Local Governments and Their Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain 9780773576469

Table of contents :
Contents
Figures
Tables
Preface
1 Autonomous Intergovernmental Spain
2 Local Governments in Intergovernmental Processes
3 Building Federal Spain: The Autonomous Communities
4 Integrating Local Governments into the State of Autonomies
5 Intergovernmental Financing: The Ties that Bind
6 Intergovernmental Politics and Actions
7 International-Intergovernmental Dimensions
8 Policy Networks in Local Government: Three Case Studies
9 Reform and the Challenges of Urban Governing
10 Accomplishments and Challenges
Appendices
A: 1977–2005: A Post-Franco Intergovernmental Chronology: Events, Actions and Agreements
B: Notable Changes to Law 7/1985
C: Major Changes to Local Financing Law
D: LRAU: Explained by a Spanish Lawyer
References
Index
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
W
Y
Z

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LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR INTERGOVERNMENTAL NETWORKS IN FEDERALIZING SPAIN

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Local Governments and Their Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain ROBERT AGRANOFF

McGill-Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston London Ithaca G

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© McGill-Queen’s University Press 2010 isbn 978-0-7735-3616-6 (cloth) isbn 978-0-7735-3623-4 (paper) Legal deposit first quarter 2010 Bibliothèque nationale du Québec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper that is 100% ancient forest free (100% post-consumer recycled), processed chlorine free McGill-Queen’s University Press acknowledges the support of the Canada Council for the Arts for our publishing program. We also acknowledge the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Book Publishing Industry Development Program (bpidp) for our publishing activities. Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Agranoff, Robert Local governments and their intergovernmental networks in federalizing Spain / Robert Agranoff. Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 978-0-7735-3616-6 (bound). – isbn 978-0-7735-3623-4 (pbk.) 1. Central-local government relations – Spain – History. 2. Decentralization in government – Spain – History. I. Title. js6311.a27 2010

320.80946

c2009-904080-8

Typeset by Jay Tee Graphics Ltd. in 10.5/13 Sabon

Contents

Figures vii Tables ix Preface xi 1 Autonomous Intergovernmental Spain

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2 Local Governments in Intergovernmental Processes

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3 Building Federal Spain: The Autonomous Communities

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4 Integrating Local Governments into the State of Autonomies 5 Intergovernmental Financing: The Ties that Bind 6 Intergovernmental Politics and Actions

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7 International-Intergovernmental Dimensions

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8 Policy Networks in Local Government: Three Case Studies 9 Reform and the Challenges of Urban Governing 10 Accomplishments and Challenges

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appendices a 1977–2005: A Post-Franco Intergovernmental Chronology: Events, Actions and Agreements 271 b Notable Changes to Law 7/1985

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c Major Changes to Local Financing Law d lrau Explained by a Spanish Lawyer References 283 Index 303

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Figures

1.1 Spain’s Governmental Units

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2.1 Thirty-one Instruments of Intergovernmental Relations 2.2 Intergovernmental Management Practices

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2.3 Sixty-three Economic Development Policy/Program Tools 2.4 Expansion of a Spanish City’s Industrial Park 3.1 Distribution of Normative Powers

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51

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3.2 Institutional Arrangements Related to Intergovernmental Relations 70 3.3 Autonomous Community Organization 4.1 Basic Law on Local Government

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4.2 A Classical City Government Administrative Model

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4.3 Organization Chart: City Council of Balsareny (Catalonia) 4.4 Organization Chart: City Council of Tudela (Navarra) 4.5 Organization Chart: City Council of Lérida (Catalonia)

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101 102

4.6 Organization Chart: Personnel Area, City Council of Badajoz (Estremadura) 103 5.1 Ley 39/1988, Reguladora de las Haciendas Locales (Regulation of Local Finance) de 28 de diciembre de 1988 (lrhl) 135 7.1 The Labyrinth of European Union Administration in Spain

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Figures

7.2 European Charter on Local Self-Government (Excerpts)

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8.1 Selected Jávea Infrastructure and Public Works Projects

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9.1 What Is Pacto Local?

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9.2 femp-State Accord on a New Local Finance Commission 9.3 Proposed Local Government Home Rule Reforms

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Tables

4.1 Census of Spanish Governmental Units

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4.2 Municipal Services Production and Provision, All Valencia Municipalities, 1991 111 4.3 Municipal Services Production and Provision, Valencia Municipalities, under 5,000 Inhabitants, 1991 112 4.4 Municipal Services Production and Provision, Valencia Municipalities, 5,000 to 20,000 Inhabitants, 1991 113 4.5 Municipal Services Production and Provision, Valencia Municipalities, of more than 20,000 Inhabitants, 1991 114 4.6 Characterization of Larger and Smaller Cities

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5.1 Main Autonomous Community Financing Mechanisms (percentages) 131 5.2 Revenue Sources, by Population Size of Municipalities and for Other Subnational Governments 139 5.3 Relative Importance of ac Transfers (2002)

142

5.4 Budget/Spending Classifications of ac and Local Entities, 2002 (percentages) 144 5.5 Budget Summary for a Small Municipality

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5.6 Budget Summary for a Large Municipality

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6.1 Major Parties in Municipal Elections

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Tables

6.2 Evolution of the Political Parties in Municipal (me) and General Elections (ge) 152 9.1 Local Government Empowerment Reform

239

9.2 Local Government Management Reforms

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9.3 Local Government Partnerships

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9.4 Local Democracy Reform Instruments

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Preface

This work emanates from a larger project at iigr-Queen’s University on the role of cities in multilevel systems, federal and federalizing. As a result of my years of teaching and researching u.s. intergovernmental relations (igr), in the u.s. and since 1990 in Spain, plus my work on local governments’ horizontal and vertical connections, I was asked to be the representative scholar for Spain. It allowed me to move from doctoral professor and research advisor to in-the-field scholar in Spain for the first time in nearly a decade, to learn how governing has evolved, and to confirm my suspicions that, similar to the United States, Spain is a highly intergovernmentalized country. This book represents a more intensive analysis than my chapter “Local Governments in Spain’s Multilevel Arrangements” in the project report book, Spheres of Governance: Comparative Studies of Cities in Multilevel Governance Systems, edited by Harvey Lazar and Christian Leuprecht (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007). My fascination with the complexity and ambiguity of Spain’s overlapping multijurisdictional intergovernmental system began when I first took residence at the Instituto Ortega y Gasset in 1990. I thought no system could be as ambiguous and challenging as that of the u.s. For a country roughly one-fifth the size of the u.s. in population, it clearly provided a fertile field, with some 12,000 or so “countable” governments, subgovernments, and special arrangements, not to speak of the innumerable effects of multi-level governance, ranging from the European Union to the myriad of municipal corporations, off-budget arrangements, and contracts for services. Like my home country, my country of part-time

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residence is a cacophony of government-to-government transactions that demonstrate some promise of patterning and explanation. From the local perspective, the aim of this book is to explain these patterns and to demonstrate the place of local government in federal, decentralized post-Franco Spain. As the book focuses on the igr of local governments, their autonomous community and central government connections are emphasized rather than a general analysis of local governments. Their basic services, organization and administrative structures, legal position, and finance structures are only covered insofar as they have a bearing on igr. Unfortunately, basic works on local governments in Spain are not of as much interest as autonomous communities are, and most of these works are available only in Spanish. Many persons were helpful in making this project come to fruition. Professors Robert Young of the University of Western Ontario, Harvey Lazar of Queen’s University, and Christian Leuprecht of the Canadian Royal Military College launched the project and provided many helpful suggestions on the early draft of the manuscript. In particular, I want to thank Harvey Lazar for encouraging me to expand the chapter into a book-length manuscript. Several academics read the manuscript in first and second draft form: Xavier Ballart of Autonoma-Barcelona, Luis Moreno of ciesMadrid, Michael Pagano of University of Illinois-Chicago, Juan Antono Ramos of University of Juan Carlos of Madrid, and Manuel Villoria of Ortega y Gasset. The anonymous readers also added to the depth of the manuscript. Juan Manuel Pedroza was my research assistant on this project for two academic years. He went beyond the normal assistant duties, translating documents, joining me in discussions in the field in Spain, summarizing Constitutional Tribunal decisions, and writing the initial draft of the courts and autonomy section in chapter 4. Clara Velasco of the Administrative Law Department, University Pompeu Fabru, Barcelona, recommended the cases. When Pedroza left Indiana University, Sergio Villamayor Tomas filled in and helped put some of the finishing touches on data and translation. I also want to acknowledge the many discussions I have had with my Spanish friends, William Jackson and Carmelina Valiente, who have steered me towards reasonable paths on many occasions. None of these persons, however, is responsible for translation errors or misjudgments in the text, which are entirely due to the author’s Spanish, which was learned late in life.

Preface

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Three persons deserve credit for manuscript preparation: faculty assistants Kim Evans, Deborah Lorenzen, and Patricia Withred. They made it possible to get so many words on the page and were unbelievably patient. The School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, deserves acknowledgment for all the support for an emeritus professor to keep working. Finally, I want to acknowledge the patience and support of my wife, Susan Klein, to whom this book is dedicated, for her help and, most importantly, for her tolerance of my post-retirement professional wanderings while in Spain. Bloomington, Indiana, u.s.a. Jávea (Alicante), Spain

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LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR INTERGOVERNMENTAL NETWORKS IN FEDERALIZING SPAIN

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rgovernmental ts/Intergovernmental Spain Networks in Federalizing Spain

1 Autonomous Intergovernmental Spain

Federal arrangements in post-Franco Spain present a model of how intergovernmental relations facilitate decentralization in new democracies. This story, however, reaches far beyond the familiar one of Basque, Catalan, and Galician nationalism, and even the building of autonomous communities. Autonomy has opened up a series of subnational government dynamics, involving a host of complex intergovernmental linkages, partnerships, and transactions. The operations of complexes of networks, primarily at the elected official and administrator level, are contributing to making government and governing work. This book examines Spanish local governments, particularly municipalities, as they engage other local governments, nongovernmental organizations, and second-tier and central government entities in their operations of services and programs in basic and emergent policy arenas. The transformative process of federal development in Spain involves substantial interactions that include its local governments, a premise easily overlooked in the building of a state made up of autonomous communities. Political inertia and media coverage focuses on regional nationalist conflicts, particularly between Madrid and the Basques and the Catalans over questions of autonomy. Internal attention has been directed to questions of the locus of power, focused on the building of the seventeen autonomous governments vis-à-vis the government of the state in Madrid. Somewhere within these communities are nearly ten thousand Spanish local governments that are also constitutionally autonomous, particularly in the sense of the objective of representing their citizens. Within their jurisdictions they deliver the basic services, develop

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Local Governments/Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain

local land, promote their economies, and focus attention on their neediest populations. While autonomous in some legal ways, the local governments do not operate in isolation. They are highly interactive and dependent on one another, as well as on their autonomous community and the central government in Madrid. The focus of this study is on these local government interactions and the place of intergovernmental relations affecting Spain’s post-Franco municipalities, provinces, and special governments as they interact within this increasingly federal country. Nearly thirty years after Spanish democracy became a reality local governments have been discovered, now appearing on the radar screen as viable and worthy of public attention. Long lost in the overall political power struggle, underfinanced and facing rising services expectations, for years they were mostly associated with life’s amenities or lack thereof, despite a highly urbanized social order. This changed by the middle of the first decade of the century, when the national newspaper El País (2006) ranked local government corruption as the number two story of that year, behind the aborted attempt at peace with the Basque terrorist group eta and ahead of the number three story on the arrest of several 11 March 2004 bombing accomplices. In regard to local government, the lead focused on the municipal government of Marbella, where over seventy government officials, politicians, business people, and lawyers have been arrested or detained. “Marbella was until 1992 a municipality beneath suspicion. Now it is nationally symbolic of corruption and urbanistic scandals, a notable affliction in some parts of Spain” (58). As gross violations of the legal code of conduct in several other identified cities are cited, El País concludes that “In these locations, the exercise of politics practised is a cause for embarrassment to their citizens, who have suffered” (62). Corruption is not the situation in every city, and it is clearly not what Spanish academics, local officials, and local government advocates envisioned for their long-standing reform agenda. That involves strengthening local governing and financing powers in a system that has focused on building the second, or intermediate regional tier, in a rapidly federalizing system. Local governments definitely have a place in this system and it is that place and its interactions with other governments in this federalizing democracy, corruption or not, that captures attention here.

Autonomous Intergovernmental Spain

5

transformation since 1975 Every Spanish city and town has some claim to the country’s history and to a considerable degree experiences a distinction that the local inhabitants feel entitles them to a substantial measure of autonomy. For example, Agilar de la Frontera in Andalucia, some thirty miles south of Cordoba, lies in bare rolling country on the edge of the campiña, or open country. Near its edge stands the ruins of a famous castle, Castillo de Polai, which stands for the town’s historical name. After the reconquest of Cordoba in 1236 it became one of the principal fortresses protecting Christian forces from Moorish raids. It figures in several Spanish ballads, and its counts were high in the order of Andalusian nobility (Brenan 1951, 47–8). Its mudejar churches and buildings stand as a living testimony to the history of this now agricultural town. This, as in most other Spanish towns, continues a long tradition of “effective independence” or patria chica (Velasco 1989) that reaches far back into Spanish history (Herr 1971, 41) and has to some extent resisted those centralizing impulses of absolutist monarchy, military dictatorship, and democratic parliamentary monarchy to harness them. No country has intergovernmentalized as rapidly as democratic Spain during its recent decades of democratization and decentralization. The post-Franco government system has moved to a federal system in virtually all but name, bringing autonomy to regional and local governments, with powers constitutionally divided regionally and centrally between the government of the state and that of autonomous community (ac) governments. (Note that ac, autonomous community, and regional government are used interchangeably throughout this book.) In Spain, this condition is called the estado de las autonomías or state made up of autonomies. The division is constantly evolving. An emerging concern in the decentralization process is the autonomy and powers of local governments, particularly municipalities and provinces, which to considerable degrees have been overlooked in the reform process. Also of local concern is their place in the intergovernmental system. As state and autonomous community powers became more established, however, a movement toward a “second decentralization” or Pacto Local emerged in the mid1990s, particularly in the large cities where most Spaniards live.

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Local Governments/Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain

This movement focused on refining the autonomous power roles and responsibilities of local governments, clarifying their democratic role, and enhancing their revenue powers. The development of Spain’s contemporary federal arrangements is, of course, integral to the entire process of the transition from dictatorship to democracy. The transition is a story that has been told many times and is the subject of considerable historical study. The transition marked an abrupt jump into modernity after forty years of official, traditional conservatism, the cultural shock of the sudden end of the atraso (backwardness) (Carr and Fusi 1981, viii). It was, as Gilmour (1985, x) suggests, a process of overcoming their anachronistic regime. “By 1975 democratic government was no longer simply a remote aspiration for Franco’s veteran opponents: it was both the natural development of the country, and the one demanded by a large majority of the Spanish people.” In an earlier study of the Spanish brand of federalism, the author (Agranoff 1996) concluded that federal evolution was based on five principles: 1) “differentiation” of a unitary state into a process of gradual adaptation of federal arrangements; 2) building of regional powers based on gradual agreements; 3) democracy and territorial decentralization as complementary processes; 4) federal arrangements adopted and utilized being instrumental in solving centreperiphery conflicts; and 5) federal construction complementing the development of the Spanish welfare state, particularly as Spain accommodated itself to the expectations of the European Union. In these respects Spain’s transformation was characteristic of Elazar’s (1996) post-modern federalism. While some quarters do indeed dispute whether Spain is federal because its constitution has some unitary features and does not establish a federation, this question is probably less important than those relating to the efficacy of its arrangements in meeting its governing challenges (Agranoff 1993; Moreno 2001). Aja (2003, 97) concludes that constitutional guarantees and norms, the ac statutes of autonomy, interpretations of the Constitutional Tribunal, and many forces in governing make the Spanish autonomous state “equivalent in structure and power to actual federal states,” despite the fact that the “Constitution does not use that terminology.” Moreover, Moreno (2001, 5; also 1997) suggests that what is different about Spain’s federalization is that it “has developed in an inductive manner, step by step.”

Autonomous Intergovernmental Spain

7

spain since the transition The 1978 Constitution in Article 2 “guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions” that make up the “indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation.” Article 137 organizes the state “into municipalities, provinces, and the Autonomous Communities which may be constituted. All of these entities enjoy autonomy for the management of their respective interests.” Article 140 further guarantees their autonomy and Article 142 states that local governments have “sufficient resources” to perform their assigned functions. Although provinces and municipalities historically preceded acs, the primary intergovernmental emphasis has been on the connection between the state and the regional governments (Agranoff and Ramos 1997). Despite rapid growth in size and functional responsibilities, local governments have not attained a role as a leading player in Spanish igr. Carrillo (1997, 40) concludes that “the decentralization strategy employed has left local government in an area of uncertainty in terms of the definition of its role in the Estado de las Autonomías (the state of autonomies).” LópezAranguren (2001, 5) concludes that local governments “occupy a strong position in legal and constitutional terms but in the reality of day to day government they experience a serious lack of powers in areas important to them as well as in adequate economic resources to face the responsibilities assigned to them or those they would like to assume.” The problem is highly political because local government interests have never been able to muster the power of that of the regions within the national scheme, leaving local governments “dually subordinated” to acs and to the general government (Baena 2000, 13). The Spanish Constitution basically establishes a three-tiered system, including the government of the state, autonomous communities, and local governments comprising provinces and municipalities. Figure 1.1 provides a schematic of Spain’s major governmental configurations, including those non-constitutional arrangements that are important for intergovernmental affairs. In addition to the three tiers, legislatively some regions have established county-level sub provincial bodies (comarcas). Municipalities often create special government intermunicipal districts, or mancomunidades. At a vertical level there are numerous convenios or other bi-level stateac conferences and arrangements. Moreover, consortia represent

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Local Governments/Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain

Figure 1.1 Spain’s Governmental Units C o n s o r t i a (vertical service agreements)

Government of the State Autonomous Communities/ Regional Governments

Provinces (Intermunicipal Councils) Comarcas in some Regions

Municipal Corporations (submunicipal councils in some cities) Mancomunidades – Intermunicipal Service Districts (horizontal)

Legend

Convenios and sectoral conferences

Metropolitan Arrangements (in large cities)

Constitutional Arrangements Established by State or Regional Normative Action

numerous service agreements that can include municipal, provincial, ac, and state governments. Finally, a few of the larger cities, particularly Valencia and Barcelona, have metropolitan level planning and service functions. Thus, in Figure 1.1 the solid lines represent constitutional arrangements and the dotted lines legally authorized units. Most interesting for the purposes of this study is the dual characterization of all of these units as operating interdependently but also, particularly in the case of the constitutional arrangements, with substantial measures of autonomy.

major themes of the study When one studies igr in a focused way the numerous events, data, tables, figures, quotes, concepts, findings, and conclusions that are offered should not be absorbed without keeping the larger picture in mind. One always hopes that the supporting information will be contextual while the thematic focus is maintained. Thus, the following points should be borne in mind as the analysis proceeds.

Autonomous Intergovernmental Spain

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First, the federalizing system of government and politics that has evolved in post-Franco Spain has elements of both autonomy and tremendous intergovernmentalism. In regard to autonomy, thousands of local democratic political and governmental systems have emerged, as have seventeen regional or ac systems that operate somewhat independently of the central government in Madrid, and of one another. In this regard, the removal of central control by the dictatorship along with its administrative tutelage has created independent local and ac polities. On the other hand, the constitutional and operational nature of the system animates overlapping powers, uncertainty and ambiguity of functional responsibility, fiscal interdependence, and an “open range” for collaborative financing and servicing. As a result, a series of governing networks, political and administrative, are superimposed on the formal system of governments. That is what makes intergovernmental relations so dynamic and complex, giving rise to a system of governance along with governments (Blanco y Gomà 2002). These features help make Spain federal, and most importantly, intergovernmental. In regard to local governments, legally they are dually subordinated to central and ac normative oversight and supervision yet maintain certain degrees of freedom to operate, most importantly the ability to initiate and carry out programs and deliver services on a day-to-day basis. This is most often done through collaborative connections with both horizontal (same level) and vertical partners. In this respect, this connectivity is no different from local governments in other federal systems (Agranoff and McGuire 2003). Second, the issue of local autonomy is therefore an open and debatable question. Spain’s local governments are in a similar position to that of local governments in most federal systems. Either through governmental reform or the evolutionary march of welfare state programming, local governments have become subject to central and second-tier legislation and supervision. This is clearly the case in Australia, Germany, and the United States. Despite the worldwide concern for increasing the democratic impulse at the local level, so that communities are truly represented, the template for programming has been increasingly top-down. Nevertheless, local governments are expected not only to be responsible to higher level framework laws and policies but to be responsive to local concerns and interests. Despite such external controls there remains residual authority to act and take initiative on behalf of the juris-

10 Local Governments/Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain

diction, on the basis of community wishes (Blanco y Gomà 2002, 38). That is the kind of operational autonomy that emerges in federal systems. Spanish cities have been able to play these local cards and up the intergovernmental ante, like cities in other federal systems, and in so doing have opened the autonomy wedge to suit their needs. Meanwhile representative interests such as local government associations push for greater statutory supported autonomy to bolster their constitutionally strong but legally and politically weak position. Third, the movement to clarify and strengthen legal and political autonomy for local governments comes from an internal belief system that is linked to the notion of incomplete Spanish decentralization. The past quarter century or so has been devoted to building national and regional political party, governmental, and administrative systems. Given the emerging federal nature of this system, numerous formal and informal intergovernmental mechanisms have paralleled this system, creating almost a “fourth branch” to facilitate legislative, executive, and judicial bodies at both levels. The internal political power, government institution design, and public policy energy have been devoted to these levels. Elected officials, appointed administrators, and associations of local governments perceive that there must be a next, completing step in decentralization, that of devolving own-source revenue and policy power over those services they deliver and the local problems they face. This “second decentralization” movement is based on anticipation of some unfulfilled promises in the Constitution, due to the energy and power devoted to the autonomic state and to a series of framework laws that orient local government centrally and then are handed off to the oversight competencies of the ac governments. These hopes, however, may be unrealistic, if one takes into account the traditionally subordinate role of local governments to secondtier governments in federal countries. Fourth, high levels of intergovernmentalism at the local level are also fostered by Spanish vertical fiscal imbalance. Although municipalities do raise nearly half of their operating revenues through own-source taxes, fees, and off-budget enterprises, the remainder, including those for required services, must be scratched out from minuscule tax sharing for big cities and central grants for the smaller ones, along with meagre ac transfers, special central government projects, eu grants, and a host of joint arrangements with

Autonomous Intergovernmental Spain

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provincial and other governments, or for some small towns by defaulting on required services that the provinces or acs then assume. All of this clearly drives the intergovernmental nature of the system as the city halls hunt for around half of their revenues, or revenue equivalents. Fifth, revenue-seeking is not the only intergovernmental game. Given the shift in local government supervision to the acs, formal permission must be sought for required plans, documents, major projects, and undertakings, along with some degree of implicit oversight. While this degree of oversight varies from region to region (some delegate this function to their provinces) it generates hundreds of thousands of bilateral vertical contacts between local government and acs, most of an informal nature, since ac-local government multilateral mechanisms are relatively weak and intermittent. Formal networks and numerous written contracts are also spawned as a result. A series of multijurisdiction vertical consortia that can reach through the state, ac, province, and municipality, plus multiple interlocal arrangements, e.g. municipality-municipality or municipality-provincial, add to the mix. To compound the intergovernmental quotient, a host of local government direct contract and grant arrangements with the nongovernmental sector are also part of the system. Added to this mix are local personalistic networks of a political nature that are oriented to clients and in some towns corrupt, a nasty byproduct of the normal method of administration. Indeed, it is sometimes “difficult to differentiate ‘honest’ from corrupt activities” in the course of government operation with clientelism (Villoria 2006, 11). Contacts through personal networks clearly mix with formal arrangements in Spain’s politics. Sixth, intergovernmental programming in Spain, including at the local level, is considerably more political than in many other countries. In many countries the government administrative routines are broad and deep. Many transactions are regularly carried out by professionally appointed administrators who deal with counterparts in other governments. For example, in Canada, the United States or the u.k. a professionally educated certified urban planner head of a department in a medium-sized city transacts with a certified planner counterpart in Ontario, Sacramento, or London. In Spain this type of professionalism and intergovernmental management is characteristic of the larger cities only. In thousands of small towns city department heads are elected council persons and the ac

12 Local Governments/Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain

department head is as likely to be an appointee, often without qualifications as a professional administrator. It reinforces the political contacts and personal networks at the expense of the professional. For most towns political ability and skill is more prevalent than administrative capability. It means that whereas in many countries these prevailing intergovernmental transactions hinge on the law, technical questions, or principles and practices of planning/management, they are considerably more likely to be politicized in Spain. Seventh, related to this is a notable administrative ability-flexibility deficit that exists in a substantial number of Spanish local governments, particularly the smaller ones. While clearly not the case in every small town in Spain, it is not unusual for citizen-city hall transactions to resemble a scenario mocking bureaucracy from Monty Python’s Flying Circus television program. One couple, in a town of some 45,000 persons, went to the local tax authority to pay their property tax rates one month in advance, because they were to be at their permanent residence when taxes were due. They were told they could not pay or even make some estimated payment before statements were printed. There was no capacity to receive early payments. However, they were told that their garbage collection fees were three years in arrears, totalling some 210 Euros. They tried to pay on the spot. Oh no, we must send you a registered letter to a local address in three or four months. Then you can come back to city hall, have it stamped, and then go to another office to make payment, and bring that receipt back to this office. “You must also show proof of your taxpayer identification number” (even though it will appear on the registered letter and on the tax bill). This kind of lack of streamlined efficiency, lack of discretion, and cumbersome processing is not unusual among local governments, where the administrative leadership lacks skill and knowledge and is clearly somewhere on the pre-electronic side of the digital divide. Eighth, and finally, many Spanish local governments also experience substantial democratic deficits. Beyond voting and some not very effective consultative forums and bodies, only a few notable municipalities undertake the kind of public consultation and public involvement in identifying local problems and putting citizens’ concerns on the local government agenda that occur in other European and Western countries. The one countrywide exception to this pattern grew out of an international summit (the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit) and it was introduced by external, European Union

Autonomous Intergovernmental Spain

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stimulus. Likewise, those exceptional communities that are most involved in aspects of direct democracy tend to be those with highly educated citizens and/or substantial immigrant populations, particularly from northern Europe (see Blanco y Gomà 2002). The indigenous direct democracy movement, if it exists, is neither visible nor vocal in most Spanish towns. This, in turn, has intergovernmental implications, in that local issues and concerns that are articulated and aggregated can be important tools for local officials in preparing their agendas before other governments. In many Spanish towns only the agendas of the elite networks receive serious consideration.

autonomy Autonomy is usually thought of as a form of self-rule, where constituent units have elected governments possessing meaningful measures of decision scope and execution powers over matters of local concern. Autonomy can be constitutionally guaranteed, as is the case in most classical federations, or it can be devolved through the transfer of power “downward” to subnational units. The unfolding of the Spanish state of autonomies and local government powers appears to be some combination of the two, although the process that unfolded was clearly one of progressive and ongoing debate and the ultimate granting of devolution. Legally based devolution to autonomous units normally contains three elements, 1) transfer to a subordinate elected body; 2) transfer on a geographic basis; and 3) transfer of functions that were previously exercised by ministers and parliamentary bodies (Bogdanor 1999, 2). Autonomy is an elusive concept, although it is linked both to the shared rule element of federalism (Agranoff 2004; Loughlin 2000, 10) and to devolutionary processes (Smith 1985; Fesler 1965). There is no doubt that it virtually always has a territorial focus (Rokkan and Urwin 1982; Sharpe 1987). As Connor (1994, 83) suggests, it is “capable of covering a multitude of visions extending from very limited local options to complete control over everything other than foreign policy.” It is often understood as ethnonational government at the subnational level in pluralistic states. Ethnic national concerns compound autonomy because ethnic minorities are by nature more obsessed with a vision of freedom from control or influence by non-members. In the broadest sense it includes the right of communities (language, territory, culture, or religion) to

14 Local Governments/Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain

govern themselves, so that their distinctive features are protected and promoted (Loughlin 2000, 10). “In short, ethnocracy does not presuppose state independence. It does presuppose meaningful autonomy” (Connor 1994, 83). Autonomy as a movement is one important means that groups use to improve their status within the existing boundaries of a state as an alternative to secession. If it operates as self-rule it is a political alternative to various forms of conflict and violence. Struggles over autonomy are sometimes dealt with by central governments quite harshly, by such means as repression, civil war, even ethnic cleansing. Terrorism, liberation conflicts, and demands for secession are considered to be tools on the other side of meaningful autonomy (Gurr and Harff 1994, 2). On the other hand, the kind of autonomy that is an alternative to violence means that it is associated with home rule or local self-government. It has a long tradition, extending back in antiquity at least to the time of empire, when imperial masters traded off respect for local leadership and local governing customs for tribute and the promise of security. This common form of autonomy was largely granted because the armies of empires could never militarily hold all of their conquered territories (Bendix 1978). The provision of autonomy then comes from the process of devolution, or the transfer of power from central governments to autonomous units holding “corporate status” under state legislation (Cohen and Peterson 1999, 26). Devolution can occur by established units of highly centralized federal systems shifting power downward, through the recasting of unitary systems in a more federal direction, and by unitary states transferring power to regions and localities. While situations of devolution bear similarities to the power-sharing aspects of federation (Elazar 1987), important differences also exist. Zariski and Rousseau (1987, 33) suggest that the two forms are similar in that under devolved regional autonomy the constitution may guarantee, or at least recognize and define, the existence of regional governments. The powers of regions are frequently constitutionally enumerated, although devolved regions usually possess no exclusive powers of their own, but only concurrent powers that may have to give way to central occupancy of the field. Also, a constitutional court usually exercises judicial review over centralregional relations, much like a federation. Finally, regions not only

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have elected parliaments and governments but the bodies of regional government may not be dissolved or suspended by central government officials. Devolved regions nevertheless lack exclusive powers. With few exceptions, they are not represented as regions in the second chambers of national parliaments. Moreover, they are usually unable to construct their own structures of local and area governments, free from central advice and control. Devolved units have less fiscal autonomy, particularly with regard to taxation, than do constituent units of federal systems. Finally, in many devolved units a central government official can block the enforcement of regional legislation pending a constitutional court appeal. Thus, despite notable degrees of governing freedom by devolved units, the central government holds more sway over regions than would be the case under pure federation (Zariski and Rousseau 1987, 33; see also Turner and Hulme 1997, 159–60). The autonomous status of local governments in federal countries is normally different from that of second-tier units. Generally speaking, local governments have come under the direct supervision of states/provinces/Länder. Canadian municipalities and uppertier counties are constitutionally and legally subordinate to their provincial governments. The basic framework and responsibilities are set at that level, although federal money also flows through for particular programs (Fowler and Seigel 2002). The challenge is city coordination in large urban areas and obtaining sufficient revenue abilities and powers to meet metropolitan-level challenges (Sancton 2002). In Germany, local governments, that is counties, city-counties, and municipalities, are also creatures of their Länder. They carry out some 75–80 per cent of all federal and Länd laws under a series of mandated tasks. Only in matters of “self-government” (a home-rule equivalent) do they have meaningful discretion and, of course, within the framework of Länd and federal law (Gunlicks 2003, 99). In the United States, the federal constitution ignores local governments and early state constitutions accepted the existing authority of local governments. During the nineteenth century, their legal status shifted to being subject to powers derived from state legislatures rather than “quasi” federal in nature. Officially, they can only exercise those powers expressly granted by the states (Tarr 1998, 19). Despite these restrictions, over time legislatures have recognized certain local rights, particularly those related to

16 Local Governments/Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain

self-government and to broad grants of home rule (i.e., residual power) within state and now federal constraints. As will be demonstrated, local governments in Spain are not exactly in this federal mould. They are recognized in the Constitution, as are certain autonomy rights but, as mentioned, they are dually subject to central framework legislation and to ac legal and working supervision. Spain’s situation is thus neither purely federal nor purely devolved. The Spanish acs and local governments enjoy guaranteed existence, enumerated exclusive and concurrent powers, the right of judicial review, and their own elected institutions. Constitutional autonomy includes a central second chamber of weak territorial representation. Most importantly, the system does not allow for complete ac control over local governments (chapter 4), meaningful fiscal autonomy, and absolute policy freedom from central government control where competencies are devolved. This situation is what makes Spain such an interesting, dynamic, and complicated intergovernmental case. It fits neither the standard template of federation nor that of the classic unitary state (Watts 1999). Devolution as self-rule combines the promises of democracy with the expected efficiencies of governments that are closer to the people. Although this concern is beyond the scope of this study, the advantages of shifting democratic processes downward are said to include: increased political education and local leadership development; enhanced system-wide stability and social harmony; increased political participation and reduced power concentration; accountability through increased ability to tailor-make plans; better interorganizational coordination; opportunity for experimentation and motivation; greater personnel motivation through downward program responsibility; and deconcentration of centre work loads (Turner and Hulme 1997, 157). Devolution is normally enabled by central legislation of an organic or basic nature with supporting regulations. That has been the situation in Spain, as subsequent analysis will reveal. In this respect, Cohen and Peterson (1999, 27) identify six normative requisites of devolution: 1) granting of specific unit corporate status; 2) establishing clear jurisdiction and functional boundaries; 3) transferring of defined powers to plan, make decisions, and manage specified tasks to units; 4) establishing basic rules for interaction among units in the governmental system; 5) authorizing units to raise own-source revenues; and 6) authorizing devolved units

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to establish and manage their own budgetary, accounting, and evaluation systems. In considering the development of local governments in Spain, it will be demonstrated that a number of these concerns are contentious, particularly with regard to clear jurisdiction and defined powers, rules of interaction, and questions of ownsource revenues. These concerns have been worked out to a much greater extent in the devolution to the acs than in matters of local governments.

intergovernmental relations An important assumption of this study is that autonomy cannot function by constitutional and legal arrangements alone. An additional foundation is that of intergovernmental relations (igr), a core operational premise of federal and federalizing systems. Known in Germany as politkverflechtung, igr involves primary intranational connections and, in the case of Spain and other European Union (eu) countries, also supranational connections with various eu bodies. Whether institutionalized or ad hoc, meaningful power delegation depends on governmental interactions and transactions. In short, self-rule can be formally introduced into a country’s governing arrangements but cannot be maintained without the working connections that tie central governments to those constituent units that enjoy measures of independent and interdependent political power, governmental control, and decision-making (Agranoff 2004). To make autonomy real, many transactions occur after formal agreement through law. In Spain discrete actions follow on basic laws: multilateral conferences and bilateral sectoral convenios, bilateral transfer commissions, regulatory interactions, policy adjustments, project negotiations, executive decisions, subnational elections, political responses, and court rulings. They take place regularly. These igr moves facilitate the routine underpinnings of devolved self-government. These individual actions can be analyzed and patterned, and that is what is commonly referred to as igr. This concept involves those transactional activities and interactions between government units and with the nongovernmental sector of all types and levels. If one thinks of a set of governments like those in Spain as operating in a system, igr focuses attention on the interactions that connect the various components. If the focus is devolved regional and

18 Local Governments/Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain

local governments, its environment includes central and special units, as well as other regions. These interacting governments receive inputs such as financing, program requirements, and local demands for assistance, as well as suggestions for joint ventures from other governments. Regional and local outputs include their own governments’ normative and services decisions and actions, requirements put on local authorities, demands on the central government for greater resources or autonomy, and any negotiating postures involving other local governments or regions (Sharkansky 1981, 458). igr is also known by other labels: multi-tiered government, multilevel governance, central-local relations, territorial management, regionalization, and regional/local reform. The processes of igr are closely associated with Deil Wright’s (1988, 14–15) five features of governmental complexity and interdependency: 1) varieties of interand intra-level interactions (for example central-local, interlocal, or regional-local; 2) activities and attitudes of persons occupying public offices; 3) continuous and patterned contacts and exchanges between officials; 4) involvement of all types of officials – deputies, administrators, judges – in decision-making processes; and 5) a policy component involving actors working across the boundaries of government. The fifth feature – the presence of a policy component – means that igr also has a managerial element. Here individual problems are worked out through a network of administrative and elected officials, to accomplish specific goals (Agranoff 1996, 210; Agranoff 1997, 125; Agranoff and McGuire 2003). These practices occur in virtually every country, where multi-tiered governments interact with one another. Despite the low visibility of these transactions, in Spain this managerial dimension is most important. In addition, some interactions among elements of civil society (e.g., non-governmental organizations) and independent economic forces involve igr. These interactions will become particularly evident when the policy case studies are examined (chapter 8).

the local government reform movement In this international and global era local government has been affected by change influenced by government reform in other coun-

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tries. These reforms are both international and intergovernmental, in the sense that the ideas for altering the structure and operations of local governments tend to come from foreign countries, but the enactment of new measures is generally by higher-level governments. These local government reforms include strengthening the role of local government in exercising community leadership, improving means of managing and delivering local public services, and providing democratic reforms that allow greater openness, access, transparency, and accountability (Blanco y Gomà 2002; Denters and Rose 2005, 246). One clear influence on eu countries is a different policy-making framework for countries like Spain. The framework for problem solutions like those examined here relating to infrastructure provision, urban development, and immigration are increasingly eu as well as nation-state. Another influence within eu countries is the wave of privatization of services and deregulation of programs (Bel and Fageda 2007). This, as Loughlin (2001, 388) concludes, has led to the development of a competitive regionalism, as regions and cities find themselves competing within and across countries for eu funds and for foreign investors. Coupled with these forces are other practices that spread from country to country, such as competitive public bidding and internal markets (cross-jurisdiction) for securing public services. One important facet of local government reform is empowering local governments to anticipate area-based problems and to have the ability to coordinate the various forces in solving them. In Canada the general response to such problems in metropolitan areas is either provincial assumption of local services or a move to consolidation. Governments are combined or special regional authorities are created (Sancton 2002). The u.s. tends to rely more on competitive multigovernment networks of local public choice. State-local concepts of home rule, fiscal independence, and the legal strength of most forms of local government executive powers actually allow for such executive leadership in making connections. The u.k. and other countries have moved to strengthen the executive in these directions, either by direct general election of the mayor or by giving local councils enhanced powers over disparate local agencies and special governments (John 2004). Other changes in this arena fall into the category of strengthening the mayor’s executive responsibilities, professionalization of executive department leadership,

20 Local Governments/Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain

reduction in the size of local executive bodies, and the employment of hired executives who manage under the mayor or council, i.e., the city manager/city council coordinator form in the u.s. These moves are designed to enhance the “power of general competence that endows municipalities with the right to undertake policy initiatives in all areas that are not explicitly precluded or defined as the exclusive responsibility of another layer of government” (Denters and Rose 2005, 247). Reform of local public administration has largely followed the cross-national new public management (npm) movement. Generally imprinted from business, npm focuses on inside operations. It includes three major foci: 1) a shift from government to governance, invoking a host of nongovernmental organizations in the work of government; 2) a shift from direct service provision or “rowing” to enabling outside competition by government “steering”; and 3) a move to refocus government from itself to the “customer” and “user” of services (Snape 2004, 63). Among the npm instruments are services privatization, increased managerial flexibility and deregulation, competitive bidding for services delivery by government and non-government agencies, performance-based contract management, citizen input into management decisions, municipal companies that are self-sustaining and off-budget, institution of performance benchmarks, performance evaluation, imposition of national minimum standards of service, internal devolution of power/decision-making to services departments, and strategic (crossentity) local management. They all reinforce igr networking. Obviously no one country or even single government has instituted all of these instruments, but they have become important means of making public administration work at the local level. Public management experts believe that a number of these npm approaches – performance measurement, control of results, benchmarking – along with management information systems, will become even more valuable in the future (Prueller 2006, 21). Local government in partnership with other entities is yet another cross-national influence. As Denters and Rose (2005, 253) conclude, what a “local council does” has to be replaced with a conception that local public decision-making “increasingly involves multi-agency working, partnerships, and policy networks which cut across organizational boundaries – in essence governance.” These interorganizational or cross-entity moves include partnerships and

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alliances with nonprofit and for-profit private organizations, cooperation in services delivery among adjacent governments, establishment of quasi-nongovernmental organizations (local housing authorities, hospital trusts), local community neighborhood publicngo partnerships, joint public-private nonprofit associations, public-private economic development corporations, intergovernmental partnerships and networks, public-private strategic planning partnerships, and private joint development corporations. These interdependencies introduce newer dimensions to igr, conclude Blanco y Gomà (2002, 29). In orchestrating these cooperative partnerships and networks, local government does not lose functional responsibility but takes on an additional role, “city governments and their officials possess some legal and fiscal levers that can keep governmental units at the centre of collaborative transactions ... that outweigh ngos” (Agranoff and McGuire 2003, 43; see also Márquez 2007, 131). A final cross-national trend involves enhancing local democracy by strengthening alternatives to the electoral channel through civic engagement. Many countries have seen a steady downward turn in electoral turnout rates for local elections, and in other countries turnout has been traditionally low. Nevertheless, interest in other forms of local political participation has not necessarily waned, as global forces have encouraged “rooted cosmopolitans” to take contentious and/or concerted action at the local level (Tarrow 2005). This has led to the implementation of a series of local democratic instruments in different countries: local referenda; petitions that are transformed into council agenda items; services user boards; citizen-written motions that go on local ballots; hearing for prior appraisal of actions; permanent consultative forums (disabled, women, immigrants); future (planning) scenario workshops that involve citizens; multistage – look, appraise, act – citizen dialogue; partnership boards to encourage social integration; youth councils; opinion surveys; consultation by Internet; and calculating an electronic democracy balance sheet. These new approaches, obviously influenced by the npm customer orientation, “define the citizen as a ‘consumer,’ making choices about the kind of services he or she wishes to avail of” (Loughlin 2001, 391). These mechanisms, which are designed to improve relationships between local government and the general public, have to some degree also been introduced in Spain’s local governments (Font, Font, y Subirats 2002).

22 Local Governments/Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain

The cross national movement to improve local government has in most countries been introduced as general government initiatives of central governments. Reform has largely been top-down, in part due to political forces within most countries but also to eu efforts at strengthening financial management and managerial efficiency, and increasing the democratic quotient. On the other hand, centralization has been coupled with political decentralization, regionalization, and in some countries federalization. The reasons for these institutional reforms vary. As Loughlin (2001, 394) concludes, they appear to be a mix of: 1) imposing neo-liberal agendas, which include off-loading central functions; 2) modernizing over-centralized and inefficient systems of public administration; and 3) making genuine attempts to enhance regional and local democracy. These influences in other countries have obviously affected reform in Spain since the 1980s, particularly as an eu member. The extent to which these “modernizing” tendencies have taken hold is of central importance in understanding the development of local government in Spain.

spanish local government in history However much external influences might have affected Spanish democracy since the 1970s, local government did not begin with a completely blank slate. The developmental role of local government operates within the context of the various regimes within Spanish history, and this history also affects the contemporary scene. Urban government evolved around what the historian Vilar (1980, 3) calls the “ceaseless struggle between the will to unite, located generally at the centre, and the no less vital tendency – rooted in geography – to dispersion.” Indeed, geographical dispersion is said to contribute a great deal to regions’ and towns’ desire for independence/autonomy (Crow 1985). Regions retain a strong sense of identity and loyalty (Moreno 2001), yet local aspirations have not prevented them from contributing to the national history. In regard to cities, Gilmour (1992, 1) maintains that all of them, including those that claim to be “unSpanish,” have played important national and regional roles. Moreover, he suggests that “None of Spain’s cities has either been independent or has dominated the rest of the country. They have co-existed instead in a state of fluctuating

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interdependence, their roles and positions changing according to circumstances.” To non-Spaniards the most familiar regional issues are related to Basque and Catalan ethnic nationalism. In fact, other regions such as Aragon, Asturias, the Balearic Islands, Galicia, Navarre, and Valencia have always felt some degree of separate identity, and regions such as Andalucia and the Canary Islands have historically felt degrees of estrangement from the centre. Moreover, many of these areas (Aragon, Basque Country, Catalonia, Navarre, and Valencia) experienced degrees of confederated self-rule and distinctive immunities regarding crown taxation and governance during the Habsburg centuries (Herr 1971). Overlaying regional identities were economic differences. The Basque Country and Catalonia were the early industrial regions and thus economic powers, and their struggles with Madrid over differences in protectionism versus free trade were epic in proportion. Poorer agricultural regions, such as Andalucia, Extremadura, and the two Castiles, formed the core political centre. This created an inverted centre-periphery pyramid, in which political and economic powers were found at different poles (Lasuén 1987). To many observers, economic grievances arising from Madrid’s control over economic tools (taxation, tariffs, import-export mechanisms), coupled with different subnational language and culture, were the key conditions of ethnic conflict (Carr 1980). Fusi (1990), however, offers a different explanation. He argues that Spain was far from centralized in the nineteenth century and that the construction of a Spanish nation-state was not a function of Spanish political nationalism, but the result of a long, unplanned, and changing process of adjustment of an over-growing machinery of government to the also growing and changing problems of Spanish society. Ethnic subnationalism rose simultaneously with the beginning of unified nationalistic feeling, Fusi argues, both trends gathering strength as regional and national markets grew, as urbanization took on momentum, and as unified systems of mass communication developed. It was a process similar to that occurring in other European countries. Thus, the centrifugal tendencies that appeared in some of the more economically developed and culturally differentiated regions of the periphery was, for the most part, not a manifestation of local resistance to Castilian domination. Rather, it was an index of the weakness of the Spanish state in the

24 Local Governments/Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain

nineteenth century, with its strong regional identities, its private local networks of clientism and patronage (caciquismo), and its attachment to the feeling of patria chica, or loyalty-identity that is rooted in the village and region (Velasco 1989). Whatever the precise explanation may be, Spain has never been able to integrate all of its regions into the predominant Castilian centre. Political and economic struggles were transformed into regional conflicts during the late nineteenth and the first four decades of the twentieth century. A very short-lived First Republic (1873–74) involved forms of municipal autonomy/decentralization, but the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy quickly brought on recentralization. An experiment with regional autonomy was undertaken during the Second Republic of the 1930s, but it was followed by a civil war fought in part over regional questions. This was followed by four decades of ethnic subnational cultural and governance repression under Franco (Carr and Fusi 1979). Regional autonomy was the response during the 1975–78 transition to democracy. Towns reach back to the days of the Celts and Celtiberians, where the basic unit was the walled city or town, each with its ruler and Senate of Elders (Hills 1970, 21). Rome’s colonial outposts mark what would today be called cities, where town planning was a regular local function. The granting of municipum meant certain citizen rights, including the right to participate in the popular assembly. In addition, there were vici (villages) and pagi (country districts), which were the scenes of local markets and were used as bases of tax collection and census taking (Churchin 1991, ch. 6). By the fourth century Roman Spain prospered to the point where it was divided into nine provinces with separate administrations. While a common legal system prevailed, “It would appear that the Romans made full allowances for local customs and traditions” (Hills 1970, 25). The Visigothic rulers that followed the Romans did not disturb this municipal framework, which had been standardized by the time of Hadrian. The Moslem influence was to continue the urban tradition. Their caliphates reinforced their client states with strong cities, “with their productive economies, skilled labor, technological development, and learning” (Payne 1973, vol. 1, 25). The basis of modern autonomy was thus set during the long period of reconquest by Christian authorities. Regulations for the administration of newly conquered cities were often committed in

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writing in a document known as a fuero, which laid down certain rights, including that of choosing leaders from one’s own community, along with the obligation to pay certain dues and taxes to the crown (Fletcher 1992, 137). Over the years, non-Muslims and nonJews gained municipal citizenship (vecindad), which opened the doors to arable land within the municipal territory, grazing rights, and market rights without tolls. Meanwhile the municipal council paid their royal taxes and seignorial dues, developed economic infrastructure by building public works and safeguarding their access to the monte. Government included an elected council, elected at the annual town meeting, along with a judge, who was assisted by a sheriff and two administering council persons (regidores). As towns grew the judge evolved into a mayor (alcalde), along with a municipal representative (procurador), clerk (escribano), and treasurer (mayordomo). This universal citizen municipal experience “shaped Castilians as an urban people” (Nader 1990, 28). As early as the Middle Ages a city or ciudad could hold special status as a “city-state” independent of royal jurisdiction in its internal affairs. A town (villa) was independent of any other municipality but subject to the king or some other lord. The Spanish word pueblo not only means people but also has a legal sense as any municipality – ciudad or villa – with a functioning municipal council, regardless of its legal status (Nader 1990, xv). In the early 1500s in Castile smaller towns began to contract with some nobles, but particularly with the crown, to secure their independence, at least in terms of land rights and other obligations, through types of municipal fueros. These contracts were important steps in the development of municipal corporations, functioning with charters, conceding concession of land to the town council, and establishing governments that in some respects were independent of higher jurisdiction (Nader 1990, 17). An intergovernmental structure of sorts was clearly in place by the late fifteenth century under Ferdinand and Isabella, when they tried to extend royal power over the privileges of the towns. Mariejol (1961, 130) reports that the civil wars of their times weakened the municipal liberties of Castile but the Aragonese universidades (municipalities) remained powerful and protectively attached to their fueros. Nevertheless, the state introduced a series of royal agents called adelantados, who acted as regional chief regional

26 Local Governments/Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain

judges and administrators, and commanders in time of war. A series of royal officers with various titles – asistentes, adelantados, and corregidores – were sent to the cities and towns. Eventually all were replaced in favour of the corregidores who were sent to all towns, and as “administrators and judges at once, were the representatives of the central government, the defenders of its rights, claims and wishes” (Mariejol 1961, 170). Their mission was to extend royal supremacy, rising above local factions and alliances. Despite the “passion for wealth” of many corregidores, they were to require the commitment of local functionaries like the alcaldes, alguaciles, and escribanos (171). These officials were, in turn, overseen by investigative commissioners (pesquisidores) and inspectors (veedores) charged with ensuring a devoted and honest administration. During the Bourbon dynasty, this system was extended from Castile to Aragon and to other parts of Spain (Herr 1971, 43). Thus began the rudiments of a pre-modern form of cross-boundary administration. At the end of the Habsburg period and after the war of Spanish Succession (1702–13) the new Bourbons further centralized the state. In 1707 the fueros were abolished in Aragon and Valencia, and the towns were made subject to the same laws as Castile. Later the same laws (except civil law) were extended to Catalonia. Their councils and cortes were also eliminated in favour of Castilian intendents and corregidores, and municipal government was put in a “rigid Castilian mould” (Lynch 1989, 64). Larger cities were governed by regidores, or aldermen, nobles appointed by the crown, while smaller towns had the right to nominate regidores for crown approval. In effect “the municipality was converted into a bureaucratic agency, representing the local elite and subordinate to the crown.” Between municipal and central government the corregidor, a Castilian import, replaced officials from Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia (64–5). Lynch (1989, 66) concludes that the new king “Phillip V ruled a unitary state, its regions integrated, its dependencies reduced; no longer was the monarchy an agglomeration of component states, obsolete remnants of an imperial past.” The modern roots of local government owe their influence to the liberal Constitution of 1812 and the reforms of the 1830s. The Cadiz Constitution returned to the medieval formula “to each town its own municipal government,” which had given way to prior nucleation of populations of 25,000 and above. This led to the emergence of over 9,000 municipalities in the mid-nineteenth cen-

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tury. Also, the Constitution reintroduced uniform juridical local government law and uniformity of province and municipality throughout the nation. Provincial division came in 1833, introduced after the French model by Javier de Burgos. They acquired a “polyvalent” character as a sort of association of municipalities (Carrillo 1997). The monarchies and dictatorships of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries established additional local traditions. First, a dual function evolved, with the mayor both as president of the municipal corporation and as central government delegate to the municipal territory. In addition, local networks of obligation and favouritism emerged under the organizing control of caciques or chiefs that tied local to central government (chapter 6). Second, the French concept of administrative tutelage was introduced. Lower level governments, particularly cities, were subject to administrative controls and often prior permission, particularly from centrally appointed civil governors in the provinces, who in effect were responsible for this prefectural administration (Carrillo 1997, 42). For example, during Primo de Rivera’s military dictatorship in the 1920s he attempted to undermine the powerhouses of local patronage, as town councils all over the country were dissolved and generals took over as civil governors, while military officers were sent to provincial units as delegados del gobierno to supervise and conduct the election of new councillors, civil servants, and administrative staff. Romero (1999, 52) reports that soon these delegados abused their authority, rarely challenged local notables and land owners, and joined the rising tide of dominance over local political life. Nevertheless, the dictatorship reinforced the official intergovernmental doctrines of supervision from above, a practice that clearly was maintained during Franco’s thirty-six year regime. During the Franco years state interventionism was maintained, but largely outside the functional chain of civil governors and delegados, by expansion of the public enterprise sector and the creation of special functional agencies. Prefectural administration was also expanded, but from a functional ministry base, reducing control from the Ministry of Interior and civil governors. Thus, state activity increased in volume, not necessarily by expanding local government but by expanding state administration in the field. As Carrillo (1997, 43) concludes, “Local Administration grew only to the extent that traditional duties were needed to support the added

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burden of industrialization and urbanization.” As welfare states grew local authorities in most of Europe, “the Franco regime bequeathed to democracy a weak local government that had ‘missed the boat’ regarding the welfare state, more suitable in size and functional scope to a liberal state and rural society than to an interventionist state and urban society” (43). It will become clear that tutelage, along with many other tenets of higher-level control, gave way with the democratic transition and the introduction of autonomy under the 1978 Constitution. In many ways it restored the spirit of the Cadiz Constitution and earlier municipal traditions. Post-Franco local governments operate independently, without tutelage but with oversight, and constitutionally are dually subordinate to both the central and ac governments. This, along with the traditions of modern governance – for example, central fiscal control, the multi-tiered welfare state, and the effects of international affairs – makes local governments both independent and intergovernmentalized.

organization of this book The dynamics of igr as they influence local governments, particularly those of Spanish municipalities in the development of federalizing Spain, are the subject of the subsequent chapters in this book. Methodologically, the study combines developmental and legal analysis with a field study that includes an examination of documentary evidence, reports, and statistical studies from governmental and association sources, analysis of scholarly Spanish political and legal studies, and a field study in selected areas of Spain conducted in 2004 and 2005. The field study included structured discussions with central, ac, and local government officials, as well as observations at municipal and provincial official meetings and citizen forums. The field portion of the study focused on ac and local governments in the Andalucia, Madrid, and Valencia regions, along with focused discussions with central officials responsible for local governments. Chapter 2 focuses on the emerging role of local governments in modern governance, including the movement for autonomy and their integral role in modern welfare states. In this respect, Spain is a part of the cross-national development of contemporary gover-

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nance. Thus, the context of twenty-first century local government frames this study. Chapter 3 focuses on the specifics of the Spanish state of autonomies, on ac competencies, and on the current role of local governments in this system’s legal, institutional, and political developments. Most importantly, the shared role of ac governments in oversight of local governments is identified. This chapter makes clear that despite the state’s local government template of development from Madrid, local governments are now intergovernmentally within ac orbits. Chapter 4 examines the development of local governments within the other two major tiers of government, state and ac. Here the formal status of local governments, including the base laws and court decisions, is laid out. This includes the two most significant pieces of local government organic legislation that deal with operations and financing, as amended. Chapter 5 takes a look at local government organization and financing. It focuses on Spain’s particular mayor-commission form of government, a mini-parliamentary type, along with special authorities that diffuse power and emphasize the political rather than the administrative. The patterns of revenue sources and budgets and how they finance provincial and local governments, largely intergovernmentally, is also covered. Chapter 6 looks at local politics as they affect the intergovernmental dimension. Rather than the usual analysis of election trends, the igr analysis looks at political parties and electoral contesting, the role of local councillors as party members, and the nationalization of local elections. A discussion of local interest groups and networks of local officials complements this chapter. Chapter 7 deals with local governments within the international system. In particular, modes of access to and interaction with foreign affairs are analyzed, along with modes of intergovernmental representation in important units like the eu. Because of the position of Spanish local governments within the eu, and due to its global dimensions, their direct roles in international affairs are also assessed. Three brief igr policy case studies are presented in chapter 8. One is on the igr interconnections related to municipal infrastructure provision. The next is related to the local government impacts

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on immigration into Spain, an acute issue in that it lies at the very frontiers of Europe, with one ac very close to the African continent. The last case relates to the national issue of connections between the building industry, land developers, and local governments in land-use policy, with a focus on the Valencia land law that is leading to the “concretization” of that part of Spain, a problem that exists in all of Spain’s coastal areas. In chapter 9 the analysis turns to proposals for reform and problems of performance in Spanish local government. Since the mid1990s local interests have pushed for a Pacto Local to clarify respective responsibilities and to enhance local autonomy. More recently, other reforms that strengthen local administration by granting more home-rule powers have been proposed. These reforms need to be analyzed in the light of local capacities to handle increases in their powers and revenues, as well as those proposed to decrease intergovernmental oversight. The concluding chapter 10 looks at igr and the future. The reform of local government is placed in the context of ac reform, an expanded eu, varied local government capacities, and ongoing political problems in Spain, particularly corruption in many of the growth areas of the country. Under these circumstances, the problematic issue of whether local government can acquire more independence than their counterparts in other federal systems or whether their supporters can muster the power to achieve greater autonomy is raised. No governmental system can operate without various levels. In federal countries, central levels of basic countrywide functions like defence, foreign policy, monetary and economic affairs, and social and civil rights are essential. At local levels, amenities and basic services and quality of life programming are important. Increasingly, at intermediate levels matters of regional development, transit and transport, culture and tourism, health and social services, and education become the focal issues. Each has some measures of independence and some measures of interdependence. All contemporary governmental systems are intergovernmental, and federal countries are highly intergovernmental. Post-Franco Spain’s local governments can only be understood in these contexts.

ts/Intergovernmental ts in Intergovernmental Networks Processes in Federalizing Spain

2 Local Governments in Intergovernmental Processes

Autonomy, devolution, and regional issues are turn of the twentyfirst century forces that demonstrate the increasingly intergovernmentalized nature of public programs. igr in its various characterizations has become particularly salient in federal countries and in those with federal features because of growing interdependencies among autonomous units. Spain is clearly one of these countries, in as much as, after the death of Franco, governments at all levels increased their powers and responsibilities, and now operate in a largely overlapping fashion. Historically in many Western countries democratization brought on worker’s parties, which in turn led to welfare states, which led to widespread central programming (Ashford 1986; Furniss and Tilton 1979). The quest for equality of opportunity and the benefits of government led to expanding definitions of social needs, making government more interventionist. It also brought on increased concern for the rights of citizens. As a result, the welfare state initially led to greater bureaucratization, centralization, and managerialism in the public sector (Ashford 1986; Wilson 1975). Over the twentieth century, however, programs were increasingly put in the hands of subnational governments, as co-policy makers or as implementers, and in many situations as both. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, redefined welfare states exist virtually everywhere, with greater interest in decentralization and devolution, along with the development of new ways to deliver public services, including those involving citizens, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector (Loughlin 2000). Throughout these transformative processes, managing policies through intergovernmental processes has become a continuing concern within federalism.

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When governments are conceptualized by what they do rather than by their formal constitutional processes one immediately thinks of an intergovernmental rather than a hierarchical model (Rose 1985). Analytically the operating governance concept is, as identified in chapter 1, igr. Administratively it entails intergovernmental management, or igm. Discernible patterns among regularized program contacts through various decision structures within multi-level arrangements constitute the core of igr. igr involves a variety of types of public officials (courts, legislators, executives) and the interactions of actors across the boundaries surrounding policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation (Wright 1988). Within these patterns are the activities of igm, which Wright and Krane (1999, 1,162) define as “the process of solving intergovernmental problems under conditions of high uncertainty and complexity through the creation and use of governmental and nongovernmental networks.” As an action-oriented intergovernmental process, igm involves transacting program routines through making legal-jurisdictional, political, technical, and task or projectbased adjustments to fit policies into real situations (Agranoff 1986; Agranoff and McGuire 2003). These two processes tend to be highly developed and involve extensive activity in federal systems. Intergovernmental activities are thus referred to as the “fourth level of government.” Considerable effort is expended and mechanisms are developed in federal countries to ensure cooperation and consultation among all levels.

local government, autonomy, and the welfare state The development of modern local self-government in Western countries during the nineteenth century was in part aimed at limiting the intrusion of central governments in the affairs of communities – a clear expression of the bounded and passive state. Subnational units – regions and local governments – came to be established as legal entities, and while never intended to be completely free of central direction, their status as jurisdictions led to political, economic, and legal barriers to arbitrary central intervention. Over time, however, the assumption developed that subnational units not only had freedom from interference from central officials but also possessed freedom to do something to solve problems of the region or community (Sharpe 1987). As Kjellberg (1995, 43) concludes, “from

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originally being negatively defined, local autonomy became an instrument for the realization of communal interests, as well as a means to implement other values.” Industrialization and the emergence of democracy strongly influenced the size and division of government. At the local level, the growth of industries led to concentrations of people in cities. These urban centres emerged with efficiencies in production far superior to areas with dispersed populations. Expanded democratic participation, however, was thought to put a limit on the potential size of political units. The dilemma, as Kjellberg and Teune (1980, 138) suggest, was that the smaller the unit, the less important the impact of political decisions, the larger the unit, the less a single voice would count in the outcome of a decision. “Various approximations of optional size were tried out in various countries, leading eventually in most of them to three tiers of government: local, intermediate, and national, and two sectors: urban and rural.” What emerged were politico-administrative systems of various types to handle these tiers. The key normative vehicle was constitutionalism, an authority of the highest law that determines the overall structure. Constitutions contain the division of power within the state and usually the geographical divisions within levels, including enumeration of the main forms of subnational governments. In most of democratic Europe and the West, traditionally local governments, according to Bennett (1989, 13) fell into one of three categories: fused, where prefectural administration (explained later in this chapter) and limited local power prevailed; dual, where local operation is by an elected council and overall supervisory, legal, and financial constraints are set by central government departments; and split hierarchy, where central governments hold considerable sway over local governments, but localities have their own councils and autonomy with collective responsibility as in the dual system. The latter is a mixture of the fused and dual systems. In federal countries various blends of the three types also exist, but operation is normally within the second tier (e.g. provinces, regions, Länder, states). Spain fits the federal model in that nominal operation is by second tier, where mixtures of the dual and split hierarchy nevertheless prevail. It has overthrown its pre-Constitution past and eliminated virtually all features of the fused system. The post-World War II concern has been to make local government adjustments to these features, moving towards the simultaneous ability to manage large-scale government and to deal with

34 Local Governments/Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain

concerns of local autonomy. This has been compounded by welfare states that are “interventionists” on a variety of social, economic, and regulatory fronts. As Dente and Kjellberg (1988, 2) observe: The short answer to the question, why so much reorganization, is that it is intimately linked to recent developments in the public sphere; it is a reflection of what we used to term the welfare state, but now more aptly tend to term the interventionist state. Such a view, in all its generality, has lately gained wide currency. It is indeed obvious that local government reorganization would hardly have taken place without the dramatic expansion of the public sector in most advanced democracies since the Second World War. From this point of view local government reorganization may be looked upon as an ‘institutional afterthought.’ It appears everywhere as an attempt to solve the tension between the organizational requirements the expansion has given rise to and existing institutional arrangements. However, it is also evident that the ways in which the widening of the public sphere has taken place, the specific character it has had at various stages, and not least the ideological elements supporting local government, have had an impact on the types of reform, on their sequence in time and on the conflicts they have engendered. This widening of the public sphere has inextricably linked governments in ways that no doubt cannot be taken apart at anytime in the near future. These forces lead to important issues and questions relating to local governments in intergovernmental systems. Page and Goldsmith (1987, 1–2) identify them as questions of reorganization and decentralization. How are local government units best organized to provide public services? This includes issues relating to patterns of management, such as corporate management structures, and policy and planning systems. Even more basic are questions of decentralization of welfare state-interventionist programs: determining the locus of local versus central policy and decision-making; understanding the precise nature and significance of multilevel relations; and explaining the patterns of igr, what they are and why they are being changed. Moreover, they emphasize the importance of studying local governments from the perspectives of the functions allo-

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cated to them, the amount of discretion they possess, and their ability to influence events in their respective political systems. Also of relevance in the emergence of local government is their role as a player and their influence on the intergovernmental system. As Chandler (1993, 1) observes, “In some (nation) states local politics has considerable importance in shaping the national political system and should not be perceived as simply a subordinate localized interest. In some supposedly highly centralized national systems local interests play a role in national policymaking.” Clearly, traditional local issues such as land use, water supply, sanitization, markets, infrastructure development, and housing bubble up the system as much as they filter down. Local politics often influence national trends, being a harbinger of the next set of central elections. Most importantly, local concerns or locally developed agendas are clearly advanced to the other levels of government on a regular basis. These own-source agendas, often to interpret or adjust higher-level regulations or standards, or to seek money for purely local ideas and projects, are a regular part of the game for some (Agranoff and McGuire 2003). After all, one of the intergovernmental functions of local governments is to “up the ante” in playing the game on behalf of the local jurisdiction (Elazar 1962).

the welfare state’s “open compartments” There is no doubt that the twentieth century not only ushered in the welfare state but also gave rise to the intergovernmental model (Flora and Heidenheimer 1981). While hardly a new practice (Elazar 1962), the rise of numerous programs triggered attention to cooperative processes across governments. Ashford (1988) explains that for over a century most national social policies emerged because of national suspicion of local commitment; thus national governments adopted various means that centralized policy. In effect, programs were “parachuted” into local communities by central governments; in federal systems usually through intermediate administrative landings in constituent unit governments. However, since the 1950s, “New social issues such as drug addiction, child abuse, single parentage and the mentally handicapped were not easily organized at the national level, nor were such needs evenly distributed. As a result, the advance of the welfare state was accompanied by important intergovernmental adjustments” (19).

