Logic, Syntax, and a Structural View: The Psychology of Trump's Hall of Mirrors [1st ed.] 9783030608804, 9783030608811

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-ix
The Structural View (Harwood Fisher)....Pages 1-17
Values, Features, and Heuristics of a Structural View (Harwood Fisher)....Pages 19-31
Reduction Versus the Expanding Manifold (Harwood Fisher)....Pages 33-41
Development and History as Parameters of the Expanding Manifold (Harwood Fisher)....Pages 43-50
Metaphor, Geometric Space, and the Structural View (Harwood Fisher)....Pages 51-57
Logic and Schema Modalities (Harwood Fisher)....Pages 59-94
The Proactive SV: Logical Form, Truth, and Sociopolitical Analogies (Harwood Fisher)....Pages 95-118
The Metaphoric Float (Harwood Fisher)....Pages 119-129
Back Matter ....Pages 131-167

Citation preview

Logic, Syntax, and a Structural View The Psychology of Trump‘s Hall of Mirrors

Harwood Fisher

Logic, Syntax, and a Structural View

Harwood Fisher

Logic, Syntax, and a Structural View The Psychology of Trump’s Hall of Mirrors

Harwood Fisher The City College of the City University of New York New York, NY, USA

ISBN 978-3-030-60880-4 ISBN 978-3-030-60881-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60881-1 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Harvey Loake This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To David Wechsler, Heinz Werner, and Ivan Pavlov for boldly reaching for, achieving, and teaching analogies that bring together divers layers of the determinants of human thought.

Contents

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1

The Structural View

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Values, Features, and Heuristics of a Structural View

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3

Reduction Versus the Expanding Manifold

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Development and History as Parameters of the Expanding Manifold

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Metaphor, Geometric Space, and the Structural View

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Logic and Schema Modalities

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The Proactive SV: Logical Form, Truth, and Sociopolitical Analogies

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The Metaphoric Float

Epilogue: SV Unbound—Program Logic and the Metaphoric Span of the Open Logic Gate

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CONTENTS

References

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Index

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List of Diagrams

Diagram 7.1 Diagram 7.2 Diagram 8.1

Sun’s diagram, ‘Figure 1.1 The cascading levels of analysis’ The Borromean Rings Agency site, agent, and floatation to new relations of particulars from divergent groupings

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Abstract To relate to thought as ‘outside’ perspective on internal experience, the structural approach simulates thought. Kenneth Colby’s computer simulation generated a paranoid psychological mode represented in logic and syntax. This inspires a new structural approach (SV) for philosophical psychology. SV explicates similarities in logical form of linguistic representations of the ‘Trio’—Trump, paranoid person, and Trump follower (Trumper.) SV identifies logical and schematic forms and contingency modes. As the basis of Trio’s thought patterns, they reveal isomorphic relations in levels and types of determinants, despite level distances. The target cognitive patterns cross current psychiatric and socio-political contexts. To broaden to developmental context, Heinz Werner’s orthogenetic view of change provides an SV unlike most structuralist approaches. Resultant understanding becomes a ‘knowledge complex.’ Keywords Computer simulation · Structural approach · Trio · Paranoid · Knowledge complex

The SV Project It’s a dilemma. How can you conceive a psychology of the person, when the only subjective experience of a person you can know is your own? The psychology has to be from an ‘outside’ perspective. Yet, this perspective © The Author(s) 2020 H. Fisher, Logic, Syntax, and a Structural View, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60881-1_1

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would be a viewing angle extending from a person. Imagine that person to be ‘you,’ viewing Rodin’s ‘The Thinker.’ The object you are viewing is a depiction of a person, who appears to be in thought. You, the person viewing that depicted object, view its ‘thinking’ as an object outside yourself. What is an outside perspective from which you view and seek to know about your own thought? The given locus of thought you are thinking about is your own thought. So, ‘outside’ perspective is intimately a matter of you as a viewer. Yet, you are outside your own thinking: You can draw lines of its perspective on what you are thinking about. These are lines from a viewing angle. They will extend to, indicate, and demarcate a relation of phenomena within the given locus—the domain of those thoughts you are thinking about. That relation (and its subset of relations) then identified is of phenomena within that locus, which can be designated from that viewing angle. This designation is a structural indication. The set of viewable relations includes an involution such that phenomena of the viewing angle become part of the structure and structuring. My purpose in this book is to develop a structural approach to the psychology of the person. To relate to the dilemma of the person’s thought as an ‘outside’ perspective on his own thought as an internal experience, the structural approach will have to simulate what happens within the person. To do so convincingly, the view chosen impels a new kind of structural approach (SV) for the philosophy of psychology. This approach is inspired by Kenneth Colby’s computer generated simulation (Colby 1974, 1975, 1981; Colby et al. 1972; Faught 1978; Heiser et al. 1979). The simulation was of a paranoid psychological state of affairs, represented in forms of the person’s logic and syntax, as these would be evidenced in a communicative display. In a more recent ‘attention schema theory’ (Webb and Graziano 2015) determinative nexuses of representational forms, their computer generated simulation, and psychological chain of causes and outcomes come together. The core claim . . . is that the brain computes a simplified model of the process and current state of attention, and that the content of this model is the basis of subjective reports’ . . .

Still, this theory (Graziano 2017; Webb and Graziano 2015) does not solve the problem of the ‘outside agent.’ It does provide for selection of elements and conditions. The selection is via ‘structuring’ the

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perceiver/thinker’s perspective on an ‘object.’ The object is characterized in relation to action and outcome. This is structuring guided by schematic organization; it confines and characterizes the logical domain, elements, and their organization. In short, that process perspectivizes. Within that organization, the particulars’ relations are re-proportions. Particulars emerge with a logical identity, but their relations are analogical in respect to their structural relations. These are not only relations within the domain of the object. They are also relations to ‘outside’ elements and functions of agent origins, selections, activity, and of generative and formative forms. These forms, such as the schema, reflexively provide for matters of logical form and modality rules for logical transactions.1 The book’s main issues and target problem involve cognitive patterns crossing current psychiatric and sociopolitical contexts. The target is a central and specific example, providing explication for similarities in the logical form of the linguistic representations of Trump, the paranoid person, and the Trump follower (Trumper.) Structural analysis can widen its perspectivizing by identifying logical and schematic forms and specific contingency modes. These forms, as applicable to a psychology of thought, lead to an understanding of the basis of different persons’ thought patterns. Through their representation in a symbolic language, the forms are expressed and accessible to transformation and transaction. They not only lead to a deep understanding of cognitive phenomena. They also reveal isomorphic relations in different levels and types of determinants, despite their distance in a hierarchy from one to another level. Resultant possible understanding structurally becomes a ‘knowledge complex.’ To broaden SV enough for psychologists to apply to historical and developmental context, I look to Heinz Werner’s orthogenetic view of change in and of the structural determinants of thought (Werner 1926, 1957; Werner and Kaplan 1956.) Multi-dimensionality and directionality in Werner’s account are both developmental and dynamic. This combination provides for a novel and fertile integration with the broadening of the structural approach. The resultant SV is unlike most structuralist approaches. The structural similarities accessible within a mediating set of representations function metaphorically. Applied to a multiplex of contexts, they serve to make highly fertile analogies.2 In sum, two requirements of comparisons would illuminate thought patterns: (1) A manifold of contexts, (2) A viewing perspective, enabling means to articulate analogies that illuminate inter-contextual relations. That perspective

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is accessible by way of the semiotic functions of a set of representations. Thereby representations can be variously related to a given phenomenon or to different kinds or orders of phenomena. We seek representations that can—like metaphors—penetrate different orders and relate equivalences of phenomena from one order to phenomena within another. In a word, representations become means of comparison. The terms of the SV comparison cross over a series of contexts. The relations are drawn from computer program-compatible logic and schema forms. They yield conceptual equivalences with the forms of logical and schematic representations in the logical and psychological relationships of persons’ thought. The forms can be isolated as abstractions, hence in a context of symbolized relations. The person’s thought and its specifics as logical and psychological relations constitute another context (divisible into sub-contexts). The relation of metaphor and analogy to a structural view of knowledge. Suppose we want to know as much as we can about Trump, the Trumper, and the paranoid—the ‘Trio.’ That manifold would be a ‘knowledge complex.’3 To penetrate and advance such a corpus, we try navigating structural relations. They have the capacity to reveal and illuminate equivalences in crossover points of comparison of the different persons’ representations, thoughts, and representation-thought interrelations. To complete that knowledge complex with all due relevance is quite a task. Full review of approaches to this kind of objective is beyond the scope here. I will cite two influential contemporary views from which to build a structural approach to view how each ‘person’ of the Trio’s thinking relates to his or her representations and how each person’s representations relate to the ‘Other’s.’ 1. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) set theoretical groundwork for the relations between different conceptual and categorial levels. Kendall (2008, first page.) summarized their proposition this way: ‘ . . . our recurring patterns of spatial understanding are captured as image schemas, among which they identify CONTAINMENT, PATH and SOURCE-PATH-GOAL. These are understood to be pre-linguistic cognitive structures established through multimodal body experience. Most interesting for human cognition is the capacity of such schemas to give rise to metaphorical reasoning.’

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Lakoff and Johnson’s proposal moves its patterns organization from specific to more abstract domains. Boroditsky’s (2000, p. 3) ‘Metaphoric Structuring View’ amplifying the metaphorical relations, ‘ . . . proposes that metaphors are used for organizing information within abstract domains . . . The job of the metaphor is to provide relational structure to an abstract domain by importing it (by analogy) from a more concrete domain.’ 2. Gentner (1983) presents a second influential view. She focuses structural relations as a capacity inherent in the metaphor. Noting this capacity opens the issue of the value of a structural view of representation, if not of knowledge. A structural view is of relations of a complex of elements. In the relations afforded by the metaphor form, their identification can be set in motion and cut across conceptual and categorial borders. Any knowledge itself as complex, involves not only problems of information and its representation, but also issues of thought and its representation. Any target for knowledge is within a ‘complex,’ A structural view (SV) is an organizing perspective for a given target for knowledge (a ‘knowledge complex.’) The (SV) will consist of representations that can ‘float.’ The float is from one concept to another or from one semiotic level to another, from one category to another, from one level of organization to another, and/or from one level of analysis to another. These flotations require—and result in metaphoric equivalences. At one end of the process, we begin flotations by way of the SV’s metaphoric nature and capability. At the other end, we produce new ratios as cross-linking devices that capture new relations within a knowledge complex. It is therefore possible to direct a structural view (SV) and take advantage of its leverage on semiotic function. The semiotic function in general is to assign representation to a sign from a range of different sign capacities and perspectives (Sonesson 1990). The (SV)’s specific semiotic function provides representations with powers of figurative relating. Thus, to identify the similarities in these new representations and relationships, SV comparisons can also cross over the highly divers different levels of these phenomena. These levels can be as disparate as presumed neurological sources of thinking are distant to and materially and functionally different from subjective experience of thought.

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Target Problem for Analysis from a Structural View Kenneth Colby’s computer program PARRY can simulate a paranoid person’s dialogical interaction with others. The program’s logic and syntax (and that of the paranoid) have the same structures (Wilks and Catizone 1999). So it seems—and so I will show—does Donald Trump, and so too the avid Trump follower (‘Trumper.’) Once again, structural similarities function metaphorically. They serve to make analogies that cross over from the program to each compared persons’ thought, representations, and relationships. To identify the similarities, the comparisons can also cross over different levels of these phenomena.4 A Structural View (SV) presents these comparisons as similarities that shed light on contingencies for presenting, representing, and judging truth. These contingencies can tie the Trumper to the logic of Trump and its adherence to logical and schematic formats. The formats show standard predictable rules, such as those governing predictable and discernible negation patterns. Even so, unlike categorical logic, the SV presents rules as neither solely dedicated to supporting a concept of truth, nor coherently yielding to analysis by categorical truth tables.5 With the absence of these functions, the SV is unlike most views classified as ‘structuralism.’ SV analysis refers to persons—but also to a computer program simulating persons. The SV perspective and its method avoid traps of ordered classification templates, viz., those yielding dubious psychiatric diagnoses and hard to decouple mixes of personality and political factors. Instead, SV analysis is based in logical and schematic formulations. These are not merely after-the-fact factors. They can govern, yet also be projected within a ‘knowledge complex.’ On one hand, it is specific as it is reflective of a logical and linguistic pattern, like PARRY and its dominion over different individuals with the same pattern. On the other hand, a knowledge complex also exists within a wider manifold of psychological dynamics and development. The SV takes on the non-traditional role of interpretant (see note 7 below). The SV is unlike traditional structuralist models. They propound discrete levels with characterizing patterns. Within a target domain, SVgenerated relevant analogies can relate disparate levels of explanation for their displayable similarities. Distances in classification levels are bridged, and similarities made available in distant—even opposing—domains or contexts of meaning.

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Traditional structuralist models in psychology and psychiatry tend to produce taxonomies to classify categories. This again is a hierarchization. Syndromes and symptoms, for example, follow a logic-driven ordering of classes and subclasses. The result is categories, which, when subjected to empirical analysis of their particulars, wind up re-formed. This is obvious in the half-life of DSM categorizations and their focus on psychiatric identification of the factors composing categories of psychological functioning. The traditional structural model for a psychology dealing with cognitive phenomena tends to center on processes of thought instead of the nature of their representation. Two accounts of traditional structural approaches to the psychology of cognitive experience. The first account (I) (Wiest) is a summing up of the traditional structural accounts. I cite Baar’s specific model (II.) Both (I and II) focus the relation of consciousness to unconscious process and product. I. Wiest’s (2012) review sums up a concept of hierarchical theories of the mind. The concept does provide a structure. It is hierarchical, presumably providing linkage of the cognitive (both conscious and unconscious) with the neurological. That structure, by way of its architecturally formative capability, can provide the isomorphism to relate unconscious thought, conscious thought, and those ‘trajectories’ afforded by the hierarchical linkages. In this way, the ‘phylogeny’ of consciousness by its hierarchical nature leads to a parallel with the presumed evolutionary course of neurological phenomena and their role in psychiatric phenomena. As a course leading to a structural model, it also leads to a focus on taxonomic categories. These categories do not hold up—They are neither dynamically valuable, nor reliable for assigning disposition. The explanatory base of this model is more tied to the schema of events and output over time than to a logic of transformation rules and its modal possibilities. II. Baar’s (1997) global workspace is also a hierarchy with similar traffic patterns. The functions of conscious capabilities are more specific. They go both ways: from conscious to unconscious and the reverse. The main feature is the selective and integrative capacity of conscious awareness, perspective, and capacity for processing (cf. Baars, pp. 17, 19, 43)

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Searching for isomorphisms wherever they are within a complex structure. The traditional structural approach to the nature of thought does appear to cope with if not meet the fundamental problem of the person’s cognitive experience. Yet, it does not engage the forms (and/or semiotic devices) that would find isomorphisms in the various levels of determination of thought—levels both evolutionary and developmental. The Wiest review (2012) and the Baars model of the global workspace (1997) focus on the relation of conscious and unconscious process and phenomena. (A notable exception to this focus is the Lakoff and Johnson model. It relates linguistic forms as representations of cognitive phenomena of thought and perception—but particular attention given to the schema. Still, the crucial form of logic and its possible transformations are not there to assist in managing traffic from divergent levels.) Missing in these ‘traditional’ structural approaches is a medium to make the transaction between the forms of representation and the cognitive phenomena. Going back some, Peirce had taken on this very problem focusing the semiotic process and its forms. The perspective SV proposes provides and focuses a key representational ‘language.’ It is the language of forms that signal operations, such as negation and boundary rules. The example this book most pursues is the logic gate 6 The SV’s ‘representational language’ approach involves both logical and syntactical formulations. Their modalities include figurative powers of relating meanings in distant levels of organization and in varying time frames. In Peirce’s analyses, the interpretant is a form that could navigate between representations and thought (and in their interrelatedness).7 A thought (say, thought ‘A’) may be represented by the concept of an isolable relation. If, for an object, say, a little cylinder, that isolable relation is its floating in the air, the little cylinder could be conceptualized as a toy airplane. Contrariwise, it is a pen! But that is only if it is on the desk. This pen-to-desk (say, ‘p Rd ’) relation would be inherent in the thought’s changes to the form of the object as a particularized representation, viz. ‘The pen is on the desk.’ These changes are at the object’s points of formation, contact with context, and then again in its status as a product. In all, the changes are systemic. The SV suggests not merely representational instances, but a representational system. It functions as an interpretant language to mirror objects of thought in a process with systemic factors.

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PARRY and Trumper There is a host of explanations of the Trump supporters’ immunity to contradictions of Trump’s statements and claims. This phenomenon is of an apparent unshakeable hold to their beliefs. That hold is irrespective of the sense of those beliefs, of their comportment with demonstrable facts, of their opposition to credible authority. In a word, this hold is irrespective of what we might call the beliefs’ ‘truth value’—either logically or by material demonstration [For examples, see the Washington Post Fact Checker analysis: Kessler et al. (Jan. 20, 2020.)] No shortage of attempts explains the phenomenon.] Julie Beck (2017) provides a recent reminder of the influential view of the power of cognitive dissonance to direct belief to that which is consonant with a person’s vested beliefs. She quotes the summary statement of Festinger’s challenging principle—as if it eerily sounded the alarm for the present phenomena of the ‘Trumper’s’ beliefs.8 In 1956, Festinger et al. wrote: Tell him you disagree and he turns away. Show him facts or figures and he questions your sources. Appeal to logic and he fails to see your point … Suppose that he is presented with evidence, unequivocal and undeniable evidence, that his belief is wrong: what will happen? The individual will frequently emerge, not only unshaken, but even more convinced of the truth of his beliefs than ever before. (1956, p. 3; Beck’s 2017 quote is from the 1967 edition).

Beck neatly sums up this classic view: ‘This doubling down in the face of conflicting evidence is a way of reducing the discomfort of dissonance.’ But, things can get worse! Converting dissonance into grandeur. Recall the original Festinger and Carlsmith study (1959). The cognitive dissonance phenomenon is accentuated when lying is paid for with a small amount of money. If the individual asked to lie is paid a small amount of money to do so, admitting the lie is difficult. The dissonance involved is greater than if there were more ‘reason’ to lie—viz., the payoff would be greater. If, on the other hand, the money paid is more significant (larger), the reduction of cognitive dissonance is not as urgent. I bring this up, because, the less return the Trumper gets for having committed herself to accepting lies, the more this serves to increase the commitment to the lie. Accordingly, the more Trump’s lies build up, the less return the Trumper is getting for

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her belief in what he says. But, if the classic dissonance principle holds, the less the return, the more dissonance; hence, the less reason to disbelieve him or abandon his positions. Now for my blockbuster statement: The more this dissonance, the more the reason to adopt what would appear the verisimilitude of a reciprocal paranoid ‘delusion of grandeur.’ That would be a merging of the Trump and the Trumper view that he is the only reliable source of truth, and anyone and anything to the contrary is false—in our day’s vernacular, ‘fake.’ One can go further into present-day approaches to explain the ‘slippery slope’ Trump and Trumpers enter. It slides to more and more of the lying. This is summed up by Sharot and Garrett (2018, May 23) and undergirded by research [e.g., Garrett et al. (2016)]. It will become clear that movement to a ‘grandeur’ status is not an idea attributed to a diagnostic category, but instead; the proposal of a structural configuration of thought and attitude that reflects its nature and function. Presently, there’s a gamut of explanations, each casting this structural merger phenomenon as ‘immunity’ from facts or reasonable or authoritative presentations of contraries. This gamut includes: (1) the supporter’s attitude that the presentation of contradictions constitute ‘invitations’ to think about how the statements ‘could be true’ (Stgregory 2018, April 18); (2) brain-based determinants (‘greater conservatism was associated with increased volume of the right amygdala’—Ryota et al. 2011, April 7); (3) unawareness of cognitive capability, particularly, shortcomings—leading to overestimation of knowledge and judgment (Oxley et al. 2008). This overestimation is a reference to the ‘Dunning-Kruger effect’—namely, ‘the scope of people’s ignorance is often invisible to them.’ (Dunning 2011). Sadly, when the question comes up, ‘what can we do to potentially change the minds of Trump loyalists before voting day in November,’ some are beside themselves—just as Azarain (2016, Aug. 4), who concludes, ‘As a cognitive neuroscientist, it grieves me to say that there may be nothing we can do.’

From Information to Metaphor to Knowledge Pettigrew (2017) continues the general social science tradition of attempting to identify attitudes by way of questionnaires offering scaled items that would add up to indicate attitudes, if not part of a larger commitment. Psychologists, some time ago, will have called that larger commitment a ‘sentiment.’ [Bertocci (1940) traces that concept to

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Gordon Allport and to McDougall.] Popular, though, after the 1950s, was the idea of an ‘authoritarian personality.’ I will argue that although these approaches do provide information, a different approach is needed to deepen knowledge. It is a ‘structural approach’—but one decoupled from assumptions dependent on a scaled questionnaire. There is a dual focus on the cognitive forms. The first perspective is on their relation to process and product. The second is on the determinants at different levels of cognitive functioning and its history and development. I will argue this dual focus, even in its inclusion of the concept of agency, is traditionally ‘scientific’ in its logic and access to data. Yet, I propose this approach to be dependent on and aimed toward optimizing analogies. In this regard, this approach is in line with my larger argument to cast psychological analysis as predicated on the logic of discovery. More specifically, I predicate both the method and the output of the analysis are founded in and dedicated to the use of metaphor in specific and the logic of art, in general (Fisher 2017).

What Sort of Explanation of a Psychological Phenomenon Can Avoid the Pitfalls of Theoretical Unreliability and Ultimate Supercession? Worrall (1989) approached the problem of scientific realism by considering the succession of theories as they interact with exploration. The theories are essentially unreliable in that they are replaced. This succession of theory and explanation in psychology and in particular in psychological terminology and classification schemes is well known. We will mention a few relevant cases in the course of this book. Worrell concludes . . .the continuity is one of form or structure, not of content. In fact this claim was already made and defended by Poincaré. And Poincaré used the example of the switch from Fresnel to Maxwell to argue for a general sort of syntactic or structural realism quite different from the anti-realist instrumentalism which is often attributed to him. (p. 117) [my emphasis in italics.]

Wray (2018, p. 79) echoes these points and generally designates structural models as the way to advance in science. Ladyman (2016) reviews that the concept of ‘structural realism’ makes its entry into the controversies of scientific knowledge as either ontic (‘real’) or epistemic. My

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point of view is a structural view would give a chance to capture a way to know and understand psychological phenomena. These phenomena would otherwise lead to an array of theoretical approaches that do not easily cohere with each other, let alone confidently explain their targeted issues. Note on ‘post structural views,’ ‘structuralism,’ and their relation to the structural view. Many versions of ‘structuralism’ are often identified as such by ‘post-structuralist’ viewpoints. Deconstructionists, for example, take aim against general frameworks and/or enduring forms that determine meanings, experiences, and behavior—physical or linguistic, and phenomenological or objectively observable. Ladyman (2016) chronicles a general sense of opposition to ‘structural realism’—whether it refers to material or abstract relations. Another way of conceiving the major objection to the realism brand of the structuralist view is to concede the ‘structures’ are not a matter of realism. They are not pointing to some ‘real’ object(s)—‘ontically.’ Thus, via a language, like mathematics, which becomes a form, .. . the exposed structures are indeed essential, they will provide a basis for organizing and understanding properties of the subject and perhaps also suggest (or predict) new properties, as well. (Rickart 1995, p. 5)

As a framework, these structures are not conceived as a determinative ‘firmament.’ I do not agree the SV is a framework in any sense of generic governance or ordering. Instead, I develop SV as a series of framings that can be coordinated, but each structural formulation is related to others in a series of analogies. While such ‘framing forms’ are relational, the relations revealed are figurative; they involve equivalences and/or ratios. In some ways the structural view (SV) does provide a language. Although representational, it is abstract and symbolic. With its terms and propositions, such a description and set of formulations provide for comparisons of sub-structural levels. This is without regard to either pre-position or superposition in a classification hierarchy. In this sense, there is actually an area of agreement with the post-structuralists. The agreement is in the way the terms and propositions of this structural view are used. The purpose of the structural comparisons is the formation of ratios and equivalence relations. These permit the comparison of pattern and particulars otherwise distant from each other. The distance is acceptable. To an extent, this acceptance is a ‘deconstructionist’ attack on the

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presumed determinism of a structuralist view—whether of language’s role or a matter of psychological forms, such as those of Piaget. Instead, this SV approach to a scientific view will have devolved into what some see as a ‘poststructuralist’ approach to experiencing and noting distance. So, with this ‘SV’ are different phenomena, and one can represent their particulars. The representations achievable are of phenomena that can cross over and under lines in a hierarchy. These phenomena otherwise would have been relegated to specific domains at different levels in a ladder of substructures. These substructures will also have been hierarchically situated—either with some known contiguities or in a taxonomic structuring. Yet, with all this latitude, and eschewing of a set ordering, the ‘SV’ is not ‘post-structural.’ This book’s ‘structural view’—in common with the poetic means of association of meanings in text—forms a series of logical and schematic patterns that can operate analogically. Its search is to find equivalences without regard to either the taxonomic order or the assumptions of ontic or material contiguities.

Notes 1. Modality can refer to epistemics—what you can know and how you can know it; it can apply to what you can represent; to ontic considerations (what is and is not)—in sum, to what is included and excluded in and/or by thought, form, and context. 2. Thoughts are in one context; representations, in another. Each context has its own rules, relations, and meanings. They constitute and govern the context’s epistemic basis. How you know a thought is not the same as how you know its representation. Together thought and representation are two contexts within the multiplex of contexts. 3. It is Otto Selz’ idea that the objective in the search to solve a problem— and find an unknown—is the completion of a ‘knowledge complex.’ (1922, pp. 145–146; 1924, p. 37.) Karl Popper interprets Selz’ approaching an ‘unknown’ as if it were in a mathematical equation (ter Hark 2009, pp. 180–181.) As I see it, the thinker moves an initial analogy-type relation along until its particulars lead in the direction of schematics. (This description from Fisher 2020 unpublished m/s.) 4. The term. ‘levels ’ infers organization and some variant of hierarchization. ‘Levels’ of organization may be assigned variously—as types of determinants, as categorial and conceptual, as specific to abstract, and as semiotic representations, their referents and relation to thought.

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5. In their introduction to ‘pluralisms’ that generate, govern, and characterize the concept of ‘truth,’ Wyatt et al. (2018) review a wide array of different logics, modalities, and perspectives, (empirical; psychological.) In addition to these vantage points are different perspectives on truth—in logic, mathematics, science, and law. This book cannot review all these. The central idea I advance is to evaluate the pursuit of truth by way of simulation of its logical objectives and operations. This takes the form of negation operations and their vicissitudes. 6. The ‘logic gate,’ is a virtual circuit that assigns a binary (1, 0) for the state of affairs that is either ‘yes’—the category is present or active, or no— it is not (e.g., Logical connective 2014.) Logic gates accommodate the propositional logic patterns of occurrence, making them accessible to truth tables. See note 31. 7. interpretant’—a term Peirce defined and re-defined from 1866 to 1910. Quoted in several places is his 1897 ‘On Signs’ (2.228) definition: A sign, or representamen, is something, which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. (Interpretant’ 2017) 8. The Urban Dictionary (2018) defines ‘Trumper’: ‘A person who believes everything that comes out of Trump’s mouth even when confronted irrefutable truth.’Coincidently—quite separately—is the word ‘trumpery’ defined as ‘worthless nonsense’ by Merriam-Webster.com (2018). That source points out ‘Trumpery derives from the Middle English trompery and ultimately from the Middle French tromper, meaning “to deceive.”

References Azarain, B. (2016, August 4). A neuroscientist explains what may be wrong with Trump supporters’ brains (c) 2018 Raw Story Media, Inc. | PO Box 21050 Washington, DC. 20009. https://www.rawstory.com/2016/08/a-neuroscie ntist-explains-what-may-be-wrong-with-trump-supporters-brains/. Baars, B. J. (1997). Theater of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 4(4), 292–309. Beck, J. (2017, March 13). This article won’t change your mind: The facts on why facts alone can’t fight false beliefs. The Atlantic. https://www.theatl antic.com/science/archive/2017/03/this-article-wont-change-your-mind/ 519093/.

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Bertocci, P. A. (1940). Sentiments and attitudes. The Journal of Social Psychology, 11(2), 245–257. https://doi.org/10.1080/00224545.1940.9918748. Boroditsky, L. (2000). Metaphoric structuring: Understanding time through spatial metaphors. Cognition, 75(1), 1–28. Colby, K. M. (1974). Ten criticisms of PARRY. ACM SIGART Bulletin, 48, 5–9. Colby, K. M. (1975). Artificial paranoia: A computer simulation of paranoid processes. New York: Pergamon Press. Colby, K. M. (1981). Modeling a paranoid mind. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4, 515–560. Colby, K. M., Hilf, F. D., Weber, S., & Kraemer, H. C. (1972). Turing-like indistinguishability tests for the validation of a computer simulation of paranoid processes. Artificial Intelligence, 3, 199–221. Dunning, D. (2011). The Dunning-Kruger effect: On being ignorant of one’s own ignorance. In J. M. Olson & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 44, pp. 247–296). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-385522-0.00005-6. Faught, W. S. (1978). Motivation and intentionality in a computer simulation model of paranoia. Basel: Birkhäuser. Festinger, L., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959). Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58(2), 203–210. Festinger, L., Riecken, H. W., & Schachter, S. (1956). When prophecy fails. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. https://doi.org/10.1037/ 10030-000. Fisher, H. (2017). Person, psychologist, and psychology suspended in a phase 1 science. Theory & Psychology, 27 (4), 524–549. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 0959354317699717. Fisher, H. (2020). Unpublished m/s. Garrett, N., Lazzaro, S., Ariely, D., & Sharot, T. (2016). The brain adapts to dishonesty. Nature Neuroscience, 19, 1727–1732. Gentner, D. (1983). Structure-mapping: A theoretical framework for analogy. Cognitive Science, 7, 155–170. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15516709cog 0702_3. Graziano, M. S. A. (2017, November). The attention schema theory: A foundation for engineering artificial consciousness hypothesis and theory article. Frontiers in Robotics and AI, 14. https://doi.org/10.3389/frobt.2017. 00060. Heiser, J. F., Colby, K. M., Faught, W. S., & Parkison, R. C. (1979). Can psychiatrists distinguish a computer simulation of paranoia from the real thing? The limitations of Turing-like tests as measures of the adequacy of simulations. Journal of Psychiatric Research, 15(3), 149–162. Interpretant. (2017, November 4). Term. In M. Bergman & S. Paavola (Eds.), The commens dictionary: Peirce’s terms in his own words (New ed.). Term

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originally defined by Peirce (1897). Retrieved from http://www.commens. org/dictionary/term/Interpretant. Kendall, G. S. (2008). What is an event? The event schema, circumstances, metaphor and gist. In International Computer Music Association August 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.bbp2372.2008.137. Kessler, G., Rizzo, S., & Kelly, M. (2020, January 20). President Trump made 16,241 false or misleading claims in his first three years. Fact Checker Analysis. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 2019/04/29/president-trump-has-made-more-than-false-or-misleading-cla ims/?utm_term=.8584e705928a. Ladyman, J. (2016). Structural realism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Winter ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win 2016/entries/structural-realism/. Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Logical connective. (2014, August 14). New world encyclopedia. Retrieved September 13, 2015, from http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/p/index. php?title=Logical_connective&oldid=983664. Oxley, D. R., Smith, K. B., Alford, J. R., Hibbing, M. V., Miller, J. L., Scalora, M., et al. (2008). Political attitudes vary with physiological traits. Science, 321(5896), 1667–1670. Pettigrew, T. (2017, March 5). Social psychological perspectives on Trump supporters. Journal of Social and Political Psychology. North America. Available at https://jspp.psychopen.eu/article/view/750. Accessed 19 Aug 2018. Rickart, C. E. (1995). Structuralism and structures. Singapore: World Scientific. Ryota, K., Feilden, T., Firth, C., & Rees, G. (2011, April 7). Open access https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2011.03.017. Selz, O. (1922 [1981]). The psychology of productive thinking and of error: A condensed version. In N. H. Frijda & A. D. De Groot (Eds.), Otto Selz: His contribution to psychology (pp. 106–146). The Hague and New York: Mouton. Selz, O. (1924 [1981]). The laws of cognitive activity, productive and reproductive: A condensed version. In N. H. Frijda & A. D. De Groot (Eds.), Otto Selz: His contribution to psychology (pp. 20–75). The Hague and New York: Mouton. Sharot, T., & Garrett, N. (2018, May 23). Trump’s lying seems to be getting worse: Psychology suggests there’s a reason why. nbcnews.com. https://www. nbcnews.com/think/opinion/trump-s-lying-seems-be-getting-worse-psycho logy-suggests-there-ncna876486?cid=sm_npd_nn_tw_ma. Sonesson, G. (1990, July 16–21). The semiotic function and the genesis of pictorial meaning. In Proceedings from the Conference of the International Semiotics

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Institute. Center/Periphery in representations and institutions (pp. 211–156). Imatra, Finland: Acta Semiotica Fennica. Stgregory. (2018). ‘Everything Is Content: Marketing with the Internet of Things.’ April 18. Retrieved from https://stgregory.com/2018/04/18/everything-iscontent- marketing-with-the-internet-of-things/. ter Hark, M. (2009). Popper’s theory of the searchlight: A historical assessment of its significance. In Z. Parusniková & R. S. Cohen (Eds.), Rethinking Popper (pp. 175–184). Dordrecht: Springer. Webb, T. W., & Graziano, M. S. A. (2015, April). The attention schema theory: A mechanistic account of subjective awareness. Frontiers in Psychology. Consciousness Research, 23. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00500. Werner, H. (1926). Einfuhrung in du Entwicklufgpsychologie [Introduction to developmental psychology]. Leipzig: Barth. Werner, H. (1957). Comparative psychology of mental development (Rev. ed.). New York: International Universities Press (Original work published 1926). Werner, H., & Kaplan, B. (1956). The developmental approach to cognition: Its relevance to the psychological interpretation of anthropological and ethnolinguistic data. American Anthropologist, 58, 866–880. Retrieved from https://anthrosource.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10. 1525/aa.1956.58.5.02a00070. Wiest, G. (2012). Neural and mental hierarchies. Frontiers in psychology, 3(516), 1–7. https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00516/full. Wilks, Y., & Catizone, R. (1999). Human-computer conversation. arXiv preprint cs/9906027. Worrall, J. (1989). Structural realism: The best of both worlds? Dialectica, 43, 99–124. Reprinted in D. Papineau (Ed.), The philosophy of science (pp. 139– 165). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wray, K. B. (2018). Resisting scientific realism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wyatt, J., Pedersen, N. J., & Kellen, N. (Eds.). (2018). Introduction. In Pluralisms in truth and logic (pp. 1–31). Cham: Springer.

