Logical Investigations [2] 0415241901, 9780415241908

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ical stigations

B 3279 H93

und Husser!

International Library of Philosophy Edited by Jose Bermudez, Tim Crane and Peter Sullivan

Logical Investigations

Advisory Board: Jonathan Barnes, Fred Dretske, Frances Kamm, Brian Leiter, Huw Price and Sydney Shoemaker

Recent titles in the ILP:

Edmund Husser!

The Facts of Causation O,H.M~

Translated by J. N. Findlay from the Second German edition of Logische Untersuchungen

The Conceptual Roots of Mathematics R. lucas

Edited by Dermot Moran

Stream of Consciousness Bany Oointon

Volume II

Knowledge and Reference in Empirical Science Jady Auouni

(Investigation III, Volume II of the German editions)

J.

Reason without Freedom David Owens The Price of Doubt N. M. L Nathan Matters of Mind Scott Sturgeon Logic, Form and Grammar Peter Long The Metaphysicians of Meaning Gideon Makin Logical Investigations, Vols I & II Edmund Husserl

On the theory of wholes and parts The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings (Investigation IV, Volume II of the German editions)

On intentional experience and their lcontents' (Investigation V, Volume II of the German editions)

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge (Investigation VI, Volume II, Part 2 of the German editions)

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Contents

Fif1t published in Gel1llt here thought of as' provocative', is only in question as an (i0081. ob;~ ~ot as an external reality. which really ~nd p~ycho-physically iIltenU~o my mental life, A battle of centaurs, seen 10 a pIcture or framed det(1llU~pro\'okes' my approval just like some beautiful, real landscape: ill f~ on the latter psycho-physically as the real cause of my mentally if I k>Oed state of pleasure, this 'causation' is altogether different from the pro\1)~ we ha\'e when we see the visible landscape - in virtue of such causauo~ a mode of appearing and such and such piclured colours and ltId ~ as the 'source', 'ground' or 'cause' of my pleasure. Pleasantness or ronr:re do oot belong as effect 10 this landscape considered as a physical ~ but ooly to it as appearing in this or Ihal manner, perhaps as thus reality, . d'109 us 0 r t h'IS or tal, h '10 Ihe conscIOus ' and thus judged of or as remm act lint in question: it is as such that the landscape 'demands', 'arouses' such rcelings. l1 (b) Are there non-Intentional (eelin,s? DistinctIon between

(••'h'I_sensations and (eel/ne-acts

We may now ask more generally whether, in addition to the intentional \"'lrieties of feeling, there are not other non-intentional species. It may seem at fint that an obvious 'Yes' is the right answer. In the wide field of socalled sensory feelings, no intentional characters can be found. The sensible pain of a burn can certainly not be classed beside a conviction, a surmise, a volition etc. etc., but beside sensory contents like rough or smooth, red or blue etc. If we recall such pains, or any sensory pleasures (the fragrance of a rose, the relish of certain foods etc. etc.), we find that our sensory feelings are blended with the sensations from the various sense-fields, just as these latter are blended with one another. . Every sensory feeling, e.g. the pain of burning oneself or of being burnt, doubt after a fashion referred to an object: it is referred, on the one ~ to ~he ~go. and its burnt bodily member, on the other hand, to the other Whlc~ mfllcts the burn. In all these respects there is conformity with the ~nsatlons: tactual sensations, e.g., are referred in just this manner to h11y member which touches, and to the external body which is touched. "'ou~ I~~gh this r~ference is realized in .intcn,tlonal. experie~ces, no one ease th ok of calling thc referred sensations mtentlOnal. It IS rather the Ptrttptat Our sensations are hcrc functioning as presentative contents in bert r~~1 acts. or (to use a possibly mislcading phrasc) that our sensations llot acts Ive an objective 'interpretation' or 'taking-up'. They themselves are tional Ch but acts are constituted through them. wherever. that is. inten~ an' aracters like a perceptual interpretation lay hold of them, and as it borill&~~ate them. In jusl this manner it seems that a burning. piercing, In, fused as it is from the stan with certain tactual sensations, must

:a: "nd

110 On intentional experiences and their 'COntents'

itself count as a sensation. It functions at least as other sensatiOOI providing a foothold for empirical, objective interpretations. All this seems unobjectionable, and the whole question dispoled seem to have shown that some feelings are to he reckoned among ill experiences. while others are non-intentional. But we are led to doubt. then. whether two such sorts of 'fee . form a single class. We spoke previously of 'feelings' of liking and approval and disapproval, of valuation and disvaluation - expel...... ously akin to theoretical acts of assent and rejection, of laking to be probable or improbable, or to deliberative acts of jud voluntary decision etc. Here we have a kind, a plain unity of ........, included nothing but acts. where such sensations of pain and no place: descriptively the latter belong, in virtue of their speci8c among tactual. gustatory. olfactory and other sensations. Being II sentative contents of objects of intention. but not themselves . they manifest descriptive differences so essential, that we cannot believe in the unity of a genuine class. In both cases of course, we 'feelings'. i.e. in the case of the above-mentioned acts of liking 81 ia of the above-mentioned sensations. This fact need not perp5ex, than our ordinary talk of 'feeling", in the sense of touching, need astray in the case of tactile sensations. Brentano has already pointed to the ambiguity here dealt with. ia ing the intentionality of feelings. He draws a distinction, in seDII words. between sensations of pain and pleasure (feeling-sensatiODl) and pleasure in the sense of feelings. The contents of the fo~ I should simply say, the former - are in this terminology 'ph . the latter are 'psychical phenomena', and they belong therefore tially different genera. This notion I regard as quite correct, but whether the meaning of the word 'feeling' does not lean p towards 'feeling-sensation', and whether the many acts we call 'fi not owe their name to the feeling-sensations with which they are interwoven. One must of course not mix up questions of suitable with questions regarding the factual correctness of Brentano's d' Our distinction should constantly be kept in mind and fruitfullY in analysing all complexes of feeling-sensations and feeling-actS. concerning some happy event, is certainly an act. But this act, w . merely an intentional character, but a concrete and therefore compJel. ence, does not merely hold in its unity an idea of the happy event act-charactcr of liking which relates to it: a sensation of pleasure at the idea, a sensation at once seen and located as an emotional exc:i the psycho-physical feeling-subject. and also as an objective pro event seems as if bathed in a rosy gleam. The event thus pleasinglr now serves as the first foundation for the joyful approach, the ... the being charmed. or however one's state may be described. A

