The notion of horos has also been associated with the notion of concept and has been translated as “concept” by some authors. This is more closely associated with the meaning of “concept” in logic. However, it is not completely independent from the discussion of concepts as the constituents of more complex thoughts in cognitive science since the later use of the term “concept” is partly based on the earlier logical use. Moreover, the Aristotelian notion of definition (horismos), which is a form of logos on the one hand and closely tied to the Category of substance (logos tês ousias was pointed out as a synonym) on the other, has a lot of similarities with the classical theory of concepts in psychology: An entity either belongs to a certain species or does not belong to it. Definitions are suited to correctly pick out species. They consist of the higher genera and the specific differences which might also be given as a (hierarchical) list of features (e.g., +‘natural,’ +‘living,’ +‘sensitive,’ +‘rational’ for ‘human being’). Hierarchical structures like that are seen by some authors as a constitutive part of classical theory in psychology. On the other hand, they are not simple, unhierachical, and arbitrary feature lists. They consist only of the genera and differences constituting real and mind-independent essences. Therefore, unlike a psychological theory, they have a specific ontological foundation which explains how they can always apply to all members of a category and not apply to nonmembers. Classical theory of concepts is often cited as a paradigmatic case of an amodal theory of concepts. However, this is not necessarily the case. The distinctions 265

between being modal/amodal, being definitional/nondefinitional, and being feature lists/structured are parallel to each other and can be combined in different ways as was shown and discussed above in sections II and IV. The prejudice that classical feature list representations are amodal might have been a consequence of the mostly linguistic setting of feature listing tasks in early psychology of concepts where features are produced as words and the ability to produce a word for a feature of the concept is presupposed. Theories of concepts in the history of philosophy after Aristotle are often said to focus solely on sortal concepts and neglect other concept types such as verbal or relational concepts. This might have been a result of the focus Aristotle puts on substances in his ontology and on definitions in his logic and philosophical methodology. However, the presence of verbal Categories and the treatment of the Category of relatives shows that Aristotle was well aware that there are other nonsortal concept types. It is at least possible to form logoi of those nonsubstance Categories while it is debatable whether it is possible to form proper definitions (horismoi) for them. One must not mistake the Aristotelian theory of definitions for a naturalistic theory of how general kinds and species are mentally represented; it is rather a normative theory on how definitions should be formed in philosophical and other scientific discourses.1 On the other hand, such a normative theory needs to be based on a descriptive theory of how it is possible for human beings to form representations and ultimately arrive at the standards set out in a normative theory. That is, unless one wants to hold an epistemic standard that cannot be fulfilled. In that case, it would be impossible for human beings to achieve knowledge. A connection exists between descriptive and normative theories because of this, but they cannot be equated by any means. The connection is necessary but requires additional assumptions. Since Aristotle is an epistemic optimist and

1 In a similar vein, Spalding/Gagné (2003, p. 75) distinguish strictly between an Aristotelian theory of definitions and his theory of concepts: “Definitions are seen to stand rather in the context of a metaphysical essentialism: In the A-T view, definitions do not constitute the concept. Instead, the definition in Aristotle is a statement of or about the essence, and is neither the essence itself nor the intelligible species. The essence, for Aristotle, is causally important to the kind, whereas the definition identifies that essence, its properties, and its causal nature. […] In the A-T view, the concept is that by which one knows the essence of a thing, so without the concept there would be no way to identify a set of exemplars that are specifically identical among which the learner can then search for a good definition (Sutcliffe, 1993, makes a similar point about family resemblance structures).”

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regards human knowledge as a given, the alternative of humans not being able to achieve knowledge not an option for him.2 As a result, one might ask whether amodal representations are required to guarantee the ability of human beings to form proper definitions. If this was the case, Aristotelian philosophy would require amodal representations. If this is not the case, there is no necessity for Aristotle to assume amodal symbols. Fodor’s atomism might be read as a normative account which demands the necessity of amodal symbolic representations. In opposition to that, Prinz argues that the same can be achieved by perceptual representations while at the same time getting rid of an additional and redundant layer of representations. Throughout the history of philosophy, there have been two main motivations for amodal and nonperceptual theories (see section III). To a certain extent, rationalists have denied the possibility of knowledge being based on perception (e.g., Descartes, Leibniz, Plato); additionally, amodal representations have been introduced as mental equivalents of language which are almost like language and understood through this analogy but do not inherit its shortcomings such as ambiguity (e.g., verbum mentis in Augustine). This second approach to concepts still sometimes forms the background of linguistic theories of concepts. There is no clear evidence that Aristotle thought that a theory of nonperceptual and amodal representations was necessary to account for knowledge. However, if there was such a theory, it would probably be connected to the notion of nous and his psychology rather than to his account of logos and his writings on philosophical methodology. The faculty of language production (logistikon) and the faculty of thought (noêtikon) are closely related to each other: in fact, both terms might be synonyms. The separability of nous might be interpreted analogously to the separability of software from hardware. If this was the case, noetic representations could be the analogy to amodal representations in Aristotle. In fact, it might be reasonable to see noêmata as the equivalents to concepts in Aristotle and the much cited prota noêmata as the first symbolic constituents of concepts and thought. In that case, amodal representations (i.e., noêmata) would be involved in logoi as word meanings. As they also have a phonetic component, logoi themselves, however, still would not qualify as concepts. Logoi would not be word meanings but rather explications of word meanings (which qualify as definitions if they are successful (i.e., successfully pick out real substances) and 2 See Höffe (1996) p. 99: “Wegen der epistemischen Zuversicht lohnt es sich, die Anstrengung der Forschung auf sich zu nehmen; wegen der Skepsis gegen das angeblich Offenkundige ist diese Anstrengung auch nötig. Ein Skeptizismus, der an der Wahrheitsfähigkeit überhaupt zweifelt, tritt dabei nicht in den Blick.”