CHAPTER 2

Values, Features, and Heuristics of a Structural View

Abstract The major commitment to a material basis and the strategy of ‘matches’ leads to a presumably desirable (and scientifically responsible) way of classifying cognitive phenomena. In the stead of the major commitment to a material basis and the strategy of ‘matches,’ the view offered argues that the search should be to find working structural operations, particularly, logic and the schema. The forms produced make for a structural view (SV) by which comparisons can be made to various levels affecting the person’s production of thought and its expression. For the comparison the SV uses analogies. SV moves forward to an expanding manifold—a ‘knowledge complex.’ Within it, analogues are derivable to reveal understandings and leverage over disparate and diverging perspectives. Keywords Structural view · Matches · Analogies · Logic · Schema

Mortals have made up their minds to name two forms, one of which they should not name, and that is where they go astray from the truth. They have distinguished them as opposite in form, and have assigned to them marks distinct from one another. (Parmenides)

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Psychology, Dynamics, and Forms Multi-leveled manifold of knowledge minus the Structural View. Sharp and Miller (2019) and Thomas and Sharp (2019) identify the problem of psychological science as one of perspective—‘macro’ and ‘micro’ levels of phenomena. It is an epistemic view of psychology as a multi-leveled manifold of knowledge. While this view does eschew a reductionist one, it continues to support a traditional approach. Its ‘macro and micro levels’ are of predisposition and its unfolding in behavior— in effect, its eventuating in outcomes at the different levels. In sum, within the manifold are governing and outcome schema patterns. Even though a structure of levels is assumed, the view is not directed to utilize or reconfigure structural relations. The approach does assume schematic structures, but they are not allied with logical factors. Those logical factors would provide the variations needed for reconfiguration of perspectives that would open new possible relations—if not new worlds of relationships. In a word, there is no logical perspective, nor focus—or locus—for the reconfiguration of logic or for re-ordering the levels and/or particulars governed. Needed is a structural approach to perspectivization! This ‘SV’ would include ‘outside’ loci—sources of agency and semiotic capabilities to cross-represent antagonistic and/or divergent levels and phenomena. Along with these structural viewing points and capabilities for innovative understandings I posit structural organizers: logic and the schema. They require a range of modalities and are dependent on a source/form of mediation to keep and or restore dynamic equilibria. That source and form will be the metaphor and analogy—inherent in the structural view I present. The structural view in relation to a manifold of classification levels. The ‘structural view’ in this book does not directly enter the controversy of which psychological theory coheres best or predicts best. A salient reason is psychological theories abound in a manifold. Within it are such separate levels of inquiry as those of neurophysiological components and their presumed psycholinguistic displays. A macro-theory addressing the manifold would coordinate different classificatory levels, not to say different scientific theories of the nature of phenomena as either phenomenological or concretely objectifiable. Needed for a ‘knowledge complex’ is either a perspective or some concept of form. Both are provided by SV. Its terms of logic and schematics accommodate form;

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a perspectivizing function is presented as a modality.1 It permits navigation of different levels of classification—whether they are considered real or merely epistemic designations. Ladyman summarizes Worrall’s (1989) argument: Since there is (says Worrall) retention of structure across theory change, structural realism both (a) avoids the force of the pessimistic metainduction (by not committing us to belief in the theory’s description of the furniture of the world) and (b) does not make the success of science (especially the novel predictions of mature physical theories) seem miraculous (by committing us to the claim that the theory’s structure, over and above its empirical content, describes the world). (Ladyman 2016, section 1; Para. 4)

Ladyman neatly identifies two extreme views: epistemic and ontic realism. I am not dividing things that way. The SV is a means of navigating these epistemic realities. They are realities of knowing and of purportedly real existing events or objects—as they exist within a complex manifold of classificatory levels. The central problem as I see it, is whatever the theory, its structure is classificatory. Otherwise, it is not a theory! Aside from this otherwise trivial point, it is a sine qua non: psychological/philosophical theories present a multiplex of domains, which relate to each other. This is the case with theories attempting a view of the individual person— whether focused by her behavior, linguistic representations, ‘underlying’ developmental factors, physiological dispositions, and/or conscious and unconscious feeling and thinking. I do not set out to resolve or ignore, or even select a classificatory structure. Yet, the domains are conceptual not only on a generalized level of objective versus phenomenological, but also on specific levels of the psycholinguistic, dialogic, cognitive science, social psychological, and the psychiatric models (DSM-based, for instance). Ergo, in any or all of these theoretical models and frameworks, navigating from one level or conceptual domain to another is a task requiring some sort of lingua franca—Voilà, the SV approach. It does not directly enter the epistemic versus ontic realism controversy. The function of SV is generically as a modality. A key feature of that modality is it permits navigation of different levels of classification—whether considered ‘real’ or merely epistemic designations. In a more specific form, that modality is made up of representations that function semiotically as interpretants.2

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These interrelate representations and thought that creates and as well results from those representations. Toward concepts that are keys to change the unchangeable. These days, manifestly there are folks impervious to any call for changing their propositions about and beliefs concerning Donald Trump. Neither facts, nor contradictions appear to change their attitudes. More importantly, neither facts nor reasoning appear to change beliefs. Awfully of concern is this: Once the beliefs are set, apparent outright changes or disproof is not accepted. Direct oppositions of facts to what is said by Trump are presented by way of either visual evidence or authoritative technical reports. In addition, Trump’s own statements completely contradict his previous statements. (A sampling appears in Kruse and Weiland 2016, May 5; also see Rafferty 2017, Oct. 11.) A further phenomenon occurs when Trump does not ‘believe’ a statement or a source, and calls it false; Trumpers agree what he says is true, and what the source says is not. This phenomenon is extended to such a point, it often appears Trump can and does hold himself to be the only source of truth—having disparaged just about all other authoritative sources. As such claims pile up, the phenomenon appears in a format like that of paranoia, when it involves delusions of grandeur. For Trump, the phenomenon can be accompanied by claims like ‘I am the chosen one.’ For his corps of believers—call this the ‘Trumper phenomena’: their belief in the claim appears in a compatible ‘format.’ Its compatibility is like that of two buildings with same set of relations to the structures, holding its arches and making possible its spatial extensions. An arch is an arch, but there are ten different types of arches. When architect Frank Gerry places layers of flexibly shapeable material on top of his structure, the building comes out very differently than a Frank Lloyd Wright product. The material, the textures, the curves, the angles—all make for different inner nature and different effects of the buildings on their environment and on their viewers (Bull 2013, 29 April). In the realm of conceptual meanings, a political concept like ‘socialist’ or ‘freedom’ in one time and place can have a totally opposite set of meanings than the same concepts in another set of contexts. (The contradictions can explode when a speaker or party subsumes them for a political purpose.) Similarly, a symbol, or a character trait can appear positive and desirable in one historical period, and not in another. A simple example of a symbol is the royal garb of the British compared to Ghandi’s dhoti. When we get into a question of aggressiveness as a desirable characteristic but at other times, a pathological one, we not

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only confront differences in sociopolitical context; we face the issue of psychiatric categorization. Diagnosis in an inchoate manifold. Psychiatric diagnosis is like other psychological theoretical frameworks in its structural dependency on an articulated classificatory development of its concepts, categories, and propositions. Diagnosis supervenes on the classificatory framework of DSM (a classification, which is taxonomic). This point is central to the thesis that psychiatric diagnosis can be a reflection of a structural set of phenomena. That structure is—at some level relative to superstructure— an upward organizational extension—and/or it is at some level relative to a downward extension to substructures. These relations are organizational—not ontic. The diagnosis of ‘paranoid’ is categorial. It classifies, but does not constitute the person. (It’s a map; not a territory!) In these terms, the psychiatric diagnosis, ipse, would not (could not) securely reflect or be coterminous with either (1) a personality predisposition or (2) any ‘underlying’ set of affairs that would determine the relevant constellation of outcomes—and the way those outcomes appear to and affect others and any social nexuses. For our specifics, we would neither have the basis for characterizing Trump’s personality, nor the basis for categorizing the Trumper’s. Still, fascinatingly, the phenomena are stable, repetitive, and predictable. In all, the traditional classification task is a search for symptoms that can dubiously be attributed to a ‘psychological’ set of conditions or to their causes. Further, these conditions or causes appear in no way accessible to external changeabilities. All this appears to be going down a blind alley. Despite what can’t be done, the psychologist’s task remains to find analogues that relate if not explain the phenomena. A bit of a dilemma here! The concepts for such analogues—sometimes called ‘constructs’— are presumably useful or transductive for inching up to concepts of changeability. Can you change a ‘True Believer’s mind’? Could the dynamic forces within the dissonance reduction configurations be redirected? That changeability, if within reach, would be either of the dedications of thought, or of the directions and qualities of its cognitive objects as products. Obviously, here we would be seeking to alter sockedin trajectories of attitudes such as in the Trumper’s valuation of logic, fact, and truth. To pursue their changeability, ‘cognitive objects’ would have to be identified and modified. The search would be open wide to include beliefs, attitudes, points of view, and so on.

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What can come out of the comparison with ‘disorders’? These days, the entire psychiatric apparatus by which to approach what we regard as disorders is in philosophical disarray. Hartner and Theurer (2018, August 9) argue broadly the social functions and the underlying mechanisms are in question. Their relationship appears to require access to different domains for their definitions, causes, and separate issues. To further deny ‘the mechanisms that generate psychiatric symptoms can … tell you that the patient is disordered’ they refer to the work of Haar et al. (2016) and Kapur et al. (2012). Although a full review is not the business of this book, it is obvious classification issues are complex. The point can be clearly characterized in the comment by Regier et al. (2013): Although, ultimately, diagnosis is still largely dependent on a “yes or no” decision, use of specifiers, subtypes, severity ratings, and cross-cutting symptom assessments help clinicians better capture gradients of a disorder that might otherwise be hindered by a strict categorical approach.

A clue to access to the needed variegation of psychological phenomena, is in Cooper’s (2014) focus on the psychiatrist relating the simulation approach to case histories. She reasons variegation is accessible ‘to the extent that case studies … as species of simulation-based explanation, psychiatry can be considered alongside all sciences that use simulations to explain’ (p. 81). Gerrans (2014) going the other way, pictures ‘simulations’ more targetedly—as developed in thought of normals and schizophrenics. He sees the agentive role of these simulations as neurologically based and inspired (e.g., p. 60). In all, for the DSM, whether or not differentiation between classes and categories is made, changes appear in taxonomy issued every 5 years (Summarized, Fisher 2020, in process.) In the SV approach I resurrect from Kenneth Colby’s 1970s work, there would be a relief to get away from the procrustean statistical fits, and more fundamentally, from the philosophical traps of the DSM enterprise. These arise when mixing dubious assumptions of social definitions of disorder with the issue of essential structure and even with the attribution of causal connection.

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A Structural Approach to the Values, Features The Values, Features, and Heuristics of a Structural View How do you find or form a scientific concept to encompass the knowledge needed to describe and explain the advent of thought—bearing in mind it would have to be manifested in behavior? Whether it is a literary, technical, or special language, you start somewhere. Byers et al. (2018, p. 181) report Valsiner’s (2013) clue, ‘the scientific “level” of a concept is developed out of the everyday concept.’ They argue that for a concept of ‘knowledge,’ there can arise fundamentally new levels of meaning for the old concept. A comparable development can be envisioned for the concept of knowledge, which might come to refer to whichever structural characteristics of the organism– environment system afford the emergence of a particular range of behavior. (p. 181)

Note the term ‘levels.’ It is justifiable to indicate each level has discrete structural characteristics. This point can easily be read to justify the kind of structuralism separating the levels and subjecting them to discrete positions in a hierarchy or taxonomy. In the search for a ‘manifold’ (and how to depict it and specify its components and dynamics,) I look to Selz’ (1922) idea of a ‘complex’ to express and depict the form the concept of knowledge requires. In the case of knowledge of a person—and in this book, of a ‘paranoid’ person—this ‘complex’ is multi-leveled. There are many levels to consider, and each level can rightfully claim its own structures. This federated nature of the organization apparently led Freud to separate the levels—such as the ‘neurological’ from the ‘psychic.’ It is widely reported Freud gave up on specifying interconnections of the neurological analysis of the brain and its relation to psychological phenomena. Northoff (2011) points to Luria’s (1973) concept of dynamic and distributed localization in the brain as in contrast—but it was not available to Freud. Nor was Northoff’s own concept, ‘difference-based coding,’ which, as he describes (p. 132), ‘… does not concern the relationship between content and regions, but rather the brains’ neural structure and organization.’ From a more contemporary point of view than Freud considered, analysis via a SV would structure the knowledge complex without regard

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to the kind of taxonomic categories or classification of ‘levels’ from neurological to psychological. The structures an SV would be pitching forward would be in the figurative form for analogical relations. These structures—as ratio-like—could adhere to dynamic relations instead of being stopped in their tracks by a hierarchical classificatory organization. The figurative mode of interconnection would free the two domains (neurological and ‘psychic’) from rigid localization or intrinsic function within a knowledge complex. Another approach to this freedom from a mechanistic way of relating the phenomena of the two domains is ‘state-based.’ This proposal for interrelation, if not interpenetration, includes the idea the brain has ‘spatio-temporal structure’ (Northoff 2012.) This approach too eschews the rigid classificatory ordering, which would block an integrative analysis of the distant levels. In contrast, the SV approach would provide analogies to the structuring. It is these analogies that would make the analysis of the distant levels, possible. With an analysis via the SV, the analogy terms could find their base of similarities as ratios reflecting structural similarities of different structures. In sum, here again, theory comes full circle. We enter into the more recent era of ‘Mind is Brain.’ Taking Worrall’s ‘structural realism’ point, I proceed without commenting on whether there can be direct evidence linking one level (say, brain structures) to another (say, proclivity for extreme defensiveness), and I propose heuristic values of a ‘structural view.’ The ‘structuralist’ view’s long history in psychology is not our topic. However, we note twentieth century technological developments have catalyzed structurally depictable views. Thus, the advances of cybernetics and various forms of information technology have considerably added to the view of a structural manifold extending from a linguistic field of events to neurological substructures. A specific example is the work of Lakoff and the psycholinguists as projected in Lakoff and Johnson (1999). The full implications for accommodating not only information but also phenomenological structures are from Piagetian ideas and can be credited to an unsung Freudian influence. Freud’s influence adds additional power to the structural approach: It is through his use of diagrammatic depictions of agency and poetic descriptions and synthesizing conceptualizations of the interactions of logic and psychodynamically motivated

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representations (see Gamwell 2006, p. 6). Freud’s diagrams open analogical possibilities and therefore add potential for representing dynamics and change. A structural view, SV, as I conceive it, can provide a set of framed rules and their relations. Consider such sets, ‘structures.’ A set’s governance and its replications can go just so far It can serve for analysis in and on other levels of an epistemic view that would, if fully extended, be a manifold of knowledge of a (target) phenomenon. In this, the structural view is constrained: it has bounds within that manifold. Yet, it is also the nature of SV that it seeks its place in relating to and in accommodating to the various possible levels of organization. These levels range from those of superstructures —upward organizational extensions—to substructures, viz., downward extensions, all of which inhere within the manifold. So, the structural view can serve not merely for the analysis of these levels— but for its ‘logical fit’ to other levels. The logical fit is the ‘reach exceeding its grasp’ I propose SV can achieve. The logical fit is with stuff that can generate hypotheses and ideas. This will take time to spell out. In brief, the logical fit does not demand disparate levels be seen as causally related. Nor does it demand an immediate ontological statement relating disparate phenomena on different levels within the knowledge structure. Noë and Thompson (2004) examine a prime example of what the logical fit cannot do. They label their argument the ‘matching-content doctrine.’ This position is that ‘the first task of the neuroscience of consciousness is to uncover the neural representational systems whose contents systematically match the contents of consciousness.’ They examine the idea that ‘there will be—indeed, must be—a one-to-one mapping (under some description) from features of conscious experience onto features of the minimal neural substrate.’ With this approach one could envision examining and ‘matching’ structures from one level to another. The reductionist dream would take over the idea of there being two sets of fundamental disjunctions. One set is both metaphysical and qualitative. In it the disjunction is between the experiential and the merely reactive. The second set is purely qualitative, if only because of differences between macro and micro oriented encapsulations and concepts of different levels of organization. In it, the disjunction is in the scope of determinants of different types, the potential courses of their interaction, and the qualities of their outcomes. The reductionist dream pops out with insistence on ‘the matchingcontent doctrine.’ Noë and Thompson (2004, p. 4) state its offer: ‘the

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first task of the neuroscience of consciousness is to uncover the neural representational systems whose contents systematically match the contents of consciousness.’ They conclude The isomorphism at issue is … simply a shadow cast by our explanatory posture. It reflects our explanatory strategy in a given case, rather than a metaphysical commitment to psychophysical supervenience or internalism. (p. 26)

They reach this conclusion by arguing that events at levels reflecting phenomenological or experiential phenomena do not have these parallels at neurological levels. Those events, instead, have different characteristics.3 Therefore, ‘the NCC program [should instead] study the neurobiological processes that causally enable (but do not constitute) our embodied mental life’ (p. 26). We look over the edge to the structural approach.

Notes 1. The idea of modality as it has been used in relation to logic has a series of formal definitions. Wooldridge (2000, p. 3) summarizes these. In current use, the term mainly refers to Kripke’s modal logic and its application to the concept of ‘possible worlds.’ (See Garson 2018.) If the logic chosen includes in its picture the agent using or forming it, then modality can refer to these perspectives as contingencies as well as to those internal to the possible worlds targeted as such. Even more generally, modality can refer to how we know things or make judgments. With Vaidya’s (2017) labeling, ordinary, and extraordinary modal judgments affect decisions and argumentation (also see Kment 2017). It is not this book’s task to explore or expound upon each of these formal definitions or uses. The use of the term ‘modality’ is as a general choice of rule alteration, transformation, or suspension the thinker may make. In logic, the choice may technically be to make for possibilities. This book’s emphasis is more general—it is in the forming or eliminating of boundaries of inclusion. 2. As in note 3 above, Peirce has several definitions of this term: This definition is pertinent here (Peirce 1895): A sign is a thing that serves to convey knowledge of some other thing, which it is said to stand for or represent. This thing is called the object of the sign; the idea in the mind that the sign excites,

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which is a mental sign of the same object, is called an interpretant of the sign. (Chapter I. Of Reasoning in General EP 2:13.) 3. Regard this issue as similar to the difference between Freud’s versus Luria’s conceptions. The one asks structure to be functionally attributable—the other—to be assigned to dynamic events and their identifiable phases.

References Bull, S. (2013, April 29). Two Franks—Frank Gehry and Frank Lloyd Wright. prezi.com. https://prezi.com/u8isa3id98aj/two-franks-frank-gehryand-frank-lloyd-wright/. Byers, P., Abdulsalam, S., & Vvedenskiy, E. (2018). Knowledge claims as descriptions of dispositions: A discourse analytic study of conceptual knowledge. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 38(3), 165–183. https:// doi.org/10.1037/teo0000082. Cooper, R. (2014). Psychiatry and philosophy of science. Milton Park, Abingdon and New York, NY: Routledge. Fisher, H. (2020). Unpublished m/s. Gamwell, L. (2006). The role of scientific drawings in 19th- and early 20thcentury research. In L. Gamwell & M. Solms (Eds.), From neurology to psychoanalysis: Sigmund Freud’s neurological drawings and diagrams of the mind (pp. 5–12). Binghamton: Binghamton University Art Museum. Garson, J. (2018). Modal logic. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Fall ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/ entries/logic-modal/. Gerrans, P. (2014). The measure of madness: Philosophy and cognitive neuropsychiatry. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Haar, S., Berman, S., Behrmann, M., & Dinstein, I. (2016). Anatomical abnormalities in autism? Cerebral Cortex, 26, 1440–1452. https://doi.org/10. 1093/cercor/bhu242. Hartner, D. F., & Theurer, K. L. (2018, August 9). Psychiatry should not seek mechanisms of disorder. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology. Advance online publication. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/teo0000095. Kapur, S., Phillips, A. G., & Insel, T. R. (2012). Why has it taken so long for biological psychiatry to develop clinical tests and what to do about it? Molecular Psychiatry, 17, 1174–1179. https://doi.org/10.1038/mp.201 2.105. Kment, B. (2017). Varieties of modality. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ spr2017/entries/modality-varieties/.

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Kruse, M., & Weiland, N. (2016, May 5). Donald Trump’s greatest selfcontradictions. The many, many, MANY sides of the likely Republican nominee, in his own words. POLITICO Magazine. https://www.pol itico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/donald-trump-2016-contradictions213869. Ladyman, J. (2016). Structural realism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Winter ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win 2016/entries/structural-realism/. Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the flesh. New York: Basic Books. Luria, A. R. (1973). The working brain: An introduction to neuropsychology. New York: Basic Books. Noë, A., & Thompson, E. (2004). Are there neural correlates of consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11(1), 3–28. Northoff, G. (2011). Neuropsychoanalysis in practice: Brain, self and objects. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Northoff, G. (2012). Psychoanalysis and the brain—Why did Freud abandon neuroscience? Frontiers in Psychology, 3, 71. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg. 2012.00071. Peirce, C. S. (1895). Short Logic: Chapter I. Of reasoning in general. MS [R] 595. Rafferty, A. (2017, October 11). Donald Trump has history of contradictory statements on nuclear weapons. nbcnews.com. https://www.nbcnews.com/ news/all/donald-trump-has-history-contradictory-statements-nuclear-wea pons-n808466. Regier, D. A., Kuhl, E. A., & Kupfer, D. J. (2013). The DSM-5: Classification and criteria changes. World Psychiatry, 12(2), 92–98. https://doi.org/ 10.1002/wps.20050. Selz, O. (1922 [1981]). The psychology of productive thinking and of error: A condensed version. In N. H. Frijda & A. D. De Groot (Eds.), Otto Selz: His contribution to psychology (pp. 106–146). The Hague and New York: Mouton. Sharp, P. B., & Miller, G. A. (2019). Reduction and autonomy in psychology and neuroscience: A call for pragmatism. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 39(1), 18–31. Thomas, J. G., & Sharp, (2019). Mechanistic science: A new approach to comprehensive psychopathology research that relates psychological and biological phenomena. Clinical Psychological Science. https://doi.org/10.216 7702618810223. Vaidya, A. (2017). The epistemology of modality. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Winter ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/win2017/entries/modality-epistemology/. Valsiner, J. (2013). Guided science: History of psychology in the mirror of its making. New Brunswick, Canada: Transaction.

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Wooldridge, M. (2000). Computationally grounded theories of agency. In MultiAgent Systems, 2000. Proceedings. Fourth International Conference (pp. 13– 20). IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers). Worrall, J. (1989). Structural realism: The best of both worlds? Dialectica, 43, 99–124. Reprinted in D. Papineau (Ed.), The philosophy of science (pp. 139– 165). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER 3

Reduction Versus the Expanding Manifold

Abstract Pursuits of psychologists, information scientists, and psychiatrists are ‘science-oriented.’ Commitment to material or observable events is via statistical ‘matches’ of concept to material or observable events. To change this becomes critical in a confluence of personal and sociopolitical. The block is strong in the case of the ‘Trio.’ For their forms of thinking, expression, and reflections in socio-political contexts, traditional logical form incorporating ‘truth’ is outflanked by schematic transformation—particularly, reversal of causal agents’ identity. The SV uses analogies. The pattern-to-pattern comparison is to logical form of paranoid reversals, not to particulars, like anxiety assigning responsibility. SV opens new relationships to a multi-ordered framework. Reversal patterns in syntactic assignment within sentences can be compared with schematic re-assignment of cause and outcome in other levels—macro (physiological) or micro-levels (electro-chemical.) Reversal patterns can be applied to historical or developmental sequence. Primitive mechanisms can exchange control over output with developed ones. Keywords Matching · Socio-political · Schematic reversal · Causal agent

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General Considerations of the Search for NCC and Their Relation to Structural analysis To seek neural correlates for consciousness without some way of revealing their relation to consciousness would be close to useless. To pursue the NCC thesis, we would need evidence for a direct connection—one not dependent on information about and theory of the connection with intermediate levels. Yet, to skip the intermediate levels that might be connectors would make a poor ontological model.1 To try to make the cause–effect connection specific from a neurological to a phenomenological event is like asking for a magic transformation to instantiate a causal outcome. Instead, we can address the issues of the many-leveled multiplex of factors from the neural ‘correlates’ to the phenomena of consciousness. The idea is ‘some’ levels are better suited for seeking the relation of particulars that would help conceptualize connections and understandings in a paralleling of logical structures. What sort of levels? ‘Matching’ specifics on one level to specifics on another can be conceived as contributing to propositions, but has largely been applied in terms of mapping. Gentner (1983) distinguishes three kinds of mapping that predicate comparisons from a ‘base’ to a ‘target’: 1. A literal similarity statement is a comparison in which a large number of predicates is mapped from base to target, relative to the number of nonmapped predicates … The mapped predicates include both object-attributes and relational predicates.…. 2. An analogy is a comparison in which relational predicates, but few or no object attributes, can be mapped from base to target.…. 3. An abstraction is a comparison in which the base domain is an abstract relational structure (Gentner 1983, p. 159). These are at different levels of abstraction from the object attributes. Higher order relations become structural. They become ‘distinctions invoked rely[ing] only on the syntax of the knowledge representation, not on the content’ (Gentner 1983, p. 158). Anderson (1990) and Camp (2006, 2018) take up the relation of mapping to propositions. In their analyses, mapping is judged as disjunct from propositional structure and its relevance to psychological issues of thought and mind. Anderson presents an intriguing logical point:

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… there is a many-to-one mapping from mechanisms to behavioral functions, and consequently identifying the behavioral function will not identify the mechanism. So, behavioral data will never tell us what is in the mind at the implementation level. (p. 24)

On the other hand, Camp (2018, p. 21) describes that ‘propositional structure is ‘digital, universal, asymmetrical, and recursive.’ Maps are ‘predicative.’ So consider some trends not in the direction of matching a specific on one level to a specific on another. Instead, they are aimed at looking for logically similar and/or compatible patterns. In the patrimony of Worrall’s leap away from ‘realism,’ read these trends as ruling out focus on levels and their matches as ‘concretely identifiable.’ Instead, rule in leaping up to a (structural) language. That would be a language describing—or identifying—forms that govern and /or pervade disparate levels of functioning. Still, with ample warnings about the shortfall in accumulating matches, as Cleeremans (2005) reviews, many have sought the neural correlates of consciousness. (NCC). This includes Freud, Crick, and Chalmers! Obviously, there are the problems Worrall recounts about theory and evidence. Cleeremans offers a distinction where the matching for a logic pattern is more on the basis of a pattern within a pattern than a specific within a pattern: … there are reasons to claim that the search for the NCC should now be (and indeed, is) augmented by similar efforts aimed at unraveling what one could call, on the one hand, the behavioral correlates of consciousness (BCC), and, on the other hand, the computational correlates of consciousness (CCC …). (2005, p. 84; also see Frith et al. 1999, pp. 107; 109)

I offer that the SV seeks to invade the inevitably resulting enigma to find and create pattern matches. In a word, the structural comparison is of a pattern to a pattern within a pattern—not to a particular within a pattern. More recently, Polák and Marvan (2018) argue against a ‘causal analysis.’ Omitting a chase for causes would skirt around the issues of theory half-life and of insubstantial, if not contradictory, empirical findings (e.g., Laws 2016; Stanley et al. 2018) Instead, though, Polák and Marvan suggest correlating ‘types’ from phenomenological levels to physiological ones. Their concept is close to what I intend by structural forays into the existing levels.2 These forays are to raid existing concepts.

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From within them, the search proceeds to find particulars from which, first to metaphorize equivalences, then to turn these into analogues or transducers. Structural possibilities for transduction. The SV can have logical and geometric properties. ‘Geometric’ here can be a matter of picturing the organization of classificatory levels. The form depicted—such as the Venn Diagram or some variant of it—can be one representing logical relations. The geometry can also be in a form representing part-to-whole relations or some other graphic of organizational relations.3 Geometric depictions can help show transformations involving relations of similarity that obtain despite temporal and/or logical contradictions and contraries. Heinz Werner (1957), among others, compared primitive to pathological and to early or immature conceptual behavior (see Bibace 2005, p. 241) These are three modes of production. For each of the three, you can show an enveloping characteristic geometric similarity in its outcomes: By way of each mode, the result is in the form of a syncretized whole. Yet, as Werner pointed out, the primitive, the immature, and the pathological are not the same. Yes, one could show similarities in primitive totems (call them, T) compared to more contemporary stereotypes and scapegoats (label these, S.) Take, as an example, an invidious contrast. Consider the totems of people of the Northwest before the coming of the Europeans—an art form used for social order, and to record family history, display a family crest, and socially share artistic events (Native American Netroots 2010) Compare these totems to stereotypy issues and images of Der Stürmer. The social purposes are diametrically opposite. These comparisons could probably be made geometric representations by Venn configurations of overlapping circles. The comparisons could evince similarities—although, once again, the products compared are clearly not the same. There would be many differences if the interrelations of (S) and (T) were related to Venn representations of social behavior and moral code. One could surely talk about different representations and their overlaps depicting positive and negative directions for societal purposes. Given the similarities, it is urgent to find the heart of the differences. Even if paranoid and the Trumper—and PARRY—share similar logical structures; each of these Trio members is not the same. It can become urgent to find a way to the determinants making for the differences. The power of equivalences to find analogues to elucidate similarities and differences. Colby (1981; see p. 24) did reach an articulated

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projection of the scope and prowess of a structural approach to psychological issues as they are manifested in linguistic and logical patterns. I will present the SV as of value to psychological knowledge as a complex manifold. There is more than simply the topic of the linguistic production of individuals. A person’s developmental level and mental history and stage are contributing issues. In 2007, Barsalou, Breazeal and Smith conceptualized the interrelations of different levels determining thought. They brought together the issues of computer simulation, specification of ‘architecture’ and the necessity of a developmental perspective.4 They made three points I cite to link Colby’s effort and aim to my present purpose: One— . . . the coordinated relationships between perception, action, and cognition must be identified to characterize cognition adequately . . . much work shows increasingly that these systems are exquisitely linked. (p. 81)

Two— The task that couples these systems is an imitation game. (p. 83)

Three—(a point I now develop to build an architecture for the ‘knowledge complex’) One way to approach this issue is to ask how one might build an artificial agent whose system-level properties emerge from a developmental history. (p. 85)

My proposal emerges as not merely specific to SV’s potential to provide logical and diagrammatic picturing of the psychological relations of PARRY, the paranoid, Trump, and the Trumper. In a direction Barsalou et al. (2007) indicate (also see Pezzulo and Calvi 2011) SV could (and should) have a broad approach and application to psychology. Given the multiplicity of levels pictured for persons, for computer simulations, and robots, my proposition should resonate: The psychology of thought and representation leads to the picture of a multiplexity and complex manifolds within it. So, emboldened, I will broaden the scope.

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Simulation Excelsior Simulation by computer is not the only option for the ‘knowing’ of another person’s mind. A variety of folk approaches would say persons could know what is on another person’s mind. There is a lot to that. You can often guess what the next person is about to say or do. Still, all that is a far cry from knowledge of the ‘architecture’ of another person’s thought. Important to mention here is the allied set of concerns in a ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM) approach. This approach can be seen as a simulation theory. The major assumption of ToM models is that an individual, Person A, has, as a given, a module of understanding—which, in effect, is a ‘theory of mind.’ From it, the individual draws understandings of another person, and in the process attributes some approximation of what the ‘Other’ is thinking and experiencing. Right in tune with the mix of concerns of this book, Gallagher and Varga (2015) present an ambitious objective, viz., to work out ‘theoretical frameworks connecting social cognition and psychopathology, and generating fruitful, philosophically well-grounded and empirically informed reflections relevant to psychiatric research.’ They cite a version of a ‘folk’ explanation for one person knowing another’s ‘mind.’ Assumed are ‘ . . .processes in which we make sense of the mental states of others (p. 1).’ They summarize the ToM approach as follows: ‘ … “theory” is defined as a system of inferences that can be used to “mind read”, i.e., to attribute mental states in order to explain or make predictions about the Other’s behavior.’ Polceanu and Buche (2014) list the two basic ToM approaches: Theory-Theory (TT . . . implies a ”folk psychology” that is used to reason about others in a detached way … Simulation Theory (ST) … sustains that the individual’s own decision mechanism is used for inference (simulation), using pretend input based on observations. (Polceanu and Buche 2014; section 1.1)

Simulation Theory (ST), Gallagher and Varga (2015) explain, is a variation of the exposition and display of how another ‘mind’ works. Note this ‘simulation’ is by another person, instead of by a computer. Thus, ‘. . . ST proposes we mentally “step into the shoes” of the relevant person and

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model the mental states behind the behaviors by generating an internal simulation’ (p. 1). A person’s ‘theory of mind’ may emanate from such sources as are neurologically encoded. It takes the form of an architecture of forms such as the schema and logical transactions. We come back to square one: How do you know about those? The ToM simulations may correctly represent that we ‘know’ about ‘Others’ minds; but the can is kicked down the road. How we know becomes a question of further simulation. In the close focus of this book, we see the need for an independent ‘outside’ agent as an artist to create and pinpoint connections. For these artist-generated functions, I emphasize a ‘structural view.’ It will have metaphoric and analogical capacities. The SV approach is neither like the ST nor the TT version of the TOM approach.5 Each of these approaches depends on psychological structures and dynamics—solely. In that isolation, these approaches fall short of specifying the interaction of the psychological dynamics with logical and schematic forms. In contrast, from the SV point of view, those interactions are utilized within and applied from it.

