Local Integration of Migrants Policy : European Experiences and Challenges [1st ed.] 9783030509781, 9783030509798

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xxv
New Challenges in Local Migrant Integration Policy in Europe (Jochen Franzke, José M. Ruano de la Fuente)....Pages 1-9
Between Central Control and Local Autonomy: The Changing Role of Swedish Municipalities in the Implementation of Integration Policies (Christine Hudson, Katarina Giritli-Nygren, Gustav Lidén, Linda Sandberg)....Pages 11-34
The Norwegian Case: Integration Through Local Autonomy and Institutionalization (Susanne Søholt, Kristian Rose Tronstad)....Pages 35-52
Finland’s Immigration Policy: State Objectives, Local Solutions (Saara Koikkalainen)....Pages 53-71
The Swiss Rationale of Integration Policies: Balancing Federalism, Consociationalism and Direct Democracy (Stefanie Kurt, Gianni D’Amato)....Pages 73-85
Migration in the Netherlands: Threats and Opportunities (Laurens Jonathan Zwaan)....Pages 87-105
Germany: From Denied Immigration to Integration of Migrants (Jochen Franzke)....Pages 107-121
Ireland’s Evolving Migrant Policy: Recurring Rhetoric, Sporadic Action (Bríd Quinn)....Pages 123-140
Reception of Asylum Seekers and Refugees in France: Between Rigour and Humanism (Christophe Bonnotte, Michel Sénimon)....Pages 141-167
Immigration and Integration Policies in Poland: Institutional, Political and Social Perspectives (Małgorzata Molęda-Zdziech, Marta Pachocka, Dominik Wach)....Pages 169-199
Slovenian Migration Management at the Local Level (Uroš Pinterič)....Pages 201-213
Local Integration Policy of Migrants in Croatia: In Search of Coherence and Capacity (Ivan Koprić, Goranka Lalić Novak, Teo Giljević)....Pages 215-230
Romania’s Policy of Migration and Integration: Unattractive Host Nation and Alternative Transit Route (Iulia-Sabina Joja)....Pages 231-244
Challenges of Immigrant Integration in Spanish Local Governments (José M. Ruano de la Fuente)....Pages 245-260
Internal Geopolitics and Migration Policies in Italy (Giuseppe Bettoni, Isabella Tamponi)....Pages 261-283
Public Opinion on Migration and the Role of the Media in the Context of the “European Refugee Crisis” (Saara Koikkalainen, Niko Pyrhönen, Östen Wahlbeck)....Pages 285-309
Integrating Immigrants: Capacities and Challenges for Local Authorities in Europe (Jochen Franzke)....Pages 311-333
Conclusions: An Overview of Local Migrant Integration Policies in Europe (Jochen Franzke, José M. Ruano de la Fuente)....Pages 335-344
Back Matter ....Pages 345-350

Citation preview

MIGRATION, PALGRAVE STUDIES IN SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE DIASPORAS AND CITIZENSHIP

Local Integration of Migrants Policy European Experiences and Challenges Edited by Jochen Franzke José M. Ruano de la Fuente

Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance

Series Editors Linze Schaap Tilburg University Tilburg, The Netherlands Jochen Franzke University of Potsdam Potsdam, Germany Hanna Vakkala University of Lapland Rovaniemi, Finland Filipe Teles University of Aveiro Aveiro, Portugal

This series explores the formal organisation of sub-national government and democracy on the one hand, and the necessities and practices of regions and cities on the other hand. In monographs, edited volumes and Palgrave Pivots, the series will consider the future of territorial governance and of territory-based democracy; the impact of hybrid forms of territorial government and functional governance on the traditional institutions of government and representative democracy and on public values; what improvements are possible and effective in local and regional democracy; and, what framework conditions can be developed to encourage minority groups to participate in urban decision-making. Books in the series will also examine ways of governance, from ‘network governance’ to ‘triple helix governance’, from ‘quadruple’ governance to the potential of ‘multiple helix’ governance. The series will also focus on societal issues, for instance global warming and sustainability, energy transition, economic growth, labour market, urban and regional development, immigration and integration, and transport, as well as on adaptation and learning in sub-national government. The series favours comparative studies, and especially volumes that compare international trends, themes, and developments, preferably with an interdisciplinary angle. Country-by-country comparisons may also be included in this series, provided that they contain solid comparative analyses.

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/15960

Jochen Franzke · José M. Ruano de la Fuente Editors

Local Integration of Migrants Policy European Experiences and Challenges

Editors Jochen Franzke Economics & Social Sciences University of Potsdam Potsdam, Brandenburg, Germany

José M. Ruano de la Fuente Department of Political and Administrative Sciences Complutense University Madrid, Spain

ISSN 2523-8248 ISSN 2523-8256 (electronic) Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance ISBN 978-3-030-50978-1 ISBN 978-3-030-50979-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50979-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Praise for Local Integration of Migrants Policy

“A must-read for decision makers, scholars and stakeholders who are interested in how innovating migration policies go beyond the national level and focus on the local dimension for effective integration. Evidence from an array of European Union experiences explained in readable prose by the best specialists will open your eyes to the possibilities hosted by the local level for successful migrant-centred policies.” —Aída Díaz-Tendero, Researcher, National Autonomous University of Mexico “This is the book that the whole of Europe—if not the whole World— has been waiting for! It is well composed and thought provoking, and the aspects of migration, integration policy and local governance are fluently discussed. The representative selection of country cases illuminates interesting viewpoints and history, and examines problems and solutions in different contexts. Migration concerns municipalities—it concerns us all.” —Hanna Vakkala, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Lapland, Finland “A unique volume providing deep insights into practices of migration integration and local governance in the context of migration processes in European countries. Given the significance of migration issue for modern societies (especially from the governance perspective) within current global political economic and socio-cultural environment the provided v

vi

PRAISE FOR LOCAL INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS POLICY

comparative analysis of European practices and experience of handling the migration on local level turns out to be exceptionally relevant and extremely important.” —Andrey A. Kinyakin, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), and Head of Science & Education, Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM)

Contents

1

2

3

4

5

New Challenges in Local Migrant Integration Policy in Europe Jochen Franzke and José M. Ruano de la Fuente

1

Between Central Control and Local Autonomy: The Changing Role of Swedish Municipalities in the Implementation of Integration Policies Christine Hudson, Katarina Giritli-Nygren, Gustav Lidén, and Linda Sandberg

11

The Norwegian Case: Integration Through Local Autonomy and Institutionalization Susanne Søholt and Kristian Rose Tronstad

35

Finland’s Immigration Policy: State Objectives, Local Solutions Saara Koikkalainen

53

The Swiss Rationale of Integration Policies: Balancing Federalism, Consociationalism and Direct Democracy Stefanie Kurt and Gianni D’Amato

73

vii

viii

CONTENTS

6

Migration in the Netherlands: Threats and Opportunities Laurens Jonathan Zwaan

7

8

9

10

Germany: From Denied Immigration to Integration of Migrants Jochen Franzke

107

Ireland’s Evolving Migrant Policy: Recurring Rhetoric, Sporadic Action Bríd Quinn

123

Reception of Asylum Seekers and Refugees in France: Between Rigour and Humanism Christophe Bonnotte and Michel Sénimon

141

Immigration and Integration Policies in Poland: Institutional, Political and Social Perspectives Małgorzata Mol˛eda-Zdziech, Marta Pachocka, and Dominik Wach

11

Slovenian Migration Management at the Local Level Uroš Pinteriˇc

12

Local Integration Policy of Migrants in Croatia: In Search of Coherence and Capacity Ivan Kopri´c, Goranka Lali´c Novak, and Teo Giljevi´c

13

14

87

Romania’s Policy of Migration and Integration: Unattractive Host Nation and Alternative Transit Route Iulia-Sabina Joja Challenges of Immigrant Integration in Spanish Local Governments José M. Ruano de la Fuente

169

201

215

231

245

CONTENTS

15

Internal Geopolitics and Migration Policies in Italy Giuseppe Bettoni and Isabella Tamponi

16

Public Opinion on Migration and the Role of the Media in the Context of the “European Refugee Crisis” Saara Koikkalainen, Niko Pyrhönen, and Östen Wahlbeck

17

18

ix

261

285

Integrating Immigrants: Capacities and Challenges for Local Authorities in Europe Jochen Franzke

311

Conclusions: An Overview of Local Migrant Integration Policies in Europe Jochen Franzke and José M. Ruano de la Fuente

335

Index

345

Notes on Contributors

Giuseppe Bettoni Professor of Geography at the University of Rome Tor Vergata since 2005. Expert in geopolitics, he studied Political Science in Bologna (Italy) and Geography and Geopolitics at University of Paris. He has lectured at several universities such as London School of Economics, University College of London, Science Po Toulouse. His research focus is the antagonism between territorial actors, territorial organisations, decentralisation and identity issues particularly. In recent years, he has studied the power balance following the effects of globalisation, and constitutional reforms with a specific interest on “metropolitan” issues. A highly regarded lecturer and analyst, he is regularly solicited by medias such as radios, televisions and press, especially in France and Italy. Christophe Bonnotte is a Senior Lecturer in Public Law at the University of Limoges (France) and Secretary-General of the international NGO EUROPA. His main research topics are: Administrative law, civil services, political and territorial organisation of the State and public services. Gianni D’Amato is Professor at the University of Neuchâtel, Director of the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research NCCR—on the move and Head of the Swiss Forum of Migration and Population Studies (SFM). His research interests focus on citizenship, mobilities, populism and the history of migration.

xi

xii

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Jochen Franzke Co-editor of the Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance book series, board member of the Institute of Local Government Studies at the University of Potsdam, co-chair of the European Group for Public Administration (EGPA) Study Group on Local Governance and Democracy (2005–2018); research on local governance, local democracy and public administration reform in Germany and Europe in comparative perspective. Teo Giljevi´c PhD, is an Assistant professor of Administrative Science at the Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb, Croatia. He is the author of many articles in the field of public administration and governance of migration and integration of migrants. His professional interest includes public administration, human resources management, law enforcement and human rights, governance of migration and integration of migrants. He is a president of Commission for complaints in the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia, citizen’s committee for civil oversight over police enforcement appointed by the Croatian Parliament. Katarina Giritli-Nygren Professor of Sociology and Director of the Forum for Gender Studies at Mid Sweden University. Her current research addresses different forms of governance relationships with a focus on spatial processes of inclusion and exclusion in terms of gender, class and ethnicity in different contexts. Christine Hudson Professor in political science at Umeå University. She has researched extensively on various aspects of local and regional government. In her recent work, she focuses on processes of inclusion and exclusion particularly in relation to gender, age and ethnicity. Iulia-Sabina Joja is a Transatlantic fellow researching Black Sea security at the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University and an adjunct professor teaching European security at the Georgetown University Security Studies Program. She was visiting scholar with the Center for Military History and Social Sciences of the German Armed Forces and an associate lecturer at the Bucharest University of Economic Studies. Her main subjects of interest are European strategic profiles, European governance and Euro-Atlantic security policies. She has studied Political Science and International Relations at Freie Universität Berlin and at the NSPAS Bucharest, holds a Master of Arts in International Conflict Studies from King’s College London War Studies Department and wrote her Ph.D. on Romanian Strategic Culture (published

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

xiii

with Columbia University Press). Iulia has held positions at the United Nations, the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the European Parliament, NATO ACT and as adviser on security and defence at the Romanian Presidency. Saara Koikkalainen is a University Lecturer at the Karelian Institute of the University of Eastern Finland. Her PhD thesis (2014) in sociology focused on the labour market experiences of highly skilled intra-European migrants. Her research interests include, for example, migrant labour market integration, privileged and highly skilled migration and migration decision-making and she has published in, e.g., Nordic Journal of Migration Research, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Journal of Finnish Studies and International Migration. Her current research examines the impact of the Brexit process on intra-European migration, especially between the UK and the Nordic countries. Ivan Kopri´c is president of the Institute of Public Administration and Editor-in-chief, Croatian and Comparative Public Administration, New books: Europeanisation of the Croatian Local Government (ed.; in Croatian: Europeizacija hrvatske lokalne samouprave). Zagreb, Institut za javnu upravu, 2018, Evaluating Reforms of Local Public and Social Services in Europe: More Evidence for Better Results. Editors: Ivan Kopri´c, Hellmut Wollmann, Gérard Marcou. Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, Migrations, Diversity, Integration, and Public Governance in Europe and Beyond. Stefanie Kurt is an Assistant professor at the school of Social Work at the University of Applied Sciences and Arts Western Switzerland and IPLeader in the Swiss National Center of Competence in Research NCCR— on the move. She holds a Master of Law degree in International and European Law from the University of Bern and a Ph.D. in Law from the University of Neuchâtel. In her research and publications, she discusses questions of Migration Law and Policy, with a particular to Citizenship and integration policies in Switzerland and Europe. Goranka Lali´c Novak PhD, is an Associate Professor of Administrative Science at the Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb, Croatia. He is the author of several books and many articles in the field of public administration and governance of migration, asylum and integration, including the book Legal and Institutional aspect of Asylum, 2016 (in Croatian). For the Government’s Office for Human Rights and the Rights of National Minorities, he coordinated and prepared the Action plan for integration

xiv

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

of refugees at the local level (2018). He participated in several projects aimed at the integration of migrants at the local level in Croatia. Gustav Lidén Associate Professor of Political Science at the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at Mid Sweden University. His research is focused at the local political arena and includes policy areas covering migration and integration policy. Małgorzata Mol˛eda-Zdziech Associate professor of Political Science and Ph.D. in sociology. Since November 2017 she has been representing abroad the Polish Academy of Sciences as the Director par Interim and since June 2018 as the Director of Polish Contact Agency in Brussels. She is also a member of Directory of the Association FrancePologne and expert in the international non-government association EUROPA(Entretiens Universitaires pour l’Administration Publique) in Limoges (France). Since 2009 she has been a member of Citizens’ Legislative Forum, founded by Batory Foundation. She is an author and coauthor of numerous publications regarding lobbying, media and communications, including a book on celebrities in public life (Czas celebrytów. Mediatyzacja z˙ ycia publicznego/Time of celebrities. Mediatization of public life, Difin, 2013). Her current research interests focus on: lobbying, advocacy, groups of interest, media and communication. Marta Pachocka is an assistant professor at the Department of Political Studies of the Collegium of Socio-Economics of SGH Warsaw School of Economics and at the Centre of Migration Research (CMR) of the University of Warsaw. She is a coordinator of the EUMIGRO project— “Jean Monnet Module on the European Union and the Contemporary International Migration—an Interdisciplinary Approach” (2016–2019) at SGH Warsaw School of Economics. She was one of two researchers in the project entitled “Warsaw test project of integration of foreigners with regard to the needs of the labor market” (WITEK), implemented by the Office of Aid and Social Projects of the Capital City of Warsaw (2016– 2018). Her main research interests include: socio-demographic changes in Europe/the EU and their consequences; international migration, migration and asylum in Europe; EU policy on migration and asylum; reception and integration policies in Europe; forced migration studies; international economics and international organizations. Uroš Pinteriˇc is a Professor of Political Science at the Alexander Dubˇcek University in Trenˇcin, Slovakia. Between 2017 and 2020, he was a Jean

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

xv

Monnet Chair. Prior to that, he was working in various higher education institutions, including Charles University in Prague. He authored multiple books, chapters and articles, covering a wide array of topics, from local development to the modern development of political systems. His main perspective was over time developed in the critical reflection of different economic, political and social realities. Niko Pyrhönen is a Postdoctoral Researcher at The Centre for Research on Ethnic Relations and Nationalism (CEREN), University of Helsinki. Since defending his PhD dissertation The True Colors of Finnish Welfare Nationalism (Sociology, 2015), his research has focused on right-wing populist hybrid media mobilization practices and narratives in the ’alt-right’ news outlets in several countries as well as on transnational conspiracy theories as political mobilization, and Christianism and religion-based far-right affinities. His work has been published in, e.g., Sociological Inquiry and Discourse, Context & Media and his current research focuses on cyclical peaking of hate speech in mainstream public debate. Bríd Quinn Prior to her recent retirement, Dr. Bríd Quinn worked in the Department of Politics & Public Administration at the University of Limerick. Her research and recent publications focus on local governance in Europe; EU territorial policies; administrative reform and higher education policy. She is a member of the Council of Europe’s Group of Independent Experts on Local Government and also carries out consultancy work in Ireland and abroad for development organizations and state bodies. José M. Ruano de la Fuente is Ph.D. Professor of the Complutense University of Madrid (UCM) and has been visiting scholar in several European and American Universities. His main research fields are comparative public administration and local governance. Currently he is VicePresident and member of the Scientific Council of the European association Entretiens Universitaires Réguliers pour l’Administration en Europe (EUROPA) and member of the Permanent Study Group on Local Governance and Democracy in the European Group of Public Administration (EGPA). Linda Sandberg Senior lecture at the Centre for Gender studies at Umeå University. In her research she focuses on spaces of gendered fear

xvi

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

of violence, and the intersections of race and gender as well as planning for safety and security from a gender perspective. Michel Sénimon is the General Delegate of the international NGO EUROPA. After serving as Director of Human Resources (HRD) for the Pyrénées Atlantiques Departmental Council in Pau, he was HRD for the Limoges University Hospital Centre. He is currently Deputy DirectorGeneral in charge of Human Resources at the University of Limoges. A specialist in civil service law, which he has been teaching for many years in different organisations, he has acquired, through his geographical and functional mobility within the Territorial Civil Service, the Hospital Civil Service and the State Civil Service, not only a solid professional experience in the management of HR policies and reforms, but also a real profile as a decision-maker and public manager. Susanne Søholt main research areas: Migration to, and integration, inclusion and diversity in rural and urban areas, Immigration and integration policies and politics, the role of the city in coping with a dynamic multi-ethnic municipality, How different categories of immigrants and minority population navigate to create wanted life situations, Housing and integration. Isabella Tamponi Assistant Professor of Geopolitics and Communications at the University of Rome Tor Vergata since 2012. She has completed a Master’s in Communication and Information Sciences at the University of Rome “Tor Vergata” (2011), and a Research Master’s Degree in Geopolitics at the Yves Lacoste French Institute of Geopolitics (IFG) at the University Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis. Professor Tamponi specialises in communication, storytelling and cartography. Kristian Rose Tronstad main research areas: Dynamics in migration, immigration, mobility, Immigration policy and integration politics, Introduction programmes for refugees, Gaps in welfare between the majority and minority populations, Labour market integration. Dominik Wach an affiliate in the Centre of Migration Research of the University of Warsaw, researcher in the IMINTEG project – “In search for models of relations between immigration and integration policies” cofinanced by the National Science Centre in Poland (2015–2018). Political analyst who specializes in migration, integration and Middle Eastern affairs, for over 10 years professionally involved in integration of refugees.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

xvii

Coordinator on behalf of the Warsaw Family Support Centre of the project entitled “Warsaw test project of integration of foreigners with regard to the needs of the labor market (WITEK)”. Former human rights observer in the West Bank (oPt) and humanitarian worker supporting refugees in Jordan. Östen Wahlbeck is a Professor of Sociology at the University of Helsinki, Finland, and Adjunct Professor of Human Rights and Multiculturalism at the University of South-Eastern Norway. He holds a PhD in Ethnic Relations from the University of Warwick, UK. He has published widely in the fields of Migration Studies, Economic Sociology, Multiculturalism, and Refugee Studies, including several international books as well as articles in Ethnicities; Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies; Journal of Intercultural Studies; Journal of Refugee Studies; and Mobilities. He has been the project leader of several large research projects funded by the Academy of Finland. Laurens Jonathan Zwaan is certified management consultant (CMC) and researcher for the public sector in The Netherlands at Leeuwendaal. Laurens is member of the scientific council of “Entretiens Universitaires Réguliers pour l’Administration en Europe” (EUROPA) and is liaison between EUROPA and Radboud University.

Abbreviations

ADA AfD AME AMIF ANAC ANCI ATSA BVA CADA CAES CAO CARA CAS CBOS CDA CDA CESEDA CII CIMADE CIP CNDA CPSA CRC

Asylum Seeker Allowance in France German Political Party (Alternative für Deutschland) French State Medical Aid European Commission’s Fund for Asylum, Migration and Integration Italian National Anti-Corruption Authority National Association of Italian Municipalities French Temporary Reception—Asylum Service French Polling and Social Research Institute Reception Centre for Asylum Seekers in France French Reception and Case Evaluation Centres Dutch Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers Italian Governmental Centres for Accommodation of Asylum Seekers Emergency Reception Centres for Asylum Seekers in Italy Centre for Public Opinion Research in Poland Accommodation Centres of Asylum Seekers in Italy Dutch Christian-Democrat Party French Code for Entry and Residence of Foreigners and Right of Asylum French Inter-Ministerial Committee for Integration French Inter-Movements Committee for Aid of Evacuees Swiss Cantonal Integration Programs French National Asylum Court Italian First Aid and Reception Centres for Asylum Seekers UN Convention on the Rights of the Child xix

xx

ABBREVIATIONS

CRHH CSO CU DA DAAEN DASS DGM DIAIR DIHAL DNA DTV DUO EASO ECHR EEA ESF ESRI ESS EU EUMIGRO EUROSTAT FAQ FNA FNIA FNPSA GDP GUDA GUS HSE HUDA IAAP ICAR ICI ID-card IFOP IIP IMF

French Regional Housing and Accommodation Committees Irish Central Statistics Office Dutch Christian Party French Directorate of Asylum French Reception, Support for Foreigners and Nationality Directorate Irish Directorate for Asylum Support Services Dutch Directory General for Migration French Inter-Ministerial Delegation for Reception and Integration of Refugees French Inter-Ministerial Delegation for Housing and Access to Housing French National Reception Facility System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees Dutch Service for Return and Departure Dutch Education Executive Agency European Asylum Support Office European Court of Human Rights European Economic Area European Social Fund Irish Economic and Social Research Institute European Social Survey European Union Jean Monnet Module on European Union and Contemporary International Migration European Union Statistical Office Frequently Asked Questions Swiss National Foreigners Act Swiss Foreign Nationals and Integration Act Italian National Fund for Asylum Policies and Services Gross Domestic Product French Asylum Applications One-Stop Shops Polish Main Statistical Office Irish Health Service Executive French Asylum Seeker Emergency Shelter Irish Integrated Academy for Athletic Performance Foundation in Romania Integration Climate Index Identity Card French Institute of Public Opinion Individual Integration Programmes in Poland International Monetary Fund

ABBREVIATIONS

IMISCOE IMR IND INIS INTREO IOM ISAF IWG JHA JLD JRS KDS KELA KGSt LEADER LECP LSDC MIGRI MIPEX MMC RTV SLO MSNA NCCR NCP NGO OECD OFII OFPRA OPMI PiS PO PPN PRAHDA RIC RS SALAR SDP SDS

xxi

International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion Research Network International Migration Review Dutch Immigration and Naturalisation Service Irish Naturalization and Immigration Service Irish Department of Social and Family Affairs International Organization of Migration Within UN International Security Assistance Force Program Integration Working Group Romanian Justice and Home Affairs Council French Administrative Court to the Judge of Freedoms and Detention Jesuit Refugee Service Committee for Social Dialogue for Foreigners Finnish National Social Insurance Institution German Municipal Association for Administration Management French acronym for “Liaison Entre Actions de Développement de l’Économie Rurale” Irish Local Community and Economic Plan Irish Local Community Development Committee Finnish Immigration Service Migrant Integration Policy Index Slovenian Radio-TV Unaccompanied Foreign Minor (Italy) Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research Irish New Communities Partnership Non-Governmental Organization Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development French Office of Immigration and Integration French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless People Irish Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration Political Party in Poland (Law and Justice) Political Party in Poland (Civic Platform) Public Participation Network French Reception and Accommodation Programme for Asylum Seekers Republican Integration Contract in France Republic of Slovenia Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions Social Democratic Party in Romania Slovenian Democratic party

xxii

ABBREVIATIONS

SER SFI SFS SIPROIMI SIU SIV SKL SNS SOP SOU SPRAR SURS SVR TFEU TNC UK UNAR UNHCR UNICEF URSZR VLS-TS VVD WW

Dutch Social and Economic Council Swedish for Immigrants Training programme Swedish National Union of Students Italian System for Holders of International Protection and Unaccompanied Minors Iris Local Authority Social Inclusion Unit Swedish Migration Agency Association of Swedish Municipalities as Well as Provincial Parliaments Slovenian National Party Standard Operating Procedures Swedish Commission on the Reception of Refugees Italian Project for Protection System for Refugees and Asylum Seekers Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia German Council of Experts for Integration and Migration Treaty on the Functioning of the EU Third-Country National United Kingdom Italian National Anti-Discrimination Office United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Children’s Fund Slovenian Office Protection and Rescue Visas Valid for Residence Permit in France Dutch Liberal Party World War

List of Figures

Fig. 3.1

Fig. 14.1

Fig. 14.2 Fig. 16.1 Fig. 16.2 Fig. 16.3

Increase in immigrant population (immigrants and Norwegian-born to immigrant parents) by origin, world continents 1970–2018. Source Statistics Norway, Population statistics Evolution of immigrant population in Spain (2008–2019) (Source Own elaboration on the basis of data from the National Institute of Statistics) Evolution of asylum seekers in Spain (2008–2019) (Source Ministry of the Interior) The support (percent) for a common European policy on migration The frequency (percent) of immigration mentioned as one of the two most important national concerns The frequency (percent) of immigration mentioned as one of the two most important EU issues

37

246 249 297 298 300

xxiii

List of Tables

Table 3.1 Table 4.1 Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 6.3 Table Table Table Table

6.4 8.1 8.2 10.1

Table 10.2 Table 10.3 Table 10.4

Table 12.1 Table 17.1 Table 17.2

Immigrants and Norwegian-born to immigrant parents, by country background Humanitarian migration in Finland 2013–2017 Population and migration in the Netherlands 1900–2018 (×1000) Average yearly population and migration 1901–2018 per year per decennium (×1000) Population and migration in the Netherlands 2005–2018 (×1000) Public opinion in the Netherlands on migration Immigration statistics Ireland 1987–2017 Place of birth of Irish citizens 2016 Attitudes towards receiving refugees from countries affected by armed conflicts (in %) Attitudes towards receiving refugees from countries affected by armed conflicts vs. party electorates (in %) Attitudes towards the relocation of refugees from the Middle East and Africa Decision to accept refugees from Muslim countries in the context of the threat of losing financing from EU funds Migration balance 2008–2017 Basic case indicators for migrant integration policy Indicators of local migrant integration policy in Brandenburg cases

38 66 89 91 94 98 124 125 187 188 189

189 217 322 330

xxv

CHAPTER 1

New Challenges in Local Migrant Integration Policy in Europe Jochen Franzke and José M. Ruano de la Fuente

This book mainly examines new challenges and approaches in national and local migrant integration policy (hereafter referred to as ‘integration policy’) in European countries. The so-called European refugee crisis, which up to now culminated in 2015, dramatically heightened the need for effective and coordinated integration policies. This applied to all political and administrative levels, from the EU Commission at the supranational European level, the national governments of its member states to the regional and, not least, local authorities. This has inevitably resulted in a further diversification of policies regarding refugees, asylum seekers and other categories of migrants in Europe.

J. Franzke (B) Economics and Social Sciences, University of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany e-mail: [email protected] J. M. Ruano de la Fuente Department of Political and Administrative Sciences, Complutense University, Madrid, Spain e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 J. Franzke and J. M. Ruano de la Fuente (eds.), Local Integration of Migrants Policy, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50979-8_1

1

2

J. FRANZKE AND J. M. RUANO

DE

LA FUENTE

After a long development process, the European Union finally granted their citizens the right to freedom of movement and residence within their territory in 2004. Since then, the term ‘immigrant’ within the European Union has officially exclusively used to refer to non-EU citizens. Accordingly, the European commission defines ‘immigration’ as the action by which a person from a non-EU country establishes his or her usual residence in the territory of an EU country for a period that is, or is expected to be, at least twelve months. Nevertheless, large parts of the population still regard all kinds of immigrants as foreigners. Immigration today is one of the main political challenges of European integration and perhaps even the future of the EU hinges on solving this issue. The number of people with citizenship of a non-member country residing in an EU Member States on 1 January 2018 was 22.3 million, representing 4.4% of the EU-28 population. In addition, there were 17.6 million persons living in one of the EU Member States other than that of their citizenship (Eurostat 2018).

1.1

Multi-Level Governance and Migration Policy

In the context of migration, the scientific literature focusses more frequently on the terms cultural, structural and social integration of migrants (see Heckmann 2015, p. 72; Freeman and Mirilovic 2016; Brettell and Hollifield 2000) by set apart between the social integration of individuals and that of system integration, which deals with group-related and institutional processes. The latter is the focus of our book. The integration of migrants is both a final goal and a long-term process. Alba and Nee (2003, p. 23) formulate it like this: “Integration is a process wherein immigrant newcomers and the communities in which they settle – both the individuals and institutions – mutually adapt to one another. Integration is also an endpoint reached when individuals only minimally perceive themselves and others in ethno-racial and national terms, when these attributes have, at most, a negligible negative impact on opportunities and life chances”. Competences in the policy field of migration and integration are distributed across different layers within the multi-level governance system in the European Union, its member (national) states, the regions and the local tiers of government (counties and municipalities).

1

NEW CHALLENGES IN LOCAL MIGRANT …

3

The focus of this volume is on the developments in integration policy at the local level. Nevertheless, there is a strong link between national and local integration policies. Additionally, the national integration policies in Europe differ vastly between the EU countries, as well as over time. Therefore, not only the national legal framework of integration policy, but also the current political and cultural debate on the integration of migrants at the national level should be included. At the same time, we must remember that the traditional state-centric modes of government increasingly fall short of ‘addressing the complex nature of contemporary integration challenges’. As a result, more polycentric approaches of governance have gradually emerged between a range of government actors, as well as semi-public, non-governmental and even private organisations. In fact, since the so-called refugee crisis in 2015, local governance networks in many EU countries have demonstrated that they can react more quickly and more effectively to the new challenges than any state institution. At the same time, of course, they also present a challenge to the formulation of a coherent and consistent integration policy at the national level (Scholten 2012, p. 47). Scholars and policy makers have long focused predominantly on the national level when analysing migration and integration policy. Yet, scholars have increasingly recognised that “while we often think of immigrants as moving from one country to another, really they arrive from a particular place and settle in a particular community” (Singer 2012, p. 9). Migration concerns municipalities, and consequentially, its benefits and burdens are most experienced at the local level (Scholten and Penninx 2016, p. 89). When migrants arrive in their communities and plan to live there, local authorities have a responsibility to act. When no national integration policy exists or is counterproductive, local authorities forced to develop their own integration policies shaped by pragmatism, participation and trust (Scholten and Penninx 2016, p. 99). Municipalities, especially larger cities, tend to take on a more active role, not only in policy implementation, but also in policy formulation and in policy exchange (Capono and Borkert 2010, p. 11). In light of this, the question arises whether these new polices still follow the models of their national state or whether distinct local approaches already exist. In this context, we present three hypotheses. First is the national model thesis, which assumes a top-down hierarchical government structure and consequently claims that local authorities predominantly implement national migration policies (Dekker et al. 2015). Second is the local

4

J. FRANZKE AND J. M. RUANO

DE

LA FUENTE

dimension thesis, which argues that all policies adopted by municipalities share certain common characteristics. While some are more pragmatic and place greater emphasis on cooperation with migrant organisations to better fulfil their needs, others are more exclusive and restrictive to migration, fearing that migrant communities could threaten social peace and public order in the receiving societies (Capono and Borkert 2010; Dekker et al. 2015). Third, the individualisation thesis claims that each local authority develops its own, distinct policy. This is determined by specific indicators such as the economic situation, existing migrant population and local political culture as well as other factors including the housing situation, level of employment, demographic issues, public safety and access to services (Dekker et al. 2015; Gambetta and Gedrimaite 2010; Juzwiak et al. 2014).

1.2 The Role of Local Authorities in Integration Policy Above all, since 2015 the role that local authorities play in the integration of migrants has increased sharply in many European countries. This role “has developed from primarily a level of policy implementation to a level of policy development” (Scholten and van Breugel 2018, p. 3). Many municipalities in a number of European countries have moved towards an active integration policy, sometimes beyond the scope of their formal competences in this area (OECD 2018). The so-called European refugee crisis of 2015 has accelerated this development and the focus of policy makers and scholars has thus shifted towards the local level. New challenges have also emerged at the horizontal level (see Kraal and Vertovec 2017). Local integration policy now focuses much more on inhouse cross level and cross-department coordination within local administration than in the past. The ability to respond to multi-dimensional needs and create opportunities for migrants’ calls for strong coherence in implementation measures related to housing, health, employment, education, welfare, etc. (OECD 2018). Additionally, cooperation between local authorities and local (non-state) stakeholders or actors is increasing, for example civil society institutions supporting migrants and refugees, or local private firms offering employment opportunities, etc. Also, in the vertical dimension, new challenges of coordination between the different levels of governments have emerged, including an increasing number

1

NEW CHALLENGES IN LOCAL MIGRANT …

5

of conflicts over the resources and competencies in this area. All these changes present a huge challenge to local administrative capacity and local finance.

1.3 Dimensions of Local Integration Policy of Migrants Dekker et al. (2015) found that there is either a “specifically local dimension to integration policies” (p. 634), or that local governments follow their national counterparts in terms of policy goals, processes and underlying ideologies. The significance of local policies for successful integration, along with the possible tools and challenges for municipalities and policy learning between local governments, are increasingly being analysed in the literature (e.g. Juzwiak et al. 2014; Scholten and Penninx 2016). However, up to now only few studies evaluate the question of a distinct local dimension, with the exception of Dekker et al. (2015). Integration is a very complex, multi-dimensional concept and policy field to analyse from various perspectives (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003; Juzwiak et al. 2014; Vetrovec 2010). The latter define integration as “all activities that seek to incorporate migrants and/or refugees into a city” (p. viii). Thus, integration policy includes all policy fields that “contribute to making immigrants and refugees a functioning part of society and that guarantee rights to these populations” (p. viii). Integration policy generally refers to political-administrative action that has to do with the integration of migrants into the host society. The two basic theoretical approaches can be termed as ‘integration’ or ‘assimilation’, each with multiple gradations and mixtures. In any case, adaptation activities on the part of either the migrants and/or the host society are expected. Any interaction or understanding of adaptation, such as incorporation and inclusion, requires the process of mutual adaptation between migrants and the existing local society. Dekker et al. (2015) distinguish between four different models of (national) integration policy: the assimilationist, multicultural, universalist and differentialist model. Assimilationist policies encourage migrants to adapt their behaviour, cultural norms and values; a “unidirectional integration of the immigrant into the host society” (p. 639) is demanded. By contrast, multicultural policies recognise the positive potential of migrants and encourage their emancipation. These policies are sensitive to the needs and problems of migrants and institutionalise their specific

6

J. FRANZKE AND J. M. RUANO

DE

LA FUENTE

identities. In this model, a multicultural society viewed as desirable and associated with the concept of diversity is more likely to see equality rights, potential and opportunities associated with migration. Policies focusing on the legal-political or socio-economic domain can be classified as universalist or differentialist. The former contains policies that do not explicitly recognise differences between groups, but targets the individual, his rights and obligations. The respective tools and measures described best as “mainstreaming” (Scholten and van Breugel 2018). If policies aim to preserve group identities, institutionalise group boundaries or lead to the segregation of different groups, they belong to the sphere of differentialist policies (Dekker et al. 2015, p. 639). The division of integration policies into several sub-dimensions seems suitable for structuring the analysis and making comparisons more transparent. The three dimensions commonly used in the literature are the socio-economic, socio-cultural and legal-political one (e.g. Alexander 2007; Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003; Boswell 2003). The socioeconomic dimension mainly contains policies on the labour market, education, social services and social welfare. Cultural and religious policies, as part of the socio-cultural dimension, contain, for example provisions for recognising and dealing with different religious groups, societal core values and language challenges. Finally, the legal-political dimension contains all questions relating to equal rights, participation in decisionmaking (especially voting rights), self-organisation of migrants and their citizenships.

1.4

About This Book

Limited knowledge appeared to be available, especially on the impact and results of integration policies in cities and municipalities. In addition, there have only been a few European comparative scientific studies analysing this specific theme. Furthermore, the role of local authorities in this policy field and their cooperation with civil society initiatives, or networks in particular, are underrepresented topics in these studies. This has led to serious gaps in both the body of academic knowledge and in policy-focused knowledge. This volume will contribute to filling both these gaps. Altogether, the case studies in this book will present a good overview of a variety of migration policies and the various institutional arrangements

1

NEW CHALLENGES IN LOCAL MIGRANT …

7

within and amongst different actors, such as local administrations, local councils, local media, local economy and local civil society initiatives. As previously mentioned, the main aim of this book is to explore the dynamics, experiences and drivers of integration policy at the local level in different European countries. Above all, the authors focus on developments in this policy field following the summer of 2015, when the influx of refugees from outside Europe reached its peak. Since then, migration related issues have become one of the major societal problems facing most European countries. At the same time, these issues are causing dramatic polarisation and domestic conflicts in a number of European countries, including the rise of anti-migration political parties. The degree of diversity between the EU countries has clearly increased since 2015, sometimes even within these countries. Migration as a topic is extremely complex as within the European and nation-state multi-level system competences spread across different political and administrative levels. The focus of this book is on the local authorities’ policy, which in any case needs to address this issue because of the presence of migrants in their community. For each individual country case, the authors attempt to answer whether the local authorities are able and willing to play a pioneering role in the integration of migrants and what limits are set by the national framework conditions. Part II of the book consists of 14 country-specific chapters, which allow a European comparison and show the increasing variance in migration policy approaches within and between European countries. The degree of local autonomy, the level of centralisation and the traditional forms of migration policy are factors that especially influence the possibilities for local authorities to formulate their own integration policies. In our sample, the case studies on Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland represent Central Europe; Sweden, Norway and Finland the Scandinavian area; Ireland the Anglo-Saxon area; and France, Spain and Italy the Continental European Napoleonic Space. Of particular importance in our sample is the inclusion of post-communist countries in Eastern and Southern Europe, which had a completely different migration history from that of the west of the continent in the twentieth century. The case study on Poland represents Central and Eastern Europe, while Romania, Croatia and Slovenia represent South-East Europe. All country chapters in this book structured as far as possible according to the same pattern. At the beginning of each chapter, we deal with the basic aspects and specific features of national migration policy, which

8

J. FRANZKE AND J. M. RUANO

DE

LA FUENTE

includes the traditional forms of migration and integration policy as well as the specific values underlying national policies. We then provide an analysis of the constitutional regulations of migration and the distribution of responsibilities for integration policy across the different tiers of the political-administrative system. Wherever possible, the focus is on local authorities in cities and municipalities. Based on the current challenges of local integration policies, the authors examine the effectiveness of policy instruments applied, policy implementation and the results of implementation, respectively. Part III of the book consists of two specific thematic chapters deepening the analysis in two specific cases. Jochen Franzke analyses the challenges facing local authorities in Europe of integrating migrants, their administrative capacities and the problems of coordination between different branches of local administration in this policy field. Östen Wahlbeck, Saara Koikkalainen and Niko Pyrhönen examine the development of public opinion within the European Union on migration since 2015, and the role played by the media in the context of the ‘European refugee crises’. Finally, in the conclusions (Part IV), the editors, Jochen Franzke and José Ruano, summarise the most important results in the foregoing chapters and provide an outlook for further research.

References Alba, R. D., & Nee, V. (2003). Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Alexander, M. (2007). Cities and Labour Immigration Comparing Policy Responses in Amsterdam (pp. 1–54). Paris: Rome and Tel Aviv. Brettell, C. B., & Hollifield, J. F. (2000). Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines. London and New York: Routledge. Boswell‚ Ch. (2003). European Migration Policies in Flux: Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion‚ Wiley-Blackwell (The Royal Institute of International Affairs‚ Chatham House papers). Capono, T., & Borkert, M., (Eds.). (2010). The Local Dimension of Migration Policy. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Dekker, R., Emilsson, H., Krieger, B., & Scholten, P. (2015). A Local Dimension of Integration Policy. A Comparative Study of Berlin, Malmö and Rotterdam, IMR, 49(3), 633–658.

1

NEW CHALLENGES IN LOCAL MIGRANT …

9

Entzinger‚ H. B.‚ & Biezeveld‚ R. L. (2003). Benchmarking in Immigrant Intergation (Report for the European Commission)‚ European Research Centre on Migration and Ethic Relations (ERCOMER). Eurostat. (2018). Migration and Migrant Population Statistics. https://ec.eur opa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_p opulation_statistics#Migrant_population:_22.3_million_non-EU_citizens_liv ing_in_the_EU_on_1_January_2018. Freeman, G. P., & Mirilovic, N., (Eds.). (2016). Handbook on Migration and Social Policy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Gambetta, R., & Gedrimaite, Z. (2010). Municipal Innovations in Immigrant Integration: 20 Cities, 20 Good Practices. Washington, DC: National League of Cities. Heckmann, F. (2015). Integration von Migranten Einwanderung und neue Nationenbildung. Wiesbaden: Springer. Juzwiak, T., McGregor, E., & Siegel, M. (2014). Migrant and Refugee Integration in Global Cities. The Hague Process on Refugees and Migration, XXX(2)‚ (pp 81–87). Kraal, K., & Vertovec, S. (2017). Citizenship in European Cities: Immigrants, Local Politics and Integration Policies. London: Routledge. OECD. (2018). Working Together for Local Integration of Migrants and Refugees. Paris: OECD. Penninx, R., Kraal, K., Martiniello, M., & Vertovec, S. (Eds.). (2004). Citizenship in European Cities: Immigrants, Local Politics and Integration Policies. Aldershot: Ashgate. Scholten, P. W. A. (2012). Beyond National Models of Integration? Rethinking Interconnectedness and Fragmentation in Dutch and French Integration Policies. In H. J. M. Fenger & V. J. J. M. Bekker (Eds.), Beyond Fragmentation and Interconnectedness (pp. 44–58). Amsterdam: IOS Press. Scholten, P. W. A., & Penninx, R. (2016). The Multilevel Governance of Migration and Integration. In R. Penninx & B. Garcés-Mascareñas (Eds.), Integration Processes and Policies in Europe (pp. 91–108). Dordrecht: Springer. Scholten, P. W. A., & van Breugel, I. (Eds.). (2018). Mainstreaming Integration Governance: New Trends in Migrant Integration Policies in Europa. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Singer, A. (2012). Migration and the Metropolis. In R. Omidvar (Ed.), Practice to Policy—Lessons from Local Leadership on Immigrant Integration (pp. 9–10). Toronto, ON: Maytree Foundation. Vetrovec, S. (Ed.). (2010). Migration; Critical Concepts in the Social Sciences: Theories (Vol. I). Routledge: London and New York. Zincone, G., Penninx, R., & Borkert, M. (Eds.). (2011). Migration Policymaking in Europe: The Dynamics of Actors and Contexts in Past and Present (IMISCOE Research). Amsterdam University Press.

CHAPTER 2

Between Central Control and Local Autonomy: The Changing Role of Swedish Municipalities in the Implementation of Integration Policies Christine Hudson, Katarina Giritli-Nygren, Gustav Lidén, and Linda Sandberg

C. Hudson (B) Department of Political Science, Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden e-mail: [email protected] K. Giritli-Nygren · G. Lidén Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Mid Sweden University, Mid Sweden, Sweden e-mail: [email protected] G. Lidén e-mail: [email protected] L. Sandberg Umeå Centre for Gender Studies, Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 J. Franzke and J. M. Ruano de la Fuente (eds.), Local Integration of Migrants Policy, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50979-8_2

11

12

C. HUDSON ET AL.

2.1

Introduction

The underlying goal of Swedish integration policy is ‘to ensure equal rights, obligations and opportunities for all, irrespective of their ethnic and cultural background’.1 As a Scandinavian country, Sweden is often characterized as a decentralized unitary state in which the local level has both broad autonomy and a multitude of responsibilities within the welfare sector (Lidström 2011). In terms of migration policy, Sweden represents, together with the Netherlands, the longest tradition of maintaining a specific local policy within this area (Penninx 2015). The role played by the local level has, however, varied over the years, not only because of domestic changes, for example, in the political complexion of national governments, but also because of altering circumstances internationally. Nevertheless, the municipality remains important with regard to migration and integration. The aim of this chapter is to provide a broad picture of Swedish local government’s responsibilities, the changing nature of the role it has played and is playing with regard to refugee reception and integration policies and the challenges it currently faces.

2.2 Background: Swedish Migration Policy in a Historical Perspective Even though Sweden is considered to be a country with a long history of having a generous migration policy, it is also a history of restriction. Looking more closely at this policy area, it is possible to identify a number of quite different phases in which immigration and integration policies have oscillated between liberal and more restrictive characteristics. After the Second World War, foreign labour was welcomed to fill vacancies in Sweden’s expanding industries. However, in 1967, Swedish trade unions pushed for a more restrictive policy which, in conjunction with the economic recession in the early 1970s, resulted in Sweden only receiving labour migration from the other Nordic countries (Lundh and Ohlsson 1999). However, this tighter regulation was followed in 1975 by a completely new immigration policy that was formulated as a response to a situation in which Sweden had increasingly become a destination 1 https://www.government.se/government-policy/introduction-of-new-arrivals/goalsand-visions-of-introduction-of-new-arrivals/.

2

BETWEEN CENTRAL CONTROL …

13

country for refugees. This policy, with the motto of equality, liberty and collaboration, had multicultural characteristics. It aimed to ensure that new minority groups would be given support to preserve their own culture as well as being provided with the Swedish welfare state’s full range of services (Borevi 2012; Lundh and Ohlsson 1999). In 1985, integration policies were institutionalized at the local level, but were to be achieved in cooperation with AMS the national government labour market agency (the predecessor to the current Swedish Public Employment Service) and SIV the Swedish Immigration Agency (the predecessor to the current Swedish Migration Board) (Lundh and Ohlsson 1999; Bäck and Soininen 1998). However, almost simultaneously the Government enforced a new policy, later summarized as the ‘Whole of Sweden Strategy’, which circumvented local autonomy and permitted national government to place immigrants in all the municipalities (Borevi 2012). Both these policies were later reformed by the centre-right government that took office in 1991 and which was in charge when significant numbers of refugees fled to Sweden from the former Yugoslavia. The new Government refocused integration policy and placed emphasis on establishing immigrants in the labour market as well as trying to solve housing problems by making it possible for asylum seekers to find their own accommodation. The latter measure obviously altered the possibilities for national government steering of the placement of immigrants (Borevi 2012). The ‘Whole of Sweden Strategy’ was thereafter terminated and a system was established in which national government negotiated with the municipalities on the reception of immigrants. However, this did not affect the possibility for immigrants to resolve their own housing situation. After joining the EU in 1995, Sweden’s policy underwent a refocus when it incorporated EU policy and shifted from immigration to integration policy, which stressed not only the rights of immigrants but also their obligations (Lidén et al. 2015). In 1997, the social democratic government introduced a new integration policy (Prop. 1997/98:16) that was to guarantee newly arrived immigrants a two-year long introductory phase, administered by local government, to help them assimilate into Swedish society. After this period, no specific measures beyond the traditional welfare state services were to be provided. This reform downplayed multiculturalism and features of a stricter policy became apparent (Borevi 2012). Thus, for example, more restrictive provisions with regard to the immigration of family members were introduced. The age limit for

14

C. HUDSON ET AL.

family reunification was lowered to apply to children under the age of 18 (previously 20) and the possibility for elderly parents to reunite with their children in Sweden was removed. In July 2006, the growing numbers of unaccompanied minors seeking asylum led to changes in Swedish legislation. Responsibility for providing accommodation for this group was transferred from the Swedish Migration Board to the municipalities. The reception of unaccompanied minors subsequently followed a pattern that was influenced by local political opinion and structural preconditions in municipalities (Lidén and Nyhlén 2016). Later the same year, a centre-right government took office and, during their following two terms of office, two noteworthy policy changes were implemented. Firstly, the ‘establishment reform’ was launched in 2010 under the Establishment Measures for Newly Arrived Immigrants Act (Lag 2010:197) which had important consequences for the role of the local level. Under this reform, responsibility for integration was centralized and placed under the aegis of the national government agency, the Swedish Public Employment Service. The reason stated for this was that the integration of immigrants in the labour market had been largely unsuccessful and that there was considerable variation in how municipalities handled this issue (Lidén et al. 2015). Up to this point, integration policy had been highly decentralized and implemented largely at the municipal level with the municipalities ‘fully in charge of providing and administrating the introduction programme’ (Wiesbrock 2011, p. 55). However, the municipalities retained an important role in the reception of newly arrived refugees, particularly with regard to housing, schooling and education. (This is discussed further in the section on the distribution of responsibilities). The 2010 reform also emphasized ‘activation’ and gave increased attention to the individual migrant’s obligations to establish him/herself in the labour market (Qvist 2016). Secondly, the Government reached an agreement with the Green Party in 2011 that involved a general liberalization of migration policies, both in terms of the regulation of entry to Sweden and how integration policies were to be outlined and targeted (Bolin et al. 2014).

2.3 Contemporary National Migration Policy: From Generous to EU Minimum In the wake of Sweden becoming an increasingly important destination country for immigrants with the numbers of people seeking asylum in Sweden increasing substantially over several successive years

2

BETWEEN CENTRAL CONTROL …

15

(Riksrevisionen 2017), there have been enormous changes in migration policy. Sweden has gone from having the EU’s most generous asylum laws to the minimum EU level. In autumn 2015, Sweden faced immigration on an unprecedented scale as people fled from war zones and violence. As the refugee situation escalated, many services were under strain by the early autumn of 2015. More than 163,000 applications for asylum were received during 2015, over half of them in the period September–November (Migrationsverket 2016). Over 35,000 of these were unaccompanied minors. Relative to its population size, this was the highest yearly inflow of asylum seekers ever experienced in an OECD country (OECD 2016). The Government, responsible government agencies (particularly the Swedish Migration Agency), the County Administrative Boards and municipalities were under a heavy workload and were forced to reprioritise extensively to manage the situation (Riksrevisionen 2017). The initial engagement and support for refugees was followed by political debate and public opinion demanding that limitations should be put on the numbers granted asylum and shelter. The Government sought to ensure a more manageable situation and agreement on a more restrictive policy was reached in a broad coalition of parties comprising the Government (the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party) and the opposition Alliance (the Moderate, the Centre, the Liberal and Christian Democratic Parties). In November 2015, the Government also introduced temporary border controls at Sweden’s intra-Schengen borders, for example, with Denmark. These ‘temporary’ border controls were prolonged several times during 2016 and 2017 and have currently been extended to 11 November 2020. Persons entering Sweden at these border crossings are required to show proof of their right to enter and stay in the country, for example, by providing a passport or national ID-card. The key role played by Swedish municipalities in the reception and integration of refugees (Lidén and Nyhlén 2015) led to mounting concern about how they would cope with the increasing arrival of refugees many of whom were in poor health and suffering from trauma. Refugee reception and the placement of centres became a burning issue (Andersson 2016). Previously, it had been voluntary for municipalities to accept refugees which meant that some municipalities took considerable responsibility while others did nothing. Furthermore, somewhat surprisingly, the actual placement of newly arrived refugees have been more frequent in municipalities with weak preconditions for successful labour market integration than in those with strong preconditions (Wennström and Öner

16

C. HUDSON ET AL.

2015). It was argued that, in order to ensure better organization of refugee reception, speed up the integration of newly arrived refugees in society and their establishment in the labour market as well as reduce rising costs, all municipalities should be required to accept refugees. Thus, in March 2016, legislation (Lag 2016:38) was introduced that gave municipalities and national government agencies joint responsibility for receiving refugees. Under this legislation it was made mandatory for all municipalities to accept refugees and to provide (either themselves or in coordination with other actors) accommodation and services such as health care, language training, schooling for children, leisure activities and work training/experience. This was often on an unprecedented scale for many small municipalities and they experienced difficulties in complying with the regulations. The Swedish Migration Agency was heavily criticized by the Swedish National Audit Office (Riksrevisionen) for focusing on its own activities during this crisis and thus placing ‘municipalities into situations that forced them to contravene central government regulations on schools, social services and reception of unaccompanied minors’ (Riksrevisionen 2017, p. 12). In June 2016, the Reception of Asylum Seekers Act (Lag 1994:137) was altered so that an asylum seeker whose application for asylum is refused automatically loses the right to aid if s/he does not leave the country voluntarily. Once a definitive decision has been made that the asylum seeker is to be expelled or deported, the right to a daily allowance and to asylum accommodation paid for by the Swedish Migration Agency is withdrawn. An exception is made for families with children under 18 and these still have the right to aid until they leave the country. In addition to actions taken by the Government to reduce the influx of immigrants to the country, a number of policy changes concerning integration were initiated. In July 2016, a new approach to residence rights was introduced under the Temporary Limitation on the Possibility to Obtain Residence Permit in Sweden Act (Lag 2016:752). This Act made temporary rather than permanent residence permits the norm. Under previous legislation, all persons in need of protection generally received a permanent residence permit. According to the new legislation, those applying for and given asylum now usually only receive a temporary residence permit. Those who are granted refugee status receive a threeyear residence permit, and those who obtain the status of persons eligible for subsidiary protection receive a 13-month residence permit. When the permit runs out, the possibility of repatriation of the person to his or her

2

BETWEEN CENTRAL CONTROL …

17

country of origin is re-evaluated. For those granted refugee status, if they are able to support themselves by the time their residence permit expires, they may be granted a permanent residence permit. For those granted subsidiary protection status, their permit may be extended if there are still reasons for them to require protection when the initial permit expires. This temporary law also limits asylum seekers’ ability to reunite with their families. Only those who receive refugee status and a three-year residence permit will be given an opportunity for family reunification. The stricter requirements for family reunification include that reunification will only be permitted if the applicant can provide for those arriving (previously the requirement was only that the applicant could support him/herself). The asylum seeker must also have a home of a size and standard that is sufficient for the family to be able to live there together. This law was presented as a temporary solution to handle a challenging situation and was to be valid until July 2019. However, support has been lacking in the Swedish parliament for a return to a more liberal migration policy. A bill (Prop. 2018/19:128) has been introduced that prolongs the more restrictive migration policy for a further two years until July 2021. This continuation of the more restrictive policy has been reached in an agreement between the governing coalition, the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party, and the Liberal and Centre Parties. Nevertheless, a number of changes have been introduced that lessen some of the restrictions. For example, previously only a person with refugee status could be reunited with his or her family in Sweden, this right has now been extended to those with a status as a person in need of subsidiary protection. A further change is that someone classed as a stateless person may now, under certain circumstances, be eligible to receive a permanent residence permit.

Distribution of Responsibilities Over the Different Tiers of the Political-Administrative System 2.4

Traditionally refugee reception has been a policy area ‘with a strong tradition of collaborative governance, decentralized decision-making and a relationship between central and local government characterized by negotiation, dialogue and reciprocity’ (Qvist 2016, p. 20). However, it is important to point out that the municipalities’ responsibilities and

18

C. HUDSON ET AL.

how tightly these are controlled by national government have varied over time. The governance of migration policy involves vertical (hierarchical) steering in which the national government level is responsible for formulating and deciding the main policy framework and goals; and local (horizontal) cooperation with much of the practical work related to migration handled at the local level and where the municipalities play a key role (Lidén and Nyhlén 2014). In more recent years, this has been further complicated by the introduction of market-based steering (Qvist and Tovatt 2014). National Level Swedish Migration Agency (Migrationsverket) The Swedish Ministry of Justice handles matters relating to migration and asylum policy. It is responsible for the Swedish Migration Agency which is the government agency tasked with applying the laws and carrying out the activities decided on by the Riksdag (the Swedish Parliament) and the Government with regard to migration policy. Its remit is to strive for ‘a long-term, sustainable migration policy that safeguards asylum rights and, within the framework of regulated immigration, facilitates mobility across borders and promotes a needs-driven labour immigration, while utilizing and considering the development effects of migration, and furthering European and international cooperation’.2 Sweden’s migration policy comprises refugee and immigration policy, return policy, support for repatriation and the link between migration and development as well as global cooperation on these issues. The Swedish Migration Agency makes decisions regarding work and residence permits, as well as asylum and citizenship. With regard to the reception of refugees, the Migration Agency provides housing and money for food to asylum seekers, while they await a decision. A refugee who enters Sweden is either temporarily placed in a Migration Agency accommodation facility or can organize his/her own accommodation while waiting to be granted a residence permit or the issue of a deportation order. The average waiting time for this decision was 15 months in May 2016 (Scholten et al. 2017). Once a residence permit has been granted, it is primarily the job of the Swedish municipalities and the Swedish Public Employment Services to 2 https://www.migrationsverket.se/English/About-the-Migration-Agency/Our-mission. html.

2

BETWEEN CENTRAL CONTROL …

19

be involved in the integration of the newly arrived refugee into Swedish society. The Migration Agency pays compensation to the municipalities to cover the costs of the introduction and settlement of newly arrived refugees. Swedish Public Employment Service (Arbetsförmedling) The Swedish Government regards employment as the key to the integration of newly arrived people into Swedish society. Work is seen as not only enabling newly arrived refugees to support themselves, but also to develop Swedish language skills, learn about Swedish society, and to build a wider social network. As mentioned earlier, reforms were introduced in 2010 that dramatically altered the decentralized character of integration measures (Scholten et al. 2017; Wiesbrock 2011). In order to increase the labour market focus of integration policies and to ensure a more standardize approach across the country, responsibility was shifted away from the municipalities. Instead the Swedish Public Employment Service was given overall responsibility for the personalized two-year introduction programme for newly arrived refugees and their families. Once an immigrant has been granted a residence permit, s/he is expected to participate in this introductory programme. This combines language training and civic orientation (provided by the municipalities) with labour market activities. The aim is for the immigrant to learn Swedish, find a job and become self-sufficient as quickly as possible. In January 2018, new regulations were introduced that mean that virtually the same rules and requirements apply to newly arrived immigrants as to all other jobseekers (Prop. 2016/17:175; Lag 2017:584). A plan is drawn up for the activities the immigrant has to follow, such as courses in Swedish and applying for suitable jobs. In common with other jobseekers, newly arrived immigrants are required to submit an activity report every month on what they have done and the progress made (previously they were only required to do this every six months). If an immigrant is participating fully in the programme, s/he may be entitled to assistance from Swedish Social Security Agency (Försäkringskassan). The individual must follow the activities plan, submit an activity report and apply for suitable jobs in order to receive this benefit otherwise s/he risks losing it. The reform of the introduction programme was expressly designed to enable immigrants to establish themselves faster in society, as well as minimizing the risk that the conditions for this establishment might

20

C. HUDSON ET AL.

vary because of the room that the municipalities had previously had for manoeuvre (Prop. 2009/10:60). The aims of the reform harmonized with the broader ‘workfare’ ambitions of the centre–right government in power at that time to increase employment amongst all groups in society. A completely new feature was the ‘introduction guide’ (etableringslotsar) who were to provide newly arrived immigrants with professional support to facilitate their establishment in working life and enable them to become self-sufficient as fast as possible. Although financed by the Swedish Public Employment Service, most introduction guides are private actors rather than public employees with the aim of allowing the newly arrived immigrants to choose among different suppliers. However, this ‘choice’ model has been criticized by the National Audit Office as newly arrived immigrants have limited prerequisites for acquiring knowledge about different introduction guide options thus limiting their ability to make a wellinformed choice (Riksrevisionen 2014). Further criticism has also been raised concerning the quality and ‘seriousness’ of some of these private sector providers (Lidén et al. 2019). As Qvist (2016) has pointed out, the reform of the introduction programme involved the somewhat paradoxical ambition of both greater control and flexibility. Transferring responsibility to the Public Employment Service was seen as a way of increasing central control and ensuring a more uniform supply of employment measures and equal quality standards across the country, at the same time it was argued that services should be individualized and made more flexible. These changes disrupted the collaborative tradition of decentralized decision-making in Swedish local refugee reception and led to ‘reduced joint decision-making capacity at the local level’ (Qvist 2016, p. 29). Contradictions in the constitution of the current system where responsibility is shared between several different actors (national government agencies, the municipalities, and publicly financed private actors) have been pointed out (Lidén et al. 2015) leading to coordination problems, shortcomings in accountability and inefficiencies (Riksrevisionen 2014). Indeed, a recent OECD report states that a stronger, more structured coordination is required between the Public Employment Service and the municipalities to ensure coherent pathways to employment and avoid duplication of services (OECD 2016).

2

BETWEEN CENTRAL CONTROL …

21

Local Level The County Administrative Boards (Länsstyrelser) The County Administrative Boards are the extended arm of national government at the regional level. They are responsible for and participate in planning, organizing and implementing measures to assist newly arrived refugees. This is done in collaboration with the municipalities, government agencies, companies, organizations and voluntary associations. They are tasked with improving and strengthening the municipalities’ preparedness and capacity with regard to refugee reception and integration and for unaccompanied minors. Since January 2011, the County Administrative Board has had an extended mandate to negotiate locally and regionally with the municipalities and other relevant actors regarding the reception of unaccompanied minors. It is charged with coordinating national government efforts in the region through collaboration with other authorities and organizations to ensure that the best interests of the children are taken into account in decisions and other actions. The County Administrative Board also has the task of supporting municipalities in the coordination of municipal activities such as Swedish for immigrants and civic orientation. From 1 January 2017, this coordinating role has been strengthened (SFS 2016:1363). In addition, it allocates national government grants to municipalities to facilitate settlement, increase municipal preparedness and reception capacity as well as to provide, for example, introductory guidelines to help refugees orientate themselves in Swedish society. It follows up the organization and implementation of measures to assist new arrivals and unaccompanied children, both at regional and municipal level. It is responsible for deciding the annual quota for each municipality (kommuntal ) within its region based on the regional quota (länstal ) set by the Migration Agency (this is discussed more below). Municipalities (Kommuner) Once an immigrant has been granted a residence permit in Sweden, it is primarily the job of the Swedish municipalities and county councils, along with the Swedish Public Employment Services, to be involved in their integration into Swedish society. Although, as mentioned earlier, the main responsibility for the introduction programme was transferred to the Public Employment Service under the 2010 Act (Lag 2010:197), Swedish municipalities still play an important role in the welfare and labour market

22

C. HUDSON ET AL.

integration of refugees and, in accordance with UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), in providing schooling for children even while they are awaiting a decision on a residence permit. Once a refugee has been granted a residence permit, s/he must leave the Migration Board accommodation facility as the legal responsibility for the refugee is transferred from national to local government. The municipality is responsible for providing help to those immigrants who need assistance in finding accommodation. In 2016, the Reception of Newly Arrived Immigrants for Settlement Act (Lag 2016:38), once again changed the situation for municipalities so that they now have a mandatory, rather than a voluntary, responsibility to accept immigrants. The aim with the new law is that newly arrived refugees should be accepted for settlement in a municipality and commence their entry into the labour market and the local community as quickly as possible. From 2017 onwards, a quota is determined for each year for each region (länstal ) by the Migration Agency, the County Administrative Board then decides the quota for each municipality (kommuntal ) within its region. These are set out in a Government directive and the municipalities are required to accept those refugees assigned to them. Regard is to be paid to the situation in each municipality (such as the local labour market and availability of accommodation) when deciding the number of refugees to be assigned. Although no sanctions for non-compliance have been stipulated, there is a warning that these may be introduced if necessary. These changes introduce a new situation for the municipalities, for example, they are now required to take into account the provision of accommodation for refugees in their housing policies and programmes, although many face a housing shortage (Länsstyrelserna 2017). Thus, they are put under greater pressure to develop strategies for refugee reception and integration. Taken together with the possibility for immigrants to choose their own place of settlement, this has created considerable pressure on some municipalities. Although the aim was to create a situation in which there was a more equal reception of refugees throughout the country, the Official Swedish Commission on the Reception of Refugees (Mottagandeutredningen) set up in 2015 argues in its final report (SOU 2018:22) that the high incidence of asylum seekers and immigrants with residence permits organizing their own accommodation aggravates the uneven distribution between municipalities. This opportunity is, therefore, currently under

2

BETWEEN CENTRAL CONTROL …

23

review and there are proposals to limit immigrants’ possibilities to resolve their own housing situation. In addition to accommodation, Swedish municipalities are responsible for providing language training in Swedish - Swedish for Immigrants (SFI). This can either be organized by the municipality itself or by contracting out such services to private actors. However, the content and quality of SFI has been found to vary considerably between municipalities (OECD 2014). Some municipalities offer a highly developed service, including language training tailored to particular professions, whereas others offer a much more limited service (Länsstyrelserna 2017). The municipalities are also required to arrange courses in civic orientation that provide an introduction to Swedish society. Dissatisfaction with the standard of these courses led the Government, in 2018, to commission a review of their content with the ambition that they should better facilitate immigrants’ establishment in society and the labour market and that greater emphasis should be put on informing about Swedish norms and values (Regeringen 2018). Once the immigrants have completed the introduction programme, if they are unable to provide for themselves through, for example, employment, they are usually the responsibility of the municipality. This has led some municipalities to engage in other integration efforts in addition to their compulsory obligations. A common example is that municipalities frequently provide the work experience placements that are administered by the Public Employment Service as well as playing a key role in coordinating actors from the civil sector with respect to work placements in private businesses.

2.5

Implementation and Results of Integration Policies

The idea that people who seek refuge in Sweden should be received in a humanitarian and professional manner has been a long-held ideal of refugee reception and integration work, and receiving refugees and assisting with their integration into society has been a part of the Swedish welfare state since the 1970s (Eastmond 2011; Wiesbrock 2011). In the Swedish context, public debates about integration are centred on the obligations of refugees and migrants to ‘integrate themselves’ into society, living by Swedish values and norms, mastering the language and adjusting to the Swedish way of life, thus conflating integration with the concepts

24

C. HUDSON ET AL.

of acculturation or assimilation (Schmauch 2011). This differs in many ways from official documents and policies in which integration has been regarded as the solution to the social exclusion faced by migrants, refugees and their children. The consequences of the current policy framework have not been fully investigated. However, an econometric analysis by Andersson et al. (2016) comparing the old system with the new found some small positive effects on the employment prospects or the income of those affected by the reform. There are, nevertheless, shortcomings in the present system as are illustrated in Larsson’s (2015) study of the Swedish public employment service. This draws attention to problems such as where clients considered to have the best/worst chances of being successful in the labour market get the least support and efforts are instead targeted at the intermediate group. Furthermore, the study indicates that only a limited amount of time is spent actually helping clients to find jobs, and that administrative tasks and collaboration with other actors consume a disproportionate amount of time. These findings are mirrored to some extent in interview studies with immigrants who describe a system that is hard to grasp and filled with complex administrative procedures (Brännström et al. 2018; Bucken-Knapp et al. 2019). Moreover, the transfer of responsibility for immigrants and the integration policy from the municipalities to the Public Employment Service has been criticized for leading to a narrower integration perspective that focuses on employment and fails to provide support for integration in other aspects of everyday life (Brännström et al. 2018). Local conditions, such as the state of the labour market and the availability of housing; the presence of certain values (such as humanitarianism and solidarity with refugees) or the strength of support for the anti-immigrant, far-right political party, the Sweden Democrats; as well as the possibility of compensation from national government have all played a key role in influencing municipal decisions to accept refugees (Lidén and Nyhlén 2014; Bolin et al. 2014). Most refugees, in terms of absolute numbers, are received in the larger cities located in southern Sweden as the conditions for their reception and integration into the smaller towns and communities of the north are more constrained with fewer employment and housing opportunities (Lidén and Nyhlén 2014). Nevertheless, sparsely populated, rural municipalities frequently accept much higher numbers of refugees per capita (Johansson 2011). Attitudes towards refugees differ between and within municipalities. While some

2

BETWEEN CENTRAL CONTROL …

25

local leaders see the acceptance of refugees both as a humanitarian action and as a strategy for municipal survival (Riksrevisionen 2014), others are strongly opposed to it; the same applies to the local inhabitants as well. In turn, local differences in the labour market, business structure, access to finance and the willingness to include foreigners affect the possibility for immigrants to get jobs or start businesses and be included in society (Andersson et al. 2016; Behtoui and Neergaard 2010; SKL 2015a). As mentioned earlier, analyses in the wake of the coordination task prescribed by the ‘establishment reform’ have pointed out several challenges that involve the local level. Qvist (2016), for instance, emphasizes the formal barriers and conflicting norms concerning inter-organizational relations that are experienced by local actors. Lidén et al. (2015) show similar tendencies and describe a situation in which cooperation between the involved actors is characterized as mandatory and hierarchical. This creates a situation in which the state dominates in bargaining situations and where local discretion is highly changeable. Even the Official Swedish Commission on the Reception of Refugees indicates in its final report (SOU 2018:22) that central–local relations within this policy field are contested and characterized by a significant level of distrust. This has been exacerbated by the considerable responsibility taken by the municipalities following the refugee crisis in 2015 (SOU 2018:22). Taken together, the current state of this policy area has created a system that has meant considerable challenges for achieving efficient cooperation and the institutionalization of integration policies at the local level.

2.6

Current Challenges and Innovative Solutions in Local Integration Policies of Migrants and Refugees

As previously mentioned, the large influx of asylum seekers in 2015 has presented a major challenge for Sweden’s refugee reception, housing situation and the socio-economic integration of immigrants (OECD 2017). Many of its services both nationally and locally have been stretched to breaking point and dependency on civil society and voluntary organizations for organizing refugee reception has increased. This has compounded the problems for many immigrants’ integration into the labour market and their unemployment levels have been shown to be considerably higher than for native born Swedes (OECD 2014). Further

26

C. HUDSON ET AL.

many are doing jobs for which they are over-qualified. Integration into society has also proved difficult and there has been increased segregation in both housing and schools not just in the major cities—Stockholm, Malmö, Gothenburg, but also in smaller towns and communities. The rise of populist, far right, racist parties such as the Sweden Democrats has also had consequences for the reception and integration of immigrants. However, there are examples of initiatives undertaken by municipalities to try to combat these problems. A few illustrations are discussed below. Housing Problems One of the major challenges for Swedish municipalities is the very strained housing situation for asylum seekers. There is a housing shortage not only in the major cities and many municipalities have difficulty in acquiring accommodation that they can offer to asylum seekers. Even though the numbers have decreased compared with 2015, forecasts indicate that a relatively large number of people will seek asylum in Sweden in the coming years. This means that the demand for housing will continue to be high. In 2017, 88% of municipalities estimated a deficit with regard to housing for asylum seekers. The most common reason for this is that there is a general lack of rental accommodation in many municipalities (Boverket 2017). Hence, asylum seekers often face a situation where the need for housing is significantly greater than the supply. There is simply not enough housing and the lack of vacant apartments has meant that an increasing number of municipalities are able to receive fewer newly arrived refugees than the quota allocated by the Swedish Migration Agency and the County Administrative Board (Boverket 2015). One example of how a municipality has tried to cope with this situation since the Settlement Act (Lag 2016:38) came into force in 2016 is Skellefteå municipality in the far north of Sweden. The shortage of accommodation is high in the municipality’s urban centre and housing has, therefore, been sought in its more rural areas. The municipality used the Geographic Information System (GIS) to map potential homes for new arrivals in the surrounding villages. The inventory identified 2500 currently unoccupied buildings, mainly inherited houses and summer homes that are standing empty. The owners of these properties were subsequently sent a letter explaining the situation with regard to the Settlement Act and the need for housing for asylum seekers and offering them the opportunity to rent out empty houses in rural areas that are

2

BETWEEN CENTRAL CONTROL …

27

often difficult to sell. The project is described as providing a basis for a ‘living countryside’ as asylum seekers have primarily been assigned to smaller villages that are fighting declining populations. However, a challenge for the project is to find homes with good public transport connections as few refugees have access to a car (see https://skl.se/int egrationsocialomsorg/asylochflyktingmottagandeintegration/idebankfo rintegrationsarbetet/bostaderochbosattning/bostaderochbosattningnya nlandasetablering/gamlahusblirnyahemfornyanlandaiskellefteakommun. 12023.html). Educational Issues A recent OECD study has shown that the labour market outcomes of immigrants and their children often lag behind those of other Swedes (OECD 2014). There is a considerable gap, for example, between employment rates among low-educated immigrants and the native-born population who also have a low education level. In an effort to rectify this situation, a requirement for further training/education was introduced in 2018. It is now obligatory for newly arrived immigrants participating in the introduction programme who only have a low level of education to undergo further education/training if their limited education hinders them from finding suitable employment. The aim is to motivate them to study in order to strengthen their chances in the Swedish labour market. However, this measure does not help immigrants who are employed but are in jobs that require lower skills/qualifications than their formal education. For example, over 30% of immigrants who have attained a tertiary education are working in jobs for which they are over-qualified (OECD 2017). For this reason, in 2015, the Government initiated discussions regarding possible measures to create ‘fast tracks’ into the labour market for new arrivals who have training or professional experience that is needed in Swedish industries/professions facing a skills shortage. These include engineers, teachers, technicians and doctors. The aim is to help them to find work quickly, in a sector/profession that is relevant with regard to their education, experience and interest. Efforts have also been made to improve the validation process to enable professionals to obtain Swedish certifications more efficiently. With regard to compulsory education, the large numbers of children arriving in recent years either with their families or as unaccompanied

28

C. HUDSON ET AL.

minors have placed considerable demands on schools in many municipalities. The Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR) has pointed out that municipalities’ reception, organization and approach need to be continually developed, not least because it generally takes newly arrived children longer to attain educational goals than for pupils born in Sweden (SKL 2015b). It emphasizes the importance of developing working methods that can be adapted to suite children and young people regardless of background. An example which seeks to facilitate the integration of newly arrived refugee children and their parents into the Swedish school system is Start Ronneby. The project is run by Ronneby municipality in close proximity to its other activities for newly arrived refugees. It aims to provide an introduction to the Swedish school system that benefits not only the newly arrived pupils and their parents, but also the receiving schools. Since January 2015, all newly arrived children in the municipality receive a four week long introduction to Swedish pre-school and school during which their existing knowledge is assessed. All the schools and nurseries in the municipality have been involved in deciding what should be included in the project. Considerable focus is placed on close contacts and providing clear information to parents and children on the Swedish school, Swedish values and the rights and obligations of children and parents. It is seen as important that both parents and pupils are prepared and know how the Swedish school works and what to expect. The aim is that the children and their parents will feel safe and confident in the new school environment. During the fifth week the teachers employed in Start Ronneby participate in a ‘handover’ conference with the schools receiving the pupils and help to facilitate the children’s transfer into the Swedish school system. Information is also provided on home language instruction and supervision as well as activities such as Swedish for immigrants and civic orientation for adults.3 The Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR) has been highly critical of the current system of refugee reception and has drawn up an ‘Agenda for Integration’ (SKL 2017). This contains 65 concrete proposals for the Government and parliament to create better asylum reception, integration and establishment of refugees as well 3 https://skl.se/integrationsocialomsorg/asylochflyktingmottagandeintegration/ideban kforintegrationsarbetet/barnungafamiljochskola/integrationbarnungaochfamilj/startronn ebyforberedernyanlandaeleverochforaldrar.7441.html.

2

BETWEEN CENTRAL CONTROL …

29

as areas of improvement for municipalities and regions. It argues, for example, for a reduction in the national level’s detailed management of the establishment of newly arrived refugees in the labour market and for greater responsibility to be given to the municipalities. The reform of the Public Employment Service in 2019 involving a considerable reduction in its budget and the consequent closure of a large number of local offices, has strengthened SALAR’s argument for responsibility for coordinating the integration of newly arrived refugees in the labour market to be transferred to the municipalities (SKL 2019). The municipalities are regarded as having the local organization required for successful integration. They also have close contacts with local business and civil society, which can provide the labour-intensive efforts and networks that newly arrived refugees need to establish themselves in society and working life. SALAR points out that failed integration means not only that the refugees’ labour-power is not utilized, but can also lead to increased social vulnerability and increased costs for unemployment and financial assistance.

2.7

Conclusions

Sweden has experienced immigration on an unprecedented scale in recent years and migration policy has undergone dramatic changes moving from having been one of the most generous policies to the minimum EU level. The future direction of Swedish migration policy remains unclear as the ‘temporary’ more restrictive measures continue to be prolonged. In June 2019, the Government appointed a cross-party commission of inquiry to examine Sweden’s future migration policy (Dir. 2019:32) due to report in August 2020. The inquiry is to consider the design of the policy with the aim of establishing a system that is sustainable in the long-term. The intention is to reduce the need for temporary solutions and ensure a permanent system that has broad support in the Swedish Riksdag. The current climate towards migration in the Swedish parliament would, however, seem to suggest that a return to the past more liberal migration policy is unlikely. The role of local government has also changed considerably in recent decades with greater centralization and harder national government steering. Nevertheless, the municipalities continue to play an important role in the reception and integration of immigrants into Swedish society. However, it is somewhat unclear how local government’s role

30

C. HUDSON ET AL.

may develop in the future as the final report of the Official Swedish Commission on the Reception of Refugees (SOU 2018:22) suggests two alternatives for allocating responsibility for accommodation and interventions during the asylum period. One option gives the municipalities a greater responsibility for housing and measures for asylum seekers whereas the other allocates the responsibility for asylum seekers mainly to national government agencies. The then Minister for Employment, Ylva Johansson’s reply emphasizes collective responsibility and seems to indicate that it is likely that the municipalities will continue to play an important role in the reception and integration of refugees. ‘On the basis of the report, it is now important to find a sustainable balance in the division of responsibility between these actors [municipalities, county councils and the state]. We all have a shared responsibility for reception to work well. It is also important for civil society and other actors to be able to contribute to a good reception’ Ylva Johansson, Swedish Minister for Employment, 28 March 2018 (https://www.regeringen.se/artiklar/2018/03/ylva-johans son-kommenterar-mottagandeutredningens-slutbetankande/). However, what this balance will be still remains to be decided.

References Andersson, J. P., Lanninger, A. W., & Sundström, M. (2016). Etableringsreformens effekter på de nyanländas integration (The Establishment Reform’s Effects on the Integration of Newly-Arrived) (Slutrapport). Stockholm: Stockholms Universitet. Andersson, R. (2016). Flyktingmottagandets geografi (The Geography of Refugee Reception). In I R. Andersson et al. (Ed.), Mångfaldens dilemma (The Diversity Dilemma) (pp. 39–74). Malmö: Gleerups. Bäck, H., & Soininen, M. (1998). Den kommunala invandrarpolitiken: Arenor, aktörer och barriärer (The Municipal Immigrant Policy: Arenas, Actors and Barriers). 1. uppl. Stockholm: SNS. Behtoui, A., & Neergaard, A. (2010). Social Capital and Wage Disadvantages Among Immigrant Workers. Work, Employment and Society, 24(4), 761–779. https://doi.org/10.1177/2F0950017010380640. Bolin, N., Lidén, G., & Nyhlén, J. (2014). Do Anti-Immigration Parties Matter? The Case of the Sweden Democrats and Local Refugee Policy. Scandinavian Political Studies, 37 (3), 323–343. https://doi.org/10.1111/14679477.12031.

2

BETWEEN CENTRAL CONTROL …

31

Borevi, K. (2012). Sweden: The Flagship of Multiculturalism. In G. Brochmann & A. Hagelund (Eds.), Immigration Policy and the Scandinavian Welfare State 1945–2010 (pp. 25–96). Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Boverket. (2015). Boendesituationen för nyanlända (The Accomodation Situation for Newly-Arrived Refugees) (Slutrapport, RAPPORT 2015:40). Regeringsuppdrag, Karlskrona: Boverket. Boverket. (2017). Boverkets bostadsmarknadsenkät 2017 (The Swedish National Board of Housing, Building and Planning’s Housing Market Questionnaire 2017). https://www.boverket.se/sv/om-boverket/publicerat-avboverket/oppna-data/bostadsmarknadsenkaten/. Brännström, L., Giritli-Nygren, K., Lidén, G., & Nyhlén, J. (2018). Lived Experiences of Changing Integration Policies. Nordic Journal of Migration Research, 8(1), 25–34. https://doi.org/10.1515/njmr-2018-0009. Bucken-Knapp, G., Fakih, Z., & Spehar, A. (2019). Talking About Integration: The Voices of Syrian Refugees Taking Part in Introduction Programmes for Integration into Swedish Society. International Migration, 57 (2), 221–234. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12440. Dir. (2019:32). Den framtida svenska migrationspolitiken (Sweden’s Future Migration Policy). Stockholm: Justitiedepartementet. Eastmond, M. (2011). Egalitarian Ambitions, Constructions of Difference: The Paradoxes of Refugee Integration in Sweden. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 37 (2), 277–295. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2010. 521323. Johansson, L. (2011). Glesbygden – första stopp för flyktingar (Sparsely Populated Areas—First Stop for Refugees). Välfärd 4, 18–19, SCB. Lag. (1994:137). om mottagande av asylsökande m.fl. (Reception of Asylum seekers etc. Act). Stockholm: Svensk författningssamling 1994:137. Lag. (2010:197). om etableringsinsatser för vissa nyanlända invandrare (Establishment Measures for Newly-Arrived Immigrants Act). Stockholm: Svensk författningssamling 2010:197. Lag. (2016:38). om mottagande av vissa nyanlända invandrare för bosättning (Reception of Newly-Arrived Immigrants for Settlement Act). Stockholm: Svensk författningssamling 2016:38. Lag. (2016:752). om tillfälliga begränsningar av möjligheten att få uppehållstillstånd i Sverige (Temporary Limitation on the Possibility to Obtain Residence Permit in Sweden Act). Stockholm: Svensk författningssamling 2016:752. Lag. (2017:584). om ansvar för etableringsinsatser för vissa nyanlända invandrare (Responsibility for Establishment Measures for Newly-Arrived Immigrants Act). Stockholm: Svensk författningssamling 2017:584. Länsstyrelserna. (2017). Mottagande och etablering av nyanlända 2016 (Reception and Establishment of Newly-Arrived Refugees 2016). Meddelande nr

32

C. HUDSON ET AL.

2017:16. Jönköping: Länsstyrelsen i Jönköpings län 2017. www.lansstyrelsen. se/jonkoping. Larsson, J. K. (2015). Integrationen och arbetets marknad: Hur jämställdhet, arbete och annat “Svenskt” görs av arbetsförmedlare och privata aktörer (Integration and Labour Market: How Gender-Equality, Work and Other Things “Swedish” Are Carried Out by Employment Officers and Private Actors). Stockholm: Atlas Akademi. Lidén, G., & Nyhlén, J. (2014). Explaining Local Swedish Refugee Policy. JIMI, 15(3), 547–565. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-013-0294-4. Lidén, G., & Nyhlén, J. (2015). Reception of Refugees in Swedish Municipalities: Evidence from Comparative Case Studies. Migration and Development, 4(1), 55–71. https://doi.org/10.1080/21632324.2014.894178. Lidén, G., & Nyhlén, J. (2016). Structure and Agency in Swedish Municipalities’ Reception of Unaccompanied Minors. Journal of Refugee Studies, 29(1), 39– 59. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fev015. Lidén, G., Nyhlén, J., & Nyhlén, S. (2015). Forced Cooperation from Above: The Case of Sweden’s Establishment Reform. Policy Studies, 36(5), 468–486. https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2015.1089983. Lidén, G., Nyhlén, J., & Nyhlén, S. (2019). Neoliberal Steering in Swedish Integration Policy: The Rise and Fall of Introduction Guides. Scandinavian Journal of Public Administration, 23(1), 23–40. http://ojs.ub.gu.se/ojs/ index.php/sjpa/article/view/4299. Lidström, A. (2011). Sweden: Party-Dominated Subnational Democracy under Challenge? In J. Loughlin, F. Hendriks, & A. Lidström (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Local and Regional Democracy in Europe (pp. 261–281). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lundh, C., & Ohlsson, R. (1999). Från Arbetskraftsimport till Flyktinginvandring (From Labour Market Import to Refugee Immigration), 2: a rev. Uppl. Stockholm: SNS. Migrationsverket. (2016). Applications for Asylum Received 2015. https://www. migrationsverket.se/English/About-the-Migration-Agency/Facts-and-statis tics-/Statistics/2015.html. Myrberg, G. (2017). Local Challenges and National Concerns: Municipal Level Responses to National Refugee Settlement Policies in Denmark and Sweden. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 83(2), 322–339. https:// doi.org/10.1177/0020852315586309. OECD. (2014). Finding the Way: A Discussion of the Swedish Migrant Integration System. Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs. Paris: OECD. https://www.oecd.org/migration/swedish-migrant-intergation-system.pdf. OECD. (2016). Working Together: Skills and Labour Market Integration of Immigrants and Their Children in Sweden. Paris: OECD.

