Living Responsibly: Ethical Issues in Everyday Life [1 ed.] 9781848882508, 9789004374096

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Living Responsibly

Series Editors Dr Robert Fisher Lisa Howard Dr Ken Monteith Advisory Board Simon Bacon Katarzyna Bronk John L. Hochheimer Stephen Morris Peter Twohig

Ana Borlescu Ann-Marie Cook Peter Mario Kreuter John Parry Karl Spracklen S Ram Vemuri

A Probing the Boundaries research and publications project. http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/probing-the-boundaries/ The Persons Hub ‘Living Responsibly’

2014

Living Responsibly: Ethical Issues in Everyday Life

Edited by

Jan Prothmann

Inter-Disciplinary Press Oxford, United Kingdom

© Inter-Disciplinary Press 2014 http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/publishing/id-press/

The Inter-Disciplinary Press is part of Inter-Disciplinary.Net – a global network for research and publishing. The Inter-Disciplinary Press aims to promote and encourage the kind of work which is collaborative, innovative, imaginative, and which provides an exemplar for inter-disciplinary and multi-disciplinary publishing.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission of Inter-Disciplinary Press.

Inter-Disciplinary Press, Priory House, 149B Wroslyn Road, Freeland, Oxfordshire. OX29 8HR, United Kingdom. +44 (0)1993 882087

ISBN: 978-1-84888-250-8 First published in the United Kingdom in eBook format in 2014. First Edition.

Table of Contents Introduction Jan Prothmann Section 1

Moral Judgement and Responsibility A Breakthrough in the Common Ethical View Kakali Ghoshal

Section 2

Section 3

vii

3

Hitting the Moral Decision like a Ball Madhu Kapoor

11

Aspects of a Morally Responsible Practice Eva Buddeberg

19

Poverty, Justice and the Environment Ethical Consumerism, Personal Responsibility and Systemic Problems Ornaith O’Dowd

31

Global Justice: What Do We Owe to the Poor? Makoto Usami

39

Thou Shalt Take Care of Your Own Waste: Rural Practices in a Global Metropolis and Their Implications Kin-Ling Tang

49

Workplace Citizenship and Public Administration: Competition or Participation? The Italian Case Umberto Buratti

61

The Meaning of Being an Ethical Psychologist: Second Year’s Psychology Students’ Perspective Klaudija Pauliukeviciute and Kristina Zardeckaite-Matulaitiene

71

Employees’ Attitudes toward Ethical Behaviour at Work: Impact of Their Individual Characteristics Kristina Zardeckaite-Matulaitiene, Aukse Endriulaitiene and Justina Naujokaitiene

81

Emotion Management in Business Communication Anna Rostomyan and Anabel Ternès Section 4

97

Human Relationships Why are the Stories We Tell Morally Important? Gavin Fairbairn

111

To Be Parents between Care and Pillage: The Double-Sided Ethics within the Life of Intercountry Adoptive Families in Italy Rossana DiSilvio

119

Caring Networks: Rethinking the Moral Obligations Placed on Statutory Care Services Sue Hollinrake and Will Thomas

131

Introduction Inter-Disciplinary.Net This volume represents an historical snapshot of the presentations and interactions that took place at the 2nd Global Conference on Living Responsibly. This introduction gives a brief overview of the chapters. We encourage you to read the entire volume, soaking in its interdisciplinarity, for that is what InterDisciplinary.Net presents beautifully. In Section 1, ‘Moral Judgement and Responsibility’, general overarching questions related to the ethical dimensions of everyday life are addressed. There are three chapters in the first section authored by Kakali Ghosal, Madhu Kapoor, and Eva Buddeberg. Section 2, ‘Poverty, Justice and the Environment’, employs the overarching general ideas behind ethical dimensions of everyday life to more specific topics. The chapters in this section, more often than not, wrestle with the problem of collective action. This set of three chapters are authored by Ornaith O’Dowd, Makoto Usami, and Kin-Ling Tang. In Section 3, ‘Workplace’, the authors discuss such topics as citizenship, ethics in the workplace, handling and dealing with the various and vast behavioural characteristics of individual workers, and dealing with the emotions and emotional conflicts between workers and administration. This section includes chapters that are authored by Umberto Buratti, Klaudija Paulinkeviciute, Kristina Zardeckaite-Matulattiene, Aukse Endriulaittene, Justina Naujokaitiene, Anna Rostomyan and Anabel Ternes. Wrapping up this volume is Section 4, ‘Human Relationships’. In this section, scholars discuss such important topics as how storytelling plays a role in everyday ethics, and responsible living. As well, authors discuss parenting, more specifically living in poverty and scraping by, teaching children how to be ethically and morally stable and sacrificing ethics to survive. The volume wraps up with another important topic, ethics and morals in positions of care-giving. We sincerely hope you enjoy this volume. The authors and editor thank you for reading their very important on-going research and studies. For further information on this project, visit Inter-Disciplinar.Net at http://www.inter-disciplinary.net. Jan Prothmann edited this volume. Jan is a consultant working in international development cooperation. As a practitioner, his main area of work is rural development and natural resource management. Within this context, he is particularly interested in problems related to ‘distributive justice’, ‘social and resource dilemmas’ and ‘free will’.