Notes 1. Louis Rukeyser (fabled host of the 1990s stock market show, ‘Wall Street Week,’) used to quip when he went on vacation the stock market went down. The events were in two domains that have a similar logic pattern, but the audience would laugh at the idea of cause and effect. Still, there will have been an ‘If A; then B’ pattern to find the specifics for A in the domain of LR’s vacation and for B in the stock market. You could read the ‘If A; then B pattern’ as a proposition—it might be a schema, but then, that’s another step to looking for evidence. Probably, though, the distance between the logic and the specific connectors was too great to squeeze out particulars that could be analogues of causal factors. So, one possibility is the general logic pattern itself is worth taking in hand as something one could use to relate one to another level of analysis. If so, the thinker could go on to focus in on either target domain—the vacation (V) or the stock market (SM) domains. Within either, she could begin to look for subdomains—previously unselected—where the logic would relate to factors across the V and SM. The old Stock Market saying: ‘Sell in May and go away’ may well have factors—like good weather for Wall Street vacations! These may be worth looking at for some sort of parallel of the logic of Rukeyser going on his vacation and the stock market going down.

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2. The forays are deliberative and via the ‘floating’ phenomena I describe. 3. Freud’s ‘agency’ drawings and his topographical drawings of the mind depict interactive access relations between loci. He uses abstract representations for functions to relate them (Gamwell 2006, p. 129) Further, topological transformations of Venn relations are suggested in this book’s Figure 1. 4. ‘Cognitive architectures have been historically introduced for three main reasons: (i) to capture, at the computational level, the invariant mechanisms of human cognition, including those underlying the functions of reasoning, control, learning, memory, adaptivity, perception, and action [2] (goal 2 is crucial in the cognitivist perspective [3]), (ii) to form the basis for the development of cognitive capabilities through ontogeny over extended periods of time (goal 3 is a main target of the so-called emergent perspective), and (iii) to reach human level intelligence, also called General Artificial Intelligence. . .’ Lieto et al. (2018, p. 2). 5. A TT comes closer than ST (simulation theory,) since it advances to the point of developing ‘meta-representations’—therefore, it offers concepts that characterize. While metaphoric and analogical possibilities are there too, their representations are presumably of thought—not language. Their abstract status is not pinned down to referents with clear identity. Hence, these meta-representations are not founded in abstract terms and structures subject to logical computational reformations.

References Anderson, J. R. (1990). The adaptive character of thought. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Barsalou, L. W., Breazeal, C., & Smith, L. B. (2007). Cognition as coordinated non-cognition. Cognitive Processing, 8(2), 79–91. Bibace, R. (2005). Relating to Dr. Werner: Past and present. In J. Valsiner (Ed.), Heinz Werner and developmental science (pp. 235–260). Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media. Camp, E. (2006). Metaphor in the mind: The cognition of metaphor. Philosophy Compass, 1(2), 154–170. Camp, E. (2018). Why maps are not propositional. In A. Grzankowski & M. Montague (Eds.), Non-propositional intentionality (pp. 19–45). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cleeremans, A. (2005). Computational correlates of consciousness. Progress in Brain Research, 150, 81–98. Colby, K. M. (1981). Modeling a paranoid mind. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4, 515–560.

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Frith, C., Perry, R., & Lumer, E. (1999). The neural correlates of conscious experience: An experimental framework. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 3(3), 105–114. Gallagher, S., & Varga, S. (2015). Social cognition and psychopathology: A critical overview. World Psychiatry, 14(1), 5–14. Gamwell, L. (2006). The role of scientific drawings in 19th- and early 20th century research. In L. Gamwell & M. Solms (Eds.), From neurology to psychoanalysis: Sigmund Freud’s neurological drawings and diagrams of the mind (pp. 5–12). Binghamton: Binghamton University Art Museum. Gentner, D. (1983). Structure-mapping: A theoretical framework for analogy. Cognitive Science, 7, 155–170. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15516709cog 0702_3. Laws, K. R. (2016). Psychology, replication & beyond. BMC Psychology, 4, 30. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40359-016-0135-2. Lieto, A., Bhatt, M., Oltramari, A., & Vernon, D. (2018). The role of cognitive architectures in general artificial intelligence. Cognitive Systems Research, 48(May), 1–3. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2017.08.003. Native American Netroots. (2010). Indians 101: The Totem Pole. Posted on November 18, 2010 by Ojibwa. Retrieved September 10, 2018, from https://nativeamericannetroots.net/diary/771. Pezzulo, G., & Calvi, G. (2011). Computational explorations of perceptual symbol systems theory. New Ideas in Psychology, 29(3), 275–297. Polák, M., & Marvan, T. (2018). Neural correlates of consciousness meet the theory of identity. Frontiers in Psychology, 9. Retrieved from https://www.fro ntiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01269/full. Polceanu, M., & Buche, C. (2014). Towards a theory-of-mind-inspired generic decision-making framework. arXiv preprint arXiv:1405.5048. Stanley, T. D., Carter, E. C., & Doucouliagos, H. (2018). What meta-analyses reveal about the replicability of psychological research. Psychological Bulletin. Advance online publication. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/bul0000169. Werner, H. (1957). Comparative psychology of mental development (Rev. ed.). New York: International Universities Press (Original work published 1926).

CHAPTER 4

Development and History as Parameters of the Expanding Manifold

Abstract Chapter 4 expands the SV, providing Heinz Werner’s orthogenesis theory as an historical and developmental account of dynamic change to logical and schematic forms. The expansion overlays logical and schematic forms upon the SV and its account of the unfolding of psychological forms and processes. The SV is helpful in not only exploring present dynamics of language and thought, but also relating these dynamics to historically and developmentally instrumental influences. Werner’s framework accommodates development of thought, logic, and schematic forms as nested complex manifolds of developmental progressions. This great range of psychological concepts and structures illuminates connections with factors in present dilemmas. The frame can focus logic and schema ‘pictures’ and their identifiable modality contingencies. Earlier forms can obtain at later points of development. ‘Origins’ of a cognitive process and its manifestations can float and be applied by relating distant or disparate levels. Origins can be explored via analogue ‘floats.’ Keywords Orthogenesis, manifold, analogue · Modality · Schematic form

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Werner’s Isomorphisms as the Basis for a Structural View of Knowledge Werner’s orthogenetic principle allows for parallels between forms that serve different causes and contexts. Primitive versus present-day pathological is one set of parallels Werner identified. Primitive versus rhetorical is another set. A fundamental, representation and thought, is a ‘metaset.’ Primitive logic can serve a pars pro toto format. But its form is also painfully apparent in rhetorical and sociopolitical depictions and characterizations—another set of parallels. There are others. We can apply the pars pro toto principle to Freud’s analysis of dream logic, but also to an analysis of conceptual ‘play’ in selecting juxtapositions contrary to the conceptual ordering of objects and processes. Moreover, one case of play may be conscious; the other not so. The pars pro toto format is there at these different phenomenal orders of thought, where it can engineer and assist new ordering within categories. Forms generative in poetics—viz., ‘tropes’—become the logical forms of a structural approach. They create new combinations and categories. They keep a knowledge system dynamic—they produce (create) new knowledge (see p. 150).1 The pervasive non-categorical logic—called tropic logic—can thus function within a structural view. In such logic, opposites may be equal, the particular contain tain the generic, the part contain—or exceed— the whole. The logic is not categorical in that the laws of identity and contradiction are violated by substituting the equivalences of tropes—or even the logic of dreams—for logic with class/subclass ordering. (For a more complete depiction of the concepts of ‘tropic logic’ and its range in language, discourse, rhetoric, logic, and the self-other conceptions, see Lanigan 2019, p. 27; also see Lanigan 2018. Also see my basic work on the specific logical structure of the different tropes—Fisher 1998.) This logic’s function, which in this book I center on the analogy format, is deliberative within a mature articulated conceptual (and multi-leveled) organization that is categorially logical. In all, Werner’s approach allows the structural organization and dynamic change needed for a knowledge complex.

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Development and History as Parameters of the Expanding Manifold SV and the Developmental Progression of Structures Deeply and pervasively, Heinz Werner applied a ‘structural-functional’ perspective (Glick 1992; Valsiner 2005). Under its wide umbrella is the enormous range of a complex manifold of historical development and change with its nested complex manifolds of developmental progressions. The progressions include phylogenetic and ontological changes. Their characteristic direction is toward differentiation and hierarchization. These are changes the book characterizes as structural transformations, fundamental to its psychological issues and concerns. Directed toward this great range of phenomena, the SV scope can radiate—reflecting and refracting Werner’s corpus of psychological concepts and structures. Nor is the choice of Heinz Werner’s theoretical frame limited to macro-issues. In its application here, it is more specifically targeted to the role and function of PARRY. PARRY’s relation to the paranoid follows Klein’s traditionally conceived explication (1946) of the psychodynamics of the paranoid individual as rooted in developmental origins and outcomes. Colby’s programmed Parry syntax codified the paranoid logic that Freud unfolded. Like Klein, Baeza (2016) also casts the account as developmental. She recounts Freud’s psychodynamic account of paranoid logic as psychic adjustments rooted in the vicissitudes of defenses and the exchanges of psychic agency predominance. For the paranoid, that which is enhancing is reserved to the self. All events, values, and outcomes to the contrary are expelled and attributed to others—a formulation codified in Colby’s programmed Parry syntax negations. Freud’s descriptions of the paranoid’s rejecting the ‘other’ and holding tightly to a narcissistic commitment are seen in logical terms, when Baeza writes, The logical structure of paranoia and paranoid projection is the architectonic that holds together the genealogical account of pathology and the rise of the systematic “totality”, for the totality arises as the delusional system symptomatic of paranoia. (p. 41)

Is the follower of the paranoid leader also ‘paranoid’? Relative to the followers’ mirroring of a leader, she offers that the paranoid’s valuations and the social attributions consonant with them are ‘structurally related’

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to the sociopolitical phenomena of fascism. In Freud’s views the developmental course of the follower results not in mere vulnerability, but in a need to absorb the paranoid leader’s rejection of the other. With Colby’s specifications, the codified analogy of paranoid logic achieves the status of a structural view. It extends not only to the analysis of the followers, but also to the products of the sociopolitical contexts. I propose that the structural view (SV) comprehensively presents forms that can be analogized, applied, and mined at various sub-structural levels. Logic and Schematics in Klein’s Position Concept. Klein applies the term ‘position’ to the paranoid’s thinking. The term places developmental stage within an organization and perspective. The stageposition duality, characterizes the forms and vicissitudes of the paranoid’s logic and schematics. To accommodate the stageposition interaction, I specify the paranoid’s logic and schematics as a meta-theoretical frame. All that makes for the structural view (SV) I advocate in this book. Not only can the SV depict the psychodynamic and epigenetic interactions affecting the paranoid’s self and agency as cognitive objects. Patterns within the metaframe can also reveal productive analogies, which show commonalities of logical, schematic, and psychodynamic patterns in individual paranoid and in sociopolitical contexts. I present Werner’s theoretical frame to inform the potentialities of psychological theory as we apply it to Colby’s more targeted—and technologized—project. We could look at his targeted project as a thing in itself, and from it, identify the logical and syntactic patterns and modality considerations for an endgame product of analogues. There is then danger to avoid—the derivable analogues might be so super-refined, one technological viewpoint would simply feed on another. So it would not be a good idea—peremptory over-refinement could be just as it was when Kurt Lewin tried to jump to a concept of vectors and scalars. Of course, that jump could feed his vision of a topological form. However—this is ‘2020 hindsight.’ In assuming the technical features of a topological space, it would be better to first focus pictures of logic and schemas and their identifiable modality contingencies. These pictures would not get chewed up in the technical gears of the topological space. The logic and schema pictures would be there, and serve as media for making analogies. These analogies would hopefully cut across the different levels of classification in a multi-dimensional knowledge complex. This complex is massive— multifariously including not only the logic and schema forms as both forms and media. It also includes relevant forces and factors determining

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these forms’ classificatory status. In particular, these forces and factors are psychodynamics, subjective experience, representation, and the dynamics of psychological phenomena. How to contemplate and construct the massive knowledge complex. Altogether, this knowledge complex is a lot to contemplate and construct. Yet, to offset getting lost in technological circles, it does have to be admitted and articulated as extended and compound. We need Heinz Werner’s sense of the more encompassing manifold of meanings, processes, and perspectives for a theory of mind and its vicissitudes of representation, logic, and changes in temporal scope.2 I suggested the SV can provide two kinds of pictures of knowledge. The first is the ‘big picture.’ That is provided by logical and geometric displays. The ‘big picture’ functions to perspectivize knowledge complexes. The second kind of picture functions to display process. This display can occur insofar as SV’s properties are logical. Ordering follows the hierarchical form inclusion rules. Entities follow rules of identity and contradiction. This commitment to rules, in turn, makes it possible to show process as particulars of origin and particulars of outcome. Insofar as the properties are geometric, points of origin and outcome can be expressed as a logic of sequence. This logic of sequence can begin from and end in variable points in hierarchical order. The logic place agency at points of origin that vary from particular to generic—and it may proceed in inversions of the usual order. Accordingly, the second kind of picture is processual and shows three steps: (a) The logical and the spatial sequence operate together. (b) They produce and provide analogues. (c) These analogues present ratios for attempting scientific conceptions of such cognitive understandings as demonstrable relations. The two pictures—the big picture and the process display—make up the SV as a structural view. For viewing Werner’s theory as a domain from which to pursue the devolution and instantiation of this compendious structural view, Glick (1992, p. 562) provides this advisory: I have found it useful to think of Werner’s theory as a methodological guidepost telling one where to look to identify the operations that serve to distinguish levels of functioning and, hence, to allow for layered process descriptions…. One must, then, painstakingly examine the level of structural-functional organization by being sensitive to the various classes of variation that might apply.

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The hope is to produce ‘analogues.’ They would be designed to function as transducers for depictions and processes, inducing their compatibility with those on other levels. In a way, the ‘analogue’ can simulate, if not stimulate, an orthogenetic transformation. Werner’s idea of orthogenesis has to be applied neither solely at the origin point(s) of the manifold, nor at the outermost frontiers of their possible outcomes and product forms. Instead, it can float and be applied by relating distant or disparate levels.3

The SV as Historical Denouement of a Perspective on Historical Denouement Werner’s view provides the historical—both ontogenetic and epigenetic— contexts in their separate and in their interpenetrative modalities. To know about these contexts, we ‘enter’ them. (This could be a matter of apprehending what we read, for example.) Once we have access to the informational contexts reflecting Werner’s contexts, we direct our pursuit of their features. In that pursuit, we form the SV. This entails a denouement of our apprehensions. For a quick glimpse of what this denouement might be like, consider examples first of what it is like and then of what it is not like. The examples I cite are of the ways two quite different thinkers make a transformation to unfold an idea—in particular, a ‘structural view.’ First, consider the denouement to be like Skinner’s transformation of stimuli from the role of ‘pre-determinants of a response’ to the role of ‘result of a response’: That unfolding produces a ‘structural change’—the view emerging is a surprise, yet, it stays with the terms and framework that begin the search. The course in this transformation of a perspective is not like that of a second view—Freud’s. His is a startlingly different change. His journey is from a neurologically based view to psychic models cut off from the pursuit of neurological concepts. These successor models are clearly structural views, such as can be seen in the relation of different ‘agencies.’ His idea is the psyche becomes a point of perspective. That perspective opens an alternative world from which to draw concepts and understandings of psychological vicissitudes. To zero in on this idea of ‘the psyche,’ Freud proceeded systematically to nullify the neurological ‘connections.’ So, that the resultant postulation is of a structural view— a world of psychological structures and their transformations—is not a surprise.

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In both the Skinner and Freud cases, the forming of the SV—and hence the SV, itself—is a dynamically moving process by which to picture a dynamically moving process. It can encompass and give form to predisposing, contemporaneous, and emerging phenomena. The SV as we engage it moves historically from and to ‘final cause.’ Viz., to create this perspective and relate its representations, we do not insist on the outcome of a linear process as a replication of the features of the structures preceding it. In all, the SV is a selection of determinative levels characteristics, dynamics, and rules. That selection neither is necessarily of a primordial level, nor can it be a penultimately overarching frame. That is because the dynamics of the manifold as knowledge preclude its finality.

Notes 1. Joranger (2013) argues the generative nature of poetic language and the revelatory nature of forms like metaphor (p. 515; 518.) She points out Literature in general and poetic language in particular seems to have the power to create new definitions of the relationships between meaning and symbol and between image and expression—in short, a new way of conceiving how meanings are manifested. (p. 521) 2. This ‘sense’ is a structurally a conceptual organization. To understand how it was constructed is to trace the elements—and the trajectories—of Werner’s interests and competencies—which include his interest in the nature of music. 3. On the ‘layered’ nature approach to the psychology of the mind, see also Wieser (2016, pp. 141–143).

References Baeza, N. (2016, October). Adorno’s “wicked queen of snow white”: Paranoia, fascism, and the fate of modernity in dialectic of enlightenment. European Journal of Psychoanalysis. http://www.journal-psychoanalysis.eu/adornos-wic ked-queen-of-snow-white/. Fisher, H. (1998). Metonymy, metaphor, and category: Logic versus semantics. Semiotica, 121(1–2), 41–88. Glick, J. A. (1992). Werner’s relevance for contemporary developmental psychology. Developmental Psychology, 28(4), 558–565.

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Joranger, L. (2013). Mental illness and imagination in philosophy, literature, and psychiatry. Philosophy and Literature, 37 (2), 507–523. Klein, M. (1946). Notes on some schizoid mechanisms. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 27, 99–110. Lanigan, R. L. (2018). The rhetoric of discourse. In R. C. Arnett, & F. Cooren (Eds.). Dialogic Laws, K. R. (2016). Psychology, replication & beyond. BMC Psychology, 4, 30. Lanigan, R. L. (2019). Immanuel Kant on the philosophy of communicology: The tropic logic of rhetoric and semiotics. Semiotica PDF Edition (pp. 1–43). Published online 22 Jan 2019. https://doi.org/10.1515/sem-2017-0112. Valsiner, J. (Ed.). (2005). Heinz Werner and developmental science. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers. Wieser, M. (2016). On the Ganzheit and stratification of the mind: The emergence of Heinz Werner’s developmental theory. In D. M. Carre, J. Valsiner, & S. Hampl (Eds.), Representing development: The social construction of models of change (pp. 137–146). London and New York: Routledge.

CHAPTER 5

Metaphor, Geometric Space, and the Structural View

Abstract Metaphor creates multi-directionality for its terms. The SV, a means of revealing points of comparison, is metaphoric. Its selections have quasi-logical structure; like part ≡ whole. As specifics, these equivalences can relate the subjective and objective realms. SV’s terms can collate divergent levels of analysis, viz., neurological reactivity and emotional decision- making. SV’s groupings straddle diverse causative sources and determination levels. These form variant modes of logic and schemas, which SV depicts to compare the Trio’s (Trump, Trumper, and paranoid) forms for ways of thinking and forming linguistic presentations. In linguistic displays, appear violations: in the classic schema form, causal sequence and in categorical logic, rules of identity. SV depicts these violations as variable formats, and the variability as a function of modality contingencies. The thinker as agent, outside all this diagrammatic casting, carves pathways to different perspective points to enhance connections within a manifold of interrelations. Keywords Metaphor · Divergent levels · Categorical logic · Modality · Equivalences

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Specific Assumptions of the SV as Metaphoric For a structural view, the selected structure has logical and syntactic forms as substructures. I advocate a specific path for the development of the SV and its value in creating perspectives and thence finding specific relationships, such as those within the PARRY comparisons. To utilize the SV optimally is to evince capacities of its analogical perspectives that can be transformations for exploring divergent levels of the phenomena involved. To show the path to this, I propose to make the logic and dynamics of the divergent relationships more accessible via a specific methodological augmentation—viz., relating diagramming to logical structuring of a multiplex classification manifold. The immediate point here concerns geometric representation that affords extensions to be made in conjunction with the SV potentials. The terms I apply are to flag and state directions for these extensions. General geometric terms for accessing and enhancing the SV. The overall picture of the knowledge manifold organization is as topological. Geometrically, that picture would be like a ‘torus’ with a ‘Hopf-fibration.’ A technical follow-up on these terms from geometry and topology would be beyond the book’s scope. The direction I suggest is to geometrically visualize the logical structuring. General definitions of terms outline that idea: A ‘torus’ is a form that can project geometric visualization of logical transformations. A general definition of the torus holds it to be The standard representation of such a space in 3-dimensional Euclidean space: a shape consisting of a ring with a circular cross-section: the shape of an inner tube or hollow doughnut.

To represent logical transformations, a form like the torus, would reflect changes in the relations of space and perspectives that change the viewing of its boundaries. Séquin (2012, July) offers this definition: Topologically, a torus is any surface that results from closing a rectangular domain onto itself by joining opposite edges, while observing their orientations. (p. 191)

Definitions.net (n.d.) offers several other general definitions relevant here: One appears in various sources:

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A fibration is a continuous mapping p: E→B satisfying the homotopy lifting property with respect to any space.

To clarify the terms here a bit: In topology, two continuous functions from one topological space to another are called homotopic . . . if one can be “continuously deformed” into the other. (AskDefine n.d.)

There are 4 advantageous characteristics of this geometric approach to a knowledge complex: 1. The structural organization of a knowledge complex as geometric planes. Different levels of classification can be geometrically depicted as on different planes. The planes represent logically classificatory levels of a ‘knowledge complex’—an organization of levels of phenomena offering percepts, concepts, classes, and propositions about individual persons and classes of persons. The planes can variously turn to superpose other planes. They can intersect and cross each other, representing an exchange of the superposing position. 2. Structural and sub-structural parameters. When a structure, either within or outside a knowledge complex, is selected, its substructures and the forms within them can be subsumed within it. Consider the issue of a ‘person’ as an entity expressible as a ‘knowledge complex.’ Working with the concept of the knowledge complex as a picture, it would be a view of particulars. Dynamically as thought, that view of particulars would be subject to recursion, that is—to thought about it. We have to start somewhere, and that is with a ‘given picture’— an entity that has an inside and an outside. We are interested in thought/representation forms and patterns. Inside this ‘knowledge complex’ entity could be various classes of cognitive objects. Outside could be a moral code as a substructure—say, as a list of laws or commandments. The code could account for individual beliefs, which constitute an inside substructure. All this ‘inside’ appears logically organized—as within classes and subclasses. I include the idea that there is superposition of levels. All levels from biochemical to a collective of

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physical motor and sensing systems may be subsumed within ‘interactive information exchange models.’ Keep in mind, any mapping from one class or level or type to another is not the same issue for such a ‘knowledge complex’ classification ordering as for a taxonomic one. A person ‘DSM-defined’ as a taxonomic collection of classes (such as symptoms), and categories (such as syndromes), is an entity. That entity is an information-driven structure. Information is also driven in a reflexive way by its meanings. Hence, there is a structure to knowledge of this entity, the information-driven structure. It becomes obvious when we approach knowledge of a ‘person’ as of such an entity. View a person as who he is dependent on the balance of ‘ego considerations’ relative to instinctive forces. Call this entity a ‘person–Freudian style.’ The entity has a classification structure for which meaning drives information. The classification order is not set in stone. Meaning drives information, or the other way around. This sequence in both directions and either sequence’s outcome are all matters of which logical organization you impose. Each of these sequences can be a result of your imposing and then observing how it works. For these entities, there are figure-ground switches worthy of an Escher rendition! The upshot? A substructure selected for ‘comparison’ would not present an opportunity for confident mapping. With this ‘person–Freudian style’ type of entity, we are not dealing with the presumed steadiness of a taxonomic category. The taxonomic approach does not help here. Sometimes in looking to classify matters, there is a paranoid person’s obviously non-factual statement. Taxonomic focus might cite the issue of psychotic versus neurotic as superposing a ‘sub-issue,’ say paranoid versus sociopathic. But that’s ‘sometimes!’ Other times, that superposition would be turned upside down. Mapping fades as determinative—let alone doable. Instead, we can project a metaphoric relation to other substructures, and possibly to superstructures. All this appears as what Peirce meant by ‘moving pictures.’ These are the structures and their relations making up a ‘knowledge complex’ (Selz’ term)! The SV should serve to conceive the knowledge complex’ structure with its semiotic latitudes, and as reflective of the structures and substructures of a person. Reflective of these features, I offer the following SV-based description of the knowledge complex’ structures and their relations:

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A grouping of different level forms and semiotic representations of the organization of information and forms. This grouping offers knowledge of and representations of the individual as a member of a particular group of individuals.

3. The range of displays. Colby’s program is comprised of codes, syntactic rules, and logical rules and formats. From these ‘barebones’ forms and means, it can directly produce displays of language and dialogical responding analogous to those of ‘paranoids.’ We can specify these forms driving PARRY’s linguistic display. Just what are the drivers for the ‘actual’ paranoid responses, which appear so similar to the programs? The SV would dive into the multiplex of the paranoid person. There we would find all sorts of subsystems— physiological, neurological, emotion producing, and so on. They are organized in levels for the production of the paranoid responding. The levels are determinative, yet not parallel to the barebones coding producing PARRY’s linguistic display. A given determinative level may regulate the paranoid’s response in the case of a given input. Some input is more likely to excite an aural memory. Other input is more likely to produce excitement at a neurological level, yet dampen down physiological responses tied to emotions. I will refer to a ‘regnant’ level of the paranoid’s organization of syntax, semantic structuring, and other aspects of linguistic display. The regnant level floats from plane to plane and in and out of a superposing position. Picture a ‘paranoid denial’ lodged at such a position. Why is its regnancy constant? (Can the superposition be changed?) Suppose an electrochemical switch is at such a position and level of influence that it is the driver for a ‘paranoid denial.’ It might also be that for an individual having learned that pattern of logical form to a linguistic response, a given electrochemical switch station shows up as particularly active. Whatever the course of these material events, we are ‘outside’ observing. From there, we can project and explore ratios— our metaphoric and analogical structuring 1 The ratios are between the subsystems (and forms) of PARRY and those of the paranoid person for whom PARRY’s linguistic displays are being compared. 4. Metaphoric function. The codes, syntactic rules, and logical rules offer metaphoric comparisons to conceptualize phenomena on different levels of the functioning and explanation of the functioning of the individual. Consider comparing patterns of binary

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coding to these possible different levels: electrochemical signal patterns, neurologically based measures of excitability, emotional arousal patterns. The likening can also extend to the more cognitive levels and to patterns of concept use. These vary from detail rich to abstract and from over-symbolic to primitively-based on selected particulars. Overall governance and structuring outcomes. In all, the structural approach to a knowledge complex (SV) offers syntactic structuring compatible with the schema. It also offers logical structuring, compatible with categorical logic, some of its variants, and some changes in modality contingencies. These governance subsystems occupy a dynamic place within the SV. The psychologist can forage within that ‘place’ to select metaphoric ‘equivalent’ factors and their relationships at, in, and between other levels of conceptualization and organization within the knowledge complex. By these means, the governance functions and their elements can emerge from variations of the relationships of the different levels’ particulars. In the present book, PARRY is a syntactic/logical approach to dialogically inspired sentences and to concepts projected as attitudes and reasoning patterns. This approach serves as an overarching metaphor to compare the ‘paranoid’ person’s displays with those of Trump and the ‘Trumper.’ This comparison can be expanded into analogies with a person’s subsystems and also with displays in social contexts. A brief historical note is in order: The logical turns in the paranoid’s representations are typical of the use of ‘projection’—considered an ‘immature’ defense (see Ciocca et al. 2017). Projection as an ‘immature’ defense’ is presumed characteristic of the paranoid person. Descriptions of these defenses have been made available for computer simulation at least since the 1960s. This includes a conception of the progress of defensive responses Colby attempts to trace from a traumatic event as a start point, to various conversions, which change in accord with memory of the event. (See Wegman 1985, p. 181.) In all this, the assumption is: multiple levels of factors. Extending from the physiological to the psychological, they affect the logic of the person’s expression and enter a series of complex schematic sequences. Wegman’s idea of ‘knowledge structures’ (p. 27) is likened to the Schank and Abelson schematics provided in their computable and computerizable ‘script’ concept. Here, we include the

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schema and logic patterns, but we go further. Both patterns are subject to computable Boolean variations. Yet, neither is anchored to concepts of mapping and matching that would validate that computability.

Note 1. The idea of geometrically picturing the logic and/or psycho-logic of ‘paranoid denial’ as a superposing plane is merely a device to view locus of particulars and/or controlling levels of determinants. The metaphors (the structural views as such) specify the exchangeability of the superposing positions of the planes.

References Askdefine.com. (n.d.). Retrieved October 29, 2020, from http://askdefine.com/ define/fibration. Ciocca, G., Collazzoni, A., Limoncin, E., Franchi, C., Mollaioli, D., Di Lorenzo, G., et al. (2017). Defence mechanisms and attachment styles in paranoid ideation evaluated in a sample of non-clinical young adults. Rivista di Psichiatria, 52(4), 162–167. fibration. (n.d.). Definitions.net. Retrieved October 29, 2020, from https:// www.definitions.net/definition/fibration. Séquin, C. H. (2012, July). From Möbius Bands to Klein-Knottles. In Proceedings of Bridges 2012: Mathematics, Music, Art, Architecture, Culture (pp. 93–102). Wegman, C. (1985). Psychoanalysis and cognitive psychology: A formalization of Freud’s earliest theory. Orlando, FL: Academic Press.

CHAPTER 6

Logic and Schema Modalities

Abstract Are we simplistically analogizing SV’s ‘target knowledge complex’ between human and computer cognitive production and representation? Does this reduce cognitive to linguistic production? The analogy is to ‘logic gates’ that block entry by negating concepts and meanings—and by the same operations, block those very blocks. The thinker’s cognitive operation excluding thought is via the ‘logic gate.’ The products are logic and schema modality factors of a ‘knowledge complex.’ Focus on logic gates and Boolean logic specifically connects our analogy with SV—both derived from logic governing computer simulation. SV not only governs the knowledge complex enriching understanding of the individual’s thinking. It also deploys and governs combinations of categories and operations in dynamic socio-political contexts. Central nexuses are a specific mix of logical and schematic forms-in-variation. This can be diagrammed—if the mind’s eye can spot vantage points for modal contingencies optimizing logical and schematic forms to thinking tasks. Keywords Modal contingencies · Logic gates · Knowledge complex · Boolean logic

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Structures of Syntax and Logic: Two Mirrors Facing Each Other Kant (1787/1929) considers a schema to be a medium between understanding and our representations in images and concepts. As a medium, the schema takes the form of a template, and it has operative rules. It provides an understanding by which we can apply our concepts and categories ‘to any object’ (Kant 1787/1929, p. 182). Kant sees this capacity and its outcome as ‘a product of imagination’ (p. 182). Matherne (2014) develops as Kantian, the idea of the ‘hidden art’ of the schema. I propose this view culminates in the use of the schema’s underlying template as a base for applying the terms of an analogy. This base, a point of perspective (as is the SV), is ‘inside’ the schema—its template—but its perspective as a mirror’s, refracts from it. This mirror, faces another mirror—logical format, which presents thoughts moving to understandings. Each of the mirrors not only reflects the other’s perspective but also refracts its own upon it. The resultant point of perspective accommodates a wide range of levels of organization—one that is hierarchized. That hierarchy issues from and extends to different levels of cross-influence, such as the neurological on the psychological and the other way around.

Enter the SV and Access to Imagination The SV can bring to the fore different levels of organization. The features for the chosen particulars and for their match can be drawn from the disparate levels of that multi-tiered organization. The mix of this dynamics of choice and logic of matching is a hallmark of the realization of the psychology theorist’s imagination. The resultant organization is likely a hierarchy of concepts from different scientific disciplines—concepts drawn from sciences dealing with the nature of brain, mind, and behavior. The hierarchical organization is to explain the mind  brain two-way relationship and to facilitate an integrative view. Such theoretical bases and relations may represent a common denominator for sciences dealing with the nature of brain, mind, and behavior (see Wiest’s summary 2012, p. 7). How does the psychologist as thinker and theorist select, maintain, and re-impose the order in the organization of the levels of mind-brain phenomena and their relation? That order is not only a form for the

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multiplex relations of the different levels, but it also affects the logic of structure and outcome within the discrete levels. So, we seek a ‘master form’ that accounts for maintenance and replicability of the relations within discrete levels. There are repetitions of the sequential forms of input and output, sentence structuring of action and outcome, and propositional sequence of inductive computation as determinative. These are ‘master-form’ phenomena that cross the borders of the phenomena and the objective. How this crossover is achieved in—and ‘understood by’—thought is a matter for a structural view. In classic terms, the issue is force and guidance of form. Let’s go to an archetypal form. Kant’s identification of the transcendental schema and its force in relation to representation is as archetypal. This form has its origin in ‘imagination,’ where its very denouement is via selecting terms for relating particulars, but avoiding the barriers of classification levels.1 A classic example is how Skinner selected to use the term ‘stimulus.’ ‘Stimulus’ is placed in a ratio to ‘response.’ A schema-based classification characterizes input and its result or sequelae. It provides an origin-tooutcome direction governing the organization. With a ratio, a relation can go either way from one term to another. In the schema-based classification, the term ‘stimulus’ could then read out either as an origin or as an outcome. In a sense, schematic—and if you want, causal—direction is at first blush, irrelevant to the issue of the psychologist’s selections of either placement within concepts or of organizational order. It would be cartbefore-the-horse to organize what we haven’t first focused as some sort of object or phenomenon. Classification slots for groupings or sequential occurrences simply have to wait! The spatio-temporal sequence of a schema is avoided. Kant’s focus would be the value and impact of structure and its role as functors, which can reveal the role and loci of formal and final cause. When these enter, the thinker’s perspectivization is not so simple.