2

BETWEEN CENTRAL CONTROL …

33

OECD. (2017). Territorial Reviews: Sweden 2017 Monitoring Progress in MultiLevel Governance and Rural Policy. Paris: OECD. Penninx, R. (2015). European Cities in Search of Knowledge for Their Integration Process. In P. Scholten, H. Entzinger, R. Penninx, & S. Verbeek (Eds.), Integrating Immigrants in Europe (pp. 99–115). IMISCOE Research Series. Cham: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16256-0_6. Prop. (1997/ 98:16). Sverige, framtiden och mångfalden - från invandrarpolitik till integrationspolitik (Sweden, the Future and Diversity—From Immigration Politics to Integration Politics). Stockholm: Riksdagens tryckeri. Prop. (2009/10:60). Nyanlända invandrares arbetsmarknadsetablering egenansvar med professionellt stöd (Newly-Arrived Immigrants’ Establishment in the Labour Market—Individual’s Own Responsibility with Professional Support). Stockholm: Riksdagens tryckeri. Prop. (2016/17:175). Ett nytt regelverk för nyanlända invandrares etablering i arbets- och samhällslivet (A New Regulation System for Newly-Arrived Immigrants’ Establishment in the Labour Market and Society). Stockholm: Riksdagens tryckeri. Prop. (2018/19:128). Förlängning av lagen om tillfälliga begränsningar av möjligheten att få uppehållstillstånd i Sverige (Prolongation of the Law on the Temporary Limitation on the Possibility to Obtain Residence Permit in Sweden). Stockholm: Riksdagens tryckeri. Qvist, M. (2016). Activation Reform and Inter-Agency Co-operation—Local Consequences of Mixed Modes of Governance in Sweden. Social Policy & Administration, 50(1), 19–38. https://doi.org/10.1111/spol.12124. Qvist, M., & Tovatt, C. (2014). Från förväntningar till utfall - Etableringsreformen på lokal nivå (From Expectations to Results—The Establishment Reform at Local Level). Nyköping: Länsstyrelsen i Södermanlands län. Regeringen. (2018). Uppdrag till Länsstyrelsen i Jönköpings län om översyn av samhällsorientering för nyanlända (Commission to County Administrative Board in Jönköpings Region to Review Civic Orientation for NewlyArrived) (Diarienummer: A2018/00335/I). Stockholm: Arbetsmarknadsdepartementet. Riksrevisionen. (2014). Nyanländ i Sverige - effektiva insatser för ett snabbt mottagande (Newly-Arrived Refugees in Sweden—Effective Measures for a Speedy Reception). Stockholm: Riksdagens interntryckeri. Riksrevisionen. (2017). Lärdomar av flyktingsituationen hösten 2015 – beredskap och hantering (Lessons from the Refugee Situation in 2015—Preparedness and Management) (RIR 2017:4). Stockholm: Riksdagens interntryckeri. Schmauch, U. (2011). Working Hard to Integrate—The Role of Gender in Integration Discourse. In S. Fahlgren, A. Johansson, & D. Mulinari (Eds.), Normalization and “Outsiderhood” Feminist Readings of a Neoliberal Welfare State (pp. 49–57). Sharjah: Bentham Science Publishers.

34

C. HUDSON ET AL.

Scholten, P., Baggerman, F., Dellouche, L., Kampen, V., Wolf, J., & Ypma, R. (2017). Policy Innovation in Refugee Integration? A Comparative Analysis of Innovative Policy Strategies Toward Refugee Integration in Europe. Rotterdam: Erasmus University Rotterdam. SFS. (2016:1363). Förordning om länsstyrelsernas uppdrag avseende insatser för asylsökande och vissa nyanlända invandrare (Ordinance on the County Administrative Board’s Responsibility Regarding Measures for Asylum Seekers and Newly-Arrived Immigrants). Stockholm: Riksdagens tryckeri. SKL. (2015a). Framgångsrik lokal integration (Successful Local Integration). Stockholm: Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting. SKL. (2015b). Skolgång för nyanlända elever. Exempel och inspiration från kommuner (Schooling for Newly-Arrived Pupils: Examples and Inspiration from Municipalities). Stockholm: Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting. SKL. (2017). SKL:s agenda för integration. Om asylmottagande och nyanländas etablering (The Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions’s Agenda for Integration: On Asylum Reception and the Integration of New Arrivals). Stockholm: Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting. SKL. (2019). Behov av snabbutredning om möjligheterna att flytta samordningsansvaret för nyanländas etableringsinsatser till kommunerna (Need for Urgent Investigation of the Possibility to Transfer Responsibility for Integration of New Arrivals to the Municipalities) (SKRIVELSE 2019-05-07). Stockholm: Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting. SOU. (2018:22). Ett ordnat mottagande – gemensamt ansvar för snabb etablering eller återvändande (An Orderly Reception—Collective Responsibility for Speedy Establishment or Return). Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik. Wennström, J., & Öner, Ö. (2015). Den geografiska spridningen av kommunplacerade flyktingar i Sverige (The Geographical Spread of Refugees Placed in Municipalities in Sweden). Ekonomisk Debatt, 43(4), 52–68. Wiesbrock, A. (2011). The Integration of Immigrants in Sweden: a Model for the European Union? International Migration, 49(4), 48–66. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1468-2435.2010.00662.x.

CHAPTER 3

The Norwegian Case: Integration Through Local Autonomy and Institutionalization Susanne Søholt and Kristian Rose Tronstad

3.1

Introduction

Norway ranks among the countries in Europe with highest immigration relative to population size. Over the last ten years, two global developments have lifted immigration and integration to the top political agenda. First, in 2004 and 2007, enlargements of the common European labour market triggered a huge influx of temporary and more permanent labour migrants from Poland and the Baltics. Second, Norway received 31,500 first time asylum seekers in the wake of the refugee crisis in 2015. Ad hoc reception and accommodation systems for the asylum seekers were in focus while people kept arriving. In the aftermaths, integration and inclusion of those staying on with legal residency have renewed and intensified public debates on integration related to all residents with immigrant

S. Søholt (B) · K. R. Tronstad Oslo Metropolitan University - OsloMet, Oslo, Norway e-mail: [email protected] K. R. Tronstad e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 J. Franzke and J. M. Ruano de la Fuente (eds.), Local Integration of Migrants Policy, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50979-8_3

35

36

S. SØHOLT AND K. R. TRONSTAD

background. How the political Norway on national and local level is catching up, responding to and taking the eventual lead in these questions is believed to influence the kind of diverse social democratic society that is developing.

3.2

Population Change: A More Diverse Society

Norway has experienced international immigration for hundreds of years (Kjeldstadli 2003). Nevertheless, it is the increasing and diverse immigration from the 1960s and onwards that have influenced the population change and ongoing diversity that characterizes the Norwegian society of today (Fig. 3.1). In 2018, the immigrant population, including descendants born in Norway, has increased to 17% of the population, from a tiny 1.5% in 1970, while a third of the population has immigrant background in Oslo (Statistics Norway 2018).1 As shown in the Table 3.1, the structure of the migrant population has developed from the migration processes itself, and partly from the natural demographic development with births and deaths. Most groups go through a transition whereby migration counts for less and less (Wessel 2010). Since the 1990s until 2018, the largest groups of immigrants to Norway has come for family reasons, the second for work, while refugees rank as the third most important group. In 2018, people have more than 200 origins in Norway.2 The six largest groups of the immigrant population concerning origin are coming from Poland (110.509), Lithuania (43.930) Somalia (42.406), Sweden (38.870), Pakistan (37.412) and Syria (29.889) (Statistics Norway 2018). Together they portray the changing dynamics between conditions in sending countries, pull factors in Norway, and changes in immigration regulation. The result is a dynamic and diverse multi-ethnic society comprising of labour immigrants from the 1960s and 1970s and labour immigrants from the EU in the twenty-first century, as well as refugees from Africa and Asia with subsequent family reunion in all groups. Family migration has risen steadily, now comprising around one third of the total inflow over the

1 https://www.ssb.no/statbank/table/06913/tableViewLayout1/. 2 https://www.ssb.no/statbank/table/09817/.

North-America and Oceania Europe (excl. EU/EEA)

Lan-America

Africa

Europe (Incl. EU/EEA)

Asia (incl. Turkey)

Fig. 3.1 Increase in immigrant population (immigrants and Norwegian-born to immigrant parents) by origin, world continents 1970–2018. Source Statistics Norway, Population statistics

1.000.000 900.000 800.000 700.000 600.000 500.000 400.000 300.000 200.000 100.000 0 3 THE NORWEGIAN CASE …

37

38

S. SØHOLT AND K. R. TRONSTAD

Table 3.1 Immigrants and Norwegian-born to immigrant parents, by country background 2018

Total The EU28/EEA, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand Asia, Africa, Latin America, Oceania except Australia and New Zealand and Europe except EU28/EEA Including EU28/EEA countries Other European Countries Africa Asia including Turkey North America South and Central America Oceania

Immigrants and Norwegian-born to immigrant parents Total

Immigrants

Norwegian-born to immigrant parents Total

Immigrants and Norwegian-born to immigrant parents in % of Population

916,625 382,882

746,661 343,470

169,964 39,412

17.3 7.2

533,743

403,191

130,552

10.1

369,122

330,619

38,503

7.0

77,131

59,756

17,375

1.5

127,155 304,042

93,735 227,631

33,420 76,411

2.4 5.7

11,404 25,519

10,580 22,171

824 3348

0.2 0.5

2252

2169

83

0.0

Source Statistics Norway, Population statistics

past 25 years (Statistics Norway 2017). Labour immigrants from the EU form the largest immigrant groups in Norway in 2018, but it is the refugee crisis and the unprepared for influx of refugees in 2015 that is the core in contemporary political debates about immigration and integration. Norway ranked fourth behind Germany, Sweden and Austria as the country with the highest number of asylum applications, adjusted for population size (Eurostat 2016).

3

3.3

THE NORWEGIAN CASE …

39

Policy Changes

When the guest workers arrived in Norway in the 1960s and 1970s, there were no expectations that they should stay and become part of society. However, as they did stay, there was a growing recognition of guest workers as humans with needs for well-being and family life outside the working place. Politics for recognition developed to policies for an inclusive multicultural society. In the beginning of the twentyfirst century a parallel policy focusing on duties and expectations to immigrants developed. These expectations are even more up-front today. Policy development has primarily been a response to the population change and character of challenges and problems following the actual immigration, available and legitimate solutions, at the same time as the intention was/is to influence immigration and integration to contribute to a good society. Instead of rational policymaking and planning, immigration and integration policies have been pushed by incremental steps (Lindblom 1979), encapsulated in often highly politicized public debates and with a glance to politics in neighbouring countries. Immigration and integration policies have operated together or as different policy areas. Below we present three arguments for policy change. The first two relate mainly to immigration policy, while the third links immigration and integration. Need for Control The first White paper on immigration from 1968–1969 embraced a liberal immigration policy, while the later White papers focused on the need for control, starting with a temporary halt in immigration from 1976, until the introduction of the Immigration Act in 1988. Since then this act has been revised several times with main intentions to restrict immigration. The latest proposal for policy change is opening for double citizenship (2018). The former reasons for denying people double citizenship was fear of lack of integration and belonging to Norway. Today the decisive argument for double citizenship is linked to immigration control, as it opens for forced return and repatriation.

40

S. SØHOLT AND K. R. TRONSTAD

Balancing Norwegian Immigration Policy to the EU A main focus in the immigration policy is how to balance Norwegian immigration policy to the EU (Ministry of Justice 2009–2010). Due to the disillusionment in the ability of international conventions and actors to adapt to the rising volumes of asylum seekers to Europe, Norway has become part of the European trend characterized by a ‘rush to the bottom’, where the intention is not to stand out as more attractive for refugees and other immigrants than other European countries. An example is Parliament’s response to the European refugee crisis in 2015, which opened for approval of previously contested means of regulating immigration through stricter polices (Hernes 2018; The Government 2015). Sustainability of the Welfare State Arguments for restricting and controlling immigration has been and still is linked to the sustainability of the universal and generous Norwegian welfare state (Ministry of Justice and Public Security 2017, p. 2). Sainsbury (2012, p. 1) argue that researchers increasingly have viewed migration, immigrants and ethnic diversity as challenges to the welfare state or as threats to existing welfare arrangements, while putting less attention on the structures for inclusion/exclusion in the receiving countries. The welfare state argument links immigration and integration policies because in Norway, all legal residents are entitled to universal social rights, which again impose duties of welfare provision to municipal and state level actors. This is a central reason for the increased focus on immigrants’ responsibility to participate in the labour market and pay tax. Another argument is that being able to take care of oneself and one’s family is believed to be core for individual well-being. The integration policy has two footings—integration into society by becoming active (economic) citizens at the same time as the immigrants have the option to retain and develop own culture and religion. The latest White papers on integration have faded down retention and focused on expectations and demands to participate in society as well as individual freedom to choose one’s own life carrier, to the favour of cultural and social expectations (Ministry of Justice 2015–2016). The importance of fighting negative social control in ethnic communities is underscored in a joint letter to the municipalities from three Ministers in December

3

THE NORWEGIAN CASE …

41

2017 (Ministry of Justice 2017). Whether one looks at integration, in its entire spectrum, from the point of view of the state, the municipality, civil society, the majority or the immigrant population themselves, immigration, integration, inclusion and diversity have become inherently nuts and bolts in the political project for the Norwegian society.

3.4

Institutionalization

Embedded in the policy development in the immigration and integration field is an ongoing institutionalization. This process includes the establishment of new actors, laws and regulations as well as a more regulated sharing of responsibilities between levels of government and the public, private and civil sector. The policy fields have achieved a solid funding, which may serve as a pull factor for further expansion and institutionalization. One definition of institutionalization concerns the nature of the governing institutions that structure the behaviour of individuals—both the governing and the governed (Peters 2001). The halt on integration in 1976, followed by the Immigration Act (1988) and later the Introduction Act (2003) as well as laws to enhance equality and prohibit discrimination (2017), are all examples of institutionalizations where the law gets a central role with intentions to influence individual and organizational behaviour. It can be argued that the institutionalization of these policy fields have resulted in a more instrumentalistic approach to immigration and integration questions in the municipal political arenas (Steen 2016), thus not catching up on the more populist views in these policy fields. ‘State Engineering’ The institutionalization at national level took different forms and covered the establishment of specific departments for policymaking in the Ministries, implementation of national policies through directorates and government agencies, financial support to municipalities to take responsibility for integration, and support to enhance immigrants to organize. In short, the Norwegian institutionalization of the immigration and integration field is an example of ‘state engineering’. With the help of political instruments, the intention is to influence public and private institutions on all levels as well as individuals, to behave in ways that would develop society in wanted ways concerning immigration, integration and diversity.

42

S. SØHOLT AND K. R. TRONSTAD

Even though there are insufficient knowledge on how the institutionalization of immigration and integration policies work, there is a strong belief that institutions do matter (Peters 2001). One of the first institutionalizations was related to social problems and housing for the guest workers in the 1960s and 1970s. Their difficult housing situation was seen as a societal problem and imposed the Ministry for Local Affairs and Work to establish a national housing company to support the municipalities to find housing solutions for the immigrants (Ministry of Local Affairs and Work 1975–1976). A few years later in 1979, the Government established a company to assist refugees with housing, before the companies merged, and then closed down in 1994. Another initiative to institutionalize immigration and integration policies was to establish directorates to implement governmental policies. The Directorate for Immigration was established already in 1987, while the Directorate of Integration and Diversity was established in 2006. The intention with this reorganization of national policy was to prioritize implementation. The main area of responsibility for the latest Directorate was to follow up the Introduction law, administer the economic means and support the municipalities in settlement of refugees. While housing assistance included all kinds of immigrants until the mid-1990s, the integration policy of the twenty-first century targets mainly refugees. With some exceptions, all other immigrants are entitled to the ordinary welfare arrangements and they are seldom included in the specific integration policies. Thus the ‘welcome regimes’ differ with immigrant category. A specific institutionalization affects the integration and welfare field. That concerns the well-established three-party cooperation between the state, the labour unions and the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprises (NHO). These parties negotiate wages and labour market conditions in general and initiatives and strategies to include immigrants in the labour market and prevent social dumping. Because of the importance of immigrants’ participation in the labour market for the legitimacy of the universal welfare state, this cooperation is crucial. Without support from the labour market organisations, it is difficult for the state to impose new strategies for immigrants’ labour market inclusion.

3

3.5

THE NORWEGIAN CASE …

43

From State to the Role of Local Authorities in the Integration Policy of Immigrants

In Norway, immigration and integration policies started out as a national responsibility. Today immigration policy is still on national level, while integration policies are becoming local and inclusion policies become embedded in sector policies on all levels. As in other countries, it is increasingly recognized that immigrants’ everyday integration takes place at the local level (Caponio and Borkert 2010; Penninx and GarcésMascareñas 2016; Schiller 2015). The Norwegian municipalities are responsible for implementing national integration policy like first-time housing and the introduction programme for refugees. In addition, more municipalities develop their own diversity policy to cope with and benefit from the population change on a regular basis (City of Oslo 2017). The State Controls Immigration Policy Despite municipal involvement in integration policies, the state maintain control over the immigration policy and sets the conditions for asylum policy and for asylum seekers, even though it affects the municipalities. Asylum seekers live in asylum centres located in the municipalities, but mostly run by private companies based on government tenders. The asylum centres are defined as ‘businesses’ and are thus outside municipal control when it comes to establishing or closing down their activity. Still the asylum seekers are entitled to some welfare services provided by the municipality like basic health care, school and kindergarten for the children. Asylum seekers are free to socialize and take part in community organizations etc., thus influencing community life. From State to Municipality After the closing down of the state companies responsible for housing in the mid-1990s, municipal responsibility for integration of refugees have forced itself to the forefront, supported by the general decentralization of welfare provision to the municipal level (Loughlin et al. 2011). However, different from other Nordic countries, Norwegian municipalities have autonomy to decide if they want to settle refugees, and how to arrange for and implement integration programmes and policies.

44

S. SØHOLT AND K. R. TRONSTAD

The state and the Association of Norwegian Local and Regional authorities have agreed on a model for allocation of refugees throughout Norway, following principles of burden sharing and equitable territorial distribution. According to this agreement, the state requests the municipalities to settle a certain number of refugees, while the municipal councils decide if they want to settle refugees and how many. However, when decided, the municipality is obliged to find refugees’ first housing and offer a two-year obligatory introduction programme. For each settled refugee, the municipalities get compensation for five years. This economic support is not earmarked, so its use hinges on local political decisions, thus making this compensation attractive. Importantly, each municipality is otherwise free to organize the settlement of refugees as it sees fit, and to find housing in either the municipal or the private housing market. Until the refugee crisis in 2015, the system with local autonomy for settling refugees had not been able to match the demand for refugee housing with supply (Hernes 2017). Though debated in the parliament on several occasions due to the long queues for refugee settlement, both the current and the former government supported the system. The system remained intact also during the refugee crisis. One reason could be that the populist right-wing Progress Party, which is part of the current coalition government and was in charge of immigration and integration policies at the time of the crisis, opposed overruling the municipalities on receiving refugees, even when the system for settlement was not working well. Another reason in retrospect, is that the municipalities managed to double the settlement of refugees during the crisis. One explanation from the municipalities was their possibilities to work out local solutions, with considerable economic support from the state (Søholt and Aasland 2019).

3.6 Effectiveness of Implementation of Integration Policy and Integration Results Previous research indicate that integration outcomes for immigrants in Norway, as compared to other countries, are reasonably good (OECD 2015; Tronstad 2016). The level of education is relatively high among immigrants in Norway, and it has increased over time. The employment rate among immigrants is higher in Norway than in the other Scandinavian countries and in most other EU countries. The same applies to income level, adjusted for purchasing power parity. Also, among immigrants with low levels of formal education, employment rates of

3

THE NORWEGIAN CASE …

45

immigrants are relatively high in Norway. In addition, immigrant women have higher employment rates in Norway than in most other European countries (OECD 2015; Tronstad 2016). However, behind these indicators of integration outcomes, there are persistent gaps between the majority and the minority populations in important areas of society. Many immigrants, also those with high levels of formal education, have poor Norwegian reading skills. Immigrant households are far more likely to be at risk of poverty than are native-born Norwegian households. Children raised in immigrant households are four times more likely to live in ‘poor households’ compared to children whose parents are not immigrants (OECD 2015; Tronstad 2016). Another recent study, drawing on Norwegian longitudinal administrative data covering labour earnings and social insurance claims over a 25-year period, found encouraging signs of labour market integration for refugees and family migrants during the initial period (Bratsberg et al. 2017). However, this study also found that the initial period of convergence between immigrant/native employment differentials reversed after approximately 10 years of residence. After that, employment and social insurance differentials increased between native Norwegians and the various entry classes of immigrants. The persisting gaps between native Norwegians and foreign-born have spurred massive public debate about migration and the sustainability of the Norwegian welfare state. On the one hand, migration of relatively young people of core working age is considered a key component to counteract the demographic development of an ageing population and population decline in rural areas. On the other hand, immigration, particularly immigration of refugees, is costly. And, the sustainability of the Norwegian welfare state could be at stake if a large proportion of newly arrived immigrants are excluded from different domains such as labour market and housing (Tronstad et al. 2018). In a short-term perspective, the Norwegian government invests in the newcomers by providing language training and a compulsory and paid introduction programme for newly arrived refugees. The Norwegian Introduction Act comprises two schemes: the introduction programme (from 2004) and Norwegian language training and social studies for adult immigrants (from 2005). The goal is to give the individual basic skills in the Norwegian language, a fundamental insight into Norwegian social conditions and to prepare him/her for work or education. The target group of the introduction programme consists of adults (18 and 55 years

46

S. SØHOLT AND K. R. TRONSTAD

at settlement) who have been granted asylum and thus the status of a refugee, are resettlement refugees, other subsidiary protection, or are reunited with a refugee of the above-mentioned categories. Those who are in the target group for the scheme and require basic qualifications have a right and obligation to take part in the introduction programme. The municipality is obliged to arrange the introduction programme for newly arrived immigrants in the target group who live in the municipality. The Introduction Act at the same time gives the municipalities a legal framework and financial support for the settlement and integration work. The introduction programme should be individually adapted full-time skill acquisition. The goal is to increase the possibility of newly arrived immigrants to participate in working and social life and to increase their financial independence. Participation in the programme entitles the participant to introduction benefit. The annual benefit equals twice the National Insurance basic amount. Participants under 25 years of age receive 2/3 of the benefit. The benefit is taxable. A recent evaluation of the introduction programme found that there were huge differences in short-term and long-term integration outcomes between various groups of refugees, related to, inter alia, gender, level of formal education and country of origin. The evaluation confirmed findings from previous studies showing considerable variation in integration outcomes for refugees depending on which municipalities they were settled in (Djuve et al. 2017). Previous studies suggest that the variation in integration results between different municipalities only partly can be explained by the individual characteristics of the participants and regional labour market conditions (Lillegård and Seierstad 2013; Tronstad 2014). Hence, the equality of the services provided by the municipalities have been questioned (Tronstad and Hernes 2017).

3.7 Policy Instruments and the Existing Challenges of Local Integration Policies Integration policy is an excellent example of a ‘wicked-problem’, where coordination between different public bodies, both vertically and horizontally, is a demanding exercise. The introduction programme implemented at municipal level shall include components from different sectoral policy areas, including education, language training, labour market, family and health. The broad and desirable tailored design of the

3

THE NORWEGIAN CASE …

47

programme requires horizontal coordination between different government agencies, both at national level between ministries, as well as coordination of bodies at municipal level such as the local branch of the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV), Adult Education centres and the Municipal Refugee Office. In addition, private actors such as NGO’s and social partners are key stakeholders in the work. The complexity is not only challenged by the horizontal coordination, but vertical coordination is also crucial for a successful implementation. Designing an introductory programme is a comprehensive and demanding municipal service, especially for smaller municipalities, which requires both professional and administrative capacity. Since the legislation give the municipalities huge freedom for local adaption of the programme, it is important that the government agencies manage to guide and contribute appropriately so that not all municipalities will have to invent the ‘wheel’ all over again (Tronstad and Hernes 2017).

3.8 Good Practice in Local Integration Policies of Migrants Considering the autonomy of the municipalities to adapt their integration policies and measures, there are many examples of good practices in Norwegian municipalities. A small municipality, Rælingen, within the capital area of Oslo serve as an example of good practice. Rælingen is well known for its slogan ‘Tough love’ when it comes to immigrants’ integration. Like other municipalities, they provide language training, but also other tailor-made measures that have become compulsory parts of the introduction programme. The intention is to qualify refugees for the local labour market, but also to make them ready to participate in different arenas in Norwegian society, as parents and as future Norwegian citizens. The content of the slogan means that the task of the participants of the introduction programme is challenging, and the social workers have high expectations to them. The municipality expects the refugees not to be passive recipients, but to be active participants as they wish to focus on seeing the refugees’ resources. As a reward, the refugees can expect close follow-up and guidance on personal and professional as well as family issues, tailored to their individual needs. As a result, Rælingen is one of the municipalities in Norway with the highest transition rate from introduction programme to work for their participants.

48

S. SØHOLT AND K. R. TRONSTAD

There are other examples of municipal employees that prioritize close contact with local employers. They know the need for skills among local businesses, and forward immigrants to work practice, wage-subsidized jobs or regular employment. Other municipalities emphasize cooperation with civil society to facilitate places and activities bridging the gap between majority and minority population. Strong involvement from private actors such as sports clubs and other organisations enhance ‘social capital’ and tend to have a positive effect on matching in the labour market, since information about skills and job opportunities are easily transferred (Søholt et al. 2015).

3.9

Attitudes Towards Immigration and Immigrants in Norway

Immigration and immigrants’ integration continues to be one of the most pressing political issues in Norway, with 28% of the voters rating it highest on the political agenda in the last general election in 2016 (Bergh and Karlsen 2017). With continuing high levels of labour migration to Norway, as well as continuing pressure to manage the potential new flow of refugees and asylum seekers from war zones around the world, this topic is unlikely to lose its significance in the foreseeable future. In order to compare attitudes in Norway on immigration and immigrants, the European Social Survey (ESS) is the most authoritative data on support for or opposition to immigration. According to Heath and Richards (2019), the population in Norway, together with other Nordic countries, are most positive towards immigration and the impact on the country. In the period from 2002 to 2014, Norway was also one of the countries where attitudes changed most in a more tolerant direction (Heath and Richards 2019). A recent study based on Norwegian data confirms the development in attitudes on immigration. Time series data on various aspects of attitudes towards immigrants and immigration from a biannual survey of the Norwegian population was used to study trends in the period 1993– 2015 (Hellevik and Hellevik 2017). The balance of positive over negative answers has become increasingly more positive with regard to how the cultural and economic role of immigrants is perceived. The same is true for attitudes towards the helping of refugees and the regulation of immigration. Cohort analyses show the trend to be a result of both generational replacement and individuals changing attitudes. A change in

3

THE NORWEGIAN CASE …

49

value orientation, from traditional to modern, and from materialistic to idealistic values, is the most important factor in creating the generational differences and the changes in attitudes over time within the rest of the population. A greater number of people with a higher education and a greater number of immigrants settling in Norwegian municipalities both contribute to the increasingly positive attitudes. Objective or subjective economic situation has not affected the changes in attitudes (Hellevik and Hellevik 2017).

3.10 Concluding Remarks: Local Autonomy or More State Control? The consequences of a failed integration policy are serious, both for the individual migrants, the local community who welcomes our new citizens and for the welfare state. It is therefore important to ask the following question: Does the state use a proper combination of policy instruments to achieve desired integration results at the local level? And, does the municipal level take advantage of their local autonomy to tailor their local integration policy? The balance between state governance and municipal autonomy in integration policy touches upon classical ponderations between different public values in multilevel governance. Three aspects are crucial for municipal autonomy. The first concerns the municipality’s freedom from being governed by the state. The second relates to the citizens active participation in democracy thus influencing local politics, while the third is about efficiency. The efficiency argument held that municipalities are the most capable to implement national goals in local settings, especially when the implementation is target-oriented and not regulated by detailed laws and rules (Fiva et al. 2014; Hansen 2014; Kjellberg and Hansen 1979). However, these three concerns have to compete with other values in the Norwegian welfare state. One is that all people, included immigrants and refugees, should have the same welfare and integration services, regardless of where they live in Norway. This is of extreme importance, since refugees cannot choose where to be first-settled but are assigned to a municipality by the state. As mentioned, studies show that there are considerable variations in integration outcomes for refugees depending on which municipality they were settled in. Even though local autonomy in integration policy is deemed to affect municipalities’ willingness to receive refugees, the different quality and content in municipal

50

S. SØHOLT AND K. R. TRONSTAD

introduction programmes is an argument for more state control in this policy field. One possibility is to target parts of the funding for the introduction programme to activities that have proven to support refugees’ labour market integration. Another option is to condition subsidies to local municipal - private collaborations about how to develop work places to include people with different experiences and expectations to the labour market, and at the same time enable the job seekers to match the demands for qualifications in the local labour market. Valuing the local autonomy in Norway as an advantage, opens possibilities to approach the ‘wicked-problems’ of integration at the problem-solving level with the ‘ought to be’ involved actors.

References Bergh, J., & Karlsen, R. (2017). Sakseierskap i lokalvalgkamp. In J. Saglie & D. A. Christensen (Eds.), Lokalvalget 2015 - et valg i kommunereformens tegn? (pp. 113–124). Oslo: Abstrakt forlag. Bratsberg, B., Raaum, O., & Røed, K. (2017). Job Loss and Immigrant Labour Market Performance. Economica, 85(337). https://doi.org/10.1111/ecca. 12244. Caponio, T., & Borkert, M. (2010). The Local Dimension of Migration Policymaking. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. City of Oslo. (2017). Flyktningemeldingen. [Refugee report]. Oslo: City of Oslo. Djuve, A. B., Kavli, H. C., Sterri, E. B., & Bråten, B. (2017). Introduksjonsprogram og norskopplæring. Hva virker - for hvem? [Evaluation of the introductory programme and Norwegian language training. What works for whom?] Oslo: Fafo-report 31. Eurostat. (2016). Asylum in the EU Member States Record number of over 1.2 million first time asylum seekers registered in 2015 Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis: Top citizenships. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/ 2995521/7203832/3-04032016-AP-EN.pdf/790eba01-381c-4163-bcd2a54959b99ed6. Fiva, J. H., Sørensen, R. J., & Hagen, T. P. (2014). Kommunal organisering: effektivitet, styring og demokrati. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Hansen, T. (2014). Kommunal autonomi - hvor stort er spillerommet? [Municipal autonomy – what is the room of manoeuvre?] In H. Baldersheim & L. Rose (Eds.), Det kommunale laboratorium. [The municipal laboratory] Oslo: Fagbokforlaget. Heath, A., & Richards, L. (2019). “How do Europeans differ in their attitudes to immigration? : Findings from the European Social Survey 2002/03–2016/17 ”

3

THE NORWEGIAN CASE …

51

(OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 222). Paris: OECD Publishing. Hellevik, O., & Hellevik, T. (2017). Utviklingen i synet på innvandrere og innvandring i Norge. [Development in views on immigrants and immigration in Norway]. Tidsskrift for Samfunnsforskning, 58(3), 250–283. Hernes, V. (2017). Central Coercion or Local Autonomy? A Comparative Analysis of Policy Instrument Choice in Refugee Settlement Policies. Local Government Studies, 43, 798–819. Hernes, V. (2018). Cross-National Convergence in Times of Crisis? Integration Policies Before, During and After the Refugee Crisis. West European Politics, 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2018.1429748. Kjeldstadli, K. (2003). Norsk innvandringshistorie [History of immigration in Norway]. (K. Kjeldstadsli Ed., Vols. 1–3). Oslo: Pax forlag A/S. Kjellberg, F., & Hansen, T. (1979). Det kommunale hamskifte: reformer, verdier og deltakelse. [Municipal transformation: reforms, values and participation]. Oslo: Gyldendal. Lillegård, M., & Seierstad, A. (2013). Introduksjonsordningen i kommunene. En sammenligning av kommunenes resultater [Introductory programmes in the municipalities. A comparison of municipal results]. Oslo: Statisics Norway. Reports 55/2013. Lindblom, C. E. (1979). Still Muddling: Not Yet Through. Public Administration Review, 39(6), 517–526. Loughlin, J., Hendriks, F., & Lidström, A. (2011). The Oxford Handbook of Local and Regional Democracy in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ministry of Justice. (2009–2010). Norsk flyktning- og migrasjonspolitikk i et europeisk perspektiv. [Norwegian refugee and migration policy in a European perspective]. Oslo. Ministry of Justice and Public Security. (2015–2016). Fra mottak til arbeidsliv - en effektiv integreringspolitikk [From asylum reception centre to work – an effective integration policy]. (Meld. ST. 30). Oslo. Ministry of Justice and Public Security. (2017). Arbeidet mot negativ sosial kontroll. [Work against negative social control]. Oslo. Ministry of Local Affairs and Work. (1975–76). Om innvandringsstoppen og arbeidet med innvandringsspørsmålene. [About the immigration halt and work with the immigration questions]. Oslo. Meld. St. 107. OECD. (2015). Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2015. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/publications/indicators-of-immigrant-integration2015-settling-in-9789264234024-en.htm.. Penninx, R., & Garcés-Mascareñas, B. (2016). Integration Policies of European Cities in Comparative Perspective: Structural Convergence and Substantial Differentiation. Godina, 32(2), 155–189.

52

S. SØHOLT AND K. R. TRONSTAD

Peters, B. G. (2001). Institutional Theory in Political Science. London: Continuum. The Government. (2015). Asylforliket [The Asylum Concilliation]. Oslo: The Government. Sainsbury, D. (2012). Welfare States and Immigrant Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schiller, M. (2015). Paradigmatic Pragmatism and the Politics of Diversity. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 38(7), 1120–1136. https://doi.org/10.1080/014 19870.2014.992925. Søholt, S. & Aasland, A. (2019). Enhanced Local-Level Willingness and Ability to Settle Refugees: Decentralization and Local Responses to the Refugee Crisis. Journal of Urban Affairs. https://doi.org/10.1080/07352166.2019. 1569465. Søholt, S., Tronstad, K., Rose, & Vestby, G. M. (2015). Sysselsetting av innvandrere - regionale muligheter og barrierer for inkludering [Regional opportunities and barriers for labour market integration of immigrants]. Oslo: NIBR-report 2015:20. Steen, A. (2016). Deciding Refugee Settlement in Norwegian Cities: Local Administration or Party Politics? Journal of Refugee Studies, 29(4), 464–482. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/few032. Tronstad, K. R. (2014). Bosetting og integrering av flyktninger i Telemark, AustAgder og Vest-Agder. [Settlement and integration of refugees in Telemark, Aust-Agder and Vest-Agder]. Oslo: NIBR-report 2014:107. Tronstad, K. R. (2016). Integrering i Skandinavia. IMDi-report 2016. http:// www.hioa.no/Om-OsloMet/Senter-for-velferds-og-arbeidslivsforskning/ NIBR/Publikasjoner/Integrering-i-Skandinavia. Tronstad, K. R., & Hernes, V. (2017). Integrering av flyktninger. [Integration in Scandinavia]. In J. Askim, K. Kolltveit, & J. G. Røe (Eds.), En smartere stat. Veier til bedre politikk og styring. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Tronstad, K. R., Nygaard, M., & Bask, M. (2018). Accumulation of Welfare Problems Among Immigrants in Norway (8). NIBR-report 2018:8. Wessel, T. (2010). Immigration to Norway. In R. Andersson, H. Dhalmann, E. Holmquist, T. Kauppinen, L. M. Turner, H. Skifter Andersen, S. Søholt, M. Vaatovaara, K. Vilkama, T. Wessel, & S. Yousfi (Eds.), Immigration, Housing and Segregation in the Nordic Welfare States (pp. 150–163). Helsinki: University of Helsinki.

CHAPTER 4

Finland’s Immigration Policy: State Objectives, Local Solutions Saara Koikkalainen

4.1

Introduction

Finland, a Nordic country situated between Sweden in the West and Russia in the East, has been a member of the European Union (EU) since 1995. With a population of 5.5 million (2017), it is one of the less populous member states, ranking in the 17th place among the current 27 members of the EU (EUROSTAT 2020). Finland has traditionally been a country of emigration (Korkiasaari 2008); it became a net receiver of immigrants as late as in the 1980s and 1990s, and the share of foreign citizens permanently living in Finland is still only 4.4% (241,000) and the share of the foreign-born 6.8% (349,000) of the population (EUROSTAT 2020).1

1 Due to the longer immigration history and more liberal policies, in Sweden the share of foreign citizens is 6.8% and of the foreign-born 21.7% of the population (EUROSTAT 2020).

S. Koikkalainen (B) Karelian Institute, University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu, Finland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 J. Franzke and J. M. Ruano de la Fuente (eds.), Local Integration of Migrants Policy, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50979-8_4

53

54

S. KOIKKALAINEN

Finland has traditionally stressed the role of international law and agreements in its formulation of international policies, such as asylum policies. It joined the Refugee Convention and Protocol in 1968 and has been a significant contributor to the budget of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The first group of Chilean refugees arrived in the early 1970s and the reception of so-called quota refugees, selected in collaboration with the UNHCR, began in 1979 with the arrival of refugees from Vietnam. The country’s immigration and refugee reception policies have been developed within the framework of its traditional Nordic welfare state policies and as a part of the extensive public sector (Wahlbeck 2018, pp. 2–4; see also Martikainen et al. 2012). An important change in Finnish immigration policy occurred in 1990 when Ingrian Finns, the descendants of Finns who had migrated to Ingria near the St. Petersburg area in the seventeenth century, were categorised as return migrants. This led to the return migration of around 30,000 Ingrian Finns from the present-day Russia and Estonia by 2016 when the immigration programme was closed (Mähönen and Yijälä 2016). Also, the arrival of the first larger refugee group, the Somalis, in the early 1990s marked an important change in the balance of incoming and outgoing migration (Heikkilä 2017). The Finnish welfare state has a residence-based, universal model of social protection (Kangas and Palme 2005). The Nordic or socialdemocratic welfare state regimes are typically based on high levels of taxation and income redistribution as all citizens are entitled to wide range of benefits and services. High employment levels, of both men and women, are required to finance the system and the rather high standard of living typical for this region (Esping-Andersen 1990; see also Timonen 2003). Legal residence in Finland entitles individuals to basic social security, including family allowances, health care, sickness and parental benefits, national pensions and basic unemployment allowance and labour market subsidy. In addition to the welfare benefits available for the whole citizenry, administered by The National Social Insurance Institution (KELA), there are also benefits related to employment, such as earnings-related unemployment allowance and pensions, which are administered by semi-public insurance bodies. These include work-related pensions and trade union administered unemployment funds (Koikkalainen et al. 2011; Helander et al. 2016; Kiuru 2014). This chapter examines the Finnish immigration system, its relationship to the welfare state and immigrant access to the labour markets. As the

4

FINLAND’S IMMIGRATION POLICY …

55

basic social security is not tied to either Finnish citizenship or employment per se, the system has both benefits and drawbacks for a migrant entering the system from the outside. The chapter begins with a presentation of how a migrant gains residence in Finland, then continues to describe how immigrant integration measures are administratively organised at the national, regional and local levels and concludes with immigrant data, public opinion and reflections on what are the best qualities of immigrant integration processes in Finland.

4.2

Becoming a Permanent Resident in Finland

Migrants intending to stay in Finland for longer than three months are required to acquire a residence permit. Citizens of an EU Member State, or of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway or Switzerland do not need a residence permit for Finland, but they do have to register their right of residence with the authorities. Matters pertaining to immigration and the provision of international protection are detailed in the Aliens Act (Finlex 2018b), which is in line with the relevant EU level directives and regulations on e.g. free movement of persons and refugee and asylum policies. A residence permit can be granted based on work, self-employment, family ties, studying, remigration or “other, special grounds”, for example because of an intention to marry a Finnish citizen or being a victim of human trafficking. The residence permit can be either fixed (Type B, max duration one year at a time), continuous (Type A, max duration four years at a time) or permanent (Type P). The first residence permit is always issued for a fixed term, but after 4 years of residence with a continuous permit (A) it can be turned into a permanent residence, if the grounds for the permit still apply. Migrants who enter Finland as asylum seekers can either receive an asylum or refugee status, a residence permit based on subsidiary protection or a residence permit on other grounds. In addition, there is a quota (currently 750 individuals/year) for refugees who already have a refugee status defined by the UNHCR (MIGRI 2018). Once a migrant is granted a residence permit based on one of the reasons above, there are still two thresholds s/he has to cross before becoming a real resident, who is able to access public health care, different benefits and other welfare services available to citizens and permanent residents. First, s/he will have to apply for coverage under the Finnish social security and health insurance scheme from National Social Insurance Institution (KELA), and second, s/he will have to be registered as a

56

S. KOIKKALAINEN

resident of a city, town or municipality where s/he plans to live.2 Namely, there are two different authorities who are in charge of residence-based benefits and services and thus are required to officially assess whether the migrant’s move to Finland is considered “permanent” (Homanen and Alastalo 2015, p. 147). For example, when a migrant’s personal data is recorded in the Finnish Population Information System3 at the local register office in the capital city Helsinki, home to the largest concentration of foreign-born individuals in Finland, s/he then has the right to the same services as any other resident of the city. The Population Information System, a detailed and extensive register on all those who reside in the country, was developed as a part of the building process of the Finnish welfare state, as it was considered essential that all authorities have access to reliable data on those legally resident in Finland (Homanen and Alastalo 2015, p. 149). By law, all residents are required to notify the authorities in charge of the register whenever they move permanently or temporarily for more than three months. This applies to moves within the same city, within Finland or to abroad, and the information is thus automatically available to the postal services (Local Register Offices 2018). The information stored in the register is widely used throughout the country in public administration, elections, taxation, judicial administration and statistics (Population Registration Centre 2018).

4.3 Integration Policy: National Aims and Objectives Integration is a term with multiple meanings. Kivisto (2015, p. 10) rightfully asks: into what do immigrants become integrated to when they move to a country like Finland? Does integration imply simply being employed or perhaps also embracing mainstream culture, religion, identity or values?

2 These two registrations are based on different legislation: The Finnish Act on the Application of Residence based Social Security Legislation (Finlex 2018c) and Finnish Municipality of Residence Act (Finlex 2018d). 3 Foreigners can acquire a Finnish personal identity code when they register for the Population Information System. This can be done either at the local register offices, tax office or already when the migrant deals with the Finnish Immigration Service MIGRI as long as the right to reside in Finland permanently is clear (Population Registration Centre 2018).

4

FINLAND’S IMMIGRATION POLICY …

57

In Finland there has been a strong emphasis in integration of immigrants primarily via the labour markets as the input of all residents has been seen necessary for the financing of the welfare state system (e.g. Martikainen et al. 2012; Koikkalainen et al. 2011). In terms of integration into the Finnish society, a dual logic is often implied: immigrants are expected to become full members of the public sphere primarily through employment, but are given the right to maintain their “own culture” in the private sphere (Leinonen 2015, p. 6). The Finnish model of integration policy has been developed in a multiculturalist fashion with reference to the Dutch and Swedish systems (Saukkonen 2013, p. 97). The chapter on Basic rights and liberties of The Finnish constitution (Finlex 2018a, 6§) states that everyone is equal before the law and no one shall, without an acceptable reason, be treated differently from other persons on the ground of sex, age, origin, language, religion, conviction, opinion, health, disability or other reason that concerns his or her person. To fulfil this obligation and foster the attainment of equality for migrants, The Act on the Promotion of Immigrant Integration (Finlex 2018b) aims to make it easier for immigrants to play an active role in Finnish society, promote gender equality and ensure non-discrimination and positive interaction between different population groups living in Finland. The Act defines integration as follows: “integration means interactive development involving immigrants and society at large, the aim of which is to provide immigrants with the knowledge and skills required in society and working life and to provide them with support, so that they can maintain their culture and language” (Finlex 2018b, Sect. 34 ). According to the Act on the Promotion of Immigrant Integration (Finlex 2018b), which has been in force since 2011, all immigrants who are legally resident in Finland are entitled to integration measures, regardless of their nationality or reasons for moving to Finland. The right to integration assistance and education applies, therefore, both to an intra-European migrant married to a Finn and to a refugee resettled directly from an UNHCR refugee camp as a quota refugee, even though integration measures are often understood to be targeted primarily at those arriving due to humanitarian reasons. All registered immigrants are entitled to receive basic, written material about Finland, including 4 This is a direct quote from a translation that is prepared by the authorities, but not considered official law text. In legal matters, only the official versions available in Finnish or Swedish are to be used.

58

S. KOIKKALAINEN

information on the Finnish society and working life, one’s rights and obligations, and services available for assisting integration. In addition, all immigrants have the right to a personalised integration plan if they are unemployed jobseekers or recipients of social assistance, under-aged without a guardian in Finland, or if based on an initial assessment, they appear to be in need of a plan promoting integration (Finlex 2018b, Chapter 2, Sect. 12). The aim of integration activities is to bring the strengths of the immigrants’ own cultures to full fruition in the new context, make sure that immigrants can play an active role in society and to promote the achievement of equality of rights and responsibilities for immigrants in Finland. At the national level, The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment is responsible for the preparation of a government integration programme, which contains the integration objectives for four years at a time (Finlex 2018b, Chapter 4, Sect. 34).5 The fact that a Ministry in charge of, for example, industrial policy, promotion of competition and consumer policy, public employment services and energy policy is also tasked with immigrant integration, speaks to the importance that employment plays in the ethos of integration policy in Finland.

4.4 Integration Activities: Regional and Local Practices While the Act on the Promotion of Immigrant Integration (Finlex 2018b) details the overall goals of integration policy, the responsibility for providing the integration measures lies at the local level with the cities, towns and municipalities. The Act clearly states: “Measures and services promoting integration are provided as part of basic municipal services and the services of the employment and economic administration and as other measures promoting integration” (Finlex 2018b, Chapter 2, Sect. 6). Here lies the special nature of the Finnish integration system: each municipality is tasked with and responsible of making an “(…) integration programme 6 for promoting integration and for strengthening 5 Matters pertaining to immigration policy are the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior. Integration policy was transferred from that ministry to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment during the government negotiations after the 2011 parliamentary elections (Saukkonen 2013, p. 94). 6 Italics added.

4

FINLAND’S IMMIGRATION POLICY …

59

multi-sectoral cooperation that is approved by the municipal council of each municipality and that is reviewed at least once every four years” (Finlex 2018b, Chapter 3, Sect. 32). The municipalities, therefore, have considerable autonomy in how the integration process is supported, and may, for example, choose to collaborate with neighbouring municipalities in providing the necessary services. By law, offering placements to quota refugees or asylum seekers is not compulsory for the municipalities. In fact, the lack of these municipality places has hindered the path towards integration for many, as those already granted international protection or a residence permit have been stuck at a refugee camp abroad or at a reception centre in Finland until the authorities manage to find a municipality that agrees to offer them a placement. To manage the integration activities, smaller municipalities may simply employ one immigration coordinator at the social services office, while larger cities with higher numbers of immigrants may choose to set up an immigration unit that operates as a part of the social services. The role of third-sector organisations, such as the Finnish Red Cross and other non-governmental organisations, is often significant in arranging cultural activities, language courses and fostering contacts between the locals and the newcomers (Hansen and Holm 2016.) At the regional level, the main authorities responsible for promotion of integration of immigrants and the promotion of good ethnic relations are the 15 Centres for economic development, transport and the environment, working under the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment. They also collaborate with other regional authorities and provide municipalities with reimbursement for the costs arising from the integration measures implemented during the first three or four years of the migrant’s residence in a given municipality.7 The reimbursement is conditioned on the municipality having an integration programme in place (Finlex 2018b, Chapter 4, Sects. 37–40, Chapter 6, Sects. 44–45). The exact duties of each party are listed in the Act on the Promotion of Immigrant Integration (Finlex 2018b). The Centres for economic development, transport and the environment are tasked with monitoring that

7 The reimbursements are divided into imputed reimbursements and those paid on the basis of actual costs. In 2018, the imputed reimbursement rate is 2.300e/year for each person aged 7 or over, and 6.845e/year for children under 7 years. These are paid for four years for quota refugees and three years for persons arriving through the asylum procedure (Centre of Expertise in Immigrant Integration 2018).

60

S. KOIKKALAINEN

the municipalities have adopted and are implementing their respective integration programmes. At the grass-root level, local Employment and economic development offices are in charge of interviewing individual migrants and preparing their personalised integration plans. This applies to the plans prepared for migrants who apply for work or training. As an alternative, the personalised plan can also be drawn at the municipal social services office, if the migrant is not actively looking for work, but is, for example, staying at home taking care of the family’s children. This process highlights the key principles of the Finnish system: that integration is seen as a labour market question, not so much as a cultural or social issue, and that migrant services are integrated to the basic services offered to all residents, not delegated to administratively separate immigration offices at the local level. The personalised integration plan has to be drawn up within three years of the receipt of the migrant’s first residence permit. The first plan is made for the maximum duration of one year at a time and the migrant is entitled to having the plan in place for three years with the option of getting an extension for two years. The plan includes an individualised set of activities and services that will support the migrant’s efforts in getting a good enough command of either the Finnish or Swedish language as well as other skills necessary in living and working in Finland. The plan may also include teaching of the migrant’s own mother tongue, studies on the Finnish society, studies complementing basic education or, if necessary, basic reading and writing skills and other personalised measures. The plan may also cover self-motivated studies in open university or in a programme leading towards a vocational or professional qualification or university or university of applied sciences degree. During the period covered by the integration plan, the migrant is entitled to financial support which is either paid as a labour market subsidy (the basic unemployment benefit) if the migrant is a jobseeker or social assistance (a means-tested form of last resort assistance) (Finlex 2018b, Chapter 2, Sects. 11–20.) As per the monetary level of the financial support, the same rules apply as to any other applicant applying for such assistance.

4.5

The Challenges of Achieving Integration

Despite the emphasis on employment as the key sign of integration, immigrant unemployment levels have continued to be around three times higher than with the native population (Wahlbeck 2018; Heikkilä 2017).

4

FINLAND’S IMMIGRATION POLICY …

61

There is considerable variation among immigrants of different backgrounds. Reliance on unemployment benefits is highest among those who migrated from refugee-sending countries and lower among those who moved from OECD or so-called Western countries (Tervola and Verho 2014; Heikkilä 2017). A study on immigrant labour market integration also noted that immigrants born in Afghanistan, Somalia and Iraq also earned less, received more social benefits and had lower employment rates than other immigrant groups or natives in 1990–2013. The difference seems to persist over time, as the average earnings of men from these countries were still only 22–38% of the average earnings of native men of the same age while the earnings of female migrants were even smaller (Sarvimäki 2017.) These differences in labour market participation are attributed both to reasons pertaining to the Finnish labour markets and to the migrants living in Finland. For the former, there are employer prejudices towards foreign qualifications and workers, lack of easily accessible entry-level jobs and the tendency to rely on social networks when looking for employees. For the latter, many migrants have difficulties reaching a high-enough command of the Finnish/Swedish language, they lack local qualifications and easily transferable work experience, and thus are in a disadvantaged position in comparison with the native jobseeker (e.g. Heikkilä 2017). The integration process does not, therefore, manage to adequately address the problem of labour market integration of firstgeneration migrants, even though the situation may be different for the second generation that goes to school in the country. It has been argued that the Finnish welfare system based on universalism is an important inclusion mechanism for migrants, as the basic accessibility to benefits and services reinforces also wide participation in other areas of society (Wahlbeck 2018; Martikainen et al. 2012). As the migrant living permanently in Finland gains access to the same basic services as any other Finn, it could be assumed that the playing field would be rather even, so to speak. However, the situation has a number of drawbacks both for those wishing to start life anew after coming to the country for humanitarian reasons and some potential complications also for those coming to work in Finland. Some risks inherent in the system may target immigrants with a refugee background at a higher rate than the native-born. Namely, Finnish social policy programmes are structured to target specific social risks, such as unemployment or work disability, rather than tackle poverty or

62

S. KOIKKALAINEN

social exclusion at a more general level. In addition, there are only few programmes that specifically target immigrants. Second, the system is somewhat difficult to navigate as some benefits are tied to individual work history and income while others take into account the income of the entire household. Also, the system does not recognise dependencies between adult generations, so the understanding of what constitutes a household or a family is narrower than among many immigrant groups (Koikkalainen et al. 2011, pp. 145–146). In addition, there is a constant debate between the municipalities and the state concerning the adequate level of reimbursements provided for the municipalities to finance the integration measures implemented at the grass-roots level (Saukkonen 2013). When a migrant moves to Finland because of work, the authorities need to determine whether this implies the intent to stay in the country permanently. This, in turn is vital in terms of the benefits the migrant and his or her family is entitled to. The variables to consider include, whether the employment contract is temporary or permanent, is the migrant from an EU/EEA member state or a third country, is there a social security agreement in place between Finland and the country of origin, and whether the migrant has family members living either in Finland or back in the country of origin. For example, if a Russian citizen lives and works in Finland on a permanent employment contract, his or her entitlements to different benefits and services may depend on the fact whether the family lives in Helsinki (residence considered permanent) or St. Petersburg (residence considered temporary) (Ministry for Social Affairs and Health 2018). The complexity of the system makes it difficult to fathom and the migrants may have hard time understanding what services and benefits they are entitled to. Also, the system is at times somewhat arbitrary, as individual public servants have the power to decide who is entitled to which benefits (e.g. Helander et al. 2016).

4.6 Immigrants, Minorities and the “European Refugee Crisis” Even though the first small refugee groups arrived to Finland already in the 1970s, the country is still often perceived as a country of emigration. It has been estimated that during the past hundred and fifty years over 1.3 million Finns have emigrated abroad (Martikainen et al. 2013, p. 26).

4

FINLAND’S IMMIGRATION POLICY …

63

Many European countries imported workers for post-WWII reconstruction during the guest-worker period (1950–1970). For Finland, this meant the migration of approximately 530,000 Finns to work in Sweden.8 This history plays a role in how many Finns still perceive their country as a rather homogeneous place from where one may leave, but not as a place where foreigners are necessarily welcome to settle. However, according to Statistic Finland data, 2018 was the third year in a row when deaths exceeded births in Finland, and according to their population projection, birth rate is still decreasing and the current numbers of incoming migrants can only sustain the country’s population growth until 2035. The demographic dependency ratio is worsening and thus the country needs more immigration to sustain the services of the Nordic welfare state (Statistics Finland 2018a). In a European perspective, both the size of the foreign-born population as well as the numbers of those seeking protection from Finland have remained modest. Yet during the past twenty-five years, the speed of internationalisation has been rapid: in the year 2000, the share of inhabitants with a foreign background was 2.1% of the population, while in 2017 the share had risen to 7.0%. In terms of numbers of this signifies a rise of 348,000 persons9 (Statistics Finland 2018b). A statistically representative interview study on the migration motivations of the foreign background population living in Finland 2014 concluded that for a majority the reason for moving was related to family and close personal relationships (54%, 123.000 individuals). A fifth of the interviewees had moved primarily for work (18%, 41.000) and one in ten for studying (10%, 23.000) or as a refugee or an asylum seeker (11%, 24.000) (Sutela and Larja 2015). The largest minority group living in Finland are the Swedish-speaking Finns, who form about 5.4% of the population and enjoy extensive rights guaranteed, for example, by the fact that Swedish is the country’s second official language. Among the other so-called traditional minority groups, 8 An estimated half of these migrants have since returned to Finland (Korkiasaari and Tarkiainen 2000). 9 Statistics Finland has migration-related data on the numbers of foreign citizens, foreign-born individuals and the share of those, whose mother tongue is some other language than Finnish or Swedish. As a way of estimating the numbers of first and second generation immigrants living in the country, the category of “foreign background” is used. In this type of classification all persons, who have at least one parent born in Finland are categorized to have a Finnish background. Foreign background thus signifies a person whose parents (or the only known parent) were born abroad.

64

S. KOIKKALAINEN

who have lived in the country for more than a century, there is a small indigenous Sámi population (9.000), and a Roma minority (10.000) as well as small communities of Jews, Tatars and Karelian Finns (Minority Rights Group Finland 2017). By country of birth, the largest groups of immigrants living in Finland in 2017 originated from Russia and the former Soviet Union (70.900), Estonia (46.000), Sweden (32.000), Iraq (16.300) and Somalia (11.400) (Statistics Finland 2018b). It is good to note, that of those born in Sweden, many are in fact return migrants with roots in Finland. Even though the public opinion in the country with regard to immigrants is in general more positive than the EU-28 average (European Commission 2017), the “European refugee crisis” of 2015 brought forward heated media and online discussions between those promoting the rights of asylum seekers and those fearing a deterioration of internal security or even “islamisation”. At the opposite ends of the debate were the human rights activists arranging Refugees welcome—demonstrations and the newly formed, nationalistic Soldiers of Odin, who organised groups of young men to patrol the streets to “protect Finns from attacks by invaders” (e.g. Maasilta and Nikunen 2018). Unfortunately for the asylum seekers looking for a future in Finland, the “crisis” happened at a time when the populist, anti-immigration Finns Party had just joined the Finnish government for the first time after the 2015 parliamentary elections. After gaining 17.7% share of the votes, it held five ministerial posts in the government formed together with the agrarian Centre Party and the conservative National Coalition Party (e.g. Nykänen 2016.). In reaction to the “crisis”, the government led by Juha Sipilä of the Centre Party published a “Government action plan on asylum policy” (8 December 2015) which stated that “Finland’s shortterm objective is to stop the uncontrolled flow of asylum seekers into our country, to bring asylum costs under control and to integrate effectively those who have been granted asylum” (Finnish Government 2015, p. 1). The paper was largely based on the Finns party’s critical views on immigration. Based on the action plan, the government implemented a total of 12 different amendments to the Alien’s Act (Finlex 2018e)10 which governs immigration and asylum policies.

10 For an overview of the development and the Alien’s Act see Signe et al. (2007, pp. 99–101).

4

FINLAND’S IMMIGRATION POLICY …

65

The changes made in the Alien’s act include, for example, removing the possibility of granting asylum seekers a residence permit based on humanitarian grounds, limiting access to council during the immigration interviews, shortening the time within which an appeal has to be made on the negative asylum decision and tightening the family reunification criteria (Wahlbeck 2018; Saarikkomäki et al. 2018). To manage the highly increased workload, the Finnish Immigration Service MIGRI opened seven new branch offices, recruited more than 200 new employees and commissioned the opening of a total of 184 new reception centres around the country (MIGRI 2015). The role of the Finnish Red Cross in managing the situation was crucial: it was in charge of opening 104 of the new centres and had access to more than 30.000 private individuals as volunteers (SPR 2016). In addition, the country of origin information on Iraq, Somalia and Afghanistan was updated in May 2016 with the implication that these countries were considered safe for return for at least some asylum seekers. Due to this policy change, the recognition rates for applicants from these countries have been lower than the EU average (e.g. Horsti 2017). This is evident, for example, in the first instance decisions granted to the largest group of asylum seekers arriving in Finland in recent years, the Iraqis. While in 2015 the decision was positive for 85% of the applicants in Finland, the same as the EU-28 average of that year, in 2016 it first plummeted to 24% (EU-28: 63%) and in 2017 rose to 37% (EU-28: 57%) (EUROSTAT 2018). The geo-political location of Finland at the Northern edge of Europe, and as a neighbour of Russia with a tight border enforcement system, has largely prevented any larger refugee movements towards the county. In the recent years, Finland has received an average of 3.400 asylum seekers per year until the year of the “crisis” in 2015, when the situation changed drastically as the number of asylum seekers rose by nearly a tenfold to more than 32.000 (EASO 2018). The highest share of applicants came from Iraq (20.500), Afghanistan (5.200), Somalia (2.000), and Syria (900). In addition, 1.000 quota refugees were selected directly from refugee camps. Since then the numbers of applicants have returned closer to the long-time average as 5.600 asylum applications were submitted in 2016 and 5.000 in 2017. A summary of recent trends in humanitarian migration towards Finland is presented in Table 4.1.

66

S. KOIKKALAINEN

Table 4.1 Humanitarian migration in Finland 2013–2017 Finland

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Asylum applicants First time asylum applicants Pending cases at the end of the year First Instance Decisions Refugee status Subsidiary protection Humanitarian protection Rejection Second or Higher Instance Decisions Refugee status Subsidiary protection Humanitarian protection Rejection

3210 2985 2495

3620 3490 1795

32,345 32,150 27,750

5605 5275 15,000

4990 4325 9335

570 785 295 1 565

490 475 300 1 070

1060 460 160 1 280

4320 1705 1 045 13 685

2400 650 380 3 745

50 75 50 55

75 60 30 45

50 45 15 55

185 50 60 395

535 195 95 435

Source EASO (2018) Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the European Union 2017

4.7

Conclusion

The Finnish immigrant integration system relies upon the inclusion of migrants into the welfare state services offered to all citizens and permanent residents. In addition, speedy entry into the labour markets is a stated goal that should also ensure that migrants become “stakeholder citizens” (Bauböck 2009) and participants in their new home country. Implementing the integration measures has been delegated to the lowest administrative level possible and thus municipalities have the responsibility and freedom to implement the kinds of services that they see fit within the overall aims of the national integration policy. This is a clear strength of the system, as each municipality can design the kind of service structures that best suit the size of the town or city, the types of immigrants that live there as well as the mix of other actors, such as local non-governmental organisations, willing to provide cultural and language services to the newcomers. The Finnish system has both advantages and disadvantages. While the general welfare services and benefits provided by the state should be equal to all residents, immigrants may suffer as the system is complicated and does not necessarily recognise their special needs. Because of the amount of local freedom in arranging integration activities, the quality is not the same throughout the country, as some municipalities are willing to

4

FINLAND’S IMMIGRATION POLICY …

67

invest more resources than others. The integration of migrants into the labour market also continues to be a challenge, which leads into welfaredependency and the risk of social exclusion for the migrants and to the loss of tax income and the benefit potentially achieved from the skills and expertise of the immigrants for the state and the Finnish labour markets. It is clear that the delegation of implementing integration measures to the municipalities leaves considerable room for innovation at the grass-roots level. In a best-case-scenario, stressing local solutions provides opportunities for flexible, context-specific integration activities that are tailored to the needs of the immigrants and the local communities. Yet, due to disagreements on the adequate level of state support for the integration effort, it is common for the municipalities to implement the services with different types of project funding, which often leads to the innovations being abandoned once the external funding runs out. There is, therefore, room for improvement if Finland wishes to achieve the aims listed in the legislation related to immigrant integration and to tackle the challenges posed by the demographic trend of ageing population.

References Bauböck, R. (2009). Global Justice, Freedom of Movement and Democratic Citizenship. European Journal of Sociology/Archives européennes de sociologie, 50(1), 1–31. http://hdl.handle.net/1814/12376. Centre of Expertise in Immigrant Integration. (2018). Online Manual on Refugee Reception. Helsinki: Centre of Expertise in Immigrant Integration, Registry of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment. https://kotouttaminen.fi/en/online-manual-on-refugee-reception. Accessed 20 November 2018. Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. European Commission. (2017, October). Special Eurobarometer 469. Country Fact Sheet: Finland. Special Eurobarometer 269, Integration of immigrants in the European Union. Wave EB88.2, TNS opinion & social. Brussels: European Commission. EASO. (2018). Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the European Union 2017 . Brussels: European Asylum Support Office. https://www.easo.europa. eu/easo-annual-report. Accessed 9 July 2018. EUROSTAT. (2018). First Instance Decisions on Applications by Citizenship, Age and Sex Annual Aggregated Data. http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/ submitViewTableAction.do. Accessed 19 November 2018.

68

S. KOIKKALAINEN

EUROSTAT. (2020). Eurostat Statistics Explained: Population Change and Population Change Statistics. Brussels: European Commission/Eurostat. http:// ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Population_and_pop ulation_change_statistics. Accessed 16 September 2020. Finlex. (2018a). The Constitution of Finland (731/1999). https://www.finlex. fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1999/en19990731.pdf. Accessed 26 June 2018. Finlex. (2018b). The Act on the Promotion of Immigrant Integration (1386/2010). https://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2010/en2 0101386.pdf. Accessed 26 June 2018. Finlex. (2018c). The Finnish Act on the Application of Residence Based Social Security Legislation (No. 1573/1993.) https://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaanno kset/1993/en19931573.pdf. Accessed 26 June 2018. Finlex. (2018d). Kotikuntalaki [Finnish Municipality of Residence Act] (No. 11.3.1994/201). https://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/ajantasa/1994/19940201. Accessed 26 June 2018. Finlex. (2018e). Ulkomaalaislaki [Aliens Act] (No. 301/2004, amendments up to 1152/2010 included) https://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/2004/ en20040301_20101152.pdf. Accessed 17 November 2018. Finnish Government. (2015, December 8). Government Action Plan on Asylum Policy. https://valtioneuvosto.fi/sv/artikeln/-/asset_publisher/hallituksentiedotustilaisuus-turvapaikkapoliittisesta-toimenpideohjelmasta. Accessed 18 November 2018. Hansen, S., & Holm, H. (2016). In R. Gothóni & U. Siirto (Eds.), Pakolaisuudesta kotiin [From Being a Refugee to Arriving Home] (pp. 159–188). Helsinki: Gaudeamus. Heikkilä, E. (2017). Immigrants in the Finnish Labour Markets and Future Needs in an Ageing Society. In: E. Heikkilä (Ed.), Immigrants and the Labour Markets: Experiences from Abroad and Finland (pp. 129–160). Turku: Migration Institute of Finland. Helander, M., Holley, P., & Uuttana, H. (2016). Trying to Secure a Future in Uncertain Conditions. Arbor. 192(777), a286. http://dx.doi.org/10.3989/ arbor.2016.777n1002. Homanen, R., & Alastalo, M. (2015). Hyvinvointivaltion rajankäyntiä maistraatissa. Ulkomaalaisten rekisteröintikäytännöt erilaisten statusten ja valtiollisen tiedon lähteenä [Enacting the Welfare State Border at Local Register Offices. Residence Registration Practices for Migrants as a Source of Different Statuses and State Knowledge]. Yhteiskuntapolitiikka, 80(2), 147– 159. http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi-fe2015083111059. Horsti, K. (2017, May 19). Unjust to Everyone? Responses to Deportation of Asylum Seekers in Finland. OpenDemocracy, Can Europe Make It? -debate. https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/karina-horsti/injust

4

FINLAND’S IMMIGRATION POLICY …

69

ice-to-everyone-moral-responses-to-deportation-of-asylum-seekers-in-finland. Accessed 19 November 2018. Kangas, O., & Palme, J. (2005). Coming Late—Catching Up: The Formation of a “Nordic Model”. In O. Kangas & J. Palme (Eds.), Social Policy and Economic Development in the Nordic Countries (pp. 17–59). Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. Kiuru, B. (2014). Migrant Access to Social Security and Healthcare: Policies and Practice in Finland. Helsinki: European Migration Network (EMN). http://www.emn.fi/files/926/FINAL_EMN-SosiaaliturvatutkimusEN.pdf. Accessed 26 June 2018. Kivisto, P. (2015). Pluralism and the Dynamics of Contemporary Integration. In E. Heikkilä, A. Kostiainen, J. Leinonen, & I. Söderling (Eds.), Participation, Integration and Recognition: Changing Pathways to Immigrant Incorporation (pp. 10–20). Turku: Institute of Migration. Koikkalainen, S., Tammilehto, T., Kangas, O., Katisko, M., Koskinen, S., & Suikkanen, A. (2011). Welfare or Work? Migrants’ Selective Integration in Finland. In E. Carmel, A. Cerami, & T. Papadopoulos (Eds.), Migration and Welfare in the New Europe. Social Protection and the Challenges of Integration (pp. 143–158). Bristol: Policy Press. Korkiasaari, J. (2008). Yleiskatsaus [General Overview]. In K. Björklund & O. Koivukangas (Eds.), Suomalaiset Euroopassa [Finns in Europe]. Suomalaisen siirtolaisuuden historia, osa 6 [The History of Finnish Migration, Part 6] (pp. 14–24). Turku: Institute of Migration. Korkiasaari, J., & Tarkiainen, K. (2000). Suomalaiset Ruotsissa [Finns in Sweden]. Suomen siirtolaisuuden historia, osa 3 [The History of Finnish Migration, Part 3]. Turku: Institute of Migration. Leinonen, J. (2015). Introduction. In E. Heikkilä, A. Kostiainen, J. Leinonen, & I. Söderling (Eds.), Participation, Integration and Recognition: Changing Pathways to Immigrant Incorporation (pp. 6–8). Turku: Institute of Migration. Local Register Offices. (2018). Notification of Move. Website of the Local Register Offices. http://www.maistraatti.fi/en/Services/Notificationof-move/. Accessed 20 July 2018. Maasilta, M., & Nikunen, K. (2018). Pakolaisuus, tunteet ja media [Refugees, Affects and the Media]. Tampere: Vastapaino. Martikainen, T., Valtonen, K., & Wahlbeck, Ö. (2012). The Social Integration of Immigrants in Finland. In J. Frideres & J. Biles (Eds.), International Perspectives: Integration and Inclusion (pp. 127–146). Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Martikainen, T., Saukkonen, P., & Säävälä, M. (2013). Johdanto: Suomi muuttuu kun Suomeen muutetaan [Introduction: Finland Changes as Migrants Move to Finland]. In T. Martikainen, P. Saukkonen, & M. Säävälä

70

S. KOIKKALAINEN

(Eds.), Muuttajat. Kansainvälinen muuttoliike ja suomalainen yhteiskunta [Migrants: International Migration and Finnish Society] (pp. 13–22). Helsinki: Gaudeamus. MIGRI. (2018). Permits and Citizenship. The Website of the Finnish Immigration Service. https://migri.fi/en. Accessed 18 June 2018. MIGRI (2015). Maahanmuuttoviraston vuosi 2015 (The Year 2015 at the Finnish Immigration Service). Helsinki: Finnish Immigration Service. https://migri.fi/documents/5202425/6772175/2015+Vuosikertomus. Accessed 18 November 2018. Mähönen, T. A. & Yijälä A. (2016). Inkerinsuomalaisten paluumuuttajien kotoutuminen Suomeen [The Integration of Ingrian Finn Return Migrants to Finland] (City of Helsinki Urban Facts. Study Reports 2016:7). Helsinki: City of Helsinki. Ministry for Social Affairs and Health. (2018). Social Security Internationally. Website of the Ministry for Social Affairs and Health. https://stm.fi/en/inc ome-security/international-social-security. Accessed 21 June 2018. Minority Rights Group Finland. (2017). National Minorities in Finland: A Richness of Cultures and Languages (Eds., O. Daher, L. Hannikainen, & K. Heikinheimo-Pérez). Helsinki: Minority Rights Group Finland. Nykänen, T. (2016). The Aloof Election Manifesto. Radical Political Right in Finland in the Borderlines of Neoliberalism and Cultural Nativism. Nordic Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 6(2), 124–131. https://doi.org/ 10.1515/njmr-2016-0012. Population Registration Centre. (2018). Population Information: The website of the Finnish Population Registration Centre. https://vrk.fi/en/population-inf ormation-system. Accessed 20 June 2018. Saarikkomäki, E., Oljakka, N., Vanto, J., Pirjatanniemi, E., Lavapuro, J., & Alvesalo-Kuusi, A. (2018). Kansainvälistä suojelua koskevat päätökset Maahanmuuttovirastossa 2015–2017. Pilottitutkimus 18–34 vuotiaita Irakin kansalaisia koskevista myönteisistä ja kielteisistä päätöksistä [The Decisions Regarding International Protection at the Finnish Immigration Service 2015– 2017: A Pilot Study of the Positive and Negative Decisions Given to 18–34 Year-Old Iraqis]. Oikeustieteellisen tiedekunnan tutkimusraportteja ja katsauksia [Reports of the Faculty of Law], 1/2018. Turku: University of Turku; Åbo Akademi; Non-discrimination Ombudsman. Saukkonen, P. (2013). Maahanmuutto- ja kotouttamispolitiikka [Immigration and Integration Policy]. In T. Martikainen, P. Saukkonen, & M. Säävälä (Eds.), Muuttajat. Kansainvälinen muuttoliike ja suomalainen yhteiskunta [Migrants: International Migration and Finnish Society] (pp. 81–101). Helsinki: Gaudeamus. Sarvimäki, M. (2017). LaborMarket Integration of Refugees in Finland. Nordic Economic Review, 7 (1), 91–114.

4

FINLAND’S IMMIGRATION POLICY …

71

Signe, S., Saksela, S., & Wilhelmsson, N. (2007). Finland. In A. Triandafyllidou & R. Gropas (Eds.), European Immigration: A Sourcebook (pp. 99–112). London: Routledge. Statistics Finland. (2018a). Population Projection 2018–2070. Official Statistics of Finland. Helsinki: Statistics Finland. https://www.stat.fi/til/vaenn/2018/ vaenn_2018_2018-11-16_en.pdf. Accessed 20 November 2018. Statistics Finland. (2018b). Population of Finland by Country of Birth. Based on Official Statistics of Finland. Statistics Finland website http://pxnet2.stat.fi/ PXWeb/pxweb/fi/StatFin/. Accessed 9 July 2018. Sutela, H., & Larja, L. (2015). Yli puolet Suomen ulkomaalaistaustaisista muuttanut maahan perhesyistä. Ulkomaista syntyperää olevien työ ja hyvinvointi tutkimus 2014 [Over Half of Finland’s Population with a Foreign Background Has Immigrated Due to Family Reasons. A Study on the Work and Welfare of Foreign-Born in 2014]. Online publication. Helsinki: Statistics Finland. www. tilastokeskus.fi/tup/maahanmuutto/art_2015-10-15_001.html. Accessed 10 July 2018. SPR. 2016. Vuosikertomus vuodelta 2015 [Annual Report 2015] Helsinki: Suomen Punainen Risti – SPR [Finnish Red Cross]. Tervola, J., & Verho, J. (2014). Maahanmuuttajien sosiaaliturvan käyttö vuonna 2011 [Immigrant’s Use of Social Benefits in 2011]. The National Social Insurance Institution, Kela, Työpapereita 64 [Working papers 64]. Helsinki: Kela. Timonen, V. (2003). Restructuring the Welfare State: Globalisation and Social Policy Reform in Finland and Sweden. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Wahlbeck, Ö. (2018). To Share or Not to Share Responsibility? Finnish Refugee Policy and the Hesitant Support for a Common European Asylum System. Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/155629 48.2018.1468048.

CHAPTER 5

The Swiss Rationale of Integration Policies: Balancing Federalism, Consociationalism and Direct Democracy Stefanie Kurt and Gianni D’Amato

5.1

Introduction

Switzerland, a non-European Union member, is a federal state that experienced since decades an intense political debate on the rationale of integration. Its integration policy, marked by the federal level, 26 cantons,

The article was supported by the National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR)—on the move, which is funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation. Both authors drafted, wrote and edited the chapter. S. Kurt (B) School of Social Work, HES-SO Valais-Wallis, Sierre, Switzerland e-mail: [email protected] G. D’Amato Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies, University of Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel, Switzerland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 J. Franzke and J. M. Ruano de la Fuente (eds.), Local Integration of Migrants Policy, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50979-8_5

73

74

S. KURT AND G. D’AMATO

2222 political municipalities and various social actors, as well as challenged by consociationalism and direct democracy, changed—as in other European countries—its paradigm in recent years. Swiss integration policies, influenced strongly by labour market demands, is outlined today within the Federal Act on Foreign Nationals and Integration (FNIA). This legal framework with its principles and rules sets integration priorities mainly in regular structures such as school, work places and health institutions. Complementary, the Cantonal Integration Programs (CIP) adds specific integration measures in three different pillars and the Integration Agenda targets even more specifically person undergoing the asylum procedure, such as refugees and temporarily admitted persons. This established practice is the outcome of different particular institutional settings, such as consociationalism in Swiss politics as much as the expression of direct democratic popular (veto-)power through xenophobic movements. Moreover, though the federal level has the competence to frame integration policies, the local level is also involved in this process and can include its opinion due to the multilayered consociational political system. Accordingly, art. 53 para. 1 FNIA states that not only the federal and the cantonal level, but also the local level has to take integration and the protection against discrimination into account in fulfilling their functions. Consequently, local actors share a large responsibility in implementing Swiss integration policy. In particular, the local level “shall create favourable regulatory conditions for equal opportunities and for the participation of the foreign population in public life” (Art. 53 para. 2 FNIA). At present, studies on the effectiveness and outcome of (federal) integration policies at the local level are not yet available. However, different cantonal comparative studies reveal consistent differences between cantons not only in applying federal legislation but also concerning the rationale of the integration policy. Anyhow, examples of current local integration initiatives determine the scope of action within a federal framework. Thus, this chapter offers a short introduction in the Swiss immigration rationale displaying remote and more recent developments. It mentions three important shifts of the integration rationale in Swiss history. The second part analyses institutional aspects of Swiss migration policies, such as federalism, consociationalism, direct democracy and the consequences for municipalities. Accordingly, it confronts the results with the effectiveness and impacts of Swiss integration policy at local level in spite of the absence of specific research studies, followed by a short overview about

5

THE SWISS RATIONALE OF INTEGRATION POLICIES …

75

current data on public opinion. Some reflexive remarks are presented at the end of the chapter.