Consciousness as intentional experience

III

~t merely seen in its thinglike content and context. in the rese . I hem:spoa., of affairs, which has an intrinsic priority as regards authenticity. After saying all this, we may maintain generally that there an belwel.'n names and assertions which affect their 'semantic esst1ta'. rest on the essential difference of presentations and judgements, II II same, in lem/s of intentioll(ll essence, whelher one perceil'es QlI ju(lges Ihat il exists, so it is not Ihe same if one names an exislmt til or says or predicates of it thai il exists. We may now note that to el'ery positing name a possiblej'w.l. . . evidently corresponds, or that to e)'ery attribution a possible pr responds alJd I'ice )'erso. After we have: rejected the essential these acts, we: can assume: only that we have here a case of la connection, and of connection governed by ideal law. Ideal COOD~ not point to the causal genesis or the empirical concomitance of they coordinate, but to a certain ideally governed, operative of the ideatively graspable act-essences1 in question, which have and law-governed ontological order, in the realm of phen,__,--_, ideaJity, just as pure numbers and pure specifications of geometric have theirs respectively in the realms of arithmetical and geornet:ril:al If we enter the a priori reaches of pure Ideas. we can likewise say (in pure. i,e, unconditional universality) could not pe~onn I.btt: : acts without being able to perform those coordinated \\'lth them. account of the specific semantic essence of the acts concerned.. We further. that there are coordinations, interesting from the pol?t cI logical validity, law-governed equivalences. rendering it imposslbleotl irrational to start with the words 'this S' without 'potentially' that there are 5's, In other words, that propositions containinJ names should be true. and that. the existential j~d~~ments, which 'fbiI to such names should be false. IDvolves an a PTlOTlIDCOnslstenC)'. • of the ideal. analytic truths which are rooted in the 'mere fofdl thought. or in the calegories or specific Ideas which belong to tilt: forms of thinking proper.

Study of founding presentations to the theory of judgement

ISS

~nuation. 116

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Whether assertions can function plete names

. yel anolher important class of instances to consider and shall use We ha\econfirm our notion of the relation of nominal acts and judgements. thefll to concerned with cases where declarative sentences are not merely Weare . , 'mtent, an d so seem. as actua l ' used with dcterlTlllllDg assertIons, to be parts mes but where they seem to function as full and complete names. e,g. ~:t rai~ has se~ in at last will d~light the fan,ners·. It seems impossibl~ to id the admiSSion that the subject-sentence IS here a complete assertion. ~\'O it means that rain has really set in. The modified expression of the ;gemenls by way of a subordinate clause-fonn here only serves to show thai our assertion is functioning as a subject. that it provides the basic act on wbich a predicative assertion may be imposed. All this sounds very nice. If the disputed conception had real support in our class of instances, and were really allowable there, a doubt would arise Yo'hether, despite :Ill previous objections, it might not apply even over a Ilider field. Let us consider our example more closely. If asked what the fanners are glad about. one replies with a 'that so-and-so' or 'about the fact that rain has at length fallen'. The fact. therefore. the state of affairs posited as existmt, is tbe object of the gladness. is the subject about which we are making aD assertion. This fact can be variously named. We can simply say 'this', as illthecase of all other objects. we COdn also say 'this fact', or. more definitely. 1he fact of the set-in min. of the setting in of the rain' etc. We can also say. ~ above. 'that the rain has set in', Our coordination shows that this clause ts a ~arne in exactly the same sense as all other nominal expressions of acts, that It does nOI differ essentially in sense-giving backing from other acts. It e~actly as they do, and in naming presenls; as other names name in t~lngs. properties etc.. so it names or presents a slate of affairs. which paniCular IS an empirical fact. If~t is the difference between such naming and the independent assertion Ie/i ,?,rtote of affairs. when. e.g.. we make the assertion: 'Rain has at last

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n, h SOrnet ' PrOCeed Irnes happens that we first assert something absolutely. and then the: fa to ?ame the state of arT:lirs: 'Rain has at last set in. That will delight ia in ;;:;~r: .. ,Here ,we c:ln slu~y .:In unde~iabl.e con.trust. !he state of affairs UIeSl ' ases the same. but It IS our obJcct m qUIte a dlffcrent manner. In ra let in: ~htfom:ard assertion we judge about Ihe rain. and about its having ~ a th are In a pregnant sense objective to us. presemelJ, But we do not lTlere sequence of presenlations. bUI ajudgemem. a peculiar 'unity of ess ·. thai binds these togethcr. this binding logether the con" ~.s of Ihe Sltllt' 01 affairs is constituted: to execute jlldgl'lllem. and to IQIls of II SI(I((' of affairs, it! lhis symht·t;r positing 01 something as