The Need for Analogy Does Not Go Away Form, Level, Imagination, and Structure Well—The schema is Kantian: it is deep set; its terms follow its sequence and logic. With imagination, new and various terms can fit the predestined slots. Consider a more au courant term—the ‘frame.’2 Within it, we focus on causally tying the neurophysiological level to the activities and

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qualia of thinking. How secure is that tie? Remember, the tie is via what we can constitute as information. So, it is apt to ask: With that imagined frame, and within it, we would be forming a relationship between terms. How secure—how apt—is it? How reflective of the state of affairs? How productive, if not predictive? The very steps of tying the neurophysiological datum to thinking qualia begin in the imaginative process placing them within the same frame. Anna Abraham (2016) reviews the available evidence for tying imaginative thought to neurophysiological sites and patterns. Her comparisons of these disparate levels of function are by way of different sets of terms. Similarities are put forth in compounds consisting of terms that have an insecure relation to the loci of other terms. The ‘term’ selected to evidence ‘thought’ is ineluctably a compound composed solely of factors of ‘representation.’ It might be ‘a group of words in an approved dictionary of terms.’ In all, to achieve the compound for thought we are back to the compound for representation. I still have to ask, ‘Where is that thought—ipse?’ Well, thought, ipse, is—and, as the term being compared, still would be—a matter of metaphorical reference. One popular operationist idea in psychology is thought ‘is’ the ‘… responses [that] can be generated… [by a] divergent creativity task: Alternate Uses Task’ (Abraham 2016, p. 8). That idea is of an analogy—something like this basic ‘imagination analogy’:

A

B

C

D

Thought : Imagination :: Divergent objects : Alternate Use Within that ‘imagination analogy,’ the process of thinking proceeds ‘analogically.’ In general terms, this is by ratio as an expression of equivalence. Here, specifically it involves the relation of the analogy via analogues to conform to or realize the form of a schema. Thus, Gick and Holyoak (1983, p. 8) write that a schema can be abstracted from the two analogs by “eliminative induction” … In essence, the process of schema induction involves deleting the differences between the analogs while preserving their commonalities…. The schema can be viewed as an abstract category that the individual analogs instantiate in different ways.

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Accordingly, we work out new operational analogies. We conceive such an analogy as the basis of the imagination a task can spur. We look at the specific task in the Alternate Uses test, by considering its primary query, ‘How many different ways can you think of to use a brick?’ The brick’s (B) relation to a basic use [for example, to construction, (C)] operates as a metaphor—(B) : (C). The Test’s task is to expand (B) : (C) to accommodate ‘different’ uses. A general formulation of this expansion would plumb the nature of the brick. That ‘nature’ (B’) would be an extension including particulars that could affect ‘uses.’ A category of ‘use,’ immediately diverging from construction, would be destruction (D). Within it, a brick could be used as a grinder or a mashing device. Ergo, the form for the ‘divergent thought’ is B : C :: B’ : D—a form that could be generative for ways different than those that are usual (related to construction). For comparisons of phenomena more distant from each other and from immediate observability, Anna Abraham (2016) has great hopes for securing a plethora of connections between neurophysiological events and imaginative thought. So far, though, it’s not as easy to find the metaphors and analogies that can be justified. Despite the evidence accrued that neurophysiological studies can be a bridge to understanding imaginative thinking (2012), Abraham and associates found when … unconscious sources for the creative thinking were involved, the correlations with neurophysiological sites and events were not as accessible to … insights about thinking that occur as a function of implicit, unconscious, bottom-up driven or spontaneous modes of cognition. (p. 1913)

Moreover, as far as neuro-imaging is concerned, they deemed it not possible as yet to generalize the current findings in a significant manner to gain insights about the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying alternate aspects of creative thinking that occur as a function of implicit, unconscious, bottom-up driven or spontaneous modes of cognition. (2012, p. 1913)

In this description is the variety of ‘levels’ and the obvious disconnects from one to the other. These disconnects are not only in the nature of the phenomena (subjective vs observable). They are also in the relation of measures to phenomena. Moreover, there is the difference in function— say, of the different areas of the brain.

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In sum, the question of approaching divergent levels of particulars, measures, and functions involves continually re-sectioning phenomena in the disparate levels. Yet, while Anna Abraham continues to search the multiplicity of levels, the question fundamentally remains one of continuing to find analogies. However, levels not only can be subsystems of phenomena as particulars and superordinating systems as their categories. They can be structurally ordered levels of abstraction too. Thus, [David] Marr … proposed a general framework for explanation in cognitive science based on the computational perspective. … any particular task computed by a cognitive system must ultimately be analyzed at three levels (in order of decreasing abstraction): 1. the computational … 2. the algorithmic … and 3. the implementation level (how the algorithm is actually implemented in neural activity). (Isaac et al. 2014, p. 791).

Even if an account of the objects of the knowledge complex requires including not only multiple representational levels of its particulars but also organizational levels of its framework, Kant will have had the form to start things off. The schema. The trick in pushing knowledge forward would include deciding what the objects are that become the metaphoric bases for the associations. This is where the definition of just what a structural approach is becomes urgent. Kant’s forms, Marr’s abstraction ladder, and the SV approach to the knowledge complex. For a knowledge complex to be a scientific objective requires accepting it as a manifold with its layers and levels of representations: concepts, propositions, depictions, and explanations. The Kantian assumption is that forms such as the schema organize the apprehension of objects of knowledge. This book’s structural view (SV) holds that perspectivizing—via levels and modes of logical and analogical organization—provides for re-organization of different levels. SV’s perspectivizing opens a focus on particulars as well as their groupings. Within the potentialities of computability and subjecting of logical rules to different modal rules, the knowledge complex can advance to new and fruitful comparisons—sometimes of divergent levels, sometimes of unexpected parallels of particulars despite their distance either logically or taxonomically. The present day approach, such as afforded by computer simulation—and in this book specifically, the logic gates—reveals the logic of computability to be applicable to psychologically complex phenomena as well as to the mix of these phenomena with sociopolitical factors

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and contexts. The argument for the necessity and fecundity of such an approach is hinted at in David Marr’s semiotic conceptualization of 3 levels of information analysis. It recently appears as a well-documented challenge in the conceptualization of the levels to be explored in arriving at ‘knowledge’ about art and the aesthetic experience (Skov and Nadal 2018, 2019). The form that Skov and Nadal (2019) advance for an account of aesthetic appreciation is a particularly good example of a proposal for a ‘knowledge complex.’ They present evidence and hold that such an account … is about an unfolding interaction between sensory processing and neural activity in the reward circuit.

More sweepingly, they depict that the class of objects we categorize as art engages a neurobiological system that did not evolve specifically to perform this job. (p. 9)

The ‘system’ opens to levels of different component systems and their physiological processing and situational contexts. Therefore, it appears as a manifold—a knowledge complex—within which they find it necessary to seek out the relation of divergent subsystems. Critically, they call for a complex computational chain of processing steps that involve several different neurobiological systems, all of which project information back and forth while appreciation unfolds in a situational context. (p. 11)

This is, as I see it, the pursuit of a ‘knowledge complex.’ It is in line with the SV view as I propose, viz., with its dependencies on computer simulation and logic gate computations.

Logical Form, and Syntax of the Schema in Transformations by Analogy Elements of SV in Colby’s Quest. Our excursion into Kantian form and psychological process has taken us to the foundations of analogy and the necessity of its use and power in service of any structural view. To look at ideas and attempts to make sense of psychological interactions, if

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not interpenetrations of form, from one level of organizing knowledge to another, I don’t want to go that far back to Kantian times. Our purpose is to come closer to the present, and to what the SV would have to offer. The book asks about the Trio—the paranoid, Trump, and the Trumper. We described a general basis for analogy and form to focus this Trio’s patterns, to relate form to representation, and to seek possible analogues with thought and knowledge for those patterns. Specifically, what can we make of the syntactic and logical rules and patterns Kenneth Colby identified and turned into transducers to produce representational patterns designed to pass the Turing test? There appears general agreement—including Colby’s own sentiment (1981): A true and complete passing of the Turing test is not the objective. The judges who could not tell the difference between PARRY and a ‘real’ paranoid are a legitimate part of the picture. Yet, the lesson is the same as with the ‘Uses’ test. The designed tasks of an empirical demonstration by someone other than the experiencing thinker are ‘outside the cave.’ The ‘no difference’ objective cannot be adequately designed either from the point of view of a marvelous simulation or from a technique of assessing it. So to assert a shortfall between the display and the reality may be a misnomer. To describe and catalogue the machinery producing a printout of PARRY’s representations requires factors and concepts distant from those of the manifold of material and phenomenological factors. If either the manifold factors or their machine printout is a metaphor for the ‘Other,’ the metaphor can be expanded to apply to a human paranoid representation of the ‘other.’ In this process, a concept of a human paranoid representation can be extrapolated. So too can a sociopolitical nexus for productions like those of Trumpers. Comparisons can be made. The ‘ratios’ relating structural phenomena are inspirations for linking islands of knowledge. This linking had become Colby’s main objective for structural analysis in his (1981) argument.

Structural Analysis and Logical Mode Kenneth Colby (Colby et al. 1972; Colby 1974, 1975) opted for a structural view of the thinking of paranoids. Was this approach in the tradition of the multi-disciplinary approach to psychiatry of von Domarus (1944)? He had identified the logic system of schizophrenics as breaking the law of excluded middle.3 To make that structural point, the mix he offered was of neurology, mathematics, and perhaps anthropology (Abraham 2017,

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pp. 23–24). The ‘structure’ involved was logic, and an explanation of the break would be of ‘faulty logical processing’ as a ‘skip’ in noting a basic exclusion—viz: ‘Something cannot be both true and untrue.’ The ‘skip’ could be by assuming a level on which these things are both ‘true’—that is when they are subclasses and considered from a subsuming class. The logical disorder would allow the paranoid to completely avoid a categorical logical stasis for what is true: Something, which is not true, can be true. All this is subject to the issue of logic as a formal computation. In schizophrenia, the logic picture is far from that simple. Mellet et al. (2006) report schizophrenics ‘had significantly better logical performances than their paired healthy participants.’ The ‘impairment’ had advantages in some cognitive tasks. Moreover, in their extensive review, Cardella and Gangemi (2015) point out evidence schizophrenics are less influenced by semantic and emotionally loaded content and tend to do better than normals on logical reasoning tasks. They conclude the problem in schizophrenic reasoning is not the lack of logic, but the excess of it, a sort of intellectual attitude toward the world. (p. 7)

Cardella and Gangemi reason from the point of view of ‘phenomenological psychiatry’ and in their taxonomy create categories like ‘schizophrenia’ and ‘“healthy” and “paranoid.”’ The data they analyze is in an attempt to apply logic templates to the statistically distributed differences shown in the group data within these categorizations. Of course, these differ as the nosological categories change from von Domarus forward. Cardella and Gangemi’s reasoning is subjected neither to the vagaries of their own analogical projections and formulations; nor to the levels of analogical thought, experience, and categorization of the different precategorized taxonomy ‘members’ von Domarus’ ‘functional fixedness’4 to deal with psychological phenomena began—and remained—within the grips of nosology and the taxonomies within which thinking would be categorized and conceptualized. The logic involved will have been pocketed and not open to the expanding interactions with the other levels and perspectives a dynamic structure would need to accommodate. Within these constrictions, it is possible for the psychologist (or psychiatrist) to use reason—to apply logical templates—and find sub-structural integrities as pockets of ‘logical truth,’ while these do not fit into a larger ‘frame’ of meanings. By sticking close to this taxonomically based version of a ‘structural’ approach, truth (as a logical possibility) is sabotaged! It

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bobs its head up from mixed layers of possibilities in a sea of variability. (That variability is of levels of causation X the inaccessibility of competing sources of agency.) In a word, logical ‘truth’ does not cohere with the problem of a manifold of knowledge. This is a major instance of the point I stress: A structural approach invoking logic and the schema as organizing perspectives has to be modal—viz., depict the contingencies of the knowledge complex. The orthogenetic shift to heterarchical structure. The knowledge complex is a dynamic form serving the capacities of the individual to orchestrate the layers of her organismic sub systemic functions in concert with the impingements of the environmental surround. The hierarchical structure of the individual’s layers of causal structures and forms is like Leonardo da Vinci’s drawing of the ‘Vitruvian Man’ as a well organized system and its foundational material contributions to an organic construction. However, locus of control can jump out of the ordered arrangements of subsystems. The levels of superposing determinative steering of the entire set of the organism’s functions can re-locate dynamic power—creating power centers irrespective of material order of the building blocks for layer-dependent functions. For an example, some emotional subsystem can be influential in governing neural supported on-off switch patterns that become decisions, which might otherwise be cool step-wise calculations. The hierarchy of the Vitruvian Man’s layers is converted to a homunculus type picture, wherein the overall functional domination of the organismic structure shows that disparate aspects of the total organization run things together as a heterarchy.5

Von Domarus Redux von Domarus’ elemental observation that schizophrenics failed to apply the ‘exclusion of middle term,’ as a principle, does not appear to cover either the psychological or the logical issues involved. It has not been borne out in tests of schizophrenic reasoning. Yet, we do credit von Domarus as a starting point for the combination of logical and thinking patterns Colby essayed with the PARRY program. The underlying idea is attractive for the notion of a ‘logic module’ that would/should characterize a person’s thinking. The underside of that module would read: The ‘“failure to apply the middle term filter” is a basic violation of a basic thinking process.’ Still, that attractive idea does not appear to cover the issue either for schizophrenics or for paranoids in general.

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Part of the problem is the principle and its rule of implementation in thought fail a variety of logical patterns, not to say their interaction with semantic contexts. Nevertheless, the idea of a filter engages a basic logical function—negation, and the violation of the filter—a double negation.6 Therefore, a more articulated account of negations, one as logic gates, might serve to refigure von Domarus’ insight. We can start that revisit in the terms of the SV approach to the simulation of paranoid logic and its negations. The paranoid person’s specific patterns Colby identified show ‘baked in’ negations of agency and of outcomes associated with the ‘self’ as the target agency. These baked-in negations would cause problems with a middle term filter and an expansive semantic field. Suppose that person’s thinking was subjected to agency not recursively negated. Then, that person’s allotment of baked-in negations would tend to show up almost totally in violation of a middle term rule. A paranoid person can say, ‘I cannot make a judgment.’ Person B retorts, ‘You have just made that judgment.’ Person A responds, ‘It’s not my rule.’ So, we have a ‘runaway’ course from a person whose identity is not subject to contradiction, and in this a clue to Trump and the Trumper’s inability to locate truth. Return to logic vis-à-vis the individual’s psychology. There, these ‘middle term’ problems may be psychologically, if not physiologically, endemic to the schizophrenic. As we have pointed out, though, they are also present in the paranoid’s logical construction of agency and outcome. This is easily shown in the syntactic formulae constituting Colby’s grammatical schema for PARRY. In the logical picture, for the paranoid, this pattern of negation of agency is also ‘baked in’ for the relation of any propositional terms. [To explain, weirdly, the self can never be an agent— except to say so. Right there at work is the Peirce principle: It is at the most general level where the middle term rule would fail (Lane 1997). The agency to deny agency regresses to a vanishing point!] The excluded middle rule and the knowledge complex. To zero in on the shortcomings of von Domarus’ observation7 we have to take into account not only the paranoid’s logical sensibilities and sometime prowess, but also, the many observations that the principle of excluded middle can fail—or simply not hold for a knowledge complex. I will briefly track this basic issue as a needed structural differentiation of the targets of logical analysis. This will help identify what can be retained from von Domarus’ observation, and in turn what can inform the Structural View.

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Reconceiving the Workings of the Excluded Middle Principle We began this book’s look at the ‘Trio,’ by viewing the psychology of the paranoid through the lens of Colby’s PARRY and its syntactic transformations. As I viewed the syntactic patterns and logic of this program‘s simulation, I expanded a description of its ‘structural view.’ This SV, as I present it, is informed by the logic and schematics a paranoid thinker applies to agency and its psychological relation to the ‘I’ as subject. This rendition, replete with its negations of agency and outcome, also extends to an interrelation of such logical constructions with ‘truth.’ von Domarus’ earlier observation that schizophrenics failed to apply the ‘exclusion of middle term’ principle does not cover the issues involved. It has not been borne out in empirical tests of paranoid reasoning. Bandinelli et al. review studies attempting to check von Domarus’ principle (2006, pp. 118–119). They find mixed results, but conclude the violation of the logical principle is ‘not a root cause.’ Instead, they appear to assume schizophrenics’ distortions in reasoning to be pragmatic and psychologically driven—particularly, when paranoia is involved. In paranoia, ‘themes’ selected become templates, dominating what would otherwise be open uses of a schema. The ‘template’ Colby considers, is logic based, or at least constructed via negation patterns. As he allots it, the syntactic ‘not-I,’ is inserted into the cause slot of the paranoid’s schema. Where this insert occurs, it functions as a pattern for dissociating self from causality, and agency from forming cognitive objects and steering their fate. The dissociation in such ‘pathological’ structuring is not isolated to the paranoid or to the schizophrenic. These phenomena seem easily congruent forms in the thinking and representations making up the phenomena of the ‘Trumpers.’ Moreover, for the Trumpers, the failures of the principle of excluded middle do not disappear when taking into account their acceptance of non-truthful statements and propositions. What occurs in the paranoid? Lane’s (1997) analysis of Peirce’s view of the excluded middle principle provides needed insight. Peirce’s interpretation is: LEM (the rule of excluded middle) does not apply to generalized terms. Two reasons are: (1) It does not apply to propositions, insofar as they include predicates. Reasoning can take place affecting the relation of the larger inclusive unit (proposition) and the predicate included within

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it. (2) The reasoning can be about the relation between a proposition and a negated version of that total proposition. In all, logical units such as propositions do not exist in an isolated structuring. Propositions and sub-propositions are nested. This nature of propositions is more the issue than any ‘skipping over’ or ‘failure to apply’ the excluded middle principle!8 In the patrimony of Peirce’s point, the paranoid’s problem is reacting to concepts and categories as ‘general’ or undifferentiated. Paranoids abnegate the conflicts between a general reading of the unit and that which is within the specific instantiations of the units they are processing. (This ‘undifferentiated’ organization of a whole [as I say, of a ‘complex’], is something Werner saw as a ‘re-surfacing’ of a prior stage. That can occur in the mature organism [Werner 1926—summarized by Valsiner (2005, p. 77)].

Development, the Absence of Development, Primitivity, and the Status of Oppositions Werner (1957) noted the similarity between primitive and pathological form in thinking. He was careful not to conflate the two. A primitive ‘grouping’ could be a thought, a form expressed, or an object represented. For our analysis it could be a term or signification. Whichever—if it were a primitive unit—its status would be of coexisting antitheticals. Their coextension will not have required a de-differentiation. A primitive state of affairs would not have developed to a point of differentiation. Instead, that primitive status would be indigenous to the logical structure of the grouping. Peirce’s analysis isolates LEM and limits it to abstract terms or categories. His principle, used to re-enter the issues von Domarus raised, appears to apply where there would be a far-reaching rejection of specific meanings. Thus, the schizophrenic disorder may include a lockout of subclasses. The law of excluded middle is being correctly applied at an overgeneralized level, and the sub-class ‘violations’ seemingly properly characterized as such. The net result is bifurcated, where the law of excluded middle does work—but only when the full corpus of the logical subordinated entities (sub-classes) and operative iterations (negations of negations) is attenuated. There, contraries that creep inward to ‘facts’ within the proposition being evaluated are irrelevant. They may simply be oppositions that coexist. So, just what might have led von Domarus to the conclusion the ‘law’ was not being applied? One

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would suppose the schizophrenic would look at opposing subclasses as non-contradictory. Evidence is mixed on this. (In this book that review is not made.) Where opposing classes do (or could) coexist, LEM would fail—it would not be ‘true.’ However, as Werner pointed out about the primitive, the schizophrenic may similarly not have the differentiations one would expect had accrued and developed in the course of cognitive and social development. Nor, for the schizophrenic, will the status of antitheticals in the same thought and/or term, concept, or grouping, necessarily be an ‘undoing.’ If (or where) the state of affairs were analogous to a primitive one, it will not have required a block to differentiation as a developmental phenomenon. For a non-schizophrenic paranoid, we could theorize pathological negations. These might call for a developmental block, isolating the individual, and in some cases, isolating causal sequences. Introducing these negations paralyzes the application of the mutual exclusion law, thus messing up propositions and terms. Insight into this logical picture of a block and the conditions of its removal or suspension could come originally from Freud’s descriptions of dream logic; then from the interpretations of Matte Blanco’s (1975) bi-logic. On the other hand, if the schizophrenic’s status for term or concept has not divided into class and sub-class, Freud’s (1910) essay on the antithetical meaning of primary words applies. It gives the basis for a penetrative view of the semantic components of any units (terms, concepts) as a schizophrenic may interpret or choose to interpret. There can be opposition and contrariety without contradiction or cancellation. (These topics cannot fully be developed here.) Philosophers and logicians to the rescue. Philosophers comment on the failures of the ‘exclusion of the middle term’ principle (e.g. Brouwer, Dummett—see Honderich 1995). This principle would appear to adequately apply to, if not characterize, categorical logic. Yet, it becomes highly problematic when that logic is called forth to apply to propositional relations in semantic contexts of various sorts. The principle is fatally flawed in its application to general propositions (Lane 1997). As Lane interprets C. S. Peirce, general propositions posit complex relations. What passes for a unit—a proposition—is composed of the whole proposition and of that nested within it—viz., its predicate. Further, if we think about a knowledge complex, we can consider a proposition within it as containing another proposition. In this approach to knowledge as information and thought, propositions and schematic representations appear as nested and/or recursive

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logical forms. The regression from one form to a cognate form expands outwards, if we also include the proposition or predications in speech and communicative contexts—monologues, dialogues, and so on. All this points out knowledge complexes are multifariously divisible into different levels. Cross comparisons from one level of meaning and/or inclusion of, or abstraction to another are accessible to multiple patterns of negation. With these characteristics and operational possibilities present, that situation is ripe for a structural analysis the SV would provide. It is also highly vulnerable to replication of the failures of LEM in political and rhetorical contexts and the accompanying structures of communication and governance of communication. Those structures would be governance rules and principles, such as constitutional documents, manifestos, and philosophical tracts, and laws, codes—not to say, ‘proofs.’ In the sociopolitical realm, there is an inherent ‘antilogic’ in that the argument (propositional) structure has a dialectical base. Kant would say there would be antinomies, and these may be metaphysical. On the level of the formal intermix of negation in logic and in natural language, the antinomies are there with their effects at various levels of meaning and the organization of the various levels of referents and of representation. Accordingly, with the pseudo-isolation of a proposition from its structural elasticity, the reliance on LEM leads to failures of the exclusion of the middle term—hence to the isolation of logic from truth. In a moment, we take another look at von Domarus’ observation. First consider sociopolitical context vis-à-vis LEM.

Socio-Political Context and the Law of Excluded Middle Ladder of supervenience: Sociopolitical structures. With these vicissitudes in applying the law of excluded middle in a sociopolitical context, exacerbations can affect a non-paranoid individual. It is not necessary here to broadly consider whether the Trumper’s dynamic psychology and/or developmental histories are the same as the paranoid’s. Even without that grand compression, I can point again to specific Trumpers’ similarities to the paranoid. Those are in the logical structures—particularly the ones pivoting on issues of agency. Sociopolitical structures (sps) are dependent on supervening laws and principles (splp) codified to govern those sps structures. In turn, the

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reliance on laws is dependent on the operative structure of legal reasoning rules, principles, and resolutions (rrrpr.).9 Symbolically summarize this supervenience ordering in terms of logical inclusion, as   Sps ⊆ splpsplp ⊆ rrrpr. Moreover, thought and communication inevitably intermix with this set of reliances on laws. The upshot of this intermixing is another isolation of truth—this, from the legal and logical issues and practices of judgment applied to truth. The Return of von Domarus via Peirce’s Focus and Werner’s View of Developmental Vicissitudes. Return to the psychology of the paranoid as it is informed by logic and schematics. The paranoid constructs logical relations of agency to the ‘I’ as a subject. They take the form of contradictory propositions about agency’s psychological relation to the ‘I’ as subject—and the interrelation of such logical constructions with ‘truth.’ (The I ‘is’ an agent—the I is not an agent! Even were ‘I’ to say only either; my saying so is a contradiction like a candle, ‘burning at both ends.’) The law of excluded middle is being correctly applied at an overgeneralized level, and the sub-class ‘violations’ seemingly properly characterized as such. The intermixing has the effect of isolating the truth from our ability to point to and grasp it. Finding it is like the search in ‘Where in the world is Waldo’! von Domarus’ observation that paranoids failed to apply the LEM principle does not cover the issues involved. In general, its having been evaluated within its applicability to nosological categories is a problem. Given that the world in which truth is to be found is an intermixture of thought, its levels, and logic and its levels, a ‘structural look’ is the antidote. In Russell’s terms, this would be a view that could handle the ‘relational’ nature of a mixed bag of propositions (Tatievskaia 1999). The structural view would provide perspective on the mix (different levels and different, but relatable particulars) that would allow for a nesting of propositions. This nested nature of propositions provides the clue to the fate and destiny of LEM. Can we say just where that rule is a muddle—just where it does not work? Peirce’s principle tells us LEM does not apply to generalized terms—and propositions. Put all this together with von Domarus’ notion of a thinking pathology as one disengaging the rule. Perhaps a clearer way

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of showing the relation of the rule violation to the paranoid’s problem is to conceptualize the paranoid thinker as reacting to concepts and categories as ‘general.’ Paranoids may simply abnegate the conflicts between a general reading of the unit and that which is within specific instantiations of the units they are processing. Thus, if a specific application of a general Constitutional law conflicts with the general meaning, the ‘beauty’ of the logic of the general meaning can be retained, if the specific level is denied, denigrated, or shifted to another domain of meaning.

Analogy, Agency and the Challenges to Simulation To take into its purview logical and psychological modes, the SV would aim to utilize ‘simulation’ to provide a logic that can go back and forth with analogical formats. Agency could be various and variously located. An individual can launch a decision from within his awareness of self in action or as an observer of that action. His sense of agency may be attributed to how he feels others’ would—or should—act. So, agency could be in a list of ‘commandments’—or ‘negotiating tactics’—as from Trump’s ‘Art of the Deal.’ For a Trumper, agency could be present in following the conclusion of Trump’s reasoning. The assignment of agency may be made consciously or unconsciously. Orchestration of agency and the individual’s phases of conscious and unconscious forms of thought are major issues. Zizzi and Pregnolato (2013) summarize that ‘the schizophrenic mind remains trapped in the unconscious logical mode too long’ (p. 1037). This appears an instance of ‘conscious’ and ‘unconscious’ agency affected by psychological issues of awareness. There appears a complex interaction and interrelation of psychological processes, epistemic realms (subjective and observable), thought, and communicative representation. Such complexity of interrelations inheres within any manifold of knowledge. Logic twists to impose its form and its different modes in different manifestations at different levels of any manifold of knowledge. To specify the interrelations, to set up analogies proposing newer and deeper understandings and that can lead to penetration of the complex structure, requires some way of making for a mediating view—in this book, the SV. To be sure, as Colby views them, logical patterns—whether manifestations in the paranoid’s or in a non-paranoid’s statements—would be open to possible material causes. The logic patterns are linked not only to

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schematic ones; but also to interactions with person variables, including their embodiment status. Are all these logic  schematic and schema ↔ schema relations of ‘linked’ patterns? In the ‘world’ of baseball, look for patterns in a batter’s batting stance and ‘link’ them to patterns in the arm movements of the pitcher throwing the ball. The pitcher’s and batter’s frames of movement relate within that same ‘world.’ Analogies based on movement speed and arcs are subject to the same physics. Theoretically, they are also open to ‘predisposing’ and contributing causes, such as specific neural configurations. Perhaps also, in the ‘whirlings’ of the different actors in the world of thought and communication, proposed specific syntactical structurings and their psychological significance can be related to neurological structures. Such relations are on levels structurally distant from each other. Their connection via material cause would require all sorts of articulation of other organizational and ontological ‘levels’ of structuring and causation. We invoke the idea of a specific ‘connection’ between a person’s syntactic structuring and a presumably powerful material basis in neurological structures or phenomena. Should we not instead, call that invoked connection what it is, viz., the reduction of the syntactic structuring to a material phenomenon on either side of a schema? A specific connection with the presumably powerful material basis of neurological structures or phenomena is not the focus of explanation, either in Colby’s proposals and project (e.g. Colby et al. 1972); or by me in this present book. (Too many traps would spring. For starters, these include the plethora of possible inter and intra subsystem patterns of causal interaction and problems of reflexivity and haecceity.) A structural view seems promising, but opening the knowledge manifold produces the opposite to reduction—variegation of possible foci. How about logic to hold things together—operating as the spine of a structural view? On one side, categorical logic would appear intrinsic to logical thinking or processing of thinking. On the other, categorical logic shall have been replicated via programming of negation rules in logic gates and in the pervading use of Boolean logic. Is it the case that the very computational nature of logic can work its way to liberalize it—to create different modes and their contingencies? Peregrin (2016) argues convincingly that … logic does not tell us how to reason in the sense of instructing us how to weave our webs of our beliefs effectively. It makes explicit the

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constitution of the most powerful, and most general, cognitive tools we have – disjunction, implication, negation etc. – and in this way it makes for the very possibility of having beliefs and weaving their web. (pp. 158–159)

Peregrin thus provides a sweeping analysis of the fundamental functions of logic in reason, rhetorical objectives and projects, and a variety of attempts. These are epistemic (i.e. aimed at producing knowledge that is psychologically based or based on social agreement to selected ways of asserting the claim of knowledge is justified). He argues that ‘logic’ is not a guide to ensuring ‘truth’ in any of these projects or their claims. Instead, logic serves as a coherent set of rules to be applied—perhaps with variation, but applicable in the several epistemic pursuits. These pursuits include the psychological and the social spheres as selected domains for which to search for, find, assemble, and assert knowledge. We will take this characterization as consonant with a structural view that utilizes ‘logic gates’ and their capacities to govern and deploy basic logical rules. The knowledge accruable by simulation and that extends to understandings of the ‘Trio,’ is thus based on this assumption: The logic gates provide fundamental rules including rules whereby negation and negation patterns allow change in the configuration of contradictions in a given domain.10 Negation and its patterns are themselves fundamental ‘gates’ to alternation of thought—not only in its accessible and knowable specifics, but also in the propositional constructions the thinker can assume and put forth as an agent—both as choice of action and belief about what is a state of affairs. In 1929, Ryle saw this relation between negation and the ‘disjunctive set’ of predicates that can alternate as dispositive in the way a person conceives and decides within an epistemic pattern of truth, belief, and logical course of agency and action. He wrote, …when a ‘predicate’ is denied of a ‘subject’, that predicate must always be thought as one member of a disjunctive set, some other member of which set (not necessarily specified) is asserted to be predicable of the subject. (1929, p. 5)

The capacity for alternating the pattern and the particulars of its content revolves around the logical governance of negation. We will take this characterization as consonant with a structural view that utilizes ‘logic gates’ and their capacities to govern and deploy basic logical rules. This capacity gives flexibility to the logical understructure of the language and

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thought, generically—and specifically to the analysis that would penetrate the understructures of the language and thought (the individual beliefs and their social expression—as applicable to the target phenomena in the Trio. Ergo, my proposal: We can make observations that seem to cut across from logic in thought to logic via programmed rules, such as played out via logic gates. Consider the range of phenomena—(a) within the program, (b) in the programming, and (c) in governing the output of computer-produced information, its course procedurally, and its application to information. Is this connection to logic gates and Boolean logic and its scope enough of an analogue to go further than simply parallel ‘“logical” switches’ and gates at a neuronal level?11 Is the logic-tothought connection convincing enough to justify a structural model for a multifarious knowledge complex—one including human thought and its vicissitudes? Or, are we simply—too simplistically—making the target knowledge complex an analogy between human and computer cognitive production and representation? Let’s see if an analogy is or has to remain a mere reduction. Before we do, we re-assert the SV as in line with its provision for ‘a body of rules.’ These are not only rules from the vantage point of logical forms—and their relation to thought. They are also syntactic rules determining expression of thought in language. The SV would be structured like Nelson Goodman’s idea of a ‘symbol system’ (Giovannelli 2017). In virtue of its range of syntactic and logical forms, that system constitutes a body of rules that … consists of a symbol scheme… i.e., of a collection of symbols, or “characters,” with rules to combine them into new, compound characters— associated to a field of reference. … [its] syntactical rules—determining how to form and combine characters—the system by semantic rules— determining how the range of symbols in the scheme refers to their field of reference. (s/s 3.2)