Rationale of Immigration to Switzerland: A Short Introduction from a Historical Perspective Towards Recent Developments

5.2

From the Second World War until the late 1990s, the labour market demands influenced Switzerland’s admission policy and subsequently the integration rationale. Admission policies focused on the principle of labour rotation that targeted the need of the economy, and not on integration instruments or integration programmes for migrants. Thus, Switzerland did not consider labour market migrants as a potential part of the population. A first shift to a more inclusive migrant integration policy started in the 1970s, as the migrant’s stays lengthened and their attitudes and expectations started to influence the rationale of the admission policy. Nevertheless, actors who supported a more inclusive legislation reform, concretely the federal government, as much as regional economic interests and human rights were continuously opposed by a strong xenophobic movement. This movement influenced the decisionmaking process through constitutional initiatives and the implicit threat to take a referendum against liberal legal reforms. This policy was consistent with the Swiss minimal welfare state, as Switzerland excluded migrants from access to social services and benefits until the 1970s (D’Amato 2012; Niederberger 2004; Campisi 2014). Influenced by the oil crisis in the 1970s, a next paradigm shift changed the rationale since the State realized that migrants, who were working in Switzerland and not returning home, would stay, start a family and have children. This awareness lead to several important legal changes, such as the introduction of an unemployment insurance, the inauguration of a larger welfare system, including protecting migrants and the possibility for family reunification. Thus, labour migrants received access to social citizenship. In parallel, “unwanted” non-economic migration increased in Switzerland, letting the asylum sector emerge. The Swiss government reacted with a twotiered approach as it introduced a new severity approach on asylum and a deterrent policy with regard to irregular immigration, but determining also integration measures for the desired labour migrants, although this

76

S. KURT AND G. D’AMATO

later policy was negligible at the beginning (D’Amato 2012; Niederberger 2004; Campisi 2014). A second important shift in Swiss integration policy rationale started with the entry into force of the total revised National Foreigners Act (FNA) in 2008. One of the most important issues during the political and societal debates on the FNA was whether integration should be a State’s responsibility to be promoted and required or whether it would be the duty and responsibility of immigrants to integrate into Swiss society at their own expense. Between these two dissimilar understandings of the future integration policy, the Parliament finally found a consensus. On the one hand, the State should provide integration instruments; on the other hand, migrants shall contribute to her/his own integration into Switzerland. This core principle of ‘promoting and requiring’ (encourager et exiger; Fördern und Fordern) of integration (art. 4 FNIA) is still today shaping the Swiss discourse on integration. Additionally, according to this legal framework integration starts (only) with a secure legal status. Thus, only migrants with a valid legal residence permit have access to integration programmes and/or to specific integration measures (Kurt 2017b). Only a year later, in 2009, the Tripartite Conference, a political platform in which the federal, cantonal and municipal level coordinate their efforts, presented a report on the future development of the Swiss integration policy (TAK 2009). The Tripartite Conference demanded, among other measures, a stronger legal regulation of integration measures. The Federal Council responded suggesting the implementation of cantonal integration policies that could benefit of federal financial support. Moreover, the Federal Government recommended to revise the current integration regulations in the FNA as well as to strengthen the protection against discrimination (Report Schiesser 2010). Soon afterwards, Cantonal Integration Programs were initiated (CIP; started in 2014 and prolonged until 2021), with its legal provisions embedded in the partially revised FNA. Currently, every canton has its own Cantonal Integration Program based on three pillars, “Information and counselling”, “Education and employment” and “Mutual understanding and social integration”. The third and last important shift towards a Swiss rationale on immigration was the favourable vote on the popular initiative ‘Against Mass Immigration’ balloted 9 February 2014 and promoted by a major populist party. The article stipulates that the ability to integrate should be a decisive criterion for granting residence permit (art. 121a para. 3

5

THE SWISS RATIONALE OF INTEGRATION POLICIES …

77

Swiss Constitution). For the first time an article of the Swiss constitution mentions the term integration in connection with migration issues. This voting influenced also the ongoing partial revision of the FNA. Finally, the outcome of this process was a new law, the Federal Act on Foreign Nationals and Integration (FNIA), which entered into force on 1 January 2019. It implements the so-called integration stage model, which promotes the incremental upgrading of one’s legal status in combination with integration exams (Kurt 2017a, b). Recently, the Swiss Confederation and the cantons decided to implement, embedded in the already existing Cantonal Integration Programs, a supplementary Integration Agenda. Switzerland intends to strengthen and harmonize integration measures for refugees and temporarily admitted persons and to synchronize it with the acceleration of the asylum procedure. The restructuration and acceleration of the asylum procedure is the outcome of a longer political process, influenced in 2011 by the increasing asylum claims and finally implemented in March 2019. However, as asylum claims decreased (from 39,523 in 2015 to 18,088 in 2017) and due to the acceleration of the asylum procedure, the focus is currently set more on labour market integration of asylum claimants who have a high probability to remain in the country, though they may have different legal status (Integrationsagenda Schweiz 2018). Additionally, NGO engagement may gain more importance, since the restructuration and acceleration of the asylum procedure opens to them a new field of action in implementing integration measures to formerly excluded groups (Efionayi-Mäder et al. 2015). Nevertheless, specific research on this topic is missing, particularly at local level.

Institutional Analysis of the Swiss Migration Policies: Federalism, Consociationalism, Direct Democracy and the Consequences for Municipal Autonomy 5.3

Swiss institutional structures, notably federalism, consociationalism and direct democracy, constitute a framework in which many actors and stakeholders attempt to influence the decision-making process and consequently shaping the integration policy of migrants. Subsequently, political system of this sort challenge local authorities since they are not only involved in the decision-making process, but also addressed to implement the previously negotiated integration policy and integration agenda.

78

S. KURT AND G. D’AMATO

Federalism As a federal state, Switzerland is confronted with the challenges of multilevel governance. Certain centralizing mechanisms, which in Germany and the US are enforced by the Supreme Court, are less successful in Switzerland. Centralizing legal approaches are counteracted by Parliament and the people. As Wolf Linder has stated, one important limitation of the central government institutions in Switzerland is the limited possibilities for coercive implementation of federal policies (Linder 1998: 22). In this sense, federal political authorities are often compelled to induce cooperation with the cantons by offering financial subsidies (e.g. Cantonal Integration Programs and the Integration Agenda). This federal structure may have an advantage, since knowledge of local interests can lead to quicker, more appropriate decisions, ensuring greater recognition of particular interests (e.g. minorities). While the Federation has the legislative power in most areas, responsibility for implementing federal policies resides largely with the cantons. For the Federation, this has the advantage of reducing its workload; for the cantons, the advantage lies in controlling their own programme priorities and being able to adapt federal policies to local contexts. These aspects of the Swiss federal state also affect integration policies. In this case, the central actors are the cantons and the municipalities (Cattacin and Chimienti 2009). In particular, cantons have room for manoeuvre when it comes to the promotion and implementation of integration provisions as recommended by federal institutions (D’Amato and Gerber 2005). In many cantons, the Cantonal Offices for Migration are the actors who decide how the law is interpreted and implemented regarding to integration aspects connected to a legal status. Additionally, integration offices develop measures intended to help migrants to integrate in areas such as education, work places and institution of health in the regular structure of integration (Wichmann and D’Amato 2010). In terms of implementation, this executive federalism is decisive: it is one of the cornerstones of the Swiss political system. Although the legislative authority lies with the federal government, its implementation is entrusted to the cantons. For the cantons to fulfil this role, they need a margin of appreciation in the application of federal laws. This allows the adaptation of the implementations to local conditions, which leads to a higher legitimacy of the decisions. This is the case for

5

THE SWISS RATIONALE OF INTEGRATION POLICIES …

79

the Cantonal Integration Programs (CIP) and the newly adopted Integration Agenda, which provide both sufficient material and conceptual resources, which would otherwise not be locally available. Other characteristics of the Swiss political system are direct democracy and consociationalism, which above all favour strong organizations that can win a referendum. These peculiarities have consequences for the design of migration policy in Switzerland (see in detail Cattacin and Kaya 2005): there is a risk that federalist regulations at the cantonal level will foster a patchwork of measures that are exposed to the continuous populist instrumentalization. Consociationalism and Direct Democracy Consociationalism and direct democracy are important for understanding Switzerland’s outcome and output in integration policies. But, as Mahnig and Wimmer (2003) stated in their lucid article, these two characteristics of the Swiss political system are responsible for the country’s intense politicization of migration issues and the exclusion of migrants from political participation. Consociationalism includes reaching a compromise between political forces that goes beyond the search for simple majorities (Linder 1998). A permanent process of compromise building between these groups characterizes Swiss politics. Another important means to influence the political decision-making process is the consultation procedure, the phase in legislative preparation when draft bills by the Confederation are evaluated by the cantons, parties, associations and sometimes by other interested circles throughout Switzerland, in order to ascertain the likelihood of their acceptance and implementation. Persons not invited to take part in the consultation procedure can also state their views on a proposal. All views and possible objections are evaluated with a view to the veto power of those who reject a reform by means of a referendum. The Federal Government then passes the main points of its proposal on to Parliament and debates the draft bill in light of the outcomes of this consultation. Direct democracy gives social groups some opportunities to participate directly in the political process through the aforementioned popular initiative and referendum. These are in place at the federal as well as local levels. According to some observers, it is the instruments of direct democracy that allowed the consociational system to emerge, because all

80

S. KURT AND G. D’AMATO

laws voted in Parliament can be submitted to a referendum and therefore need the support of large alliances within the political elite (Neidhart 1970). These two main characteristics of the political system provoke major politicization of the migrant issue and the exclusion of immigrants from the political participation. Since the interests in the political field of migration are too divergent, it is difficult for the parties to come to an agreement easily. Second, the instruments of direct democracy have forced the political elite to negotiate anti-immigration attitudes with populist challengers. Immigration policies that had permitted the various actors to agree to accommodate the economic needs of the country became one of the most contested and controversial issues since the 1960s, when radical right-wing populist parties started to gain public support claiming that Switzerland was becoming ‘over-foreignised’ by ever-increasing immigrants. Using the tools of direct democracy, these xenophobic movements succeeded in vetoing liberal government reforms and put their parties under pressure through the launching of eleven popular initiatives and several referendums to curb the presence of foreigners. Although until the minaret initiative 2009 none of these initiatives passed, they have already since the 1970s consistently influenced the migration policy agenda and possibly public opinion on immigration issues urging the Swiss government to adopt more restrictive admission policies (Niederberger 2004), as manifested recently with the approval of the “mass immigration initiative” in 2014. Other European countries may be able to adopt policies ‘behind closed doors’ (Guiraudon 2000) to extend political and social rights to migrants, but this is nearly impossible in Switzerland.

5.4 Effectiveness and Impacts of the Swiss Integration Policy on the Local Level So far, there are no in-depth studies regarding the effectiveness and impacts on the local municipality level regarding the integration policy in Switzerland. Although the Swiss federal structure and its legislation helps to promote and harmonize the implementation of cantonal legislation through its Cantonal Integration Program, the integration policy is framed ultimately at the local level (see Bader et al. 2011). Nevertheless, a study from 2011 underlines the importance of cantonal differences in applying the legal framework on integration (Wichmann et al. 2011; Probst et al. 2019), and a second study emphasizes the more restrictive approach of German and Italian speaking cantons compared to the

5

THE SWISS RATIONALE OF INTEGRATION POLICIES …

81

French ones when it comes to integration policies (Manatschal 2011, 2013). Consequently, both results illustrate how integration and integration policy may be interpreted and implemented differently at sub-state level within a federal framework. Finally, the variation of implementation and the different cantonal priorities in executing integration policies has been confirmed by a recent evaluation of the Cantonal Integration Programs 2014–2017 (SEM 2016). Local integration policies dates back to the 1990, but were first recognized at the federal level through enacting an ordinance on integration in 1999 (D’Amato and Suter 2012). One of the rare studies on the effectiveness of local integration policies, published in 2011 and referring to the canton of Berne, comes to the conclusion that different factors mark the intensity of communal integration policies. Local differences within the same canton are due to the institutional setting: some municipalities have the capacity to start with a structured organization, establishing concepts and need assessments, and providing the necessary financial resources, while other municipalities are reacting ad hoc, responding pragmatically only in the case of need. Regarding the content of those integration policies, the municipalities in the canton of Berne have more commonalities than differences. Therefore, the federal and cantonal level, including their financial contributions, exercise more influence in shaping the content of local integration policies than the composition of the migrant population (Bader et al. 2011). Examples of Recent Local Initiatives: Encouraging Access to Citizenship In the past years, different cantonal or local actors implemented different initiative around the encouragement to access Swiss citizenship. A recent example of a cantonal initiative is the active promotion of naturalization in the canton of Geneva. Due to the federal changes in the Swiss Citizenship Act and its more restrictive conditions, the government of Geneva decided to stimulate the application of those migrants who fulfil the legal criteria for naturalization. Other cantons (e.g. Vaud) and cities (e.g. Zurich) adopted the encouragement policy of Geneva. Cantons are not the only actors. Due to the margin of appreciation, local authorities have the possibility to implement integration policies, too. One of the recent examples is Berne’s introduction of Urban Citizenship in its integration guidelines. The city of Berne announced

82

S. KURT AND G. D’AMATO

to examine—together with civil society associations (in particular the association for sans-papiers)—the introduction and implementation of a City-Card in its new integration rules. According to this provision, all persons living in the city of Berne may become a City-Card holder able to prove their identity, regardless of their legal status. The aim has been to label the city as “migrant-friendly” and to establish a “welcome-culture” for all new residents of Berne (Stadt Bern 2018). These few examples illustrate the complexity of the Swiss integration rationale. To conclude, some integration policies result from a bottomup, others from top-down approach. Even if the majority of provisions regarding integration policies is framed by the federal level, the mix of these different approaches enables the cantonal and municipal level to adopt specific measures and adapt it to its needs. But future political developments or legal changes are difficult to be anticipated due to the complex system that balances direct democracy, federalism and consociationalism. Actual Data on Migration and Public Opinion on Migrants The Federal Statistical Office published 2017 a study on diversity and coexistence in Switzerland. It is one of the first public opinion studies that give large insights on how migration and multicultural coexistence is perceived by different parts of the population. In Switzerland, inhabited by more than 190 different nationalities and more than 10 different religious communities, 36% of the population answered that they feel bothered by individuals identified as “other and different”. However, in the majority of cases the population is tolerant and in favour to grant more rights to the migrant population. Subsequently, 56% of the interviewed persons in the poll state that integration of migrants’ works well. Nevertheless, 66% recognize racism as a key social problem. However, the majority is convinced that integration measures and prevention policies operated against racism are useful. However, 29–34% of the interviewed persons are unsatisfied or unhappy with the implemented framework and favour either more or less measures (FSO 2017). Conclusion Switzerland has had in the past an intense political and societal debate on integration policy. The different developments as well as direct

5

THE SWISS RATIONALE OF INTEGRATION POLICIES …

83

democracy, federalism and consociationalism mark the Swiss integration rationale until today. Due to its multi-level system of governance, local and even more so cantonal actors are involved in establishing and in implementing the pillars of Swiss integration policy. Additionally, since the introduction of the Cantonal Integration Program in 2014 and the newly Integration Agenda Switzerland in 2018, Switzerland has institutionalized and to certain extent harmonized its integration policy. Thus, all cantons and municipalities have implemented a structure that promotes integration. However, the institutional framework still admits openness towards new initiatives, and is able to target the specific needs of cantons and municipalities. Subsequently, in-depth studies on local integration policies that address good practices and innovative forms are still to be done. It would help to gain a deeper understanding on the true outcome of these policies, namely there where people actually live.

References Bader, D., Pecoraro M., Schönenberger S., & Wichmann N. (2011). Integration im Kanton Bern – Migrationsbevölkerung und Integrationsförderung im Fokus. Neuchâtel: Rapport SFM. Bundesrat (Federal Council). (2010). Bericht zur Weiterentwicklung der Integrationspolitik des Bundes. Bern (Report Schiesser). Campisi, L. (2014). Die rechtliche Erfassung der Integration im schweizerischen Migrationsrecht, Zwischen rechtlichen Vorgaben und innenpolitischen Realitäten. Zurich and St. Gallen: Dike. Cattacin, S., & Kaya, B. (2005). Le développement des mesures d’intégration de la population migrante sur le plan local en Suisse. In H. Mahnig (Ed.), Histoire de la politique de migration, d’asile et d’intégration en Suisse depuis 1948 (pp. 288–320). Zurich: Seismo. Cattacin, S., & Chimienti, M. (2009). Lokale Politik der Eingliederung der Migrationsbevölkerung in der Schweiz - Zwischen Pragmatismus und Populismus. In F. Gesemann & R. Roth (Eds.), Lokale Integrationspolitik in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft (pp. 655–671). Wiesbaden: Springer. D’Amato, G. (2012). Switzerland. In C. Joppke & L. Seidle (Eds.), Immigrant Integration in Federal Countries (pp. 162–191). Montreal: McGill Queens University Press. D’Amato, G., & Gerber, B. (Eds.). (2005). Herausforderung Integration: städtische Migrationspolitik in der Schweiz und in Europa. Zürich: Seismo. D’Amato, G., & Suter, C. (2012). Monitoring Immigrant Integration in Switzerland. In R. Bijl & A. Verweij (Eds.), Measuring and Monitoring Immigrant

84

S. KURT AND G. D’AMATO

Integration in Europe: Integration Policies and Monitoring Efforts in 17 European Countries (pp. 326–343). The Hague: The Netherlands Institute for Social Research/SCP. Efionayi-Mäder D., Truong J., & D’Amato G. (2015). Wir können uns ein Abseitstehen der Zivilgesellschaft nicht leisten. Zivilgesellschaftliches Engagement im Flüchtlingswesen. Neuchâtel: Rapport SFM. Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartement, Integrationsagenda Schweiz, Bericht der Koordinationsgruppe vom 1. März 2018. Bern. Guiraudon, V. (2000). Les politiques d’immigration en Europe: Allemagne, France, Pays-Bas. Paris: L’Harmattan. Kurt, S. (2017a). Fast-Tracking Full Citizenship in the Context of the Swiss Integration Stage Model (NCCR on the Move Working Paper #15). Neuchâtel. Kurt, S. (2017b). A Modest Start: Integration Policies in the Field of Asylum. Highlights #2. E-Magazine NCCR on the Move: Neuchâtel. Linder, W. (1998). Swiss Democracy: Possible Solutions to Conflict in Multicultural Societies. Houndmills: Macmillan. Mahnig, H., & Wimmer, A. (2003). Integration Without Immigrant Policy: The Case of Switzerland. In F. Heckmann & D. Schnapper (Eds.), The Integration of Immigrants in European Societies: National Differences and Trends of Convergence (pp. 135–164). Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius. Manatschal, A. (2011). Taking Cantonal Variations of Integration Policy Seriously—Or How to Validate International Concepts at the Subnational Comparative Level. Swiss Political Science Review, 17 (3), 336–357. https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.1662-6370.2011.02027.x. Manatschal, A. (2013). Kantonale Integrationspolitik im Vergleich. Eine Untersuchung der Determinanten und Auswirkungen subnationaler Politikvielfalt. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Neidhart, L. (1970). Plebiszit und pluralitäre Demokratie. Eine Analyse der Funktion des schweizerischen Gesetzesreferendums. Bern: Francke. Niederberger, M. (2002). (in collaboration with Cattacin, S.): Migrationspolitik in Agglomerationen. Eine explorative Analyse der zentralen Problem- und Interventionsfelder in der Schweiz. Forschungsbericht, Studie im Auftrag der Tripartiten Agglomerationskonferenz – TAK: Neuchâtel. Niederberger, M. (2004). Ausgrenzen, assimilieren, integrieren: die Entwicklung einer schweizerischen Integrationspolitik. Zürich: Seismo. Probst, J., D’Amato, G., Dunning, S., Efionayi-Mäder, D., Fehlmann J., Perret A., et al. (2019). Kantonale Spielräume im Wandel, Migrationspolitik in der Schweiz. Neuchâtel: SFM Studies #73. Staatssekretariat für Migration. (2016). Jahres- und Zwischenberichte der kantonalen Integrationsprogramme KIP. Bern. Stadt Bern. (2018). Schwerpunktplan 2018–2021 zur Umsetzung des Leitbildes zur Integrationspolitik.

5

THE SWISS RATIONALE OF INTEGRATION POLICIES …

85

Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO). (2017, October 10). Initial Findings from the Survey on Diversity and Coexistence in Switzerland 2016 (Press release). Tripartite Agglomerationskonferenz (TAK). (2009). Weiterentwicklung der schweizerischen Integrationspolitik, Bericht und Empfehlungen der TAK vom 29. Juni 2009. Bern. Wichmann, N., & D’Amato G. (2010). Migration und Integration in BaselStadt: ein “Pionierkanton” unter der Lupe. Forum suisse pour l’étude des migrations et de la population (SFM). Neuchâtel. Wichmann, N., Hermann, M., D’Amato, G., Efionayi-Mäder, D., Fibbi, R., Menet, J., & Ruedin, D. (2011). Gestaltungsspielräume im Föderalismus: Die Migrationspolitik in den Kantonen. Bern: EKM.

CHAPTER 6

Migration in the Netherlands: Threats and Opportunities Laurens Jonathan Zwaan

6.1

Introduction

A quick overview of migration in The Netherlands from its birth as a nation up to the present day, shows that the Dutch form a nation of migrants, more than some of them would care to admit. It is mostly the last two decades that migration has become to be perceived as a problem and by some even as a threat towards our system of western democratic values. At the same time modern Dutch society is faced with an ageing and shrinking population to which mitigation may provide an answer. We will see how the underlying values to Dutch migration policy contribute to present day conflicting views on migration. Exploring the role of the tiers within public administration in implementing these policies, we will see that especially integration largely rests on local shoulders. We will demonstrate how challenges are met at a local level by hopeful good practices, demonstrating that migration should not

L. J. Zwaan (B) Leeuwendaal, Utrecht, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 J. Franzke and J. M. Ruano de la Fuente (eds.), Local Integration of Migrants Policy, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50979-8_6

87

88

L. J. ZWAAN

been perceived only as a threat. Migration also brings opportunities but is in need of a concise policy in order to overcome the threats.

6.2

A Nation of Migrants

Migration critics in The Netherlands tend to forget that most Dutch have ancestors with a migration background. The rapid growth and wealth of cities within the young Dutch republic, from its foundation in the sixteenth up to the eighteen century, was largely based on migration. In the first half on the seventeenth century 40% of the population of Amsterdam was born outside of The Netherlands. Some immigrants could be categorised as refugees (protestants and Jews), however most came on economic grounds (Lucassen and Penninx 1997; Lucassen and Lucassen 2018). In the nineteenth century the attitude towards migration changes. With the rise of the nation state and nationalism we see a search for the Dutch identity leading to a more pronounced distinction between the Dutch and the alien. In 1848 the first law on aliens is passed. This law was mainly an instrument to extradite (mainly German and Belgian) beggars and vagabonds. The law on Dutch nationality and residence (1892) finally made a clearer definition of Dutch nationality as full membership of a cultural and linguistic bound community within one nation. Before the main criterion to be Dutch was to be born on Dutch soil. Now anyone born to a Dutch citizen would be Dutch. During the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century migration numbers where low and at times even negative, save some special circumstances such as the arrival of Belgium refugees at the outbreak of the First World War (1914), the arrival of Jews form Germany and Austria in the years leading up to World War II and the repatriation from Indonesia after the independence of Indonesia in 1949. Especially in the fifties we see large scale immigration of Dutch citizens to Canada, Australia and New Zealand, leading to negative net migration numbers. In the sixties net migration numbers change to positive when The Netherlands starts to recruit labour migrants from the Mediterranean. From the second half of the eighties the net migration is strongly influenced by chain migration, when the labour migrants, which were expected to be temporary guests, remain and bring their families over (Lucassen and Lucassen 2018). Table 6.1 shows the total population, the immigration and the net

2000

2010

2018

1,5

Total population growth (incl. administrative corrections)

Relative population growth (%)

Source https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline

3 75

Net migration

1,5

87

0

35

35

0,5

34

-21

63

42

1,3

103

10

57

67

1

89

-7

26

20

1,7

174

20

51

71

1,2

139

-13

58

45

1,2

162

33

57

91

0,8

118

53

59

113

0,8

118

60

57

117

0,8

123

72

61

133

0,5

81

63

91

154

0,6

104

88

153

243

25

1990

Emigration (excl. administrative corrections)

1980

28

1970

Immigration

1960

5104 5858 6754 7825 8834 10027 11417 12958 14091 14893 15864 16575 17181

1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950

Population and migration in the Netherlands 1900–2018 (×1000)

Population on January 1st

Table 6.1

6 MIGRATION IN THE NETHERLANDS: THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES

89

90

L. J. ZWAAN

migration from 1900 to 2018 for each tenth year (and 2018). Since inbetween years sometimes peak significantly, we present in Table 6.2 the average figures per year over each decennium. In the second half of the twentieth century we see roughly three categories of migrants. First migrants from former colonies (Indonesia, Suriname, and The Antilles). Secondly asylum seekers, whose origin varies over the decennia depending on geo-political circumstances (Hungarians in 1956, Portuguese early sixties, Czechs in 1968, Chilean in the seventies, Sri Lankan in the eighties, and Yugoslavian in the nineties). The third and largest category consists of labour migrants. In the fifties Italian workers were brought in to work in the Dutch coalmines. Rapid economic growth in the sixties led to a widening search parameter for recruitment of foreign labour. Attention shifted at first to Spain, Greece and Yugoslavia and subsequently to Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia. The Dutch government regulated this large flow of migration and acted as a mediator for the industry. Eventually foreigner workers arrived without family, intent on eventually returning to their country of origin. In the seventies and eighties, the number of returnees dropped significantly, and migrant workers started to bring their families over to The Netherlands. The ministry of Justice tried to maintain legal barriers against family reunion arguing that a more lenient policy would lead to permanent settlement. However, the ministries of both social and economic affairs were more inclined to make settlement easier and got the upper hand. Over the seventies and eighties Turks and Moroccans from less developed rural areas with less prospect on a social and economic stable future on return, numerically became the dominant group of labour migrants (Lucassen and Lucassen 2018). In the sixties and beginning of the seventies public opinion was relatively open and friendly towards migrants. Gradually the public debate became more diverse and sometimes contradictory. Large scale migration through family reunion in the mid-seventies and eighties coincided with a period of economic decline, deindustrialisation and growing unemployment, which struck the Moroccan and Turkish migrants, whom mostly had poor education, a-proportionally hard. Especially Moroccans, often concentrated in less prosperous quarters of the larger Dutch cities, withdrew within a closed and conservative Islamic subculture. Public opinion in this period became more divided. On the one hand there are the protagonists of the ideal of a multi-cultural society. Tolerance and respect towards the migrant’s cultures was the norm. Critique

27 33 -6 76 1,4

Immigration

Emigration (excl. administrative corrections)

Net migration

Total population growth (incl. administrative corrections)

Relative population growth (%)

Source https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline

5427

1,6

97

11

30

41

6280

1,4

100

0

45

45

7247

1,2

100

0

46

47

8309

1,3

119

-13

45

33

9264

60-69

70-79

80-89

90-99

00-09

10-18

1,3

139

-14

62

49

1,3

154

9

56

64

0,8

113

33

61

93

0,6

80

26

59

85

0,6

97

52

60

113

0,4

71

41

78

119

0,5

79

70

123

193

10638 12121 13526 14444 15351 16230 16857

00-09 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59

Average yearly population and migration 1901–2018 per year per decennium (×1000)

Population on January 1st

Table 6.2

6 MIGRATION IN THE NETHERLANDS: THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES

91

92

L. J. ZWAAN

regarding possible negatives sides of these cultures or more of the conservative form they took within the migrant’s subculture was suspect and regarded as politically not correct. Endless subsidies for minority groups helped in maintaining closed subcultures. At the same time, we see the rise of anti-migration sentiments, sometimes even with nationalistic and even racist undertones. Where the mainstream political parties tended to support the multi-cultural ideal more populist movements got opportunities to exploit the growing feelings of unease within parts of the population. The last two decennia migration has become more and more recognised as a problem. At the same time the topic has become intertwined with Islam. The success of populist politicians (such as Pim Fortuyn, who was assassinated, and later on Geert Wilders and his PVV) exploiting the fear for Islamisation has led to a shift in position on migration of more mainstream parties. More critical voices against migration and possible social, economic and cultural effects, both realistic and more extremist exponents that used to be regarded as at the least suspect, regained a more legitimate platform in the public debate (Lucassen and Lucassen 2018). In 2000 publicist, politician and Professor Paul Scheffer wrote a newspaper article (Scheffer 2000) that gave a critical review on the ideal of the multi-cultural society. Coming not from a populist party but from a respectable source, this article gave an impulse to the debate on integration. During the second cabinet Balkenende (2003–2006) the debate would result in a stricter immigration policy, leading to a negative net migration balance (Bijl et al. 2017). Under influence of the public debate on migration the Civic integration act (Wet inburgering) was passed in 2006 and has since then been adapted several times, formulating strict requirements on integration. The act demands knowledge of the language and culture prior to entry in the country. This knowledge is tested in a mandatory exam. The political climate and debate do not always coincide with the actual migration figures. Between 1995 and 2010, while the migration debate hardened, the net migration balance actually dropped significantly, especially during the cabinet Balkenende II (2003–2006). Only after the accession of Eastern European countries to the Schengen agreement (December 21, 2007) migration of Eastern Europeans caused the net migration balance to become positive again. A further and significant rise,

6

MIGRATION IN THE NETHERLANDS: THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES

93

peaking in 2015 and 2016, was caused by refugees from war zones such as Iraq, Eritrea and especially Syria. In Table 6.3 we present the yearly population and migration starting from 2005. The rise in net migration from is linked to the war in Syria. The influx from Syria has declined somewhat since 2016, however migration from other (eastern) European countries, especially Poland, has inclined since. The population is still growing but since 2015 only because of migration. From 2015 the autochthonous population is shrinking (Bijl et al. 2017). In the last decade the absolute population growth largely (and in 2015 and 2016 entirely) depended on the net migration. The Central bureau of statistics has calculated several migration scenarios. In their most restrictive scenario, the population would shrink to 16 million and age significantly. Even then in 2060 30% of the population would be first- or second-generation migrants. In their least restrictive scenario, the population would increase to over 20 million and result in at least 37% of the population with a migrant background. In the context of an ageing population some regard migration as a welcome solution to an emerging problem of shrink and aging. However, others warn for the pressure on our system of western democratic values in an age in which borders are under pressure (Scheffer 2018).

6.3

Values and Goals

The underlying values of migration policy in The Netherlands are mixed and sometimes in conflict. On the one hand there is the desire to be an open society. On the other hand, there is fear that hard-won achievements, both economic as cultural, could be threatened by an uncontrollable influx of aliens, putting a drain on our prosperity and undermining our democratic society and western values. For a part our desire for an open and welcoming society is founded in the awareness that The Netherlands for a long time has been a migration country. The migrants that came to The Netherlands in the sixteenth, seventeenth and even eighteenth centuries played an important part in the building of this nation and its prosperity. The genetic makeup of almost every present-day Dutch citizen will show foreign influences. The desire to be open also lies in the dependency of Dutch economy on the outside world. The Dutch are traders and The Netherlands has since the sixteenth

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

0,1

Total population growth (incl. administrative corrections)

Relative population growth (%)

Source https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline

10 24

Net migration

0,3

47

26

91

117

0,5

80

53

90

144

0,5

89

61

85

146

0,5

81

63

91

154

0,4

75

57

106

163

0,3

49

48

110

158

0,3

50

48

117

165

0,4

71

61

122

183

0,5

78

78

127

205

0,6

102

103

127

231

0,6

100

81

154

235

0,6

104

88

153

243

91

2010

Emigration (excl. administrative corrections)

2009

101

2008

Immigration

2007

16334 16358 16405 16486 16575 16656 16730 16780 16829 16901 16979 17082 17181

2006

Population and migration in the Netherlands 2005–2018 (×1000)

Population on January 1st

Table 6.3

94 L. J. ZWAAN

6

MIGRATION IN THE NETHERLANDS: THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES

95

century (or even earlier) up until to today almost continuously been one of the most prosperous countries in the world, thanks to its geographical position and its trade with the outside world. In 2017 The Netherlands was in position eighteen for nominal GDP and in position twelve for nominal GDP per capita (IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2018). The Dutch sometimes describe themselves as a nation of traders and preachers. Aside the economic outlook ideological aspects also come into play. Christian orientated political parties (both Roman Catholic and protestant) advocated the right for family reunion and fair and equal treatment of the labour migrants of the sixties and seventies. The liberal parties joined their plight stressing on liberties and equality. At that point socialist parties tended to have a more restricted view towards migration, based on fear for jobs and workers’ salaries. During the seventies and eighties however the ideal of an open and multi-cultural society took hold and this ideal was adopted by the higher educated elites within the, up to than more reluctant left-wing parties. In recent years a more restrictive view towards migration has somewhat shifted from a left wing to a right-wing position, including that of the liberals and Christian democrats. Under pressure of the success of populist parties, the political climate has shifted. Preserving cultural identity and western values have become arguments which are brought opposed to the multi-cultural ideal. The more populist part of the left-wing parties takes the more traditional left-wing position pointing out the threats against our welfare state. In the present (coalition) government both approaches are represented. The liberals (VVD) and Christian democrats (CDA) tend to represent the more restrictive approach. This may be partly giving in to populist parties with even more outspoken xenophobic positions, attempting to reclaim part of the electorate by a more moderate but still restrictive approach. Partly this may be genuine concern for the Christian and liberal legacy. At the same time their Christian and liberal ideals compel them to take a humanitarian position, thus making them internally torn on the issue. The other two coalition parties could also be characterised as a Christian party (CU) and a liberal party (D66), but in the Dutch perspective could be seen as centre left whereas VVD and CDA could be seen as centre right. In these two parties the Christian or liberal tendency to openness towards the alien seem less clouded by economical or cultural fears.

96

L. J. ZWAAN

In its coalition agreement this coalition of four governing parties say to strive for a humanitarian and effective migration policy aimed at integration and participation (VVD et al. 2017). Those who may stay should participate as soon as possible and thus improve their chances. The Civic integration act (Wet inburgering) from 2006 underlines this. Those who may not stay should leave as soon as possible. Dutch migration policy under the present administration (https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderw erpen/migratie) has six pillars: • Prevention of irregular migration. • Strengthening shelter and protection of refugees and displaced persons. • A solidary and solid asylum system within the EU and The Netherlands. • Less illegality and more return. • Advance legal immigration routes. • Stimulate integration and participation. The conflicting views on political level are a reflection of conflicting tendencies in public opinion. In 2017 the Dutch ranked migration and integration as the most urgent political priority for the present cabinet (Den Ridder et al. 2017). This concern should not be interpreted as a dominantly hostile climate concerning migration. Values reflected in public opinion on migration are conflicted and show paradoxes just as national policy does. Sometimes fear of the unknown and alien gets the upper hand. At other times sentiments of compassion and solidarity have the upper hand. But almost always emotion and preconception on either side seem to dominate the public debate rather than objective facts. Up to the eighties public opinion was more or less neutral to positive on the issue of migration. In general, newcomers received a welcoming environment. In the eighties and onwards unease over migration, especially in larger cities grew, mobilised by populist political movements. Fear of Islam gradually became a dominant theme within the public debate on migration. The murder on film director Theo van Gogh (November 2, 2004) by a radicalised Muslim and more recently (2014–2017) the Islamic inspired terrorist attacks in Paris, Brussels, Nice, London and Berlin have had an impact on the view on migrants from Muslim countries. The wave of Syrian refugees in 2015 and the haphazard way this was

6

MIGRATION IN THE NETHERLANDS: THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES

97

handled by the authorities led to resistance and unrest in the autumn and winter of 2015. The small village Oranje (130 inhabitants) already had an asylum seeker centre with 700 refugees. The announcement that another 700 refugees would be settled there led to an uprising and roadblocks by the people of Oranje (Fontein 2015). After emotional protests, plans for another centre for asylum seekers in the villages of Steenbergen where withdrawn (Schreuder 2017). In the village of Geldermalsen plans for an asylum seekers centre led to the violent siege of the town hall. The mayor and aldermen had to be rescued by a riot squad (Van Dinther 2016). Such reactions led to the conclusion that a joint approach from the national administration and the municipalities was needed, with a more evenly distribution over municipalities rather than the concentration of large quota in less populated areas. Shortly before the riots in Geldermalsen an administrative agreement on reception of asylum seekers (Rijksoverheid 2015) already had been reached between the national administration and the municipalities. Such outbursts of opposition against the arrival of migrants, especially in your own backyard, are contrasted by equally strong acts of solidarity. The Syrian refugee crises mobilised many Dutch to volunteer and help out in asylum seeker centres or support migrant families in their integration process. The Dutch Council for Refugees (Vluchtelingen werk Nederland) is active in supporting refugees and coordinates the efforts of many volunteers. There are other initiatives such as the foundation Vrolijkheid (which translates as “happiness”), a multi-cultural, not-forprofit network of artists, play writers, actors, musicians and volunteers who invest in children and teenagers in asylum seekers centres. Vrolijkheid organises creative activities on a regular basis in 30 asylum seekers centres in the Netherlands. Sometimes those who protested against the coming of migrants might be the same people who join in protest when migrants close to them are extradited. Once families have become part of the community the sentiment changes. There are many examples of protests when due to long procedures, families are extradited years after their arrival, especially when children are involved (De Telegraaf 2017). So public opinion tends to swing between opposites. The coalition agreement of the cabinet Rutte III (2017) stated that de arrangement (2012) to pardon migrant children (and their family) that resided five years or longer in The Netherland under certain circumstances could stay would not be relaxed. In 2019 however under pression of the public sentiment the Christian democrats

98

L. J. ZWAAN

(CDA) changed their position leaving the liberals (VVD) alone in their stern position. Subsequently a more lenient arrangement was agreed upon. Although anti-migration and even xenophobic voices in this decennium are heard more loudly, due to the rise of populist parties and even more thorough the easily accessible platform of social media, the general attitude of the Dutch towards migrants has not hardened. Research by the social and cultural plan bureau even shows, despite the unrest concerning the Syrian refugee’s crisis, a more positive outlook in 2016 compared to the nineties as is shown in Table 6.4. In the period 2008–2017 the percentage of Dutch who believe that the presence of other cultures enriches our society fluctuates around 42%, while the number of those who disagree to this proposition fluctuates around 26% when asked if The Netherlands would be a more pleasant country if less migrants would live here. And although the majority (59%) of the Dutch is of the opinion that The Netherlands should not receive lager numbers of refugees the support for aid towards refugees is larger than in most other countries in the European Union. Only the Swedes are more positive (Den Ridder et al. 2017). As part of the UNHCR resettlement programme, The Netherlands invites around 500 refugees each year, mainly from refugee camps, to settle in The Netherlands. However, the Dutch administration prefers and supports reception in the region and stresses the need for a joint European approach towards migration and in particular asylum seekers (VVD et al. 2017). Their concern is that the same values that entice us to welcome migrants, especially those in need, may fall victim to a too rapid and uncontrolled influx of people form less open societies. Table 6.4 Public opinion in the Netherlands on migration

There are too country We should be We should be of subsistence origin

1994 (%)

2016 (%)

many people with other nationalities in our

49

31

lenient in allowing access to political refugees lenient towards migrants with hardly any means due to the economic situation in their country of

75 25

85 45

Source Bijl et al. (2017)

6

6.4

MIGRATION IN THE NETHERLANDS: THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES

99

Role of the Tiers of Public Administration

The Dutch administration is divided in three tiers, national, provincial and municipal (Zwaan 2016). Migration policy is primarily the domain of the national administration. The provinces play a modest role, for instance in coordination of the inflow and distribution of asylum seekers. Municipalities have an important role in the housing of asylum seekers and the integration of migrants. In 2015 an administrative agreement on reception of asylum seekers was reached between the national administration and the association of Dutch municipalities (Rijksoverheid 2015). The minister of migration as part of the ministry for justice and security is responsible. Several services aid him in making and implementing the migration policy: • The directory general for Migration (DGM) develops and coordinates migration policy. (Until 2018 this was the directory general for Aliens affairs.) • The Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) implements the foreign nationals’ policy in the Netherlands. • The Service for return and departure (DTV) implements the policy for approach to illegal stay and return of migrants to their country of origin. • The Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA) is a non-departmental agency (linked with the ministry for justice and security) responsible for the reception of asylum seekers and support them in preparing a future in the Netherlands or elsewhere. The 2018 budget of the ministry of justice and security on aliens was over e 1.1 billion. (Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie 2017) Other ministries are involved as well. Integration of migrants in Dutch society however falls under the responsibility of the ministry of Social affairs and employment and more specifically under the directory of society and integration (DSI). Civic integration exams are the responsibility of the ministry of Education, Culture and Sciences. The Education Executive Agency (DUO) organises these exams as well as study loans for integration courses. Asylum seekers will be accommodated by the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA) until the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) has decided on their asylum application. The

100

L. J. ZWAAN

municipality is an important partner for COA when a reception centre has to be established in its territory. And once the asylum seeker receives a residence permit, it is up to the municipalities to provide housing and, as long as the asylum seeker is unemployed, social benefits. The division of this task over the municipalities is regulated on a national level according to the administrative agreement (Rijksoverheid 2015). The average cost of an asylum seeker in a reception centre is e 37,300 per person a year (https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/asielb eleid/vraag-en-antwoord/uitgaven-rijk-provincies-gemeenten-voor-opv ang-asielzoekers). Anyone from outside the EU that wants to settle in The Netherlands has to integrate according to the Civic integration act (Wet inburgering). The intended integration implies: (1) learning the language (level A2); (2) active participation in society and (3) economic independence. To obtain a legal status the migrant must pass the civic integration exam and sign a participation statement. Ideally this is taken through the embassy in the country of origin, before entering The Netherlands. If the migrant already happens to be in the country the exam can be taken in The Netherlands. Taking an integration course prior to the exam is recommended but not mandatory. The cost of both course and exam are on the migrant. In case of asylum a loan up to e 10,000 can be provided by the state. In the case of family reunion, a loan up to e 5000 can be obtained. On passing the exam the debt will be relieved. Failure to pass a civic integration examination within three years and/or refusal to sign the participation statement may lead to a fine and even to the rejection of an application for renewal of a regular residence permit for a fixed period and to the withdrawal of such a residence permit. The exams and loans and the imposing of the fines are the responsibility of the Education Executive Agency (DUO). Under the amended Civic Integration Act, municipalities will be required to offer asylum migrants social guidance to help them make their way in their new community. For 2018 the budget for integration was e 317 million (Ministerie van Sociale zaken en werkgelegenheid 2017). The ministry passes the budget on to the municipalities who are responsible for the execution of the social guidance.

6.5

Local Challenges and Good Practices

The execution of the integration policies falls mainly on the municipalities. When faced with large numbers of migrants such as the Syrians

6

MIGRATION IN THE NETHERLANDS: THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES

101

in 2015 and 2016, housing is the first worry. The Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA) establishes and manages reception centres but is dependent on the cooperation of the municipalities for space and permits. The protests in Oranje, Steenbergen and Geldermalsen show that municipal administrators often come face to face with their own citizens when allowing such centres on their territory. Municipalities have learned the hard way that this demands careful communication with the citizenry as well as proportionality between the scale of the community and the number of asylum seekers to be housed. Once a residence permit is obtained it is again the municipality that has to assist in finding housing and, until a job is found, supply social security. In 2018 municipalities had to house 21,007 permit holders (https:// www.aedes.nl/feiten-en-cijfers). In the Netherlands social housing is the domain of (not for profit) housing corporations. It is these associations that supply the actual housing. In 2016 the corporations allotted 14% of the vacant houses to permit holders and planned the building of 14,600 houses dedicated to this target population (Nachtzaam 2016). These challenges ask for creative solutions from municipalities and housing corporations. Solutions are for instance the realisation of temporary prefab housing, the transformation of office buildings into apartments, the realisation of communal housing for youths and students and the temporary use of mobile homes. (https://www.aedes.nl/artikelen/ klant-en-wonen/bijzondere-doelgroepen/statushouders/creatieve-opl ossingen-voor-huisvesting-vergunninghouders.html). There are interesting examples of cross overs between housing projects and citizens’ initiatives, aimed at the integration of permit holders. Municipalities can play a facilitating role in these initiatives. In Berkel en Rodenrijs the housing corporative (3B Wonen) housed 40 Syrian permit holders in a former nursing home. The housing corporative, the municipality, the local department of The Dutch Council for Refugees and the neighbourhood work closely together to help these Syrians to integrate. From the neighbourhood many volunteers were mobilised, supplying used furniture, helping out with forms, language practice etc. An open house, organised by the Syrians themselves, drew more than 150 visitors, thus further strengthening the connection with their new environment (https://www.aedes.nl/artikelen/klant-en-wonen/huisve sting-vergunninghouders/praktijk/buurt-betrokken-bij-doorstroomwo ningen-vluchtelingen.html).

102

L. J. ZWAAN

The municipal responsibilities are not limited to housing. As supplier of social security, the municipal social security service must aid and stimulate the permit holder in finding employment. And the Civic integration act gives municipalities the responsibilities to aid, monitor and stimulate the integration into Dutch society. Article 17 states that the executive board (mayor and alderman) of the municipality supplies social guidance to the permit holder. However, the municipality can determine the nature of the social guidance and a large part of the responsibility to integrate still rests on the migrant. The migrant must pass an integration exam, but is free in choosing a course and only the exam is mandatory, not the course. Although article 9 of the Civic integration act regulates certification of courses, there are over 300 providers, which makes it difficult to choose a fitting proposition. De Waal (2017) argues that in imposing demands on newcomers the balance has been lost. Newcomers don’t know the language, the culture, the bureaucracy and have scarce financial means. Opposed to the authorities they are evidently the weaker party. De Waal and others (Leerkes and Scholten 2016) argue that where most emphasis lies on policies regarding access, a shift in attention is needed towards integration. Potentially migrants bring useful skills and can add to the workforce in a demographic setting of shrink and aging. This potential is not efficiently mobilised, and newcomers will become a strain on society (cost of welfare, crime, social and cultural division etc.) if investments in these newcomers do not take place or are directed ineffectively. Recent research (Blom et al. 2018) shows that integration policies are too fragmented. Newcomers get lost in the system and remain dependant on welfare for too long, integration and language courses often don’t match the specific needs of the individual newcomer and the quality of municipal social guidance varies. It is argued that the expectations regarding the own responsibility of newcomers is unrealistic and that the system, leaning more on punishment than reward, is insufficiently effective in stimulating integration. In response the minister of Social affairs and employment is planning to reform the integration policy and revise the Civic integration act, recognising that integration in its present form is too complicated (Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2018). The minister plans to give municipalities more instruments to give direction and coherence to the integration process. Also, the integration process must start earlier on, even when the asylum seeker is still in a reception centre

6

MIGRATION IN THE NETHERLANDS: THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES

103

awaiting housing in the municipality or even awaiting their permit of residence. This could mean that asylum seekers with a high probability of receiving clearance should be placed in a reception centre in the municipality where permanent residence is foreseen. De demands on language skills will be raised from A2 to B1. The course market will be reformed, aiming at more transparency and higher standers. The necessity to apply a study loan at DUO to pre-finance the course will be abolished. Selection, contracting coerces and financing the integration and language courses will become a municipal responsibility. During the process of integration and aiming at self-sufficiency municipalities will be responsible to unburden the newcomer (for instance taking care of health insurance, rent, utilities etc. out of the welfare benefit) and at the same time stimulate the newcomer to aim at integration and self-sufficiency (such as assistance in finding employment). Some municipalities already aim at taking more control and coordination within their present possibilities. For instance, Rotterdam already pays certain recurring expenses out of the welfare benefit (Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2018). Another example is the municipality Haren, which realises an above average percentage of successful integration exams (85%) by starting their social guidance in an early stage cooperation with the local reception centre, by offering an extra locally organised training programme, by stimulating newcomers to follow their course at the regional vocational school (ROC) and by coordinating tailor-made use of available resources (Van Ooijen 2017). Already in 2003, the Social and Economic Council (SER) point towards good practices where lessons are to be learned concerning successful integration (Sociaal Economische Raad 2003). They stress the importance of cooperation between municipalities, education institutes and (potential) employers. Good practices demonstrate that migration should not been perceived only as a threat. Migration is and has throughout Dutch history been a constant factor that can open new opportunities as long as it is not ignored but pro-actively addressed. To quote Scheffer (2018), “organised migration can greatly contribute to a society, whereas uncontrolled migration will lead to social tension”.

104

L. J. ZWAAN

References Bijl, L., et al. (Eds.). (2017). De sociale staat van Nederland 2017 . Den Haag: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau. Blom, M., et al. (2018). Inburgering: systeemwereld versus leefwereld. Evaluatie Wet inburgering 2013. Barneveld, Significant. De Waal, T. M. (2017). Conditional Belonging: A Legal-Philosophical Inquiry into Integration Requirements for Immigrants in Europe. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam. De Telegraaf . (2017, August 13). Opnieuw protst tegen uitzetting kinderen. De Telegraaf . Den Ridder, J., Dekker, P., & Van Houwelingen, P. (2017). Burgerperspectieven 2017|3. Den Haag: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau. Fontein, J. (2015, October 7). Hoe minidorp Oranje uitgroeide tot omstreden opvangcentrum. de Volkskrant. Leerkes, A., & Scholten, P. (2016). Landen in Nederland. De vluchtelingenstroom in integratieperspectief . Rotterdam: Erasmus University. Lucassen, L., & Lucassen, J. (2018). Vijf eeuwen migratie. Een verhaal van winnaars en verliezers. Amsterdam: Atlas Contact. Lucassen, J., & Penninx, R. (1997). Newcomers. Immigrants and Their Descendants in the Netherlands 1550–1995. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis. Ministerie van Sociale zaken en werkgelegenheid. (2017). Rijksbegroting 2018 XV. Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid. Den Haag: SDU. Ministerie van Sociale zaken en werkgelegenheid. (2018, July 2). Wijziging van de Wet inburgering en enkele andere wetten in verband met het toevoegen van het onderdeel participatieverklaring aan het inburgeringsexamen en de wettelijke vastlegging van de maatschappelijke begeleiding. Den Haag: Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (Brief aan de Eerste Kamer; 34 584). Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie. (2017). Rijksbegroting 2018 VI. Veiligheid en Justitie. Den Haag: SDU. Nachtzaam, H. (2016). Onderzoek Aedes: bouwplannen corporaties voor vluchtelingen. Den Haag: Aedes. https://www.aedes.nl/artikelen/klant-enwonen/bijzondere-doelgroepen/statushouders/bouwplannen-voor-huisve sting-14600-vergunninghouders.html. Rijksoverheid. (2015, November 27). Bestuursakkoord verhoogde asielinstroom. Den Haag (Administrative Agreement on Reception of Asylum Seekers). Scheffer, P. (2018). De vorm van vrijheid. Amsterdam: De bezige bij. Scheffer, P. (2000, January 29). Het multiculturele drama. NRC Handelsblad. Schreuder, A. (2017, October 7). In roerig ‘Steenbergistan’ is de rust weergekeerd. NRC. Sociaal Economische Raad. (2003). Inburgeren met beleid. Den Haag: SER.

6

MIGRATION IN THE NETHERLANDS: THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES

105

Van Dinther, M. (2016, June 16). Geldermalsen wil helemaal geen vluchtelingen opvangen. De Volkskrant. Van Ooijen, M. (2017). Vijf best practices van gemeenten bij succesvolle integratie. Amersfoort: Lysias. VVD, CDA, D66, & Christen Unie. (2017). Vertrouwen in de toekomst. Regeerakkoord 2017–2021. Den Haag. Zwaan, L. J. (2016). Decentralisation in the Netherlands. Decision-Making Close to the People or Efficient Organisation of the State? In M. Ruano & C. M. Profiroiu (Eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Decentralisation in Europe. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

CHAPTER 7

Germany: From Denied Immigration to Integration of Migrants Jochen Franzke

7.1 Germany’s Historical Path from an Emigration Country to an Immigration Country Germany’s transition from a transit and emigration country to an immigration country has a long history (Borchert and Bosswick 2011; Bendel 2014). Thus, in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the number of those who emigrated overseas from or via Germany, especially to North America, dominated. Up until the late 1950s, overseas emigration exceeded immigration. However, beginning in the 1960s, more people regularly came to the Federal Republic than moved away. West Germany first became a de facto immigration country when temporary migrants settled permanently, started new families or migrated their families to join them. Indeed, the parallel process of immigration and emigration in Germany is still ongoing today. For example, between 1990 and 2014,

J. Franzke (B) University of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 J. Franzke and J. M. Ruano de la Fuente (eds.), Local Integration of Migrants Policy, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50979-8_7

107

108

J. FRANZKE

an estimated 20 million people immigrated to the now united Germany, while around 15 million emigrated in the same period. In 2017, the migration gain for Germany amounted to 416,080 persons (according to the Federal Statistical Office 2018). Traditionally, German immigration policy has mainly been driven by economic needs and thus—until the 1970s—was understood as temporary. Consequently, up until 1998 federal governments regarded Germany as a paradigmatically non-immigration country. As a result, national policies towards immigration did not exist. Furthermore, since 1955 non-German immigrants have been fully integrated into the German social security system because the system does not differentiate between them and German nationals. Therefore, the German system favours a universalist (non-) policy approach. In the 1950s, labour shortage led to the immigration of so-called guest workers (Gastarbeiter) through guest worker programmes. The West German government started recruiting foreign workers from across Southern Europe and the Mediterranean in 1955 after signing a recruitment agreement with Italy.1 Later agreements were signed with Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968). The West German government mistakenly assumed that these guest workers would only stay in Germany temporarily. Although it had been clear since the 1970s that most of them would in fact remain permanently, the political consequences were neglected, no comprehensive integration policy was put in place and naturalisation remained impossible (Borkert and Bosswick 2011, p. 96f.). Against the backdrop of the economic slowdown, West Germany stopped the recruitment of foreign labour in November 1973. After the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 and German unification in 1990, German migration policies required reform. With the Ordinance on Exemptions from the Recruitment Ban (Anwerbestoppausnahmeverordnung ) in 1990, Germany returned to demand-driven immigration, allowing contract and seasonal workers to work for several months in the country. Nevertheless, immigration was still perceived as

1 The other German state, the German Democratic Republic, signed similar recruitment agreements for so-called contract workers in the 1960s, including Poland (1965), Hungary (1967), Mozambique (1979) and Vietnam (1980), as well as Angola, Cuba, Nicaragua and South Yemen. The number of contract workers amounted to approximately 94,000 persons (in 1989).

7

GERMANY: FROM DENIED IMMIGRATION …

109

a temporal socio-economic issue (Borkert and Bosswick 2011). Triggered by the sharp rise in the number of asylum seekers between 1991 and 1993, mainly following the Yugoslav war, critical public discourse surrounding refugees intensified. In response to this backlash, German constitutional asylum regulations were further restricted in 1993. The adoption of the Foreigners’ Law (Ausländergesetz) in 1990–1991 also touched the legal political domain. For the first time, naturalisation was open to foreigners living at least five years in the country (Borkert and Bosswick 2011). After 1998, the new Social Democrat/Green federal government departed from the paradigm ‘Germany is no immigration country’ and adopted a number of reforms in immigration, integration and citizenship law. The new citizenship law was adopted in 1998 and implicated Germany’s departure from the strict jus sanguinis principle to include jus soli elements (Dekker et al. 2015). The result was that children born in Germany to foreign parents acquired German citizenship at birth if one parent had been living in Germany for eight years and had been granted unlimited residency. Since 2014, dual citizenship is possible. In 2005, the first German immigration law (Zuwanderungsgesetz)2 entered into force and contained provisions on the entry into and residence in Germany by foreigners, the purpose of residence, the termination of residence and asylum procedures. During the drafting of this legislation, according to the multi-stakeholder approach, a multipartisan committee with representatives from ‘significant social groups and researchers’ was engaged for the first time to develop policy proposals (Dekker et al. 2015, p. 645). Since then, the federal government perceives immigration as an important source for the successful globalisation of Germany and its economy. In implementing the law, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge), operating within the portfolio of the former Federal Ministry of the Interior, was obliged for the first time to develop guidelines for the integration of migrants in Germany. Integration courses consisting of

2 Amendments to the Act took effect on 28 August 2007, including provisions to

implement eleven EU directives on residence and asylum rules, to prevent sham or forced marriages and enhance internal security. Additionally, the amendments implemented decisions of the German Conference of Interior Ministers on nationality law to facilitate the immigration of company founders and provisions to foster the integration of legal immigrants.

110

J. FRANZKE

language training and learning about German culture and history, along with pilot programmes for integration projects at the local level with local organisations, were introduced (Borkert and Bosswick 2011). In addition, economically self-sufficient immigrants had a chance to apply for permanent residency. Since 2006, so-called National Integration Summits have been held regularly. These conferences bring representatives of federal states and local authorities together with businesses, trade unions and migrant organisations, etc., to discuss problems related to social cohesion and migrant integration in Germany. Moreover, a National Integration Plan (2007) and a National Action Plan for Integration (2013) resulted from this dialogue process. These plans identify eleven policy areas that are crucial for migrant integration: primary education, secondary education, vocational training and professional development, labour market and employment, migrants in the public sector, health and healthcare, local integration, language—integration courses, sport, civic engagement and integration, media and culture (Dekker et al. 2015). At the last summit in June 2018, participants committed themselves to developing a new national action plan. As to immigration legislation, German law distinguishes between the various migrant groups in a very bureaucratic way, extending to 107 legal paragraphs with some 50 different types of residency permits. Immigration to Germany is in fact possible through a number of different channels. • EU citizens: As EU citizens, all nationals of the Member States of the European Union (EU) have the right to move freely within the EU and to enter and reside in any EU Member State. Article 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) as specified by Directive 2004/38/EC guarantees this right, which has been transposed into German law by the Freedom of Movement Act/EU of 2004 (Gesetz über die allgemeine Freizügigkeit von Unionsbürgern). • Non-EU citizens: Immigration to Germany as a non-EU citizen is limited to skilled or highly educated workers and their immediate family members. Germany has three types of residence titles: visas of up to 90 days, temporary residence permits and permanent settlement permits. Working permits including the residence title are available to foreigners who either fall into one of the permit categories of skilled workers or can prove that their employment is in

7

GERMANY: FROM DENIED IMMIGRATION …

111

the public interest. Since the introduction of the EU Blue Card in August 2012, it has become easier for skilled workers from non-EU countries to try and find work in Germany. • Asylum seekers and refugees: Immigration policy is based on the 1993 amendment to Article 16a of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) and on the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees (also known as the 1951 Refugee Convention) and its 1967 Protocol. Bound by the 1951 Refugee Convention, Germany grants refugee status to any individual fearing persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, social or political group. Since 2005, recognised refugees enjoy the same rights as asylum seekers. During the asylum procedure and depending upon the level of protection under the Asylum Procedure Act 1992 (Asylgesetz) and the Residence Act 2004 (Aufenthaltsgesetz), refugees entering Germany are granted different legal statuses, possess different rights and have access to different educational and vocational programmes (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2018a). • Ethnic German re-settlers: Ethnic Germans from the successor states of the former Soviet Union and from other Eastern European states are entitled to immigrate to Germany through a special acceptance process. • Irregular Migration: The reality of the current migrant situation unfortunately includes irregular migration with an estimated 350,000 people entering Germany illegally in 2017. Even this simplified overview shows the complicated nature of German immigration law. It remains a political task to simplify immigration procedures. With this aim in mind, the introduction of a new comprehensive immigration law is now on the political agenda (see below).

7.2 German Immigration Policy Within a Multi-level Federal System German migration policy is determined by four main actors in a fragmented system of shared responsibilities between different tiers of the political administrative system. Firstly, the European Union level is responsible for protecting the external borders of the EU and implementing the Dublin system and, secondly, the federal level is responsible

112

J. FRANZKE

for the legal conditions of immigration and economic, labour and social policies in Germany. At the federal state level, the sixteen federal states have responsibility for the management and implementation of migration policy in their own territory. In particular, they are responsible for the accommodation of asylum seekers. Finally, the local authorities in the two-tier system with 294 counties, 107 county-free cities and 11,040 municipalities are tasked with managing the practical questions related to the reception and integration of all migrants, regardless of their status (Franzke 2017; Brockert and Capone 2010). The following provides a more detailed description of how competencies related to German integration policy are allocated. Firstly, based on its legislative competences, the federation (Bund ) is responsible for setting the basic legal framework for the immigration and residence of migrants in Germany, including refugees. As such, the federation is the central player in national immigration and integration policy (Bommes 2010, p. 37; Franzke et al. 2017). In addition, the federation has central steering competencies in the areas of economic, labour and social policy that are especially relevant to immigration issues. In asylum and refugee policy, the federation is responsible for setting the legal framework and implementing the asylum procedure. According to the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community (Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat ), German migration policy is ‘intended to manage, control and limit the immigration of foreigners to our country. It pays attention to the ability of our society to take in and integrate new arrivals and to our economic and labour market interests. Migration policy also serves to meet our humanitarian obligations’.3 The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees as the central federal institution in migration policy perceives the integration of migrants as a long-term process aimed at integrating all people who live permanently and legally in Germany into German society. According to the Federal Office, this means that migrants should be able to participate equally and fully in all parts of social life. It takes the view that two prerequisites are decisive for successful integration: ‘to learn German and to respect and abide by the constitution and its laws’ (Federal Office for Migration and

3 See https://www.bmi.bund.de/EN/topics/migration/migration-node.html.

7

GERMANY: FROM DENIED IMMIGRATION …

113

Refugees 2018b). Unfortunately, it does not mention the necessity of measures to facilitate adaptation to German society. In addition to the federal integration measures, integration policy in the multi-level system is executed at the federal state (Länder) level, which is responsible for the accommodation of asylum seekers. However, the federal states mostly assign this task to their local authorities, which receive appropriate financial compensation from the respective federal state. All German federal states have developed their own integration concepts and/or corresponding guidelines. In order to increase the binding nature of migration policy efforts, specific integration laws have been adopted in four federal states, with the first in Berlin (2010) followed by North Rhine-Westphalia (2012), Baden-Wuerttemberg (2015) and Bavaria (2016). The first three are aimed at ensuring equal participation of people with a migration background in all areas of social life. By contrast, the Bavarian Integration Act, passed in 2016 to cope with the increased influx of refugees, refers more specifically to the individual integration of immigrants, formulates expectations from them and focuses on their cultural integration into the German society. Within the framework of the German multi-level federal system, immigration policy differs across the 16 federal states. One example is the procedure for asylum seekers. To ensure a fair and equitable distribution of asylum seekers among the federal states, allocation is regulated through the quota system for initial distribution of asylum seekers, known by the acronym EASY (Erstverteilung der Asylbegehrenden), based on the so-called Königstein formula (Königsteiner Schlüssel ). In order to calculate a distribution quota for asylum seekers between the federal states, a special commission comprised of the federation and federal states (Bund-LänderKommission) determines annually how many asylum seekers a federal state has to admit. The percentage is based on a federal state’s tax revenue (weighted two-thirds of the quota) and population size (one-third). Thus, in 2018, the most populous federal state, North Rhine-Westphalia, took in the most asylum seekers with 21%, whereas the city-state of Bremen took in only 1%.4 Additionally, the implementation of asylum policy legislation differs greatly between the federal states. For example, the 1992 Federal Asylum 4 According to the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (http://www.bamf.de/ EN/Fluechtlingsschutz/AblaufAsylv/Erstverteilung/erstverteilung-node.html).

114

J. FRANZKE

Seekers Benefits Act (Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz) requires accommodation to be provided in reception facilities. However, there is no common standard for reception facilities among the federal states. In SchleswigHolstein, for example 83.4% of the asylum applicants live in decentralised accommodation, compared to only 44% in neighbouring MecklenburgVorpommern (data for 2017). This results in completely different framework conditions for the pace and depth of integration of asylum seekers into society.5 Surprisingly, there are also great differences in the processing of asylum applications. Here, the exclusive responsibility lies with the central federal agency, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. Operating from 42 regional offices throughout Germany, this should in theory lead to a high level of uniformity. In practice, however, this is not the case. Recognition rates differ strongly among the federal states, despite the uniform provisions of the asylum law and jurisdiction and the clear authority attributed to the federal agency. Bremen and Saarland, in particular, have high recognition rates (for the period 2010–2015), while Berlin and Saxony have significantly lower rates of recognition (Riedel and Schneider 2017). In addition, the proportion of rejected asylum seekers who either left voluntarily or by deportation differs, ranging from 67% in Thuringia to 30% in Berlin (Deutscher Bundestag 2015, p. 29). At municipal level, the long-cultivated approach by federal governments of denying permanent immigration is still impossible because when people are at the door, local authorities have a duty to help them. This creates pressure to take immediate action. Therefore, integration policy at this level has always been seen as a lasting and reciprocal learning process (Gesemann and Roth 2009; Aumüller 2009). In 2017, in collaboration with the Bertelsmann Foundation and the Robert Bosch Foundation, the Municipal Association for Administration Management (Kommunale Gemeinschaftsstelle für Verwaltungsmanagement, KGSt ), the German local authority think tank, developed a common vision for municipal integration management (KGSt 2017, see also KGSt 2005). Its prime focus is on the integration of immigrants from war and crisis-torn countries. An integrated concept provides examples of the diverse and necessary offers and services in the field of integration 5 According to data from the Federal Statistical Office, Wiesbaden (https://www.des tatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesellschaftStaat/Soziales/Sozialleistungen/Asylbewerberlei stungen/Tabellen/Tabellen_EmfaengerBL.html).

7

GERMANY: FROM DENIED IMMIGRATION …

115

within and outside of local government and the ways to coordinate them (Reichwein 2009). Furthermore, practical advice for action in the areas of housing, language, education, labour market and economy, health, sports and culture, as well as the key success factors for municipal integration management, such as citizen engagement, security, digitisation, agility and impact controlling, are given. The KGSt realistically assumes that ‘the starting point in the municipalities differs in many ways and therefore the local challenges. There are no patent solutions’ (KGSt 2017). The addressees of local integration policy are therefore not only the migrants, but also the local population as a whole (Filsinger 2009, p. 284ff.). With regard to municipal integration policy practices, the differences in the status of migrants play only a minor role. As long as a migrant is in town, the local administration is obliged to deal with him and provide support. Even when dealing with refugees without a secure residence status, the non-integration strategy pursued by the federation and some federal states could never be reconciled with the pragmatic interests of the municipalities. It is, however, difficult to pursue this course for those refugees with no prospect of staying in Germany and who will have to leave the country eventually. Although the municipalities bear the main burden for the reception and subsequent integration of the refugees, they are rarely involved in shaping the respective legal framework. They are, therefore, highly dependent on the policy decisions of the federation and the federal states (Aumüller et al. 2015, p. 30ff.). This inevitably leads to some legal, financial and practical difficulties when it comes to implementing local integration policies. Municipalities feel overburdened, in particular by the frequent changes in the law and lack of adequate funding to carry out the integration tasks. In many cases, integration policy at the local level was already much more advanced than ‘federal states and federal policy’ before the refugee crisis of 2015–2016 (Aumüller 2009, p. 128; see also Aumüller et al. 2015). In response to the local situation, municipalities had already started implementing their own ‘integration policy and integrated work’ (Filsinger 2009. p. 291). The predominantly self-confident approach to the challenges has made it possible for many cities, as centres of immigration, to acquire considerable expertise in the field. They assume a moderator role that should not be underestimated (Bommes 2010, p. 36ff.) However, this only applies to some large cities in West Germany.

116

J. FRANZKE

In East Germany and in the peripheral areas, this policy has so far been less successful. Civil society actors and local governments addressed the question of integration long before Germany developed a national strategy, leading to bottom-up integration policy and a high level of civil society engagement (Bommes 2010; Dekker et al. 2015). With regard to coordination and cooperation, integration policies in Germany consist of two dimensions—vertical coordination between multiple levels of political decision-making and implementation (the federal government, governments of the 16 federal states (Länder) and local governments), and horizontal coordination across different governmental departments. This applies to both the federal administration and the administrations of each individual federal state. Beyond this, integration policy is ‘cross-cutting – touching upon education, labour, demographics, the economy, and urban development’ (Bendel 2014, p. 5).

7.3

Trends in Migration and German Migration Policy Since 2015

A long history of immigration spanning decades has greatly changed the fabric of German society with its 81.7 million inhabitants (data from a recent micro-census published by the Federal Statistical Office). In 2017, approximately 19.3 million people living in Germany had a migrant background,6 among whom roughly 51% were German citizens and the others foreigners. This is an increase of 4.4% compared to the previous year. The actual number of foreigners in Germany is around 10.6 million, most of whom have immigrated from Turkey (approx. 1.5 m) and Poland (approx. 0.9 m). The regional distribution of people with a migration background varies throughout Germany. In parts of Hesse, Baden-Wuerttemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia, they make up more than 30% of the population, while in East Germany the figure is only 6–7%. The average age of the German population is 44.1 years, of persons with a migration background 35.4 years, and that of immigrants 23.6 years (Federal Statistical Office 2018).

6 A person has a migrant background if he/she, or at least one parent, was not born with German citizenship.

7

GERMANY: FROM DENIED IMMIGRATION …

117

Since the decision of the federal government under Chancellor Merkel on 5 September 2015 to allow refugees from Hungary to enter Germany without registering, the domestic political situation in Germany has permanently changed. Here are just three important trends worth mentioning. The number of asylum applications in Germany has fallen according to data released by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees since the all-time high of 745,545 (2016) to 222,683 (2017), and 158,512 (January–October 2018). Nevertheless, this has not helped to reassure the situation in Germany. The issue of migration coupled with the associated fears and anxieties among parts of the population continue to be explosive. The surge in the number of refugees seeking sanctuary in Germany from the summer of 2015 onwards led to a considerable increase in the number of Germans committing themselves to providing practical assistance, material and financial donations for refugees. Nearly half of the people living in Germany have been active in some form of civic activity welcoming refugees. Moreover, new and innovative forms of voluntary involvement in refugee aid have emerged (Zentrum für zivilgesellschaftliche Entwicklung 2017, p. 10). Civil society initiatives that support migrants, especially refugees, will continue to be important for the success of integration policies. Since 2015, public attitudes in Germany towards immigration have changed dramatically. Today, society is deeply polarised and in part dissatisfied with how migration issues are being handled. That said, scientific analyses and opinion polls reveal a more positive picture than the partially heated public debate would suggest. The majority of Germans still support immigration. According to the Integration Climate Index (ICI), the index for people without a migration background dropped marginally from 65.4 points in 2015 to 63.8 points in 2016 (Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration 2018, p. 1). The most recent opinion poll carried out by the Allensbach Institute in September 2018 confirms these findings. The study found that 51% of Germans still support immigration in light of labour shortage and population decline, whereas only 28% of Germans were against further immigration. Fears based on immigration into the German social systems, which have the highest support rates in Europe, remain strong and continue to rise. As a result, about two-thirds of Germans are demanding more restrictive regulations on social benefits, especially for refugees and

118

J. FRANZKE

asylum seekers. Many Germans are particularly concerned about the emergence of parallel societies, risks to internal security and cultural conflicts, especially with non-European immigrants, according to a Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung report published on 19 September 2018. These fears are much higher in East Germany than in the West. The conflict over migration policy has led to profound changes in the German party system. Since 2015, the far right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) party has managed to firmly establish itself within the German party system by attracting voters with their strong antiimmigration rhetoric. In September 2017, the party won 12.6% of the vote and entered the German Parliament. Meanwhile, the AfD is represented in every federal state parliament. It is still able to capitalise on the fact that immigration remains one of the most important political issues in Germany. At the same time, electoral mobilisation has been taking place since 2015, with voter turnout increasing in almost every election. According to a survey conducted in June 2018, a large majority (70%) of Germans believe that European countries should work together to tackle the refugee crisis. Only 23% said that each country should decide for itself (IfD Survey No. 11087). At the same time, people in Germany said they felt abandoned by other countries in this regard. Approximately 67% of respondents believed that the other EU Member States were not doing enough to find a common European solution to the refugee situation. The fact that there appears to be no recognisable solidarity within the EU to cope with the refugee crisis is contributing to public uproar in Germany.

7.4

Conclusion

German immigration policy has changed dramatically since the beginning of the refugee crisis in 2015, when Germany adopted an open border policy. Chancellor Merkel has since vowed that ‘a situation like the one in the late summer of 2015 cannot, should not, and must not be repeated’ (Der Spiegel, 6 December 2016). Regardless, German immigration policy remains focused on economic and labour market interests. Germany will continue to fulfil its humanitarian obligations, especially with respect to refugees and asylum seekers. The government is responding to changes in public opinion, which has become more critical of migration. Notwithstanding all the changes, German immigration policy still follows a universalistic approach, the impact of multiculturalism has become less, and assimilation approaches have gained in importance. The federal government is giving more attention than in the past to the

7

GERMANY: FROM DENIED IMMIGRATION …

119

‘limited ability of German society to take in and integrate new migrants’.7 Hence, three key elements characterise Germany’s current national migration policy: better management of immigration, more regulations and restrictions on immigration, while at the same time facilitating the entry of much-needed skilled workers. The German Council of Experts for Integration and Migration (SVR) proposes, for example that a German Immigration Code ‘could summarise and simplify existing immigration regulations and facilitate immigration, especially for skilled workers, ... German authorities should more easily recognise foreign professional qualifications’ (Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration 2019, p. 77). A number of committees propose improving the German education system instead of adopting new integration laws. Better management of migration focuses on the institutional practices of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees and what is needed to speed up its decision-making on welfare issues. A second focus is on new approaches to facilitate the migration of skilled workers to Germany and accelerate the recognition of foreign professional qualifications of refugees and applicants for permanent jobs offers. The federal government attempts to achieve better control of the flow of immigrants, above all, through stronger border controls at the EU external border and, at least temporarily, at the German borders. In addition, the scale of irregular migration is to be reduced and all persons who submit legally officially registered. This new focus is also an indication that the government is responding to the loss of migration control during the years 2015 and 2016. This will be achieved through a series of measures that aim at keeping arrival numbers low and motivating refugees, especially those with little prospect to remain, to leave the country. At the local level, the integration of migrants presents a very mixed picture. The overall integration of immigrants from the EU runs fairly smoothly. Regarding the integration of refugees and asylum seekers, there are still some cities that see immigration as an opportunity and cultivate multicultural approaches. Other cities assume that migrants will adapt and assimilate into society. Taking a next step forward in migration policy, the federal parliament a comprehensive, transparent and easy-to-understand immigration law in July 2019.

7 See https://www.bmi.bund.de/EN/topics/migration/migration-node.html.

120

J. FRANZKE

References Aumüller, J. (2009). Die kommunale Integration von Flüchtlingen. In F. Gesemann & R. Roth (Eds.), Lokale Integrationspolitik in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft. Migration und Integration als Herausforderung von Kommunen (pp. 111–130). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Aumüller, J., Daphi, P., & Biesenkamp, C. (2015). Die Aufnahme von Flüchtlingen in den Bundesländern und Kommunen. In Behördliche Praxis und zivilgesellschaftliches Engagement. Stuttgart: Robert Bosch Stiftung. Bendel, P. (2014). Mainstreaming Immigrant Integration Policy in Germany. In Elizabeth Collett, Milica Petrovic, & Peter Scholten (Eds.), Experiences of Mainstreaming Immigrant Integration in Europe: Lessons for the Netherlands. Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe. Bommes, M. (2010). Kommunen: Moderatoren im Prozess der sozialen Integration. Aus Politik Und Zeitgeschichte, 60, 46–47. Borchert, M., & Bosswick, W. (2011). The Case of Germany. In Migration Policymaking in Europe. The Dynamics of Actors and Contexts in Past and Present (pp. 95–127). Amsterdam: IMISCOE. Brockert, M., & Capone, T. (2010). Introduction: The Local Dimension of Migration Policymaking. In T. Capone & M. Brockert (Eds.), The Local Dimension of Migration Policymaking (pp. 9–23). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Dekker, R., Emilsson, H., Krieger, B., & Scholten, P. (2015). A Local Dimension of Integration Policies? A Comparative Study of Berlin, Malmö, and Rotterdam. International Migration Review, 49(3), 633–658. Deutscher Bundestag. (2015). Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Ulla Jelpke, Sevim Da˘gdelen, Katrin Kunert, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion DIE LINKE (Drs. 18/5614). Zahlen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland lebender Flüchtlinge zum Stand 30. Juni 2015, Drucksache 18/5862. Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration. (2018). Summary of the 2018 Integration Barometer. https://www.svr-migration.de/ wp-content/uploads/2018/09/SVR_Integration_Barometer_2018_Summ ary.pdf. Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. (2018a). The Stages of the Asylum Procedure. An Overview of the Individual Procedural Steps and the Legal Basis. Berlin. http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Publikationen/Bro schueren/das-deutsche-asylverfahren.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. (2018b). Glossary: Integration. http://www.bamf.de/EN/Service/Left/Glossary/_function/glossar.html? nn=1449076&lv2=5832434&lv3=1504366.

7

GERMANY: FROM DENIED IMMIGRATION …

121

Filsinger, D. (2009). Entwicklung, Konzepte und Strategien der kommunalen Integrationspolitik. In F. Gesemann & R. Roth (Eds.), Lokale Integrationspolitik in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft. Migration und Integration als Herausforderungen von Kommunen (pp. 279–296). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Franzke, J. (2017). Refugees Coordinators in German Municipalities: Innovation for Better Coordination Within Local Administration and with Civil Society? Paper presented at 2017 EGPA Congress in PSGIV Local democracy and Governance in Milan, Italy. Franzke, J., Koszel, B., & Sakson, A. (Eds.). (2017). Migrationspolitik in Deutschland und Polen: Herausforderungen und Lösungsansätze in der europäischen Flüchtlingskrise. Potsdam: WeltTrends (Potsdamer Textbücher: Band 31). Gesemann, F., & Roth, R. (Eds.). (2009). Lokale Integrationspolitik in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft. Migration und Integration als Herausforderung von Kommunen. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. KGSt. (2005). Management kommunaler Integrationspolitik. Strategie und Organisation. Kommunale Gemeinschaftsstelle: Köln. KGSt. (2017). Kommunales Integrationsmanagement. Teil 1: Managementansätze und strategische Konzeptionierung, Köln (Bericht 7/2017); Teil 2: Handlungsfelder und Erfolgsfaktoren gestalten, Köln (Bericht 15/2017). Reichwein, A. (2009). Kommunales Integrationsmanagement—Ansätze für eine strategische Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration (2019): Bewegte Zeiten: Rückblick auf die Integrations- und Migrationspolitik der letzten Jahre Jahresgutachten 2019, Berlin. https://www.svr-migration.de/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/SVR_ Jahresgutachten_2019.pdf. Riedel, L., & Schneider, G. (2017). Dezentraler Asylvollzug diskriminiert: Anerkennungsquoten von Flüchtlingen im bundesdeutschen Vergleich 2010– 2015. PVS, 58(1), 21–48. Steuerung der Integrationsarbeit. Lokale Integrationspolitik in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft (Frank Gesemann and Roland Roth, Eds., pp. 297–307). Wiesbaden. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Zentrum für zivilgesellschaftliche Entwicklung (Hrsg.). (2017). Zweiter Engagementbericht der Bundesregierung, zentrale Ergebnisse, März 2017, Freiburg. https://idwonline.de/de/attachmentdata56971.pdf.

CHAPTER 8

Ireland’s Evolving Migrant Policy: Recurring Rhetoric, Sporadic Action Bríd Quinn

8.1

Introduction

‘Céad Míle Fáilte’ (a hundred thousand welcomes) is frequently used as a descriptor of Ireland’s hospitality and openness. But can it be used to encapsulate Ireland’s migrant policies? Because Ireland has traditionally been a country of emigration rather than immigration, until recently, the country’s migration policy developed in a pragmatic and ad hoc manner with most policy development coming about over the past twenty years. The stance has been consistent, promoting a mainstreaming, intercultural and integration-focussed approach. Citizenship issues and naturalisation, labour mobility, social integration, refugee support and asylum issues are recurrent themes in the documents and actions which constitute Ireland’s migration strategy. Much of the policy development has happened at national level but local government is more than just an implementer of national policies and strategies. Policy framing, agenda setting and

B. Quinn (B) Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 J. Franzke and J. M. Ruano de la Fuente (eds.), Local Integration of Migrants Policy, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50979-8_8

123

124

B. QUINN

policy formulation also take place at the local level, in response to specific local circumstances and needs. This chapter reviews migration trends in Ireland and outlines the development of migration policy, its legal foundations and the underlying principles and values. The expanding role of local government in migration policy is then explored and examples of good practice highlighted. Irish attitudes to migrants and the policy challenges are discussed before conclusions are drawn. The EU Labour Force Survey of 2014 is frequently used for comparison of migrant policy data but Ireland (along with Netherlands and Denmark) did not participate in the survey so much of the data in this chapter is drawn from Irish sources.

8.2 Migration: A Growing Phenomenon in Ireland Before examining the content and implementation of migrant policy, it is beneficial to review migration trends. Migration movements to Ireland have ebbed and flowed reflecting domestic and global economic and political changes. A decennial review of Ireland’s immigration statistics since 1987 illustrates the growing rate of in-migration over the last thirty years (Table 8.1). Table 8.1 Immigration statistics Ireland 1987–2017

Year

Immigrants (000)

Population (000)

1987 1997 2007 2017

17.2 44.5 151.1 84.6

3546.5 3664.3 4375.8 4792.5

Source CSO (2017)

The increase in the number of immigrants between 1987 and 1997 is particularly noteworthy and indicates the opportunities of the ‘Celtic Tiger’ era for highly skilled immigrants and the increasing numbers of foreign students opting to study in Ireland. The table also identifies the fluctuation in the number of immigrants over the three decades, a fluctuation brought about by changing socio-economic contexts.

8.3

Composition of the Migrant Population

Many in-migrants are Irish people who emigrated to the UK in the 1950s and 1980s or to the USA and Australia in the 1980s. For example, Mac

8

IRELAND’S EVOLVING MIGRANT POLICY …

125

Éinrí and White (2008) show that returning Irish migrants comprised approximately 40% of the total number of immigrants between 2000 and 2005. However, from the mid-1990s there was a discernible flow of asylum seekers, averaging 10,000 per year in the early 2000s. There were also growing numbers of labour migrants, even prior to the EU enlargement of 2004. Ireland’s decision not to impose visa criteria on migrants from the new EU states led to significant migration from those countries. The economic crisis from 2008 onwards made Ireland a less attractive place for those seeking employment. Nevertheless, the number of non-Irish citizens living in the country continued to increase. The latest figures show that non-Irish nationals account for 12.7% of the overall population (CSO 2019). Ireland’s most recent census, carried out in 2016, showed that 17.3% of residents were foreign born. This is the fourth highest proportion of foreign-born residents within the EU. As Table 8.2 shows, fewer than half of those come from within the EU-15. Table 8.2 Place of birth of Irish citizens 2016

Place of Birth

Population

%

Ireland (including N. Ireland) UK Rest of EU-15 EU-13 Rest of World Total

3,879,515 277,201 63,335 230,452 239,413 4,689,921

82.7 5.9 1.4 4.9 5.1 100

Source CSO (2017)

The 2016 Census indicates that non-Irish nationals living in Ireland originate from 200 different nations. The largest groups are Polish nationals, UK nationals and Lithuanians (McGinnity and Kingston 2017). Ireland attracts proportionally higher numbers of highly educated nonEU-born migrants, with tertiary education among the non-EU-born population in 2015 reaching a rate of 65.3% (Eurostat 2017, p. 11). Yet, Barrett et al. (2017) note that immigrants experienced higher levels of poverty and unemployment than Irish people, with particularly low employment rates for Africans. The Migrant Rights Centre of Ireland has repeatedly highlighted specific areas of employment, such as hospitality, domestic and care work, where migrants are over-represented. The concentration of migrants within local authority areas varies significantly, with disproportionate share of migrants living in cities. The 2016

126

B. QUINN

Census recorded 18.6% of Galway City’s residents as non-Irish while the Donegal local authority area, at 7.3%, had the smallest proportion of non-Irish nationals. The ESRI found that in cities, immigrants from outside the EU and people with poor English language proficiency show a tendency to reside in areas of above-average unemployment (Fahey et al. 2019). Irish towns also vary hugely in the proportion of non-Irish population. In Ballyhaunis (Co. Mayo) non-Irish nationals represent 39.5% of the total population.1 This figure differs significantly from the average non-Irish population of 14.9% for all towns over 1500 in 2016 (CSO 2017). The varying settlement rates mean that migration policy is of greater concern to some local authorities than others.