'0 ,,.:n

In

156

On intentional experiences and their 'contentS'

referre(J to something, are one a1/(J the same. A thesis is enacted, and second dependent thesis is based, so that, in this basing of thesis Oq the synthetic unity of the state of affairs is intentionally constituted. a synthetic consciousness is plainly quite differenl from setting before aile in (l single-myelJ Ihesis. in a possible, direct sllbject-act, in Q lion, One may compare the ways in which Ihe rain 'comes to conscio

the assertedness of the slate of affairs. and the presentational, na~ which in our example succeeds it, and which applies to Ihe same affairs: 'Thai will delight the farmers'. 'That', as it were, points a the state of affairs: it therefore means this same state of affairs. reference is not the judgement itself, which has preceded it as a thus qualified mental happening now passed away: it is a new act of kind, which in pointing to the stale of affairs previously constituted thetic, many-rayed fashion, now simply confronts this state of atTain single-rayed thesis, and so makes it an object in a sense quite difJi the way the judgement does so, The state of affairs comes more' . to consciousness in the judgement: the single-rayed intention t state of affairs presupposes the many-rayed judgemental intentioD. reference to the lauer is part of its intrinsic sense. But in each conscious approach there is rooted, in a priori fashion, an essentilll possibility of transformation into the single-rayed approach, in state of affairs will be pregnantly 'objective' or 'presented'. (Just. an a priori possibility, resting on the ideal essence of geometrical fi 'one' can turn them about in space, distort them into certain atbel' etc.) It is now at all events quite clear that the manner in whicb conscious of something, or in which it is our intentional object, is in each case. Otherwise put. we are dealing with 'essentially' difli or with acts differing in intentional essence. If we ignore pointing proper, what is essential in the 'That' of 0lIl' ous example is also present in the thought of the mere sentence a slIbject-position (and any other position in a contex.t whicb presentation). and is necessarily absent from the thought of a and independent assertion. A.f soon as the semantic moment whiC~ the definite article comes (l/iW!, a presentation ill ollr present sense u Whether a language or dialect actually employs the article or nol, one speaks of der Mensch or homo, of Karl or der Karl is irrelevant.. moment of meaning attaches to the sentence 'That Sis func.o subject, is easily seen. For 'Thai Sis P' means what we mean by Tbilt S Sis p', or. a little more elaborately. The fact. the circumstance thai The situation is not of a kind. after all this. to encourage us to judgements, actual predications, that could be logical sllbjeclS or acls. We rather see that there is a difference of intentional essence sentences serving to name states of affairs. and the corresponding ser of states of affairs, a gulf bridged by ideal relations of law. An as

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---fi

Study of founding presentations to the theory of judgement

/lc/ion as

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/lame, 1I0r

ll nel'f!r ',III/(/Ilfre. . I.e..'Its SSfllll

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n(lme

(IS

157

all assertion. withollt challging its

. essence, an dh 'h'Its very meanmg. , semantic t erewlt . t rh' s does not of course mean that the correspondmg acts are descnp_ I Ialien. The matter of the assertion is in part the same as that of the Il~~rnalact, in both the same state of affairs is intended in the same terms. , gh in a different form. The great affinity of expressive form is no matter thOUchance, but h. as semantlc. ' roots. If .occaslO.na ' I I y the ex.pres.slon ' of stays hanged. despite a change In semantic funcllon, we are dealing with a "norticular casc 0 feqUIvocatIOn, " wh'ICh bel ongs to the broad class of cases :ere expressions have anomalous meanings. These anomalies, arising from the pure essence of the semantic field, resemble the anomalies of pllre gramnror.) Our conception accordingly admits of a consistent working-out: we differentiate in all cases between presentations and judgements and, among presentations, between such as are positing and existentially committed, and such as are nol. We shall accordingly not hesitate to deny judgement-status to antecedents of the form 'Because S is which state causes: we shan put t/rem in the S(lme reJtltion 10 hypothetical antecedents that we have recognized Qj obtaining between positing and non-positing names. The 'because' may point back to a judgement that asserted S to be P, but this judgement is not again enacted with the causal sentence itself. We no longer assert that Sis P, but we impose on a purely presentative substructure, that of an antecedent characterized in its very sense as a modified judging synthesis. a second consequential thesis which is grounded upon, and which 'looks to', the ~ormer. The whole is a new form of judgemental synthesis, whose sense, a hule elaborated, can be said to be: the conditioning of the being of one state of affairs by that of another which grounds it. Only as so combined, morea~tecedent and consequent function as a judgement, as when we assert SIS P-, and because this is so, 'Q is R'. Here it is not enough to establish :~a~ a,se~ue~ce s~nt~eti~a.lIy, but to have and to. hold Ihe ~wo states of c ~ SIS P and Q IS R Judgementally together, In our relating. synthetic onSCIOusness itself. " ' I presentations " StnNQ/e. The ....x(enslons Just rna de s how t hat nomina m the or ~t., narrow sense merely represent a wider, but still limited class of ,thetic' " . acts. Th'IS m~st be re.member~ In , what follows, evenSlOgle.r·lyed Wile' posltmg The ( n we connect our treatments wnh genumely nommal presentations. errn • . I ' ingl y be .nomma presentation', understood as a class-term, must accordo given a much widened sense. ,. Ur Stand- d f ' , JUdge . ar S 0 termmology must also be noted, accordlllg to which a canno~e~t Eneans a complete. independent assertion. That such a meaning caUsal wllhout intrinsic change become the meaning of a hypothetical or ~bove. antecedent or indeed any nominal meaning, is the thesis established

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Chapter 5

Further contributions to the theory of judgement. 'Presentation' as a qualitatively unitary genus of nominal and propositional acts

§J7 The aim of the following investigation. The concept of an objectifying act The investigations just completed have not done with the questioa at the beginning of §34. Our result was that presentations and j are essentially different acts. Since the ambiguity of words again help of standard-selling concepts. we mean by 'presentations' ",,1IIiI_ and by 'judgements' assertions that are nonnally performed and Naming and asserting do not merely differ grammatically, but 'in which means that the acts which confer or fulfil meaning for each. intentional essence, and therefore in (let-species. Have we thereby prescntation and judgement. the acts which lend meaning and fulfilment to naming and assertion. belong to different basic cJ(UM301 tional experience'? Obviously our answer must be negative: nothing points to sucb. We must recall that intentional essence is made up of the twO matter and qllOlity, and that a distinction of 'basic class' obvioudJ only to act·qualities. We must further recall that our exposition doCI all entail that nominal and propositional acts differ in quality, mucb . • they differ generically as regards quality. This latter point should not arouse objection. The matter of a~. sense no alien, external attachment. but an internal moment, an I be-' side of the act·intention. of the intentional essence itself. Talk atbe differing 'ways of consciousness', in which. we can ~ ~wa:e off ..... state of affain;. should not mislead us. It points to a distinction 0 not one of act-qualities. Quality may remain id~ntical - so muc~~as us since we fonned the Idea of matter - whIle the same obJ ...-aJcIII differently present to consciousness. One may think. e.g., of eqUl tbC iting presentations. which point by way of differing mallets to object. The essential change of meaning which an assertion under~ it passes over into the nominal (or other parallel) function, a polO proof we found so important above. may involve no more than a c