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The most basic of such adjustments involve shifting more powers and program responsibilities among levels of government. In chapter 3 the division of competencies among governments and the overlapping powers between the state, ac, and local governments will become clear with regard to Spain’s welfare state programs. Indeed, virtually all are normatively and administratively linked at least at two levels. Programs, including immigration, social services, education, economic and regional development, environmental protection, public health, income support, tourism and culture, and other aspects of social protection, are virtually all intergovernmental. Federations and emerging federal countries reflect an allocation of powers that requires “a balance between the independence and interdependence of the federal and regional governments in relation to each other” (Watts 1996, 31–2). In some systems the design of administrative authority corresponds with the distribution of legislative authority, whereas in other systems jurisdiction is somehow divided. In either case intergovernmentalization brings on what Deil Wright (1988, 49) identifies as the overlapping authority model of interaction. In contrast to inclusive (total top down control) or coordinate (independent or confederal control) authority models, the overlapping model is characterized by: substantial areas of governmental operations involving several levels simultaneously; areas of (complete) jurisdiction autonomy and jurisdiction that are comparatively small; and limitations to the power and influence of any one jurisdiction (or official), leading to exchange, negotiation, and work towards agreements. The overlapping model in mixed welfare state programs provides a platform for interaction based on jurisdiction.

place, autonomy, and the non-prefectural tradition Territory or place is a long-standing basis of governmental organization and political expression. It is one of the fundamental characteristics of any polity. Sharpe (1987, 152–3, 156) outlines four neglected political characteristics of territoriality. First, the boundary of a polity, its extent and shape, may critically determine who is and who is not included and thus it determines the composition of majorities and minorities. Second, each unit or jurisdiction – nation state, constituent second-tier unit, or local government – is unique

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in the sense that its spatial location cannot be shared by any other polity. Third, an individual’s location can determine shared collective interests as much as can ideology, occupation, religion, or class. Fourth, the role of scale in a democracy is often overlooked, which can affect the nature and quality of representation, distance to citizens, and efficiency in services. Territorial division and “territorial democracy,” as Elazar (1994) suggests, is necessary in federal polities for maintenance of diversity within overall unity. Equality of political attachments needs to prevail in every territorial jurisdiction as a fundamental principle of organization. Indeed, those federal systems that have experienced historically young polities – Australia, Canada, the United States – have never had a premodern experience of any other form of organization but territoriality (262). As was implied in chapter 1, the modern experience of territorial organization is inextricably bound with autonomy.

replacing prefecturalism: lifting of administrative control The prefectural system with its use of tutelage in many ways stands in conceptual contrast to federal and devolutionary autonomy. While the concept of administrative guardianship originated with the Napoleonic administrative system in France in the nineteenth century, it spread to many countries of Southern Europe and to Turkey and Japan, among other countries. In its most basic form, a representative of the central state administration holds prior approval power over regional and local decisions, plans, and budgets, and in some cases over many of the “details” of administering state programs within subnational governments. In most countries that used pure tutelage it has been partially or effectively set aside or attenuated and replaced by the gradual granting of autonomy, or by various means of weakening prefectural power. Prefectural administration substantially remains in Turkey, basically unchanged until its very recent attempts to join the eu. It presents a living example of the opposite of autonomy. Tutelage is a process that applies to all units of the state administration and to subnational governments. Constitutionally, the principle of tutelage goes to the “integral” aspect of the state and its administration, in Articles 123–127, with its principles of central government and decentralization. As applied to local government Article 127 states:

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The central government, for the sake of maintaining the provision of local services in harmony with the principle of the integral nature of the administration, securing the unity in public services, protecting the public interest and meeting the local needs as deserved by the local conditions has the power of tutelage (i.e. administrative control) to be implemented according to the principles and procedures to be stated in the law over local governments (Yasimis 1996–97, 74). For example, the tutelage exercised over local government budgets includes both a priori and a posteriori control. A central government agent (usually provincial or subprovincial governor) has to ratify budgets before they can be put into effect (Guner 1994–95). This practice is true of most other actions and transactions of subnational governments, ranging from internal reorganization to all purchasing. In addition, many issues that involve capital expenditures and flexible interpretations of normative issues can only be approved by the central ministries. It is estimated that on a given working day, upwards of 100,000 local officials and managers visit Ankara to seek such permission. Tutelage in Turkey is supported by hundreds of laws, decrees, regulations, and administrative circulars, which regulate local and regional authorities. Prefectural administration has given way in most countries where it was once employed so as to promote self-rule among subnational units. Japan, for example, has a history of tight central fiscal and program control over its prefectures, but a set of vertical linkages based on intergovernmental relations has also emerged (Reed 1986, 34). Since 1990 it has tried to transfer control downward to regions and large core cities under the Regional Devolution Act and the Law for the Promoting of Decentralization, both enacted in 1995. Although reform has been slow, regional and local authorities are emerging as the major providers of education and social protection services. They have also gained more decision control over public works and development projects. Lagging behind is the control by the central state over the “enormous volume of transfers which dwarf the significance of fiscal resources controlled by the subnational governments” (Jinno 1997, 20). This leaves substantial control in the hands of the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Finance. Nevertheless, the central government has committed in principle to abolish kikan inin jimu (agency-delegated functions) carried out by

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prefectural governors, mayors, and administrative committees to build “a new intergovernmental relations based on the principle of equal partnership” (Masujima 1999, 176). The essential concern is that in a non-prefectural situation of subnational autonomy the principle of prior approval does not exist. In some countries, e.g., Canada, “provinces tightly control the structure and power of local governments.” “If Canada is one of the most decentralized federations in terms of federal-provincial relations, it is one of the most centralized in terms of provincialmunicipal relations” (Cameron and Simeon 2000, 107). Tightly controlled orders come down the line from provincial ministry to local department. But this is unusual in federal countries. In most, supervision gives way to different forms of non-intervention and after-the-fact review and/or forms of less formal interaction, a sort of collaborative federalism, during intergovernmental program transaction. To a considerable degree, compliance is a matter of informal or internalized acceptance of the legal and regulatory authority of the higher level government. To be sure, there is a “zone” of mandatory rules and controls that are based in law and regulations, and subnational governments face degrees of normative guidance. What is less well understood in the process is that subnational governments also have a considerable “zone of freedom” to act locally but also within the framework of national (or state) legal powers, both as a unit of self-government and in intergovernmental networks. In practice many action alternatives exist for subnational governments. In the Agranoff and McGuire (2003, ch. 3) study of u.s. local government intergovernmental transactions, five response modes were found to prevail: 1) total avoidance of standards or regulations, i.e., abstinence; 2) strict normative compliance, even without direct monitoring; 3) minor higher-level interaction, information, and accommodation; 4) major higher-level bargaining and negotiating with higher governments; and 5) advancing the local jurisdiction’s own program agenda or comprehensive program as a means of displacing higher-level expectations that embedded in rules and regulations. A sixth possibility, not evidenced in the study, would be open defiance or failure to follow a standard or regulation. This is often followed by litigation or other means of judicial dispute resolution. There could be many more possibilities. What is important about these possibilities is that under autonomy, after a

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normative/framed contract or plan is negotiated and accepted for an intergovernmental program, prior approval is virtually nonexistent or occurs over minimal concerns. Jurisdictions are generally free to act within broader legal and regulatory stipulations as they “receive” and administer external programs within their own jurisdictions. Prior approval is rare under these circumstances. These conditions allow considerable “give and take” in the processes of exchange among autonomous governments, as policy implementation studies involving u.s. federal grants reveal (e.g., Pressman and Wildavsky 1973; Church and Nakamura 1993). Conceptually, this type of policy interaction was initially captured in the United States by Jeffrey Pressman in his study of federal aid to cities. He reminded us that “Donor and recipient need each other, but neither has the ability to fully control the actions of the other. Thus, the aid process takes the form of bargaining between partly cooperative, partly antagonistic, and mutually dependent sets of actors” (1975, 106–7). Helen Ingram’s (1977) study of environmental programs concluded that these programs are not necessarily instruments of federal control but opportunities to bargain. While federal officials would like to bind state and local program managers to federal policy, subnational governments seek the maximum possible leeway to pursue their own separate goals and objectives with federal help. Similarly, Liebschutz (1991) depicts an intergovernmental fiscal system in New York as one defined by bargaining and negotiation. In social services programs, as Richard Elmore (1987, 36) concludes: “this give and take has become a managerial strategy in the implementation process. [The] bargain is a two-way affair, inherently different from hierarchical control. A contract is not an instrument of coercion.” It is a managerial game that, according to Williams’ study of manpower and community development (1980, 197), “requires … subtle skill and much knowledge about the roles, the players, and available strategies in the federal-local bargaining situation.” Thus, not only are extended chains of connections established through autonomous governments, but complex relationships are established over the management of these programs.

understanding igr complexity The normal processes of intergovernmental policy development are protracted, odious, and often tedious and without a doubt bring on

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frustration in some circles, lack of interest in others, and sometimes both (Poirier 2002; Sharkansky 1981). Is it always that way? Clearly, under conditions of simple transfer of power upward or downward, few complicated intergovernmental processes would follow. For example, in the nineteenth century when the u.s. federal government preempted state activities in setting interstate transportation rates, states no longer were involved in these activities. They became a matter of federal policy-making and administration. In Spain this appears to increasingly be the case with regard to various aspects of environmental policy, where eu directives and international treaties are preempting ac powers. On occasion, federal governments have merely turned over or affirmed program responsibilities to constituent units and then substantially removed themselves from a policy arena. This pattern is emerging with regard to land-use policies, where Spanish acs have virtual free rein. In other cases central governments choose not to act in a policy arena or they are constitutionally limited from acting. These processes are not unknown in Canada (Watts 1996), e.g., in education and environmental policy, and occur with increasing frequency in decentralizing federal Belgium, e.g., in education, agriculture, economic development, and foreign trade (Fitzmaurice 1996). But rarely are such processes so neatly compartmentalized. The typical public policy effort is interactive, even when most of its elements are normatively and administratively transferred downward. For example, the Spanish broad (block) grant for social services follows the pattern of many other European meso-government social programs (Moreno 2003) in that the centre transfers money downward to regional governments and from them to municipalities, based on regional decisions and contracted operations with ngos. But some services are based on an “Agreed Plan,” with national needs (e.g., domestic violence, substance abuse, settlement of immigrants), along with a set of fiscal and program reporting requirements. The “Plan” is negotiated between regional/local officials and the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, and then introduced into law. Reporting and auditing is limited. The Spanish “Agreed Plan” is an example of a “minimal” intergovernmental program that is largely the province of regional governments (Chacón 1995). Programs that have been around for some time and have protective constituencies are considerably more engaged. In Spain that is clearly the case with regard to infrastructure provision, the subject of one of our case studies in chapter 8. It is also the pattern in the

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United States for hundreds of the 1,100 domestic programs listed in the u.s. Catalogue of Domestic Federal Assistance to State and Local Governments. Other federal governments follow the involved infrastructure pattern for some programs. Federal governments also operate other policies more like the Spanish Social Services model, where there is substantially more flexibility “down the federal line,” so to speak. It is important to recall that even the flexible Spanish example retains important elements of political and managerial cooperation, and fiscal and program reporting, along with many opportunities for deciding and managing the details along the intergovernmental chain from central ministry to contractee. These involved policy processes are typically but not uniquely federal. In contemporary welfare states both federal and nonfederal systems experience high levels of policy intergovernmentalization. For example, a study of British and French tourism and regional development policy (Armstrong and DeKervenoael 2000) found that five levels – European Union, national government, regional government, county department, and local levels (including ngos) – were substantially involved in both financial responsibilities such as revenue raising, budgeting, and spatial targeting, and functional allocations such as setting the terms and operations of programs. As a result of the substantial involvement of so many tiers, “responsibility” was impossible to assess. On the other hand, multiple involvements were said to enhance certain delivery system efficiencies, such as financial targeting, policy knowledge, and economies of scale at higher levels and networking opportunities and capacity for innovativeness at regional and local levels. Processes such as these and the Spanish infrastructure process lead to the establishment of numerous intergovernmental mechanisms.

macro igr When the concept of igr was new scholars began to talk about the means of “cooperative federalism.” Because the bulk of administrative work has to deal with local citizens’ services there is a notable local presence of central government programs, but through regional and local governments. Well before the development of twentieth-century welfare states national governments used their superior resources to initiate programs administered by subnational

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governments (Cameron and Simeon 2000; Elazar 1962; Grodzins 1966, 17; Skocpol 1995). In federal systems like the u.s., national administrative structures rarely supplanted the powers of state and local governments (Skowronek 1982). As multi- tiered processes were studied from the 1930s to the 1960s, igr scholars found many mechanisms of interaction. igr has moved well beyond the heady days of cooperative federalism into more complex and involved means of interaction. The example in the previous section, involving Spanish infrastructure funding, illustrates that along with residual cooperation (Agranoff 2001), we find administrative, financial, legal and political practices that constitute the type of “indirect supervision” or normative regulation identified earlier. There are many ties and concerns related to politics, money, and the law. The Spanish infrastructure example is not unique. A wide range of administrative, political, economic, and legal igr instruments exist in most of today’s federal systems. Thirty-one of the more commonly used igr mechanisms are identified in Figure 2.1. They are not listed in any particular order of importance. They are extensively used in the twenty-five or so federal countries and those that have significant federal features, particularly constitutionally based regional autonomy (Agranoff 2004), although they vary from country to country and program to program. Interestingly, virtually all of them but three – vouchers, regional/metropolitan councils of government, and ac level second chambers – are operative within the Spanish intergovernmental system. It is difficult to stipulate that some are exclusively political, economic, legal, or administrative. Nevertheless, among the more important economic mechanisms are the various forms of subventions or grants, tax efforts such as shared taxes, tax forgiveness, reciprocal taxation, fiscal auditing and accounting, intergovernmental loans, and intergovernmental fiscal equalization commissions. Among the more important and widespread legal mechanisms are regulations imposed by higher level governments on subnational governments, government enterprises, cooperation and intergovernmental agreements among governments, reciprocal or interdependent legal actions (e.g., eu social policy and the many organic laws governing subnational governments). The important political instruments include various intergovernmental councils, first minister’s conferences in parliamentary federal systems, partnerships with non-public sector, sectoral conferences, the second

Figure 2.1 Thirty-one Instruments of Intergovernmental Relations 1. Economic Devices G Grants or subventions (general revenue/unrestricted; broad/bloc; targeted/ categorical) G Fiscal audits (look behind reviews) G Tax policies (reciprocal taxation schedules; tax abatements/forgiveness; tax sharing; tax transfers; tax cession) G Intergovernmental loans G Shared (with private sector and other governments) capital projects and investments; shared venture capital investments G Vouchers for commodities or direct services G Intergovernmental fiscal study/equalization commissions G Procurement of goods, services, personnel from other governments 2. Legal Approaches G Intergovernmental regulation (program requirements, crossover rules, crosscutting requirements), executive orders, direct regulation, partial preemption, total preemption by higher-level government G Cooperative agreements to jointly operate a program (health statistics, emergency management, internal security) G Government enterprises (electric, water, sewage utilities) G Intergovernmental agreements (joint fire services, combined libraries, special education cooperatives, mutual aid for police emergencies) G Interdependent legal actions (eu social policies, joint workplace regulation, joint income tax format agreements) G Organic laws on governmental structure, local taxation, local civil service, local competencies 3. Political/Government Bodies G Intersectoral/intergovernmental networks and councils G First ministers’ conferences G Partnerships among government and non-government organizations. G Sectoral conferences (environment, economy, education) G Councils of governments (regional, metropolitan) G Parliamentary second chambers G Intergovernmental associations (municipalities, provinces, mayors, local councils, local civil service unions, corps of civil servants) G Intergovernmental lobbying/representation G Elected official to elected official contacts G Political party channels 4. Administrative Practices G Program standards and requirements G Contracts for services/programming between governments G Benchmarks for service performance/outcomes G Exchange of personnel G Program audits (look behind reviews) G Regional/metropolitan governments or special authorities G Negotiated performance programs (in lieu of controls and requirements)

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legislative chamber in countries like Germany and South Africa, forms of intergovernmental contacts and lobbying by individual officials and by associations, and the use of internal political party channels to advance intergovernmental interests. Finally, the most notable administrative instruments include contracts for services, program assessments or audits, negotiation for performance or results in exchange for controls, and various forms of placed-based or regional management at the horizontal level (see below). Again, the fourfold categorization is somewhat artificial. There are economic concerns at the heart of all of these interactions. It is hard to remove politics from virtually any intergovernmental action and virtually all economic mechanisms are based somewhere in law. Organic intergovernmental law reflects the product of highly political processes, and so on. From the standpoint of understanding the place of Spanish local governments in igr we are primarily concerned with how these instruments serve cooperation within various policy systems. First, they are either formal mechanisms or formalized patterns of behaviour that link independent governments. The Broad Social Services Grant program makes this clear. As linking mechanisms they acknowledge interdependence of governments in sets of policy systems. Second, they tend to be continuing processes that link governments from day to day and year to year. These are not normally one-time actions, so officials become used to dealing with one another through these mechanisms. Clearly that is the situation with regard to infrastructure financing in Spain. Third, while they have been identified as instruments and actions, behind them are the individuals who act on behalf of their governments. As Anderson (1960, 11) once asserted, strictly speaking governments do not have relations, but entail “human beings clothed in office that act on behalf of their governments.” It is ac officials, mayors, local administrators, and nongovernmental officials who count in Spain. Fourth, as mentioned, these mechanisms serve programs or have policy intent behind them. For example, fiscal transfers do more than transfer operating funds; they are normally designed to serve some form of fiscal equalization. The audit requirements in the Spanish education programs are designed to see that the target

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population receives the proper mix of instruction and related services, as designed in the framework legislation. Fifth, igr instruments primarily involve the interactions of administrative officials working out the details and procedures of broader public policies. While elected officials, i.e., politicians, often do become involved in some negotiations, accommodations, and agreements, the bulk of the interactive mechanisms are set up after basic policies are framed, and are conducted by appointed program heads and their staff. In other words, in addition to a few hundred elected ac ministers and local commissioners, thousands of Spanish bureaucrats at all levels have their hands in these programs. A sixth and final characteristic is that from a constitutional law, fiscal federalism, public policy, and public administration standpoint these intergovernmental instruments are translatable into “researchable patterns” that can contribute to a body of igr knowledge. Spain is no exception (Alda y Ramos 2005; Máiz et al. 2002; Moreno 2001). Such bodies of knowledge are constantly being added to on both a country (Wright 1988; Galligan 1995; Rhodes 1997; Oates 1999; Walker 2000) and a comparative basis (Agranoff 1992; Bennett 1990; Elazar 1987; Nathan and Balmaceda 1990; Watts 1996).

managing igr A complete analysis of igr in autonomy situations requires that post-enablement actions in the implementation and assessment stages be taken into account. In Spain and in other countries these processes unfold through multiple tiers of government and the nongovernmental sector. This is the “micro” process of igm, that is, those behaviours of officials representing jurisdictions in policy processes as they try to make something work. In this section the process will be illustrated by looking at the steps a Spanish city must go through to expand its industrial park. The difficulty with actions such as development of an industrial park and thousands like it is that they are hidden from public view as officials work out policies on a day-to-day basis. As defined earlier, igm involves the solving of problems through networks of actors, primarily administrators. As a sub-activity of igr, it is a means of coping and working within the existing system. It deals with regular and routine contacts and transactions, and entails joint

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actions of officials dealing with jurisdictional-legal, political, and technical issues while some project or task is being accomplished (Agranoff 1986). It is also important to account for the conditions under which igm operates: partial accountability; the likelihood of differing objectives held by the various jurisdictions; programming of an ongoing or continuous nature; and exchanges of resources, information, and power across organizational boundaries (Rosenthal 1984). igm encompasses many different kinds of managerial behaviours. Early in the development of u.s. policy implementation research the game was known as dealing with grants and regulations, along with “bargaining and negotiation” over some questions to make programs work (Williams 1980; Ingram 1977; Pressman 1975). Later in the research stream, it was discovered that many, many transactions occur that require cooperation (Elmore 1987), such as those in the earlier infrastructure example. Indeed, igm has become a pervasive policy activity that can be the entire job of some “boundary spanners” in central and subnational governments and can consume up to twenty per cent of the time of city government managers (Agranoff and McGuire 2003). Empirical examination of igm activities reveals that they are considerably more involved than earlier studies suggested. Figure 2.2, drawn from research for the Agranoff and McGuire (2003) study of u.s. city economic development, or business promotion/cooperation, lists twenty-one distinct igm actions. They are both vertical, that is, those devices used for working with state and federal governmental officials, and horizontal, those used for working with other local governments, ngos, and the private sector. The vertical igm instruments are of two types, those that try to make some form of adjustment to the system within the boundaries of the policy intent of programs and those designed to determine information or joint understandings. The horizontal instruments either serve particular investment projects or help to develop or maintain networks of officials. The frequency of these actions is reported in the full study (108, 113). For present purposes, it is important to note that all twenty-one actions are regular instruments used by managers, although with great variation. These instruments are used to coordinate programs, that is, to help make intergovernmental policy work within a given situation. Following the example of city economic development, the Agranoff

48 Local Governments/Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain Figure 2.2 Intergovernmental Management Practices Type of Practice

Use in IGM

Purposes of Practice

Discretion-seeking (Vertical)

Requesting and granting local “asymmetrical” treatment not technically or apparently within standards or regulations

Waivers Model program efforts Policy changes Funding innovation Negotiated flexibility Trading compliance for performance results

Information-seeking (Vertical)

Seeking and providing program details and/or reaching operating understandings regarding program operations

Seek program availability and eligibility Seek program operation information Seek interpretation of standards Seek new funding Seek technical assistance

Project-based (Horizontal)

Leverage and engagement of public and private resources to accomplish plans, projects, and other efforts

Develop managerial partnerships in projects Seek financial resources from partners Combine or leverage financial resources Build financial partnerships for projects

Structural design (Horizontal)

Development and maintenance of organizations or networks for program design and implementation

Engage in joint policy making Seek policy making assistance Consolidate policy effort Contract planning or implementation Employ joint financial incentives Access technical resources

Source: Adapted from research by Robert Agranoff and Michael McGuire, Ameritech Economic Development Project, Institute for Development Strategies, Indiana University.

and McGuire research tested the use of some sixty-one policy tools. These are potential actions normally authorized by state governments in the u.s. Depending on the state, city governments have the option of enacting, by council ordinance, these instruments to pro-

Local Governments in Intergovernmental Processes

49

mote their local economies. They are listed by category in Figure 2.3. Some involve direct provision of city services, some are merely promotional (exhortation), some involve the direct use of a city’s governance power (order), others involve various forms of government subsidy, and others involve different kinds of government investment in the long-term future of the city (endogenous). Again, the manner and frequency of engaging such policy tools varies considerably from city to city and time to time (134–9). They illustrate the “over what” the horizontal and vertical intergovernmental instruments such as program waivers or joint planning listed above are transacted. While these tools are particular to economic development, each policy arena would have its own set of program or policy tools that form the means of igm transaction between governments. The use of each of these tools normally entails quite involved cooperative managerial processes of an intergovernmental nature. To illustrate the process we will look at how a hypothetical Spanish city might employ igm. The protracted transactions that involve one or more of these strategies can be illustrated by how one medium-sized Spanish municipal government might promote expansion of its industrial zone (park) through various means (Figure 2.4) of direct provision (improve water and sewer), orders (relax environmental regulations), direct subsidy (provide grants and donate land), and endogenous (share project equity). First, the project must be added to the pgou or General Plan for Urban Development. That requires private sector and provincial agreement, ac approval, and council approval. Second, the land must be rezoned from commercial to industrial, a process that involves council transactions only. Third, citizen input on the proposed changes must be secured through initial hearings. Then a fourth stage of technical, engineering, and legal papers must be prepared, followed by appropriate input, particularly from the provincial government. Funding eligibility also includes review by all parties: central (ae), ac, council, province, and private investors. This fourth step normally take six months to one year. A fifth phase involves submission of the package, after council review, to the ac government for initial assessment, comment, and qualification. Sixth, it comes back to the city for reconsideration in the light of ac proposals and adjustment. A great deal of negotiation and giveand-take will take place here. Seventh, further hearings are required

Figure 2.3 Sixty-three Economic Development Policy/Program Tools 1. direct provision

Improve water systems Improve traffic circulation, streets Improve sewage systems Improve-expand recreation facilities Aesthetic improvements Improve street cleaning-garbage Improve-expand parking Improve public safety services Improve pedestrian amenities Acquire land Clear land of unusable structures Consolidate lot to create large sites

Source: See Figure 2.2

2. exhortation/ promotion Visit existing business Develop promotional material Visit prospects Attend conferences Use community resource databases Develop business roundtable Use direct mail Participate in trade shows Advertise in media Send videos to prospects Host special events Give achievement awards Provide executive mentoring

3. orders/use of governance Adopt sign/façade control regs Improve building inspection process Modify the zoning process Consolidate permit issuance Adopt historic district regs Use ombudsman to resolve problems Adopt antilitter regsprograms Condemn land Relax environmental regs/procedures

4. direct or indirect subsidy Abate taxes Provide tax increment financing Sell land to developer Issue bonds for private development Offer direct loans to private businesses Provide in-kind services Provide grants Contribute cash to projects Offer historic preservation incentives Subsidize loans Donate land to developers Guarantee loans Donate unused real property Relocate business from redev. areas Credit taxes Reduce utility rates Relocate new businesses

5. endogenous/grow from within Rehabilitate buildings Provide employee training-retraining Provide technical assistance to management Share equity in projects Act as business incubator Manage industrial property Manage sale-lease back Develop export markets Set up trade missions

Figure 2.4 Expansion of a Spanish City’s Industrial Park Project Component (Step)

Needed Action

Agreement/Approval AE

Funding Source/Obligation

AC

Municipal

Other Local

Private

X

X

X

X

AE

AC

Municipal

Other Local

Private

X

X

X

X

X

X

1. Add to General Plan

Engineering hearings Council debate

2. Rezoning

Hearings Prepare ordinance Council adoption

X

3. Industrial Park Hearings

Obtain neighbours/ others’ views

X

X

4. Technical Details

Reengineering Site preparation Infrastructure Operation plans

X

X

5. Project Approval

Submit to ac for legal and technical

X

X

X

6. Reconsideration after ac

Technical and other adjustments

X

X

X

X

X

7. Second Hearings

Input on revised details

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

8. Renegotiation

Resolution of details of disagreement

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

9. Project Implementation

Infrastructure funding Environmental waivers Land/site preparation Construction Business purchases Street improvements

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X X

X

X

52 Local Governments/Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain

and, after agreement by several of the parties, in another six months or so, it returns to the ac capital for confirmation and permission to implement. Eighth, if there is local disagreement or city-ac disagreement the process is delayed and negotiations, potentially with each party, ensue to reach project compromise. This could easily hold up projects for another year. Ninth, with agreement the project implementation begins, again involving most parties. What is revealing about Figure 2.4 is the number of approvals, consultations, and funding agreements required (over 50 in total) over a several year period. Moreover, it requires not only extensive private sector involvement and financing but measures of central ae, ac, provincial, and other local (e.g., mancomunidad) government involvement. While complex enough, this illustration of a multitransaction igm process no doubt grossly oversimplifies reality. Implementation will then involve a set of its own steps, with similar negotiations, approvals, and commitments. First comes infrastructure funding acquisition through grants, loans, or bonding. Second, applications for environmental waivers. Third, a whole series of steps involved in land improvement and site preparation. Fourth, arrangements, design, and contracts must be made for building construction. Fifth, the city may want to create some business attraction packages beyond land donation, e.g., start-up grants. The latter will have its own set of processes. Sixth, the water system improvements have to be designed and contracted. Seventh, any road/street improvements, particularly access streets need to be planned, designed, authorized by council, financed, and contracted. Finally, plans have to be made for operation of the expanded industrial park. This may involve city operation, a city corporation, consortia, or other arrangements. Thus, there are many more implementation steps – around seventeen broad transactions in this example – to go through to make a project happen. They involve the routines of igm, encompassing legal, fiscal, political, and technical concerns, to get something done. These micro processes are an invisible but real part of igr. What does this protracted routine behaviour mean for the understanding of intergovernmental policy cooperation? First, managers at the local level, where programs meet people, clearly participate in national and state programs but try to fit them into the needs and expectations of the local community. That is why they seek expanded information and discretion channels. Interactions over

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the policy tools, for example, are designed to meet both higher policy aims and jurisdiction needs, and, of course, to secure dedicated project funding from another government. This often involves some degree of consultation and negotiation, and in the process brings the hand(s) of higher level government into a process where the decision may have been local but the action is intergovernmental. As a result of the one or more governments’ interests, a second implication is the need for communication/transaction channels between levels of government. These routines of policy cooperation come primarily through telephone, e-mail, face-to-face, or written communications and sometimes through more formal application procedures. The important issue is that lines of contact be maintained and used, a skill that many experienced public managers learn over a period of time (McGuire 2002). A third issue is that these vertical interactions are normally based on a set of horizontal interactions within the community. In economic development, most city transactions regarding economic development policy tools come as a result of a networked process among business or potential businesses, other local governments, community groups, and various ngos such as Chambers of Commerce or local economic development corporations. Working with the city they develop agendas that have the policy adjustment implications that ultimately “go up” the vertical igm line. Since these agendas are not always over a single program or policy, a fourth issue is that intergovernmental programs must often be “packaged” into a coherent set of cooperative and interactive adjustments that serves a community’s need. This phenomenon of “packaging” will be illustrated, as one small city’s process of expanding its industrial park is explained. It demonstrates how several programs can be intergovernmentally adjusted for some broader purpose. A fifth and final finding with regard to igm is that while an increasing number of local managers appear to be playing these games, not all do. While the opportunity is there for every city to become heavily engaged in igm, the economic development study revealed that a notable number of cities do not. Some do not extensively engage the policy system because they do not have the knowledge or skill, or because other, internal priorities take precedence. Others face internal opposition. In regard to economic development, some cities may be in such an economic position so that they

54 Local Governments/Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain

do not need to work hard to promote their economies. They may be inactive in this arena but more active in other areas (Agranoff and McGuire 2003, ch. 3). Whatever the circumstances, it is a game that everyone can play, but clearly everyone does not.

conclusion For at least a century local governments in federal systems have been tied to intermediate and central governments by program as well as by law. The welfare state brought on education and social welfare services and later health, employment, and environmental programs. The ties between the levels involved law, money, services, and many other mechanisms. Importantly, the concerns of one level became the concerns of all levels and consequently the actions of one level affect the other levels, creating multiple networks of decisions and operations. It is the intergovernmentalization of public affairs. While this phenomenon came rather late to Spain, it nevertheless was introduced with federalization and institutional autonomy after the transition. In an attempt to “catch up” to other European welfare states, a series of intergovernmental programs and mechanisms were introduced to facilitate new policies in education, health, social services, and a host of other arenas. These programs fit well into decentralizing Spain through a series of grants, regulatory programs, revenue transfers, cooperative agreements, consortia, and other mechanisms, making Spain as federal as other countries that possess constitutional federations.

ts/Intergovernmental pain Networks in Federalizing Spain

3 Building Federal Spain: The Autonomous Communities

No one involved in the formation of Spain’s autonomous state designed it as a federation, or quasi-federation, but it proved impossible to prevent federalization. With the exception of a brief earlier autonomous experiment in Catalonia under the Second Republic, Spain was a unitary country under a succession of monarchs and dictators, yet “the social and cultural cohesion that makes up Spain’s unity does not obliterate its internal rivalries.” As a result, a degree of “concurrence among the nationalities and regions” is necessary (Moreno 2001, 1). Thus, with the post-Franco transition to democracy, a broad interparty interregional consensus was needed to forge the Constitution of 1978. It was made possible by a process that involved but extended beyond reaching agreement among elites. In the thirty-six years of Franco regime control (1939–75) Spain had gone through radical cultural and economic transformations, particularly in the fifteen years leading up to his death. Spain was “thus a modern consumer and civil society which permitted the construction of a new order based on reconciliation and compromise” (Romero 1999, 162). A Pacto del Olvido (pact of forgetfulness) facilitated a collective amnesia about past conflicts and atrocities on all sides that allowed the founders of the new regime to abandon old passions. One history of the transition (Carr and Fusi 1979, 244) characterized the final agreement as one that reflected the need to look ahead rather than behind: The new democratic constitution is long – 169 articles – complex, unnecessarily detailed, turgid and repetitive. However, it

56 Local Governments/Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain

enjoys one important advantage over all previous Spanish constitutions; it is the first constitution in Spanish history that is neither the unilateral imposition of a party nor the expression of a single ideology. It attempts to synthesize divergent ideological viewpoints; its linguistic infelicities, not all of which were removed ... While controversies surrounding the church and education were equally volatile, those surrounding regional autonomy and recognition of national groups and their right to self-governance were contentious and acrimonious. It became clear early in the deliberations that the success or failure of a constitution hinged on the development of an autonomous system while safeguarding the unity of the country (Gilmour 1985, 199–200).

democracy and the

AUTONOMIAS

state

The processes of building the Estado de las Autonomías and that of democracy were, to key architects of the post-Franco regime, two sides of the same coin. As Díaz-López (1981, 266) has suggested, “for the majority of those favouring autonomous regions (whether nationalists or not), the ideas of democracy and autonomy have been inseparable such that the process of political decentralization in Spain is felt to be fundamental to liberty and democracy.” Studies of “democratization,” that is, free and open contestation and universal participation (Huntington 1991, 7), or transition from authoritarian rule, including that of Spain, reveal that these transformations usually occur in relation to economic, social, military, and sometimes administrative transformations (Huntington 1991; O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986). As in other southern European countries, societal conditions for transition to political democracy were made ripe in Spain by an expanding middle class, increased urbanization and exodus of small farmers to the cities, secularization, working-class opposition, state capitalization, and internationalization of the economy (Giner 1986; see also Carr and Fusi 1979). In regard to democracy and autonomy, Schmitter (1993) refers to the encouragement of local autonomy as “a possible component of the sequence of transformative processes” common to such transitions (19). In the minds of most Spanish democrats, self-rule was associated with decon-

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57

centrating the central state and its ubiquitous bureaucracy. This meant creating and strengthening subnational representative governments through decentralization. The government structure component of democratization was a most important development, as Spain possessed a central government that was generally considered to be weak but highly centralized. Slowly and reluctantly, power shifted downward as a result of the Constitution. The process of transferring competencies was one where central officials and administrators were accused of “protecting their turf,” whereas the central representatives themselves claimed that they were protecting general interests. Nevertheless, by 1987, when Basque policing and health services were transferred, a benchmark had been reached. Virtually all the competencies listed in the original statutes of autonomy had been transferred. About this time the “slower route” acs began to add new responsibilities. With the subsequent addition of substantial expenditure and responsibility items like education, finally reached in 2002, all the ac governments have moved into the orbit of making policies related to the core domestic programs and possessing major servicing responsibilities for these programs under the auspices of elected governments (Subirats y Gallego 2002).

the constitutional dimension and its development The Constitution of Spain became official three years after the 1975 death of Franco, on 29 December 1978. It represented the culmination of extended debate and regime reform that built on the traditions of autonomy represented in the Cádiz Constitution of 1812, the short-lived federal First Republic in the 19th century, and the regional autonomy movement (installed for Catalonia, adopted for the Basque provinces and Galicia, but interrupted by the Civil War) of the Second Republic of the 1930s. The Constitution ushered in democracy and launched the possibility of building-in modern federal arrangements (Elazar 1996) and, most important for these purposes, a highly intergovernmentalized system of local, regional, state, and European level relations. The chronology in Appendix A identifies the key intergovernmental events that have shaped Spain – ac and local government – beginning with the first free elections in forty years in 1977, up to

58 Local Governments/Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain

the issuance of the White Paper on local government reform (chapter 9) by the national administration in early 2005, the revision of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy in 2006, and the economic recovery plan of financial subventions of 2008. It is these legal and political developments that have built on the Constitution. These key events indicate that the system was not so much designed but initially framed and then evolved by a combination of political agreements on the broad questions along with an igr at a working level. It was, as Moreno (2001, 61) aptly concludes, an “accepted solution (that) took the form of an unwritten pledge to extend the procedures of political dialogue and consociationalism into the future. This open model of asymmetrical decentralization did not presuppose the ways and means by which the different spatial entities could finally be articulated,” at least initially avoiding “The formulation of a clear division of powers based upon ‘orthodox’ federal techniques.” Instead the events described in Appendix A demonstrate how series of electoral processes, organic laws, subnational institution building, Constitutional Tribunal decisions, transfer of competencies, financing arrangements, reform proposals, and agreements or pacts among major parties gradually built the system. Virtually all of the major changes have come about as a result of forging major agreements among the parties, a practice that extends from the pre-constitution period to current negotiations relating to further reforming the autonomy system (Agranoff 1996). The Constitution clearly establishes a multilayered and interdependent framework of governments. As stated, Article 2 identifies unity and autonomy as first principles and frames a three-tiered system, including acs and local governments. The acs are the relatively new bodies that were “chartered” by the national parliament through statutes of autonomy, a sort of equivalent to a state/provincial constitution for each territory. The Constitution is similar to many modern European constitutions, in that human rights and civil liberties, principles of social justice, and rights of association are spelled out early in the document, and are important judicially enforceable rights that apply to all levels of government. For example, Article 27(8) states that “the public authorities shall inspect and standardize the educational system so as to guarantee compliance with the laws.” This provision implies enforceable rights and has led to some levels of acrimony between Madrid and some

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regions, over language, history, and other cultural instruction, particularly regarding the government of the state’s role in encroaching on autonomy in decentralized programs, as they protect rights. The powers laid down in the Constitution are somewhat misleading in an overlapping system designed to maximize intergovernmental cooperation. Article 149 enumerates some 32 different “exclusive state competencies,” including the normal foreign and international relations, defence, international trade and organizations, state finance and debt, management of the economy, social pensions, interregional transport and economic matters, and many other matters that affect more than one region. Somewhat distinct in federal systems would be administration of justice (all regional and provincial courts are, in effect, part of a single central system), labour legislation, public security (except for municipal police), academic and professional degree standards, and authorization of consultative referendums. This article also contains some difficult language that has led to the highly interdependent system: (3) The matters not attributed expressly to the state by this Constitution belong to the Autonomous Communities by virtue of their respective statutes. Authority over matters not assumed by the Statutes of Autonomy shall belong to the state, whose norms shall prevail in case of conflict over those of the Autonomous Communities in everything which is not attributed to their exclusive competence. The law of the State shall in every case be supplementary to the law of the Autonomous Communities. This clause has led to the Constitutional Tribunal upholding the basic autonomy of the regions yet has maintained the right of the general government to be included in matters of their broad competence. Moreover, Article 150 allows the parliament to transfer portions of state competencies to the acs, including transfer of financial means, yet maintains the state power to “harmonize the normative provisions of the Autonomous Communities even in the case of matters attributed to their competence when the general interest so demands.” This clause, which is largely left up to parliamentary discretion, has been the source of considerable intergovernmental conflict. In regard to ac competencies, Article 148 lists some twenty-two, ranging from the power of ac self-government to economic devel-

60 Local Governments/Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain

opment and social programming, environmental protection, sport, tourism, and health and social services. Most important with regard to local governments is that acs are responsible for “organization of their institutions of self-government,” “alterations of municipal boundaries,” “in general the functions which belong to the State Administration concerning local corporations and whose transfer is authorized by the legislation on Local Governments,” “regulation of the territory, urbanism and housing,” and “the coordination and other functions with respect to local police forces.” Five years after establishing their initial competencies, acs were able to expand their competencies, and from 1985–2002 a gradual transfer of competencies from the state to acs occurred, most importantly the transfers of education, health, and social services to all 17 communities. In the immediate post-constitutional period ac legislation followed a course known as the principio dispositivo, wherein each community assumed different powers within constitutional limits. In addition, there was a gradual and disparate assumption of powers based on the different ways acs gained automony (e.g., fast or slow route). This meant that different communities at different times could claim different powers. However, the later non-nationalist slow route communities argued for more powers to be transferred to them quickly, to catch up with the other regions. As a result of a series of political accords (Agranoff and Ramos 1997), autonomy was sped up and in 1981 the Parliament legislated certain features of homogeneity. The popular call was that instead of sugar and cream for the Basque Country, Catalonia, Andalucia, and Galicia, it was café para todos. Thus, harmonization and equalizing powers (by 2002) gradually set aside the principio dispositivo. Each ac government possesses a constitutionally required unicameral elected parliament, a council of ministers, a president who is the territorial first minister, and an administrative corps. Regional elections are held separately from statewide elections, and follow similar patterns of partisan alignments to those of state elections (Pallarés et al. 1997). ac administrative agencies were partially built through the transfer of state civil servants whose programs were regionalized. In a practical sense, the intergovernmental chronology makes clear that many basic laws are established by the government of the state in Madrid and the ac shares in constitutional and normative

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powers. This is normally the case with regard to local governments. Overall the situation is considerably more complicated, as the tabular division in Figure 3.1 indicates. This data covers a total of some 91 different competencies in most policy/program arenas, foreign and domestic. It is part of a multi-country database – The Allocation of Powers Project – of federal systems (Argullol et al. 2004). The Spanish data was compiled by Prof. Carles Viver í Pi Sunyer, a former member of the Constitutional Tribunal. The project breaks out competencies into seven categories that reflect constitutional allocation, judicial decision, and actual practice, which leads to an interesting seven-fold typology: 1) exclusive state power; 2) state regulation/legislation with second level administration/management (ac used in Figure 3.1 because it pertains to Spain only); 3) state power over basic principles/remaining second level; 4) coinciding powers recognized at both levels; 5) exclusive second level powers; 6) municipal local powers; and 7) joint asymmetric solutions. Figure 3.1 clearly demonstrates the mixed Spanish pattern where no exclusively local powers are enumerated, whereas numerous powers are shared legislatively or administratively, or both, between the state and ac governments. Most subnational powers are in the categories of: 1) state powers over basic principles/minimal norms, with the remaining functions belonging to the acs; 2) concurrent powers with state prevalence in case of conflict; and 3) exclusive ac powers. From the standpoint of organizing and oversight of local government Figure 3.1 further demonstrates the mixed system of competencies. The Viver data indicates that ac governments do not in practice have exclusive authority over local governments if one looks at the shaded items that normally pertain to exclusive secondtier government powers in federal systems, including those related to legal control of local governments. First, the state retains ultimate or exclusive control and regulation over motor vehicle traffic, even within ac and municipal boundaries, as well as final permission to authorize public demonstrations. Second, in category 3 the state has minimum normative control over economic planning, environmental legislation, sanitation, and most importantly “municipal intervention and supervision.” The latter power enables the state to establish basic local laws. That means that the exclusive powers in category 5, exclusive to ac, where most local government competencies lie, are attenuated by the powers in category 3. As a

Figure 3.1 Distribution of Normative Powers

1. exclusive state power, with a monopoly or quasi-monopoly over all public functions: citizenship, passport issuance, internal identity documents, internal and external immigration, border control, right to asylum; pact and treaty agreements, representation in international organizations, embassies, international relations; command of armed forces, recruitment, induction or deployment of troops; general regulation, establishment of judicial organs and powers, judicial personnel (selection, nomination); mercantile legislation; exterior trade, customs and tariff system, commerce among autonomous communities, public debt; construction of major infrastructure, award grants for the private management of infrastructure, motor-vehicle traffic, aerial navigation, maritime transportation, maritime fishing, mail, radio-electronic space (radio waves), telecommunications; sanitation legislation; pharmaceutical product legislation; establishment of minimal education training (age, content); export of cultural goods; old age and widower pensions, unemployment pensions; general citizenship rights and guarantees; general public safety regulation; trade and possession and use of arms; authorization of citizen demonstrations; narcotics control; and contraband control. 2. exclusive state power regarding legislation or regulation matters, and autonomous community power regarding administration or management according to state law (state regulation and autonomous community administration): intellectual and industrial property legislation; penal legislation; labour and social legislation; coinage (currency and exchange), official weights and measures; expedition and approval of official titles; territorial regulation and expropriation; protection of cultural, artistic, and monument heritage. 3. state power over the principles or minimal normative bases of a matter; remaining functions correspond to the autonomous communities: banking institutions, credit arrangements, stock market and investment, insurance, economic planning; environmental protection, coasts and maritime-terrestrial zones; forest resources; energy resources; control of radio wave space;

Figure 3.1 continued

4.

5.

6. 7.

private mass media (press, radio, tv); sanitation legislation; general regulation of education, education content, professional or technical training, regulation of university education; regulation of agriculture; administrative organization system, civil service system and payment, administrative process, administrative contracts and grants, administrative control mechanisms; municipal intervention and supervision. coinciding powers with recognition of normative powers at both levels, but with prevalence and preponderance to the state in the case of a normative conflict: railroad infrastructure; promotion of scientific and technical investigation; protection of historical and cultural heritage, cultural promotion, general cultural manifestations, promotion of reading, cinematography, and theatre and music; information and communication technologies; protection of languages and dialects, imposition of linguistic standards; employment programs, poverty programs; protection of marginal sectors within the population. exclusive powers of the autonomous communities with monopoly or quasi-monopoly of all public functions: trade within an autonomous community; environmental protection (management/control), territorial arrangement or regional development, urbanism (land property regime), land use or zoning, management of urban development, control and discipline of urban development; system of public sanitation services system, construction and management of sanitation centres; creation or authorization of scholastic centres, creation and authorization of universities; geriatric management or control; protection of minors; agriculture (promotion and control), livestock, inland fishing, and aquaculture; crafts, industry, retail trade, tourism; management of penitentiary centres. municipal or local powers: none surveyed. other solutions (for example: joint powers; joint functional powers in the affected territory or matter; asymmetric distribution of powers): execution or fulfillment of treaties; material

64 Local Governments/Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain Figure 3.1 continued

investments; civil legislation; procedural legislation; hydraulic use and resources; roads, terrestrial transportation (regulation and authorization/control), airports, ports; archive system and management, library system and management, museum system and management; coordination of police forces, civil defence during emergencies, security in public places. Source: From Enric Argullol et al. Federalismo y Autonomía (Barcelona: Ariel 2004). Compiled by Carles Viver i Pi-Sunyer. Translated by Juan Manuel Pedroza.

result, local government regulation has become very much a shared function, where the basic laws and normative framework have been primarily from the state level but implementation and interactions with local governments has shifted to the ac level. Finally, category 7 indicates that for some functions relating to local governments, some form of joint or special arrangement is in effect that does not necessarily exclude the involvement of the state and the ac.

the institutional framework of igr The building of the state must also include inquiry into the role of established institutional structures, particularly how they contribute to the relationships needed to ensure that units make decisions that are consistent with yet reasonably independent of central supervision and control. Institutions such as legislative bodies and executive agencies matter because they are arenas for contending social forces, as well as collections of standard operating procedures and structures that define and defend interests (March and Olsen 1984, 738). As Rhodes (1997, 79) suggests, institutional analysis seeks to explain relationships between structure and outcomes such as democracy and the ways in which rules, procedures, and formal organizations succeed or fail in constraining political behaviour. As a result, how do different arrangements established in law and practice provide the means for establishing the transactions needed for meaningful subnational autonomy? Conversely, do institutional forces deter autonomy? The central question is: do institutional arrangements and the linkages that arise from them provide for ac and local autonomy?

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The institutional arrangements in the Constitution, framework laws, and other legislation frame the central-subnational system of autonomy and its corresponding igr. These institutional instruments are legal, fiscal, and political forces that evoke igr through the Spanish multi-tier arrangements (Agranoff and Ramos 1997). A brief “primer” of institutions highlights the constitutional and operational features between state and ac by legislative, executive, and judicial functions. A more complete constitutional study of the operation of these institutions can be found in Aja (2003). The bicameral Cortes, or parliament, holds essential powers in creation, oversight, and harmonization among acs and local governments. However, many competencies have been transferred to the acs, and the national government has a diminished role in local supervision. However the Constitution retains the right of the central parliament to enact laws establishing the principles necessary for harmonizing the rule-making provisions of the acs, even in the case of matters over which jurisdiction has been conferred on the latter, when this is necessary in the general national interest (Article 150.3). This provision has allowed for “mandating” or national regulation. The most important legislative functions relate to the power of approval and amendment of ac statutes of autonomy, an equivalent to ac constitutions. Harmonization of ac and local government powers and financing are also very important because the first chamber, or the Congress, is a substantially more powerful body than the Senate. Its role in forming the government, in ratifying decree-laws that emanate from the government, and in general legislation is central. Initiation of legislation can emanate from the ac assemblies, the government, the Congress, and the Senate. Both houses of parliament must approve cooperative agreements between acs. The only exclusive Senate power (which has never been invoked) is that granted under Article 155.1, which states that if an ac fails to fulfill its obligations under the Constitution or other national laws, the government, on majority Senate approval, is empowered to force compliance. Spain possesses a strong prime minister and cabinet government and the executive role is central in intergovernmental relations. Executive powers include the right to provide national oversight and control in areas of devolved or concurrent competencies and introduction of organic laws that affect subnational government operations and financing, to establish general instructions

66 Local Governments/Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain

regarding the budget structure, accounts, taxing, and borrowing of local governments. The government has also operated through a myriad of cabinet and subcabinet committees and special commissions that often include subnational officials. Some of these are advisory; some are operational. The Ministry of Public Administration (map) is the agency directly charged with overall intergovernmental study, cooperation, and capacity-development, but in practice this is shared with many functional ministries. map also is most directly involved in local government affairs and reform. At an early period in Spain’s democracy, nominal prefecture-like holdover representation of the government among subnational governments was formalized under the delegado del gobierno (ac) and gobernador civil (province). Except in a few instances, the role of the latter has become less important than that of ministerial representatives and administrators in the field. As part of the 1996 governing pact with the Catalan nationalist party, Convergence and Union, national legislation included the abolition of the gobernadores civiles. The central government presence in the acs remains with the delegados, who have few important powers left, and at the provincial level, there is coordination by a subdelegate, who is much less important than the gobernadores. Finally, review and/or dispute resolution activity is split among two court systems and a special body: (1) the Constitutional Tribunal for all questions relating to civil rights and to the actions of governments; (2) the Audit Tribunal, which reviews public accounts (some regions have their own audit bodies but remain subject to Audit Tribunal review); and (3) the superior court system, for all other matters, which operates on a territorially decentralized basis under national supervision by the Supreme Court of Justice. The latter court system is where most issues regarding local government actions would be litigated. From the standpoint of intergovernmental relations and the building of federal democracy, the Constitutional Tribunal is of the greatest significance. The power of the Tribunal extends nationwide, and its judgments or sentencias are made in three general areas: (1) appeals against constitutional laws and regulations, including statutes of autonomy, organic laws, ordinary laws of national and regional parliaments, and international treaties; (2) appeals for protection of citizens’ rights and freedoms, under

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charges that public bodies or authorities have violated them; and (3) appeals regarding the powers or compentencies of the acs in cases where there are disputes over power between the central government and the ac. In the third situation, either party may appeal, and the legislation, decree, or regulation is suspended for up to five months while the Court considers an opinion. The Court has been most instrumental in defining the state of autonomies as one with federal arrangements.

the ac governments In many ways the regional governments have developed into form and functions similar to those of other European second tier or mesogovernments (Sharpe 1993). In this sense, they are not only intergovernmental partners in welfare state programs but also governments in their own right, representing their citizens, forging regional policy and engaging in their own games of regional politics. As Moreno (2001, 145) observes: Mesogovernments are no longer dependent on those programmes of rationalization carried out during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by central bureaucracies and elites. Their own entrepreneurs, social leaders and intelligentsia have taken up many of the initiatives and roles once the exclusive province of those “enlightened” actors who held the reins of power of their nation-states. Positions of political influence are now more evenly distributed in central, meso-level and local institutions. Co-option of regional elites to the central institutions of government are no longer the exclusive routes available to ‘successful’ political careers. The initiatives of these governments in many areas of social and economic life have led to a new cosmopolitan location that combines opposition to the centralized model of the unitary state and mobilization of regional-based identities. The framework for establishing Spain’s regional bureaucratic agencies was clearly modelled after that of the Spanish state model. Not only were competencies transferred, but employees of the state corps of civil service were moved “downward,” so to speak. ac government civil service employees began in 1982 with a total of

68 Local Governments/Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain

over 44,000, growing to over 750,000 by 1999 with the transfer of public university employees. Most important of these transfers involved health and education employees, which alone accounted for 260,000 teachers, medical staff, and related employees. By 2006 the number of ac employees totalled 1.22 million, of which 500,000 were teachers, 435,735 health service workers, and 239,287 civil servants working for their governments (Boletín Estadístico 2006, 12, 32). Villoria (1999, 114) concludes that generally these bureaucracies changed very little in organization and functioning as they moved to the regional capitals. Decentralization was an important element of the process of transition and consolidation, but the central bureaucracy’s role in rapid transfer has had grave consequences for “localization” of its problems, perpetuating certain inefficiencies, unnecessary conflicts, and permanent lack of confidence in the bureaucracy’s ability to change (115) (see also Bañón and Tomayo 1997). Article 152 of the Constitution stipulates that the regional governments of the four fast-route communities (Andalucia, Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia) contain a legislative assembly (parliament), an executive (governing) council, a president, and a high court of justice, with the court, as indicated, being part of the single, country-wide system. No institutions were specified for the other thirteen slow-route communities, only that their institutions be named in their statutes of autonomy. However, a part of loapa (see Appendix a) that was not overturned indicates that all regions would have the same structure, and generally that has been the case. Indeed, loapa provisions that stand include uniform regional elections, term limitations for ac legislatures, limits on the size of governments to ten cabinet agencies (since modified), and uniform rules for constructive no-confidence rules in their assemblies. The regional parliaments or assemblies are unicameral, but in many ways are like the lower house in Madrid, or Congreso de los Diputados. Deputies are elected, normally in four-year cycles, by the same system of proportional representation and seat allocation as for Madrid. The size varies from the largest, Catalonia, with 135, to La Rioja, at 33. Regional elections for the 13 slow-route communities are held on the same date, set by the central government, in conjunction with local elections. The other four acs space out their elections to coincide with their annual dates and can call

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them on their own, and on different dates. Generally each assembly has a presiding president, a presiding council (mesa), and a standing council, working through plenary sessions (plenos) and in committees (comisiones). Most importantly, the ac statutes of autonomy gives these regional parliaments the power to adopt laws related to their competencies without prior review or approval from the central government. Most of these proposals (proyectos de ley) come from the all-important executive. These regional assemblies produced more than 3,300 laws and normative decisions in 2002, regarding over 1,800 transfers of competencies from the state (Ramio y Salvador 2002, 99). Two additional and notable assembly powers are the right to present proposed bills to the central Congress in Madrid and the right to present appeals relating to ac powers to the Constitutional Tribunal. The executive branch includes the president (first minister), ac executive, and regional ministries. The president is chosen by the majority party or coalition in the assembly and is symbolic head of the region and leader of the regional executive in terms of policy and political questions, with the power to nominate and dismiss members of the executive. Normally one or more vice-presidents are also selected. The Executive comprises regional ministers, normally ac deputies, who head the major departments. Figure 3.2 depicts one government organization chart for an ac, that of Aragon. With some variation, each consejería or ministry in Aragon is further broken down into administrative layers of vice ministers, secretary generals or technical secretary generals, and directors general (see also Ramió y Salvador 2002, 112). Normally ministries are further layered into subdirector generals, services, sections, subsections, and administrations, in most cases “isomorphically” modelling the state institutional structure. Because the thirteen slow-route communities were once limited to ten ministries, they are often grouped by function, as in the case of Aragon, diversity of regional interests, internal political pressures, and/or by policy rationale (Ballart y Ramió 2000, 239). The ten most common ministries among the 17 regions include: environment, presidency, culture, social welfare, health, education, finance, economy, labour and employment, and agriculture. Some regions also have ministries of public works, tourism, public administration, and transport. From an intergovernmental standpoint virtually all of these agencies have some impact on local governments, although environment, presi-

Figure 3.2 Institutional Arrangements Related to Intergovernmental Relations Legislative Shared Powers G Approval/amendment of autonomy statutes G Agreements of cooperation between acs (145.2) G Criteria for allocation of Interterritorial Compensation Fund (158.2) G Harmonization of legislation of acs, national regulation (150.3) G Request (jointly with government) the provision of ac information, even in areas of exclusive competencias (6,109) G Organic framework operation and finance of local governments (140–142) G Deliberate all legislation introduced by ac assemblies at the central level

Executive G

G G

G

G

G

G

G

Congress G Ratification of decree-laws adopted within a 30 day period, including those of an ac or intergovernmental nature (86) Permanent Committee on Public Administration

G

G

Supervision of devolved competencies, even where exclusive ac control (8) (153) Right to challenge ac laws before Constitutional Tribunal (161.2) Introduction of organic laws or basic legislation that affects powers, operation, and finance of subnational governments ac legislatures can request government passage of legislation (87.2) Cabinet committee Comisión Delegada del Gobierno para la Politica Autonómica (comprising ministries of justice, economy, and finance, public administration, interior, and secretary of state for acs) Council of State: advisory body of government officials, covers conflictive administrative and legal matters, including matters of rule-making and contracting between units of government Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera de las Comunidades Autónomas, finance ministries from acs, state finance minister, minister of map; consultative body for coordination of public investment, cost of services, public debt, distribution of funds to acs Interministerial committees on focused problems Special commissions; comprising central and ac officials, transfer of competencies, mixed commissions; vertical convenios; interterritorial technical commissions and councils Ministry of Public Administration, responsible for coordination at all levels of government; includes Secretariat of State for Territorial Administration, Secretary of State for Public Administration, National Institute of Public Administration

Judicial Constitutional Tribunal Adjudicates the constitutionality of ac legislation, actions of government in regard to acs, laws passed by Cortes in relation to acs, local governments (153) (161) G Adjudicates civil rights, including actions of governments (161) G

AC Tribunals G

Tribunales Superiores de Justicia have been established in the acs, under supervision of the national Supreme Court of Justice

Figure 3.2 continued Legislative Senate G Empowerment by majority to force ac not fulfilling obligations to comply or steps taken to protect general interest (155.1) (only exclusive power of Senate; has never been invoked) G Permanent Committee on Autonomous Regions and Territorial Administration Audit Tribunal G Legislatively created post-audit body that oversees all public sector accounts (136), including ac accounts; some acs also have their own audit bodies.

Executive G G

G

G

G

G

G

Judicial

Subcabinet secretaries for relations with acs (in several ministries) Ministry of Finance issues general budget instructions and the accounting plan (112.2 and 114 lrbrl) for local government budgets, tax ordinances, and borrowing requests under national law Comisión Nacional de Administración Local comprising central government and local officials, deals with matters relating to local government Delegado del Gobierno coordinates and oversees central government (154) programs in acs (more official than real) Gobernador civil coordinates central programs in provinces and with local governments (more official than real); downgraded to subdelegate in 1997 Conferencias Sectoriales, multilateral specialized commissions comprising of the corresponding state ministry and ac ministry for discussion and negotiation of policies affecting acs. Bilateral Cooperation Commissions between ministries of the state and ac ministries in areas of continuing consultation and need.

Source: Elaborated from the original, Robert Agranoff and Juan Antonio Ramos Gallarín, “Toward Federal Democracy in Spain: An Examination of Intergovernmental Relations.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 27(4): 1–38, 1997.