8.4

Developing Ireland’s Migration Policy

As Ireland became a destination country rather than an emigrant country from the 1990s onwards, clearer migration and asylum policies were required. Policies were developed with relation to eligibility, channels of migration, migrant roles and the rule of law. The approach adopted focussed on integration, aiming to ensure migrants are enabled to participate sufficiently in economic, social and civic life. In developing such policies Ireland has respected its obligations under international law e.g. its commitments on human rights. Processes and policies within the European Economic Area (EEA) and EU have also influenced the development of Ireland’s migration policies Ireland’s approach to reception and integration of Kosovar refugees in the late 1990s was perceived as a model of its kind. The increasing number of asylum seekers in the 1990s led to establishment of the Directorate for Asylum Support Services (DASS) in November 1999. Subsequently, DASS was replaced by the Reception and Integration Agency in 2001. Until January 2003, foreign nationals who were parents of children born in Ireland could apply for permission to remain in Ireland on this basis. In 2004, the Irish Constitution was amended by a referendum, removing the automatic right to citizenship to all those born in Ireland. Legislation based on this amendment came into force in January 2005.

1 Migration to Ballyhaunis has continued since the 1970s when specialist butchers were recruited from Pakistan to work in a newly converted Halal meat plant.

8

IRELAND’S EVOLVING MIGRANT POLICY …

127

In 2004, the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform produced the National Action Plan Against Racism. While the primary focus of the plan was on anti-racism and interculturalism, it drew attention to issues which continue to underpin current migration policy such as service provision, economic inclusion and equality of opportunity. An Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service (INIS) was created in 2005 and is responsible for: asylum, visa, immigration and citizenship processing; asylum and immigration policy; immigrant reception, integration and repatriation. In September 2006, the National Economic and Social Council published a report entitled Managing Migration in Ireland. This seminal document focussed strongly on the labour market dimension and continues to influence migration policy. The integration function was assigned to the new Office of the Minister for Integration in July 2007. The first step towards an explicit migration strategy was publication of Migration Nation—A Statement on Integration Strategy and Diversity Management (2008). The document supported developmental criteria for the acceptance of immigrants, reflecting the thinking of the era. A National Intercultural Health Strategy (2007–2012) provided a framework for action by the health service to respond to increasing cultural diversity. Similarly, an Intercultural Education Strategy was published in 2010. It focussed strongly on ethnicity. The Office of the Minister for Integration was replaced by the Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration (OPMI) in 2011, which aims to develop, drive and coordinate migrant integration policy across government Departments, agencies and services. Following wide consultation, the Migrant Integration Strategy was published in 2017. It delineates 76 actions, with an assigned organisation and clear timeframe for each of the actions. The document stresses that mainstream services should focus on integration in order to ensure that migrants gain equal access to such services. It includes targeted measures to address perceived barriers such as language proficiency and education and contains a number of actions to encourage greater political participation by migrants. The Irish Refugee Protection Programme was established in September 2015 and agreed that Ireland would accept up to 4000 persons seeking protection under the EU Relocation and Resettlement programmes. A total of 2555 people had arrived in Ireland under the programme by July

128

B. QUINN

2019 (PQ 336). In 2016, the position of Minister of State at the Department of Justice and Equality with special responsibility for Equality, Immigration and Integration was created, indicating the new government’s commitment to migrant policy. A public consultation process on Guiding Principles for economic migration policy was implemented in 2018 and a review of the employment permits regime was published in 2019. Most interventions are funded from central government department budgets. Funding from the EU’s Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund enables some projects. Twenty projects were selected to receive e4.5 million between 2017 and 2019. Under the ESF funding stream, Funding for Integration and the Employment of Migrants Projects, e3.3 million has been allocated and e5.2 million has been awarded to promote gender equality. In conjunction with the Migrant Integration Strategy a Communities Integration Fund has been created by the Irish government. During 2019, e526,000 is being made available to support community organisations to promote migrant integration, raise intercultural awareness and combat racism in their local communities.

8.5 Legal Foundations of Ireland’s Migration Policy Because migration was not an issue, for the first sixty years of independence there was little legislative development or case law. The legislative foundation for the Irish immigration system was the Aliens Act 1935. Other relevant legislation includes the Aliens Order 1946; the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Acts 1956–2001; the European Communities Rights of Residence Regulations 1977 and 1997 ; the Refugee Act 1996; the Immigration Act 199 and the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000. From the mid-1990s there was a significant flow of migrants leading to legislation to deal with emerging issues. Legislation included a Refugee Act 1996 implemented in 2000; Immigration Acts in 1999 (dealing with deportations), 2003 (carrier liability) and 2004 (immigration officers’ powers); the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 2004; an Illegal Immigrants Trafficking Act 2000; the International Protection Act 2015 and various Employment Permits Acts between 2003 and 2018. In addition to specific legislation, migration policy is framed by Ireland’s Employment Equality Acts 1998–2011 (which prohibit discrimination at work) and the Equal Status Acts 2000–2012 (which prohibit

8

IRELAND’S EVOLVING MIGRANT POLICY …

129

discrimination outside the workplace). Thus, migration policy is bound by citizenship and employment laws which have become more restrictive and laws upholding equality which have been expanded and strengthened.

8.6 Principles and Values Underpinning Migrant Policies These various national programmes, strategies and legal instruments cumulatively frame Ireland’s migration policy which is multi-faceted. There has been consistency in the principles on which it is based with an integrative approach being championed. The EU’s Common Basic Principles on Integration (agreed in 2004) have acted as a backdrop for developments in Ireland and are reflected in current policies and documents. The core principles articulated in Migration Nation (2008) were: A partnership approach between Government and civil society organisations Integration policy to be integrally linked to wider social inclusion strategies Policies that avoid “the creation of parallel societies, communities and urban ghettoes, i.e. a mainstream approach to service delivery to migrants;” A commitment to effective local delivery mechanisms that align services to migrants with those for indigenous communities. (Office of the Minister for Integration 2018) Reinforcing those principles, the Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration describes the current policy as: • A policy of mainstreaming service delivery for migrants • Promoting interculturalism with emphasis on finding common ground and creating mutual respect • The provision of core public services in a manner that serves all customers equally regardless of cultural identity • A ‘two-way process’ bestowing both rights and responsibilities on migrants and the host society • Mutual adaptation

130

B. QUINN

• A ‘whole-of-Government’ approach • The need to embed migrant integration within the wider social inclusion context through activities of sports clubs, unions, the media etc. • Effective and equitable provision of services through the private sector (e.g. Retail, wholesale, banking etc.) • Local level integration measures • Building capacity and encouraging self-determination among migrants (http://www.integration.ie/en/isec/pages/integrationp olicy). These principles also shape local government’s approach to migrant policy. Although integration is the dominant discourse in Ireland’s migration policy, recently there have been calls to introduce an explicit human rights and equality dimension to the analysis and development of integration policy in Ireland with a study being funded by the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission (see Murphy et al. 2017).

8.7 Implementing Migration Policy: An Expanding Role for Local Government Ireland’s politico-administrative system is strongly centralised. Local government in Ireland has more limited functions than is the case in most European countries. Because of this, local government has limited resources but implements many national policies on behalf of the government. Thus, local government is seen as a key player in the implementation of Ireland’s migration policy and the local authority role has become more specific in recent policy iterations. Until the mid2000s, the approach was one of piecemeal integration activities, often promoted by the various local development/social inclusion organisations and frequently funded under EU programmes such as LEADER or the National Anti-poverty strategies in collaboration with local authorities. From the mid-2000s local authorities had become more involved in migrant issues but recession from 2008 onwards affected the nature and pace of integration activities which were curtailed due to local authorities’ reduced resources. Publication of Migrant Nation in 2008 set expectations about the role of local authorities in achieving integration, highlighted the need

8

IRELAND’S EVOLVING MIGRANT POLICY …

131

for dedicated funding and stimulated activity by local authorities. Many authorities established working groups or networks to coordinate migrant integration activities. The 2015 Migrant Integration Strategy specifies a number of actions expected to be carried out by local authorities, namely Action 17. Initiatives will be undertaken aimed at increasing the number of migrant representatives in local authority fora, like Public Participation Networks (PPNs) and other representative fora • Action 52 Integration strategies will be updated • Action 53 A Migrant Integration Forum will be established in every local authority area • Action 60 Multi-lingual materials on voter registration and on elections will be made accessible and available • Action 62 Local Authorities will take action to have migrant representation on all Joint-Policing Committees • Action 64 Local Authorities will develop and publish their policy on the early removal of racist graffiti in their respective areas. Progress has been uneven with regard to these Actions, particularly with regard to migrant integration strategies. Some local authorities (8) have specific strategies. Others (11) detail their integration actions in other plans, such as the Local Economic and Community Plans. The remaining eleven local authorities are in the process of creating plans or strategies (OPMI 2019). The Immigrant Council found significant variations in the structure, focus and content of the 21 plans they analysed and in the degree to which the plans were driven by local authorities. They state that ‘some plans were almost 100% driven by the NGO sector’ (2018, p. 8). However, it must be borne in mind that the socio-economic context, national policies and local government structures and responsibilities changed during the diverse time-frames of the plans analysed. Common themes in the plans include awareness-raising about migrant issues, data-collection, engagement strategies and the need for supports with regard to housing and English language proficiency. In the spheres where local government has a mandate such as social housing, libraries, and electoral processes, councils have made clear commitments to integration. Since the local government reforms of 2014, Local Community Development Committees (LCDCs) operate in each local authority area bringing together local authority elected members

132

B. QUINN

and officials; State and non-State local development agencies; community and voluntary organisations and other representatives of civil society. The reforms of 2014 assigned a clear local economic development function to local councils who are now obliged to produce six-year Local Community and Economic Plans (LECPs) to which LCDCs make an important contribution. Disappointingly, the Immigrant Council’s review of LECPs found that while some plans contained specific integration actions, five of the 31 made no mention of migrants. However, many of the LCDC constituent organisations are involved in various aspects of migrant policy. Furthermore, Local Authorities are expected to take action to ensure migrant representation on all Joint-Policing Committees. As highlighted above, because of their limited functions the work of local councils in developing, implementing and evaluating migrant policy depends significantly on the contribution of NGOS, voluntary groups and collaboration with other public sector organisations. The organisations described below typify the non-state bodies which enable local authorities to achieve their migration policy aims. The New Communities Partnership (NCP) is an independent national network of 175 immigrant led groups which work with local authorities. Doras Luimní (established in Limerick but now with branches in Portlaoise and Wexford) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation working to promote and protect human rights. The Jesuit Refugee Service is an NGO which conducts advocacy work as well as providing direct support services to refugees. The Immigrant Support Clinic offers free information, advice, advocacy and support for immigrant communities in Kilkenny. Mayo Intercultural Action is a community organisation promoting the positive effects of interculturalism and participation of refugees, asylum seekers, migrants and their families in all aspects of the community in County Mayo. Many of the education and employment interventions for migrants tend to be delivered by bodies such as local development organisations and Education and Training Boards which liaise with but are not part of local government. Other state agencies such as the Health Service Executive (HSE), INTREO (which deals with all employment and income supports) and the Gardaí (police) have statutory responsibility for key elements of integration. The extent of inter-agency collaboration on migrant issues varies significantly between local authority areas, reflecting contextual and organisational culture issues.

8

IRELAND’S EVOLVING MIGRANT POLICY …

133

8.8 Examples of Good Practice and Innovation by Local Government Over the years, local government in Ireland has introduced many innovative actions focussed on migrants. Some local authorities such as Dublin City Council and Limerick City and County Council are currently implementing their third integration strategies and have extrapolated lessons from previous strategies, carried out needs analyses and implemented widespread consultation processes in order to increase the effectiveness of their policies. Since the majority of migrants settled in cities, urban local authorities were often to the fore in developing strategies but councils in rural areas have also devised and implemented migrant policies. Below are examples of the pro-active approach of some local authorities. • Meath, Longford, Louth, Kilkenny, Laois and Kerry councils were recently assessed as achieving ‘reasonably good integration of migrant issues into their Local Community and Economic Plans’ (Immigrant Council 2018, p. 10). • Limerick City Council established an Integration Working Group (IWG) in 2007 to bring together statutory, non-statutory and voluntary bodies to share information and best practice. The IWG continues to lead migrant policy activity in the local authority, and is responsible for coordinating the implementation of the 2017–2021 Integration Plan. • From their establishment, local authority social inclusion units have concerned themselves with migration issues and policies. For example, in 2002 Limerick City Council’s SIU produced a booklet on Asylum Seekers and Refugees. • In Cork, a multi-agency steering committee led by Cork City Council’s SIU is currently working towards the achievement of Sanctuary status for the city. • The four Dublin councils are jointly running a project on Promoting Civic Participation of Third Country Nationals through Local Authority Platforms. • Louth County Council supports Louth Minority Ethnic Consortium’s ‘Integration of Target Communities’ programme under its Peace & Reconciliation Partnership.

134

B. QUINN

• Donegal County Council has been requested by the Department of Justice and Equality to act as the lead agency supporting the resettlement of UNHCR Programme Refugees in Donegal. • In Galway, the BRIDGE project promotes the effective delivery of reception and integration supports to asylum seekers and third country nationals living in Galway City and County. It is supported by Galway City Council and the AMIF. • Clare County Council supports the work of Clare Immigrant Support Centre (CISC) which provides a range of free services and programmes to immigrants. • Offaly Sports Partnership leads the Integrated Academy for Athletic Performance (IAAP) involving young people from counties Sligo, Offaly, Galway and Laois. The project aims to increase the visibility and performance of children of an ethnic minority background in sport. • Mayo, Donegal & South Dublin County Councils have identified Cultural Diversity, with a specific reference to new communities, as a key area for strategic development within their arts services and local cultural provision. These examples convey the diversity of approaches to migrant issues being adopted in different local authority areas. They illustrate the way in which local authorities act upon national policies while also responding to local policy needs and collaborating and sharing best practice with other local authorities, NGOs and state agencies.

8.9

Irish Attitudes and Opinions on Migration

All these activities take place in a context which is shaped by generally positive attitudes towards migrants. Irish people’s attitudes towards migrants tend to be less extreme than is the case in other countries. However, those attitudes have been strongly influenced by the country’s economic situation (Turner and Cross 2015; McGinnity et al. 2018) with attitudes varying in line with socio-economic changes. In 2002 Irish attitudes were perceived to be among the most liberal in Europe. By 2010 attitudes had become more negative (this is not surprising in a period of severe economic hardship) but had become more positive by 2014. A 2018 study by McGinnity et al. examines evidence from the European Social Survey. It finds that Irish attitudes to immigrants and immigration

8

IRELAND’S EVOLVING MIGRANT POLICY …

135

vary significantly over time, depending on the ethnicity of the migrants, the respondents’ education, their financial security and on the level of individual contact people have with people from different ethnic backgrounds. While there is strong support for immigrants of the same ethnic group, support for specific groups of migrants such as Roma is lower in Ireland than the average for ten other Western European countries surveyed. However, Irish people’s attitudes do not vary much with age or whether they are rural or urban dwellers. Unlike other European countries, Irish attitudes are not affected by whether their politics are classed as left wing or right wing. It would seem that Irish attitudes at local level continue to be positive. A 2018 Eurobarometer showed that 80% of Irish respondents selected the response Integration is successful in the local area or country. This was the highest proportion of positive responses across all EU member states and 26% above the EU average (Special Eurobarometer 469). The Minister of State with special responsibility for equality, immigration and integration said that the findings are ‘encouraging and are a credit to local communities and organisations working in support of integration throughout Ireland’ (Stanton 2018).

8.10

Challenges

Ireland’s migration policy has emerged in a pragmatic manner which is often reactive, emerging in response to various problems or obligations. There are challenges specific to local government but many of the challenges confronting local government regarding migrant policy are general problems. The characterisation of migrants continues to change. It has evolved from minority ethnic categorisations to the incorporation of second and third generations with immigrant backgrounds. Such change brings challenges in the targeting of interventions. Similarly, the heterogeneity of the migrant community presents challenges to all policy actors to accommodate the diversity of needs and expectations. Immigrant integration in Ireland, as elsewhere, varies significantly depending on country of origin, level of education and ethnicity. Education and employment policies fall within the jurisdiction of national government in Ireland so issues such as recognition and equivalence of qualifications and English language proficiency are national challenges. Yet, migrants tend to concentrate in specific local authority areas leading to intensification of these challenges. The incremental nature of migrant policy and the

136

B. QUINN

distributed responsibility for its implementation enable flexibility between government levels and between implementing bodies. But this fluidity also presents accountability and effectiveness challenges. Resource issues affect the implementation of migrant policy by Ireland’s local government, a sector particularly affected by the austerity regime. Responses to a questionnaire listed ‘lack of adequate resourcing for the strategy’ as one of two key impediments to implementation of local migrant strategies (Immigrant Council 2018, p. 12). Respondents also referred to lack of expertise or staff training in local authorities to effectively engage with migrant communities. Language barriers, service limitations and an inadequate supply of housing are further challenges to achieving the aims of the strategy. Although mandatory (e.g. LCDC) and voluntary (e.g. integration networks) structures have been created to facilitate inter-agency collaboration regarding integration and other issues at local government level, such collaboration is uneven. It proves difficult to get all stakeholders together to implement even the agreed actions of the LECPs. With migrant issues often perceived as peripheral, collaboration is sporadic. Respondents to the Immigrant Council questionnaire highlighted ‘difficulty engaging stakeholder organisations to participate in the strategy and attend meetings or events’ (2018, p. 10) as a serious implementation challenge. This is not peculiar to Irish local authorities as the international literature on partnership describes similar problems with inter-agency collaboration elsewhere (See, for example, Vangen et al. 2015). There are challenges regarding information and understanding which can shape attitudes towards migration and affect integration. There have been isolated incidents of racism and hate-crime and some incidences of NIMBYISM (Not in my back yard). Without accurate information about the number of migrants and their occupations, etc., perceptions of economic and cultural threats from migrants can persist among the public. In the recent Special Eurobarometer, Ireland scored less than the EU average in terms of the number of respondents who felt that they were ‘well informed about immigration and integration’, with only 35% of respondents in Ireland feeling ‘well informed’. This suggests a greater need for dissemination of accurate information on the characteristics of migrants and the diversity of Ireland’s immigrants. Similarly, respondents to the Immigrant Council’s questionnaire identified ‘the indigenous population believing migrants represent competition for resources in the

8

IRELAND’S EVOLVING MIGRANT POLICY …

137

areas of education, health, housing and employment’ as one of the key challenges to migrant integration (Immigrant Council 2018, p. 11). Involvement by migrants in Ireland’s political life is sporadic although the UNHCR observes that Ireland is unusual in having easy access to politicians, representatives and institutions in general (UNHCR 2014). With regard to the MIPEX international indicators of the political participation of migrants, Ireland scored highly in 2015 on electoral rights, political liberties, consultative bodies and implementation policies (See http://www.mipex.eu/ireland). This reflects the fact that everybody who lives in Ireland may stand for election and vote in local elections. The problems of mobilising migrants to become politically involved at local level may also be linked to the limited range of functions at local government level. ‘It is arguably a challenging task to mobilize migrants if the comparatively weak local government cannot address most of their concerns ranging from immigration, health and education, unlike in European countries’ (Szlovak 2017, p. 856). However, increasing the level of political participation of migrants is a key theme in the Migrant Integration Strategy. Action 58 states that migrants will be encouraged to participate in local and national politics to the extent that these areas are legally open to them and places the responsibility for this on political parties. Action 59 declares that migrants will be supported and encouraged to register to vote. The Migrant Mobilisation Conference in March 2018 brought together more than 100 migrant community leaders in order to promote migrant participation in politics ahead of the local elections in 2019. Subsequently, fifty-three ‘new Irish’ candidates contested the local elections in 2019 and eight councillors from a migrant background were elected. Interestingly, migrant candidates tend to adopt an ‘apolitical community representative approach’ which differs from the highly partisan approach common in Ireland’s multi-seat constituency elections. Many of the local migrant strategies analysed by the Immigration Council mention the need to support political engagement and increase voter registration among migrants. Such actions are slowly bearing fruit.

8.11

Conclusions

Globalisation, transnational mobility, transnational labour markets and transnational social and political issues have brought migration policy high on the agenda of governments. This has resulted in a myriad of

138

B. QUINN

approaches to migrant policy and in many countries to the emergence of a form of ‘immigration federalism’ with responsibility for migrant policy dispersed over various levels of government. Local governments endeavour to design (and/or) implement migrant policies that match social and economic needs with differing socio-political contexts. Policy trends and policy convergence can be discerned but national and local specificities are determining factors in the moulding of migration policies as illustrated by the Irish case detailed in this chapter. Ireland’s migration policy is multi-dimensional and targeted at economic, political and social migrants with varying needs and skill levels. Policy development has been relatively recent and mainly reactive, responding to the waves of asylum seekers since the 1990s; the labour market migrants generated by the 2004 enlargement of the European Union; the opportunities of the Celtic Tiger economy and the recent recovery as well as the continuing flow of student and family migrants. The underpinning principles suggest a tolerant attitude and a focus on multiculturalism and integration reflecting trends in migration policy elsewhere. The components of the policy cover legal, financial, educational and welfare dimensions, necessitating collaboration within and between levels of government and involving state and non-governmental actors. There is recognition that a multi-level approach is necessary not only to achieve diversity but also to address issues such as housing, employment and education which are crucial to enabling integration. Consequently, local authorities are significant actors in the sphere. However, their role is constrained by their limited range of functions and councils’ limited resources and underdeveloped capacity for migrant policy interventions. Nevertheless, the examples described in this chapter indicate the interest and innovation that is evident among local authorities. Local policies, structures and processes for governing migration, integration and diversity continue to evolve reflecting national and local priorities and perceptions. There is evidence of policy entrepreneurship by some local authorities and individuals within councils. There is also evidence of effective action by NGOs and evidence which illustrates that when collaboration is enabled, successful interventions occur. As the elements of the national migrant strategy are increasingly implemented, the tasks designated to local authorities should expand the range, intensity and impact of migrant policy at local level. There is awareness of the need for greater diversity in local administrative and representative bodies. Both top-down and bottom-up efforts to mobilise migrants are emerging

8

IRELAND’S EVOLVING MIGRANT POLICY …

139

but change is slow. The rhetoric of integration and diversity is ubiquitous but migrants and migrant issues are rarely at the top of the agenda. Among Ireland’s local authorities, differences in priorities and organisational cultures, varying concentrations of migrants and differing levels of resources mean that migrant policy is piecemeal and not yet fully forged.

References Barrett, A., McGinnitty, F., & Quinn, E. (Eds.). (2017). Monitoring Report on Integration 2016. Dublin: ESRI. Commission of the European Communities. (2018). Special Eurobarometer 469 Integration of Immigrants in the European Union. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/results-special-eurobarom eter-integration-immigrants-european-union_en. Accessed May 20, 2018. CSO. (2017). Census of Population 2016—Profile 7. Migration and Diversity. Dublin: Central Statistics Office. Available at https://www.cso.ie/en/ csolatestnews/presspages/2017/census2016profile7-migrationanddiversity. Accessed June 16, 2018. CSO. (2019). Population and Migration Estimates 2019. Available at https:// www.cso.ie/en/csolatestnews/presspages/2019/populationandmigrationes timates2019. Accessed August 29, 2019. Department of Justice and Equality. (2017). The Migrant Integration Strategy: A Blueprint for the Future. Dublin. Available at http://www.justice.ie/ en/JELR/Migrant_Integration_Strategy_English.pdf. Accessed September 5, 2018. Eurostat. (2017, March). Migration and Migration Population Statistics. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/Mig ration_and_migrant_population_statistics#Migrant_population. Accessed May 20, 2018. Fahey, É., Russell, H., McGinnity, F., & Grotti, R. (2019). Diverse Neighbourhoods. Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) Research Series. Immigrant Council of Ireland. (2018). Discussion Document and Proposed Actions for Local Authorities on Developing Local Migrant Integration Strategies. Dublin: Immigrant Council. Available at https://www.immigrant council.ie/sites/default/files/2018-07/Keeping%20it%20local%20Report% 20WEB%20version.pdf. Accessed July 30, 2018. Mac Éinrí, P., & White, A. (2008, July). Immigration into the Republic of Ireland: A Bibliography of Recent Research. Irish Geography, 41(2), 151–179. McGinnity, F., Grotti, R., Russell, H., & Fahey, É. (2018). Attitudes to Diversity in Ireland. Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) Research

140

B. QUINN

Series. Available at https://www.ihrec.ie/app/uploads/2018/03/Attitudesto-diversity-in-Ireland.pdf. McGinnity, F., & Kingston, G. (2017). An Irish Welcome? Changing Irish Attitudes to Immigrants and Immigration: The Role of Recession and Immigration. The Economic and Social Review, 48(3), 253–279. Murphy, C., Caulfield, L., & Gilmartin, M. (2017). Developing Integration Policy in the Public Sector. Maynooth: Maynooth University. National Economic and Social Council (NESC). (2006). Managing Migration in Ireland: A Social and Economic Analysis. Dublin: Stationery Office. OPMI. (2019). Progress Report on Ireland’s National Migrant Integration Strategy. Dublin: Office for the Promotion of Migrant Integration. PQ 336. (2019). Parliamentary Question 336. Available at https://www.oireac htas.ie/en/debates/question/2019-07-11/336/. Accessed August 29, 2019. Stanton, D. (2018, April 17). Minister of State Stanton Welcomes Ireland’s Results in Special Eurobarometer on Immigrant Integration. Available at http://www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/Pages/ireland-scores-highly-on-att itudes-towards-immigrant-integration (Press Release). Szlovak, P. (2017). Exploring the Reasons for Migrant Under-Representation in Irish Electoral Politics: The Role of Irish Political Parties. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 40(5), 851–870. Turner, T., & Cross, C. (2015). Do Attitudes to Immigrants Change in Hard Times? Ireland in a European Context. European Societies, 17 (3), 372–395. UNHCR. (2014). Refugee Integration, Capacity and Evaluation in Europe: Ireland Report. Dublin: UNHCR. Vangen, S., Hayes, J. P., & Cornforth, C. (2015). Governing Cross-Sector, Interorganizational Collaborations. Public Management Review, 17 (9), 1237– 1260.

CHAPTER 9

Reception of Asylum Seekers and Refugees in France: Between Rigour and Humanism Christophe Bonnotte and Michel Sénimon

9.1

Introduction

France is the oldest country of immigration in Europe since the second half of the nineteenth-century mass immigration has come to fill workforce shortages. Therefore, it was depicted as a land of welcome. Since then, France has developed an entry and residence system in the country which basically responds to labour market changes and more generally to the economic sector developments but which also claims to stick to a humanist and universalist tradition inherited from the Enlightenment, characterised by the protection made available to victims of persecution or violence because of their religious beliefs or their political or philosophical convictions (asylum seeker and refugee status).

C. Bonnotte (B) EUROPA Association, Limoges, France e-mail: [email protected] M. Sénimon University Limoges, Limoges, France e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 J. Franzke and J. M. Ruano de la Fuente (eds.), Local Integration of Migrants Policy, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50979-8_9

141

142

C. BONNOTTE AND M. SÉNIMON

The evolution of legislation setting out the conditions of entry and stay of foreigners in France has been marked by exacerbated sensitivity of the population on this subject which has been used also by the political class: thus, beyond the sole criteria for recognition of refugee status, the conditions for stay on the national territory during the instruction phase are characterised by a desire of the public authorities to control asylum seekers. The French system is also marked by a problematic articulation of competences between the State and the local authorities: if the competences as regards entry and stay on the national territory as well as the recognition of the refugee status belong well to the State, it is the local authorities which are on the front lines as regards the hands-on organisation of their reception and integration.

9.2 Migration Issue in France: Statistical Data Concerning Immigration to France Immigration data (migration flows, asylum, naturalisation) for 2018 were published by the Ministry of the Interior on 15 January 2019. During the migration flows, France issued 3,420,395 visas in 2017 (+11% compared to 2016). In 2018, the number of visas issued by France amounted to 3,571,399 (+4.4% compared to 2017). This increase results from a rise in the number of short-stay visas and in particular tourist visas. In 2017, 247,436 first residence permits were issued (+7.4%). This increase between 2016 and 2017 was largely due to the increase of the first cases of refugee status and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection (35,825 statuses, an increase of 56.5% compared to 2016). In 2018, 255,550 first residence permits were issued (+3.3% compared to 2017). Among the variety of reasons for applying for a residence permit, the family reason remains on top, followed by professional immigration accounting for 13% of permits issued (11% in 2017 but representing an increase of 20.5% compared to 2016). In 2018, 80,580 (80,339 in 2017) first residence permits were issued to students. Concerning illegal immigrants, 30,276 left the French territory in 2018 (versus 26,783 in 2017), including 17,887 by forced deportations (16,489 in 2017) and 2070 by assisted returns (1078 in 2017). As regards asylum, in 2018, the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless People (OFPRA) received 122,743 asylum applications, an increase of 22% compared to 2017 (100,755 asylum

9

RECEPTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES …

143

applications, up 17% from 2016); OFPRA and the National Asylum Court (CNDA) issued a total of 33,380 decisions granting protection status (refugee or subsidiary protection, 31,964 decisions taken in 2017). The final rate of approval of the refugee status is 35.7% in 2018 (stable percentage compared to 2016—37.7%—and 2017—35.8%). Finally, in terms of naturalisation, 7778 persons acquired in 2018 French nationality by decree or by marriage (−7% compared to 2017, the year in which 83,674 persons had acquired French nationality). The 2017 activity report (the most recent activity report published to date, published on 12 June 2018) of the French Office of Immigration and Integration (OFII)—one of the two main operators in reception and integration of asylum seekers and refugees in France—announced 97,549 asylum seekers for 2017, excluding accompanied minors, registered at the one-stop shops against 77,142 in 2016, representing an increase of 26.5%. At the same time, the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless People (OFPRA) has recorded 92,275 first-time applicants, an increase of 19.2% over 2016. The OFPRA data on first-time asylum seekers also highlight the following trends: the group of the first 5 nationalities applying for asylum is composed of Albanian, Afghan, Syrian, Haitian and Sudanese nationals with, respectively 12.3, 7.1, 6.1, 6 and 5.1% of total applications; the share of “European” applicants represents 28.1% of all first-time asylum seekers; the share of “African” applications represents 38.6%, an increase of 14.9%; the share of “Asian” applicants represents 25.6% of the global flow. There is no change compared to its 2016 level; the share of “American” asylum seekers totals 7.3% of the overall flow of first-time applicants, up 11.5%. The OFII’s activity report also provides insight into the following points: • The asylum seeker allowance (ADA see below) in 2017 was available to 81,000 beneficiary households monthly, i.e. about 113,000 people (+13%) for an average monthly amount of e361 paid per household (an annual total of e350 million: +14%) • 2142 people were relocated (1981 from Greece and 161 from Italy) • In 2017, the national system for the reception of asylum seekers proposed 77,182 places of accommodation (54,145 in 2016, i.e. + 42.5%), • 18,487 cases (+11.5%) were filed for family reunification

144

C. BONNOTTE AND M. SÉNIMON

• 69,509 people received a medical check-up (−67.8%). • 110,066 long-stay visas valid for residence permit (VLS-TS) were validated (+13.3%) • 103,184 Republican Integration Contracts (RICs) were signed (−2.8%); 53.5% of signatories were referred to language training (+12.8 points).

9.3

Public Opinion on the Migration Issue

Various surveys conducted by polling institutes in France unambiguously speak for a strong feeling of mistrust, if not hostility, towards immigration in general and refugees and migrants, in particular. This feeling of hostility has been also fairly constant over time. There are many public opinion polls on this topic and we will limit ourselves here to only two that seem to illustrate this feeling of mistrust and its steadiness. The first survey, whose results we would like to discuss here, was published on 12 July 2017; it was produced by the French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP). It is entitled The French and their perceptions of immigration, refugees and identity. It shows the following trends: a large majority of the French think that the pace of immigration has accelerated: 85% of respondents believe that the number of foreigners living in France has increased in the last five years (even though, in fact, neither the pace of immigration nor the net migration to France has increased during the last decade). This survey also shows a strong feeling of mistrust, if not rejection or denunciation, of the implementation of the policy of reception of refugees and immigrants in France and in Europe. The reasons given are due to the economic climate and the employment situation that would not accommodate a larger foreign population; this opposition to policies of reception and integration for refugees and migrants are also fuelled by a feeling of insecurity linked to terrorist attacks in France and Europe. Thus, 45% of respondents are in favour of the closing of national borders to immigrants, including refugees, because they cannot accommodate them. Only 21% of respondents agree with the statement that “most refugees who come to France will succeed in integrating in society”. 46% of respondents disagree with this statement. The second survey whose conclusions we would like to present here was carried out for the BVA—Regional Press for the 2019 European elections. Entitled the French, the European Union and the migration issue, this poll was conducted from 26 November to 6 December 2018. It

9

RECEPTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES …

145

appears that 7 out of 10 French people have a harsh opinion on the migration policy of France as well as of Europe: 67% of the French have a negative opinion of the relevant action taken by France and 68% of Europe’s work in this field. Logically, 59% of the French consider that the European Union should show greater firmness regarding the reception of migrants while only 27% consider that it should show more humanity. For 63% of the French, France welcomes too many migrants and only 52% agree with the idea that France should accommodate refugees who seek asylum because they are persecuted in their country. In this regard, the BVA polling institute takes note of sharpening opinions on the asylum issue, this figure being 13 points lower than a previous survey conducted in January 2018 (BVA poll for L’Obs: 65% of the French think they should welcome asylum seekers) and 23 points lower than an IPSOS survey for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in November 1999 (74% of the French declared themselves in 1999 at the heart of Balkan crisis, in favour of the right of asylum, 59% of respondents said they were ready to “donate their time to participate in aid campaigns”. More than half of the French were ready to make donations to the UNHCR, and a third said they were ready to “host a refugee or refugees for a given period of time”. However, 47% of the interviewees felt that the priority was to “encourage, where possible, the return of refugees to their country of origin”. A majority of French people are opposed to the idea of hosting a larger number of migrants in the EU (53%) at national (61%) and regional (60%) levels. Finally, for 67% of the French, the migration crisis endangers the future of the European Union.

9.4 Main Characteristics of France’s Migration Policies France has been a country of immigration since the second half of the nineteenth century. Until 1945, there is no immigration policy as such, but simply short-term measures, responding to specific situations or issues as regards control of foreign communities (Lochak 2006). Since 1945, the state has been gradually intervening much more willingly and actively in immigration matters. After the Liberation, the legal framework applicable to foreigners was based on the adoption, very hastily, of the ordinance of 19 October 1945 intended to establish the

146

C. BONNOTTE AND M. SÉNIMON

rules of acquisition of the French nationality and the ordinance of 2 November 1945 on the entry and stay of foreigners in France: (Spire 2008). The ordinance of 2 November 1945 (repealed by Ordinance No 2004-1248 of 24 November 2004 on the Legislative Part of the Code on the Entry and Stay of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum), in its initial version, deals essentially with two major topics: “on the one hand, the identity card of foreigners which characterises the mode of their stay in France, then the deportation, which will end this stay” (Batiffol 1948). Beyond the concerns expressed by the 1945 ordinance—the regulation of the entry and stay of foreigners on the national territory; the organisation of the possibility of their deportation for reasons of public order—the policy that will be followed in this area is largely determined by economic considerations, and particularly labour (Lochak 2006). Faced with the consequences of the 1973 oil crisis on the economy (following the Yom Kippur war), and the resulting increase in unemployment, the State Secretariat for Immigrant Workers, abolished in 1938, was reinstated by the new President of the Republic. Valery Giscard d’Estaing temporarily suspended immigration for workers and families on 3 July 1974: he insisted on the importance of controlling the flow of labour force as a solution to reverse the upward curve of unemployment. Since 1977 onwards, France’s migration policy has further tightened by promoting voluntary departures (return assistance) or not (facilitation of deportations, especially of foreigners whose residence permits have expired). These guidelines will be against international commitments binding on France and the principles enshrined in the internal legal order. Opposition by the political class, both right and left wing—for obviously different reasons—will condemn these draft measures. The political change of 1981 and the coming to power of the Socialist Party and the leftist forces deeply affected France’s migration policy (Law 81-973 of 29 October 1981 on the conditions of entry and residence of foreigners in France (precise definition of the type of documents required for entry and changes in the conditions of deportation of an illegal alien). It defines three main orientations: (1) The guarantee of the right to stay of immigrants present on the national territory. (2) The cancellation of return assistance schemes. (3) Reform of the deportation regime: apart from a situation of absolute urgency, the deportation decision must be approved by an ad hoc committee, and cannot be pronounced by the prefects alone.

9

RECEPTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES …

147

The affirmation of a right to stay is accompanied by a legalisation campaign (Interministerial Circular specifying the conditions of exceptional legalisation introduced for clandestine workers and other illegal immigrants, this regulation affected a total of 130,000 people) and recognition of new rights for foreigners (freedom of association for foreign residents). The austerity turn in the face of the economic crisis and long-term unemployment, and the responsiveness of public opinion to migration issues (correlated with the electoral success of the far-right antiimmigration party, the National Front) will be an incentive to the left of the government to tighten its migration policy. These ones will henceforth meet two main objectives which will remain the paradigms of immigration policies in the future (which are characterized by the accumulation of legislative texts and reflect the sensitivity of this question in public opinion, to which the political power must address signs testifying to its capacity to control the subject, and at the same time the ineffectiveness, the vacuum of these migratory policies, powerless to provide a long-term, stable over time, balanced solution to this question): control migratory flows, and the integration of current communities. Various texts adopted over the past decade bear the mark of this search for a balance between firmness and generosity, or, at the very least, solidarity with fragile, vulnerable communities. The most recent texts adopted since 2015 try to reconcile the strengthening of the rights of refugees and asylum seekers with strict control of immigration is the Law No 2015-925 of 29 July 2015 reforming the right to asylum reinforces the rights of asylum seekers and consolidates the rights of asylum seekers: • It allows asylum seekers to benefit from advice before the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless People (OFPRA); • It systematises the suspensive appeal to the National Asylum Court (CNDA) for asylum seekers, even in an accelerated procedure; • It also allows a better diagnosis and taking into account vulnerabilities at all stages of the applicant’s journey (sick people, women victims of violence, minors …) • It speeds up the proceedings, without compromising the quality of the investigation and preserving the rights of the applicants. The goal is at the end of 2016 to reduce the processing of an asylum application to an average of 9 months, while it is now nearly 15 months. The entire asylum application chain is reviewed in this sense: the

148

C. BONNOTTE AND M. SÉNIMON

first associative reception until the end of the asylum procedure. To achieve this objective, substantial resources have been allocated to OFPRA whose independence is enshrined in the law as regards education. As for the CNDA, it is at the heart of the litigation system. • It creates hands-on housing for asylum seekers across the country, to avoid territorial concentrations. This is accompanied by the development of accommodation in CADA: the goal is eventually that every asylum seeker—who wishes so—to find accommodation in the territory of the Republic, and quality social monitoring. The law of 7 March 2016 on the right of foreigners pursues 3 main objectives, namely to better welcome and integrate those who have the right to settle in France, to promote the mobility of excellence, knowledge and expertise and to fight more effectively against illegal migratory flows, with due respect for human rights. Firstly, the law generalises, after the first year of legal residence in the territory, the multi-year residence permits which will have a duration of between 2 and 4 years. This development contributes to securing the right to stay for legal foreigners but also to simplifying their administrative procedures. This will also reduce the number of visits to offices of prefectures for the benefit of improving the reception of foreigners. Then, the law created a new residence permit designed to strengthen the attractiveness of France for international talents: the “talent passport”. This residence permit, for a period of up to 4 years from the first issue, targets foreign nationals likely to contribute to our competitiveness and our influence. Finally, the law strengthens tools to fight against illegal immigration. Its first aim is to increase the effectiveness of house arrest prior to the deportation of illegal aliens. It reforms the litigation system of administrative detention, transferring from the administrative court to the judge of freedoms and detention (JLD) the control of the legality of the administrative detention decision, the latter being considered as more protective of freedoms (the JLD will now intervene after 48 hours) and more effective. The Law of 10 September 2018 for controlled immigration, an effective right of asylum and successful integration pursues three objectives: To reduce the time to investigate the asylum application, to strengthen the fight against illegal immigration and to improve the reception of

9

RECEPTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES …

149

foreigners admitted to stay for their skills and talents. The purpose of the law is to reduce the waiting time for the asylum application to six months on average and to facilitate the deportation of rejected persons to the border. Foreigners arriving in France will have 90 days from their arrival to apply for asylum, against 120 previously. Asylum seekers will have 15 days, instead of one month before, to appeal the decisions of the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless People (Ofpra) on the granting of refugee status before the National Asylum Court (CNDA). Appealing the asylum decision will no longer allow the suspension of a deportation decision for people from the so-called “safe” countries. In addition, a rejected applicant will no longer be able to apply for another stay except in the event of new circumstances. During the appeal period granted to unsuccessful applicants who will have to leave the territory, recourse to house arrest will be possible. The maximum duration of detention will be doubled from 45 to 90 days. The administrative deduction for verification of the right of residence will be increased from 16 to 24 hours. The offence of unauthorised crossing of external borders to space will be punished with one year in prison and 3750 euros in fines. The law provides for exchange of information between the French Office for Immigration and Integration (OFII) and emergency accommodation services, concerning asylum seekers and refugees. The law aims to guarantee the right to stay of beneficiaries of international protection and their family members, by extending the duration of the residence permit for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection and stateless people and the benefits of subsidiary protection to four years (instead of one year), from the moment of their first admission to the residence and when it is renewed. It standardizes the conditions of issue of residence permits for family members of beneficiaries of international protection and extends the benefit of family reunification to the siblings of underage refugees. The law also provides enhanced protection for girls who are at risk of FGM and contains protective provisions for victims of domestic violence. The text expands the scope of the talent passport to employees of innovative companies. The mobility of students and researchers between their country of origin and France will be facilitated, but also within the framework of intra-European mobility programmes. The job search will be facilitated for those who have completed their studies in France and will justify a sufficient level.

150

C. BONNOTTE AND M. SÉNIMON

Respective competences of the State and local authorities with regard to reception and integration of refugees: an asymmetrical co-production of the reception and integration policy? State Control of the Reception and Integration Policy for Asylum Seekers and Refugees The obligations of the French State with regard to the reception of refugees are very largely defined by the so-called Reception package (Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers, Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection). It should be added that the European framework for reception of asylum seekers and refugees is supplemented by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, whose Article 18 enshrines the right of asylum “in line with the rules of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the Status of Refugees and in accordance with the Treaty establishing the European Community”. Furthermore, it should also be noted that the European Convention on Human Rights, while not specifically recognising a right to asylum, contains several provisions of direct relevance to asylum seekers and refugees: the right to life, the prohibition of torture and slavery, the right to liberty and fair trial, freedom of religion and expression, the right to an effective remedy and the prohibition of discrimination. The European Court of Human Rights has, moreover, quite early on enshrined the applicability of the ECHR to these categories of applicants. If the EU is not a party as such to the European Convention on Human Rights, unlike its Member States, Article 6(2)-(3) of the EU Treaty states that “The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union’s competences as defined in the Treaties. Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law”. This European framework is transposed into the national scheme for the reception of asylum seekers and refugees, re-established by the law of 10 September 2018, and codified in the Code for Entry and Residence

9

RECEPTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES …

151

of Foreigners and Right of Asylum (CESEDA), the implementation of which is primarily the responsibility of the State which has the competence in principle in this area (1). Local authorities have no specific power to intervene on this issue: they act only in the alternative and on the basis of the “common law” powers entrusted to them by law, not specifically refugees and asylum seekers (2). National Reception System for Refugees and Asylum Seekers: The State’s Principal Competence in Receiving Refugees and Asylum Seekers The organisation and application of this national system are shared between several entities, underlining the complexity of the implementation of a migration policy seeking to reconcile humanity/solidarity with refugees and asylum seekers and firmness as for the reception on the national territory of non-EU foreign nationals. The recent instruction of 17 January 2019 of the Minister of the Interior to prefects, on the guidelines for the year 2019 of the policy of reception and integration of foreigners in France (Instruction on the guidelines for the year 2019 of the reception and integration policy for foreigners in France) underlines that “at the national level, the integration policy for newcomers, including the more specific refugee policy, is managed in close coordination between the Reception, Support for Foreigners and Nationality Directorate (DAAEN), the Directorate of Asylum (DA) and the Interministerial Delegation for Reception and Integration of Refugees (DIAIR)”. The following two national operators should be added to these three directorates or delegations: The French Office for Immigration and Integration (OFII) created in 2009, under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior, is the only operator in the State in charge of legal immigration. It fulfils 4 main missions: • Management of legality procedures alongside or on behalf of prefectures and diplomatic and consular posts; • The reception and integration of immigrants authorised to stay in France for a long period and signatories as such of a Republican Integration Contract with the State; • Reception of asylum seekers; • Assistance for the return and reintegration of foreigners in their country of origin.

152

C. BONNOTTE AND M. SÉNIMON

As regards the reception of asylum seekers and refugees, the OFII is responsible for the First Reception of Asylum Seekers (PADA) and manages the national reception system: The OFII manages and finances the structures of first reception of the asylum seekers (SPADA) within the frame of a public contract signed with external operators and opens the material conditions of reception (CMA) to the asylum seekers after their one-stop shop for asylum seekers (GUDA). The OFII coordinates and organises the National Reception Facility (DNA) system for asylum seekers and refugees. The French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless People (OFPRA) is an administrative public institution created by the law of 25 July 1952. It is responsible for the application of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the Status of Refugees, then of the New York Convention of 1954 and decides independently on the asylum and statelessness applications submitted. Placed under the tutelage of the Ministry of the Interior, its independence is guaranteed by Article L. 721-2 of the Code of Entry and Stay of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum according to which “the Office exercises in all impartiality its missions (…) and receives, in their fulfilment, no instruction”. The OFPRA has three main missions: • A mission to examine applications for international protection on the basis of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the New York Convention of 28 September 1954 and CESEDA. • A legal and administrative protection mission for statutory refugees, statutory stateless people and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. • A consultancy mission in the context of the asylum procedure at the border. It gives an opinion to the Minister of the Interior on the manifested modalities based or not on a request for authorisation of entry into the French territory for asylum. First reception of asylum seekers and refugees (SPADA): The reception of asylum seekers and refugees takes place within the framework of First Reception of Asylum Seekers (SPADA); this is under the management

9

RECEPTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES …

153

of associations (France Terre d’Asile, COALLIA, Refugee Forum-Cosi, ALPHA3A, Association Dauphinoise Home Foreign Workers —ADATE, Departmental Association for the Development and Coordination of Actions with Foreigners of Savoy, CVH —Human enhancement centre …) working on behalf of the French State. Their function is to inform the applicants about the conditions for granting a status and the asylum application procedure, to provide the documents required to file an application for protection, to assist applicants in their application for asylum. There are 34 PADA managed by the OFII distributed within each metropolitan area. Filing and processing of asylum applications; issuance of asylum application certificates: asylum applications one-stop shops (GUDA): The November 2016 reform introduced one-stop shops for asylum seekers (GUDA), places where the services of the prefecture and the OFII are brought together. The competent prefect receives from the foreigner applying for registration of his/her application the documents provided for in Article R. 741-3 of the Code of Entry and Stay of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum. If the foreigner fulfils the conditions to obtain it, the prefect issues a certificate of asylum application. The order of 20 October 2015 designates the prefects as entities competent to register asylum applications and determine the State responsible for their treatment. Right to remain on the national territory: Before examining the material, reception conditions implemented by national law, it is necessary to specify that the refugee status recognised by the OFPRA entitles the holder to a ten-year residence permit. In addition, asylum seekers whose examination of the application falls within the jurisdiction of France and who have applied to the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless People (OFPRA) have the right to remain on French territory until notification of the decision of the latter or, if an appeal has been lodged, until the date of the decision of the National Court of Asylum (CNDA). Right to accommodation: The right to accommodation for asylum seekers and refugees is enshrined in the National Scheme for the Reception of Asylum Seekers and Integration of Refugees as per Article L.744-2 of the CESEDA which sets the asylum seekers in each region and the distribution of accommodation for them. This

154

C. BONNOTTE AND M. SÉNIMON

national scheme is decided by the minister responsible for asylum, after consulting the ministers responsible for housing and social affairs. This national scheme for the reception of asylum seekers and refugees sets out, every two years, the share of asylum seekers who must reside in each region, taking into account the demographic, economic and social characteristics as well as the capacity for reception of asylum seekers of each region. The national scheme is broken down into regional plans drawn up by the State representative in the region, following the opinion of a consultation committee composed of representatives of local authorities, departmental services for national education, accommodation facility managers for asylum seekers and asylum seekers’ rights organisations. These regional schemes: • Set the guidelines for the distribution of places of accommodation for asylum seekers and refugees in the territory of the region; • Present the regional arrangements for registering asylum applications and for monitoring and accompanying asylum seekers; • Define actions for integration of refugees. They also determine the distribution of temporary accommodation places offering reception, information and social, legal and administrative support,available to foreigners until the receipt of their asylum application certificate, when they do not have stable address. The article provides for the situation where the share of asylum seekers residing in a region exceeds the proportion fixed for this region by the national scheme for the reception of asylum seekers and the reception capacities of this region: In this case, the asylum seeker may be referred to another region, where he/she is required to reside while the asylum application is under examination. The OFII determines the region of residence according to the share of asylum seekers hosted in each region, according to the national scheme, and taking into account the needs and the personal and family situation of the applicant. Asylum seekers are required to reside in the area where they are domiciled, for the duration of the procedure for the examination of their

9

RECEPTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES …

155

asylum application. They may leave it only with the authorisation of the OFII. This authorisation mentions the area in which asylum seekers are allowed to travel and the duration of the trip. In case of refusal of authorisation, a written and reasoned decision is notified to the interested party. If an applicant leaves temporarily the area where he/she is domiciled without authorisation of the OFII, this puts an end to the material conditions of reception. The places of accommodation are divided into several categories with 3 levels (Notice of 4 December 2017 on the evolution of the housing stock of asylum seekers and refugees). Level 1: Reception and case evaluation centres (CAES)—a shelter with immediate assessment of administrative situations. These centres should make it possible to proceed without delay to the analysis of the administrative situations and to a follow-up of the public shelters from the beginning of their care and a fast orientation towards other accommodation arrangements according to the administrative situation of the persons. Level 2: accommodation adapted especially to persons under the Dublin procedure and the accelerated procedure. This second level includes the Reception and Orientation Centres (CAO—approximately 10,000 places) opened within the framework of the public contract “Reception and Accommodation Programme for Asylum Seekers” (PRAHDA—5350 approximately), “Temporary Reception - Asylum Service” (ATSA), “Asylum Seeker Emergency Shelter” (HUDA—about 23,000 places). Given the fragmentation of the number of these structures, the Notice of 4 December 2017 indicates that a rationalisation effort is required. Several options are proposed: the transformation of the CAO into a Provisional Accommodation Centre (CPH—approximately 5000 places hosting beneficiaries of international protection); the transformation of CAO into CAES, Reception Centres for Asylum Seekers (CADA) or HUDA Level 3: enhanced support for Reception Centres for Asylum Seekers (CADA—42,000 places), pillar of accommodation especially for asylum seekers under a normal procedure. The CADA is the reference accommodation for asylum seekers in the normal procedure (Article L.348-1 of the Code of Social Action and Families).

156

C. BONNOTTE AND M. SÉNIMON

In total, according to CIMADE (Inter-Movements Committee for Aid of Evacuees, created in 1939: association of solidarity and support to migrants, refugees, displaced persons, asylum seekers and illegal foreigners), the reception capacity is of more than 90,555 places. The OFII estimates that it is 97% saturated, or 87,000 people accommodated. However, it remains insufficient with regard to the accommodation needs, the number of asylum seekers in the course of proceedings benefiting from the material conditions of reception envisaged by the CESEDA being of 134,661 in October 2018. Needs assessment: The CESEDA, in its Article L744-6 modified by the law of 10 September 2018, provides for an evaluation of the needs of the asylum seeker, referred to as vulnerability assessment carried out within a reasonable time, by the OFII, at the end of a personal interview with the asylum seeker. The purpose of the asylum seeker’s vulnerability assessment is to determine, where appropriate, his/her particular reception needs, in particular with regard to particularly vulnerable or vulnerable persons: minors, unaccompanied minors, people with disabilities, the elderly, pregnant women, single parents with minor children, victims of human trafficking, people with serious illnesses, people with mental disorders that have been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual abuse, such as female genital mutilation. This vulnerability assessment should thus make it possible to identify the applicant’s medical needs. Access to care: Two types of arrangements allowing access to care are put in place, depending on the legality status or otherwise of the presence of the foreigner on the national territory. With regard to illegal foreigners: State medical aid (AME). The state medical aid (AME) is a system that allows illegal foreigners to benefit from access to healthcare. It is awarded under conditions of stable residence and resources. Applicants must reside in a stable manner, that is to say continuously for more than 3 months in France (Metropolitan France and overseas departments, except Mayotte where the AME is not applicable). Their resources must not exceed a certain ceiling. Dependents may also benefit from the AME provided that they are: Spouse, cohabiting partner or partner bound by a beneficiary’s PAC or a dependent child (under 16, beyond and up to 20 years in the case of continued studies).

9

RECEPTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES …

157

Regarding asylum seekers waiting for a response from the OFPRA (with a legal status): universal protection for illness (Puma) (Articles L.160-1 et seq. and R111-3 of the Social Security Code). During the examination period of the asylum application, and the registration of the application (order of 10 May 2017 fixing the list of residence permits provided for in I of Article R. 111-3 of the Social Security Code), foreigners have access to universal health protection (Puma). In this respect, they are exempt from the residence requirement in France for more than 3 months required in order to benefit from the CMU-C. They must nevertheless be able to prove the legality of their stay by presenting: Either a proof of appointment or a convocation of the prefecture, Or a certificate of asylum application with provisional authorisation of stay (APS) or a receipt of OFPRA, accompanied by an attestation of the accreditation. This system is completed by the complementary CMU which ensures: • Additional contributions (that is to say the portion not reimbursed by the Health Insurance) to the fees and the acts of healthcare professionals, drugs, hospitalisation cost; • Exemption from the flat-rate contribution of e1 for consultations or medical acts, radiology check-ups, medical tests, medical exemption on medicines, paramedical acts and medical transports; • The coverage of the daily fixed price without limitation of duration in case of hospitalisation. The asylum seeker allowance (ADA): Article L.744-9 of the CESEDA, modified by the law of 10 September 2018 whose conditions of application have been specified by Decree No 2018-1359 of 28 December 2018 on the material conditions of reception states that the asylum seeker who has accepted the material conditions of reception proposed by the OFII benefits, under conditions of age and resources, from an asylum seeker allowance. The payment of this allowance shall end at the end of the month in which the applicant’s right to remain in France terminates or on the date of his/her actual transfer to another State if his/her application falls within the jurisdiction of that State. For persons who obtain refugee

158

C. BONNOTTE AND M. SÉNIMON

status or benefit from subsidiary protection, the benefit of the allowance expires at the end of the month following the month of notification of the decision. Republican integration contract (CIR): It has succeeded the Contract of Reception and Integration since the adoption of the law on the right of foreigners in France, promulgated on 7 March 2016, the Article L.311-9 of the CESEDA states that this contract formalises the commitment of a foreign national, newly arrived and wishing to remain permanently in the national territory, to follow a personalised course of integration. The latter has to understand the values and principles of the Republic, to learn the French language, to accept the social and professional integration and the access to autonomy. It includes: • Civic training on the principles, values and institutions of the Republic, the exercise of rights and duties related to life in France and the organisation of French society; • French language training; this includes a sufficient number of teaching hours to enable the newly arrived foreigner to take up employment and integrate into French society. This training may lead to certification; • Career counselling and support to promote professional integration, in association with the structures of the public employment service; • Support adapted to the needs to facilitate the conditions of reception and integration. • In the overseas departments and regions, the training referred to in point 1 of this article includes a section on the history and geography of the overseas department and region of residence of the foreigner. This training, in its various aspects, is supported by the State. It can be organised in association with economic, social and civil society stakeholders, either national or local. The instruction of 17 January 2019 of the Minister of the Interior (NOR: INTV1900478J) relating to the orientation for the year 2019 of the policy of reception and integration of foreigners in France reinforces the integrative scope of the CIR: all newcomers, including refugees, will benefit from the doubling of language training classes from March

9

RECEPTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES …

159

2019, up to 400 or even 600 hours for non-readers, non-writers, accompanied by language level certification for those who reach the A1 level; doubling the hours of civic education from 12 to 24 hours, accompanied by renewed pedagogy; the introduction of a “professional integration” component, including an end-of-CIR interview on the OFII platforms, during which the newcomer will be referred to a public employment service operator who will conduct an in-depth interview of professional orientation then will provide support for adapted employment. Information and access to rights: The foreigner who has obtained a refugee status or benefits from subsidiary protection and has signed the Republican integration contract is entitled to personalised support for access to employment and housing. Access to the Labour Market Access to the labour market may be allowed to the asylum seeker when the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless People, for reasons not attributable to the applicant, has not decided on the asylum application within nine months from the submission of the application. In this case, he/she benefits from continuing vocational training provided for by the Labour Code. The Interministerial Committee for Integration (C2i) of 5 June 2018 called for strengthening the EIF through the addition of a personalised professional dimension component organised around the following guidelines: A welcome for the purpose of orientation and professional integration at the start of the CIR by strengthening the OFII’s job information role at the start of the course. An interview at the end of CIR: during this interview, the OFII guides foreigners to the public employment service operator (Pôleemploi, Local Mission, APEC) most suitable to help them. A thorough career orientation interview for each newcomer looking for work: This interview will determine the course adapted to the needs of each (age, social difficulty, linguistics …). Each public employment service operator is mobilised to organise support for employment, tailored to the person, in line with the labour market.

160

C. BONNOTTE AND M. SÉNIMON

The C2i also intends to propose actions aimed at “removing the bottlenecks ” and “opening access to employment ” thanks to: Language training to quickly find a job Increased access to work for asylum seekers waiting for a response from the OFPRA who will be able to access the labour market within six months. The fight against obstacles via rapid access to rights (work, social rights, housing) as soon as a refugee status is granted. Recognition of qualifications and access to learning and mobilising business networks.

9.5

Reception and Integration of Refugees and Asylum Seekers: The Subsidiary Competence of Local Authorities

Although the State has jurisdiction over the reception of asylum seekers and refugees, it is actually the local authorities which are “on the front line” and are most directly concerned by the reception of these populations, because, in fact, they are the ones facing the material and practical difficulties raised by these issues, and in particular those of accommodation, support, integration, funding of reception and coordination with state services. Illustrating this exercise of powers of the state and local authorities, the Senate (Round Table “Local authorities and the reception of refugees: crises and prospects”, Information Report No 40 [2015–2016] of Mr Jean-Marie BOCKEL, made in the name of the delegation to local authorities, filed on 8 October 2015) uses the formula “national steering, territorial co-organisation”. The intervention of the local authorities is further complicated by the removal of the general jurisdiction clause of local authorities—with the exception of municipalities (communes)—by Law No 2015-991 of 7 August 2015 on the new territorial organisation of the Republic (Decision No 2016-565 QPC of 16 September 2016, Assembly of the Departments of France). French local authorities—communes; departments; regions—and their public entities can therefore intervene on the basis of the skills recognised

9

RECEPTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES …

161

in the following areas: Safety; social action and health; employmentprofessional inclusion; teaching; childhood-youth; sport; cultural action; vocational training and apprenticeship; intervention in the economic field; city politics; housing and habitat. In particular, because it is the most directly concerned, in direct contact with the issues of reception and integration of refugees and migrants, the municipalities intervene on the basis of their common law powers. In this respect, they benefit from a clause of general competence, enabling them to intervene on any subject of communal interest. Therefore and as part of the implementation of the reception and integration of migrants and refugees actions municipalities can intervene on the basis of their skills in administrative policing (good order, safety, security, public safety) and the prevention of delinquency; they can also intervene in health and social action (creation, management of an institution or public service of a social or medico-social nature: reception centres for children under six years of age, construction or subsidisation of the realisation infrastructure and public health facilities), housing (participation in housing finance, local housing programme, departmental housing plan, participation in social rental housing commissions), education and schooling (financing of housing), operating expenses related to the schooling of children in private or public schools of other municipalities (school catering of primary schools, organisation of extracurricular activities). The mayors’ information booklet, published on 12 September 2015 by the Ministry of the Interior, presents, in a non-exhaustive and nonbinding way, various initiatives likely to be taken by local elected officials in terms of receiving applicants for asylum and refugees: mayors who have shown their willingness to contribute to the reception can find their place at different stages of the arrangements deployed by the state: • By providing buildings to create places of accommodation for asylum seekers, during the processing of their application; • Providing long-term housing for asylum seekers who have acquired refugee status after their case has been investigated; • If necessary, by offering social support complementary to that organised by the State. It should be noted that the local authorities, especially the municipalities do not intervene alone: the French government authorities have fully

162

C. BONNOTTE AND M. SÉNIMON

recognised that the action of civil society, especially that of associations, is necessary for the proper implementation of the integration of the individuals concerned, particularly through integration, employment, training, sport or culture. The state itself therefore recognises the major role of associations in the implementation of the integration and reception of migrant’s policy. Indeed, many actions are carried out by the associations in connection with the migrants: from the regular service of a breakfast to the participation as operator of the National Home Organization. Faced with such involvement of civil society, some cities in Europe (or states, such as Germany), contribute to coordination with associations, sharing responsibilities. Thus, the city of Lisbon has created, with all the associations of the agglomeration, a platform of support to the refugees (PAR). In the city of Aix-en-Provence, thanks to the “Agir” collective, platforms bring together all the actors concerned by the issue of migrants. The French State, while recognising the importance of the action of the associations, however leaves it to the communities to organise themselves with these associations or NGOs. The French government sometimes maintains an ambiguous discourse disqualifying associative action. For example, in a speech delivered in Calais in June 2017, the Minister of the Interior asked the associations and NGOs concerned “to go and exercise [their] talents elsewhere”. In January 2018, the President of the Republic accused them of encouraging migrants to settle illegally and advised them to “guard against false good feelings”. In reality, the support of the public authorities is at the discretion of the opportunities. However, it would be in the interest of the state to engage in meaningful dialogue with these associations and NGOs, as do and have done in other European Union states (such as Germany). Indeed, the lack of public financial resources in this area could be partly offset by the associative action, which achieves results with little means. In addition, such a dialogue will make it possible to institutionalise and formalise partnerships “on the ground” between local authorities and associations (for example some town halls finance associations housing certain migrants, or open training centres in partnership with associations). Social cohesion would only be enhanced again. The formalisation of the territorial co-organisation of the reception policy for asylum seekers and refugees

9

RECEPTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES …

163

Designation of an Interministerial Delegation for Reception and Integration of Refugees (DI-AIR) The policy of reception and integration of asylum seekers and refugees is implemented by an Interministerial Delegation for Reception and Integration of Refugees (DI-AIR) instituted by Decree No 2018-33 of 22 January 2018. The missions entrusted to it concern: Participation in the definition and organisation of the policy of reception and integration of refugees or persons granted subsidiary protection. It evaluates its implementation. Coordination, in connection with the Directorate General for Foreigners in France, of the actions of various ministries contributing to the sustainable integration of refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, particularly in the areas of access to rights, language proficiency, health and social care, vocational training and access to employment and housing. The coordination of the reception in France of the beneficiaries of protection arrived within the framework of the European programme of resettlement. To do this, it mobilises relevant state services in the territories and involves local authorities, the voluntary sector and representatives of civil society. At the Interministerial Committee for Integration (CII) held on 5 June 2018, the DI-AIR was also entrusted with the steering of the implementation of the National Strategy for the Integration of Refugees. The latter is defined in 7 priorities (2 transversal priorities: “Strengthening the steering of the refugee integration policy”, “Engaging each refugee in a reinforced integration process ” and 5 thematic priorities: “Improving the mastery of the language and access to training and employment of refugees ”, “Guaranteeing access to housing for refugees ”, “Improving access to care for asylum seekers and refugees ”, “Improving access to rights ”, “Fostering links between refugees and France”) and 67 actions to be available in the territories. This national strategy requires the concerted action of the various actors-operators of public policies for the reception and integration of refugees: the Directorate General of Foreigners in France (DGEF— Ministry of the Interior), the French Office of Protection of Refugees and

164

C. BONNOTTE AND M. SÉNIMON

Stateless People (OFPRA), the French Office for Immigration and Integration (OFII), the Interministerial Delegation for Housing and Access to Housing (DIHAL) which are specifically in charge of implementation of these policies, but also local authorities and civil society—associations. Integration of the topic “Reception and integration of asylum seekers and refugees” in various territorial planning and programming documents: This integration prioritises the strengthening of the role of regional schemes for the reception of asylum seekers (Article L. 744-2 of the CESEDA), extended to the topic of the integration of refugees, as tools for local steering of the reception and integration policy: these regional plans are drawn up by the State representative in the region, after consulting a consultation committee composed of representatives of local authorities, departmental services of national education, managers of places of accommodation for asylum seekers and associations defending the rights of asylum seekers and in accordance with the national scheme for the reception of asylum seekers. Their function is: • To lay down guidelines on the distribution of places of accommodation for asylum seekers and refugees on the territory of the region, • To present the regional arrangements for the registration of asylum applications and the follow-up and accompaniment of asylum seekers and define actions for the integration of refugees. • To determine the distribution of places of temporary accommodation offering services of reception, information and social, legal and administrative support which can benefit, until the presentation of their certificate of asylum application, when foreigners do not have stable home. These regional plans are drawn up after the opinion of the regional housing and accommodation committees (CRHH), taking into account the departmental action plan for housing and accommodation of disadvantaged people. They are also developed in connection with other existing common law mechanisms. The integration of the topic “Reception and integration of asylum seekers and refugees” into local policies requires the establishment of regional and departmental steering committees under the authority of the prefects. At the departmental level, three topics will be addressed:

9

RECEPTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES …

165

The reception and accommodation of asylum seekers and refugees; the deportation of rejected persons and the readmissions in the context of the application of the Dublin III Regulation and the Integration of refugees. In order to complete the mechanism to integrate the national strategy for the reception and integration of refugees into local policies, the prefects are invited to appoint regional and departmental coordinators of asylum policy and integration of refugees and to set up working groups with refugees to better identify upstream problems in line with the needs of the field. A Contractualisation Policy Between the State and Local Authorities The National Strategy for the Integration of Refugees formulated at the end of the Interministerial Committee for Integration (CII) provided that “Local authorities, departments or regions that are willing to develop integration schemes on their territory may sign with the State, as well as with the associations concerned, a ‘commitment agreement for the reception and integration of refugees’ formalising the actions implemented, such as the development of sports and cultural activities, the provision of infrastructure, equipment, housing, staff and funding for associations working for the integration of refugees”. French law provides now for the possibility of concluding contracts between the State and local authorities. An annex is devoted to territorial contracts for the reception and integration of refugees. This reaffirms the role of “metropolises and the communities that compose it”. Territorial contracts are read as “improving the lives of refugees” in all areas: language, access to training and employment, housing, culture, leisure. It is thus clearly requested that municipalities and local missions be closely associated with these approaches. To do this, several areas of intervention are planned: • Consolidate the steering of the integration policy at the local level; • Engage each refugee in an integration process (through the “integration contract republican”); • Improve access to language, vocational and language training and employment; • Guarantee access to housing for refugees; • Facilitate access to refugee law; • Change the look on the refugees.

166

C. BONNOTTE AND M. SÉNIMON

Such contracts will be concluded on the basis of a diagnosis of identified needs. For this, several actors will be able to associate with the commune: • Institutional actors such as the State, the department, the communes, the OFII, etc.; • Civil society through the participation of associations and local populations; • Private actors such as companies, chambers of trades, etc. • In addition to these contracts, another tool is available to local authorities: local calls for projects. Indeed, this instruction recalls that 5.7 million euros are, in 2019, devoted to partnerships between the state and local communities to “engage with communities’ actions for newcomers”. These partnerships, in addition to the contractual possibility, offer the Prefect the possibility of making local calls for projects with two components: • Actions for all newcomers (support for employment, strengthening of the “parental support for parents’ success”); • Actions aimed specifically at refugees (comprehensive assistance for refugees, integration of refugees). Currently no record of the implementation of these different actions is possible, these are still too recent. Therefore, it will be necessary to carefully monitor their implementation and results. For example, in terms of housing asylum seekers, a state prerogative, some municipalities, notably in Sarthe, have agreed to provide vacant housing for families. The political stakes behind such actions are very strong. For example, small municipalities have a strong interest in hosting families, because it allows, for example, to keep a minimum number of students in classes so that their school does not close. As for the state, this allows it, through such partnerships to overcome the lack of space in its accommodation in large cities (Le Mans for Sarthe for example).

9.6

Conclusion

Thus, faced with the challenge and the challenge of representing the reception and integration of migrants, the state is not the only one to react. Local governments and civil society, the first level concerned, also

9

RECEPTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES …

167

have a role to play, and this role is increasingly becoming institutionalised and recognised by the state, recognising its inability to manage the situation at the state level alone.

References Articles on French Migration policy: Batiffol, H. (1948). L’ordonnance du 2 novembre 1945. Travaux du Comité français de droit international privé, 7e année, 1945– 1946. 1948 (pp. 93– 132). Bockel, J.-M. (2015, octobre 8). Table ronde «Les collectivitésterritoriales et l’accueil des réfugiés: crises et perspectives». Rapport d’information n° 40 [2015–2016]. Costa-Lascoux, J. (2008). Les aléas des politiques migratoires: 1945–1981. Migrations Société, 117–118(3), 63–70. Dornel, L. (2014). L’appel à la main-d’œuvre étrangère et coloniale pendant la Grande Guerre: un tournant dans l’histoire de l’immigration? Migrations Société, 156(6), 51–68. Durand, M., & Lemaitre, G. (2006). La politique migratoire française à un tournant. Économie Internationale, 108(4), 115–137. Hessel, S. (2008). Le devoir d’insertion, vingtans après. Le grand tournant des années 70 et les défis actuels. Migrations Société, 117–118(3), 53–62. Lochak, D. (2006). Le tri des étrangers: un discours récurrent. Plein droit, 69(2), 4–8. Slama, S. (2005). Le séjour payant. Plein droit, 67 (4), 11–14. SPIRE, A. (2008). La bataille pour unstatut des étrangers (1935–1945). Plein droit, 79(4), 36–40. Wihtol De Wenden, C. (2002). Ouverture et fermeture de la France aux étrangers. Un siècle d’évolution. Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’histoire, 73(1), 27–38. Wihtol De Wenden, C. (2008). La politique française d’immigration et d’intégration par ses acteurs. Migrations Société, 117–118(3), 47–49.

Opinion Surveys/Polls: The French and Their Perceptions of Immigration, Refugees and Identity, 12 July 2017, study conducted by the French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP). The French, the European Union and the Migration Issue, 19 December 2018, a study conducted in the framework of the BVA—Regional Press for the European elections 2019.

CHAPTER 10

Immigration and Integration Policies in Poland: Institutional, Political and Social Perspectives Małgorzata Mol˛eda-Zdziech, Marta Pachocka, and Dominik Wach

10.1

Introduction1

The aim of this chapter is to present and discuss the immigration and integration policies in Poland, especially in recent years, in various aspects: institutional, political and social. The issues of immigration to Poland, the 1 This chapter was prepared as a result of research collaboration of co-authors within the framework of the project EUMIGRO—“Jean Monnet Module on the European Union and the Contemporary International Migration – an Interdisciplinary Approach” (project number: 575228-EPP-1-2016-1-PL-EPPJMO-MODULE; agreement/decision number: 2016–2187) carried out at the Collegium of Socio-Economics of SGH Warsaw School of Economics and co-funded by the Erasmus+ Programme of the European Union. The chapter was submitted for publication at the turn of 2018 and 2019, and it presents the situation and data available at that time.

M. Mol˛eda-Zdziech (B) · M. Pachocka Department of Political Studies, Institute of International Studies, SGH Warsaw School of Economics, Warsaw, Poland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 J. Franzke and J. M. Ruano de la Fuente (eds.), Local Integration of Migrants Policy, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50979-8_10

169

170

M. MOLEDA-ZDZIECH ˛ ET AL.

situation of foreigners and immigrants, and their integration within Polish society are complex and multidimensional. This paper focuses on the integration activities and policies dedicated to foreigners, including those implemented by both central and local authorities as well as NGOs. The chapter opens with the migration situation in Poland as a starting point for reflections on immigration and integration policies after 1989 and their interrelation until 2018. Then, good practices and innovative solutions in local integration activities are presented. Next, the paper discusses considerations related to the political context of immigration and integration policies in Poland since 2015, in particular, the mediatisation of the issue of immigration, especially refugees in connection with the massmigration and refugee crisis, and consequently to triggering moral panic in Polish society. Continuing with this theme, the paper offers an overview of public attitudes to immigration, with the example of the acceptance of asylum seekers and refugees in Poland in 2015–2018, followed by conclusions.

10.2

Migration Situation in Poland

Poland has 38 million inhabitants. In recent years, it has been a net emigration country and this trend has intensified since 2004 when it was granted membership in the European Union (see Eurostat Database 2018b, d). According to estimates provided by the Central Statistical Office of Poland, around 2.5 million Polish residents were temporarily abroad (defined as more than 3 months) at the end of 2016, with the vast majority (2.1 million) in the other EU Member States. Among the EU countries, the largest number of Polish emigrants resided in the United Kingdom (788 thousand people), Germany (687 thousand people), the Netherlands (116 thousand people) and Ireland (112 thousand people) (GUS 2017). However, the most recent studies show that Poland’s migration status is gradually changing and it is slowly becoming

M. Pachocka e-mail: [email protected] D. Wach Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland e-mail: [email protected]

10

IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION POLICIES IN POLAND …

171

an emigration-immigration country or even an immigration one, with the predominant inflow comprised of Ukrainians for economic reasons (see, e.g. CSO 2017; Brunarska et al. 2016; Misiuna and Pachocka 2014; Fihel et al. 2012; Okólski 2018). According to provisional and estimated data by Eurostat, in 2016, immigration to Poland amounted to 208.3 thousand people, including 50.6% of nationals. Among non-national immigrants, there were 22.8 thousand citizens of other EU Member States and 80.1 thousand citizens of non-member countries. Relative to the size of the resident population, Poland recorded 5.5 immigrants per thousand inhabitants while the EU average was 4.6 per thousand (Eurostat Statistics Explained 2018). Among the immigrants, the prevailing portion is Ukrainians, followed by much lower shares of migrants from China, Belarus, Vietnam, Russia and India (OECD 2018, pp. 272–273). In 2017, there were 54.2 thousand valid permanent residence permits in Poland, with the majority in the Mazovian region (including the capital city of Warsaw), and 155.7 thousand temporary residence permits. The total number of valid documents for foreigners in 2017 was 305.5 thousand and they encompassed—in addition to the valid permanent residence permits—documents related, i.e. to residence due to humanitarian reasons, EU long-term resident stay, refugee status, etc. (Migracje.gov.pl 2018). In the last few years, the number of migrant workers in Poland has been increasing significantly, which was reflected in the much higher number of work permits issued (OECD 2018, pp. 272–273). In 2017, it was 235,626 work permits while in 2016, 121,872. It means that the number almost doubled on a year-to-year basis (Wortal Publicznych Słuzb ˙ Zatrudnienia 2018). Other data concern forced migrants seeking asylum in Europe. According to Eurostat data sets, in 2017, there were 5045 non-EU asylum applicants2 in Poland out of 712,235 in the whole EU-28. This was a very small number compared to the main EU target countries, but also lower than the number of applicants in Poland in 2015–2016, when they exceeded 12 thousand people a year (Eurostat Database 2018a). In

2 “‘Asylum applicant’ means a person having submitted an application for international protection or having been included in such application as a family member during the reference period”. Source: Eurostat Metadata (2018a).

172

M. MOLEDA-ZDZIECH ˛ ET AL.

2017, only 510 positive first instance decisions3 were issued in Poland, compared to 437,555 decisions in the entire EU, encompassing among others decisions granting refugee status, subsidiary protection status, or authorisation to stay for humanitarian reasons (for countries where applicable).4 The rejection rate was very high (Eurostat Database 2018c). Moreover, Poland did not implement EU relocation and resettlement schemes proposed under “The European Agenda on Migration” in 2015, which was considered a comprehensive response by the EU to the migrant and refugee crisis in Europe. It is difficult to estimate the number of foreigners and immigrants in Poland for several reasons, “including the fact that various entities collect slightly different data on foreigners, including the Central Statistical Office, the Border Guard, the Office for Foreigners, the Ministry of Family, the Labour and Social Policy and the National Labour Inspectorate; the methodological framework used in Polish public statistics distinguishes between temporary and long-term migrants; migration in Poland is circular and incomplete; and there is a high mobility of nonEU migrants. One of the basic sources of information on the distribution of immigrants in Poland is the National Census. The last such census was carried out in 2011, and its results were published in subsequent years. The next census is planned for 2021. (…) According to the 2011 National Census, the number of immigrants temporarily staying in Poland was 56.3 thousand people (Kostrzewa and Szałtys 2013, p. 28), including 40.1 thousand temporary immigrants staying more than 3 months in Poland (Kostrzewa and Szałtys 2013, pp. 96–97). In 2011, the distribution of immigrants temporarily living in Poland for more than 3 months was uneven, characterized by the largest concentration in four voivodships – Masovian with Warsaw as the capital (27.1%), Lesser Poland with Krakow as the capital (8.7%), Lower Silesia with Wroclaw as the capital (8.9%) and Silesia with Katowice as the capital (8.4%)” (Szulecka et al. 2018, pp. 23–24).

3 “First instance decision: decisions (positive and negative) considering applications for international protection as well as the grants of authorisations to stay for humanitarian reasons, including decisions under priority and accelerated procedures taken by administrative or judicial bodies in Member States. First instance decisions include decisions granted to persons who are a subject of the Dublin Regulation (Council Regulation 604/2013/EC)”. Source: Eurostat Metadata (2018b). 4 See more Eurostat Metadata (2018b).

10

IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION POLICIES IN POLAND …

173

10.3 The Specificity of the Evolution of Polish Immigration and Integration Policies Poland, contrary to many Western European countries, does not have a long immigration history and is in a group of European countries delayed in its transformation of migration status (from emigration to immigration state). As M. Okólski correctly noted, Polish economic modernisation—one of the main factors leading to the transformation mentioned above—started in the late nineteenth century, several dozen years later than in Western and Northern Europe. Moreover, it was later delayed or even stopped by two world wars and a central planning economy typical of countries in the Soviet sphere (2010, p. 24). Once the significant changes in the Polish political and socio-economic regimes started in 1989, Poland was seen by politicians and scholars as a “transit country”. Despite a significant increase in border traffic after 1989, which was a new situation for Poland, most foreigners, often from post-Soviet states, were only temporary immigrants on their way to the richer Western European countries. Nonetheless, with time, Poland evolved from an emigration to an emigration-immigration country (Łodzinski ´ 1998). This situation was typical in Central and Eastern Europe in early and mid-1990s. A lack of acts of law, procedures and funds concerning management of the increasing inflow of immigrants, combined with other problems in the times of system transformation, showed that Poland was not ready to meet all the challenges, including the integration of foreigners (Gł˛abicka 1998, pp. 8–9; Łodzinski ´ 1997, p. 81; Szonert 2000, p. 36). This means that Poland did not have a coherent immigration or integration policy at that time. The slow development of immigration policy in Poland is well reflected in one of the proposed divisions of this policy into different phases. The first, institutionalisation phase, lasted for over a decade (1989–2001) and was characterized by the implementation of the UN 1951 Refugee Convention, bilateral agreements, basic acts of law and cooperation with other countries in the field of migration. It was followed by the Europeanisation phase (2001–2004) when Poland started its EU accession process and unified the law with European law. The last phase, stabilisation (after 2004), can be described as a period when the system stabilised and core solutions and laws were further developed (Lesinska ´ et al. 2010, pp. 262–264). It clearly shows that the development of immigration

174

M. MOLEDA-ZDZIECH ˛ ET AL.

policy at the beginning was not seen to be among the most important ones and later was driven mostly by external factors. Another popular division proposed by Łodzinski ´ and Szonert (2016) also presents the slow development of this policy and similar factors that influenced its evolution. In this approach, the first phase of the democratic transformation ended in 1997 by issuing the Act of 25 June 1997 on foreigners, which can suggest that it took eight years after a multidimensional transformation to prepare comprehensive law regulating immigration issues, residency, refugee status and asylum, expulsion of foreigners and institutions active in the field of migration. The second phase, 1998–2004, could be characterized as an adjustment of Polish law to European law due to Poland’s preparations for EU membership. The third one, from 2005 to 2015, was a period of maturing immigration policy, and finally, a fourth stage, after 2015, as a transition period caused by “the migration and refugee crisis” (Łodzinski ´ and Szonert 2016, p. 12). We could observe quite a similar situation in the evolution of Polish integration policy, often seen only as a fragmented, undeveloped part of wider immigration policy (KPRP 2015, p. 21). According to one of the approaches, the first phase of its development lasted also for more than a decade (1989–2000) and was understood as ad hoc humanitarian actions rather than ones connected to integration. From the very beginning, in the absence of laws regulating the integration of immigrants and institutions responsible for this task, NGOs played the main role in this field and their actions were focused mostly on forced migrants, including beneficiaries of international protection—refugees (Florczak 2003, pp. 98, 102, 251–254). The second period (2000–2008) started with the emergence of the first integration tool financed from the central budget and offered by local social-support institutions—“Individual Integration Programmes” (IIPs)—directed only to forced migrants. Also, Poland got access to European Funds allowing the financing of different integration activities. The third period (2008–2015) was a continuation of the slow development of integration policy based on IIPs and a further increase in the role of European Funds (European Refugee Fund and European Fund for the Integration of non-EU immigrants), which were the main source of financing in the field of integration. The last period (after 2015) is closely connected with the migration and refugee crisis and its impact on Polish integration policy (Wach 2018).