----

Further c:ontribution5 to the theory of judgement

159

. ql/a!itl· or (It least qllalitati!'e genus (according to the kind of nominal r. · .onrtr . lll/C h(lnget.I ,.... 'ficationl /IIay remain 111~~ \ this describes the actual situation ococomes plain if we carefully at· d tlo the mallcrs themselves. Completion by nominally significant articles t~~e ':he eircumswnce that'. 'the fact that', where a propositional meaning is JU: de to fuoction as subject. has been shown by the above examples to be ~ry. The examples introduce us to contexts where transfonned sense with a transfer of unchanged. essential. material content. and where, ~fore. interpretative functions are present which the original assertion I d:s. or for which it has substitutes. The essential moments which agree in ~e twO caseS. also undergo, as we can see in each case, a different 'categorial trUCluring·. One may compare. e.g.. the fonn 'S is P' with its nominal ~ificatiOn 'S which is The following treatments will show. on the other hand, that there is a quaJitariJ'e community between nominal and propositional acts; we shall therefore end by demarcating yet another nell' concept of presenllllion, wider andmore sigllijictlll/ Ihan the farmer. which will give us a new, most important interpretation of the principle that each act has its basis in presentations. To keep our present two concepts of 'presentation' apart. we shall ..ithout making final recommendations as to terminology - speak of 'nomina.I aets' in the case of the narrower concept. and of 'objectifying acts' in the case of the wider. We need hardly stress. after our whole introduction of the concept of "nominal presentation' in the last chapter. tbat the expression does not merely cover acts attached to nominal expressions, and conferring or fUlfilling their meaning, but also all acts that function analogously, even if Dot performing the same grammatical role.

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III

Qualitative and material differentiation of Objectifying acts

:mong nominal lIcts we distinguish positing from non-positing acts. The onner were after a fashion existence·meanings: they were either sensuous ~pts. or percepts in the wider sense of pretended apprehensions of what ..;r ~ther acts which. without claiming to seize an object ·itself. in 'full~ l~ or intuitive fashion. yet refer to it as existent. I The other acts leave ertImlt> ourseI ves to what > > IS rea IIy represented lR n , B d > , / ..uSlg d > > , s rtpresentatlve,content, Y so, Ol~~ we lorm, a r~l."Ce presentation, ,Wllh II redUced object ,ll~ regard to whIch It IS purely lRlUltlV~, We can ~ccordlOgly • Iha t the inlUlf/I'£' substance (Gelwlt) of a presentation compflses aI/that ~y UTe inllli/ioll;1I it, just as we may also speak of the object's purely intuit· ~: content. of all that is rendered intuitive in this presentation, The like ~ppl)es to the signit,ive s~bs~an,ce of the presentation: this can be said to be aU that is pllre significatIOn lR It, Each total act of intuition has either the character of a percept or an ilIlagination: its intuitive substance is then either perceplllal or imaginatil'l! substance or content. This must not be confused with the perceptually or ilIlaginatively presenting content in the sense defined in §22, Perceptual content comprises (though not in general exclusively) strictly presentative contents: imaginative contents comprise only analogizing contents, It is not to the point that these latter contents permit of another iDlerpretation (as in the case of physical images). in which they function strictly presentatively. On account of the mixture of perceptual and imaginative components which the intuitive substance of a percept permits and usually exhibits, we can again consider adopting a division of perceptual content into pllre perceplllal OOI1tmt, on the one hand. and sllpplememary image-conrem, on the other. If then, in each pure intuition we take P, and I, to be the weights of its purely perceptual and purely imaginative components. we can write down lhe symbolic equation P,

i=O i=1

s=1 s=O,

237

:~

+ I, = 1

I symbolizes the weight of the total intuitive content of the pure

iat~t~on. ,and thus the total content of its object. If I = 0, i.e, if the pure

In the former. the presentation (Vorstdhmg) would have ,onlY content: no propeny of its intentional object would remam ovd was brought to intuitive presentation (Dllrsrellllllg) in its content. The case of purely signitive presentations. well-known to ~s a~ ~ure intentions. therefore appears here as a limiting case of IOtUlUO~" In the second case the presentation (Vors/el!lmg) has flO sigmll,ve whatever. In it all is fulness: no part. no side. no property of its objc:d. be intuitively presented (dargeste/ft). none is merely indirectly and su meant. Not only is everything that is intuitively presented also, . much is analytically true - but whatever is meant is also intuill.. sented. This new class of presentations may be defined as pure 111 >

"'.

IS f ree rrom a,11 . , ' called a pure perImagmal cont,ent: .It should .be tIl:lbra' ~ shall here Ignore the qualitatively asserllve character usually tailed ~ 1n,Ihe sense of the term 'perception', But if PI' = 0, the intuition is Oot pure IlI/og;l/(l/ioll, The 'purity' of pure perception relates, therefore. merely 10' ., h Of an' slgmtlve. ut also to imaginative supplements, The narrowing intllitilmpure percept which throws out symbolic components yields the pure tvtr'yt~~ W~ich is immanent in it: a further reductive step then throws out , Can :~: :ma~i,ned, and yields the substance of pure perception. ~tified w~tultl\'ely ~rese~tative content in the case of pure perception be Itrict $tn nh the ob~t It~lf? ,The essence of pure pr~ntation (in the lie) Surely consists m bemg a pure self-presentation of the object, "'iliCn