Structure: Perspectivizing or Indulging Reduction? Persons we regard as paranoid appear to reliably use a logic system denying causation as others would present it. Where a non-paranoid person does present a cause or source of causation, it would typically

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involve two steps for the paranoid: (1) deny or negate the source (2) deny the outcome. The use of negation can be seen q. e. d. in such ‘immature’ defense mechanisms as denial and projection. Melanie Klein’s (1946) psychoanalytic thesis was the ‘schizoid-paranoid position’ has its origins in an early stage. She used the word ‘position’ (instead of ‘stage.’) There is recent concord with Klein’s conception. Segal (2011, p. vii) explains the term ‘position’ implies the concept ‘Basic modes of psychic organization’. Spillius (2007, p. 35) attributes the term ‘position’ to ‘an organization of typical anxieties, defense mechanism, and object relations.’ Both developmental and organizational explanations of the ‘position’ concept are consonant with, accessible to, and realizable as a structural view. These origins would ineluctably predestine the ‘position’s’ recurrence in the paranoid individual. In their statistical study, Ciocca et al. (2017) find in paranoid cases, … it is possible that there is a hyper-activation of immature defence mechanisms in which negative aspects of self, characterizing paranoia … are projected to other people, such as in a maladaptive response. (p. 166)

To offer sentences for Colby’s simulation, Colby et al. (1971, p. 15) provide an “‘I-O’ [input-output] behavioral repertoire of a model [that] corresponds to the I-O behavioral repertoire of the modeled human process.” In the grammatical (and schematic) structure of the sentence meanings to be programmed, we can see the paranoid ‘defenses’ activated. In those sentences’ format, the causal agent is exchanged and an ‘opposite’ effect or outcome substituted. This exchange appears pro forma, when agency is attributed to a ‘paranoid’ person (or rather, to its simulation). These ‘opposite propositions,’ simulated as linguistic responses, instantiate the generally agreed upon theoretical nature of the paranoid reaction. As Colby et al. reason, to have a category of persons as ‘paranoid’ suggests relative stability in the categorized person’s deployment of these logical variations and their syntactic forms. These variations and forms include the two-step denial of the source of causation and the outcome—irrespective of the locus from which a claim is made. Paranoid or not, we have here a run of operations of negations and double negations that can include these sub-patterns: The source of an ‘original’ claim can be anyone—including the person issuing the denial. Moreover, the denial counterclaim can be made by anyone or anything. This includes the denial counterclaim to the prior claim by the person

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making the original claim. In addition, as a full-throttle action, the claim being denied can have been a counterclaim.12 The dominant issue is the source denied is the ‘Other’—who sometimes could be a former self. In the case of Trump, so much and so many claims are, at the very outset, counter-claimed by a negation of the ‘Other’s’ claim, the Trumper’s easiest path is to join the declamation. So, the path of least resistance is the denial of contradiction, and the elevation of denial to a truth status! Nexuses for neurological and logical accounts accessible in SV. The pattern of logical variation vis-à-vis syntactic form co-occurs in a remarkably stable pattern in the paranoid, in Trump, and in the Trumper. We note from several perspectives why that stability in pattern and perspective may be there—and may be counted on to co-occur and recur—as matters not merely in the person’s output, but in her determinative subsystems. All of this replicability within the patterns’ various levels can easily point us to the NCC thesis: The stability within and across individuals would be a matter of neurological wiring or some other physiological set of determinative pathways. Contrariwise, we do not have to be reductive as our way of matching up with a structural view such as a simulation based on computer logic and syntax program and product. An SV can match up with other determinative levels. Is computer logic and syntax (CCC) best cast as NCC or as ‘Person’s Cognitive Correlates’ (PCC)? Suppose a Trumper believes a claim, and there is a credible assault on it: It is not a fact. Or, it is a belief something is true, but ‘factually,’ a false belief. Were that person, as thinker, to take those assaults seriously, she would be ‘out in the cold.’ Could not our ‘thinking’ Trumper string together all the negations involved and sift out what is not ‘true’? Not so fast. However codifiable the balancing of those negations would be, she would still be out in the cold. Why would a person subject herself to this pile of assaults? Psychodynamic reasons explain how she could sustain it. In the face of the logical variation and the need for syntactic form stability, a chain of declamations provides a way out. One such declamation is pivotal for the paranoid and the Trumper: The acceptance of self in a causal position is too conflictful in regard to the assumptions of responsibility, or even to projected attributions of causality to others. So, the declamation may be via a substitute causal linkage. Chaining across layers of cognitive dynamics and processing. Suppose we attempt a linking that appears removed—or mightily distant from—a neurological explanation. We define ‘conflict’ in terms of competing motives, and regard the choice of one over the other as an

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assessment task. The thinker’s difficulty in choosing may be a cognitive deficit, such as inability to evaluate multiples of cost/benefit in comparing two sets of options. As a quick example, for some individuals any choice can become a ‘double-bind.’ For them, the only way out is to declaim agency where choice is involved. To safeguard, a paranoid principle can obtain in the extreme: No ‘I’ in the causal slot is not converted by negation to its complement (‘~I’). Withal, the major point remains a structural one: the paranoid person is reliably committed to a given logic system with its rules of contradiction and identity applicable to given syntactic patterns. To be paranoid is to have a stable pattern; hence the ‘home’ for that pattern would be a dynamically balanced ‘entity’ with the tendency to maintain that balance. The tendency would presumably cross subsystems of thought and representation and also of developmental structures—as they would function across different periods of time in the individual’s functioning and development. (This would mean the negation of agency has psychodynamic origins and consequences.) In this stabilizing, it is more to the point to say that ‘entity’ is a person, as opposed to an attitude or attitude cluster. We are supposing the paranoid phenomenon involves a governing system with subsystems, instead of being a subsystem like an attitude, which may in its own variability be less stable. In all, the structural approach to a paranoid can be fit to its systematized variations. For this approach, the program and its simulations proffer a prevailing and enduring logic system. It characterizes persons, who appear ‘paranoid,’ and it governs their thoughts and representations. That logic system, if specified, opens the possibility not only of understandings, but also ‘structural’ remedies. These could be much in the scope of presuming metacognitive functioning and its access to remediation (Cf. Bernstein et al. 2015). A generic assumption is change in paranoid or paranoidlike communication could be a function of a superposing logic or other structural change. That structural change might be a result of communication patterns or modes—and more challengingly—it could be the cause of those patterns. Such change can be via a ‘chatbot.’ Fulmer et al. (2018) report Tess is a chatbot—in the style of ELIZA. It is customizable, and has been used to implement counseling inspired reactions to patient statements.

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Therapists and counselors can contribute to how they would answer patient statements. The chatbot is programmed accordingly. Even more intriguing is the assumption the change can be one affecting the person’s thinking and report of thinking, as in communication with an other person. That would require a structural view, and would advance from communication to a metacognitive approach. Based on Colby’s PARRY computer simulation, Faught (1978) presents a theory of the paranoid person. In that theory, the paranoid’s belief system is characterized by ‘rigidity’ and the ‘person’s beliefs remain fixed …’ (p. 68). These descriptions appear in tune with ‘common sense observations,’ and, as well, with the reports of the Trumper’s reactions. The common sense position would be a paranoid’s system of thinking is a closed one— eminently stable and predictable. That state of affairs would be accounted for in psychoanalytic terms as the product of an early centrally determinative stage of development. Famously, as alluded to above, psychoanalyst, Melanie Klein did propose an early psychodynamic onset of what she labeled the schizoid-paranoid position, viz. … a constellation of anxieties, defences and internal and external object relations that Klein considers to be characteristic of the earliest months of an infant’s life and to continue to a greater or lesser extent into childhood and adulthood. Contemporary understanding is that paranoidschizoid mental states play an important part throughout life. (Spillius and Hinshelwood 2011, p. 63)

Moreover, … schizoid ways of relating are never given up completely…. (p. 64).

The common sense position and the force of a critical developmental stage are each versions of the paranoid system as stable and predictable. Yet, counter to both, the closedness of the system may be penetrable by logically inspired and syntactically constructed alteration. Possibilities of pattern change may be presented to the paranoid, and because of the exposure of negation patterns, a ‘mode for restructuration’ introduced. This is not to restrict such possibilities to specific countermeasures such as Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT). As a general structural feature, despite the closed system, a ‘mode for restructuration’ can at the least

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coexist ‘outside’ the paranoid’s acceptance of the rules of schematization and its inversions of subjects and objects. There is always the possibility paranoid statements—even paranoid attitudes—are assimilated to pragmatic purposes. The pragmatic can be associated with and/or assimilated to psychopathic, and/or sociopathic purposes—and, as well, for political purposes, as the great orator Cicero pointed out in instructions on how to keep listener’s opinions and sentiments in check (Cicero and Tr. Watson 1875). The Trumpers’ allegiance—no matter what—to Trump’s beliefs may be a function of divergence that takes place in an early paranoid trend, or perhaps as a deep denial of it. (To explain, the paranoid trend is to negate and disagree. ‘Deep denial’ may be to agree no matter what. This logical conversion is ‘structurally’ very like the ‘ultra-paradoxical logic’ Pavlov described.) In either divergence or denial—as does a ‘paranoid core,’ the Trumper’s core appears heavily committed to the use of negation patterns, steadfast in the resultant beliefs, and closed to counterargument. The SV pays off—not by its articulating the whole set of internal relations of substructures. Instead, it reveals echoic resonance in some substructures, such that there appears more than one point of leverage for effecting change. Certain combinations of these substructures could be at work; they could have the potential of change agents—yet not interfere with history or dynamic balance to produce leverage, analogues for change, and differences in the paranoid components of cognitive products. This set of sub-structural resonances, as potentials, could make a significant contribution to the ‘knowledge complex’ at issue. All this—however present or learnable—does not deny the inventiveness or ‘immunity to facts or counter-evidence’ of the person dedicated to an absurd proposition (or conspiracy theory). The book’s purpose is not to argue the case for an overarching logic to govern and change a pathological one. Rather the presentation of alternate structuring would have two functions: (a) to illuminate just what the commitments are, and (b) to provide possibilities of change through alternate formats. In all, my proposal is to include within the SV, (1) its window on the paranoid’s (and the Trumper’s) approach to schematization along with the issues of a logic modality, (2) possible alternative paths in schematization and possible changes in and of logical modality. Orchestrating the two— schematics and logic modality—significantly increases the strength of the change possibilities.

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Colby achieved a two-step demonstration of his thesis that he could identify the structural basis for paranoid ‘thinking’—or at least, for its display. For one thing, the identification was instantiated by his computer program, PARRY (1972). Second, the program was put to a test. He achieved convincing results when some judges could not distinguish protocol products of ‘real paranoids’ from those of PARRY. Judges were asked to determine whether ‘computerbot’ responses in a question/answer dialogue were those of a person. Heiser et al. (1979) report the degree of correct response that passed the Turing Test (Also see Warwick and Shah 2016). Viz, for a good number of cases, the ‘program’ was judged to be a ‘real person.’ Colby viewed the PARRY program along with its passing the Turing test. His (1975) major assumption was that paranoid thinking is ‘a mode of processing symbols’ and that mode will have been based on ‘[a]n underlying organized structure of rules’ (quoted by Boden 2008, p. 370). Technically—and this is very important—he showed the likelihood this structure of rules was the basis for the paranoid person’s report—i.e., the linguistic expression of such a person’s thinking. Colby’s (1981) interest, as he reviewed it, was less in the ‘Turing test’ as an empirical marker for the effectiveness of his PARRY product. It was more in that he sought a ‘structural equivalence.’ He described that objective this way: A structural equivalence involves inferring a similarity between the relations or structures of an algorithm and its postulated counterpart in humans. The equivalence lies in a propagated similarity of processes and structures, more abstract than the manifest analogy of input/output behavior. When a relation holds between two central components of a model, a corresponding relation is posited to hold between corresponding components of the modeled entity. (1981, p. 532)

In logical and syntactic terms, the upshot of the structural explanation would be a description of the logic modality, and—if I can coin the term—the schema modality. Logic and Schema modalities. The logic modality, as I sum it up, can be ‘classical,’ if the particulars for a category ‘… follow non-contradiction, and in the case of induction, consistency’ (Fisher 2017a, p. 6). This modality serves the forming of working concepts by way of induction and deduction. Contrariwise, the modality can also legitimize ‘abductive’ thinking, as a pattern of forming concepts from a key particular that

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can be predictive. Gabbay and Woods (2001) insert a version of Peirce’s concept of this ‘abductive’ way of reasoning into a pragmatic trend on the part of the thinker, as agent. As they put it (p. 150), ‘Part of what a logical agent does is make abductions.’ They offer their idea of a logical reasoning sequence (footnote 10, p. 150): The inference sanctioned by this rule can be schematized as follows. 1. S is arguing that p is the case. 2. I have no knowledge of anything amiss with this argument. 3. So I accept that p. Read ‘S’ to stand for Trump; ‘I’ for the Trumper: This sequence applies to the Trumper, for whom step 2 is a negation of anything in the complementary class of the belief of ‘S.’ Thus, for the Trumper, no knowledge, no knowledge presented, to be presented, and no argument against either can declare Trump’s argument false. It is important to see ‘knowledge’ is the issue, not merely putative ‘fact.’ That dubbed a ‘fact’ would have to be believed to be such. Belief is subject to negation and its arguments. On that account, no argument declared as true, if it is not declared true by Trump, can be believed.13 With all this, and with these belief/doubt rules extended both to past and future time contexts, for the Trumper, as ‘true believer,’ the logic gate may be rusted shut. For non-extreme and non-paranoid individuals, to open the applicable logic gate may also demand a good deal of agentive gyration. Since a ‘logical rule’ is being broken, the gyration requires movement to the outside of the subsystem borders marked by the above reasoning sequence.14 These subsystems are of logical domains and rules as units. All these—at each level of inclusion—include their set of rules of internal transaction and external governance. Those immediately involved logical rules are T/F rules > argument > proposition > class and complement. In association with these are the psychological subsystems of belief and doubt. In the face of these rules, and their echoic appearances at the different system levels, keep this fundamental premise in mind: As Gabbay and Woods (2000, p. 96) phrase it, ‘… a logic is a formal idealization of a logical agent.’ With their idea, the agent can be social, sociological, and/or a computer generating function. Splitting agency that way gives

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room to the variety of loci of agency in a knowledge complex. In regard to the paranoid and the Trumper, relocation of agency becomes a major issue. That is because any self-located agency is (a) a very sensitive psychological juncture for negation and denial, and (b) subject to relocation—at least as the negation of the non-agency of the ‘Other.’ The potential for a structural analysis may include ways of opening gates that block access to different agency loci.15 Wooldridge (2000) discusses a computational model of ‘epistemic modality,’ which can attribute or affect agent functions in carrying information. This approach can yield a structural analysis not only of agency, but also of its relation to the schema. The schema and its forms interact with logic and its modalities. In brief: ‘The schema is a generic set of organizing rules for the “whole” object’ (Fisher 2017b, p. 71). As I summarize Otto Selz’ critical concept, the ‘anticipatory schema’ (1922, for example), it … appears to be Selz’s recognition of three cognitive capabilities: The first is de facto knowledge of a relationship … The second is the ability to designate a relationship as symbolic. This is the ‘psychological structuring,’ which he casts as schematization. The anticipatory schema makes use of this aspect of schematization. It enables a third capability—to evoke a new and ‘coordinate’ relation. This is a critical capacity for applying what we already know as the leverage by which to achieve new knowledge. (Fisher 2017b, pp. 63–64)

In line with Selz’ analysis of the ‘anticipatory schema,’ we come to what I’ve termed, the schema modality. It entails that the form’s function can vary in accord with the use of symbolic representations. This variation in function as the schema’s mode can be fit to an interrelation with the logic’s mode. That is tilted toward a more generic governance of form and its bounds. Bergson (1902) and Bergson and Carr (1920) had formed a cogent view of transformative …movement of the “dynamic scheme” in the direction of the image which develops it. It is a continuous transformation of abstract relations, suggested by the objects perceived, into concrete images capable of recovering those objects. (Bergson 1902; Bergson and Carr 1920, p. 210)

The transformation as I picture it takes logical form, but a logic mode can liberalize the rule of contradiction: rules of contradiction and identity do not have to apply. The schema modality’s liberalization can take aim

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at rules of diachronic time and spatial position. With the use of symbolic representations, these rules (e.g., Fisher 2017b, p. 64) also do not have to apply. The schema can take on contingencies affecting time sequence: the diachronic format can be suspended. By observing what is in a future time zone, the future can affect the present (see Dowden 2019). That comprises interpolation from what happens in the future to what may happen from the present going forward. Clearly, schema contingencies can advance imaginative thinking. As Simon (2007) recognized, Selz’ concept of the anticipatory schema as a form accommodates, if not advances, productive thinking. As a form, this version of the schema provides for a mechanical-type sequence by which cognitive processing can proceed with unknowns. That is a great contribution to problem solving as a task involving the identification of new elements in the relationship that would resolve a problem. Selz’ approach is to symbolize the unknowns. The cognitive processing is then open. The terms for the logic of this processing (as one contingent on ratio) are not specified. Nor, in effect, are they conceptualized or codified as analogical comparisons. Yet, with all this left open and not specified, there can be attention to schematic elements and sequence and its symbolized ‘unknowns.’ This attention is a contribution to the articulation of the relations within the ‘knowledge complex.’ However, it falls short of specifying the full advantages of a structural view. What’s needed? Notably, the SV adds the recognition of abstract symbols as computable and as instrumental in finding new ways to configure logical groupings. They function analogically, not reaching categorical form, yet refining to the point of ‘analogues.’ The introduction of a schema modality perforce admits ‘analogues.’ These are not strictly logical as bounded entities. Their ‘If A then B’ sequence is merely hypothetical— established by depending on a future event to construct a factor that would operate in a forward-moving cause–effect direction. So, there is a way forward. In the thought process following these rules, forms, and contingencies, the movement, if assigned to logic gates, is toward the achievement of identity and contradiction as basic rules for the integrity of cognitive objects and their transactions. Structural explanation in logical and syntactic terms. In search of the SV, my application of Colby’s objectives appears in line with his aim to create a structural entity for the ‘paranoid’ individual. I aim the forms of PARRY and their analogies at creating a structural entity like a

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‘computerbot.’ While it appears a ringer for a ‘Trumper,’ its PARRY armature and its relation to the paranoid would reflect—as if a three-paneled mirror—parallel appearances for the paranoid, the Trumper, and Trump. With these reflections of Trump and the Trumper and sociopolitical context, the objective would shift its focus to social values, effects, and functioning. That is not my endgame. I am more interested in showing an outcome such as this ‘structural entity’ can compel your thinking to focus the cognitive architecture of the ‘Trumper.’ In a word, my proposal is for a structural viewing point that can float in and out of an architecture and foster change in forms and relations in its dual loci—(a) its internal loci and (b) its position, structure and function in a context outside it.

Notes 1. This process Selz labeled ‘anticipatory.’ He (and more generally, the Würzburg School) might call it ‘productive thinking’ (Simon 1981). 2. The distinctions between the schema and the frame are best summed up by considering thought and logic as more closely tied to the schema, and information, as the more limited purview of the frame. Corcoran and Hamid (2016) describe an encompassing view of the schema. They provide links (and their limit as links) between the schema and logical forms. Tannen (1985) and Tannen and Wallat (1987) discuss frames and schemas—attributing the more encompassing function of constituting a ‘knowledge structure’ to the schema. They mean this in a way specific to either the interpretation or the collection of information needed for a specific target, situation, or topic. 3. A succinct account traces the law of non-contradiction (LNC) and the principle of ‘excluded middle’ (LEM) to Aristotle: For Aristotle, LNC is understood primarily not as the principle that no proposition can be true simultaneously with its negation, but as a prima facie rejection of the possibility that any predicate F could both hold and not hold of a given subject (at the same time, and in the same respect). A full rendering of the version of LNC appearing at Metaphysics 1006b33–34—‘It is not possible to truly say at the same time of a thing that it is a man and that it is not a man’— would require a representation involving operators for modality and truth and allowing quantification over times … In the same way, LEM is not actually the principle that every statement is either true

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or has a true negation, but the law that for any predicate F and any entity x, x either is F or isn’t F. (Horn 2018) 4. Duncker (1945) conceived ‘functional fixedness’ as a block to conceiving something differently in a particular use. 5. Encyclopaedia Britannica provides this definition: A heterarchy possesses a flexible structure made up of interdependent units, and the relationships between those units are characterized by multiple intricate linkages that create circular paths rather than hierarchical ones. Heterarchies are best described as networks of actors—each of which may be made up of one or more hierarchies—that are variously ranked according to different metrics. (Heterarchy 2014) 6. If modality is the watchword, there may be linguistic/semantic, but also logical modalities. The possible contradictions in the semantics of terms may be different from the categorical possibilities for contradiction of propositions. 7. We referenced shortcomings as shown by attempts to study schizophrenic vs non-schizophrenic reasoning. Williams (1964) using syllogisms did not find for the effect of schizophrenics versus normals. Mellet et al. (2006) as did Cardella and Gangemi (2015) found schizophrenics reasoned better than normals on some tasks. 8. To get a closer look at Peirce’s terms, regard this interpretation from Lane: … internal negation is a contrary-forming operation on general propositions and a subcontrary-forming operation on vague, or indefinite, propositions. And insofar as it applies to predicates, it means only that internal negation is a contrary-forming operation on general predications, which are construed by Peirce as universal quantifications, and that internal negation is a subcontrary-forming operation on vague, or imprecise, predications, which are construed by Peirce as existential quantification. (p. 698) Note: the negation logic seems to work if the negation is internal to the general proposition. It does not work if the proposition is vague or imprecise—or existential. LEM would work with internal negations of general propositions but not indefinite ones. 9. The reliance on laws is dependent on political and moral considerations in different societies (Raz 1971, 1990).

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10. The idea of ‘logic gates’ arises several times. In more than one way, it is critical for the conception as well for the functions of the SV. The reader might first look back to the general idea in note 6 as introduction to note 31 below, and then read ahead to note 31 for elaboration. 11. The ‘logic-gate’ concept has been conceived as one that can navigate levels from the neurological to the computational. Goldental et al. (2014, p. 1) citing the ‘1943 McCulloch and Pitts’ idea ‘the brain is composed of reliable logic-gates,’ propose ‘a computational paradigm in which the brain consists of dynamic logic gates (DLGs) which are governed by time dependent logic modes.’ They set out the following: A dynamic AND gate and a dynamic OR gate; a dynamic NOT gate, a dynamic XOR gate, a dynamic AND gate. A dynamic GENERALIZED AND gate; a dynamic XOR gate. These are ‘constructed to parallel particular arrangements of neural cells… ‘and weak/strong stimulations’ (2014, pp. 5–6; 8/10; 12; 14). 12. This run appears very accessible to a simulation via a series of negation gate operations. 13. This is a very big issue, since the evaluation of any argument requires going outside the argument to a principle for evaluation. That’s where the logic within and outside the argument gets caught in circularities and the problems with excluded middle obtrude. 14. The scientist (particularly interested in psychological issues) may cope, moving out of a gated domain by ‘pragmatizing’ her logic—a là Peirce’s methods of ‘paragmaticism,’ and abduction. 15. Hopefully! Remember in Disney’s Fantasia, the sorcerer’s apprentice makes a broom that cannot stop reproducing no matter how it is cut up into pieces.

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Lane, R. (1997). Peirce’s “entanglement” with the principles of excluded middle and contradiction. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 33(3), 680– 703. Matherne, S. (2014). Kant and the art of schematism. Kantian Review, 19(2), 181–205. Matte Blanco, I. (1975). The unconscious as infinite sets. London: Duckworth. Mellet, E., Houdé, O., Brazo, P., Mazoyer, B., Tzourio-Mazoyer, N., & Dollfus, S. (2006). When a schizophrenic deficit becomes a reasoning advantage. Schizophrenia Research, 84(2–3), 359–364. Peregrin, J. (2016). What is (modern) logic taken to be about and what it is about. Organon F, 23(2), 142–161. Raz, J. (1971). Legal principles and the limits of law. Yale Law Journal, 81, 823. Raz, J. (1990). The politics of the rule of law. Ratio Juris, 3(3), 331–339. Ryle, G. (1929). Negation. Reprinted from ‘Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society’, suppl. vol. to vol. IX, 1929, by permission of the editor. In Ryle, G. (2009; 1971). Collected papers volume 2 collected essays 1929–1968. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge and Taylor & Francis e-Library. Segal, H. (2011). Introduction. In M. Klein (Ed.), Envy and gratitude and other works, 1946–1963. New York: Random House. Selz, O. (1922/1981). The psychology of productive thinking and of error: A condensed version. In N. H. Frijda & A. D. De Groot (Eds.), Otto Selz: His contribution to psychology (pp. 106–146). The Hague and New York: Mouton. Simon, H. A. (1981). Otto Selz and information-processing psychology. In N. H. Frijda & A. D. de Groot (Eds.), Otto Selz: His contribution to psychology (pp. 147–163). The Hague, the Netherlands: Mouton. Simon, H. A. (2007). Karl Dunker and cognitive science. In J. Valsiner (Ed.), Thinking in psychological science: Ideas and their makers (pp. 3–16). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Skov, M., & Nadal, M. (2018). Art is not special: An assault on the last lines of defense against the naturalization of the human mind. Reviews in the Neurosciences, 29(6), 699–702. Skov, M., & Nadal, M. (2019). The nature of perception and emotion in aesthetic appreciation: A response to Makin’s challenge to empirical aesthetics. Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts. Advance online publication. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/aca0000278. Spillius, E. (2007). Encounters with Melanie Klein: Selected papers of Elizabeth Spillius. London and New York: Routledge. Spillius, E. B., & Hinshelwood, R. D. (2011). The new dictionary of Kleinian thought. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Tannen, D. (1985). Frames and schemas in interaction. Quaderni di Semantica, 6(2), 326–335.

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Tannen, D., & Wallat, C. (1987). Interactive frames and knowledge schemas in interaction: Examples from a medical examination/interview. Social Psychology Quarterly, 50, 205–216. Tatievskaia, E. (1999). On logical form. In J. L. Falguera López, J. L. Falguera, U. Rivas, & J. M. Sagüillo (Eds.), Proceedings of the International Congress Analytic Philosophy at the Turn of the Millennium. Santiago de Compostela = Actas del Congreso Internacional La Filosofía Analítica en el Cambio de Milenio: Santiago de Compostela (pp. 133–142). Servicio de Publicaciones. Valsiner, J. (Ed.). (2005). Heinz Werner and developmental science. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers. von Domarus, E. (1944). The specific laws of logic in schizophrenia. In J. S. Kassanin (Ed.), Language and thought in schizophrenia (pp. 104–114). Berkeley: University of California Press. Warwick, K., & Shah, H. (2016). Turing’s imitation game: Conversations with the unknown. Cambridge and New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Werner, H. (1926). Einfuhrung in du Entwicklufgpsychologie [Introduction to developmental psychology]. Leipzig: Barth. Werner, H. (1957). Comparative psychology of mental development (Rev. ed.). New York: International Universities Press (Original work published 1926). Wiest, G. (2012). Neural and mental hierarchies. Frontiers in psychology, 3(516), 1–7. https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00516/full. Williams, E. B. (1964). Deductive reasoning in schizophrenia. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 69(1), 47–61. https://doi.org/10.1037/ h0044311. Wooldridge, M. (2000). Computationally grounded theories of agency. In MultiAgent Systems, 2000. Proceedings. Fourth International Conference (pp. 13– 20). IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers). Zizzi, P., & Pregnolato, M. (2013). Mind, logic and mental diseases. Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research, 4(10), 1033–1040.

CHAPTER 7

The Proactive SV: Logical Form, Truth, and Sociopolitical Analogies

Abstract Belief, doubt, and truth are subject to ‘modal contingencies’ based on negation’s roles and contexts. Logical roles reflect and motivate psychological and logical needs for spatio/temporal replication. Belief can occur by defining a goal and operations to achieve it. Social role directs modal contingencies to the logic of Trump’s, Trumpers,’ and ‘paranoid’ individuals’ beliefs. Social role can account for logic determining the psychologists’, psychiatrists,’ or social scientists’ beliefs. Logical roles of belief, doubt, and truth play out in contexts requiring social utility. They and the schemas’ various forms are a function of basic psychological and logical needs for spatio/temporal replication. SV’s assignments of modality to schemas and logical relations expand knowledge complex patterns. SV’s viewing point is moveable within or to a point outside the patterns it compares. Truth and doubt are sociopolitical judgments expressed in linguistic patterns and related to logic subject to modalities of interaction with psychological dynamics. Keywords Belief · Doubt · Truth · Psychological dynamics · Modalities of interaction · Sociopolitical judgments

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The SV and Its Effects on the Picture of Cognitive Objects, Outcomes, and their Structures Object Structure and the Inner and Outer Determinant Structures. I evoke an architectural analogy. It relates not only the inner to the outer structure, but also an outer to an inner structure. Sun (2012) depicts multiple interacting social, psychological, and neurophysiological levels of an architecture as linking and/or crossing each other and even producing ‘mixed levels.’ He (2006, p. 11) illustrates this in a diagram showing the ‘correspondence between levels with a cascade of maps of different resolutions’ (Sun 2004, p. 8) (Diagram 7.1). Sun’s diagram of ‘cascading levels of analysis’ with its multiple possible foci calls for an account of loci that would serve as ‘viewing points.’ We expand the manifold here to the concept of the ‘knowledge complex.’

Diagram 7.1 Sun’s diagram, ‘Figure 1.1 The cascading levels of analysis’

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For a viewing point opening to a cognitive architecture you can ‘see,’ I choose (SV)—a structural model describing a perspectival point of focus relative to a manifold. Consider the manifold of knowledge (described as a knowledge complex). Our target knowledge complex is of a person whose linguistic displays are ‘paranoid.’ The complex has all the levels of determination eventuating in this display. These include the developmental and the psychodynamic, as Klein observes. The viewing point is a focus. In geometry, we would identify it as ‘One of the fixed points from which the distances to any point of a given curve, such as an ellipse or parabola, are connected by a linear relation’ (‘Focus’ 2019). This rendition is consonant with our ‘floating’ displays as in Diagram 8.1. We can also describe the locus as at a ‘level’—viz., a hierarchical place or plane in relation to other phenomena we picture. Each ‘level’ has its own combination of rules and forms as they pertain to a picture of its logic and schematic formats. The developmental and psychodynamic levels of psychological determination, I have argued, can appear to function ± Ciceronian premised understructures of rhetoric and motivation. With the idea of analogy as a viewing point from which to focus and refocus particulars from different levels, we can now put together the needed perspective for exploring, understanding, and introducing change into the relations of multi-leveled psychological determination. I put it that: ‘The SV provides a perspective from which to choose the particulars for the terms of the analogy.’ The perspective’s level, from which the terms are chosen, has characteristics making it reflective of other levels and perspectives. Colby’s (1981, p. 532) statement (quoted above) shows he approaches the idea of a structural view as an analogy. The best I can do in this book to describe the chosen level is to say it is ‘suggested’ by PARRY’s eerie ‘doppelgangers’ of the paranoid ‘person’ and the paranoid’s structural twin in the Trumper. A system of logic gates is needed for governance of the levels and for regulation of inter and intra- level transactions via logic and analogy. From the structural viewing point, the potential for setting out that system of logic gates is as implementable Boolean functions (see University of Surrey 1997, 1998, 2005). Such a system is not merely logically facile, it also can be varied to follow a set of ‘rule-breaking’ modalities. Let’s see what it brings to psychological issues.

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Modality as a Function of Exchanges Logic gate modalities can differ at different ‘levels’ of psychodynamic determination. For the choice of an operative modality, isolate the phenomena at these levels as ‘psychological.’ Assume a given modality at a given psychological level can account for the array and extent of those particulars. Admittedly, this account narrows the scope of that level’s phenomena. That narrowing is artificial. Necessarily within that scope are epistemic contingencies. Still, without considering them, the operative modality focused can frame an array of psychological particulars as logically possible or accessible. With a graphic depiction, the viewer can visualize vicissitudes of a modality’s logical organization of particulars.1 Within that logical organization, the viewer chooses a psychological level, (D)—say, it is of development. That (D) level of particulars can either inspire a view of another level, (PD)—psychodynamics, or the inspiration is the other way around. A point from which that inspiration sequence can arise is from either an element or a compound, which can be depicted within these (D) and (PD) levels. These are operating and organized in a Moebius type twist as superposing and superposed levels (or planes). The chosen ‘D’ level graphically would give rise to diagrammatic possibilities of displaying the relation of development to different levels. The relation of development to psychodynamics can affect such things as complexity and adequacy of a set of functions to channel and express emotion when it is aroused. (As it would fit Werner’s orthogenetic thesis, a choice could be made to operate at a less developed cognitive stage if this would provide a psychodynamic advantage.) The levels of development and of psychodynamics change and exchange their degree of influence over cognitive and affective process and products. Graphical diagrams—by way of their planes that intersect and switch or exchange superposition—can depict the levels and their changes and exchanges. For the moment consider these changes and exchanges of development and psychodynamics as exchanges of or by ‘partner’ levels. The modalities here would be those of a given level, those of its ‘partnering’ level, and those of their points of coinciding. With these ‘level variations’ in mind, logical borders and boundaries vary since the superpositions are exchanged. In sum, the modalities affecting logical bounds might be a matter of the acceptable variability of negations. The variability could be of meanings, of predicates, of grammatical subjects, and/or

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objects. The variability can also be a function of rules of conjunction and disjunction. A Moebius strip turns over at some points exchanging planes. At other points the planes are coterminous. Accordingly, there are points where development and psychodynamics are ‘in sync,’ and other moments, where one or the other rushes ahead. At an early point of development, that which is at the level of psychodynamics may involve an undifferentiated sense of reference to the ‘I’ or the person’s sense of self. Development to a later stage may restrict attribution of self-reference— or in the case of the paranoid, expand it! An example occurs when a reference to a person’s self is made. In response to such an attribution, the person can first say ‘You say I did wrong,’ and then ‘rebut.’ She can offer various points of exchange: ‘I say you did wrong’; ‘You say I did no wrong’; ‘You did not say I did wrong.’ The negations of these points of exchange can be a function of the psychodynamics (say of paranoia), and of stage of development, and of the interrelation (or crossover points) for each. The Moebius strip turns over at some points exchanging planes. The strip not only can twist back, but it can also twist back and forth. Further, some levels of (as) structural determinants are overarching or even ‘outside.’ For example, the development and psychodynamic levels can be superposed by an agency such as a conscience code or societal rules.