10

IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION POLICIES IN POLAND …

175

Irrespective of the period and level of development, integration policy was and still is seen by policymakers as a “pull factor” for foreigners (Lesinska ´ 2010, pp. 102–103) and a burden on the national budget. Another issue is the extent to which one can talk about coherent and comprehensive policy with regard to integration, in a situation where there are many independent actors (central, local, international, transnational, non-governmental and public) from different areas that can work towards the common goal of integration at the same time. As Matusz-Protasiewicz (2013) noted, the largest cities (local level) in which foreigners usually settle play the most important role in their integration.

Relations Between Immigration Policy and Integration Policy at the Central and Local Levels

10.4

Poland is a unitary state where immigration policy is created and developed at the central level but often influenced by regulations on the EU level. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs through its diplomatic missions abroad is responsible for issuing entry visas for foreigners and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration designs and coordinates implementation of immigration policy in the country. Both, the Polish Border Guard—a state security agency responsible for protecting Polish and EU external border and border traffic management—and the Office for Foreigners—responsible for immigration, residency and the protection of foreigners seeking asylum—are subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration. However, some tasks like temporary and permanent residency issues or family reunification are the competence of Voivodeship Offices—a government administration body in provinces (regions). Moreover, in some cases, local administration bodies are also involved in the process of the legalisation of stay. For example, an employer who wishes to hire a third-country citizen has to receive a positive decision from the local Labour Office. Nonetheless, the local authorities cannot create and implement their own immigration policy or establish services implementing it. The list of state actors dealing with migration and protection/asylum in Poland in recent years is much longer and it also includes such entities as the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy, the Ministry of Investment and Development, the National Labour Inspectorate, the

176

M. MOLEDA-ZDZIECH ˛ ET AL.

Central Statistical Office and the Refugee Board. In the field of integration activities, the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy should be mentioned, as it provides foreigners with support concerning various social services and deals with their access to the labour market. These institutions are supplemented with representations, offices and agencies of international organisations and transnational stakeholders, NGOs and civil society. These are, i.e. the UNHCR Office in Poland, IOM Country Office in Warsaw, the headquarters of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), National Contact Point in Poland of the European Migration Network and several NGOs operating mostly in big cities such as Warsaw, Gdansk, Cracow and Lublin.5 General rules regarding immigration, residency or international protection and the situation of foreigners in Poland are regulated by, among others, such legal acts as the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997, Act of 12 December 2013 on foreigners and Act of 13 June 2003 on granting protection to foreigners within the territory of the Republic of Poland. Regarding integration policy, we can observe a different situation in which the central and local administration share some responsibilities but also one where independent policy can be built at the local level. Access to the labour market, education, or social services is regulated by central-level laws including the Act of 20 April 2004 on the promotion of employment and labour market institutions, Act of 12 March 2004 on social assistance, Act of 7 September 1991 on the system of education, Act of 27 July 2005 Law on higher education and many others.6 Nonetheless, the local administration can introduce its own laws and solutions widening the integration offer guaranteed at the central level. The Polish integration system of foreigners, as mentioned above, developed very slowly and relied mostly on ad hoc, local activities provided by NGOs. The situation changed a little bit when the first sustainable element of integration policy was introduced in 2000 through the Act of 18 February 2000 amending the Act on social assistance and Act on old-age pensions and disability pensions from the Social Insurance Fund. However, it was limited only to beneficiaries of international protection.

5 For more migrant-assisting state and non-state bodies, see Migrant.info.pl (2018). 6 For more about the migration and asylum legislative framework, see European

Migration Network (2018) and Czeranowska et al. (2018, pp. 19–22).

10

IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION POLICIES IN POLAND …

177

Based on the amended Act on social assistance, “Individual Integration Programmes” should be provided by Family Support Centres (local institutions responsible for social assistance) to refugees living in Poland and should be the main and comprehensive tool of their integration. This element of integration policy, coordinated by the central administration and financed from the central budget, is an example of a top-down approach in which a governmental task is commissioned to the local authorities. Within this system, the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy is responsible for the shape of Polish integration policy, its supervision, implementation and evaluation. The Voivodes—a government administration body—and governor of voivodeships7 are responsible for the coordination and completion of the IIPs, but the Family Support Centres—units of local government—have to run these programmes and cooperate with other local institutions (e.g. labour offices, schools, social offices, clinics, NGOs) in the integration process (Klaus and Chrzanowska 2007, p. 5). Unfortunately, the lack of executive acts and problems with funding delayed the successful implementation of IIPs until 2000–2001 (Kosowicz and Maciejko 2007, p. 61; Łodzinski ´ and Z˛abek 2008, p. 329). Moreover, the duration of these programmes was planned for just 12 months and only a very narrow group of forced migrants—foreigners with refugee status—could use it. Even later amendments to the Social Welfare Act from 2008 and 2014, which widened the group of foreigners entitled to IIPs to include those with subsidiary protection status and temporary residency based on family reunification with refugees, could not be seen as a sufficient change in the integration system. During the course of the IIPs, foreigners should receive financial benefits for subsistence costs and covering expenses related to Polish language courses and have access to specialised social counselling provided by social workers. If needed, health insurance could also be covered. To receive this kind of support, foreigners had to apply for it within the first 60 days after receiving a decision granting one of the forms of international protection and sign onto an integration programme (a type of social contract). Foreigners can expect social support but also have to fulfil obligations 7 Since 1 January 1999, the administrative division of Poland has been based on three subdivisions—voivodeships (provinces), powiats (counties or districts), and gminas (communes or municipalities). Currently, Poland has 16 voivodeships, 379 powiats and 2479 gminas. Some major cities have the status of both powiat and gmina.

178

M. MOLEDA-ZDZIECH ˛ ET AL.

agreed in the contract, such as attending Polish language courses, register in the Labour Office and actively search for a job, and stay in contact with a given social worker responsible for the process of their integration. Integration programmes were and still are seen as an ineffective tool of integration policy, and as dedicated to a very narrow group of migrants. In the opinion of the Supreme Audit Office, the “social assistance system for refugees does not provide them with proper integration with the society, nor does it create conditions for independent living” (NIK 2015, p. 9). Nonetheless, the integration offer and effectiveness differ by municipality and depend mostly on the experience of the social workers and the number of additional integration projects provided by local institutions and NGOs. Also, one has to take into account that IIPs are the only sustainable component of integration policy and that the social assistance system in Poland is, in general, rather poorly developed compared to other European welfare states, especially Western European and Scandinavian ones. Even if integration programmes are considered the core element of the centrally planned integration system in the country, the main burden of integration activities, especially devoted to other categories of migrants, is on the shoulders of local authorities and NGOs (Babis 2012, pp. 130–131; Pawlak et al. 2010, p. 35). Since 2004, when Poland joined the European Union, EU funds were used not as complementary but as the main source of financing any integration projects other than IIPs. Understandably, many actions were dedicated to the most vulnerable immigrants, such as asylum seekers and refugees. In this field, organisations used mostly financing from the European Refugee Fund (ERF) and many projects were run in Centres for Foreigners or cities and towns near those centres. Often, these projects were treated as a way to improve the offer available under the IIPs or even to supplement them (NGOs provided important integration actions such as Polish classes, legal assistance, labour housing market counselling, etc.). Moreover, projects co-funded from the European Fund for the Integration of non-EU immigrants (EIF) were the main source of funding integration projects for immigrants other than forced migrants. This situation led, on the one hand, to a lack of control and proper evaluation of integration projects provided by organisations and, on the other, to the dependence almost entirely on European funds. The emergence of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), a replacement for ERF and EIF, changed entirely situation in the Polish integration field. Although AMIF was planned to operate

10

IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION POLICIES IN POLAND …

179

only from 2014 to 2020, in Poland, the first programmes started in the second half of 2015. Delays and new ways of applying for grants (e.g. financing only some fields of integration such as legal or psychological assistance) resulted in the partial or complete suspension of some NGO activities. Others that did not want to cease their activities but had no funds ran up debt. In the absence of other ways of financing, AMIF was treated not only as a source of funding of individual projects but also whole organisations (Kosowicz 2015, pp. 93–94). The situation worsened at the turn of 2015–2016 when the recruitment of applications was blocked. The new right-wing government explained that this decision resulted from new challenges in integration policy such as the emergence of the refugee crisis, the increase in terrorist activity in Europe and growing concern about the impact of migration on internal security (MSWiA 2018). As a result, organisations working on integration lost funding and could not operate normally. Some organisations had to be closed and others had to fire their workers and limit their projects. The integration offer was reduced almost only to support for asylum seekers and forced migrants and did not improve in the following years. The lack of structural programmes (besides the IIPs) and financing of integration are not the only problems. Polish migration and integration policies have no clear vision. After a long consultation process, in 2012 the government approved the strategic document “Polish Migration Policy—the Current State of Play and Proposed Actions”, which was supposed to be a package of guidelines for both policies. Although the document was widely consulted with experts, NGOs and local institutions, from the very beginning it was criticised as too general and lacking solutions to the biggest problems (HFPCz 2014; SIP 2014). At the same time, another strategic document referring directly to integration policy, “Polish integration policy of foreigners—assumptions and guidelines”, which should be a supplement to “Polish Migration Policy”, was not approved by the government. Moreover, the new government of the Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwo´sc´ , or PiS), elected in 2015, annulled in 2016 the previously accepted “Polish Migration Policy”, leaving the migration and integration policies without a strategy. The vacuum in this field pushed local authorities to act and in 2017, twelve presidents of Polish cities signed a declaration of cooperation in the field of migration. The idea for this initiative was to exchange ideas and good practices. According to the declaration, a working team on migration and integration was established that should be supported by IOM and UNHCR (UMP 2017).

180

M. MOLEDA-ZDZIECH ˛ ET AL.

In early 2018, the Polish Council of Ministers adopted the document “Socio-economic priorities of migration policy”, which indicates the directions of Polish policy in the future, taking into account the demographic, social and economic situation of the country. According to this document, the new migration policy of Poland must: • be adapted to the priorities of the labour market, • focus on supplementing labour resources with people from outside Poland in industries or occupations with competency gaps (including protection of the national labour market), • respond to the needs of foreigners and Polish citizens living abroad, including repatriates, so as to encourage them to come to or return to the country and establish or transfer business activities there, • prevent further emigration and ensure an increase in return migration. At the same time, detailed solutions resulting from national socioeconomic priorities are to be included in the future overall action plan (MIiR 2018).

10.5 Good Practices and Innovative Solutions in Local Integration Activities As mentioned above, the lack of a strategy for migration and integration policies in Poland has had a major impact on local authorities dealing with the integration of foreigners. Often, at the local level one can observe loosely dispersed integration activities rather than actions executed under a common, long-term policy. Some argue that NGOs are the main actors in shaping integration policy and that they fill the gap in this area left by the central and local authorities. Others point out that NGOs have to put themselves in a good light for the central and local administration to prove the necessity of their work (Jó´zwiak et al. 2018; Pawlak 2013, p. 151). Nonetheless, some local governments (usually big cities) are the pioneers in Poland in shaping the basic elements of integration policy, and it is possible that they will repeat the experience of some western examples where cities preceded the central level in this field (Matusz-Protasiewicz 2016, p. 12). Moreover, most migrant-oriented institutions and organisations are located in big cities, including Warsaw, Gdansk and Lublin,

10

IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION POLICIES IN POLAND …

181

where many foreigners live (see Migrant.info.pl 2018; Uchod´zcy.info 2018). These cities’ experience shows that sometimes successful solutions become stable elements of local integration policy, but it is still questionable to call this phenomenon systematic policymaking. Warsaw, home to the largest number of foreigners, shows that it is possible to provide a wide spectrum of integration solutions without an explicit strategy. A good example of inclusive policy towards foreigners and organisations working in the field of integration, implemented by local authorities, is the Committee for Social Dialogue for Foreigners (Komisja Dialogu Społecznego ds. Cudzoziemców, or KDS) at the Warsaw City Council’s Centre of Social Communication. KDS was established as an initiatory and advisory body in matters related to foreigners. The committee is entitled to delegate its members to commissions considering grants and other types of financing from the city budget in the field of integration and dealings with foreigners. It can also give opinions on local and central legal acts regarding foreigners (KDSC 2012). In practice, KDS has a real impact on the local authorities and can indirectly create city-level integration policy. It is also worth noting that the Warsaw City Council, in cooperation with many actors working for migration, multiculturalism and integration, established the Multicultural Centre as a place where representatives of various cultures and communities living in Warsaw could make themselves feel at home. The centre was the first place of that type where public space was given to institutions and NGOs but also to anyone who had a wish to support or promote different cultures and multicultural dialogue and who could share information or educate others about multiculturalism, migration and integration. The Multicultural Centre is also meant to promote the image of Warsaw as a multicultural city open to foreigners (Gulinska ´ and Malyugina 2015, pp. 113–115). A different approach was presented in Gdansk, where, on the initiative of the city’s president (mayor), Paweł Adamowicz,8 an interdisciplinary and multisectoral group was established to work on a strategic document, called the “Immigrant Integration Model” (see Gdansk City Hall 2016). In the face of increasing immigration to Poland, especially from Ukraine, Gdansk decided to plan local policy and prepare itself for the future. The 8 The mayor was stabbed by a man during an open-air Grand Finale of the Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity Foundation in Gdansk ´ in January 2019 and he died a day after.

182

M. MOLEDA-ZDZIECH ˛ ET AL.

main objective of this model—implemented in 2016—is to develop a migration management system in public and social institutions in the city and to strengthen the integration of immigrants. The main areas where the municipality wanted to increase its integration capability were education, culture, health and social services, housing, the labour market and anti-discrimination and cooperation efforts between the local community and immigrants (Gdansk City Hall 2016, p. 45). Moreover, Gdansk was the first Polish city where a Council of Immigrants, a special advisory body, was established by the city’s president to operate and support the implementation of the “Immigrant Integration Model” (Portal Miasta Gdanska ´ 2016). Another example is the city of Lublin and Lublin Province, near the border with Belarus and Ukraine, affected by relatively significant immigration from these countries. Lublin’s local authorities demonstrate an approach that involves the integration of foreigners and the promotion of multiculturalism. Since 2008, the Lublin Cultural Centre has organised an annual festival devoted to the presentation of cultural, national, ethnic and religious diversity in the region. These events have been focusing primarily on contemporary relations and the functioning of a multicultural society (see Centrum Kultury in Lublin 2018). Also, the Municipal Office of Lublin decided to include integration actions in its strategy. One of the city’s priorities defined in “The Lublin Development Strategy for the Years 2013-2020” is enhancing cultural openness. The local administration tries to use Lublin’s cultural diversity potential and good cooperation with NGOs and volunteers, whose actions are often more advanced than the government system (Gulinska ´ and Malyugina 2015, pp. 39–41; Wciseł 2015, p. 44).

10.6 Political Context of Polish Immigration and Integration Policies Since 2015: Mediatisation of Immigration and Triggering Moral Panic It is impossible to write about Polish immigration and integration policies in recent years without considering the political background and current scene, though always in flux as a result of elections. The year 2015 marked an important turning point and a change in approach to the immigration and integration of foreigners. In addition, that same year, EU countries

10

IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION POLICIES IN POLAND …

183

faced large-scale immigration from North Africa and the Middle East, quickly dubbed as the mass-migration and refugee crisis. Contrary to most polling, the presidential elections in May 2015 concluded with an unexpected win for Andrzej Duda, the Law and Justice (PiS) candidate. He won against President Bronisław Komorowski, who at that time was attempting re-election and who had the support of the party Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, or PO). As the two main parties PO and PiS entered the parliamentary campaign, Civic Platform was headed by Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz. Although the actual leadership of PiS is held by Jarosław Kaczynski, ´ the formal leadership was entrusted to Beata Szydło, who had been the chief of Duda’s election staff. In June 2015, it was announced that Szydło would become a candidate for the post of prime minister if PiS won the parliamentary elections. Since then, the subject of immigrants and the need to make decisions within the framework of immigration and integration policies has become a leading topic, not only on the European political agenda but also in media, especially public outlets. In view of the lack of consensus among the EU Member States on this issue, the lack of rapid political decisions at the EU level and the lack of European solidarity, this topic promptly became the basis for building a sense of fear and threat at the local level (e.g. Klaus et al. 2018; Pachocka and Visvizi 2018). The changes soon began to function as an illustration of global risk, in line with the concept of “risk society” developed by Ulrich Beck, a German sociologist (e.g. Beck and Gernsheim 2002), which means that we live in an age of constant and ubiquitous risk, covering all dimensions of life: political, economic, environmental and cultural. The migration and refugee crisis in Europe is an excellent example of the multidimensional nature of the problems it evoked. The topic of the migration and refugee crisis was also discussed in the 2015 parliamentary election campaign in Poland. The dispute over the position the Polish government was to take in the face of the crisis was one of the loudest and most divisive on the Polish political scene. It concluded with a special meeting of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland9 on 16 September 2015, during which the government presented the situation and announced a plan to accept 7 thousand asylum seekers, in accordance with arrangements agreed at the EU level. PiS opposed this, questioning

9 The Sejm is the lower house of parliament in Poland.

184

M. MOLEDA-ZDZIECH ˛ ET AL.

the legitimacy of the decision, which was based on the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility between the EU members, both mentioned in Article 80 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. This article stipulates: “The policies of the Union set out in this Chapter [in the field of migration, asylum and border management – Authors] and their implementation shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member States. Whenever necessary, the Union acts adopted pursuant to this Chapter shall contain appropriate measures to give effect to this principle”. The parliamentary elections were held on 25 October 2015 and were a clear victory for PiS.10 Thus, the eight-year period of government under PO came to an end and PiS rose to power. The little-known Szydło became prime minister. Kaczynski, ´ formally an ordinary deputy, on the other hand, has been playing the role of informal leader of government and to this day is the unquestionable authority for supporters of the ruling party. Thus, his statements are considered important and are publicised by media, and the consequences are far-reaching. It is important to stress that Kaczynski ´ plays the role of an opinion leader, in accordance with the definition of the term known in sociology and media studies. Kaczynski, ´ in line with the campaign statements, questioned the logic, importance and need to accept refugees under the commitments declared by the previous PO government. At a meeting in Maków Mazowiecki, Kaczynski ´ even suggested that refugees may transmit fatal diseases, saying: “The Minister of Health should answer because there are issues related to the dangers in this area. (…) After all, there are already symptoms of very dangerous diseases not occurring in Europe for a long time: cholera on Greek islands, dysentery in Vienna, parasites, protozoa. This is not meant to discriminate against anyone, but it is necessary to check” (Gazeta.pl 2015). This statement was spread widely across all media and it played a key role in creating an atmosphere of fear and danger. The statements of politicians who play the role of opinion leaders are never neutral; they always have some impact. Politicians, assisted by specialists in social communication, are aware of this and deliberately tailor their messages. In this case, the aim of this statement was to heighten the sense of danger. 10 Turnout in the 2015 parliamentary elections in Poland was 50.92% while in the presidential elections it was 48.96% in the first round and 55.34% in the second round (PKW 2018a, b).

10

IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION POLICIES IN POLAND …

185

In the parliamentary campaign, politicians, in their statements in media, introduced unambiguous, negative images of immigrants/refugees, reducing their presence only to problems they might cause: terrorism, dangers to the cultural and religious identity of the Polish people or epidemiological and health threats.11 According to researchers, the mediatisation of politics is “politics that has lost its autonomy. Has become dependent in its central functions on mass media and is continuously shaped by interactions with mass media” (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999, p. 250). Mediatised policy must take into account the logic of media and its framing (Mol˛eda-Zdziech 2013, pp. 23–70). One of the consequences of this phenomenon is that such statements can induce “moral panic”, which in turn serves to justify political decisions (Cohen 2011): “The studies of Cohen, Young and Person show moral panic as acting on behalf of the dominant social order. They are a means of orchestrating consent by actively intervening in the space of public opinion and social consciousness through the use of highly emotive and rhetorical language which has the effect of requiring that ‘something be done about it’” (McRobbie and Thornton 1995, p. 562). The immigrant/refugee issue, in the case of Poland, is a very good and clear example of this. Managing negative emotions has become an integral part of political communication strategies, especially in the case of social media. The basic methods used by politicians to manipulate social media include attacking the opposition and enlisting trolls to harass specific people, communities or organisations. These are targeted, systematic measures to discredit minority groups and political opponents. Poland was mentioned in the “Challenging Truth and Trust: A Global Inventory of Organised Social Media Manipulation” report as part of a group of countries where political parties officially cooperate with PR companies in the dissemination of manipulated information during elections (Bradshaw and Howard 2018).12

11 An example is the interview with the Minister of Science and Higher Education in Poland and Deputy Prime Minister, Jarosław Gowin, conducted by Radio Kraków in which he stated that Muslims “spread the plague of terrorism in Western Europe” (Siedlecka 2015). 12 The report, published in 2018, showed the methods by which politicians manipulate public opinion through social media. Researchers from Oxford analysed 48 countries, including Poland. The analysis concerned data for the period 2015–2017, i.e., the presidential and parliamentary election campaign and PiS victory.

186

M. MOLEDA-ZDZIECH ˛ ET AL.

The mediatisation of politics involves identifying problems and putting them on the public agenda. This process in media theory is described in the agenda-setting hypothesis. This hypothesis was put forward for the first time and elaborated by McCombs and Shaw, who presented how, during election campaigns, particular topics are assigned specific meaning and importance in the press and television (McCombs and Shaw 1972). Different media create specific hierarchies of topics, providing the public with a ready list of issues that consume their attention. However, the aspect of the relevant selection criteria of these issues over different ones is omitted (Mol˛eda-Zdziech 2013). Kaczynski’s ´ statement suggesting that refugees can spread diseases was an important element of the PiS media agenda. It took media by storm and was repeated multiple times. The introduction of such a negative narration about refugees has also affected popular culture. Television series are a good example of this. In Poland, the series “Father Matthew” (“Ojciec Mateusz”) aired by Polish National Television (Polska Telewizja Publiczna, or TVP), which enjoys high ratings and is broadcast in primetime, was planning to introduce the theme of refugees. In one episode, a Muslim refugee, who had been living in Poland for some time and was married to a Christian woman, was accused of planting a bomb on a playground. The accusation turned out to be wrong, and the perpetrator was to be another, newly arrived refugee. Mikołaj Woubishet, an actor from Wroclaw who was offered this role, refused it. He explained that he did not want to contribute to “preying on the fear of refugees” (Piekarska 2018). This short story is a good illustration of accepted communication patterns. The content appearing in public media, which is under the influence of the government, is not broadcast without a goal in mind. It is intended to perpetuate the current narrative and, in some cases, to provoke moral panic.

10.7 Public Opinion on Immigration: A Case Study of the Acceptance of Asylum Seekers and Refugees in 2015–2018 Since the start of the migration and refugee crisis in Europe, the Centre for Public Opinion Research (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, or CBOS), a public opinion polling institute, has included the subject of attitudes towards receiving refugees in the monitored areas. As the results of CBOS surveys show, the Poles surveyed are not open to receiving

10

IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION POLICIES IN POLAND …

187

refugees from countries affected by armed conflicts (CBOS 2017a, b, 2018). At the same time, the attitude towards receiving refugees depends primarily on the country of origin of the refugees but also on the political inclinations of the respondents. The results of the survey of May 2015, i.e. at the very beginning of the crisis in Europe, show that 14% of respondents declared their willingness to take in refugees while as many as 58% declared their willingness to take them in until the conflict in their country of origin was resolved. Since September 2015, the number of respondents declaring a positive attitude towards accepting refugees and letting them settle down in Poland has fallen from 8% to 5% in June 2018. Compared to May 2015, the number of respondents declaring a temporary willingness to take in refugees, until the time of conflict resolution in their countries of origin, decreased from 58% to 29% in June 2018. This is accompanied by a consistent increase in the declaration that Poland should not take in refugees: from 21% in May 2015 to 60% in June 2018 (see Table 10.1). According to CBOS research, the residents of cities with at least half a million people (12%), people with higher education (10%) and respondents declaring that they favour left-wing politics (11%) report more favourable attitudes towards the unconditional settlement of refugees. The opposite attitude and reluctance to accept refugees is more often declared by rural residents (73%), workers (77 and 78% unskilled and qualified, respectively), people employed on private farmsteads (78%), Table 10.1 Attitudes towards receiving refugees from countries affected by armed conflicts (in %) Date of survey Answer Yes, we should take them in and let them settle down. Yes, we should accept them until they can return to their country of origin. No, Poland should not take in refugees Difficult to say

V 2015

I 2016

X 2017

VI 2018

14

4

4

5

58

37

29

29

21 7

53 6

63 4

60 6

Question: “Do you think that Poland should take in refugees from countries affected by armed conflicts?” Source authors’ elaboration based on: CBOS (2018, p. 2)

188

M. MOLEDA-ZDZIECH ˛ ET AL.

respondents with a lower level of education, and those identifying themselves with the right-wing (see Table 10.2). It is worth noting that participation in religious practices does not affect the attitude towards accepting refugees (CBOS 2018, pp. 2–3). From May 2015 (21% of “definitely not”) to June 2018 (14%) there was a decline in strong opposition to receiving refugees from the Middle East and Africa. However, as shown in Table 10.3, a general negative attitude (answers “rather not” and “definitely not” together) was observed over the years 2015–2018. In 2017–2018, CBOS also asked Poles “if Poland was in danger of losing money from EU funds, should it take in refugees from Muslim countries”, with 45% of the respondents in May 2017 strongly opposed, 50% in October 2017 and 46% in June 2018. It is interesting that between May 2017 and June 2018, the total number of opponents of accepting refugees from Muslim countries, despite a potential financial penalty for Poland, increased from 70 to 75% (see Table 10.4). Such results Table 10.2 Attitudes towards receiving refugees from countries affected by armed conflicts vs. party electorates (in %) Respondents’ answers in % Party electoratesa

Law and Justice, including United Poland (Solidarna Polska) and Agreement (Porozumienie) Civic Platform Kukiz’15 Modern (Nowoczesna) Non-voting

Yes, we should accept them and let them settle down

Yes, we should accept them until they can return to their country of origin

No, Poland should not take in refugees

Difficult to say

1

16

80

4

17 0 7

47 35 70

28 56 23

7 9 0

2

20

70

8

a Determined on the basis of the declaration of voting preferences in possible parliamentary elections

Question: “In your opinion, should Poland take in refugees from countries affected by armed conflicts?” Source CBOS (2018, p. 3)

10

IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION POLICIES IN POLAND …

189

Table 10.3 Attitudes towards the relocation of refugees from the Middle East and Africa Date of survey Answer

V 2015

I 2016

X 2017

VI 2018

Definitely yes Rather yes Rather not Definitely not Difficult to say

3 30 32 21 14

3 27 26 37 7

4 16 23 52 5

5 17 26 46 6

Question: “Due to the large influx of refugees from the Middle East and Africa to some EU countries, these countries are unable to cope with this issue. In your opinion, should Poland accept some of the refugees coming to Europe?” Source authors’ elaboration based on: CBOS (2018, p. 4)

Table 10.4 Decision to accept refugees from Muslim countries in the context of the threat of losing financing from EU funds

Date of survey Answers

May 2017

October 2017

June 2018

Definitely yes Rather yes Rather not Definitely not Difficult to say

9 16 25 45 5

3 12 24 50 11

5 11 29 46 9

Question: “If Poland was in danger of losing money from EU funds, should it take in refugees from Muslim countries?” Source authors’ elaboration based on: CBOS (2017a, 2017b, 2018, p. 5)

of opinion polls partly coincide with overlapping anti-migrant, antirefugee, anti-Muslim and anti-European attitudes and narratives observed in Poland. Górak-Sosnowska and Pachocka (2019, p. 232) state that: “Nowadays, the anti-migration, anti-refugee narrative is mixed with antiMuslim, anti-Arab and anti-European discourse. We are dealing with great simplification regarding the links between the increasing immigration to Europe and the threat of its Islamisation, as well as limiting the decision-making sovereignty of Poland by the EU and its institutions in the context of the implementation of the relocation scheme or a reform of the judiciary. In this context, the unfavourable attitude towards Muslims seems to be part of a larger puzzle, related to Poland’s struggle for selfidentification and redefinition of both its identity and position on the

190

M. MOLEDA-ZDZIECH ˛ ET AL.

European scene. Unfortunately, this important process takes place at a difficult time for the EU, which is affected by different crises and challenges, and for Poland, which is ruled by the right-wing Law and Justice party (e.g. Misiuna and Pachocka 2017)”. A very important factor influencing the perception of refugees is the language used to describe this issue, also observed in the case of the CBOS surveys. The phrasing of a question, for example, as “the influx of refugees from the Middle East and Africa” (geographical term) rather than “refugees from Muslim countries” (a term emphasising religious differences, further reinforced by media coverage, in which refugees from Muslim countries are portrayed as perpetrators of terrorist attacks) leads to different consequences. In this context, a CBOS report from 2018 notes that it “can also be assumed that Poles, as a nation that is largely religiously homogeneous, tend to be more reluctant towards Muslim migrants rather than refugees in general” (CBOS 2018, p. 6). A separate issue worth discussing is the fact that PiS since its electoral victory in 2015, in its political communication strategy has emphasised the issue of (economic) migrants from Ukraine and Ukrainian asylum seekers and refugees from conflict areas in the eastern part of the country while at the same time opposing the acceptance of refugees as part of the solidarity obligations resulting from membership in the European Union and the relocation scheme. In this context, it is worth noting that according to the results of the CBOS survey in 2018, the attitudes of Poles towards Ukrainians are stable: since the beginning of the survey period in August 2015, at least 50% of the respondents have been in favour of accepting Ukrainian refugees from areas affected by conflict (answers “definitely yes” and “rather yes” together), while about onethird of them opposed this idea. In a CBOS survey from June 2018, 56% of adult Poles agreed to receive Ukrainian asylum seekers while 35% opposed it (CBOS 2018, p. 7). The attitude of openness towards Ukrainian forced migrants is mainly influenced by factors determining the situation of the respondents within the social structure: education, work, income and place of residence. Overall, the higher the position in the social structure, the more openness to receiving them is declared by the respondents, and the lower the position in the social structure, the more reluctant the surveyed respondents are towards refugees. Education and professional standing have the strongest impact on the declared attitudes towards accepting Ukrainian refugees, as 78% of those with a positive attitude are managers and specialists with higher education while

10

IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION POLICIES IN POLAND …

191

74% are learners and students. The reception of refugees from Ukraine is supported by 75% of the inhabitants of cities with a population of over 500 thousand people, and those with the highest incomes (74%), compared to the less educated (46%) and the rural population (43%). Opposing attitudes, that is, a reluctance to accept Ukrainian refugees, are declared first of all by unskilled workers (59%), people assessing their own financial situation as poor (55%), those with a monthly income below 900 PLN (about e220) per person in a household (47%). It should be noted that the lack of precise political views is also conducive to an attitude of reluctance towards admitting Ukrainian migrants (47%). On the other hand, having declared a specific political party preference did not influence the opinion on the reception of refugees from Ukraine to a significant extent. With the exception of the supporters of the Modern Party (Nowoczesna), “the attitude of other groups of voters is similar to the distribution of opinions among all Poles. It can, therefore, be concluded that the admission of migrants from outside of Europe, regulated on a higher level (including by the European Union), is a political subject. On the other hand, when it comes to providing shelter to Ukrainians, Poles are visibly guided by personal convictions, and to a lesser extent, they take into account party preference” (CBOS 2018, p. 7).

10.8

Conclusions

The migration and refugee crisis in Europe highlighted the importance of the issue of the integration of newcomers in European societies, especially in target countries such as Germany or Sweden. Although the crisis did not affect Poland directly, much attention was devoted to issues concerning the admission and integration of immigrants in the political, media and social narratives. The peak year of the crisis in the EU, 2015, coincided with the parliamentary and presidential elections in Poland, as a result of which PiS came to power. This had an impact on the implementation of immigration and integration policies at the central and local levels, affecting directly and indirectly both state and non-state actors in this area (e.g. local authorities and NGOs). Since PiS took over in 2015, the vision of a closed society or even an autarky has consistently been built in Poland and there has been a change in the organisation of public policies concerning immigrants, including both voluntary and forced ones. One element of the political transformation after 1989 was the pressure to rebuild a civil society that is capable

192

M. MOLEDA-ZDZIECH ˛ ET AL.

of self-organising and associating within NGOs. The aim was to restore the Solidarity movement, based on social capital, i.e. the aspects of civic activity and engagement. Among others, thanks to financial support from European and national grant systems, many NGOs were established with the aim to help immigrants’ social and cultural adaptation and economic integration but also to increase awareness among Poles of the issues of multiculturalism. PiS changed that: it cut off NGOs helping immigrants and refugees from financial resources, transferring these funds to Voivodes. The PiS government took advantage of a gap in the EU regulations and organised “limited” calls for projects in which only the Voivodes could participate. Since 2015, the PiS government has been blocking payments from the EU Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (see Klaus et al. 2017). In the spring and summer of 2017, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs organised two “limited” calls for applications and only state institutions—voivodship offices—could apply. Until then, these have only dealt with the issues of residence permits and work permits. The aspects of integration, language learning and so on, were the areas developed by the NGO sector. As the authors indicated in their report from 2017, NGOs that have been forced to reduce legal support and integration activities for foreigners, lose continuity and stability in their activities (Klaus et al. 2017). Professional teams consisting of lawyers, psychologists, cultural mentors and social workers are falling apart, as shown by the example of the Help Centre for Foreigners (Centrum Pomocy Cudzoziemcom, or CPC), operating within the framework of the Ocalenie Foundation (Fundacja Ocalenie or FO). So, how can one talk and write about migration in order to avoid moral panic and to prevent the formation of negative public opinion towards people from outside one’s own national group? As shown by the results of the CBOS research, cited above, education and place in the social structure largely influence attitudes towards immigrants. Therefore, all activities should be oriented towards education and the transmission of reliable information, which builds up a solid knowledge base. Stereotypical messages that disseminate only the basic narrative framework of refugee/immigrant-Muslim-terrorist is extremely simplistic, unequivocally negative and only strengthens the mechanisms of panic and fear. Certainly, to arrive at effective migration and integration policies, it is necessary to move away from the multiplication of such an unambiguously negative stereotype towards the provision of true information to

10

IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION POLICIES IN POLAND …

193

the public, which forms the basis of reliable knowledge on the topic of immigrants. In this field, NGOs, which often employ immigrants or are even created by them, have the greatest amount of experience.

References Babis, P. (2012). Wpływ Unii Europejskiej na budow˛e polskiej polityki integracyjnej. In M. Bieniecki, & M. Pawlak (Eds.), Praktyki integracji. Do´swiadczenia i Perspektywy (pp. 117–134). Warszawa: Caritas Polska. Beck, U., & Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2002). Individualization: Institutionalized Individualism and Its Social and Political Consequences. London: Sage. Bradshaw, S., & Howard, P. N. (2018). Challenging Truth and Trust: A Global Inventory of Organised Social Media Manipulation. Oxford: University of Oxford. https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/ sites/93/2018/07/ct2018.pdf. Accessed 27 December 2018. Brunarska, Z., Kindler, M., Szulecka, M., & Torunczyk-Ruiz, ´ S. (2016). Ukrainian Migration to Poland: A “Local” Mobility? In O. Fedyuk & M. Kindler (Eds.), Ukrainian Migration to the European Union: Lessons from Migration Studies. Berlin: Springer. Cohen, S. (2011). Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers. London and New York: Routledge. CSO (Central Statistical Office). (2017). Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Poland. Central Statistical Office. Warsaw: CSO. Fihel, A., Stefanska, ´ R., & Kaczmarczyk, P. (2012). Recent Trends in International Migration in Poland. Central and Eastern European Migration Review, 1(1), 69–90. Florczak, A. (2003). Uchod´zcy w Polsce. Mi˛edzy humanitaryzmem a pragmatyzmem. Torun: ´ Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek. Gdansk City Hall. (2016). Immigrant Integration Model. Gdansk: ´ Gdansk City Hall. https://www.gdansk.pl/download/2017-06/91579.pdf. Accessed 27 December 2018. Gł˛abicka, K. (1998). Załozenia ˙ i przesłanki polskiej polityki migracyjnej. In K. Gł˛abicka, M. Okólski, & D. Stola (Eds.). Polityka migracyjna Polski, „Prace Migracyjne” (nr. 18). Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Społecznych Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. Górak-Sosnowska, K., & Pachocka, M. (2019). Islamophobia and the Quest for European Identity in Poland. In I. Zempi & I. Awan (Eds.), The Routledge International Handbook of Islamophobia (pp. 225–236). London and New York: Routledge. Gulinska, ´ A., & Malyugina, O. (2015). Miasta Otwarte. Warszawa: Inna Przestrzen. ´

194

M. MOLEDA-ZDZIECH ˛ ET AL.

HFPCz (Helsinska ´ Fundacja Praw Człowieka). (2014). Uwagi Helsinskiej ´ Fundacji Praw Człowieka do dokumentu „Plan wdrazania ˙ – Polityka migracyjna Polski – stan obecny i postulowane działania” z dnia 4.02.2014 r. Warszawa: HFPCz. Jó´zwiak I., Sánchez-Domíngues, M., & Sorando, D. (2018). Mainstreaming by Accident in the New-Migration Countries: The Role of NGOs in Spain and Poland. In A. Scholten & I. van Breugel (Eds.), Mainstreaming Integration Governance: New Trends in Migrant Integration Policies in Europe (pp. 47– 70). Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Klaus, W., & Chrzanowska, A. (2007). Integracja i pomoc społeczna wobec uchod´zców w Polsce. „Analizy, Raporty, Ekspertyzy” (nr 8). Warszawa: Stowarzyszenie Interwencji Prawnej. Klaus, W., Lévay, M., Rzeplinska, ´ I., & Scheinost, M. (2018). Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Central-European Countries—Reality, Politics and the Creation of Fear in Societies. In H. Kury & S. Redo (Eds.), Refugees and Migrants in Law and Policy Challenges and Opportunities for Global Civic Education (pp. 457–494). Berlin: Springer. ˙ Klaus, W., Ostaszewska-Zuk, E., & Szczepanik, M. (2017). Fundusze Europejskie i ich rola we wspieraniu integracji cudzoziemców w Polsce. Warszawa. http://www.hfhr.pl/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/raport_po-FAMI_net. pdf. Accessed 27 December 2018. Kosowicz, A. (2015). Zła fama FAMI („Trzeci sektor”, No. 35). Warszawa: Instytut Spraw Publicznych. Kosowicz, A., & Maciejko, A. (2007). Integracja uchod´zców w Polsce – w liczbach. Warszawa: Agencja Wydawnicza MakPrint. Kostrzewa, Z.‚ & Szałtys, D. (2013). Migracje zagraniczne ludno´sci. Narodowy Spis Powszechny Ludno´sci i Mieszkan´ 2011 [pdf]. Warszawa: CSO. KPRP (Kancelaria Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej). (2015, July). Polityka migracyjna Polski wobec wyzwan´ demograficznych („Biuletyn Forum Debaty Publicznej”, nr 36). https://www.rpo.gov.pl/sites/default/files/Biuletyn% 20FDP%20nr%2036%20-%20Polityka%20migracyjna%20Polski%20wobec% 20wyzwa%C5%84%20demograficznych.pdf. Accessed 27 December 2018. Lesinska, ´ M. (2010). Polityka integracyjna. In A. Górny, I. Grabowska-Lusinska, ´ M. Lesinska, ´ & M. Okólski (Eds.), Transformacja nieoczywista. Polska jako kraj imigracji. Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. Lesinska, ´ M., Stefanska, ´ R., & Szulecka, M. (2010). Zał˛acznik 2.1. Rozwój polityki migracyjnej. In A. Górny, I. Grabowska-Lusinska, ´ M. Lesinska, ´ & M. Okólski (Eds.), Transformacja nieoczywista. Polska jako kraj imigracji. Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. Łodzinski, ´ S. (1997). Problemy prawne polityki migracyjnej Polski w latach 1989–1995 na tle rozwi˛azan´ obowi˛azuj˛acych w krajach Unii Europejskiej.

10

IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION POLICIES IN POLAND …

195

In J. E. Zamojski (Ed.), Migracje i Społeczenstwo: ´ Zbiór Studiów, tom 2. Warszawa: Instytut Historii PAN. Łodzinski, ´ S. (1998). Problemy polityki migracyjnej Polski w latach 1989–1998 (czerwiec) a nowa ustawa o cudzoziemcach („Raport nr 147”). Warszawa: Biuro Studiów i Ekspertyz Kancelarii Sejmu. http://biurose.sejm.gov.pl/tek sty/r-147.htm. Łodzinski, ´ S., & Szonert, M. (2016). „Niepolityczna polityka”? Kształtowanie si˛e polityki migracyjnej w Polsce w latach 1989–2016 (kwiecien) ´ („CMR Working Papers”, Nr 90/148). http://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/ 2016/06/CMR_WP_90148.pdf. Accessed 27 December 2018. Łodzinski, ´ S., & Z˛abek, M. (2008). Uchod´zcy w Polsce. Próba spojrzenia antropologicznego. Warszawa: Polska Akcja Humanitarna, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR. Matusz-Protasiewicz, P. (2013). Rosn˛aca rola poziomu lokalnego w kreowaniu polityki integracji imigrantów w Unii Europejskiej. Central and Eastern European Migration Review, 2(2), 75–97. Matusz-Protasiewicz, P. (2016). Miasto jako wazny ˙ element w kształtowaniu polityki integracji migrantów. In M. Dudkiewicz (Ed.), Cudzoziemcy w Warszawie, czyli jak zmierzy´c si˛e z nieuniknionym (Raport). Warszawa. https://cudzoziemcywaw.files.wordpress.com/2016/06/raport1.pdf. Accessed 27 December 2018. Mazzoleni, G., & Schulz, W. (1999). “Mediatization” of Politics: A Challenge for Democracy? Political Communication, 16(3), 247–261. McCombs, M., & Shaw, D. (1972). The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media. Public Opinion Quarterly, 36(2), 176–187. McRobbie, A., & Thornton, S. L. (1995). Rethinking “Moral Panic” form Multi-Mediated Social Worlds. The British Journal of Sociology, 46(4), 559– 574. Misiuna, J., & Pachocka, M. (2014). Demographic Changes in Europe in the 21st Century: Will Poland Become an Immigration State? In E. Latoszek, A. St˛epniak, A. Kłos, & M. Krzeminski ´ (Eds.), 10 lat członkostwa Polski w Unii Europejskiej – ocena i perspektywy (pp. 59–77). Sopot: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdanskiego. ´ Misiuna, J., & Pachocka, M. (2017). La Pologne en Europe au debut du XXIeme siecle: a la croisee des chemins. Herodote, 164(1), 145–161. Mol˛eda-Zdziech, M. (2013). Czas celebrytów. Mediatyzacja zycia ˙ publicznego. Warszawa: Difin. NIK (Najwyzsza ˙ Izba Kontroli). (2015, November 13). Pomoc społeczna dla uchod´zców. Informacja o wynikach kontroli. https://www.nik.gov.pl/kon trole/P/14/049/. Accessed 27 December 2018.

196

M. MOLEDA-ZDZIECH ˛ ET AL.

OECD. (2018). International Migration Outlook 2018. Paris: OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/migr_outlook-2018-en. Accessed 27 December 2018. Okólski, M. (2010). Polska jako kraj imigracji – wprowadzenie. In A. Górny, I. Grabowska-Lusinska, ´ M. Lesinska, ´ & M. Okólski (Eds.), Transformacja nieoczywista. Polska jako kraj imigracji. Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. Okólski, M. (Ed.). (2018). Wyzwania starzejacego ˛ si˛e społeczenstwa. ´ Polska dzi´s i jutro. Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. Pachocka, M., & Visvizi, A. (2018). Rethinking the Twin Migration and Refugee Crises in Europe Through the Lens of Safety and Security. In C. E. Pacheco Amaral, V. Cucerescu, G. Gabrichidze, I. Horga, A. Kruglashov, E. Latoszek, & M. Pachocka (Eds.), The European Union and the Eastern Partnership: Security Challenges (pp. 453–470). Chi¸sin˘au, Tbilisi, and Cern˘aut, i: Tipografia “Print-Caro”. Pawlak, M. (2013). Organizacyjna reakcja na nowe zjawisko. Szkoły i instytucje pomocowe wobec uchod´zców w Polsce po 2004 r. Warszawa: Instytut Profilaktyki Społecznej i Resocjalizacji. Pawlak, P., Szelewa, D., & Polakowski, M. (2010). Od polityki (dez)integracji do migrant-mainstreaming. In P. Pawlak, D. Szelewa, M. Polakowski, M. Fijałkowska, & I. B˛abiak (Eds.), Polityka (dez)integracji. Zarzadzanie ˛ integracja˛ obywateli panstw ´ trzecich w Polsce. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar. SIP (Stowarzyszenie Interwencji Prawnej). (2014). Uwagi do planu wdrazania ˙ dla dokumentu „Polityka migracyjna Polski – stan obecny i postulowane działania” z dnia 3.02.2014 r. Warszawa: SIP. Szonert, M. (2000). Rok 1990 – Pocz˛atek opieki nad uchod´zcami. In J. E. Zamojski (Ed.). Migracje polityczne XX wieku – Migracje i Społeczenstwo ´ (nr 4). Warszawa: Instytut Historii PAN. Szulecka, M., Pachocka, M., & Sobczak-Szelc, K. (2018, September 14). Poland—Country Report: Legal and Policy Framework of Migration Governance (Global Migration: Consequences and Responses—RESPOND’s Working Papers Series). http://www.crs.uu.se/respond/working-paper-ser ies/. Accessed 27 December 2018. Wach, D. (2018). Ewolucja polskiej polityki integracji cudzoziemców po 1989 roku. In H. Chałupczak, M. Lesinska, ´ E. Pogorzała, & T. Browarek (Eds.), Polityka migracyjna w obliczu współczesnych wyzwan. ´ Teoria i praktyka. Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej. Wciseł, W. (2015). Lublin – miasto integracji. In W. Wciseł (Ed.), Integracja cudzoziemców w wybranych krajach i miastach europejskich – dobre praktyki. Lublin: Stowarzyszenie Solidarno´sci Globalnej.

10

IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION POLICIES IN POLAND …

197

Act of 12 December 2013 on Foreigners (Journal of Laws from 2013, item 1650, with amendments). Act of 12 March 2004 on Social Assistance (Journal of Laws from 2004, No. 64, item 593, with amendments). Act of 13 June 2003 on Granting Protection to Foreigners Within the Territory of the Republic of Poland (Journal of Laws from 2003, No. 128, item 1176, with amendments). Act of 18 February 2000 Amending the Act on Social Assistance and Act on Oldage Pensions and Disability Pensions from the Social Insurance Fund (Journal of Laws from 2000, No. 19, item 238). Act of 20 April 2004 on the Promotion of Employment and Labour Market Institutions (Journal of Laws from 2004, No. 99, item 1001, with Amendments). Act of 25 June 1997 on Foreigners (Journal of Laws from 1997, No. 114, item 739). Act of 27 July 2005 Law on Higher Education (Journal of Laws from 2005, No. 164, item 1365, with amendments). Act of 7 September 1991 on the System of Education (Journal of Laws from 1991, No. 95, item 425, with amendments). CBOS (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej). (2017a, January). Komunikat z badan´ CBOS („Stosunek Polaków do przyjmowania uchod´zców”, no. 1/2017). https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2017/K_001_17.PDF. Accessed 27 December 2018. CBOS (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej). (2017b, December). Komunikat z badan´ CBOS („Stosunek do przyjmowania uchod´zców”, no. 163/2017). https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2017/K_163_17.PDF. Accessed 27 December 2018. CBOS (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej). (2018, July). Komunikat z badan´ CBOS („Stosunek Polaków i Czechów do przyjmowania uchod´zców”, no. 87/2018). https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2018/ K_087_18.PDF. Accessed 27 December 2018. Centrum Kultury w Lublinie. (2018). Wielokulturowy Lublin. http://www.wie lokulturowylublin.pl/. Accessed 27 December 2018. Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 (Journal of Laws from 1997, No. 78, item 483, with amendments). Czeranowska, O., Kaczmarczyk, P., Pachocka, M., Rosinska, ´ A., Salamonska, ´ J., Szczerba-Zawada, A., Et al. (2018). Atlas of Transitions. New Geographies for a Cross-Cultural Europe. Context Analysis—Warsaw, Poland. Warsaw: Centre of Migration Research—University of Warsaw. Project „Atlas of Transitions. New Geographies for a Cross-Cultural Europe” (2017–2020). http://www.atlasoftransitions.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/ 09/CONTEXT-ANALYSIS-Poland.pdf. Accessed 27 December 2018.

198

M. MOLEDA-ZDZIECH ˛ ET AL.

Eurostat Database. (2018a). Asylum and First Time Asylum Applicants by Citizenship, Age and Sex Annual Aggregated Data (rounded) [migr_asyappctza]. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database. Accessed 27 December 2018. Eurostat Database. (2018b). Emigration by Age and Sex (migr_emi2). https:// ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database. Accessed 27 December 2018. Eurostat Database. (2018c). First Instance Decisions on Applications by Citizenship, Age and Sex Annual Aggregated Data (rounded) [migr_asydcfsta]. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database. Accessed 27 December 2018. Eurostat Database. (2018d). Population Change—Demographic Balance and Crude Rates at National Level (demo_gind). https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ data/database. Accessed 27 December 2018. Eurostat Metadata. (2018a). Applications (migr_asyapp). https://ec.europa.eu/ eurostat/cache/metadata/en/migr_asyapp_esms.htm. Accessed 27 December 2018. Eurostat Metadata. (2018b). Decisions on Applications and Resettlement (migr_asydec). https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/migr_a sydec_esms.htm. Accessed 27 December 2018. European Migration Network. (2018). The Main Legal Acts Regulating the Situation of Foreigners in Poland. https://www.emn.gov.pl/ese/legislation/ polish-legal-acts/8783,The-main-legal-acts-regulating-the-situation-of-foreig ners-in-Poland.html. Accessed 27 December 2018. Eurostat Statistics Explained. (2018). Migration and Migrant Population Statistics. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Mig ration_and_migrant_population_statistics. Accessed 27 December 2018. Gazeta.pl. (2015, October 13). Kaczynski ´ o uchod´zcach: „Cholera w Grecji, ˙ dezynteria w Wiedniu, pasozyty…”. ˙ Celinski: ´ „Mówiło si˛e: te Zydki nios˛a tyfus”, Gazeta.pl. http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,143907,190 19635,kaczynski-o-uchodzcach-cholera-w-grecji-dezynteria-w-wiedniu.html. Accessed 27 December 2018. GUS (Główny Urz˛ad Statystyczny). (2017). Informacja o rozmiarach i kierunkach czasowej emigracji z Polski w latach 2004–2016. Warszawa: GUS. KDSC (Komisja Dialogu Społecznego ds. Cudzoziemców). (2012). Regulamin Komisji Dialogu Społecznego ds. Cudzoziemców przy Centrum Komunikacji Społecznej Urz˛edu m.st. Warszawa. http://ngo.um.warszawa.pl/sites/ngo2. um.warszawa.pl/files/zalaczniki/dokumenty/kds_cudzoziemcy_regulamin_ 2012.pdf. Accessed 27 December 2018. Migracje.gov.pl. (2018). https://migracje.gov.pl/en/statistics/scope/Pol and/type/statuses/view/map/year/2017/?x=0.9331&y=1.1008&level=1. Accessed 27 December 2018. Migrant.info.pl. (2018). Migrant-Assisting Organizations. http://www.migrant. info.pl/migrant-assisting-organizations.html. Accessed 27 December 2018.

10

IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION POLICIES IN POLAND …

199

MIiR (Ministerstwo Inwestycji i Rozwoju). (2018, March 29). Nowe priorytety rzadowej ˛ polityki migracyjnej. https://www.miir.gov.pl/strony/aktualnosci/ nowe-priorytety-rzadowej-polityki-migracyjnej/. Accessed 27 December 2018. MSWiA (Ministerstwo Spraw Wewn˛etrznych i Administracji). (2018). Dwa nowe nabory w ramach Funduszu Azylu, Migracji i Integracji. http://fun dusze.mswia.gov.pl/ue/aktualnosci/13784,Dwa-nowe-nabory-w-ramachFunduszu-Azylu-Migracji-i-Integracji.html. Accessed 27 December 2018. Piekarska, M. (2018, January 24). W serialu TVP “Ojciec Mateusz” muzułmanski ´ uchod´zca podłozy ˙ bomb˛e na placu zabaw. Wrocławski aktor Mikołaj Woubishet odmówił tej roli. Wyborcza.pl. http://wroclaw.wyborcza.pl/ wroclaw/7,35771,22935879,uchodzca-z-bomba-w-ojcu-mateuszu.html. Accessed 27 December 2018. PKW (Panstwowa ´ Komisja Wyborcza). (2018a). Wybory do Sejmu i Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2015. https://parlament2015.pkw.gov.pl/. Accessed 25 December 2018. PKW (Panstwowa ´ Komisja Wyborcza). (2018b). Wybory Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2015. https://prezydent2015.pkw.gov.pl/. Accessed 27 December 2018. Portal Miasta Gdanska. ´ (2016, September 19). 12 imigrantów b˛edzie doradza´c prezydentowi Gdanska. ´ Kim s˛a? Portal Miasta Gdanska. ´ https://www.gda nsk.pl/migracje/12-imigrantow-bedzie-doradzac-prezydentowi-gdanska-kimsa,a,61460. Accessed 27 December 2018. Siedlecka, E. (2015, July 16). Zaraza intelektualna, Wyborcza.pl. http:// wyborcza.pl/1,75968,18365784,zaraza-intelektualna.html. Accessed 27 December 2018. Uchod´zcy.info. (2018). Organizacje i inicjatywy działajace ˛ w Polsce. http://uch odzcy.info/kto-juz-dziala/. Accessed 27 December 2018. UMP (Unia Metropolii Polskich). (2017). Deklaracja prezydentów o współdziałaniu miast Unii Metropolii Polskich w dziedzinie migracji. http://www. metropolie.pl/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Tekst-deklaracji-UMP-z-30czerwca-2017.pdf. Accessed 27 December 2018. Wortal Publicznych Słuzb ˙ Zatrudnienia. (2018). Zezwolenia na prac˛e cudzoziemców. http://psz.praca.gov.pl/web/urzad-pracy/-/8180075-zezwol enia-na-prace-cudzoziemcow/. Accessed 27 December 2018.

CHAPTER 11

Slovenian Migration Management at the Local Level Uroš Pinteriˇc

11.1

Introduction

Slovenian management of migration has to be taken into the consideration not only in political, legal, economic and societal perspective, but it has to be understood (in national or local frame) also in historical development. Slovenian territory1 is a historical crossroad for migrations, where different civilisations meet, greet or fight. During the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia period, Slovenia was the destination country for many people from other republics of Yugoslavia, due to better living standard and due to the organisation of the military service. Due to the previous geo-political reality, Slovenia had gained also territories with the Italian, Austrian and Hungarian population, not to mention two Gipsies populations and so called Koˇcevje Germans (Slo: Koˇcevski Nemci). However, Slovenia became independent with approximately 88% Slovenian inhabitants and remaining 12% of non-Slovenian population 1 Or better, region in which modern Slovenia is positioned today.

U. Pinteriˇc (B) Alexander Dubˇcek Univeristy in Trenˇcin, Trenˇcin, Slovakia © The Author(s) 2021 J. Franzke and J. M. Ruano de la Fuente (eds.), Local Integration of Migrants Policy, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50979-8_11

201

202

ˇ U. PINTERIC

(SURS 2018). In such conditions, Slovenia became refugee shelter for the victims of the Yugoslavian disintegration war in 1990s as well as primary economic migration destination for the same set of nations. This resulted in further drop of share of Slovenians in the national composition to 83% of Slovenians in 2002. After 2002, nationality composition was not measured anymore. Based on the migration trends, fertility and mortality data, one can assume that there is about 75% of Slovenians in 2018. At the same time, 2018 data show that 94.1% of inhabitants in Slovenia are Slovenian citizens (SURS 2018). The difference between nationality and citizenship can be the starting point for understanding Slovenian migration management and its consequences. We can say that Slovenian government is extremely successful in integrating people into the technical perspective with number of foreigners at the level of the statistical margin. However, the share of foreign citizens in Slovenia between 2014 and 2018 increased for 1.2%2 (SURS 2018). In these conditions, Slovenian administrative-political structures have to manage the integration of the migrants. Many of them have direct experience with 1990s Balkan migration wave, which was different in comparison to 2015. However, Slovenia failed to the level, that even the European Court of Human Rights recognised the failure in the complaint case 26828/06 from 12 March 2014 (ECHR 2014), which originated in over 25,000 “erased” citizens (Mirovni inštitut, n.d.), who were deleted from the Slovenian national databases due to their lack of awareness of the legal demand that they register as foreigners, despite they lived in Slovenia for long period before disintegration of Yugoslavia. The remaining 170,000 people managed to re-register, apply for Slovenian citizenship, and thus retain their legal rights by becoming Slovenian citizens. Despite somewhat distant, the history of this case shows the confusion in Slovenia’s government migration integration logic. This is well shown also in 2015 onwards migration wave. In this chapter we will address primarily the main “migration concern” of the Europe, but we will under no circumstances avoid migration issues, which we consider somewhat normal especially in the perspective of different collective identities.

2 Assuming that some of these people will apply for Slovenian citizenship when appropriate, and understanding that last nationality check was in 2002, we can trust previous assessment that in 2018 there is 80% of Slovenians living in Slovenia.

11

11.2

SLOVENIAN MIGRATION MANAGEMENT …

203

Legal Perspective

Slovenian integration of migrants is subordinated to the international (e.g. UN 1951 Refugee Convention—“Geneva convention”) and European rules (e.g. so called Dublin Regulation; Regulation [EU] No. 604/2013) in the field of human rights, which shall be considered universal and thus not specific for any European Union member state (despite understanding of the non-national law can be peculiar in the cases of individual countries, to say the least). Furthermore, Slovenian constitution provides general protection of the human rights, but it is not specifying any situation regarding the refugees, which would be additional to the international or European law. In this manner, treating the refugees is subject to the national law and sub-legal acts. Act on international protection (Ur.l. RS 11/2011) is the basic document defining the national perspective on refugees. It is based on the European legal frame, and was last amended in 2010 (before the migration crisis in 2015). The only important foundation for the relation with the local governments is set in the article providing the right of the asylum seeker to plea for the asylum with the local government (among other institutions).3 Second act regarding the refugee situation is Asylum Act (Ur.l. RS 134/2003), which defines the asylum procedures on one hand and in the perspective of the local community involvement, only binds them to accept the asylum plea from the asylum seeker. Third act is the Foreigners/Aliens Act (Ur. l. RS 1/2018), which on one hand completely exclude local governments and at the same time indicate the time when other previously mentioned acts step in the force. In this manner Foreigners Act is regulating the general migration and has supremacy over the Asylum act and International protection act. Article 10b (par. 2) of Foreigners act defines when aforementioned acts are allowed to be used. Article 10b of Foreigners act was widely criticised by the human rights protection organisations, including Amnesty International, due to the lack of sensitivity and direct violation of human rights (AI 2017). The same 10b article was also the subject of the constitutional test upon the demand of the Ombudsman of Republic of Slovenia in April of 2017 (MMC RTV SLO 2017a). The decision on the subject was not provided so far (August of 2018), despite Constitutional Court stated that the subject will be considered as priority. 3 Other stipulations, which target local communities are putting them in the passive role.

204

ˇ U. PINTERIC

One of the main concerns about the currently valid Foreigners act (Ur.l. RS 1/2018) is that it enables the state to participate in the chain return of the refugees (asylum seekers) to the last known “safe” country. Return procedure can be understood as, among other things, humiliation and torture, which is prohibited by the Constitution of Republic of Slovenia especially in the perspective of the recent scandal in the USA, with the separation of children from families. The general logic follows the European approach to technically get rid of refugees after the danger in a certain area is considered to be reduced.

11.3 Perspective on Migration and Internal Ideological Struggle As well as in the rest of the Europe, also in Slovenia migration is currently rather sterile expression to address the hundreds of thousands of nonEU citizens who are trying to enter the European Union by any means possible, and who are risking their lives doing so. The issue which is not clarified for political reasons is that there are few different types of “migration”. Political/Civic migration for the safety of life and health reasons, which goes in the category of shelter seeking individuals, and even if they have economic interests, it is not the primary reason for abandoning the country of origin. Second group are external economic migrants, who are coming out of the EU territories and they are trying to enter the EU for predominantly economic reasons. At this point, the question if poverty is to be considered life threatening condition which should be ground for protection of such person. Third part is represented by inner economic migrations among EU member states. There is absolutely strong influx of non-EU economic migrants, there is also high share of actual political migrants/refugees but the part which is in the shadow of non-EU migration is that about 30–40% (depends on the individual country) of immigration to individual EU country is represented by the inner EU migration flows (Eurostat 2018). Despite this seems to be irrelevant for the debate, it is the indicator that all the big changes in the structure of the population are multidimensional and that the migration management is not only media and politics oversimplified issue of Syrians who should fight for their freedom and Afghani who should build their own economy instead of burdening the European one. It is also about the (in)ability of individual European nations to run the sound economies and systems, which would provide proper answer to the issues of the

11

SLOVENIAN MIGRATION MANAGEMENT …

205

ageing population and social security of the nations. Youth unemployment, increasing retirement age, decreasing social security, internal and external disparities, hard recovery after the major economic crisis, etc.,4 combined with the momentary inflow of the big amount of people from different cultural context are fertile conditions for raise of xenophobia and nationalism, as it was shown in many countries. Raise of extreme right-wing parties all over the Europe indicates the cleavage between multiculturalist desires of European ideals and deeply rooted nationalisms of the past centuries. In this perspective the search for the “external” enemy is fast and simple. Rather helpless individuals, with limited or no support network are branded as new »them« who will “occupy” and change the nature of the European identity for ever. In the Slovenian case, this situation had led to the delayed reaction of 2018 parliamentary election (Volilna komisija RS 2018), when Slovenian National Party (SNS) as extreme5 right-wing party, was, without strong campaign, re-elected to the Parliament (after 2011 dropout) and when the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) as right-wing party, won the election, while applying visible anti-migration campaign as part of its campaign strategy. Culture of fear strategy was applied by different propaganda channels including media reporting, spin and public figures (e.g. former head of Slovenian national intelligence office) who are warning the population of the danger which is coming. However, in the retrospective, it can be argued that the migration-related dangers never developed into anything more than threats, regardless of significant number of migrants who crossed or entered the country. Last such case is from October 2018, when the incident on Bosnian–Croatian border, when group of “migrants”6 tried to forcefully enter Croatia and to continue their way, was reported as long as it was “violent” (e.g. STA in Dnevnik 2018a;

4 In this manner Eurobarometer 87 from Spring 2017 shows that eliminating Terrorism and Migration from the list of mayor concerns of Europeans, would completely change the set of the policy issues (see European Commission 2017). 5 It shall be noted that rhetoric of this extremism is much weaker than in the case of comparable German or French counterparts and that in some cases, xenophobic argument was even more present in SDS than in SNS case. 6 It is interesting how the word “refugees” was over the time deleted out of the reporting, which provides the ground for the spin that those people are coming to “steel the jobs” and not to search for the shelter.

206

ˇ U. PINTERIC

S.U. 2018). Slovenian media did not report on existence of such population (despite it was indicated that late 2018, Slovenia might face new migration wave) before, nor did provide the closure of the situation by reporting the final outcome of the riot (which we can assume that the refugees were kept out of the Croatia at the end). With such open ending coverage of the events, media create the space for interpretations in the mind of the citizens and enable them to think that anytime soon migrants will be entering Slovenia.

11.4

Reality of Local Government Involvement

Due to the fact that refugees (migrants) have to cross border line, which is secured by the police (formally under Ministry of interior of RS), there is rather slim chance that any refugee will get into the situation to ask for asylum at the municipality. Especially due to the fact that after the arrest, such person will be taken to the police for identification and unless asking for asylum right away, will be returned back to the previous country (in Slovenian case most commonly to Croatia). From that point onwards, such people will be taken to the asylum facilities which are under the control of the Ministry of interior and are completely detached from the local governments until the decision regarding the asylum is provided. Severe migration crisis in 2015 showed lack of preparedness and communication on national as well as other levels.7 Typical case can be seen in the municipality of Logatec case (see Internet 1), where department of the asylum system was opened in 2015. Despite coordination with the municipality was necessary‚ first official information (n.d. based on other news, 18 September 2015) for public reads as: we inform general public that two buses of refugees are coming to Logatec – families, so vulnerable groups. The settlement is coordinated by Ministry of interior RS, URSZR (Office of RS for protection and rescue), and command of civil protection Logatec. The settlement will take place in late afternoon and evening hours. Personnel of Health centre Logatec is alerted. (Internet 2)

7 Leaving aside political and xenophobic aspects of the situation, despite we will be referring to it as well.

11

SLOVENIAN MIGRATION MANAGEMENT …

207

Further on, there is development of the situation with constant in-and outflow of migrants, protests of the local community and direct decisions of the Ministry of interior and other national bodies. In the same manner and against the will of the local population state provided inclusion and education for the minors in the local primary school based on the sovereign authority (Internet 1). It has to be noted that, regardless of how insensitive this seems, there is most likely the only possible way to address this issue when there is general “not in my backyard” attitude.

11.5

Practical Cases

Slovenian migration management involving local communities was visible in few cases for shorter or longer period of time. There are strong cases of Obrežje and Šentilj refugee logistic camps, cutting barbed-wire scandal and deportation scandal. Despite the nature of each of these four cases is significantly different, they all show different parts of the same picture. Obrežje is border locality between Slovenia and Croatia, within the municipality of Brežice. At the peak of the migration crisis in September and October 2015, more than 200,000 people passed the border in this locality (ePosavje 2015a). At the level of treatment, the state organized the riot police and fully equipped military presence,8 while total report was only 23 security incidents in the same period (MMC RTV SLO 2015). After the initial confusion,9 the national and local structures of civic protection, police and military started the synchronised action. Inbetween, as well as later on, enormous support was provided by the local community as well as citizens, volunteers and NGOs across the country, who took significant share of humanitarian work (providing the life necessities as well as other services, needed or requested by authorities) (e.g. Mikuš Kos 2015). However, ignorance of the government was visible at all levels and at all times in this manner, the temporary ad hoc refugee centre was not removed at least until October 2016 when the migration wave was under control and without the need for the facilities (ePosavje 2015b). Government responded to this with the prolongation of the existence of refugee centre in Dobova for additional six months, 8 For what the state was criticised, not only by AI, human rights activists, but as well security experts (see MMC RTV SLO 2015). 9 We are skipping the topic on coordination of migration flow on the Croatian side, which can be further blamed all the way to Greece.

208

ˇ U. PINTERIC

against the will of local community. The economic damage in the municipality between September and December 2015 was assessed to 1.3e mio (ePosavje 2015c). Despite government was calling on potential victims of the business damage to report their situation, it is impossible to find any reporting on reparation. Barbed-wire scandal is the late 2015 invention of national government who decided to install “technical barriers” (cutting barbed-wire) in certain territories of green border, in most cases on the Slovenian banks of rivers Sotla, Kolpa and few other locations. Despite it was considered temporary solution to ensure better control of migrant flows it was strongly opposed by the citizens as well as representatives of local communities. State also in this case acted to form the sovereign position and informed owners of the land-lots that they will install barbed-wire on their land according to the legal possibilities without any plan on long term management of the “technical barriers” and without consideration about farming cycle10 (ePosavje 2015d). Different initiatives for human rights opposed to such measures from the beginning together with the hunters (who had certain amount of damage on wild life population, due to deer being tangled in barbed-wires), the local governments started to press on the national government harder in early 2016, realising that war-zone outlook will damage their tourist potential and in certain cases directly prevent them from enabling riverbanks of Kolpa river as tourist destination (UŠK 2015). Despite government was not responding to this criticism, part of the barbed-wire fences was washed away in floods, some parts were removed as an act of civil disobedience, while the remaining parts are still on the locations, grown in the grass in 2018. From the state transparency perspective, the barbed-wire was not properly tendered, which was developed as a side scandal (Škerl Kramberger 2017). The reality shows that the 6.6e mio worth of barbed-wire did not stop the decomposition of the Schengen system in the sense of increased border control on the Austrian side at least until mid-2019 (MMC RTV SLO 2018). The last example of Austrian anti-migration policy is exit of Austria from new UN migration treaty (and will thus join the USA and Hungary) (see STA 2018b).

10 Despite there is obviously legal ground, providing the state right to do so in order to protect the border, we can assume that the measures and the way how they were implemented were understandable for the war situation and much less so for the migration control.

11

SLOVENIAN MIGRATION MANAGEMENT …

209

Šentilj logistic camp was established after Obrežje logistic camp as transportation station for smoother transfer of the refugees towards Austria. When it became clear that the migration wave is directed not only to safety but also towards the good possibilities for life, the whole route started to work as rather organized transport system between country borders. At the same time Slovenia was keeping the control of the inflow of migrants by regulating the amount of people who entered the country in relation to how many people left the country in Šentilj for Austria. On one hand, this method enabled migrants to reach destination countries faster and safer (due to the organized transport between entry and exit points of the country), on the other hand information on such behaviour decreased attempts to cross the borders outside the entry points what resulted in higher control over the situation. Due to the fact that the destination country was practically one gate away, the security issues were bit more severe in Šentilj in the situations when Austrian side rejected to continue to accept new immigrants. The story with Šentilj migration centre after spring 2016 is in principle the same as in the case of Obrežje. The facility is still (as well in the case of Obrežje and Lendava) in the immediate reactivation mode. The maintenance costs for all three locations cost over 1e mio per year and they are empty for about two years (Mauˇcec 2017). With the backlash of the migration wave, in the form of migrant quotas, Slovenia accepted rather insignificant amount of refugees (solved cases which were awarded legal status of refugee and have different rights than asylum seekers), who were assigned to Slovenia. Part of them should be stationed in the municipality of Maribor. Maribor local administration refused to provide the accommodation in municipal housing for the refugees. Citizens also opposed to accept the refugees in their municipality. Ministry of interior solved the situation by accommodating them in “private accommodations”, known as integration houses under the auspice of Ministry of interior (Mariborinfo 2017; MNZ 2017). Document providing information on solution to the “Maribor disagreement” holds also the interesting observation basis for the last example of lack of rule of law or highly discretionary deciding how to solve different cases of migrants/refugees. State secretary at Ministry of interior in the previously quoted document states that “integration houses” enable refugees to integrate into Slovenian society quicker and to improve their independence, gives them opportunity to learn

210

ˇ U. PINTERIC

the language, find work and start new life, etc. (MNZ 2017) despite such benevolent explanation to Maribor municipality about the future prospects of refugees in Slovenia in late 2017 the case of Syrian refugee A. Šami happened. He entered Slovenia with the first wave of migrants in early 2016, and applied for asylum in Slovenia. He learned Slovenian language, he was engaged as support for integration of other refugees, he had a job in Slovenia and was everything what was explained above in the MNZ (2017) document. However, Ministry of interior tried to deport him in November 2017 (in few attempts) back to Croatia where he was first registered (but did not apply for asylum) as refugee (MMC RTV SLO 2017b). The scandal ended in mid-April 2018, when Administrative court of Republic of Slovenia decided that Slovenian authorities are and shall be competent to decide whether this individual should get asylum in Slovenia (MMC RTV SLO 2017c). Despite we believe that there are many more such cases with one or another solution, this one is of specific nature, since person in question actually became integrated in the society to the level that he was recognised in certain circles that supported him in making his case. At the same time, despite not connected to the local environment, this case shows how strongly the migration policy is controlled and managed by Slovenian Ministry of interior.

11.6

Conclusion

Slovenian migration management happens in the context of the international treaties, European and national legislation. Based on the geographical position legal framework on one hand provides certain protection to the refugees when entering Slovenia, but at the same time it protects Slovenia from the refugees in the first place. Technically, only way to enter Slovenia as a refugee, without fear to be returned to the previous “safe country” is by direct flight from the country were somebody’s life is endangered. Since Slovenia has no such air connections, there is situation where Slovenia can de jure reject any asylum seeker and return such individuals to the previous safe country (most likely Croatia). Despite the general positive note on protecting human life, the reality is pivoting around the legal loopholes, where state is trying to keep refugees out of the country as much as possible, and treats them very similarly to the illegal economic migrants (not to skip the part that illegal economic migrants are trying to play refugees whenever possible). Lack of linguistic skills in a first place, combined with the lack of the cultural

11

SLOVENIAN MIGRATION MANAGEMENT …

211

knowledge, disables authorities from basic recognition possibilities in the sense. One of the mayors reported issues from the 2015 migration wave was inability to define the origin of the people in order to ensure proper categorisation and procedure. Based on the ideological perspective, migration wave created new raise of the xenophobic rhetoric in Europe and in Slovenia as well, enabling extreme right-wing parties to rise again as well as for the right-wing parties to run the electoral campaign on the xenophobic argument, which marginalised policy issues of the development of Slovenia. Regarding the involvement of the Slovenian local governments in the migration issues, one can say that they have absolutely no competence. All the activities are decided by the central level institutions, while locality can only participate or hope that their argument will be strong enough that the central institutions will follow their desires. In this sense, understanding the role of local level of government in the migration management issues in Slovenia tells more about how centralized Slovenia is. However, based on the characteristics of Slovenian attitude towards migrants, it might be the case that centralization is the only possible way to fulfil the expectations written in constitution and international documents. Because we can assume that there is very slim chance that any municipality would accept the measures, which would provide (relative) safety for migrants as well as for the citizens.

Sources and References Act on International Protection (Ur.l. RS 11/2011). AI. (2017). Zakon o tujcih: pregled kršitev. Available at: http://www.amnesty.si/ zakon-o-tujcih (30 August 2018). Asylum Act (Ur.l. RS 134/2003). Constitution of Republic of Slovenia. Available at: http://www.pisrs.si/Pis.web/ pregledPredpisa?id=USTA1 (19 February 2018). ECHR. (2014). Case of Kuri´c and Others v. Slovenia. Available at: http:// hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22001-176434%22],%22docu mentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],% 22itemid%22:[%22001-176434%22]} (17 July 2018). ePosavje. (2015a). V Dobovi presegli številko 200.000 obravnavanih tujcev. Available at: http://www.eposavje.com/on/23466-obravnava-tujcev-v-dob ovi.html (20 September 2018).

212

ˇ U. PINTERIC

ePosavje. (2015b). Svet KS Dobova v petih toˇckah o namestitvenem centru v Dobovi. Available at: http://www.eposavje.com/on/26541-svet-ks-dobova-onamestitvenem-centru-v-dobovi.html (25 August 2018). ePosavje. (2015c). Brežiška podjetja ob beg. krizi utrpela za 1,3 milijone evrov škode. Available at: http://www.eposavje.com/on/23543-breziska-podjetjabegunska-kriza.html (26 August 2018). ePosavje. (2015d). Policisti o postavitvi zaˇcasnih tehniˇcnih ovir. Available at: http://www.eposavje.com/on/23301-policisti-o-postavitvi-zacasnihtehnicnih-ovir.html (28 August 2018). European Commission. (2017). Standard Eurobarometer 87 . Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/ getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/2142 (13 June 2018). Eurostat. (2018). Migration and Migrant Population Statistics. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_ and_migrant_population_statistics (15 August 2018). Foreigners/Aliens Act (Ur. l. RS 1/2018). Internet 1: Logatec Municipality Web Portal on Refugees. Available at: http://www.logatec.si/index.php/za-obcane/razno-za-obcane/migranti (18 July 2017). Internet 2: Information on Arrival of Refugees to Logatec Municipality. Available at: http://www.logatec.si/index.php/za-obcane/razno-za-obcane/migranti/ 4431-informacija-za-javnost-nastanitev-beguncev (18 July 2018). Mariborinfo. (2017). Obˇcina beguncev ni želela, država jih je namestila k zasebnikom. Available at: http://mariborinfo.com/novica/lokalno/obcina-beg uncev-ni-zelela-drzava-jih-je-namestila-k-zasebnikom/129345 (10 September 2018). Mauˇcec, J. (2017). Beguncev ni že leto in pol, šentiljski center pa ostaja v pripravljenosti do julija. Available at: http://mariborinfo.com/novica/lok alno/beguncev-ni-ze-leto-in-pol-sentiljski-center-pa-ostaja-v-pripravljenostido-julija (10 September 2018). Mikuš Kos, A. (2015, December 5). Begunci in prostovoljci: Skrb in cˇ loveˇcnost. Dnevnik. Available at: http://www.dnevnik.si/1042726032 (20 September 2018). Mirovni inštitut. (n.d.). Izbrisani - informacije in dokumenti. Available at: http://www.mirovni-institut.si/izbrisani/statistike/ (15 July 2018). MMC RTV SLO. (2015). Podatki policije: praktiˇcno ni razlogov za posredovanje med begunci. Available at: http://www.rtvslo.si/begunska-kriza/podatkipolicije-prakticno-ni-razlogov-za-posredovanje-med-begunci/378815 (20 September 2018). MMC RTV SLO. (2017a). Varuhinja cˇlovekovih pravic pošilja zakon o tujcih na ustavno sodišˇce. Available at: http://www.rtvslo.si/slovenija/varuhinja-

11

SLOVENIAN MIGRATION MANAGEMENT …

213

clovekovih-pravic-posilja-zakon-o-tujcih-na-ustavno-sodisce/420186 (15 July 2018). MMC RTV SLO. (2017b). Izgon sirskega begunca razburja: “Namesto da bi ga postavili kot zgled, ga pošiljamo stran”. Available at: http://www.rtvslo.si/slo venija/izgon-sirskega-begunca-razburja-namesto-da-bi-ga-postavili-kot-zgledga-posiljamo-stran/437766 (13 September 2018). MMC RTV SLO. (2017c). Upravno sodišˇce primer Šami vrnilo ministrstvu. Available at: https://www.rtvslo.si/slovenija/upravno-sodisce-primer-sami-vrniloministrstvu/441649 (13 July 2018). MMC RTV SLO. (2018). Kickl: Nadzor meje s Slovenijo zagotavlja varnost Avstrijcev. Available at: http://www.rtvslo.si/evropska-unija/kickl-nadzormeje-s-slovenijo-zagotavlja-varnost-avstrijcev/468646 (20 October 2018). MNZ. (2017). 200-7/2016/2 (11-02): Response of State Secretary Boštjan Šefic to the Vice-Mayor of Maribor Municipality Regarding the Accommodation of Refugees. Available at: http://mariborinfo.com/sites/mariborinfo/files/pdf/ odgovor_sefic.pdf (10 September 2018). Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Application for International Protection Lodged in One of the Member States by a Third-Country National or a Stateless Person. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R0604 (15 June 2018). Škerl Kramberger, U. (2017, April 22). Bodeˇca žica, tajni posel stoletja. Dnevnik. Available at: http://www.dnevnik.si/1042769685 (29 August 2018). STA. (2018a). V spopadih med migranti v BiH posredovala policija. Available at: http://www.dnevnik.si/1042842628 (28 October 2018). STA. (2018b). Avstrijska vlada se umika iz dogovora ZN o migracijah. Available at: http://www.delo.si/novice/svet/avstrijska-vlada-se-umika-izdogovora-zn-o-migracijah-108510.html (1 November 2018). S.U. (2018, October 24). VIDEO: Drama na meji: migranti prebili blokado, veˇc je poškodovanih. Slovenske novice. SURS. (2018). Available at: http://www.stat.si/popis2002/gradivo/2-169.pdf (15 July 2018). UNHCR. (1951). Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10 (14 February 2018). UŠK. (2015, December 21). Bodeˇca žica: Hrvati in Slovenci so ob koncu tedna skupaj protestirali – s klešˇcami v rokah. Dnevnik. Available at: http://www. dnevnik.si/1042727026 (29 August 2018). Volilna komisija RS. (2018). Izzidi glasovanja za celotno Slovenijo. Available at: http://dvk-rs.si/arhivi/dz2018/#/rezultati (20 August 2018).