Section 1 Moral Judgement and Responsibility

A Breakthrough in the Common Ethical View Kakali Ghoshal Abstract The present chapter attempts to take a break from the predetermined concept that ethical rules are in-built or a priori. It is rather the other way round. While we perform, we create moral principles. Had it been otherwise there would not have been so much conflict and contradiction among various moral parameters. It is true that our life is governed by socio-political background. But the ethical framework that we follow in our life is open on all sides. We can create and cultivate them according to our need and situation. It is not that there is any ideal set up for any individual life. Thus ethics is something that evolves gradually as life progresses. No two lives can share the same plane of existence on this planet. Then how can there be any common prescription of laid down rules that can be regarded as moral? Though ethical rules are said to be prescriptive they are, in fact, situationbased-cultivated-rules. Further, it is we who stamp those rules as obligatory. They emerge from the pragmatic phase of our lived-life. Therefore, for me, the ethical principles are a co-mingling of what is called the ‘left ideal’ and the ‘right ideal’. They stand for ‘certain negative elements in the ideal itself that can disrupt its application’ and ‘is though right as such yet has certain drawbacks in its application’ respectively. Deliberate elimination of the negative elements of the left ideal and the correct application of the right ideal leads to form the kernel of the Ideal that reminds one of the concept of the ‘golden mean’ of Aristotle and that of the Buddhist ideal of the middle path (Madhyama panthā) and the mixed economy of both extremes. Key Words: Breakthrough, a priori, cultivated rule, left ideal, right ideal, golden mean, madhyama panth, mixed economy. ****** 1. A Breakthrough in the Common Ethical View Let us start with a conversation between a teacher and a pupil. While walking together, they came across a temple. The pupil bowed before the temple. The teacher asked, ‘Whom do you salute?’ The pupil answered, ‘To God.’ The teacher questioned, ‘Why God? He is under the Universal Law (vidhi).’ The Pupil said, ‘So be it, I bow to the Law.’ The teacher answered, ‘The Law is governed by the result of an action (karmaphala).’

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__________________________________________________________________ The pupil answered, ‘So be it, I bow to the result of an action.’ The teacher replied, ‘The result of an action is determined by Action (karma) itself.’ The pupil answered, ‘I realize; I bow before the action of a human being.’ This conversation reveals the gravity of human action in the social and ethical context. But as life goes, how to determine the course of one’s action― this chapter tries to focus on that. Before that, it is worth quoting from Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland to substantiate the point explicated in this chapter― ‘Cheshire Puss’, asked Alice, ‘Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?’. ‘That depends a good deal on where you want to go,’ said the Cat. ‘I don’t much care where,’ said Alice. ‘Then it doesn’t matter which way you go,’ said the Cat.1 Indeed life is not a beaten track to be followed blindly; it is rather a path to be treaded through responsibility. In this, the first and the foremost of all is the responsibility of living responsibly and with this one enters the domain of ethical life. As responsible living being we do not simply exist in this world, but ought to live our life here. As Oscar Wilde rightly puts it, ‘To live is the rarest thing in the world. Most people exist, that is all.’2 Existence in all its aspects precedes life, that is, one must exist to live. But mere existence makes no life. Life is an encoded message of nature that has to be decoded through actions. Inanimate objects do exist but do not live. Animate objects exist and live and act towards their living, but of them only human beings can bear responsibility towards their life, can reason what is right or wrong, good or bad, moral or immoral. As we decide on this, we move on to an ethical plane of existence. What is it that we call ethics? It is the study of moral standards governing the conduct of a person and judging them as right or wrong, good or bad. Such decisions lie entirely within one’s purview of life and what is normally referred to as ethical, is something that evolves gradually as the life progresses. No two lives share the same plane of existence; hence each life has its own course of actions that are subjected to various parameters. However, there is no end to providing such parameters. The present chapter tries to bring out the evolving aspect of ethics and takes a deviation, a breakthrough from the common notion of ethics being prescriptive. It focuses on the fact that sometimes while we perform, we create moral principles and thus ethics becomes a performance and not any code of conduct. Our life is regulated by our survival factors― natural, physical (which includes the gene factor also), social, cultural, political, religious and ritual and the belief-