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formally adequate (i.e., consisting of the genus and the specific difference)). On the other hand, prota noêmata cannot without any doubt be described as symbolic and amodal. They are said to be connected to phantasmata. Therefore, they might be considered to be perceptual representations. This does not have to be a contradiction because, in a similarity account, perceptions in Aristotle might be described as symbolic and perceptual at the same time (in contrast to analogous representations). There is one normative usage of “concept” only briefly mentioned above that is very near to logos in the Aristotelian writings and, therefore, should be mentioned here before coming to a close. When “concept” is used discussing philosophical methodology, e.g., if philosophy is said to be involved in conceptual analysis, it is almost the same as what Aristotle has to say about logos in his account on philosophical methodology. In that regard, it can be translated with “concept” and “Begriff ” without any limitation from a terminological point of view. However, this does not have anything to do with the descriptive theories of concepts as mental representations of the kind which can be found in psychology and philosophy of mind (including its historical predecessors) and to which it has been wrongfully compared by many authors. Rather it is connected to normative theories of concepts in which the concepts formed in philosophical discussions have to adhere to certain epistemic standards. In summary, there are some important similarities between the Aristotelian theory of logoi in general and definitions in particular and modern amodal theories of concepts especially classical theory. On the other hand, logoi cannot be said to be amodal concepts in the modern sense in any way. If Aristotle has a theory of amodal representations or of concepts as amodal representations, it is not to be found in what he has to say about logoi and definitions.

1.2  Pathêmata and modal theories of concepts Pathêma has been shown to be a very general term. It is used as the point of reference in this dissertation solely because of the way it is used in the opening passage of De interpretatione, which symbolizes the connection between language and psychology. There are several reasons to equate them with phantasmata: (a) both are said to be involved in thought and language comprehension, (b) both are said to be likenesses of real entities, (c) phantasmata are described as a result of pathein; the cognate pathos is used to describe them, (d) an explicit reference to the psychological writings for the treatment of pathêmata is given. Since the notion of phantasia is very prominently developed in De anima, it is safe to assume that both can be equated. Phantasia can be described as the link 268

between perception and higher cognitive capabilities such as thought, language, and memory even if only the psychological writings are taken into account. Phantasia in its most basic form is the capability to keep sense impressions once the objects of perception are no longer present and to bring them back to use them in different ways. According to Barsalou, this is a mere recording system which would not be sufficient for conceptual representations. However, having phantasmata allows other cognitive operations. Dreams are the uncontrolled surfacing of such impressions. Memory is the reoccurring of such impressions as representations of something past. Language and thought are implied to always be at least connected to phantasmata. From these definitions it should be clear that a) phantasmata are necessarily related to perception, i.e., they are perceptual (and, by virtue of that, modal) at least in some sense of the word and b) the notion of phantasma is at least broader than the notion of concept. The faculty of phantasia in its most general form requires a lot less than what is required by a theory of concepts. It can be seen as a simple storehouse of past impressions. However, there are some conceptual tasks which phantasmata are assigned to fulfill in addition to other nonconceptual cognitive tasks such as episodic memory. Therefore, one might, with some caution, come to the conclusion that at least a subset of phantasmata can be said to be modal concepts according to modern theories of concepts. The theory of phantasia is a necessary prerequisite of a perceptual theory of concepts. Several tasks associated with the common sense – such as coordinating common perceptibles throughout the different senses, coordinating different modal-specific perceptions into a multimodal singular perception, perceiving differences across modalities by virtue of the different senses, and perceiving oneself as perceiving (i.e., the metaperceptual capacity inhering in perception itself) – generate more complex perceptual representations as they are demanded by Barsalou’s account of how a perceptual system might have the representational power to give rise to conceptual representations. For example, the way he stresses the role of the introspective sense to be able to build perceptual representations of abstract concepts such as ‘truth’ can be built on the metaperceptual capacity in Aristotle. Being compositional is one of the prerequisites in Barsalou for expressiveness of perceptual symbols which is clearly fulfilled by phantasmata. In addition to that, Barsalou sees perceptual symbols as a recombinable coordination of different modalities, as schematic, i.e., leaving out information present in the original perceptions. Furthermore, they are not fully determined in their reference by their causal history and can be made to stand for something else. As a consequence, they can be described as symbolic, i.e., standing for more 269

than they are able to depict. Aristotle acknowledges that phantasmata fulfill all the criteria Barsalou provides for the sufficient expressiveness of a perceptual theory of concepts. This was shown above in section V. The question in what way phantasmata can be said to be modal and perceptual is largely related to the question how Aristotle conceives perception. The notion of modality can be tied to the notion of the five senses. A sense can be individuated first and foremost in terms of its proper objects3, but also of the organs and the medium involved. Sense organs are not only the superficial sense organs like the eyes but also their internal extensions, i.e., the heart in Aristotle’s physiological account and the brain in a modern physiological account. Phantasmata are said to remain in the sense organs after the process of actual perception. Since this important role is attributed to the organs of perception both to define perception and to explain phantasia, it makes a lot of sense to say that phantasmata have to be described as perceptual and modal in terms of an implementational account of modality. This is another major feature they have in common with perceptual symbols according to Barsalou. Aristotle stresses the similarity between phantasmata and aisthêmata at several points and uses this similarity to explain, e.g., the way phantasmata are used to interpret newly encountered objects, which is reminiscent of the way perceptual symbols are said to be involved in categorization. The notion of similarity (homoiômata) is present in De interpretatione 16a. In consequence, phantasmata can also be said to be perceptual according to the similarity account which is as important to Barsalou’s notion of perceptual symbols as the implementational account. Unlike modern theories of concepts, Aristotle stresses the similarity of the external world and perceptions. Apart from some cases (e.g., somatotopical representations) this could not, of course, be accepted by modern theorists such as Barsalou. The similarity of perceptions and perceptual symbols involves them having the same format. Mental representations can only be said to be similar to external entities insofar as they successfully translate features, e.g., structural features of the world, into a representational format. The similarity stated by Aristotle between the world and perceptions might be this kind of similarity; however, he does not sufficiently distinguish it from the similarity between perceptions and phantasmata. The similarity between real entities and their representations is mediated by the latter being impressions left by the former, i.e., there is a direct causal link between real entities and their perceptual representations 3 Johansen (2012, p. 93) speaks of “the priority of objects” in this context.