The Inner, the Outside, and the Architectural Analogy To account for determinants at both ‘inner’ and ‘outside’ loci, turn to the architectural analogy. Buildings can have inner structures that do not look like the building as a product, yet are determinative. Buildings can also have structures—a product of determinative external armatures, which I’ll describe in a moment. Structures inside. A building, as you view it, would not stand either without structures supporting it and relating its parts, or without the stressors holding that relationship in its optimal constancy. You might say the building’s structure is beholden to its points of origin—structures and stressors. This dependency, a dynamic process, is a matter of structurally internal determinants, and, as well, the features of their presentations. We have some recursion here: In an analogous way, these internal determinants have to have structural origin points too. The structures and

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stressors, as workings of that architecture, have their points of origin dynamically responsible for its phenomena. My point is not to track some infinite chain, but to develop the architectural analogy. So, stay within it by assuming its structure(s) will give us a workable conceit for the structural dependencies we need to bring to light. It would take some doing to talk about the structure of cognitive objects and their relations in architectural terms. Still, we can observe the logical and syntactic patterns to be like a layout of a city of buildings that come to constitute the individual’s cognitive objects.

Structures and their Outside Structural Determinants Cast our ‘city of buildings’ layout as an architectural armature for imaging the individual’s cognitive objects. It can expand to an analogy for the structural description we are seeking. The architectural armature and its heuristic place in the SV layout and objects produced. In architecture, an ‘armature’ is a concept of a determinative structure. MacDonald (1982) conceives it as a setting—a ‘framework’ for what we can ‘see’ as ‘unmistakable imagery.’ It reflects ‘integrated functional and symbolic wholes.’ Although their expressions … differ widely from place to place in size and plan and in degree of formal complexity, they are all conceptually and schematically analogous, and are made up of elements and motifs from the same architectural repertory. (p. 5)

All of this is most distressing, if not fascinating. It is distressing, because we can observe the architecture, but be ‘outside’ of the level(s) at which are causal nexuses. So, we can identify a paranoid set of statements, but even with that linguistic product, we cannot ‘be’ at a point of origin for the person making the statements. That point may be a moment seared into a neural set of pathways to an emotionally charged memory. Equally possible at other levels are parallel concomitant events compressed into the ‘point of origin.’ There may be a causal nexus in the belief system of the person issuing a statement. At that nexus is a grouping of psychological, ethical, architectural, and political factors. Psychologically, the issuance of the paranoid statement will have been an action of denial or projection. The statement can have issued from the proto-ethical code:

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‘Preservation of advantage is to deny anything negative about the self.’ Then, what might appear in the architectural form of a paranoid statement, like ‘That person is responsible—not me,’ can merely be a political calculation. With all that dynamic crisscross of the grouping, change is still possible. Just as we can change the way or form by which we express a depressed feeling and not change the dynamics determining that feeling or its change, we can change nodes and stressors, so the architecture appears like a different building—even one ‘out of time’ in relation to the assemblage of other buildings. A quick example would be the Guggenheim Museum design in relation to all other museums in Museum Row in NYC.2 We need Lewis Carroll’s Cheshire Cat here to take home the proviso: the subtractions and substitutions can go just so far. Yes, there are social (and economic) functions and outcomes. Compared to the schematic dynamics and the modality potentialities of the logical organizers of thought and its cognitive objects, these are not as basic—either to the dynamic production of the individual’s displays or to their variability. In all, my focus on the ‘Trumper’ is not sociopolitical analysis, such as Eric Hoffer’s (1951) in his ‘The True Believer.’ Nor in service of that sort of analysis, do I make connections to the merging of leader-follower beliefs in the sociopolitical context detailed in the earlier Lowenthal and Guterman work (1949), Prophets of Deceit. I do refer to the consonant phenomena of the present-day Trump devotee—he, who agrees with just about all of Trump’s reversals of attribution. But in doing this, I focus the logical particulars—Trump’s transformations made via the use of negation. This phenomenon of negating everything is a crisscross of psychological identity, logical identity, and negation. Here, the Trumper defines her identity by tying it to another source that denies personal agency—which violates personal identity. However, the attribution of identity reaches for non-contradiction by placing it outside of personal psychological identity! The Trumper’s choice reminds me of Al Capp’s cartoon character Li’l Abner, proclaiming: ‘Ah believes in the law, irregardless.’ The psychological phenomenon does appear close to the phenomenon of Hoffer’s ‘True Believer.’ Although not the main focus here, I do and should note the social explanations and the effects we all would recognize as interacting with and playing into the hands of authoritarianism. These effects show up

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here in parallel to the structure of the Trumper ‘output.’ Moreover, the same output effects eerily constitute those of the totalitarian’s use of propaganda. Major examples of these effects are the creation of ‘empty’ words and the absence of an articulated set of authoritative sources for decisions—all of which Hannah Arendt (1958) sharply pointed out. Pettigrew (2017, p. 107) updates the trend toward focusing authoritarianism. He reports the attempts in social science research continue to be by way of scales constructed to measure degree of presence of attitude, trait, belief, and so on. However, the present-day objectives aim to separate authoritarianism as a general personality trend from the commitments to such attitudes and beliefs as part of a political ideology. He reports, “… recent work reveals that Trump supporters tend to be especially high scorers on scales that measure… ‘authoritarianism as a personality construct’ versus as ‘a political ideology.’” Decoupling scales from the concept of structural analysis. The trend in social science research has been to use scales in forming and buttressing theoretical views of cognitive processes, their organization, content, capabilities, and the qualities of their processing and output. This trend has continued to pivot on the development of the scales. These scales are based on constructs, and there is an attempt to show what they measure vindicates and feeds back into the assumptions about the constructs. In this regard, Suedfeld (2010) gives a corroborating account of the concept and measure of Schroder et al.’s (1967) ‘Conceptual complexity theory.’ He describes the theory’s scope in terms of the capacity of the specific scale—‘PCT’—‘a semiprojective sentence (later, paragraph) completion test…’ (p. 1670). It … measures the structure of thought, not its content. Structure refers to the conceptual rules utilized in thinking, deciding, and interrelating: how people think, not what they think. Any belief or thought might be expressed at any level of complexity, and conversely, opposing ideas can be expressed at the same level.

The scale’s measures are presumed to reveal structural aspects of not merely information processing, but also levels of thinking. Noteworthy is the presence of a structural approach, conceived to articulate levels of rules, concept formation, and cognitive functioning—elements of the knowledge complex I propose more generically. Such a manifold of thought—its determinants, processes, and products—would be accessible

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to the SV. Its scope would include not merely their display as information processing output, but also depictions of thought and its regress to agency. Tracking from the social and political arena inward to formal determinants of thought and reasoning. I do not agree the primary basis for reasoning is necessarily the socially driven needs and values making up its specific pool of contingencies. Nor do I agree reasoning, per se, is simply a social form for the organization and presentation of argument. The Sophists argue the primacy of social and political determinants. Present day psychologists can view these determinants as the individual’s incorporation of social valuations. Mercier and Landemore (2012) and Mercier and Sperber (2011) link the power of social values to drive reasoning with the idea that the fundamental use of reason is argument. Twists of reason with the social valuation of cognitive objects produce a reflexive set of beliefs: Beliefs can bounce backward to produce the logical structures that then govern them. For example, if ‘winning’ is socially valued, premises within and about the reasoning are worked into the individual’s logic and schematic patterns. Argument produces contrary premises, assuring conclusions will be at loggerheads. In that case, the reasoning per se does not have to involve truth. More twists: sources of agency. Keep in mind: the social valuation is a product of individual agency and social dependency. The individual’s beliefs are not only socially directed and related; they are also generated by and applicable to the individual. Schematically, these are twists of the dynamic logic and reasoning forms with agency and social dependency. They yield reversible cause–effect patterns such as eventuate in the Trumpers’ psychological outcomes. The factors in these twists are three structural entities. These are closed curves, which are overlapping and graphically represent three sets: (a) agency and social dependency3 (b) dynamic logic, and (c) reasoning forms with agency. Diagrammatically consider these structural factors to appear as Borromean rings—as in Diagram 7.2. Conceive the rings here as interpenetrating and/or diaphanous disklike representations; each disk a domain—its population of particulars. Regard the figures as planes that crossover each other—and thereby mark exchanges of superposition, governance, and/or determinative primacy.4 For the Trumper the three (a, b, c) strands converge as a search for an ‘ultimate’ attribution. They simply and resolutely keep the movement directed toward a definitive source. That source, since it is located only

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Diagram 7.2 The Borromean Rings (Source Jim.belk—own work public domain file: Borromean rings illusion.png. Created: 26 March 2010, https:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borromean_rings#/media/File:Borromean_Rings_Ill usion.png)

as an exchange of locus, is in the movement from one plane to the other. Hence, the locus is somewhat in the form: ‘Not me—you.’ ‘I’ am not the source—some ‘you’ is. How did that vase get broken—I didn’t do it’; you did. How did the Reichstag fire start? ‘Not us,’ was the National Socialist claim—Them (the Communist Party).

Truth and Its Involution Bertrand Russell (Whitehead and Russell 1997, p. 43) breaks out of the idea that judgment—like that of what is true—can be a matter of simply relating two terms—as one might do in forcing the judgment—True or False. Instead entering the scene is a ‘judging mind,’ and a surveying of more than two terms. In short the mind is part of the formula, and the other component is its relating the ‘constituents of the proposition.’

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Logic in a sociopolitical arena can play havoc with its terms, their subject/predicate status, and their instantiation in the different roles of factors in a schema. The havoc especially can occur when the logic’s categorial focal point deals with the ‘I’ as actor. It super-especially occurs when the logic matches the tactics we can identify in a PARRY pattern. Thus, the tactic in the redistribution of the ‘actor’ term in the Reichstag example is logically equivalent to a ‘paranoid’ reversal of the term ‘I.’ ‘I’ did this’ becomes [~‘I did this’.] The tactic is ‘squared’ by making the ‘~I’ a concrete substitute actor—such as ‘You.’ This ‘squaring’ allows the outcome to remain in view; so the outcome of the original proposition appears to remain ‘true.’ This yields a fantastic allure—the truth of the outcome is affirmed; yet, the question of origin is open. Logically, the category is changed; but its particulars remain intact—constituents. Specifically, where the category focuses the ‘I’ as the agent of the action, we retain the general slot for the agent, but not the specific identity of ‘who’ it is: Thus, we get to the question of “How do you ‘know’ who the who really is?” If ‘I’ have the operative agency; then only ‘I’ can place myself in the agent slot. But, place a ‘~I’ in that slot. In this, the ‘I’ as agent becomes another instance of the failure of a middle term principle.5 The question, “How do you ‘know’ who the who really is?” can become a wrestling match, entangling logic with as vast an issue of semantic extension as the one that begins its flair with ‘Who set the Reichstag fire’? Or it could be the more pedestrian case of clouding the terms for a deduction of ‘Who broke the vase?’ Well, with the ‘use of the reverse’ tactic,6 each of these (the vast and the pedestrian) comes down to ‘What is the truth?’ The tactic of the ‘reverse’ focuses on the ‘not-me.’ The responsibility for negative actions and outcomes is to fall on the ‘not me.’ Yet, more centrally here the source for the truth of any statement or proposition lies with the ‘me.’ The penultimate use of the tactic of substitution leads to “Not you; not anyone; not anything; and not some identifiable ‘not me’ can be the source of truth.” If Trump is then identifiable as ‘me,’ he can either speak the truth, or there is no truth. This can lead to a more ultimate status for truth—especially, if you do not accept the penultimate status of Trump as a source of the truth. Then we are dealing with a challenge to truth going beyond the ‘reverse’ in a subject → object relation. The reverse keeps a formal venue for the truth. That reverse would be a variant of ‘~I; the Other is the cause.’ In that case, it is the schema format employed to legitimize the claim. The situation is the same as regards

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logical propositions. Thus, if the final arbiter of truth is subject to a legitimacy of a negation transformation (anything could not be true); then any proposition computationally conceived is at its basis only temporarily true. The rules of negation and contradiction would move a categorical formed statement, proposition, or conclusion toward entropy. We have here a version of Arendt’s ‘exploded categories’ (1994, p. 302). The forms remain intact; yet there is a search for a substitution for truth. And that could be something like the Trumper’s acceptance of a flow of opposing claims of facts and propositions. When we get past the paranoid’s denial of agency and on into its assignments to others or other causes, we arrive at beliefs not only in inverse causes and outcomes, but also in the belief in the self as having the power to assign agency. In a sense we have an ‘inverse paranoid’ in the Trumper—whose belief can become she is the deciding force of an ‘inverse truth’—the truth that there is no truth. Important to see here is the structural completion of the Sophist dream of separating the truth from reasoning. Step 1: assumes no truth in reasoning, merely an ‘antilogic.’ With it, it is possible to have ‘opposite’ arguments. They would appear as propositions following a valid format. Step 2 carries the argument into terms and concepts, so their meanings can be put forth as oppositions—somewhat as in the ‘Peace is War’ format in Orwell’s 1984. Step 3 conceives the slots of the schema format as reversible. Withal, not only a search for logical identity, but also, a surfacing of contradiction would produce entropy. To veer off the structural explanation for a moment, consider that ultimate status in which there is no possibility of the truth. If there is no truth, there is no logical identity that can be ascribed. Suppose I say to you I was at Trafalgar Square last night. That would entail each term as having been ‘true.’ Yet, you, as the careful arbiter of that statement, might insist none of the terms could be determined (or proved) to be true. That state of affairs would include these three things you could not say: (1) Just what ‘Trafalgar Square’ is, or where it is. (2) Who I am, or where I was. (3) Just what constitutes ‘night’ or that it ever occurred. If you did set those doubts as contingencies, you would wind up with sets of contradictions. For example, where the symbol, ♦, stands for ‘It is possible that…’, the term ‘I’ for the person ‘I am,’ might be presented this way: [♦‘I’ → ‘I’] and [‘I’ → ~‘I’.] Such an ascription of either identity or contradiction would engender the search for both, and in both cases, there would be a move toward entropy—if the standard categorical logic were the macro-frame. It would appear you could not have a categorical logic to

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guide the assessment of the universe of the entailed objects, categories, propositions, and so on. (Whitehead and Russell [1997, p. 38] make a similar argument with their concept of ‘vicious-circle fallacies.’) In addition, joining the march to conglomeration, you could not assess either inductive reasoning—including cause–effect patterns—or the applicability of concepts to their particulars or contents. This state of affairs would totally discombobulate any attempt at maintaining not only a ‘categorical logic’ but also a schematic system as the bases for knowledge and communication. If, as sophists like Protagoras and Gorgias would ‘reason,’ there is only rhetoric and not truth, the dynamic balance of the communication and knowledge systems fails. Either system could be used to assail the proposition (or statement) of truth by or within the other (system). The individual then would have neither a personal access to knowledge through thought, nor a way to interrelate in a communication matrix to achieve it. At best, were such a ‘twilight zone’ the macro-frame, we might have a modal logic, but chasing truth down would be like burning a candle at both ends. Inversions of the powers of logic, modalities, and the schema. Paradoxically, we can make a structural argument for the ‘antilogic’ view of reasoning! The structure of the argument presumes forms and dynamics of logic and the schema are present in reasoning. A logical structure for an antilogic view would then be a ‘vicious circle’ argument! The antilogic view predicates disintegration of a dynamic balance of knowledge and communication. The vicious circularity is pronounced: The disintegration is an arguable result of the ‘truth’ functions of the schema and of categorical logic. The schema provides a temporal/causal sequencing, which permits one or another sort of replication accessible to different observers. It provides a truth test for a material basis for the person’s relation to environmental events. The logic modality provides for a symbolic presentation of stable representations. The representations are (or become) symbols, partly due to absence of content. (A symbol represents something else. It is not a ‘thing’ or event; nor is its generic nature anything but signifier or pointing device.) That status allows for the symbol’s clear ascription of logical identity in reference to its composition and in its relations with other symbols. To optimize the SV, we proposed its interpretant capacities, particularly realizable as simulations, take on syntactic and logical forms. We also proposed the schema and categorical logic be accessible as governing

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forms in the thinker’s search for meaning, its replicability, its development, and its representation to others. These are forms within the search for and development of knowledge, so, there would be necessary precursors for a regnancy of the schema and categorical logic as governing forms: These precursors consist of a commitment and its applications. The commitment is to dialectical thinking, reasoning, and to their applications. The applications are to argument, and hypothesizing. This commitment and its applications are applied to all sorts of contractual decisions, contracts, and their evaluations. They form a grouping that includes principles and laws as well as constitutions and other contracts.

Trump, the Trumper, and the Liar’s Paradox Hillary Putnam (1981, p. 52) has a view similar to Russell’s. It is helpful in reminding the person who either declares the ‘truth’ or believes something as true—when it manifestly is not. Putnam’s concept is that the person judging has a conceptual scheme. An evaluation of objects or of the sign representing an object is not possible without considering its place within the person’s conceptual scheme. So, to evaluate ‘truth’ one cannot escape thinking about one’s own conceptual scheme. Trump in effect proposes all statements can be untrue. This applies to schematics of events, such as those factually reported about the crowd at his inauguration. Pronouncing media statements and photographs about that crowd as ‘not true’ is logically an opening for a substitution: The substitute subject ‘the largest crowds ever’ is inserted into a subject slot in a schematic sequence concluding with the action and outcome, viz., ‘attended the inauguration.’ This sequence then becomes that which can be ‘factually’ stated. In the sense Gorgias, the Sophist, argued a long time ago, ‘factual’ statement too would not be true—rather only rhetorical, and therein possibly effective. In Putnam’s view, it (say, a fact or statement of a fact) is a matter of agreement among a particular cadre’s ‘scheme of description.’ The SV allows for agency outside the knowledge complex and its scheme. This allows a recursion factor by which thought-about-thought and its products can be expressed as a ‘moving picture’—formally, as an interpretant. Within Trump’s system of contingencies, the logic governing evidence such as photographs and a concordance of press accounts, is outflanked by an ‘alternate’ declaration of what was seen and what occurred. The system

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of contingencies becomes the modality for his logic. Within a classic logic, there is the logic of identity. It holds identity can be offset by contradiction. Within Trump’s logic, that very rule can be contradicted too. The rule any identity is not true if it is contradicted is applied to the identity as a logical rule. One can argue this is a category mistake. One can also look at this application as one of stating how contradiction and truth work within a given ‘modality.’ Within that modality’s governance—via its set of contingencies—any logic of identity and contradiction is not a guide to the ‘truth’ insofar as a statement can counter it to the contrary. For example, if identity of a category depends on non-contradiction; then it can be countered, when its contradiction can make sense. For one thing, the Gorgias argument might make sense if the nature of logic were to reflect recursiveness of thought. Oddly, a convincing argument to that point is the Walt Whitman statement; ‘Very well, then I contradict myself, I am large, I contain multitudes’.7 By such a countering and by such a powerful opposing sense, the logic of contradiction and identity is supplanted by logic—a logic of dynamic negation(s). This appears odd, since the more usual argument would be that the rhetorical nature of reasoning allows for competing statements. The dynamic (and the recursive) functions of negation turn in on the law of contradiction, and assail its application for the purpose of reasserting it! This use of dynamic negations is compatible with the experience of the limitation(s) of the concept of truth.

Negation in and Out of Modal Contingencies In terms a Sophist might accept, there is a modality one can posit for a possible world in which there is no truth. With that modality, a logic system can be put in place. It can be constructed to follow categorical rules despite the gulf between the ‘truth’ and the forms of the logic employed (see Castelnérac and Marion 2013). Berto (2015) ascribes broad powers to the general function of logical negation. He shows for a standard or categorical logical form, negation can differentially affect modal contingencies. There is interaction between negation, logic, contradiction, and modal contingencies. That interaction is paradoxical; it can coexist along with negation following logical rules.

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Contingencies suspending classical rules may be dependent on (and therefore coexist with) subsystems with classical rules intact. The contingencies may be directed to phase out and to eventuate in restoration of or be superseded by classical rules. Here is an example to characterize the seemingly imponderable mix of reason and egocentrism in the Trumper (cf. Trump Nation 2016). The interaction with contingencies that impugn the propositional flow, but then restore it might go like this: I might assume if a technology supersedes my skill, I will not get a job with that skill. The major contingency in place is to accept the proposition: technology is progress. Yet, it is easy to impugn. How is it progress, if I am out of work? A nested reason the contingency is in place is the belief the technology will be preferred as economical. However, I can doubt the technology is effective either in production or in saving money. It’s not only one person out of work; it is all workers at the closed ‘outmoded’ facility. Is that ‘progress?’ Thus, the contingency and its nested reason can be disparaged as mere dodges for a false sense of equilibrium. Was the proposition of ‘progress’ a truth or a ‘truism?’ A substitution for truth that arises becomes the source declaiming it. If ‘someone’ talks against technology, I surely want to listen to the argument. So, a possible world is presented: I can get a job despite the argument that skill has been replaced by technology! The newly presented argument is a presentation of doubts: it is not true that technology is progress or will serve to replace my skill or its value. Logic is still in place—except that it is now inverted—turned in a perfectly ‘logical’ direction: Having the skill to do a job implies doing it. Doubts then surround an uncompleted schematic—its implied outcome or product would be missing. The proto-proposition is If A; then B (If the skill is there; a job should be the outcome). (This is a case of material implication, viz. A ⇒ B). The state of affairs presents this would not happen: technology making the job unnecessary; hence not an outcome. So, an offered proposition would be based on If A; then ~B.

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And negating that as well as the proto-proposition above, leaves this version of doubt: If A; then [_____]. The blank indicates doubt; the logic of the propositions leading to the uncompleted schematic produces doubt. Along with such doubts, not-B can be negated in various ways: ‘Technology is not there; technology will fail; the product won’t be as good.’ Etc. ~(If A; then ~B) So you can get an inversion, ~(If A; then ~B); Therefore, If A; then B. The result is a proposition in a positive form. What now follows is not that ~(If I have this skill, I will not be able to use it to get my old job). Instead, with the doubts in place, the ‘positive form’ (material) proposition can be advanced that If I have the skill, I’m needed. The logic, inverted in this way, is a source of a powerful set of contingencies in a modality for a possible world Trump can come to symbolize as making sense: Those presenting the hyped value of technology as a valuable contingency for a valuable possible world are ‘lying.’ A more valuable possible world is dependent on valuing skills. It entails a powerful set of contingencies. What follows logically within that possible world is not that your job will not materialize. Those logical or factual arguments supporting the ‘hyped’ view of technology are ‘lies’ insofar as they are claimed as true. This ‘valuable’ acknowlegement of disappointment in the illimitable presentation of truth that turns out not to be the truth, endears the messenger.

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This set of acknowledgments escalates to a weird awfully hard outcome to explain. The Trump follower (Trumper) attributes truth to the premise there is no truth. Therefore, Trump is the ultimate source of the truth. The buck stops there. If Trump is shown not to be offering the truth, he would be a liar. That would really upset the applecart, because then it would not be true there is no truth—a situation of double paradox, to say the least.

Truth in Embers and the Trio’s New Fires of Authenticity Logic and the Schema in the Sociopolitical Manifold In a sociopolitical context, the issue of ‘truth’ can undergo two sets of negation transformations. One set appears in thought about propositions, statements, and even concepts, principles, and rules that follow logical laws. A second set appears in meanings with unresolved oppositions in sub-contexts. Examples are (a) whether a political promise means what it says, or (b) whether the purpose of a tax can be the opposite of its stated intent. The ‘logic’ of 1984 applies to sociopolitical contexts. That logic (with its modality contingencies) offers rules straddling both sets— viz., those affecting thought and those affecting meaning. The famous 1984 premise, ‘War is Peace,’ appeals to a logical rule of identity. As such, it is in the form of a proposition, which abstractly identifies one term as coterminous with the other—just as if the terms had no content! (Grist for the paranoid mill!) However, the terms do have referents, viz. semantic content. Equating the terms ‘war’ and ‘peace’ suspend, if not violate identity. Truth in sociopolitical contexts. In sociopolitical contexts, evaluating just what truth is entails pragmatic challenges of intent, semantics, and perspectivizing. The label of ‘truth’ can mean one of its opposites—‘lie’— and the other way around. Within a matrix like this, there can be various levels of social and psychological reaction. These include physiological response and activation, such as from neural signaling. There is interaction and interdependency of the levels and their oppositions in meaning and in their interrelation. Within and as a function of all this, the attribution of truth as it would be marked by logical identity and contradiction can be turned to reveal their oppositions. Furthermore, these transformations

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can be pushed along, magnified, and initiated, pursued, and undone by logic gate points and patterns. Is there truth within such a complex and dynamically changeable matrix? Assume logic and pragmatic inductive rules can apply. Also presume a lie told could be marked by a negation of the fact it purports. We can further assume the presence of rules, laws, practices, constitutions, and other instances of the application of forms of logic and schematics. With these sources and forms of coordination, we can hope for logical regularities. There can be logic gates. Hence, under certain sociopolitical—not to exclude psychological—circumstances, negation of what is purported (and set in the form of rules supported by logic gate control) can be undone by another logic gate operation. Withal, we come again to the question of truth in the sociopolitical matrix. Therein, we find the phenomena of truth, its assessment, valuation, and psychological status embattled and sometimes inaccessible to a logical status. To sum up how these phenomena impact a sociopolitical matrix, such as that within which the Trio is an entry, the following analysis shows the interplay of different psychological and logical factors. At the least, in this interplay are shifts of focus. From a logical focus, a psychological view may not be logical. From a psychological focus, logic may be suspended, confounded, or denied. This interplay offsets the identification of truth at any specific junction of levels in a person’s knowledge of the thought, meaning, proposals, and the logic of all that. Despite that offset, the schema form is there to mediate any such judgment of truth. Suppose a person says, ‘My feeling is Trump is providing the truth, despite facts showing his statement to be non-factual.’ Call that person’s statement ‘S’—a psychologically based judgment, which is likely subjected to a presentation of an external sequence of some observable ‘X causes Y.’ Call the sequence, ‘s,’ viz., a schema. Applied to S, we get s(S). But the ‘s’ as a functor or as a ‘frame’ including ‘S’, splinters, reconceives, and reconfigures S as a judgment—rendering it at most, quasi-logical.8 The schema form is thus applied to various transformations of the meaning and context of truth and then used to construct propositions about the sociopolitical outcomes. Well, is there such a thing as a ‘lie’?

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The Appearance of an Ultra-Paradoxical Belief in Lies via an Authentic Source The Hahl et al. (2018) sociological study provides a way to see how the concept of truth is knocked off kilter and how it regains leverage in the form of ‘authenticity’ (see p. 27). Statements and propositions are so batted about, the truth of a statement, which appears to be an outright lie, is either hard to establish, irrelevant, or it forms a massive traffic jam with the accepted set of propositions.9 The study points out Trump voters reconcile his lying demagoguery with his perceived authenticity. An example the authors give is this: The demagogue distinguishes himself in his willingness to bear the social consequences of publicly saying that the emperor is naked. He may not claim to speak “truth to power,” but he claims to speak a larger truth about power—that social control (e.g., “political correctness”…) is suppressing significant private dissent. (p. 21)

Recognizing the demagogic lie as a lie but justifying it as symbolic protest achieves this freedom from the nexus of truth as social control. The freedom is to regard the truth as contextual—not restricted to the identity of a term or proposition. Therefore, there is a many faceted matrix of meanings, terms, propositions, and the outcomes of these as personal and societal effects. Within this manifold, truth and non-truth can be determined by a series of negations and double negations. If the truth from one domain (say, of laws and rulings on those laws) is juxtaposed to the referents of that domain (those laws), the juxtaposition can be at different semantic levels. Thus, one thinker can say a law like one governing Jean Valjean’s theft of silver candlesticks makes sense as an exchange of crime and punishment of crime. But another thinker, Victor Hugo, can take up the question of balancing hunger with forgiveness. The juxtapositions of levels can also be at different levels of their distance from psychological experience (feelings, memory, self reference, etc.). The ‘truth’ for individuals facing these contexts and sorting through them by setting up logic gates is a search for a stop point in the modifications of the patterns of negation-upon-negation in the logic gates. In Arendt-type terms, the negations begin to affect not only all concepts, but also all conceptualizing, and thus—agency! We then need a value to stop the process and declare as a truth-point an agency outside the gates.

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Within the view of Hahl et al. (2018), in the sociopolitical context, the conception—let alone, evaluation—of truth versus lying yields to the context. It is enmeshed in the statements, propositions, rules, laws, and philosophical positions affecting the thinkers. Their claim to truth has effects that bounce around the matrix and its contexts affecting the thinker(s). In short, the claims bring out a search for agency as protest and a probe for intention. But agency and intention are psychological factors. They operate to provide ‘authenticity’ of the statements and propositions. These operations are transformations of acceptance. The transformations take propositions out of a negated status, which marks them as ‘false.’ Not only that; they lift them out of their governance by and/or accessibility to a ‘true-false’ dichotomy. The concept of truth therefore ceases to be a governing form or a demonstrable product. In these regards, authenticity can ace out truth as the judgment of the value that triggers negation of the logical identity and contradiction involved in a lie. Let me try to unpack all that. Suppose a governing principle is you will most benefit materially if you follow the rule in the target statement: ‘Pay more tax than you can afford.’ The person (or political advocate) arguing either it is true or it is false can appear to be lying. For Joe Citizen, the original statement can be a lie; the support for it can be a lie; and the refutation can be a lie. We then have a whirl of negations either in the support or in the refutation. So whether the target statement is true to you (as a given person) may be less in the whirl of negations in the logic involved than in the authenticity of someone descrying the idea of a governing principle or its rationales—no matter what sociopolitical direction the rationale supports! A plague o’ both your Houses! With all that, there is good news. This very way of looking for the acceptance of ‘authenticity’ in statements that would not pass the ‘truth’ test, may appear to be an ultra-paradoxical reaction to an ‘outright lie.’ It will have surely seemed untrue that infecting someone with cowpox would prevent smallpox. In the non-commonsensical idea of ‘immunization,’ the infection can be fought ‘on another level.’ Likewise, for a sociopolitical complex, there are ingredients of a social philosophy, a political interaction, and a personal cost—each different level ‘ingredients’ in the sociopolitical mix. As cognitive and logical objects, ingredients identified are on different levels of the organization of rules, categories, judgments and conclusions—let alone ways of coordinating subjective experience with sociolinguistic and sociopolitical contexts. This multiplex

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of diverse, yet interrelated, levels is grist for the mill of a structural analysis. Why is that? An SV perspective can cut across the different levels of a target issue as a cognitive object for a given thinker or thinkers. There are crossovers from negations of meaning in a semantic context to the functions of negation in a categorical logic of terms and propositions. It is inviting (and ontically pressing) to cognize these two contexts as reflective of the gap between the forms of thought and the forms of representation (Horn 1989; Horn and Wansing 2016). The mediating connector is the SV processing that can handle both—the logic gate and its variety of negation patterns.

Notes 1. Keep in mind the structural view is a step away from being a ‘viewer.’ You, the reader, are the viewer of the structural view. 2. For given classical composers, some music in a specific period of serious musical composition appears much ahead in its form and sound when compared with composers’ works written during that period. An example is Mozart’s Adagio in B minor K.540. 3. Agency and social dependency are placed together. In this, consider social dependency as subsidiary to agency—as a ‘psychological concept.’ In this way social dependency is a component of it (see Goldspink and Kay 2003, 2008). 4. The planes relate to each other such that each can invade the other’s space. This is shown in drawings of figures represented by Pinna (2011). In representing figures with spaces that are penetrable and/or diaphanous (p. 1) contour exchanges are shown [Fig. 1A (p. 2)]. The figures’ space represents a domain, but each figure’s contents can ‘float’ so as to exchange from one plane level to the other. To represent these characteristics, color [as in Fig. 15 (p. 10) can be used]. 5. The failure appears a category error: the ~I in the schematic, ‘~I did x’ is not that which is the contradiction of the schematic, ‘I did x’. The contradiction is not in the schematic; it is in the agent-produced variation of ‘I’ as ~I. If looked at this way, the LEM is intact as a principle, and the violation is a category mistake such as a paranoid might make. 6. The ‘reverse’ is of the ‘I’ to the ‘not I’ made legitimate by the I’s conversion of the ‘I’ to the ‘not-I.’ 7. Another way to make logical sense of Whitman’s statement is to create a class > subclass structure, and say Whitman regards his self (his ‘I’) as a superposing class. Any contradictories would be possible subclasses contained therein and subject to his imposition of other classes as superordinating.

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8. A great example of this is in Socratic dialogues in which the person (P) presenting S is questioned about the ‘object’ he describes/conceives. The questioning can pursue the object within an action-outcome or a series of P’s experienced particulars of the object. The schema is clearly involved, when the sequence records, X causes Y , and the schema is also present via an external sequence of some observable ‘X implies Y .’ 9. Different perspectives on the terms and events within a schema are dependent on not only different persons, but also different instruments—scientific included—and different units and concepts of measurement.