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__________________________________________________________________ system developed gradually through them. Our thoughts flow accordingly and under certain circumstances they choose their own alternative. Whether that is right or wrong depends on time to come. There are no fixed norms or ideals that rule life. The standard of each life vary from individual to individual as per one’s surroundings, caste, creed and religion. There is no common prescription for uncommon instances. Let us consider for example the following two common cases― the case of a dying patient still undergoing treatment and the case of a person who has committed such a criminal offence that he has been sentenced to death. Now, in the first case a doctor is generally not supposed to say this to the patient that he is going to die. Rather, the doctor often says, ‘Don’t worry, everything will be all right.’ On the other hand, in the latter case the accused person is being not only informed but is made aware of his death at every moment. What about the ethical readings here? Both are on the verge of death, yet different reactions to their greatest tragedy of life. They are human beings and have the right to live and that too with complete dignity, whatever the circumstance is. One is nearing death naturally and indeed draws our sympathy; the other is forced to die and we say that he has reaped his own destiny i.e., the accused person is suffering because he ought to suffer for his actions. So goes the social verdict. Are the social reactions towards them morally wrong? From a particular perspective, perhaps it is not. Here we decide on our attitude not from any fixed moral obligation, but our conscience and our emotions do play a role here according to the circumstance. The principles and ideals of life get reared up through experiences, and each individual gradually develops its own value-system. From the very childhood a child is made to learn─ ‘this is right’, ‘this is wrong’, ‘you ought to do this’, ‘you should not do that’ etc. Thus the person gradually starts belonging to a valuesystem. But as one steps towards one’s future life, all these value-oriented principles are put to the test of practical experience. Life starts manifesting itself not as abiding by those values, but modifying them towards achieving a better life. One always aspires for what one thinks as the highest or sets as the perfect goal in one’s life. The concept of ‘the highest’ or ‘the perfect’ gives rise to certain principles that reason stamps as obligatory; mind applies them to judge actions as right or wrong. In this whole scenario, when an action turns out to be in favour of the enhancement of society and the people, it is referred to as right action and gets tagged as something ethical. Since these principles emerge from the pragmatic phase of our lived-life, none of them can be regarded as either absolutely ethical or absolutely unethical. Actions being the need of survival amidst unpredictable circumstances of life, there can be no rigid ethical course. There can be neither any extreme end to meet the needs nor any fixed norm to deal with unpredictable circumstances. How can there be one medicine for many diseases? If not, how can there be any common prescription of laid down rules that can be regarded as moral irrespective of circumstances? Very aptly indeed the Indian epic Mahabharata