72 Local Governments/Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain Figure 3.3 Autonomous Community Organization legislative assembly

cabinet

high court of justice

ministry

ministry

ministry

vice-ministry

secretary general or technical secretary general

directors general Source: Xavier Ballar y Carlos Ramió, Ciencia de la administración. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2000, 237.

dency, finance, economy, public works, and agriculture would be the most significant. Also, in the eleven multiprovincial communities, each ministry or consejero has provincial capital offices or delegaciones (which tend to be similar in form to the regional ministry, with duplicated directors general) that carry out regional policy, represent the ac government on coordinating bodies (e.g., economic development councils), and are an important first and regular point of contact for local governments. The delegaciones are headed by a delegado autonómico who is now the primary provincial representative for internal administration, or what is called “home affairs” in the u.k. Finally, regional governments often establish a series of autonomous administrative bodies, dependent on some ac ministry, but operating quite independently. Examples would be regional institutes of public administration, councils for womens’ affairs, regional research institutes, and in some cases large functions such as the regional health service (Newton 1997, 135). This elaborated administrative structure is important for local government contact in Spain’s highly intergovernmental system. The ac bureaucracy was built by a combination of new, untested politically appointed program and service heads, including provincial delegations, plus the transferred functionaries who worked for the state and were included in the transfer of competencies, and a very large collection of professionally trained specialists such as

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teachers, health-care workers, and engineers. Overall, a great deal of technical competence and experience was “transferred in” at the operating level. According to Ballart y Ramió (2000, 273): When it comes to outlining criteria for organizing their administrative structures and personnel, autonomous communities have made little use of their self-governing capacity. The communities have demonstrated an apparent lack of interest in crafting a distinctly autonomous organization to match their new powers and responsibilities to take on society’s emerging demands. Such shortcomings can be explained by examining the convergence of a number of distinct circumstances: G

G

G

The complex organizational design of autonomous communities includes significant and telling sub-sections. The design and sub-sections were directly transferred and imposed by the federal government’s General Administration (Administración General del Estado). Autonomous communities have maintained and inherited these designs due to the deep-rooted difficulties associated with modifying them.

In addition, the rapid introduction of an autonomic governmental structure has entailed a certain level of improvisation when it comes to organizational design. This has been the case because, since their inception, the autonomous communities have been preoccupied with (a) acquiring new powers and (b) quickly embarking on the management of such powers as a means to securing immediate legitimacy. The hurried priorities did not allow the communities to think carefully about alternative ways of managing their powers, especially ways that differed from the central government. They also failed to think about how to most suitably organize the distinct administrative units within each autonomous community. As a result, ac governments have not only failed to take on the option of organizational flexibility under autonomy, but have perpetuated what was considered to be a weak state model. Neverthe-

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less, the venues of intergovernmental contact are shifting from Madrid and the gobernadores civiles to the regional capitals.

igr and the acs In contrast to the study of local governments, the acs have been subject to a number of solid research projects from legal (Aja 2003), developmental (Agranoff y Bañón 1999; Subirats y Gallego 2002), policy (Lancaster 1989), administrative (Ballart y Ramió 2000) and ethnic territorial (Moreno 2001) perspectives. A recently published study (López [coord] 2006) examines a wide range of institutionalized ac igr instruments over time, with particular emphasis on the formal means of interlevel connections within a constitutional and legal framework and within the context of important political agreements. Horizontal (ac to ac) cooperation has been slow to develop. However, the ac governments that have reformed their statutes began to meet in 2008–09 to jointly analyze the rate at which their respective statutes have been implemented and to identify primary challenges. Also, the group has adopted two conventions: cooperation on gender violence and on hunting and fishing (IAC Newsletter 2009, 2). This study identifies four mechanisms of special importance: sectoral conferences, bilateral cooperation commissions, joint plans and programs, and collaboration agreements. Since each of these have a direct bearing on local governments, we briefly review the study findings. In the early 1980s Article 8 of the Autonomous Harmonization Act proposed the creation of sectoral conferences as multilateral meetings and an issues forum between acs and the central government. They were promoted by Madrid to rationalize the ac process through mutual exchange of ideas and joint problem analysis. They were encouraged by subsequent agreements about a decade later (González 2006). At the point of the study 27 such conferences were in existence, presided over by cabinet ministers and staff, with ac program counsellors and staff counterparts in attendance. They also operate with spin-off workgroups. Those conferences of greatest interest to local governments include: local affairs, infrastructure and territorial organization, culture, social services, housing and urban life, and the conference on fiscal and financial affairs. Hundreds of these meetings have led to a total of 559 intergovernmental agreements including 39 in the areas identified (Gonález

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2006). With the notable exception of special regime acs, Basque Country and Navarra, who account for about one-third of all absences, they are well attended and have smoothed relations in a number of important areas such as health, agriculture and rural development, and university coordination. However, González (2006) concludes that conferences do not work very well in areas where ac-Madrid conflict is the greatest and thus there is less need and interest in structuring stable cooperation. Bilateral cooperation commissions (bcc) are single projectoriented negotiating bodies comprising first- and second-level management from the State and ac administrative bodies. These are the bodies that originally negotiated the transfer of services “downward” to ac responsibility, requiring stable mechanisms of contact between the two levels. Subsequently, they dealt with other power transfers. The speed with which these commissions were established varied greatly, with the Madrid ac and Valencia not establishing theirs until 2000, almost two decades after enactment of their statutes of autonomy. bcc regulations emphasize identification and creation of bilateral cooperation projects by cooperation agreement, joint plans, and programs, or some other mechanism, and promote all activities relating to the prevention and handling of intergovernmental conflicts. Data compiled by Ramos (2006) indicates a total of 19 bcc in existence (17 ac and 2 autonomous cities). The greatest number of meetings are those with Catalonia, and normally the highest number of meetings are held when the national and ac political parties are the same. With regard to issues of primary interest to local governments, bcc meeting agendas from 2000–2002 have most frequently emphasized program administration, fiscal policy, immigration, and police services. Ramos (2006) concludes that bccs encourage interaction of a wide range of public actors working toward more integrated and coordinated programs, working transparently and with versatility and flexibility. Joint plans and programs between Madrid and ac governments are voluntarily entered into and formalized regarding common activities. They exist primarily in the area of overlapping or joint competencies. Since 1999 they have been relegated as the major multilateral projects emanating from the Sectoral Conferences. Each plan must specify common objectives, activities to be performed by each administration, human and material resources to be contributed by each party, a funding commitment, and the duration,

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mode of supervision, and evaluation mechanisms for each (Alda 2006). These agreements have been primarily promoted by the various ministries (particularly Finance and Social Affairs) in Madrid, although a substantial proportion (around 113) have been the result of eu initiatives. Substantively, agreements relating to water supply, tourism, volunteer work and the disabled, and youth services are of the greatest interest to local governments. From 1997–2003 a total of 170 joint plans were signed, mostly funded (61.8–92.7 per cent) by the central government, depending on year and agreement (Alda 2006). This igr mechanism is now a regularized or administratively consolidated practice, that channels and adapts decisions across governments in a semi-transparent fashion. Collaboration agreements are both bilateral and multilateral cooperation contracts freely entered into by respective governmental parties. They are perhaps the most common agreements and are the functional equivalent of intergovernmental contracts in other systems, as well as those used by Spanish local governments. For example, provincial public works and services contracts with municipalities have been in effect for decades. In 1992 Act 30 brought acs into the regulatory regime of contractual arrangements, including ac obligations with regard to oversight of local governments. Since the establishment of the ac system, over 5,000 have been signed between regional and central governments, over half of them since 1996 (López 2006). However, many of these are renewals or slightly revised agreements. The most agreements (until 1999) have been signed with Catalonia (436), the fewest with the Basque Country (70). The most active ministries include education (with half the total), social services, environment, agriculture, and then public works. In most years, between 80–100 per cent of these agreements are multilateral, although in some years as many as 2/3 proved to be bilateral. Funding is normally two-thirds central government and one-third ac, although in some cases city councils, the eu, or private sources are involved. Contracts demonstrate the intense and continuous relations between acs and Madrid, channeling stable contacts and mechanisms for the smooth operations of government (López 2006). The four formal mechanisms of igr – sectoral conferences, bccs, joint plans and programs, and collaboration agreements – have proved to be important vehicles for building the Estado de las Autonomías. Sometimes lost in the visible bilateral intergovernmental

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contacts of a highly political or partisan nature, the steady work of building a new, autonomous tier of government through institutionalized means of collaboration are forgotten. These four mechanisms, however, continue to function as means of cooperation and conflict resolution, sometimes preceding, sometimes following political contacts of a direct nature. These mechanisms certainly carry the detailed work of intersectoral agreement and are clearly complementary to the broader, politically oriented processes identified in this study. They are instrumentally important to local government functioning, in as much as funds and programs worked out between ac and Madrid ultimately affect implementation within communities, and to some degree set the tone for relations between acs and local governments.

the politics of administration The four igm mechanisms have served to reinforce decentralization. The downward ministerial and bureaucratic shift also means that ac governments are now important intergovernmental contact points in the Spanish system of igr. A lot of activity that was initially focused on activity with the state – initially on transfer of competencies, both technical and financial (money followed the transfers), then over expansion of ac competencies – is now focused on the acs. Part of the ac role has been fighting the reluctance of the state to give up control. In this process, there was an established, but not exclusive, pattern of preference for bilateral negotiations between individual acs and the state. On general issues, such as regional financing or autonomy questions the bulk of acs lobby for their interests on a solitary basis. This would be less true of inter-regional efforts at various instruments of collaboration. For example, at present the regions are united in seeking greater financial support for their deficit-laden health care systems. The several acs with stronger non-state parties (Basque, Catalonia, Canaries, Galicia) have also coalesced to exact more control, resources, and responsibility from the state. This has been particularly true when a minority government is being formed with the help of these regional nationalist parties. As new forces arise, e.g., who might regulate and tax the internet and spin-offs, the acs are expected to become active in negotiating their turf, whether bilaterally or unilaterally (Aja 2003, 233).

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In addition to the high power stakes and financial stakes over ac governing of its allocated functions, intergovernmentalization has contributed to the politicization of ac administrative structures. Mesa (2000, 14) suggests that the range and penetration down the levels of the bureaucracy by political appointees to be well beyond the normal ministries and secretaries, leading to a politicization of administration (italics hers), with all of its manifestations, into the intermediate arenas of the public’s business: penetration of personal and ideological loyalists into the functionary or operating level of the administration down to the services, sections, and administrations; penetration of staff assistants and personal confidantes working with program and service heads; and, “colonization” of functional personnel, e.g., in professional positions such as doctors, teachers, and engineers, who are personally appointed by higherlevel political appointees. Mesa indicates that the “colonization” practice is one of long standing, whereas the other two – political penetration of administrators and staff operatives – accompanied the building of the ac governments. In relation to igr this politicization means that virtually every transaction, no matter how technical it may be in nature and substance, may be accompanied by political overtones. Moreover, it will be demonstrated that party lines and party discipline are rather important in general, including in intergovernmental transactions, making many interactions different for the out of ac power local government. Within this politicization of administration the ac government, particularly its consejo and their ministries and affiliated agencies are focal intergovernmental actors. They represent the ac government with regard to concerns with the state and with the local governments. The ac governments manage the primary distribution of public funds throughout the regional territory. They are ultimately responsible for ensuring that services in areas such as education, health, and social services are delivered in all towns, especially the very smallest ones. They are also responsible for articulating the social and economic position of the region, e.g., promoting their economies and dealing with nettlesome questions in funding negotiations. In local governments, the acs were initially passive, feeling their way in regard to oversight and supervision. As they began to exert themselves, tensions over matters of power and resources began to accelerate. This belligerence later gave way to long periods of working out relationships on a number of fronts, but not in the

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art of opening up greater self-rule over the basic services of local governments (Ballart y Ramió 2000, 288–9).

the constitutional tribunal Spain has a separate Constitutional Tribunal (ct), which under section IX of the Constitution is the supreme constitutional interpreter, having the final say on legislative appeals and in disputes between governments. Its powers were codified by the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court of October 1979, and all other constitutional bodies are subject to its controls. The ct is the final venue for appeal on government-to-government disputes and on fundamental rights (other issues, Supreme Court). The 12-member panel of jurists (selected among lawyers, professors, other court judges) are variously appointed for nine-year terms, nominally by the king but actually by both houses of Cortes, the government, and a judicial council. Article 161 of the Constitution designates ct jurisdiction throughout the territory, and appeals can include statutes of autonomy, organic laws, ordinary central and ac laws, treaties, and the standing orders of the Congress or Senate. Appeals can come from a variety of sources: the government, ombudsmen, groups of deputies or senators, and others. Most important from an intergovernmental standpoint are conflicts between the state and autonomous communities over divisions of power, norms, or regulations enacted by ac governments, which in turn have a rebound effect on local governments. Also important for the ct, but not related to this study, are their powers of adjudication of fundamental rights or freedoms that have been said to be created by the state, ac, or other official bodies. The Constitutional Tribunal and Autonomy: The ACs Since the focus of this study is on local governments it would be impossible to cover the entire fabric of ct actions that have defined the state of autonomies (Aja 2003, ch. 2). However, the “basics” of defining autonomy and the role of the central government vis-à-vis the acs are fundamentally important. Thus, this section explores how the Spanish ct has supported self-rule and shared rule, so fundamental to igr in federal systems.

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The Constitutional Tribunal ruling in 1983 regarding the Ley Orgánica de Armonización del Proceso Autonómico (loapa), which tried to reduce some of the powers already granted to the acs and require ac assemblies to seek central government approval for their laws, was perhaps the single most important action in preserving the right to regional self-government. The Court, acting on six challenges (five from acs, one from national deputies), declared major portions of this law to be unconstitutional, particularly provisions that involved central government actions concerning overturning ac parliamentary laws or other actions. Basing its decision on Section 2 and Article 137 of the Constitution, the Court determined that “autonomy” means the possibility of making the final decision in relation to a given competencia. This resulted in the setting aside of certain central controls in favour of both ac laws and ac administrative decisions. Many other decisions likewise upheld regional autonomy. For example, the Court declared Catalonia’s attempt to abolish its four provincial governments as a violation of the right to provincial self-rule. Indeed, during the early 1980s, the Court acted as referee in many conflicts in which the Basque and Catalan governments (and, to some degree, that of Andalucia) sought to maximize their powers. Central and regional powers were outlined during this time, in which the Court “adopted an approach based on a formal legal concept of intergovernmental relations and was heavily influenced by the idea of regional (and local) self-government as a fundamental right” (Vallés and Chuchillo 1998). While supportive of regionalism, the Court nevertheless made a series of decisions preserving the power of the national government to oversee, supervise, and even intervene in certain ac affairs. The Court has maintained that, while national, regional, and local interests can be clearly differentiated, national institutions have full responsibility for promoting and protecting “general interests.” Decisions upholding national involvement came in many critical policy areas, including education, health care, economic development, and tourism. Tourism had been understood to be delegated completely to the acs, but the Court ruled that it affects economic development, which is a shared responsibility. In effect, this means that the central government can enact “basic legislation” and “basic norms” regarding ac functions, rejecting the initial position on the part of some acs that the communities had final authority

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over powers granted in their autonomy statutes, to the exclusion of central control, and reaffirmed the national right to regulate and assume supervisory powers (Cruz 1990). The Court has also been active in sorting out problems of power distribution. The statutes of autonomy, which constitute the basic charter for each ac, have been regarded as both the highest rules for each region and the law of the state, on a status just below those of a constitutional nature. The Constitutional Court has, on the other hand, ruled that it can go beyond the statutes of autonomy to interpret them within the framework of the Constitution. This has been most important in regard to the complex issue of the distribution of powers and jurisdictions between the central government and the acs. It signals a change of considerable interest to Spanish constitutional scholars (Baena 1985), for legislation in the immediate post-constitutional period had been based on the previously identified principio dispositivo, wherein each community assumed different powers within the limits established by the Constitution. However, a gradual and disparate assumption of powers, based on the different ways regions gained autonomy, negated this principle. Over a period of time the Court has allowed for powers to even out. The ct has taken the broad view of the Constitution, particularly its provision of delegating powers, to even out the distribution of competencies between various acs.

conclusion It is essential to take into account the building of the autonomous state to understand the context of local governments in Spain, particularly their intergovernmental roles. The new constitutional system was built inductively, and the ultimate result, a yet unfinished story, is a federal system in all but name. As such, along with decentralized powers and autonomy of subnational government operation comes the federal phenomenon of inclusive or overlapping powers for many functions of government. Few Spanish functions are exclusive, and thus the influences on local government are numerous, both horizontal and vertical. The building of the autonomous state and the system of igr that it has generated has a mighty impact on local government. Beyond basic or framework laws and relevant decisions of the Constitu-

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tional Tribunal for most functions, local governments in Spain fall under the direct aegis of their ac governments. Important local concerns such as urban planning, infrastructure and capital development, general services, and basic local administration now largely fall under the direct jurisdiction of the regional governments. That is why the autonomous state is so fundamental to the understanding of local governments’ igr.

Governments ts/Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain

4 Integrating Local Governments into the State of Autonomies

The status of local governments – provinces, municipalities, and special units – proved not to be in the original plans of decentralization and autonomy. Although democratization at the local level began early through a series of elections, local governments were more or less left alone until the mid 1980s, when basic framework laws were enacted. In the interim the ac statutes of autonomy and rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal more or less launched the intergovernmental pattern that exists to this day: central framework laws, shared central-ac administrative and legislative oversight, with measures of residual local autonomy or self-rule, including a form of local ordinance powers. However, concerns regarding local government powers have never received the kind of attention or prominence that has been accorded to those relating to ac powers vis-à-vis the state.

the constitutional situation Local government is not nearly as constitutionally elaborated as that of the acs. Articles 140–142, covering three short paragraphs, basically outline the structure of local governments. The Constitution “guarantees the autonomy of the municipalities.” Enjoying full legal personality, their governments comprise mayors and councillors, elected in free and direct secret suffrage. The Constitution refers to enacted law as determining the manner of elections and council proceedings. Article 141 names provinces as legal entities “determined by the collection of municipalities and territorial division for the fulfillment of the activities of the state.” The central government and the acs oversee the diputaciones or provincial

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governments. In the two island acs, Baleares and Canaries, each island “shall also have their own administration in the form of cabildos or councils.” Finally, Article 142 articulates a right of financial autonomy of local governments, “The local treasuries must have the means necessary for carrying out the functions which the law attributes to the respective corporations and they shall be supported basically by their own taxes and by sharing those of the State and the Autonomous Communities.” While brief in scope, and without delineating particular competencies, these constitutional provisions have two important implications. First, the local government autonomy guarantee prevents meaningful local consolidation of small local units. Municipal consolidation is not permissible without the explicit agreement of the “citizens involved” in the potentially dissolving corporation. Normally villages “fade away” when they empty out of citizens. In the early twentieth century there were 9,267 municipalities, compared to the 8,107 reported in the early twenty-first century. The National Institute of Statistics (ine) reports a total of 2,648 population points with zero inhabitants (Álvarez 2007). In a recent book on contemporary Spanish life, Tremlett (2006, 399–400) characterizes the decline of villages and settlements as “the biggest revolution in Spanish life over the past century. Hundreds of villages have, in fact, been abandoned altogether. Many have just one or two families left in them ... The process of decline is all too familiar. First the young families go, then the primary school closes. This is followed soon after by the shop and – the death blow – the bar.” He concludes that the pueblo is the old world, the city is the new (400). In many rural places that are alive but underpopulated the continuation of very small village government continues. Unlike the powers of Canadian provinces and most Northern European countries, any program of local government reform therefore does not include municipal consolidation. In the same vein, any possibility of elimination of provincial governments, which has been desired by some regions, is proscribed by court decision. Regarding legally abolishing local governments the Constitutional Court ruled in stc 4/1981 that local entities are not in “a position of subordination or hierarchical dependence on the state administration or autonomic (communities).” In the early 1980s Catalonia attempted to abolish its four provinces in favour of county-like governments, or comarcas, and the Constitutional

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Tribunal interpreted (because autonomy is not stated as it is for municipalities) provincial status as also being guaranteed autonomy. The revised 2006 Estatut of Catalonia (Art. 90) replaces provincial councils with vegurias, or territorial areas of intermunicipal organization, for organization of ac services. A veguria was a territorial jurisdiction of a magistrate in the historical kingdom of Aragón, Cataluña, and Baleares. It remains to be seen whether this form of organization will hold up under court appeal. Seven uniprovincial acs have both diputaciones (they retain a legal presence) and “consolidated” ac governments. Second, despite devolved competencies to the acs, local government has been subject to a series of central basic laws. These laws have established the earlier identified principle of “dual legal subordination” of local governments to both the general government and to their ac governments. This has been characterized by Marquez (2007, 2) as “bifronte” in character, where competencies are regulated by the state and acs. These practices are supported by decisions of the Constitutional Tribunal (stc 84/1982; 214/1989). Under such a system the responsibility for the functions of local government lie with an elected council, but within supervisory, legal, and financial constraints set by higher-level governments (Bennett 1989, 41). As Figure 3.1 makes clear, in Spain this involves both the ac and the state. Unlike the United States or Canada, where local governments are exclusively organized under the imperium im imperio powers of the states/provinces (Kingdon 1993; Zimmerman 1995), Spanish local governments also have delegated powers from central and ac authority under the administrative supervision of the acs. It took two rounds of local elections, in 1985 and in 1988, for Parliament to focus attention first on local government structure and powers, and then on local government finance. The 1985 Ley Reguladora de las Bases del Regimen Local (lrbrl) and the 1988 Ley Reguladora de las Haciendas Locales (lrhl) (chapter 5) established the base lines of post-Franco local governments across the country. lrbrl reinforces the principles of autonomy laid out in the Constitution. Article 2.1 of the law restates that, in regard to direct interests and public activities, local governments should have the “capacity to manage Local Entities [cap. orig.] in conformity with the principles of decentralization and to administratively manage close to their citizens to the greatest extent possible.” Subsequent

86 Local Governments/Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain

reforms are primarily modifications of lrbrl and lrhr, which remain as the basic laws. In its early stages, lrbrl left a situation where, beyond the basics, a great deal of the specifics of legislating were left to the normative powers of ac governments. Moreover, many of the functions allocated to local governments were among those already allocated to territorial governments, as has been indicated with regard to the constitutional powers of acs. The statutes of autonomy of the ac governments constitute the next “constitutional” level affecting local governments. Not all statutes of autonomy contain detailed local government provisions, but most restate their relevant constitutional competencies over local government, particularly regarding creation and dissolution of municipalities and alterations of municipal boundaries, and mention mechanisms of financing. For example, the statute of autonomy for Andalucia (Decreto 2/2007) recognizes in Article 60 basic intergovernmental responsibilities of municipalities within the ac system. Title iii is the local government article, enumerating the municipality as the basic unit, stating various competencies and responsibilities, and authorizing intergovernmental agreements and arrangements. Article 95 also points to a permanent ac-municipal consultative body. Article 96 identifies provincial competencies as those delegated downward from the state and acs and those upward from municipalities. Article 191 outlines local financing, including municipal right to participation in ac and State revenues, the ac government’s right to fiscal oversight and supervision, the need to allocate funds according to legal criteria, and the need to follow national law in establishing a system of fiscal collaboration among entities. The Valencia ac statute of autonomy (Ley Orgánica 1/2006) also has a local government article. After stating its competencies over local governments and their boundaries in Article 63, it also establishes competencies over urban boundaries, urban development and housing, local public works, and a series of other functions affecting local government. Title viii, Articles 63–73, contains the local government section, including recognition of local autonomy, government by free and open elections, the right to delegate ac functions from the Cortes Valencianas to local governments, regulation of extra municipal local governments, and detailed statements of delegated provincial powers and powers of coordination. Finance of local governments, Article 71, is similar to that of Andalucia.

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However, the 2006 revision (from 1982) of the Valencian statute has new articles stating the principles of subsidiarity and consistency with the European Charter of Local Government, and the creation of a mixed commission on local governments (Art. 70). Article 72.1 states that, should other regions change their basic financing system and/or add new competencies that change funds acs receive, Valencia has the right to follow suit, including compensation for future competencies. The constitutional distribution of powers outlined in Figure 3.1 demonstrates that most powers relating to local governments are shared. Those related to the environment, economic development, health and sanitation, and municipal intervention and supervision are truly shared. Powers related to land use, regional development, city planning, trade, and tourism tend to be more exclusively those of acs. Also, the fiscal dependency of both ac and local governments makes the system even more intergovernmentalized. Other Units of Government In Spain the line up of players requires more than a constitutional accounting of governments. In addition to the three basic tiers and four governments of state, ac, province, and municipality, under state and ac government legislation other functional and actual units of government, primarily for the purposes of municipal coordination, have been established. They must also be accounted for when assessing the powers of local government. First, some acs have created comarcas, or counties, for multi municipal servicing and planning. Catalonia has the most active system of comarcas (41), which emphasize territorial planning, rural services coordination, and cultural promotion. Comarcas are sub-ac units established from the top, so to speak, to carry out ac functions and services. Under the new Catalan Estatut, comarcas remain but are now to be voluntary intermunicipal bodies. Second come mancomunidades, or single/multi-purpose public horizontal partnerships to deliver services, voluntarily engaged by two or more municipalities. They exist all over the country and primarily deliver the following services: refuse collection, water treatment, water supply, cultural activities, fire services, social services, tourism promotion, and economic development. They can be created without ac approval.

88 Local Governments/Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain

Third, there are consortia, or vertical partnerships of public organizations from different levels, e.g., municipality or mancomunidad, provincial government, ac government. The most prevalent consorcio, which are almost always single function and are most commonly between provinces and municipalities, fall in the following areas: economic development, water supply, cultural promotion, refuse collection, theatre management, hospital management, public works, urbanization, and promotion of tourism. Again, they do not require prior approval. Fourth come a series of special or asymmetric arrangements. For example, two of the larger cities, Valencia and Barcelona, have metropolitan-level planning, water, and transit powers blended into two units in each of the urban areas, for a total of four “Metropolitan Areas.” At one time (1974–87) there was a Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona, responsible primarily for urban planning and transit. It was succeeded by two public corporate entities, one to manage transportation (18 municipalities) and another to manage water and waste-water services (33 municipalities). An institutional structure, held over from the Corporation, is a voluntary Association of Municipalities (33 municipalities) of the Metropolitan Area for the provision of other services across municipalities. As of 1997 the Authority for Metropolitan Transportation is metropolitan-wide, covering seven camarcas and 164 municipalities, over an area of 3,000 km2 (Garcia 2003; Tomàs 2005). Madrid does not have a metropolitan structure per se, but its ac government, with near corresponding boundaries, serves to coordinate planning and service functions. The city of Madrid has sought special status as the capital city, but it has not received support from either its ac government or the central government (Maldanado 2003). Madrid does not rely on structure, but reflects a regional neo-corporatist system of policy networks based on elected territorial, administrative, and corporation actors (Tomàs 2005, 55). Other arrangements also exist. The two North African city-territories (or possessions) have their autonomy legally linked to two different Andalucian Provinces, even though they are independent “city-states.” Many cities have submunicipal councils and have somewhat decentralized their service arms. The two island acs emphasize their cabildos or island councils, three for the Balearics and seven for the Canaries, effectively replacing diputaciones at the provincial level. Finally, as mentioned, in the seven uni-provincial acs the provincial and ac governments are effectively merged.

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This all leads to a relatively dynamic census of Spanish governments. Table 4.1 part A provides a recent accounting of the complex array of governments, not including some 3,200 submunicipal governments. Even without these councils, over 10,000 governments exist in a country of 45.2 million people registered on the census at the end of 2007. In addition to the state, i.e., the general government, 17 acs, and 50 provinces, almost one thousand (988) special districts or mancomunidades existed in the 2005 count plus just over 900 consortia or vertical structures. The figures for consortia and mancomunidades are based on reported totals that are no doubt underestimated. Most important are the over eight thousand municipalities, an issue that will be an important theme throughout. Part B of Table 4.1 enumerates the sub-ac governments by territory, where the range is considerable. Generally, the more provincial governments in an ac, the more governmental arrangements, with the exception of comarcas, which are concentrated in Aragon and Catalonia. Municipal distribution depends highly on terrain and territorial extension (not displayed), with Castilla y León with over 2,000 mostly small towns or over one-quarter of the total. Part C of Table 4.1 breaks down the over 8,000 municipalities by 2004 population, demonstrating the urban nature of the Spanish population. Just over one-half of the total population lives in the 123 largest cities, and another one-third lives in cities over 5,000 in population. The almost seven thousand municipalities under 5,000 contain just under fifteen per cent of the population. In other words, nearly seven out of eight municipalities are fewer than 5,000 in population and almost six out of eight are under 2,000. This makes Spain a country of urban dwellers, mostly in large cities, but with many relatively tiny municipalities. Except for their guaranteed constitutional status, many of these small entities would be called villages or settlements in other countries, and might well be candidates for consolidation.

range of municipal/local responsibility and functions The municipal governing code is laid out in lrbrl of 1985 as amended. Figure 4.1 provides a summary translation of this framework law, including its major alterations, particularly the important 2003 revision for cities of major population. lrbrl defines the

90 Local Governments/Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain Table 4.1 Census of Spanish Governmental Units A. Units of Government in Spain Autonomous Communities Provinces Comarcas Mancomunidades Consortia Municipalities

17 50 81 988 909 8,107

Source: www.minhac.es (2005)

B. Autonomous Community

Andalucía Aragón Asturias Baleares Canarias Cantabria Castilla y León Castille-La Mancha Catalonia Extramadura Galicia Madrid Murcia Navarra País Vasco Rioja (La) Valencia Total

Mancomunidade s

Provinces

Comarcas

Consortia

Municipalities

n

%

n

%

n

%

n

%

n

%

8 3 1 1 2 1 9 5

16.0 6.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 18.0 10.0

0 32 0 0 0 0 1 0

0 39.5 0 0 0 0 1.2 0.0

87 68 17 7 20 18 216 122

8.8 6.9 1.7 0.7 2.0 1.8 21.9 12.3

254 22 14 77 18 4 48 30

27.9 2.4 1.5 8.5 2.0 0.4 5.3 3.3

770 730 78 67 87 102 2,248 919

9.5 9.0 1.0 0.8 1.1 1.3 27.7 11.3

4 2 4 1 1 1 3 1 3 50

8.0 4.0 8.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 6.0 2.0 6.0 100

41 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 81

50.6 0 0 0 0 0 8.6 0 0 100

76 83 43 41 10 63 36 25 56 988

7.7 8.4 4.4 4.1 1.0 6.4 3.6 2.5 5.7 100

244 24 21 38 20 11 28 2 54 909

26.8 2.6 2.3 4.2 2.2 1.2 3.1 0.2 5.9 100

946 383 315 179 45 272 250 174 542 8,107

11.7 4.7 3.9 2.2 0.6 3.4 3.1 2.1 6.7 100

Source: Ministry of the Economy and Public Finance (2005), http://serviciosweb.minhac.es/apps/ispl/aspx/comh300.html

C. Range of Population Size

0–2,000 2,001–5,000 5,001–20,000 20,001–50,000 50,001> Total

Number of Municipalities

Total Population

n

%

n

%

5,919 1,007 854 205 123 8,108

73.0 12.4 10.5 2.5 1.5 100

2,975,840 3,138,752 8,236,982 6,070,295 21,416,025 41,837,894

7.1 7.5 19.7 14.5 51.2 100

Source: National Statistics Institute, Statistical Yearbook of Spain (2004), 85–6. www.ine.es/prodyser/pubweb/anuario04/anu04_2demografia.pdf

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basic organization of the ayuntamiento or city government, its officers and functions, and makes interim provisions in finance (until 1988). It also defines its primary intergovernmental functions in services coordination. In 2003 designated large cities were given special status and new managerial responsibilities.

municipal corporations Under lrbrl municipalities are governed by councils (plenos), municipal commissions (comisión) or executive committees, and mayors (alcalde) elected by their councils. The law strengthened mayoral power to appoint a commission solely composed of the majority party in council, as opposed to the previous (pre 1985) practice of proportional representation. Municipalities under 100 in population are allowed to operate in open assemblies, in which the mayor and council are directly elected and operate by majority decision of all voters. Smaller municipalities under 2,000 in population also have reduced executives bodies (Marquez 2007, 281). For example, municipalities that have between 100 and 250 inhabitants elect five councillors by a majority system and the mayor is chosen among them. All larger municipalities elect councillors (7 to 25 or more depending on size) according to proportional representation and the mayor is chosen from within this group. The mayor is normally the head of the majority party in council and combines several functions: chair of the council, chief city representative, chief of municipal administration, and head of municipal police. In a fashion similar to the commission form of city government in the United States, departments are normally headed by elected councillors (Carrillo 1991). Indeed, the mayor can delegate executive powers to any councillor. In municipalities over 5,000 in population a local government board is required to assist the mayor in carrying out municipal responsibilities. The municipal council does not have the authority to draft laws but can draft and enact regulations (ordenanzas) that are in conformity with Cortes and/or ac parliament legislation. City officials are elected in constituencies called términos municipales, that is at-large or municipality-wide party lists in rank order, headed by each party’s nominee for mayor. Electoral laws predated lrbrl, enacted in 1977 and 1978, but local elections are now governed by another 1978 law and one enacted in 1985. It is the 1978 law that establishes the number of councillors per municipality (Newton 1997).

92 Local Governments/Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain

As Figure 4.1 outlines, lrbrl specifies municipal functions, with increased responsibilities as a city becomes larger. All municipalities must provide public lighting, a cemetery, refuse collection, street cleaning, potable water for homes, a sewage system, paving of public streets, access (from the country) to the population centre, and food and beverage control. Municipalities with populations of 5,000 or above are additionally responsible for public parks, public libraries, markets, and solid waste treatment. Cities with populations greater than 20,000 must also include civil defence, social services, fire prevention and control, and public sport facilities. Finally, municipalities over 50,000 population must also include urban transport and environmental protection. Of course, cities under these population limits can offer those services before their population reaches a threshold of obligatory services. For example, urban transport, social services, and fire protection are often offered when they are not required. Intergovernmentally, lrbrl states that municipalities can develop alternative arrangements by soliciting their ac government, except for mancomunidades, where no permission is required. Also, municipalities can seek a dispensa in the provisional production of a required service under Art. 262 of lrbrl and, upon initial approval, further permission is no longer required. Normally, the provincial government picks up the service. This has led small municipalities to a massive separation between the provision and the production of services, particularly through provinces/consortia, but also by comarcas and mancomunidades (Bañón y Carrillo 1992). In 2003 major cities were also required to include municipal district committees, to decentralize management by districts, and to establish mechanisms of citizen participation in municipal management, but maintained the mayor and council as the body of “maximum political representation” (Law 57/2003, art. 122). Appendix B identifies these and other major changes to lrbrl that have altered the character of local government. Most importantly, Law 11/1999 removed direct powers from councils over managing economic development, personnel, town planning, granting licences, and other aspects of administration. Other significant changes include municipal requirements for registration of foreign residents, provisions to deal with acts of terrorism against city governments, specification of municipal location for settling citizen complaints, the need for a municipal registry (padrón), alteration in the way

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inhabitants are counted, reinforcement of the merit system of municipal hiring, and reinforcement of ac-provincial guaranteed public service delivery in underserved areas. Finally, a Royal Decree of 1996 added that municipalities with populations exceeding 20,000 were given additional service responsibilities in policing, fire services, social services, and public sport facilities. The administrative structure of each city follows the mayor and commission form, as depicted in Figure 4.2. It models the typical Spanish medium-sized or large city government, where the majority in the pleno or council forms the cabinet and become the commissioners. The mayor is the majority party coalition leader and chooses a commission for him/herself that normally includes one or more important city departments. The mayor is thus functionally only the head of those units/departments under his/her direct control. The other commissioners, majority party or majority coalition leaders, head other city commissions, units, and departments not in direct line of authority to the mayor (Márquez 2007, ch. 3) but as part of a shared executive body. The mayor as party and/or coalition leader is quite important. The mayor convenes and presides over council sessions, prepares the budget, authorizes expenditures, and presents the final accounts. The mayor also represents the municipality in all legal and ceremonial matters, executes council decisions and supervises municipal administration. As party leader, the mayor plays an important role in organizing the commissioner-department heads and chooses them in some circumstances. It is a form of cabinet government (Executive Board) where the “first minister” is in administrative terms more than first among equals. Each commissioner can have multiple functions, e.g., tourism and culture, public works and environment, finance and general administration, and each of these will have a unit chief or secretary or auditor/inspector and department heads. Within the departments there are likely to be additional administrators – service chiefs, section chiefs, business managers, and base office directors, depending on the city (Ballart y Ramió 2000, 306). The law also requires that cities house a national corps of public managers charged with central functions. These are the clerks, auditors, and treasurers, who are restricted from direct policy roles but can provide legal advice, authority to witness documents, and fiscal control and internal supervision. From an intergovernmental standpoint, particularly in

Figure 4.1 Basic Law on Local Government

l e y 7 / 1 9 8 5 , d e 2 de a b r i l , r e g u l a d o r a d e l a s b a s e s del regimen local (lrbrl) G Establishes statutory government structure, local powers, and finance guidelines for local entities. government structure The municipality (municipio) is the basic local organization of the territorial organization of the federal government. It has legal personhood and total capacity for the fulfillment of its aims (Article 11). The city council (ayuntamiento) exerts its powers in a municipality. Each municipality belongs to a single province (Article 12). The Government and the municipal administration correspond to the city council, integrated by the mayor (alcalde) and the council members (Article 19). The mayor, the deputy mayor, and the municipal council exist in every city. The local governing body (junta de gobierno local) exists in all municipalities with populations exceeding 5,000. (Article 20). The mayor is the president of the corporation. Their responsibilities include: G G G G G

G G G

To direct government and municipal administration; To represent city council; To convene and to preside over the council sessions; To direct, to inspect, and to impel municipal services and works; To develop economic management in agreement with the approved budgets; To head the municipal police; To approve the instruments of development planning; To order the publication, execution, and fulfillment of the agreements of the city council. (Article 21)

The municipal council’s responsibilities include: financial control of government, agreements relative to participation in supra-municipal organizations, initial approval of general planning, approval of regulations and decrees, allocation of fiscal resources, approval and modification of budgets (Article 22). The province (diputación provincial) is a local organization made up of a grouping of municipalities, with its own legal personhood and capacity for the fulfillment of its aims. It must uphold inter-

Figure 4.1 continued

municipal principles of solidarity and balance. Its responsibilities include: to assure the integrated and suitable delivery of services in the entire provincial territory and to participate with autonomous communities and the government of the state in the coordination of local administration (Article 31). The following operate in open assembly: a) municipalities with fewer than 100 inhabitants and those that traditionally rely on a singular government regime and administration; b) others whose geographic location makes such an arrangement advisable. Constitution in open assembly requires a majority decision of two-thirds of the members of the municipal council and approval by the autonomous community (Article 29). local powers/competencies Municipalities can promote activities and provide services that satisfy the needs of the local community. Its powers include: public safety, traffic and transportation, civil defence and fire prevention, city-planning, housing, parks and gardens, historical-artistic patrimony, environmental protection, public health, social services and social reintegration, water and public electricity systems, road services, sewage and waste treatment, cultural and sporting activities and tourism, and public education (Article 25). municipalities are required to render the following services: (a) In all municipalities: Public lighting system, cemetery, refuse collection, road cleaning, domiciliary potable water supply, sewage system, access to the population centre, paving of public routes, and control of food and drinks. (b) In municipalities with populations over 5,000: (criteria established in Real Decreto-Ley 11/1995, of 28 of December) public parks, public libraries, market, and solid waste treatment. (c) In municipalities with populations over 20,000: civil defence, social services, fire prevention and control, and public sport facilities. (Real Decreto-Ley 7/1996, of 7 June). (d) In municipalities with populations over 50,000: urban transport and environmental protection. Municipalities can solicit from their respective autonomous communities exemption from the

Figure 4.1 continued

obligation to provide minimum services when fulfillment of these services is impossible or very difficult (Article 26). Competencies of provinces include: a) coordination of municipal services; b) legal, economic, and technical assistance and cooperation; c) provision of public services of supra-municipal and supra-local character; d) cooperation in economic and social development and planning of the province; and e) general promotion and administration of the particular interests of the province (Article 31). Local entities will be able to impose sanctions in cases of infractions such as: disturbance of the peace, impediments to delivery or enjoyment of public services, destruction of public infrastructure or equipment, or other elements necessary for the delivery of public services (Articles 139–141, added by Law 57/2003). funcionamiento (46–54) impugnacion (63–68) corporaciones locales (73–78)

interadministrativas (55–62) ciudadanas (69–72)

local finance Local finance ministries will be equipped with sufficient resources to fulfill local entities’ aims (Article 105). Local entities will have autonomy to establish and collect taxes. The power of the local entities in financial matters will be exerted through fiscal decrees and decrees of management, collection, and inspection. Local entities have powers of financial management, collection, and inspection (Article 106). Local entities annually approve a single budget, and the federal government will determine the budget structure of the local entities (Article 107). Local organizations are subject to the public accounting system (Article 114). The external control of accounts and the economic management of local entities correspond to the National Audit Office (Article 15).

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Figure 4.1 continued

municipalities with major populations (added by law 57/2003) The norms under this title apply to: a) municipalities whose population surpasses 250,000; b) capital municipalities of provinces whose population is over 175,000; c) municipalities that are capitals of a province, autonomic or host capitals of the autonomic institutions; d) municipalities whose population surpasses 75,000, with special economic, social, historical, or cultural circumstances. When a municipality reaches the required population, the corporation will have six months to adapt its organization to the new status (Article 121). The municipal council, formed by the mayor and council-members, is the organ of maximum political representation of the citizens in the municipal government (Article 122). The structure of municipal government will include a municipal council (Article 123), a mayor (Article 124), a deputy mayor (Article 125), and a local government committee (Articles 126–127). City councils must create districts equipped with organs of dispersed management, to impel and to develop citizen participation in the management of the municipal services and their improvement, without damaging the unit of government and management of the municipality (juntas municipals de distritos) (Article 128). Financial management criteria include: fulfillment of the objective of budgetary stability and separation of the accounting and financial management functions. The allocation of resources will be based on the definition and the fulfillment of objectives (Article 133). The municipal fiscal system shall function under management principles of efficiency, sufficiency, flexibility, and unity. Its powers include: management, liquidation, inspection, collection and revision of fiscal acts; the proposal, elaboration, and interpretation of the council’s fiscal norms (Article 135). Internal controls will correspond to a General Municipal Intervention agency (Article 136).

routine igm transactions, many, many potential city administrators may be regularly contacting ac officials, seeking information or negotiating the kind of flexibility they need to operate.

Figure 4.2 A Classical City Government Administrative Model Mayor

Professional Dimension

Political/ Professional Dimension

Political Dimension

Commission or Cabinet

Commission

Unit Chief

Department

Commission

Unit Chief

Department

Commission

Service Secretary

Unit Chief

Department

Department

Commission

Unit Chief

Department

Commission

Auditor Inspector

Unit Chief

Department

Department

Administrative Structure Source: Adapted from Carlos Ramió, “Desarrollo organizativo de Ayuntamento gerencial” Gobernio local y modelo gerencial. Barcelona: Fundació Carles Pi i Sunyer.

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Figures 4.3–4.6 offer a brief look at some real organization charts for Spanish cities. The first is for Balsareny (Catalonia), a town around 3,000 persons. The mayor is the councillor for tourism, environment, and public services and the commission comprises two deputies and two additional councillors. Note that the five executives take on a very broad range of functions: 1) finance and internal operations; 2) education programs and trade; 3) general services and tourism; 4) culture and events; and 5) health and human services. Some 17 different functions are listed. This is not atypical, with a small number of councillors taking on a large number of responsibilities. In Figure 4.4 we see the table of organization for the city of Tudela (Navarra), a town of some 34,500 persons. Here the mayor takes on important police/security functions and general operations but no other commissions. That is left to only four additional councillors, who oversee 24 services. Notably it also has units that focus on information services, education centres, employment, and consumer affairs. Figure 4.5 shows the extensive departmentalization of Lérida (Catalonia), a city of 140,000 persons. According to its chart the mayor has not taken any commission, but no less than six deputy mayors and one other councillor have departmental responsibilities. The city is broken into seven broad areas: Welfare, CultureSports-Civil Rights, Participation-Education-Environment, Urban Affairs, General Services, Economy, and External/Intergovernmental Affairs. All but two commissions – General Services and External – also have a professional administrator as “Executive Chief,” who serves as the manager of the commission under a council member and who oversees some 17 departments. For example, the councillor in charge of Economy works with an executive chief who is responsible for the departments of Economic Development, Treasury/Tax, Trade and Tourism, and Knowledge/Information Management. It is a highly professionalized structure with commissions and departments headed by specialized managers. Extensive departmentalization of larger cities is further illustrated in Figure 4.6, where the single function of human resources in Badajoz (Extremadura), a city of 140,000 persons, is illustrated. The Commission is under a councillor who is also a deputy mayor. Four departments are under this commissioner: workplace health and safety, pension payments (to central government), human

Figure 4.3 Organization Chart: City Council of Balsareny (Catalonia) mayor clerk, auditor

deputy mayor Area of Treasury & General Services

Municipal Treasury Budgeting Economic Development Public Patrimony Human Resources

deputy mayor Area of Education & Trade

councillor Area of Environment, Tourism & Industry

specialist (Education Services)

specialist

Management of Municipal Education Programs

Environment

Business and Relations with Business Associations

Public Works

Garbage Collection

Promotion of Tourism and Industry

councillor Area of Culture, Youth & Sports

councillor Area of Welfare & Health

specialist

Management of Public Events and Festivities Promotion of Culture and Relations with Cultural Associations Promotion of Sport and Relations with Sport Associations

Source: Elaborated by Sergio Villamayor, from Balsareny’s City Council web page. http://www.balsareny.net/ajunt_org.htm

Coordination of Social Services and Relations with Social Associations Women Services and Diversity Policy Public Health and Primary Medical Assistance Centres

Figure 4.4 Organization Chart: City Council of Tudela (Navarra) mayor Archives Service

Local Police Public Security

General Secretary

Industrial Development

Auditor, Clerk

Personnel

Mayor’s Bureau

Juridical

Civil

Area of Treasury and Taxation

New Technologies

Area of Urban and Economic Development

Area of Citizen Services

Urban Planning

Urban Landscape

Environment

Industry

Outsourced Services

Agriculture and Cattle

Employment

Patrimony Treasurer Taxation Procurements

Information Services

Education, Social Centres

Trade Employment

Area of Welfare and of Women

Sports Citizen Office Consumer Office Administrative Services

Source: Elaborated by Sergio Villamayor, from Tudela’s City Council web page. http://www.tudela.es/cas/ayuntamiento/0102orgadmin.asp

Welfare

Health Services Welfare Programs Women Services

Figure 4.5 Organization Chart: City Council of Lérida (Catalonia) mayor

deputy mayor Area of Participation, Education, and Environment

deputy mayor Area of Welfare

deputy mayor Area of Culture Sports and Civil Rights

Executive Chief

Executive Chief

Executive Chief

Youth

Culture

Public Participation

Public Health

Sports

deputy mayor Area of Urban Affairs

deputy mayor Area of General Services

Executive Chief

Urban Planning Property Registry

Executive Chief

Home Affairs/Public Works

Economic Development Treasury/Tax

Women Immigration

councilor Area of Economy

Public Security Education

Trade & Tourism

Environment

Knowledge/ Information Management

Source: Elaborated by Sergio Villamayor, from Lérida’s City Council web page. http://www.paeria.es/cas/ajuntament/organigrama.asp

deputy mayor Area of External Affairs

Figure 4.6 Organization Chart: Personnel Area, City Council of Badajoz (Extremedura) deputy mayor Area of Personnel, Employment & Promotion, and Reprography

executive chief Office of Personnel Management

chief of section Workplace Health

Administrator

Technician in Workplace Safety

chief of section Social Security Payments

chief of section Workplace Health

chief of section Workplace Health

Chief of Department

Chief of Department

Chief of Department

Administrator

Administrator

Administrator

Administrator Assistant

Medical Assistant

Source: Elaborated by Sergio Villamayor, from Badajoz’s City Council web page. http://www.aytobadajoz.es/concejalias/index.html

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Local Governments/Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain

resources/personnel, and departmental liaison. Notice that each is staffed with a section chief (political/professional in Figure 4.2) and a series of professional appointees. In sum, Figures 4.2, 4.5, and 4.6 demonstrate a different professionalism of management from that of smaller cities. These charts suggest that local government has become quite complex. Several organs of municipal administration deserve mention. First come departments (delegaciones or areas), usually headed by a council member. The types of departments vary from city to city. It is not unusual for larger cities to have separate units for public works, public safety and security, traffic and transport, culture and tourism, economy and finance, commercial and industrial development, environment and health, and general government (human resources, purchasing, mayor’s office, etc.). These departments are mostly staffed by non-political employees. Second, larger ayuntamientos often externalize and/or establish municipal autonomous bodies that operate as public enterprises in program areas such as culture and sport, festivals, museums, solid waste water provision, and public housing. These entities generate their own revenue (usually fees) and are normally free of budgetary restrictions. Indeed, a variety of arrangements characterize big city municipal services. Water supply in Spain’s five largest municipalities demonstrates this diversity: Madrid is supplied by Canal de Isabel II, a public corporation owned by the Madrid ac, Barcelona has used the private firm agbar since 1882, Valencia uses a mixed firm emiuasa under the joint ownership of the private firm Aguas de Valencia (80 per cent) and municipal holding (20 per cent), a public firm owned by the local government (emasesa) delivers Seville’s water, and Zaragosa delivers water in-house through a public unit. For management of solid waste in Spain’s ten largest cities, six use private production, two use mixed firms, one uses a public firm, and one uses a public department. As Warner and Bel (2006, 1) conclude, “Diversity and flexibility of organizational arrangements is a central feature of the Spanish experience.” Third, larger municipalities operate with a number of non-elected advisory committees (comisiones informativas), made up of councillors from the majority and minority parties. To a considerable extent, these committees often mirror city administrative departments, serve to enable all councillors of different parties to participate in matters of policy and administration, and serve as channels

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of communication between the city commission and minority political parties. Bilbao, a city of some 350,000 persons in the Basque Province of Viscaya, for example, has a large number of permanent councils: for the civic centre, district or neighbourhood councils, a council for the elderly, a celebrations council, a drug dependency council, an equality commission, a development cooperation council, a social welfare council, and an urban redevelopment plan council (Ajangiz y Blas 2008, 114). Fourth come the previously mentioned district committees (juntas municipales de distrito). Normally organized by a nominated councillor, who may or may not be on the commission, but who is usually from the ruling party. These committees are usually composed of respected citizens who reside in the district, who work with the councillor to represent the interests of the local residents (vecinos), and who channel their concerns and service delivery complaints to the council and departments (Newton 1997, 151–2). For example, in 2001 the City of Cordoba (Andalucia) promoted a series of 14 district assemblies to provide for and support the municipal infrastructure plan (Giménez, Gomà, Gutiérrez, y Riera 2002, 87–8). Local administration is indeed complex and in need of considerable coordination. Ballart y Ramió (2000, 328) point to four distinct ambits of operations when one traces through the different arenas of municipal government structure: 1) the deliberative political structure, pleno, and deliberative commissions; 2) the political executive structure, the city commission and political administrative actors, the mayor, deputy mayor, and mayoral staff, and councillors; 3) the strategic administrative structure, that is, the national corps staff of local government officials – town clerks, municipal auditors, and treasurers – who are recruited by competitive examination but appointed by municipalities; and 4) the city operating administrative structure, chiefs of service, section heads, business managers, and operating staff. This model of organization means that, unlike the case of many other countries, many city administrators and operating staff are not under the supervisory control of the chief executive officer, and some are not even officially part of city government, but belong to a national corps of trained city functionaries. One premise of the reform movement is redirection of the management role of the mayor to be directly supervisory of the administration, and reducing the management role of the pleno (Villoria 2004, 38).

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provincial governments Provincial governments (diputación provincial) are empowered with much less detail in lrbrl. They have a dual character as intermediate local authorities representing municipalities as well as serving as divisions for the administration of state and ac functions. While they do not have the same type of “autonomy” as that of municipalities, their existence has been guaranteed by Constitutional Tribunal interpretation. lrbrl charges provinces with upholding intermunicipal functions, and with assuring “integral and suitable delivery of services in the entire provincial territory,” as well as a responsibility to “participate with ac and the state governments in the coordination of local administration” (Art. 31). Provincial institutions include: 1) an ordinance-making council, elected indirectly by municipal councillors, who also become provincial delegates (except in the Balearics and the Basque provinces); 2) a provincial commission or executive committee; 3) a president elected by the council, usually from the majority party; and 4) administrative departments headed by a delegate (Marquez 2007, 318–25). Within their broad charge, provincial functions vary considerably. According to Farfán (2002, 70–1), in practice they fulfill one or more of the following five roles: 1) exercise of “downward” delegated state and ac competencies under Article 37 of lrbrl, e.g., sports, culture, social services; 2) fulfillment of “upward” delegated functions for economies of scale, primarily by municipalities, e.g., social services, social protection; 3) own-source or council derived functions, e.g., rural roads, technical services, fire safety, and civil protection; 4) assistance to municipalities that cannot meet the required minimum services under Article 36 of lrbrl, e.g., water, sewerage, or others on the list of nine required services; and 5) functions that emerge to promote the general well-being of a supra-municipal or “sectoral character,” such as planning, human resource development, economic development, adult and continuing education, culture, and tourism. Provincial governments are required to prepare an annual investment plan, Plan Provincial de Cooperación a las Obras y Servicios de Competencia Municipal, covering the needs of the smaller municipalities within the province, funded jointly by the provincial council, ac, and sometimes European Union governments.

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In addition to merged governments in the seven uniprovincial acs, several notable exceptions complicate this pattern. The three Basque provinces have more powers, negotiated under their statute of autonomy, particularly regarding the power to levy taxes, fund municipalities, regulate other local governments, and govern their territories. They also exercise several functions that are normally carried out by acs in other territories. The Basque provinces also enjoy direct election of diputación councillors, independent of their municipal councils. As mentioned, the two island acs operate with island councils, which enjoy somewhat greater powers than other provincial councils. In the Baleares, these councils comprise elected ac deputies whereas in the Canaries the councillors are elected by universal suffrage at the same time as municipal elections. The tiny North African city-state enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla have another form of special status: they are organized as municipalities of the Andalucian provinces of Cadiz and Malaga, respectively. Civil authority in these territories is shared with a delegado del gobierno (formerly civil governor in all provinces), responsible to the Ministry of the Interior in Madrid. In 1986 these two enclaves were granted municipal autonomy under the constitutional powers of ac devolution, but were not granted legislative powers, as was the case with regard to all 17 acs.

other local arrangements The next or subprovincial unit is the comarca, authorized under Article 42 of lrbrl, formed by municipal assent and subject to ac regulations. It is a form of service and/or planning district. These intermunicipal units reach deep into the Catalonian autonomy movement. According to Conversi (1997) they were first proposed in the 1890s to operate education across municipal lines. They were later adopted in the Second Republic. Catalonia extended comarcas to its entire territory in 1987 (Boletín Oficial 4 Abril: 1621), after the Constitutional Tribunal refused to let the ac government abolish its four provinces, to engage in a process of “modernizing local administration and increasing potential management capacity, yet preserving municipal autonomy through the ‘voluntary’ transfer of functions.” In other words, they were designed to provide management where municipal functions were nonexistent, allowing for functional organization of services, and to concentrate resources at reasonable scale (Losada 1989, 77). The law identified the follow-

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ing functions as most important: planning and zoning, health services, social services, culture, sport, adult education, public health, environment, plus any others delegated “upward” by municipalities or “downward” by the Generalitat or Catalan ac government. In practice, each comarca adopts a different bundle of functions, with many of a very limited scope (AGPC Dossier 2001, 6). The Aragon ac is another region with active comarcas, particularly in basic services like fire protection, water and sewage, emergency services, and planning/development for eu funding. The horizontal intermunicipal partnership mancomunidad apparently began in medieval times. The oldest recorded is from 1409 in the Basque Country, comprising 13 municipalities, to manage forest resources (Martín-Mateo 1987). Their regulation dates back to 1860, 1924, 1955, and now under lrbrl of 1985. Their functions were previously identified as those related to municipal services, particularly in rural areas. According to a study by Font, Gutiérrez, and Parrado-Díez (1999), 87.3 per cent of municipalities joining mancomunidades are towns under 5,000 in population. The average number of municipalities in those special districts is eight. Almost half (43.4 per cent) are single-purpose units, with the average number of municipal units at five per unit. They are governed by boards made up of appointed municipal councillors or other politicians. Funding is largely derived by municipal and some ac contributions. Management is often delegated to a corps of professionals. They are chartered by intermunicipal agreement, whereas comarcas require ac parliamentary legal approval in the event a region does not create them “from the top,” as in the case of Catalonia. Vertical partnerships or consortia have been identified as centred around municipal (and sometimes mancomunidad) agreement with provincial, ac, central government or some combination. On occasion non-profit organizations or other non-governmental organizations may join consortia. As stated, they tend to be single purpose, although some are multi-purpose, such as one established between the Province of Almeria and four of their municipalities (in Andalucia) to promote the related activities of public works, urban development, and tourism. Consortia tend to be governed by executive committees of different types: 1) local councillors; 2) service managers and administrators from different entities; and 3) a general manager who reports to a board of directors made up of councillors and administrators from different entities.

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Consortia more commonly involve larger cities, and tend to be growing in response to municipal budget shortfalls and to certain pooling of services/funding requirements of the European Union. Spain’s 52 eu-supported rural development centres, many of which are in Andalucia, are based in consortia that are tied to “Plan Leader” grants (Newton 1997). The consortia provide the maximum amount of legal and operational flexibility. In a number of ac governments, consortia partnerships are discouraged in favour of mancomunidades because they are less able to be legally controlled and their managerial orientation erodes the role of democratically elected municipal councillors in favour of appointed administrators and professional managers (Font, Gutiérrez, and Parrado-Diez 1999). As is the case in cities all over the world, Spanish municipalities increasingly “externalize their services” to nongovernmental organizations. Through mechanisms like contracting, purchase of services, and sometimes grants, external carriers have become the newest level of intergovernmental actors. The leading areas have been in sanitation (refuse collection) services, adult and continuing education, and social services. Other less prominent examples of externalization include aspects of environmental control (testing, recycling, information, and education), administration (billing, messages, accounting, document registry), and economic development (business promotion, new business assistance). These practices not only add an additional layer of actors to the world of municipal government but also raise questions of control, effectiveness, responsibility, citizen response, and accountability (Ballart y Ramió 2000, 339–40). While many persons associate these arrangements with higher quality of services and efficiency, the evidence is not definitive (341). One clear conclusion is that municipal externalization extends the network of actors. It raises overall levels of intergovernmental involvement.

cities in the intergovernmental services arena Networking intergovernmentally is a way of Spanish municipal life. Demonstration of the high level of intergovernmentalization now focuses on a case study of municipal services production and provision in Valencia. Although somewhat dated (survey 1991, publica-

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tion 1994,) it constitutes a unique set of responses from municipal officials regarding the myriad connections they engage in for basic services. It demonstrates that municipal officials go well beyond mancomunidades and consorcios and also engage in direct service connections with the State, ac, province, and nongovernmental sector. The study provides a snapshot of local intergovernmental connections that over time have no doubt increased in volume. The Valencia Federation of Municipalities and Provinces and the University Institute Ortega y Gasset undertook this survey of municipal structure and services. The survey contained a bank of questions relating to some forty-one public services, mostly on a municipal delivery basis, with some of them relating to jointly operated public services. This section examines fourteen of those basic services to discern patterns of interdependent operation, that is, intergovernmental interaction. The data in Table 4.2 are for all municipalities surveyed. Table 4.3, Table 4.4, and Table 4.5 cover three important increments of population size. As indicated, lrbrl contains important servicerequirement distinctions for municipalities under 5,000, from 5,000 to 20,000, and over 20,000 in population. In each table, the column headings represent the following absolute values and percentages: number of municipalities providing each service; municipalities that deliver the services through their own organizational structures; municipalities that collaborate with the central government in delivering the services; municipalities that collaborate with the ac government in delivering the services, municipalities that collaborate with the provincial governments in delivering the services; municipalities that rely on intermunicipal arrangements for service delivery; and municipalities that externalize by reliance on private firms, nongovernmental organizations, or volunteers for service delivery. Mancomunidades would be counted under intermunicipal service delivery, whereas consorcios could show up under central government, ac, or provincial cooperation. Although municipal provision and production proved to be the prevailing modes for local services in the Comunidad Valenciana, a clear and probably increasing intergovernmental flavour can be seen in the production side of local service systems. A wide range of governmental and nongovernmental actors participate in the production of local public services, including not only the municipalities

Table 4.2 Municipal Services Production and Provision, All Valencia Municipalities, 1991 Modes of Production Municipal Production Services Fire Protection Urban Planning and Zoning Parks Paving of City Streets Rural Road Maintenance Public Water Supply Public Lighting Refuse Collection Sewerage Systems Cultural Programs Sports Facilities Sanitation/ Public Health Cemeteries Social Services

Cooperation with Central Government

Cooperation with Autonomous Government

Cooperation with Province

Intermunicipal Service Delivery

Private Firms, NGOs, Volunteers

Number of Municipalities

N

%

%

N

%

N

%

%

N

465 515

83 443

17.8 86.0

4 1

0.9 0.2

53 14

11.4 2.7

404 51

86.9 9.9

8 1

1.7 0.2

57 48

12.3 9.3

435 532

402 362

92.4 68.0

1 10

0.2 1.9

9 40

2.1 8.1

9 173

2.1 32.5

0 0

0.0 0.0

30 168

6.9 31.6

518

361

69.7

34

6.6

172

33.2

75

14.5

1

0.2

97

18.7

535 538 515 505 456 502 435

437 451 202 457 396 478 252

81.7 83.8 39.2 90.5 86.8 95.2 57.9

0 0 0 0 3 1 4

0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.2 0.9

17 0 0 3 87 17 318

3.2 0.0 0.0 0.6 19.1 3.4 73.1

15 7 57 8 100 20 29

2.8 1.3 11.1 1.6 21.9 4.0 6.7

16 0 81 4 18 0 1

3.0 0.0 15.7 0.8 3.9 0.0 0.2

91 103 230 45 87 27 10

17.0 19.1 44.7 8.9 19.1 5.4 2.3

491 485

432 270

88.0 55.7

0 2

0.0 0.4

0 147

0.0 30.3

0 32

0.0 6.6

0 230

0.0 47.4

29 17

5.9 3.5

N

N

%

Source: Publius/Fall 1997, “Toward Federal Democracy in Spain.” Federación Valenciana de Municipios y Provincias/Instituto Universitario Orgeta y Gasset, Bianuario Estadístico sobre el Gobierno y la Administración Local en la Comunidad Valenciana (Valencia: fvmp, 1994).

Table 4.3 Municipal Services Production and Provision, Valencia Municipalities of Under 5,000 Inhabitants, 1991 Modes of Production Municipal Production Services Fire Protection Urban Planning and Zoning Parks Paving of City Streets Rural Road Maintenance Public Water Supply Public Lighting Refuse Collection Sewerage Systems Cultural Programs Sports Facilities Sanitation/ Public Health Cemeteries Social Services

Number of Municipalities

N

%

342 385

57 313

16.7 81.3

306 402

277 264

394

Cooperation with Central Government

Cooperation with Autonomous Government

%

N

4 1

1.2 0.3

90.5 65.7

1 4

264

67.0

405 408 385 378 326 372 316

359 336 166 343 268 348 164

370 355

317 145

Cooperation with Province

%

N

%

45 11

13.2 2.9

294 51

86.0 13.2

0.3 1.0

6 33

2.0 8.2

7 149

29

7.4

142

36.0

88.6 82.4 43.1 90.7 82.2 93.5 51.9

0 0 0 0 1 0 3

0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.9

16 0 0 1 60 16 237

85.7 40.8

0 1

0.0 0.3

0 88

N

Intermunicipal Service Delivery

Private Firms, NGOs, Volunteers

%

N

4 1

1.2 0.3

49 37

14.3 9.6

2.3 37.1

0 0

0.0 0.0

22 109

7.2 27.1

57

14.5

1

0.3

65

16.5

4.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 18.4 4.3 75.0

11 6 48 7 81 19 22

2.7 1.5 12.5 1.9 24.8 5.1 7.0

10 0 72 4 16 0 1

2.5 0.0 18.7 1.1 4.9 0.0 0.3

37 81 133 30 76 23 8

9.1 19.9 34.5 7.9 23.3 6.2 2.5

.0 24.8

0 20

0.0 .6

0 215

0.0 60.6

26 9

7.0 2.5

N

%

Source: Publius/Fall 1997, “Toward Federal Democracy in Spain.” Federación Valenciana de Municipios y Provincias/Instituto Universitario Orgeta y Gasset, Bianuario Estadístico sobre el Gobierno y la Administración Local en la Comunidad Valenciana. Valencia: fvmp, 1994.