trpriofl' w

2]8

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge

one which means the intuitively presentative content (Jirectly (in tbe of 'seW) as its object. This would. however. be a paralogism, The as presentation in the strict sense. so interprets the intuitively p......... content. that the object appears as itself given with and in this conte:Qt. entation (in the strict sense) is pllre. when each part of the object is and intuitively presented in the content. and none is merely i...'Ii..~ symbolized. As there is nothing in the object not strictly presented. 10 is nothing in the content not strictly presentative. Despite such euct pondence. self-presentation may still have the character of the all-sided perspectivity (of a completed perceptual picture): it Deed DOt the ideal of adequation, where the intuitively presenting content is intuitively presented content. The pure picture-presentation, wbidI. pletely depicts its object through its freedom from all signitive holds in its intuitively presentative content a complete likeness oftbe This likeness can approach the object more or less closely, to a complete resemblance. The same may be true in the case of pure with the sole difference. that imagination treats the content as a image. whereas perception looks on it as a self-revelation of the object. perception no less than pure imagination admits. accordingly, of • degrees of fulness. without thereby altering its intentional object. the degrees offilllf/!sS of ;n1l1itil'e con/en!. to which degrees of fu10ell resentative content run eo ipso parallel, we may distinguish: I. The exten! or richness of the fulness, according as the con1eDl object achieves intuitive presentation with greater or less co~ . 2. The Jil'e!iness of this fulness. i,e. the degree of apprOlUIDabOR primitive resemblances of the intuitive presentation to the co moments of content in the object. 3. The reality-level (Realitiitsgehalt) of the fulness. the greater number of its strictly presentative contents. .' In all these regards. adequate perception represents an Ideal: it maximum of extent. liveliness and reality: it is the self-apprehenstt are, however, more inclined to call the object which is our (logical) td~ the Ihing -known'. In slIch knowledge another act plainly is present. ~ perhaps includes the former one. but is nonetheless different from it: poper is known as whit~, o~ r'dther a,s a whi.te thi~g, whenever we expr~ :. percept in th~ ~rords .whlte paper. The mtentlon of the word 'white' ooiY partially COInCides .wlth the colour-aspect of the apparent object; a surPlus of meaning remams over, a form which finds nothing in the appearpee itself 10 confinn it. White paper is paper which is white. Is this form DOl also repeated, even if it remains hidden, in the case of the noun 'paper'? Qaly the quality-meanings contained in its 'concept' terminate in perception. Here also the whole object is known as paper, and here also a supple-.wy form is known which includes being, though not as its sole form, in ibdf. The fulfilment effected by a straight percept obviously does not extend 10 such forms. We bave but to ask, further, what corresponds in perception to the difTereDl.'t between the two expressions 'this white paper' and 'this paper is white', w'cicb an: both realized on the same perceptual basis, we have but to ask what side of perception is really brought out by this difference - the differCIICe, that is, of the attributive and the predicative mode of statement _ and .1,. in the case of adequate adaptation, this difference brings out with PftUliarexactness, and we experience the same difficulty. Brieny we see that ~,~ of structured meanings is not so simple as the case of a 'proper' 1ldivid~1 meaning. with its straightforward relation of coincidence with ~on .. Certainly o~e can tel! one',s auditors, intelligibly and unambiguthat I see that thiS paper IS white'. but the thought behind such talk let;" not be that the meaning of this spoken sentence expresses a mere act of ~'~t may also be _lhe case that the epistemic essence of our seeing, in tahi CO e a~parent object announces itself as self-given, serves to base cerIIre&t thDnectlve or relational or otherwise formative acts. and that il is to IIlcb ac~t our expression in its changing forms is adjusted, and that it is in ~ perfonned on a basis of actual perception, thai our expression in rotlnded° Such changing forms. finds fulfilment. If we now combine th~se lion, andact~ or rather act-forms with the acts which serve as their foundal:OnlPle:o; gIve the comprehensive name 'founded act' to the whole actPossibili~S t.hat result from such formal 'founding', we may say: Granted the tlo longe; ;US,I ~ket~hed, our parallelism .ma~ be ~e-eslablished, but it is tbt I1ltre parallehsm between the meanll1g-lI1tentlons of expressions and ....;ng .percepts which correspond to Ihem: it is a parallelism between -Inte . Ililons and Ihe above mentioned p(~rceptu(l/ly founded acts.

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r

2H

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

Sensuous and categorial intuitions

27S

~our judgem.ent would cease to know anything. It means. in all

§41 Continuation. Extension of our sphere of examples

.iIQlI~ col!italive style. Just what could be known by the aid of intuition. if

lf we suppose our range of examples widened so as to cover the of predicative thinking. we shall encounter similar difficulties ... possibilities of resolving them. Judgements in particular will C01Do have no dcfmite relation to anything individual which ought to through any intuition: they will give gelleral expression to rela_ ideal unities. The general meanings embodied in such jud&emeall be realized on a basis of corresponding intuition. since they origin. mediately or immediately. in intuition. The intuited indi . however. what we mean here; it serves at best only as an '"odi..10 an example. or only as the rough analogue of an example, for the which alone interests us. So. for instance. when we speak 'colour' or specifically of 'red'. the appearance of a single nlCl furnish us with a documenting intuition. It also at times happens. that one calls such a general 518 pression of intuition. We say. e.g., that an arithmetical axiom ex we find in intuition. or we raise objection to a geometrician tbIt expresses what he sees in his figure without deducing it fo borrows from his drawing and omits steps in his proof. Such talk sense (as when the objection scores no mean hit against the f, of Euclidean geometry) but 'expression' here means something . the previous cases. Even in their case expression was nnt a mere of intuition: this is even less the case here. where our thought'•• not aimed at intuitively given phenomena nor at their intuitive relationships. and call in our case not be aimed at them. For ~ stood geometrically is known to be an ideal limit incapable m intuitive exhibition in the concrete. Even in our case. nonetheles&, generic field as such. intuition has an essential relation to ex • its meaning: these. therefore. constitute an experience of general related to intuition. no mere togetherness of them aU, but a belongingness among them. Even in our case. concept and ~:= oriented towards intuition. through which alone. after COI'1 justment. self-evidence. the crown of knowledge. emerges. It reflection. on the other hand. to see that the meaning of the ex question is not found in intuition at all. that such intuiti?n onlY'fi, a filling of clarity ,md in the favourable case of self-eVidence. know only too well that the overwhelming majority of general and in particular those of science. behave meaningfully without anY tion from intuition. and that only a vanishing section. even ~f the proven. are and remain open to complete intuitive iIIununa Even in the general realm. as in the realm of individuals, our. has a relation to intuitively founded acts of thought. Should Ul