CHAPTER 12

Local Integration Policy of Migrants in Croatia: In Search of Coherence and Capacity Ivan Kopri´c, Goranka Lali´c Novak, and Teo Giljevi´c

12.1

Introduction

Croatia is a country in the north-western part of the Balkan Peninsula with 4.3 million inhabitants on the territory of 56,594 square kilometres. The country has a rather long, complicated, and dynamic history. Various political and state regimes, state unions with (and within) Austria, Hungary, Italy, and Yugoslavia, divergent internal organisation and affiliations of the Croatian regions, and different borders in different phases

I. Kopri´c (B) · G. Lali´c Novak · T. Giljevi´c Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia e-mail: [email protected] G. Lali´c Novak e-mail: [email protected] T. Giljevi´c e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 J. Franzke and J. M. Ruano de la Fuente (eds.), Local Integration of Migrants Policy, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50979-8_12

215

216

´ ET AL. I. KOPRIC

of its history resulted in an observable mixture of people with regard to their national, cultural, and confessional affiliations. Such circumstances have endowed Croatia with historical experience of multi-ethnicity, multi-confessionalism, and multi-culturalism. This experience is a favourable condition for well-designed and friendly integration policy of migrants. However, frequent political changes, conflicts, and wars in this part of Europe indicate that previous attempts to build a society tolerant to diversity might be unsuccessful, which would diminish the chances of easy integration of migrants. During the twentieth century, Croatia was predominantly a country of emigration. At the beginning, people emigrated due to economic reasons, especially from the rural areas because of the crisis in farming and increasing rural over-population. Immediately after World War II, emigration included political migration (displaced persons, refugees, collaborators of the previous regime and some ethnic groups). Overseas and Western European countries became the main destination for Croatian labour migrants from the end of the 1950s to the beginning of the 1970s. The Croatian Homeland War of 1991–1995 and the wars and crises in other Balkan countries resulted in two different phenomena. On one hand, there was emigration of the Serbs from Croatia to Serbia and to some other countries. The number of people who were not ethnic Croats in Croatia decreased from more than 866,000 in 1991 to fewer than 347,000 in 2011 (decrease of about 420,000 people), according to census data. On the other hand, there was massive immigration because Croatia hosted more than 400,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia (Gregurovi´c and Mlinari´c 2012, pp. 101–102). The global economic crisis of 2008 hit Croatia rather hard (see in Kopri´c et al. 2018b). It triggered increasing emigration from the country that was further accelerated after the accession to the European Union (EU) in 2013. The contemporary demographic characteristics are: (a) decline of the total number of inhabitants, (b) decreased birth rate, (c) increased mortality rate, (d) population concentrated in the largest cities, and (e) aging of the population (Laji´c 2004). With the gradual removal of limited access to the labour market in EU member states for Croatian nationals, it is expected that even more people will immigrate to the Western EU states. Consequently, Croatia will have to import labour force in the coming decades, especially for the deficit professions (cf. also Župari´c-Ilji´c

12

LOCAL INTEGRATION POLICY OF MIGRANTS IN CROATIA …

217

2016). The lack of workforce is already indicated by the rise of the annual quota for the employment of aliens. The total annual quota bounced from 7026 permits in 2017 to 31,000 permits in 2018. Croatia has recently started to develop its migration and integration policies. The relatively low number of immigrants directed the integration policy mainly at the refugee population. As Croatia is a heavily centralised country, formulation and implementation of integration policy is mainly done at the central level, while local and regional self-governments have few competences. The current research project of the Institute of Public Administration (2018–2021) focuses on mapping, systematisation, and analysing of the integration institutions, analysing the questionnaire results (74 local governments with more than 10,000 inhabitants were surveyed in 2018), and analysing data and attitudes collected through semi-structured interviews with the city mayors of the 17 largest Croatian cities (Kopri´c et al. 2018a). This chapter analyses the development of migration and integration policies, the distribution of responsibilities among different governmental tiers, and the situation with local integration capacity in Croatia according to the data obtained by empirical research. Several good local practices are also presented.

12.2

Migration Profile and Public Attitudes About Migrants

Croatia is at the same time a country of both immigration and emigration: However, the emigration trend is currently stronger than the immigration one, creating a negative migration balance (Table 12.1).1 Table 12.1 Migration balance 2008–2017 Year Net migration

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

−22,451 −17,945 −10,220 −4884 −3918 −4165 −4875 −1472 7053

Source DZS (2017)

1 Available at https://mup.hr/ministarstvo/dokumenti/statistika.

218

´ ET AL. I. KOPRIC

In total, there are over 35,000 aliens with registered residence in Croatia.2 At the end of 2017, only 7550 third-country nationals (TCNs) with permanent residence were registered in Croatia, 85% of whom were citizens of the countries of the region (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia). There were also 5106 permanent residents of the European Economic Area (EEA; mostly from Germany, Slovenia, and Italy). In addition, a total of 10,736 TCNs (the majority originating from the region) and 11,628 EEA nationals with temporary residence were registered. Therefore, it can be concluded that the economic immigration to Croatia has a regional character, as most immigrants come from the neighbouring countries (cf. Gregurovi´c and Mlinari´c 2012). Because of the unfavourable economic processes, Croatia is among the least attractive EU countries for economic migrants (Knezovi´c and Grošini 2017, p. 24). Regarding forced migration flows, Croatia is a relatively new destination for refugees and asylum seekers from the countries outside South Eastern Europe. In the period 2006–2018, international protection was granted to a total of 544 persons. The number of asylum seekers is on the rise (in 2017–1887 people; in 2016–2234), but most of them left the Croatian territory before the end of the status determination process. Asylum seekers are mostly from Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq. During the migrant–refugee crisis (September 2015–March 2016) around 650 thousand refugees and migrants passed through Croatia, but only 22 of them applied for asylum. Currently, there is an increased pressure of irregular migrants from Asia at the Croatian borders with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia participates in the European programme of relocation and resettlement of third-country nationals or persons without citizenship, who meet the requirements for approval of international protection. By the end of 2017, 81 persons from Yemen, Eritrea, and Syria were relocated, and 40 Syrians were resettled in Croatia. The public opinion towards the migrants is ambiguous. The 2017 Eurobarometer has shown that Croatians are not informed about immigration- and integration-related matters (81% of respondents). They consider the immigration from outside the EU more of a problem than an opportunity (39% of respondents, while 34% perceive it equally as a problem and an opportunity); they do not have personal ties with 2 The last census in 2011 has shown that the number of foreign residents (35,490) represent 0.83% of the population (4,284,889).

12

LOCAL INTEGRATION POLICY OF MIGRANTS IN CROATIA …

219

migrants (77% of respondents do not have any friends or family members who are migrants currently living in Croatia) and very rarely or never interact with migrants (70% of respondents). They consider the integration of most migrants as fairly successful (45% of respondents against 40% of those who think that the integration is generally unsuccessful) and the perception regarding the impact of migrants on society is more negative (36% of respondents) than positive. Other public opinion surveys also indicate that Croatians are more and more convinced that “secret plans” of radical and Islamist groups are behind refugee and migration flows, while their concern for jobs spurs negative attitudes towards aliens which is further worsened by the perception that refugees and immigrants are badly educated people of low economic status (Bariˇcevi´c and Koska 2016). According to our 2018 survey results, comprising answers of 62 out of 74 mayors of local governments with more than 10,000 inhabitants (response rate 83.8%), mayors report good to very good overall immigrant acceptance level, with observable cautiousness and recognition of risks. The highest acceptance level has been identified with regard to potential immigrants from Western Europe, Scandinavia, Canada, and United States (average 3.95 on 1–5 ladder). The lowest acceptance level has been identified regarding potential immigrants of different confessions (not-Catholic; average 2.61) (Kopri´c et al. 2018a).

12.3 Croatian Migration and Integration Policies: Documents, Values, and Goals The development of national migration policy was a consequence of conditionality in the process of EU accession, and Europeanization had a transformative influence on the development of the Croatian asylum system. The strongest impact was on legislation, a much weaker on structures and practices. Certain institutions were absorbed, although without a significant modification of existing structures and logic of political behaviour. Similar to many other policies, Europe was used as the main reason for legitimisation of the proposed solutions. The first strategic document, Migration Policy of the Republic Croatia for the Period 2007 –2008, was adopted in July 2007. It acquired the principles of freedom of movement, solidarity and humanity, and at the same time took into account the economic, social, and cultural development of Croatian society. The second strategic document, Migration Policy of the

220

´ ET AL. I. KOPRIC

Republic of Croatia for the Period 2013–2015, was adopted by the Parliament only a few months before Croatia joined the EU. The document focuses on securing a positive impact of migration trends on the country’s overall development, especially on the economy. The goal was that all state bodies and other stakeholders focus and work on finding effective responses to the positive and negative effects of migratory movements. It covered the following areas: visa policy, the status of aliens, the acquisition of Croatian citizenship, asylum, integration policy, irregular migration, and the Croatian diaspora. The measures in the area of integration were of more technical nature. Policy documents were not formulated as a component of a longterm strategic development plan, and were directed towards the technical aspects of the included policy areas. Both documents were adopted without the expert and public debate. In line with the second migration policy document, the Standing Committee for the Implementation of the Integration of Foreigners into Croatian Society was founded, consisting of representatives of the state administrative bodies. In 2013, a Working Group of the Standing Committee prepared an Action Plan to Remove Barriers to the Realization of Certain Rights in the Field of Integration of Aliens in 2013–2015 Period. The accent was on the integration of refugees. The new Action Plan for the Integration of Persons Granted International Protection for 2017 –2019 Period was adopted in 2017, covering seven areas of integration: social welfare and health care, housing, language learning and education, employment, international cooperation, inter-agency cooperation, and raising awareness. At the moment, there are no strategic documents or policy measures directed towards the integration of other types of migrants, most likely because of the number and composition of the migrant population in Croatia.

12.4 Legal Regulation of Migration and Distribution of Responsibilities for the Integration of Migrants The main legislation in the field of migration is the Aliens Act (2011), which regulates the conditions for entry, movement, residence and work of TCNs and nationals of Member States of the EEA, as well as their

12

LOCAL INTEGRATION POLICY OF MIGRANTS IN CROATIA …

221

families, conditions of employment, and rights of posted workers in Croatia.3 TCNs granted temporary stay are entitled to the following rights: professional development; education and student scholarships; social welfare; rights arising from pension, health insurance and the right to child allowance; tax benefits; access to the market of goods and services; freedom of association and freedom to connect and to be a member in organisations representing employees or employers or organisations whose members are engaged in special professions, including remuneration provided by such organisations; terms of employment through employment agencies; and working conditions. In addition to those rights, TCNs on permanent stay are entitled to work and selfemployment. The Aliens Act does not provide any measures to support aliens’ integration into the Croatian society. The Act on International and Temporary Protection (AITP 2015) defines the following rights and obligations of refugees (asylees and foreigners under subsidiary protection): residence; family reunification; accommodation; work; health care; education; freedom of religion; free legal assistance; social welfare; assistance to integration into society; ownership of real property; acquisition of citizenship. Integration of refugees is trans-sectoral and includes measures in several areas to be implemented by various ministries and agencies. The coordination body is the Government’s Office for Human Rights and the Rights of National Minorities. It coordinates the work of all ministries, NGOs, and other bodies participating in the procedure of refugees’ integration into society. The Ministry of Interior is responsible for assistance to integration, which includes drawing up a plan of refugees’ integration in terms of their individual needs, knowledge, abilities and skills, providing assistance to refugees for the realisation of the drawn-up plan, and supervising the implementation of the plan. In addition, other ministries and state offices are involved in exercising rights granted to refugees. International organisations, such the UNHCR, have an important role in monitoring the implementation of integration policy and relevant legislation. Many NGOs provide different services and various forms of assistance to refugees. It is not only local governments and their institutions

3 Cf. http://www.mrms.hr/posting/posted-workers/.

222

´ ET AL. I. KOPRIC

that participate in implementation of integration policy at the local level but also branch offices of national and county administrative organisations, the private sector (employment), social partners (trade unions, associations, and organisations of employers), academia and educational institutions (learning the Croatian language, and other educational programmes), and other international organisations (such as UNICEF). There is also a significant role of voluntary actions, charities, and citizens’ self-help in everyday integration activities (cf. Kopri´c et al. 2018a).

12.5 The Role of Local Authorities in the Integration of Migrants and Refugees The Croatian local government system comprises two tiers of government: municipalities (428) and towns (128) at the first level, and 20 counties on the second. The local government system is characterised by territorial fragmentation, limited local scope and autonomy, huge variations in the capacities of governments, and hesitant decentralisation instigated in 2000 without significant results (Kopri´c et al. 2018b; Kopri´c and Ðulabi´c 2018). The vast majority of local governments (80%) have fewer than 5000 inhabitants. This size is suboptimal considering the scope of local affairs, resulting in their inability to take over the affairs in line with the constitutional provisions. Local decision-making and policy autonomy are undermined by numerous sectoral laws and other state documents. Local competences are predominantly executive and technical. Counties have appeared as salutary solution for weak local capacities, in opposition to the Constitutional provisions. Because of local governments’ weak fiscal, economic, personnel, and organisational capacities, only 34 towns (6% of the 556 local units) perform functions in education, health, and social care initially intended for decentralisation to the local level by the then Government’s Programme and amendments to the Constitution of 2000. Instead, the counties perform decentralised functions for the other 522 local governments, which strongly deviates from the constitutional provisions. More than 90% of local units perform only a rudimentary list of affairs for their communities. Even the role of counties is reduced to redistribution of funds (grants and transfers) from the state budget to the institutions in which they have, only by virtue of formal provision, founding rights (social care centres,

12

LOCAL INTEGRATION POLICY OF MIGRANTS IN CROATIA …

223

secondary schools, health care centres, student dormitories). Counties have only limited ability to influence programmes or raise standards in education or health care. Along with central administration and NGOs, local governments provide a range of public services (e.g. social welfare, health care, education, etc.) necessary for the integration of migrants. Although the Action Plan for 2017–2019 contains 59 measures, local governments are included in the implementation of only seven of them, clearly indicating centralistic governance. According to the Action plan they are co-responsible in the following: undertaking activities aimed at raising the quality of life of refugees; amending social welfare decisions to include refugees; recommending meal centres to provide culturally and religiously appropriate food for aliens; strengthening the partnership of NGOs and educational and training institutions in implementation of projects for intercultural education and education in civic and human values; establishment of a network of contact persons (coordinators) for realisation of the rights of refugees at the local level; and development of a new implementation framework on local level. Despite strongly centralised model of integration, it has been recently recognised that the local level needs to have a predominant role in the long-term economic, social, and cultural integration. In order to support the preparation of local integration strategies and action plans, the Government’s Office for Human Rights and the Rights of National Minorities initiated the development of the Framework for the Integration of Persons Who Have Been Granted International Protection at the Local Level in 2017. This document was developed from October 2017 until January 2018 in a participative process. Although it focuses on the integration of refugees in the local millieu, its measures are also applicable to other types of migrants. It can be used in developing long-term local strategies and action plans of integration. The Framework covers the strategic areas of integration: work and employment; promotion of inclusion and social cohesion; accommodation and housing; social protection and social services; and strengthening the local capacities and cooperation. The Government’s Office for Human Rights has shared this document especially with local governments in which refugees have been settled. The first steps in the capacity building have recently been taken by the Government’s office which organised a series of meetings with local governments that have hosted or probably will host refuges. Meetings

224

´ ET AL. I. KOPRIC

were held with a twofold purpose: firstly, to inform the local governments about integration policy and their role and responsibilities in the upcoming period; and secondly, to discuss the possible criteria for the deployment of persons who have been granted international protection to particular local governments.

12.6

Recent Trends in Local Integration Policies

No local government has adopted a local strategy or action plan of integration of migrants. It is not surprising because only 5% of local governments had immigrants arriving on their territory during the 2015 migration wave (Kopri´c et al. 2018a).4 However, there are some examples of local integration measures focusing on migrants, mainly as a part of local welfare policies or local development strategies. Local welfare policies for migrants, financed through the local budgets, supplement the rights and services provided by the national welfare legislation. Decisions on welfare policies of the Cities of Rijeka and Osijek include aliens into their scope. Similar decisions of the Cities of Zagreb and Split include asylum seekers and refugees as beneficiaries, but not other types of migrants. The Welfare Plan of the City of Zagreb for the 2014–2020 Period has provided for the development of a network of services for asylum seekers and refugees. It advocates for territorial (neighbourhood) approach which involves cooperation of local civil servants with community members, service providers, and civic initiatives. It also mentions “Literacy project” whose main objective is to sensitise the local population to the acceptance of new neighbours (refugees) through literature. According to the Plan, priorities in the provision of public services to refugees are to analyse state and needs of refugees in the City of Zagreb, to ensure temporary housing, and to ensure proper integration of refugees. In 2017, gradual integration of all asylum-seeking children who had acquired the necessary conditions for inclusion in kindergarten programmes was reported.5 Generally, local political leaders (mayors) have a realistic picture of risks, problems, and potential advantages of immigration. They also show 4 Interestingly, about 90% of those governments had experiences with refugees and displaced persons in the early 1990s (Kopri´c et al. 2018a). 5 Report for 2017, http://web.zagreb.hr/Sjednice/2017/sjednice_skupstine_2017.nsf/ 0/C12581370033D600C1258288001FA7A0/$FILE/02%20Izvje%C5%A1%C4%87e.pdf.

12

LOCAL INTEGRATION POLICY OF MIGRANTS IN CROATIA …

225

an observable lack of extreme attitudes. A large majority of them (77%) opposed the statement in the 2018 survey questionnaire that multiculturalism is not desirable. Even more of them (66%) disagree with the statement that immigrants are not welcome. However, only 44% assess that their local communities would easily accept and integrate migrants. Economic rationality and concerns can be observed from the 2018 survey results. About 61% of local leaders perceive the need for specific local employment policies which would reflect local needs for lacking professions and educational level with migrants in mind. Some 47% express their concerns that local economies are not able to employ all possible immigrants indicating immigration as an economic problem. Less than a half of them, 45%, do not believe in easy and direct economic benefits of immigration. Because of that, only 33% would proactively search for more intense immigration, counting on economic benefits of local employment. In addition, 61% of local leaders do not think increased local employment can finance increased demand for local services well. They think that significant support from other budgets (EU, national, county) is necessary for integration of potentially large number of immigrants in their local communities. Local leaders generally believe in the cohesion, resilience, and social strength of their communities. Only 31% of local leaders predict unacceptable political changes in their local communities because of high immigration rate; only 16% see health risks; only 13% see risks of social and religious conflicts. However, a majority of them (68%) think that more immigrants would cause some other types of social problems. They are rather cautious in assessing local capacities. Sixty percent of local leaders assess the capacity of local institutions (kindergartens, schools, health, and others) as insufficient for the integration of migrants. Only 15% believe in the leading role of religious institutions in the integration of migrants, while 70% believe that based on solidarity, NGOs ought to have the main role in integration. They mostly rely on the Red Cross, utilities, and local cultural institutions as the institutions with best capacities. Mayors consider that elderly care, kindergartens, and employment institutions have the lowest capacities for integration of migrants in their respective local communities. Cities reported better capacities and can serve as the main points for integration of immigrants, while smaller local communities are in a precarious situation. Fragmented (chaotic) structure of local governments (576

226

´ ET AL. I. KOPRIC

of them in two tiers) with additional fragmentation of national administrative branch offices (about 1500 of them) makes integration a rather complex and demanding task. In the complicated local context, political leaders need to be proactive, adaptable in building local institutional networks, motivators of local communities relying on social solidarity, linking pins of the local economy and employment services, successful in rising local revenues and grants. The critical question is—is it possible to elect such great achievers in many small local self-government units? It seems that the selection or development of such firm local leaders is not very probable. Rather opposite is true currently, since the 2018 research shows strong reliance of local leaders on the central initiative, policy, and support (all results from Kopri´c et al. 2018a).

12.7 Good Local Practices in Integration of Migrants and Refugees Integration House and Centre for Integration of Refugees “SOL” In 2013, the Croatian Red Cross established the Integration House in Zagreb, where refugees can receive information and assistance and participate in various social and educational activities conducted by volunteers, including the refugees themselves. One of the important activities is the Croatian language course, since in the last few years there have been problems with organising official courses. Refugees are provided with support when seeking employment, as well as during the procedure of the recognition of previously completed education, validation of certificates and translation of documents. The children are helped to acquire school education, enrolment in school and kindergarten, inclusion in sports and other activities outside the school, and the organisation of summer holidays. In the beginning of 2018, Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) opened the Centre for Integration of Refugees “SOL” in Zagreb, with the main aim of empowering refugees, supporting their integration, and familiarising and connecting them with the local community. The City of Zagreb provided the space for the Centre. The activities of the Centre include teaching the Croatian language; support in mediation for retraining and employment; teaching of the Croatian language, culture, and customs for

12

LOCAL INTEGRATION POLICY OF MIGRANTS IN CROATIA …

227

children who have been granted refugee status; workshops for empowering female refugees and developing new skills and knowledge; intercultural meetings between locals and refugees. JRS started a crowdfunding campaign translated as “Yesterday strangers, today neighbours” for raising additional funds for the work of the Centre. By mid-May, they raised $13.390. As an innovative solution, JRS has developed different activities for the supporters, which are also intended to connect local population with refugees. Supporters can opt, depending on the sum invested, for different activities with refugees (dinner, learning Arabic, lectures about Syria, etc.). Rijeka as the European Capital of Culture and Inclusion of Migrants into the Programme “The Port of Diversity” The City of Rijeka has entered the second round of competition for the European Capital of Culture 2020 a. The programme of the City of Rijeka “Port of Diversity” consists of three main concepts devoted to Work, Water, and Migration. Exhibitions such as the Black Disguises and programmes devoted to celebration of the International Migrants Day significantly contribute to the integration of migrants into city’s society.6 Furthermore, the mayor of Rijeka signed the Cohesion Alliance.7 The Cohesion Alliance advocates for the EU budget 2020–2027 to make cohesion policy more effective, visible, and available to every region in the European Union which, among other things, addresses global issues such as migration. During the academic year 2013/2014 the project Students’ Integration into a Multicultural School Environment was implemented in elementary school Podmurvice in Rijeka, as a joint project of PrimorskoGoranska County and the City of Rijeka, mainly financed by the EU. The main goal of the project was teaching migrant students the Croatian language and Croatian culture and customs over seventeen-month period. The results have shown that the longer learning time migrants had to learn Croatian has improved the knowledge of the language

6 See more at http://rijeka2020.eu/en/. 7 Cohesion Alliance was created through cooperation between the European associations

of cities and regions and the European Committee of the Regions. http://cor.europa.eu/ en/takepart/Pages/cohesion-alliance-intro.aspx.

228

´ ET AL. I. KOPRIC

and contributed to the integration of migrant students in the school environment (Paljušaj and Kegalj 2016). In 2013, a new Islamic Centre and mosque was opened in the City of Rijeka.8 The complex consists of the mosque, a multipurpose hall, a teaching room, kindergarten, library, and other offices whose facilities can be used in integration activities. An example of the development of interfaith dialogue is the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Interreligious Council of Rijeka 2020 signed by the mayor of Rijeka and representatives of Rijeka’s largest religious communities (Catholic Church, Orthodox Church, Islamic Community of Rijeka, Jewish Community of Rijeka, and Baptist Church of Rijeka) in 2017. Religious communities have committed themselves to further strengthening interreligious dialogue within the City of Rijeka and Primorsko-Gorska County.9

12.8

Conclusion

For decades, Croatia has been primarily an emigration country, and in terms of migration flows, it has not been perceived as a preferred destination for migrants and refugees from non-European countries. However, due to aging population and emigration, the country will have to invest resources in attracting migrants. Simultaneously, at the policy level, there is a lack of strategic approach to immigration as an instrument of economic development. The development of migration policy in the last decade can be described as ad hoc policy-making, which resulted in the absence of a viable system of migrant integration into Croatian society. Despite the development of a legal and institutional framework, integration policy in Croatia, according to the results of MIPEX research in 2015,10 is only partially favourable, with an overall grade of 43/100,

8 According to the 2011 census the total Muslim population in Croatia was 62,977

which is 10% more than in 2001 census (56,777). There are 24 places of worship to Muslims, eighteen smaller places of worships—masjids and four mosques. Two mosques are in the cities of Zagreb and Rijeka and two are in small municipalities Cetingrad and Gunja near border with Bosnia and Herzegovina (cf. Žuni´c 2011). Newest mosque was opened in 2018 in Cetingrad municipality. 9 See fee0.

https://rm.coe.int/compilation-of-good-practices-from-icc-cities-2017/168076

10 See http://www.mipex.eu/croatia.

12

LOCAL INTEGRATION POLICY OF MIGRANTS IN CROATIA …

229

placing Croatia in the 30th place among 38 countries encompassed by the research. It is difficult for migrants to exercise certain rights such as the right to permanent residence, the right to acquire the Croatian citizenship, and the right to family reunion. At the same time, the integration policy directed towards the refugees has gradually developed, as the number of refugees, who are the most vulnerable group of migrants, is on the rise. The integration policy is centralised, with few local competences. Due to a relatively low number of migrants and lack of local capacities, a proactive approach in the development of local integration strategies and policies is lacking. In addition, NGOs that could provide support in local integration policies do not exist in many parts of Croatia, especially in rural areas. Since most local communities have no experience in integration of migrants due to their low numbers, the capacities of local bodies and services need to be additionally strengthened and an efficient cooperation with other actors in the local community has to be established. Otherwise, Croatia is going to continue its traditional passive-reactive approach to solving public problems and act only when the integration of migrants threatens to become a major problem. As it can be expected that the migration profile of Croatia will change in the future, local governments ought to take their role in the integration of migrants and build their capacities for successful implementation of national and local policies. Empirical research on the acceptance of migrants, the capacity of local institutions, and other relevant dimensions of integration at the local level shows that local political leaders are well aware of the complexity and burden of this task. Although they recognise directions for solving the capacity problems, they still predominantly rely on central and EU support.

References Bariˇcevi´c, V., & Koska, V. (2016). A Survey on the Causes of Xenophobia, Racism and Discrimination Based on Ethnicity in the General Population of the Republic of Croatia (Field Survey: Preliminary Report). DZS. (2017). Migracija stanovništva Republike Hrvatske u 2016. Zagreb, Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Hrvatske, 21. srpnja, broj 7.1.2. https://www.dzs.hr/. Eurobarometer. (2017). Special Eurobarometer 469 Integration of Immigrants in the European Union. Fieldwork October 2017, publication April 2018.

230

´ ET AL. I. KOPRIC

Gregurovi´c, S., & Mlinari´c, D. (2012). Challenges of Migration Policies in Croatia: Migration History, Trends and Prospects. AEMI Journal, 10, 99– 113. Knezovi´c, S., & Grošini, M. (2017). Migration Trends in Croatia. The Study. Zagreb, HR: Hanns Seidel Stiftung, Institut za razvoj i med-unarodne odnose. Kopri´c, I., & Ðulabi´c, V. (2018). Evaluation of the Decentralisation Programme in Croatia: Expectations, Problems and Results. In I. Kopri´c, H. Wollmann, & G. Marcou (Eds.), Evaluating Reforms of Local Public and Social Services in Europe: More Evidence for Better Results (pp. 243–260). London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Kopri´c, I., Klari´c, M., & Kopri´c Habeš, I. (2018a, 21–25 July). Can the Migrants Be Integrated Centrally? Paradoxes of the Croatian Local Government System Revealed After the 2015 Migration Crisis. Presentation at the 25th IPSA World Congress of Political Science, Brisbane, Australia. Kopri´c, I., Škarica, M., & Manojlovi´c, R. (2018b). Local Public Services and Austerity Measures in Croatia: Adaptations of the Resilient Social Model Through the Central-Local Power and Blame Games. In A. Lippi & T. N. Tsekos (Eds.), Local Public Services in Times of Austerity across Mediterranean Europe (pp. 167–191). London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Laji´c, I. (2004). Noviji razvoj stanovništva Hrvatske – regularno i neregularno kretanje stanovništva. Migracijske i etniˇcke teme, 20(2–3), 171–185. Paljušaj, A., & Kegalj, N. (2016). Integracija skupina u nepovoljnom položaju u redoviti obrazovni sustav – uˇcenje i pouˇcavanje hrvatskoga jezika u djece stranaca i azilanata. Život i škola, LXII (2), 221–237. Žuni´c, A. (2011). Moderna i suvremena islamska arhitektura u Hrvatskoj. Behar: cˇasopis za kulturu i društvena pitanja, XXIV, 88–99. Župari´c-Ilji´c, D. (2016). Iseljavanje iz Republike Hrvatske nakon ulaska u Europsku Uniju. Zagreb, HR: FES.

CHAPTER 13

Romania’s Policy of Migration and Integration: Unattractive Host Nation and Alternative Transit Route Iulia-Sabina Joja

13.1

Introduction

Until 1991, when Romania entered the transition phase from a communist regime in the East block to a democracy aspiring to join the Euro-Atlantic community, the country had no refugee policy and received no asylum applications. Starting with 1991 until now, Romania has had a continuous asylum policy. Always the poorer option among the European countries and with a somewhat reluctant policy towards migration, Romania has received so far a total of 38,000 asylum requests (Save the Children Romania 2017). Even in the context of the 2015 refugee crisis, the country has neither been a major transit, nor a destination country for refugees and migrants. Rather, the most significant aspect of migration policy Romania has been confronted with is the outflow of Romanians. The inflows have so

I.-S. Joja (B) Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA © The Author(s) 2021 J. Franzke and J. M. Ruano de la Fuente (eds.), Local Integration of Migrants Policy, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50979-8_13

231

232

I.-S. JOJA

far been a marginal concern, reflected in the politicians’ lack of preoccupation for the issue. However, Romania’s access to the Black Sea, its EU status and border with Serbia has made it a growingly important transit route to the West (Mogos et al. 2018). In 2016, for instance, human traffickers made millions in Romania transporting refugee seekers from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq to the Schengen area (“35 de grup˘ari…”). Romania has also been in 2016 among the top five European countries from which most counterfeited documents originated (European Migrant Smuggling Centre 2017). With a quick pace, in the context of EU policy limiting or blocking the migration routes used during the 2015 crisis, Romania is becoming one of the main European transit routes. By January 2018, Romania is mentioned in the annual report of the newly established European Migrant Smuggling Centre (2018) as one of the two Balkan migration routes. The challenges for the national migration policy are manifold and concern the country both as a transit route for illegal migration, as well as a host nation for refuge seekers. National authorities have put in place a legislative and institutional framework and have implemented the governmental policies with mixed results. This chapter outlines the current Romanian migration and integration policy through a brief analysis of the governmental politics and the goals of migration policy (Chapter 1), by offering an overview of the institutional policy on migration and integration, as well as an evaluation of the up-to-date results of this policy (Chapter 2); it also provides an analysis of the challenges Romania is facing in terms of migration policy and formulates recommendations for future policy and implementation based on lessons learnt and good practice in Romania (Chapter 3). Finally, the conclusions summarise the key takeways of Romania’s contemporary migration and integration policy, and highlight the relevance of lessons learnt from Romania’s migration policy for practitioners.

13.2

Political Context and Policy

Romania’s national policy on migration is at the rhetorical, official level a multidimensional one, with an overarching cause-oriented approach, and a priority of the country’s foreign policy as an emerging donor. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Romania advocates for a comprehensive approach to the refugee crisis and supports the EU’s efforts to promote sustainable and effective solutions in the context of the crisis;

13

ROMANIA’S POLICY OF MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION …

233

it contributes to relocation efforts, such as through the Syrian Refugee Facility in Turkey, offering shelter, access to education and basic services for the refugees (RoAid 2017). If countries’ policies would be divided into two categories—those addressing root causes for global migration with the aim of reducing the need to invest in integration policies at home, on one side, and those focused on demographic issues and thus prioritising integration policies and an open-door policy, on the other side—Romania’s position on migration is clearly of the former, focused on addressing root causes. As an emerging donor, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has granted between 2015 and 2016 1.5 million euros to refugees. In 2015, in the context of the migration crisis and European debate, Romania’s initial position was that of alignment with right-governed Central and Eastern European countries, and a hard stance against Muslim migration. The President, Klaus Iohannis, as well as the Social-Democrat government indicated in September 2015 that Romania will reject the proposed number of 6351 reallocated refugees decided by the EU Commission; the government declared Romania will only accept the previously convened number of 1785 per year and that it will be voting against the obligatory quota within the Justice and Home Affairs Council (JHA) (Dr˘aghici 2015). Surprisingly, however, Bucharest shifted its position shortly after. The President declared himself unhappy with the approach of the majority vote in the JHA but accepted the negotiated quota of 2475 (Hera 2015), thus refusing to align himself with the countries that pursued the issue in the European Court of Justice. In the end, Romania negotiated with the EU a gradual relocation process, with approximately 2000 refugees to be transferred to Romania in 2016. This would have been double the average number of yearly asylum applications in Romania. In March 2016, President Iohannis supported the increase of funding for Turkey in the context of the migrant policy, but underlined that the relocation process will not lead to a modified quota for Romania and that the relocation would have to be on a strictly voluntary basis (Acord UE-Turcia privind migra¸tia 2016), thus ensuring the minimal number of refugees relocated from Turkey to Romania. To address these internal institutional weaknesses, the Technocratic government, appointed in November 2015, initiated a major collaboration project on equal footing between itself and the non-governmental sector. This initiative of the Technocratic government—a Coalition for the

234

I.-S. JOJA

development of integration policies for refugees —had a great potential of significantly contributing to the success of governmental integration policies through the transfer of know-how from the civil sector—massively present and involved in Romania on all issues related to integration of minorities—to the level of national governmental policies. The initiative to better coordinate and manage the phenomenon was implemented by giving the Ministry of Labour1 coordinating powers (Global Focus and Arcadia 2015). The Coalition was organised into five working groups in the fields of justice, primary logistics, social, local and cultural integration that were to meet regularly for consultations. Nevertheless, the Technocratic government that had the initiative only lasted one year and the new Social-Democrat government, installed in January 2017, never embraced or took on the Coalition, effectively killing the project. Furthermore, the perpetual crisis Romania has faced internally over the past few years due to judicial, social and economic instability (leading to several major protests and the overthrow of governments) accentuates the country’s perception of insecurity and exerts enormous pressure. The internal crisis has pushed migration policy to the background of the political agenda and determined public opinion to see issues related to refugees as issues Romania cannot afford to have.

13.3 Institutional Reforms in the Context of the Migration Crisis and Results of Migration Policy The Romanian authority responsible for the operational management and implementation of the policy in the areas of migration and asylum at the national level is the General Inspectorate for Immigration, a specialised structure of the central public administration that is subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Inspectorate was created based on a governmental decision from 2007 with the aim of coordinating the governmental efforts on migration and of implementing the state’s refugee policy. On the other hand, the integration process itself is coordinated by the Ministry of Labour through the Coalition for Integration

1 Not the Ministry of Interior Affairs, which reflects the governmental understanding of the migration crisis as a long-term integration issue (and not a security challenge).

13

ROMANIA’S POLICY OF MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION …

235

of Refugees, a structure that brings together representatives of both the governmental and non-governmental sector. In the context of the refugee crisis, the government expanded its hosting abilities for refugees to a total capacity of 950 permanent places (expandable to up to 1500 in times of crisis) within six regional hubs. However, despite the refugee crisis and Romania’s growing importance as a transit route, the economic situation as one of the poorest EU members and a rather reluctant open-door policy towards refugees and migration caused only a slow increase in the number of foreigners staying on Romanian territory. According to the annual report of the General Inspectorate for Immigration (2018),2 the number of foreigners on Romanian soil increased between 2016 and 2017 by a mere 4%. The total number of foreigners in Romania in 2017 (including EU nationals) was over 116,000, out of which only 3921 persons benefitted from a form of protection3 (idem). Though Romania agreed on paper to host up to almost 4000 refugees per year, the country receives far less, One of the reasons for the small number of refugees is the less-than-open-door policy that reflects the politics’ reluctance towards becoming a host nation for migrants. In addition, a reduced number of refugees indicates that Romania remains an unattractive country for migrants. Furthermore, these numbers clearly show that the Dublin Agreement and the relocation agreements between EU countries are inefficient and can therefore not be implemented according to their aims. The Inspectorate’s most recent report on migration policy indicates a significant increase in asylum requests, compared to the previous year: in 2017 Romania received almost 5000 requests, more than double the number in the period 2014–2016. But the core reason for the small number of refugees on Romanian ground is the approval rating of 63% of asylum requests, a decrease by 10% from 2016, Furthermore, Romania’s low approval rating of migration is lower than the average European, and the country has one of the strictest enforcement policies among EU members—adding to Romania’s unattractiveness for asylum seekers. This is demonstrated by the actions of the national enforcement agencies, who

2 The governmental institution responsible for the implementation of migration and asylum policy. 3 Most of whom are from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan.

236

I.-S. JOJA

reported in 2017 a total of 3580 foreigners staying illegally in Romania, with 502 refugees (mostly Pakistan, Iraq and Turkey) already being forced by authorities and under escort to leave the country. The number of enforced expulsions increased as well compared to 2016. Lastly, Romania’s unattractiveness is reflected in economic terms as well: the state offers asylum seekers 240 euro/month, less than most EU member states. The Inspectorate has adjusted its 2015–2019 strategy for migration, enabling education and the creation of work places for refugees in Romania (Bolocan and Ghica 2018). So far, the Inspectorate has externalised the majority of services offered for asylum seekers to nongovernmental organisations and has financed these services through the European Commission’s Fund for Asylum, Migration and Integration (AMIF) (Beniamino 2018). The Inspectorate established the structure of financing and programmes by division of the Romanian territory into five regions. In cooperation with the International Organisation for Migration, the Inspectorate has contacted both international and local NGOs active in the area of migration in Romania to offer integration services for migrants. A clear trend of creating and boosting integration programmes at regional and local level, as a number of local NGOs has been founded in Romania in 2014 in accordance with EU migration policy and national legislation and in preparation of the upsurge in asylum requests starting with 2015. For each region a number of NGOs cooperaates with the Inspectorate and the International Organisation for Migration in creating and managing regional integration centres that offer information and advisory services, language and culture courses, social activities, health support services, and material assistance to refugees. The regional centres offer “one-stop-shops” that support the integration of migrants (România e Acas˘a). In region 1 (South) three regional integration services are coordinated by two international NGOs (the Ecumenical Association of Churches in Romania and the Schottener Social Services Foundation) and two local associations (the Global Help Association Craiova and the Romanian Association for the Promotion of Quality and Success Practices in Bras, ov) in a common project “INTERACT” until summer 2019. Region 2 (South-East) has two centres created through the externalisation of services from the Inspectorate in cooperation with one international NGO, the Jesuit Refugee Service, and one local NGO, Inim˘a de Copil Galat, i, in the common project “My Place”. Region 3 (North-East)

13

ROMANIA’S POLICY OF MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION …

237

encompasses two regional centres coordinated by an international NGO, the Ecumentical Association of Churches in Romania and a national one, ICAR Foundation, in the project “Integration of foreigners with legal residence in the Romanian society: a common construction”. Region 4 (North) has five centres managed by the local branch of the International Federation for Human Rights and a local NGO, the Association for Social Assistance Baia Mare, as well as in association with several other local NGOs through the project “Migranet”. Lastly, in region 5 (West) the Ecumenical Association of Churches in Romania and a local NGO, Filantropia Oradea, coordinate two centres under the project “Integration services for beneficiaries of a form of protection and for foreigners residing in Romania, in the Western Region”. In all regions several past cooperation projects between Romanian and international NGOs for the integration of refugees and migrants have taken place starting with 2012 (www.migrant.ro), spearheaded by the Romanian NGO The Intercultural Institute Timis, oara starting with 2009. At the national level the Inspectorate facilitated the funding of a Romanian language and culture learning project financed by the European Commission, React_Ro. The Inspectorate has externalised the language and culture learning service for migrants and refugees to a local NGO, the Intercultural Institute of Timis, oara. The latter partnered up with the International Organization for Migration and the Schottener Foundation to create in the timeframe July 2017–July 2019 the educational resources to enable Romanian language and culture learning. Particularly the language project suggests the governmental authorities’ tendency to outsource integration efforts to the non-governmental sector. Romania is, however, becoming an important transit route. The national, as well as international media have reported a sharp increase in illegal crossings of Romanian territory in 2017 compared to the previous year (Marica 2018; McLaughlin 2017). Also, in the second half of 2016 the Black Sea has become a maritime transit route for refugees, Romanian authorities being confronted with numerous incidents of illegal boats arriving on the Romanian coast (Gherasim 2017). The small number of persons under international protection Romania hosts (compared to other Eu countries) is also caused by a clear failure of the relocations planned to take place from Greece to Italy, based on agreements Romania has signed. These relocation procedures differ from asylum requests in the sense that Romania as a host nation makes an offer to Italy or Greece (output) or one of the two countries sends such

238

I.-S. JOJA

a request to Romania to transfer refugees. According to the General Inspectorate on Immigration, last year Romania sent a total of 1272 requests to Italy and Greece, resulting in only 98 persons transferred. Inversely, Romania received a total of 3122 requests from the two EU member states, out of which Bucharest approved 89. Compared to 2016, when a total of 568 people was transferred from Italy and Greece to Romania, there is a spectacular reduction in numbers. These numbers suggest the failure of the relocation accords implementation based on the Dublin Agreement and the inefficiency of the EU’s capacity to enforce the number Romania has negotiated with Brussels—of 4180 transferrals per year. The overwhelming number of asylum requests received by Romania directly in 2017 were from conflict areas: Iraq (2742), Syria (945), Afghanistan (257), Pakistan (247), Iran (207). From a logistical point of view, national authorities managed the flow of incoming refuge seekers without any problems: the occupation rate of asylum centres in 2017 was of only 62.5%. Additionally, a proof of the efficiency of the national authorities’ integration policy consists of a high increase in the participation in programmes for integration of people under international protection: the General Inspectorate for Immigration’s report from last year shows that 1533 persons participated in integration programmes offered or managed by the government, compared to 2016, when roughly a third, 588 persons, took part in integration activities.

13.4 Challenges for Current and Future Migration Policy and Recommendations Based on Lessons Learnt The challenges Romania’s migration policy has faced over the past few years have occurred on several levels and infer long-term implications for both Romania’s and the EU’s policy-making. The country’s growingly important role as a transit route for illegal migration means that addressing the challenges and finding comprehensive solutions based on lessons learnt is even more compelling. First, Romania’s ambiguous stance on global migration expressed by the President’s radical, sudden and unexplained change of policy and the continuous divide between the government’s stance on the issue and that of President Iohannis have far-reaching implications. In September

13

ROMANIA’S POLICY OF MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION …

239

2015 the President rejected in a statement the quota of 6351 refugees per year and changed his position at the European Council on 15–16 October 2015. The incoherent statements in the context of the 2015 EU negotiation on the refugee crises and the discrepancies between the position of the President, on one side, and that of the former Prime Minister Victor Ponta, on the other side, have affected the public perception on the refugee issue, as well as the position of Romania at EU level (Arcadia report). The lack of adequate communication with the Romanian society and the country’s unexplained initial vote against the quota system and later change of position were insufficiently explained to the voters, creating the perception of Romania opposing refugees; the Prime Minister’s confusing statement “we will defend it if others close borders” amplified the insecurity of the public perception already dominated by fear (idem). Furthermore, the incoherence at the institutional level has cumbered Romania’s position in negotiations at the European level and comes with the risk of Romania becoming branded a xenophobic EU member. States in the region whose policy is marked by xenophobia and lack of solidarity (idem). The public perception regarding migrants and refugees is another major challenge for Romania. A study conducted in 2016 concluded that the citizens’ lack of information concerning refugees and asylum requests, as well (and most importantly) the negative impact of media coverage affected Romanian’s hatred and fear towards refugees (Iacob et al. 2016). The hostile public perception is not a reflection of a deep-seated xenophobic sentiment–Romania hosted no political anti-migration campaigns or movements, and there is no violence against migrants. Rather, the anti-migrant attitudes are caused by a lack of education concerning migration and refugee issues, as well as by Russia’s pervasive anti-EU and anti-migration disinformation. The impact of the media coverage, particularly in the age of fastspreading international news, is clearly reflected in Romanians’ public perception on issues related to refugees: 54% Romanians disagree with the presence of refugees in Romania, naming as their rationale the fear of social instability and violence, cultural differences and fear of economic instability. Especially the latter reason has no basis in Romania, where— unlike in Western countries—the economic stability is constantly affected not by the increase in migrants, but by the governments’ handling of the economy. But Romanians fear that beyond the pervasive economic

240

I.-S. JOJA

and political instability an increased number of migrants will add to the country’s vulnerabilities. The number of Romanians who are against the EU migration quota (65%) is significantly higher than the number of Romanians who disagree with migrants principally, demonstrating a result of the governments’ incoherent migration policy. Furthermore, international media coverage and propaganda become evident when Romanians’ perception of migration in Europe is analysed: 45% associate the migrant crisis with “social war” and 31% with religious conflict, while only 18% with temporary unrest; 72% believe the presence of refugees in Europe will create a future revolt. These strong beliefs disclose a high degree of assumption and transfer from European and international debates. During the migration crisis the Romania media aggressively covered the issue, significantly fueling Romanians’ fears. Most interestingly, Romanians’ negative perception of the migration crisis is contradicted by individual perception, as shown in the same study. 62% Romanians believe Romania should be more involved internationally in solving the refugee crisis. Furthermore, 70% believe Romania is an unattractive country for migrants. Since the European migration crisis, Romania has made significant steps towards an institutionally coherent migration policy. Most importantly, Romania had a ground-breaking initiative of involving civil society to a very high extent in both policy-making and implementation. The Technocratic governments’ initiative boosted the governmental migration policymaking and implementation, ensuring efficiency, as well as nongovernmental support through the transfer of know-how from the civil sector—massively present and involved in Romania on all issues related to integration of minorities. The cooperation ended however shortly after, effectively cancelled by a new Social-Democrat government (Colintineanu 2016) under the auspices of the Ministry of Labour (Colintineanu 2016). When the issue of migration and refugees disappeared at the end of 2016 from political agenda and public discourse, civil society started an initiative called Coalition for the Rights of Migrants and Refugees (2017) at the beginning of 2017. The Coalition’s aim is to promote and coordinate advocacy initiatives, to monitor their effects, to interact with policy-makers and to influence migration-related public policies. Lastly, a significant challenge Romanian authorities face is the one of fake documents. Romania has already been singled out as a top resource for the issuing fake documents for asylum seekers, as well as a significant

13

ROMANIA’S POLICY OF MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION …

241

traffic route. This constitutes the illegal part of the activity. Along with this phenomenon a major challenge is the fact that 95% of refuge seekers are undocumented. After three months of stay, according to procedure, the Romanian state offers refugees a (possibly fake) identity. At the operational level, the integration of refugees also enlists a series of challenges for Romania. One of the few national conferences on the topic highlighted the fact that, given Romania’s—perceived as well as real—lack of attractiveness, many asylum seekers decide to leave the country for richer member states; this phenomenon can hardly be prevented, due to the right of free movement (Global Focus and Arcadia 2015). According to EU law, the passports refugees receive qualifies them for permanent protection and thus gives them rights similar to those of Romanian citizens (except for the right to vote).4 Romania’s challenge, based on the recent success of integration projects, will consist in providing enough incentives for refugees to stay in Romania. Integration projects constitute major investments, in which in the case of Romania both the governmental and non-governmental sector are involved. Creating communities and environments that favour integration, as well as a welcoming society, is the next challenge Romania faces. Already, the groundwork has been laid through the projects of a civil society with a long tradition (for a post-communist country) in its efforts for the integration of minorities. The NGOs involved in Romania in these activities range from think tanks and churches to organisations for human rights. These facts represent a major advantage. The next step will be to develop programmes that increase the acceptance from the host society and diminish the impact of the negative media coverage on the issues related to migration. Beyond these efforts, the main challenge for Romania will remain the social-economic integration of refugees, as the country already has a great number of socially vulnerable minority groups (Global Focus and Arcadia 2015).

4 Except for those individuals that receive a form of temporary protection and not the refugee status.

242

I.-S. JOJA

13.5

Conclusion

As a new donor and host nation for migrants, as well as one of the poorest EU countries, Romania has not been confronted so far with any major incoming migration. However, its access to the Black Sea, EU status and border with Serbia has made it an alternative and growingly important transit route for asylum seekers and migrants. Nevertheless, inflows and transits of migrants have failed to gain a spot on the political agenda. The European migration crisis of 2015 has pushed the issue briefly to the forefront of the political debate, handled badly by decision-makers. The President initially aligned Romania with Central and Eastern European countries opposing migration without explaining his position, only to make a U-turn and insufficiently explain a negotiated quota of around 2500 refugees to be transferred to Romania per year. The contradictory nature of the official statements, as well as the negative national and international media coverage have had a significant negative impact on public opinion in Romania. National authorities have put in place a legislative and institutional framework and have implemented the policies with mixed results. To address these internal institutional weaknesses, a Technocratic government invested in November 2015 initiated a major project of collaboration on equal footing between itself and the non-governmental sector—a coalition for the development of integration policies for refugees. The initiative had great potential of substantially contributing to the success of governmental integration policies through the transfer of know-how from the civil sector to the level of national governmental policies. However, the Social-Democrat government, appointed January 2017, dropped the initiative and effectively silenced the issue, removing it from the public agenda. At the operational level, the Social-Democratic government proved to be well prepared for the migration flows. But these flows have so far been minimal—far less than Romania had negotiatied with the EU in 2015. At the political and discourse level, its official position and the negative press have fuelled the fears among the Romanian public. The only way to address that is by financing integration programmes inclusive of the host population. The most important lesson to be learned from Romanian migration policies integration policy is the invaluable contribution civil society can bring. Lastly, Romania’s unattractiveness remains its most

13

ROMANIA’S POLICY OF MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION …

243

significant challenge, to which the country has found no solution so far. It will have to provide enough incentives for refugees to stay in Romania.

References 35 de grup˘ari de trafic de persoane, anihilate în 2016. (2016, December 3). Digi24. https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/actualitate/justitie/35-de-gruparide-trafic-de-persoane-anihilate-in-2016-624861. Accessed 28 April 2018. Acord UE-Turcia privind migra¸tia/Iohannis: România nu va primi un num˘ar mai mare de refugiat, i. (2016, March 18). Euractiv. https://www.euractiv.ro/ extern/acordul-cu-turcia-privind-refugiatii-a-fost-aprobat-de-liderii-statelormembre-ue-3841. Accessed 28 April 2018. Bolocan, V., & Ghica, S. (2018, April 23). Strategie. România se preg˘ate¸ste s˘a converteasc˘a noul val de refugia¸ti în for¸ta de munc˘a lips˘a de care se plâng angajatorii. Adev˘arul. https://adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/strategie-rom ania-pregateste-converteasca-noul-val-refugiati-forta-munca-lipsa-plang-angaja torii-1_5ade0bc5df52022f7526601d/index.html. Accessed 9 January 2019. Beniamino, C. (2018, March 12). Statement of Jesuit Refugee Service Policy Sir Advocacy for Europe Officer. https://jrsromania.org/perspectiva-jrs-eur opa-asupra-sistemului-de-azil-din-romania/#more-2412. Accessed 9 January 2019. Coalition for the Rights of Migrants and Refugees. (2017). http://advocacy. cdcdi.ro/article/english. Accessed 24 April 2018. Coalition for the Rights of Migrants and Refugees—Annual Conference. (2017). http://advocacy.cdcdi.ro/content/conferin%C8%9B-anual%C4%83-coali% C8%9Biei-pentru-drepturile-migran%C8%9Bilor-%C8%99i-refugia%C8%9Bi lor-cu-tema-%E2%80%9Dmigra%C8%9Bie. Accessed 24 April 2018. Colintineanu, L. (2016, February 24). Coalit, ia Nat, ional˘a pentru Integrarea Refugiat, ilor nu s-a întâlnit niciodat˘a de la înfiint, are. Euractiv. https://www. euractiv.ro/politic-intern/coalitia-nationala-pentru-integrarea-refugiatilor-nus-a-intalnit-niciodata-de-la-infiintarea-ei-3618. Accessed 20 April 2018. Dr˘aghici, M. (2015, September 13). Analiz˘a: Consiliul JAI analizeaz˘a propunerile CE privind imigran¸tii. România respinge cotele obligatorii. Mediafax. http://www.mediafax.ro/politic/analiza-consiliul-jai-analizeaza-propunerilece-privind-imigrantii-romania-respinge-cotele-obligatorii-14710768. Accessed 30 April 2018. European Migrant Smuggling Centre. (2017). First Year Activity Report. https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/emsc-first-year-act ivity-report. Accessed 30 April 2018. European Migrant Smuggling Centre. (2018). Second Year Activity Report. http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/apr/eu-europol-migrant-smuggl ing-centre-annual-report-pr-2017.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2018.

244

I.-S. JOJA

General Inspectorate for Immigration. (2018). Evaluarea Activit˘at, ii Inspectoratului General pentru Imigr˘ari în anul 2017 . http://igi.mai.gov.ro/sites/def ault/files/evaluarea_activitatii_in_anul_2017.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2018. Global Focus and Arcadia (Romania Association for International Cooperation and Development). (2015). Criza refugiat, ilor: provoc˘ari interne s, i implicat, ii de politic˘a extern˘a. Gherasim, C. (2017, September 9). Is Romania Ready to Deal with Its Rising Migrant Numbers? Euronews. http://www.euronews.com/2017/ 09/16/is-romania-ready-to-deal-with-its-rising-migrant-numbers. Accessed 2 May 2018. Hera, M. (2015, September 23). Primele declara¸tii ale lui Iohannis dup˘a ce România a aflat câ¸ti imigran¸ti va trebui s˘a primeasc˘a. Ziarul Financiar. http://www.zf.ro/business-international/primele-declaratii-ale-lui-iohannisdupa-ce-Rom%C3%A2nia-a-aflat-cati-imigran%C5%A3i-va-trebui-sa-primea sca-14740119. Accessed 28 April 2018. Iacob, A., et al. (2016). Raport privind percept, ia românilor despre criza refugiat, ilor. Asociat, ia Pro Democrat, ia. http://www.apd.ro/wp-content/upl oads/2016/04/Raport-de-cercetare-privind-criza-refugiatilor.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2018. Klaus Iohannis s, i-a schimbat pozit, ia fat, a˘ de refugiat, i. (2015, September 23). Hotnews. https://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-politic-20445737-live-text-ora-1200-klaus-iohannis-sustine-declaratie-presa-inaintea-plecarii-consiliul-european. htm. Accessed 30 April 2018. Marica, I. (2018, February 28). Almost 6,000 Foreign Citizens Try to Cross the Romanian Border Illegally in 2017 . Romania Insider. https://www.romaniainsider.com/cross-romanian-borders-illegally-2017/. Accessed 18 April 2018. McLaughlin, D. (2017, September 7). Romania Stops Migrant Ship on Emerging Black Sea Smuggling Route. Irish Times. https://www.irishtimes. com/news/world/europe/romania-stops-migrant-ship-on-emerging-blacksea-smuggling-route-1.3209485. Accessed 30 April 2018. Mogos, A., et al. (2018, May 10). Shut-out Balkan Migrants Find Romanian Backdoor to EU . Balkan Insight. http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/art icle/shut-out-balkan-migrants-find-romanian-backdoor-to-eu-05-09-2018. Accessed 10 May 2018. Roaid. (2017, June 20). Ziua mondial˘a a refugiatului. http://roaid.ro/post/ ziua-mondiala-a-refugiatului-451. Accessed 20 April 2018. România e Acas˘a. http://www.romaniaeacasa.ro/programe-integrare/. Accessed 9 January 2019. Save the Children Romania. (2017, June 20). Ziua Internat, ional˘a a Refugiatului: Salvat, i Copiii România a asistat, în ultimele 12 luni, 800 de copii nevoit, i îs, i abandoneze casele, pentru a-s, i salva viat, a. http://salvaticopiii.ro/upload/ p00010012_Ziua_Refugiatului_2017.pdf. Accessed 30 April 2018.

CHAPTER 14

Challenges of Immigrant Integration in Spanish Local Governments José M. Ruano de la Fuente

14.1

Becoming an Immigrant Receiving Country

In 2019, Spain surpassed for the first time in its history the barrier of 47 million inhabitants despite a natural negative increase of 45,002 people, although compensated by a positive net migration rate of 209,097 foreigners (National Institute of Statistics 2020), among which Colombians (27,929 more people in 2019), Venezuelans (24,238) and Moroccans (20,627) stand out. The migration rate has been continuously positive since 2015 after partially overcoming the economic crisis that particularly affected Spain between 2008 and 2014. According to these figures, the foreign population in Spain currently amounts to 5,023,279 people (10.67% of the population), of which the most represented nationalities are Moroccans (734,402), Romanians (669,222), British (295,067), Italians (256,269) and Colombians (227,102), with strong

J. M. Ruano de la Fuente (B) Department of Political and Administrative Sciences, Complutense University, Madrid, Spain e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 J. Franzke and J. M. Ruano de la Fuente (eds.), Local Integration of Migrants Policy, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50979-8_14

245

246

J. M. RUANO

DE

LA FUENTE

sustained increases of Venezuelan immigrants due to the political and economic crisis that this country has been going through for years. According to global data from the National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2020), more than a third of the foreign population legally resident in Spain comes from the EU, while the rest is divided between Africa (20%), Latin America (16%) and Asia (8%). From a demographic point of view, the foreign population is younger than the Spanish one and is in the range of 30–50 years old, while there is a certain growth in the presence of women in the youngest cohorts (between 20 and 40 years old), who have gone from 46% in 2002 to 53% in 2019 (Fig. 14.1). This current situation contrasts with the image of Spain as an exporter of workers to Latin America and Europe for centuries and especially during the first decades of the twentieth century and, after the Second World War, until the end of the 1960s. The change in trend began in the 1980s with the first arrivals of immigrants from Latin America, which were joined in the 1990s by contingents from Morocco and Eastern Europe (mainly Poles and Romanians). These immigrants have settled mainly in those provinces that have offered more employment opportunities, although in many cases they are in precarious jobs in 7.000.000 6.000.000 5.000.000 4.000.000 3.000.000 2.000.000 1.000.000 0 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Total foreigners

EU cizens

Fig. 14.1 Evolution of immigrant population in Spain (2008–2019) (Source Own elaboration on the basis of data from the National Institute of Statistics)

14

CHALLENGES OF IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION …

247

labour-intensive industries, which has led to a strong concentration of the population in the Mediterranean regions (Catalonia, Community of Valencia, Murcia, Andalusia) and Madrid, so that only seven provinces concentrate approximately 56% of the entire foreign population in Spain. The novelty of immigration in Spain explains why immigration was only regulated until the 1980s with the approval of the first law on the rights and freedoms of foreigners in a context where immigrants barely exceeded a quarter of a million people and the majority were European citizens. However, the consolidation of immigration in the 1990s posed as the main challenges of immigration the management of the absorption of foreign labour and the borders control. Thus, throughout the 1990s different social actors began to intervene in migration policy (NGOs, unions and immigrants’ associations) and the first contradictions began to emerge between the actions implemented by the central government and those by the regions and local governments (López Sala 2007, p. 8). In 1994, the central administration approved the Plan for the Social Integration of Immigrants, which, for the first time, sought to address immigration from a global perspective, emphasising the fight against discrimination, racism and xenophobia and the fight against barriers to integration. By the end of the 1990s, the stakeholders were fully consolidated and some public programmes were implemented in the area of social integration and in the fields of housing, health, education and social services, although in an uncoordinated manner and without yet considering immigration policy as a comprehensive policy. During the period 2000–2007, the flow of immigrants to Spain accelerated as a result of the country’s economic growth (with an increase in the population of some 6 million inhabitants and the absorption of 50% of all immigration getting into the European Union), family regrouping, bilateral agreements with the countries of origin and geographical (with Africa) or cultural (with Latin America) proximity. The 2001 Global Programme for the Regulation and Coordination of Immigration and Aliens (GRECO in Spanish) is the first general plan that seeks a model of immigration coordinated with the European Union, the regulation of migratory flows and the protection of displaced persons and refugees. It should be borne in mind that this strong migratory process is accompanied by the naturalisations of Latin American citizens, who only need two years of legal residence to obtain Spanish nationality, as opposed to the 10 years of almost all other origins. The GRECO programme emphasised

248

J. M. RUANO

DE

LA FUENTE

the fight against irregular immigration and the organisation of migratory flows through the signing of agreements with countries of origin of immigration. Since 2007, migration policy has combined its concern for border control with actions to promote social integration. The Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration (PECI in Spanish), the first plan drawn up with the participation of social organisations, is an example of the struggle for social integration and directly involved trade unions and business organisations in the management of labour flows from abroad. Furthermore, the Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants is the institutional sphere for consultation, information and advice on integration in which public administrations, trade unions, business organisations, NGOs and immigrant associations are represented in this instrument for civil society participation. Also in the same period, the Autonomous Communities began to implement their own plans for the integration of immigrants, so that in 2007 practically all Spanish regions had their own social intervention plans in this area (Carrasco 2014). Most of these programmes are of a general nature and deal with aspects such as reception, education, employment, health, housing, social services or legal advice, creating, albeit in a disorganised way, a recognition of the rights of migrants. For their part, as it will be seen below, local governments are beginning to incorporate immigrants into the municipality’s general social services and, particularly the larger ones, are also starting to develop their own integration plans geared to the most immediate needs of their new neighbours. The year 2008 marks the beginning of a strong economic crisis that will last at least until 2014 (with continued negative growth rates), which meant an abrupt halt to the arrival of immigrant population. The correlation between migratory flows and the economic cycle is evident and, in the face of the economic recession, the political authorities are once again emphasising the control of irregular immigration through the use of European instruments (FRONTEX and the Visa Information System), domestic ones (detention and expulsion of immigrants, introduction into the criminal code of the crime of human trafficking and promotion of the voluntary return of immigrants in a situation of social vulnerability) and the signing of cooperation agreements with African countries to strengthen joint controls and encourage expulsion and readmission procedures. The economic crisis led to a drop in the migration balance of

14

CHALLENGES OF IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION …

249

almost half a million people by 2014, i.e. less than 10% of the 6 million net inflows that occurred before the crisis. From 2015 to date, the improved economic climate has again led to a continued increase in immigration rates. In addition, the numbers of asylum applications have also grown systematically in recent years: Spain received less than 15,000 applications in 2015, but since then the number of applicants has multiplied to more than 112,000 by December 2019. The closure of refugee routes to Greece and Italy following EU agreements with Libya and Turkey has shifted migratory pressure towards the Western Mediterranean, but although less spectacular for the media than the arrival of small boats of refugees by sea, the main gateway for immigration are the airports (Fig. 14.2). In the same way that the first waves of immigrants in the 1980s and 1990s found public institutions ill-prepared for this challenge, the strong growth in asylum applications has shown that Spanish administrations were not ready. In the last two years, Spain is the third country in Europe, after Germany and France that receives the biggest figures of asylum applications, but one of the countries that recognises the least number of refugees and one of the slowest in resolving cases, so that 23% of the asylum applications to be resolved are Spanish. Of all the applications, 35% are from Venezuelans, who are mostly denied refugee status 120.000 100.000 80.000 60.000 40.000 20.000 0 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Fig. 14.2 Evolution of asylum seekers in Spain (2008–2019) (Source Ministry of the Interior)

250

J. M. RUANO

DE

LA FUENTE

or subsidiary protection, but are the only group that are automatically recognised as having a residence and work permit of up to two years for humanitarian reasons, which has contributed to placing the Venezuelan population as the first group of asylum seekers, followed by those from Syria and Colombia. In short, what has characterised the problem of immigration in Spain has been the lack of a comprehensive immigration policy. On the one hand, the linking of migration policy to the economic cycle has not served to facilitate the incorporation of immigrants into the labour market beyond temporary and precarious jobs. Moreover, immigration that was treated as temporary became permanent because of the very needs of the Spanish economy, the processes of regularisation (in 2000, 2001 and 2005) and family regrouping, and the obtaining of Spanish nationality, especially by the Latin American immigrants. Thus, although official statistics detect a reduction in the number of foreign residents in Spain during the years of the crisis, more than a third (34%) of them have obtained Spanish nationality, and therefore disappear from the statistics on foreigners. In fact, if we consider people born abroad, the percentage of this type of population would rise to 14% compared to 10.6% of the foreign population because 2.1 million have dual nationality. In addition, the policy of voluntary return of foreigners in a vulnerable situation implemented during those same years had little success, with fewer than 20,000 people taking advantage of these programmes between 2008 and 2012 (Carrasco 2014, p. 11). On the other hand, the fight against irregular immigration through the strengthening of border controls is ineffective in itself in curbing the arrival of immigrants and refugees, as well as raising suspicions of human rights violations. In this sense, in view of the evolution of immigration figures and their correspondence with the economic cycle, it seems that employment opportunities are really the main incentive for immigration, as opposed to the attempts of public authorities to prevent, slow down and order the arrival of people in search of better life opportunities.

14.2

Perceptions and Attitudes Towards Immigration

In order to analyse the perceptions of Spanish public opinion towards the migration phenomenon, the series of studies carried out between 2008

14

CHALLENGES OF IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION …

251

and 2017 by the Centre for Sociological Studies (CIS in Spanish), a stateowned institution specialised in opinion polls and researches, has been analysed. As it will be seen below, just as the migration cycle seems to correlate with the economic cycle, the opinion expressed by the population on immigration seems also to evolve in parallel with the country’s economic situation. Thus, those who consider the number of immigrants to be “high or excessive” are more likely to do so during the economic crisis (2008– 2014). This is expressed by 79.2% in 2010 and more than 70% of those surveyed in the following three years. From 2015, this opinion is losing support to 61.1% who say the same in 2017. Also, during the years 2010 to 2012 are the majority (52.4% in 2010) who believe that immigrants should adopt “the way of life of the country”, while that requirement is relaxed towards more pluralistic positions after the economic crisis, when less than half of the Spanish (28.7% in 2016 or 36.1% in 2017) consider this condition as important. These statements could be understood as the expression of a certain mistrust of the presence of immigrants in Spain. Similarly, when asked if the laws are too tolerant of immigrants, more than 40% of the population surveyed during the economic crisis (42.1% in 2010 and 42.7% in 2011) agree with this statement, but this opinion drops to a quarter (21.4% in 2016 and 25.4% in 2017) in the years following the crisis. Also about two out of three Spaniards considered that immigrants “receive more than they contribute” to society (61.5% in 2010 and 62.7% in 2011), compared to 55.5% who have the same opinion in 2017, and a significant part identifies immigrants with the problems of crime and insecurity (32.5% in 2008 and 30.2% in 2009), while the same opinion is losing presence in recent years (21% in 2016 and 15.4% in 2017). As a global expression of the opinion of Spaniards towards the phenomenon of immigration, during the years of the economic crisis barely 40% considered it positive (40% in 2010 and 2011 and 39.6% in 2012), while this positive perception is shared by more than half of those surveyed in recent years (51.7% in 2016 and 51.6% in 2017). This perception about the contribution of immigration expressed in the studies of the Centre for Sociological Studies is also consistent with the 2019 Eurobarometer Standard (Eurostat 2019). According to their data, 58% consider that immigration is positive (compared to 50% of other Europeans), 69% are in favour of immigrants from the EU (compared to 64% of other Europeans), 54% are also in favour of non-EU immigrants

252

J. M. RUANO

DE

LA FUENTE

(compared to 40%) and, finally, 79% believe that help should be given to refugees (compared to 69% in other European countries). Thus, the attitude of Spaniards is generally more positive towards immigrants than in other European countries, although this opinion is strongly influenced as seen before by the economic context. The influence of the economic context can also be seen by analysing the results of the monthly CIS barometers which ask, among other issues of political and social climate, about the country’s main problems. In the period 2008–2012, immigration is between the fourth and sixth most important problems in Spain, behind unemployment, economic problems, housing, terrorism and the payment of pensions. However, from 2013 onwards, this concern about immigration will begin to lose prominence in the list of the country’s most pressing problems and will be between the eighth and eleventh place among the main concerns of Spaniards, who are more interested in economic problems, unemployment, and now also in corruption, the politicians’ performance, health and territorial problems.

14.3 The Management of Immigration and Asylum Policies In June 2018, a few days after arriving at the government, the Spanish Prime Minister gave instructions to welcome the ship Aquarius to the port of Valencia, which was travelling with more than 600 refugees and immigrants after Italy prevented its entry to its ports. However, in November the same government refused to welcome another ship with 12 immigrants that had to wait off the Libyan coast for several days until Malta agreed to pick them up and prevented the departure of Spanish flag ships such as the Open Arms to rescue immigrants adrift. This change of approach in just six months reflects well on the lack of consistent criteria of the Spanish authorities on immigration. In the first place, it must be said that the Spanish Constitution, in its article 149.1.2, grants exclusive competence to the central administration in the management of “nationality, immigration, emigration, status of aliens, and right of asylum“. However, the Constitution establishes that cross-sectional competences in the field of immigration such as social assistance, health, education and culture are the responsibility of the Autonomous Communities, which are in charge of work permits

14

CHALLENGES OF IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION …

253

(this is the case of Catalonia and Andalusia), while the central Administration manages residence permits and keeps the general competence for the integration of immigrants. For their part, local governments, in accordance with Law 7/1985, can provide any public service “that contributes to satisfying the needs…of the neighbourhood community”, which is why, in practice, medium-sized and large cities have implemented initiatives for the integration of immigrants through their social policy departments and by using their own funds or getting earmarked grants from the central administration or their Autonomous Community. In addition to this relationship between the three layers of territorial government, there is the role of social actors: firstly, business organisations and trade unions, which are interested in the effect of immigration on the labour market and, especially, in labour-intensive sectors (such as construction and agriculture) with high risks of illegal recruitment and precariousness. Secondly, the NGOs and the immigrants’ associations themselves, represented together with the public administrations in the Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants (which is the general area for consultation and decision-making on immigration policy) are involved in the grass root implementation of policies at the municipal level, so that the public authorities achieve a threefold objective: to strengthen the associative network of the immigrant population (which is highly financially dependent on the public administrations), to achieve a greater degree of legitimacy for their policies and to adapt implementation more efficiently to the specific features of the municipality. As it can be seen, a peculiarity of immigration policies is that the general aspects of the regulation of immigration are in the hands of the central administration (border control, establishment of quotas and flows, family reunification, conditions and permits of residence and repatriation), but the regions have most of the powers that affect integration (work permits, employment, housing, health, education and social services policies), while local governments with some material tools and skilled human resources (the largest municipalities) try to manage the migratory pressure on their territory by implementing programmes that try to cover the shortcomings of the regional integration policies (Ruano 2019). Thus, a complex institutional structure can be observed in which, in addition to the EU authorities, various central government ministries must implement coordinated policies (Ministry of the Interior and

254

J. M. RUANO

DE

LA FUENTE

Ministry of Employment, at least) and, in turn, this layer of government must rely on the capacity of the regions to integrate the immigrant population into their territory and on local governments that try to manage conflicts between immigrants and the native population while trying to tackle the most urgent situations (unemployment, unaccompanied minors, housing). This institutional arrangement implies that the institutional design and the policies themselves can be and can evolve very differently according to each region and each municipality (Fernández 2018, pp. 172–180) and, in addition, the distribution of roles among actors is changeable, i.e. the same actor can play different roles in different programmes or can be involved in several programmes simultaneously. For example, an NGO may act as a channel for demands for services for immigrants, it may provide information on the problem or it may end up offering services directly from its own resources, while a public institutional actor may focus on the funding of services, their direct or indirect provision and their subsequent evaluation. This need for coordination between different bodies within the same administration, between territorial administrations, and between these and social organisations makes it very difficult to design a single policy that is capable of implementing an effective reception and integration system. The Spanish Ombudsman, in its annual reports to Parliament and in specific reports on asylum (Ombudsman 2016, 2017), has denounced the structural deficiencies in the management of immigration and international protection. In particular, this institution has noted increasing delays in the processing and resolution of asylum application files, has denounced the operation of centrally managed refugee reception centres (CAR in Spanish, responsible for providing accommodation, food and urgent psychosocial assistance and other social integration services to people who lack the necessary resources), which, in many cases have had to stop providing services to asylum seekers without their file being resolved, and have had to rely frequently on the subsidy of reception places managed by NGOs. Particularly worrying is also the situation of minors staying in Alien Detention Centres (CIE, in Spanish), who are detected by NGOs once they are released as adults as it is impossible to repatriate them. The CIE were created in 1985 with the aim of detaining and guarding foreigners in an irregular situation and “guaranteeing their expulsion”. The fact is that most of the inmates in the seven CIE in Spain are released without being expelled after spending a maximum of two months in

14

CHALLENGES OF IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION …

255

detention, i.e., they are given the most severe penalty in the legal system in order to achieve an objective that is not achieved in most cases. Thus, according to data from the Ministry of the Interior, the number of immigrants who entered Spain illegally increased from 16,292 in 2016 to 27,283 in 2017 and 64,298 in 2018 (Ministry of the Interior 2008– 2019). Most of these entries are from the Mediterranean coast and the North African cities of Ceuta and Melilla. After a maximum detention period of 72 hours, the judge orders their release or their placement in a CIE (except in the case of the thousands of minors) with a view to their expulsion. However, the lack of documentation, the lack of diplomatic representation from the immigrant’s country of origin or simply the fact that the maximum two-month detention period has expired means that a high percentage of inmates are not expelled. In 2016, only 29.02% of the 6930 foreigners in detention were expelled, while in 2017 and 2018 this percentage rose to 37.28 and 58.33%, of the less than 8000 inmates, respectively. The increase in the percentage of expulsions in the last year is not due, as it might seem, to a leap in the efficiency of the system, but to the preferential internment of immigrants in an irregular situation of Moroccan (36%) or Algerian (32%) nationality, whose repatriation is easier thanks to the international agreements reached with their countries than those from sub-Saharan countries (Servicio Jesuita a Inmigrantes 2019), so it can be said that internment is being used as a tool for border control. In short, the significant increase in the number of people who have requested international protection in Spain in recent years has resulted in a “reception and integration system” that is incapable of providing an agile response to the needs of refugees who have not yet formalised their request or who have exceeded the 6–9 month period of the reception period, so they are forced to seek help from municipal services which, in cities such as Madrid or Barcelona, have collapsed and dedicate the same municipal resources to immigrants as to homeless people. The Spanish refugee reception system only grants some kind of protection to about one third of all applicants (CEAR 2018, p. 123), which is a major obstacle to starting a social and labour insertion pathway. This reception system lasts 18 months (24 for the most vulnerable) and is divided into three stages. The first phase (“reception”), which takes six additional months, includes language training, housing assistance and job training; the second phase (“integration”), which lasts other six months, includes a series of financial assistance to cover their basic needs (housing, food, clothing, etc.); and the third phase (“autonomy”) consists

256

J. M. RUANO

DE

LA FUENTE

of specific support in case of need, although during all the stages the refugees continue to receive legal, psychological and linguistic support and employment guidance. However, the system is not easily adapted to the particular circumstances of applicants and their subsequent fate depends largely on the social protection and minimum income schemes offered by the Autonomous Communities, which require different conditions from case to case. The basic problem is the lack of political definition of the desired system of protection. This lack of a single model leads to an ambiguous and modest reception and integration system, which is only activated in serious moments of crisis due to fears of the political and economic costs of caring for refugees and a possible “call effect” that would further strain the system’s scarce resources.

14.4 The Role of Municipalities in the Care and Integration of Immigrants and Refugees Despite the fact that formal competence in the area of immigration lies with the central administration, and that the Autonomous Communities have most of the competence in the provision of services related to integration (education, health, housing, work permits, social assistance), the role of the municipalities is central in the implementation of immigration policies on the ground, since many of them have designed initiatives, programmes and reception policies, as well as trying to encourage their participation and political representation through local councils. This municipal schemes have been possible thanks to the fact that Spanish municipalities have the formal capacity to intervene in any area of interest to the local community. Of course, this formal capacity to act is conditioned by having the material and human resources to carry out these actions, so in practice this “general clause of competences” is exercised by the medium and large municipalities. Thus, in view of the 2015 migration crisis, various Spanish cities such as Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Alicante, Palma and others proclaimed themselves “cities of refuge” with the aim of making material resources (such as housing, spaces for training, etc.) and symbolic ones (actions to promote the social and cultural participation of this population, awareness-raising campaigns, etc.) available to the organisations that attend to people seeking international protection.

14

CHALLENGES OF IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION …

257

Beyond these actions, the most relevant thing is that the municipalities cannot be alien to the migration phenomenon and its consequences, so the first decisions of local governments are the gateway to the general system of reception and integration of this social group. In this sense, municipal registration, social insertion reports and adequate housing reports are key administrative actions for access to essential social services such as health, education, housing or to request their regularisation or family reunification. The municipal census, a basic instrument for municipalities to know their real population and plan the provision of public services, is an indispensable requirement for the inclusion of foreigners in an irregular situation. The social integration report also makes it possible to prove that the immigrant has family or social ties in the territory, which is a very important element in demonstrating the applicant’s situation as a temporary resident (in addition to being able to prove effective residence from the time of registration and the availability of means of subsistence). Likewise, a negative municipal report would be a major obstacle for the applicant for family reunification. It is therefore clear that these three administrative procedures are key to the social integration of immigrants. But, in addition, municipalities have a certain margin of discretion in assessing the conditions required insofar as the requirements are not clearly defined by law or implementing regulations. Garcés shows in her empirical study on migration policies in the municipalities of Catalonia (Garcés 2011, pp. 73–77) how the requirements demanded by one or other municipality in issuing these reports are variable. Thus, while virtually all municipalities register all persons living there even if they have no fixed address, some municipalities require a minimum period of registration for the positive evaluation of the social inclusion report, which ranges from six months to one year; some municipalities require knowledge of one of the official languages (Spanish or Catalan), while others require knowledge of Catalan; or, in the assessment of suitable housing, there are also disparities in administrative practice, so that some municipalities require a purchase or rental document and for others the tenant’s authorisation is enough. Just as these administrative actions differ between municipalities, so do the differences in reception and integration systems. Firstly, because only some municipalities have developed services specifically aimed at the immigrant population or have tried to include immigrants in the general social services aimed at the general population and even fewer municipalities have coordinated and cross-sectional immigration policies, simply

258

J. M. RUANO

DE

LA FUENTE

for reasons of capacity and resources. Thus, only the larger municipalities have been able to design ambitious reception and integration policies, either with their own resources or with the participation and involvement of social organisations, while the medium and small municipalities, which are the majority in Spain, are barely able to implement limited actions or to try to provide shelter for the immigrant population in the humble social protection systems. In any case, the actions of municipal reception are not incompatible with those deployed by the central and regional administrations. The creation by the central Administration of funds for the reception and integration of immigrants was an incentive for the drafting and reform of specific programmes by municipalities that had not acted in this field, while the regions have tried to coordinate, centralise, fiscally promote and legally order the plans of the municipalities in their territory.

14.5

Conclusions

Spain went from being a country of emigrants to a receiving country of immigrants from the 1980s onwards. These migratory flows have been more or less intense depending on the economic situation of the country, just as the attitudes of Spaniards towards immigrants have been more or less positive depending on the economic cycle. Migratory policies have been preferentially linked to border control and labour market regulation, leaving aside aspects relating to the effective integration of immigrants, which only gradually gained ground thanks to universal inclusion in education, health and social services. Spanish immigration policy is a multilevel policy. While the central Administration has general competence in the control of migratory flows, residence permits and conditions of stay of the immigrant population, the Autonomous Communities are responsible for the provision of essential services in the integration processes, while the municipalities try to make up for the deficiencies of the higher administrations by means of their own resources or grants, in a centralised manner or with the involvement of social organisations. The simultaneous and uncoordinated action of the territorial administrations has resulted in divergent actions between regions and between municipalities. The municipalities are the gateway to the reception and integration systems and their administrative procedures (census, social inclusion report and adequate housing report) are key elements that

14

CHALLENGES OF IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION …

259

determine the subsequent phases of immigrant integration. However, the criteria for action are divergent and only the large municipalities have enough means to implement actions worthy of being considered orderly immigration policies. The NGOs and the Ombudsman have been denouncing for years chronic structural deficiencies in the system of social care and integration of immigrants that end up in the lack of a shared vision of the migration phenomenon, excessive delays in the resolution of cases, neglect of vulnerable populations, collapse of the primary care system, lack of protection for minors, ineffectiveness of detention centres and violation of human rights.

References Carrasco, C. (2014). Políticas de inmigración 2000–2012. VII Informe sobre exclusión y desarrollo social en España (Working Paper 5.8). Madrid: Fundación FOESSA. Center for Sociological Studies, CIS. (2008–2017). Actitudes hacia la inmigración. http://www.cis.es/cis/opencms/ES/busqueda.html. Accessed November 2019. Comisión Española de Ayuda al Refugiado, CEAR. (2018). informe 2018. Las personas refugiadas en España y Europa. Madrid: CEAR. Ombudsman. (2016). Estudio sobre el asilo en España. La protección internacional y los sistemas de acogida. Madrid: Defensor del Pueblo. Ombudsman. (2017). Informe anual del Defensor del Pueblo. Madrid: Defensor del Pueblo. Eurostat. (2019, November). Standard Eurobarometer number 92. https://ec. europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/survey/getsurveydet ail/instruments/standard/surveyky/2255. Accessed December 2019. Fernández, B. (2018). ¿Quién gobierna? Políticas públicas e integración de inmigrantes en España. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch. Garcés, B. (2011). Dimensió administrativa. Estudi exploratori sobre les polítiques locals en materia d’immigració à Catalunya. In R. Zapata & B. Garcés (coords.), La gestió municipal de la immigració à Catalunya (pp. 67–95). Barcelona: Associació Catalana de Municipis. National Institute of Statistics. (2008–2019). Barómetros (2008–2019). http:// www.cis.es/cis/opencm/ES/11_barometros/index.jsp. National Institute of Statistics. (2020). Cifras de población, July 2019. https:// www.ine.es/dyngs/INEbase/es/operacion.htm?c=Estadistica_C&cid=125 4736176951&menu=ultiDatos&idp=1254735572981.

260

J. M. RUANO

DE

LA FUENTE

López Sala, A. M. (2007). La política española de inmigración en las dos últimas décadas del asombro migratorio a la política en frontera y la integración. Inmigración en Canarias: contexto, tendencias y retos (pp. 23–38). Santa Cruz de Tenerife: Fundación Pedro García Barrera. Ministry of the Interior. (2008–2019). Asilo en cifras. http://www.interior. gob.es/web/archivos-y-documentacion/documentacion-y-publicaciones/pub licaciones-descargables/extranjeria-y-asilo/asilo-en-cifras. Accessed December 2019. Ruano, J. M. (2019). Actors, Aims and Challenges of Local Strategic Planning in Spain. In C. Hintea, M. Profiroiu, T. Ticlau (Eds.), Strategic Planning in Local Communities: A Cross-National Study of 7 Countries. London: Palgrave. Servicio Jesuita a Inmigrantes, SJM. (2019). Informe CIE 2018. Discriminación de origen. https://sjme.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/InformeCIE-2018-SJM.pdf.

