Logic or the Art of Thinking [5 ed.] 0521483948, 9780521483940

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CAMBRIDGE TEXTS IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Series editors

KARL AMERIKS Professor ofPhilosophy at the University ofNotre Dame

DESMOND M. CLARKE Professor ofPhilosophy at U1liversity College Cork The main objective of Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy is to expand the range, variety and quality of texts in the history of philosophy which are available in English. The series includes texts by familiar names (such as Descartes and Kant) and also by less well-known authors. Wherever possible, texts are published in complete and unabridged form, and translations are speciaJly commissioned for the series. Each volume contains a critical introduction together with a guide to further reading and any necessary glossaries and textual apparatus. The volumes are designed for student use at undergraduate and postgraduate level and will be of interest not only to students of philosophy, but also to a wider audience of readers in the history of science, the history of theology and the history of ideas.

For a list of titles published in the series, please slle end ofbook.

ANTOINE ARNAULD

AND

PIERRE NICOLE

Logic or the Art of Thinking Containing, besides common rules, several new observations appropriate for forming judgment TRANSLATED AND EDITED BY

JILL VANCE BUROKER California State University, San Bernardino

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Published by the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge The Pitt Building,Trumpington Street, CambridgeC02 I Rl' 40 West zoth Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA 10 Stamford Road,Oakleigh,Melbourne 3166, Australia

© in the translationand editorial matter Cambridge University Press 1996 First published 1996 A catalogu« record for this bool: isavailable from the British Library

Library of Congress cataloguing ;'1 publicatioll data Arnauld, Antoine, 1612-16..YL.Qn!y_fQL_!L.lnltl Q( it, as when I say, "tranap.ar.ent~," "kJ)_Qjyl\tq!!!lllQk..R.!:'__ ~~lU·.'lt!onaljl.Jlll!lal." These additions are not simple explications but determinations, because they restrict the extension of the first term, causing the word "body" to signify no more than some bodies, the word "people" only some people, and the word "animal" only some animals. When these added conditions are individual, they make a general word individual. When I say, for example, "the present Pope," this determines the generalword "Pope" to the unique and singular person Alexander VIe Two sorts of complex terms can be further distinguished: those that are complex in expression,and others that are complexonly in meaning. The first kind are those in which the addition is expressed. Such are all the examples mentioned up to now. The latter kind are those in which one of the terms is not expressed but only implicitly understood. In France when we say "the King," for example, this term is complex in meaning, because in uttering the word "King" we do not have in mind merely the general idea which answers to this word, but we mentally join to it the idea of Louis XIV, who is presently King of France. There are countless terms in ordinary speech that are complex in this way, such as the name "Sir" in each family, and so on. There are even words that are complex in expression for one thing and yet complex in meaning for others. When we say "the prince of philosophers," for example, this term is complex in expression since the word "prince" is determined ... Alexander VII; the father of Alexander the Great, this determines the general word "father" to a unique man, since there could only be one who was the father of Alexander. - Two ... (I)

45

Logic orthe Art a/Thinking by the word "philosopher." But with respect to Aristotle, whom the Schcolrnen indicate by this term, it is complex only in meaning, since the idea of Aristotle is only in the mind without being expressed by any sound that distinguishes it in particular. All connotative or adjectival terms either are parts of a complex term when their substantive is expressed, or are [67J complex in meaning when it is implicit. For, as we said in chapter 2, these connotative terms indicate a subject directly although more confusedly, and a form or mode indirectly although more distinctly. Hence the subject is only a very general and confused idea, sometimes of a being, sometimes of a body, which is usually determined by the distinct idea of the form joined to it. Album [white], for example, signifies a thing that has whiteness, which determines the confused idea of a thing to represent only those things having this quality. \\-:hatiu.Y..tlli..J}J.QKrmlllrk1t&P Ul-trov oto6",evov, whereas the relative qui. quae, quod separates it a bit more, and becomes the subject of a new proposition, 0 tl1t8P Uj..lrov otootat. Thus it is true that neither of these two translations, "This is my body which is given for you" and "This is my body, my body given for you," is entirely perfect. One translation changes the confused meaning of the article into a distinct meaning, contrary to the nature of the article; the other preserves this confused meaning, but the relative pronoun separates into two propositions what the article makes into one proposition. Being forced by necessity to use one or the other, however, does not give us the right to choose the first while condemning the other, as this author claimed in his remark.

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CHAPTER 2 The verb

Up to now we have borrowed what we have said about nouns and pronouns from a little book published a while ago under the title A General Grammar, with the exception of several points we have explained somewhat differently. [I09) But with to the Perpetuity ofthe Paith (Reponse au traitede la perpt(uiiC de la[oj (Charenton, 1 668J) of Arnauld. Clairand Girbalidentify the minister as AndreLortie; cf p, 72 n. 2.

Second Part respect to the verb, which it discusses in chapter 13, I shall only transcribe what the author says, because it seems to me that nothing more can be added to it. I People, he says, have had no less need to invent words indicating affirmation, which is our principal way of thinking, than to invent words indicating the objects of our thoughts. Properly speaking, this is what the verb consists in. It is nothing other than!! word witose ftrincip'al llmctio..n is to sig!J.i[:i.Jl!1..9fiirmalion, that i!!...l~£...thl!t...!hs di~e whets":. .1hiL~old is em~_«d is we 4iWl!!l'~..Qf a .Rer12!l~!t~ly c~~~J.\!dg~s aJld.mak!