tJ:-

e:tP: ~I!e~ent

is indeed true at all. Knowledge always has the character of

~~rt1~nt and :eing must be arri\"eCi at 'through reOectlon- on certalO judgements, or that It can ever be arri'"eCi at in this fashion, 'ReOection' is in other respects a fairly vague .-ord. In epistemology it has at least the relatively fixed sense that Locke p\'( it. that of int~rnal ~~ptio~: w~ can only adhe~. to this sense in inltrprtting a doctnne whIch ImaglDes It can find the ongm of the concept of /king through reflecting on judgements. The relational being expressed in predication, e.g, through 'is', 'are' etc., lacks independence: if we round it out to something fully concrete, we get the stale of affairs in question, tile objective correlate of the complete judgement. We can then say: As Ihe lOUible object slll/ltlf to sense-perception so the state of affairs stands to the 'hmJming Ulmre' in which it is (more or less adequately) gil'en - we should like to say simply: so the state of affairs stands to the perception of it. As the c:onoept Sensuous Objeci (Real Objec/) cannot arise through reflection upon pat:eption, since this could only yield us the concept Perception (or a concept .of oertain real constituents of I)erception), so the concept of State of ~lIrs cannot arise out of reAection on judgements, since this could only yidd us concepts of judgements or of real constituents of judgements. That percepts in the one case, and judgements (judgemental intuitions, Iletttpts of states of affairs) in the other, must be experienced. in order that ;:~~~Ch ~ct of ~bstraction should g.et ~tart~, goe~ w,ithout sayi~g. ~ut tha penenced IS not to he made objective. ReflectlOn-. however, Implies ~hat we reflect upon. the phenomenological experience, is rendered ~~e to us (is inwardly perceived by us). and that the properties to be No/ ~ are really given in this objective content. 6rq in 7n;eflenioll upon jlldgemems, nor eren llpoll fll/jilments ofjlldgements, ~e juljilmems of jlldgemems themsell'es lies the true source of the ptJ b' Stme 0if ....'!Ii'" . I" . . or".. as J"17S (lilt Bl'mg (m the copulative sense), Not In these ~ .....;. ~:ct.r, but in Ih" objects of these acts. do we have the abstractive ~PPtop '~c enables us to realize the concepts in question, And naturally the mod'fi . . It is iflate f I ICatlons of these acts yield just as good a basis, ~_:naCtob' f ' ~lic U' VIOUS rom the start that. Just as allY other concept (or Idea. It{ Which nlly) can only 'arise', Le, become seJf-gil't!I/ to us, if based on an OQ,. tyCS at least sets some individual instance of it imaginatively before ~ SO the concept of Being can arise only when some being, aClllal or y, IS Sf'1 before ollr yes. If 'being' is taken to mean predicativc being,

.~:~s meaning .n'lIoll',

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some stale of affairs must be given to us. and this by way of an gi\'es ii, an ana/oglle of common senSIlOus intllition. The like holds of all categoria/ forms (or of all categories). An e.g.. is given. and can only be given. in an actual act of assembly. that is. expressed in the conjunctive fonn of connection and the concept of Aggregate does not arise through reflection on tbiI • stead of paying heed to the act which presents an aggregate, we ba.. to pay heed to what it presents. to the aggregare it renders concreto. and then to lift the universal fonn of our aggregate to universal consciousness.

A B-de

§45 Widening of the concept of intuition, and in pa,.ticula,. of the concepts pe,.ception and imagination. Sensible and categor-ial intuition If we now ask: 'Where do the categorial fonns of our meaninp fulfilment, if not in the "perception" or "intuition which we tried ally to delimit in talking of "sensibility"'. our answer is plainly the discussions just completed, We have taken it for granted that forms, too. can be genuinely that the same applies to variously structured total meanings, aDd to the 'material' elements of such meanings, and our a;:~:::: beyond doubt by looking at each C'dse of faithful perceptual will explain also why we call the whole perceptual assertion lUI of perception and. in a derivative sense. of whatever is intuited presented in perception. But if the 'categorial forms' of the exp~ together with its material aspects, have no terminus in pc • the laller we understand merely se/lse-perception, then talk of ex percept must here rest on a different meaning: there must at act which renders identical services to the categorial elementl of that merely sensuous perception renders to the material elementl. tial homogeneity of the function of fulfilment, as of all the ideal ships necessarily bound up with it, obliges us to give tbe name' to each fulfilling act of confirmatory self-presentation, to each act whatever the name of an 'intuition', and to its intentional name of ·object'. If we are asked what it means to say that .ftrllCtllred memli/lgs find fulfilment. confirnl themselves in pe: can but reply: it means only that they relate to the object itself in its srrllcfllre. The object wi~h these c~tegorial forms is ~ot mereIY:e~ Illl in the case where meamngs function purely symbohcally. but It IS our very eyes in just these forms. In other words: it is not merelY of. but intuited or perceived. When we wish. accordingly, to set f< this talk of 'fulfllment" is getting at. what structured meaniogs structural elements express. what unitary or unifying factor co

Sensuous ;and Utegori;al intuitions

~vclY,

281

we unavoidably come on 'intuition' (or on 'perception'