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in Aristotle. This causal link is also stressed in modern philosophy by proponents of causal theories of reference. Prinz sees this as one of the main advantages of perceptual theories in virtue of a general account of perception always establishing a causal connection prior to concept formation. Aristotle is clearly interested in establishing this causal connection to explain how successful perception works and to be able to explain higher cognitive capabilities in terms of lower ones as well as the sharing of perceptual representations in between cognitive agents. It has been discussed that representations in perception could still be symbolic (as opposed to analogous) in this respect. The similarity could consist of translating the perceptual stimuli into a format comparable to computer code. In this case, representations could be symbolic and perceptual at the same time. However, the same is true for a similarity account in the modern debate. The functional account, on the other hand, is closely tied to the paradigm of behavioral experiments, i.e., experiments in which analogous and symbolic representations yield different results in the subject’s behaviors. Since this experimental paradigm is not present in Aristotle, there is nothing that could be compared to a functional account of modality in his work.4 However, this third option seems to be the least important in Barsalou and is rather cited as additional evidence. Taking all these considerations into account, it can be said that the account of perceptual representations presented in Aristotelian psychology has much in common with modal theories of concepts in the modern debate concerning its motivation, its explanatory virtues, the way it is conceived, and the phenomena it has to explain. On the other hand, there are some major differences that result mostly from the progress of science, namely the way areas of perceptual representation can be identified in a physiological account and the behavioral paradigms in psychology and linguistics.5 In addition, it might still be possible 4 Although it should be noted that Aristotle does consider something like reaction time in relation to memory of more common notions. Furthermore, Höffe (1996, p. 100/101) states that there is a rudimentary experimental approach to parts of Aristotle’s biology. It can be said that, because of his methodology, Aristotle should not be willing to hold a theory which is not in accordance with empirical data. 5 In a similar vein, Salmieri (2008, p. 128) states that the Aristotelian theory of concepts is based in psychology and oriented on perception rather than language like modern amodal and computational accounts of thought: “Twentieth Century philosophy, especially in the Anglo-American tradition, was characterized by a preoccupation with language and a discomfort with the mental, which it regarded as occult and unscientific. In this context, which still colors much contemporary literature on the mind, it is natural to seek to explain thought (or to explain it away) by relating it to language. […] Something resembling this sort of reasoning can be found in ancient philosophy—for

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to say that phantasmata only function as perceptual detectors, while concepts in Aristotle should be equated with noêmata which in turn are to be understood as symbolic and amodal.

2.  Logoi and pathêmata – connecting the dots In the previous two chapters, the notions of logos and pathêma in Aristotle have been discussed separately and have been compared to their modern counter parts. It is now time to discuss how these two notions are related to each other, if at all. First it is important to stress that both occur in very different parts of Aristotelian philosophy: Logos is mainly discussed in the Organon and occurs in the other writings in the context of methodological discussions. It is concerned with the way philosophy is conducted, philosophers produce logoi of which some qualify as horismoi or as syllogisms because of their formal and referential properties. Logos can be translated as “concept” in the sense of a normative theory of how scientific (especially philosophical) concepts ought to be formed. Pathêma and phantasma are treated in the psychological writings, which can be described as part of Aristotle’s natural philosophy. Phantasma can be translated in some contexts as “concept” in the sense of a mental representation which comes into being through repeated encounters and is crucial for a number of cognitive processes. Prima facie it might be enough to state these two different areas and see both as distinct aspects of Aristotle’s philosophy that need not be related at all. However, there are several reasons why this is unsatisfactory: (1) The cross references show that the author saw these topics as interconnected throughout the course of all writings even though a general developmental account might be right about different stages of Aristotelian philosophy. (2) The function that is assigned to logoi and pathêmata in the opening passages of the Categories and De interpretatione seems to be the same, which

example, in Plato’s Sophist where “what we call διάνοια” is identified as λόγος that “occurs in the soul in conversation with itself without φωνή” (287e, cf. Theaetetus 190a)—, but this is not Aristotle’s own approach. Instead, he relies on a prior understanding of thought to illuminate the components of speech. The De Interpretation’s account refers back to the De Anima’s discussion of thought to get purchase on the way in which words are “without combination and division”. There is much to be said for Aristotle’s approach. Indeed, without some prior understanding of thought, I do not think that it would be possible to attain the sophisticated, self-conscious knowledge of grammar that it is now easy to take for granted when analyzing thought in linguistic terms.”

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makes it necessary to discuss their relation and the way both can fulfill the same function if they are shown not to be the same kind of entities. (3) The passage from the Posterior Analytics which states logoi as the end result of a process starting from phantasmata seems to imply that there is a continuum between both forms of representation. (4)  De anima 403a20 states that pathê are logoi enhyloi. This is reminiscent of the way Modrak (2001) interprets logos as form present in reality, mind, and language. She speaks of the pathêma as an “enmattered” logos.6 Since the world of Aristotle’s philosophy is one world (at least after he left Platonism behind, if developmental accounts like Jaeger’s are to be trusted) unlike, e.g., Plato’s two worlds or modern philosophical dichotomies as they can be found in Descartes or Kant, there can be no unbridgeable gap between logoi and pathêmata; rather they have to stand in some relation to each other. The gradual account from Posterior Analytics might be one possible relation; another possible relation which has already been ruled out would have been identity (thus explaining the fact that they seem to explain the same kind of phenomena). A third option would be to interpret logos as form basically equivalent to eidos and, therefore, as the nonmaterial aspect of pathêma. The last option has been ruled out on the basis of close examination of passages from Metaphysics and Physics which shows that the reading of logos as a linguistic entity is the most prevalent. De anima 403a20 puts this conclusion into perspective since it seems to state that pathêmata should be described as logoi. The expression logoi enhyloi is unique and does not occur elsewhere in Aristotle. However, it can be connected to a class of definitions mentioned in Metaphysics, namely definitions making reference to matter such as the definition of ‘snub-nosed.’7 The context of the passage indicates that this is the proper interpretation; it basically states that pathê/pathêmata should be defined in relation to matter and not independently of matter. Therefore, the preferred default interpretation of logos as linguistic and explication of word meaning is not threatened but rather strengthened by this occurrence. It has been established that the Aristotelian theory of definitions as a normative theory builds on his theory of language and the notion of logos must be combinable with the actual capabilities of human beings. These cognitive capabilities and their basis in perception and memory are described in the psychological writings. Thus, one task of the psychological writings is to give an account of how 6 Modrak (2001) p. 255. 7 Ross (1923, p. 137) translates as “formulae involving matter.”