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__________________________________________________________________ preaches that it is sometimes difficult to determine the reasons on which duties stand even as it is difficult to find out the legs of a snake. We are the architect of our own life-structure in the sense that we are what our actions make us. And, we act not always according to our sheer will but sometimes as bearing the responsibility that life bestows on us. Our will-power acts as the enhancing factor no doubt, but it cannot function on its own without being aided by the surrounding factors that might be either favourable or unfavourable for us. We determine our ethical strictures not as something prescribed to us as obligatory, but they take shape in us through our experiences aided by various constraints and thus mould our destiny. The Bṛhadāraņyakopaniṣad beautifully says ― kāmamaya evāyaṁ puruṣa iti | sa yathākāmo bhavati tatkraturbhavati || yatkraturbhavati tatkarma kurute | yatkarma kurute tadabhisaṃpadyate || 3 That is, ‘You are what your intense, driving desire is; as your desire is, so is your will; as your will is, so is your act; as your act is, so is your destiny.’ However, the thoughts imparted in the sacred literature of Upanishads are that life is destined to merge with the eternal truth underlying this universe. In other words, life is the journey of the ‘Individual consciousness’ towards the ‘Universal consciousness’. But the ease of the journey gets determined by an individual’s reactions and responsibilities towards life at each stage. It is true that as life advances each individual develops some sort of core rigidity in his or her belief system. But the ethical framework that one follows in one’s life is open on all sides. To explain, we might compare it with the basic structure of a diamond, the precious gem of nature. The word ‘diamond’ is derived from the Greek word ‘adamas’, meaning ‘I tame’ or ‘I subdue’, in a sense ‘the unconquerable’. Diamond, is made up of carbon atoms and these atoms form a bonding of rigid tetrahedral structure. It is this rigid arrangement known as the diamond lattice that makes diamond colourless and clear; and, due to its relatively high density it has its unique sparkle and lustre. However, diamonds in their original state are generally dull and not bright. It is through skilful cut and proper polish that diamond is made to shine with its real brilliance reflecting its inner fire of brightness. Though diamond is the hardest of all elements, it can be cut along certain directions of its natural planes of weakness. Likewise, each human being is the precious creation of nature and has one’s own basic mind-structure that might be referred to as the person-lattice. It is the network, the continuous arrangement of units of belief that form a rigid bonding as dominated by one’s physical, genetic and other biological factors. Due to this network, each individual has a unique code of behaviour and personal traits. But besides this, an individual has his own natural planes of weakness also. The various social and environmental parameters cut

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__________________________________________________________________ through these planes of weakness and shapes out the real human persona. Like that of a diamond, the fire of human-brilliance remains hidden within till it receives its perfect treatment in the hands of nature. Through social evolution of one’s thoughts, evolves the real ‘I’, the moral ‘I’, by taming the crude ego. Given a metaphysical intonation it amounts to saying that the latent divinity in the heartcore of the human persona starts manifesting itself in the light of its inner wisdom enkindled by the magic wand of Universal consciousness. The human persona starts evolving as a multi-dimensional being and grows its ethical outlooks as a social being, and acts and reacts to a particular situation accordingly. One can create and cultivate one’s ethical outlooks according to one’s need and situation, and not that there is any ideal set up for any individual. The true spirit of Indian Philosophy as echoed in the Vedānta lies in the thought that the goal of humanity is the attainment of the pure eternal bliss, the ānandam. Indeed every human being wishes to free itself from the shackles of suffering that befalls life. But in this, each individual is to realize that the root of all sufferings is its ego-centric attitude. Not in the ‘I’ but in the ‘we’ there lies the true happiness of a life worth lived. In the Hitopadeśa, a story telling Indian literature, the author sings the eternal song of oneness when he describes the whole creation as a harmonious whole family (vasudhaiva kuṭumbakam) ― ayaṁ nijaḥ parove’ti gaņanā laghucetasām | udāracaritānāṁ tu vasudhaiva kuṭumbakam ||4 That is, ‘‘this is my own and that is a stranger’, is the calculation of the narrowminded; but for the magnanimous-hearts, the entire earth is but a family.’ This paves the path for universal brotherhood. Human civilization has survived till today not because of its existing moral injunctions but because of its inherent power of conscious reflection on those injunctions. Life is precious and life ought to be kept precious through rational, logical, impassionate action. Any action aimed at the ‘greatest goodness of the greatest number of people’ is to be judged pragmatically. One has to educate one’s own self in choosing between the existing parameters. Proper education, in the truest sense of the term, leads to proper knowledge. Proper knowledge enkindles the light of wisdom and with wisdom dawns the power of vision. Such vision reveals the true mission of a life that has to be achieved on the pragmatic plane of existence. However, what is proper or perfect is a question of course. But we can at least think of it without making any theoretical claim. There is a prevailing concept that ethical rules are in-built or a priori. But it is rather the other way round. The social and political, personal and impersonal aspects of an individual have no rigid ethical frame as their support. For instance, one knows that water flows downwards, but if required one has to exert force to raise it upwards. In the same way, what human society cultivates as the virtuous