Table 4.4 Municipal Services Production and Provision, Valencia Municipalities, 5,000 to 20,000 Inhabitants, 1991 Modes of Production Municipal Production Services Fire Protection Urban Planning and Zoning Parks Paving of City Streets Rural Road Maintenance Public Water Supply Public Lighting Refuse Collection Sewerage Systems Cultural Programs Sports Facilities Sanitation/Public Health Cemeteries Social Services

Cooperation with Central Government

Cooperation with Autonomous Government

Cooperation with Province

Intermunicipal Service Delivery

Private Firms, NGOs, Volunteers

Number of Municipalities

N

%

N

%

N

%

83 88

21 88

25.3 100.0

0 0

0.0 0.0

6 1

7.2 1.1

73 0

88.0 0.0

4 0

4.8 0.0

5 8

6.0 9.1

87 88

83 64

95.4 72.7

0 4

0.0 4.5

2 7

2.3 8.0

2 20

2.3 22.7

0 0

0.0 0.0

4 37

4.6 42.0

85

60

70.6

5

5.9

24

28.2

12

14.1

0

0.0

21

24.7

88 88 88 86 88 88 80

53 76 30 75 86 87 59

60.2 86.4 34.1 87.2 97.7 98.9 73.8

0 0 0 0 2 1 1

0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 1.1 1.3

1 0 0 1 20 0 52

1.1 0.0 0.0 1.2 22.7 0.0 65.0

4 1 8 0 17 1 5

4.5 1.1 9.1 0.0 19.3 1.1 6.3

5 0 7 0 1 0 0

5.7 0.0 8.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0

35 13 60 12 8 3 2

39.8 14.8 68.2 14.0 9.1 3.4 2.5

81 88

77 83

95.1 94.3

0 1

0.0 1.1

0 41

0.0 46.6

0 10

0.0 11.4

0 13

0.0 14.8

2 4

2.5 4.5

N

%

N

%

%

N

Source: Publius/Fall 1997, “Toward Federal Democracy in Spain.” Federación Valenciana de Municipios y Provincias/Instituto Universitario Orgeta y Gasset, Bianuario Estadístico sobre el Gobierno y la Administración Local en la Comunidad Valenciana. Valencia: fvmp, 1994.

Table 4.5 Municipal Services Production and Provision, Valencia Municipalities, of more than 20,000 Inhabitants, 1991 Modes of Production Municipal Production Services Fire Protection Urban Planning and Zoning Parks Paving of City Streets Rural Road Maintenance Public Water Supply Public Lighting Refuse Collection Sewerage Systems Cultural Programs Sports Facilities Sanitation/Public Health Cemeteries Social Services

Cooperation with Central Government

Cooperation with Autonomous Government

Cooperation with Province

Intermunicipal Service Delivery

Private Firms, NGOs, Volunteers

Number of Municipalities

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

40 42

5 42

12.5 100.0

0 0

0.0 0.0

2 2

5.0 4.8

37 0

92.5 0.0

0 0

0.0 0.0

3 3

7.5 7.1

42 42

42 34

100.0 81.0

0 2

0.0 4.8

1 3

2.4 7.1

0 4

0.0 9.5

0 0

0.0 0.0

4 22

9.5 52.4

39

7

94.9

0

0.0

6

15.4

6

15.4

0

0.0

11

28.2

42 42 42 41 42 42 39

25 39 6 39 42 42 29

59.5 92.9 14.3 95.1 100.0 100.0 74.4

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

0 0 0 1 7 1 29

0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 16.7 2.4 74.4

0 0 1 1 2 0 2

0.0 0.0 2.4 2.4 4.8 0.0 5.1

1 0 2 0 1 0 0

2.4 0.0 4.8 0.0 2.4 0.0 0.0

19 9 37 3 3 1 0

45.2 21.4 88.1 7.3 7.1 2.4 0.0

40 42

38 42

95.0 100.0

0 0

0.0 0.0

0 8

0.0 42.9

0 2

0.0 4.8

0 2

0.0 4.8

1 4

2.5 9.5

N

%

%

N

Source: Publius/Fall 1997, “Toward Federal Democracy in Spain.” Federación Valenciana de Municipios y Provincias/Instituto Universitario Orgeta y Gasset, Bianuario Estadístico sobre el Gobierno y la Administración Local en la Comunidad Valenciana. Valencia: fvmp, 1994.

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but also the acs, provinces, nongovernmental organizations, volunteers, and, in some cases, the central administration. Differences in the patterns of service production can be identified for the whole Comunidad Autónoma. From the analysis of the selected fourteen services provided by a larger number of municipal governments (at least in 80 per cent of them), some general conclusions can be drawn (Table 4.2). Direct involvement of municipal corporations in the production process is prevalent. Nevertheless, the situation is not the same among the various services provided by local authorities. More than 90 per cent are involved in the production of urban infrastructures like parks and gardens, sewerage systems, and sport facilities. In contrast, less than 40 per cent are involved in home garbage collection and only 17.8 per cent of municipal bureaus participate directly in the production of fire protection. The participation of central government agencies in the production of local services is insignificant, at least for the services analyzed here. The role played by the ac in the production process is, by contrast, extremely important in the case of public health and social services and in some services related to basic infrastructures, particularly road maintenance. While perhaps eroded in some service areas in favour of ac governments, provincial governments nevertheless play a notable role in the production of fire protection. Their participation is also relevant for the building and maintenance of certain local infrastructures. Finally, an interesting percentage of municipalities rely on private enterprise, nongovernmental organizations, and volunteers for producing basic urban infrastructures and services, where contracting for services and partnerships would show up. Population size influences the patterns of local services production (see Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5). Larger municipalities, in terms of number of inhabitants, tend to be more involved in virtually all types of service production processes through their own bureaus than do smaller municipalities. The use of intergovernmental or interorganizational arrangements seems to be a function of resources availability within the local unit of government, with the smaller cities being the most strapped for resources. Intergovernmental cooperation would not be primarily caused by culture, but by necessity, which is congruent with Ernesto Carrillo’s (1991) picture of local government in Spain. That would explain why intermunicipal arrangements such as mancomunidades are not more

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extensively used; municipalities are not wealthy partners. The deeper pockets would be with the province or ac. The production of welfare-state oriented services like public health, culture, and social services is clearly intergovernmental in large, medium, and small towns. In the case of social services, the presence of the ac increases; however, the role of intermunicipal arrangements loses importance as the number of inhabitants increases. The important role of intermunicipal devices in the production of social services in small municipalities would be related to the requirements posed by other levels of government – state and ac – for the receipt of intergovernmental grants. Interestingly, public health protection is an area in which collaboration with the ac is the general rule. Finally, basic urban infrastructures and services are areas of high municipal involvement. Taking parks and gardens, water supply, public lighting, and city street paving as examples, broadly speaking larger local authorities rely more on contracting formulas than smaller ones do (Table 4.5). In the case of city street paving, municipal contracting seems to be an alternative to the traditional role played by the provinces in smaller towns. If anything has changed since this data was gathered, it would be that greater levels of overall cooperation would be present, with even more emphasis on intermunicipal cooperation, and a near absence of central government involvement in either the provision or production of services (Bel and Costas 2006; Miralles 2004). Research recently performed on solid waste services in metropolitan Barcelona reveals similar patterns to that of Valencia in the 1990s among the 33 city waste-water agencies created in 1987. It shows that no municipality undertakes all services (waste disposal, paper/cardboard collection, glass collection, treatment of paper, and treatment of glass). Waste is almost always done by the municipality or contracted to the private sector, whereas virtually all treatment is by the special district, with the other collection services showing a very mixed pattern of municipal or district operations, leading to “a very complex distribution of management strategies in urban waste service provision” (Termes and Alerm 2007). This case analysis of Valencia cities suggests two important conclusions regarding the intergovernmental development of federalizing Spain. First, within the framework of state-mandated services by level of population (Figure 4.1), municipalities have and

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exercise options to either provide or produce services. Services production and provision are the norm in most traditional urban services and provision without production in newer welfare-state services. Second, a relatively high level of intergovernmental interaction is occurring in the provision of nontraditional municipal services, with production cooperation occurring through a range of different entities. The high level of intergovernmental activity suggests a dynamic system of self-governing yet collaborative entities. Municipalities are deeply enmeshed in multiple sets of intergovernmental networks. Internal Administrative/Operational Differences Among Cities The data on services provision and production reveal substantial differences by the size or population served by municipal corporations. One would expect vast political, managerial, and operational differences between the open assemblies of under 100 persons in villages and cities like Madrid or Barcelona, that have populations in the millions and host thousands of visitors daily. While systematic data on size differences in the character of city governments do not exist, the limited evidence available can be broadly portrayed. Table 4.6 attempts to draw out relevant city differences. Although comparisons might be made across topics (horizontally) they will be explained by size (vertically) since it is these differences that are of the greatest interest. The smaller cities (under 100– 5,000) not only carry a lighter load of required services competencies but also are the most likely to transfer out these obligations to other jurisdictions, particularly to the provinces. They tend to have few municipal employees, and in some cases the national corps of clerks, treasurers, and comptrollers may be their only full time employees. These are the only administrative staff that have a university qualification. These persons can be the only managers per se, often advising and managing without administrative training. To the extent that there is departmentalization their elected councillors run these functions as commissioners, often as “volunteer administrators.” As a result the councillor is representative, services supervisor, and volunteer manager. These cities often minimally produce local services but rely on external arrangements and contracting. Their systems of information and communications

Table 4.6 Characterization of Larger and Smaller Cities Factor

Small Cities (100–5,000)

lrbrl Servicing Competencies

Smaller number, likely to transfer some out to other jurisdictions

Staffing

National corps Clerk and controller may be only full time Commissioners, heads of departments

Executive Corps

Role of Councillor

Representative, service supervisor, volunteer administrator

Provisional Production

Minimal provision. Production by other entities Sporadic, contracted or none

Information and Communications Technology Tax Bases

Intergovernmental Contacts

Narrow, small fee base, subsidies

Horizontal, especially provincial and interlocal arrangements, sporadically with ac, almost never with Madrid

Medium Cities (5,001–49,999) More required, likely to take on some optional, e.g., environment, transport, fire Most departments are professionally staffed, but small numbers in some Commissioners, heads of departments, along with a manager core in some Service oversight, politician, and technical involvement Provision and production Small number of specialists plus contracts Moderate, medium fee base, subsidies Horizontal and some vertical, particularly ac, rarely with Madrid

Large Cities (50,000 and larger) Full range of services Maximum competencies All departments professionally staffed

A political and managerial core at the head of departments Policy leadership, representation, services innovator, community interlocutor Provision and production Departmentalization supplemented by contracting Large, maximum fee bases, own-source reliable since 2003, 1% income tax sharing Some horizontal (e.g., province neighbouring communities), heavily vertical with ac, less frequent with Madrid, and declining

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technology tend to be lower technology and irregular. To the extent that they have information systems, they would be contracted out. As small population entities, usually in low-growth areas, their property tax and fee bases are small, accelerating the externalization of services and requiring extensive financial in-kind subsidies. Intergovernmentally, their contacts are mostly horizontal, particularly with provincial interlocal bodies. They are perhaps the least frequent actors in any type of vertical intergovernmental involvement with the ac and the central government. The picture changes considerably for the medium-sized cities (5,001 to 49,999) in the Spanish context. These cities take on more lrbrl competencies, such as fire and social services, and many are likely to take on even more than are required, for example, transport and environment. They are in a better position to take on nonrequired services requested by citizens and councillors. Most of their service departments are professionally staffed by engineers, psychologists, accountants, and information specialists, along with the national corps of clerks and controllers. The smaller ones in this size category, of course, have smaller departments and staff complements, in some cases a manager and one or two clerical persons. The councillors who are commissioners are somewhat less involved in the day-to-day operations, but they are likely to engage in some political and technical involvement. Indeed, a study by Brugué and Vallés (2005, 214) about the changing role of councillors in medium-sized cities revealed less hands-on involvement in the details of administration and willingness to delegate to trusted and professional public employees. These cities both produce and provide services, somewhat higher in the production scheme than the smallest cities because they have more resources and operating staff. Most of these cities now invest in information and communications technology through a combination of one or two specialists and external services contracting. Their tax and fee bases are substantially broader than the small towns, meaning that with transfers they can meet more citizen and required service demands than is possible in the smallest cities. Finally, their intergovernmental contacts tend to be both horizontal, particularly with provinces and close-by cities and intermunicipal arrangements, and vertical, frequently with the ac and perhaps occasionally with the state. Cities with over 50,000 population are probably similar in services and administrative support to most European cities of their

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size. They almost always offer a full range of services, usually many beyond those required by law. Indeed some services that have been transferred out by smaller cities, e.g., integration of immigrants, hospitals, and homes for the infirm and mentally impaired, are incorporated into city services. Most departments would have a professional at the head, below the elected political core, and would have a large complement of professionally trained lawyers, accountants, engineers, social workers, and environmental specialists, along with line employees. Their capacity to advise the elected councillor head on management issues is considerable, since a councillor would still head the political core leadership of city departments. Again councillor-heads will be less likely to become too involved in the details of running their department. The role would entail policy leadership, representation, overseeing services innovation and acting as a community interlocutor (Brugué and Vallés 2005). Barcelona’s model for organizing large urban projects for the 1992 Olympic Games involved decentralization in to ten districts, introduction of modernized public administration, and extensive intergovernmental contacts by city officials for project funds (Tomàs 2005, 54). Again provision and production would be the norm, with this sized city being in a good position to choose between the two based on managerial rather than financial criteria. Information services in the larger cities are normally departmentalized with relatively large staff, supplemented by some contracting. One Madrid suburb of over 100,000 persons had a departmental staff of 63 persons, 40 of whom were information specialists of different types. These cities have the broadest tax and fee bases, which are reliable resources, but traditionally their population growth- based service costs and capital projects, particularly infrastructure of all types, make them the largest consumer of transfers, including income tax sharing for the largest of these cities. Intergovernmental activity in these bodies goes in all directions, with some to provincial governments and neighbouring cities, and heavy vertical involvement with the acs and to some greater extent than smaller cities with the central government. Spain’s largest cities are increasingly professionalizing and administration is taking over what were previously political functions. Trained architects and urban planners have taken over urban planning departments, accountants and economists finance departments, information and computer specialists information services departments, civil and operating engineers public works depart-

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ments, and fire and police supervisors are academy trained. These individuals join the ranks of the psychologists, social workers, and other social-service professionals who have always staffed local social services departments. They are more able to serve linking and coordinating functions, provide advice and counsel to members of the government commission, implement management innovations, and engage in external negotiations (Magre and Berlana 2007, 13–14). This leaves big city councillors more removed from the core operations of running departments, and more political only in the sense of debating local policies and less in the sense of politicizing the operations and services of the departments they head up (Brugué and Vallés 2005). While these are central tendencies, one can clearly see that over the past fifteen years or so, the differences in services delivery, administrative organization and support, revenue bases, and intergovernmental capacities between small and large cities have become vast. As subsequent chapters discuss, revenue disadvantages, administrative and staffing deficiencies, political over-administrative postures, information management deficits, and weaker intergovernmental ties, it is important to bear in mind that these tendencies are most characteristic of the smallest cities and, to a lesser extent, some medium-sized cities (Brugué and Vallés 2005; Subirats y Vallés 1990, 77). The Constitutional Tribunal, Autonomy, and Local Governments Two early Constitutional Tribunal (ct) decisions that were directed at acs also have an important bearing on local autonomy, in that they reinforce the role of central government in transfers and maintenance of autonomy. In 1982 the Catalan Government challenged a central government budget law that related to the transfer of services to local areas. The court ruled that the state was limited in powers because local entities enjoy constitutionally guaranteed autonomy to manage local interests ... (stc 4/1981) but within central framework laws the ct declare and transfer services and functions and still maintain respect for local autonomy. The ct has defined municipal autonomy as fundamentally consisting of the “capacity to decide freely between the various legal options available to them, according to essential policy criteria” (stc 4/1981). Transfers of funds also can be made to help emerging local interests to support local expansion of powers. The central government was

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not violating local entities’ power to establish self-governing institutions because it does not prevent local entities from acting on corresponding local laws nor does it subject local entities to precise, arbitrary, or illegitimate restrictions. A second, Basque appeal in 1983 dealt with whether an ac can automatically assume powers outlined in its statute or must take additional transfer steps. The ct overturned the Basque civil service regulations, saying that two types of transfers exist: local powers and local services. To name a power does not allow an ac to assume a power, but it can transfer specific services through personnel or modification of functions. In this case the power to regulate vacant civil service positions in the agencies of the state falls within the scope of central, not regional, powers. The civil service and transfer of services decisions represent important precedents for the government in Madrid to reach beyond ac autonomy and affect local powers in a system of dual subordination. In another early appeal a group of senators challenged different and conflicting local normative decisions. They argued for a more uniform ordinance framework within autonomy. They also wanted to remove state power to coordinate supra-municipal (e.g., provincial) interests. The government in Madrid challenged the whole appeal on the following objections: 1 The Constitutional Court should declare its incompetence in resolving matters of constitutional legitimacy and defer to regular courts and pre-existing legislation. 2 The appellants’ legal representation should include adequately accredited legal counsel (‘bastanteo de poderes’). 3 Legislators, not judges, should reserve ample latitude to define local autonomy; especially autonomic systems and functions. 4 The appellants should pinpoint concrete and specific legal provisions they deem unconstitutional. The ct decided to reject inadmissibility, to declare unconstitutional and null and void some pre-1978 Constitution legal provisions, and not to consider other provisions of autonomy laws. The ct answered the government’s objections with an important local autonomy declaration: 1 The Constitution is a superior (i.e., hierarchically supreme) and posterior law. Its primacy can override subsequent law that con-

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flicts with the Constitution. The ct enjoys a monopoly to rule whether subsequent laws conform to the Constitution, and all other judges and courts should not apply pre-Constitutional provisions or laws that have been repealed by the Constitutional Court. 2 An appellant’s representative(s) act as ad hoc professionals before the Constitutional Court and have the choice to request additional direction from accredited attorneys. 3 In a pluralistic political system, a ct sets limits within which actors make legitimate political choices. Article 137 of the Constitution guarantees that municipalities, provinces, and autonomous communities enjoy autonomy in the management of their respective interests. Autonomy is understood as a limited power, not full sovereignty, and in no instance can the principle of autonomy oppose the principle of national unity. Law provides the framework for giving concrete meaning to the principle of autonomy. The Constitution affirms the compatibility between opportunities to exercise autonomy and limitations on autonomy. Local powers should never be so generic or indeterminate as to render local entities subordinate to or dependent on regional or central governments. Local powers should be precise. 4 The ct delimited the scope of laws and provisions subject to its ruling. It also decided to examine the constitutionality of several other subjects: a Creation, modification, and dissolution of municipalities b Creation and dissolution of municipal unions (‘mancomunidades’) c Forcible imposition of municipal unions by the central government d Naming municipalities and assigning capital cities e Control over local entities’ government agencies f Establishment of a municipal bill of lading or waybill system (‘régimen de carta’) g Resolution of conflicts of authority between local entities, and the establishment of courts’ powers h Public goods (‘bienes comunales’) i Personal property (‘bienes de propios’) j Local public finance controls In short, this decision provided for the entry of the ct into the realm of municipal and local government law.

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The ct has also been active with regard to the regulation of municipal functions; for example, urban planning. The first action in 1988 involved a central government challenge of a Catalan decree regarding the scope of local planning powers, namely that all local agreements must directly affect matters under the scope of local powers, which include urban planning. The ct held that local agreements that are not written so as to fall within the limits of autonomy are unconstitutional and thus the Catalan decree went beyond their power to regulate local corporations. A similar move was made a few months later when the central government again challenged the Catalan government because their laws fostered local agreements that went beyond the regulatory system that defined autonomy. Three years later the central government challenged a Canary Islands urban planning/environmental protection law that they claimed hollowed out local guarantees to autonomy. The ct declared parts of the law unconstitutional because no administrative controls existed that safeguarded national government environmental protection statutes, but found another pact to be acceptable because such control existed. A final case involves a 1993 decision by the Catalan government to expand its local regulations over advisors of savings banks (most of which are provincially based). The central government challenged this expansion, arguing that it undermines the normative base that governs the autonomic system, which governs the creation and modification of the boundaries and agencies of a local entity. The ct ruled that the Catalan government cannot so extend those powers related to the local system under base law and those related to savings banks, and that the Catalan government must respect central norms. Finally, the Court considered whether the Catalan government can exercise its local powers and add conditions to the procedures for designating the general advisors of savings banks. 1 The Court reiterated an earlier ruling that the constitutional guarantee of autonomy is general in character, and that the federal government is responsible for establishing basic principles and criteria for its application. 2 Basic conditions cannot establish a uniform system that all local entities must adopt, but instead allow for a diversity of options.

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3 However, only central legislators can broaden the conditions in question. The list contained in article 47.2 of lrbrl is understood to be closed and exhaustive. Thus, there are limits to which subnational governments can exercise autonomy, and the powers of ac governments over local government supervision is clearly circumscribed. To sum up, a leading constitutional scholar concludes that “The prevailing conception of local autonomy, inscribed in local government law and case law, would suggest that recognition of local authorities’ right to take part in affairs, particularly those listed in the local government law, is sufficient. In practice, this means that the laws governing these areas do not usually grant full public decision-making powers to municipalities for entire sectors of activity” (Aja 2001, 245). Possessing virtually no exclusive powers, local governments are dually subordinated to central and ac. As Aja (2001, 246) concludes: A wide range of circumstances, however, still exists in which sectoral legislation requires prior authorization or subsequent endorsement of local agreements by the central state or the autonomous communities. This is constitutionally permissible only in so far as they do not constitute general controls, but occur in specific cases in which interests at a level higher than the purely local, which may be affected by a municipal decision, can be demonstrated. These are in fact situations where powers are shared between the local authority and the next level of administration, in areas where coordinated, consistent action is required (urban planning offers a multitude of instances). The latter offers a way of restoring what amounts to regulation in areas where, legally, this is not possible. This situation, in turn, obviously reinforces a highly intergovernmentalized Spanish local government system. This constitutional situation supports the later contention (chapter 9) that local authorities feel that local autonomy is incomplete compared the the ac’s. Along with revenue shortfalls, this lack of power is what has led to the Pacto Local and other reform movements. In 1998 the central government did submit a reform bill that

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included the ability of municipalities to go to the Constitutional Tribunal to litigate matters of their autonomy and other home rule matters. But the acs, which have proved to be resistant to any further shifting of powers downward, remains key.

conclusion Spain’s intergovernmentalism reaches back into its historical development where communities were guaranteed their governments. This tradition was carried into the Constitution of 1978 where the autonomy of municipalities and provinces were protected. Along with the growing number of special units of governments, such as consorcios and mancomunidades, it places the census of governmental units at over 10,000, not to speak of thousands of other contractual and collaborative arrangements among governments, particularly in a number of service areas, ranging from fire protection to social services. Local governments, while guaranteed autonomy and a share of central resources, in practice have become dually subordinated to state framework legislation and ac oversight of their major functions, while they seek service resources wherever available. While the Constitutional Tribunal has clearly established autonomy as the freedom from the routine controls of tutelage, it is yet to include the type of residual authority or basic home rule that local interests in Spain seek. City governments operate internally on a parliamentary council system similar to that of the acs and the state. The mayor is the majority party leader, elected by that majority, and each council department is headed by an elected council or from the majority. Shared or delegated executive powers between the mayor and council means that local hierarchies are vertically flattened and segmented, not only within the municipal structure but with a host of allied agencies and autonomous bodies, which contributes to mixed models of administration and high levels of cross boundary contact (Magre and Berlana 2007, 15–16). Provincial councils comprise indirectly selected municipal councillors, who organize these governments along similar lines. The result in both cases leads to both administrative and professional deficits, in favour of political administration. This, of course, includes the intergovernmental dimension of planning, programming, and evaluation.

lts/Intergovernmental Financing Networks in Federalizing Spain

5 Intergovernmental Financing: The Ties That Bind

In Spain, as is the case of other federal systems, the question of financial decentralization is very much bound up with issues of autonomy. “Until now the indicators of cooperation with municipalities have been operationalized by conditional grants from higher levels of government. It assumes that cities cannot clearly express their priorities,” reflected a senior official in the central government in Madrid regarding the state of municipal finance. Actually, the local government taxation-financing system is more consistent with the model of the decentralized state or what economists call fiscal federalism, in as much as municipalities and other local governments fund a greater proportion of their services out of their own source taxes and revenues. Nevertheless, the system would be considered “incomplete” (Prieto 2002, 82), in the sense that dependence on state and ac subventions remains, not to speak of in-kind financing through cooperative municipal-to-provincial, consortia, and mancomunidad arrangements. In regard to the mancomunidad, cooperative funding by provincial service assumption or some other intergovernmental “pick-up” arrangement proves to be the only choice for many small, low tax-base municipalities. And unlike countries like Canada, where provinces have relieved municipalities of certain service functions by assuming them on a provincewide basis, in Spain such assumption is on an individual city-bycity, service-by-service basis, through negotiation and intergovernmental transaction. Larger municipalities, on the other hand, not only have basic service-financing challenges but also have greater need to provide services to commuters and visitors, along with rising costs. This means

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servicing beyond the traditional city functions and beyond its citizen limits, broadening their residential, industrial, and commercial configuration into “interjurisdictional networks,” further intergovernmentalizing the big city finance question (Caramés 2002, 2). These challenges mean that, not only in small towns but also in metropolitan cities and suburbs, in Spain fiscal federalism is characterized by vertical fiscal imbalance. One federalism principle is that of fiscal autonomy and a frequently raised question in federal systems is, in effect: Is autonomy fiscally protected through subnational power over revenue raising and revenue distribution? It is one core “test” of the autonomy principle. However, whatever principles of fiscal home rule may be enshrined into autonomy, with few exceptions they have proved to be the most difficult to effect in most countries. Own-source fiscal powers are normally considered to be keystones of autonomy (Davis 1956; Nathan and Balmaceda 1990; Oates 1990). Central governments, however, hold most fiscal cards and they reluctantly cede them to autonomous subnational governments (Agranoff 2004). Indeed, in many federal countries the greatest struggles over autonomy prove to be over fiscal control. The significance of own-source revenue control flows from the basics of political economy. Elazar (1987, 185) refers to the importance of contractual sharing of public responsibilities, including financing, which is a cornerstone of what he identifies as contractual non-centralization in federal systems. Economists would argue that this principle would apply to devolution. Those services that decentralized levels of governments finance are primarily allocational, particularly local government amenities and basic services. Their primary rationale is the provision of goods and services, as opposed to higher-level government economic stabilization and distribution. At the subnational level, adjustments to local needs and customs can be made, matching decisions to local desires and tastes (Oates 1990, 45–6). This has led tax-assignment economists to suggest a división of taxes, based on factors of primary function, mobility, transferability, and use level (Musgrave 1983). Following these principles, Article 9 of the European Charter of Local Self-Government (1985) (see chapter 7), which incorporates both regional and municipal principles, contains eight fiscal standards that include subnational rights to own-source revenue, decision-making, intergovernmental resources, and credit sources.

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Davis (1956, 17) argues that federal systems, “fiscal independence” is substantially similar to those tenets involved in constitutional independence. He lays down four integral benchmarks of subnational fiscal independence: 1) the right to decide when to raise revenue; 2) the right to elect the purposes for which revenue is to be raised; 3) the right to determine the amount raised; and 4) control over the machinery to administer these decisions. These principles would equally apply to other autonomy situations (Heald, Geaughan, and Robb 1998), including those related to local governments in decentralized political systems. Of course, one might add the modifier “substantial” to principles of decision and control, in as much as in all federal and autonomy situations the general government is responsible for managing the economy and central taxation, which, along with equalization, is their rationale for forms of subnational fiscal involvement. To understand the overall picture, one must understand the first piece of the local financing puzzle, which involves the pattern of subnational funding to support devolution of services through the territorial governments, where most Spanish money has flowed downward.

ac financing: slow devolution The essence of financing of regional governments involves an everchanging matrix of devolution of taxes, with the main variation being ac assumptions of central functions. One important variant is that two acs – Basque Country and Navarra – are considered foral (historic rights) regimes, where most taxes are collected locally and payments for central government services are negotiated every five years through the cupo (Basque) and aportación (Navarra), and these regions self-finance decentralized services for which other regions must depend on central financing (Mitxelena 2006, ch. 7). The fifteen other “common regime” acs initially depended on transfers of funds for devolved services and general operations. These grants have been conditional, unconditional, and targeted project/service in nature. Within these 15 acs, there was historically tremendous variation in funding, depending on levels of competencies and services (Cicuéndez y Ramos 2006), although since 2002, with an evening out of service levels, funds are more or less allocated downward through formulas based on population and economic status (Mitxelena 2006, 126).

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Evolution began in the early 1980s, in the early years of the ac process, when a basic law, Ley Orgánica de Financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas (lofca), was passed on regional financing, and a series of bilateral (Basque and Navarre) and multilateral commissions were set up. The most important multilateral council was the Tax and Financial Policy Council Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera (cpff) and its working groups. Later commissions were set up for Coordinated Taxation Management and an Arbitration Council. In a later phase, from 1986 to 1993 agreements were made to encourage the further devolution of competencies, for example, in education and health, for some ten slow-route acs. These transfers were completed by 2002. In this phase a percentage (initially 15 per cent) of taxes was guaranteed and other taxes were shared (Cicuendéz y Ramos 2006). The latest major fiscal reform was put in place in 2001, with a shift to tax-sharing formulas and, in some cases, the transfer of normative powers over minor taxes. acs were guaranteed one-third of income tax revenues and 35 per cent of other taxes (tobacco, electricity, transportation) in return for the transfer of education and health (Ruíz-Huerta, Herrero, y Vizan 2002). These minor tax functions introduce for the first time “joint tax responsibility” of an instrumental nature, in as much as acs generally prefer transfers where their politicians are not responsible for raising or collecting taxes. ac taxes are on gaming, hotels, large commercial establishments, pollution, and waste chemicals. State-ac unconditional transfers are mainly used as one means of equalizing income among territories, particularly to correct vertical imbalances. Conditional transfers, or block grants, are used for targeted but broad programs, where the use of funds is generally negotiated between the parties. These make up the bulk of funds transferred, normally around two-thirds of all ac financing (Table 5.1). They are currently distributed according to formulas that weigh population (94 per cent), land area (4.2 per cent), dispersion ratio of public entities (1.2 per cent) and island territory (0.6 per cent). Health transfers also factor in the ratio of population over 65 years of age (24.5 per cent of weight) (Cicuéndez 2006). Other, special transfer funds also benefit acs. The Interterritorial Compensation Fund offers state investments in infrastructure, public works, irrigation, territorial structuring, housing, transport, communications, and related projects that are primarily targeted to poorer acs (ten in 2002). They traditionally amount to less than five per cent of all transfers. The Sufficiency Fund was established

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Table 5.1 Main Autonomous Community Financing Mechanisms (percentages)

Financing Mechanism 1. Financial Resources 2. Tax Resources Own taxes Transferred/Agreed, Arranged taxes Surcharge on State taxes Charges from transferred State taxes 3. Conditional Transfers Investment financing Linked to public policy areas Investment Financing State-autonomous community contract programs Subsidies to companies and families Financing of Local Corporations 4. Unconditional Transfers Own resources Conditional + unconditional transfers Transfers for Autonomous Community powers % transfers for Autonomous Communities according to Art. 143 % transfers for Autonomous Communities according to Art. 151 Total (1+2+3+4)

Transitory model1

Five-year period 1987–1991

Five-year Five-year period period 1992–1995 1997–2001

3.08 19.74 0.56 17.83

5.3% 22.72 0.85 20.73

7.72 21.48 1.08 19.12

2.54 33.77 1.02 31.79

0.02 1.33

0.07 1.08

0.16 1.12

0.11 0.85

54.04 7.85 18.15 9.81 1.20

47.72 3.71 21.30 8.14 0.78

45.50 1.78 24.78 7.93 0.39

45.98 1.25 21.80 13.26 0.37

2.77

1.38

1.07

1.20

14.27

12.39

9.52

8.10

23.14 3.66 77.19

24.25 6.24 71.96

25.29 8.96 70.80

17.70 3.78 63.68

53.11

51.43

53.35

42.32

28.14

30.88

32.02

35.23

71.86

69.12

67.98

64.77

100

100

100

100

1 In the transitional period, figures were taken from the last year in force (1986). 2 Own resources include financial revenue (loans and debt) and own taxes. * Source: Own records from the “Report on Autonomous Community Financing” (1986–2001 provisional series), badespe, Ministry of Tax. Reproduced by permission from Ruth Cicuéndez Santamaria y Juan A. Ramos, “La dímension intergubermental del sistema de financión autonomico,” en Lourdez López Nieto (Coord.), Relaciones intergubernamentales en la España democrática: interdependencia, autonomía, conflicto y cooperación. Madrid: Dykinson, 2006, 191.

in 2001 to guarantee that service minima do not fall below countrywide standards. For each region, transfers from or contributions to the central government were calculated as the difference between “adjusted” spending needs and its revenue-raising capacity. It is a

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minor adjustment (only Madrid and the Baleares acs have transferred in funds) to disparities in fiscal capacity, averaging about 665 euros per capita in the 13 common regime acs receiving money in 2005, from a total of around 27 million euros (Mitxelena 2006, 134). European Union transfers provide to another source of ac revenue, most of which comes from the European Regional Development Fund (feder in Spain). From 2000 to 2006, all regions received some funds, with Estremedura, Galicia, and Andalucia receiving the greatest share. In all some 29.7 billion euros were shifted to the Spanish acs during this period, estimated by Mitxelena (2006, 141–3) at ten per cent of all regional funds. Depending on how it is integrated, an overall picture of ac financing reveals the vertical fiscal imbalance. An oecd study of Spanish fiscal decentralization concluded that these tax concessions and tax sharings not only widened ac taxbases but expanded discretionary powers. They calculated that in 2003 own taxes amounted to 53 per cent of the total. The problem is that acs had discretion over the tax rates in only one or two small taxes and had limited discretion over the others (Joumard and Giorno 2005, 18). Mitxelena’s (2006, 109) figures for 2005, compiled from official sources, reveal that real, non-ceded own-source taxes amounted to only 0.9 per cent of all revenues, whereas ceded taxes totalled 50.3 per cent and 46 per cent were in total transfers. The latter total included 1.5 per cent Interterritorial Fund, 34.5 per cent participation in state services and eight per cent eu funds. Table 5.1 provides a concise developmental picture of ac financing under the earlier models, from the first lofca model until the previous model (1977–2001). Compiled by Cicuéndez and Ramos (2006), it demonstrates that own-source taxes (third row) never amounted to more than around one per cent of ac revenue. Transfers, on the other hand (conditional and unconditional transfers), amounted to two-thirds or more. Conditional transfers for devolved services always amounted to twice the percentage of unconditional transfers. Higher responsibility communities (Article 151) obviously received a greater share of transfers. Finally, there is the financing of local governments. The main item, financing of local corporations, steadily declined (in the light of other, direct transfers) from over 14 per cent to eight per cent in the last five-year period, although some funds listed under “Investment Financing” saw their way to local governments through provincial financing schemes. The overall picture shows the development of

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greater fiscal dependence by acs on the centre, a situation that stands in stark contrast to that of local corporations. The new fiscal reforms, which include high cost items like education and health, have transferred the bulk of these conditional grants to the transfer of taxes category, as mentioned above. Why such fiscal dependence and ultimately vertical imbalance? To some degree it reflects the differential political power of the acs, along with the games they have played. This highly political process has been played in virtually every electoral cycle: throughout a myriad of national parliament bilateral and multilateral commissions; in coalition-making in the national parliament when there are minority governments; in the exertion of pressure to transfer more funds for devolved services; and in playing the politics of equity between the more economically advantaged and disadvantaged regions. There is also the pressure to deal with horizontal imbalances. “Different economic structures and distinct development levels, the principle of solidarity . . . means that consistently there is a politics of territorial cohesion” (Mitxelena 2006, 200, 201). It has meant that the ac share of the distribution of public resources (including social security) has grown from 2.9 per cent in 1981 to 35 per cent in 2005. By contrast, the “local entities” share has grown from 9.5 per cent in 1981 to 15 per cent in 2005 (Mitxelena 2006, 108). This record is partly because of greater own-source revenue potential in local governments and partly because to date no municipal services have been directly transferred locally like those of the acs. Municipal services either pre-existed or were simply legally pre-empted (e.g., traffic control) by a higher level. Comparatively, services transfers give the acs greater political and administrative leverage for increasing state funding, which they have clearly played out, as witnessed by the continuing low proportion of real own-source ac taxes. ac financing continues in transition as revised statutes of autonomy have been negotiated between late 2005 and 2008. A Catalan statute approved by referendum in 2006 makes reference to its government having the normative capacity to determine and administer taxes within its territory and to have its own tax courts, but other provisions make it clear that this must be done in conjunction with state oversight and acknowledging bilateral negotiations and principles of coordination “between public administrations.” Until this arrangement is operational, and clears several Constitu-

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tional Tribunal challenges, it is not clear how far this will move Barcelona-Madrid relations to that of the Special Regime acs of the Basque Country and Navarre. It may, however, signal an intermediate position where acs do take greater fiscal control and ultimately responsibility.

the financial position of spanish municipal and other local governments Local finance since the 1960s has been a pattern of movement from heavy reliance on own-source taxes to a mixed system that began with a series of national transfers. With the establishment of the Estado de las Autonomías, reliance on ac and central government transfers set the current pattern. In the last years of the Franco regime about half of local funding was transferred from the central government in a centralized tax system in which 92 per cent of local taxes were set by Madrid (Carrillo 1997, 61). The system of local finance changed little through most of the 1980s. lrbrl established few financial standards other than affirming local entities’ right to establish and collect taxes, identifying local budgeting powers, and affirming the right of audit by the National Audit Office. A financial framework law (39/1988) Ley Reguladora de las Haciendas Locales (lrhl) addressed local government finance a full decade after the Constitution went into effect. (In addition to “ranch house” hacienda has taken on the public revenue meaning of finance or treasury, from the days of royal household finances. Hence the Ministry of Economy and Finance in Madrid is the Ministerio de Economica y Hacienda.) lrhl identified permissible sources of local taxes, affirmed city and provincial powers to set rates, prohibited local taxes on public services, but permitted fees, and required local government subventions from central and regional government to be conditional. Figure 5.1 provides a summary translation of lrhl along with linkages to its modifications. Municipalities were granted the powers to tax real estate, local business, economic activities, motor vehicles, construction and labour, and capital gains on urban land. They were also allowed to exempt government entities and certain non-profit organizations. Within ranges set by the central government, tax rates are set by tax base, population, exemptions, quotas, and other related criteria. Cities can also introduce tax relief measures related to their own

Figure 5.1 Ley 39/1988, Reguladora de las Haciendas Locales (Regulation of Local Finance) de 28 de diciembre de 1988 (lrhl)

financial resources Local entities’ financial resources include: property taxes; taxes classified as special rates and contributions and surcharges on taxes of the autonomous communities or other local organizations; their share in federal and regional taxes; subsidies; the product of credit operations and fines and sanctions in the scope of its powers (Article 2). Local entities’ resources include revenue derived from natural yields or products within their territories, as well acquisitions resulting from inheritance or donations (Article 3). Local organizations must not tax activities or expenses outside of their respective territories or introduce obstacles to the free movement of people, goods, services, or capital (Article 6). Local entities are in charge of the management, liquidation, inspection, and collection of their revenues. Fiscal agents for federal, autonomous community, and local organizations will collaborate in local tax management, liquidation, inspection, and collection (Articles 7–8). Local entities decide the imposition and reduction of their taxes and approve corresponding fiscal decrees (Article 15). Local entities must announce the adoption of fiscal agreements within 30 days for public review published in the ‘Boletín Oficial/Official Bulletin’ of their respective province (Article 17). Local entities can establish charges and/or fees for the purpose of service delivery and the fulfillment of their administrative activities and local powers (Article 20). Local entities cannot establish charges or fees for any of the following: water supplies from public sources; public lighting; civil defence; street cleaning; compulsory education (Article 21). Local entities are entitled to participate in federal and regional taxation (Article 39). Subsidies to local entities cannot be used for purposes other than those for which they were granted (Article 40). Local entities, including municipalities and provinces, can establish public prices for public service delivery to the fulfillment of their powers, within the specifications of Article 20 (Article 41, 117, 129). Local entities can coordinate credit operations and seek public and private credit sources (Articles 49–50).

Figure 5.1 continued

municipalities City councils can establish charges, fees, and special contributions for the delivery of services or the fulfillment of their powers (Articles 58–59). City councils can demand the following taxes: taxes on real estate (Articles 61–78); taxes on economic activities (Articles 79–92; modifications by Laws 51/2002 & 62/2003 exempt government agencies – especially those responsible for social security and education – the Red Cross, and other organizations); taxes on motor vehicles (Articles 93–100). Also, city councils can establish taxes on construction, installations and labour (Articles 101–104) and taxes on the increasing value of natural urban lands (Articles 105–111). For each, provisions are outlined for any or all of the following: taxable base, population and actions; exemptions; quotas, tax period and accrued income; and management. Municipal capitals – of a province or an autonomous community – as well as municipalities with a population of 75,000 or more are ceded a prescribed percentage of the collection of federal taxes. In addition, these municipalities participate in federal tax collection (Articles 112–116; added by Law 51/2002). provinces Provincial Delegations can establish charges, fees, and special contributions for the delivery of services or the fulfillment of their powers (Articles 58–59). They can also establish a surcharge on taxes on economic activities (Article 124). Provinces cede a prescribed percentage of the collection of federal taxes and participate in federal tax collection (Articles 125–127; added by Law 51/2002). Provinces can receive subsidies to finance provincial plans of cooperation for public projects and services that fall under municipal powers (Article 128). special systems: Among others (Balearic Islands, Canaries, and the North African units of Ceuta and Melilla), the municipalities of Madrid and Barcelona have special financial systems. b u d g e t i n g & sp e n d i n g The budgetary cycle coincides with the calendar year (Article 145). Local entities draft and approve a general budget, which includes the budgets of dependent autonomous organizations (Article 146).

Figure 5.1 continued

The following accompany the general budget as annexes: investment and financing plans and programs; performance, investment and financing programs; the status of the consolidation of the budget with those of local autonomous and commercial organizations; debt forecasts and repayment plans (Article 147). Local entities’ budgets will be drafted by their president, accompanied by reports of the previous budget, the organizations’ personnel and investments (Article 149). General budgets must acknowledge impact on the inhabitants of the territory as well as those directly affected that do not live in the territory and any organizations legally constituted in the territory. Claims against the budget rest on the following basis: the budget did not follow established statutes; it omitted mention of the credit necessary for the fulfillment of indispensable obligations; its income is insufficient to match budgeted expenditures income (Article 151). Budgeting expenditures – limited and binding in character – must be used for the specific purpose for which they are authorized in the general budget of the local entity (Article 153). Budget management follows subsequent stages: authorization of expenditures; execution and fulfillment of spending commitments; liquidation of spending obligation (Article 165). The Treasury collects taxes, fulfills fiscal obligations and responds to any extra-budgetary commitments (Article 177). Accounting for budgetary exercises must conform to Ministry of Economy and Finance principles (Article 183). The Ministry of Economy and Finance approves general accounting principles; approves the general accounting plan for local entities according to the general public accounting plan; and establishes the accounting books (Article 184). Local entities must take on and fulfill accounting responsibilities (Article 185). Local accounting is organized around the following aims: to establish balance; to document results; to register budgetary execution and the activities and status of the Treasury; to facilitate the collection of necessary data for public use; to facilitate the exercise of legal, financial, and efficiency controls; to inventory and control immobilized resources and control indebtedness (Article 186). A general accounting body – made up of members from the Local Entity and members from local autonomous and commercial organizations – will perform accounting duties annually. Smaller entities may tailor simplified

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Figure 5.1 continued

accounting bodies to match local needs (Articles 189–191). Inspectors aim to control all acts of a local entity and their autonomous organizations related to the liquidation of financial rights and obligations as well as to income and payments derived from such liquidation (Article 195). Source: Translated and compiled by Juan Manuel Pedroza. Chronology of major changes in Appendix C.

taxes. Provincial governments were originally allowed to establish tax rates and special service fees and were allowed a surcharge on the municipal taxes on economic activities, the only provincial own-source tax. Since 1990, this surcharge rate has been left up to provincial discretion. In the pre-lrhl years, provinces enjoyed a share of a Spanish version of the transaction tax, but when Spain joined the European Union in 1986 and the value added tax (vat) was enacted, the transaction tax was abolished and the provincial share was replaced by an unconditional central grant. Provinces also receive important infrastructure capital grants, which are mostly distributed to municipalities as project (conditional) grants. These financing patterns were changed for larger cities in 2002–04. This pattern remains for all other local governments. Local governments traditionally rely on the same type of mixed source financing as do their counterparts in other federal systems. Table 5.2 is a reproduction and translation of Gizénog’s (2002) calculations for the tax situation in 1998 for municipalities, by population size, provincial capitals, diputaciones and island councils, and by mancomunidades. Before the big city revenue reforms of 2002–04 direct taxes and fees were key revenue sources for all cities, as are transfers from acs and the central government. The largest cities, those over 100,000 population and provincial capitals, received a notably large share of transfers. Smaller cities, on the other hand, received a greater proportion of capital transfers, no doubt a reflection of their poorer capital borrowing position. Provincial governments display a similar mixed pattern, but receive less in certain fees and inheritance taxes. As indicated earlier, mancomunidades rely mostly on payments from other governments (mostly municipal) and on some capital transfers. The final column

Table 5.2 Revenue Sources, by Population Size of Municipalities and for Other Subnational Governments Local Revenues Sources (percentages)*

Under 5,000 inhabitants 5,001 to 10,000 10,001 to 20,000 20,001 to 30,000 30,001 to 50,000 50,001 to 100,000 More than 100,000 Provincial capitals Provinces and island councils Service districts (mancomunidades) total total (only cities)

Direct 1 Tax

Indirect Tax2

Charge/Fee

22.69 26.73 30.00 31.47 34.81 34.26 33.84 31.57 29.82 2.43

3.51 4.52 4.57 4.72 5.32 5.01 3.64 4.02 32.61 0.00

15.26 19.71 21.33 19.00 20.67 18.67 13.98 15.58 4.36 10.48

29.70 30.49 28.88 29.79 27.10 28.63 37.31 36.48 26.39 67.92

4.12 2.32 1.81 2.20 2.68 1.53 1.10 2.18 0.79 0.77

1.54 2.28 3.02 3.57 3.13 4.03 3.03 3.62 0.38 1.13

23.18 13.95 10.39 9.24 6.29 7.88 7.09 6.55 5.65 17.28

100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

29.41 30.38

13.01 4.22

12.91 17.09

31.74 32.74

1.79 2.32

2.20 3.12

8.93 10.13

100.00 100.00

3

Transfer

4

Income

5

Property

6

Capital

7

Total

1. direct taxes (property, business, vehicles) 2. indirect taxes (capital gains) 3. charges and fees 4. current transfers 5. income from own assets 6. sale, cession or transfer of property rights 7. capital project transfers *Compiled from Public Administration Accounts (1998) Source: Translated from Gízenog, Antonio. Federalismo fiscal. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2002, 417.

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in Table 5.2 represents revenue sources for all municipalities in 1998, where again own taxes, fees, and transfers appear to be the most important categories. Several recent finance changes have altered this picture somewhat. These are identified in Appendix C. Since 2001 the new ac financing surcharge includes increased income tax sharing (from 15 per cent in 1993 and 30 per cent in 1996) to 33 per cent plus new tax sharing of 35 per cent of iva, 42 per cent of the beverage tax, and 100 per cent transfer of electrical energy, transport, and petroleum taxes. The new system ties ac financing more to their economies and revenue systems, and places them in a better position to help finance local governments (Ruiz-Huerta, Herrero, y Vizán 2002). Local government financing was revamped in 2003 and 2004, as local taxes and central government grants were overhauled. The first reform included overhaul of the small (under 1 million euros) business tax, eliminating that category from the rolls and introducing more progressive rates for larger businesses, while providing tax reductions for new companies. Small municipalities can now adjust tax rates within a wider band, a power granted earlier to larger municipalities. It also widened the band of tax rates (0.4 to 1.1 per cent) for small municipalities, expanded municipal power to differentiate rates according to use, and added tax relief for households introducing renewable energy. Small municipalities were also granted the same powers as big cities to set the tax rates on motor vehicles, increases in land values, and on construction and public works. In regard to the 2004 transfer reform, an asymmetric system has been introduced. Large municipalities (over 75,000 persons and provincial capitals) receive a share of the personal income tax (1.7 per cent), value added tax (1.8 per cent) and excise taxes (2.1 per cent) collected within their jurisdiction, in lieu of a previous unconditional grant. Small municipalities remain the recipients of central transfers, based on population, tax capacity, and tax effort. Finally, a “special regime” was introduced for municipalities classified as tourist cities, which are assigned a 2 per cent share of the fuel and tobacco excise taxes collected within their boundaries (Joumard and Giorno 2005). A law on “Modernization of Local Government” in 2003 also gave cities more direct budgetary powers. Estabilidad presupestaria requires unified budgeting (including spin-off enterprises and units) and expenditures along budgetary lines. Cities were also given

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greater regulating power over local taxes. These changes, coupled with the fact that cities do not bear major financing responsibility for health, education, and social services, should give them stronger expenditure flexibility and leeway to offset any possible future slowing of revenue growth. Local corporations continue to rely heavily on transfers, including some sharing of the income tax revenue now transferred to the acs. Table 5.3 lists the ac-local entity transfer picture for each region. The first column provides the percentage of ac funds (central transfers plus own revenues) that are transferred to local governments. The range is considerable, from 74.8 per cent in the Canaries (where the island councils carry most responsibility) to only 12.3 per cent in Valencia. Among the highest transfer levels are those of the special regime acs of Navarra and the Basque Country. Again, in the case of the Basque Country, provincial powers are more significant than in most of Spain, and thus a larger proportion of financial devolution would be expected. Nevertheless, with the Canaries exception, no region transfers more than about half of its revenues downward. The second column in Table 5.3 provides the percentage of local revenue derived from transfers in relation to total revenues. The range is again considerable, but excepting special regime Navarra, no other region targets transfers as notable portions of ac funds. Overall, their local impact on revenues is generally less than one-fifth of total local revenue.

local budgets The budget and spending guidelines are also established by the 1988 lrhl. It establishes calendar-year budgetary cycles and, since 1998, includes requirements for investment and financing plans, performance reports on investment programs/financing, debt forecasts, and the status of consolidating budgets with local autonomous and municipal business enterprises. The latter is a move toward eu standards. The new eas95 European Union accounting system requires consolidation of debt of public companies, in as much as Spanish acs and municipalities tend to fund parts of their investment programs through public companies, attempting to avoid debt limitations. A 2002 Law on Local Government Debt tightens the ability of governments to engage in off-balance shortterm financing and modifying local bond market conditions

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Table 5.3 Relative Importance of AC Transfers (2002) CCAA

Andalucia Aragón Asturias Baleares Canarias Castilla y León Castilla-La Mancha Cataluña Extremadura Galicia La Rioja Madrid Murcia Navarra País Vasco Valencia

% AC Transfers to Local Entities

% of Total Revenues

25.1 25.0 41.8 43.7 74.8 28.0 36.5 25.1 37.9 16.5 38.5 25.8 40.1 52.2 41.6 12.3

8.3 9.7 18.2 9.1 15.7 10.1 14.6 6.1 18.7 9.5 13.6 4.5 12.4 44.0 3.3 4.6

Source: Juan A. Ramos y Ruth Cicuéndez, “La dimension institucional de las relaciones autonómico-locales en un contexto de gobierno multinivel” Ponencia presentado al 7th Congreso de Ciencias Politicas y Administración Públicas Española, Madrid, 2005.

designed to encourage more reliance on municipal bonding. These changes have created “a new climate of uncertainty” among municipal government finance officials, as they fear diminished access to debt and worry about how capital projects might be financed (Vallés, Arzoz, y Cabasés 2003). The national Fiscal/Stability Law does ease some restrictions on infrastructure financing, although there is concern that infrastructure spending will displace other priorities at the local level. The responsibility for budget preparation is placed in the hands of the mayor or council president in smaller cities. Controls on expenditures are enumerated and budget management must include authorization, execution, liquidation, and reporting. Accounting principles are established and monitored according to Ministry of Finance guidelines. General expenditure categories of Spanish subnational government demonstrate the heavy burden that the welfare state places on ac and local governments. Table 5.4, compiled by the Spanish Finance Ministry, breaks down 2002 expenditures by standard Spanish expenditure categories. Not included in these figures are expenditures for education and health, which were partly central and partly ac until after 2003, when they became ac exclusively.

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For acs, social services, economic development, and regulation of productive sectors (e.g., manufacturing, commerce, agriculture) take up the bulk of spending. Transfers amount to a small portion of the budget, although some central government funds are passed through in ways that would not show up in this set of calculations. Local entities spend the largest share of their funds on social protection and social services, and lesser but significant amounts on economic development and regulation. The expenditure levels on public security are also understandable, given local policing requirements in larger cities. What does not show up in this category are the large amounts of provincial expenditures on behalf of municipalities. Farfán’s (2002, 76) data suggest that provincial governments spend 11.5 per cent of their budget on municipal transfers, plus 24.22 per cent on social services and 18 per cent on economic benefits, which primarily benefit municipalities. Indeed, no doubt all but the line items for general services and civil protection – the social and economic categories – are really spent either by or on behalf of municipalities, particularly the smaller ones. Earlier data that separate out cities (Farfán 2002, 76) indicate that municipalities spend more on civil protection (police and fire) but also substantial shares for social services. Table 5.4 suggests that cities and provinces have somewhat higher proportions of public debt than do acs, owing to a combination of lower fiscal transfer ratios and large capital expenditures. Overall, welfare-state costs of health, education, and social programs that were transferred from 1982–2002 make up over half of all subnational expenditures. To illustrate local budgeting, two municipal summary budget proposals are presented in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. The first (Table 5.5), for the small municipality of Albuñal in Andalucia (Granada), just exceeds 3 million euros. Most revenues are raised locally, with only about one-third in transfers. Over half of the revenues are from direct taxes and fees, with the remaining amount from a few minor sources. Not surprisingly, over half of the expenditures were for personnel and one-fourth for purchasing. Also, notice how small capital expenditures were for this year, less than 500,000 euros. Other capital projects may be funded by provincial budgets, consortia, or off-budget enterprises. Also, the small expenditure on services would indicate that many social and other services were otherwise picked up by ac governments, as suggested by data presented in the previous chapter.

Table 5.4 Budget/Spending Classifications of ac and Local Entities, 2002 (percentages)†

CCAA CCAA

EELL

Andalucia 1.9 14.89 Aragón 4.76 22.87 Asturias 30.68 9.00 Baleares 5.34 10.80 Canarias 2.84 10.28 Cantabria 3.44 12.36 Castilla y León 1.14 13.77 Castilla-Mancha 2.90 13.72 Cataluña 5.10 17.79 Extremadura 1.98 18.79 Galicia 2.21 11.73 La Rioja 5.06 13.37 Madrid 4.28 10.03 Murcia 3.08 11.58 Navarra 4.50 10.17 País Vasco* 4.01 5.53 Valencia 2.72 12.23

General Services

Social Protection and Growth

Social Services

Economic Development

Economic Regulation

Regulation of Transfers to Industry Public Entities

CCAA

EELL

CCAA

EELL

CCAA

EELL

CCAA

EELL

CCAA

EELL

CCAA

EELL

CCAA

0.08 0.24 0.47 0.46 0.42 1.60 0.09 0.12 2.83 0.12 0.28 1.33 1.11 0.72 1.86 7.26 0.57

5.95 1.58 5.82 8.03 4.07 6.06 4.63 4.87 5.82 5.34 4.83 5.23 10.05 8.07 5.98 1.53 7.44

5.83 8.90 14.34 10.42 8.81 7.13 13.28 11.03 5.73 14.42 6.44 16.03 13.89 10.18 9.17 4.01 7.94

13.19 7.95 15.64 13.52 11.86 9.66 11.38 14.91 7.41 10.64 11.25 9.67 9.33 9.04 14.64 6.36 10.28

55.80 34.84 44.98 51.15 70.76 53.70 41.35 32.74 62.91 38.45 60.77 47.04 56.89 57.32 42.65 63.97 69.77

39.00 39.61 45.92 44.20 39.50 45.46 42.79 43.21 49.52 40.49 39.46 43.07 54.88 50.10 58.09 9.92 45.37

5.03 10.09 16.19 11.96 7.19 13.41 11.85 10.95 5.18 9.87 7.25 15.70 13.52 8.37 9.95 5.81 8.30

10.32 11.85 9.44 13.80 15.32 13.03 13.66 11.46 10.21 11.88 17.24 9.39 6.81 7.45 3.23 7.55 9.61

0.86 5.27 2.44 2.15 2.61 2.84 1.50 0.84 0.94 1.85 1.74 2.87 1.47 1.93 2.30 0.93 1.82

5.24 2.35 2.94 2.28 2.83 4.32 2.87 3.03 3.16 3.61 3.12 12.85 2.73 3.49 2.62 1.38 3.82

12.21 26.06 12.12 10.36 3.42 10.69 26.87 28.39 1.52 29.30 7.27 8.01 1.96 14.61 5.18 5.58 4.30

1.58 2.09 2.74 1.56 4.59 0.23 2.21 1.66 0.90 1.60 1.31 1.90 0.49 2.09 1.75 0.94 1.47

11.53 0.79 0.00 2.76 0.00 0.47 4.74 0.44 3.04 6.35 3.47 0.23 1.17 1.05 11.28 1.16 9.87 3.35 0.00 1.12 8.97 2.85 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.17 22.23 0.26 0.53 64.90 0.00 1.65

EELL

Public Debt CCAA

EELL

6.73 5.83 3.39 3.42 0.92 3.71 2.76 1.75 5.91 4.03 5.07 3.96 6.88 3.69 2.15 7.90 4.56

9.02 8.95 8.02 5.38 5.21 7.17 7.65 5.98 7.84 6.52 8.23 4.41 5.64 7.99 3.27 1.89 8.15

Source: Liquidaciones Presupuestarias de las ccaa y de las eell, ejercicio 2002. Dirección General de Fondos Comunitarios y Financiación Territorial, Ministerio de Economica y Hacienda. † Does not include education and health * In the Basque Country the provinces designate 80 per cent of their funds for transfer to other public entities.

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Table 5.5 Budget Summary for a Small Municipality Albuñol Budget Proposal (Fiscal Year 2005) Euros (millions)

Percentage

759,624.00 185,500.00 904,682.74 1,013,096.91 11,665.85 2,874,569.50 0.00 127,977.82 0.00 0.00 127,977.82 3,002,547.32

25.30 6.18 30.13 33.74 0.39 95.74 0.00 4.26 0.00 0.00 4.26 100.00

1,645,929.80 755,329.38 128,473.92 35,130.55 2,564,863.65 292,531.97 43,295.40 0.00 101,856.34 437,683.71 3,002,547.36

54.82 25.16 4.28 1.17 85.42 9.74 1.44 0.00 3.39 14.58 100.00

revenue 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Direct taxes Indirect taxes Charges, fees, public prices, etc. Financial transfers Property taxes Financial Revenue (lines 1–5) Sales, cession or transfer of property rights Capital transfers Assets Liabilities Capital Revenue (lines 6–9) total revenue

expenditures 1 Personnel 2 Goods and services expenses 3 Interest 4 Financial transfers Financial Expenditures (lines 1–4) 5 Property/capital investments 6 Capital transfers 7 Assets 8 Liabilities Capital Expenditures (lines 5–8) total expenditures

Source: Consolidated figures courtesy of Ildefonso Cobo Navarrete, Province of Granada, Andalucia. Translated by Juan M. Pedroza.