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the human mind in general is able to produce knowledge even though it does not achieve knowledge in all cases. This aim is achieved by showing how higher cognitive abilities build on lower abilities such as phantasia that are already present in animals. This fits nicely with the account of the Posterior Analytics which states that the lower forms of representation do not yet fulfill the standards a logos or horismos has to fulfill; they are merely conglomerates of past experiences that can be applied to newly encountered particulars and can explain successful interaction with the world. This is enough to qualify as concepts for the standards of modern psychology, i.e., descriptive theories of concepts. It can be compared to a prototype theory and even more closely to an exemplar theory of concepts. In Metaphysics, mnêmê and empeireia seems to be states where only representations of individuals (e.g., exemplars) are applied while technê, in contrast, is constituted by having a summary representation. If this is true, Aristotle would allow for both prototype and exemplar representations for the same category which would make him a concept pluralist. The epistemic value of exemplars is regarded as lesser than summary representations which are achieved at a higher level. Aristotle follows Plato in this regard. A horismos has to be the representation of a universal and to apply to all members of a category, which is not true of the representations that the psychological writings focus on. Maybe this kind of generality can best and most clearly be achieved by a linguistic representation, i.e., a logos. But proper logoi can only be formed once word meanings are established by pathêmata. They can explicate and sharpen word meanings and are, therefore, considered as a higher level of adequate representations contributing to knowledge.8 On the other hand, there can be logoi which are not supplemented by the more fundamental components of experience. They are “mere” logoi and can be insufficient to judge individual cases.9 This shows that “concepts” on the lower levels, i.e., phantasmata/pathêmata are seen as sufficient to fulfill basic conceptual tasks to a certain degree in Aristotle. This would be adequate for a descriptive psychological theory of concepts in the modern debate. 8 Salmieri (2008, p. 218) conceives the relation in a similar way: “A concept is a unit of thought that consists in (putative) knowledge of what something is, the account of which knowledge is a definition.” Also p. 266/267: “This causal-conceptual perspective on the world develops gradually from perception, which is a particularistic and imprecise (or causally shallow) knowledge of the objects, and it culminates in νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη which are universal and maximally precise. The early stages of this process occur naturally, but the later ones require methodological knowledge based on a philosophical understanding of universality—on a solution to the problem of concepts.” 9 See Höffe (1996) p. 43/44.

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This interpretation, which nicely connects both doctrines and goes along quite well with the textual evidence from Posterior Analytics, has two problems: (a) In what way can logoi and pathêmata both explain the meaning of words and phenomena such as homonymy and synonymy? (b) How can logoi be precise and phantasmata imprecise if the reference of words is ultimately determined by phantasmata? The first issue can be solved by having a close look at the passages in question. In De interpretatione, it is said that words are signs of pathêmata which are, in turn, signs of the external entities, this can be read as an account of how signification in language works. In Categories, it is said that a logos can be provided that has the same meaning as the word in question. It is not said that the logos is a mediate representation that is always present, only that it can be formed. Because of this, it is possible for words to have both corresponding logoi and pathêmata which signify the same thing as the word without the logoi being identical to the pathêmata. The ability to form logoi or even definitions is distinct from and of higher value than the more general faculty to understand language mediated through pathêmata. In describing the relation between logos and pathêma in this way, the equation between both and the notion of word meaning made by Modrak (2001), which I cited in the introduction of this dissertation, is challenged: Setting aside questions about the psychological nature of the pathêma, it seems reasonable to suppose that the internal state is constitutive to the logos and thus that the two passages are describing the same three items from different perspectives. (Modrak 2001: 28)

The main reason for this difference is that she interprets logos as form that can be immanent in real objects, mental representations, and language. Logos is understood here as “articulation of word meaning” rather than “word meaning.” That being said, both can fulfill the same functions to a certain degree, e.g., both explain homonymy, pathêma at a cognitive level, and logos at the level of philosophical and scientific discourse. Apart from that the position developed here concerning the nature of representation in Aristotle and the way the psychological side of the process is described has much in common with Modrak’s account of meaning. The second problem might not be a problem, but rather a virtue. If words could only be replaced by definitions, which once again contain words, the result would either be a basic set of undefined and, therefore, meaningless words or circularity, i.e., meaning mainly consisting of interconnections between words which are meaningless apart from their connections. This is reminiscent of the notion of conceptual nets and similarity nets in modern psychology and linguistics and one 275

of the reasons those accounts have been criticized for providing no real and independent theory of meaning. However, if there is another dimension of meaning that is mediated ultimately through perception, the basic words of a language can be based on that and more elaborated meanings can be constructed through language and definitions. It is important to stress that Aristotle does not disregard the epistemological value of perception but rather sees perception and phantasia as being able to successfully represent reality in general, albeit they are not successful in all cases. If they were not able to truthfully represent reality, all higher capabilities could not be built on them. Therefore, the normative component of nous forming the first constituents of thought is introduced to guarantee the proper relation to real entities being embodied in perceptual representations, i.e., phantasmata. However, these simple representations need more elaboration to become proper knowledge via further reflection, which can be conducted by linguistic means.

3.  What are concepts in Aristotle? After all these clarifications about Aristotle and his philosophy, the question still remains: does he have some equivalent to a theory of concepts? Furthermore, if this is the case, what is the equivalent to concepts in Aristotle? Theories of concepts, of course, are quite varied and not all of them aim for the same kind of entities. At this point, I want to recall the systematic definition of concepts from the second chapter of this dissertation: (C) A concept is a mental particular realizing a functional kind which enables a cognitive subject to successfully perform categorization tasks (both concerning categories and individuals) or other higher-order thought processes.

The similarities and differences between Aristotelian psychology and functionalism have been discussed and it can be said that it is not too farfetched to speak of functional kinds in the context of Aristotelian psychology.10 Aristotle intends to explain the way words and more general mental representations (pathêmata) can be about the world, even though he does not go into detail; therefore, comparing him to the subtle computational differences between such models as prototype theory and exemplar theory would be a bit anachronistic even though the 10

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Kenny (2010, p. 108) ties his distinction between abilities and vehicles to Aristotelian Metaphysics: “The notion of a vehicle, as I have explained it, is an extension of Aristotle’s exploration of the differences between actuality and potentiality. The vehicle of a power is the abiding actuality in virtue of which a substance possesses a potentiality which finds expression in transitory exercises. This underlying actuality may be an ingredient, or a property, or a structure.”

difference between exemplars and summary representations was shown to be present in his hierarchy of representations above. Spalding and Gagné (2013), who wrote one of the very few works actually comparing Aristotle to modern psychological theories of concepts, state that the Aristotelian notion of concepts differs considerably in this regard from modern psychological theories of concepts including classical theory to which it is often compared since, according to them, concepts in Aristotle are simple thoughts and not summary representations.11 One could say that Aristotle is less concerned with the task of categorization and more concerned with the task of concepts as constituents of more complex representations. They see a stark contrast to classical theory in psychology and summarize the relation between basic concepts and definitions in Aristotle in much the same way it has been done above: In the A-T view, the intelligible species (i.e., that by which things in the world are represented to the mind in their abstract and universal character) is developed from empirical experience, by the intellect, which is the power of the human mind that deals with the abstract and the universal. The intellect can then reflect on the intelligible species, can reason about it, can compare it with other information from the world, and so on. One result of this process of reflection and comparison can be a definition that identifies the genus and the differentia, which together explain the properties that arise from the essence of the thing. There is no obligation for a person to create such a definition, and the definition assumes the prior existence of the intelligible species, but the intelligible species in no way assumes the existence of a definition. (Spalding/Gagné 2003: 73)