~o:jeCt')' We cannot manage without these words, whose widened sense aJ)lI course evident. What shall we call the correlate of a non-sensuous is _presenl:ltion. one involving non-sensuous structure, if the word ~b~, is not available to us? How shall we speak of its actual givenness, ob.iC'pa rent givenness. when the word 'perception' is denied us? In comor l1Pparlance. therefore, aggregllles. imJejinite pluralities, toralities, numbers. Pl;nCliOIl S. prl'lJicllll!s (right-ness). stales of affairs. all count as 'objects', ~ Ihe acts through which they seem to be given count as 'percepts. " Plainly the connection between the wider and narrower. the supersensllous (I Co raised aOO\'e sense, or categorial) and sensuous concept of perception, is ~ extc11lal or contingent matter, but one rooted in the whole business on und. It falls within the great class of acts whose peculiarity it is that in tbctn something appears as ·actuar. as 'self-given'. Plainly this appearance ofac1uality and self-givenness (which may very well be delusive) is throughOUI characterized by its difference from essentially related acts through which alone it achieves full clarity - its difference from an imaginative 'making present', or from a merely significative 'thinking of', which both exclude ~'(so to say appearance 'in person'), though not excluding the belief ia being. As regards the latter, imaginal or symbolic representation is plmible in two manners: in an assertive manner, asserting something's being ia imaginal or symbolic fashion, and in a non-assertive manner. as 'mere' imagination or thinking without taking something to be. We need not enter ~ closely ~nto the discussion of these differences after the analyses of the JIm'lO.us section, which permit of a sufficiently general interpretation. It is dear, 10 any case. that the concept of imagination must be widened in corresJ10tIdence with the concept of perception. We could not speak of something ~per-sensuouSlY or categorially perceil'ed. if we could not imagine this thing .the same manner' (i.e. not merely sensuously). We must therefore draw a qWte general d' t' . be the '" IS mctlon tween sensuous and calegorial intuition (or show POSSibility of such a distinction). a ~~tended concept of Perception permits. further. of a narrower and ~ be 1?lerpretation. In the widest sense even universal states of affairs ICnse said to be perceived ('seen'. 'beheld with evidence) In the narrower , perception tenninates upon individual. and so upon temporal being.

o!

146 Ph bet"",

Ita

enomenological analysis of the distinction een sensuous and categorial perception

1ri.l~1Jr neXt treatm ems we sha 11 fi rst on Iy d'lSCUSS . . . "ql 0 mdlvldual percepts. then ~ d~:.t~eatment 10 take in individual intuitions of the same order.

~ S1JPe~I~~ be~w~n 'sensuous' ~nd 'supersensuous' percepts was only ~led talk clally mdlcated. and qUlle roughl~ char-dcte~zed above. Antiof external and mlemal senses, plamly stemmmg from the naive

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Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

metaphysic and anthropology of daily life, may be useful in pointioa sphere to be excluded, but a true determination and circumSCriptioQ sensory sphere is not thereby reached, so depriving the concept of perception of its descriptive underpinning, To ascertain and clarify distinction is all the more important. since such fundamental . as that between categorial fonn and sensuously founded matter similar distinction between categories and all other concepts, de~ on it. Our concern is therefore to seek more profound descriptive izations, which will give us some insight into the essentially diffi stitution of sensuous and calegorial percepts (or intuitions in &I'eI: they do not need to be conslituted in many-rayed in acts of higher level. whose obj~ts are set up for them by way obj~ts, already constituted in other acts, Each straightforward act of perception, by itself or together, acts, can serve as basic act for new acts which at times include It, merely presuppose it, acts which in their new mode of consci~ wise bring to maturity a flell' awareness of objecls which ess~lll/al1~ poses rhe oltl. When the new acts of conjunction, of disjunction, 0 • and indefinite individual apprehension (that - something), of ~en of straightforward, relati.on~1 and co.nn~tive kl,lOwledge, anse, : : then ha ve lilly sort of subJ~tlve expertenl.'es, nor Just acts connect original ones. What we have are acts which, as we said, set liP ~eW acts in which something appeal.f liS lIclllal al/(I self-gil'en, which given, and could not have been given, as what it now appears to be. foundational acts alone. On Ihe orher hlllld, the nell' objects (Ire

Sensuous and categorial intuitions

283

------------=-=:.:..::...::-=-==~.=:.::.-:=

's 1lll'I' af{' related 10 lI'fllll appeal's in rhe basic acrs. Their manner of

oJdel OI"I~l~e is' essentially detennined by this relation, We are here dealing

. b' a.ppear. 'I spht:re ot 0 ~ects,

Ilie ' II call 011 Iy sholl' rhemseil'es 'in person . in sm.-h l\'lth lIl't'\", In such founded acts we have the categorial element in intuif~ od knowledge, in them assertive thought, functioning expressively, UO~ ~ulfilmcnt; the possibility of complete accord with such acts detennines fin ~ruth, the rightness, of an assertion. So far we have of course only the sidered the sphere of perception, and only its most elementary cases, ~~ one sees at once that the distinction of straightforward and founded ~s can be extended from percepts t.o all.intuition~, We clearly envisage the possibility of complex acts whIch In mixed fashion have a part-basis in straightforward percepts and a part-basis in straightforward imaginations, and the further possibility of setting up new foundations on intuitions which thetl1selves have foundations, and so building up whole series of foundings upon foundings. We further see that signilive intentions have structures patterned on such foundings whether of lower or higher order, and that again mixtures of signitive and intuitive acts emerge out of such 'founding', founded acts, in short, that are built on acts of one or the other sort. Our first task, however, is to deal with the elementary cases and elucidate them completely.

jed

1\'