CHAPTER 15

Internal Geopolitics and Migration Policies in Italy Giuseppe Bettoni and Isabella Tamponi

15.1 Introduction: Italian Geography---A Predicament Up until the 1980s, Italy was a country of emigrants. After then, however, it has become an important destination for migratory flows. Its position in the middle of the Mediterranean, as well as its proximity to the coasts of Tunisia and Libya—think about how, for example, the provinces of Sicilian cities, Caltanissetta and Syracuse, extend south of Tunis—make Italy an easily accessible gateway to enter the European Union. Before the crisis that began in 2011 with the Arab Spring, Libya functioned as a buffer zone for immigration. At this time, however, Italy has assumed that role in new geopolitics of “buffer states” (Giordano 2018, p. 333). Up until 2011, the agreement between the governments of Italy and Libya allowed strict control of migrant departures from the Libyan coasts; at that time, fewer migrants began their travel in countries other

G. Bettoni (B) · I. Tamponi Department of History, Humanities and Society, Università degli Studi di Roma “Tor Vergata”, Rome, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 J. Franzke and J. M. Ruano de la Fuente (eds.), Local Integration of Migrants Policy, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50979-8_15

261

262

G. BETTONI AND I. TAMPONI

than Libya. Data shows that in 1998 Italy received 6498 applications for refugee status by non-Europeans (28% of which were granted). In 2008, the number of applications rose to 11,918, though only 9% of those were granted. In 2017, 128,219 refugee applications were received, though only 8% of those were granted.1 Frequently, over half of refugee applications are rejected, therefore some applicants may petition for humanitarian protection. This means that by 2012 the number of arrivals in Italy was six times greater than before. Even ahead of the Libyan crisis, immigrants from various countries on the south shore of the Mediterranean were still landing in Italy. The points of origin of boats and ships arriving to Sicily, Calabria and Puglia were not only the neighbouring Albanian coast, but also countries such as Lebanon and Egypt. After the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, Libya faced huge challenges, among which the escalation of a massive underground market, which consequently facilitated any kind of smuggling and in particular human trafficking. Thus, various pathways of human traffic shifted to Libya, not only migratory flows from West Africa, for example, but also from as south as Sudan. Even flows that came from Asia across the Balkans are now concentrated towards getting to Libya, and from Libya to the nearest destination: Italy. At this point, it is necessary to explain how the policies that Italy has put in place to manage these migratory flows have evolved over time.

15.2

Immigration in Italy

The Italian government has implemented a multilevel system capable, albeit with some limitations and snags, to receive thousands of asylum seekers. In recent years, government agencies, local authorities and the private sector have cooperated to achieve the goal of redefining the term “hospitality”. Although in Italy the humanitarian impetus for solidarity and integration is strong, the public opinion often questions these values, which are perceived as downfall instead of as accomplishments, and portrays migrants as a danger rather than as a resource. The key elements of 1 Data from monthly collection by the Department of Civil Liberties and Immigration, Ministry of the Interior (1990–2017), published in Quaderno Statistico and updated yearly. Latest version is of 1990–2018. http://www.libertaciviliimmigrazione.dlci.interno.gov.it/ it/documentazione/statistica/i-numeri-dellasilo.

15

INTERNAL GEOPOLITICS AND MIGRATION POLICIES IN ITALY

263

the political narrative on immigration in Italy are the perception of widespread economic and social insecurity linked to migrants, the fear of terrorist attacks and the failure of whichever government is in power to guarantee safety and security to the citizens. Clearly, the need is strong for proposals which keep migrant people safe and their dignity preserved by removing them from the grip of those who speculate on their destiny before, during and after their voyage. It is time to produce global agreements on migrants and refugees that can hold together the necessities and demands of all to improve the protection of those who flee their own country. In response to this need, a few years ago the Italian Ministry of the Interior launched a resettlement program, which showed a serious commitment to the humanitarian cause. In 2016, the number of incoming migrants reached the quota of 181,436 (18% more than the previous year). Of these, 71% were men, 13% were women and 16% were minor children. This trend of growth observed in 2016 became evident in the first half of 2017, when the number of arrivals was 83,752, 19.3% more than in 2016. Data show that more incoming migrants were males (74%, a 4% increase compared to 70% in the first half of 2016) against fewer women and minors (respectively 11 and 15%). By comparing annual data on incoming migrants, we note an increase in arrivals between May and August, a phenomenon linked to the summer weather conditions; however, arrivals peaked in October (27,384 landings), followed by a minimum of arrivals in December (8428 landings). Due to its geographical location in the Mediterranean, Sicily is the region where the largest number of arrivals takes place (around 68% of the total), followed by Calabria (17%) and Puglia (6%). The other two main landing areas are Sardinia and Campania, but on these routes the boats are often “erried” by ships that intercept them at sea, and lead them to the ports that have greater availability of docking at that time. In 2016 almost all the migrants who arrived to the Italian coast by sea (90%) set sail from the coast of Libya; the remaining share started out in Egypt (7%) and Turkey (2.1%). As for their countries of origin, 20.7% are from Nigeria, 11.4% from Eritrea and 4.7% from Guinea; the remaining percentages show migrants from Ivory Coast (6.8%), Gambia (6.6%), Senegal (5.7%), Mali (5.5%) and, below ten thousand individuals from Sudan, Bangladesh and Somalia.

264

G. BETTONI AND I. TAMPONI

In the first half of 2017, the largest number of migrants who landed in Italy were from Nigeria (16.9%), followed by Bangladesh (9.8%) and Guinea (9.3%). With regard to migration policies, Italy manages migratory flows from non-EU countries with policies that combine reception and integration with plans of action to combat irregular immigration. By decree of the President of the Council of Ministers, the so-called “flow decree” introduced by law n. 40/1998, the State periodically plans the maximum quota of foreigners to be admitted onto the Italian territory for employment and self-employment. This legislation also provides for entry into employment in special cases (Article 27 of the Consolidated Law on Immigration). In collaboration with third-party agencies and the governments of the migrants’ countries of origin, and in compliance with Article 42 of the Consolidated Law on Immigration, the integration of foreign citizens who have legal immigrant status in Italy receives support by the State, the regions and the local authorities. Some programs for integration provide information on the rights and opportunities for integration or return to the countries of origin; others promote linguistic, civic and professional training; and others still help with lawful employment. The local Immigration Councils, instituted in each prefecture by decree of the President of the Council of Ministers 18 December 1999, monitor the presence of foreign individuals on the territory as well as their level of social inclusion and employment in order to promote specific local integration policies, in partnership with other institutions and with private social-work agencies. All these organisations connect the Central Government with the local authorities to unscramble issues related to immigration.

15.3 Government Structures and Migrant Reception and Assistance While the Italian government has attempted to reorganise and rationalise the system, to date the situation on the territories is rather uneven. The system has been criticised for the “bottleneck” between the first and second phase of reception, and which is due to the absence of regional hubs, that is, entry-level government structures, even though they were required by law, and which have been replaced by the CAS, or “backup”

15

INTERNAL GEOPOLITICS AND MIGRATION POLICIES IN ITALY

265

reception centres. Compared to SPRAR, notwithstanding the commitment of the Municipalities to join the network and the recent expansion of posts, the availability of resources does not meet the need. This disproportion is clear: as of 31 December 2016, 73% of the 188,084 migrants entered into the system were hosted in the CAS, 7.8% in the other reception facilities (CPAS, CDA, CARA) and 0.4% in the so-called hotspots; on the other hand, the SPRAR network hosted 23,352 beneficiaries (18.7%). As of 15 July 2017, the available reception centres were 205,003 in total, of which 77.4% in CAS, 15.3% in SPRAR and 7.2% in the first-reception centres. The low turnover and the long periods spent in the various structures are due to the delays by local officials in the examination of applications for international protection, as well as in appeal cases after a denial. This is a critical problem which affects the system at every level, and which is very inefficient cost-wise. The constant pressures by migrant arrivals have led to a progressive slowdown in the requests as of 2017 (−10% compared to 2016); in July 2017 close to 140,000 pending applications were still open. The average adjudication time for applications in 2014–2016 was 257 days or less, however, there has been a considerable acceleration in the process, which gone from 347 days in 2014, to 261 in 2015, to 163 in 2016. Decree n. 13 of 17 February 2017, which was ratified into Law n. 46 on 13 April 2017, described “urgent provisions for the acceleration of proceedings in the field of international protection, as well as for the fight against illegal immigration” due to the high number of humanitarian protection requests, and the need to ensure that competent and specialised personnel adjudicated asylum applications. This law authorises the Ministry of the Interior to release nationwide announcements for the recruitment of up to 250 highly qualified employees to examine and adjudicate requests for international protection locally. Law n. 46/2017 intervened in a more decisive manner by launching 26 specialised sections (as many as the courts of appeal) “in matters of immigration, international protection and free movement of citizens of the European Union”, and by adding to their competencies the appeal of denied asylum applications by the Territorial Commissions.

266

G. BETTONI AND I. TAMPONI

With the purpose of ensuring fairness and transparency, on 7 March 2017 the Ministry of the Interior signed a decree2 approving new measures for the management and the funding of migrant’s reception facilities, as well as for the supply of goods and services pertaining thereto. This decree incorporates all the regulations provided by ANAC (National Anti-Corruption Authority) on the protocols for awarding contracts for the management of reception centres. Among the main changes are: • subdividing the top manager post into four separate positions; • rendering services traceable, and awarding contracts to the most economical provider; • introducing a social clause to promote personnel retention; • expediting the inspection and monitoring by the Ministry of the Interior of the quality of services rendered. Another highly debated topic on the number of applicants for international protection in Italy concerns the regional distribution of migrants. Overall, in 2016 the majority of migrants were housed in reception facilities in Lombardy (12.6% of the total), followed by Lazio (9.3%), Sicily (8.8%), Piedmont (7.9%), Campania (7.9%) and Veneto (7.7%). Between 2014 and 2016 the number of participants in the various structures registered an increase in Veneto (+533.9% of presences), Tuscany (+395.5%) and Trentino-Alto Adige (+364.1%). It is worth noting that, while in Lombardy the percentage of migrants rose from 7.9% in 2014 to 12.6% in 2016, the figures decreased consistently in Lazio (from 13.2 to 9%), in Puglia (from 8.8 to 7%) and in Sicily (from 21.2 to 8.8%). When we examine how the number of migrants per region has shifted by considering the quality and the services offered by the reception structures, we see a significant increase in the backup reception centres in some regions, such as Lombardy, Piedmont and Tuscany; regions like Sicily exercise a very strict control of the number of available places in the CAS. In terms of first-reception centres, Sicily has the highest percentage of

2 Decree of the Ministry of the Interior (2017, March 7): Outline of contract award for the supply of goods and services related to the operation of first aid and reception centres, reception centres, temporary reception facilities, centres for identification and repatriation. http://www.interno.gov.it/it/sala-stampa/comunicati-stampa/firmato-decreto-strasp arenza-strutture-accoglienza-dei-migranti.

15

INTERNAL GEOPOLITICS AND MIGRATION POLICIES IN ITALY

267

migrants in reception centres as well as in hotspots. In the same timeframe, the SPRAR centres in Lazio and Sicily have come to hold the highest number of migrants in their respective regional centres, followed by a wide margin by Calabria and Puglia. Overall, the reception system includes 40.5% of Italian municipalities, one-third of which is located in Lombardy (20.3%) and Piedmont (10.8%). In terms of regional involvement, Tuscany sits at the top of the list with 83% of all Tuscan municipalities hosting asylum seekers, followed by Emilia-Romagna with 78.1%, while Valle D’Aosta (20.3%), Abruzzo (19.3%) and Sardinia (17.8%) host fewer asylum seekers. Other relevant data to better comprehend the geography of migrant reception in Italy concern the demographics of the host municipalities. Of the total number of municipalities offering places for seekers of asylum and international protection (40.5%), those with fewer than 5000 inhabitants are the majority (50.2%, representing about 70% of the total Italian municipalities) while those with a higher number of residents (5001– 15,000 inhabitants) offer just over 3 places in 10 (30.7%). Finally, the distribution of places in various types of structures by municipal size is fairly unbalanced. A look at the most patent differences shows that SPRAR places prevail (20.8%, against 8.7% of CAS and 17.3% of CPAs) in the municipalities with more than 250,000 inhabitants. In communities with a population between 50,000 and 100,000, the number of CPA places is higher (21.3%) vs. 11.6% for SPRAR and 11.3% for CAS. In municipalities with a number of residents between 5000 and 15,000, the CPAs hold the highest number of places (28.5%) vs. 17.8% for SPRAR, and 21.3% for CAS. Finally, in smaller municipalities with fewer than 5000 inhabitants, the CPAs hold fewer places (15.5%) than SPRAR and CAS combined (23%). An important reminder here: the responsibility on migrants in Italy rests with the State, and more specifically with the Ministry of the Interior. On the Italian territory, the prefectures manage all parts of the process, from reception in the ports up to the distribution of the migrants in the various reception structures. The decision where to send the migrants after their registration, upon indication of the prefectures, rests with the Ministry of the Interior. However, local authorities in Italy have great political power and the Central Government hardly ever operates against their will. This implies constant negotiations between the Ministry, the prefectures, the regions and the municipalities.

268

G. BETTONI AND I. TAMPONI

SPRAR was an initiative which the municipalities began in collaboration with private local companies, however, 95% of this initiative is financed by the State. The State never interferes in the realisation of one of these projects. Even when the regions had few or no SPRAR projects, the impulse came from the National Association of Municipalities, not from the State. The Conte Administration, which appointed Lega leader Matteo Salvini as Minister of the Interior, has radically changed the situation. The SPRAR project changes its name to SIPROIMI (Protection system for holders of international protection and for unaccompanied minors). SPRAR was intended for people who had suffered trauma or unaccompanied Minors, but actually accepted, whenever possible, those who had applied for Refugee status, but had not yet received it. Now SIPROIMI applies only to those who have suffered violence or trauma, and to unaccompanied minors (in no other category) who must already have hold Refugee status. At the moment SIPROIMI is operating under a significant budget cut, which we will discuss later.

15.4

The Reception System in Italy

The Italian reception system was crafted by the Unified Conference of 10 July 2014, at which time the government, the regions and the local authorities reached an agreement for a first “National Plan to Face the Extraordinary Flow of non-EU Citizens, Adults, Families and Unaccompanied Foreign Minors”, which shortly after became Legislative Decree 142/2015. The foundation for that agreement was the willingness to abandon the emergency strategy adopted until then, and to reorganise and rationalise the system nationwide, in compliance with European directives, by reporting all actions related to the reception and hospitality of migrants to an orderly and programmable management. On the wake of the regulations by the European Agenda on Immigration, Legislative Decree 142/2015, incorporating the European directives 2013/32/EU and 2013/33/EU, continued the process of consolidation of the new reception strategy by drawing a system articulated in different phases. The system of migrant reception in Italy operates on several levels:

15

INTERNAL GEOPOLITICS AND MIGRATION POLICIES IN ITALY

269

• a preliminary relief phase, first assistance and identification,3 which takes place in government centres (hotspots 4 ) established in the areas most affected by migrant landings5 ; • a first-reception phase, which takes place in government centres set up by decree of the Ministry of the Interior, for the time necessary to carry out identification procedures, completion of asylum applications6 and examination of the migrant’s health; • a second reception phase where the so-called SPRAR (System of Protection for Asylum Seekers and Refugees) is implemented, which is prepared by the local authorities to guarantee a process of full, 360° integration for the migrant.

3 The large majority of incoming migrants is not in possession of identity documents, which is why, in the face of unverifiable declarations, fingerprints are the only unrevokable and individualising data. The data is then entered in the national Central Identification Office database, and in Eurodac, which is the European database for identity verification, which allows to crystallise the historical data of the passage of a migrant to a given place. 4 Hotspots are reception centres which house migrants upon their arrival in Italy. Here

migrants receive the first medical treatment, health screening, are identified and reported, and can apply for international protection. The maximum length of stay in these centres is approximately 48 hours. To date, there are four hotspots in Italy: Lampedusa (established 1 October 2015, 500 places), Pozzallo (established 19 January 2016, 300 places), Trapani (22 December 2015, 400 places) and Taranto (29 February 2016, 400 places). These centres are managed not only by the Italian government, but also by European agencies such as Frontex, EASO and Europol. 5 Article 17 of the Decree Law n. 13 of 17 February 2017 (converted with amendments into Law n. 46 of 13 April 2017) stipulates: “a foreign person who has been found due to irregular crossing of the internal or external border, or who has arrived onto the national territory as a result of sea rescue operations, is conducted to special crisis points [hotspots ] to receive first aid”. 6 In Italy, the right to asylum is guaranteed by Article 10, paragraph 3 of the Constitution: “Foreign persons who in their home country are prevented from the effective exercise of democratic freedoms guaranteed by the Italian Constitution have the right to asylum in the territory of the Republic, according to the conditions established by law”. Depending on individual cases, the foreign citizen who requests refugee status may be granted a residence permit for political asylum for a period of 5 years with the possibility of renewal, or a status of humanitarian protection. Specifically, refugees are foreign citizens who, due to the fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, or because they belong to a particular social group or political opinion, find themselves outside of the territory of their country of citizenship, and cannot or do not want to avail themselves of the protection of that country. Those foreign citizens who do not qualify for refugee status are eligible for humanitarian protection, if there are real and well-founded reasons to validate their request.

270

G. BETTONI AND I. TAMPONI

Asylum applicants are evaluated initially in the hotspots and CPSA (Centres of First Aid and Hospitality). Later they are transferred either to the firstreception centres (regional/interregional hubs) or to specific temporary structures already operating on the national territory, such as Reception Centres (CDA7 ) or Reception Centres for Asylum Seekers (CARA8 ), where they remain for the time necessary to identify a solution for their second reception phase. Each Italian region is required to have at least one hub with a capacity between 100 and 250 beds, until it gradually deletes the CARAs, but, with the exception of the city of Bologna, none of these structures have been activated. The placement of migrants in various hubs on the national territory is dependent on the recognition of their refugee status: those eligible to apply for a residence permit for political asylum are housed in “open hubs”, while migrants who are defined as illegal immigrants are moved to the so-called “closed” hubs. Open hubs (mainly located in the north of Italy) host migrants under international protection while they wait for their asylum application to go through. The closed hubs (located mostly in the south of Italy), on the other hand, host migrants waiting for repatriation. The adoption of standard operating procedures (SOP) is an essential step to combine these various phases and to clarify the different responsibilities of the agencies involved. In Italy, the Minister of the Interior chaired a working group composed by key players such as Italian authorities, European Commission, Frontex, Europol, EASO, UNHCR and IOM. This group drafted procedures which provided operational guidelines for hosting activities in hotspots and follow-up in their respective centres, and which were adopted officially on 17 May 2016. The right to accommodation is granted to asylum seekers who are also unable to provide for themselves during the time needed to determine eligibility for international protection; if an asylum seeker entered the SPRAR program, for an additional six-month period is available as well as 7 These Centres were established by Law n. 563/1995 “for housing while administrative measures were defined”. 8 These Centres were established by Presidential decree 303/2004, which merged into Legislative Decree 25/2008, pursuant to Article 20, paragraph 2 (abrogated by the current legislative decree 142/2015) to allow the identification of the migrant and housing during the period needed for status recognition.

15

INTERNAL GEOPOLITICS AND MIGRATION POLICIES IN ITALY

271

the possibility of an extension. The conditions of such accommodation, however, vary depending on the type of centre, the type of structure, the level of professionalism of the managing staff, the quality of services offered and the length of stay—all these factors inevitably influence the migrant’s path to social integration. The exclusion from the public assistance programs puts migrants at risk of serious marginalisation, forcing them to look for makeshift housing solutions, often in arduous living conditions. In most “improvised” settlements, government agencies apply no structured interventions, and first-response assistance is delegated to humanitarian organisations and volunteers. This absence of structured government action feeds an attitude of scepticism and distrust towards institutions, which worsens the tendency to ghettoization (ANCI 2017). Doctors without Borders research (MSF 2016) shows two types of makeshift settlement in Italy: open-air settlements such as parks and squares, subway and railway tracks, or wooded areas by migrants who have just entered Italy, and are waiting to begin asylum and reception procedures as required by the law abandoned buildings, shipping containers and slums for refugees who have been in Italy for several years, but who have never entered the reception system, or have left it without completing the path of social integration effectively. The openair settlement is inhabited mainly by migrants who have arrived to Italy either through the North-eastern border after having travelled the socalled “Western Balkans route”, and is located either near border towns such as Trieste, Gorizia and Udine up to Trento and Bolzano, or is a government centre of first reception, as in Foggia and Crotone. The latter type of makeshift settlement is present throughout the country, in metropolitan, urban and rural areas. The population of these settlements for the most part is in critical condition due to overcrowding, lack of water and sanitation, and waste disposal problems.

15.5

The SPRAR Project

Between the years 1999 and 2000, volunteer associations and nongovernmental organisations accomplished various degrees of reception, both networked and decentralised. Based on their experiences, in 2001 the Department for Civil Liberties and Immigration of the Ministry of the Interior, the National Association of Italian Municipalities (ANCI) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) signed

272

G. BETTONI AND I. TAMPONI

a Memorandum of Understanding to design a national asylum program. Moreover, this agreement generated the first public nationwide system for the reception of asylum seekers and refugees (SPRAR project, http:// www.sprar.it). With the law n. 189/2002, these measures of hospitality became purview of the Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR). Thanks to the same law, the Ministry of the Interior formed a coordination structure—a Central Agency for information, promotion, consulting, monitoring and providing technical support to local authorities—and entrusted its management to ANCI. In turn, ANCI implements all activities with the operational support of the Cittalia Foundation. The Central Agency plays also a role of coordination and counselling of special hospitality services, which serve migrants in the most vulnerable categories, such as unaccompanied minors, disabled people (even those temporarily disabled), individuals requiring home care including specialised and prolonged health care, the elderly and the victims of torture and violence. Furthermore, the Central Agency provides training to its employees. SPRAR is composed of a structural network of local authorities who, by accessing the National Fund for Asylum Policies and Services (FNPSA), perform integrated reception services for recipients of humanitarian relief and protection, refugees, unaccompanied foreign minors and migrants who apply for international protection. This network interacts and cooperates with numerous third-party agencies. This ensures that hospitality procedures go beyond the mere distribution of food and accommodation, and in fact provide complementary services for information, accompaniment, assistance and guidance by leading individual migrants to a path of socio-economic integration. The main features of SPRAR are: • A multilevel governance structure whereby the available resources and the institutions politically responsible for the reception and hospitality for migrants (such as the Ministry of the Interior and local authorities) are public; • The local authorities are voluntary participants in the hospitality network; • The actions of “integrated reception” are decentralised; • Third-party agencies perform an essential, collaborative role in conducting successful actions of migrant reception and hospitality;

15

INTERNAL GEOPOLITICS AND MIGRATION POLICIES IN ITALY

273

• The development and promotion of local networks, where all parties are involved in the successful reception, protection and integration of those who apply for, and those who hold international protection status. Over the years, SPRAR has expanded significantly as a result of the geopolitical situation of the Middle East and of the African continent, and of the migratory flows from these areas towards Italy and Europe. Additional funding either provided by the Ministry of the Interior, or made available through targeted projects (for example, the so-called “eight per thousand”) facilitated this expansion. In 2016, the National Fund for Asylum Politics and Services (FNPSA), which constitute the SPRAR structural network financed 652 projects (ANCI 2017, p. 137); 508 of these assignments targeted the reception of traditional international protection applicants, 99 benefited unaccompanied foreign minors, and 45 helped people with mental illness and/or physical disability. Overall, the projects financed by the FNPSA made available 26,012 places for migrants, of which 23,399 for individuals in the traditional categories, 2039 for the reception of unaccompanied foreign minors, and 574 for people with mental illness and/or physical disability. 555 local authorities administered these assignments, of which 491 Municipalities, 27 Provinces, 13 Municipal Alliances and 24 other bodies (Territorial and Social Areas, Inter-municipal Consortia, Healthcare Organisations and Highland Communities); around 1000 local authorities were involved in the SPRAR project. In addition to the beneficiaries of the 33,873 places funded by FNPSA, 467 additional beneficiaries were welcomed in places funded by the so-called Resettlement program, and 188 by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) program. In 2016, 47.3% of accepted migrants were requesting international protection9 [9] (compared to 58% in 2015), 28.3% held humanitarian protection status10 (19% in 2015), 14.8% held subsidiary protection

9 An international protection applicant for is a person who, in a state other than the one of origin, applies for the recognition of such protection. In Italy, this protection is granted by the Territorial Commissions for the Recognition of International Protection. 10 In the event that the Territorial Commission does not accept the request for international protection, yet considers that there may be serious humanitarian reasons, it shall

274

G. BETTONI AND I. TAMPONI

status11 and 9.6% obtained refugee status.12 These data show how the SPRAR network advanced the residence permits of its beneficiaries: if in 2015 the accepted migrants were mainly requesting international protection, in 2016 the majority thereof was granted some form of protection, or a permit for humanitarian reasons. These figures connect closely to the circular by Ministry of the Interior dated 5 May 2016; this circular generated the entry procedures into the CAS (Special Reception Centres), which were managed by the Prefectures belonging to the SPRAR network, and which approved the inclusion of those who had either obtained protection status, or had a residence permit for humanitarian reasons. As to different categories of services, and very much in line with the previous year, in 2016 health care (20.9%) was the most requested, followed by cultural mediation (17%). If we disaggregate the data by beneficiary status, over one-third of the services, particularly the most basic, first-phase services, was granted to asylum seekers (38% compared to 50% of 2015); 33.8% to humanitarian protection holders, 16.9% to migrants with subsidiary protection status, and 11.3% to refugees. ANCI and the Ministry of the Interior agreed to expand the nationwide reception system for asylum seekers, and international protection status. At the beginning of 2017, ANCI created and made available to local authorities a series of initiatives and specific tools to support SPRAR in a sustainable and effective manner. The decree by the Ministry of the Interior dated 10 August 2016 lists tools such as: the application tutorial, the “SPRAR Access Help Desk”, and the FAQ, and a hotline. The shared purpose of these tools is to orient the Municipalities in choosing their function within SPRAR, and to assist on topics of capital importance for the development and implementation of quality hospitality projects within SPRAR. Overall, these support services have proven very effective

transmit the request to the Police Commissioner for a possible residence permit for humanitarian protection (Article 5, paragraph 6 of Legislative Decree No. 286/1998). 11 Subsidiary protection is another form of international protection. Those who are granted this form of protection—even if they do not possess the requisites for the recognition of refugee status—are safeguarded because, if they return to their country of origin, they would face the risk of suffering serious harm. This definition is detailed by Article 2, lett. g) of Legislative Decree n. 251/2007. 12 Refugees hold international protection status, as established by Article 1° of the 1951 Geneva Convention, incorporated into Italian law by law n. 722 of 1954.

15

INTERNAL GEOPOLITICS AND MIGRATION POLICIES IN ITALY

275

in offering technical information and guiding local authorities on a series of issues related to the Protection System. The growth of SPRAR between 2001 and 2016 shows that the Central Government wanted a better system to receive and integrate asylum seekers, and a better management with Local Authorities, especially the Municipalities. This two-fold objective was achieved in two steps: • an increase in general reception but also in small-group projects in order to have a less visible and less invasive impact for the citizenship, therefore avoiding reception centres for hundreds or even thousands of people. • the decision as to where to send asylum seekers would rest with the Cittalia foundation, a direct offshoot of the National Association of Italian Municipalities, and not with the State. Cittalia would also manage various projects, approve them, and get them financed by the Ministry of the Interior. In practice, everything appeared to be will of the different municipalities, and of various public and private local actors; this way the State would impose nothing and would defuse conflict. The reception system for unaccompanied foreign minors and The National Plan for the Integration of International Protection Status. Over 28,000 minors—28,223 to be exact-landed on the Italian coast in 2016 (15.6% overall), more than 10.7% compared to the previous year. Almost all came to Italy alone (25,846 or 92%), and the remainder in the company of at least one adult. The impact of such a large flow of unaccompanied foreign minors (MSNAs) on local welfare systems has been so forceful that it has threatened to break the bank of some southern Italian municipalities. The reception system of MSNAs is regulated by the “National Plan to face the extraordinary flow of non-EU citizens, adults, families and unaccompanied foreign minors” as defined at the Unified Conference of July 2014. Legislative Decree 142/2015 and, more recently, Law 47/2017 prescribed the implementation of the National Plan. As ratified, the Plan reiterates the need to assign the MSNAs to a governance system, and to entrust responsibilities to the Ministry of the Interior, including the increase in placement and capacity in the SPRAR program.

276

G. BETTONI AND I. TAMPONI

Furthermore, Law n. 190/2014 stipulated that “in order to better manage and allocate spending, beginning 1 January 2015, the resources of the Fund are transferred for the same purposes in a Fund for the reception of unaccompanied minors, established in the estimates of the Ministry of the Interior in paragraph 181”. With this Fund, the Ministry of the Interior distributes a quarterly contribution of 45 euros maximum per capita to the Municipalities, which sent their request through the respective Prefectures. The National Plan for the reception of the MSNAs consists of two phases: First level of reception with activation of highly specialised government structures geared towards identification; Second level of reception, adequately strengthened and financed, of all unaccompanied foreign minors within SPRAR, even non-asylum seekers. Later, Legislative Decree n. 142 of 2015, as well as with the new Law n. 47 of 7 April 2017 ratified the protection plan called “Provisions on protection measures for unaccompanied foreign minors”. This legislation, as an agreement between the Ministry of the Interior and the local authority where the structure is located, provides that MSNA-specific, first-rate government facilities for the time strictly necessary (thirty days or fewer) be activated, and that an identification process be completed within ten days, including an assessment of biological age. After this first aid phase, unaccompanied minors are accepted within the SPRAR in programs purposely crafted for this vulnerable category, which take into account the needs and characteristics of the child within the limits of the resources of the National Fund for asylum services and policies. In 2016 unaccompanied foreign minors who applied for international protection were 5930 (5% overall, about 20% of the minors who touched Italian soil). The majority comes from the African continent (88.4%), is male (95.1%) and falls in the 14–17 age group (99%). The number of asylum applications presented by MSNAs was 1383. In most cases humanitarian protection was granted (65.7%, fewer when compared to 81.2% in 2015). Other protection options are limited for MSNAs: 4.8% of requests were granted refugee status, and 2.4%. subsidiary protection Denials increased significantly, from 8.2% in 2015 to 24.4% in 2016. In the first half of 2017, however, the outcomes of asylum applications amounted to 3.149; of these, the majority (69.15%) was granted humanitarian protection, 4.9% refugee status and 3.8% subsidiary protection, while the denials were 20.4%.

15

INTERNAL GEOPOLITICS AND MIGRATION POLICIES IN ITALY

277

On September 26, 2017 the Ministry of the Interior presented the first “National Plan for the Integration of International Protection Status”, shared within the National Coordination Roundtable instituted within the Department for Civil Liberties and Immigration at the Ministry of the Interior. Numerous representatives attended this event according to a multilevel governance model. The objective of this plan is to provide the entire system with specific guidelines for integration: “a complex process which starts from the first phase of reception and leads towards individual autonomy. A successful integration of the migrants requires that the residents of the reception areas are informed and prepared; the integration must conform to the local context, and fit within the existing welfare system. Those who experience greater vulnerability, such as refugee women, victims of human trafficking and unaccompanied foreign minors, must be treated with greater care.”13 Article 4-bis of the Italian Constitution provides for the signing of an integration agreement, which formulates a true pact between the State and the foreign citizen, who then mutually recognise the fulfilment of rights and duties. This rule aims “to integrate the process geared towards promoting the coexistence of Italian and foreign citizens, and respecting the values found by the Italian Constitution, with the mutual commitment to participate in the economic, social and cultural life of Italian society”. We find the same principle in the “Statement of values of citizenship and integration” of the Ministry of the Interior, which emphasises the importance of respect for values and duties: “Italy pledges that all persons, from their first moment on the Italian territory, can enjoy fundamental rights, without distinction of sex, ethnicity, religion, social status. At the same time, every person who lives in Italy must respect the values at the foundation of our society, the rights of others, the duties of solidarity required by law. This responds to a unified concept of citizenship and coexistence between the different national, ethnic and religious communities. The mission of integration relies on equality of rights and duties for citizens and immigrants, and aspires to reconcile the observance of positive and legitimate cultural and social differences with the respect for shared values. We must better identify the expectations of immigrants so 13 Ministry of the Interior (2017, October), Piano nazionale d’integrazione per i titolari di protezione internazionale, p. 11.

278

G. BETTONI AND I. TAMPONI

we can define their rights, indicate the values and duties that everyone must follow for the realisation of the overall integration project, and facilitate the harmonious coexistence of the migrant community and religious groups in Italian society, in compliance with the Constitution and the laws of the Republic”. At the national and local level, duties for immigration are divided among several administrations: • The Ministry of the Interior is directly responsible for the verification and issuance of residence permits in Italy; it combats illegal immigration; it also provides guidance services to newly admitted citizens. It manages the first-reception services of asylum seekers, the international protection system, unaccompanied foreign minors, and the European Fund for Asylum, Migration and Integration (FAMI). The Ministry also participates in the planning of job opportunities, and coordinates the Local Councils for immigration in an effort to connect central and local governments through the Prefectures. • The Ministry of Labour and Social Policies, in collaboration with the regional administrations and local authorities, distributes duties in the field of social and labour integration policies for migrant people, policies to protect unaccompanied foreign minors present on the Italian territory, and plans the annual flow of foreign citizens entering Italy for employment, alongside other pertinent agencies. • The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation is in charge of issuing visas, family reunifications and of evaluating the education and schooling of incoming immigrants. • The Ministry of Justice deals with the appeals system for cases where international protection status has been denied, and manages interventions in favour of minors who have entered the criminal justice system through the Department of Juvenile Justice. • The Ministry of Education, University and Research, together with the National Observatory for the integration of foreign students and for Inter-culture, promotes school policies in favour of the integration of incoming migrant pupils. • The Ministry of Health promotes access to health care to foreign citizens, and promotes social inclusion. • The Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Forestry deals with the integration of immigrants in the agricultural sector through training, orientation and job placement.

15

INTERNAL GEOPOLITICS AND MIGRATION POLICIES IN ITALY

279

• The National Anti-Discrimination Office (UNAR) promotes initiatives to prevent and stop discrimination, xenophobia and racism. Regions and local authorities, after the reform of Title V of the Constitution (2001), acquired an important role in the management and planning of interventions for the inclusion of immigrant citizens. Generally speaking, the Italian regions plan, address, coordinate and evaluate policies, and financial allocations for their full fruition; moreover, they play a key role in the definition of welfare policies, and access to social rights. The most recent regional regulations position the Municipalities at the core of the functions related to immigration matters. Local governments, in fact, are no longer terminals of regional policies, but real actors in their elaboration and implementation, particularly in terms of welfare mediations. The duties of regions and local authorities range from health care, education, social integration and teaching Italian to enhancing the culture of origin, cultural mediation, access to housing, training and job placement. Moreover, third-party organisations, which safeguard the protection and promotion of migrants’ rights, are a nationwide issue. Some found some coordination and shared purpose in the Asylum Roundtable, the only official instrument of participation of the private sector at the institutional level, thanks to its inclusion in the National Coordination Roundtable. These are very different organisations by type and size, for example: local or national associations dealing with immigration and the right to asylum; large religious and non-religious associative networks; national and international associations of coordinating networks. These organisations are very important for the integration of foreigners for various reasons: for example, they handle information and foster awareness among Italians on the right to asylum and motives of migratory flows; they manage local and national reception, assistance and guidance, as well as protection and promotion of migrant rights; finally, they lobby and influence public administrations, local, regional and national governments to make choices and foster programs which benefit migrants in the community. The programmatic priorities of the National Integration Plan are:

280

G. BETTONI AND I. TAMPONI

• Supporting interreligious dialogue to combat racism and the risk of Islamophobia; • Language training, making it compulsory to take the language courses held in the various reception system structures; • Access to education, and recognition of previous education and schooling by standardising procedures and alternative assessment methods; • Supporting tools for job placement and training, in particular creating a training program based on common-core education standards, which facilitates entry into the job market; • Access to health care by strengthening the organisation and delivery of services; • Access to housing and residence, so that migrants with international protection status can exit the reception system; • Encouraging family reunification by implementing regulatory changes to increase the number of valid permits; • Information on individual rights and obligations, and orientation to services available on the territory; • Preventing and combating discrimination; • Implementing processes of participation and active citizenship by fostering the participation in voluntary activities and socialisation initiatives; • Strengthening institutional communication at the various levels of government. The National Integration Plan receives the majority of its funding from the European Union through the Migration and Integration Asylum Fund, the European Social Fund, the Fund for Regional Development and from Emergency Measures; disbursement happens in a complementary fashion to avoid excess spending and overlap. Some local authorities contribute financially to Integration Plan activities in their district as well. In order to give continuity to the work by the National Integration Plan, the Italian government founded the Integration Roundtable, which implements various programs, and monitors their effectiveness. Regional organisations support the Integration Roundtable to strengthen the migrant integration system and the dialogue between various institutional offices, as well as between the centre and the periphery, including various national, regional and municipal departments, and third-party collaborators.

15

INTERNAL GEOPOLITICS AND MIGRATION POLICIES IN ITALY

281

Up to the Gentiloni administration, the role of associations and NGOs was one of reception process in addition to SPRAR. The Conte administration has actively hindered associations who work to integrate migrants. In many cases, communications by the Ministry of the Interior led by Salvini have spoken of “exploiters” or real “traffickers”. This crucial change in policy comports real economic punishment. This strategy has only one explanation: to make the integration of asylum seekers as difficult as possible.

15.6

Conclusions

The management of migrants and particularly of asylum seekers in Italy, as we have seen, is complicated for several reasons. Italy is a country that was unaccustomed to major incoming migratory flows when it suddenly found itself swept by large numbers of migrant arrivals. Moreover, its institutional structure is very complex and imperfect. The Constitutional Reform of 2001, which assigned the regions a greater administrative role than ever before, has fostered antagonism and serious hardship in how responsibilities are distributed and decisions made. Immigration, after the most recent elections of 4 March 2018, has become the government’s main issue, despite the evident decrease in arrivals. Due to this decrease, the Italian government considered cancelling the SPRAR program, which, as we have seen, has consistently been the most successful in the integration of refugees, much more so than the traditional interventions by the Central Government through the Minister of the Interior. By now SPRAR has been replaced by SIPROIMI, as we described above. Ultimately, this is part of a very clear and dangerous strategy by the Conte Administration, which aims to reduce drastically costs related to the reception of migrants, and precisely to interfere with access to SIPROIMI. In fact, the government has decided to change emergency reception locations, such as first-reception centres, into a longterm system even though they are not made for stays longer than six months; this change creates tensions within the first-reception centres. More importantly, with the so-called Salvini law (decree-law of 4 October 2018, n. 113) all migrants who are not in possession of regular status will have to be “refouled” though not repatriated, which is impossible both for a matter of international law and for a logistical question, but simply removed from the reception facilities. In practice, this law will send people with no immigration status into the streets of Italian Municipalities. The

282

G. BETTONI AND I. TAMPONI

savings that may be gained from the budget cuts to the reception system will in fact be spent on the hardship imposed on the Italian municipalities who will have to cover social expenditures to manage these migrants. In any case, neither the closure of ports nor the refoulement of migrant ships back to the shores of Libya have modified the joint public commitment in terms of migrant reception by the Italian government and the local authorities. On the other hand, various regional and local politicians and representatives are reacting in different ways to Minister Salvini’s attitude. Their reaction demonstrates the peculiarity of Italian institutions (Bettoni 2016), which is due to a stubborn resentment between the different levels of government. For example, representatives of the Lazio Regional Council from both centrist and opposition wings have written a manifesto called “Inclusion for an open society”. This document calls attention to how immigration, while financed by the Central Government, is primarily a matter managed by local authorities, and yet the Central Government wishes to represent it as a matter exclusively under its own control. All this makes immigration in Italy a classic case of disparity between a legislator’s political project and its portrayal and communication in the media. In conclusion, since 2016, Italy has therefore paid a heavy price due to two main factors: (1) its closeness to Libya: the Mediterranean crisis linked to the destabilisation of North Africa after the Arab springs made Libya the main hub for migrants from Africa and Asia headed to Europe through Italy. (2) The Dublin regulation turned out to be a failure, since migrant entries do not happen uniformly in all countries, and, according to several scholars, it puts some EU member states under extreme pressure while others are involved only marginally (Giordano 2015), which truly undermines the very foundations of the European Union. Under media pressure and as a consequence of these factors, the Italian government has gone from an attempt to manage and integrate asylum seekers (administrations by Renzi and especially Gentiloni) to a strategy of criminalising immigration and setting up obstacles not only to the arrival but also to the integration of those migrants who manage to land in Italy.

15

INTERNAL GEOPOLITICS AND MIGRATION POLICIES IN ITALY

283

References ANCI. (2017). Rapporto sulla protezione internazionale in Italia (p. 27). Roma. Bettoni, G. (2016). Constitutional Reform and Territorial Organisation in Italy. In J. Ruano & M. Profiroiu (Eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Decentralisation in Europe. Cham: Springer International Publishing. Giordano, A. (2015). Financial Crisis and Migration in Europe. Between Territorial Impacts and Sustainability of the Policies. In M. G. Lucia & L. S. Rizzo (Eds.), A Geographical Approach to the European Financial Crisis (pp. 33–42). Roma: Aracne Editrice. Giordano, A. (2018). La frontiera Mediterranea tra mobilità umana e (in)sostenibilità del sistema confinario europeo. In M. G. Lucia, S. Duglio, & P. Lazzarini (Eds.), Verso un’economia della sostenibilità: lo scenario e le sfide. Roma: Franco Aneli. MSF (Medici Senza Frontiere). (2016). Fuori Campo, Richiedenti asilo e rifugiati in Italia: insediamenti informali e marginalità sociale.

CHAPTER 16

Public Opinion on Migration and the Role of the Media in the Context of the “European Refugee Crisis”

Saara Koikkalainen, Niko Pyrhönen, and Östen Wahlbeck

16.1

Introduction

In the year 2015, the European media, politicians and the public experienced a “European refugee crisis” as the rise in the numbers of migrants and asylum seekers arriving via the Mediterranean peaked at more than one million. The “crisis” was a continuation of a long-term development, but at that time many different groups of people found themselves in Turkey, from where they continued towards Europe in a seemingly

S. Koikkalainen (B) University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu, Finland e-mail: [email protected] N. Pyrhönen · Ö. Wahlbeck Swedish School of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland e-mail: [email protected] Ö. Wahlbeck e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 J. Franzke and J. M. Ruano de la Fuente (eds.), Local Integration of Migrants Policy, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50979-8_16

285

286

S. KOIKKALAINEN ET AL.

“homogeneous flow of refugees” (Crawley et al. 2016). Triandafyllidou (2018, p. 200) sees the situation as one with multiple “crises”: not only was there an unprecedented volume and pace of refugee and migrant arrivals to Europe and the reactions to this by the EU and its different member states, but also a positive crisis of solidarity and a dramatic rise in “asylum panic”. In terms of numbers, the increasing amounts of people arriving in Europe across the Mediterranean had already been alarming for a number of years, but the situation only became a “crisis” once the issue became politicised and mediatized in the destination countries (Colombo 2018). In the aftermath of the situation, the question of managing the flows of asylum seekers and integrating those granted with permission to stay, has become an important policy issue at all levels of governance in Europe (e.g. Glorius 2018). The crisis coincided with a rise of populist politics in many EU member states (e.g. Boswell 2019) and highlighted the policy discrepancies among the member states, which were tempted to try to direct the new arrivals elsewhere, rather than negotiating a joint European approach towards the reception and fair distribution of asylum seekers in the EU. As Crawley and Skleparis (2018) note, during the crisis the different categories into which the individuals arriving in Europe were put became deeply politicised as the image of the “deserving refugee” (fleeing the Syrian war) was contrasted with that of the “opportunistic economic migrant” (taking advantage of the situation to get to Europe) (see also Holmes and Castañeda 2016). Even though the “crisis” can be characterised as unprecedented and historical, humanitarian migration is not the only current migration phenomenon in Europe. The map of European migration (King 2002) nowadays comprises a diverse mix of different patterns, some of which are formed through recent political and economic events, while others are the product of older migration trends. Important intra-European migration streams include East-West migration from the “new” to the “old” EU member states and migration between certain neighbouring countries within the EU. In addition to asylum and irregular migration, there is also labour migration towards the EU from outside the continent (e.g. from China) and from other European countries, such as Albania and Ukraine, for example (King and Okólski 2019). According to Eurostat (2019), there were 21.6 million citizens of non-EU countries living within the EU in 2017. In addition, there were 19.6 million intraEuropean migrants with the citizenship of another EU member state.

16

PUBLIC OPINION ON MIGRATION AND THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA …

287

In absolute terms, the largest numbers of non-nationals were found in Germany (9.2 million persons, top nationalities Turkey, Poland, Syria), the United Kingdom (6.1 million, Poland, India, Ireland), Italy (5.0 million, Romania, Albania, Morocco), France (4.6 million, according to separate Census data from 2011 [Eurostat 2014] mainly from Portugal, Algeria, Morocco) and Spain (4.4 million, Romania, Morocco, United Kingdom) (Eurostat 2019). Even though the realities of population movements across national borders in Europe are much more diverse than merely the arrival of asylum seekers from refugee-sending countries, often this image dominates public discussions and media stories and has a major impact on the public view on migration. Several studies have shown that the public tends to overestimate the number of migrants, leading to more restrictive preferences on migration policy (Sides and Citrin 2007; Consterdine 2018). Some groups of de facto migrants, such as intra-European or highly skilled migrants, may not even necessarily be perceived as “migrants” at all. The context that frames immigration concerns leads the public to associate different types of immigrants with different threats (e.g. Hellwig and Sinno 2017). For example, migrants who are perceived as people in need of protection are far more welcome than migrants who are perceived as economic migrants (e.g. Blinder 2015). Blinder (2015) argues that public opinion on immigration and immigrants tend to measure attitudes to what he has called “imagined immigration”, which is related to, but distinct from what actual immigration to a particular country is really like. He concludes that the public’s attitudes are influenced by what the public imagines the dominant type of migration to be and whether they perceive such migrants to pose a burden or an opportunity for their country (see also Consterdine 2018, p. 8). The “European refugee crisis”, and the heated media debates surrounding the situation, highlighted the importance of understanding the relationship between public attitudes and media narratives related to migration in different European countries. Research indicates that there is considerable variation in how migration and its consequences are perceived, both depending on the social context, the period, the type of migration and the type of immigrants. Opinion polls like the Eurobarometer and the European Social Survey (ESS) have found significant differences among European countries concerning public opinion towards migration and the trajectories along which public opinion develops over time. In addition, significant differences also exist between regions and

288

S. KOIKKALAINEN ET AL.

cities. The concentration of the foreign-born population in capital regions and metropolitan areas is a global trend (OECD 2018, p. 46). In Europe, this is visible especially in the United Kingdom and Belgium, where the regional disparities in the distribution of migrants are the greatest. Whereas foreign-born residents represent only around 5% of the population in North East England, their share is around 40% in the Greater London area. In Belgium, the lowest share of foreign-born (~5%) is found from West Flanders, while in Brussels the share is nearly 45% of the population (OECD 2018, p. 47). This chapter focuses on the relationship between public opinion on migration and its media coverage. We present state-of-the-art research findings on this topic and discuss this complex relationship in the context of the 2015 “refugee crisis”. While the extent to which integration efforts have been successful in each country may also play a role in how migration as a phenomenon is understood, it is beyond the scope of this article to assess that. Based on recent research and studies based on, for example the ESS data, we first present insights concerning public opinion on migration and then highlight the role of media in responding to the “crisis”. Because the latest ESS opinion poll was conducted in 2014 (Wave 7), we will also use data from the Eurobarometer to trace possible changes in public attitudes in response to the crisis and its mediatization, with a particular focus on a selection of European countries that were impacted by the situation in different ways.

16.2

Insights on Public Opinion on Migration

Generally, research shows that public opinions on migration depend on how migration and its consequences are understood and perceived. The extensive literature on public attitudes and immigration has focused on different explanatory models and premises, including individual characteristics, cultural factors and the impact of media and politics. This research can be divided, broadly speaking, into two bodies that sometimes produce contradictory results. One emphasises rational and economic explanations, and the other underlines the importance of social identity and culture (Consterdine 2018, p. 6). At the individual level, it has been found that greater social distance from immigrants increases opposition to immigration, as do also the greater perceived size of the immigrant population and symbolic or economic threat that the individual attributes to immigrants. Other known factors that increase racism and prejudice

16

PUBLIC OPINION ON MIGRATION AND THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA …

289

towards immigrants are the feeling of deprivation of one’s own group in comparison with immigrants and having strong nationalist sentiments and conservative attitudes (Heath et al. 2020, p. 478). A connection between attitudes on migration and different contextual variables has also been found. For example, in periods of economic recession attitudes towards immigration tend to be more negative compared to periods when there is a larger need for labour (e.g. Kessler and Freeman 2005; Kuntz et al. 2017). Furthermore, attitudes to immigration also depend on the social and economic characteristics of the respondents. Surveys tend to find support for the so-called contact hypothesis (Allport 1954), according to which higher levels of education and social contacts with immigrants correlate with a positive attitude towards immigration (e.g. Kessler and Freeman 2005; Markaki and Longhi 2013). Birgit Glorius (2018) examined the development of public opinion towards asylum seekers, refugee integration, and burden sharing in a number of European countries, i.e. Germany, Finland (significant reception countries), Italy, Greece, Spain (entry gate countries), Hungary and Bulgaria (new EU member countries) and Turkey (gateway country to EU). Her analysis was largely based on the cross-national European Social Survey (ESS) and the Eurobarometer (Glorius 2018, p. 6). She identified certain country clusters that are related to politicisation patterns and evaluated whether the attitudes towards refugees and their reception are linked to parallel changes in other topics. Glorius (2018) finds that the framing of immigration, especially asylum migration, varies between countries and respondents and concludes that perception on migration varies in relation to individual factors, such as education level, age and wealth. Yet there is also variation at the societal level which is related to the level of diversity and the economic and political stability of a given country as well as low levels of interpersonal and institutional trust (Glorius 2018, pp. 10–11). Based on a survey of 18.000 eligible voters in 15 European countries, Bansak et al. (2016) examined public attitudes towards asylum seekers. They conclude that across the surveyed countries and irrespective of respondent age, education level, income or political ideology, those asylum seekers who are perceived to have higher employability, have more consistent asylum testimonies and severe vulnerabilities, and are Christian, receive the greatest public support. They note that asylum seekers are thus evaluated based on their potential economic contributions and humanitarian concerns about the deservingness of their claims and that there is

290

S. KOIKKALAINEN ET AL.

also an anti-Muslim bias. Based on the same data, Bansak et al. (2017) further note that while only a minority in each country is willing to accept more asylum seekers to one’s own country, a majority is in favour of a European level system, where the asylum seekers would be proportionally allocated to EU member states. These results suggest that citizens do care about the fairness of the responsibility-sharing mechanism, rather than only focus on the consequences of such European agreements on national asylum policies. In their review study, Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) covered approximately 100 studies related to immigration attitudes from more than two dozen countries and spanning over 20 years. According to their analysis of this accumulated knowledge on the topic, attitudes on immigration are mostly driven by “symbolic concerns about the nation as a whole”, rather than self-interest in the form of calculations on the impact of immigration on one’s own economic situation (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014, p. 227). Based on this evidence, it is clear that the connection between public opinion and various socio-economic factors and variables is not direct. Moreover, it is important to note that the cumulative evidence does not pertain to public opinion on actual migration. Rather, the key issue in public opinion studies is the perception of migration. For example, analysis of opinion polls in the context of the “European refugee crisis” showed that a change in public opinions did not happen as a direct consequence of an increase in the number of arrivals. In fact, many of the countries with the most negative opinions received relatively few migrants (cf. Consterdine 2018; Glorius 2018). Opinion polls like the ESS show surprisingly large cross-country differences in the levels of anti-migrant attitudes in European countries. The level of support of migration was included in the ESS questions in 2002 and 2014 when the respondents were asked to evaluate whether their country turns into a better or a worse place as a result of migration. Even though migration increased in a number of countries since 2002, the perceptions did not change significantly and tended to mostly change towards a slightly more positive perception. However, there is a split largely between northern and western Europe on the one hand and southern and eastern Europe on the other hand, with more negative views in the latter. As for the reasons of these perceptions, the intensity of contact to migrants as well as the economic situation of the country is usually noted by the respondents in the ESS (ESS 2016; Messing and Ságvári 2018). These differences

16

PUBLIC OPINION ON MIGRATION AND THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA …

291

in public opinion among the member states of the EU clearly constitute a challenge for the attempts to develop common EU policies on migration. However, there are also indications that there is a possibility to overcome these differences at the European level. As already mentioned, research has found that a majority support a fair system of responsibility-sharing concerning asylum seekers (Bansak et al. 2017). The Eurobarometer polls, described later in this chapter, also show that there exists relatively steady support for common European migration policies. The ESS results in 2014 also show that public attitudes towards immigration vary with respect to the subjective perception of migrants’ characteristics. Results show a clear hierarchy of acceptance regarding the ethnicity and economic/cultural background of migrants. People who are perceived to be “from the same race or ethnic group” are preferred most, while people from poorer countries outside Europe are generally found to be less welcome (ESS 2016). It has also been shown that group relative deprivation, the feeling that one’s group is unfairly deprived in comparison to relevant out-groups (such as migrants), is linked to a perceived threat of immigration both at the individual and country levels (Meuleman et al. 2020). Further, an analysis of the willingness of the ESS2014 respondents to accept culturally distinct groups of migrants to their communities reveals three classes of individual attitudes: restrictive, selective and open. The proportions of individuals belonging to these classes vary across European countries, so the local context does matter significantly (Heath and Richards 2020). Researchers who have analysed the cross-country differences in the ESS have argued that the general “social health” of a society translates into a feeling of safety and stability, which allows acceptance of and solidarity with migrants (Messing and Ságvári 2018, p. 24). Conversely, migrants may also serve as a target to express all kinds of fears regarding one’s own livelihood. Thus, the (real or perceived) effects of immigration such as a competition for social services or resources in times of neoliberalisation may cause xenophobic reactions to migrants (Glorius 2018, pp. 9–10, see also Meuleman et al. 2020). There is also evidence in the ESS of an increased polarisation within societies comparing the results of 2002 and 2014. Particularly striking is the fact that an increased proportion of European publics felt that no migrants should be allowed to come from poorer countries outside Europe, while at the same time there was also an increase in the proportion of those

292

S. KOIKKALAINEN ET AL.

who felt that many such migrants should be allowed entry (ESS 2016). The increase in polarisation was most pronounced in many Western European countries that experienced large increases in migration since 2002, such as Austria, Finland, Spain, Sweden, and the UK, but also some Eastern European countries with rather low immigration levels (Poland, Slovenia). Furthermore, the age and education of the respondents played a key role: the older and low educated displayed the most critical views towards immigration, while the younger and highly educated were more favourable to immigration (ESS 2016, see also Heath and Richards 2020; Duffy 2014). As these results from opinion polls suggest, opinions are shaped by how migration is perceived. These opinions may change over time and are not necessarily connected to actual changes in the number of migrants living in or arriving in one’s country. The perception of immigration is related to how the political issues and public debates on migration are framed, and research indicates that this framing varies considerably between different countries (e.g. Freeman et al. 2013). Based on an analysis of the ESS data, Heath and colleagues (2020, p. 479) conclude that there are “([…] several different sorts of European publics, depending on each country’s history of immigration and emigration, as well as on the nature of the integration policies which governments have pursued, the normative signals which these provide, the political context and the strength of far-right parties”. Finally, in her analysis of the state-of-the-art research on public attitudes, media and political discourse towards asylum seekers and refugees, Consterdine (2018, p. 7) concludes that there are a number of issues of which there is a relative consensus within this heterogeneous research field. First, the perception of migrants and the overestimation of migrant stocks and flows, including the speed of ethnic change resulting from incoming migrants, determine individual attitudes towards immigration. Second, there is evidence to support contact theory: there is a positive correlation between immigrant contact and permissiveness towards immigration. Thirdly, there is an overwhelming consensus that the level of education attainment shapes attitudes towards immigration, i.e. those with higher education tend to see this phenomenon more favourably. Fourthly, even though many public opinion surveys do not differentiate between migrant types or origin countries, there is evidence to show that public attitudes are differentiated depending on the type of migrant both in terms of ethnicity and nationality as well as the reason of migration.

16

PUBLIC OPINION ON MIGRATION AND THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA …

293

16.3 Media Reports on the “European Refugee Crisis” In the context of the “European refugee crisis”, it has been pointed out that the discourse changed over time from an initial humanitarian and emphatic framing towards a hostile or suspicious framing (Consterdine 2018; European Commission 2017). This change is also found in local media reports, although research has found a large regional and country variation in the media coverage of the crisis in 2015 (Berry et al. 2015; Georgiou and Zaborowski 2017; Triandafyllidou 2018). Triandafyllidou (2018) has outlined how the “crisis” developed through specific events that were widely reported in media. The pattern of mediatization and politicisation of the “crisis” was highly ideologically charged, and the labelling of the developments as a “crisis” was itself part of this ideological pattern (Krzyzanowski ˙ et al. 2018). Analysis of media narratives on both sides of the Mediterranean found that the tone of narration across countries shifted over time from emphatic solidarity and goodwill to migrants fleeing war zones towards negative stereotyping with a focus on threat, terrorism and crime (European Commission 2017). In an overview of the literature on the role of the media, Consterdine (2018, pp. 13–14) finds “that the media’s framing of the refugee crisis – often through securitisation or threat themes – is highly significant in forming public attitudes including inducing a sense of panic”. There are a number of interesting studies that highlight the role of the media and focus on the complex relationship between migration and public opinion in different European countries. For example, Georgiou and Zaborowski (2017) conducted a cross-national study, which analysed major newspapers in eight European countries, and included also two major Arabic-language newspapers. Their report, which was prepared for the Council of Europe, argues that the European press played a “central role in framing refugee arrivals in 2015 as a crisis for Europe—new arrivals were seen as outsiders and different from Europeans” (Georgiou and Zaborowski 2017, p. 3). Secondly, the authors found significant differences among countries, especially between the west and the east of Europe, and between media in receiving and non-receiving countries. There was also a change over time, with sympathetic and empathetic frames in the early stages of the crisis gradually being replaced with suspicion and even hostility. Furthermore, the study found that refugees and migrants had limited agency and no voice in the press, and the media paid

294

S. KOIKKALAINEN ET AL.

little attention to the context of the refugee plight, for example, or on the situation in the refugee’s countries of origin. The UNHCR commissioned a report on media coverage in Spain, Italy, Germany, the UK and Sweden already at an early stage of the crisis (Berry et al. 2015). The initial observation was that the term “refugee” was used far more frequently in Germany and Sweden, while the other countries predominantly discussed the crisis in terms of arrival of “migrants”. There was also a wide difference in the themes covered by the media reports in different countries. For example, the study found that humanitarian themes were more common in the Italian press than in the British, German or Spanish press. The Swedish press was the most positive towards refugees, in contrast to the studied British media, which was found to be the most negative and polarised (Berry et al. 2015, p. 1). Corbu et al. (2017) analysed Romanian online news articles during the crisis with 21 keywords. They demonstrate that online media mainly referred to the crisis in terms of accountability, and more specifically firstly responsibility and secondly conflict. Greussing and Boomgaarden (2017) used computer-assisted analysis to identify the dominant frames of the 2015 crisis in six Austrian newspapers. Their finding was that in addition to the focus on the administrative aspects of coping with the arrivals, the established narratives of security threat and economisation were the most prominent, while less attention was paid on humanitarianism frames or providing background information on the refugees’ situation. During the most intense phases of the crisis, the framing patterns of tabloid and quality media became highly similar, thus confirming the predominance of stereotyped interpretations of refugee and asylum issues in both media types (Greussing and Boomgaarden 2017). Even though the link between media and public opinion is a complex and multifaceted one, there is clear evidence in the literature that when the media portrays migrants as a security threat or a problem, it fosters negative public attitudes towards immigrants. News media and social media are natural sources of information about migration and migrants for many people, who do not necessarily encounter migrants in their everyday lives. Stories, images, narratives and media coverage provides raw materials from which people generate their own ideas and thoughts about who immigrants are and what they do (Allen et al. 2019, p. 51). Thus, the media has the power to correct or reinforce individual misperceptions and stereotypes about migrants and refugees (Ruhs et al. 2019, p. 6). Journalists and newspapers can, therefore, influence the public by producing

16

PUBLIC OPINION ON MIGRATION AND THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA …

295

their own discourses or reshaping the existing ones on a given topic. For example, the use of metaphors linked with water, an elemental force that is difficult to contain, or portraying migrants as of an out-of-control mass or potential invaders, generates a negative frame and a threatening context for the topic of migration (Baker and McEnery 2005). The media presentations of the “crisis” changed over time and varied across European countries that all had different geopolitical situations, ongoing societal debates, economic challenges, asylum policies, as well as distinct histories as countries receiving migrants and refugees from abroad. Under conditions such as those present during the “refugee crisis”, the politization of a topic like migration is time and space specific, and hence there are differences in how the politicians, media and the public reacted to the situation in the various EU member states (Consterdine 2018, p. 4). The following section will utilise data from the Eurobarometer polls to outline some examples of these differences.

16.4

Data on Public Opinion: The Eurobarometer

In this chapter, the Eurobarometer is used as the key indicator of public opinion on migration in Europe. It is an opinion poll coordinated by the European Commission, which has been conducted in EU member states since the 1970s. The opinion poll is based on standardised interviews that largely focus on opinions towards European institutions and EU policies. The interviews are conducted two times a year, each time with a new sample. The Eurobarometer has in recent years included questions that ask about feelings for immigration and the measures that should be taken in relation to immigration, which makes it possible to use the Eurobarometer data to reflect changes in public opinion during the refugee crisis of 2015. Thus, we now highlight a number of findings from the Eurobarometer covering this period (11/2014–3/2018). Regardless of the year of the study, a clear result of the Eurobarometer is that the respondents have a more positive feeling about intra-EU migration among the member states, than immigration into the EU from third countries (cf. Kessler and Freeman 2005). On average, the positive response for intra-EU migration has also increased from 2015 to 2017. While about two thirds of the respondents in EU member states are positive about immigration within the EU, only one third is equally positive about immigration from outside the EU (cf. Glorius 2018).

296

S. KOIKKALAINEN ET AL.

The Eurobarometer (11/2014–3/2018) has also included questions related to migration policies, whether one’s country should help refugees, one’s perception on irregular migration to the EU, and an assessment of European policy developments on migration. Regarding the response to the question “Our country should help refugees”, the data reveals that a majority in Europe feel a sense of national responsibility to help refugees. Yet, the Eurobarometer shows a clear difference between member states in the percentage of respondents that agree with that claim. In the northern and western parts of the EU, an overwhelming majority agrees, while only a minority does so in some countries in eastern and southern Europe (cf. Simonovits and Bernát 2016). Still, on average, the response to this issue is rather stable and does not differ very much between 2015 and 2017 (Glorius 2018, p. 20). Even stronger than the opinion that refugees should be helped is the opinion that additional measures need to be taken to fight illegal migration to Europe. Almost 90% of all respondents in both 2015 and 2017 share this opinion, and among them, around two thirds see the responsibility at the EU level or both EU and national levels, while around 20% see this more as a national issue (Glorius 2018, p. 21). However, the opinion concerning a common European policy on migration is not quite as positive. The support ranges from 39 to 86% in different countries, but, as illustrated in Fig. 16.1, which shows the changes in selected European countries, there are only minor, mostly single-digit changes within the countries between 11/2014 and 03/2018 (European Commission 2018). Notwithstanding the stable public opinion on common European migration policy during this period, Eurobarometer points to several rapid, country-specific shifts in public opinion concerning the relative importance of immigration on domestic and European political agenda. Considering that some of the major shifts in public opinion are to opposite directions and may coincide with changes in how national media covers the “crisis”, it is important to briefly examine them here. Because presenting the data from each of the participating EU28 countries would not be feasible, we selected six member states in different parts of Europe, east and west, north and south. In addition, the figures are also shown for EU28. Each state was impacted by the situation in different ways; Italy (IT) as a country of first-arrival, Hungary (HU) as a transit country and four northern states—Germany (DE), Finland (FI), Sweden (SE) and the

16

PUBLIC OPINION ON MIGRATION AND THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA …

297

Fig. 16.1 The support (percent) for a common European policy on migration

United Kingdom (UK)—as countries embodying divergent histories as asylum seeker destinations. During the period of observation (11/2015–3/2018), more than one in four (28.9%) of the Eurobarometer respondents in the six-country sample considered immigration a key national concern, a figure slightly higher than the average value in all member states (23.4%). Unlike the support for common EU refugee policy, this concern significantly fluctuated both within individual member states and in EU28. Particularly the second half of the year 2015 – the early stages of what was to be dubbed as “the refugee crisis” – can be identified as distinct, simultaneous peaks in the national concern for immigration (Fig. 16.2). Even so, three countries—Finland, Germany, and Italy—are clearly set apart from the rest of the states by the steepness of the increase (Fig. 16.2). In comparison to the “pre-crisis” levels in May 2015, when immigration was mentioned as one of the two most important national concern by 6% (FI), 35% (DE), and 31% (IT) of the respondents, the November Eurobarometer reported frequencies of 41, 76, and 30%, respectively. The 41% point change in German public opinion is the greatest measured in absolute terms, partly brought about by the fact that Germany, together with Austria and Sweden, bore the brunt of the emergency as refugees’ final destination country (Triandafyllidou 2018,

298

S. KOIKKALAINEN ET AL.

Fig. 16.2 The frequency (percent) of immigration mentioned as one of the two most important national concerns

p. 214). The change, however, can also be linked to at least two specific cases of extensive broadcast media coverage. Both the closure of the Hungarian-Serbian border (on 15 September 2015) and the role adopted by Chancellor Angela Merkel (especially since August 2015) as the vocal protagonist of “the culture of welcome” took place between the May and November 2015 Eurobarometers, contributing to a prolonged sense of acute crisis among the German population (Triandafyllidou 2018, pp. 209–211). In relative terms, the Finnish case of a 35% point shift in public opinion between the two measurements marks a nearly sevenfold increase in the proportion of the population regarding immigration as a key national challenge. Unlike Germany, Finland had received only very few asylum seekers (some 3000 annually) before 2015, the summer of which saw a tenfold increase in this figure (MIGRI 2019). Moreover, the right-wing populist Finns Party had entered the coalition government in May. The party took an active role in politicising the issue of common European asylum policy in national media, making use of the increased saliency of “the immigration question” to the end of forcing Finland to abstain from the crucial vote in the European Council in September (e.g. Wahlbeck 2019). The worry that abstaining may damage “the Finnish reputation in the EU” was covered in all major news outlets for several months

16

PUBLIC OPINION ON MIGRATION AND THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA …

299

between the May and November 2015 Eurobarometer polls (Pyrhönen and Wahlbeck 2018). The single percentage point change in the Italian public opinion marks a case that is in stark contrast not only with the drastic shift in Finland and Germany but also with regard to the other member states. Indeed, Italy was the only country where the importance of immigration as national concern was declining during this time, albeit very slightly. Unlike most other member states, Italy had received steadily increasing numbers of refugee vessels across the Mediterranean already for several years before 2015, particularly in 2014. Over 800 people drowning in a shipwreck 18 April 2015 brought about particularly intensive national and international media coverage during late April and early May 2015 (Triandafyllidou 2018, p. 214). Against this background of asylum seeking in Italy, the summer between the two consecutive Eurobarometer polls of 2015 (EB83 and EB84), did not manifest itself as particularly different from before, neither in the Italian media reporting nor in the light of number of refugees, both of which remained relatively steady in comparison to the year 2014 (Castelli Gattinara 2017, pp. 323–324). In comparison to immigration as a national concern, this concern becomes significantly more accentuated within the EU-domain (Fig. 16.3). During the five-year period of observation, 38.8% of all Eurobarometer respondents (42.3% in the six-country sample) mention immigration as one of the two most important EU issues. As the concern for immigration is as much as 15% points higher in the EU-domain than on the national level, it appears that citizens in member states tend to place more hopes and demands on the EU than on their national governments for “resolving the crisis”. In most member states, the public opinion of immigration as an important EU issue follows a similar temporal pattern of politicisation to immigration as a national concern, most commonly peaking in the second half of the year 2015. After the peak, however, public opinion develops along different trajectories in several of the examined member states. In the following, we will briefly examine the Italian and Hungarian developments in public opinion with regard to the changes in the national level of mediatization. Of the countries studied here, immigration was least commonly mentioned as an important EU issue in Italy, peaking at 49% of the Eurobarometer respondents in November 2015 and 2016. The second peak marks a clear departure from the European pattern. Italy is the only

300

S. KOIKKALAINEN ET AL.

Fig. 16.3 The frequency (percent) of immigration mentioned as one of the two most important EU issues

country where the importance of immigration as an EU issue increases among the population during the year 2016, and also the only one where the frequency of this perception peaks after 2015. This can be partially attributed to at least two co-occurring narratives in the national media. Firstly, since the early 2015, the Italian prime minister Matteo Renzi started making appeals to the public where he repeatedly vowed to make refugee crisis one of the key issues on the EU agenda, increasingly demanding “total political solution for the crisis” after the 18 April 2015 shipwreck (Colombo 2018, pp. 7, 14). Secondly, while these appeals were widely covered in the national media, the second peak in Italian public opinion only took place after the “Balkan route” was closed in late 2015. As crossing the central Mediterranean became the asylum seekers’ main route to Europe, the number of casualties close to Italy rose drastically, which was also reflected in the coverage of the national media (Krzyzanowski ˙ et al. 2018; Castelli Gattinara 2017). The outlier case in the development of public opinion after 2015 can be found in Hungary. The perception of immigration as an important EU issue starts in Hungary as one of the lowest among the member states (19% in the May 2015 Eurobarometer). However, the frequency of this

16

PUBLIC OPINION ON MIGRATION AND THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA …

301

perception among the Hungarian respondents at the end of the timeframe (the November 2018 Eurobarometer) is almost 10% points higher (54%) than in Germany, the country with the second-highest figure (45%). This trajectory of Hungarian public opinion starts diverging from the rest of member states from 2016 onwards, when the importance of immigration as an EU issue generally declines, comparatively at a very slow rate. In order to address this exceptional development, it is important to note that at the end of the timeframe (November 2018 Eurobarometer), the Hungarian support for a common European refugee policy was the lowest among the countries studied. It is hard to explain these two developments solely on the basis of the mediatization of the “refugee crisis”. However, taking into account how negatively the EU’s attempts to tackle the crisis were portrayed in the Hungarian media open a more lucid explanatory avenue. Hungarian media outlets – for years largely curtailed by the prime minister Victor Orbán’s right-wing populist, antiimmigration party, Fidesz (Schlipphak and Treib 2017, p. 358) – painted a thwarted image of the “refugee crisis” as a scourge generated by the EU’s failed migration and refugee policy (Triandafyllidou 2018, p. 203; Stern 2016, p. 7). The compound narrative effectively suggested that as the problem is created by the EU, Hungary could avoid the worst calamities by staying clear from any joint EU-level policy measures in the field of migration.

16.5

Conclusion

The research presented in this chapter shows that public perceptions related to migrants and refugees are impacted by many factors and are time and place dependent. In her analysis based on Eurobarometer data Glorius (2018, pp. 10–11) concludes that hostile or xenophobic attitudes towards immigrants tend to develop in societies where the residents have only few experiences with migrants, where economic and social security systems are unstable and where the levels of interpersonal and institutional trust are low. She concludes that even though migration is perceived as an important issue for the national and European policy level, issues internal to the political situations of the countries in question, such as unemployment and the economic situation and its impact on one’s personal life, are perceived as even more important (Glorius 2018, pp. 18–19). There is a sharp contrast between the attitudes towards immigrants arriving from within the EU and from outside of Europe. While intra-European

302

S. KOIKKALAINEN ET AL.

mobility is considered mostly positively with more than half of respondents across EU member states seeing such migrants in a positive light, the feelings towards migrants from outside Europe are more polarised and mostly negative. Namely, at the EU average, only around one third of respondents express a positive feeling towards immigration from outside the EU (Glorius 2018, pp. 18–19). It is also necessary to examine immigration in the regional and local context, as the shares of migrants living in each city or municipality vary considerably also within European countries. Thus, the economic and socio-economic characteristics of a particular area play an important role both in the public perception of migration and in the integration possibilities available for migrants via the local labour market, for example. In addition, research has shown that integration outcomes are often different for EU and non-EU foreign-born individuals. Thus, when implementing integration strategies at the grass-root level, the policies should be tailored to the profile of the local migrant community and the specific challenges that the foreign-born population faces. For instance, in regions with high unemployment levels, the perceived competition for jobs between migrants and native-born may contribute to higher levels of anti-migration attitudes, and therefore also make it more difficult for migrants to integrate (OECD 2018, pp. 63–71). In her analysis of research literature focusing on media and immigration, Consterdine (2018, pp. 12–13) finds a number of consistencies. Firstly, the media’s framing of immigration – often through securitisation or threat frames – is highly significant in forming public attitudes. If the chosen frame is securitisation or threat, it may increase anxiety among the public and lead to further politicisation of the issue. Secondly, research overwhelmingly finds that migrants are often presented in a negative manner and as a problem (see also Berry et al. 2015; Esses et al. 2013). Thirdly, while media reporting tends to conflate all types of migrants, political actors do make distinctions between “genuine” political asylum seekers and so-called bogus economic refugees. Finally, the migrants’ voices are rarely heard in the press, while political elites dominate the press coverage and influence the language used. Further, she finds that the empirical studies of media and migration consistently note that the media tends to conflate the terms economic migrants, refugees and asylum seekers without making attempt to separate these categories (Consterdine 2018, p. 15).

16

PUBLIC OPINION ON MIGRATION AND THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA …

303

In recent years, there has been a desire for more evidence-based policy-making in the field of migration and integration policies in many countries. This has been regarded as a way to find solutions to “managing migration” in a way that would also appeal to the public. Yet, in the era of “post-truth politics” the debates related to migration have been especially prone to voices calling into question the role of “experts”, whose opinions are seen to differ from those of the “people”. Ruhs et al. (2019, pp. 2–3) stress that there are many reasons why research data and facts may play a relatively minor role in public debates and policy-making on migration and integration. They suggest that a triangular relationship exists between research, public debates, and policies. The media frames migration-related stories in a particular way, but members of the public also influence the media as consumers, who are free to choose the kind of content they are interested in reading and sharing via social media. Debates in policy circles can stimulate media to focus on particular issues, which, in turn, generates further public discussions and may also impact the selection of topics in migration research (Ruhs et al. 2019; Allen et al. 2019; see also Scholten 2018). The relationship between the media and public opinion is not straightforward, but it is clear that the mainstream media in each European country plays a major role in setting the agenda for discussion on migration by framing stories in a particular way and selecting the kinds of topics that are considered newsworthy. Allen et al. (2019, p. 52) conclude that media coverage on migration influences public opinion and perception in at least two ways: first, negative coverage is associated with negative attitudes towards migrants and second, the content produced and shared can shape public understanding of what immigration is and who immigrants are. Thus, as it clearly has an impact on public perception on migrationrelated topics, portraying a balanced view would be of public interest. For policymakers, it is also important to understand the local context, so as to evaluate what measures can reduce the potential mistrust felt towards migrants and increase trust and co-operation. When the public view on migration is examined at the sub-national level, findings suggest that the economic conditions of the native-born residents are highly relevant for their attitudes towards migrants, even more so than the actual economic contribution made by the migrants in the region. In addition, regions with a higher concentration of migrants tend to have more positive views on migration, suggesting the development of a “diversity culture” that

304

S. KOIKKALAINEN ET AL.

builds over time and shows that diversity can be an enriching contribution to the area (OECD 2018, p. 72). How a balanced view could be promoted remains a challenge as any emerging news story can start dominating and framing also future discussions on migration. Good examples of this in recent years are the reporting of the death of the 3-year-old Syrian refugee Alan Kurdi on a beach in Turkey in September 2015 (e.g. The Guardian 2015; Frankfurter Allgemeine 2015) and the alleged sexual assaults of women by groups of foreign men during the 2016 New Year’s Eve celebrations in Germany (e.g. The Guardian 2016; Frankfurter Allgemeine 2016). While the former generated a wave of sympathy for those risking their lives to reach safety in Europe, the latter portrayed those arriving as a threat to autochthonous Europeans. Of course, altering dominant news-framing practices remains a notoriously elusive endeavour for any researchers, experts and policy makers aspiring to participate in public debate. However, by providing correct statistical information, stressing the diversity of migration patterns in contemporary Europe and taking part in media and public discussions on migration, it is possible to paint a picture of migration that escapes the negative, black-and-white imagery, and instead captures the shades of grey for the public to consider.

References Allen, W., Blinder, S., & McNeil, R. (2019). Informing Realities: Research, Public Opinion, and Media Reports on Migration and Integration. In M. Ruhs, K. Tamas, & J. Palme (Eds.), Bridging the Gaps: Linking Research to Public Debates and Policy-Making on Migration and Integration (pp. 50–65). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Allport, G. (1954). The Nature of Prejudice. Boston: Addison-Wesley Publishing. Baker, P., & McEnery, T. (2005). A Corpus-Based Approach to Discourses of Refugees in UN and Newspaper Texts. Journal of Language and Politics, 4(2), 197–226. https://doi.org/10.1075/jlp.4.2.04bak. Bansak, K., Hainmueller, J., & Hangartner, D. (2016). How Economic, Humanitarian, and Religious Concerns Shape European Attitudes Toward Asylum Seekers. Science, 354(6309), 217–222. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aag 2147. Bansak, K., Hainmueller, J., & Hangartner, D. (2017). Europeans Support a Proportional Allocation of Asylum Seekers. Nature Human Behaviour, 1(0133). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-017-0133.

16

PUBLIC OPINION ON MIGRATION AND THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA …

305

Berry, M., Garcia-Blanco, I., & Moore, K. (2015). Press Coverage of the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in the EU: A Content Analysis of Five European Countries (Report prepared for the United Nations High Commission for Refugees). Geneva: UNHCR. www.unhcr.org/56bb369c9.html. Accessed 16 April 2019. Blinder, S. (2015). Imagined Immigration: The Impact of Different Meanings of ‘Immigrants’ in Public Opinion and Policy Debates in Britain. Political Studies, 63(1), 80–100. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12053. Boswell, C. (2019). Research, ‘Experts’, and the Politics of Migration. In M. Ruhs, K. Tamas, & J. Palme (Eds.), Bridging the Gaps: Linking Research to Public Debates and Policy-Making on Migration and Integration (pp. 21–33). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Castelli Gattinara, P. (2017). The ‘Refugee Crisis’ in Italy as a Crisis of Legitimacy. Contemporary Italian Politics, 9(3), 318–331. https://doi.org/10. 1080/23248823.2017.1388639. Colombo, M. (2018). The Representation of the ‘European Refugee Crisis’ in Italy: Domopolitics, Securitization, and Humanitarian Communication in Political and Media Discourses. Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, 16(1–2), 161–178. https://doi.org/10.1080/15562948.2017.1317896. Consterdine, E. (2018). State-of-the-Art Report on Public Attitudes, Political Discourses and Media Coverage on the Arrival of Refugees. CEASEVAL Research on the Common European Asylum System (2). http://ceaseval.eu/ publications. Accessed 16 April 2019. Corbu, N., Buturoiu, R., & Durach, F. (2017). Framing the Refugee Crisis in Online Media: A Romanian Perspective. Romanian Journal of Communication and Public Relations, 19(2), 5–18. https://doi.org/10.21018/rjcpr. 2017.2.234. Crawley, H., Düvell, F., Jones, K., & Skleparis, D. (2016). Understanding the Dynamics of Migration to Greece and the EU: Drivers, Decisions and Destinations (MEDMIG Research Brief No. 2). https://www.compas.ox.ac. uk/2016/understanding-the-dynamics-of-migration-to-greece-and-the-eu-dri vers-decisions-and-destinations/. Accessed 16 April 2019. Crawley, H., & Skleparis, D. (2018). Refugees, Migrants, Neither, Both: Categorical Fetishism and the Politics of Bounding in Europe’s ‘Migration Crisis’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 44(1), 48–64. https://doi.org/10. 1080/1369183X.2017.1348224. Duffy, B. (2014). Perceptions and Reality: Ten Things We Should Know About Attitudes to Immigration in the UK. The Political Quarterly, 85(3), 259–266. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12096. ESS. (2016). Attitudes Towards Immigration and Their Antecedents: Topline Results from Round 7 of the European Social Survey. London: European Social Survey. www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/findings/ESS7_toplines_i ssue_7_immigration.pdf. Accessed 16 April 2019.