Mental representations (i.e., pathêmata/phantasmata/noêmata) picking out essences successfully are required by the Aristotelian account of truth and his general epistemological optimism.12 That is why the primary constituents of 11

12

Spalding/Gagné (2013) p. 73: “Because of this difference, the A-T view is much less concerned with the nature or format of a representation, compared with the modern psychological views, and therefore does not present the same kind of descriptions of concepts that modern views do. Instead, the A-T view is much more interested in describing how concepts fit within the overall cognitive system and in describing what they allow the person to do. Hence, there is a difficulty in aligning the two different views of concepts for direct comparison.” Ackrill (1981, p. 31) puts it this way: “In general Aristotle simply took for granted that Greek linguistic usage and habits of thought accurately and finally reflected objective reality.” Modrak (2001, p. 112) describes Aristotle’s optimistic attitude in epistemology: “The agreement is due, Aristotle believes, to the fact that the species exist independently of us and causes us to have certain perceptions. Because of the nature of our minds, these perceptions cause us to form the common concept that is the meaning of the various vocal signs used by human beings to name the species.”

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thought can be said to be always true in a certain sense.13 This theory of concepts as ‘coming into being through induction on the basis of perceptual representations’ can be seen as Aristotle’s answer to the epistemological problem of universals, i.e., how knowledge of universals is possible. Since a Platonic account involving anamnêsis is not available to him, he has to base his account of concept acquisition on natural processes and the inherent capacities of human beings as biological entities. This shows once again that the ontological and epistemological problem of universals are at the heart of philosophical theories of concepts. Definitions are linguistic representations picking out essences based on the prior ability to pick out essences mediated by a concept. Ultimately, the question is whether it is only the general designation of a concept formed by the intellect that is seen as the concept or also the perceptual representations starting from which the intellect arrives at this general symbol.14 In the latter case, concepts in Aristotle might still be amodal. This discussion has some similarity to Fodor’s informational atomism, in which only abstract symbols are allowed in concepts while the identification procedure is not described as part of the concept. Since concepts cannot be equated with definitions and the information contained in phantasmata is quite diverse, the Aristotelian view is closer to prototype and exemplar theory than to the classical view even though it is generally less concerned with conceptual formats than modern psychological theories of concepts.15 Empeiria might still be interpreted as consisting of exemplars before a katholou, i.e., a universal representation is formed.16 Aristotle could be described as a pluralist as mentioned above. 13 See Salmieri (2008) p. 156: “What we cannot do is err about what it is to be something per se. We cannot, e.g., think that what it is to be a man is to be a quadruped, because anyone who we might describe as “thinking” this would fail to make even the sort of cognitive contact with men that would be required to say something false about them.” 14 See Spalding/Gagné (2003) p. 81: “It might or might not be a summary in a more general sense, depending on whether one considers just the intelligible species to be the concept, or whether one also considers all the information in the phantasms to be part of the concept.” 15 See Spalding/Gagné (2003) p. 82: “The A-T view combines elements of each of the three main views that have developed within the probabilistic consensus on concepts. Thus, from the perspective of the A-T view, it is not surprising that there should be empirical evidence in favor of each of these three perspectives.” 16 Starting from a normative perspective Salmieri (2008, p. 217) does not see these representations as being concepts, even though they enable subjects to categorize objects etc.: “[…] an experienced person has a certain δύναμις that is distinct from a (precise) concept but can approximate to its function.”

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There is no one-to-one equivalent to “concept” in Aristotle since the notion of phantasma is broader, i.e., it might be said that some phantasmata but not all are concepts according to a descriptive and psychological theory of concepts. The notion of pathêma/phantasma seems to be the closest equivalent to a psychological notion of concept that Aristotle has to offer. The notion of noêma, i.e., thought, is also too broad to be translated as “concept” since concepts are supposed to be the constituents of thoughts and noêma is also used for complex thoughts. It might be that prota noêmata is the closest equivalent of “concept” in Aristotle;17 however, it only occurs once in this form. In this one occurrence, as a matter of interpretation, it is either very closely associated with the notion of phantasma or not very well defined at all. Prota noêmata are not definitions but nonetheless are always and necessarily successful in picking out their representata. This distinguishes them from prototypes and exemplars. They are not concepts according to classical theory, i.e., lists of necessary and jointly sufficient features. Aristotle’s theory of nous should rather be seen as a normative theory that builds on a basic perceptual system of representations. That a theory of concepts can be both normative and perceptual was shown in the historic overview discussing the notion of phantasia katalêptikê in Stoic philosophy. Coincidently, this is a direct historic successor of Aristotle. In Nicomachean Ethics, nous is said to be the faculty of horoi which have no corresponding logos. This could mean that it is prior to forming of a logos. It is said to be more like aisthêsis than episteme, though not concerned with the individual perceptibles but rather with the abstract entities inherent in perception comparable to mathematical entities.18 Nous is able to arrive at a representation of the unified essence out of individual perceptual representations. The expression protoi horoi is also used for the objects of nous.19 It could be parallelized to protê noêmata and indicate that the first thoughts produced by nous based on perceptual representations can function as constituents of syllogisms without forming a definition first. This is parallel of concepts as constituents of higherorder thought in modern theories of concepts. The notions of logos and horismos, on the other hand, are also associated with a normative theory of concepts but more with a philosophical and logical one than with psychology. Nevertheless, there are some affinities to classical theory, which have already been discussed, and also to theory theory especially concerning the 17 Salmieri (2008, p. 125/126) also sees prota noêmata as being basically equatable with an Aristotelian notion of concepts. 18 See Eth. Nic. 1142a25–30. 19 See Eth. Nic. 1143b1.