Table 5.6 shows the budget for Granada, a city of nearly 300,000 people. Financial transfers amounted to a smaller proportion of its budget, about one-fourth, whereas local direct and indirect taxes constituted nearly 40 per cent of city revenues. Capital revenues and transfers also amounted to about one-fourth of the total budget. Interestingly, Granada had to spend less on personnel, just under 30 per cent, and nearly 15 per cent on financial transfers, no doubt grants to local service and cultural organizations (below). Capital expenditures also make up a much larger proportion of the Granada budget. The two budgets reflect that big cities have to rely more on their own revenues and that they have much greater operating and capi-

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Table 5.6 Budget Summary for a Large Municipality Granada Budget Proposal (Fiscal Year 2005) Euros (millions)

Percentage

73,070,977.71 11,898,522.06 28,738,395.82 54,057,060.96 2,907,501.00 170,672,457.55 5,656,632.16 34,265,357.23 1.00 5,759,735.78 45,681,726.17 216,354,183.72

33.77 5.50 13.28 24.99 1.34 78.89 2.61 15.84 0.00 2.66 21.11 100.00

63,204,116.83 56,795,389.36 5,864,619.27 32,114,227.53 157,978,352.99 14,674,732.16 29,404,734.45 1.00 14,291,363.13 58,370,830.74 216,349,183.73

29.21 26.25 2.71 14.84 73.02 6.78 13.59 0.00 6.61 26.98 100.00

revenue 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Direct taxes Indirect taxes Charges, fees, public prices, etc. Financial transfers Property taxes Financial Revenue (lines 1–5) Sales, cession or transfer of property rights Capital transfers Assets Liabilities Capital Revenue (lines 6–9) total revenue

expenditures 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Personnel Goods and services expenses Interest Financial transfers Financial expenditures (lines 1–4) Property/Capital investments Capital transfers Assets Liabilities Capital Expenditures (lines 5–8) total expenditures

Source: Consolidated figures courtesy of Ildefonso Cobo Navarrete, Province of Granada, Andalucia. Translated by Juan M. Pedroza.

tal obligations. Small cities have less revenue and appear to do a great deal of self-financing or not undertaking projects and services. Beyond their own resources they must rely on various forms of intergovernmental cooperation, which varies from town to town. Most Spanish municipalities of any size will allocate a small portion of their budgets to civic and cultural activities. Jávea, a coastal town in the Valencia ac allocated just over 500,000 euros out of a total budget of 42 million euros to some 40 local organizations. These included nearly 90,000 euros for adult and continuing education, cultural programming for several schools, sports clubs, and other cultural clubs. Examples of the latter include the local “amas de casa” or housewives club, senior citizens (pensionistas), widows

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of Jávea, the Winegrowers Club, and two cycling clubs. In addition, the city allocated 1.2 million to “Fiestas” and 300,000 for donations to third world causes (Jávea International Civil Society 2004, 11). These expenditures, which are not untypical, demonstrate the reach of municipalities beyond basic services.

other funds Two additional Spanish project sources that have had a notable impact on local finance include the Interterritorial Compensation Fund (fci) and the Regional Incentives Program. fci is established in Art. 157.1c of the Constitution and is designed to correct regional fiscal imbalances, particularly for public works and economic development infrastructure projects. Established in 1984, it initially was oriented to poorer regions but subsequently was used as a vehicle to transfer funds to all acs. In the 1990s fci was realigned to be complementary to eu investment funds, particularly the European Regional Development Fund (erdf), and thus was “rededicated” to poorer regions. By the year 2000 fci was overshadowed by erdf (known in Spain as feder) and other eu funds. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Finance (map 2003, 81) reports that 692 fci/feder projects were funded in 2002, totalling just over 2.5 billion euros. Of this total, just under 800,000 were Euros further subvented to local governments for projects in the areas of tourism, economic development, job creation, and public works. With the addition of ten new countries to the eu, Spain’s proportion of development funding will decrease and fci may gain greater prominence. The other eu source is project funding, e.g., those under the Regional Incentives Program (pir), designed to match ac and local funds aimed at job creation. The Ministry of Economy and Finance awards over 400 such projects every year (Newton 1997). Spain has done very well with obtaining eu funds as a result of its relatively poor country/high unemployment status, at least until the accessions of 2004. Data from the EC show it receiving between 52 and 58 per cent of the Cohesion Fund (about 15 billion euros) plus an additional 1.2 to 1.5 billion euros as a result of changes in the vat formula between 1993 and 1999. After protracted negotiations, pre-enlargement funding included an additional 6.5 billion euros per year for structural growth. Other eu sources include the eu Social Fund, Agricultural Guarantee Fund, and the important

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environment and transport infrastructure Cohesion Fund. Spain received 62 per cent or 11 billion euros of the Cohesion Fund from 1999–2004 (Closa and Haywood 2004). These funds are essential sources of financing for municipal infrastructure and social services funds in as much as they are normally channeled to the acs and then to local projects and programs.

conclusion Spanish public finance is multilevel and highly intergovernmentalized in character. The trends in Spanish financing of local governments reveal movement toward shifting of revenues downward from the central government and gradual lifting of controls on taxes and budgets. The Spanish mode relies heavily on ceding of taxes and on conditional and unconditional transfers. Local self-financing is, however, operative to a greater degree than in ac governments. While fiscal supervision of local governments is largely ac in orientation, it follows a template established in Madrid in the same way as municipal services. Indeed, the conditional fiscal ties between state and ac and ac and local governments shifts national implementation downward at the expense of discretion (Agranoff and Ramos 1997; Agranoff 2004). Intergovernmentalization is lubricated by these regulations and transfers at the expense of own-source financing, where taxes are levied and funds are spent at the same level. Fiscally, Spain clearly has a system of vertical fiscal imbalance that Solé-Vilanova (1990, 351) has characterized as “consumption federalism.” In terms of building Spanish decentralization and autonomy, fiscal “home rule” has been very difficult for the fifteen common regime acs and local governments to achieve. As is the case in most countries, the central government has tremendous revenue advantages. It builds in both the solidarity of equalization and fiscal dependence by transfers. It also accelerates the intergovernmental ties. Without substantial revenue powers, however, ac and local governments lack the responsibility associated with decision-making and expenditure control that federal systems are supposed to guarantee.

ts/Intergovernmental Politics and Actions Networks in Federalizing Spain

6 Intergovernmental Politics and Actions

Spain’s democratic political system is, of course, relatively young, but nevertheless it is stabilizing. While the antecedents to the two national political parties have been around for some time, the major left-of-centre Socialist Workers Party of Spain (psoe) has transformed itself into a social democratic party and the younger right-of-centre Popular Party (pp) has become a Christian democratic party along western European lines. The other smaller left parties, now in a United Left (iu) coalition, and a host of regionalist and ethnic nationalist non-state parties (Pallares et al. 1997) sometimes have a longer history but they are not country-wide political forces and affect local politics in only a few regions of Spain. Their local government influence is normally limited to the single region of their organization. At all levels the major political forces are those of the psoe and pp. All parties in Spain, however, reflect the “importance of the role played by party elites in Spanish electoral politics” (Gunther, Sani, and Shabad 1988, 406), whose networks are important in governing. National and local elections are linked in Spain, with general elections being run-ups for the next round of local elections, or the reverse, with only marginal differences in party support between them. In this sense, Carrillo (1997, 5) observes that “cities become ‘Trojan horses’ for political parties wishing either to maintain or to gain national or regional access.” Of course, there is more to local politics than organized political parties. There are also networks of clients or patrons, policy networks in areas like economic and land development, businesses, trade unions, employers associations, social welfare interest groups and providers, local cultural associations, neighbourhood groups, and numerous nongovernmental

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organizations (Font, Font, y Subirats 2002). Along with political parties, all of these forces form the local political system and therefore have some potential impact on the intergovernmental arena. During the Franco regime, and even earlier, local governments were regarded as direct agents of the central regime. That changed as the Constitution of 1978 offered them the independence that goes along with autonomy. The elimination of administrative tutelage also contributed. That means that local politicians have the potential, if they choose to exercise it, to be role players in the intergovernmental system. These roles are essential for operation of local civil societies within the federal matrix. Local governments, for example, deal directly with people and are operational focal points in multi-tiered systems. Working with their citizens and groups in the community, as well as with regional and federal officials, local officials, according to Elazar (1962, 24–8), play five essential roles: (1) acquirer of external aid for local needs; (2) adapter of government functions and services to local conditions; (3) experimenter with new functions and services (or new versions of traditional ones); (4) initiator of governmental programs that spread across state and nation; and (5) underlying the others, provider of a means by which a local community can pay the “ante” necessary to “sit in the game,” that is, to secure an effective voice in governmental decisions of local impact. Elazar also factored in the interlocal matrix, because local governments operate within their civil communities, which include the other local governments, local units of regional and federal governments, public nongovernmental bodies, local political parties, and so on. These processes of intergovernmental politics are explored in this chapter. It is not a complete account of Spanish local politics, but it covers the intergovernmental dimension. First, local political forces and interests are explained, along with local elections. This discussion is followed by structures of municipal organization for federal action. Then the scope of federal-municipal interactions is considered. This is followed by a discussion of the nature of federalmunicipal action. Finally, municipal-ac interaction is examined.

local politics: parties Statewide political parties and a myriad of local parties in the cities and towns essentially carry local politics for contesting elections

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Table 6.1 Major Parties in Municipal Elections Votes† Political Party pp psoe Total Votes Cast

Percentages

Councillors

1999

2003

1999

2003

1999

2003

7,334,135 7,296,484

7,875,762 7,999,178

34.44 34.26

34.29 34.83

24,623 21,917

23,615 23,244

21,491,984

63.99*

* Of all votes cast in list system † Other parties gaining more than 2 per cent of vote: 1999 Left United 5.95 and 6.68 respectively; and Convergence and Union (Catalonia) 5.95 and 3.44 respectively. Twenty-seven non-state parties also gained a total of 50 seats in their regions. Source: Ministero del Interior, Resultados electorales (www.elecciones.mir.es).

and for organizing local governments under the current system of mayor-commission government. In most of Spain the two major parties contest municipal elections (provincial council delegates are designated by municipalities except in the Basque country [direct election] and Baleares [ac deputies]) along with non-state parties. In some regions like the Basque Country, Galicia, and Catalonia, these parties have considerable strength. In addition to non-state parties many municipalities have local parties, some of which are unique to a municipality, that also contest municipal elections. For example, many coastal cities with foreign immigrants who have settled and become citizens (eu country permanent residents can also vote in municipal elections) have small parties representing foreigners. These parties rarely gain control of the government but sometimes join ruling coalitions. Nevertheless, local contests almost always involve the omnipresence of statewide parties operating within the municipality. The strength of major parties in local elections can be seen if one looks at aggregate election results. Table 6.1 depicts municipal election results for the two major parties in the aggregate for 1999 and 2003. It shows the dominance of the two major parties. In these elections, the psoe and pp were virtually even in raw votes, at just over 7 million, with around one-third of the total vote each. The other statewide party, iu, was third with 5.95 per cent and 6.6 per cent of the vote in each election. The only regional party to exceed two per cent was Convergence and Union (ciu), a Catalan nationalist party coalition. In terms of seats, in 1999 the pp’s total of 24,623

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Table 6.2 Evolution of the Political Parties in Municipal (me) and General Elections (ge) UCD

ge-79 me-79 ge-82 me-83 ge-86 me-87 ge-89 me-91 ge-93 me-95 ge-96 me-99 ge-00 me-03 ge-04 me-07 ge-08

DCS

34.3 31.3 7.1 2.9 1.8 9.1 9.6 7.8 3.9 1.7

AP/PP

PSOE

PCE/IU

CIU

PNV

5.8 3 26.2 25.9 26.1 22.3 25.6 25.3 34.7 35.2 38.8 34.4 44.5 34.3 37.7 36.1 40.1

30 27.9 48.4 42.7 44.3 36.7 39.2 38.3 38.7 30.8 37.4 34.3 34.1 34.8 42.6 35.3 43.6

10.5 12.7 4.1 8 4.6 7.7 8.9 8.4 9.2 11.6 10.5 6.5 5.4 6.1 5 5.5 3.8

2.6 3 3.7 4.1 5 5.1 5 4.8 4.9 4.4 4.6 3.6 4.2 3.4 3.2 3.3 3

1.5 2.1 1.9 2.1 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.6 1.2 1.4 1.3 0.5 1.5 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2

Indep. 15.2 9.9 4.9 7.6 3.3 5.9 6.7 6.3

Sources: From ge-79 to ge-96: Capo, J. (1998) “El Debate sobre el sistema electoral local. Imágenes, Intereses y propuestas” en map. Elecciones Locales. 153. From me-99 to me-07: Ministerio del Interior de España: Elecciones y Partidos Políticos: Procesos Electorales. http://www.mir.es/dgpi/Elecciones. For ge-08: Elecciones a Cortes Generales. Resultados Provisionales. http://www.generales2008.mir.es/99pdf/g08-estatalc.pdf

exceeded that of the psoe’s total of 21,917, with the rest distributed in smaller but notable numbers, e.g., over 4,000 ciu in Catalonia and nearly 1,600 total non-state party seats in the Basque country (pnv, pnv-ea). In 2003, each of the two major parties elected over 23,000 councillors. 2003 also demonstrated a ciu decline, a harbinger of their ac loss in Catalan elections the next year. Table 6.2 depicts the party strength linkages between local and general elections. Looking at municipal elections since the1980s, there is a very close correspondence between local elections and the general election either preceding it or following it. Major non-state parties like pnv and ciu receive similar shares over time. Local councillors from pp/psoe have fluctuated over time, but much less so with regard to the proximate general elections. Their relative support in recent local elections demonstrate their dominance locally and nationally except in a few ethnic nationalist regions. The clear exceptions to the local-national vote similarity are the two national spikes for pp in 2000 and psoe in 2004. The 2007 local vote indicates a slight lead for the pp, only to have psoe return

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to national victory by a 3.5 per cent margin. Carrillo (1997, 59) concludes that general elections “have thus far become a sort of primary or run-up for local elections,” meaning that in most cities, local elections results usually resemble the last general elections. The differences are marginal over time (Carrillo and Diaz 2003), but the general pattern holds. Overall, these parties demonstrate the penetration of national parties at the local level. Márquez (2007, 466–8) concludes that, in addition to the influence of statewide political parties, several other factors converge to form local government ruling bodies, that is, absolute majority, minority and one other party, and plural party coalitions. One is the influence of regional parties and regional elections, most of which are held at the same time as municipal elections. Regional politics can also have a bearing on who heads a local list and who follows this person. Several personal factors, e.g., personality of local leaders, the prestige of families. or local concerns, can also have a bearing on who might form the local government. Finally, issues of left-right ideology may have a bearing on how party lists line up, from leader/mayor candidate to those who are down the list. Internal party organization at the local level is similar among the parties. The basic unit of psoe is the local unit. It consists of a local assembly, a decision-making and monitoring body, and the local committee or its executive body. Provincial congresses are directly elected by local assemblies, and also include a provincial executive committee and a provincial committee. The latter pattern is similar to the party structure of the acs. Over the years in central power during the 1980s and 1990s psoe became a more centralized organization, with the rank-and-file more subservient to leadership actions controlled by elected officials. By 1994 the great majority of its Congress delegates were elected or appointed officials. iu is similarly organized, but its basic unit is at the ward or submunicipal level. The pp also operates with local committees or juntas. Local leaders are then incorporated into provincial committees, who in turn are integrated into regional party structures. However, at the local level, basic pp party units are more independent and free floating, and it too has submunicipal branches in some large cities (Newton 1997, ch. 10). The most important party function at the local level is to serve as the vehicle to recruit, select, campaign for, and organize municipal government. The process of negotiating local coalitions is clearly an action “above all others,” as the head

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of the list (mayor candidate) and others in order “signify” a future government to be elected (Márquez 2007, 125). This accord also allows for post-electoral compromises for the formulation of the government (ibid. 126). Indeed, in many cities and towns the parties are only active around election time, selecting candidates, campaigning for office, and organizing the government if the party/ coalition is successful in building a majority. Some empirical evidence indicates that local parties are emerging from these limited roles in a number of medium and large cities. Although still largely perceived as electoral machines, elected party councillors are also seen as agents involved in helping to promote relations in the community, a sort of platform for citizen-government dialogue. Compared to their role in the early democracy years, councillors are now more likely to hold periodic meetings with party activists and supporters, particularly over pending and future city actions. Councillors also spend more time in party offices than they previously did. Rather than just becoming political managers, local parties now “provide a place for reflection, dialogue and relationships; a new way of understanding local government” (Brugué and Vallés 2005, 208).

local politics: client-based and policy networks During the last half of the nineteenth century the constitutional monarchy at the country level was controlled by two monarchist or dynastic parties which had a tacit agreement to alternate in a turno pacífico or peaceful rotation. This was accomplished by controlling local oligarchic leadership. Functioning of the turno depended on the local bosses or chiefs, called caciques, who were thought of as kingpins of the entire structure. Romero (1999, 11) describes this role thus: They were the local notables, the bigwigs and influential bosses of each locality. They could be landowners or their agents, officials, money-lenders, lawyers or even priests. It was they who delivered the expected majorities to the governments in Madrid. The caciques made universal adult male suffrage inoperative. They ran their areas as personal fiefs having unlimited powers to settle local affairs, choose judges, appoint officials, undertake

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public works and even levy taxes in accordance with their will. No government dared to move against them as its position in office depended on them. They filled the gap left by the lack of real political mobilization and took advantage of their key role as the link between the central administration and the country. Hence the caciques could systematically violate the law with impunity and build a clientelist network, the so-called amigos políticos (political friends), based on patronage and self-interest. Their friends were rewarded and promoted and their enemies coerced, arrested and in some cases even murdered. Romero (1999, 12) concludes that the system benefited from Spain’s economic and cultural backwardness and the lack of national integration, where “caciques were perceived by their fellow citizens as the only valid link between their communities and the distant central state.” Although perhaps less prevalent than was once the case, remnants of the local client and group networks remain as important local political players. Villoria (2006, 189–92) identifies three distinct types of contemporary clientelism: 1) electoral, based on personal promises of favours and benefits; 2) bureaucratic, rooted in government connections through subventions, contracts, or public concessions or privileges; and 3) partisan, where positions in the party hierarchy or government are promised and exchanged. In an era of an expanded electorate where there is less voting intimidation, one has to remember that not every citizen would play such games. Most surveys indicate that no more than one-quarter of voters ever contact government officials. For those who do contact local officials, perhaps only some local citizens play these games. According to Gibbons (1999, 122), where clientelism exists it involves the linkage between local political officials in government who are “committed and indebted.” Each official, major or minor, “weaves himself in a web of influence and support with the object of absorbing the maximum possible power in his own hands.” The power is used for securing social benefits, contracts for service, and land use permits, in a system where an amigo (friend) is needed to put in an enchufe (plug) to local clients, who in turn offer their loyalty and support. While virtually the rule under Spanish monarchy and dictatorship, these practices continue under democracy in many communities, particularly the smaller ones. But in all cities

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local government subventions and services purchases can operate this way, for example with local government contracts. In an intergovernmental sense, client-based networks exist all the way up the line, from municipal to provincial to ac to Madrid. At each level, powerful officials may be the conduit to an important decision and for resources. This practice is considered to be on the borderline between legality and illegality, in that the reciprocal or moral obligations in such a system are personal or private (Clapham 1982, 5), but clearly it “operates as a preoccupation within the wider context of the Spanish state” (Villoria 2006, 192). Policy networks are also pervasive at the local level. These are informal arrangements comprising local associations, private sector interests, government departments, and citizen groups. These networks are not as powerful in Spain as in other countries, due to its weak or limited-interest association strength and strong political parties, but they are nevertheless real. For example, the land-development interests, particularly in construction, real estate, and housing, work closely with city hall to promote home and office building. Contractors and suppliers of materials work with local governments to promote infrastructure development. In the social services, local groups like Catholic Charities, the Red Cross, and associations of disadvantaged groups work with city social service agencies and neighbourhood groups to leverage ac level funds and services. Policy networks can often begin the intergovernmental process and are also at the end of the chain of program implementation. Local trade unions, normally affiliated with central labour bodies, are also political forces. They are part of the democratic corporatist politics that put group interest at centre stage by representing workers when dealing with government. The psoe leaning Unión General Trabajadores (ugt) and the iu leaning Union Confederation of Workers Commissions (cc.co) and other labour bodies have affiliate members in most cities. Generally, unions are relatively weak in Spain, although under democracy corporatist politics have incorporated labour and business into the formulation of major economic policies. Unions have relatively low membership levels compared to other industrial countries. Local unions of importance to the local-ac-central intergovernmental system are public employee unions of doctors and health officials, teachers, and police officers. The police unions are particularly salient in that they bargain directly with local officials, particularly mayors. Few

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mayors want a public police employee strike on their hands, so they settle disputes quickly and municipal police wages are relatively high. In turn, this means that the local financial squeeze increases, sending mayors back to other levels of government for more discretionary funds. A series of local associations are also of potential intergovernmental importance. One set would be local chambers of commerce (small businesses) and employers (large business) associations, which are likely to advance local projects (e.g., infrastructure, regulation/de-regulation, ordinances) that could bubble up the line. Also of significance would be those associations interested in promoting cultural affairs and programs and associations linked to the social, development, and infrastructure programs previously mentioned. None of these groups is usually led by local elected officials, but their issues or concerns (e.g., street widening, zoning of land as industrial, a local festival) could be brought to local government, which in turn uses political party, municipal government, or clientelistic channels to advance such causes. An association officer can then be part of the intergovernmental action. At the local level, most such political issues eventually move up the line through government channels, but more often than not they are started somewhere outside of government by organized interests.

municipal organization for central government action As competencies were devolved to the level of acs from 1985–2002 contact between local governments and Madrid diminished. Nevertheless, a variety of political and governmental mechanisms exist for municipalities to take action with regard to the central government. Many of them are indirect but nevertheless real, and clearly some municipalities take greater advantage of this type of representation and action than do others. As stated in chapter 4, the larger the city the more action is likely to be taken on one or more of these fronts, whereas most small municipalities have little ac contact and virtually no direct contact with the national government. Many sectoral conferences, convenios, and the aforementioned vertical cooperative agreements identified in chapter 3 are organized at the central governmental level. Börzel’s (2000) study of the “Europeanization” of Spanish regional policy indicates that for

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both domestic and European policy arenas acs to some extent participate in implementation of sectoral conferences. In many nonEuropean-related sectoral conferences, municipalities and other local government interests have a de facto role and often representation of some type in these joint intergovernmental administration exercises. Under the law (Ley 30/1992) conferences are designed to facilitate the exchange of views and positions, joint examination of problems in each sector, and exploration of joint means of meeting such problems. Sectoral conferences that have a direct bearing on local government include those on social affairs, industry and energy, infrastructure and territorial planning, civil protection, water, public housing, and traffic. In 2005 a sectoral conference on “local affairs” was created. Bilateral vertical transfer commissions, comprising mostly national and ac officials, were also significant during the period up to 2002, when powers were transferred downward to the acs. An early Constitutional Tribunal decision ruled that transfers could not be undertaken multilaterally; Madrid must negotiate transfers (service, personnel, costs) region by region, program by program. Again, local governments had only an indirect role in this process. Vertical cooperative mechanisms (consortias) are also points of municipal-national and municipal-ac contact. For example, many infrastructure projects are funded by such consortia, which amount to agreements outside the normal legislative process. Few regulations or normative standards, including oversight, approval, or debt limitations, govern these arrangements and local officials normally exert greater discretion in funding opportunities. According to one provincial finance official, “consorcios allow municipal and provincial officials to direct funding to those projects they feel are of the greatest priority without the hurdle of regional permission.” A number of standing national advisory bodies also play important intergovernmental roles from time to time. The one devoted to local affairs is the National Commission on Local Governments. Made up of public officials and local government interests from all levels, it is the most symbolic advisory body and forum for local government interests. While the Commission has been the catalyst for identifying municipal problems, in a larger political sense it is clearly not an important intergovernmental body. More important bodies would be the Fiscal and Financial Policy Council, the Council of State, numerous interministerial committees, and other

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special bodies. Local governments would, at most, have indirect influence on these cabinet/sub-cabinet level bodies. Local government influence at the national level is most directly manifested by the peak ac-wide interest associations that make up the Spanish Federation of Municipalities and Provinces (femp). Established initially by big city mayors in 1981, it draws governmental members from most regions (there are also Basque and Catalan municipal associations) and from most political parties. About 6,000 of the 8,000 plus municipalities, amounting to 94 per cent of the population, belong to femp, as do 49 of the 50 provinces. femp’s stated purposes include: propagation and defence of local autonomy; representation of local interests before other public administration bodies; development of the European spirit of the role of local governments; international cooperation; assistance to local governments of all types; forging of partnerships to advance local government; and interpretation of local competencies. Most importantly, femp sees its role as “intervention, if such role is necessary, in the normative legal sphere that affects local entities” (femp 2005). femp has been a major force in trying to promote increased municipal autonomy, exclusive competencies, and a greater share of state financing. It has been the catalyst for the Pacto Local movement, pressuring the government in Madrid to authorize increased local powers without ac supervision (chapter 9). femp was the driving force behind the change in financing for large cities and provincial capitals. This new legislation followed an accord signed in November 2002, between femp, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Public Administration. The federation does more than lobby. It develops new initiatives, such as those in administrative modernization, bridging the digital divide, and spatial planning for small communities. It has a full set of training programs and sponsors exchange workshops, organizes seminars on urban problems, and prepares materials on practical problem-solving (http://www.femp.es/formacion/charater.htm). femp has regional associations in most acs, which also conduct regionally based research programs, work with local governments on economic and social development programs, and lobby before their respective ac assemblies. Direct contact, a legacy of the client-based network system, is also a time-honoured Spanish mode of interaction for those local governments that choose to exercise this option. First, in a country

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where political party ties are important, it goes without saying that mayors or other local elected officials that have connections/affiliations with the current party in power in Madrid will from time to time exploit them. The major two party system, pp and psoe, has alternated in power for some years at the central government level. Both parties are federal in structure, and local and regional elections are, as suggested, highly national in influence (Carrillo y Díaz 2003). Where the big city mayors are of the same party they will use these ties. Although time is clearly diminishing this factor, one reason that this party channel is important is that the pp and other non-state parties (Pallarés et al. 1997) of the right have in some areas absorbed the local client-based networks and agents characteristic of previous regimes. At the same time, left parties, particularly psoe, have exercised measures of regional-local discipline, and have incorporated trade unions in some areas, with local elected officials playing an important role in the psoe structure. There is a saying in the psoe “El que se mueva no sale en la foto,” or “Whoever moves will be out of the picture.” Indeed, party discipline has been a strong force in preventing additional measures for local decentralization at the ac level, in turn encouraging local officials to seek access from higher levels. Second, even when party ties are not congruent up the intergovernmental line, there will be important matters where mayors of larger cities will make some contact with national officials. Because of the importance of party ties, they may bring along one or more of their influential minority party councillors who belong to the national party in power. Local notables who are known in Madrid may also be brought along. Third, while decreasing because of the transfer of power to acs, there are also direct administrative contacts with the national government. For example, many infrastructure projects involve eu, national, and ac financing, and sometimes approval. This generates regular direct administrative contacts that begin in the proposal stage and continue through design, approval, engineering, construction, and inspection stages. In this process local administrators learn who the players are and how they might be played. Although less apparent and visible than, say, interest group representation, direct administrative contacts are critical and time-honoured in Spain. The term “enchufe” therefore has more than an electrical

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outlet/receptacle meaning; it also refers to the action or effect of plugging in personal connections, even in non-party situations. Provincial governments provide an additional, albeit minor, channel of national government interaction. Until 1996 each province had a civil governor representing the national government. The gobernador civil was somewhat of a holdover from the prefectural system of the Franco regime, and was responsible for public order and public safety, and in charge of national police and security forces operating at the provincial level, particularly in emergencies such as floods, storms, and droughts. The civil governor was also responsible for coordinating national government services between central and local authorities. With the advent of the acs, a Government Delegate (Delegado del gobierno) was also assigned at that level to perform similar functions. Upon the advent of the pp Aznar government in 1996, the civil governors disappeared in favour of a provincial/subdelegate, directly responsible to the ac-based delegate in the regional capitals. While clearly downgraded in importance, it is another point of local-federal interactions, particularly regarding matters of policing and emergencies. One clear intergovernmental pattern is that, as functions are increasingly devolved to the acs, local-regional interactions have increased. In regard to infrastructure policy, one local manager said “Municipalities are in a position of dependency on [the regional government of] Madrid. There is very little contact with the central government.” Another local councillor of public works said, “When we want to initiate a project we do not go to Madrid. We go to the Valencia government (ac) for two things: permission and money.” Many of the patterns outlined above – conferences, regional bodies of femp, and direct contacts – would hold at the ac level. This focus is likely to continue as long as the Pacto Local continues to be blocked at the ac level. One provincial official put it this way: The 1999 attempt to enact a ‘Pacto Local’ in Madrid (regional government) outlined an organic role for municipalities. But a problem persists: the authority and official power to follow through on such a role continues to be blocked at the regional level. Authority, which should ideally have been decentralized from the central government down to the regional government

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and finally to the provinces as well as municipalities – in practice – [it] stops short at the regional level. As a result, municipalities (and their provincial councils) have increasingly shifted their federal interactions toward regional capitals. Contact with Madrid continues, but on a much less intense scale, whereas the intensity of regional conferences, femp regional and other association activity, political party, and other direct channels, shifts to ac and provincial governments.

the scope of central municipal interactions In a system of divided and overlapping competencies such as Spain’s (see Figure 3.1), a broad range of interactions exist. The best way to illustrate the patterns of interaction is by providing some concrete examples that affect municipalities. In regard to exclusive state competencies the state has retained one important competency (in addition to foreign affairs, defence, and immigration) that touches most municipalities, that of public safety, including aspects of traffic control. Two national police forces, largely rural and urban, patrol and provide many non-routine policing functions, make most of the criminal investigations and arrests, and work alongside municipal police in matters of emergency. Municipal police have primary traffic control responsibilities and are responsible for matters of minor order (e.g., beach and festival patrol). The various police forces often need to work together on issues of major concern, e.g., large gatherings and fires, demonstrations, bomb threats, and bombings, as well as in criminal investigations. Traffic control and planning remains centralized in the Ministry of the Interior, where even certain types of local public works “sign offs” of police concern remain. Also, the rules and procedures of municipal traffic control are heavily regulated from Madrid. In this sense, the national government’s exclusive competency on public order reaches deep into the municipal realm. Indeed municipal police are local employees but are in many ways direct agents of Madrid. Similar program dependence would prevail in areas such as immigration, eu affairs, the monetary system, and pensions. Contrast this with the most important concurrent competency for our purposes, that of local government operation and regulation.

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As demonstrated, the national government has established the basic patterns and forms of local governments, has established base-line services for municipalities and finance formulas, and authorizes the acs to establish further degrees of autonomy, e.g., Pacto Local. The Constitutional Tribunal has upheld this basic establishment and framework power (Baena 2000). It is up to the ac governments to establish the pattern of governance beyond those of basic laws, to transfer powers to local governments, and to regulate local actions regarding municipal functions under lrbrl and the financing regulations. This means that most municipal interactions regarding general government are with the ac capitals and officials. In regard to general local government matters, most interactions have shifted to the acs, where the regulatory and fiscal powers operate. One official put it this way, “ellos legislan, municipios cumplen” or the (ac) authorities legislate and municipalities comply. Even if this is not always the case, the acs hold the municipal cards in terms of most programs. A similar pattern of shifting interactions and intergovernmental transactions would be true of other important concurrent competencies: economic development, education, health, environment, and communications media. Exclusive ac competency arenas normally mean there is indirect federal interaction, if any. One example is social services, transferred to the acs during the 1980s. Since that time social services are legislated and delivered by acs and municipalities, along with some contracting with ngos, mostly the Red Cross and Catholic Charities. For services such as those for integrating immigrant populations, in most acs municipalities directly contract with the regional governments to supplement social help that would go along with education, health, housing services. The regional governments develop plans and designate the services to be funded. Until 2006 the only central government involvement was block grant funding and orchestrating the Plan Concertado de Servicios Sociales (Agreed Plan for Social Services), a program where the acs (with municipal representation) negotiate and voluntarily agree to provide minimum basic services in all regions (Chacón 1995). Law 39/2006 established formal local government participation in planning and management of services for dependent populations in ac plans, given their competencies for delivering these services. Moreover, Royal Decree 504/2007 required acs (and municipalities indirectly) to establish levels of dependency or disability and to have

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individual plans of services for these clients. Services for immigrants are part of this agreed plan and are integrated into the National Plan for Integration, which is mainly a document of recommendations only (Tamayo y Carrillo 2002). The national government gathers reports but does not regulate or supervise general social services or those for immigrants. Thus, municipal intervention is almost exclusively by acs. The same is generally true with regard to agriculture, tourism, consumer protection, urban planning and development, and other exclusive ac competencies. Other types of competencies are those that are compartmentalized for each of the two spheres of government. The most important concerns in this arena include railroads and rail traffic, transport, hydraulic improvements and works, ports and airports, museums, and libraries. Some of these program arenas are ac in operation and some belong to the state. For example, rail transport includes a national network and most acs operate regional transit systems. Both of these systems connect the larger municipalities, particularly provincial capitals and cities over 100,000 in population. Museum and library sites are within cities, as are airports and ports. This means that affected municipalities must be in direct interaction with the relevant governments, a sort of dual intergovernmental interaction situation. Finally, there are special types of competencies where the role of the central government and ac governments are either unclear or there is considerable confusion and application on a near case-by case basis (Aja 2003, 131). This would include such areas as culture, public enterprises, television, public order, and certain types of taxes. Culture, for example, involves virtually every level of government, although the central and regional governments clearly take the lead in planning and programming. Municipalities actually put on the most cultural programs out of their own funds and with subvented money. They would ordinarily deal with the acs regarding funding for most of their cultural programs but sometimes a national program may be temporarily or potentially located within a city, for example, a travelling art exhibit or the possible location of a national museum. Then the interaction would be national. Public order in the case of an emergency, e.g., the 11 March 2004 Madrid rail station bombing, became a municipal-national issue immediately. Each issue is somewhat different but in this category involvement might entail any two or all levels of government.

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So the pattern of interaction varies, which reinforces the concept of intergovernmental networks of action. Central government programs involve national expenditures, ac programs ac expenditures. It is impossible to unbundle expenditures for programs like policing, where two state (national police, civil guard) forces are allocated by province and city, but remain on the central payroll. Even where competencies are exclusively ac, the central government is often indirectly involved, such as in the case of social services. This is emblematic of the complicated pattern of relationships that exists in Spain.

the nature of municipal federal interaction In recent years, municipalities have had to turn more to regional governments because of increased devolution. Moreover, the fiscal ties, as tax revenues flow downward, create substantial dependency that serve to limit legal autonomy (Agranoff 2004). In spite of these changes, municipal governments maintain important means of interaction with the centre. First, there is the corporatist tradition of Spanish politics. As Wiarda (1993, 48–9) explains, Spain is one of several southern European countries that has not only the tradition of recognizing the rights and obligations of certain social institutions – family, community, church, armed forces, organized labour, university – but also a way of structuring state-society relations in a hierarchical, disciplined, monopolistic, and state-centred fashion. “Corporatism, in this sense, typically seeks to integrate labor, business and government in a functioning, well-ordered, harmonious, and technocratic regime.” While some of this has broken down in the three decades since the end of the Franco regime, there remains a tradition of placing issues such as municipal concerns on the national policy agenda by negotiating agreements (pactos). This occurs in many policy arenas (see Lancaster 1989). Clearly, the ac Estado de las Autonomías was largely built on a series of agreements that involved not only ethnoterritorial concurrence but also a series of negotiations during times of minority governments where the ruling party was weak (Agranoff 1996; Moreno 2001). The same holds true with major labour-management negotiations, where bargaining normally occurs between major industry leaders, officers of the largest unions, and the national government (Salmon 1995).

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In regard to municipalities, the corporate tradition has meant that the interests of cities are normally carried to the national government, including the effort to pass lrbrl in 1985, the finance law of 1988, Pacto Local in 1999, the big city reforms in 2003, and most recently, the 2005 “White Paper on Local Government” (chapter 9). Each of these has involved negotiations between femp, almost always led by big city mayors (who are officers and normally of the same party as those in national power) and high officials within the national government. For example, the 2003 reforms followed a negotiated agreement between these two parties that provides substitute financing for the elimination of the tax on business activities, new tax sharing arrangements, and new means of local taxation (http://femp.es/documentos/financación.pdf). In this very important sense, the corporatist tradition leads cities to try to negotiate with the centre, often through femp. Second, various central government initiatives have reached around acs to include local governments, particularly municipalities. In the early 1990s the national government launched an extensive modernization campaign that included upgrading the managerial and analytical skills of government employees throughout the system. The effort was geared to introduce information technology into the system and to ready Spanish public administration for increased eu participation. Local governments were the primary targets of this program, with programs in finance and budgeting, contract administration, organization design, budget execution, information systems, and urban management (map 1991). Currently the national government is taking on a new infrastructure challenge of local governments, a “digital divide” or brecha digital among many small local governments. Third, just as large cities have the capacity and regularly the need to reach to the national government through direct contact with Madrid, the reverse is also true. Large projects or events in a city means that Madrid must reach into the municipality. For example, the amount of municipal-federal interaction and flow of resources to ready Barcelona for the 1992 Olympic games was no doubt incalcuable (the city government and the central government were of the same party). In 2001 the national government, controlled by the pp and elected officials of the pp from the city of Elche (pop. 120,000) in Alicante province, were able to prevail upon the fellow pp government in Valencia to create a new medical school that was

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nominally part of the University of Alicante. Needless to say, the medical school was located in Elche. Soon after the Elche campus grew, as other new faculties located there, paralleling the Alicante campus. Likewise, the city of Madrid is always touched by various national ministries as the central government promotes cultural affairs and special celebrations there. Many but not all of the direct national interventions are successful, but it is a means of reach, and when Madrid central comes with money, it is hard to turn down. Fourth, as autonomy through devolution evolves more action to the acs, the non-hierarchical relationship means that some forms of direct interaction are more the exception than the rule. Spain rid itself of the prefectural system, and Art. 137, which guarantees that along with other governments, municipalities “shall enjoy self-government for the management of their respective interests,” has led to the removal of the more draconian of the old prior permission tutelage powers of the civil government. Most local governments are in ordinary circumstances left to their own devices to implement the functions that are assigned to them. With the exception of the central core of clerks and auditors, inspectors do not regularly monitor these activities, nor is non-compliance ordinarily reported. Instead, provincial or other forms of intergovernmental cooperation is recommended and ordinarily pursued. While the ultimate weapon of municipal grievance is enforceability in the courts, normally local governments are now left alone without direct supervision. Contact over details or programming would be the exception, not the rule. Fifth, frequently citizen or group reports of non-compliance, fraud, or abuse, or some combination, are directed to the central government. If it involves an ac competency it is now passed down or it becomes a court matter. Court litigation over alleged municipal infractions, particularly with regard to land use or zoning issues, is common. These are ac competencies and local responsibilities. Since the judiciary system is considered under Articles 127 to be a single, unified system of courts, even though a high court sits in all seventeen regions, with the exception of civil (i.e., family) law in a few regions, the law is considered to be the same in the whole country. Thus, if municipalities become involved in court litigation they are really dealing with the intervention of the national court system and helping to forge a national system of laws involving municipalities.

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Thus, while autonomous and self-governing, the national-local government agenda-building is clearly asymmetrical, with the balance of intervention ability that of the national government. It frames basic legislation directly or indirectly, provides a large share of revenue, is the strongest negotiating actor in the corporatist bargaining scheme, and its courts ultimately resolve local government disputes. On the other hand, the removal of the prefectural or tutelage system has greatly enhanced the everyday operating autonomy of local governments; there is now considerably more local control over implementation. In this sense, self-governance has been allowed to work, for better or worse, at municipal and other local government levels and the intergovernmental connections, while real, are considerably less frequent.

regional government involvement The involved system of competencies – dual, exclusive, concurrent, compartmentalized, and special cases – makes the issue of ac-local mediation difficult to generalize. In regard to issues such as the autonomy and home rule powers of local governments, the ac governments have in effect become obstacles to many local officials, in as much as no region has meaningfully adopted the home-rule principles of Pacto Local into their municipal code. Local officials complain that ac governments have not really supported further decentralization of power on their behalf. One official in a suburb of Madrid said: [The] Madrid (ac) Ley de Pacto remains undeveloped. It only enters debate around election time when opportunist parties refer to decentralization. The goal of further decentralization should be to promote “co-responsibility” in delivery of services between local entities, on the one hand, and regional and central authorities, on the other. Another local official from Andalucia said that, instead of acs intervening with the state on behalf of local government, their neglect and unwillingness to share power has led to alarming stagnation. “In 1975, 14–15 per cent of public funds were managed and spent by local entities. In 2005, long after the ‘grand’ revolution of decentralization, that figure decreased to 13 per cent. Apparently, decentralization has great limits.”

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Regional ministries vary considerably in name and in combination of functions. Only three regions – Baleares, Catalonia, and Navarra – have permanent legislative committees that deal exclusively with local affairs (Ramos y Cicuéndez 2005). The 1981 loapa accord, upheld by the courts, originally limited the slowroute communities to no more than ten ministries, meaning that some functions that are separate at the national level and in other acs were combined (Ramió y Salvador 2002). This has been repeatedly modified through Estatutos amendment and various autonomous pacts (Ballart y Ramió 2000, 241) and thus several now have more than ten ministries. Most ac regimes have at least one ministry that deals with interior or home affairs matters (gobernación) but only one or two identify local government affairs in their title. These ministries serve as the direct intermediary between ac and local government on ordinary matters of general government, policing, traffic, and public order (Ramos y Cicuéndez 2005). Virtually every ac government does have, however, a second level director-generalship for local administration. In addition ac public works and transport ministries would be the contact regarding infrastructure and related issues. Social services, which would include immigrant matters, would normally be combined with some other function, such as health or labour (the latter is the case at the national level since 1996). Extraordinary matters would be handled by the presidencia or office of the regional president/prime minister. Each region configures their ministries somewhat differently, but the most important administrative officials normally include councillors (ministers), vice councillors, directors-general, and general secretaries (Ramió y Salvador 2002, 109–11). In addition, all but two acs, Valencia and Madrid, had some form of consultative body under their original statutes of autonomy that brings local governments and the ac governments together. The 2006 Valencia statute fills this void for that region. Andalucia, for example, has operated with a Council of Provinces since 1982 and an Andalucian Council of Municipalities since 1988. Five other regions similarly have dual councils for provinces and for municipalities, with the other regions (most are uniprovincial) having a single commission on local administration. According to Ramos y Cicuéndez (2005, 12) these bodies discuss issues of local concern and are consulted on key issues, particularly on proposed laws and regulations, matters of potential cooperation, and issues of delegation of ac powers to local governments. They are also forums for

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the discussion of financial issues and for explaining financial and program requirements in provincial plans for (municipal) cooperation. These bodies are important vehicles for representation of ac federations of municipalities and/or provinces (e.g., femp affiliates) along with ac major city and small town representation. Interaction between the acs and the central government on issues of general administration, including that of local affairs, is reported by Ramió y Salvador (2002, 102) as moving through three important phases of ad hoc intergovernmental interactions. The first was over the rapid and near indiscriminate transfer of services, raising many questions about the appropriate models of management. The second was a more careful construction of ac administration that was modelled after that of the administration of the state. It was a more gradual phase, with some improvisation and luck in adaptation. It also was a time of discovering and clarifying limits between just where the power would lie. The third phase was one of definition/redefinition of the central government’s limitations, and realization that their role in many competencies had become marginal (see also Bañón and Tamayo 1997). The process amounted to testing self-governing, understanding the limits of self-organization of acs, and adapting to local necessities. Since that time, intergovernmental relations between ac and national ministries have become highly regularized. A study by Máiz, Beramendi, y Grau (2002, 396–8) documents the growing number of intergovernmental forms and committees. In 1989 there was only the Fiscal and Financial Council. By 1995 there was a total of 24 such councils and ten additional committees related to these sectoral conferences. While none of these dealt directly with the problems of local government organization, many touched on local concerns: rural affairs, social services, infrastructure, civil protection, housing, and European affairs. The many joint plans, accords, and covenios were bilateral between ac governments and national ministries, where any policy or financing that followed the agreement only trickled down to the local level. They tend to be “forums for 17 autonomous games among 18 actors” (Máíz, Beramendi, y Grau 2002, 420). As a result of this process local governments have largely been left out of the picture of ac-Madrid interventions on many questions of a basic intergovernmental nature. The pattern of negotiations, whether they be multilateral or bilateral has led to waves of systemic asymme-

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try, to be followed by moves toward symmetry (Agranoff 1999) at the ac level. For local governments, Carrillo (1997, 53) concludes that the pattern follows at that level, “making the fate of a local government depend on its own ac either on account of its degree of self-government or on account of the policy it chooses to follow with regard to the local authority, or both.” For local governments, it has meant that to get the attention of the national government, they normally must get the attention of ac government. In addition to direct contacts and some representation on national councils (e.g., the social services sectoral conference has local government representation), the process depends on the circulation of elites from local governments into ac policy and administrative positions, forming clusters of ac officials who have experienced and understand local government and can become a “major influence on (local) policy questions and infuse more service capacities into intergovernmental cooperation” (Carrillo 1991, 168).

the political culture of spanish igr Four key issues stand out as characteristic of the Spanish political culture related to municipal-ac-central or intrafederal relations. First is the aforementioned corporatist tradition in Spanish politics, which can often manifest itself at the local level. Second is that as mentioned in most of the country the political party system is national in character, pervading local elections. This leads to a system of political administration. Third, as is the case with many Southern European countries, corruption in government is relatively widespread, at least in some local governments, particularly regarding land use and development, and to a lesser degree related to other forms of regulation. Fourth, Spain is a country of multiple loyalties, regional and country, and within each region lies a considerable amount of local identity/loyalty. This patria chica of community patriotism leads to the long tradition of local independence – for municipality and individual – and resistance to being managed from above. In this section, an attempt will be made to illustrate each of these features. The corporatist tradition in politics was illustrated earlier with regard to municipal-federal interaction and the role of femp as a negotiating party. A similar pattern of conflicting parties negotiating with local officials prevails. A case example from a small

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(32,000 pop.) coastal town in the Valencia ac, Jávea, will suffice. This growing town has a small fishing port/marina at the northern edge of its large bay. A conglomerate of powerful developers offered to “improve” the port by building and operating an enlarged marina for luxury boats, high-end housing and hotels, and upscale restaurants. The development would not only gobble up thousands of square metres of natural coastline, but push the fishing industry to another town and force out of business the few small shops, bars, and restaurants near the old port. Finally, it would end the nonprofit Club Nautico’s franchise on housing small boats. The “port improvement” project was tempting to the Jávea ruling pp and local party coalition on the city council, in as much as the tax base of the city would be greatly enhanced and it would allow this city to compete with nearby towns for more well-to-do citizens. The problem was opposition from five groups: the indigenous Jávea-based fishing industry/cooperative and their extended families; current boat owners/Club Nautico members; residents of the port area, most of whom are Spanish and Latin American low- and moderate-income families; environmental advocacy groups; and many foreign-born residents, mostly from northern Europe, who want to preserve what has become a shrinking pristine coastal village. Thus opposition was initially underestimated by the city council, which held hearings with the intention of amending their long-range capital improvement plan to include port improvement. They even discussed funding enhancement through the Valencia ac and eu Cohesion funds. But the opposition would not go away. It was formidable, combining old and new residents of the town. Over a period of five to six months some councillors who were initially favourable began to withdraw their support, particularly those from the two small parties that joined with the pp to form the governing coalition. The pp bloc was on the edge of panic. They called a negotiating summit among supporters of both sides to break the impasse. Initially the council majority turned to the development conglomerate. They were asked to scale down the proposal. The developers scaled down the proposal by about 20 percent. The opponents held fast. The council was between their constituents and some very influential investors. Since negotiations did not work, the council turned to the friendly ac government, whom they expected to side with the developers. The mechanism they used was to put the port improve-

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ment “on hold” and the city requested that the Valencia ac repossess and manage the coastline that covers the disputed area around the port. Presumably, it would decide for the improvement project. Valencia accepted and within two months began building a small port management office. Six months later, sensing large infrastructure investments and the volatile nature of the issue, the ac government announced that it did not have the funds to make additional port improvements. The city government had apparently washed its hands of the issue and the developer announced “temporary withdrawal” of the plan. The business interests did not give up. Two years later a “port improvement” plan was announced by the ac. Local opposition continues, including that of the Jávea mayor. This is corporatist politics, at least Jávea style. In a similar fashion to national government bargaining among the parties, the issue has moved entirely outside of normal city council processes. The only official action the government took beyond endorsement in 2008 was to request that Valencia “take” the port coastline. Many other local decisions follow this corporatist model of the involved parties deciding both inside and outside of government venues. Party government at the local level has important implications in terms of intergovernmental operations. In most cities party discipline is reasonably tight, particularly within the majority or leading party in the case of a coalition. Party government, in the Spanish local government sense, means both legislative and administrative functions. As in larger parliamentary bodies that form the government, city and provincial councillors become department heads. The difference is that most of the leading ruling party/ruling coalition members are both legislator and administrator. The dominant local political culture thus stresses representation as opposed to administration. “Representative management” is the best characterization, where members of the pleno are involved in the day-to-day management of services. This gives rise to what Carrillo (1997, 60) calls “political inflation,” where government structures tend to have a strong political weight attached to them: The impact of this phenomenon varies depending on the size of the organization. Small municipalities, where the number of elected members exceeds the number of public employees, serves as a prime illustration. Government being greater than that of administration allows the town council members to

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compensate for the lack of staff through a sort of free volunteer work. Yet, in large cities with differentiation in government, this leads to a considerable number of town councilors becoming involved in the daily administrative management of the organization’s departments as their main profession. This type of behavior leads to a fragmentation in the administrative organization, making the problem of confusion between the political and administrative spheres even more acute. Unlike other higher levels of government, such as central government, this is not as attributable to bureaucracy’s involvement in politics as it is to the invasion of politics in administration. As a result, where professionalization of the local bureaucracy has not taken place, in the local political cultures the management function often takes on a secondary or even marginal role. The visibility accorded to corruption is not at all new in Spain. Over the years Transparency International normally ranks Spain between twentieth and thirtieth of some 160 countries in depth of corruption, for example, twenty-third in 2003 (Villoria 2006). During the psoe government of Felipe González and the pp government of José María Aznar in the 1990s there were serious charges of irregular financing of both parties through devolving of “black money” from those doing business with each government. There have also been regional government scandals, for example, the financing of the money-losing Terra Mitica amusement park in Valencia-Benidorm. Attempts at reform include a Fiscal Anticorruption body, and in 2004 the Zapatero government ratified the United Nations Treaty Against Corruption, as one among 140 countries. Urban corruption, as noted in the opening of this book, became a star in 2006, with Marbella as the lead. There urban officials are accused of pillaging the finances of businesses in return for municipal favours. One Marbella planning official, Juan Antonio Roca, is charged with taking bribes from dozens of constructors and realestate agents in return for building permits, ignoring regulations, and securing illegal documents from dishonest lawyers. The Ministry of the Interior calculated that Roca had acquired a fortune of over two billion euros when his modest municipal associate planner’s salary was his only reported income. Other Marbella officials over recent years, first under the late multimillionaire Mayor Jesús Gil and later under Julián Munoz and Marisol Yagüe, used the

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mechanisms of administrative, political, and judicial control to support corruption and to maintain the abuses. Other cities subsequently put under scrutiny include Andratx in the Baleares, Telde in the Canaries, Ciempozuelos in Madrid, Camas in Andalucia (Seville), and Orihuela in Valencia (Alicante). Other mega-urbanization projects in three regions have been cited for environmental violations. One editorialist (Pradera 2006, 12) concluded that the universality of corruption has even opportunistically led rival political parties to buy one another off, as happened in Madrid in 2004. In late 2007 the Guardia Civil arrested 16 Madrid municipality employees in the Planning Department. They were accused of speeding up licences for opening commercial establishments. The typical “cost” for a 25-day licence (as opposed to two years) was 20,000 euros. This has clearly modified the image of corruption in Spain. In late December 2007 the national newspaper El País surveyed its readers. It asked, “Do you believe the town halls are corrupt?” The response was 94 per cent yes, 6 per cent no (reported in Grapevine, January 2008, 17). While corruption can occur in any political system, Spain and Spanish local governments, appear particularly vulnerable. Fernando Jiménez (1999, 80–1) refers to influence trafficking as one of the major concerns of Spanish politics, on a par with issues such as terrorist violence and unemployment. This type of corruption has become a major matter of public debate and a concern of public policy. In the democratic transition “It has constituted a lost opportunity to build sound and practical rules and traditions of political responsibility” (85). National scandals receive the most prominent attention, the most recent being the aftermath of the collapse of a subway tunnel under construction in the Carmel section of Barcelona, leading to multiple injuries and the evacuation of hundreds of residents from their homes. The regional government lost control of the project because of the excessive use of subcontractors and intermediate companies. The contractor was found to be using substandard materials to cut costs. Many arrangements must necessarily be made by local governments with people who have a financial stake in the decisions of councils. This includes local councillors, contractors, real-estate developers, and real-estate agencies. The tradition of certain types of petty corruption is widely accepted in Spanish society. For example, city officials know that

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taxpayers are regularly fraudulent in their tax reporting, by paying local licence fees under the table, by not applying for required licences, by falsifying the purchase prices of properties, and by hiding home improvements from tax assessors (e.g., where reassessment is by aerial photography the improvements will be made in the basement or garage). Culturally, these are not exactly considered to be fraudulent practices, but rather minor ways of working the system. The fourth and final cultural trait is the long-standing autonomy/ independence streak of the citizens of Spain. In chapter 1 the independent tradition of Spanish cities was identified. Moreno (2001, 5) explains that in all of Spain, more than two-thirds of its citizens express a form of dual identity or compound nationality to region and state, and to their institutions. Crow (1985, 12) suggests that this is largely because the geographic unity of Spain is an illusion. For years regions were mutually inaccessible. Within these regions Spain has a deep communal tradition, where village activity was based on common management of lands, cooperative water rights, common access to sheep trails, and fishing cooperatives. Some communities even had their own monetary system. This led to orientation to the community over the years and a strong sense of own government or a “home rule” tradition that in practice has somewhat superimposed itself over national and now regional regulation. This tradition of home rule despite the system of regulation “from above” is manifested in many ways. One easy illustration is that during the Franco era many villagers who farmed in the country had two storage places for their grain. One in the field where the grain was kept most of the year and one in their town dwelling, which was filled at tax time, so as to avoid paying large national inventory taxes. Municipal officials, even those sent by Madrid, were aware of this practice, but tolerated it as part of the local culture of independence over one’s domain. Municipalities regularly and openly report that they do not deliver the services required under lrbrl but no one penalizes them. It is considered to be their independent prerogative to offer whatever services they choose, not to follow some list from Madrid or the regional capital. Indeed, they are “rewarded” by provincial assistance in delivering these required services. The Valencia government has repeatedly warned others against land takings under their land law (chapter 7) but no city has been fined, penalized, ordered to desist, or judged before a

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Valencian court. The culture of independence means that cities are to be left alone to do good or evil, but to “do” for the community. Few higher level officials seem to care or wish to interfere locally. Only the courts occasionally step into these arenas, and in the case of Marbella the ac government in Seville formally requested that Madrid dissolve the local government. This culture is one of leaving considerable operating leeway at the local level and goes back to the tradition of allowing local governments rights to operate on their own. It is a historic legacy of patria chica. Just as every Spaniard is in many ways an autonomous subset of one, so are their communities self-organizing and governing units that exert limits on interference.

conclusion Spain’s intergovernmental politics are no different from any other country in that they reflect the country’s political culture, governmental structures and mechanisms, parties and elections, legal arrangements, and constitutional limitations. In particular, it is a country where personal contact prevails, whether it be through clientelistic networks, or through party or governmental channels that coincide with and often supersede formal mechanisms of intergovernmental cooperation. It would clearly be a mistake to regard network by consortia, convenios, and sectoral commissions as the only means of intergovernmental interaction, because politics and personal knowledge really matter in Spain, where knowing how to do something is often not enough, and must be facilitated by knowing who sits where, which is what is needed to get something moving. The network of officials in a given program area is normally always in operation. Who can answer a question, facilitate a permission, or transmit a resource is based on the “enchufe” principle. Party politics are also important, particularly if there is political congruence among levels. It is also a system where local and/or regional loyalty is important. In sum, that is why the politics of igr, that is, among governments, is as important as those politics within jurisdictions.

rgovernmental ts/Intergovernmental Dimensions Networks in Federalizing Spain

7 International-Intergovernmental Dimensions

Municipalities are increasingly affected by and involved in connections across country borders. Their roles in international affairs fall into two general categories, ordinary and extraordinary. Ordinary international affairs such as trade missions, commercial and cultural exchanges, “sister city” alliances, transport linkages, promotion of tourism, and other aspects of intermestic policies generally flow freely and directly these days between Spanish and foreign cities. Barcelona, for example, has taken a leadership role in such pan-European urban networks as Eurocities and Metropolis. Ordinary issues would also normally include eu affairs, such as requests for financial assistance, and compliance with a considerable fabric of domestic and economic legislation. Spain’s accession to the eu “altered the pattern of external relations and redefined the position of Spain in the world from a protected national economy to an economy embedded in one of the world’s core trading regions and within the corporate space of multinational countries” (Salmon 1995, 67). These ordinary foreign affairs are of course conducted without a lot of direct supervision but operate under the umbrella of national powers of foreign policy, currency, and commercial relations, and of relevant ac powers, for example, those in infrastructure, urban planning, and social services. Extraordinary issues, on the other hand, e.g., municipal appeals to the European Court of Justice, high level meetings of foreign dignitaries, peak international cultural and sporting events, may require more direct involvement with the central government in Madrid. For example, in March 2005 the city of Granada hosted an

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International Summit on Security at the Alhambra Palace. The meeting was established by direct contact among city officials, the Spanish Ministries of Defence and Interior, and foreign ministries. Between 2002 and 2005 a number of Valencian cities found themselves in the European Court of Human Rights, when Spanish courts refused to hear landowners’ appeals regarding their zoning under a controversial ac land-use law (chapter 8). Finally, the Barcelona Olympic Games of 1992 involved considerable joint international activity by the city government, ac Generalitat, and Madrid.

intermestic politics in federal countries Constituent unit diplomacy has complicated the operation of federal governments. Foreign policy has clearly become “the last policy domain to become intergovernmentalized in the world’s major federal democracies” (Kincaid 2002, 92). Compounding or perhaps protracting this reduction in federal governments’ capacities for territorial management and regulation of exchange relationships (Keating 1999, 3) are both supranational bodies such as the eu and governance networks that, as is the case with domestic politics and government, surround constituent unit transborder activities. For countries like Spain, the eu presents an unavoidable intergovernmental overlay. Networks have become a reality in domestic policymaking. Thus both are becoming increasingly important in transborder igr. The international experiences of Spanish subnational governments, as they affect domestic politics and government, can offer important lessons for intermestic relations within a country’s federal arrangements. The international involvement of constituent units in federal countries raises interesting questions about the nature of federalism. Foreign affairs was once thought of as the exclusive province of the central government. For example, political scientists in the u.s. of an earlier era were taught the principles embodied in the important case, Missouri v. Holland (252 u.s. 416 [1920]), the migratory bird treaty with Canada that overrode states’ powers in regulating hunting and upheld federal government supremacy under its treaty-making power. Today that case is, of course, far from the last federal word on the subject of foreign affairs powers. While the u.s. federal government engages in a greater number of

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international treaties and agreements, it also deals with enforcement of foreign agreements made by its state and local governments. This raises important questions related to centralization and greater general government involvement in constituent unit powers. Greater constituent unit involvement in foreign affairs is brought on by the changing international order. Such forces as a globalizing economy and the information revolution are compounded when international “regimes” such as the eu and the Council of Europe become involved in domestic affairs. For Spain, it has also meant a great deal of reaching out to several countries in Latin America on an economic and cultural front. It leads to subnational governments wanting more of a role in foreign “policy-making.” Constituent units such as Spanish acs and cities try to maximize use of their own “policy spheres” internationally as well as domestically. Catalan ac leaders regularly make foreign visits on behalf of their government; particularly to European countries, but also to places such as Quebec and Asian countries. The Barcelona city government has promoted an international organization of cities under the umbrella of the United Nations. As a result, subnational governments are increasingly asserting their rights to participate at their federal or nation-state levels in those foreign policy decision processes that affect them. They are also anxious to acquire and preserve as much freedom as possible with regard to the implementation and enforcement of international law (Ehrenzeller et al. 2002, 75–6). This has generated greater general or central government interest in forms of coordination with subnational officials on intermestic issues. For example, in the u.s. the National Governors’ Association consults regularly with the Office of the u.s. Trade Representative, and since 1988 it has an Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee to advise the president on state and local government concerns. Many u.s. states cooperate with such federal agencies as the u.s. Foreign Commercial Service, International Trade Administration, u.s. Import-Export Bank, and u.s. Small Business Administration. The basic laws/constitutions of Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland include statements safeguarding constituent unit rights in foreign affairs and provisions that their international interests are to be taken into consideration when federal governments engage in foreign agreements, including those of transnational organizations such as the European Union or the United Nations.

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Constituent unit diplomacy can lead to problems of consistency of policy. For example, in matters of trade and development, these multiple relationships often challenge federal governments’ ability to speak with a single national voice on central international economic issues. It is not unusual for Catalonia to express economic preferences on free trade or manufacturing goods that are not in complete agreement with Madrid. u.s. state and local governments have been in sharp disagreement on commercial connections regarding South Africa and Northern Ireland. Sometimes nontreaty international pacts, agreements, and understandings by subnational governments, e.g., with Chinese provinces, have raised national-state conflicts, as have matters of states providing direct financial subsidies for exporters, which is contrary to u.s. policy. Perhaps the largest arena of federal-state controversy in the u.s. and in many other countries is direct foreign investment. The federal government limits such investments and requires open disclosure of interests, whereas the states or Länder or acs want to protect their ability to create and protect jobs and business expansions. Indeed, Earl Fry (1990, 125) once predicted that, in the u.s., the state and federal governments could someday be on a collision course in the area of foreign investment. In Spain, direct investments in Latin America promoted by acs and cities have sometimes been in conflict with central policy. These dynamic elements of internationalization come as a result of the new international order. International bodies, foreign trade, open communication and markets, cross-boundary networks, cultural exchanges, and the like, all ramp up the connection between domestic and international politics and policies. This, in turn, accelerates the interest in the subnational federal units, which, in the case of Spain, are primarily the acs and municipal governments.

constitutional dimensions As the 1978 Constitution was written, it was clear that international relations and affairs were not uppermost in the minds of the framers. Article 149.1.3 grants exclusive powers of international relations, but does not define what such relationships might be. However, in other articles, e.g., 56.1, 63.2, 94.1 and 97, the state’s primary international domain is made clear. However, they

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primarily refer to treaty-making powers and international representation, whereas there is no reference to other international activities, e.g., trade, industrial development, fishing, agriculture, health, and culture and the arts. While these were not mentioned, issues relating to nationality, immigration, asylum, foreign trade, defence, registration of foreign vessels, and the defence of Spain’s “cultural, artistic and monumental heritage” were mentioned. This would suggest that there are non-state exclusive areas, the former list, which opens the door for subnational foreign involvement, and indeed the scope of the acs and their local governments transcends their domestic spheres to include ambits of involvement beyond the country’s borders. From a constitutional legal perspective this means extending the powers of the acs. García (1995, 125) indicates that the statutes of autonomy generally raise four international issues: 1) enactment of measures to execute treaties and conventions related to ac competencies; 2) provision by central government of information on treaties negotiated by Madrid that affect acs; 3) initiatives acs promote, through the state, in signing treaties with other states with linguistic, cultural, and historic connections; and 4) the power to recognize by means of law communities of inhabitants that reside outside the region in other countries or acs. In effect these are normally contracting of international obligations under state powers of international affairs. The involvement of the acs and their constituent governments has, for the most part, been the most important and most contentious with regard to European Union (eu) participation and representation. To some observers eu membership has negatively affected subnational (particularly ac) competencies in agriculture, fisheries, industrial policy, environment, regional planning, transport, energy policy, and culture, by reducing the autonomy of original governments either directly or because the central government has exclusive rights to final decisions on these issues within eu bodies (Colino 2001). Spanish membership has also enhanced ac interests in some ways, giving them a role with regard to their domestic competencies. The Constitutional Tribunal has gradually approved increased ac international activity, so long as it does not compromise the unity of Spanish foreign policy. For example, the Constitutional Tribunal upheld Catalonia’s right to promote its cultural practices and values

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outside Spain, so long as these efforts did not compromise national sovereignty or generate state responsibilities with other parties. In a 1995 case upholding Basque representation and an eu office in Brussels, the court concluded that a rigid and expansive concept of exclusive jurisdiction in Article 149.1.3 meant that to deny the constitution was not to deny acs (and by implication other subnational governments) any possibility of carrying out those activities not exercising sovereignty, or creating international obligations, or generating state obligations (Garcia 1995, 126). In effect, the court was saying that to deny such activity would prevent acs from carrying out those activities necessary to achieve their objectives within the framework of power devolved to them. Indeed, a law (23/1998, Art. 20) supports development (e.g., third world) cooperation by acs and local entities as an “expression of solidarity with their respective societies,” and “an expression of autonomy and selfresponsibility.” This doctrine of ac international activity reinforces the autonomy principle. On the other hand Colino’s (2007, 53) comprehensive report on ac involvement in foreign affairs for the Observatory of Spanish Foreign Policy concludes that while the government in Madrid has been flexible since the tc ruling that acs could be involved in their areas of competence, it has not been without some resistance. The central government’s tendency is to maintain a statewide policy, a status quo posture inherent in operating within the internal system. This is manifested by imposition of bureaucratic criteria and slowdowns over the instruments exercised by the communities, in effect undermining autonomy. Issues between ac and Madrid become complex when the state level sets policy and the ac implements, as in the case of the environment. “What emerges is a form of ‘territorial complexity defined by the interaction of four levels of government (eu, national, regional, or local): which of these levels is dominant at any given moment depends on the policy stage (such as formulation, regulation or implementation) and policy sector in question” (Closa and Heywood 2004, 86). Autonomy is most clearly manifested in the implementation phase of the eu policy, in as much as the central government is less involved in this stage. The newer arenas of eu policy development, such as gender equality, telecommunications, immigration, and environment, exhibit the greatest levels of multigovernmental complexity of involvement.