147 Continuation. Characterization of sense-perception as 'straightforward' perception We shall now scrutinize the acts in which sensuous concreta and their sensu-

ous ~nstituents are presented as given; as opposed to these we shall later

Cl)ns~der the quite different acts in which concretely determinate States of AffaIrs, ~ollections and Disjunctions are given as complex thought-objects, or as objects of higher order, which inc/llde rheir foulldarional objects as real ~~.I' (ree/~) ill rhem.\'eil'e.f. We shall then deal with acts of the type of gener~~ng or Indefinitely individual apprehension. whose obj~ts certainly are of I Cr level, but which do 1101 include their foundational objects in themselves. n our ~ellse.pcrceptiol1. the 'external' thing appears 'in one blow', as soon as ""-~ a~ce falls upon it. The manner in which it makes the thing appear I . , "'''''l:nt IS str . I ., acts T /IIg If.JOfll"l/f( : It requIres no apparatus of founding or founded . . . ha~ ~ what ~omplex mental processes it may trace back its origin, and in W manner, IS of course irrelevant here, e are nOt" . , '1>, ph Ignonng the obVIOUS complexity that can be shown to exist in enomcn I . t ' Particularl ' ~ OgIC~1 co~tel1t?f the straIghtforward perceptual act, and ~1a y In Its ullltary Illtentlon, "'ith ally :onstitutive properties certainly pertain to the thing when it appears others gIven c.ontent. some of them themselves 'falling under perception', ~teQa:ere!y Intended, But we certainly do not live through all the articuts ot perception which l\'ould arise were we to attend to all the details

28'1

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

of the thing. or. more precisely. to the properties of the 'side tUflled were we to make them objects i~ the~r own ri~t. No d~~bt idea.. of supplementary p~opert~es. not .glven In percepuon. are. dispositi0llll, cited', no doubt intentions which relate to them contnbute to pO~1ilIi and determine its total character. But, just as the thing does Oot before us as the mere sum of its countless individual features, wtticb. preoccupation with detail may distinguish. and as even the latltT . . . dirempt the thing into such details~ but takes note of them only in die complete. unified thing. so the act of perception also is always a eneous unity. which gives the object 'presence' in a simple, i.rnmediatt The unity of perception does not therefore arise through our 0-..,. activity. as if only a form of synthesis. oper,tting by way of foUDde4 could give unity of objective reference to part-intentions. It . articulation and hence no actual linkage. The unity of perception being as a straightforward unity, as an immediate lusion 01 part ' lI'itholll the addition ollieII' art-intentions. We may also be unsatisfied with a single glance. we may handle ... from all sides in a continuous percepfllal series. feeling it over as it our senses. But each single percept in this series is already a ~ thing. Whether I look at this book from above or below, fre:m . outside. I always see this book. It is always one and the same thin.. not merely in some purely physical sense, but in the view of our themselves. If individual properties dominate variably at each s1Cp, itself. as a perceived unity. is not in essence set up by some ov founded upon these separate percepts. Considering things more closely, we should not present ttM: the one sensible object could be presented in a founded act (to • ously developing act of perceiving). while it merely does not .MfItI presented in such an act. Closer analysis shows that even a conUO ceptual nux involves a lusion of part-acts in one act. rother than a act 10llnded llpon SIIch port-acts, ..' To prove this we embark on the f?lIowmg dISCUS~lon. . .. The individual percepts of our senes have a contmuo~s uOl.ty..S tinuity docs not amount to the mere fact of temporal adJuncu~n. till of individual acts rather has the character of a phenomen?logJcal ... which the individual acts are fused, .In this unity. o~r maOlfold ta~ merely fused into a phenomenological whole. but mto one. t~C, I cisely. into Olll.! concept. In the continuous running on of indlvldua e.t we continuously perceive the single. selfsame object. Can we noW continuous percept since it is built out of individual percepts, a. in the seose: aD fiowuled upon them'! It is of course founded upon. them a whole is founded on its parts. not however m Ihe sen se here according to which a founded act manifests a new act-character. in the act-characters that underlie it and unthinkable apart fro lO

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Sensuous and categorial intuitions

285

sc before us perception is merely. as it were. elttended: it allows parts the c:I broken oIT from itself which can function as complete. independent to be pts, But the unification of these percepls into a continuous percept is percthe perfonnance of some peculiar act, through which a new consciousness not t mething objective is set up. We find. instead. that absolutely nothing of s."iS objecti\'e1y meant in the extended act. bUI that the same object is ~tinUouslY meant in it. the very object that the part-percepts. taken singly, re already mean .mg. "tOne might lay stress on this sameness. and say that our unity is plainly a ",ity 01 itkll1ijicOIioti. that the intenli~n of ~he seri~lI~ arran:&ed a.cts coincideS continuously. and that so the unity anses, This IS certamly nght. But ",ity 01 illemijiratiotl is unavoidably distinct. dlWS not so)' the same as the ", it1 0! an oet olidentification, An act meons something. an act of identification means identity. presents it. In our case ao identification is performed. but no identity is meant, The object meant in the differing acts of the continuous perceptual series is indeed always the same, and the acts are one through coincidence. but what is perceived in the series. what is rendered objective in it. is solely the sensible object. never its identity with self. Only .-hen we use the perceptual series to found a novel act. only when we articulate our individual percepts. and relate their objects to each other, does the unity of continuity holding among these individual percepts - the unity of fusion through their coinciding intentions - provide a point d'appui for a consciousness of identity, Identity itself is now made objective. the moment of coincidence linking our act-characters with onc another, serves 15 represematil'e content lor a new percepl, 10llnded upon our articulated individual percepts. This brings to intentional awartness that what we now ~ and what we saw before are one and the same. Naturally we have then lO do with a regular act of our second group. Our act of identification is in IOber fact a new awareness of objectivity. which causes a new 'object' to appear to us, an object that can only be apprehended or given in its very telfhOOd in a founded act of this sort. Before we penetrate further into our new class of acts and objects. we "rl USt . however. first round off our treatment of straightforward percepts. we may presume to have cleared up the sense of the concept of a straiglllfion.,'uTtI pc . 'Nt h rcept. or. what we lake for the same. of sense-perceptIon. then ba . ave also cleared up Ihe concept of a s('lIsible or real objl'ct (in the most lt~I.C ~nse of ·real'). We define a real object as the possible object of a lndl~ tforward percept. There is a necessary parallelism between perception Prec,1JJ1IIKiIiIl/WIi. which guarantl.'Cs that a possible im:lgination (or more ' 0 r llnagmatlOns) . .. I ' Pondlsely •'\ \vh 0 ei senes lavmg t he same essence, corres"ith s 10 each possible percept.