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__________________________________________________________________ and meritorious for any individual, can turn out to be not-so-practical-principal under certain circumstance and then the individual will have to make its own way going against the existing parameters. How to decide between the existing moral parameters? The Śrīmadbhagavadgītā5, a compendium of Indian ethics, reflects such moral dilemma that every human being faces in life in some way or other, through the character Arjuna, the warrior hero. The entire composition is presented in the battlefield by Lord Krishna acting as his charioteer. Arjuna’s moral conflict as ‘to be or not to be’ starts when he realizes that he has to fight his kinsmen and teachers. All existing moral parameters sprout in his mind and reason succumbs to his ‘petty sentiment’. His conflict is between such moral parameters as ‘if he kills them, he will accumulate sin’, ‘if he escapes from the battlefield, that will be a disgrace for him as a warrior’, ‘if he fights and wins, he will enjoy a bloodsmeared kingdom which will never give him peace’ etc. The only rescue offered here is Krishna’s action-oriented ethics― one should never step down from one’s duty in any circumstance, whatever be the consequences. To be strictly moral one has to transcend the mere mundane level of existence and rise above one’s personal motives. This phase of moral upliftment is the greatest and the purest responsibility of humanity in the truest sense of the term. It can be achieved not through freedom from action, but through actions performed with the sheer feeling of responsibility that an individual bears towards nature. In this, one has to meditate with one’s serious power of thinking as to what one’s course of actions should be. The power of vision will enlighten the path leading to the right mission. This might sound somewhat philosophical. But then the journey of life along the path of righteous action does unfold itself on the philosophical plane of morality. Morality itself is an abstract concept and falls under no customary judgment. It is not theoretical; in practice we are our sole responsibility in deciding the moral sceptre for us. Once we fail in this, we become the inescapable result of our own tragedy. But, a life adhering to truth, honesty and selfless love sets its own standard of living and then the concept of morality sprouts in lithe spontaneity from it. It depends on how we want to treat ourselves― as merely succumbing to a circumstance or existing in our own rights with firm determination. Therefore, it can be said that the ethical principles are a co-mingling of what might be called the ‘left ideal’ and the ‘right ideal’. ‘Left ideal’ involves in it certain negative elements that can disrupt its application and is hence subject to orientation. ‘Right ideal’ as such is the right, but has certain drawbacks in its application. Deliberate elimination of the negative elements of the ‘left ideal’ and the correct application of the ‘right ideal’― this leads to form the kernel of the Ideal which in future will serve as the commonness of property of both ideals. This reminds one of the concept of the ‘Golden mean’ of Aristotle and that of the Buddhist ideal of the middle path (Madhyama panthā) and the mixed economy of both extremes. Neither extreme rigidity nor extreme flexibility, neither the excess nor the denial, but the ‘…Middle state between…’ as Aristotle puts it, is the choice

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__________________________________________________________________ left to an individual. This is known as the Golden Mean of rational choices. It depends on circumstances and cannot be prescribed. Thus, between two extreme ends, one is to find a midway outlet as follows― Bashfulness – Modesty – Shamelessness, Prodigal – Liberal – Mean, Cowardly – Courageous – Rashly. Of course, this cannot always be the way out. When Lord Buddha sets in motion the wheel of Dharma (the righteous) referred to as the Dharmacakrapravartana, he imparts the thought of the noble path, the middle path, traversing through right understanding, right thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration. Whatever we call ethical is what a life sets as the paradigm for itself through these means. Thus, we reap our own destiny. It is the transformation of the inner self that follows no rigid course. In the eternal churning of the cosmic wheel of time that goes on and on, there is no station to rest, no shelter to repose, but only the path of action for an individual in search of stability of mind amidst the transitory. So, one has to be dynamic and make a breakthrough in the cosmic scenario to achieve one’s destiny as is favourable to the upliftment of humanity. But one should be aware of what one reaps, so that one can proclaim― I am what I live to be, I am what my actions make me to be, I am what my ethics lead me to be, and thus, I am what I ought to be. So, towards this end let us be on our way, as the Vedas say, caraiveti, caraiveti! Move on, Move on!

Notes 1

Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (Fairfield: 1st World Library – Literary Society, 2004), 57. 2 Oscar Wilde, The Works of Oscar Wilde, (Leicester: Galley Press, 1987), 1023. 3 Swami Svarupananda Giri, ed., Upanishad Ratnamala (D Novo Printers, 1960), 4.4.5. 4 Bal Shastri, ed., Hitopadeśaḥ (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Surbharati Prakashan, 2010), 74. 5 Kanaihyalal Joshi, trans., The Bhagavadgītā (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Orientalia, 1977), Chapter 2.

Bibliography Carroll, Lewis. Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. Fairfield: 1st World Library – Literary Society, 2004. Joshi, Kanaihyalal, trans. The Bhagavadgītā. Varanasi: Chowkhamba Orientalia, 1977.