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subnational governments and the eu The Regions Spain’s Constitution of 1978 contains only a general clause (Article 93) on enabling eu accession and only once (the only constitutional amendment to date) has it been modified by a single word to allow eu citizens to vote in local and European Parliament elections. This has allowed for extreme flexibility and change in the spirit of the Constitution with regard to the eu. The Spanish Constitutional Tribunal has maintained that eu law lacks constitutional standing, but does recognize the supremacy of Community law over domestic law at an “infra-constitutional level” (Closa and Heywood 2004, 79). eu policy and program issues affairs generally flow from the central governments through the ac governments. At one time it was felt that central governments were the most active “upstream” representatives with regard to policymaking and regions were the “downstream” actors in implementation. Time has eroded this distinction in many countries, particularly in Spain. While at an earlier point in Spain’s development the central government had the upper hand in making policy and then in informing the regions, by the mid-1990s the ac began taking a more proactive role. Rachel Jones (1997, 20) concludes that since the opening of discussions regarding structural funds reform in the late 1980s and early 1990s “direct dialogue between regional authorities and eu institutions and a greater regional input into the policy process” has made policy development a two-level game. Closa and Heywood’s (2004, ch. 4) study of Spain’s role in the eu identifies several important ac responses to eu involvement. First, it has affected ac governments. Almost all acs have adopted organization models that include subdirectorates with a focus on eu affairs, interdepartmental bodies dedicated to formulating eu policy and orientation, and interministerial coordination mechanisms to promote regional responses. Second, because of limited legislative influence, only a few ac parliaments have standing eu committees or regularly debate eu-related development plans. Third, and more important, virtually all of the 17 acs have lobbying offices in Brussels that exchange information, promote regional interests and concerns, support regional activities (most important, attending Committee of Regions), support and advise

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eu institutions on regional matters, and participate in consultative committees. Also, these regional representatives (offices can have up to 40 staff and spend one-half million euros) participate in those Spanish eu projects (around one-fourth) that are submitted by regions. The fourth response is regional and local representation on the Committee of Regions, with 21 elected officials: 17 from acs and four nominated by femp. While a consultative body, the committee has circumvented its lack of formal powers by allying itself with the executive or the European Commission so that the latter recognizes the former as most important in policy implementation (Mentz 2005, 7). Fifth, acs have become involved in inter-regional associations, particularly the Association of European Regions, and specialized associations such as the High-Technology Route, which includes Catalonia and Valencia, and the Arco-Atlántico, which unites coastal regions, including four in Spain. Many of these bodies are said to have exceeded eu Commission hopes in promoting trans-frontier cooperation (Closa and Heywood 2004, 91). Figure 7.1 presents the range of eu level institutions with whom Spain relates, depicting its own set of intermestic processes and convoluted forms of igr. Inside Spain several mechanisms also attend to subnational affairs. First is the Conference for eu Affairs (carce), established after years of protracted negotiations. Chaired by the Minister of Public Administration, it includes the Secretaries of State for eu and for Territorial Administration and one representative nominated by each ac president. carce tries to reinforce the state role in eu policy-making and its oversight in implementation but recognizes the role of subnational governments regarding their arenas of competency. It has become a venue for exchange of information and joint discussions, eu matters, coordination of the outcomes of sectoral conferences, and dealing with any issues not under the purview of the sectoral conferences. It also strives for horizontal coordination, but this has proved elusive, given Spain’s territorial diversity. The 17 eu related sectoral conferences themselves provide a second domestic vehicle. Set up in key policy areas, they have no power or ability to enforce policies or regulations. They are heavily dependent on state power, and most have no real fixed pattern of operation, despite regularly scheduled meetings. Many of them are reported to be poorly attended by the acs, particularly by Basque and Catalan representatives (González, 2006).

Figure 7.1 The Labyrinth of European Union Administration in Spain Brussels eu institutions European Council eu Council

coreper ll l Merten Antici Special Committees and Working ec Court of justice

European Commision Comitology Directorates– general

Economic and Social Committee

Prime Minister

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

General Affairs Sectoral Councils

European parliament

Central Government spanish representation

Spanish Permanent Representation

Spanish Legal Service at the ecj (Luxembourg)

Government

Secretariat of State for European Affairs

Spanish Cortes: Joint committee for the eu

Interministerial co–ordination Council of ministers Delegated committee for economic affairs

Interministerial committee for proceedings before the ecj

Interministerial committee for Working eu affairs groups and Meetings M. of Economy

Regional Offices M. of Justice in Brussels 55 Regional Map Sectoral ministries Committees advisers in case and Experts Regional of ec Law Constitutional Groups violation by an Councillor in Court the Permanent Committee ac Representation of the Regions State–wide and regional interest groups

Source: Carlos Closa and Paul M. Heywood, Spain and the European Union. London: Palgrave MacMillian, 2004, 61.

Autonomous Communities

Intergovernmental coordination between the Central Government and the Autonomous Communities

Interdepartmental coordination in the 17 autonomous communities

Regional Governments

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Third, the more aggressive regions, particularly the Basque Country and Catalonia, have set up bilateral commissions. They, in effect, bypass carce and the sectoral conferences, and are made up of many high-level state and ac committee officials. They are generally designed to avoid conflict in implementation and, in the case of Catalonia, are part of their broader strategy to support unilateral initiatives, bargain with the central government, and promote interregional cooperation. Fourth, in 1996, the central government agreed to two additional measures: the appointment of ac representatives to Spain’s Permanent Representation (reper) and to eu Commission committees and working groups. This representation function is closely related to ac offices in Brussels. ac representatives were subsequently added to over 50 eu committees, most importantly those involved in the various fund allocations. Fifth, and finally, the Spanish Senate’s General Commission for the Autonomous Communities is a standing committee of 62, half nominated by ac parliaments. It receives information from the central government on eu rules with regional implications, develops criteria for Spanish representation on international bodies that involve acs (e.g., Committee of Regions), and monitors the receipt and distribution of eu structural funds. Through its subcommittees, it has generated many reports on the existing and future roles of the acs within the eu (Closa and Heywood 2004, 93–7). Figure 7.1 depicts the entire range of Spanish government bodies that are eu related. Local Governments How do local governments fit into the eu scheme of affairs? As entities that are constitutionally autonomous but dually subordinated in practice to the state and acs, their foreign affairs role falls within the general rubric of regions. The acs, particularly those of the Basque Country and Catalonia, have pushed their independent role within the eu the hardest. Clearly they have won some battles, e.g., in the Constitutional Tribunal and in the political arena. Cities, even within these regions, having less autonomous powers have not been able to play this eu card in the same way. Moreover, the social and economic policies and programs that affect cities the most – immigration, infrastructure, environment, social protection, employment development, economic development, education, and

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technology development – are in effect eu social and economic arenas that are within ac competencies and indirectly those of cities, because that is where the affected populations live and where programs are administered. Also, most eu funds, with perhaps the exception of structural funds, would ultimately be channelled from ac governments to provinces and municipalities, even if they first hit the central government. This makes local government eu affairs very much eu-ac affairs. On the other hand, from an indirect regulatory standpoint the eu has a very important influence on the operation of local governments. A number of central/ac ministerial orders are drawn up to transform eu directives into Spanish law. This would include many orders from the Ministries of Public Administration and Foreign Affairs in Madrid. eu legislation affects local authorities in their role as: 1) employers, service providers, and property owners; 2) monitoring, enforcing, and listening bodies; and 3) agents for the development of their territory. Some examples of these principles are pinpointed by Callanan (2003, 408–9) in his evaluation of the eu impact on Irish local governments: G

G

Urban Waste Water Directive (91/271/ec). This Directive has had, and will continue to have, large-scale financial implications for local authorities, including major investment in waste water collection and treatment infrastructure in towns and cities above a certain size. While the capital costs for construction of such facilities are provided for by way of eu and central government grants, the costs associated with management and maintenance largely fall to local authorities. There are also administrative implications with regard to sampling requirements. Landfill Directive(99/31/ec). This Directive sets out targets for the reduction of biodegradable waste going to landfill sites, obliges member states to draw up national strategies which identify how they plan to achieve these reductions and contains requirements regarding the pretreatment of municipal waste, collection of gases and procedures concerning controlling and opening, management, closure and monitoring of a site. The Directive and the strict standards associated with it will increase the charges levied on users of landfill and result in a greater emphasis on recycling and waste management strategies.

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G

G

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Public Procurement Directives (93/37/eec, 93/36/eec, 92/50/eec and 93/38/eec). There are a number of Directives governing the allocation of contracts by local authorities and other public bodies for public works, supplies and services. Specific provisions, entailing considerable administrative implications, apply to the advertising and publication of notices in the Official Journal of the European Communities, tendering procedures (open or restricted procedure), contract award procedures (lowest price or most economically advantageous tender), time limits and specification of standards. Working Time Directive (93/104/ec). Local authorities are employers of large numbers of people and consequently employment legislation will have implications for human resource management. For example, this Directive regulates the maximum number of working hours employees can be obliged to work each week. Environmental Impact Assessment Directive (85/337/eec and 97/11/ec). This Directive obliges local authorities to assess at planning stage the environmental impact of projects where certain thresholds are met or where an infrastructure project is likely to have a significant impact on the environment. Water Framework Directive (2000/60/ec). This provides for river basin management by catchment area and requires that local authorities co-operate with each other within river basin districts to achieve ‘good water status’ by 2015.

All of these, of course, have direct financial and administrative implications for local government. Indirect effects also have to be taken into account, for example 92/21/eec, on the masses of some motor vehicles, weight limits for vehicles, road maintenance requirements, and vehicle restoration. Other indirect effects include health and safety legislation, recycling targets, water quality, and bird habitat sites. eu actions can also have consequences for local governments in areas outside direct/indirect legislation. Although there is no eu housing policy, there are housing management and “access” rights for those moving through eu countries. The eu Stability Pact that limits public debt to three per cent of gdp affects all spending, including central assistance to local governments. The introduction of the euro led to massive changes, from accounting systems to

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parking meter alterations. In many eu countries, including Spain, the euro introduction provided a way to align its local government financial accounting and reporting systems. In this respect, the eu introduced the Open Method of Coordination at the 2000 Lisbon Summit, encouraging public management “best practices” and “quality.” The eu also sponsors Quality Conferences for Public Administration on alternate years, to encourage bottom-up buy-in across different levels of government (Salskov-Iverson 2008). Finally, the European Commission and, sometimes, the European Court of Justice become, in a way, courts of appeal for those objecting to construction projects. While investigations often reveal no breach of law, delays caused by investigation can often highlight potential problems and public opposition, and sometimes lead to project withdrawal. With violations, of course, construction funds can be withdrawn. eu-stimulated Regional Development Plans, which are anchored largely in cities, serve as examples of direct local involvement. They have been the key to receiving Structural Funds. The Spanish government has used these eu funds as a means for redistribution. A Royal Decree (22/2000, Art. 4. 1/4) recognized the right of representatives of local entities to develop budgets for Funds of Cooperation and Solidarity, as represented and selected by their associations. In the same year the Council of Ministers recognized the input of acs and local entities as a means of applying appropriate procedures and acquiring information (Camps y Martí 2002, 244). Municipal contacts for these funds do not normally involve direct contact with ac capitals. Nevertheless, local authorities are reported to feel marginalized by the overwhelming go-between role of the acs on other issues. Cities often try to invoke the lever of the subsidiarity principle against the regional administration, particularly when their administrations belong to a different party from that of the ac, but report little success on mainstream eu issues. Spanish eu involvement is, as Colino (2001) suggests, an extension of its internal intergovernmental relations. He identifies five types of adaptive strategies in response to eu integration: 1) participation, influence, and inclusion; 2) control, defence, and prevention; 3) self-affirmation, confrontation, and competition; 4) cooperation and alliances; and 5) institutional innovation. The game will shift somewhat among these categories after 2007, as Spain’s relative poverty status has changed, because it has a larger

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economy than the ten new central and eastern European countries. The eu ceiling for cohesion funding is below 90 per cent of the eu average and, according to 2003 income, Spain was at 95 per cent, taking the new countries into account. Spain received new environmental and transport infrastructure funds on a phase-out basis until 2007, after which it became ineligible. While no one really knows what all of this means, it will not doubt shift the game to remaining eu funds, such as the Social Fund. In regard to Colino’s typology, subnational governments will be pressured to accelerate confrontation and competition plus institutional innovation.

the council of europe and the european charter More low key but of direct interest to local governments’ search for created autonomy through home rule is the Council of Europe, particularly its Charter on Local Self-Government. Founded in 1949, the Council is designed to foster unity among the people of Europe, promote cooperation, improve living conditions, develop human values, promote human rights, and uphold the principles of parliamentary democracy. In effect, it covers all arenas of European affairs but defence. It is governed by an Assembly (from country Parliaments) and a Committee of Ministers (from governments). Spain was admitted in 1977. The European Charter on Local Self-Government was enacted in 1985 as a means of protecting and strengthening local autonomy – principles to which all democratic states should ascribe. It was an initiative of the Council’s Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (clrae), renamed in 1994 the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (clrae) as a recognition of its significance. The original clrae presented the Charter to the Conference of Ministers in 1984 and it was officially signed in 1985 at clrae’s twentieth Plenary Session. The charter’s purpose, according to Council information, (http:// conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Reports) is to set standards for safeguarding local authorities, committing the parties to rules guaranteeing the basic political, administrative, and financial independence of local authorities. Figure 7.2 highlights some key provisions of the charter. The portions that illustrate the principles of local selfgovernment include constitutional and legal foundations, the scope

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of local authorities’ powers, administrative autonomy and limits on supervision, financial independence, and the right to judicial remedy. The European Charter on Local Self-Government places great emphasis on municipal (and other local) autonomy in decisions affecting the community, local own-source financing, and the right to settle jurisdiction-level disputes in each country’s judicial system. In the Spanish context, Canales (1999, 252–3) suggests that the charter reinforces the elimination of tutelage. It narrows the Spanish national government’s ability to supervise local administration, makes clear that local governments should have greater control over the competencies assigned to them, speaks for greater “horizontal” (own-source) rather that “vertical” (subventions) fiscal powers, and calls for a system of sorting out competencies by level of government. Under such a system, the local governments, particularly municipalities, have the potential to play a greater role in international affairs, rather than being limited to acting through their acs or their central governments. Canales concludes that if enacted by the acs, Pacto Local (chapter 9) would reinforce this role of subsidiarity in both the eu and other foreign affairs and would make Spanish local governments fully functioning international agents under the European Charter. Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) This international association was founded in Geneva in 1951 by a group of European mayors. Later it opened its membership to regional governments. It is an umbrella organization of country associations of towns, municipalities, and regions from more than 30 countries, together representing some 100,000 authorities. cemr is primarily supported by national association fees, although the eu also supports the association through an annual grant. femp is the primary Spanish cemr member, although parallel Basque and Catalan associations are associate members. National associations that are not members of the Council of Europe or are from countries that do not hold free elections or subscribe to the European Charter provisions can only be associate members. Basically cemr promotes many of the same aims as the European Charter by trying to influence European law and policy, to exchange experiences with self-governance, and to engage in contacts with

Figure 7.2 European Charter on Local Self-Government (Excerpts)

part i article 2 – constitutional and legal foundation for local self-government The principle of local self-government shall be recognized in domestic legislation, and where practicable in the constitution. article 3 – concept of local self-government 1. Local self-government denotes the right and the ability of local authorities, within the limits of the law, to regulate and manage a substantial share of public affairs under their own responsibility and in the interests of the local population. 2. This right shall be exercised by councils or assemblies composed of members freely elected by secret ballot on the basis of direct, equal, universal suffrage, and which may possess executive organs responsible to them. This provision shall in no way affect recourse to assemblies of citizens, referendums or any other form of direct citizen participation where it is permitted by statute. article 4 – scope of local self-government 1. The basic powers and responsibilities of local authorities shall be prescribed by the constitution or by statute. However, this provision shall not prevent the attribution to local authorities of powers and responsibilities for specific purposes in accordance with the law. 2. Local authorities shall, within the limits of the law, have full discretion to exercise their initiative with regard to any matter which is not excluded from their competence or assigned to any other authority. 3. Public responsibilities shall generally be exercised, in preference, by those authorities which are closest to the citizen. Allocation of responsibility to another authority should weigh up the extent and nature of the task and requirements of efficiency and economy. 4. Powers given to local authorities shall normally be full and exclusive. They may not be undermined or limited by another, central or regional, authority except as provided for by the law.

Figure 7.2 continued

5. Where powers are delegated to them by a central or regional authority, local authorities shall, insofar as possible, be allowed discretion in adapting their exercise to local conditions. 6. Local authorities shall be consulted, insofar as possible, in due time and in an appropriate way in the planning and decisionmaking processes for all matters which concern them directly. article 8 – administrative supervision of local authorities’ activities 1. Any administrative supervision of local authorities may only be exercised according to such procedures and in such cases as are provided for by the constitution or by statute. 2. Any administrative supervision of the activities of the local authorities shall normally aim only at ensuring compliance with the law and with constitutional principles. Administrative supervision may however be exercised with regard to expediency by higher-level authorities in respect of tasks the execution of which is delegated to local authorities. 3. Administrative supervision of local authorities shall be exercised in such a way as to ensure that the intervention of the controlling authority is kept in proportion to the importance of the interests which it is intended to protect. a r ticle 9 – finan c i a l r e s o u r c e s o f l o c a l authorities 1. Local authorities shall be entitled, within national economic policy, to adequate financial resources of their own, of which they may dispose freely within the framework of their powers. 2. Local authorities’ financial resources shall be commensurate with the responsibilities provided for by the constitution and the law. 3. Part at least of the financial resources of local authorities shall derive from local taxes and charges of which, within the limits of statute, they have the power to determine the rate. 6. Local authorities shall be consulted, in an appropriate manner, on the way in which redistributed resources are to be allocated to them.

Figure 7.2 continued

7. As far as possible, grants to local authorities shall not be earmarked for the financing of specific projects. The provision of grants shall not remove the basic freedom of local authorities to exercise policy discretion within their own jurisdiction. 8. For the purpose of borrowing for capital investment, local authorities shall have access to the national capital market within the limits of the law. article 10 – local authorities’ right to associate 1. Local authorities shall be entitled, in exercising their powers, to co-operate and, within the framework of the law, to form consortia with other local authorities in order to carry out tasks of common interest. 2. The entitlement of local authorities to belong to an association for the protection and promotion of their common interests and to belong to an international association of local authorities shall be recognized in each State. article 11 – legal protection of local self-government Local authorities shall have the right of recourse to a judicial remedy in order to secure free exercise of their powers and respect for such principles of local self-government as are enshrined in the constitution or domestic legislation. Source: Council of Europe, European Charter of Local Self-Government, Council of Europe, European Treaty Series, No. 122, Gdoberis, 1985, Strasbourg.

partners in other parts of the world. Its major working groups/ policy areas include: employment, energy, environment, equal opportunity, governance and the eu, information society, local and regional democracy, north/south cooperation, employment in local government, procurement, regional policy, social affairs, transport, and urban and rural policies. It also promotes a very successful town-twinning network, involving over 26,000 European towns. In this activity, it works with the eu Director General of Education and Culture. It now forms the European section of a new multicontinental international organization, “United Cities and Local Governments.” The association sponsors a wide range of seminars and issues a variety of reports. For example, it has conducted seminars on the

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impact of eu accession on municipalities and towns for new central European and other enlargement members. Another conference dealt with tourism assistance. Reports cover such subjects as how to set up “intelligent” recycling bottle banks and how to promote gender equality. It also supports an online exchange of experiences and best practices. Other Connections Spanish cities now have ample opportunities to participate in other global and/or European networks. Local Governments for Sustainability, launched as a result of the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit, has over 700 members, encourages sustainability and green procurement (www.ielei.org/about). The Stockholm Challenge is a global network program for information and communication technology (ict). It invites nominations for ict innovations from all types of governments, gives awards, and exchanges ideas (www.stockholm challenge.se). The Eurocities network (www.eurocities) involves 130 major cities of over 250,000 persons as full members, and provides associate status for smaller local authorities. Eurocities emphasizes sharing and co-production of knowledge and lobbies before eu institutions. The United Nations also runs several programs that target cities, including the World Summit of the Information Society, promoting the benefits of city information exchange, along with its conference, similar to the Rio Earth Summit, on environmental and development (Salskov-Iverson 2008). Cities on the World Scene – Agenda 21 A good example of local government involvement with a global agenda item promoted by the eu is Agenda 21, a long-range sustainable environment development effort that emanated from the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit. The Ministry of Environment in Madrid has discussed the possibility of formulating a national plan, but none has been forthcoming. Generally speaking, the acs have claimed that the national government has absolutely no role in this matter, in that it is an environmental program. Many ac governments have adopted general legislation maintaining that this is the primary responsibility of their local governments. ac laws generally encourage eco-audits, development of ecological guilds, definition

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of sustainability indicators, creation of local sustainability commissions, creation of ac water promotional and information commissions, short-term actions, and adaptation of long-range plans. Catalonia, for example, has adopted an Agenda 21 program. A report on Spain and Agenda 21 indicates that the province of Barcelona has adopted a model eco-audit and action plan along these lines and has “encouraged” municipalities to adopt programs along the lines of the ac program (Font, Font, y Subirats 2002). Over 50 Catalonian cities have participated since 1997. One model municipality in the Balearic ac is that of Calvia, a small tourist city on Majorca. It initially combined its urban plan with the Agenda 21 process. An initial draft was presented to a variety of local actors: unions, environmental groups, academics, businesses, and regional government. In the next phase six areas of emphasis were defined: 1) water, energy, residues, transport, and recycling; 2) local economy, tourism, and diversification; 3) territorial and urban systems; 4) population and quality of life; 5) environment, including land and sea systems; and 6) patrimony. Working groups were established to formulate proposals. The next stage was the creation of citizen forums that led to 40 action proposals; these were turned into a plan and a global forum. The final stage was approval by citizen referendum. The Calvia Agenda 21 plan is said to enhance the city’s intergovernmental position of reducing local reliance on tourism and to mitigate its environmental degradation effects. Also, it strengthens the mayor’s international efforts to act on behalf of the city by providing a platform for action (http://prosus.vio.no/spain). International Affairs of Cities Some large cities have already begun to create their own “space” in international affairs. For example, Barcelona has been active as a member of cross-border alliances, working with the Catalan government and the private sector to forge economic alliances (Keating 1999; Hocking 1999). This is particularly the case with regard to its involvement in the four motors of Europe, an alliance of BadenWürtemburg, Lombardy, Rhone-Alps, and Catalonia, designed to establish research-based networks, develop production innovations, and apply territory-bound lessons from their industrial districts. Valencia, Seville, Alicante, and Santiago are other cities that

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regularly engage in this type of intermestic politics. Most of these activities are focused on economic activities. Of course immigration policy is another force that is generating municipal international involvement. The increasing role of cities in intermestic politics can be illustrated by examining the range of one city’s activities. Barcelona has been, of course, an international city for centuries. Its primary activities are buttressed by the international activities of its ac government, the Generalitat. It has European and non-European Office Cooperation Areas within the ac presidency. It cooperates with several semi-public bodies that operate in the areas of information on Catalonia for the eu, business development, commercial promotion, tourism promotion, health coordination, educational and scientific cooperation, promotion of the teaching of Catalan in universities outside Catalonia, and external promotion of culture. As is the case in other acs, the Catalan government has “given private initiative the space it needs through their external activities” (García 1995, 138). Camps y Martí (2002, 245–52), in their study of the international activities of Catalan cities, identify four categories of activity: hermanamientos or brotherhood cities of cultural and economic cooperation, particularly in Latin America and the southern hemisphere; mociones or government resolutions related to policy statements, such as on the status of women, child exploitation, disadvantaged populations, or items of foreign policy; consejos de cooperación, or instruments of coordination policy for municipal development with foreign communities, normally through city- generated ngos; and, fondos de cooperación, or donated funds for development activities in the third world, normally intergovernmentally financed under the Law of International Cooperation (23/1998). These funds are normally channelled through development ngos, locally and overseas. Camps y Martí conclude that cities that engage in these cross national activities are those that possess the “social capital” to reach across borders, seek solidarity with the more vulnerable in the third world, and demonstrate a level of policy maturity for new types of local policy on city agendas. The local politics of international cooperation for these cities is transformative in nature, as it promotes policy education, neighbourliness, sensitivity, and civic sensibility in the municipal sphere of activity (253).

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As Spanish cities accelerate their international connections, particularly in economic development and expanding trade, they will inevitably become more interested in what Earl Fry (1995) identifies as municipal readiness strategies for international action. They are highly intergovernmental in a contemporary governance sense. They include recognizing the key role of small and medium-sized businesses; having concern for an appropriate regulatory stance; candidly assessing of local comparative advantages and disadvantages; increasing intergovernmental cooperation; regularizing linkages with the private sector; developing a strong educational base and worker training; avoiding investment decisions that are harmful to the long-run fiscal health of the city; exploring the advantages of different types of tourism; recognizing a city’s internal cultural diversity; and institutionalizing the internationalization process. These are among the core challenges faced by Spanish cities as they build networks that reach across borders, particularly in the economic sphere.

conclusion Spain’s local governments, particularly in its larger cities, are no different from many of their counterparts in other openly democratic countries in that they engage in different forms of international affairs. They are both influenced by and influence various governmental, economic, social, educational, and cultural events beyond their borders. For Spain, a primary governmental exchange influence would have to be with the European Union. As a member, various elements of eu economic and social policy affect all Spanish governments. eu legislation regarding environment, governmental operations, and financial management directly influence local governments. Spain has also had notable success in acquiring substantial shares of eu funding, particularly in infrastructure, economic development, and agriculture. This, in turn, has led to substantial subnational representation in Brussels and in the intergovernmental councils that help form various Spanish positions before the eu. Other international contacts support subnational efforts in promoting economic activity, cultural exchange, and tourism. As a model of peaceful transition to democracy, Spain’s experiences are valued by other nations in bodies like the Council of Europe, particularly

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by the newly independent post-Soviet countries. The ability of subnational governments to reach out internationally has been made possible by Constitutional Tribunal decisions that reinforce autonomy by upholding ac and municipal foreign programs, as long as they do not interfere with the foreign policy of Madrid. The move to internationalization and global impacts does not necessarily mean they are replacing country orientation and attitudes. Like any other eu country, Spain has been known to be protective of its interests. In governmental matters it has held steadfast to its practices of multilevel consortia and off-budget municipal enterprises, considered to be fiscally irresponsible by the eu Commission. In social and cultural affairs it has resisted outlawing bullfighting and eliminating the letter “ñ” from its alphabet so as to standardize computer keyboards (Imagine pronouncing the name of the country “Espanna”). It has resisted the eu labour market pressure to drop the split workday, with its normal 2–2.5 hour lunch break. That is why it appears more important that Spain (and others for that matter) experiences global influences, not some form of global thinking that directly imprints policy. Tarrow (2005, 72) concludes that despite some intellectuals and journalists propagating such thinking among both elites and ordinary citizens territorial identities are narrowly diffused, nationally contingent, and remain rooted in national and regional contexts! If citizens’ attitudes are becoming more “global” these attachments coexist with national identities. If elites are part of an international system, it is a system with strong national roots that more closely resembles a dispersed set of unequal spatial relations than an integrated global network. International concerns present another overlay on igr, but not necessarily in a fashion that displaces country or local concerns or interests within the autonomous state. Clearly, the eu and other international governance has not replaced the role of domestic governmental institutions and policy.

ts/Intergovernmental n Local Government Networks in Federalizing Spain

8 Policy Networks in Local Governance: Three Case Studies

One of the most important dimensions of igr is its policy component, as actors work across the boundaries of government to approach important issues and solve problems. As Krane and Wright (1998, 1,172) indicate, questions about practices such as intergovernmental fiscal transfers and regulations invariably provoke important policy issues. In these policy processes higher-level governments make efforts to impose some degree of control over their interaction with officials in another jurisdiction or unit. Officials need some form of compliance to achieve their ends. Meanwhile, officials at lower levels seek to obtain others’ resources while striving to retain autonomy and discretion within external normative expectations and/or money. The trade-offs that result from the interactions among officials at central and local levels directly determine the character of the policy or program established (Pressman 1975). As Krane and Wright (1998, 1,172) conclude, “How the particular program is designed (e.g., the grant formula) and how it is to be administered (e.g., by local governments) go a long way in determining the distribution of benefits and costs among the intended as well as actual targets (jurisdictions and for citizens) of the public program.” Spain’s policy processes necessarily reflect the overlays of government institutions, financing, political organizations, and sociopolitical forces. Gibbons (1999, 111) concludes that the structure of policy subsystems, i.e., the actors and institutions in policy networks, and degree of state autonomy and resources, along with the country’s capacity to act, involves varied policy styles. “We identify not so much a single Spanish policy style but a variety of strategies

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of policy deliberation involving the following key traits and features: consensus and conflict; majority and minority party government; patron-client and group networks.” One would also have to add to this list consumption federalism, along with the myriad connecting institutional arrangements in Spain, from the state in Madrid to the municipal neighbourhood association. The new politics of citizen participation, externalization of services, and work with the business sector has brought on new public administrative relations with the non-governmental sector. Morata y Hanf (2000, 6) indicate that this stance has brought on new forms of collaboration and joint decision as joint objectives are concretized. As the cases indicate, some of this experience is enhancing new policies and democratic politics whereas others are fostering systems of collusion and corruption. Chapter 7 indicated how important aspects of the international dimensions can also influence policy. In particular, public policy is increasingly shaped by the eu in member countries. With regard to Spain, this is made clear in the excellent study of European social policy by Gallego, Gomá, y Subirats (2003, 33). They conclude that the dynamics of European social policy has been clearly “integrationist,” dismantling national protective barriers to employment and labour market policy and promoting social protection through the European Social Fund, other funds for regional development in poor regions, and funds for rural development. They conclude that these efforts have become a “supranational force” adding a new dimension to intergovernmental relations that is an integral part of the policy process. In other words, multilevel policy processes in Spain can range from the eu to the municipal level. This chapter illustrates multilevel involvement in policy by examining three case studies involving Spanish local governments operating within their intergovernmental networks. The first deals with physical infrastructure provision, that is, how local governments find partners and engage the other levels in financing and implementing new roads, bridges, water supply, and other types of public works. The second case touches a core facet of European and Spanish social policy, that of immigration. It demonstrates how municipalities appear to be “at the end of the line,” so to speak, with regard to some policy arenas. The third policy case deals with municipal land-use policy networks. It looks at a Valencian ac land law and how it has fostered corruption between local officials and

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private land investors. Together, the cases provide some policy network insights with regard to the role of local governments in igr.

infrastructure Perhaps no policy arena is more intergovernmentalized than municipal infrastructure provision. Municipalities are required to have basic services in public lighting, water and sewers, street paving, refuse collection, and for the largest cities parks, libraries, solid waste treatment, and markets. Larger cities are also required to provide fire services, urban transport, and environmental protection. Also, municipal roles in social services, culture, sport, and recreation lead to social infrastructure needs. Local units may also become involved in some activities that are shared between the national government, acs and other local governments. For example, it is not unusual for municipalities to provide the land and build public school buildings, whereas education is a shared central/ac competency. Infrastructure funding, as will be demonstrated, follows a similar mixed pattern, involving eu, central government, ac, and provincial funding streams. Figure 3.1 underscores this mixed service/funding pattern, in as much as “construction of major infrastructure” is listed as an exclusive central power, “municipal intervention and supervision” as a mixed power, yet regional development, land use, property regulation, management of urban development, and related functions are exclusive ac competencies. Not every town in Spain is booming and the lack of infrastructure support is cited as one reason why some rural areas are left behind. Teruel, a historic (because of its mudéjar architecture) but depopulating city of some 30,000 persons and a provincial capital in Aragon, is quite isolated. It lies some 300 kilometres east of Madrid, has no rail link to the capital, and the journey to the closest regional capitals, Valencia or Zaragosa, takes up to three hours. Teruel province is tied for the lowest population density in the country at only 9.8 persons per square kilometre. A Teruel civic ngo, Teruel Exists, was formed in 1999 to campaign for a high speed ave train link to Madrid and the coast. “We need infrastructure. We want to be included in the major railway and highway plans,” says Amado Goded, head of Teruel Exists. Other investments are also needed to stem depopulation. For example, clay found throughout the region employs just

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200 persons, whereas neighbouring Castellón province in the Valencia ac employs over 20,000 in this industry. Alabaster and bauxite are mined in Teruel province but shipped to Valencia and Italy for manufacturing. The mayor of Teruel, Lucía Gómez, on the other hand, thinks that the existing planned communications corridor to link the area with Catalonia and the Cantabrian Sea is much more important, and that the external investment in infrastructure has doubled since 2005. “In the last three years 130 kilometres of highways have been built and 240 million euros is being invested in the Teruel-Zaragoza and Teruel-Valencia lines to handle high-speed trains,” reports the head of ac Public Works Department Javier Velasco, a former mayor of Teruel (Galan 2006, 3). The experience of Teruel highlights the importance of infrastructure for the development of towns as well as the heavy dependence of most cities on regional and central governments to finance and develop major projects, particularly in the area of transportation and communications infrastructure. The central program of infrastructure provision for municipalities is largely one of direct financing, or by a series of discretionary conditional (project) grants that are channelled through provincial governments. Administered by the Director General of Local Cooperation in the Ministry of Public Administration (map), these municipal projects are broad in scope or project eligibility and normally involve central, ac, provincial, and municipality financial participation, and sometimes eu and private financing. An additional channel was opened up in early 2009 through the central government’s 33 billion euro economic stimulus package. It includes 19 billion euros for transportation infrastructure, which will benefit local governments in part, as will five billion for environmental projects. Of direct impact is eight billion in direct local government building projects in a Fundo estatal de inversión local. About half of Spanish cities are expected to benefit from this one time program. Eligibility, according to the rules in the Bulletin of the State (boe 1/30/04, 3721) involves a series of intergovernmental sign-offs, documentation of the relationship of the project to the Plan of Cooperation (below), linkage to complementary plans and projects, a series of certifications (e.g., labour protection, environmental, administrative), a project timetable, and contractors’ specifications. This is obviously an attempt to get municipalities to integrate specific projects with broader long-range planning, an effort that,

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as we will see, many municipalities resist. In addition to these targeted grants, a portion of unconditional funds is also passed on directly to the provincial governments, which in turn is subvented to municipalities. According to discussions with officials from this map directorate in Madrid, municipalities over 50,000 in population are required to come up with some self-financing match, but they also enhance the local match with eu funds, particularly Cohesion and the Regional Development Fund (feder). Large cities also have a better record of obtaining ac and/or national funds. Cities under 50,000 do not normally compete for national funds, but are financed through the diputación allocation, eu, and small amounts of ac money. In the arena of highway/roadway construction, the diputación was reported to be responsible for 40–44 per cent of all intermunicipal roads, with the rest falling on the central government and acs. Three future infrastructure financing problems are foreseen by national government officials. First is the loss of eu funds, which have been important for less wealthy regions of Spain. Second are recent debt limits placed on financing local infrastructure. The third involves the economic downturn late in the decade, which has triggered new stimuli that include infrastructure reinvestments. It is unclear whether these might carry over from year to year. All will reduce previously experienced funding flexibility, and will place more financing pressure on central and ac governments. At the local level the province is an important unit of government for all but the very largest municipalities. Each province must develop Planes Provinciales de Cooperación de la Obra y Servicio Municipal. This city-oriented provincial public works plan charges provinces with the responsibility of harnessing its investment efforts toward municipalities in such areas as water and wastewater, sanitation and public health, road projects, and the like. In addition, provinces work with smaller municipalities in promoting sporting and cultural activities, secondary roads, transportation coordination, all of which also lead to infrastructure needs. A Royal Decree (835 27 June 2003 boe No. 186 p. 27352–58) makes intergovernmental cooperation obligatory for infrastructure projects and recognizes the mixed role in funding of different local entities and the eu and central government. Since provincial plans and local projects require ac approval, most local officials agree that regional governments do “have the

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last word.” Provincial and local officials have become increasingly “skeptical of the powers of autonomous communities to approve their plans.” “They (Valencia in this case) routinely act unilaterally in regard to our projects, making changes at will without discussion and consultation.” An official in the Madrid ac related that “road projects (of an intermunicipal nature) and public transport are imposed by the autonomous community, in response to traffic jams and the problem that, in Madrid City, rush hour lasts all day.” In regard to a train extension project, several cities surrounding Madrid mobilized to urge the ac government to address projects more openly and equally. A provincial official related that when plans for extending train services in a municipality arise, the project management becomes haphazard. The ac charges the municipality with planning the project, but without any guarantee that it will be funded. As a result, municipalities devote time to a project that may or may not happen. Another official said that when deciding to build a regional hospital to centralize dispersed medical care in a series of growing Madrid suburbs, there was uncertainty and even municipal offers of donated land. The Madrid ac government made a unilateral decision to locate it elsewhere. Cities are required to submit for approval to acs a Plan General de Urbanismo, which outlines urban planning strategies and establishes specific criteria for use of space and anticipated needs. To comply with the plan local governments must direct programs and resources for urbanization programs that are often beyond their powers and project the use of regional resources to a greater degree than the law allows. For example, many local government officials know that financing new school buildings is well beyond the ambit of their powers, but they are greatly encouraged (some would say coerced) into building them with local money. Social programs, such as retirement and youth centres, while locally needed and demanded, are often “held hostage” by ac governments until municipalities agree to support school construction. Many small municipalities are reluctant to update their General Plans, because it reduces their flexibility to get approval if a lucrative project comes along. For example, at a summer 2004 general meeting in the city of Teulada (ac Valencia, Province Alicante) attended by the author, the mayor and public works director announced that a lucrative high-income housing project had come along at its beach area, Moraira. Also announced were new pro-

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jects for a Moraira school building (to replace temporary classrooms), expanded parking facilities, and a renovated building for a seniors’ cultural centre. None of these projects were on the General Plan, which had not been updated and filed since 1989. The city planned to file several amendments to the 1989 plan for ac approval. Teulada/Moraira has grown in population from about 7,800 persons in 1989 to nearly 25,000 in 2004. This regular practice of overlooking the General Plan allows for flexibility, and the ability to deal with large private development corporations. Larger cities have more difficulty in circumventing local plans, because unlike Teulada/Moraira, their projects are numerous and almost always rely on larger proportions of external funding, particularly from the central government. Meanwhile, the ac governments are not always interested in enforcing updated general plans because it reduces their flexibility to say yes or no a project. One municipal official related that often the message from his ac is, “build it and then we will tell you if we can provide matching funding. When we spend a lot of money on a project that keeps us all very anxious.” The whole situation of both sides circumventing the plans and being pushed to engage in projects beyond municipal powers raises lots of opportunities to bargain. However, to the same official, it reflects little concern for public ethics. “No se dice, se hace” or, “this is not said, but it is done.” Municipalities nevertheless push ahead through provincial governments with infrastructure projects that go well beyond their stated powers and required services. Figure 8.1, from a Jávea list of pending and projected projects, is illustrative of a medium- sized municipality. It demonstrates the range of programs that a city becomes involved in, as a result of citizen demand, lack of ac effort in providing such services, ac funding limitations, and the aforementioned pressure by acs on municipalities. Cities will turn to provincial governments for help, normally on a case-by-case basis. Initial contacts are almost always informal. Any public works project will de facto be a collaborative effort. Municipalities (or other local entities) seek assistance through two separate channels: conditional grants (subvenciones) or less restrictive agreements (convenios administrativos). Conditional grants have to follow ac promulgated rules and guidelines, including formal inclusion in the Plan General (or amendment). A number of conditions follow, including intergovernmental collaboration, similar to those

Figure 8.1 Selected Jávea Infrastructure and Public Works Projects

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Municipal swimming pool Museum of the Sea Municipal auditorium Port social centre Municipal bus station Music university (academy) New school at Arenal Subject to decision: The new hospital A direct connection to the motorway A link to the railway system The amplification of the port The roundabout on the Benitatxell road The development of the peripheral road system (Via Benitatxell and the Camino de los Cabanes) Almost ready to open: the new offices for the Gestion Tributaria (tax collection offices) About to open: The Municipal Library Change of site: Town tourism office into the present tax collection offices The new road from the Port to the Denia road and new Ronda Norte The building of the one-way coast road: Avenida del Mediterráneo, and the return route along Via Genovese New bridge for the above road Renovations to the Hermita church on the Denia road* Renovation work on the church in the town* Port roundabout A use and project for the Cine Central** Completion of artists’ workshops in Farmacia Tena** Car and large vehicle parking throughout the community

* Historic sites ** Municipally owned Source: Jávea International Civic Society Bulletin February/March 2004, 4.

illustrated above with regard to central grants. Financing guidelines stipulate that provinces provide 60 per cent of the funding, while municipalities provide the remaining 40 per cent. Convenios are agreements that take place outside the ac legislative process. They apply to public projects that require a significant portion (e.g., 98

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per cent ) of public funding. Unlike subvenciones, few decrees or forms govern how these agreements are to be implemented, and local officials can exercise considerable discretion in authorizing and executing these projects, including the channelling of funds to needed projects. These convenio-based projects are often the “crown jewels” of provincial and municipal governments, said one provincial official. In his particular province, it is not unusual to have 50–60 such projects launched in a given year. This is not always good, he related, because many municipalities “lack a mature fiscal and budgeting capacity,” and since so many are small, this is not likely to change. “Perhaps provincial governments should develop this expertise and act as municipal consultants, aiding in the decentralization process.” Finally, and importantly, some infrastructure projects are not regulated and funded through intergovernmental cooperation. These tend to be projects of a “private” nature, such as residential/commercial development: utilities, minor roads, open spaces, and other amenities that are privately funded, or funded through a combination of municipal financing and private funding. The latter is, of course, from property developers. It is not unusual for developers to trade off the rezoning to residential of land that they have purchased or have access to (even when it is not in the town plan) for promised infrastructure improvements. One small coastal town exchanged permission to develop land that would double their housing stock in exchange for the developer supplying piping to the water treatment plant for the entire city. The more a city is reluctant to go into debt to finance such infrastructure projects, the more amenable they are to this form of “trade-off” private financing. To many of the local officials who were consulted in this study, the issue of power distribution is as important as the issue of money. They want more direct control over infrastructure decisions, and would even be willing to spend more money if they had control. One provincial official relates that in many ways the ac governments have become “a new enemy.” In addition to being against centralization of power at the central level, local governments are more skeptical of the powers of the acs. Often with regard to infrastructure it is a matter of lack of concrete rules and consistency in action. A deputy mayor said that with regard to subsidized/affordable housing, rents often end up higher than many can afford, defeating the original purpose. Without rules regarding

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management of residential properties for those of moderate income, many people go without affordable housing. “This lack of explicit rules is another form of control used by the autonomous community.” In other cases the ac uses the lack of rules to push municipalities into infrastructure projects beyond the lrbrl prescribed competencies. The same official concluded that “Although the process is anti-democratic, we have little choice but to participate.”

immigration Spain was transformed from a country of emigrants to one of immigrants between the 1970s and 1990s. In 1970 outmigration (mostly for employment) was over 2.2 million persons, whereas only 147,000 plus foreign-born persons settled in Spain. In 1994 the pattern was reversed as nearly 500,000 immigrants entered the country while outmigration was reduced by over half (Casey 1998, 319). Immigration policy clearly illustrates the reality of intergovernmental networking in Spain. All levels of government are involved, including a substantial ngo sector. It has been summarized as involving three dimensions of formal and informal networks that include a symbolic or public policy development stance, a substantive dimension that involves new means of management and frameworks of regulations, and an operative dimension that involves the management of specific municipal programs (Pelàez, Donaldson, González, y Montardit 2002, 275). As one of the important “Frontiers of Europe” Spain now has an acute immigration problem that, from a policy standpoint, is mostly central and eu but from an impact standpoint very much affects those municipalities where most foreign nationals settle. The Canary Islands ac is only 100 kilometres from Africa and the land connection between North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula is about 15 kilometres at its narrowest. While Spanish unemployment declined in the decade from 1997–2007, a changing Spanish economy required people willing to fill those jobs that appear to be no longer of interest to Spaniards, for example in construction, agriculture, and home-based child and elder care. One government study (El País 2–8–08, 1, 15) reported that of the 17.24 million Spanish jobs, 850,000 or 4.5 per cent were occupied by immigrants, with 34 per cent of the new positions created in 2004 taken by immigrants. Workers from North and Central Africa, Eastern

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Europe, and Latin America filled these jobs. In addition, older and wealthier people, mostly from Northern Europe, become “e.t.s” or eternal tourists looking for milder climate, lower prices, and leisure activities. Of the estimated 2.7 million foreigners in Spain in 2005, one million were believed to be there illegally. This is estimated to be three times as many as in 2001 (El País 2–23–05, 8). Since 2007 the Spanish economy has declined, particularly in the building sector, leaving about 400,000 immigrant workers unemployed. Immigration – legal and illegal – has thus become a volatile policy issue in which municipalities have insignificant roles in policy-making but have pivotal roles in dealing with the actual problems that these policies create. The intergovernmental dimension of European and Spanish immigration policy can be broken into the four phases of prevention, admission, control, and integration. The first three – prevention of illegal entry, appropriate entry policies, and control over the number of immigrants – are considered to be eu and national government level issues. The fourth, integration into recipient nations, regions, and cities in Spain is considered to belong to acs and municipalities (Zapata-Barrero 2004, ch. 1). National-eu policy reflects an ambivalence over business demands for skilled and non- skilled labour migrants and concern for integration to control surveillance, deportation, and law enforcement against undocumented migrants. The latter has become particularly salient in light of the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and the Madrid bombings in 2004. Confounding the European approach are attempts to design a Common Asylum and Migration Policy (camp) in which governments have tried to play the security/integration game to their own interests. In particular, the eu is considered unlikely to replace the complex variety of labour recruitment schemes among its members. Europe’s desire to promote itself as a competitive locale is not likely to change this (Mentz 2005, 6–7). Spanish national policy has been one of police search and concerted sweeps, encouraging legal entry into the regular economy. This is, among other reasons, designed to help fill the social security fund that faces a declining birthrate among Spaniards, and to encourage coordination and planning for subnational governments (Carrillo y Delgado 1998). As is the case in other European countries, Spanish immigration is a volatile political issue. Immigration and national security have

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been prominent issues in recent elections, as part of candidate platforms. Public safety and immigration control regularly spark interest among candidates for local, regional, and national office. The March 2001 elections sparked debate concerning which party could best control the immigration question. In early 2002 a woman from the Dominican Republic was killed by xenophobes and racists. Attention continues to be focused on immigration throughout the country. Control issues can become part of local government politics. For example, in April 2005 the Popular Party of the city of Alicante (Valencia ac, 316,000 people) launched a campaign to stop a second ferry route from Algeria to Alicante. According to El País (Llorente 4–1–05, 3), “From its positions of power in the city council and the Valencian regional government, the pp has fomented a climate of confrontation with the Algerian residents of Alicante through its fierce opposition to the Transmediterránean line.” The president of the ac, Francisco Camps, said in the ac parliament that the pp does not want more Algerian ferry passengers in Alicante “because there is no economic reason for it.” One opposition leader accused the pp of “xenophobia and of adopting positions more in tune with those of the extreme right.” The pp spokesperson on Alicante’s city council blamed North Africans for higher unemployment, overburdening of public health care and schools, and other social problems. The new ferry line was said to be a threat to coexistence. The president of the Alicante diputación blamed the deterioration of the city’s historic centre on the increasing number of Algerian shops. In addition to national action regarding control of borders, deportation, and encouragement of legal entry as a path to citizenship, the central government has undertaken some action with regard to integration planning. As integration first came on the radar screen in the early 1990s, the Ministry of Social Services began to take notice of ac actions. In particular, the importance of encouraging the existing network of ngos, including the Red Cross, Catholic Charities, labour unions, and immigrant associations became salient. In many ways the same ngos and public agencies involved in the Agreed Plan for Social Services or “Plan Concertado” were involved (Moreno 2000, 148–9). The result was a 1994 central plan, regulated among the acs, called the Plan para la Integración Social de los Inmigrantes (pisi). The aims of pisi

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include combatting discrimination, promoting mutual tolerance, guaranteeing social and legal rights, combatting barriers to integration, and eliminating barriers and xenophobic thinking. A series of strategic actions were laid out in pisi, including a legal framework, ideal labour and professional conditions, and projected responsibilities of territorial, educational, and cultural authorities (Ramos, Bazaga, Delgado, y Pino 1998, 9). More plans followed pisi, e.g., greco, 2000–04, State Immigration Plan of 2005, aimed at compatibility with eu policies, and creation of various government agencies, interdepartmental boards, and commissions to study and promote integrated services; between 1994 and 2005 six different councils, research centres, and agencies were established. Most important in terms of integration was the creation of the Instituto de Migraciones y Servicios Sociales (imserso) in 1997, within the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (Zapata-Barrero 2004). acs began to turn their attention toward integration in the late 1990s. Most formed interdepartmental commissions that incorporated the input of ngos. For example, Andalucía formed five different bodies in 2000–2001: an interdepartmental policy group, a contracted research observatory, a coordinating body, a mixed forum for popular input, and a legal assistance network. It led to an integrated plan that included: 1) social integration, employment, personal adjustment; 2) assurance of access to public services; 3) coordinated (case management) services; 4) change in social services to accommodate new populations; 5) promotion of positive attitudes toward immigrant populations; and 6) continuous improvement of living conditions of immigrants. The particular services involved include: education, health, employment, social services, developmental services, social sensitivity, housing, cultural, and legal assistance (particularly for illegal sector workers) (Zapata-Barrero 2004). Other regions, such as Madrid and Catalonia have similar plans in effect (Zapata-Barrero 2004). In practice, less is offered by the acs than meets the eye. For example, the Madrid Regional Immigration office has provided only information and data regarding immigration; it has offered no direct services (Tamayo y Carrillo 2002, interviews). In Andalucía, the Observatory has found services to be offered but poorly coordinated, with the exception of a well-developed network of employers. Problems of coordination were particularly acute in public education, sanitation/health, and housing agencies.

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It is at the municipal level, where immigrant populations settle, that the problems of integration occur. As mentioned earlier, municipalities over 20,000 in population are responsible for social services, under ac supervision. But the responsibility is not the real issue, since almost all immigrants settle in large cities, and where there are reasonable concentrations they will inevitably affect numerous city services. The municipalities surrounding Madrid, plus those of Catalonia, Andalucía, and Valencia, particularly their coastal areas, are the heaviest hit. While immigrant populations are heterogeneous, they tend to congregate residentially based on country of origin. This has been a barrier to inter-immigrant integration, not to speak of integration with the general Spanish population (with perhaps the exception of the small number of middle-class Latin Americans who immigrate and assimilate rapidly). Each municipality has a different capacity to deal with the influx of migrants. Local service networks include the office of social services attached to the municipality, ac-run school programs, city housing agencies, ac-operated health services within the city, ac employment services, locally based immigrant associations (e.g., local immigrant solidarity groups: Latin American, Dominican Women, North African, and Chinese), Red Cross, Catholic Charities, and municipal cultural associations. Unless a city has a lead local agency, such as a commission for refugee assistance, services tend to be uncoordinated. If any coordination is done without such a commission, it is normally through the municipal social services office/commission. In the late 1990s municipalities began to ask for additional grants and funding to meet the increasing demand for services. Some housing and relocation assistance is trickled down through provivienda, a housing program operated in collaboration with ngos. For example, Andalucía has increased service monies, particularly since its cities are periodically inundated by workers rotated off crop harvesting, as agriculture has become more diversified. Labour unions have denounced the poor working conditions of immigrant agricultural labour (e.g., housing, working conditions, hours, wages, child labour) and have promoted regulations for services assistance. On the other hand, the Valencia ac has offered no new city-dedicated money, expecting municipalities to finance integration programs out of existing budgets. Beyond services for integration, higher-level governments provide little in the way of assistance. The central government and acs pro-

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vide information to municipalities in the form of lists of known “illegals.” The sweeps for illegals, who would then presumably be slated for deportation, when they happen, are the responsibility of the national police. Municipalities have not really had a direct role in the enforcement side of illegal immigration. Indirectly however, because they handle work permits, residence permits, authorization to return to the home country, settlement services, reuniting of families, and mediation and translation services, the cities do become involved in immigrant services, for which they receive modest grants. One problem for municipalities is that illegal immigrants would not show up on municipal registers. The same is true for the welloff “eternal tourists” who enter the country under visitor status but stay longer than the 100-day limit, establish a residence, but are not enrolled citizens or on the municipal census or padrón. This leads to service demands by immigrants and others residing in the territory but they are not counted in the allocation of grants and in service allocations. For example, Jávea has a padrón of 32,000 people but the estimated “real” population approaches 45,000, with an estimated 1996 loss of 190 euros per person per year (just under 2.5 million euros) in revenue sharing. Municipalities have raised the question of whether they can register (empadronar) persons even if they are not citizens. For those who live in Spain over 180 days and have a residencia registered with the diputación, the answer is yes. This normally includes the wealthier immigrants. But some of these well-off migrants are reluctant to register for fear of losing health benefits back home, or in the interest of maintaining a home in their country of citizenship, or because of concern over being able to return home. During the 1990s the national government, in collaboration with femp, promoted an empadronamiento campaign. Nevertheless, for non-documented immigrants no policy has been established. The problem of empadronamiento is one of the greatest concerns to those municipalities hit especially hard by immigration. In summary, the immigrant problems for municipalities are myriad. Most importantly, municipalities have limited powers and resources to tackle the social and other service expectations placed on them. While local networks of employers are relatively well developed, local education, housing, and social service networks are uncoordinated in most places. Access to many services and programs require documentation and passports that certain immigrants do not have. Undocumented immigrants tend not to be part of the

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system of assistance. These issues have caused persistent criticism by the Spanish Commission on Refugee Aid (clear), an ngo. In addition, there is animosity and intolerance to immigrant groups, along with inter-group animosity (e.g., between Moroccans and Romanians) within communities. Sensitivity to diversity and intercultural consciousness are needed, particularly in nonsegregated housing areas. Another issue is the well-off eternal tourists. They not only make demands on municipal services, but in some towns establish their own enclaves, often choosing not to learn Spanish, and establishing “Little Germany” or “Little Britain” communities. Their service expectations tend to mirror their home municipal experiences, while Spain has different traditions. In this situation it is not so much the issue of jobs, but the degree to which new residents demand services (often in their native language), without really integrating into their new places of residence. In February 2005 the national government enacted a policy change designed to stop the estimated 800,000 clandestinos, that is, illegal immigrants, working in the underground economy. It is aimed at getting them to pay their taxes and contribute to social security, which will help to allow these immigrants to blend into the economy. Spain will now grant residence permits to immigrants who can provide proof of their registration with a municipality from before 8 August 2004, proof that they have no criminal record, and a work contract of six months (for agricultural workers three months; for domestic workers, 30 hours per week). Immigrant employees had until 7 May 2005 to provide contracts to local authorities. Once these conditions are fulfilled and are given conditional approval, immigrants are registered with social security and start paying into the system. The government will also promote legal immigration by providing threemonth visas designed to give immigrants time to find work in Spain before applying for residence. While the program has a number of supporters who feel that the labour market playing field will level somewhat and that more workers will be contributing to social security, detractors such as clear have said it does not protect non-workers: children, the elderly, and those who can’t work. Critics have also argued that it will increase inter-group tension. Most importantly, some critics, including the opposition pp, have argued that it will mean that more foreigners will be laid off and the underground economy will not be changed. Ana Pastor, pp social affairs spokesperson said,

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“Those who ask for contracts will simply be fired” (Levante 2–8–05, 1, 15). A report in El País (2–24–05, 15) indicated that in the first 16 working days 48,247 immigrants registered under the new program, 63 per cent of whom were from the Madrid, Catalonia, and Valencia regions. On the same day, the government announced that it planned to make one-half million employment inquiries between the May 7 deadline and the end of 2005. Nevertheless, by the end of 2007, it was estimated by the Labour and Immigration Ministry that some 600,000 of its 4.7 million immigrants were undocumented. As the economy turned down in 2008, towards 12 per cent unemployment, and as the building industry declined by 40 per cent in some regions, immigrants were the hardest hit by unemployment. Migrants by the thousands claimed benefits. The government in Madrid began offering incentives to move under a “plan of voluntary return,” allowing migrants to claim future unemployment payments early, in two lump sums, if they hand in their residence permits and agree to stay away for three years. Some may be eligible for as much as 25,000 euros. Very few recent immigrants, however, have shown any interest in returning home. Spain’s immigration policy has been internationally praised as potentially more effective than the various control means that other countries have used. Two issues are clear, however. One is that in a declining economic situation immigrants present a reverse socioeconomic burden, swelling unemployment rolls and impacting communities. The other is that locally the registration process has injected municipalities directly into the admission and control process in ways that previously were responsibilities of other levels of government. It is another example of what one provincial official characterized as how municipalities are treated. “Se tienen que tragar lo que les caiga” that is, “they have to swallow whatever comes their way.”

local government: land use in valencia ac Land use in Spain has risen to the top of the visibility chain because of the large gains accrued through riskless speculation on land by purchase and resale operations motivated by quick capital gains rather than value-adding. Tight controls on land use in Spain has

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been the exception, such as the role of the Catalan Land Institute, a public body, which has guided ac land development, particularly by controlling growth within existing towns or close by towns, using a polycentric city model (García 2003, 348). Limited local government financing resources lead to budget-enhancing real-estate deals. These, along with entrenched political party leadership interests controlling local councils and a lack of local government transparency and democratic participation in urban development, combine to encourage speculation and uncontrolled growth. Spanish law supports this process. When a town or city council rezones a protected area of land, 90 per cent of the capital gains accrued from the transaction go to the owner rather than the town hall, almost the reverse of the situation in most European countries. A 1956 Land Law still on the books introduced price controls, artificially inflating them as a possible use for future urban development. This mechanism benefits the land owner, who gains without making any investment. Moreover, any capital gains can be financed by the developer or local authorities who are expropriating the land (De la Vega 2007, 5). A notable illustration of greater local government use of this policy flexibility in areas of high population growth concerns the Valencia ac lrau or Law Regulating Urban Activity land-use law. This has opened many corruption doors and has created new clientelistic policy networks involving local governments and land interests. Enacted in 1994, it was intended to protect small rural parcel holders in areas threatened by urbanization from needless expropriation and/or from having to bear large shares of infrastructure development costs. It has not worked out that way. lrau allows municipalities to create a pai or Plan de Actividades Integradas giving the urbanizing agent (developer) full autonomy in all matters such as projecting and implementing his/her own urban plans, and including any prices for land and or buildings he or she may see as convenient. The agent is supposed to present a “financial economic proposition” that states what the developer will be paid for the work to be carried out to develop the urbanization. Moreover, the city government can benefit to the extent that added building licence fees provide needed revenue, and up to 10 per cent of the land under Integrated Development Plans can be reserved (that is, acquired) for “public use.” The property owners’ rights are limited to being informed, to making “suggestions for alterations”

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to city government, and (if a contribution is provided), to demanding execution of alterations, and to having town hall supervision (Correcher 2003, 2–3). The law is further explained in Appendix D. There appears to be little or no protection of property rights in lrau. It has opened the door to developers, in collusion with real-estate promoters and city halls, “taking” portions of rural land to compensate for their infrastructure costs. On the Valencia coast, it is known as the land grab law. In the small town of Hondon de los Frailes in Alicante province a proposal was made in 2004 to build nearly 1000 homes under lrau on land currently owned by 126 property owners. Before any public meeting the city worked out a Plan Parcial amendment to its General Plan with a set of architects, developers, and real-estate brokers. It was to be transmitted to Alicante (province) and Valencia (ac) for approval. Residents fought this plan, but lawyers for the other parties fought them fiercely. Ultimately, the plan was scaled back to 200 homes. In nearby Pilar de la Horadada, the minority party convinced two majority councillors to “turncoat” and support a censure motion changing the government. Two days later the new majority approved a project involving 5,200 housing units on a 2.6 million square metre section of rural land. The old majority claimed that there were several investment links, through families and shadow companies, to the new majority. In another Alicante Province town, Benissa, the town hall informed residents of one rural neighbourhood that three developers had placed a bid to develop their area, one for a commercial area, one for housing, and one for a luxury hotel. Either way they would have to yield some of their land to pay for infrastructure or pay large portions of the costs. Numerous rural residents find that their house/plot is now affected by urbanization plans. Among the worse-case scenarios, one property owner in the coastal town of Moraira faced a 200,000 euro bill as her contribution to infrastructure costs. Another property owner in Pedramala is being forced to hand over half of his land and make a 90,000 euro contribution to infrastructure costs. One of the persons interviewed for this study was told that the developer wanted one-third of his land, including a piece for an access road that was designed to go right through his swimming pool. Others have similarly been forced to give up land for approach roads. Residents who cannot afford the charges are being forced to sell their homes.