References Arendt, H. (1958). The Human condition. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. Arendt, H. (1994). Mankind and Terror. In H. Arendt (Ed.), Essays In Understanding, 1930–1954: Formation, Exile, And Totalitarianism (pp. 297–306). Harcourt Brace. Berto, F. (2015). A modality called ‘negation’. Mind, 124(495), 761–793. Castelnérac, B., & Marion, M. (2013). Antilogic. Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication, 8, 1–31. Colby, K. M. (1981). Modeling a paranoid mind. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4, 515–560. ‘Focus’. (2019). Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/focus. Goldspink, C., & Kay, R. (2003). Organizations as self-organizing and sustaining systems: A complex and autopoietic systems perspective. International Journal of General Systems, 32(5), 459–474. Goldspink, C., & Kay, R. (2008, April). Agent cognitive capabilities and orders of emergence: Critical thresholds relevant to the simulation of social behaviours. In Proceedings of AISB Convention, Communication, Interaction and Social Intelligence. Retrieved from http://www.aisb.org.uk/convention/ aisb08/proc/proceedings/06%20Agent%20Emergence/04.pdf. Hahl, O., Kim, M., & Zuckerman Sivan, E. W. (2018). The authentic appeal of the lying demagogue: Proclaiming the deeper truth about political illegitimacy. American Sociological Review, 83(1), 1–33. Hoffer, E. (1951). The true believer: Thoughts on the nature of movements. New York, NY: HarperCollins. Horn, L. R. (1989). A natural history of negation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Horn, L. R., & Wansing, H. (2016). Negation. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Winter ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/arc hives/win2016/entries/negation/.

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Lowenthal, L., & Guterman, N. (1949). Prophets of deceit, studies in prejudice series (Vol. 5). New York: Harper & Brothers. MacDonald, W. L. (1982). The architecture of the Roman Empire (Vol. 2). New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Mercier, H., & Landemore, H. (2012). Reasoning is for arguing: Understanding the successes and failures of deliberation. Political Psychology, 33(2), 243–258. Mercier, H., & Sperber, D. (2011). Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34(2), 57–74. Pettigrew, T. (2017, March 5). Social psychological perspectives on Trump supporters. Journal of Social and Political Psychology. North America. Available at https://jspp.psychopen.eu/article/view/750. Accessed 19 Aug 2018. Pinna, B. (2011). The organization of shape and color in vision and art. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 5(104), 1–12. www.frontiersin.org; https:// doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2011.00104. Putnam, H. (1981). Reason, truth and history (Vol. 3). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Schroder, H. M., Driver, M. J., & Streufert, S. (1967). Human information processing. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston. Suedfeld, P. (2010). The cognitive processing of politics and politicians: Archival studies of conceptual and integrative complexity. Journal of Personality, 78(6), 1669–1702. Sun, R. (2004). On levels of cognitive modeling. Doctoral dissertation, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. Sun, R. (Ed.). (2006). Cognition and multi-agent interaction: From cognitive modeling to social simulation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sun, R. (2012). Prolegomena to cognitive social sciences. In R. Sun (Ed.), Grounding social sciences in cognitive sciences (pp. 2–32). Cambridge and London: MIT Press. Trump Nation. (2016). USA TODAY NETWORK. USA TODAY , a division of Gannett Satellite Information Network. Retrieved April 14, 2019, from https://www.usatoday.com/pages/interactives/trump-nat ion/#/?_k=q6nm6i. University of Surrey. (1997; 1998; 2005). Basic gates and functions. Composed by Wale Sangosanya, 1997; Updated by David Belton, April 1998. Retrieved August 18, 2018, from http://www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/Projects/CAL/digitallogic/gatesfunc/index.html#introduction. Whitehead, A., & Russell, B. (1997). Introduction, chapter II, section 1: The theory of logical types. In Principia Mathematica to *56. Cambridge Mathematical Library (pp. 37–65). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511623585.006. Retrieved online: http://sshieh.web.wesleyan.edu/wescourses/2013s/390/e-texts/Whiteh ead%20&%20Russell%20Principia%20Mathematica%20Introduction,%20Chap ter%20II,%20sections%201-5.pdf.

CHAPTER 8

The Metaphoric Float

Abstract The ‘logic-gate’ engine’s basic Boolean logic operation marks and deploys negation(s), assigning exclusions and restricting particulars from groupings—constructing contradiction and identity contingencies. Negation marks operate on groupings, and also on themselves. The gate is set to negation combinations—particularly, canceling contradiction status, or rules. Gate functions form patterns designating operations specifiable in computer simulations. The gate-as-function ‘floats’ from one to another target grouping or particular to another. Its changes of target and negation combinations make its logic deeply one of transition. Concepts, categories, propositions—thoughts—change. Applied to the ‘Trio,’ logic and syntax effects of gate functions ‘float,’ affecting psychological phenomena, their embodiment, and also social context for expression and action. The gate’s negation arrays affect logical, schematic, and psychological status of truth and doubt concepts. Gate logic, present clues to PARRY’s and the Trio’s common logic patterns and modality rules, determining SV’s foci on the Trio. Keywords Gate functions · Contradiction contingencies · Identity contingencies · Heterogeneity · Boundaries · PARRY · Truth · Doubt

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Pavlov’s Ultra-Paradoxical Response and Its Structural Form as a Complex Logic Gate Structural analysis and metaphoric floating. Pavlov (1941, pp. 159– 160) may have been on the right track with his identification of paradoxical and ultra-paradoxical reactions. In his forays into psychiatry, he particularly uses the concept of the ultra-paradox phenomenon to explain the wellsprings of paranoid disorders.1 He conceived these reactions as a phenomenon that would schematically link neurological phenomena to their manifestation as ‘psychological’ behavior appearing pathological. Gantt (1941, p. 13) summarizes Pavlov’s concept of ‘the ultraparadoxical (in which the excitatory conditioned stimuli become inhibitory and vice versa).’ As Pavlov points out about the ultraparadoxical reaction of the paranoid, the stimulus, which is excitatory, becomes inhibitive (Windholz 1996, p. 165) A transformation of the stimulus (S) produces what its opposite would produce. The S → R transaction (stimulus → reaction) is contradicted—as if it were negated. Paradoxically, excitation as S would yield activity.2 Ultra-paradoxically, S yields excitation’s opposite: S → ~ R, where ~ R is specific—an opposition: non-responsive or quiescent. Were the contradiction and contrariety simulated, the negation pattern involved would appear something accomplishable by a ‘negation gate,’ functioning at one or more terms of the transaction. Consider that simulation in the terms of a code, and the code as a structural equivalent for the terms. The code representing the neurological simulation and reaction may be a ratio of electrical input and output measures. Reasoning in reverse—the simulation’s code as an analogue for the excitation, could be negated as a feature of the stimulus, as a reaction, or both. This is a look at these negations as structural code. It presents a compatibility of Pavlov’s idea about neurological determination with the binary logic of a computer coding. With this logic as a medium, Pavlov’s concept is compatible with a structural model’s potential. The deep appeal of Pavlov’s ultra-paradoxical response concept is its applicability as a structural ‘floater.’3 (Diagram 8.1). The concept’s value emerges as we convert it to a ‘structural view’— viz., a representation of a logic pattern that can become a Boolean formulation. As such, it can easily become the concept of an operation

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Diagram 8.1 Agency site, agent, and floatation to new relations of particulars from divergent groupings In the diagram different states of excitement and inhibition are separate ‘circles,’ although they have overlapping areas. The two vertical oblong circles (a and b) appear ‘within’ two horizontal oblong circles (c and d). This represents the phenomena of excitement and inhibition (a and b) within the physiological system’s subsystems of affective and neurochemical (c and d). The agent can pass through barriers from one subsystem to another and across subsystem/system borders. (Shown by the green areas.) The overlaps are pictured here in a flat 2 dimensional relation of the bounded areas. Consider this diagram’s circular forms as 3 dimensional, and their overlapping as interlocked rings (as in Diagram 3.) These exchanges from ring to ring are planar and can indicate exchanges of superordination of one bounded area’s particulars in relation to the other’s

we know via rule-based data processing as specifiable in computers and computer simulation. The operation would specifically be one marking the negation(s) of a logic gate. Each logic gate can be constructed with basic rules of ‘and’ and ‘or.’ The logic gate presents various patterns of negation and can offset negation in some combination—a set of Boolean transformations of negation. That set spells out the logic of the logic gate as the structural representation we derived within our SV. We can utilize it for its purview on human thought, and in specific here, apply its logic to the Trumper. Here is how that works:

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The logic gate inherently presents a negation; we present a negation of the gate’s negation. That negation can occur for the OR gate: The OR gate is an electronic circuit that gives a high output (1) if one or more of its inputs are high. A plus (+) is used to show the OR operation.

Another possibility is the NAND gate: which is equal to an AND gate followed by a NOT gate. (University of Surrey Department of Electrical-Electronic Engineering 1997/2005).

With this NAND gate sequencing, an expected non-contradictory sequence can be negated. In terms to parallel Pavlov’s observation, contradiction, such as in the ultra-paradoxical response, can pass through the gate. Thus, the expected (low intensity stimulus → not intense response) can be negated to become (low intensity stimulus ⇸ not intense response). That could read out: (low intensity stimulus → intense response)

The ultra-paradoxical response—and/or its logical form—can easily become the concept of an operation we know via rule-based data processing as specifiable in computers and computer simulation. The operation is specifically one marking the negation(s) of a logic gate. Each logic gate can be constructed with basic ‘and’ and ‘or’ rules. I conceive the logic gate to present various patterns of negation and to offset negation in some combination. This is a set of Boolean transformations of negation. It spells out the logic of the logic gate as the structural representation we derived within our SV. The logic gate as metaphor producer. Now turn to the logic phenomenon this book targets. We said, If Trump is shown not to be offering the truth; then he would be a liar. In the book’s terms, this conception emerges from a structural level as metaphoric. At first, this seems an odd statement. How can a clear-cut

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Boolean operation, symbolically represented as mathematically transformational, be considered metaphoric? Such Boolean transformations of sets, within the ‘negation of a logic gate’ formulation, can be shuttled across a number of different levels. These levels straddle not only different psychological phenomena and their embodiment, but also social context for expression and effects. Also, obviously within the formulation’s compass are levels relating to information and computer generating models, on one hand; on the other—physiological patterns, such as electrochemical responding. All this may present clues to the common factors in PARRY, Trump, and the Trumper—or at least clues to their logic patterns and the modality rules obtaining. Structural perspective as antidote to metaphors’ inevitable category mistakes. If the ‘truth’ could be there is no truth and a Boolean operation can be a metaphor, then there is no question—We have a tangle of category mistakes. The Trumpers try awfully hard to get away from those category mistakes by leaving the ultimate de-categorizer as the outside principle. To use Arendt’s term, Trump ‘explodes’ the categories; then, it is up to him to fill them. The logical point the Trumpers hold on to is that if Trump were debunked, they would have to return to doubting what they have seen with their own eyes. They have seen the search for truth stopped in its tracks. In our indigenously dialectical systems— laws, constitutions, contracts, and their interpretations—there is enough contradiction to go around. A good specific example is Habermas’ (2001) point: Constitutional law as determinative is in fundamental contradiction to a democratic ‘right’ for people as determinative of their own rights. So, statements, propositions, constitutions, and so on—as determinative—immobilize their accessibility to search—and that of other dialectical documents and/or systems. These are shot through with confounding contraries and contradictions. To use the homely example above, sociopolitically, there is a search for the ‘truth’ of the statement and/or proposition that technology is supposed to ‘improve lives’ and advance welfare. A massive assault to that search comes about when an expansion of information meets attribution to different levels of consideration. Technology may make macro-economic improvements yet bring pollution affecting not only specific entities—like individuals’ health—but also generic level considerations—such as environmental degradation.4 ‘Technology’ can bring terrible problems of losing jobs, and moving people away from vested jobs and social ties. It can bring new work injuries, and need for skills neither learned nor easy to conceive. That is the short

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of it. Communication itself is critically paralyzed in contraries—information is abundant, but crowds out synthesis of meanings; communication is instant, but leaves no time for meaningful absorption. With these factors present, the communication context becomes at its core, rhetorical; therefore, the logical forms veer into antilogic. Accordingly, there is no truth to ‘Progress is progress.’ ‘Progress is regress’ is just as defensible. All of this is in the general direction of ‘de-linking’ the individual from her self and as well from others (as in Goodman and Collins’ 2019 analysis cited below). When the contraries and oppositions are hidden, it is a matter of time that their surfacing gives the lie to the statements and propositions of facts and the values and intents of laws, principles, and constitutions. Our analysis shows for the Trio—PARRY, Trump, and the ‘Trumper’— the logic modes do serve the quest for and the dynamic adaptation to the truth. SV analysis can reveal a perspective on the logic equivalent in the Trio. For each of the three, there are multiple commonalities. Each searches for truth, irrespective of how each would define, find, and value it. There are, for all three, similarities of logical form, of its binds, and of its orienting and resultant attitudes. These similarities function to maintain identity and order. They bring the price of access to new ways of thinking, new ideas, or taking into account the possible differences in another person’s conclusions. When such bounds, binds, and attitudes result in this lockout, and it is common to the Trio, I would conclude the binds and attitudes to be the result of over-concretizing principles. The over-concretizing is something of a regression, occurring where there is a lockout logically and semantically. Logically, organization should serve to bump the contraries up to superposing levels of concepts that can accommodate them. Analogically, the contraries would be assigned to figurative status, so they can function metaphorically. If the contraries are so stark, they are presented as irresolvable differences. Then, figurative transformations sound hollow. Thus, Trump (and others who use stereotyping) can use a manifest infirmity to characterize a person. Its absence in another person emphasizes the difference between the persons. (One person’s ‘crutch’ does not translate into the idea any person may need a figurative ‘crutch.’) There also come times these lockouts are less the case than that the governing principle fails, because of its truth being tied up in the contradictions of self-reflectiveness. These can be matters of the problem of defining something, and by that very act, not referring directly to that

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which is being defined. The situation can be worse. It could be a massive traffic jam because of the morass due to antinomies. In all, the problem at hand calls for fundamentals—not in the logical rules or schematic patterns—but instead in the relation of the logic and the schema to the outside factors of thought and representation. Each of these is subject to agentive decisions and re-organization (which might look something like the movements in Diagram 8.1 above.) When the agentive decisions are at hand and can be specified, they become ‘macroorganizers.’ Two macro-organizers. (1) One of these organizers constitutes modality: It can set and modify rules and procedures to clarify the contingencies of time, effects, and applications. (2) The second macro-organizer is a structural view I liken to a system of representations by interpretants (see pp. 11, 16; 27; 120; note 7, 10, 52.) These two macro-organizers— combinations of thought about our representations—are dynamic. They can be directed at setting, re-setting, and modifying schematic and logical rules. Each macro-organizer therefore not only can tolerate but also introduce doubt—as a psychological, semantic, and logical state of affairs. The second macro-organizer affects the gyrations of categorical logic: The deeply perplexing problem has arisen that we cannot distinguish valid propositional sequences, nor curtail inversions, when the definition of ‘truth’ and ‘fake’ are juxtaposed. It is critical to set in motion a macro-organizer illuminating these issues and not permitting them to be bottlenecks. Even more problematic than the structural implosions mentioned is the need to move to a juncture of phenomenological and social levels to knowledge. Picture that juncture as an overlap at which the two levels switch their plane positions. This nexus of ‘routes to doubt’ is the locus of a structural perspective for the thinker. From that locus, negation of the truth can be sprayed to all levels of the knowledge under consideration. For the moment, leave alone the choice of how to symbolize this. The form would have to be one converting propositions to metaphors and analogies. This can be visualized diagrammatically by terms that overlap in their inclusion relations, and that exchange superposing positions. Here, at the point of that visualization, the term ‘structural perspective’ (our SV) takes on panoptical dimensions. From that ‘catbird seat,’ the thinker, whose levels of knowledge are depicted, can doubt each level of knowledge as well as herself. Now take another step outside to view that very

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structural perspective. The psychologist can then articulate and communicate the right of the thinker—including the Trumper’s—to doubt on all levels, even doubting the doubter. There still appears something to learn from and debate with Descartes! So, meantime, yes. Trump is attractive to the Trumper as a source (of a perspective.) This perspective is outside the nexus we have just discussed. From it, Trump—and any ‘Trumper’ seeing himself in sync with that nexus—can evade the great doubt of self the Trumper would find as an ultimate danger.

Structural Analysis Applied to the Thinker The problem of doubt vis-à-vis truth is overarching. Its sources and effects are in thought, its products, and their transmission (or communication) My approach has been to focus doubt from a structural view. The SV focus is on doubt’s formal interaction with logic and the schema. I briefly identified the following six sources and factors contributing to the vicissitudes of these forms and thereby keep doubt in constant supply: a) modality, as it affects time and event sequence, b) the multiple loci of the sources of knowledge, c) meta-levels of assertions, d) self-reflective definitions, e) propositional antinomies; f) dualities in the function of logical rules, and g) interacting contraries on different levels.

In a word, my strategy to coordinate a perspective on these problems is to re-define the nature and function of the schema and its junctions with categorical logic. Nuclear and dynamic, these forms’ great dependability would presumably not fail when alterations of contingencies threaten intact principles, interpretations, laws, and constitutions. Gabbay and Woods’ idea (2000, p. 96) ‘ . . . a logic is a formal idealization of a logical agent’ inserts an ‘outside’ dimension to logic. However, agency as outsidedness is within ‘a hierarchy of goal-directed, resource-bound entities of various types.’ (Gabbay and Woods 2001, pp. 144–145.) When the outside dimension is formally added to logic, it permits it variations. One, the abductive approach, affects just how much contradiction is tolerable for propositional sequences. In general, since a contradiction rule is elemental for a stabilized logic, this tolerance either threatens to de-stabilize or fundamentally and structurally change

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it. To achieve a re-definition of logic is to realize its form vis-à-vis interpenetrations of the different structural levels of knowledge. This would include an outsidedness of agency and lead to the psychological arenas of thought. As ‘agents,’ these interact with external events.5 These arenas and cross-interactions make for different interactions of the schema— pointedly, reversals of position of subject and object in sentences and hence of logical outcomes in what might purport to be a truth table. Metaphoric transfers and psychological access. Developing an SV with the status of logical form vis-à-vis with interpenetrations of the different structural levels of knowledge, focuses a critical start point. It reveals the introduction of ‘change agents’ (MacFarlane 1981; Nguyen et al. 2008) These ‘agents’ would be packets of rules and/or procedures, which can be in an ‘outside’ relation to other forms and structures. As forms, they can be interpenetrative, interpenetrating, and interpenetrated. I regard as a ‘nerve center,’ the formal gyrations ensuing when metaphoric transfers affect logic. These do violence to set/subset or class/subclass categorizations. ‘Outsidedness’ of the agent can place agency outside of a boundary, but within it there can also be an agent-to-object relation. So in set/subset terms, if a boundary is B and agency is A, A ⊆ B and B ⊆ A The metaphoric transfers of agents also expand the availability of particulars and of oppositions having been excluded from a given logically ‘possible world.’ We’re not done. With cuts into the structural components and into their internal and interactive relations, there is an expansion of the psychological possibilities of thought. The upshot: the thinking of the thinker can itself come into focus. It too can be subject to a structural analysis! For example, lots of things might affect a scientist’s idea of the role of a metaphor. Contingencies of logic can open psychological and social worlds as sources of metaphor. Some psychological contributors might be matters of memory. Some might be the thinker’s access to thinking about her thinking (cf. Camp 2006, p. 157) These would be factors such as the reflectiveness and recursions of thought. These factors can be engaged to deal with (1) unresolved conceptual categories and (2) contraries and contradictions in personal thinking vis-à-vis perspectives and social ‘thinking,’ communication, and its perspectives (Also see the range of explanations of metaphor, communication and thought in Camp 2006.) My proposition is not ‘defeatist.’ I do not

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propose that paradoxes and impossible twists in logic and schematization are not so easily solvable, because technologies advance faster than people can harness them and their effects. Yet, we should realize we are limited in imagining and in conceptualizing structurally accommodative frameworks. I do propose to open these frameworks to thinking and its relation to a sort of truth tables. These would work for the governance and interpretation of technologically inspired and governed language, thought, and communication systems interfacing with human thinking and communication. More generically, the objective is to make psychological and logical attempts to face doubt. The extreme doubt so troubling the Trumper, if not one of defeatism, betrays a great disappointment. It is unremitting in a persistent need for a ladder of doubt climbing to the awful dilemma resembling the liar’s paradox.

Notes 1. Adams (2019) recently argues Pavlov’s approach has been overly strictly characterized as isolated to a uni-directional hierarchy (of human subjects vis-à-vis dogs) Adams explores re-aligning its ideas. They would instead crossover to a hierarchy of categories that emerges despite divergence—in a manner the SV can perspectivize. 2. The weak stimuli give a greater response than the strong (Gantt 1941, p. 13) 3. Diagram 8.1 shows access from an outside site of agency (black circle). Thought that seeks focus ‘floats’ into a somewhat stretched Venn-type diagram of circles representing different levels of the knowledge complex. The floatation ‘stops’ at an unlikely intersect, bringing together elements or terms from different levels. Circles and their overlaps, drawn as areas of shared particulars, represent the levels. The ‘agent’s’ selection, in this illustrated case, is of elements that might otherwise not be focused. The newly combined area is in green in the diagram. Note the overlapping of the circles can be considered as representing the circles at points of exchanges, such that the level presumed to overlap the other exchanges its superposing function. 4. This theme is indelibly presented in the film, Koyaanisqatsi (Reggio and Coppola 1983). 5. The ‘outsidedness’ of an agent can refer it beyond the bounds of thought— in the surrounding socio-linguistic context, for example. However, insofar as thought itself is recursive, an agent can be outside a cognitive object. It can be ‘in’ a phenomenological surround. Hence an inside-outside structure is itself recursive.

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References Adams, M. (2019, December 30). The kingdom of dogs: Understanding Pavlov’s experiments as human–animal relationships. Theory & Psychology | OnlineFirst. First published 30 Dec 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/095935431 9895597. Camp, E. (2006). Metaphor in the mind: The cognition of metaphor. Philosophy Compass, 1(2), 154–170. Gabbay D. M., & Woods, J. (2000, June 16). The reach of abduction. Retrieved from events.cs.bham.ac.uk/esslli/notes/gabbay/gabbay.ps. Gabbay, D. M., & Woods, J. (2001). The new logic. Logic Journal of the IGPL, 9(2), 141–174. Gantt, W. H. (1941). Introduction. In I. P. Pavlov (Ed.), Lectures on conditioned reflexes. Volume II . Conditioned reflexes and psychiatry (W. Horsley Gantt, Trans. and Ed., pp. 11–38). London: Lawrence & Wishart. Goodman, D. M., & Collins, A. (2019, March 18). The streaming self: Liberal subjectivity, technology, and unlinking. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology. Advance online publication. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/teo000 0111. Habermas, J. (2001). Constitutional democracy. Political Theory, 29(6), 766– 781. MacFarlane, A. I. (1981). Dynamic structure theory: A structural approach to social and biological systems. Bulletin of Mathematical Biology, 43(5), 579–591 31. Nguyen, N. T., Jo, G. S., Howlett, R. J., & Jain, L. C. (2008). Agent and multi-agent systems: Technologies and applications. Second KES international symposium, KES-AMSTA 2008, Inchon, Korea. Pavlov, I. P. (1941). Lectures on conditioned reflexes. Volume II : Conditioned reflexes and psychiatry (W. Horsley Gantt, Trans. and Ed.). London: Lawrence & Wishart. Reggio, G., & Coppola, F. F. (1983). Koyaanisqatsi [Film]. Institute for Regional Education. Santa Fe NM. University of Surrey. (1997; 1998; 2005). Basic gates and functions. Composed by Wale Sangosanya, 1997; Updated by David Belton, April 1998. Retrieved August 18, 2018, from http://www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/Projects/CAL/digitallo gic/gatesfunc/index.html#introduction. Windholz, G. (1996). Pavlov’s conceptualization of paranoia within the theory of higher nervous activity. History of Psychiatry, 7 (25), 159–166.

Epilogue: SV Unbound---Program Logic and the Metaphoric Span of the Open Logic Gate

Realizing the Value of Structural Analysis From Colby’s programmable logic transformations to the metaphoric reach of the modifiable logic gate. We have a plethora of organizational terms for logic gates. Mathematico-logically, they can be conceived as sets. But the transformative operations are also those of thought about cognitive objects. As such, they function/become concepts; they organize meanings. As concepts, logic gates are particularly fecund when they do more than insure bounds are not violated. At a functional level they are still binary logic transducers. They transform and govern transport of various levels of information and their relation to other levels of computer and computer-type output.1 Extended in these ways, the logical form and function of ‘the logic gate’ concept can also be related to more distant levels of computational, logical, and semantic phenomena. These levels include such phenomena as the logical possibilities of a categorical logic system along with consideration of its modality contingencies. Possible applications to patterns of logical, sentential, and propositional structures and their development also open. With its enormously expandable relation, the form of this logic gate concept can become a gigantically fertile metaphor.2 Just two formal functions of organization reveal the possible patterns by which the one term of the metaphor is compared to the other. The first formal function is on a micro level. It would reveal a logical and/or schematic © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 H. Fisher, Logic, Syntax, and a Structural View, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60881-1

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relation between the two terms. This relation works within the logical and schematic forms. The micro function is provided by the logic gate’s internal qualities (patterns of negation, double negations, and boundary entry rules). The second formal function is a macro-tendency of thought to organize a ‘knowledge complex.’ It would provide for placing the newly suggested relations within an epistemic manifold. As a process of coordinating framing, The macro-function provides organization for the information within a knowledge complex and its variability at different levels of an individual’s epistemic functioning.

That variability can include the different semiotic forms, which accompany representations at the different distances of the epistemic levels. Another form of distance is in relation to the objects of thought. Those objects can themselves be considered at macro and micro levels. The levels of thought relevant here include the thinker’s logic of thought as to what is admissible within a possible world: Admissible objects and phenomena include a. Concepts b. That which is admissible within the concepts c. Other cognitive objects that can function within the possible world, and d. The capacity of the logic of thought to explain that possible world and its internal and external relations. The components making up the thinker’s logic of thought (item d) are epistemic forms and rules. They are at a ‘macro level’ of information, knowledge, and explanation. I called that macro level a ‘manifold.’ It accommodates different levels of description and explanation of an individual—relative to her logic of thought. The Sharp and Miller (2019) and Thomas and Sharp (2019) reviews identify those different levels and their characteristics, determinative powers, and interrelations. They advocate accounting for a levels duality: more global and subsuming (‘macro’) vs. highly particular and (‘micro’) levels. They see the micro levels’ patterns as either autonomously causal or interwoven. My approach is to the logic of this levels duality as analogical. A micro level within this manifold might well be the electrochemically

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inspired signal system and its vicissitudes. These vicissitudes, as Pavlov averred, would be excitatory and inhibitive at different levels of and at different process points in the manifestation of the relation of stimulus and response. Then, there would be modular pictures of the relation of the micro levels with each other and with the ‘macro levels’ of the logical and schematic structures of information. Those pictures structurally reveal how the information is or is not represented (or coded), and is or is not processed. All this wandering from one level to another is to show two things: 1. A structural analysis affords (and brings about) a wide range of possible instances. For example, the logic of reversing subject and object in a sentence can be found not only in the dialogue of a paranoid, but also in a surrender move or a jiu jitsu tactic of ‘You are striking at me; not I at you.’ That reversal goes farther: ‘The striker will suffer the pain; not the person attacked.’ This sort of schematic reversal pattern can be at other levels. Thus, a constant state of alertness can end up with exhaustion and hence missed signals. This swinging from intense use of negation to its suspension has implications not only for the ultra-paradox patterning of stimulus and response, but also for the vicissitudes of negation of the self as agent as occurs in the paranoid person. The SV derived from Colby’s PARRY appears accessible to ways of understanding, if not affecting change in paranoid alterations of personal agency. In his recent view of the paranoid personality, Lee (2018; m/s pp. 9–10) refers back to PARRY and describes points at which negation operations kick in for its simulation (cf. Colby et al. 1971, pp. 4–5). These operations pivot on the idea that the paranoid person responds to challenges to her negations of agency with more negations, while in the absence of the challenges, that tendency to negate will decay. Lee reasons that withholding the challenges decreases the use of negations, motivating ‘completion of the decay function of negative affect.’ Since negation of the self as agent is then de-motivated, it frees the person to engage the self as ‘I.’ Consider that freeing not only as Lee assumes, salutary for mental health, but also, within the Bernstein et al. (2015) concept of metacognition—freeing, affecting ‘both the processes of meta-awareness and disidentification from internal experience’. Within that enhanced viewing capability there can be a ‘re-perceiving’ or ‘disidentifying from the contents of consciousness’ (Shapiro, p. 377). In this account, compatibly with the SV, one can see thought and its recursions to and from agentive levels as a complex architecture of loci

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for launching and arresting negations—as if by a series of adjustments to negation gates or by interacting gate patterns. Applied to the concept of logic gates, the SV scope can include the design and use of logic gate operations that can in turn self-design logic gates. In this metacognitive round of processing, agency moves in and out of the individual’s phenomenological sphere. For example, the logical alterations can be via an exchange of patient and therapist. In the sociopolitical sphere, the exchange can be between rival politicos— or Trumpers and non-Trumpers. Bear in mind the psychological factors of the paranoid’s motivation and how it reflects its developmental origins and dynamics. Note well the psychoanalytic concept in Madeira et al.’s (2016) interpretation of Freud’s concept of negation and its use as ‘de-negation.’ ‘De-negation’ can be viewed as a mix of logical and psychological dynamics. In relation to paranoia, de-negation’s use can be projected onto the grammatical patterns in which agency is negated at various levels of recursion. Thus, the psychodynamics is consonant both with the Kleinian view of the paranoid position and with the extension of Colby’s description of grammatical patterns. In this book, this pattern is grammatically summarized by the ~I positioned in front of a schema of origin-action-outcome. Also, the negation maneuvers of the psychodynamic pattern are consonant with logic gate operations and their use of negation and double negations. 2. The SV comparison acts as a metaphoric reach to a knowledge complex. Similarities in patterns urge comparisons across levels. With those ‘cross-comparisons’ open, analogical ratios comparing any one comparison to another, fold out. These may be within or across levels, and may be within or between given comparisons. Lastly, representations can be presented as cognitive products of a cognitive process, and also be presented as phenomena within a social matrix. As I specifically present that matrix, it can widen to involve a given society’s commitments to argument as a source and as arbiter of ‘truth.’ The society can fashion and process rules of valuation, which may be subject to oppositions. One such opposition is of judgments legally or otherwise authoritatively prescribed, versus those, which are—you name it: Individually propounded? Rhetorically appealing? Pragmatic? The book’s aim is not to resolve these tangles, but instead to propose: Patterns, detectable within a fecund structural analysis, can yield metaphoric type concepts—the logic gate is one. The logic gate

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is a structural device, which, when configured with recursive capabilities, can produce metaphoric forms—and may be regarded as one. These metaphoric concepts illuminate commonalities among strange bedfellows, such as the paranoid, Trump, and the Trumper. Structural display of a metaphoric comparison’s functioning in revealing the relations of psychological concepts would yield a synthesizing understanding. Still, the display would fall short of making what a scientist would call a direct connection. To make the three-way connection of the paranoid, Trump, and Trumper, detectable patterns and formats may be predicated on a grand comparison. Yet, it may not directly lead to secure ways to solve or re-form the knotty problems entailed—logical, semantic, and otherwise. There is something we can illuminate first. We can throw the SV’s spotlight on the logical entanglements suspending the truth values of the triad—logic, thought, and schematic sequencing! The SV opens to this perspective to view the triad’s three forms and their relations as a three-way comparison. The SV and Colby’s Aims for Structural Analysis: The Metaphor and the Gate The triad is a governance template for knowledge complexes. It also fosters and accommodates multi-leveled knowledge complexes. When the target knowledge complex we want to know about is ‘thinking,’ and we ask about its nature and how to understand it, all sorts of levels of the inquiry emerge: To shortcut such a list, consider its most distantly and divergently related levels of the subjective experiences versus the electrochemical activity of a neural complex. This relation or that of a ‘structurally similar’ perspective on the multi-leveled knowledge complexes of the triad, may find its way to new ‘angles’ from which to understand the phenomena. For Colby, such new angles had emerged from computer simulations, which will have given rise to a structural language and conception. With his template, Colby advanced a technological perspective on a particular logic of a particular thinking. For our triad, we project a governance template. New angles to a perspective at this point may be combinations. The new combinations might include forms of political rhetoric, political contingencies for the logic of individual thought and its relation to social nexuses, and the role of poetic thinking in finding commonalities that restructure the search

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for truth. (The perspectival range would call for a combination of a wideangle focus for breadth and a long angle focus to reduce distortion. Once more, the knowledge requires topological depiction and the logic of its flotations and transformations.) As far as doubt is concerned, it may be a relief to ‘see’ its forms in the possibilities of logic gates as they govern the rules for belief and the form for the rhetoric accompanying attitudes. It is a chase to find determinants of our agency that could redesign gate rules, and in turn, increase knowledge and understanding. The pursuit and its discovery routes require a structural analysis. For that, we would need to ‘open the gates.’