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__________________________________________________________________ Shastri, Bal, ed. Hitopadeśaḥ. Varanasi: Chowkhamba Surbharati Prakashan, 2010. Svarupananda Giri, Swami, ed. Upanishad Ratnamala.D Novo Printers, 1960. Wilde, Oscar. The Works of Oscar Wilde. Leicester: Galley Press, 1987. Kakali Ghoshal is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Budge Budge College, Budge Budge, Kolkata-700137, West Bengal, India. She completed her PhD on ‘Creation in the light of Philosophy’ from Jadavpur University, India. Her field of study includes the epistemology and metaphysics of both Indian and Western Philosophy. She has a special interest in scientific expositions of some of the philosophical issues.

Hitting the Moral Decision like a Ball Madhu Kapoor Abstract In this chapter I would like to emphasise that morality is like learning one's mother tongue. No doubt it is learnt and cultivated. But it is not learnt by noting down each and every grammatical rule and its operation. Instead, we learn it spontaneously through environment in which we live and breathe. This becomes clearer when one is at a crucial point of one's life, when one is on a crossroad, when one does not know what should be done; yet one has to act. The decision taken at that stage reveals one's character which has its foothold on certain moral rules which one has learnt in course of time. But the moment when one takes decision, one may deviate from those rules according to the situation. It flashes into the mind at that very moment which is unique and un-repeatable. One takes a leap, from some known rules to unknown, according to one's inner strength which remains unlearned. One suddenly discovers one's potential. There are no objective grounds or practical advice as to how we should behave in a particular situation, or take decisions in a critical situation. We, no doubt, play with the rules just as we play any game with certain fixed rules. But when the time comes to hit the ball we innovate ourselves within those rules. That is why we human beings are so different from each other yet follow the fixed set of rules. For him what is right is accepted with total commitment to the rules learnt earlier in life. These rules are so internalised in his mental system that it works spontaneously. I will strengthen my point by citing examples from ancient texts like The Mahabharata, more specifically from the Bhagavadgita. I will also try to discuss that we have no ‘holiday’ from morality. We are 24hrs under the moral obligation, the process of which can never be ratiocinated. The so-called rational justification comes afterwards. Thus it is said in the Mahabharata: The ways of morality (dharma) are unknown to us. It remains unrevealed to us forever; still the rules are laid down by our elders. Key Words: Spontaneous, crossroads, un-repeatable, total commitment, holiday from morality, dharma. ***** Life presents us with many moral conflicts, some of which even amount to genuine moral dilemmas. The moral dilemma, encountered in real life, is not a mark of irrationality or inconsistency but emphasizes that men sometimes face moral problems for which we cannot find a simple and rational solution. In genuine moral dilemmas, rational arguments in favour of either prescriptions or actions (where both can be done) are equally balanced. Hence if the rational agent is forced to take actions, it is usually under resolved conflict, and the agent may

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__________________________________________________________________ suffer from such emotions as regret and remorse. Indian epics, like the Mahabharata supply numerous illustrations of such genuine moral dilemmas, some of which may be resolvable, but due to lack of sufficient information or informational constraints in the situation, a rational decision arrived at may seem to be unjustified. Since decision has to be taken, for the situation demands, it is taken with full knowledge of consequences and sometimes under the blind faith of emotion. But taken in the broader perspective the so called moral conscience is either biased by baser emotion as hatred or greed etc., or it is so partially. Let us start with Sartre’s example of his student who could not decide whether to join military service or to remain with his mother to serve her. He remained in conflict and searched for definite answer. Similarly Arjuna is torn up by conflict as to whether he ought to fight and kill his relative or quit the battlefield. This shows the inner conflict of the mind which is not always visible from the outside but it is there. How to resolve this conflict? The solution, which Arjuna himself opted for, reflects the imperfect human solution in an imperfect world. Either the problem does not have a definite answer or it lacks information. The information may not always be sufficient but in spite of that one is bound to take a decision. How to take a decision is a difficult question to answer. There are several paths suggested in our text books – one may look for pleasure, one may go according to one’s practical utility or one may simply follow the course of duty. Whatever may be the course of action, one follows according to one’s own choice which might have been decided by one’s social and cultural framework of mind. But, still how the choice is determined is difficult to answer. But that is not all, because, although one moves within one’s framework, one still goes beyond that when one takes a difficult decision. I will discuss that ‘beyond’ in this chapter. In this chapter I would like to emphasise that morality is like learning one's mother tongue. We do not learn it by noting down each and every grammatical rule and its operation, yet we learn it spontaneously through environment in which we live and breathe. This becomes clearer when one is at a crucial point of one's life, when one is on a crossroad, when one does not know what should be done yet one has to act. The decision taken at that stage reveals one's character which has its foothold on certain moral rules which one has learnt in course of time. But the moment when one takes decision, one may deviate from those rules according to the situation. It flashes into the mind at that very moment which is unique and unrepeatable. One takes a leap, from some known rules to unknown, according to one's inner strength which remains unlearned. One suddenly discovers one's potential in an instant. There are no objective grounds or practical advice as to how we should behave in a particular situation or take decisions in a critical situation. We, no doubt, play with the rules just as we play any game with certain fixed rules. But when the time comes to hit the ball we innovate ourselves within that rule. That is why we human beings are so different from each other yet follow the fixed set of rules. For him what is right is accepted with total commitment to the rules