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The only current recourse for such owners is for all of them (51 per cent of land) to come up with an alternative plan, which is highly unlikely to be accepted by the town. An interest group, Abusos-No, (http://www/abuso-no.org/lrau2004), based on the Valencian coast, is engaging in a public awareness campaign through the English, German, and Spanish media. It has supported individual landowners as they have appealed to the Spanish courts, which have not been willing to hear the case. As a result Abusos-No filed a class action civil rights suit before the European Court of Justice. That court ruled in favour of the plaintiffs and ordered the central government of Spain to correct the law. It has been put back into the hands of the ac government. Two attempts to change the law have not satisfied the European authorities. In mid 2008 the Valencian government was again instructed by the European court to engage in a complete overhaul of their dysfunctional urban land laws (El País, 5/19/08, Valencia edition, [email protected]). Advocates of eliminating the law maintain that any changes must exclude possibilities of existing property owners being forced to participate in new development projects, and must call for immediate suspension of all provisions of lrau and for victim compensation. Meanwhile the project developers/promoters tend to be wellfinanced companies, who connect with the local administrations that depend on fees from approval of urbanization plans and building licences, not to speak of anticipated property-tax increases. Some local officials are land owners of certain parcels in the targeted area who, knowing in advance of urbanizing land, speculate. Others are involved in taking payoffs from developers and promoters. Thus, while lrau was initially intended to protect land owners, it has become a vehicle for corruption-based land development at their expense. In as much as land use is generally a matter of local policy discretion, some local governments have used this power to create harmful policies. The situation clearly illustrates local government networks, tinged with corruption or not. Overbuilding and uncontrolled growth by new residents who have largely come from Northern Europe (e.g., 46 coastal villages now have a majority by over 25 per cent of foreign-born) for “fun in the sun” cause real problems for city governments. Much of this building is done without real urban planning, and the required services and infrastructure follow very slowly. City hall, however, must find the money to pay for them, often with the maintenance

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costs exceeding the return in taxes and fees from the developments. Local councils then find themselves entering a vicious circle as it gives planning permission to build more houses to earn more licence fees and then has to pay for more services. Eventually, a town council can use up all the land available for building, accelerating the financial crisis in as much as the town may already be in debt (Pérez-Lanzae 2006, 5). Reinforcing this process is poor communication and understanding between established Spanish residents and the new citizens. Few of the new people successfully integrate into Spanish society, and mutual misunderstandings arise over the less than welcoming spirit of long-term residents and their perceptions that outsiders are using all of the local resources. The new residents, on the other hand, make little effort to integrate themselves, focusing on their own social, charity, and fundraising events. This lack of integration carries over into local politics, where foreigners (eu citizens vote in local and eu elections) feel councils ignore them. So then they organize and make contact with local political parties, and sometimes form their own bloc. What does this lead to? Demands for more services, for example, doctors, police protection, bus service, translation services, activity centres, bicycle routes, libraries, and in some cases senior-care homes (Pérez-Lanzae 2006). These demands, which have not been planned for or financed, escalate the costs for the municipality. The housing boom levelled off in most of Spain, including Valencia, in 2007–08. By the start of 2008 1.5 million dwellings were for sale in Spain. The demand for new dwellings is expected to decline by 40 per cent of the present demand. Many large construction companies have lost up to 30–40 per cent of their value on the stock market, and 2007 closed with a loss of over 32,000 construction jobs. The director of the Valencia property fair expects two out of three large development promoters to disappear during a threeyear-long property crisis. Nonetheless, the Valencia ac government reported in early 2008 that 75 of 150 not yet approved urbanization plans will be moved forward, some 80 million square metres of building. One interpretation is that the remaining promoters are placing pressure on the regional government, since they need to upgrade the value of their assets, turning cheaply purchased farmland into scarce commodities, perhaps reselling to other builders or creditors. Meanwhile, the courts and central government, backed

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by citizen protests, have stopped some projects because of insufficient infrastructure or protection of greenspace. Another countrywide move is for builders to get femp support to increase public housing unit construction by 200,000 units per year. Municipalities will have to allocate public land for these dwellings. While most large constructors do not like these narrow profit margin undertakings, they now have little choice if they want to stay in business. The municipality’s interest is that new permits will make up for lost revenues from declining private construction (Grapevine 1/08; 2/08). While the property development market may be declining, the networks of municipal builders-promoters are unlikely to change the way land use policies are developed at the local level. lrau in Valencia is symptomatic of urban land use/abuse in growth areas throughout the country. Regions like Andalucia, the Canaries, the Baleares, and Madrid are facing similar forces, where local citizens and house buyers are pitted against developers, realestate agents, and local government officials. New construction is a primary source of urban financing, through licensing/permit fees and property taxes. Building construction – bricks and mortar – is a sensitive issue and to raise questions of controlled growth against powerful companies and local politicians, as some urban planners and architects have, goes against a long-term prevailing “boom” grain. A 1998 central land law, which considered virtually all land developable unless special provisions to protect it existed, clearly contributes. But the building boom began nearly a decade earlier, with a landscape of construction cranes, protected by law and a political will to drive the economy through construction. “Sustainable development, limiting urban development and defending our heritage aren’t vote winners ... town government doesn’t develop existing real estate, tolerates the fraudulent ruin and systematic destruction of the historic area of Portes,” related architect César Gutiérrez, as he resigned after 14 years on the Portes (Andalucia) Council (Serra 2007, 4). As a result, land use and abuse is a problem of a widespread nature.

conclusion Policy development is becoming increasingly pluralized in Spain, given its multilevel nature. The eu influence in arenas such as infrastructure and immigration demonstrates that multilevel means

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more than the country itself; programs implemented in cities like Seville, Alicante, and Madrid often begin in Brussels. The three case studies provide a picture of igr as involving more than one level, albeit differently, at various stages of the process. They demonstrate the higher-level governments’ quest for a semblance of control and policy guidance and the lower levels search for flexibility and for local decisions regarding money and operations. This is the intergovernmental policy game. Gibbons (1999, 134) concludes that it is clearly a game played by everyone along the line, because of a fundamental distrust of the capacity of bureaucratic structures to implement policy and allocate public goods in a rational and fair way. Thus policy delivery occurs through contemporary clientelistic networks mediated by political and party brokers. Blanco y Gomá (2003) have analyzed the development of urban policies. They identify first-generation urban policies as basic policies of economic development, social and cultural promotion, infrastructure, and basic environmental programs. A more innovative second wave of programs include technology and labour placement, social promotion and personal development, historic preservation and community development, and sustainable environmental programs. Traversing these two waves are third wave ongoing projects for Agenda 21 and various cultural, education, and information programs. These policy efforts seriously affect urban populations, since the overwhelming majority of Spaniards live in larger cities. One way to illustrate how third wave municipal policies have arrived is to highlight various ac supported and financed municipal programs sponsored in the towns surrounding the Valencia city metropolitan area in May, 2008 (Crónica # local 5/30/08, 8–12): La Canyada holds a conference on designating “green zones” Manises inaugurates a new Centre for Business Technological Development Picayna recognizes its cultural week at its School for Adults Paterna announces a pre-school program at its industrial park Piaporta develops a course on intercultural mediation Aldaia creates safe hiking routes for children and elderly persons Silla organizes a Council of Citizen Participation Massanassa celebrates Senior Citizen Week Alaquàs holds a series of citizen meetings on its revised general plan

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Mislata announces a month of sport and environmental activities Alaquàs announces it will sponsor a course on energy efficiency In addition to policies and programs related to basics like housing, infrastructure, and immigrant social services, Spanish towns also seek to enhance the lives of their citizens through these third wave lifestyle municipal programs. Like the politics and policy of immigration, they bring in different levels of government and new policy actors, involving local government with several other levels. They illustrate “new spaces and new structures of government” (Pelàez, Donaldson, González, y Montardit 2002, 275). As was suggested earlier regarding intergovernmental politics, in post-Franco Spain consensus politics prevailed regarding big picture items like constitutional questions, but generally Spanish politics and policy is characterized by strong executive policymaking at all levels, coupled with corporatist style negotiations. In a series of parliaments this has been particularly true with minority governments, where non-state parties and local minor parties become significant forces. Newer politics such as third generation politics and policies have not, as Gibbons (1999, 135) concludes, in any way pushed out clientelistic policy networks: Clientelism presents itself at all levels of the policy machinery in Spain as a persistent phenomenon in the routine delivery of policy resources, in exchange for such “commodities” as political support or, in some cases, individual material gain for the policy actors with access to such policy resources. There is no clear evidence to suggest that clientelism in Spain is just a vestigial hangover in the process of transformation from a traditional to a modern society. Instead, it appears to be an intrinsic part of the structure of Spain’s policy process. Policy networks provide a way of depicting a style of interaction between policy actors at the middle (or meso) levels of policy-making in some sectors. The absence of widespread interest group organization in Spain makes the pertinence of this approach rather limited, especially as whatever interest group penetration there is tends to be rather weak in the Spanish polity. But eu membership has prompted some policy network development in Spain.

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Interest-based policy networks of the third generation are then slowly emerging, (Blanco y Gomá 2002) particularly with eu encouragement, but clientelistic networks also remain. Both phenomena make policy processes highly intergovernmental in multilevel Spain.

ts/Intergovernmental enges Networks in Federalizing Spain

9 Reform and the Challenges of Urban Governing

In 2003 a prominent Andalucia mayor, Manuel Jimenez Baccios, declared before the regional federation of municipalities that Spain had arrived at a time when the focus should be on cities. “The consolidation of the Estado de las Autonomías was complete and now cities need the financial resources necessary to offer those services needed by their citizens, and to do so framing the powers that respect municipal autonomy as an important component of the state.” This is the path that local government associations must take, he concluded (Román 2003, 17). This echoes the cry of most Spanish local government reform advocates, who feel that cities have been substantially left behind in the quest to build an autonomous state. To what extent do Spanish intergovernmental reforms take into account municipal and other reforms? Is the intergovernmental system adequate to facilitate the operation of third-tier governments? These are the key questions that relate to local government reform in Spain. Four important issues constantly emerge in the course of understanding local government reform. The first is that attention to municipal restructuring – organization, powers, financing – is always overshadowed by more visible debates regarding the role of acs within the system. This is not only because of the ethnic nationalist preoccupation related to the continuing and sometimes strident demands of the Basques and Catalans but also because of the amount of central political and governmental energy and attention that is devoted to all acs as opposed to local governments. Concern for building the autonomic state crowds out local reform. Second, municipal reform is not as straightforward as ac reform, in as much

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as in typical federal fashion most local powers beyond basic or framework laws reside with the acs, meaning that change must occur region by region. It is the dual subordination issue again. To date, the acs have been generally reluctant to further decentralize power in more than symbolic ways, for example in language, in their statutes of autonomy. Third, the local governments themselves, particularly the municipalities, have been preoccupied with a “second decentralization” or transfer of powers and revenue capacities that would give them the same kind of autonomy as that of second-tier governments in federal countries. Based on federal experiences in a variety of other systems – Australia, Canada, Brazil, Mexico, the United States – this is perhaps politically and legally unrealistic. Attention to furthering this kind of autonomy has come at the expense of identifying deeper urban social and economic problems within cities. To be sure, municipal corporations may need those exclusive powers and revenues necessary to tackle any immediate local problems, but the debate is rarely over issues of housing, open space and environment, immigrant settlement, economic development, or the like. It tends to be over having the final word regarding traditional services and over sorting out and devolving powers independent of the other governments by “eroding” or even ending dual subordination. A fourth concern, related to the attention drag of further decentralization, is the participatory or democratic deficit experienced in many Spanish cities. As will be demonstrated, municipalities lag far behind their counterparts in most developed countries in facilitating citizens’ involvement or any other means of civic engagement in both local concerns and those global issues that have an effect locally. Spain remains very much an elite-dominated political system, local democracy included. The resultant attention to other matters makes it difficult to assess in any meaningful way how the “urban challenge” is being met beyond such case studies as highlighted in the previous chapter. The local government reform movement will be examined in this chapter from an intergovernmental perspective. First, the analysis puts municipal reform in the context of larger ac reform issues. Second, the decade-long movement for municipal reform through Pacto Locales is explained. Third, the latest local government reform introduced by the psoe government in early 2005 is identified. Fourth, a series of multilevel governing and urban challenges in Spain are identified, including corruption reform, problems with

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local capacities, and the form of municipal government. The chapter concludes with the identification of the “fit” of Spanish local governments in a “federal culture.”

the ac attention drain Intergovernmental attention in Spain has recently been consumed by reform of the ac statutes of autonomy, which require parliamentary approval in Madrid. Between 2005 (after the psoe resumed power) and 2008 six acs revised their statutes: Valencia, Catalonia, Andalucia, in 2006, and Baleares, Aragon, and Castilla y León in 2007. The Canary Islands was withdrawn and Castilla-La Mancha is in process before the Cortes Generales (iea Newsletter 2009). In several other acs, their parliamentary reform committees are drafting proposals. This process is unique because it is “the first time that regional parties and parliaments set the agenda of reform of their statutes without a previous consensus or agreement among national political forces regarding the orientation and goals of reform” (Colino 2007, 2). The process has not followed “any global plan or scheme concerning the territorial model to be achieved” (ibid.). It has not been without controversy, highly pitched debate, and extensive public visibility. Initially the Basques, through their parliament, called for a referendum on becoming a “free state associated with Spain,” which has been rejected by Madrid as unconstitutional, but held on to by the Basque political leaders nevertheless. Catalonia’s late 2005 proposals were less secessionist but more strident within the existing federal model, initially calling for an independent legal system, the right to raise all taxes and negotiate payments to Madrid, and the right to be called a nation. While considerably toned down by the Cortes in 2006 and reluctantly accepted (with a raise in tax sharing to 50 per cent), it was passed in Catalonia by referendum in June 2006. The Catalan Statute is now under Constitutional Tribunal appeals, a process that could take years. The psoe government in Madrid then had to turn its attention back to the Basque Country, where the terrorist organization eta declared a cease-fire in favour of joining negotiations, only to break it December 2006 with a bombing of a Madrid airport parking ramp, causing two deaths. Other eta-associated violence has continued. Months have been

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consumed with this issue, while other regions continue to negotiate their statutes, further draining intergovernmental attention. With regard to local government, each time the political quotient of ac autonomy goes up attention to other aspects of governing, particularly local government reform, goes down. From 2005 onward the psoe government in Madrid had to set aside other governance issues for the statute negotiations. The call for a Basque referendum is claimed by the centre to be unconstitutional, and it has asked for reasonable positions in conjunction with the state, “always guaranteeing respect for the constitution and counting on reasonable consensus among the parties” (El País 2–24–05, 16). The gloomiest predictions by some journalists however, included invoking of Article 155 of the Constitution, with Madrid dissolving the regional government. There was even an isolated threat by a retiring military officer of sending the armed forces into the fray, claiming its role in protecting the Constitution. While not directly relevant to this study, the Basque or Ibarretexe plan, the Catalan statute of autonomy, and other reforms have consumed a great deal of political energy, heightened tensions between regionalists and centrists, and drawn attention and energy from many other of the government’s program of intergovernmental reform. The statute of autonomy reform program is but one part of the government’s intergovernmental program. The government has also suggested that the Constitution be amended to name the 17 acs, to elevate their status within the eu. A proposal has been made to reform all ac statutes of autonomy, clarifying certain shared powers, and moving some additional powers exclusively into the hands of the acs. The government indicated that legislation will be introduced, identifying and enhancing the presence of the acs in eu decision making, particularly in their arenas of competency or in concurrent competency areas. Another long-standing area of concern identified by the government is that of Senate reform, giving it an institutional design that makes it more of a body of regional representation and decision. In this case there is disagreement regarding whether such reforms can be carried out by Constitutional reform or by statute (Aja 2003). Along the lines of executive federalism as practised in Australia and Canada (Watts 1999), the government has created a Conference of Presidents of Autonomous Communities, which meets regularly with the prime minister and

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key cabinet members on matters of mutual concern. Prime Minister Zapatero has met twice yearly with the ac presidents since 2004 and to review matters of mutual importance. One formulation of the conference organization, not acted upon, would include giving femp one seat on this body, presumably the current president of femp, who is normally a big-city mayor. The final aspect of the governmental reform program includes further guarantees of local government’s powers and revision of their financing.

the

PACTO LOCAL

or second decentralization

For over a decade local governments have been trying to catch up to acs in solidifying their autonomy through direct negotiations with the central government and secondarily through ac governments. As indicated, the Spanish corporatist mode of intergovernmental politics is to channel demands into a series of negotiations, sometimes bilateral and sometimes multilateral, through a series of summit level pacts on multiple party agreements. This is the way the ac system was built (Agranoff 1996) and this is the way femp has approached local reform. The term Pacto Local emerged for the first time in November 1993 at an extraordinary meeting of femp in La Coruña, Galicia. It emerged from the effort to “clarify and redefine the powers of local administration from a decentralization perspective, and in the light of the principles of autonomy and subsidiarity” (femp 1993). At the meeting it was concluded that local powers needed further clarification beyond the lrbrl of 1985 and, in particular, competencies that were independent of those of the acs. “Pacto Local” emerged, according to Cicuéndez (2003, 111–12), because of the contradictory and imprecise nature of local administration in Spain. First, local governments were forced to assume competencies that did not always correspond to local citizen demands. Second, local governments were forced to assume functions delegated from other levels of government without fiscal compensation. Third, those functions delegated were not necessarily those that local governments needed to meet contemporary challenges. Fourth, they were limited in political, managerial, and fiscal capacity to solve local problems. Cicuéndez concludes that the post-transition governing system was deficient in providing for selfgoverning ability.

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Figure 9.1 What Is Pacto Local?

The local governments of Spain are seeking more authority. After more than twenty years as part of the decentralized system put in place by the 1978 constitution, they think the time has come for them to step forward and play a more relevant and active role. This is what the so-called “Pactos Locales” (Local Pacts) are aimed at. They are a set of agreements between the central government, the Autonomous Communities, and the local governments with the purpose of both redefining and broadening the authority bestowed upon local entities. Municipalities are now seeking a new assignment of authority. Given the cooperative nature of the Spanish decentralized system, the only way to attain this redistribution is through an agreement between the three existing tiers of government. This is what the Local Pacts are aimed at: There has already been one Local Pact, and another one is being negotiated at the present time. The first Pact was agreed between the central government and the municipalities in the mid-nineties. As a result, between 1998 and 1999 the central government passed a set of laws that redefined and increased municipal authority. Among other changes, this Pact dealt with matters such as security in public places, transport and parking, environmental protection, tourism, health, and housing. However, this first Local Pact could not deal with most of the matters that had been proposed by the municipalities, as they were matters under the jurisdiction of the Communities, and they did not participate in that first Pact. Thus, out of 92 proposals to broaden and redefine authority that had been introduced by the municipalities, the central government was only able to deal with 32, as the 60 other proposals concerned authority belonging to the Communities. Source: Violeta Ruiz Almendral, “More Power for Spain’s Municipalities?,” Federations 2 (5): 9-10, November 2002.

Local government Pacto Local reform has moved, but as Figure 9.1 indicates it is currently stalled at the ac level. As a result of the 1999 femp-government pact the laws expanded (Appendices b, c) municipal authority. Importantly, they clarified local roles in

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Figure 9.2 femp-State Accord on a New Local Finance Commission

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Compensation for the loss of the tax on business activities. A new system of cessation of taxes to municipalities. Special tax cessation/financing for tourist municipalities. Increased utilities taxing powers. Interadministrative collaboration on delegated functions. Formation of a technical commission to look at ac legislation affecting local administration

Source: http://femp.es/documentos/financacion/acuerdo.pdf Madrid: 21 November 2002

public security in public places, transport and parking, environmental protection, tourism, health, and housing. The acs were not involved in this first decentralization pact and of 92 specific proposals identified by municipal interests, only 32 were covered by the new legislation. The 2003 second decentralization laws enhanced and clarified the fiscal and managerial powers of larger cities. Law 57/2003 attempts to separate the mayor and local government board or commission from the body of the elected councillors. Board members are appointed by the mayor, including the possibility of noncouncillor specialists. Management powers were put in the hands of the board, reinforcing a 1999 amendment to lrbrl. The full assembly of councillors was to become a chamber of debate, with powers of representation, ordinance, planning, and control. This is designed to make the mayor the head of an executive body, albeit collegiate, with board members and executive staff. Lower-level managers are to be in direct reporting relationship to respective board members and the mayor, based on specified delegated powers, the latter being unclear in previous versions of the local government laws. The government-femp fiscal accord that triggered these reforms is summarized in Figure 9.2. This round of decentralization awaits the actions of the ac parliaments, yielding some of their power to large cities regarding such critical urban concerns as urban planning, economic development, employment, consumer protection, sports, and education. As one Spanish local government scholar (Ruiz 2002, 10) put it, “From a technical

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perspective, the legal procedure to bring about this Second Decentralization will be the passing of new laws by the legislative bodies of the communities, once the pacts [between regional branches of femp or their equivalents and ac political parties] have been agreed to. These laws will have to abide by the central government’s Local Autonomy Law of 1985, and will have to establish the procedures for municipalities’ authority.”

the white paper on local reform The central government has tried to include local government in its intergovernmental reform program. It has outlined further reforms in its July 2005 White Paper on Reform of Local Government, primarily authored by an academic who has also had long experience in local government, Manuel Zafra Victor. He prepared a first draft that was subsequently reviewed and revised by a special commission (map, Primer Borrador...1–10–05). Dr Zafra was the Director General for Local Cooperation in the Ministry of Public Administration and is now chief administrator for local affairs for the Andalucia ac. After long sections on the development of local government since the middle 1980s, the Zafra White Paper (map, 2005) calls for four general principles to govern municipal powers: 1) autonomy, or the ability to meet their population’s needs with concomitant powers; 2) subsidiarity, or the ability to address those needs that directly affect their populations; 3) flexibility, or recognition of the diversity among municipalities to offer services; and 4) proportionality, or the ability to receive or levy revenues in relation to their responsibilities. Under the White Paper proposal, as indicated in Figure 9.3, minimal powers would be guaranteed, including internal organization, citizen relations, public revenue and spending, management of municipal property, control over urban development, public security, and management of urban services. It also calls for defining the exclusive boundaries of municipal powers and softening the obligatory services clauses of lrbrl, allowing for greater transfer. Furthermore, the paper asserts that local administrations should manage about 25 per cent of the public sector, stating some nineteen specific services that would give them direct control over basic infrastructure, urban development, police and fire, health and sanitation, culture and sport, and related urban services.

Figure 9.3 Proposed Local Government Home Rule Reforms

I. A basic System of Municipal Powers would: A. Structure municipal powers around three axes: 1. A “general powers” clause that allows cities to adopt and add appropriate administrative powers (normative and/or executive) that those other governmental bodies do not explicitly manage. 2. Unification of articles 26 (basic and mandatory municipal services) and 86.3 (services reserved to local entities) of the lrbrl. 3. Guarantee of minimal powers: Specification of the domain of local issues by outlining more adequate municipal boundaries, maintaining an open concept of jurisdiction that can adapt to local needs (through regional or sector regulations); maintaining the principle of subsidiarity; and recognizing municipal issues that affect neighbours. B. Local administrations should manage about 25 per cent of the public sector. Municipalities should: 1. Define and implement preventive security policies in conjunction with other authorities. 2. Regulate vehicular traffic, including parking, within their domain (urban and rural). 3. Formulate fire prevention and control and create and manage firefighting services. 4. Formulate and approve urbanization plans and territorial management instruments. 5. Oversee housing construction and residential construction standards. 6. Formulate environmental protection policies and develop sustainable plans. 7. Regulate and provide residential water supply. 8. Formulate and develop energy policy, with the goal of promoting renewable energy. 9. Regulate the establishment of telecommunications infrastructure. 10. Regulate and provide street cleaning services on public roads and in public areas. 11. Ensure optimal conditions to promote public health.

Figure 9.3 continued

12. Determine the location of cemeteries and regulate funerary services. 13. Plan and manage public sanitation centres. 14. Regulate and provide social services to promote social integration and cohesion. 15. Regulate and manage sports and leisure activities. 16. Establish, regulate, and manage cultural events through libraries, museums, etc. 17. Promote public educational centres required in the respective local community. 18. Regulate, authorize, and promote economic activities (esp. commerce, artisanship, tourism). 19. Collaborate with police and justice authorities. II. Outlining municipalities’ local authority related to regulatory, executive, and administrative powers. III. Establish general principles that govern a system of municipal powers: A. Autonomy: municipalities develop and promote activities that meet the needs of their respective populations and fulfill their local powers, and other entities must consult a municipality on matters that directly affect the latter’s populations. B. Subsidiarity: municipalities should address matters that affect the municipal population, according to the criteria of proximity and effectiveness. C. Flexibility: In recognition of the great diversity in the capacity of different municipalities to comply with their local power, some municipalities may not meet the obligations inherent in the local powers of their interest. Absent the capacity to fulfill their powers, other territorial entities may be charged to fill these gaps. D. Proportionality: All levels of government (national, regional, local) should take no actions beyond those necessary to fulfill its powers. IV. Guarantees of sufficient fiscal authority to exercise local powers. Newly transferred powers must be accompanied with sources of financing.

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Figure 9.3 continued

V. Provincial powers include: A. Cooperation and collaboration with municipalities to facilitate activities and provide services where municipalities do not exercise local powers. B. Supplementing or replacing local activities or services when a municipality cannot meet the obligations inherent in their local powers. C. Establishing supramunicipal infrastructure and services. D. Establishing non-hierarchical relations with local councils through networking and bargaining. Zafra, Manuel (coord.), White Paper on Local Government Reform in Spain. (July 2005)

Source: Translated and summarized by Juan M. Pedroza and Sergio Villamayor.

An important general competence provision is also included. Figure 9.3 indicates that the White Paper calls for a “general powers” clause that allows local entities to adopt appropriate services that other governmental bodies do not explicitly manage. For example, Ireland, a unitary country with centralized local government control, added a power of general competence in its Local Government Act of 2001. Part 9 of the Act provides broad powers for a local authority to take action to promote the interests of the local community. Section 63 outlines these functions as providing a forum for democratic representation, providing civic leadership, carrying out functions ascribed to local government, carrying out ancillary functions, and taking action to promote the community interest (O’Sullivan 2003, 47). In other words, under general powers the White Paper calls for the enablement of what in the u.s. is called municipal “home rule,” which combines the practice of Imperium in Imperio mode of granting exclusive authority in certain areas of local government and allowing for residual authority in areas not entered into by higher level governments. This blankets some devolution of powers, granting local governments powers to legislate in areas as long as they do not contradict higher level laws that are enacted by parliamentary bodies and/or decided by courts (Zimmerman 1995, 27, 29). Practitioners of local government who were interviewed for this study responded in a generally positive mode to these proposals.

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One provincial official says that it tries to establish local government as “las tercera pata del estado,” that is, the third leg of the nation-state. The ideal of splitting powers between the levels was particularly resonant, although some wished for a call for popularly elected mayors, who would be the undisputed heads of local administration, a provision that was absent in both the draft and the final proposal. Others identified the call for shifting police powers downward as a positive step, along with that of giving municipalities general powers. One summarized the proposals as an attempt to extend the current administrative autonomy to political and fiscal autonomy, particularly to avoid what many local officials characterized as the excessive political “muscling” or bullying by ac governments, particularly when using the funding influence. Finally, a deputy mayor of a large city said that local home rule would move cities away from the current situation: “[My city] has obligations but few rights or authority. The autonomous community commands but does not negotiate. Coordination is desirable, especially to take advantage of economies of scale, but I should be equal.” Inspired by the Zafra Commission’s proposals enumerated in Figure 9.3, a bill to implement the bulk of these reforms was introduced in late 2005 and initially languished after a first reading. After two years of non-action agreement was reached in late 2007 among all political parties and a final text has been submitted to the Cortes for approval, only to be set aside again because of attention to the economic crisis. If enacted the bill would ensure that local governments have defined powers and responsibilities, and the financing to carry them out.

spain and the movement for local government reform The struggle for reform might initially appear to make Spain weak, but one must remember that local governments virtually everywhere – federal and unitary alike – are singly or dually subordinated to higher levels. In this light Spain is perhaps less immune to many of the local reforms that are cutting across the nations of the eu and other countries. In terms of the broad scope of reform, two recent systematic surveys, one by local government academic experts (Prueller 2006) and another via a comparative analysis of a series of country-by-country studies (Denters and Rose 2005),

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suggest that in all cases the reforms mentioned in chapter 1 are very much works in progress, often in various model experiment and/or proposal stages. Their adoption varies considerably from country to country. Many of the enumerated reforms, like the electronic democratic balance sheet or the hiring of professional city administrators, are actually limited to one or a very few countries or situations. On the other hand, approaches such as strengthening mayors, contracting for services, and public-private partnerships have been successfully introduced and institutionalized in a number of countries. It is therefore appropriate to examine Spain’s record in regard to local reforms. The reform movement is examined through a series of tables (9.1–9.4) compiled by the author and reviewed, confirmed, and revised by Spanish experts on local government and administrative reform. Table 9.1 looks at the various issues related to empowerment. In this first category Spain does not do very well, in as much as enhancing council and executive powers has been enacted only for large cities. The reform agenda, however, includes two essential issues: granting of residual home rule or general powers and some forms of local revenue enhancement. Contained within the White Paper and part of Pacto Local, these moves, along with expanding council powers and local revenue enhancement to all cities, would substantially strengthen local governments, despite the fact that professionalization, direct election of mayors, and reduction of the executive scope and size are not currently on the agenda. The record in local management reforms is also mixed, as Table 9.2 indicates. The six (of twelve) zeros represent the absence of many of the hallmarks of the new public management (npm), particularly increased managerial flexibility, performance contracting, benchmarking, and performance evaluation. Some of these reforms were part of the modernization movement of the early 1990s (map 1991; Villoría 2000), but these efforts have lost their cachet to empowerment issues over the past decade. The 2003 law on municipal reform for large cities does introduce such npm techniques as benchmarking and evaluation, along with strengthening the mayor/executive committee’s management and budget role. On the positive side, services privatization, ngo services delivery, off-budget municipal companies, and cross-entity planning are established practices. Competitive bidding deserves special mention, in that it is required, although not for municipal own-source

Table 9.1 Local Government Empowerment Reform

Reform Concern Residual or local home rule power Direct election of mayor Enhancing general council powers Strengthening mayor’s executive responsibilities Professionalization of executive departmental leadership Reduction in size of local executive Enhancement of local revenue capacity

Established Practice

Occasional Practice

On Reform Agenda

Essential Non-Existent Issue

Comments

+ Isolated support Large cities and provincial capitals only Large cities and provincial capitals only

+/– +/–

+

Table 9.2 Local Government Management Reforms

Reform Concern Services privatization Increased managerial flexibility/deregulation Competitive bidding for services ngo services delivery Performance-based contract management Citizen input in management decisions Self-sustaining, off-budget municipal companies Benchmarks of performance Performance evaluation National minimum services standards Internal devolution power to services departments Strategic cross-entity planning

Established Practice +

+/– +

Occasional Practice

On Reform Agenda

Essential Non-Existent Issue

Comments Especially sanitation, water, adult education Very weak law Social services and culture

+

Infrastructure, economic development, housing

+

In more professionalized cities

+

Particularly by provinces and large cities

Table 9.3 Local Government Partnerships

Reform Concern

Established Practice

Interlocal intergovernmental partnerships/ agreements Partnerships and alliances with private organizations – nonprofit Partnerships and alliances with private organizations – for profit Cooperation in services delivery among adjacent governments Quasi-nongovernmental organizations

+

Neighbourhood council – ngo partnerships

+

Public-private non-profit associations Vertical intergovernmental partnerships

+ +

Private-public joint development corporations

+

+ + + +

Occasional Practice

On Reform Agenda

Essential Non-Existent Issue

Comments Waste water, fire, ambulance, cultural mancomunidades Social protection and insertion Water, ambulance, emergency health Social services, emergency health Cultural and festivals, civic celebrations Crime-watch, clean-up, urban forestry Immigrant settlement Service and economic consortia Local economic development, housing

Table 9.4 Local Democracy Reform Instruments

Reform Concern

Established Practice

Occasional Practice

Local referenda

+

Petitions for council agendas Citizen written ballot motions Prior appraisal hearings

+ +

Permanent consultative forums

+

Future planning scenario participation Multistage look-appraise-act dialogue

+ +

Partnership boards for social integration Youth councils Opinion surveys Internet consultation Electronic democracy balance sheet

+ + +

On Reform Agenda

Essential Non-Existent Issue

Comments

0 0

0

Many are local official speeches with questions Comisiones informativas, district committees of vecinos Agenda 21 to local committees Particularly for immigrants and non-Spanish residents

0

0 0

A few large cities

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services. Moreover, the law that requires bidding for external services is weak and fraught with conflicts of interest loopholes (Villoria 2004). Nevertheless, the local public management record shows some movement. That is not the case with regard to the creation of local government agreements and partnerships, where collaborative strength is omnipresent. Table 9.3 shows that in the relatively short period of democratic operation, local governments have become adept at intergovernmental-intersectoral collaboration. All nine of the partnership practices are clearly established, and conducted on a regular basis throughout the country. For example, the data presented on mancomunidades and consortia demonstrate the widespread nature of local government engagement in collaborative practices. A variety of mechanisms are prevalent for different services, as the examples of water provision for larger cities reveal. Local intergovernmental agreements prevail in such areas as fire, ambulance, waste water, and cultural affairs, whereas public-private joint development companies are mostly engaged in economic development and housing. This Spanish record of employing most forms of cooperation through intergovernmental networks stands in contrast to other countries, such as England, where “strategic local partnerships” are relatively new and face tremendous obstacles to their operation from the central government (Bel and Costas 2006; Skelcher 2004; Stoker and Wilson 2004). That leaves the scorecard for local democracy reform, where the results appear to be weaker. As Table 9.4 suggests, only two reforms are established on a regular basis, prior hearings and permanent consultative forums. The 2003 municipal reform law does require the creation of extended participation in cities over 250,000 in population. Some smaller cities have voluntarily created social councils. Whereas Article 9.2 of the Spanish Constitution recognizes the right of citizens to engage in civic affairs and encourages public authorities to promote such actions, the traditional record is not great, as Table 9.4 reflects. Public participation in Spain has been, observes Arenilla (2008, 111), “essentially limited on relatively few occasions, to the numerous elections celebrated over the past thirty years.” This is beginning to change at the local level, where political forces such as citizen associations, neighbourhood associations, and previously non-participating individuals are becoming engaged in the “formulation and management of public policies” (ibid.).

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Madrid, for example, has introduced a multi-step process of incorporating citizen views and involvement in their strategic public investment plan in eight of its disadvantaged neighbourhoods (ibid.). Madrid’s efforts no doubt followed the 2003 large city reform law, which now requires them to promote citizen involvement, for example, consultation concerning regulations, creation of citizen complaint boards (made up of councillors), the division of cities into districts, and setting up of a city social council made up of representatives of local organizations. This requirement/practice provides some evidence of closing the democratic deficit identified in chapter 1 (see also Ajangiz y Blas 2008). Other cities, e.g., in Catalonia, have engaged citizen councils in local strategic planning, but the public agency is usually in the lead, and the opportunities for real citizen involvement are quite limited (Brugué y Jarque 2002, 60–2). Citizen meetings are reported by discussants to normally amount to speeches by elected officials, followed by a few minutes of questions at the end. The most visible evidence to the contrary are recent citizen movements to oppose large urbanizations that do not provide for proper infrastructure and are perceived to lead to overbuilding. The sixth item on Table 9.4, future scenario writing, is only established on a regular basis under Agenda 21, and when undertaken such activities are often dominated by local political networks, particularly those of local business and to some degree ngos and the education sector (Font, Font, y Subirats 2002). Five other items on Table 9.4 – referenda, partnership boards, youth councils, opinion surveys, and internet consultation – do exist here and there, but are not widespread over the thousands of local governments. Not even on the radar screen of local democracy reform are council petitions, citizen motions, multistage appraisal, and development of an electronic democracy balance sheet. Of course, not every European government has adopted all of these democratic reforms, but it is indeed rare that Spanish municipalities have tried any of them. At a score of only three, with one on a qualified basis, one would have to conclude that reform of local democracy has taken a “back seat” to structural and collaborative reform, at least under current practices and agendas. These reform estimates suggest that while some means of participation are currently being introduced, Spain is experiencing managerial and democracy reform deficits at the local level. However

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different these results might be in other countries is an unknown. Managerially, the large number of small municipalities obviously makes it difficult to introduce prevailing management reforms, and leads to the extensive number of cooperative intergovernmental measures. Overlapping competencies have also institutionalized cross-national new public management bilateral and multilateral cooperation (Ramos, Alda, Cicuéndez, González, y López 2006, 6). Management tools – contracting, outsourcing, privatization, publicprivate partnerships/joint ventures, networking – as well as more open, flexible types of local organization are needed, so that cities can enhance “their capacity to provide quick and effective responses to real problems” (Alba and Navarro 2008, 11). In regard to democracy, the ability to engage in various forms of deliberative process is one way to help overcome the lack of local control. Clearly, local democracy goes beyond that of local elections. As Alba and Navarro (2008, 10) view the situation, more civic engagement is in order: But in addition to free and fair elections, local legitimacy is strengthened when there is transparency and participation in the governing process. Through participatory democracy, citizens must be able to express their preferences in designing and implementing specific policies. Election-campaign slogans and poorly debated party platforms are not enough to inform governments about the specific views of residents. A more intense civic engagement is needed; participatory tools such as neighbourhood councils, public juries and district boards are only now beginning to be used in municipalities. Spanish local authorities have been implementing such policies over the past decade, more rapidly in the last four years. Some municipalities, such as Alcobendas, have neighbourhood councils, public hearings, improved access by citizens to city councilors, and other participatory avenues for citizen involvement. Still, a view of Spain’s entire local political landscape reveals mediocre success in involving citizens in public life. As Shah (2007, 20) suggests, “The ability of local governments to fend for themselves depends on citizen empowerment engendered by the Information Revolution, that is, citizen’s awareness of their rights and responsibilities to hold government to account in view of

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the transparency and sunshine on government operations brought about by the Information Revolution.” In Spain, this deficit clearly reflects two developed themes: 1) that attention to local democracy went little beyond electoral reform in the early post-Franco days, allowing networks of corporatist-like operations to be the norm; and 2) the basic laws of government operation have provided only templates of services and responsibilities, and have done so in a confusing and overlapping fashion. Without adequate revenue capacities, municipalities have no choice but to network horizontally and vertically. In terms of public management, administrative reform and encouraging citizen engagement have clearly played secondary roles to decentralization and financial devolution. The constituency for local government reform has been largely local officials, who necessarily focus on an agenda that addresses matters of relative empowerment. With the exception of a few local arenas, strong political parties and weak interest groups and low citizen engagement at the local level have meant small or nonexistent constituencies for expanding local democracy.

concerns of local governance and governing Four additional items are worthy of being on the table of local government development: reforms against corruption in local governments; unfinished modernization or capacity enhancement; the digital divide faced by most small governments; and the lack of district representation/the commission form of government. This chapter concludes with a fifth item, a call for “federal” or limited government attitudes to support any subsequent home rule or other local advancements (see also Villoria 2004, 38). Corruption Reform The previous discussion of political culture and the case study on land use and construction highlight the visibility and prominence of municipal officials who are violating the law in collusion with the building industry. In many cases, local officials have “sold” building permits to large scale-developers to bring in city revenue from building permits, without paying any attention to the infrastructure

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needed to supply the new housing units. In Seseña (CastillaLaMancha), in the dry plains just south of Madrid, a developer named Francisco Hernando (El Pocero – Mr Drains) received town permits to build 13,500 new homes, to be one of the largest housing complexes in Spain. No provisions were made for water supply in most of the development. Estimates are that only 2,500 units have been sold and only 750 people have moved in (Economist 5/24/08, 87–8, vol. 387 No. 8581 www.economist.com). Strapped for revenue, Seseña officials no doubt worked around planning laws to sell these permits. In Estepona (Andalucia) Operation Aslapa involved charges that the city operated with a “shadow” administration to handle illegal commissions. Companies that wanted licences or planning permission were forced to make side payments into private bank accounts. Two sets of books were used, one by the mayor and one by the councillor for housing. The payoffs came from the second set of books. City officials, including the mayor, were led off in handcuffs, police carrying boxes of computers, binders, and other evidence to vans, while angry residents shouted insults at their former leaders and others shouted empty words of support (Euro Weekly News, 26 June 2 July 2008, 2, no. 1199, www.euroweeklynews.com). Building issues are not the only arenas of corruption. In the areas of outsourcing, the competitive bidding laws are regularly violated. For example, lucrative waste-removal contracts are let to companies that have relatives of municipal councillors on corporate boards. Sometimes the councillors themselves hold interests in the successful bid firm. Hundreds of such contracts are under investigation. Police corruption has reared its head as well. For example, in Coslada, a suburb southeast of Madrid, over 100 police officers have been arrested or are under investigation for taking “payoffs” for allowing drug distribution rings to operate freely, bar owners to remain open beyond their licensed hours, and prostitution rings to operate without harassment in return for free services. Local corruption is, one might say, an illegal extension of the system of enchufe or being plugged in. It involves clear violations of Spanish law, but authorities are slow to enforce the law, often waiting until egregious and highly visible violations occur (Villoria 2006). Municipal corruption’s recent visibility, as identified earlier, suggests that local government reform will no doubt be highlighted by anti-corruption measures.

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First would be stricter enforcement of the existing laws. Instead of waiting for several years for an illegal practice to become obvious and only then taking legal action, the ac governments need to act more proactively in supervising the fiscal and program activities of its municipalities. In most federal countries this involves a politically neutral accounting board that annually inspects the records of financial transactions. Transactions that are not allowable and/or are illegal are “caught” within the year and monies transacted improperly must be shifted legally and those used clearly illegally must be paid back. Failure to do so leads to immediate prosecution. Program audits are also essential by funding agencies to ensure that legislative intent is met. For example, ac social services ministries should be visiting and checking that programs for the integration of immigrants into Spanish life actually do so by educating and assisting people, and that it is not just “party money.” These so-called “inspector general” functions should be a regular part of ac governments on an active basis in the ayuntamientos. Second, anticorruption laws in the future will no doubt be strengthened and added to the municipal code by the central government. Given the visibility of no-bid or weakly bid contracts the competitive bidding laws will be strengthened. Councillors will no doubt be prevented from acting on and participating in contract selection if they have a close connection to any bidder. Conflict of interest rules will be strengthened; for example, companies that a councillor or close relative has an interest in will not be allowed to bid on a contract. Zoning laws will be strengthened and made subject to greater land use controls. ac governments may even be required to enforce these more vigorously. Other codes of conduct, for example, for police officers and other civil servants, will be more closely supervised. ac governments may have to review the actions of municipal police annually. A third arena of potential anticorruption action may fall on offbudget enterprises, e.g., municipal corporations, public private ventures consortia for infrastructure projects, and the like. Many of these have been hidden from public scrutiny. The eu’s fiscal rules about budget/inflation control have discouraged adoption of many of these enterprises. The central government could make these entities more fiscally responsible through strict financial and reporting limits, and they could be placed more closely under the supervision of the respective ac governments.

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Capacity Modernization of the Spanish bureaucracy has been a part of the Spanish government agenda since the early 1990s. At the regional level attempts to improve management were enhanced as the corps of professional employees in health, education, and social welfare were transferred from the national government to the acs. If decentralized university public employees are included, estimates place the transfer at up to one-third of all public employees or nearly 750,000 professional and operational staff. This has given the ac governments an initial round of experience in the second level of government (Villoria 2000). In the very largest of cities, as mentioned, governments have become considerably more professionalized as services departments have been staffed with recent university graduates and professionals from the private sector and from other governmental units. In this sense, municipal and other local governments have, however, had to “grow their own” capacity. Small-town Spain, on the other hand, has been largely immune to such professionalization. femp has tried to bridge the gap by offering training, but its reach is limited. Again, the other capacity problem identified earlier is that local departments are headed by city council commissioners, who are in most cities part-time local elected officials and, in most cases, do not have the technical capability to oversee their departments/ employees. The 2003 reforms constituted a first step in improving the opportunity for large cities to increase their capacities by strengthening their ability to “exercise their budgeting, accounting, financial management, and property management, with specialized bodies that are consistent with local competencies” (Carta Local 2–04 p. 14). Despite a call for modernization of administration in the White Paper on local reform, modernization efforts at this level will not, according to national officials at map, include further efforts to improve local management capabilities. Any human resource development in the arena of public management will be left up to the local governments themselves or to femp or their regional associations. Digital Competence A closely related issue in the electronic/knowledge era is the “digital divide” among local governments, particularly the numerous

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smaller units. A number of officials who were contacted in the field or at the local government level say the greatest operational obstacle for small local governments is to meaningfully tap into the “autopista electrónica” or the information superhighway. One official in Andalucía put it this way: “The challenge is no longer building roads – you can get from Seville to Paris without hitting any stoplights – but the insufficient technological infrastructure is a great obstacle for rural areas, which cannot access central decisionmaking bodies as easily as urbanized areas.” A technical staff person at the ac level related that what often happens is that technology becomes fashionable and some nefarious firms go around to the small governments selling hardware and software. They put on an impressive show and make promises about the impact of technology, sell their products, make a lot of money and leave. The small governments are left without any technical support (e.g., maintenance, training). The technology goes unused and becomes obsolete. Meanwhile the local government agencies face mounting debt to pay for it. The small governments are not equipped to articulate their needs and make judgments about fitting hardware and software to those needs. By contrast, large cities tend to have the appropriate technology and personnel. One larger city has an in-house information department of 41 professionals: programmers, analysts, operators, and other technical people. The city has its own servers and hardware. The city database is extensive – economic activities, real-estate parcels, public services installations, population census, buildings, vehicle information, vital statistics – and is directly linked to the National Institute of Statistics. About 80 per cent of its information work is done in-house. For example, the city buys and operates its own gis mapping software. It digitalizes area information from an aerial perspective and applies it for local use, e.g., property planning. Most planning functions are based on the in-house gis and this city even offers gis-based planning assistance to smaller, neighbouring municipalities. By contrast, rural and many small governments are reported to be eight to ten years behind in terms of technology. For example, most cannot tap into broad-band information networks because they lack fibre-optic infrastructure. Beyond a web page and basic internet connections, most small towns lack advanced or even current electronic capabilities (Mesa 2007, 145). Closing this divide or “brecha digital” requires more than equipment. One executive at

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the ac level says that it also requires “building a working capacity for using technology through changes in attitude, or cultural changes in mentality (largely generational), and by continued updates and certifications.” Some experienced information experts related that both the diputaciones and the private sector must step up to encourage substantial changes in the way technology is used by local governments. Participation and Government Structure The party-list system of local elections does not allow for direct district representation (Carrillo 1997, 61). Councillors run at-large and neighbourhood representation, if it occurs at all, is a function of the accident of a councillor’s address. Attempts to strengthen the role of district and neighbourhood councils (juntas de distrito, Consejos vecinales) or functional consultative bodies (Consejos sectorales) for larger cities were mentioned in the 2003 legal reforms but they, of course, must be implemented locally. Blanco y Gomà (2003) list several emergent means of local citizen participation, including involvement in local development strategic plans, inputs on local budgets, involvement in Agenda 21, planning for land use and local public spaces, community social/cultural planning, planning for local education projects, plans for integration of immigrant populations, and plans made between city-based networks of actors to develop assistance for the third world. This long list obviously does not include the actions of all cities, and no doubt few cities engage in all of these. Each of these actions, if carried out and if they influence municipal government, does indeed enhance transparency and representation. The form of municipal government, in the light of participation, is noteworthy. The mayor-commission format is virtually universal in Spain (except in cities under 100 in population) but is no longer considered to be efficient, except perhaps in the larger cities, where there is a political and an administrative corps in the executive branch. The municipal commission form is clearly modelled after the parliamentary first minister and cabinet, but the mayor is weaker in Spain than in most countries with this collective form of leadership (Mouritzen and Svara 2002). The commission form of city government was almost accidentally adopted in the u.s. when the Texas legislature suspended the Galveston city government after a flood and imposed a temporary

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government of five businessmen. The form mixes legislative and administrative roles, and puts administrative leadership in elected official hands. In the u.s. it quickly fell out of favour and now is the least popular form (less than 5 per cent of cities). According to Herson and Boland (1998, 104) it quickly lost favour because it was recognized that over the long haul it led to inept and unqualified councillors becoming heads of departments, problems of administrative coordination, inability to develop coherent city policies, political infighting among commissioners, and greater possibilities of the absolute power of commissioners over their domains (jealously guarded territoriality). In some u.s. commission cities, departments were also said to be more prone to corruption. The commission form, they conclude, has never been able to match the initial success of the Texas city from which it sprang (105). In Spain this pattern of commission problems holds particularly true for many small cities where the resources are not available to hire an administrative cadre. The digital divide example is symptomatic of the managerial-technical gap in many small Spanish cities, where “amateur” councillors also head departments. Expectations of performance are far beyond their abilities or experience. In the larger cities the 2003 reform does call for nonelected persons to be executive heads. This should open the way for expertise in planning, transportation, social services, and other specialties. The Zafra White Paper draft on Spain discusses the possibility of shifting this form somewhat, by direct election of the mayor, who would be the undivided executive head of municipal administration. It did not appear in the final version. The political parties have, from time to time, proposed several variations of direct election of mayors, for example the council candidate from the victorious coalition that receives the highest number of votes (Márquez 2007, 61–74). In any discussion of the direct election of mayors it is important to note that in countries where direct mayoral election has been recently enacted, the mayors’ powers vis-à-vis the council have not necessarily been strengthened. One study of Western European reforms concludes that “the adoption of direct election of mayors has not been accompanied by the institutional design required to introduce presidential systems in which the mayor dominates the executive he/she heads and designs, and establishes a separation of powers between the executive and the council, a result of

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the democratic legitimacy of both organs” (Magre and Berlana 2007, 188). This reform would enable the “strong mayor” form of government (parallel to that form in the u.s. and most of Canada) and would overcome many of the shortfalls of commission government. Some larger Spanish cities do use their chief deputy mayor as a sort of chief administrative officer/administrative coordinator to oversee all administration. This role would obviously be strengthened with a directly elected mayor who heads the municipal administration. In a few isolated cases, an elected mayor and commissioners have turned over all non-legislative functions to a city ceo or a form of city manager. In this case the appointed manager appoints department heads and oversees all city administration. For example, Gandia (Valencia Province) experimented with this councilmanager form in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the smaller municipal jurisdictions reform of municipal government may need to seriously consider separating legislative and executive functions, thus unifying administration.

conclusion: the federal culture issue The emergence of federal structures must also be accompanied by federal attitudes. This involves the continuing development of the federal culture idea, where national government, ac officials, and local officials are comfortable in participating in networks of collaboration. It involves the cultivation of a culture among officials and citizens to manage programs across units and hierarchical levels for results. This includes not only technical training but also enhancement of attitudes of interdependence and cooperation. Most important, it involves respect for the boundaries of one another’s government and a willingness to let others decide within their domain (Agranoff 2001; Elazar 1987). Scharpf (1996, 369) reports that the German Constitutional Court has called this the principle of “federal comity,” where all sides, even in exercising exclusive powers, are obliged to avoid undue interference with the constitutional prerogatives of other levels of government. The future of local government in Spain will rely heavily on how mutual respect and advancement of a federal culture develops. Writing over a decade ago, Carrillo (1997, 63) captured this cultural concern:

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In the long run, the condition of local governments will depend heavily on the intergovernmental style of each ac and the extent decentralization will be used within acs. Contrasts between the Catalonian and the Basque cases are nothing but paradigmatic in showing how governments at the same level and with very similar features (in terms of advanced regional economies and strong demands for autonomy) make different choices for the use of local government as an intergovernmental partner. Other differences stem from rural and urban settings, proximity to international boundaries or ports, and particular capacities to use the advantages coming from European integration. Although there are some homogenizing tendencies, the future of Spanish local governments, including municipalities, will depend on how each ac controls corrupt practices, implements or doesn’t implement Pacto Locales, promotes the big city organization and financing reforms of 2003, and supports any of the White Paperrelated parliamentary reforms that are put into law and are exercised within the principles of federal comity. It cannot be any other way, given Spain’s movement into the federal orbit.

ts/Intergovernmental and Challenges Networks in Federalizing Spain

10 Accomplishments and Challenges

Several ambitious Spanish urban architectural projects reflect an individualism uncharacteristic of the old Spain. This is demonstrated in Terence Riley’s 2006 exhibition at the New York Museum of Modern Art on how the urban scene in Spain is catching up to its European neighbours. “It’s not retrospective at all,” indicates Riley. “It is interesting how unnostalgic these projects are for some notion of old Spain. There is a freedom of expression that’s evidently available to these people now, and they are using it.” Several of the projects in Riley’s show are quite ambitious, like La Ciudad de la Cultura de Galicia, a complex of six cultural buildings designed by Peter Eisenman that will surround the old medieval centre of Santiago de Compostella, to be completed by 2010. Other “building blocks” to energize cities include a town hall in Murcia, a tennis centre in Madrid and a health centre in Ibiza. In Barcelona, instead of centralizing health, education, and special services, the city is building small, eye-catching versions in each of the city’s 41 traditional barrios, enlivening neighbourhoods and enriching the city’s architectural fabric. Riley concludes that “When the clamps come off and you give up on a unified country, you get this incredible platform for contemporary culture, driven less by these overarching nationalized narratives and more by these individual and regional expressions.” “There is freedom of expression that’s evidently available to those people now, and they are using it” (Pogrebin 2005, 26). The problem is that the building boom and its lawyer/builder/ estate agent/town councillor allies have constrained the ordinary architects and urban planners from developing a solid foundation

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beneath the more visible architectural projects. “The ruthless commodification of our cities has exiled the discipline of urban development, which has been replaced by the law of the bottom line and buildability, what I call ‘urbanology’,” observes architect Izitar González Virós, a self-styled conscientious objector to brick and mortar (Serra 2007, 4). The bulk of Spanish architecture is in the hands of big developers who repeat the same model with the sole objective of maximizing profits. This can be observed in the endless blocks of flats all over the country. Architects who work for cities have to put up with incredible pressure from inside and outside government. In Valencia, for example, some architects have engaged in debates and signed petitions defending more sustainable and rational land-use policies (Serra 2007, 5). A national manifesto, already subscribed to by over 700 architects, urban planners, and geographers, states that, land-use corruption aside (a matter for the justice system), “the current model also harms the environment, the quality of life of citizens, and access to housing. Construction is done without planning, based on partial plans or singular actions that are not part of serious land-use plans” (Serra 2007, 5). The extent to which, politically and governmentally, cities can and do act on their citizens’ program and service demands is considerably more constrained, very much like the planning and building industry. To be sure, innovative and forward-looking cities of all sizes and regions push the intergovernmental envelope, so to speak, and creatively orchestrate projects that are indigenous and individualized. For the most part, however, Spain’s local governments, particularly those of its municipal corporations where most people live, are intergovernmentally constrained from the kind of individualism that is occasionally expressed in architecture. As the previous chapters have indicated, local governments have few exclusive powers and enumerated services expectations. Their dedicated share of the resource pie is the smallest of all governments and then they are dependent on subventions or other forms of intergovernmental cooperation. They are legally constrained by electoral and government structures that for the most part ensure that politics triumphs over administrative efficiency. Representation of citizens comes somewhere down the line in importance. This is particularly true in the large number of small cities. Despite constitutional and legal autonomy, cities and provincial councils have little of the actual policy/ program autonomy possessed by the acs (López-Aranguren 2001;

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Carrillo 1991; Carrillo 1997). Forms of local government home rule have been entertained for over a decade now but, except for a few marginal changes for the larger cities, it remains on the reform agenda, often to be “pushed off” by the political attention required by ac demands. Indeed, various ethnic nationalist agendas of a regional nature have many times crowded out urban political concerns. Within such constraints, only a few ambitious, mostly largest, cities can exploit existing intergovernmental networks and push through to express the kind of innovation needed to match contemporary urban architectural creativity. In this concluding chapter an attempt will be made to transform analysis of the previous intergovernmental contexts into an overall assessment of Spain’s local governments, particularly in its cities, where most of the population lives. First, progress in building a multilevel “federal democracy” is analyzed. Second, intergovernmental performance, upward and downward, is accounted for. Third, the deficits in making Spanish local government more autonomous are more fully detailed. Fourth, limits on realistically extending local autonomy because of the normal position of local governments in federal systems is discussed. Fifth, the importance of building igr networks is reinforced. Finally, we look at the future of Spanish local government within its federalizing system.

reasonable progress Late in 2005 an association of small builders in Denia (AlicanteValencia) presented a notarized report to the city government that 2,500 houses were being constructed in the northern part of the municipality without sewerage hookups, in violation of the ac law on urban development, under powers delegated to the ac and municipal governments. The town hall froze construction of these homes, and recommended that people who bought these houses should not accept them until they are connected to a collection system. This is clearly an indication that at some levels the system does work. The most important accomplishment is the installation of constitutional democracy in Spain after Franco. A relatively peaceful transition led to the establishment of a parliamentary monarchy with a strong executive power held by the prime minister and cabinet, but with parliamentary limits that were largely contributed to by proportional representation of coalition-based governing

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majorities. A Constitutional Tribunal was also established, along lines similar to that of Germany. It has been instrumental in protecting individual rights, promoting multilevel governance, and limiting government, particularly at the centre. Finally, the central government bureaucracy has been downsized, decentralized, and limited in function, making it more of an instrument of democracy and less a centralized executive arm (Bañón and Tamayo 1997). These developments, in turn, have accelerated Spain’s entry into the European Community/Union (Closa and Heywood 2004). Another important accomplishment is that Spain finally recognized, after over two hundred years of struggle, that the state could only be unified to a certain degree. Constitutionalism in 1978 came to grips with important divisions within the state and regional power-sharing became real over the subsequent two decades. Along with democracy, autonomy gradually ushered in a federal type system of self-rule accompanied with shared rule (Elazar 1987). In theory, autonomy was the vehicle for shared rule, and it was constitutionally designed to pervade all levels. In practice it was built inductively, or step by step (Moreno 2001) and to a limited extent beyond the second tier (Canales 1999; Cicuéndez 2003). Nevertheless, a system of power-sharing has evolved in real terms in the past quarter century. Spain has also impressively “caught up” in many respects as a European welfare or social democratic state. Under Franco, social welfare was not only limited in resources and coverage, but favoured certain groups (e.g., the blind) who were least likely to threaten the regime. Workers were protected in the sense of near-ensured employment, so as to avoid major strikes, but there were few social benefits. The social protection fabric has gradually been expanded and Europeanized, so that today subpopulations in need of assistance or protection are more likely to be covered by the safety net. For example, in early 2006 the government introduced and passed a bill to provide assistance to those who are cared for in their homes, e.g., frail elderly and the handicapped. This now extensive social welfare fabric is highly intergovernmental, as programs filter through acs to networks of public and nongovernmental social and health centres that operate within cities. Cities also sponsor some intergovernmentally funded programs on their own. Public policy in Spain is now also what one might characterize as “eu worthy.” That is to say, programs in areas like employment

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policy, workforce development, gender equity, worker health and safety, environmental protection, and social protection of vulnerable populations are similar to those of other Western European countries. While Spain does not have the best record of eu legislative implementation, its social and economic policies are clearly less isolated. The latest such policy adoption is a bold stroke by the psoe government to eliminate smoking in public places, to make bars and restaurants over 100 metres square have non-smoking areas, and to give smaller establishments (under 100 metres square) their choice of entirely non-smoking or entirely smoking. This policy, which is similar to those of a number of other northern European countries, will not be easy to enforce, in as much as Spaniards are second only to Greeks in the numbers of citizens who smoke. The policy itself, however, does demonstrate this Europeanization phenomenon (Gallego, Gomà, y Subirats 2003). At the local level erosion of the system of tutelage has been important in building federal democracy. Institutionally it has meant complete removal of the provincial level supervisor, gobernador civil, and downgrading of the ac level delegado del gobierno to a regional sub-delegate. Operationally, it has meant that the system of seeking permission from the higher level, with the exception of large projects, has been removed. Town planning, for example, now resides in the city’s development of a long-range development plan, which is periodically updated and amended. The ac normally becomes involved only when special use or environmental permits or financial assistance is sought. Cities regularly partner with non- governmental organizations and the diputación without prior approval. Building permits and licences are issued from the municipal government, which is also responsible for inspections. This means that even though local autonomy may be limited from a policy perspective, considerable administrative flexibility and autonomy does exist. It is not an ideal system, but the successful elimination of top-down administration tutelage is an important step in the devolution of power, and in introducing local democracy.

multi-level igr Amid local protests by foreign citizens of the eu who are resident in Spain, some city governments began sending letters long before the

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2007 local elections telling them that they must renew their Padrón (local census) inscription or they would be removed from the voter list, making them ineligible. While the letters refer to Article 1b of lrbrl, the law actually says re-registration is for “extranjeros no comunitarios,” meaning that European Union country citizens do not have to renew (or others, e.g., Norwegians, who possess a separate agreement). Local groups of non-Spanish citizens began to protest to their city halls. Intervention at ac level ministries of justice for a clear ruling followed. A few months later the practice stopped, short of a possible suit before the ac level court of justice or the Constitutional Tribunal (www.spain.fipe.org2005). It demonstrates that a number of avenues for exchange and redress exist in this multi-level system. From an intergovernmental perspective an interactive two-way system has been introduced. Local governments themselves, and occasionally citizens, have access to the upward channels – formal and informal – required to conduct the necessary normative and resource connections to advance the interests of the community. If a local government chooses to, it may play the upward channels through bilateral contact, inter-level vertical consortia, and participation in the councils and convenios established by the acs. It can also use the channels of femp. Clearly the system is normatively and fiscally “top down” heavy, as the case will be made. But the opportunities or channels for vertical two-way connectivity do exist, politically, fiscally, administratively, and over technical matters, and are clearly wider and less constrained than they were under dictatorship. The central government in Madrid is heavily engaged in normative matters of all kinds, but the intergovernmental system disperses program and policy involvement throughout the system. Basic education, environmental protection, health and medical care, housing and urban development, labour market and workforce development, social welfare and services are all fields where policy involvement begins with the eu, involves the central government in Madrid, the 17 ac governments and, at some point, touches the thousands of local governments. Chapter 2 demonstrated that a complex of shared normative and administrative powers actually spreads policy along long transmission belts of interpretation and application. The voting enrolment on local Padrónes mentioned earlier illustrates this principle. In the interactive intergovernmental

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system, powers are shared at a number of levels. Normatively, they are mostly shared at two levels, central and ac, administratively mostly at ac and local levels. Almost every level – eu, central, ac, local – involves many important social and amenities policies, even those that are exclusive central powers. For example, the discussion of immigration, where undocumented persons must register at town halls, brings this issue out clearly. The removal of the prefectural system of prior permission from a locally based gobernador civil or Delegado has opened up the shared system to multiple points of access. Governments of the cities have many places to go. They can work with other cities to form mancomunidades. They can work with diputaciónes, acs, and the central governments to form developmental consortia. They can form off-budget municipal corporations and engage in capital financing and fee collection/debt reduction. Municipalities can externalize services to non-profit and for-profit delivery organizations. Smaller cities can seek out their diputaciónes to fill services deficits or financing for significant projects. Cities can work their acs for the same purposes, particularly for financing and regulatory relief. And the beauty of the “open range” non-prefectural administrative system is that cities can leap frog over diputación and ac and directly seek out central government assistance, primarily financial, but occasionally normative. Cities now have many opportunities to play the game, and the resultant networks are extensive. These myriad processes are all but invisible to the ordinary citizen, who mostly sees the actions of the city council and those of city hall. But some do touch citizens. A few direct citizen transactions are with the diputación (e.g., residence permits) or ac (driving licences). However, most licences (e.g., business, building), permits (e.g. renovations, tree removal), inspections, fines, and denuncias or complaints filter through the ayuntamiento. That is where most “end stage” administration occurs and that is where citizens have the bulk of their contact with government. But the long chain, of course, begins in Brussels or Madrid (sometimes both) and, in the most important cases for citizens, then goes to the ac capitals and next to local government. Only in extraordinary cases, such as the group Abusos-Urbanístios-No efforts to fight lrau, which has invoked the ac government of Valencia, Spanish courts, the eu Commission, and the European Court of Justice, does such intergovernmental action become publicly visible.