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four causes. Aristotelian essentialism is an ontological equivalent to psychological essentialism which is an important topic of theory theory. Like theory theory, Aristotle’s theory of scientific definitions stresses that simple object descriptions are not sufficient for acquiring knowledge about the world but rather information on causal origin, essential features, relations to other concepts, etc. have to be included. The resemblance of logos and horismos to classical theory and theory theory does not contradict the interpretation of scientific definitions as a normative theory of concepts in Aristotle since being definitional might have been a valid description of how concepts function if it had not been disproven empirically and theory theory, which sees concepts as theories rather than a description, is still one of the most successful theories of concepts in the modern psychological debate. Therefore, classical theory in psychology is not inherently normative but has its origin in normative epistemic requirements and has thus been proposed as a descriptive theory. The Aristotelian notion of katêgoria was shown to apply to the ontological, conceptual, and linguistic level at the same time. Therefore, it does not qualify as concept. On the conceptual level, the notion of Category can be tied to a broader notion of concept types, i.e., kinds of concepts that differ in their internal logical structure (some of Löbner’s concept types in a stricter sense – namely sortal, individual, and relational concepts as well as functional concepts like ‘father’ as the main class of examples for relative concepts – are present in the classifications Aristotle makes). The categorial scheme and the way it is conceived is further proof in addition to the psychological theory of pathêmata/phantasmata that Aristotle was clearly aware that a representational level in-between language and reality, i.e., a conceptual level, has to be assumed to explain human cognition and linguistic capabilities. The connection between phantasmata and the categorial scheme is not clarified by Aristotle himself, but based on the interpretation developed here each successfully acquired concept as noêmata should fall under one of the Categories and the categorial scheme should be already embodied in phantasmata – albeit to a lesser degree. Concerning an objectivist notion of “concept,” Aristotle is clearly denying the paradigmatic case for externalist concepts, i.e., Platonic ideas. His own answer to the problem of universals is to be found in his hylemorphism, which is an in re solution according to the medieval scheme. Therefore, the closest to the objectivist notion of concepts in Aristotle is his notion of eidos. If logos is to be understood as a synonym of eidos, which has been discussed and denied, it could also be translated as “concept” in this sense. There are many affinities to what has been discussed under the label of “concept” in the later philosophical debate and 280

modern scientific disciplines such as linguistics and psychology. Nevertheless, it is true that there is no direct one-to-one equivalent in Aristotle for any of the meanings of concept discussed above.20

4.  Applying the Aristotelian position to the modern debate While the last three sections were comparative in regard to Aristotle and the modern debate, it is now time to ask whether something can be gained by this comparison and whether any insights from clarifying the Aristotelian account can be fruitfully transferred to the modern debate on concepts. The different aspects of Aristotelian philosophy can all be tied to different theories of concepts. This observation can be used to show that there is quite a diversity of what is discussed under the label “concept.” One has to be cautious not to confuse the different demands a theory of concepts may have. The parameters have been systematically developed in section II of this dissertation and it is quite telling that for a lot of these different choices of how to describe and define concepts some form of equivalents or points of reference can be found in Aristotle. Therefore, the discussion of Aristotle’s philosophy is illustrative of this diversity and advises caution in taking these distinctions seriously since one single author might have different theories of concept at the same time. This is important, both when historically researching theories of concepts but also when arguing against a specific theory of concepts. Maybe the most important distinction to be drawn, because it can lead to many mistaken assumptions, is the one between normative and descriptive theories of concepts that has been identified as one of the dichotomies between the main aspects of Aristotle discussed in this dissertation, i.e., the notion of concepts as logoi on the one hand and as phantasmata on the other hand. Classical theory of concepts in early psychology, which has been traced back to Aristotle’s theory of definition and substance and rightfully so in a lot of regards (i.e., concepts 20 Helmig’s (2012) account of concept attainment is mostly in line with what has been developed in this dissertation. He is mainly interested in the differences between a Platonic and an Aristotelic account of concepts and form. Therefore, he puts his focus on the way concept acquisition is described in the POSTERIOR ANALYTICS. He stresses that concepts in Aristotle have their origin in particular sensibles; therefore, the Aristotelian account, unlike Plato’s account, can be described as perceptual. On the other hand, concept acquisition, at least of reliable concepts successfully picking out natural kinds, is not possible without intellect. Therefore, there is also a normative dimension to concept acquisition as described in POSTERIOR ANALYTICS and METAPHYSICS even though it starts from the senses.

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being clear-cut, consisting of necessary and jointly sufficient features to pick out a category), can be interpreted as a misguided attempt to transfer a normative theory of what concepts have to be like to a descriptive approach describing how category membership is actually represented in human minds. These shortcomings could only be overcome on the basis of philosophical criticism and empirical counterevidence – namely Wittgenstein and Rosch. This illustrates how philosophy can both be a hindrance and an important supplement for empirical theories of concepts. The same case can be made concerning the distinction between modal and amodal theories of concepts: Barsalou seems to be right that a close tie between theories of perception and theories of cognition has been established by some philosophers very early in the history of philosophy (at least since Aristotle) and has been brought up again throughout its course, e.g., in British Empiricism. On the other hand, there has also been a trend of intellectualism that disregards perception, which can be associated with Plato among others. This intellectualism is downplayed by Barsalou’s rendering of the history of philosophy. Rationalism of this kind is motivated by the normative approach of epistemology which regards perception as an insufficient basis for true knowledge. Aristotle and the Stoics show that a normative and, at the same time, perceptual theory of concepts is conceivable. It should also be noted that the distinction between modal and amodal symbols in its strictest sense is only meaningful with the backdrop of the hardware/software analogy, which of course was not a topic for the most part of the history of philosophy. Apart from that, the distinction is not clear cut and can possibly be overcome by a more precise rendering of terms or scientific progress which makes it obsolete altogether. As a consequence, Aristotle’s theory of phantasmata cannot be clearly described as modal but the same ambiguity exists in Barsalou’s own account. This shows that clarification is required. Apart from that, the mere fact that Barsalou’s account is applicable to Aristotle and other early philosophers shows that it is a very general and systematic account which is more philosophical in nature than a particular psychological theory. This is one of the points brought up against it by its critics such as Machery. On a positive note, it can function as the systematical backdrop for more spelled out and specific theories in psychology and should be rather seen as a systematic foundation and not as a specific theory that can be empirically disproven. In addition, there is the distinction between psychological theories of concepts and linguistically motivated theories (in which there exists a concept for every content word in language by definition), which is embodied in the dichotomy between logoi and pathêmata to a lesser degree. If it is implied that there is a logos 282