The SV as Opening to an Account of the Generation of Form to Achieve a Knowledge Complex A Fundamental Perspective Afforded by SV: The Psychological Development of the Schema as a Form and Its Impact on Logical Structure How does the logic gate become a metaphor? It is not only the logic gate that becomes the metaphor; it is the SV and its various simulated substructures, such as the reversal formulas for attribution of social responsibility. To be sure, other approaches to simulation via a computational logic permit and facilitate logical production of metaphoric relations. Gentner’s ‘structure-mapping’ theory of metaphors (1983, for example) is aptly compatible with a computational approach. Jamrozik et al. (2016, p. 1081) cite her conception: ‘… metaphors, like analogies, align the base and target, and then project inferences from the base to the target.’ They explain this function in terms of the base’s structuring capacity—inherent in its concepts, terms, and categories. To unpack ‘structuring capacity,’ consider the terms in Shakespeare’s metaphor, ‘Juliet is the Sun’: The Sun would be the ‘base’; Juliet, the ‘target.’ Structuring capacity, as Gentner analyzes, is ‘relational’—not a matter of the particularities of ‘attributes.’ Mappings, as an analogical operation, become the basis for a structural view of metaphors. Metaphors can then be assigned to category matchings that justify ratios of equivalence for features of a base and a target. The metaphor relates features that diverge from their relational status as a logical presentation. So, as in the

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‘Juliet is the Sun’ metaphor, the features present non-identity or contradiction with each other. As regards logical features of non-identity or contradiction, it is the genius of metaphor that they are in effect negated. In the form (format) of ratios, features from the base can be floated to a comparison point within a target and seen in patterns of equivalence. These patterns are formed as process and product embodied within the individual person. From this ‘reversal of base and target’ effect within Gentner’s structure-mapping theory, Jamrozik, McQuire, Cardillo, and Chatterjee reason, ‘the mode of metaphor mapping shifts from comparison to categorization as a metaphor becomes conventional.’ Extended in these ways, the logical form and function of categories (and categorizing functions, such as ‘the logic gate’ concept) can be related to more distant levels of phenomena. These levels include such phenomena as the logical possibilities of a categorical logic system along with its modality contingencies. Possible applications to patterns of logical, sentential, and propositional structures and their development also open. Transformation from one to another of these ‘big’ patterns is a big deal. It’s the stuff of imagination; also of scientific reformations. Here is one way this kind of relation of one pattern to another becomes a gigantically fertile metaphor: The SV provides a series of metaphors. Typically I present these in abstract symbolic terms and relationships.3 An abstraction like X → Y, functioning as a metaphor, enables ‘floatation.’ It can relate to distant levels, such as Pavlov’s focus on electrochemical neurological events of excitation and its opposite, on one hand, and the ‘logic’ of the paranoid on the other. The metaphor’s suggestive direction is not only toward a set of isomorphic relations. It is also extendable. The phenomena of distant levels might be related more deeply by yet another level of a phenomenon. Together these become relations of classificatory levels, and they are presumably contemporaneous in dynamic relations or interactions. Pavlov saw that a neural stimulus’ ‘high degree of stimulation’ can yield an opposite effect. In one case, it generates excited positive response; in another, the same stimulus generates a negative or ‘reversed’ response. Looking at this formally, the schema for its sequence of input and outcome would reflect, if not guide this ‘reversal’ variation. Well, doesn’t that reversal occur with the classic dissonance situation? Sometimes a promise of great reward can stimulate investment of money or effort; sometimes it can stimulate withholding that investment. In the Bernie Madoff case, a large reward is offered for little effort—that is, without

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deep study of the factors. That case drew a lot of attention because of those attracted to the offer. There were those repelled by it. ‘Too good to be true!’ There are guesses about psychological factors, such as a ‘trust bias.’ If the excitement of great reward is met by aversion, it is also inviting to think about the neural structures behind an attitude like ‘Think twice.’ Is there a dynamic theory explaining the parallel paradoxes on two such different levels and capturing that which is centrally motivating? Consider leverage on such problems in broad terms: how much information is needed before an action is logical or its expected outcome likely to be at another more overarching level of the context? With these terms, I relate matters of choice of action to Werner’s master proposition about knowing and acting. Viz., history and development are at work in the orthogenetic structuring of an individual’s way of knowing and acting on the environment. With historical and developmental influence, the SV takes on another even more fundamental perspectival angle. The Kantian meta-view of leads us to conceive the schema ‘deep in the soul.’ From an orthogenetic perspective, we don’t look into its depth simply as a dynamic whirlpool. Within Werner’s conception, we look to the unfolding of the elements as if they were in a ‘schema time capsule.’ Therein, the difficult concept of ‘orthogenetic’ takes on a dynamic function. Change is less a matter of temporal succession than of dynamic need for differentiation and hierarchic integration (Glick 1992, p. 560). The schema as a form would be emergent—subject to the differences Piaget marked as sequential in development (Kesselring and Müller 2011).4 As time goes on, the individual’s schema can take on the scope provided by abstract thinking. This obviously affects levels available for new differentiations and integrations. They open possibilities not only of new hierarchizations, but also of reorganization of particulars and their reassignments to loci at which new integrations are possible. All this affects logical form and the needed extension of modalities. It is important to insert that, to an extent, Piaget’s epigenetic view undergoes a shift from the ‘sequential’ to an orthogenetic picture (Kesselring and Müller 2011, p. 328). This point is gorgeously relevant to the issues of the two major forms highlighted in this book—the schema and logic. This relevance is particularly striking when we consider the fundamental issue of ‘egocentrism.’ Egocentrism as fundamental in the dynamics of logic and the schema. Piaget’s view of egocentrism (1985) holds that an individual develops her conviction events are veridically what they are seen to be.

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The individual’s development has its start point when the equation of perception and veridicality holds from her point of viewing and from none other. Deep sinking one’s anchor to that start point would obviously limit the person’s idea of ‘possible worlds.’ It would also isolate the schema from any awareness that it too is subject to alteration. Yet, the mature ‘I’ as agent can think and rethink to determine the format of the schema. Here, you can go to Diagram 7.2 (p. 174) and reverse the ‘float.’ The ‘begin’ point will have been the apprehension of an object as an egocentric view of the particulars in the green areas. Adopt the float point as going toward the locus of agency or the ‘I.’ From there, it can be refloated into the overlapping circles, resulting in a new agglomeration, now including particulars from circles representing ‘other perceivers’’ views of the object. From that new ‘begin’ point, the ‘I,’ as agent, will have affected within and outside the schema not only the schema role and placement, but also its format. Multiple possible patterns of the relationship of the ‘I,’ as agent, to the particulars of an object could/would emerge. With these possibilities, the changeability of the schema as a basic form can become a likely scenario. Think of the cause → effect relation. That’s as basic as it gets! But think of it with a bold change—reversal of the sequence. Lewis Carroll’s ‘Sentence first; then verdict’ is a classic schematic reversal. Various versions—‘Verdict first; then proof’ and even, ‘Verdict, first; then trial’—have recently been utilized sociopolitically! In the case of the paranoid, a reversal of ‘self’ as the cause of an outcome affecting an ‘Other’ appears a ubiquitous structural phenomenon. For Trump and the Trumper, it is very common as a rationale. To the extent this restructuring of the schema and the logic of causation is evident and the patterns predictive, we need to look again at Piaget’s idea of egocentrism and developmental stage. It is vital to note Piaget changed his view of egocentrism. He came to the idea the early developmental ‘stage’ of egocentrism’ can repeat itself at different points in the thinker’s development and history. I will briefly present how the SV shows the ‘mature’ thinker (particularly one from our Trio) can manifest what appears immature—viz. an egocentrism resulting from ‘pre-negating’ the other person’s point of view without either perceiving or attempting to contradict it. Is Freud right; is this a ‘regression’?

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Go another step—not merely back to an ‘earlier stage.’ Further regression? Peirce distinguishes between ‘degenerate’ and ‘genuine indexical’ use: Without a framework of Other-to-Self and Self-to-Other, indexical reference lacks the means to advance from its degenerate use to a more genuine use whose objects are mental images or memories, and even later in development, to hypothetical or possible objects. (West 2012, p. 302)

Essentially, the degenerate object has its particulars, but whatever its form, it is not shunted from and/or to an agent. Moreover, there is no ‘other’ source. As a primal view ‘egocentric’ has a self, but neither agency nor competing perspective. Its primitive ‘not me’ is ipso facto an ‘empty set.’ So is the ‘I’—as agent. So complete is the merge between perspective on the object and egocentric viewing, there is no agency— either as itself or its contraries. A given schema is not a mere ‘version’ of a schema. It is a schema. An apple falls from a tree. That it hits the ground would be subject to schematization. However, ‘truth’ requires agency+schematization. That an agent (the person) shook the tree would be subject to all sorts of negation—including absence of the image, memory, or concept of the person ‘as agent’ doing or recalling doing this. With a ‘degenerate representation,’ truth for a schematic of what occurred is not denied—it doesn’t exist. All that is a ‘not-me’ mode prior to the egocentrism Piaget focused. Recently, Southgate (2019) proposed a primal stage: infants are ‘alterocentric’ before they have a sense of self. ‘It’s not-me’ may be a deep belief in this immersion in the regnancy of the Other! In later development, the self becomes competitive agent. Negation of self as agent with ‘wrong’ thinking’ results in paranoid projection of agency. When the paranoid says ‘not me’ (denying agency), it refracts the truth negated by denial or a series of denials. Egocentrism and paranoid projection as challenges to logic gates. Classically, the paranoid and the ‘Other’ are primordially opposed. Primally, the paranoid is a self, but her thoughts are—she is not an agent; the ‘Other’ is. Fundamental to her thoughts she does all good as a degenerative production. The ‘Other,’ as an agent, does all bad. Consequently, there is a special ‘agency catch-22’—clashes of the contradictory with the truncated schema. The paranoid can assert the ‘Other’ has agency. She would have to have the agency to assert that! She appears to have had an

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encompassing ‘buck stops here’ locus for the attribution of agency. She would deny agency in the case of any undesirable action or outcome. The ‘Other’ upon whom she bestows agency—presumably has it; yet cannot serve as a locus of attribution. Any such attribution emanating from the Other is not valid. Given the paranoid’s assumption of her agency to declare it is not her agency either functioning or functional, the locus of agency per se is not a true state of affairs. Hall of Mirrors versus SV Focus. To look for and find agency within the Trio’s cast of characters is to be inside a hall of mirrors facing each other. Mirrors reflect other mirrors. At some inversions of what is reflected, agency can appear ‘aright.’ At other junctures, you see the ‘mirror version,’ where right is left, and agency but an opposing reflection. The image is an as-if agency. If you focus Trump as an origin point faced by mirrors, PARRY’s syntax and logic would be one reflection; the Trumper’s another. With SV focus, you invert the inverted perspective. The agent you view is in the schema saddle at each of the loci of the Trio. Can all this be sorted out as a matter of category levels? The agency of the ‘Other’ might be a sub-concept of the paranoid’s category of agency. The paranoid might not believe she has the agency to attribute this, and place the ‘Other’ in the position of making false attributions. The categories would be mixed up. Look at the Borromean rings’ exchanges in Diagram 8.1. Assume these exchanges of plane superposition represent exchanges of category levels. Irrespective of the contraries and contradictions introduced, the argument pictured shows category levels that can be sorted out in a mode subject to dynamic changes. With all these twists and turns, the paranoid argument can be seen from a number of conflicting perspective points. Therefore, the problem becomes highly susceptible to the logical contingency of suspending the law of excluded middle. Von Domarus rides again? The braid: logic, equilibrium, and the experience and locus of agency. The argument comprised of dynamically changeable category levels and subject to conflicting perspective points is a form that ‘moves along.’ As it does, changes occur in logical equilibrium in concert with a balancing of psychological versus logical factors in the experience and posit(s) of agency. This juxtaposition of logical steps and psychological scaffolding is best conceived visually. The impossibilities can then be viewed as architectural structuring of posits of agency and psychological exercises of agentive origin and action. The picture would resemble

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an impossible staircase in Escher’s ‘Ascending and Descending’ drawing (1960). To make the drawing, just as to sustain contradictions involved, requires negating logical negations we would have in place. They will have been there so our worlds of self and Other would be ‘possible.’ Logic gates in place would keep the impossible at bay. Negating logic gates and opening not only to impossibilities but also to isomorphisms. The following analysis shows that adopting the SV provides comparisons extending to divers, if not divergent, levels of the concepts, information, and architectural structure of the topic we are thinking about and its target concepts. The logical catch-22 just described is fascinating. It affects the logic and presumes the idea of negating logic gates to undo the rejection of the other person’s point of view. It also offers an analogue for Pavlov’s observation of an ultra-paradoxical mode. The logic gate, as a fundamental operation, negates. A primary (logical) function is to keep out that which would be contradictory. Consider the paranoid as a person rejecting the ‘Other’s’ point of view. The paranoid’s position there would be egocentric—(‘I’ can do no wrong—as ‘I’ see it.) If in this case, there exists, a psychologically induced negation—rejection of the Other’s point of view—then only by disabling the gate function of negation can you undo it. The Catch 22 for the mature individual is: she does not escape the use of the negative! That escape’s not as easy as it might look. It took ‘developmental time’ so she could distinguish between her own and another person’s point of view. Now, she has to suspend that matured distinction. To sustain the sense of balance, she tries to escape the Catch 22, by having a new (different) sense of development. This requires a fundamental alteration of the schema— that its cause–effect sequence not be independent of the presence of self within it. Because time can move forward, a stimulus can be followed by an outcome. But, if that time sequence is solely located within an egocentric locus, characteristics of an outcome and stimulus in the same slot do not have to synchronize with causal laws or be a logical outcome. If the paranoid finds an unwelcome outcome after her own behavior, there does not have to be a temporal link. She can see that outcome as caused by the ‘Other’—that attribution by association, not by sequence of events. A good example is the ‘shoot the messenger’ approach. For Trump, his past action is not the cause of a bad outcome. It’s the ‘reporter’ (the Other) who is presenting bad (fake) news! The lack of verve in searching himself when results pile up is a response resembling an

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‘ultra-paradoxical mode.’ That mode thus becomes a useful contingency within the developmental progression. How useful it would be, if that person in the room, excited by Madoff’s offer (or Trump’s ‘deal’), could decide, ‘This completely turns me off.’ That person does a number of turnarounds—including returning to her own judgment in the face of learning specialists may know more. These are turnarounds of the response to exciting values, and to the self as an agent that replaces the ‘Other.’ All this would entail what looks like regression to logical violations. Indeed, Freud had to cope with his version of the ‘return of the repressed.’ So, it sounds fair for Piaget to have to cope with a return to egocentrism. One man’s ‘regression in service of the ego’ is another man’s ‘equilibration in service of adaptation.’ Navigating the cross-sea by floats. The catch-22 is there for the psychologist’s concept of agency. For the psychologist—or for anyone who looks—finding that concept of agency is a nightmare when dealing with a mature paranoid. Egocentrism precludes the concept that agency resides in the ‘Other.’ In the course of development, it gives way to a mature realization agency is not only in the self. But it has to be in the self for it to be, if not projected, recognized! So, we’re in that catch22, when we see projection of agency remains a function of the mature paranoid—and as well, in the Trumper’s attributions. I’m reminded of swells of waves attempting to go in different directions to achieve their resolutions. The result is odd coexistence. The ‘real’ rolling waves created by separated weather systems become swells. They collide, producing a comprehensible structure—the ‘cross-sea.’ Make this our metaphor for the ‘agency catch-22.’ To look at agency in the light of its ‘cross-sea’ characteristics, visualize that entire phenomenon, structurally. It has these many loci, dynamics of opposition, and resolutions. To understand it, not only in its interactions, but also as a summative unit of knowledge–say, as a concept—we need the structural view—and our SV has to ‘float.’ It could float on one and then another ‘swell’; it could float into one or another weather system affecting the swell, its relation to a competing swell and/or to the force and resolution forming a cross-sea. Floating on the cross-sea.The SV, its terms, and its forms have to relocate from one organizational unit, its forms, and its dynamic resolutions to another. In this way, the logical perspective of SV can ‘float’ from basic psychological assumptions about the course of development of egocentrism, its equilibration, and its dynamic effects on the thinker’s schemas. The floating goes on to a consequent effect of the logic on

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thought. Therein could/would ensue multiple possible patterns of the relationship of the ‘I,’ as agent, to the particulars of an object. With their presence, schema changeability as a basic form can become a likely scenario. These cross-sea phenomena—at the different levels of analysis— can be revealed by way of the SV applied to an issue like explaining and exploring the similarities of Parry, Trump, and the Trumper. Relinking Disconnected Flotations as a Great Wave Goodman and Collins (2019, March 18) explore the sociopolitical context of liberalism. They argue its tenets ‘de-link’ from the individual self. Re-linking’ with self is also vis-à-vis sociopolitical context—by exiting it. This occurs when a narcissistic character provides the individual a direct connection with herself.5 Ironically, in the present book’s terms, that transition would be an interference with the sense of agency. Goodman and Collins ask, … what does fascism, nativism, and nationalism have that liberalism does not? One simplification of the argument here is that liberalism places tenets and mediators between its subjects, creating a libidinal break that leaves them disconnected and unlinked from one another. (p. 4)

In the inclusion of liberalism here, we have an expansion of the builtin cleft between a democracy and its individual’s sense of ‘person’ and subjectivity. This description of a sociopolitical ‘cross-sea’ places the ‘subject’—the individual—in a float; disconnected from self and from others—indeed, in that ‘cross-sea.’ Goodman and Collins see this disconnected float as disembarkation from self in a sociopolitical search for a port to reconnect a vitalistic link: Their sum up is a match for the Trump–Trumper connection: The slowly generated anomie, alienation, and de-sensitization invoked by Fromm, Durkheim, Arendt, and many others point to the effects of this unlinking. Commonly, this translates into societal enticements to relink through contrived and pseudocommunal experiences. It is a search for vitalism and the elemental. But it often takes the shape of vicarious practices such as electing a president who promises to be vicious, narcissistic, impulsive, and a childish man, tracking Jersey Shore characters, and so forth. (2019, p. 8)

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This port offers vitalistic relinking—floaters come to port and encounter ‘merging experiences.’ Their psychosocial, penultimately political, bases dovetail with Hahl et al.’s (2018) description of the authenticity experience. This sum up is a match for those offers of authenticity and the experience of vitalistic relinking that enable the Trump–Trumper connection. Parameters of the knowledge complex from floating views of SV. The Trumper feels and attributes authenticity. It substitutes for an impossible to achieve logical truth. The authenticity would thus ‘link’ the person’s ‘felt’ connection between self and assertion. The link with the Other’s narcissism gives the self a mirror—if not a mooring. It is not only within the individual. It could also serve to replace the crosscurrents between the individual mind and that, which is said, codified, and presented as sociopolitical entities—such as laws and a constitution of a state. The cross-seas would come together in a great wave closing over crosscurrents. That which is authentic in a knowledge complex is a series of interconnected links. To keep these linked requires a closed view of a possible world. Social psychologist Milton Rokeach took on the problem of opening a ‘closed mind.’ Not so easy to do. When all your propositions support a ‘closed’ view of a possible world, you would have to abnegate at least one of those propositions to open new pathways or possibilities. Rokeach’s rule (1960) is to discard a taken-for-granted premise, and look at that ‘world’ without it. But how do you do this? To make changes in the way thought is structured requires access to multiple levels of the psychological and logical factors, determinants, and sources of dynamics of the thinker. First things first—the first problem is opening gates blocking access to the complexity of multiple levels. The upshot of our analysis so far is: The SV can float above some gates that keep one context of content, in its identity, separate from another. In that float, the SV provides a perspective illuminating the dynamics, if not the form, of that relation.6 In this mode, the SV can provide a perspective on the relation of psychological factors of development, contemporary dynamics, and the status of logical form relative to the variegations of the schema as a form (also see Pezzulo and Calvi 2009). With all the levels and types of phenomena involved, just where is there a significantly generative level for a revelatory or predictive perspective?

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Within the current climate of ‘Mind is Brain’ and the expansion of various ways of imaging and tracking neurological structures and their effects, neuroscience comes to the fore. The ‘Mind is Brain’ metaphor suggests a material based (scientific!) structure for building and gaining access to the psychology of thought as a ‘knowledge complex.’ From the metaphor as a perspective, access to the complex would be entrée to its multiplicity of levels. To an extent, challenge to developing this perspective has been assigned to the role of neuroscience and its focus in the identification of neural correlates. To expand the knowledge complex via a transformation of the structural metaphor, Pezzulo and Calvi (2011) study the potential to suggest a new ontology and new questions to neurobiology as a function of robotics. The robot, I, Robot, is a metaphor for a ‘person.’ Such metaphors would agglomerate (multiplicatively produce metaphoric chains), and be transformative. Consider this 3-link chain of metaphoric expansion: 1. neurobiology : robotics 2. neurobiology : person functions, 3. robotics : (neurobiology : person functions). In ‘link’ 3, robotics becomes a function governing the whole chain: Assuming a programmed (AI) basis with its computational logic as the cognitive engine and architectural form of robot operations, we focus availability of a ‘structural analysis’ in computer simulation. The idea that the psychologist is building a knowledge complex advances Colby’s ‘structural approach’ objective. Recall how Barsalou et al. (2007) conceptualized the inter-relations of different levels: … perception, action, and cognition must be identified to characterize cognition adequately. Again, much work shows increasingly that these systems are exquisitely linked. (p. 81)

They reason these levels determining thought bring together two issues of computer simulation: specification of ‘architecture’ and the necessity of a developmental perspective (pp. 55–58; 110–115). To get at a macro-determinant, I emphasized a third foundational issue: the developmental perspective needed for building an architecture for the ‘knowledge complex.’

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The Trio’s Dialectical Core of Identity Shared Identity Flips at the Logic Gate The book’s chosen target for comparisons is the Trio’s dynamics of thinking and its sociolinguistic representations. The SV is to establish a basis for finding and pursuing equivalence patterns that cut across the paranoid, Trump, and the Trumper’s dynamics and representations. A major proposal: the logic of the paranoid, as reflected in the PARRY simulation, forms that basis. The SV provides logical forms and operations, particularly through logic gate patterns. These penetrate the equivalences cutting across the Trio—the paranoid, Trump, and the Trumper. In the process, the logical transactions and shifts align with psychological explanations of developmental patterns. However, some major developmental conceptions of these patterns of progression have produced apparent theoretical disconnects. A particularly maddening disjointedness of development and logical progression takes place in the paranoid self’s sense of the locus of agency. It not only spins like a whirling dervish; agency floats: now you see it, and now you don’t. Begin the spinning—agency is sensed and attributed to the self. Begin the floating—agency cannot be located in the self. Continue the spinning—agency is felt, sensed, and attributed to the Other. Continue the floating—your agency and its responsibilities cannot be in an eternal exile, either! We discussed this tempestuous relation of egocentrism and decentering. How is it possible both are present in the paranoid, if the theory is that egocentrism is succeeded by a decentered viewpoint? Psychoanalytically (and in Piagetian recounting) there is not only a proto-stage of egocentrism, but also that which ‘decenters.’ This beginning and its development are described in Kleinian thesis of the ‘paranoid position’: The ‘Other’ is the agent of action, and the self, agent negated. This pattern presumably makes an early developmental appearance, yet reappears, as development moves onward. If this ‘position’ (psychological as well as predicational) constitutes egocentrism, it is a focus reflecting a self with a negative capacity for agency. However, there is developmental progress—the shift from egocentrism to recognition of other perspectives and others’ perspectives. The logic gets to assign gates that govern other gates! The paranoid’s identity after that ‘progressive development’ rejects the attributions of the Other(s). Yet another gate swings open: The paranoid uses that rejection (negation) as a logic of identity: Thus, I am ~(~I). If we try to keep this logic straight from a categorical point of view, we have on hand a failure of the law of

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excluded middle. Psychologically, the development of personal identity is both progressive and regressive. There is a bright side. The implications of all this redound to a cascading function of the SV: It provides a logical coding framework. The framework supports psychological explanation and understanding. Together, these provide for building a psychological model. It describes, explains, and perhaps offers leverage for change. These possibilities and outcomes are in service of understanding and gaining leverage on a knowledge complex for the equivalences of the Trio. Not only issues of psychological and developmental theory are involved. There are also sociopolitical contexts for important, if not urgent, phenomena, such as the “leader-‘true believer’ follower.” A chain of reasoning is possible when ‘opening the gate’ and using logic gate coding in its different possible operations. Here is a brief account of logical negations as they can ‘structure’ (or report the ‘structure of’ or ‘enable’ specific transactions of) identity. These transactions are reflected not only in the individuals’ psychological status, but also in the socio-psychological (and political) discourse corpus: After shifting from egocentrism to recognition of other perspectives and others’ perspectives, the ‘developed’ paranoid rejects the attributions of the Other(s). He uses that rejection (negation) as a logic of identity, thusly: I am ~(~I). For example, Trump does not want to be a ‘loser’—or ‘a nothing.’ A lot is invested in his ‘negating’ that status. Accordingly, the Trump identity is penultimately equivalent to his negation of who he is not: {I [I am ~(~I)]}. In that symbolic formulation, the movement of the ‘I’ is to the leftmost position. This shows its function outside a massive effort to escape the resolution of identity with that of the ‘Other.’ The logic of paranoid identity and that of Trump’s appear equivalent. He has to make a series of flotations to move outside—away from the expansion of negations of the attributions of negation to self and Other. At the heart of things, the ‘truth’ of the (~I) is negated as intrinsic to the identity of the ‘I.’ The Trumper’s ‘I’: a twist from the outside to the inside of Trump’s ‘isolated’ I. The Trumper identifies with the particular I (Trump) as a move away from egocentrism to seeing herself from outside of herself. However, the identity, which is no longer egocentric, is with the identity asserted by Trump, viz., the ‘I [I am ~(~I)].’ Spelled out, the Trumper’s identity is

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I ≡ [I [I am ~(~I)].] Grotesque possibilities in the sociopolitical context. All the bouncing of identity from its negation to its reappearance via double negation is consonant with Lowenthal and Guterman’s (1949) incisive description of the relation between the demagogic leader and the weirdly close identification to that leader by large groups of followers. Referring to psychoanalyst Otto Fenichel’s statement, This narcissistic behavior which gives the dependent persons no hope for any real love arouses their readiness for identification. (Fenichel 1945, p. 10)

Lowenthal and Guterman formulate a mirror reversal logic of identity: The adherent is nothing but an inverted reflection of the enemy. He remains a frustrated underdog, and all the agitator does is to mobilize his aggressive impulses against the enemy. (p. 117)

Eerily, Kranish and Fisher (2017, pp. 52–53) find an important seed for such a logic to develop. It was in a transaction from Father to son: Nine out of ten people don’t like what they do. And in not liking what they do, they lose enthusiasm, they go from job to job and ultimately become a “nothing” Such was the challenge Donald faced as his father’s son; he was given everything at the start—and thus never able to qualify for the Horatio Alger Award—and he wanted to avoid failing in his father’s eyes and becoming a nothing.

I propose the equivalence provided by the formulation I ≡ [I [I am ~(~I)]] can be reflected in a logic gate operation and its codifications. For Trump, the equivalent is resonated in his stating he is not a nothing. For the Trumper, she can be the equivalent of that statement—particularly, if she feels she is or has become a ‘nothing.’

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Notes 1. For the definition of the logic gate see note 6. For its range of application, see notes 30, 31. 2. The following description is skeletal. It is meant to show the coordinating power of a metaphor and its potential to reveal a plethora of routes to the potentialities of thought in relation to a knowledge complex. Cf. Pinker’s concept of ‘metaphorical abstraction’ (2007, 2010). 3. In this book, I discuss the SV as a language made up of interpretants. This is a way of describing the form’s access both to phenomenological events and to particulars of their representation. The formal access is a function of the rules of negation and its capacities for logical structuring and restructuring. All interpretants are fundamentally metaphoric in structure; since each interpretant is a ratio expressing the relation of thought to its representation. 4. There are interesting issues we cannot treat here. We do treat the individual’s penchant, attitudes, and experiences in risk taking. The objective is to telescope these within a SV that expresses ‘summary’ logic and schema forms, which result from historical and development influences, and reflect these in their dynamic appearances. 5. Lots of examples are described with frightening clarity in Lowenthal and Guterman (1949, Ch. 9). 6. This is tantamount to the metaphoric function of revealing the ‘base to target relation’ Gentner conceptualized in 1983.

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Index

A Agent, 2, 3, 28, 37, 39, 69, 74, 77, 83, 85, 86, 105, 116, 126–128, 133, 139–141, 143, 144, 147 Analogical ratios, 134 Analogies, 3–6, 11–13, 20, 26, 34, 44, 46, 56, 60, 62–65, 75, 76, 78, 84, 87, 96, 97, 99, 100, 125, 136 Analogues, 23, 36, 39, 46–48, 66, 78, 83, 87, 120, 142

B Belief, 9, 10, 21–23, 53, 76–78, 80, 82, 83, 85, 100–103, 106, 110, 136, 140 Boolean logic, 76, 78 Boundaries, 8, 28, 52, 98, 127, 132

C Categorical logic, 6, 44, 56, 72, 76, 106–108, 116, 125, 126, 131, 137

Causal agent, 79 Colby, K.M., 2, 6, 24, 36, 37, 45, 46, 55, 56, 66, 68–70, 75, 76, 79, 82, 84, 87, 97, 133–135, 146 Computer simulation, 37, 56, 64, 65, 82, 121, 122, 135, 146 Contingencies, 3, 6, 28, 46, 56, 87, 98, 103, 106, 108, 110–112, 125–127, 131, 135, 137, 141, 143 Contradiction, 9, 10, 22, 36, 44, 47, 69, 72, 74, 77, 80, 81, 84, 86, 87, 89, 106, 109, 112, 115, 116, 120, 122–124, 126, 127, 137, 141, 142

D Divergent levels, 8, 20, 52, 64 Doubt, 85, 106, 110, 111, 125, 126, 128, 136

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 H. Fisher, Logic, Syntax, and a Structural View, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60881-1

165

166

INDEX

E Equivalences, 4, 5, 12, 13, 36, 44, 62, 84, 136, 137, 147–149 G Gate functions, 142 I Identity, 3, 40, 44, 47, 69, 81, 86, 87, 101, 105–107, 109, 112, 114, 115, 124, 145, 147–149 K Knowledge complex, 3–6, 13, 20, 25, 26, 37, 44, 46, 47, 53, 54, 56, 64, 65, 68, 69, 72, 78, 83, 86, 87, 96, 97, 102, 108, 128, 132, 135, 145, 146, 148, 150 L Logic, 2, 4, 6–9, 11, 14, 20, 26, 28, 35, 39, 44–47, 52, 56, 57, 60, 61, 66–70, 72–78, 80, 81, 83–87, 89, 90, 97, 103, 105–107, 109, 111–113, 120–124, 126–128, 132, 133, 135, 139, 141–143, 146–150 Logical form, 3, 44, 55, 78, 86, 88, 107, 109, 122, 124, 127, 131, 137, 138, 145, 147 Logic gate, 14, 64, 65, 69, 76–78, 85, 87, 90, 97, 98, 113, 114, 116, 121–123, 131, 132, 134, 136, 137, 142, 147–150 M Macro level, 132, 133 Matches, 27, 28, 35, 60, 80, 105, 144, 145

Metaphor, 5, 11, 20, 49, 56, 57, 66, 131, 136, 137, 143, 146, 150 Metaphoric function, 55, 150 Micro level, 20, 131–133 Modal contingencies, 109 Modalities of interaction, 46 Modality, 3, 8, 14, 20, 21, 28, 46, 48, 56, 83, 84, 86–89, 97, 98, 101, 107, 109, 111, 112, 123, 125, 131, 137, 138

O Orthogenesis, 48 Orthogenetic, 3, 44, 48, 98, 138

P Paranoid, 2–4, 6, 10, 23, 25, 36, 37, 45, 46, 54–57, 66–71, 73–75, 79–88, 97, 100, 105, 106, 116, 120, 133–135, 140–143, 147 PARRY, 6, 9, 36, 37, 45, 52, 55, 56, 66, 68–70, 82, 84, 87, 97, 105, 123, 124, 133, 141, 147 Psychological dynamics, 6, 39, 134

S Schema, 2–4, 7, 20, 39, 46, 57, 60–62, 64, 69, 76, 86–88, 105–107, 113, 117, 125, 126, 134, 137–141, 144, 145, 150 Schematic form, 3, 39, 132 Schematic reversal, 133, 139 Sociopolitical, 3, 23, 46, 64, 66, 73, 88, 101, 105, 112, 113, 115, 134, 144, 145, 148 Sociopolitical judgments, 115 Structural approach, 2–4, 8, 11, 20, 26, 28, 37, 44, 56, 64, 81, 102, 146

INDEX

Structural view (SV), 1, 3–6, 8, 12, 13, 20, 21, 24–27, 35–37, 39, 45–49, 52, 54–57, 60, 61, 64–66, 69, 70, 73–80, 82, 83, 87, 90, 97, 103, 107, 108, 116, 120–122, 124–128, 133–139, 141–145, 147, 148, 150 T Trio, 4, 36, 66, 70, 77, 78, 113, 124, 139, 141, 147, 148 Trump, 3, 6, 9, 10, 14, 22, 56, 69, 88, 101, 102, 105, 110–114, 122–124, 126, 139, 141, 148

167

Trumper, 3, 4, 6, 9, 14, 22, 23, 36, 37, 56, 66, 69, 70, 73, 75, 80, 82, 83, 85, 86, 88, 101–103, 106, 110, 112, 121, 123, 126, 128, 134, 135, 139, 141, 143–145, 147, 149 Truth, 6, 9, 10, 14, 19, 22, 23, 67, 70, 74, 77, 88, 103, 105–109, 111–115, 122–125, 127, 135, 140, 148 W Werner, Heinz, 3, 36, 44–49, 71, 98, 138