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autonomous deficit The case has been made that the capacity of cities to fully attack their local problems is constrained by a lack of vested powers. For example, Madrid’s city council has a program for the elimination of illegal makeshift “shanty” housing in its peripheral areas, but it is constrained in removal of these settlements. Sometimes it takes up to twenty years to remove them, while even more cardboard homes are erected. While the city council has authority on these matters it does not have the means to control the influx of new residents or the authority to tear the shanties down, which resides with the courts and Madrid ac governments (El País 12/13/05, 4). Is this situation a reflection of some autonomous deficit experienced by Spanish local governments, particularly its cities? Most Spaniards live and work in cities of over 30,000 in population. In these cities immigrants register, buildings are permitted, ownership papers are filed, streets are maintained, water is piped, sewers are dug, schools are built, cultural programs are offered, and so on. Also, most burglaries and robberies are committed, drugs are distributed, and murders occur in these cities. Of course, commercial transactions of all types and manufacturing and/or construction also occur. Seemingly each city would be entitled to a government that is de jure and de facto autonomous, whereas the case has been made that only constitutional autonomy exists. In legal and factual reality a perceived autonomy deficit in cities exists. According to Gordon Clark (1984) local autonomy amounts to two primary principles: the power of initiative, or the power of government to act in a “purposeful goal-oriented fashion”; and the power of immunity, or “the power of localities to act without fear of the oversight authority of the higher state” (198, 199). Libonati (1991) suggests two additional factors: 1) the degree of freedom from central pre-emption, which in some cases is under central control, in others under local control, and, in many cases, under concurrent authority, and 2) concurrence-oriented intergovernmental relations. In regard to igr, he concludes that “local autonomy also flows from recognition that a local government has capacity and standing as a collective entity to participate actively as a party in decisions by other governmental agencies which affect its interests

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and responsibilities” (88). Given such challenges as economic territorial management, European integration, the emergence of meso or intermediate governments as change agents, territorial-based political parties, and an increasing democratic impulse, the processes of igr are essential to autonomy (Keating and Elock 1998). These autonomy experts are referring to local jurisdictions’ need for some level of residual authority to make those necessary decisions that are free of higher authority in areas not already proscribed. It is the ability of the city to fully approach its own problems, locally determined. The reasons for this possible autonomous deficit have been identified throughout the book. Local autonomy is problematic because of framework laws that govern municipal powers and sources of finance. Moreover these laws allow for ordinance-making within the framework of determined services but do not grant “residual authority” or independent powers to approach problems that are unique to the community, for example, the shanty towns in Madrid city. The operation of local clientelistic networks – electoral, party, and bureaucratic – some of which are fraught with corruption, also adds to the deficit. The system in a sense “delegitimizes” by eroding the “principles of democracy” in favour of “the power of money and influence” (Villoria 2006, 301). Structural problems also add to the deficit in that mayors share administrative control with key councillors who are commissioners. Councillors are elected by party list and form the government. This, in turn, leads to weak district representation and weaker administrative structures, making it harder to gauge citizen interests and needs. Fiscal limits and dependence, plus the need to constantly rely on other governments, undermines the independence of the city government. As a result, when big challenges and problems arise, e.g., a crime wave, a natural disaster, an international event located in the city, or a major public works project, the city normally must turn to others for assistance. Even in the case of smaller but quintessentially local challenges, for example, preserving green space, extending water and sewer systems, creating park and athletic facilities, or cleaning up a littered open space area, the city may not have the authority or resources to approach these problems on their own. Overcoming these deficits is part of the unaccomplished reform agenda identified in the previous chapter.

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federal limits on autonomy Any realistic concern for extending local autonomy can only occur within limits in a federal (or for that matter any intergovernmental) system. Local governments, particularly municipal corporations, are normally considered to be creatures of second-tier governments in federal systems. The prime example is that of Canadian provinces’ complete control over local government operations. They are subject to the principle of ultra vires, meaning they cannot exceed conferred powers (Kingdon 1993, 169). However local governments may historically have once been independent communities of some sort, they have been progressively brought under the control of empire, crown, nation-state, and/or province. Any powers related to autonomy granted to local governments, such as through various aspects of home rule, is through second-tier governments in federal systems. This puts local governments in most federal countries in clearly subordinate and often weak fiscal and policy positions. A similar federal situation appears in Spain, where despite Constitutional autonomy most local government functions are subordinate to both central framework laws and the statutes of autonomy-based legislation of the acs. For example, the new Catalan Estatut states that municipal powers are guaranteed by the statute; it enumerates their powers, governed by the laws of the central parliament and allowing for ac government oversight of actions taken by municipalities (Ley Orgánica 6/2006). Much against the wishes of big city mayors in Catalonia, the regional government in Barcelona is enumerating the powers of mayors in regulating local police and is placing limits on their authority (Ellakuría 2008). These actions are clearly within the powers of the Estatut. As maintained throughout Spain, the double overlay (or subordination) occurs through the additional factor of framework laws such as lrbrl and ac normative powers. Where does autonomy enter the picture? In the absence of absolute definitions by the Constitutional Tribunal, one must go back to the four criteria stated earlier: freedom to act in a goal-oriented manner; immunity from detailed oversight by higher levels; freedom from involuntary preemption of powers once granted; and ability to participate in the intergovernmental game. Following these criteria, local governments do have autonomy within the dually subordinated federal arrangements. This is no different from most

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(and greater than some) local governments in federal systems, in as much as they operate politically and administratively through igr. These realities suggest that extensive decentralization along the lines that many Spanish local governments, femp, and the White Paper have advocated are unlikely. ac governments, having fought hard for transfer of powers, thus establishing themselves as federallike second-tier elected governments and holding policy responsibility for the social and economic fabrics of their regions, will not likely yield local powers beyond the four autonomy criteria enumerated. Local corporations have basic services-related and regulatory (e.g., land use) responsibilities already, without great prior supervision and approval, and are unlikely to carry these powers much further at the present. Local government interests do not have anything near the political power of the ac interests, are not in a good legal position, and have had difficulties keeping a second decentralization on the immediate policy agenda. Thus, autonomy is likely to remain as it has been defined.

building networks The practice of building networks of intergovernmental contacts is clearly something that thousands of Spanish local government officials have achieved. The case has been made that these linkages have been both horizontal and vertical (Agranoff and McGuire 2003). As information and knowledge needs meet up with the many social and economic challenges, the best of public management will be needed to run Spain’s handful of world cities and those other 160 or so where most of its citizens live. But this public management goes beyond that of the city government contacts themselves. Blanco y Gomà (2002, 28) articulate five local network principles based on their study of local networks of citizen participation in Catalonia: 1) citizens must become involved beyond elitist dynamics of strategic plans; 2) a network of different types of local actors must advance project proposals; 3) conceptually innovative projects need to be advanced; 4) local social capital needs to be stimulated to advance projects; and 5) projects need to have a capacity to make an impact by transforming people’s lives. As Les Metcalf (1993, 174–5) once suggested, when the problems in many policy fields are outrunning the capacities of organizations, new interorganizational capacities are needed. “But reform craft at this level is in short supply.”

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Since Metcalf’s observation a great deal more has been discovered about network management. O’Toole (1997, 45) identifies managed networks as “structures of interdependence involving multiple organizations or parts thereof, where one unit is not merely a subordinate of the others in some hierarchical arrangement.” Excluding formal hierarchical arrangements and perfect markets, networks fall somewhere in between, and they are needed to approach “wicked” policy problems that are ambitious and complex in their solution and execution (46). “Network management is a form of steering aimed at promoting joint problem-solving or policy development” through mutual adjustment, i.e., intervention in an existing pattern of relations, consensus building, and problemsolving (Kickert and Koppenjan 1997, 43–5). In Agranoff’s (2007) recent study of the internal operations of networks, it was found that not all networks actually jointly solve policy problems. Some exist to exchange information that leads to subsequent organization action, some build on these experiences to also enhance partners’ knowledge and action capacities, and still others engage in these activities plus blueprint or arrange interagency reciprocal action. All networks are designed to fill gaps in power, knowledge, and resources that organizations working alone generally cannot achieve, and all, whether formal or informal in official status, are organized and managed through political and technical cores made up of interacting organizational representatives. This is the pattern that has emerged in Spain since Franco. The most important work of cities in the near future will unfold through network processes. One example is the Parque Tecnológico de Andalucia in Malaga, a joint effort of the city government, Andalucia ac, ac universities, area industries, and the Andalucian Institute for Regional Development. It has been instrumental in combining science, technology, industry, and the market system into one of Spain’s poorest region’s effort to participate in the eu program for dissemination of r & d results (innovation) (Albuquerque 2001). Another example of the need to network is to promote broadband Internet access in cities. The latest survey indicates that Spain stands twelfth among the 15 pre-enlargement eu countries in terms of broadband access (El País 1/3/06, 5), with only 15 per cent of households online. Expansion will be promoted by a €5.7 million program of the central government’s Ministry of Labour. But placing this system into its cities’ homes and small busi-

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nesses will require active networks involving city government, internet carriers such as Telefónica (former monopoly) and smaller carriers such as Orange (United Kingdom) and Wanadoo (France Telecom in Spain), local business leaders, university technical personnel, heavy industry users like banking and credit, and representatives of equipment manufacturers. In a similar fashion, promoting knowledge-based industry and services will require governments to partner with educational institutions – technical and universities – training and development organizations, business and industry leaders, and technology firms. Each of these networks will have to become knowledge-based, around learning and human skills, facing the challenge of “having to find its own space in a socially and economically more globalized and interconnected world,” as the President of the Andalucia ac government concludes (Chaves 2001, 9).

to the future The need to network places Spanish cities into the same orbit as those of the world’s other growing and surviving cities (Clarke and Galie 1999). Its reform agenda means that governmentally something more needs to be done to enhance government. Spain’s cities need the tools for the type of individualism referred to at the beginning of this chapter with regard to their current architectural expression. Reform is needed to fill a legal and fiscal “democratic deficit,” in as much as cities do not have the capacities to govern their citizens in the sense of determining what their services needs are, or to determine and approach their quality of life concerns, or to adopt innovative own-source public policy. Like most cities in multi-tiered governments, they are highly intergovernmentalized in complex horizontal and vertical networks. They are the prime transmission agents of first and second tier policies and programs. However, most local governments in multi-tiered systems also possess reasonable measures of capacity to act independently in order to represent local wishes of its citizens. Unless they act boldly in the face of constraints on their autonomy, Spain’s city governments generally lack this ability due to structural, normative and fiscal limitations. That is why the general powers clause in the White Paper (ch. 9) that allows local governments administrative powers in areas that other governments do not explicitly manage, is

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perhaps the single most important reform on the current agenda. Short of this power, local officials are more likely to turn to officials from other governments or local special interests like constructors or promoters instead of to its citizens. Only when some egregious abuse arises, such as the Valencian land use law or being deregistered as voters, do citizens get the possibility of action in the face of poor democratic representation and city hall-economic interests collusion. Cities do require a level of devolved, independent powers and the structural and economic capacity to act to support autonomy. Only then will some capability for urban expression match that of urban architecture. Government in Spain has successfully thrown off dictatorship, has decentralized, has democratized, and has federalized in many ways. It has constitutionally recognized autonomy. It nevertheless carries some of the governing “baggage” of Southern European countries, where networks of traditional influence and “what government can do for me,” not what “we can do for government” seems to maintain itself. On the other hand, it is elected, operating programs and services, intergovernmentally active, and increasingly networking. Attention now needs to be directed toward making it all work better for its cities and their people. It is a challenge no different from that faced by cities in any other system.

APPENDICES

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APPENDIX A

1977–2005: A Post-Franco Intergovernmental Chronology: Events, Actions, and Agreements

june 1977: First free elections in forty years; the newly elected Parliament (Cortes) begins work on a democratic constitution. september and december 1977: The Generalitat (self-government of Catalonia) re-established, followed by pre-autonomy granted to the Basque provinces. By September 1978, pre-autonomy was established for a total of 14 of the 17 existing regions. december 1978: New constitution published and approved by referendum. Sanctioned by King Juan Carlos. Constitution includes “recognizing and guaranteeing the right to autonomy of nationalities and regions” and establishes “territorial organization into municipalities, provinces, and the Autonomous Communities.” 1979: Organic Law on the Constitutional Court enacted, to resolve conflicts regarding ac competencies, in accordance with Article 165 and expanding on Articles 161 and 162 regarding legal appeals. april 1979: First democratic local elections held, one month after the second round of national elections. december 1979: The Basque Country and Catalonia Autonomous Community Statutes of Autonomy approved by the Cortes following successful referendums, making them the first ac governments in operation. 1980: Organic Law for Financing of Autonomous Communities (lofca) passed, establishing the distribution of ac financing on a five-year basis. Has been amended several times, expanding ac bases of financing through the concession and management of certain taxes (judicial, arts, municipal shares, luxury and heritage, inheritance tax and transfers, gambling). Since 1996 important

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“cession” of portions of value added and income taxes. Also establishes Council on Fiscal and Financial Policy, comprising state and regional finance ministers to coordinate costs and revenues. february-july 1981: Following an unsuccessful coup attempt, in part triggered by opposition to autonomy, the Cortes adapted the Law on the Harmonization of the Autonomy Process (loapa), one of four accords on autonomy, tightening the autonomy process, and including a provision for Cortes approval of ac laws. february 1983: The Cortes approves the statutes of Autonomy for four regions – Extremadura, Balearic Islands, Madrid, Castilla and Leon, completing the establishment of the seventeen unit Estado de las Autonomías. august 1983: The Constitutional Tribunal considers six challenges to loapa and declares major portions of loapa to be unconstitutional, particularly regarding overturning of ac parliamentary laws or actions. Basing its decision on Section 2 and Article 137 of the constitution, the Court determined that “autonomy” means the possibility of making the final decision in relation to a given competencia. august 1983: Several principles of ac homogeneity were upheld in loapa for 14 of the non-fast-route acs: uniform election dates, limits on the size of regional governments, regional supervision of provincial governments, transfer of civil servants to the regions, and harmonization of financing for the “common regime” (all but Basque Country and Navara) governments. 1983–1990: The Constitutional Court in several decisions maintains that the government of the state has responsibility for promoting “general interests,” upholding national involvement in such policy areas as education, health care, tourism, and economic development. This has opened the door for central government enactment of “basic legislation” and “basic norms.” Other basic laws affecting the acs include those related to public television, public universities, the right to education, general elections, and local governments. 1985–2002: Gradual transfer of competencies from Madrid to ac governments, culminating in the transfer of education, health, and social services to all seventeen communities. april 1985: The Basic Law on Local Government (lrbrl) enacted, establishing the basic organization of provinces, municipalities, and other government bodies, and enumerating the services

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to be offered, depending on population size, either by own-source provision or in cooperation with other authorities. january 1986: Spain achieves accession to the European Union after seven years of negotiation, not only making the Spanish economy more symmetrical with others in Europe but also opening up new sources of infrastructure and social funding, along with support for regional development. january 1986: General sales tax eliminated in favour of Value Added Tax, eliminating provincial government shares. Provinces retain surcharge on municipal business taxes, fees/charges/fines; the bulk of provincial financing relies on grants of different types. 1988: Local Finance Act passed, establishing municipal ownsource taxes as property taxes, taxes on business fees and charges, vehicle taxes, and land-value increment taxes. 1990-present: Europeanization of Spanish domestic issues: asylum of terrorists, environmental policy, immigration, social policy, extradition of criminals, added to previous policy arenas in agricultural policy, regional development, economic development, and infrastructure. 1992: Law on Legal Regime of Public Administrations (amended in 1995) established mechanisms of assistance to various levels of administration and vehicles of joint exercise of common powers that require collaboration: sectoral conferences (convenios), joint planning and programs. october 1993: Agreement reached that the common regime acs would be ceded 15 per cent of the total personal income tax collected in their territory. november 1993: The idea of a Pacto Local, extending to local governments the operating principles of autonomy, decentralization, and subsidiarity in financing and in powers was advanced at a Special Assembly of the Spanish Federation of Municipalities and Provinces (femp) in La Coruña, Galicia. Its driving principles are based on division of functions between municipalities and ac governments. june 1996: Personal income tax cession to acs raised to 30 per cent for 1997–2001 period. 1996: The historic civil governors or gobernadores civiles, the central government’s appointed representative at the provincial level, a vestige of prefectural administration that dated to the 1830s, were downgraded in powers and ability to supervise local authorities. They were renamed subdelegates.

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april 1995: “Methods for the Development of Local Government” was published in the Official Bulletin of Spain, outlining areas of legislative reform, representing areas of agreement between the central government and femp, terminating six years of discussions and negotiations, outlining principal problems, identifying local government responsibilities and rules within the Estado de las Autonomías. july 2001: Fiscal and Financial Council establishes a new ac financing scheme effective 2002, that includes a 33% cession of income taxes, 35% of the iva (value added tax), 40% of beverage, coal, and tobacco taxes, and 100% transfer of electrical energy, transport, and gasoline/diesel taxes. The new system limits revenues to a greater extent to regional economies, although central government transfers will still represent 50% of revenue for poorer regions. december 2002: Technical Commission to reform financing of local governments formed among governmental and femp to examine expanded state financing of municipalities, thus beginning the “Second Decentralization” process. january 2003: Budgetary stability law comes into effect, requiring subnational governments to balance their budgets and places strict controls on borrowing. may 2003: Law on Local Finance enacted that includes tax sharing to cover loss of business tax revenues eliminated from small businesses; increase fiscal autonomy of local governments by transfer of funds (13%) to largest cities, provincial capitals, and other cities over 75,000 in population. Provinces also will receive a share of national taxes. Effective 2004 local governments will have greater autonomy to set maximum and minimum tax rates. (Smaller cities continue to receive state transfers.) june 2003: Council of Ministers approve a draft law on “Modernization of Local Government,” declaring eligible those cities over 250,000 in population, provincial capitals over 200,000, and cities where acs have ceded power. New powers would give big cities greater direct powers over budgets, council ordinance powers, the ability to appeal decisions to the Constitutional Tribunal, greater control over local police, and clarification of the use and autonomy of special district governments. Also creation of a national urban observatory. june 2004: The new central government announces that its intergovernmental program will include minor amendments to the con-

Appendix A

275

stitution, including reform of the Senate to make it an ac body and enumeration of the acs. Other reforms included revision of statutes of autonomy, opening dialogue concerning creation of a Conference of Autonomous Presidents as a means of executive federalism, revision of the financing model, and integration of the 17 acs into European Constitution language. june 2004: The European Union Statistics Office reports that Spain’s Gross Domestic Product per capita reached 95 per cent of the eu average, taking into account Spanish growth, and the economies of the ten countries that joined the bloc in May 2004. This renders Spain below the eligibility for Cohesion funds for the environment and transportation infrastructure, which is 40 per cent. Spain had been earmarked for 61 per cent of the Fund, transfers of e11.6 for 2000–06. Development funds will only be disbursed to Spain on a temporary basis. july 2005: The government in Madrid releases a “White Paper on Reform of Local Government in Spain,” outlining further changes in autonomy and financing, emphasizing the need for intergovernmental cooperation, quality public services, transparency, meeting citizen needs, and international cooperation in a global economy. june 2006: Revision of Catalan Statute of Autonomy approved in referendum after modifications in Madrid. Statutes in four other regions between 2006–08. december 2008: The central government introduces a 33 billion euro economic recovery plan that includes eight billion in direct municipal infrastructure projects, along with 19 billion for transportation infrastructure and five billion for environmental projects.

APPENDIX B

Law

Modified By*

Section/Article Modified

N OTA B L E C H A N G E S TO L AW 7 / 1 9 8 5

Type of Modification

7 (1985)

57 (2003)

Municipalities with major populations: Articles 121–138

added

7 (1985)

57 (2003)

added

7 (1985)

14 (2003)

Infractions & Sanctions: Articles 139–141 Municipal Territory & Population: Article 16

7 (1985)

1 (2003)

Intergovernmental Relations: Article 61

modified

modified

Specific Change Changes apply to: a) municipalities whose population surpasses 250,000; b) capital municipalities of province whose population is over 175,000; c) municipalities that are capitals of a province, autonomic or host capitals of the autonomic institutions; d) municipalities whose population surpasses 75,000, with special present economic, social, historical, or cultural circumstances (Article 121). Financial management criteria include: fulfillment of the objective of budgetary stability and separation of the accounting and financial management functions (Article 133). The municipal financial system shall function under management principles of efficiency, sufficiency, flexibility and unity. Its powers include: management, liquidation, inspection, collection and revision of fiscal acts; the proposal, elaboration, and interpretation of the council’s fiscal norms (Article 135). Internal controls will correspond to a General Municipal Intervention agency (Article 136). Local entities can establish infractions and impose sanctions on the breach of duties and on actions that impede the delivery of public services. The Municipal Registry must update foreigners’ registration and identification as well as facilitate inter-administrative sharing of information (without consent only when in cases where it must fulfill its responsibilities). The Council of Ministers can dissolve the branches of local corporations that pose serious harm – through agreements or actions of the organs that support, expressly or tacitly, acts of terrorism or those who participate in terrorism and those that humiliate the victims or their relatives – to the general public interest and that breach their constitutional obligations.

Law

Modified By*

Section/Article Modified

Type of Modification

7 (1985)

1 (2003)

Local Corporations Statutes: Article 75

added

7 (1985)

55 (1999)

added

7 (1985)

11 (1999)

Contracts and Hiring: Article 88 Local Entities (Municipalities, Provinces, other): Articles 20–23, 32, 35, 46, 50, 58, 118

7 (1985)

Royal Decree 7 (1996) 4 (1996)

7 (1985)

modified, added

Municipal Territory & Population: Article 26

redacted

Municipal Territory & Population: Articles 12, 15–17

redacted

Specific Change Members of local corporations who feel their security threatened can make declarations before the secretary of the provincial delegation or before the competent branch of the corresponding autonomous community. Direct hiring can only take place when it does not exceed 2% of the local budget. The changes attempt to clarify the scope of local administrative powers, with the aim of satisfying citizens’ demands as efficiently as possible. It outlines a new distribution of powers between the municipal council and the president of the local entity in order to resolve the problems created by the current responsibilities held by the council that are eminently better fit for (and more logically held by) the executive. Further, the changes attempt to cover the existing gap in communication within the legislature with respect to which local administration should resolve questions raised delimiting municipal responsibilities that pertain to different autonomous communities. Also local entities whose territories are affected by decisions made in other territories are able to participate in the general plans of public services of a supra-local nature. Municipalities with populations of 20,000 or more must provide additional services: civil protection and public safety, social services, fire prevention and extinction, and public sporting facilities. The city council exerts its powers in a municipality. Everyone in Spain is obliged to register with a Municipal Register (Padrón), and those registered in a municipality constitute its population. Municipal Registries may share information with other public administrations if doing so advances its local obligations and powers. City councils are in charge of forming, maintaining, and updating the Register. (Articles updated again by Laws 14/2003 & 53/2003).

Law

Modified By*

Section/Article Modified

Type of Modification

7 (1985)

11 (1995)

Municipal Powers: Article 26

redacted

7 (1985)

Royal Decree 2 (1994)

Civil Service Personnel: Article 99

redacted

7 (1985)

10 (1993)

Municipal Powers: Article 26

added

Specific Change The criteria for the number of inhabitants changed to the number of equivalent-inhabitants (“habitantes-equivalentes”) and defers to the autonomous communities the responsibility of establishing the boundaries of urban sprawl, with the consequences that such a boundary has in the fulfillment of its obligations. Competition in hiring will be the standard system for the provision of public employment, guided by merit corresponding to knowledge of the specialties of the territorial organization of each autonomous community and the specific merits directly related to the characteristics of the position. Autonomous communities can cooperate with provincial delegations to guarantee the delivery of public services. Also, provincial delegations can cooperate with local regions within the framework of the corresponding autonomic legislation.

*All legislative documents specified are laws, unless otherwise specified. Translated and prepared by Juan M. Pedroza.

APPENDIX C

Modified By*

M A J O R C H A N G E S TO L O C A L F I N A N C I N G L AW

Section/Article Modified

Type of Modification

Law 39 (1988)

13 (1996)

Budgeting & Spending: Articles 184, 189–191

modified

39(1988)

147 (1998)

Budgeting & Spending: Article 147

added

39 (1988)

50 (1998)

Financial Resources: Article 15

added

39 (1988)

Ruling 233 (1999)

Financial Resources: Article 45

redacted

39 (1988)

51 (2002)

Municipal & Provincial Resources: Article 112–116, 125–127

added

Translated and prepared by Juan Manuel Pedroza.

Specific Change A general accounting body – made up of members from the local entity, autonomous organization, and commercial organizations – will perform accounting duties annually. Smaller entities may tailor simplified accounting bodies to match local needs. The following accompany the general budget as annexes: investment and financing plans and programs; performance, investment, and financing programs; the status of the consolidation of the budget with those of local autonomous and commercial organizations; debt forecasts and repayment plans. Local entities exert the power to implement fiscal decrees; specifically those related to the management, liquidation, inspection, and collection of the local taxes. The use of public pricing is declared unconstitutional for: obligatory public services or activities; services or activities deemed indispensable or provided by a public monopoly system. All provinces, municipal capitals of a province or an autonomous community, and municipalities with a population of 75,000 or more cede a percentage of federal tax collection. In addition, these municipalities and all provinces participate in federal tax collection.

APPENDIX D

LRAU

Explained by a Spanish Lawyer

The innovation brought about by law 6/1994 (referred to as lrau) was to consider this urbanizing activity as a public function to be carried out by public bodies and not the landowners. In this aspect, we can consider this law as tremendously progressive. But the necessity of having to make big economic investments to carry out this means of land liberalization removed the owners of the land from their own urbanization tasks, creating a separation between urban planning and building, these becoming separate stages in the urban development process. Because of this there then appears the “Urbanising Agent,” a person or company who, whether owning the land or not, is in charge of carrying out the urbanization work, and so becomes the person who will take on, at a particular moment and voluntarily, the public responsibility to implement the urban development even though this person or company may not be the civil proprietor of the land. These urban activities, which are mostly without or with minimal repercussions, in areas adjacent to big urban centres made up of small agricultural properties, where urban expansion is necessary on land that is exhausted (tiny plots, patches of abandoned land, dumps, etc.) and isolated, open a door for the possibility of “expropriation” of the land in the best (tidying up, evening out, generating work and employment, incomes, etc.) economical interest. This often occurs in tourist areas, where it is not unusual to find big areas of land belonging to one owner, or even several such properties next to each other, whether the owner lives or not on the property. Urban development of such areas would bring huge benefits. Just imagine three 5,000 m2 plots each with one house neighbour-

Appendix D

281

ing onto another 3 or 4 plots of different sizes, all undeveloped. The density of inhabitants is minimal, in an area of high value. Would it not be more lucrative to build 250 bungalows on this same piece of land? The instrument created by the lrau to carry out such possibilities is known as the pai, the Plan de Actividades Integrada, and proceeds according to article 6.3 of the lrau as follows: 1 When two or more adjacent parcels of land can be transformed into urban land needing infrastructure (i.e., land without water, electricity, roads, etc.) or 2 When urban transformation affects more than 40,000 m2 or means the building of a road more than 1,000 m long or 3 When it is thought convenient by means of integrated proceedings to assure improvements in quality and even out the urbanization works. ... one could say that the Agente Urbanizador has full autonomy in all matters, such as projecting and implementing his own urban plans, including any pieces of land and or buildings he may consider convenient. But the right to property does not disappear simply because of the urban activity of the Agente (usually a building company or developer with substantial economic resources and potential). This process should bring about a new legal relationship binding the Agent to the affected proprietors. So the developing agent, in his pai, will present a financial economic proposition, which should contain the agreements made with the landowner, as the case may be, regarding the way in which the developer will be paid for the work to be carried out as they will carry the costs of the urbanization and should be rewarded either in cash or with other properties with building licences. The proprietors of the plot(s) will have to pay whether they wish to or not. The proprietors’ rights are mentioned in article 66.7 of the lrau and are as follows: 1 The right to be informed, in writing, at any given moment, of the expenses to be incurred for the urbanization, and to co-operate in the proceedings, providing they have paid their dues for the development.

282

Appendix D

2 The right to propose to the Administration (Town Hall) any suggestions or alterations, etc. for the correction of the proposed schemes. 3 The right, providing they contribute to the urbanization costs, to demand the corresponding execution by the urbaniser, and the corresponding supervision of the Town Hall. The Agent therefore becomes a developer, having the necessary resources to carry out the proposed urban development of an area or piece of land in a particular town or area. The Agent does not necessarily have to be the owner of the land and can carry out the proposed project on another person’s property. Likewise, he must be paid for the work carried out, be it in cash or property with building permission. The proprietors affected by a pai, who have paid the urbaniser, have the right to be informed, to intervene, or to control. The affected proprietors’ rights depend on their proportional contribution. This means that anyone whose contribution is smaller than the minimum plot stated in the pai will lose any inherent urban value. The same applies to anyone who does not comply with the payment to the Agent, who will be paid in cash; that is to say their property will be expropriated after providing a deed issued prior to the approval of the pai, and related to the value therein, or alternatively to the state (ac) legislation (rates). So hard as it may seem, this is the current legislation in the State of Valencia. Source: Salvador Correcher Belenquer, “Comments on the Land Law Regulating Urban Activity in the Valencian Community,” Jávea International Civic Society Bulletin, January/February 2003: 2–3. Translated by Ian Phillips. www.javeacivicsociety.com.

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Index

Note: Autonomous Communities are signified by ac; figures and tables are italicized. Abusos-No, 220 Abusos-Urbanístios-No, 261 African continent, closeness to Spain, 30 agbar (water supplier), 104 Agenda 21, 196–7, 223, 242t.9.4, 244, 251 Agilar de la Frontera, Andalucia, 5 Agreed Plan for Social Services (Plan Concertado), 212 Agreed Plan for Social Services (Plan Concertado de Servicios Sociales), 163 Aguas de Valencia (water supplier), 104 Alaguàs (Valencia Province, Valencia), 224 Alaquàs (Valencia Province, Valencia), 223 Albuñal (Granada Province, Andalucia), 143, 145t.5.5 Alcobendas (Madrid), 245 Aldaia (Valencia Province, Valencia), 223

Algeria, 212 Algerians, 212 Alhambra Palace, 179 Alicante (city), 197–8, 212, 223 Alicante (Province, Valencia), 219 Alicante, University of, 167 Allocation of Powers Project, 61 Almeria (Province, Andalucia), 108 Andalucia ac: Constitutional Tribunal and, 80; fast-route community, 68; field study focus, 28; immigration planning, 213–14; land use abuses, 222; local officials on, 168; rural development centres in, 109; separate identity of, 23; statute of autonomy, 86; statutes of autonomy revised, 228 Andalucian Institute for Regional Development, 266 Andratx (Balearic Islands), 175 Aragon (historic region), 26 Aragon ac: comarcas (counties) system in, 89, 108; organization

304

Index

chart, 69; Public Works Department, 204; separate identity of, 23 Arco-Atlántico (association), 185 Aslapa, Operation, 247 Association of European Regions, 185 Asturias ac, 23 atraso (backwardness), 6 Australia, federal experiences of, 227, 229 autonomous communities: attention on, effect, 228–30; census of units of government in, 90t.4.1; constitutional elaboration, 83–7, 89, 150; Constitutional Tribunal and, 79–82; estado de las autonomías (state of autonomies), 5, 7, 56–7, 76, 134, 165, 226, 272, 274; European Union and, 184–7; fast-route communities, 68; federal Spain and, 54–82; financial decentralization and, 127–48; financial devolution and, 129–34, 131t.5.1; illegal immigrants and, 214–15; intergovernmental networks and, 74–7; and Madrid (central government), interventions and, 170; normative powers, distribution, 62–4f.3.1; regional governments, scope of, 67–75; slow-route communities, 68; Special Regime autonomous communities, 134; transfers to local governments, 142t.5.3; uniprovincial autonomous communities, 88 autonomy: constitutional guarantee, 121, 124, 126, 256, 258,

262, 264, 268; Constitutional Tribunal and, 79–82; deficit, effect, 262–3; development of, 32–5; federal limits on, 264–5; financial decentralization and, 127–48; as freedom from tutelage, 126; patria chica (effective independence), 5, 24, 171, 177; regional autonomy movement, 57–8; scope of autonomy, 13–17; scope of study, 8–13, 28–30; territoriality and, 36–7 Aznar, José María, 161, 174 Aznar government, 161, 174 Baccios, Manuel Jimenez, 226 backwardness (atraso), 6 Badajoz (Extremadura), 99, 103f.4.6, 104 Baden-Würtemburg, 197 Balearic Islands ac: cabildos (councils), 84, 88; financing, 132; land use abuses, 222; legislative committee on local affairs, 169; local politics, political parties, 151; provincial governments in, 106–7; separate identity of, 23; statutes of autonomy revised, 228 Balsareny (Catalonia), 99, 100f.4.3 Barcelona (city): 1992 Olympic Games, 120, 166, 179; international involvement of, 180, 197; leadership role in pan-European urban networks, 178; Madrid-Barcelona relations, 134; Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona, 88; metropolitan level planning and service functions, 8; metropolitan structure

Index

of, 88; municipal services production, provision, 117, 120; solid waste management, 116; urban architectural projects in, 255; water supply, 104 Barcelona (Province, Catalonia), 197 Basque Country ac: absences at sectoral conferences, 75; bilateral commissions of, 187; civil service regulations overturned, 122; collaboration agreements, 76; Constitutional Tribunal and, 80; Council of European Municipalities and Regions (cemr) member, 192; ethnic nationalism of, 23, 226; fast-route community, 68; financing, 129–30, 141; independent role within European Union, 187; intergovernmental style of, 254; international involvement of, 183; local politics, political parties, 151–2; mancomunidades in, 108; municipal associations in, 159; non-state political parties, 77; policing, health services transferred to, 57; provincial governments in, 106–7; referendum on becoming free state, 228–9; and regional autonomy movement, 57; sectoral conferences attendance, 185; Special Regime autonomous community, 134 Belgium, 41 Benissa (Alicante Province, Valencia), 219 bilateral cooperation commissions, 75

305

bilateral cooperation commissions (bcc), 75 Bilbao (Basque Country), 105 bi-level state-ac conferences, arrangements. See convenios Bourbon monarchy, 24, 26 Brazil, federal experiences of, 227 brecha digital (digital divide), 166, 250–1 Broad Social Services Grant program, 41, 45 Burgos, Javier de, 27 cabildos (councils), 84, 88 caciques (chiefs), 27, 154–5 caciquismo (patronage), 24, 27 Cadiz (Province, Andalucia), 105 Cadiz Constitution, 28, 57 café para todos, 60 Calvia (Majorca, Balearic Islands), 197 Camas (Seville Province, Andalucia), 175 Canada, 41: federal experiences of, 227, 229; local government organization in, 85; provincial control in, 39, 84, 127, 264; and “strong mayor” form of city government, 253 Canal de Isabel II (water supplier), 104 Canary Islands ac: cabildos (councils), 84, 88; funds transferred to local governments, 141; immigration issues, 210; land use abuses, 222; non-state political parties, 77; planning/environmental protection law challenged, 124; provincial governments in, 106–7; separate

306

Index

identity of, 23; statutes of autonomy withdrawn, 228 Carmel (section of Barcelona), 175 Castellón (Province, Valencia), 204 Castile (historic region), 26 Castile ac, 23 Castilla y León ac, 89, 228 Castilla-La Mancha, 228 Castillo de Polai, 5 Catalonia (historic region), 26 Catalonia ac: Agenda 21 program, 197; bilateral commissions of, 187; bilateral cooperation commission, 75; Catalonian autonomy movement, 107; central government budget law challenged by, 121–2; citizen councils, 244; citizen participation, 265; collaboration agreements, 76; comarcas (counties) system, 87, 89; Constitutional Tribunal and, 80; Council of European Municipalities and Regions (cemr) member, 192; ethnic nationalism of, 23, 226; fastroute community, 68; financing, 133; High-Technology Route (association) membership, 185; immigration planning, 213–4, 217; independent role within European Union, 187; intergovernmental style of, 254; international involvement of, 180–3, 197–8; legislative committee on local affairs, 169; local politics, political parties, 151–2; local regulations challenged, 124–5; municipal associations in, 159; non-state political parties, 77;

regional autonomy movement, 57; Second Republic, under, 55; sectoral conferences attendance, 185; statutes of autonomy revised, 228 Catholic Charities, 212 Celtic period, 24 cemr (Council of European Municipalities and Regions), 192, 195–6 census, units of government, 90t.4.1 Central Africa, 210 central government. See Madrid (central government) Charter on Local Self-Government, European, 191–2 chiefs (caciques), 27, 154–5 Ciempozuelos (Madrid), 175 cities: autonomous, 75; autonomy deficit, effect, 262–3; city council organization charts, 100–3f.4.3 f.4.6; internal operations, 126; international networks, 196–200; municipal services production, provision, 109–21; North African city-states, 88, 107; solid waste management, 104; tourist cities, 140, 197, 232f.9.2; water supply, 104; world cities in Spain, 265. See also local governments; municipalities City of Culture of Galicia (La Ciudad de la Cultura de Galicia) (Santiago de Compostella, Galicia), 255 clandestinos (illegal immigrants), 216 client-based networks, 154–6

Index

clientelistic networks, 11, 155–7, 177, 218, 223–5, 263 clrae (Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe), 191 clrae (Council’s Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe), 191 collaboration agreements, 76 comarcas (counties) system, 7, 8f.1.1, 84, 87, 89, 90t.4.1, 92, 107–8 competencies (competencias), 249–51: autonomous communities and, 57–61, 65, 67, 69, 70f.3.2, 72, 75, 77, 80–1, 229–30; capacities and, 249; digital competencies, 249–1; European Charter on Local SelfGovernment and, 193f.7.2; infrastructure and, 203, 210; intergovernmental financing and, 129–30; intergovernmental politics and, 157, 159, 162–5, 167–8, 170; intergovernmental processes and, 36, 44f.2.1; international networks and, 182–3, 185, 188, 192; local governments and, 10, 16, 20, 29, 84–7, 95–6f.4.1; municipalities and, 117, 118t.4.6, 119; overlapping competencies, 245; Pacto Local and, 230; post-Franco chronology, 271–2; provincial governments and, 106; reform agenda and, 236 Comunidad Valenciana. See Valencia ac Congreso de los Diputados, 68

307

Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (clrae), 191 Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera (Tax and Financial Policy Council) (cpff), 130 consortia, 7–8, 8f.1.1, 11, 52, 54, 88–9, 90t.4.1, 92, 108–10, 126–7, 143, 158, 177, 195f.7.2, 200, 241t.9.3, 243, 248, 260–1 Constitution of 1978: autonomous communities and, in general, 229, 258; autonomy, guarantees, 121, 124, 126, 256, 258, 262, 264, 268; Basque referendum and, 229; chronology of, 271; civic affairs and, 243; effective when, 134; enabling European Union accession, 184; federal Spain, 55–69, 72f.3.3, 79–81; fiscal imbalances, fixing, 147; independence, autonomy, 150; international-intergovernmental networks and, 181–3; local agreements, effect, 124–6; Pacto Local and, 231f.9.1; as superior, posterior law, 122–3; three-tiered system, 7, 8f.1.1 Constitutional Tribunal: autonomous communities, appeals powers concerning, 69; composition, general authority, 79–82 convenios (bi-level state-ac conferences, arrangements): agreements and, 208; autonomous communities and, 260; convenios administrativos, 207; governmental unit, 7, 8f.1.1; intergovernmental networks and, 17, 70f.3.2; intergovern-

308

Index

mental politics and, 157, 177; post-Franco chronology, 273 Cordoba (city) (Andalucia), 105 corruption: acceptance of, 175–6; clientelistic networks and, 263; commission cities and, 252; growth areas, in, 30; land use laws and, 202–3, 218–20, 256; Marbella and, 4, 174–5, 177; news media ranking of, 4; politics and, 175; reform agenda and, 4, 174, 227, 246–8; scope of, 171; support of, 175, 202; United Nations Treaty Against Corruption, 174; visibility of, 174 Cortes (Parliament), 26, 65, 70f.3.2, 79, 91, 186f.7.1, 237, 271–2 Cortes Generales, 228 Cortes Valencianas, 86 Coslada (Madrid), 247 Council of Europe, 180, 191–2, 199–200 Council of European Municipalities and Regions (cemr), 192, 195–6 councils (cabildos), 84, 88 Council’s Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (clrae), 191 counties (comarcas) system, 87, 89, 108 county-level sub provincial bodies. See comarcas (counties) system Cueta (North African city-state), 107 decentralization: financial decentralization, 127–48; second

decentralization, 232. See also Pacto Local (second decentralization) delegados del gobierno, 27, 66, 70–1f.3.2, 107, 161, 259, 261 democracy: 1975–78 transition to, 24; reform instruments, 242t.9.4 Denia (Alicante Province, Valencia), 257 digital competencies, 249–51 digital divide (brecha digital), 166, 250–1 diputaciones, diputación provincial. See provincial governments Eastern Europe, 210–11 effective independence (patria chica), 5, 24, 171, 177 Eisenman, Peter, 255 El Pocero (Mr Drains - Francisco Hernando), 247 Elche (Alicante Province, Valencia), 166–7 elections and political parties, 151t.6.1, 152t.6.2 emasesa (water supplier), 104 emiuasa (water supplier), 104 empowerment reform, 239t.9.1 erdf (European Regional Development Fund), 147 estado de las autonomías (state of autonomies), 5, 7, 56–7, 76, 134, 165, 226, 272, 274; local governments, integrating into, 83–126. See also autonomous communities; autonomy Estepona (Andalucia), 247 eta (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna), 4, 228–9

Index

ethnic nationalism: in autonomous communities, 23, 226; non-state political parties, 149 “e.t.s” (eternal tourists), 211, 215–16 euro, effect of introduction, 189–90 Eurocities (pan-European urban network), 178, 196 Europe, Council of, 180, 191–2 European Charter on Local Self-Government, 128, 191–2 European Commission, 190, 200 European Court of Human Rights, 179 European Court of Justice, 178, 190, 220 European Regions, Association of, 185 European Social Fund, 202 European Union: administration in Spain, 186f.7.1; Agenda 21, 196–7; Council of European Municipalities and Regions (cemr) and, 195; domestic affairs, involvement in, 180; funding for Spain, 199; funding of autonomous communities, 132; as intergovernmental overlay, 179; participation in Spanish public administration, 166; policy development, effect on Spain, 183; public policy shaped by, 202; sectoral conferences, 185; services/funding requirements of, 109; Spain’s accession to, effect, 178, 184, 188–91, 199–200; stimulus effect of, 12–13; subnational governments and, 184–91; as transnational organization, 180

309

European Union Agricultural Guarantee Fund, 147 European Union Cohesion Fund, 148, 172 European Union Commission, 187 European Union Directives, 188–9 European Union Director General of Education and Culture, 195 European Union program for dissemination of R & D results (innovation), 266 European Union Social Fund, 147 European Union Stability Pact, 189–90 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (eta), 4, 228–9 Extremadura ac, 23 fast-route communities, 68 fci (Interterritorial Compensation Fund), 147 federalism: federal culture, 253–4; intermestic politics and, 179–81; international involvement, and nature of, 178–9; principles of, 6 Federation of Municipalities and Provinces (femp), 159, 161–2, 166, 171, 192, 215, 222, 230–3, 232f.9.2, 249, 273–4 Ferdinand, King, 25 ferry, Transmediterránean ferry line, opposition to, 212 finances: budgets, 144–6t.5.4 t.56; financial decentralization, 127–48; local financing law changes, 279; other funds, 147–8; Reguladora de las Haciendas Locales (Regulation of Local Finance), 135–8f.5.1;

310

Index

revenue sources, 139t.5.2; transfers, 142t.5.3 First Republic, 24, 57 France, prefectural administration in, 37 France Telecom (Wanadoo) (internet carrier), 267 Franco regime: corporatism under, 165; cultural, economic transformations under, 55; ethnic subnational cultural and governance repression under, 24; “home rule” tradition under, 176; local finance system of, 134; local governments as direct agents of central regime, 150; post-Franco chronology, 271–5; post-Franco Spain, xii, 3, 224, 246, 257–8, 266, 271–5; social welfare limitations under, 258; state intervention under, 27; weak local government created by, 28 Galicia ac: fast-route community, 68; non-state political parties, 77; regional autonomy movement and, 57; separate identity of, 23 Galveston (Texas, United States), 251–2 Gandia (Valencia Province, Valencia), 253 General Plan for Urban Development (pgou), 49 German Constitutional Court, 253 Gil, Jesús, 174 gobernadores civiles, 66, 71f.3.2, 74, 161, 259, 261, 273 Goded, Amado, 203

Gómez, Lucía, 204 González, Felipe, 174 González government, 174 González Virós, Izitar, 256 Granada (city), 145, 146t.5.6; international involvement of, effect, 178–9 Granada (Province, Andalucia), 143 Gutiérrez, César, 222 Habsburg period, 23, 26 Hadrian, 24 Hernando, Francisco (El Pocero – Mr Drains), 247 High-Technology Route (association), 185 home rule: autonomy granted through, 264; Constitutional Tribunal and, 126; Council of Europe and, 191; European Charter on Local Self-Government, 191–5; fiscal, 128, 148; forms of, 257; German, in, 15; history, tradition of, 14, 176; local government powers, 168; municipal, 236–7; reforms, 30, 234–6f.9.3, 234f.9.3, 238, 239t.9.1; support for, 246; tradition, 176–7; United States, in, 15–16, 19. See also Pacto Local (second decentralization) Hondon de los Frailes (Alicante Province, Valencia), 219 Ibiza (Balearic Islands), 255 illegal immigrants (clandestinos), 216 immigration: African continent, closeness to, effect, 30; local

Index

governments, and policy networks, 210–17 industrial development: burden of, 28; city organization and, 101f.4.4, 104; early industrial regions, 23; effect on government, 33; financing, 128; industrial parks, 46, 49, 51f.2.3, 52–3, 223; international activities, 182, 197; legislation, 62f.3.1; property management, 50f.2.3; zoning for, 157 industrialization, 28, 33 infrastructure requirements, 203–10, 208f.8.1 innovation (European Union program for dissemination of R & D results), 266 Instituto de Migraciones y Servicios Sociales (imserso), 213 Instituto Ortega y Gasset, xi, 110 intergovernmental financing, 127–48 intergovernmental networks: autonomous communities and, 74–7; building of, 265–8; clientbased networks, 154–6; complexity, 40–2; financial decentralization and, 127–48; institutional framework, 64–7; instruments for, 44f.2.1; intergovernmental processes and, 31–54; international networks, 178–200; management of, 46–54, 48f.2.2, 50f.2.3, 51f.2.4, 77–9; mechanisms, 42–6, 44f.2.1, 76–7; multi-level networks, 259–61; policy networks, 156–7, 201–25; political culture of, 171–17; politics and,

311

149–77; post-Franco chronology, 271–5; scope of networks, 17–18; scope of study, 8–13, 28–30 intergovernmental politics: constitutional limitations, 154 intergovernmental relationships. See intergovernmental networks intermunicipal service districts. See mancomunidades international networks, 178–200 International Summit on Security, 178–9 internet carriers, 267 Interterritorial Compensation Fund (fci), 147 interventionist state. See welfare state Isabella, Queen, 25 Japan: prefectural administration in, 37–9; tutelage in, 38 Jávea (Alicante Province, Valencia), 146–7, 171–3, 207, 208f.8.1, 215 La Canyada (Valencia Province, Valencia), 223 La Ciudad de la Cultura de Galicia (City of Culture of Galicia) (Santiago de Compostella, Galicia), 255 La Coruña (Galicia), 230 La Rioja ac, 68 land use laws: abuses under, 176–7, 202–3, 217–22, 257–8, 268; debates about, 256; Law Regulating Urban Activity (lrau) land-use law, 218–220, 222, 261, 280–2

312

Index

Latin America, 180–1, 198, 211 Latin Americans, 172, 211, 214 Law of International Cooperation, 198 laws: changes to, 276–9; Law Regulating Urban Activity (lrau) land-use law, 218–20, 222, 261, 280–2 León. See Castilla y León ac Lérida (Catalonia), 99, 102f.4.5 Ley Orgánica de Armonización del Proceso Autonómico (loapa), 80 Ley Orgánica de Financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas (lofca), 130, 132 Ley Reguladora de las Bases del Regimen Local (lrbrl), 85–6, 89, 91–2, 94–7f.4.1 Ley Reguladora de las Haciendas Locales (lrhl), 85–6, 134 Lisbon Summit, 190 Local Government Act of 2001, 236 local governments: constitutional elaboration, 83–7; constitutionally autonomous, 187, 191, 193–5f.7.2; democracy reform instruments, 242t.9.4; development of, 32–5; as direct agents of central regime, 150; dual characterization of, 8; empowerment reform, 239t.9.1; European Charter on Local SelfGovernment, 128, 191–2; European Union and, 184–91; field study focus, 28; financial decentralization and, 127–48; history of, 22–8; home rule reforms, 234–6f.9.3; integrating into

estado de las autonomías (state of autonomies), 83–126; intergovernmental processes and, 31–54; international networks, 187–91; local finance commission accord, 232f.9.2; local governance and governing, 246–53; Local Government Act of 2001, 236; management reforms, 240t.9.2; other units of government, 87–9, 90t.4.1, 107–9; partnerships reforms, 242t.9.3; reform movement, scope of, 18–22, 226–54; scope of study, 8–13, 28–30; territoriality and, 36–7; in United States, 39–40; weak local government created by Franco regime, 28; White Paper on Reform of Local Government, 58, 233–7. See also autonomous communities; cities; municipalities; regional governments Local Governments for Sustainability, 196 lofca (Ley Orgánica de Financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas), 130 Lombardy, 197 lrau (Law Regulating Urban Activity) land-use law, 218–20, 222, 261, 280–2 Madrid (central government), 69; autonomous communities and, 170; Barcelona-Madrid relations, 134; client-based networks and, 156; Constitutional Tribunal and, 121–6; and “home rule” tradition, 176–7;

Index

illegal immigrants and, 214–15; immigrant planning, 217; immigration planning, 212–13; institutional arrangements of, 202; international involvement of, 181–3; international involvement with local governments and, 178–9; late nineteenthcentury politics and, 154; local governments: diminished contact with, 157–8, 161, direct administrative contacts with, 160, direct contacts with, 166, fiscal supervision template, 148, local taxes set by under Franco regime, 134; muncipalitiescentral government actions, interactions, 157–68; normative matters, engagement in, 260; powers transfer negotiations, 158; public participation encouragement, 244; Spanish accession to European Union, effect, 200; statutes of autonomy negotiations, 229; traffic control regulations from, 162; and Valencia ac land use laws, 220, 222 Madrid (city), 223; central government and, 167; local officials on Madrid ac, 168; metropolitan structure of, 88; municipal services production, provision, 117, 120; “shanty” housing removal authority, 262–3; traffic problems in, 206; urban architectural projects in, 255; water supply, 104 Madrid ac: bilateral cooperation commission, 75; field study

313

focus, 28; financing, 132; immigration planning, 213–14, 217; land use abuses, 222; local governments and, 169; project plan approval, 206; “shanty” housing removal in Madrid City, removal authority, 262 Malaga (City, Andalucia), 266 Malaga (Province, Andalucia), 105 management reforms, 240t.9.2 mancomunidades (intermunicipal service districts), 108; finances and, 127, 138, 139t.5.2; governmental unit, 7, 8f.1.1; intergovernmental processes and, 52; local governments and, 87–9, 90t.4.1, 92, 108–10, 115–16, 123, 126; municipalities and, 261; reform agenda and, 241t.9.3, 243 Manises (Valencia Province, Valencia), 223 Marbella (Andalucia), 4, 174–5, 177 Massanassa (Valencia Province, Valencia), 223 Melilla (North African city-state), 107 Metropolis (pan-European urban network), 178 Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona, 88 Mexico, federal experiences of, 227 Ministry of Finance (Japan), 38 Ministry of Interior, 27 Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 213 Ministry of Social Services, 212 Ministry of the Interior (Spain), 174

314

Index

Mislata (Valencia Province, Valencia), 224 monarchy, constitutional, 154 Moraira. See Tuelada/Moraira (Alicante Province, Valencia) Moroccans, 216 Moslem period, 24–5 Mr Drains (El Pocero - Francisco Hernando), 247 mudejar architecture, 5, 203 multi-level networks, 259–61 municipal services production, provision: cities, scope of, 109–21; infrastructure requirements, 203–10, 208f.8.1; Planes Provinciales de Cooperación de la Obra y Servicio Municipal, 205; Valencia ac, 109–17, 111t.4.2, 112t.4.3, 113t.4.4, 114t.4.5 municipalities: budgets, 141–7; Federation of Municipalities and Provinces (femp), 159, 161–2, 166, 171, 192, 215, 222, 230–3, 232f.9.2, 249, 273–4; financial decentralization and, 134–41, 136f.5.1, 139t.5.2; governing bodies, 91–105; illegal immigrants and, 214–15; muncipalities-central government actions, interactions, 157–68; population range, 90t.4.1. See also cities Munoz, Julián, 174 Murcia (city, Murcia), 255 National Plan for Integration, 164 Navarra ac: absences at sectoral conferences, 75; financing, 129–30; funds transferred to

local governments, 141; local governments and, 169; separate identity of, 23; Special Regime autonomous community, 134 networks. See intergovernmental networks new public management (npm) movement, 20 normative powers, distribution of, 62–4f.3.1 North Africa, 210 North African city-states, 88, 107 North Africans, 212 Northern Europe, 220 Official Journal of the European Communities, 190 Olympic Games (1992), 120, 166, 179 Open Method of Coordination, 190 Operation Aslapa, 247 Orange (internet carrier), 267 Organic Law of the Constitutional Court, 79 Orihuela (Alicante Province, Valencia), 175 Pacto del Olvido (pact of forgetfulness), 55 Pacto Local (second decentralization): authorized, 163; blocked, 161–2; corporate tradition and, 166; emergence, focus of, 5–6; home rule principles of, 168, 238; implementation, 254; international affairs and, 192; introduction of, 273; local interests and, 30, 125; local revenue enhancement and, 238; move-

Index

ment, 10, 159, 227; scope of, 230–33, 231f.9.1 pan-European urban networks, 178 Parliament. See Cortes Parque Tecnológico de Andalucia (Malaga City, Andalucia), 266 partnerships reforms, 242t.9.3 Pastor, Ana, 216–17 Paterna (Valencia Province, Valencia), 223 patria chica (effective independence), 5, 24, 171, 177 patronage (caciquismo), 24 Pedramala (Valencia), 219 pgou (General Plan for Urban Development), 49 Phillip V, King, 26 Piaporta (Valencia Province, Valencia), 223 Picayna (Valencia Province, Valencia), 223 Pilar de la Horadada (Alicante Province, Valencia), 219 pisi (Plan para la Integración Social de los Inmigrantes), 212–13 Plan Concertado (Agreed Plan for Social Services), 212 Plan Concertado de Servicios Sociales (Agreed Plan for Social Services), 163 Plan para la Integración Social de los Inmigrantes (pisi), 212–13 policy networks, 156–7, 201–25 political parties, 149–54, 151t.6.1, 152t.6.2; non-state, 77 politics, 149–77; intermestic, 179–81; territoriality and, 36–7

315

Portes (Andalucia), 220, 222 prefecturalism, 37–9 Primo de Rivera, Miguel, 27 principio dispositivo, 60, 81 provinces: abolishment attempt, 107; autonomous communities and, 57, 66–7, 71f.3.2; autonomy and, 5, 15, 126; Constitution and, 7–8, 8f.1.1, 27; councils for, 169–70; countylevel sub-provincial bodies. See comarcas (counties) system; empowerment of, 107; Federation of Municipalities and Provinces (femp), 159, 161–2, 166, 171, 192, 215, 222, 230–3, 232f.9.2, 249, 273–4; finances and, 127, 135–6f.5.1, 138, 139t.5.2, 143, 165, 279; international networks and, 188; laws, changes to, 276–7, 279; local governments and, 33, 39, 41, 44f.2.1, 49, 83–5, 88–9, 90t.4.1, 92, 94–7f.4.1, 110, 119, 264; management reforms and, 240t.9.2; municipal services and, 111–14t.4.2 t.4.5, 115–17; national interactions, 161; Pacto Local and, 161–2; permissions authority, 11; Planes Provinciales de Cooperación de la Obra y Servicio Municipal, 205; policy networks and, 205, 208; post-Franco chronology, 271–4; prefectural administration of, 27; provincial division of, 27; Roman Spain, division into, 24; services provided by, 11; uniprovincial autonomous communities, 88

316

Index

provincial governments: autonomous communities and, 80; Canada, 264; empowerment of, 106–7; powers and functions, 106–7 Quality Conferences for Public Administration, 190 Red Cross, 212 reform movement: democracy reform instruments, 242t.9.4; empowerment reform, 239t.9.1; home rule reforms, 234–6f.9.3; local finance commission accord, 232f.9.2; local governance and governing, 246–53; management reforms, 240t.9.2; partnerships reforms, 242t.9.3; scope of, 18–22, 226–54 Regional Development Plans, 190 regional governments: political involvement, 168–71. See also autonomous communities Regional Incentives Program, 147 Reguladora de las Haciendas Locales (Regulation of Local Finance), 135–38f.5.1 relations, intergovernmental. See intergovernmental networks Rhone-Alps, 197 Riley, Terence, 255 Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit, 12, 196 Roca, Juan Antonio, 174 Roman period, 24 Romanians, 216 rural development centres, 109 Santiago (city), 197–8

Santiago de Compostella (Galicia), 255 second decentralization, 232. See also Pacto Local (second decentralization) Second Republic, 24, 55, 57, 107 sectoral conferences: autonomous communities and, 74–7; European Union, 185; governmental unit, 8f.1.1; intergovernmental networks and, 17; intergovernmental politics and, 157–8, 170–1; international networks and, 185, 187; local governments and, 43, 44f.2.1; post-Franco chronology, 273; reform agenda and, 243 self-government. See home rule Seseña (Castilla-LaMancha), 247 Seville (city), 177; European Union influence on, 223; international involvement of, 197–8; water supply, 104 Silla (Valencia Province, Valencia), 223 slow-route communities, 68 smoking in public, 259 solid waste management, 104 Southern Europe, prefectural administration in, 37 Spain: accession to European Union, effect, 178, 184, 186f.7.1, 188–91, 199–200; African continent, closeness to, 30; catching up, 255–9; constitutional arrangements, 8f.1.1; constitutional democracy, 257; estado de las autonomías (state of autonomies), 5, 7, 56–7, 76, 134, 165, 226, 272, 274; eu

Index

legislation implementation record, 259; European Union, policy development, effect on, 183; and Europeanization phenomenon, 259; federal culture, 253–4; federal; building of, 55–82; financial decentralization and, 127–48; under Franco, 27–8, 55, 134, 165, 176; as intergovernmentalized country, xi; Pacto del Olvido (pact of forgetfulness), 55; politics, 149–77; post-Franco chronology, 271–5; post-Franco Spain, xii, 3, 224, 246, 257–8, 266, 271–5; provincial division of, 27; public policy: as “eu worthy,” 258–9, smoking in public, 259; transition to democracy, 6; world cities in, 265 Spanish Succession, War of, 26 state of autonomies. See estado de las autonomías (state of autonomies) Stockholm Challenge, 196 Succession, Spanish War of, 26 Tax and Financial Policy Council (Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera) (cpff), 130 Telde (Canary Islands), 175 Telefónica (internet carrier), 267 Terra Mitica amusement park, Valencia-Benidorm, 174 territorial areas (vegurias), 85 territoriality, 36–7 Teruel (city), 203–4 Teruel (Province, Aragon), 203–4 Teruel Exists (civic nongovernmental organization), 203

317

tourism: autonomous communities and, 164; “e.t.s” (eternal tourists), 211, 215–16; federal Spain and, 60, 63f.3.1, 69, 76, 80; home rule reforms and, 235f.9.3; intergovernmental processes and, 30, 36, 42; international networks and, 178, 196–9; land use law and, 280; local governments and, 87–8, 93, 95f.4.1, 99, 104, 108; Pacto Local and, 231f.9.1, 232; post-Franco chronology and, 272; projects funding, 147; provincial governments and, 106; tourist cities, 140, 197, 232f.9.2 trains, high-speed, 203–4 Transmediterránean ferry line, opposition to, 212 Tudela (Navarra), 99, 101f.4.4 Tuelada/Moraira (Alicante Province, Valencia), 206–7, 219 Turkey, prefectural administration in, 37–8 tutelage: autonomy as freedom from, 126; concept of, 27; elimination of, 150, 167–8, 192, 259; under Franco, 9; under post-Franco Spain, 28; prefectural system and, 37–8 uni-provincial autonomous communities, 88 United Cities and Local Governments (international organization), 195 United Nations, 196; international organization of cities under, 180; as transnational organization, 180

318

Index

United Nations Treaty Against Corruption, 174 United States: commission form of city government and, 91, 251–2; federal experiences of, 227; international involvement, and nature of federalism, 178–9; local government organization in, 85; local governments in, 39–40; “strong mayor” form of city government and, 253 Valencia (city), 8, 88, 104, 197–8 Valencia (historic region), 26 Valencia ac: bilateral cooperation commission, 75; field study focus, 28; funds transferred to local governments, 141; High-Technology Route (association) membership, 185; immigration planning, 214, 217; land use laws: abuses under, 176–7, 202–3, 217–22, 268; debates about, 256; local governments and, 161, 169, 171–73; municipal services production, provision, 109–17, 111t.4.2, 112t.4.3, 113t.4.4, 114t.4.5; separate identity of, 23; statute of autonomy, 86–7, 228 Valencia Federation of Municipalities and Provinces, 110 vegurias (territorial areas), 85

Velasco, Javier, 204 vertical partnerships. See consortia Viscaya (Province, Basque Country), 105 Visigothic period, 24 Viver, Carles, 61 Wanadoo (France Telecom) (internet carrier), 267 War of Spanish Succession, 26 water supply, 104 welfare state: autonomous communities and, 67, 142–3; burden on local governments, 142–3; development of, 6, 9, 31–5, 42, 54, 258, 260; under Franco, 28; intergovernmental model, 35–6, 42; interventionist state, as, 34; local government role, 28, 32–5; multi-tiered, 28; services, 116–17 White Paper on Reform of Local Government, 58, 233–7 World Summit of the Information Society, 196 Yagüe, Marisol, 174 Zafra Commission, 237 Zafra Victor, Manuel, 233 Zapatero government, 174, 230 Zaragosa, 104