as a nominal definition for every word, it does not follow that there is a distinct cognitive concept, i.e., there might be logoi as explications of word meanings which are not acquired through perception but rather generated through definition. In Aristotle, having a concept as pathêma, i.e., a mental representation that enables thoughts about a category, is separated from the ability to speak about or define that category (logon didonai). This illustrates the fact that concepts are independent of language and that there is a difference between a linguistic and a psychological theory of concepts. On the one hand, concepts are clearly prior to language. It might be possible to have only linguistically motivated concepts, i.e., concepts that only exist because a certain term in language exists or concepts that only exist by virtue of the fact that we can speak about them.21 This observation might be beneficial for modern theories of concepts. While those concepts would have to be considered empty in some way, it might be a very successful approach to explain abstract concepts – one of the major challenges for contemporary theories of concept, especially perceptual ones. For example, the domain of distributional linguistics and the notion of similarity networks can be seen as a step in this direction. Unlike Barsalou’s approach, perceptual symbols for abstract concepts would not be required.22 Such an account based on the dichotomy between logoi and pathêmata would include both modal and amodal concepts as well as linguistic and prelinguistic concepts. This is also in line with the more recent trend of concept pluralism. In doing this, Prinz’s first desideratum for a theory of concepts, i.e., the wide scope of different concepts that have to be accounted for, would be abandoned – at least in the sense that there can and does not need to be a unified psychological theory of such diverse concepts as ‘dog,’ ‘democracy,’ and ‘electron.’

21 There is evidence pointing in that direction in recent research. See Wilson-Mendenhall et al. (2013) p. 920: “The conclusion drawn was that abstract concepts rely on verbal systems, whereas concrete concepts rely on perceptual systems supporting mental imagery, consistent with the conclusions drawn in many of the individual studies reviewed […]”. 22 Salmieri (2008, p. 182/183) discusses how Aristotle’s perceptual account could explain abstract concepts. He sees linguistic labeling and defining as one option. Apart from that, a common case in Aristotle are perceptions standing for their causes, e.g., essences. That would be an equivalent to a perceptual variant of theory theory. Another possible account he mentions is applying analogy, which is quite prominent in Aristotle’s works and would correspond to an account of conceptual metaphor (Lakoff, Johnson) in the modern debate.

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VIII.  Conclusion and outlook In the introduction, a number of questions were raised. This conclusion will start with short answers to these questions, which have already been presented and discussed in the sections above, before discussing the value and restrictions of such a venture and providing some outlook. Logoi are linguistic units between the level of words and the level of full statements and can be used to clarify the meaning of a word as definitions. As proper definitions (horismoi), they pick out a real essence. Pathêmata are physical traces of sense impressions that remain in the organs of perception and are used for a variety of cognitive tasks – some of them conceptual, e.g., language comprehension and object recognition, some nonconceptual, e.g., episodic memory. Both share some functions, e.g., picking out real essences, determining word meanings. However, the linguistic capacity generally requires pathêmata and a grasping of essences through the means of induction before more elaborate linguistic utterances and ultimately scientific definitions and theories are possible. Aristotle has been compared to a variety of different theories of concepts by different authors. Of particular interest in this context has been the comparison of classical theory in psychology (a descriptive and ultimately disproven theory of conceptual processing) and the Aristotelian theory of definitions (a normative theory of scientific concepts) as well as the comparison of more recent perceptual theories (descriptive theories either of conceptual processing or concept implementation) and Aristotelian psychology (a partly descriptive, partly normative theory of cognitive functions). There are components of Aristotelian philosophy which share several similarities with very different theories of concepts across disciplines. However, there is no elaborate and unified equivalent of a theory of concepts the way one can speak about theories of concepts in the modern debate. This is also indicated by the absence of a term that is clearly translatable as “concept.” Both logos and pathêma have connections to aspects of modern theories, but ultimately both fail as possible candidates for a terminological translation. Actually, the most promising candidate is prota noêmata. What speaks in favor of this is the way they are described as first constituents of thought and the medieval translation of noêma as conceptio/conceptum. However, one has to keep in mind that this is part of a normative theory of thought and there are also components of descriptive theories of concepts in Aristotle. Historically, both the Aristotelian theory of definition and his account of concepts as perceptual representations have foundations

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in Plato’s dialogues and have historical successors – like classical theory in psychology for logoi and British Empiricism for concepts as pathêmata. The comparison between pathêma and perceptual/modal theories of concepts is justified to a high degree, apart from the normative component of nous being part of the Aristotelian conception of soul. In the case of logos, there are lesser similarities since it is a normative theory based on linguistic definitions while a classical and amodal theory is a descriptive theory based on language-like representations. There is no problem in Aristotle, since both theories address different issues and operate on different levels. The modern distinction is not clear-cut since the notions of modality and being perceptual are ambiguous, this can be shown independently of Aristotle but is nicely illustrated by the different components being simultaneously present in Aristotle. From a modern perspective, Aristotelian philosophy might be read as a plea that different kinds of concepts require different kinds and formats of concepts. For example, scientific concepts should be treated differently to simple perceptual concepts of physical objects. This is in line with the recent trend towards pluralistic theories of concepts. Theory theory in particular seems to have an affinity to the Aristotelian theory of definitions. To reduce abstract concepts to language-immanent knowledge, i.e., knowledge how words relate to other words and which statements are valid in a given linguistic discourse, might be one possible approach to account for abstract concepts which is otherwise quite a problem for a perceptual approach to concepts. Apart from this, Aristotelian philosophy shows how important it is to distinguish between normative and descriptive theories of concepts on the one hand, as well as between language-oriented and cognition-oriented theories of concepts on the other hand. The answer to the last question in particular shows why comparing conceptions from very different historical periods might be a fertile undertaking. Discussing an author in which there is no singular term like “concept” enables one to distinguish differences between theories of concepts in the later philosophical and modern debate which have been veiled by applying a singular term. This is especially the case with the distinction between theories of concepts as part of philosophical methodology, e.g., when speaking of conceptual analysis and psychological theories of concepts. For the former, a classical approach like the Aristotelian theory of definitions might be perfectly justified while the latter has been empirically disproven. On the other hand, modern theories of concepts provide a systematic framework for redescribing phenomena which are discussed in Aristotle with new terms which can generate new insights in Aristotelian philosophy. One area where this transfer has been especially fruitful is the application of causal theories 286