306

S. KOIKKALAINEN ET AL.

Esses, V. M., Medianu, S., & Lawson, A. S. (2013). Uncertainty, Threat, and the Role of the Media in Promoting the Dehumanization of Immigrants and Refugees. Journal of Social Issues, 69(3), 518–536. https://doi.org/10. 1111/josi.12027. European Commission. (2017). How Does the Media on Both Sides of the Mediterranean Report on Migration? (Report commissioned by The Commission of the European Union, Euro-Med Migration and ICMPD). www.futura.news/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Media-and-Mig ration_27_April_2017_v2.pdf. Accessed 16 April 2019. European Commission. (2018). Eurobarometer 82–89, November 2014–March 2018. Brussels: European Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoff ice/publicopinion/index.cfm. Accessed 16 April 2019. Eurostat. (2014). The 2011 Census Hub. Brussels: European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/population-and-housing-census/censusdata/2011-census. Accessed 16 April 2019. Eurostat (2019). Migration and Migrant Population Statistics. Eurostat Statistics Explained. Brussels: European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ statistics-explained/pdfscache/1275.pdf. Accessed 16 April 2019. Frankfurter Allgemeine. (2015, September 3). Toter Flüchtingsjunge. Die traurige Geschichte des Aylan Kurdi. Frankfurter Allgemeine. https://www. faz.net/aktuell/politik/fluechtlingskrise/toter-fluechtlingsjunge-die-traurigegeschichte-des-aylan-kurdi-13783344.html. Accessed 16 April 2019. Frankfurter Allgemeine. (2016, January 4). Übergriffe in Köln. ‘Straftaten einer neuen Dimension’ by Burger, R. Frankfurter Allgemeine. https://www.faz. net/aktuell/gesellschaft/kriminalitaet/uebergriffe-in-koeln-straftaten-einerneuen-dimension-13997272.html. Accessed 16 April 2019. Freeman, G. P., Hansen, R., & Leal, D. L. (2013). Immigration and Public Opinion in Liberal Democracies. London: Routledge. Georgiou, M., & Zaborowski, R. (2017). Media Coverage of the “Refugee Crisis”: A Cross-European Perspective (Council of Europe report, DG1(2017)03). Strasbourg: Council of Europe. https://rm.coe.int/1680706b00. Accessed 16 April 2019. Glorius, B. (2018). Public Opinion on Immigration and Refugees and Patterns of Politicisation Evidence from the Eurobarometer. CEASEVAL Research on the Common European Asylum System (6). http://ceaseval.eu/publications. Accessed 16 April 2019. Greussing, E., & Boomgaarden, H. G. (2017). Shifting the Refugee Narrative? An Automated Frame Analysis of Europe’s 2015 Refugee Crisis. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 43(11), 1749–1774. https://doi.org/10. 1080/1369183X.2017.1282813.

16

PUBLIC OPINION ON MIGRATION AND THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA …

307

Hainmueller, J., & Hopkins, D. J. (2014). Public Attitudes Toward Immigration. The Annual Review of Political Science, 17 (1), 225–249. https://doi.org/10. 1146/annurev-polisci-102512-194818. Heath, A. F., Davidov, E., Ford, R., Green, E. G. T., Ramos, A., & Schmidt, P. (2020). Contested Terrain: Explaining Divergent Patterns of Public Opinion Towards Immigration within Europe. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 46(3), 475–488. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2019.1550145. Heath, A. F., & Richards, L. (2020). Contested Boundaries: Consensus and Dissensus in European Attitudes to Immigration. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 46(3), 489–511. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X. 2018.1550146. Hellwig, T., & Sinno, A. (2017). Different Groups, Different Threats: Public Attitudes Towards Immigrants. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 43(3), 339–358. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2016.1202749. Holmes, S. M., & Castañeda, H. (2016). Representing the ‘European Refugee Crisis’ in Germany and Beyond: Deservingness and Difference, Life and Death. American Ethnologist, 43(1), 12–24. https://doi.org/10.1111/amet. 12259. Kessler, A., & Freeman, G. (2005). Public Opinion in the EU on Immigration from Outside the Community. Journal of Common Market Studies, 43(4), 825–850. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2005.00598.x. King, R. (2002). Towards a New Map of European Migration. International Journal of Population Geography, 8(2), 89–106. https://doi.org/10.1002/ ijpg.246. King, R., & Okólski, M. (2019) Diverse, Fragile and Fragmented: European Migration Since the Mid–20th Century. Brewminate, January 4. https://brewminate.com/diverse-fragile-and-fragmented-european-migrat ion-since-the-mid-20th-century/. Accessed 16 April 2019. Krzyzanowski, ˙ M., Triandafyllidou, A., & Wodak, R. (2018). The Mediatization and the Politicization of the “Refugee Crisis” in Europe. Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, 16(1–2), 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/155 62948.2017.1353189. Kuntz, A., Davidov, E., & Semyonov, M. (2017). The Dynamic Relations between Economic Conditions and Anti-immigrant Sentiment: A Natural Experiment in Times of the European Economic Crisis. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 58(5), 392–415. https://doi.org/10.1177/002071 5217690434. Markaki, Y., & Longhi, S. (2013). What Determines Attitudes to Immigration in European Countries? An Analysis at the Regional Level. Migration Studies, 1(3), 311–337. https://doi.org/10.1093/migration/mnt015.

308

S. KOIKKALAINEN ET AL.

Messing, V., & Ságvári, B. (2018). Looking Behind the Culture of Fear: CrossNational Analysis of Attitude Towards Migrants. Budapest: Friedrich-EbertStiftung. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/budapest/14181-20180815. pdf. Accessed 16 April 2019. Meuleman, B., Abts, K., Schmidt, P., Pettigrew, T. F., & Davidov, E. (2020). Economic Conditions, Group Relative Deprivation and Ethnic Threat Perceptions: A Cross-National Perspective. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 46(3), 593–611. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1550157. MIGRI. (2019). Statistics. International Protection. Applications 1/2015– 12/2015. Helsinki. Maahanmuuttovirasto [Finnish Immigration Service]. Online database available at: http://tilastot.migri.fi. Accessed 16 April 2019. OECD. (2018). Using Statistics to Assess Migrant Integration in OECD Regions. In Working Together for Local Integration of Migrants and Refugees. Paris: OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264085350-6-en. Pyrhönen, N., & Wahlbeck, Ö. (2018). The Finnish National Report on the Politicization of the ‘Refugee Crisis’ in Public Debate. CEASEVAL Research on the Common European Asylum System (9). http://ceaseval.eu/publications. Accessed 16 April 2019. Ruhs, M., Tamas, K., & Palme, J. (2019). Introduction: Making Linkages between Research, Public Debates, and Policies on International Migration and Integration. In M. Ruhs, K. Tamas, & J. Palme (Eds.), Bridging the Gaps: Linking Research to Public Debates and Policy-Making on Migration and Integration (pp. 1–17). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schlipphak, B., & Treib, O. (2017). Playing the Blame Game on Brussels: The Domestic Political Effects of EU Interventions Against Democratic Backsliding. Journal of European Public Policy, 24(3), 352–365. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/13501763.2016.1229359. Scholten, P. (2018). Research-Policy Relations and Migration Studies. In R. Zapata-Barrero & E. Yalaz (Eds.), Qualitative Research in European Migration Studies (pp. 287–302). IMISCOE Research Series. Cham: SpringerOpen. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76861-8. Sides, J., & Citrin, J. (2007). European Opinion About Immigration: The Role of Identities, Interests and Information. British Journal of Political Science, 37 (3), 477–504. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123407000257. Simonovits, B., & Bernát, A. (2016). The Social Aspects of the 2015 Migration Crisis in Hungary. Budapest: TÁRKI Social Research Institute. http://old. tarki.hu/hu/news/2016/kitekint/20160330_refugees.pdf. Accessed 16 April 2019. Stern, R. (2016). Responses to the ‘Refugee Crisis’: What Is the Role of SelfImage Among EU Countries? European Policy Analysis, 10, 1–13. Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies. https://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/ get/diva2:1064226/FULLTEXT01.pdf. Accessed 16 April 2019.

16

PUBLIC OPINION ON MIGRATION AND THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA …

309

The Guardian. (2015, September 2). Shocking Images of Drowned Syrian Boy Show Tragic Plight of Refugees by H. Smith. The Guardian. https://www. theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/02/shocking-image-of-drowned-syrianboy-shows-tragic-plight-of-refugees. Accessed 16 April 2019. The Guardian. (2016, January 5). Cologne Inquiry into ‘Coordinated’ New Year’s Eve Sex Attacks by Connolly, K. The Guardian. https://www.thegua rdian.com/world/2016/jan/05/germany-crisis-cologne-new-years-eve-sexattacks. Accessed 16 April 2019. Triandafyllidou, A. (2018). A ‘Refugee Crisis’ Unfolding: ‘Real’ Events and Their Interpretation in Media and Political Debates. Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, 16(1–2), 198–216. https://doi.org/10.1080/15562948. 2017.1309089. Wahlbeck, Ö. (2019). To Share or Not to Share Responsibility? Finnish Refugee Policy and the Hesitant Support for a Common European Asylum System. Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, 17(3), 299–316. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/15562948.2018.1468048.

CHAPTER 17

Integrating Immigrants: Capacities and Challenges for Local Authorities in Europe Jochen Franzke

17.1 Municipalities as Pioneers of Immigrant Integration Local authorities all over Europe face a number of challenges in dealing with immigration. On the one hand, they have to respond to the needs of diverse groups of immigrants and promote their integration into the existing local communities. On the other hand, most of the framework conditions for this integration are set by the nation-states. Immigration to Europe has a long history. Most of the Western European countries experienced high immigration after World War II. Some of them today have a sizeable immigrant population of both European and non-European origin. This contrasts with the Central and Eastern European countries, which under Soviet rule were largely isolated from immigration. Even after the fall of the Iron Curtain, these countries are

J. Franzke (B) Economics & Social Sciences, University of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 J. Franzke and J. M. Ruano de la Fuente (eds.), Local Integration of Migrants Policy, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50979-8_17

311

312

J. FRANZKE

still not very attractive to immigrants, but they play quite an important role as transits to Western Europe. One aspect of contemporary globalisation is that immigration to Europe has accelerated since the late twentieth century, both in terms of speed and scale. The latest peak of immigration in 2015 and 2016 witnessed a significant increase in the number of refugees and asylum seekers coming from crisis areas in the world, especially from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and some African countries. Many of the problems of integrating immigrants in Europe are aggravated by the lack of nation-state integration concepts. For a long time, most of the European nation-states focused purely on immigration management. They were neither able nor willing to develop real integration strategies, although the host societies were becoming more and more aware of their necessity. In the meantime, however, countries like Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland, have developed integration concepts, which have yielded real benefits for their local communities (see the respective county chapters in this book). With the permanent or even temporary presence of immigrants in cities or villages, their basic care becomes almost automatically a municipal task. The various legal status of the different groups of immigrants play only a minor role. Therefore, municipalities have been almost forced into a ‘pioneering role’ in the integration of immigrants, especially refugees. Of course, there is much to suggest that municipalities are more likely to prefer inclusive, pragmatic and social space-oriented solutions than nation-states because they need to keep an eye on the social cohesion of the local population (Penninx and Garcés-Mascaenas 2018, p. 838). The ‘local turn’ of integration policy in Europe (Caponio and Borkert 2010) affects municipalities of all sizes, but multi-ethnic cities especially are among the pioneers of municipal integration policy. Examples in Europe are Berlin and Frankfurt in Germany, Birmingham in the United Kingdom, Vienna in Austria and Zurich and Bern and Basel in Switzerland (Penninx et al. 2014, p. 26f.; OECD 2018). Additionally, new research in Germany shows that middle-sized cities are also able to develop and implement such integration models successfully (DIFU 2018; Franzke et al. 2017, see also Sec. 17.7). The aim of this chapter is to attempt to outline the role of local administrations in local integration policy focusing on innovations, capacity, finance, in-house coordination, coordination with other levels of administration and cooperation with local stakeholders in this policy field. Drawing on the findings of a case study, this present chapter focuses on

17

INTEGRATING IMMIGRANTS: CAPACITIES AND CHALLENGES …

313

analysing this process, its challenges and problems with capacities by using the examples of small to medium cities in the German federal state of Brandenburg.

17.2

Coordination Within Nation-States

The general situation regarding immigration in the member states of the European Union is changing, since more and more nation-states are adjusting from pure immigration management to a policy focused on the integration of immigrants. This change is due, inter alia, to economic reasons because a sufficient number of specialists required are not domestically available. Under these circumstances, the relationship between European, national, regional and local levels has become increasingly complex (Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx 2016). Some municipalities are adopting more inclusive practices than their respective national governments, while others are adopting more restrictive practices (Caponio 2014, p. 17). As a result, the division of competences and responsibilities in immigration policy is becoming more and more complicated. Interlevel conflicts, especially relating to financial resources, are increasing. In this situation, the coordination and harmonisation of immigration policy, especially in the context of integration, is gaining importance. Many European local authorities—especially in unitary states—criticise the lack of adequate coordination with central governments in integration policy. For example, nearly 90% of the 72 cities surveyed in a recent OECD report on migration policy criticised the quality of this kind of coordination (EU-Commission/OECD 2018, p. 2, see also OECD 2018). Therefore, there seems to be a need to improve the coordination of integration policies between the different levels of government in many European countries. The responsibility for solving this problem lies with national governments. But the municipalities, through the exchange of ideas and learning from each other’s experiences at a regional, national and European level, can also contribute to this policy. On the other hand, at the same time differences in the local approaches to immigrant integration are increasing. First, the differentiation between the integration-friendly and the integration-hostile municipalities is widening. Unfortunately, the latter group is rarely evaluated. Secondly, rural and peripheral areas in particular are more affected by the emigration of young people, whereas cities have to deal more

314

J. FRANZKE

with labour migration. Cities near the EU’s external borders, especially those in Southern Europe, are most affected by refugee arrivals and illegal immigration. Third, from an EU perspective, some cities and regions are targeted by immigrants because of their prosperity and/or their attractive labour market.

17.3 Structural Convergence and Substantial Differentiation In contrast to the often symbolic and ideological debates at the national level, local politics are characterised by a bottom-up approach based on specific social spaces and pragmatic solutions to problems (Scholten and Penninx 2015) and by “structural convergence and substantial differentiation” (Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas 2016). Recent years have shown that local authorities in Europe certainly have leeway in immigration policy, use it increasingly consciously and, in some cases, even oppose the migration policy decisions of their nationstates. Sometimes, municipalities even fill in gaps that national legislation leaves open, or jump in where institutional action by other politicaladministrative levels is temporarily overstrained. Many municipalities are becoming active in terms of immigration policy because they either do not get enough support or feel let down by the national government. For this reason, they are increasingly seeking a closer cooperation with European Union supranational institutions, especially the European Commission (Bendel et al. 2019). Of course, the margins of the municipalities for the design of integration and immigration policy differ among the member states of the European Union. Homogenisation is not apparent in this policy area and, in fact, the differences seem to have increased since 2015. Significant influencing factors include, for example the general state organisation in federal and unitary states, the distribution of competences between different political-administrative levels and the level of political and fiscal autonomy of local authorities (Caponio and Borkert 2010, p. 166). But structural differences between municipalities can also play an important role. These differences include the local political culture, decision-making structures, the socio-economic situation, rurality and settlement structure, the strengths of the civil society, the immigration history or the more or less deliberately created ‘branding’ of a city (Caponio and Borkert 2010, p. 189; Dekker et al. 2015, p. 653). However, the attitude of the native

17

INTEGRATING IMMIGRANTS: CAPACITIES AND CHALLENGES …

315

local population towards new immigration and the strength of local civil society have also become increasingly influential. As different as municipalities in Europe may be, local authorities always play a key role in shaping the reality of integrating immigrants into local communities (Caponio and Borkert 2010, p. 187). Collectively, many municipalities are making demands on national governments and the European Union to expand their scope for migration policy.

17.4

Coordination

Especially with the sharp increase in the number of refugees arriving in 2015 and 2016, civil society organisations, at least secondarily, have played an important role in the practical solution of the social problems of arriving refugees. Numerous welcome initiatives have sprung up and pushed for networking under the slogans ‘solidarity cities’ or ‘refugees welcome’. Of course, civil society will also continue to play an important role in the integration process of immigrants in the long term. In this context, new challenges in the coordination of integration activities for immigrants between the different stakeholders have naturally ensued. However, among the positive results of closer coordination are the fact that many municipalities have become more active beyond the scope of their traditional integration work. Partly in cooperation with non-governmental organisations and immigrant self-organisations, many European cities offer legal advice and information on asylum processes, residence permits, family reunification and voluntary return (European Foundation for Democracy 2018, p. 27; Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas 2016; Caponio and Borkert 2010, p 176). Integration policy generally refers to political action that has to do with the integration of immigrants into the host society. The basic theoretical approaches can be termed ‘integration’ or ‘assimilation’, with multiple gradations in between (Vetrovec 2010; Brettell and Hollifield 2000). Interaction is understood as adaptation, such as incorporation and inclusion, and requires a two-way process of adaptation by migrants and the existing local society. The pluralists who view a multicultural society as desirable and characterise the concept of diversity are therefore more likely to see equal rights and opportunities associated with immigration.

316

J. FRANZKE

Integration is at the same time a final goal and a long-lasting process. “Integration is a process wherein immigrant newcomers and the communities in which they settle – both the individuals and institutions – mutually adapt to one another. Integration is also an endpoint reached when individuals only minimally perceive themselves and others in ethno-racial and national terms, when these attributes have, at most, a negligible negative impact on opportunities and life chances” (Alba and Nee 2003). The beneficiaries of local integration policy are therefore not only the immigrants, but the entire local population (Filsinger 2009, p. 284ff.). When it comes to local integration, the status of the different immigrant groups plays only a minor role. As long as they are in town, the local administrations have to deal with them and provide their support. Immigrant integration over the past decades has become a priority in the multi-level governance system in the European Union, its member (nation) states, the regions and the local tiers of government (counties and municipalities). The competences in this policy field are distributed among these political-administrative levels in the European countries in different ways. Above all, the role played by local authorities in many European countries in immigrant integration policies has significantly increased and “has developed from primarily a level of policy implementation to a level of policy development” (Scholten and van Breugel 2018, p. 3). Many municipalities in a number of European countries have moved to an active migrant integration policy, sometimes beyond the scope of their formal competences. The so-called European refugee crisis of 2015–2016 has accelerated this development. New challenges have emerged at the horizontal level, such as the in-house coordination between the different municipal administration departments involved and the cooperation between the municipal administrations and (non-)state actors, such as the civil society institutions supporting immigrants or refugees and local private firms, etc. In the vertical dimension, new challenges have also arisen in the coordination between the different levels of governments, including increasing conflicts over the resources and competencies in this area. The focus of this chapter is the development in migrant integration policy at the local level. However, there is a strong link between national and local integration policies. Additionally, there is a vast difference between the national integration policies in Europe, which has developed over time. Therefore, we need to include not only the national

17

INTEGRATING IMMIGRANTS: CAPACITIES AND CHALLENGES …

317

legal framework of immigrant integration policy but also the actual political and cultural debate surrounding integration at the national level. At the same time, we must remember that increasingly the traditional state-centric modes of government fall short of being able ‘to address the complex nature of contemporary integration challenges’. As a result, more polycentric approaches of governance have emerged between a range of government actors, as well as semi-public, non-governmental and even private organisations (Rhodes 1997). During the refugee crisis of 2015–2016, local governance networks demonstrated in many countries that they could react more quickly and more effectively to new migration policy challenges than any state institution. At the same time, of course, they represent a challenge for a coherent and consistent immigrant integration policy at the national level (Scholten 2012, p. 47). Finally, in our analyses we also refer to the basic integration policy and political culture in European countries. The model of multiculturalism that had for many years dominated the integration policies in many European countries has changed since the mid-1990s. The refugee crisis of 2015–2016 accelerated this process, too. A ‘multiculturalism backlash’ (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010) can be observed, which has been sparked by an increase in anti-immigrant sentiment in parts of the population and the rise of anti-migrant populism in the majority of European countries. In a number of them, the model of assimilation is on the rise (Joppke and Morawska 2003), with some of the EU’s central European member states now refusing to accept refugees altogether. Unfortunately, the specific effects of this anti-immigrant sentiment in modern society on local politics have hardly been evaluated. In the context of immigration ‘cultural’, ‘structural’ and ‘social integration’ have become the most widely used terms (see Heckmann 2015, p. 72). A distinction must be made between the individual level of social integration and the level of system integration, which deals with group-related and institutional processes. The latter is the focus of our book. We can define two different approaches: first, the ‘deficit approach’, which perceives migration predominantly as a problem and second, the ‘opportunity approach’, which perceives migration first of all as a chance (KGSt 2005, p. 26ff.).

318

J. FRANZKE

17.5 Municipal Integration Concepts and Capacities Local authorities in Europe use different tools in their efforts to improve the coherence of their integration policies, from adopting a local crosssectoral integration strategy, creating steering groups focused on integration policy and building capacity to care for immigrants, through to training staff working on migration issues, establishing public service one-stop-shops, and involving local migrant communities. At least for larger cities, the development of a concept, action plan or vision for the integration of immigrants has proven itself to be a suitable instrument for a successful policy. These are mostly created by the administrations themselves, inspired by their own experiences and using examples of best practices from other cities. In some countries, municipal associations, think tanks and other institutions have also developed models that can be used for this purpose. In Germany, for example the concept of integration management was developed by the local communities. However, such an approach always requires the political support of the local council. It has proved to be meaningful that the concept also involves engagement with local stakeholders, such as the private sector, civil society, churches, sports clubs, charity organisations, and with the immigration communities themselves. Such a concept typically has two dimensions: internal and external. The internal dimension should ensure that all actors are aware of the shortterm and long-term goals of integration policy in the respective city. The external dimension should form the basis for a division of labour between the local stakeholders. Smaller municipalities often lack the resources to develop a concept. However, there is usually some form of informal consensus between the main actors in local administration and other local stakeholders on the issue (see empirical part of this chapter). In developing and implementing a concept, the following aspects are particularly important: A prerequisite for achieving a coherent and sustainable integration policy is to address the needs of both the immigrant population and the established population. In practical terms, local integration policy is mostly about closing the spatial gap between these two groups. In many European cities, spatial segregation of immigrants is high and potentially

17

INTEGRATING IMMIGRANTS: CAPACITIES AND CHALLENGES …

319

increasing for many minority groups. Together with discrimination, they “constitute two major and mutually reinforcing obstacles for integration” (OECD 2018, p. 3). One way to overcome this would be to ensure equal access to quality public services across all neighbourhoods. Additionally, local authorities could create more shared public spaces (e.g. libraries, cultural centres and public squares, etc.). At the conceptual level, the inclusive governance approach, which includes all disadvantaged groups of a municipality, is becoming increasingly important for local authorities. Given the different public attitudes towards migration, communication is gaining in importance. A coherent vision could begin with communication campaigns expressing the objectives and benefits of integration. It is now an undisputed fact that integration policies require an integrated approach across different sectors (e.g. housing, education, employment and health) to meet the immigrants’ needs. A lack of coherence between them could “lead to limited access to services” (OECD 2018, p. 2). Regular monitoring mechanisms to evaluate the implementation success of a city’s integration action plans would complete the policy cycle. Unfortunately, these mechanisms are underdeveloped in many European cities. To make this tool effective, many cities would have to improve their databases. Result-oriented monitoring reports could play a valuable role in local communication policy. For the evaluation, it is important to record both the short-term and the long-term successes. Increasing the activities of local immigrant integration policy often requires organisational changes within city administration in order to strengthen reception, social cohesion and integration capacities. Nonetheless, the organisational strategies that have been adopted vary from city to city and present a wide range of administrative models. The majority of European cities do not have a distinct department uniquely responsible for the integration of immigrants. Therefore, integration services are intended either as a cross-sectional taskforce involving all departments through shared responsibility, or are placed under one single department, such as education, health, employment and social affairs, or sometimes a combination of both (such as in Stockholm and Vienna). Comparative evaluation studies on the quality of the various administrative models for the integration of immigrants are not available. Another task would be to increase the capacity of local civil services to be able to better respond to the specific needs of immigrants. Therefore, providing training for all municipal departments, which would include

320

J. FRANZKE

teachers, social workers, police and employment services, about their roles in promoting migrant integration would play an important role, as would ensuring equal opportunities in the civil service to also have public officials with a migrant background.

17.6

Cooperation with Stakeholders

In this process, local stakeholders such as national or regional agencies, public health services, housing associations, social welfare services, employers and civil society initiatives, could take over a coordination role in specific fields of integration. It remains to be noted that the experiences of the European refugee crisis of 2015–2016 are still very present in many of the municipalities, where civil society activities have drawn significant attention to the failings of the local authorities, and indeed of the entire German state. Meanwhile, the situation has returned to normal. Conflicts have arisen between urban administrations and civil society working for migrants. These have resulted from the fact that local administrations are required to act within the confines of the law, which can sometimes be time-consuming, while civil society initiatives want to respond in the shortest time possible. In many European cities, attempts are being made to make cooperation between city administration and civil society as long term as possible and to find a permanent division of labour to deal with the integration of migrants. Given their limited resources, it is certain that cities will not be able to accomplish this task without the participation of civil society. On the other hand, concerns of overburdening civil society should be taken seriously if it is to assume permanent tasks that are normally considered functions of urban governance. More recently, the focus of integration policy has shifted to language learning, employment and housing. Again, civil society networks are proving to be very helpful. For local administrations, cooperation with local private sector actors, such as chambers of commerce and industry and state employment agencies, is becoming increasingly important. In general, outsourcing to NGOs and private partners is widely used to deliver local public services, and services for migrant integration in particular. Some obstacles being faced here include long selection procedures, a lack of coordination mechanisms and potential competition with services provided by public agencies. This could be better organised by setting up

17

INTEGRATING IMMIGRANTS: CAPACITIES AND CHALLENGES …

321

coordination mechanisms with NGOs, migrant organisations and businesses operating in the sector, along with evaluating services provided to migrants and establishing standards aligned with national and regional regulations for service provision. Since there is limited availability of social housing for all vulnerable groups, migrants are more likely to live in overcrowded and substandard housing conditions. The concentration of migrant communities in certain neighbourhoods and limited access to adequate housing hamper their integration. This could be addressed by ensuring equitable policies for accessing social housing—and private housing—by providing financial and advisory support to migrants and ensuring non-discriminative treatment by landlords. Efforts to secure affordable housing for migrants should also include designing housing policies that prevent exclusion and improve the distribution of social housing.

17.7 Empirical Findings of a German Research Project on Local Integration Policy In order to substantiate the assessments of this chapter empirically, I would like to present the findings of one of my case studies. However, the study focuses on municipal refugee policy and the problems of local integration policy are looked at from this perspective. The cases studied are based on 129 semi-standardised interviews with local actors in eight cities located in the German federal state of Brandenburg. The research was carried during May and June 2017 as part of a student’s research project under my supervision.1 To focus the research sample, I chose municipalities which have their own administration and where the county administration is also located, expecting synergies between the two given their geographical proximity. The 14 county administrations in the federal state of Brandenburg are responsible for important parts of the migration policy, especially for the reception and accommodation of refugees and for integration work in

1 The interviews were conducted with the respective mayor, senior representatives of the municipal administration, municipal councillors, civil society activists (mostly from the influential refugee welcome initiatives) and other local stakeholders, based on a joint questionnaire.

322

J. FRANZKE

Table 17.1 Basic case indicators for migrant integration policy Cities

Number of inhabitants (2015)

Number of refugees (2017)

Demographic trend (2012–2030) (%)

City budget status (2017)

Number of employees in city administration (2017)

Oranienburg Senftenberg

43,526 24,625

+6.3 −14.8

Deficit Deficit

Rathenow

24,387

−10.4

Balanced

NN

Luckenwalde

20,365

−5.7

Balanced

185

Prenzlau Perleberg Beeskow Seelow

19,257 12,204 8122 5387

NN 1350 (5.3%)b Approx. 600 (2.5%) 1019 (4.9%) 429 (2.2%)a 470 (3.9%) 186 (2.3%) NN

−11.7 −11.8 −7.9 −6.0

Deficit Surplus Balanced Deficit

239 85 35 28

208 181 (2014)

Source Bertelsmannstiftung 2015 and data provided by city representatives. a Only those refugees entitled to receive social benefits. Data on refugees whose asylum application has not yet been decided are not available. b Number of foreigners

practical terms.2 Therefore, a need for intensive coordination between the two administrations exists, which could favour proximity. Eight municipalities finally agreed to support my research. The population in these cases ranges from 5400 to 43,000 inhabitants, representing the average population size of municipalities in the federal state of Brandenburg. Overall, 120 of the 417 municipalities in Brandenburg belong to this size category. As far as the type of municipality is concerned, all cases belong to so-called unitary municipalities, which are governed by a directly elected full-time mayor. They steer their own municipal administration and are controlled by the directly elected municipal council. Exactly 177 of the 417 municipalities in Brandenburg belong to this type. Five key indicators determine the framework conditions for the local integration policy in Brandenburg: size of population, number of refugees, demographic trend, status of the city budget and size of the city administration (see Table 17.1). The sample includes cities with between 2 The counties (sometimes also called administrative districts) in Germany are the higher level of local self-government in all federal states (excluding the city states), which are responsible for supra-local affairs.

17

INTEGRATING IMMIGRANTS: CAPACITIES AND CHALLENGES …

323

43,526 (Oranienburg) and 5387 inhabitants (Seelow). According to official data, the number of refugees in these cities in 2017 represented between 5.3% and 2.2% of the population.3 Nevertheless, the real figures are likely to be higher. In the federal state of Brandenburg, the percentage of foreigners in 2017 amounted to 4.1% and the number of refugees 1.4%.4 This is a very small number compared with other German regions, especially those in the west. Regarding the demographic trends, seven cases are identified as strongly shrinking municipalities with adaptation pressure. The only exception is the city of Oranienburg, which has a growing, but rapidly ageing population. This city is the only one in the sample situated in an area surrounding the German capital, Berlin, with positive socio-economic indicators. All the other cities are located on the rural periphery. When we compare the status of the city budgets, four are in deficit, three balance and one is in surplus. The number of employees in the city administrations ranges from 28 to 281. In Brandenburg, the general responsibility for the care of refugees and asylum seekers as well as general migration social work is a task for the 14 counties and four county-free municipalities laid down by law (Landesaufnahmegesetz 2016). Consequently, the heads of county administrations (Landräte), or the mayors of the county-free cities, are the final decisionmaking authority without interference by the respective council. In each county administration, there are some civil servants who are responsible for establishing contacts with migrants and asylum seekers, which include

3 Unfortunately, data on the number of refugees in Table 17.1 are not fully reliable owing to statistical reasons and a reserved information policy of the authorities concerned. 4 In Germany, the term ‘foreigner’ is still widely used (but not correctly), which in the legal sense only includes non-German nationals. To mix it with the term ‘immigrants’ is misleading because not all non-Germans living in Germany are ‘immigrants. For example, some foreigners do not even have their own migration experience. They grow up here as the third generation and do not even know the country of origin of their immigrant grandparents. At the same time, not all immigrants are ‘foreigners’ in the legal sense. There are those, for example, who immigrated as Spätaussiedler (ethnic Germans settling in Eastern Europe), or their family members, and have German citizenship. Refugees in this case study are defined as all persons seeking asylum in Germany because of political persecution in their home country, as refugees from civil war areas, receiving temporary protection under EU law, and finally as refugees with subsidiary protection because they are being threatened in their country of origin with torture or danger to life and limb. These differences have no bearing on the local integration policy since the basic needs of all these people are the same.

324

J. FRANZKE

the migration commissioner, the asylum coordinator, the social affairs director and the youth asylum coordinator. Nevertheless, the municipalities in Brandenburg still play a decisive role in integration policy. In general, their administrations are required to mobilise their own departments to implement the counties’ decisions. Additionally, they have an opportunity to pursue their own integration policy because the refugees are living in their territory and any concerns about their integration and potential conflicts between migrants and the native population have to be solved at the local level. The mayor, as chief administrative officer, head of municipal administration, municipal representative and the council’s political leader, is generally responsible for enforcing council policies, including the policy for integrating refugees. Besides this general responsibility, he can delegate professional responsibilities for the implementation of integration policy and coordination between the city council and other stakeholders, such as civil society, to a head of department within local administration or to other civil servants. The most important results of the research project are briefly summarised as follows: General approaches: Surprisingly, we found different perceptions of responsibility in our sample cities. In general, however, as in other European countries, the two afore-mentioned approaches—the ‘deficit approach’ and the ‘opportunity approach’—could be identified. Each approach has different types of consequences for administrative action. Firstly, in some cities in our sample, the administration, supported by the mayor, acts according to the motto: “Since we’re not competent but responsible for migrant integration, we’ll only do what is legally necessary”. This more or less passive policy focuses almost exclusively on the bureaucratic implementation of the counties’ constitutions, with the effect that municipal capacities required for integration are kept to a minimum. Under these circumstances, there is little need for coordination of activities in the policy field, either within city administrations or between them and other local stakeholders. There is also no need for a refugee coordinator. The second approach could be expressed by the motto: “We know we’re not competent, but we’ll do everything possible to take advantage of the situation”. Especially since 2015, in order to develop an active policy, administrations have been focusing on capacity building to develop and implement their own ideas of integrating refugees as well implement

17

INTEGRATING IMMIGRANTS: CAPACITIES AND CHALLENGES …

325

the counties’ decisions. The aim is to maximise the positive impact of migration in terms of boosting the local population and future economic development. The motivation to prevent conflicts between refugees and native inhabitants also plays a role. This approach particularly applies to those cities that have experienced a long era of population loss and now see, after many years of stagnation, a unique opportunity to put an end to this negative development with permanent migration. However, the extent to which this proactive integration policy achieves success depends on the understanding of integration. The traditional, conservative understanding of integration puts the onus on new arrivals to simply ‘adapt’ to the existing community, their rules and traditions. The more open and inclusive understanding of integration can be described as a ‘two-way process’, with policies encouraging openness, tolerance and constructive conversation on migrants and inclusion. Yet, within this understanding immigrants are often seen as a minority group (in the same way as the disabled, queer, socially disadvantaged, etc.) whose status should be improved and their discrimination tackled. In practice, mixing the approaches can take on many forms. Management of integration policy within city administration: In our sample, we could identify three models of how local integration policy is organised as an administrative task: (1) integration policy as a ‘top priority’ for the mayor (‘Chefsache’); (2) coordination through a special integration coordinator and (3) assignment of this task to a head of department in addition to other tasks. A specific refugee or integration coordinator or officer was introduced in four of the eight municipalities in our sample after migration increased in 2015: Luckenwalde, Oranienburg, Prenzlau and Senftenberg. Interestingly, in half of our cases, we found a difference between the official in-house distribution of responsibilities for local integration policy and the coordination role perceived by local stakeholders. The general political responsibility for this policy field, of course, remains with the mayor. But the organisational design and resourcing are very different. In Luckenwalde, Prenzlau and Senftenberg this demands a full-time position. In Oranienburg and Senftenberg, the refugee coordinators are employees working in the departments for education and social affairs who spend half their working time on refugee affairs. In Prenzlau, we found a distinct division of work between the refugee coordinator, who is responsible for all forms of administrative cooperation (e.g. cooperation in advisory councils, with administrations at county and federal

326

J. FRANZKE

state level, project development and implementation) and the honorary commissioner for foreigners (Ausländerbeauftragter), who is responsible for direct contact with the refugees. It turned out that refugee coordinators are mostly responsible for the in-house coordination of this policy area with the city council and other administrations. Coordination with civil society is rare, with the exception of Luckenwalde, where the coordinator seems to play a central role in local integration policy beyond the formal scope of this position. We found the first model in three cases (Rathenow, Beeskow and Seelow), where the mayor himself has taken over the coordination role in this policy field to the extent that there is no refugee coordinator. Only one city (Perleberg) followed the third model, where the task of integration policy management is assigned to the head of department of ‘education, social affairs, integration, youth and sport’. But the time he invests in this task is only about 15–20% of his working hours. In-house coordination: Within city administration, there are two different approaches for the internal coordination of refugee integration policy at the local level. In two of the cases in our sample, the city administration has set up special administrative bodies for this task. In Oranienburg, the steering group includes city council members and some district staff. In Perleberg, a special working group, ‘Integration’, managed by a department head, has been meeting since 2015 every six to eight weeks with all responsible civil servants, participants of the ‘Alliance for Family’, the ‘Arbeiterwohlfahrt ’, the Christian Youth Village in Germany, the Youth Migration Service, and with other eventrelated participants from city administration. In five of the cases, there were no specific administrative coordinating bodies for the local integration policy of refugees, but rather an informal exchange between the relevant employees (Beeskow, Senftenberg, Luckenwalde, Prenzlau and Rathenow). An incremental administrative culture prevails here, possibly because of the small size of the administrations. Finally, in the specific case of Seelow, the mayor and the employee responsible for refugee affairs meet regularly. In all the cases of our sample, the effectiveness of the coordination is generally regarded as very good by respondents from the municipal administrations (self-assessment). The municipal councillors on average view this similarly. In some cities, however, civil society representatives are more critical of the effectiveness of internal coordination within local administration, due mainly to the lack of transparency of responsibilities and activities.

17

INTEGRATING IMMIGRANTS: CAPACITIES AND CHALLENGES …

327

Local integration concept: In our sample, we surprisingly did not find any city that had a concept, strategy or mission statement (Leitbild) for local migration policy and the long-term treatment of migrants. This was justified by the respondents from the municipal administrations and the city councils above all on grounds of insufficient competences and resources, and the lack of references to appropriate county models. Nevertheless, the respondents in Beeskow reported that a ‘virtual concept’ exists, in other words a concept that is present in the minds of those responsible. Discussions on the creation of a local integration concept are currently taking place in Beeskow and Oranienburg. In the city administrations of Prenzlau, Seelow and Rathenow such a model is considered superfluous. Luckenwalde has developed instead a mission statement with an annual action plan in this policy area. In particular, many of the representatives of local civil society organisations interviewed recognise the importance of a mission statement, especially for specifying the objectives of the city’s migrant integration policy, defining the division of labour between the city administration, civil society and other stakeholders, and to provide a monitoring and evaluation policy framework. Key objectives of local integration policy: The objectives of local integration policy are similar in each city of the sample. The overarching goals are to (1) provide accommodation for refugees, (2) ensure opportunities to improve their German language skills and professional qualifications and (3) support their integration into the labour market. However, the city administrations are dependent on the cooperation with other institutions, such as for housing (with urban, cooperative and private housing associations), education and improvement in language skills (with schools, adult education centres—Volkshochschulen—and private education institutions) and for integration into the labour market (the regional job centres—Arbeitsagenturen)5 In our interviews, civil society representatives in particular mentioned that more attention should be given to the participation of refugees in local political and social life. Role of the city council: Surprisingly, in all of the cases in our sample the city councils, as a collective body, play only a minor role in local integration policy.6 The budget for all the additional costs of integrating 5 As a rule, regional job centers are common facilities between the German State Employment Agency and the respective municipality. 6 Individually, many council members are committed to integrating refugees into various local initiatives.

328

J. FRANZKE

refugees has, of course, to be prepared according to budgetary law. Apart from this, most of the councillors interviewed in the survey did not see any responsibility on the part of the city councils in this policy field due to the lack of competences. The need for a control function of the urban integration policy was also not recognised. The resolution adopted by Oranienburg city council on 23 February 2015 affirming a clear commitment to worldliness, tolerance and the fight against xenophobia as well as to the creation of the position of the city refugee coordinator was an exception. Beeskow city council took the decision using a special legislative procedure that refugees would live in decentralised accommodation. However, respondents from civil society expected to receive more support from the city councils. Role of civil society: In every city in our sample, the response of civil society initiatives to the challenges of the huge influx of refugees in 2015–2016 has been significant. A positive welcome culture by civil society has sprung up everywhere. Without the tireless efforts of these civil society organisations, the city administrations would not have been able to handle the problems of the incoming refugees. The initiatives are broadly targeted at helping people persecuted for political, ethnic or religious reasons, refugees and displaced persons, and at promoting a culture of tolerance and intercultural understanding. During the so-called refugee crisis of 2015–2016, however, the focus of their activities was primarily helping refugees. The municipal administrations in our sample are all still aware and fully appreciate the important role of civil society. This also applies to their active participation in promoting the long-term integration of refugees. In the meantime, since mid-2016 a decline in activities in most of the cities in our sample has been observed as refugee numbers have dramatically dropped. However, the organisational structures of the welcome initiatives, networks, clubs and autonomous civil society institutions continue to function reliably. In general, the role of civil society is shifting from the immediate short-term assistance to refugees to long-term support for integration into the labour market and the local community. In our sample of civil society initiatives for refugees we found examples of both centralised and decentralised structures. In four cities (Oranienburg, Perleberg, Senftenberg and Seelow), there is one major welcome initiative supporting refugees and other migrants. Of course, their efforts are supported by a large number of smaller clubs and individuals. In Rathenow, Luckenwalde, Beeskow and Prenzlau, we found a

17

INTEGRATING IMMIGRANTS: CAPACITIES AND CHALLENGES …

329

decentralised, pluralistic, but nevertheless integrated landscape of several welcome initiatives. As with any spontaneous initiative, the number of people actively engaged has dropped since mid-2016, but all the initiatives have stabilised in the meantime and are still ongoing today. In two of the cases in our sample, the refugee welcome initiatives have assumed the professional character of a ‘registered association’ (eingetragener Verein). Acquiring the status of a registered association was a necessary step to secure better funding for the work of the ‘refugees welcome’ initiatives. As a registered association, they are eligible to apply for grants. They can also arrange insurance protection and provide facilities (such as meeting points). As a registered body, they benefit from a number of tax advantages and are also entitled to receive tax-privileged donations. On the other hand, this professionalisation may lead to the loss of members who feel overwhelmed or are not ready to work in such structures. Additionally, there are differences of opinion about the extent to which such activities should be politicised. The ratio of city administrations to welcome initiatives was reported in our interviews as being generally good. The city administrations are aware that without the support of local civil society, the requirements for integrating refugees could not be met in the future. Notwithstanding, conflicts can arise. Thus, the administration in Perleberg reported tensions between them and the welcome initiatives. These mostly occur over differences in approaches, perspectives and interests. Civil society, in particular, has a single case perspective, whereas the administration has a law-oriented one. Most critically, the overall lack of coordination among civil society was also mentioned in several interviews, which can be a problem, especially in cities with decentralised welcome initiatives. Effectiveness of local integration policies: The self-assessment ratings of the respondents on the effectiveness of local integration policies varied somewhat between good in three cases and just satisfactory in four. Respondents from local administrations and local councils generally assessed policy performance to be better than the external stakeholders, especially from civil society. The effectiveness of local integration policies was considered to be particularly high where the mayor is perceived as being the central actor and external coordinator. In any event, at the time of our interviews in mid-2017, creating the post of refugee coordinator was no guarantee for a more effective local integration policy. The most important results of our research project are summarised in Table 17.2.

330

J. FRANZKE

Table 17.2 Indicators of local migrant integration policy in Brandenburg cases Main actors Internal Role of city in local coordination council administration within local administration Oranienburg Specific coordinator, mayor Senftenberg Specific coordinator Rathenow Mayor

Specific steering group Mainly informal Mainly informal

Luckenwalde Specific coordinator Prenzlau Specific coordinator Perleberg One head of department

Mainly informal Mainly informal Specific steering group Mainly informal Formal meeting with mayor

Beeskow

Mayor

Seelow

Mayor

Structure of civil society support for refugees

Type of integration policy by administration

Minor

Centralised

Mixed

Minor

Centralised

Active

Minor

Minor

Decentralised Passive; main actor civil society Decentralised More active

Minor

Decentralised Active

Minor

Centralised

Minor

Decentralised Active

Minor

Centralised

Active

Passive; main actor civil society

Source Own compilation based on interview data

Table 17.2 shows a very individual picture with few common patterns. Only the role the city council plays is considered in all cases as minor. We regard this as a shortcoming because a council’s decision to carry out a transparent and goal-oriented integration policy would strengthen the activities related to integrating refugees and encourage public support. However, our studies also showed that many councillors, as individuals, are very actively engaged in local ‘refugees welcome’ initiatives, thus underlining the traditionally dominant role played by administrations in local policy. The number of inhabitants seems to have little influence on local integration policy or on the number of administrative staff. Even in small cities, this has been well organised.

17

INTEGRATING IMMIGRANTS: CAPACITIES AND CHALLENGES …

331

It is rather the mayor’s ideas and attitudes, the strength of the local welcome initiatives and the political culture of the city that shape the local integration policy. These factors play an important role, as with all other local policies. We see here both advantages and disadvantages when it comes to successfully managing refugee integration. On the one hand, it is often more beneficial in smaller cities, as in our sample, to have direct discussions with citizens and thus be in a better position to understand their situation and address their concerns. However, internal coordination can become a challenge for small local administrations in these municipalities. Since typically only one or two employees are responsible for refugee affairs, this makes exchange within municipal administration difficult. ‘Individual fighters’ cannot expect to benefit from the knowledge of their colleagues and vice versa. In larger municipalities, on the other hand, the administrative capacity to deal with refugee affairs is greater, as is the opportunity to benefit from collaboration. It turned out that in most cities the mayors also played a dominant role in local integration policy, even when special refugee coordinators were used. Only in one case did the latter play a central role in this local policy area. Nevertheless, the innovative coordinators’ offices have created more favourable conditions for planning and implementing this cross-departmental task within city administration. On the other hand, with one exception (Luckenwalde), their involvement with civil society has been fairly limited. Particularly during the tapering off of the refugee crisis in 2015, new coordination structures between local administration and civil society began to emerge. These differ from city to city, but they all seem to be functional to this day. The high level of mutual trust that has been built up among all the local stakeholders involved in non-hierarchical governance forms a good and reliable basis for solving the problems of refugee integration into the local communities. The present findings confirm that further research on this topic is warranted because the local integration policies of the different migrant groups, including refugees are long-term ones. In addition, this directly affects the municipalities and their communities, which can lead to new conflicts. Finally, we expect further institutional learning processes in local public administration among its executives and employees. To sum up, the cities in our sample are not yet ‘integration machines’. However, on an administrative level, they coped very well with the large

332

J. FRANZKE

influxes of refugees in the years 2015 and 2016 and have built up a high level of civil society commitment. A variety of learning processes has taken place among the actors involved. The use of integration coordinators in city administrations is an innovative approach to migrant integration, which promises to be a good start for supporting the long-term process of integrating migrants into city societies.

References Alba, R. D., & Nee, V. (2003). Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Bendel, P., Schammann, H., Heimann, C., & Stürner, J. (2019). Der Weg über die Kommunen. Empfehlungen für eine neue Schlüsselrolle der Kommunen in der Flüchtlings- und Asylpolitik der EU (Eine Publikation der HeinrichBöll-Stiftung). Brettell, C. B., & Hollifield, J. F. (2000). Migration Theory; Talking across Disciplines. London and New York: Routledge. Caponio, T. (2014). The Legal and Political Dimension of Local Integration Policy (KING Project—Social Science Unit Desk Research Paper n. 9. Hg. v. ISMU Foundation). Online verfügbar unter http://king.ismu.org/wp-content/upl oads/Caponio_De-skResearch.pdf, zuletzt geprüft am, 7 November 2018. Caponio, T., & Borkert, M. (Eds.). (2010). The Local Dimension of Migration Policy. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Dekker, R., Emilsson, H., Krieger, B., & Scholten, P. (2015). A Local Dimension of Integration Policies? A Comparative Study of Berlin, Malmö, and Rotterdam. The International Migration Review, 49(3), 633–658. Deutsches Institut für Urbanistik. (2018). Vielfalt gestalten. Integration und Stadtentwicklung in Klein- und Mittelstädten. In Edition Difu. Stadt Forschung Praxis, Bd. 17, Berlin. EU-Commission/OECD. (2018). Report on the Local Integration of Migrants. Factsheet, see https://www.oecd.org/cfe/regional-policy/OECD-migrationlocal-factsheet.pdf. European Foundation for Democracy. (2018). Refugees in Europe, Review of Integration Practices & Policies, Brussel s. See http://europeandemocracy.eu/ wp-content/uploads/2018/05/2018-Refugees-In-Europe-Full-Version.pdf. Filsinger, D. (2009). Entwicklung, Konzepte und Strategien der kommunalen Integrationspolitik. In F. Gesemann & R. Roth (Eds.), Lokale Integrationspolitik in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft (pp. 279–296). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

17

INTEGRATING IMMIGRANTS: CAPACITIES AND CHALLENGES …

333

Franzke, J., Koszel, B., & Sakson, A. (Hrsg.). (2017). Migrationspolitik in Deutschland und Polen. Herausforderungen und Lösungsansätze in der europäischen Flüchtlingskrise. Potsdam Wissenschaftsverlag (Potsdamer Textbücher, Bd. 31). Garcés-Mascareñas, B., & Penninx R. (Eds.). (2016). Integration Processes and Policies in Europe (IMISCOE Research Series). https://doi.org/10.1007/ 978-3-319-21674-4_6. Heckmann, F. (2015). Integration von Migranten. Einwanderung und neue Nationenbildung. Wiesbaden: Springer VS Verlag (Springer Fachmedien). Joppke, C., & Morawska, E. (Eds.). (2003). Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States. London: Palgrave Macmillan. KGSt. (2005). Management kommunaler Integrationspolitik. Strategie und Organisation, Köln. OECD. (2018). Working Together for Local Integration of Migrants and Refugees. Paris: OECD Publishing. Penninx, R., Caponio, T., Garcés-Mascareñas, B., Protasiewicz, P., & Schwarz, H. (2014). European Cities and Their Migrant Integration Policies: A Stateof-the-Art Study for the Knowledge for Integration Governance (KING) Project (KING Project—Social Science Unit Overview Paper n.5. Hg. v). Penninx, R., & Garcés-Mascareñas, B. (2016). Integration Policies of European Cities in Comparative Perspective: Structural Convergence and Substantial Differentiation. Migracijske i etniˇcke teme, 32(2), 155–189. Penninx, R., & Garcés-Mascareñas, B. (2018). Integrationspolitik in europäischen Städten: strukturelle Konvergenz und substanzielle Differenzierung. In F. Gesemann, & R. Roth (Hrgs.), Handbuch Lokale Integrationspolitik (pp. 837–868). Wiesbaden: Springer VS verlag für sozialwissenschaften. Rhodes, R. A. W. (1997). Understanding Governance. Buckingham: Open University Press. Scholten, P. (2012). Beyond National Models of Integration? Rethinking Interconnectedness and Fragmentation in Dutch and French Integration Policies. In H. J. M. Fenger & V. J. J. M. Bekker (Eds.), Beyond Fragmentation and Interconnectedness (pp. 44–58). Amsterdam: IOS Press. Scholten, P., & Penninx, R. (2015). The multilevel governance of migration and integration in Europe. In R. Penninx, & B. Garcés-Mascareñas (Eds.), Integration of Migrants into What? Integration Policies in Europe (pp. 91– 108). Dordrecht: Springer. Scholten, P. W. A., & van Breugel, I. (Eds.). (2018). Mainstreaming Integration Governance: New Trends in Migrant Integration Policies in Europa. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Vetrovec, S. (Ed.). (2010). Migration; Critical Concepts in the Social Sciences. Vol. I, Theories. Routledge: London and New York. Vertovec, S., & Wessendorf, S. (Eds.). (2010). The Multiculturalism Backlash: European Discourses, Policies and Practices. London: Routledge.

CHAPTER 18

Conclusions: An Overview of Local Migrant Integration Policies in Europe Jochen Franzke and José M. Ruano de la Fuente

Migration to and within Europe is highly diverse, for both practical and legal reasons. It is spurred in part by the constitutional freedom that all European Union citizens have to move freely, settle down and take on a job within any EU member state. Certainly, this also includes immigration from outside Europe, including the admission of refugees and asylum seekers on humanitarian grounds and for reasons under international law. It is important to remember that refugees and asylum seekers constitute only one specific group of migrants. But what should not be overlooked is that this group of people, at least since 2015, has dominated public discussions and sometimes even academic debate on migration to and within Europe. Therefore, the analysis in this book focuses on this

J. Franzke (B) University of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany e-mail: [email protected] J. M. Ruano de la Fuente Department of Political and Administrative Sciences, Complutense University, Madrid, Spain e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 J. Franzke and J. M. Ruano de la Fuente (eds.), Local Integration of Migrants Policy, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50979-8_18

335

336

J. FRANZKE AND J. M. RUANO

DE

LA FUENTE

specific group of migrants. However, the conclusions on local integration policy can also generally be applied to other groups of migrants. The specific situation of 2015 with more than one million refugees arriving in Europe did not happen accidentally, but was rather the result of long-term trends in global migration. A number of internal side effects associated with European policy exacerbated the situation, such as the rise of far right-wing political parties and a kind of ‘asylum panic’ in many European countries. At EU level, we see the de facto collapse of the Dublin system on responsibilities for the treatment of asylum claims in 2015 and the ongoing inability to achieve long-term solutions for a joint European migration policy among the EU institutions. A lot of traditional media coverage, and especially that of some of the new social media, contributed to this situation because their discourse too often changed from an initial humanitarian and emphatic framing towards a more hostile or suspicious framing (see Koikkalainen et al. in this volume).

18.1 Interactions of National Migration Policy and Local Integration Policy In this book we examined the local migration policies in 12 EU member states and in two non-EU member states, Norway and Switzerland, which are nevertheless closely associated with the EU. The difficult task of analysing migrant local integration policies takes into account three important considerations. Firstly, they have been accustomed to very different traditions of national migration policy. They determine a high degree of path dependency in this policy field. These traditions also constitute the major features of the national legal systems for migration. In our sample, we analysed classic immigration countries like France and the Netherlands. Italy and Ireland are specific cases, because immigration started after 1990, relatively late compared to the rest of Europe. Germany is another special case because since the 1950s the country had indeed become de facto an immigration state, but officially refused to recognise this fact. It was only the consequences of the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015 that led to the de jure recognition of this status in 2018. Finally, we included the still under-explored group of central and eastern European counties, which started their transition to democracy and market economy after the end of communism in 1989, and which subsequently became EU members in 2004 and 2007, respectively. Our sample for this group includes Poland,

18

CONCLUSIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF LOCAL …

337

Slovenia, Romania and Croatia. These countries have been up and down in terms of migration. Until the collapse of communism, their borders were completely closed, which prevented almost every kind of migration. In the 1990s and 2000s, the contemporaneous emigration of many inhabitants to western European states and the immigration of foreigners to these countries started. In the 2010s, the situation changed yet again. Many former emigrants from these countries started to migrate back to their home countries, attracted by the improved standard of living and better conditions in the labour market (especially Poland). At the same time, public opinion and governmental policy was becoming more and more hostile towards any kind of influx of foreigners. The only exception in this group is Romania, which after joining the EU in 2007, and despite its low socio-economic level, is increasingly becoming a country of immigration. Second, our case studies differ in their political-administrative structure. In the sample, there are 11 unitary states, two cases of strongly decentralised countries at the regional level (i.e. Italy and Spain) and two federal states (Germany and Switzerland). This roughly corresponds to the distribution of governmental systems within the entire EU. The nature of the state structure naturally affects the degree of decentralisation and the extent of local autonomy. This also includes the competencies and scope of local authorities in the integration of migrants and their capacity for activities and innovations. Thus, in all the countries analysed, migration policy is the responsibility of the State administration, although this statement must be qualified insofar as the external borders of the countries in the Schengen area are common to all of them. Furthermore, the case studies contained in this work reflect how in federal and regionalised countries, intermediate governments (Länder, regions or cantons) play a very important role in the management and implementation of policies for the integration of immigrants and refugees, since, although the State Administration keeps its powers in the field of border control and immigration flows, intermediate governments are responsible for key services in social integration policies, such as education (except in Italy), health, housing or other social policies, resulting in processes of negotiation or interaction between levels of government of a multilevel nature. This scheme seems to be complicated, however, in the case of Switzerland by the peculiarities of its political system, based on consociationalism and direct democracy, which adds a factor of uncertainty to political decision-making and a risk

338

J. FRANZKE AND J. M. RUANO

DE

LA FUENTE

of political instrumentalisation of the immigration issue by political parties and organised social groups. The second group of countries is made up of the Scandinavian countries and The Netherlands, countries that have large local governments, with enough autonomy and strong institutional capacity that allow them to participate in the management and implementation of policies for the integration of immigrants. This relevant role of the municipal level is also present in the case of Ireland, even though its municipalities have few resources and a greater dependence on the central government. Although the municipalities in these countries retain a certain degree of autonomy that makes them key institutions in responding to the problems arising from immigration, in Sweden there is a flow of recentralization in favour of the State agency in charge and an important role for the counties in determining the quotas of immigrants destined for the country’s municipalities. Finally, it seems that the more centralised institutional design in the case of France and the Eastern European countries has allowed a topdown approach to the issue in the hands of the central government political authorities, so that the role of the municipalities is more residual in the cases of Slovenia, Romania, Croatia and, to a lesser extent, in the case of the large Polish cities. In the light of this analysis, it can be concluded that institutional design is more important for migration policies than the characteristics of the immigrant population itself. The third factor differentiates the way the states have been affected by the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015 and the migration that has persisted since then. This factor correlates strongly with the socio-economic development of the countries and regions concerned. We can differentiate between destination countries mostly in north and central Europe, which most refugees aim for because of their high standard of living, liberal immigration policy or easier access to citizenship. The second group comprises the transit countries in southern and south-eastern Europe, with Croatia, Slovenia, Romania and Poland in our sample. Because of their specific geopolitical position, Italy and Spain are both transit and destination countries.

18

CONCLUSIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF LOCAL …

339

18.2 Consequences of the so-Called Refugee Crisis of 2015 on Migration and Integration The so-called refugee crisis of 2015 has had major consequences for migration policy and integration policy in nearly all European countries. It was not the first deep cut of this kind, though, and it certainly will not be the last. During the ‘refugee crisis’, the issues of controlling, steering and limiting immigration, as well as better integrating refugees and asylum seekers into the existing society, became top political priorities in almost every European country. In some, this is still the case today. This trend also applies to the EU as a whole. Simultaneously, this topic remains one of the most controversial issues in the current internal political debate. Finding any compromises here seems to be getting more and more difficult, especially because apart from rational considerations, many elusive emotions and fears play a role as well. Immigration has also contributed to the revitalisation of rural regions, as shown in this volume with some examples from Norway and Germany. However, the many positive effects of migration, such as the increased supply of urgently needed skilled workers and new impulses to rural areas thus enhancing their economic development, are hardly acknowledged by the public. Yet, how the population views this issue varies considerably. Its willingness in general to accept immigrants outside of Europe rather than to reject them is still higher in most EU countries, especially since most of the west European old member states have their own immigration history that goes back decades, sometimes even centuries. The population has become accustomed to immigration and has learned to deal with the problems. But illegal and uncontrolled immigration is mostly not tolerated. It is worth noting that there is a sharp contrast between the attitudes of the population towards immigrants arriving from within the EU compared with those arriving from outside of Europe. While intra-European migration is considered as being mostly positive by more than half of respondents across EU member states, the feelings towards migrants from outside Europe are more polarised and mostly negative. Indeed, an EU average of only around one-third of respondents express a positive feeling towards immigration from outside the EU (Glorius 2018, pp. 18f., see also Glorius and Doomernik 2019). Perhaps this was the main reason for the great political pressure on some European countries to depart from the long-standing liberal,

340

J. FRANZKE AND J. M. RUANO

DE

LA FUENTE

migration-friendly course and focus more on the duties and expectations of migrants. But the political debate that has followed and the changing public opinion has led to more restrictive immigration policy in most EU member states. We see dramatic changes in the national migration policy of many European countries. Thus, Sweden’s immigration policy has moved from “being one of the most generous policies to the minimum EU level” (see country chapter on Sweden). The future of its migration policy remains unclear, but “a return to the past more liberal migration policy is unlikely” (see country chapter on Sweden). In other European countries, since 2015 migration and integration policy has been adjusted by new strategies, three examples being Ireland, Germany and Italy. On the other hand, Poland has so far refused to develop a new strategy. France has reacted with integration policy that takes the form of a contractualisation of relations between the state and local authorities. In Switzerland, the ‘integration rational-choice model’ has been readjusted and harmonised in accordance with the requirements of the Cantonal Integration Program 2014 and the Integration Agenda Switzerland 2018. In the Netherlands, “the multicultural ideal has come under pressure” (see country chapter on The Netherlands) and the view towards migrants has been getting more restrictive in recent years. In Slovenia too, a more restrictive policy can be observed, in particular the widening of the principle to deport refugees to the ‘safe’ neighbouring country of Croatia (see country chapter on Slovenia). The challenge to prepare as much as possible for a potential new influx of refugees and asylum seekers in the future has also influenced this debate. As a consequence, local authorities in European states are faced with the dictates imposed by more centralisation and state control of refugee integration policy. Adjustments to the division of responsibilities between the national state, regional and local authorities and civil society for the integration of new refugees are still being discussed in many countries, such as in Sweden and Norway, but are not finally decided. In other countries like Finland, local autonomy in this policy field has not yet been impaired. The main arguments for increased state involvement in local integration policies often cite their lack of quality and the need for common national standards. In some countries, the possible consequences of migration for the welfare state are being discussed, especially in Scandinavia with its universal model of social protection. Against this background, the vertical and horizontal coordination of all public actors is becoming increasingly important in migrant’s integration

18

CONCLUSIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF LOCAL …

341

policy. Firstly, in all the case studies the need to coordinate the actions of the different Ministries of the central Administration involved in migration policy is highlighted due to the transversal nature of this subject. But it also highlights the importance of implementing effective multilevel coordination measures, since the intervention of the different levels of government and the fragmented management of immigration end up resulting in different reception and integration measures between regions or municipalities that can only be explained by the institutional capacity of the Administration (Spain, Italy), the definition given to the concept of “integration” by the political authorities or the more or less reactive style of government (Switzerland) or even the political leadership of the mayor (Germany). This policy field is one of the ‘wicked’ administrative problems to be solved. First, the quality of vertical coordination of activities between the various political-administrative levels in the nation states is regaining importance, mainly between the central state, regional governments and local authorities. In some countries, this also applies to the coordination between the different tiers of local self-government, for example between the counties and municipalities in Germany. Major deficiencies in coordination had already been identified in the past. Second, the importance of building mutual trust between state and local actors is growing. In Sweden, “a significant level of distrust” has been shown to exist (see country chapter on Sweden). This is probably true for other countries as well. But the effectiveness of vertical coordination within local administrations is also crucial, especially in smaller municipalities.

18.3

Trends in Local Integration Policy

Local autonomy in migrant integration policy can be defined as “the responsibility and freedom to implement the kind of services that they see fit within the overall aims of national integration policy” (see Finland contribution), including policy framing, agenda setting, policy formulation and communication activities in response to specific local circumstances and needs. The persistent socio-economic challenges faced by municipalities in integrating migrants include housing (especially in municipalities with tight housing markets), the labour market (especially for immigrants and women with little education) and education (especially for unaccompanied children). In addition, second and third

342

J. FRANZKE AND J. M. RUANO

DE

LA FUENTE

generations of migrants get into focus of a more specific group-based integration policy. One goal of this book was to highlight the specific role of cities and municipalities in integrating migrants as well as their potential and the limits of autonomous policy decisions, which should be more than the mere implementation of the requirements of national or regional governments. According to data published in a special issue of Eurobarometer in 2018, the role of local and regional authorities in migrant integration policies is also seen by the public as being high. Here, however, only the de facto role is evaluated, not the real legal competences. In EU member states, more than 50% of respondents on average consider this role to be very important and app. 40% as important. If we look at the differentiation between the 12 member states of the EU analysed in this volume, this opinion is especially shared in Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, Spain, Finland and Slovenia (between 97% and 90%). In five countries of our sample (Romania, France, Italy, Croatia and Poland), more than one respondent in ten (10%) regard these institutions as not important for the integration of immigrants, with a particularly high proportion in Croatia (16%). It seems there are two reasons for this: first, the limited role of the municipalities in integration policy within the respective national state and, second, the national anti-immigration migration policy in some EU member states (TNS Opinion & Political 2018, p. 147). In most cases, municipalities or higher levels of self-government are responsible for implementing state decisions with regard to migrants, especially in housing, work and training. In addition, municipalities may regard integration policy as a voluntary task, for which there are different margins in European countries. In some cases, the refugee crisis has led to finding common solutions for the integration of refugees and other migrants through inter-municipal cooperation. The contributions in this book show some success factors for local migrant integration policies that can be generalised. The development and implementation of an integration strategy is advantageous, at least for multi-ethnic cities and those with a high proportion of foreigners. Informal arrangements are often sufficient in small to medium-sized municipalities (see thematic chapter by Franzke in this book). Of course, having sufficient financial resources for the local authorities is a necessary condition of a successful local integration policy, as well as creating the necessary institutional and human resources in local administration. When

18

CONCLUSIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF LOCAL …

343

implementing integration strategies at grassroots level, the respective policies should be tailored to the profile of both the local migrant community and the native population. Besides better migration management, having more evidence-based information and closer communication between local authorities and all inhabitants seems to be important, especially through social media channels. Also, the interaction of top-down and bottom-up efforts to integrate migrants is of importance. This includes local civil society institutions and networks, which actively supports local administrative activities to better integrate migrants, as well as migrant self-organisation within social organisations (such as parties, welfare organisations, churches and trade unions). The integration of migrants also includes encouraging their political participation in local civil society organisations and their selforganisation in their own interest groups to finally become “stakeholder citizens” (see country contribution on Finland). For example, in Norway, there are around 250 such immigrant organisations. Immigrants are still under-represented in the local councils. The same applies to local administrations, where cultural competence is continuing to improve. In general, it can be stated in the light of the contributions in this book that the involvement of civil society is very important (represented mainly through NGOs, non-profit entities or immigrant associations) and plays different roles according to each moment: as denouncers of problematic situations, as channels for the dissemination of the rights of the migrant population, as lobbies that try to influence the attitudes of governments and public opinion or as assistants or direct service providers either through their own resources or integrated in institutional structures in which they collaborate with public administrations in the implementation of programmes and policies. However, the role of these organizations seems to be weaker and less integrated in governance or co-production structures with public administrations in some Eastern European countries such as Slovenia, Romania and Poland, so they only play a supplementary and more assistance role. The contributions in this book show that there is considerable and, in some countries, increasing differentiation between different municipalities as far as the integration of migrants is concerned. Additionally, in this book, a series of good practice examples of local integration policies from the Netherlands, Switzerland, Ireland, Italy, Germany, Poland, among others, have been presented. In many cases, the municipalities are indeed the pioneers of migrant integration policy. In the majority

344

J. FRANZKE AND J. M. RUANO

DE

LA FUENTE

of cases, accepting refugees is a voluntary task, for example in Sweden, where “some municipalities took considerable responsibility while others did not” (see country chapter on Sweden). In Norway, studies show “considerable variations in integration outcomes for refugees, depending on the municipalities to which they were assigned” (see country chapter on Norway). Elaborating on the causes for the differing effectiveness of local integration policy should be a task for future social science research. There could be political reasons for refusing immigration in the counties and municipalities concerned, but inefficient resource management could also play a role.

18.4

Outlook

Our overview presents several implications and areas for further research on migrant integration policies, the challenges these policies are facing and the innovative solutions to address them. The consequences of migration law changes introduced since 2015 in many European countries for local integration policy, for example, have not yet been fully investigated. The same applies to in-depth studies on local integration policy and management, especially as far as cooperation between local stakeholders is concerned. Drawing on best practice elements should continue to play an important role, as it can be an approach to institutional learning on innovative solutions. Further examination of cities and towns that refuse to embark on integration policies would also be valuable. To date, such analyses are almost completely absent. We hope that our book has provided some inspiring suggestions for further research in this important area of societal politics. Through all these contributions, we hope our book provides some interesting and thought-provoking ideas and inspires further research in this important area of societal politics.

References Glorius, B. (2018). Public Opinion on Immigration and Refugees and Patterns of Politicisation Evidence from the Eurobarometer. CEASEVAL Research on the Common European Asylum System (06). Available at http://ceaseval.eu/ publications. Glorius, B., & Doomernik, J. (Eds.). (2019). Geographies of Asylum in Europe and the Role of European Localities (IMISCOE Research Series). Springer. TNS Opinion & Political. (2018). Special Eurobarometer 469, Integration of Immigrants in the European Union (At request of the European Commission, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs).

Index

A Agenda for Integration, 28, 340 Allocation of refugees, 44 Approaches, 1, 3, 5, 7, 78, 82, 95, 118, 119, 134, 138, 165, 174, 313, 315, 317, 324–326, 329 Asylum, 14, 16, 18, 28, 30, 38, 43, 46, 54, 55, 64, 65, 74, 75, 77, 100, 109, 112, 123, 126, 127, 142, 145–150, 152, 153, 157, 164, 171, 174, 175, 178, 179, 183, 184, 190, 192, 206, 231, 233–235, 238, 249, 252, 254, 265, 267, 269–272, 276, 279, 289, 295, 299, 324 Asylum seeker, 1, 13, 15–18, 22, 25–27, 30, 35, 40, 43, 48, 55, 59, 63–65, 90, 97–102, 109, 111–114, 118, 119, 125, 126, 132, 134, 138, 141–143, 145, 147–157, 159, 160, 162–166, 170, 186, 203, 204, 209, 210, 218, 224, 235, 236, 240–242,

250, 254, 262, 267, 269, 270, 272, 274, 275, 278, 281, 282, 285–287, 289–292, 298, 300, 302, 312, 323, 335, 339, 340 Autonomous Communities, 248, 252, 256, 258

B Black Sea, 232, 237, 242

C Cantonal Integration Programs (CIP), 74, 76–79, 81 Cantonal Offices for Migration, 78 Capacity building, 130, 223, 324 Capacity(ies), 5, 8, 20, 21, 47, 81, 138, 154, 156, 217, 222, 223, 225, 229, 235, 238, 254, 256, 258, 270, 275, 312, 313, 318, 319, 324, 331, 337, 338, 341

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. Franzke and J. M. Ruano de la Fuente (eds.), Local Integration of Migrants Policy, Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50979-8

345

346

INDEX

Central government, 16, 78, 128, 247, 253, 264, 267, 275, 281, 282, 313, 338 Challenges, 1–6, 8, 12, 25–27, 39, 40, 46, 47, 60, 67, 78, 87, 100, 101, 115, 124, 135–137, 166, 173, 179, 190, 232, 238, 239, 241, 243, 247, 249, 262, 291, 295, 298, 302, 304, 311, 313, 315–317, 328, 331, 340, 341, 344 Civic orientation, 19, 21, 23, 28 Civil society, 4, 6, 7, 25, 29, 30, 41, 48, 82, 116, 117, 129, 132, 158, 162–164, 166, 176, 191, 240, 241, 248, 314–316, 318, 320, 324, 326–329, 331, 332, 343 Consociationalism, 74, 77, 79, 82, 83, 337 Constitution, 8, 20, 57, 77, 109, 112, 126, 176, 203, 204, 252, 277, 278 Control over the immigration, 43 Cooperation, 4, 6, 13, 18, 25, 48, 59, 78, 101, 103, 116, 173, 179, 181, 182, 220, 223, 229, 236, 237, 248, 314, 316, 320, 327, 342, 344 local stakeholders, 312 Coordination, 4, 8, 21, 25, 46, 99, 103, 116, 160, 162, 163, 177, 206, 221, 254, 272, 279, 313, 315, 316, 320–322, 324–326, 329, 331, 341 horizontal, 47, 116, 340 vertical, 47, 116, 341 Co-organisation, 162 County Administrative Boards, 15, 21, 22, 26 Crisis, 1, 3, 4, 16, 25, 35, 38, 40, 44, 64, 65, 75, 98, 114, 115, 118, 145, 146, 170, 172, 174, 179,

183, 186, 187, 191, 203, 206, 207, 216, 218, 231–233, 235, 250, 251, 261, 286, 288, 293, 294, 297, 300, 316, 336, 342 Croatia, 7, 205–207, 210, 215–221, 228, 229, 337, 338, 340, 342 Croatian asylum system, 219 Cross-department coordination, 4 D Decentralization, 12, 14, 17, 19, 20 Demography, 4, 36, 45, 63, 67, 102, 116, 154, 180, 216, 233, 246, 267, 322, 323 Direct democracy, 74, 77, 79, 80, 82, 83, 337 Diversity, 6, 7, 36, 40, 41, 43, 82, 127, 134–136, 138, 139, 182, 216, 289, 304, 315 Dublin Regulation, 172, 203, 282 E Economic crisis, 125, 205, 216, 245, 246, 248, 251 Education, 4, 6, 14, 27, 44–46, 49, 57, 60, 78, 90, 103, 110, 115, 116, 125, 127, 132, 135, 137, 138, 148, 154, 159, 164, 176, 182, 187, 188, 190, 192, 207, 220–223, 226, 233, 236, 247, 248, 252, 253, 256–258, 278– 280, 289, 292, 319, 325–327, 337, 341 Emigration, 53, 62, 107, 123, 170, 171, 173, 180, 216, 217, 228, 252, 292, 313, 337 Establishment Measures for Newly Arrived Immigrants Act, 14 Establishment reform, 14, 25 EU policy, 13, 232 Europeanization, 219

INDEX

F Family reunification, 14, 17, 65, 75, 143, 149, 175, 177, 221, 253, 257, 278, 280, 315 Federalism, 74, 77, 78, 82, 83, 138 Federal level, 73, 74, 81, 82, 111 Federal states, 110, 112–116, 118, 313, 321–323, 326, 337 Final goal, 2, 316 Finland, 7, 53–65, 67, 289, 292, 297, 298, 340–343 Forced migrants, 171, 174, 177–179, 190 Foreigners, 2, 25, 63, 80, 90, 109, 110, 112, 116, 142, 144–149, 151, 153, 156, 158, 159, 164, 170–182, 192, 202, 203, 220, 221, 235–237, 245, 247, 250, 254, 255, 257, 264, 279, 323, 326, 337, 342 France, 7, 141–146, 148, 149, 151, 153, 156–158, 163, 249, 287, 336, 338, 340, 342 G German immigration policy, 108, 111, 118 Germany, 7, 38, 78, 88, 107–112, 114–119, 162, 170, 191, 218, 249, 287, 289, 294, 297–299, 301, 304, 312, 318, 326, 336, 337, 339–343 Good practice, 47, 83, 87, 100, 103, 124, 133, 170, 179, 180, 232, 343 H Horizontal coordination. See Coordination, horizontal Housing, 4, 13, 14, 18, 22–26, 30, 42–45, 100–103, 115,

347

131, 136–138, 148, 154, 155, 159–166, 178, 182, 209, 220, 223, 224, 247, 248, 252–258, 271, 279, 280, 319–321, 327, 337, 341, 342 I Immigrant integration, 55, 57–59, 66, 67, 135, 259, 311, 313, 316, 317, 319 Immigration, 2, 12, 13, 15, 18, 29, 35, 36, 38–45, 48, 54, 55, 59, 60, 63–65, 74–76, 80, 88, 107–110, 112, 114–119, 123, 124, 127, 128, 134–138, 141, 142, 144–148, 169–171, 173–176, 181–183, 186, 189, 191, 204, 216–218, 224, 225, 228, 234, 235, 238, 247, 249– 254, 256, 257, 259, 261–265, 278, 279, 281, 282, 287–292, 295–303, 311, 312, 315, 317, 318, 335–339, 341, 344 Immigration law, 109, 111, 119 Immigration policy, 12, 18, 39, 40, 43, 54, 92, 111, 113, 127, 145, 173–175, 247, 250, 253, 258, 313, 314, 338, 340 German, 108, 111, 118 Implementation, 3, 4, 8, 21, 23, 41, 42, 44, 47, 49, 76, 78–82, 112, 113, 116, 124, 130, 133, 136, 137, 144, 151, 161–164, 166, 173, 175, 177, 182, 184, 189, 191, 217, 220–223, 229, 232, 234, 235, 238, 240, 253, 256, 274, 275, 279, 316, 319, 324, 326, 337, 338, 342, 343 Individual Integration Programmes (IIPs), 174, 177–179 In-house coordination, 312, 316, 326 Innovations, 67, 133, 138, 312, 337

348

INDEX

Institutionalization, 25, 41, 42, 173 Integration, 2, 5–7, 12, 14, 16, 21, 22, 24, 25, 28, 29, 35, 38–41, 43, 44, 46, 47, 49, 50, 58, 60, 61, 67, 92, 97, 99, 100, 102, 103, 110, 112, 114, 126, 130, 143, 151, 161, 162, 218, 220, 225, 227, 229, 242, 256, 277, 302, 313, 316, 317, 327 activities, 58, 59, 66, 67, 130, 131, 170, 174, 176, 178, 180, 192, 222, 228, 238, 315 concept, 113, 312, 318, 327 of refugees, 15, 22, 30, 43, 119, 153, 154, 160, 161, 163–166, 220, 221, 223, 224, 226, 235, 237, 241, 281, 328, 342 Integration policy, 1, 3–5, 7, 8, 12–14, 24, 40, 42–44, 46, 49, 56–58, 66, 102, 108, 112–116, 127, 129, 130, 150, 151, 164, 165, 173–181, 217, 220, 221, 224, 228, 229, 232, 238, 242, 312, 313, 315–318, 320, 324–328, 330, 339–343 local, 4, 49, 115, 181, 224, 312, 316, 318, 321, 322, 325–327, 329–331, 336, 342, 344 of migrants, 5, 216 Introduction guide, 20 Introduction programme, 14, 19–21, 23, 27, 43–47, 50 Irregular immigration, 75, 248, 250, 264

L Labour market, 6, 13–16, 19, 21–25, 27, 29, 35, 40, 42, 45, 46–48, 50, 54, 57, 60, 61, 66, 67, 74, 75, 77, 110, 112, 115, 118, 127, 137, 138, 141, 159, 160, 176,

180, 182, 216, 250, 253, 258, 302, 314, 327, 328, 337, 341 Labour migrants, 35, 75, 88, 90, 95, 125, 216 Law and Justice (PiS), 179, 183, 190 Legal-political dimension, 6 Local authority, 1, 3, 4, 6–8, 43, 110, 112–114, 125, 126, 130–136, 138, 139, 142, 151, 154, 160, 162–166, 170, 175, 177–182, 191, 222, 262, 264, 267–269, 272–275, 278–280, 282, 311, 313–316, 318–320, 337, 340–343 Local autonomy, 7, 13, 44, 49, 50, 337, 340, 341 Local community, 22, 49, 133, 182, 203, 207, 208, 226, 229, 256, 328 Local government, 5, 13, 17, 22, 29, 115, 116, 123, 124, 130–133, 135–138, 166, 177, 180, 203, 206, 208, 211, 217, 219, 221–225, 247, 248, 253, 257, 278, 279, 338 Sweden, 12 Long-lasting process, 316

M Management of migration, 119, 201 Migrant quotas, 209 Migration policy, 2, 7, 12, 15, 17, 18, 29, 79, 80, 87, 93, 96, 99, 112, 113, 118, 119, 123, 124, 126–130, 132, 135, 137, 145, 146, 208, 210, 219, 220, 228, 231, 232, 235, 236, 238, 247, 287, 296, 321, 336, 339, 342 multi-dimensional, 138 Migration trends, 124, 202, 217, 220, 286

INDEX

Minority group, 13, 63, 92, 185, 319, 325 Moral panic, 170, 182, 185, 186, 192 Multi-confessionalism, 216 Multi-culturalism, 216, 225 Multi-ethnicity, 216 Multi-level federal system, 111, 113 Multi-level governance, 2, 78, 272, 316 Municipality, 12, 13, 21–23, 26, 28, 41, 43, 44, 46, 47, 49, 56, 58, 59, 66, 80, 100–103, 178, 182, 206–211, 248, 253, 254, 257, 302, 319, 322

N National scheme, 150, 154, 164 National strategy, 116, 163, 165 Newly arrived refugees, 14–16, 19, 21, 22, 26, 28, 29 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), 134, 138, 162, 170, 174, 176–182, 191–193, 207, 221, 223, 225, 229, 236, 237, 241, 247, 248, 253, 254, 259, 281, 320, 321, 343 Non-state bodies, 132 Norway, 7, 35, 36, 38–40, 43–45, 47–49, 55, 312, 336, 339, 340, 343, 344

O Official Swedish Commission on the Reception of Refugees, 22, 25, 30

P Poland, 7, 35, 36, 93, 116, 169–181, 183, 185–191, 287, 292, 336–338, 340, 342, 343

349

Principles and values, 124, 129 Public debates, 23, 35, 39, 45, 90, 92, 96, 117, 220, 292, 303, 304 Public Employment Service, 13, 14, 18–21, 23, 24, 29, 58, 158, 159

R Reception of Newly Arrived Immigrants for Settlement Act, 22 Refugee reception, 12, 15–17, 20–23, 25, 28, 54, 254, 255 Refugee(s), 1, 3–5, 7, 8, 13, 15–18, 22, 24, 25, 35, 45–47, 49, 54, 55, 59, 63, 65, 74, 77, 96, 97, 109, 112, 115, 117, 118, 123, 133, 142, 147, 150–154, 158, 160, 162, 164, 170, 174, 177, 178, 184–188, 190–192, 209, 217, 219, 224, 234, 239, 287, 294, 300, 317, 322, 324, 325, 327, 328, 331, 344 of allocation, 44 Regional level, 21, 59, 337 Residence permits, 16–19, 21, 22, 55, 100, 142, 144, 146, 148, 157, 171, 258, 270, 274, 278, 315

S Slovenia, 7, 201–204, 206–211, 218, 292, 337, 338, 340, 342, 343 Socio-cultural dimension, 6 Socio-economic dimension, 6 Stakeholders, 4, 47, 77, 109, 136, 158, 176, 220, 247, 315, 318, 320, 324, 325, 327, 329, 331, 344 State engineering, 41 Sweden, 7, 12–15, 17, 18, 21, 23–26, 28, 29, 36, 38, 53, 63, 64,

350

INDEX

191, 292, 294, 297, 312, 338, 340–342, 344 Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR), 28, 29 Swedish for Immigrants (SFI), 21, 23, 28 Swedish Migration Agency (SIV), 13–16, 18, 26 Swedish National Audit Office, 16 Switzerland, 7, 55, 73, 75–80, 82, 83, 312, 336, 337, 340, 341, 343

T Temporary border control, 15 The Reception of Asylum Seekers Act, 16

U Ukraine, 181, 182, 190, 191, 286 Ukrainians, 171, 190, 191 Unaccompanied minors, 14–16, 21, 28, 156, 254, 268, 272, 276 UN 1951 Refugee Convention, 173, 203 V Vertical coordination. See Coordination, vertical W Warsaw, 171, 172, 176, 180, 181 Welfare state, 13, 23, 40, 42, 45, 49, 54, 56, 57, 63, 66, 75, 95, 178, 340 Welfare system, 61, 75, 275, 277 Whole of Sweden Strategy, 13