of concepts to explain how the relation between phantasmata and noêmata can be explained and to describe one possible way (there are admittedly other ways) of making sense of the notion of nous in the otherwise bodily grounded account of soul in Aristotelian psychology. The approach taken here has mainly focused on similarities and thus was able to compare some very basic assumptions that both Aristotle and Barsalou’s perceptual approach on concepts have in common (e.g., the implementational description of concepts as perceptual representations or the similarity of them to actual perceptions). Another approach might have rather focused on the severe differences (e.g., the Aristotelian conception of nature does not allow for a theory of evolution1, the Aristotelian account of modality focuses on external and organic aspects and not on internal formats of representations, which is one of the most important aspects of theories of concepts in modern psychology and Aristotelian essentialism which has some affinities to theories of natural kinds and is ultimately a much stronger ontological thesis). Those differences, of course, came up at several points in the discussion of Aristotelian philosophy. Their consequences, however, have not been the main focus of discussion. Obviously, a lot of topics only scratched upon here could receive a lot of attention on their own, especially concerning the history of theories of concepts throughout disciplines. The aim has been to subordinate the treatment of different aspects to the overall questions. The proportions of different aspects taken up and what is left out or only mentioned but not pursued further is a direct result of this approach. The hope is to have made a small contribution towards answering how Aristotle relates to later theories of concepts, especially to psychological theories of concepts such as the very recently developed modal theories as well as providing a sufficient historical and systematical context required to achieve this aim.

1 Höffe (1996, p. 115) states that the Aristotelian teleology, unlike many believe, does not rule out evolution. Nevertheless, Aristotle believes that the world is not created and biological species are constant and not changing. There are also parts of Aristotle’s biology that can be described as a theory of adaption. See Ross (1923) p. 131: “In these and many other cases the teleological method has enabled him to detect facts which a mechanical treatment would not have discovered.” And Höffe (1996) p. 133.

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Abbreviations Corpus Aristotelicum An. Post. = Analytica Posteriora An. Pr. = Analytica Priora Cat. = Categoriae De An. = De Anima De Div. = De Divinatione per Somnum De Gen. = De Generatione et Corruptione De Gen. An. = De Generatione Animalium De Ins. = De Insomniis De Int. = De Interpretatione De Mem. = De Memoria et Reminiscentia De Mot. An. = De Motu Animalium De Part. An. = De Partibus Animalium De Resp. = De Respiratione De Sen. = De Sensu et Sensibilibus De Soph. Elen. = De Sophisticis Elenchis DMXG = De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia Eth. Eud. = Ethica Eudemia Eth. Nic. = Ethica Nicomachea Hist. An. = Historia Animalium Met. = Metaphysica Meteor. = Meteorologica Phys. = Physica Poet. = Ars Poetica Pol. = Politica Rhet. = Ars Rhetorica Top. = Topica Plato Euth. = Euthyphron Gorg. = Gorgias Krat. = Kratylos Lach. = Laches Parm. = Parmenides Phaid. = Phaidon 289

Phaidr. = Phaidros Polit. = Politeia Soph. = Sophistes Theait. = Theaitetos Other CPR = Critique of Pure Reason

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Editions and translations of Aristotle Barnes, Jonathan (ed.): The complete Works of Aristotle. The revised Oxford Translation. 2 vol. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Gigon, Olof (ed.) et al.: Aristotelis opera. 5 vol. Berlin: De Gruyter. Minio-Paluello, Lorenzo (ed.) et al.: Aristotle (Oxford Classical Texts). 12 vol. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Minio-Paluello, Lorenzo/Lacombe, Georgers (eds.) et al.: Aristoteles Latinus. Burges: Desclée de Brouwer. Rolfes, Eugen (trans.) et. al.: Aristoteles Philosophische Schriften. 6 vol. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag.

Editions and translations of other ancient authors Burnet, Joannes (ed.) et al.: Platonis opera. 5 vol. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Diels, Hermann/Kranz, Walther (eds.): Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Griechisch und deutsch. 2 vol. Berlin: Weidmann. Flückiger, Hansueli (trans.): Sextus Empiricus. Gegen die Dogmatiker: Adversus mathematicos libri 7–11. Sankt Augustin: Academia-Verlag. Mojsisch, Burkhard (ed.): Augustinus. De magistro/Über den Lehrer: Lat./Dt. Stuttgart: Reclam. Monro, D. B./Allen, T. W. (eds.): Homer. Iliad. Odyssey. Hymns. 5 vol. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nickel, Rainer (ed./trans.): Stoa und Stoiker. 2 vol. Düsseldorf: Artemis & Winkler Verlag. Ockham, Guillelmus de: Guillelmi de Ockham opera philosophica et theologica: ad fidem codicum manuscriptorum edita. Opera philosophica: 1. Summa Logicae. St. Bonaventure, NY: Inst. Franciscani Univ. S. Solmsen, Friedrich/Merkelbach, R./West, M. L. (eds.): Hesiod Theogonia, Opera et Dies, Scutum, Fragmenta Selecta. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Online Resources Aristoteles Latinus Database. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers NV. Online version: http://clt.brepolis.net/ald/Default.aspx (Accessed: 15/12/2014 – 13:51) Greek Word Study Tool - http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph (Accessed: 15/04/2015 – 11:53)

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Perseus Digital Library - http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/collection?collect ion=Perseus:collection:Greco-Roman (Access: 15/04/2015 – 11:53) Thesaurus Linguae Graecae - http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu/ (Accessed: 15/04/2015 – 11:52)

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Lars Inderelst

Lars Inderelst

Logoi and Pathêmata “Concept” is a central notion in philosophy that also influences other disciplines like psychology and linguistics. The author compares modern theories to the work of Aristotle as the first philosopher with an extensive corpus and one of the predecessors both of classical theory and of modal theories of concepts. It is surprising that there is apparently no equivalent term for “concept” in his work. Both pathêma and logos are central to his theory of language and thought. Therefore, this book describes which notion in Aristotle’s writing comes closest to “concept” and whether or not it generates a precise theory.

The Author Lars Inderelst studied philosophy and classics at the University of Düsseldorf and is specialized in ancient philosophy. As a researcher he was part of the interdisciplinary research center CRC 991 “The Structure of Representations in Language, Cognition, and Science” and compared positions from the history of philosophy to very recent trends in cognitive science such as frame-theory and embodied cognition.

Logoi and Pathêmata

Studia Philosophica et Historica 28

Studia Philosophica et Historica 28

Lars Inderelst

Logoi and Pathêmata Aristotle and the modal/amodal distinction in modern theories of concepts