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__________________________________________________________________ learnt earlier in life. These rules are so internalised in his mental system that it works spontaneously. I will strengthen my point by citing examples from ancient texts like the Mahabharata, more specifically from the Bhagavadgita. Let me take first an example which is the soul of this chapter. A tennis player when learning the process of hitting the ball, learns the grammatical rules and its operations but when one is on the court one just innovate one’s own way of hitting the ball. Later on one realizes that it was a new technique which one has created just now. Similarly when one takes moral decisions one relies on certain learnt methods of handling a particular situation. One may like that method or not, but the foundation is built and one may not come out of this built system absolutely. Ethical life is not to follow the catalogue of do’s and don’ts, of virtue and vices, of rights and duties, but also to unify them in a system. What we often call ‘rational justification’ is a vague term because it can be interpreted in many ways. It may be psychological, logical, social, political etc. For instance, when one joins a political party, one has to speak according to the party line otherwise he will be expelled from the party. Rational justification is very difficult to define, for one may coin one’s own justification which is not applicable for others. There is no such objective moral principle which must be followed by all. The very involvement of subjects makes it subjective. Though the decision must be free from the subjective hatred, greed etc. and must be impartial, yet again it is not easy to determine that criteria also. Impartiality is an essential ingredient while taking decision, as it should be. It must be autonomous to all our personal emotions. What I want to emphasize in this chapter is that it is very difficult to take a moral decision. It is like playing in a court. When one is playing with a lesser player there is not so much to evolve, but when one is playing with a superior player one is playing with different strokes all the time. The stroke is determined by the speed, gravity and skill of the player. One has to play with multiple strategies in one’s mind which is beyond the reach of the rules. In a pluralistic society like India, there are innumerable differences of language, race, religion and castes; parameters are innumerable, so it is very complex to make rules according to their demand, choices and ability. In a unitary society it is not so difficult. One can rely on certain criteria, but in a pluralistic society one has to consider the requirement of each and every section of the society in a uniform way. No doubt it enriches the society and also the individual but it also creates complexity and several irresolvable problems. The question as to how one is going to take a decision arises. The rules only show the direction but the limit is set by the individual. They are not enough to guide us in every situation and context. One has to coin one’s own ways and find out one’s own direction. It is very appropriate to quote Lord Buddha in this context when he says: ātmadīpo bhavaḥ, enlighten yourself. Rules must be practiced rigorously, but from there arises the light that will show the path. Every situation is unique in itself and irreplaceable which

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__________________________________________________________________ requires unique solution. For instance, it is true that when there is red light the vehicles will stop and people will not cross the road. Now suppose it happens by chance that there is green light and a pedestrian crosses the road. The car-driver stops the car since he is well aware that he should not crush the man. But in some other case a car-driver can argue that since there is green light he should be allowed to drive. This is said to be the hidden principle that one follows as a cardriver does. There is no written rule book that guides him in this particular situation. Thus, here he hits the ball safely and answers to his moral call from within. The driver has to go beyond the rule book and has to follow accordingly. Of course, moral weakness or weakness of will, human imperfection, limitations and fragilities are there but one has to surpass them as much as possible. One has to learn it as Kant has said: ‘That virtue can and must be taught follows from its not being innate... It must be exercised and cultivated by effort to combat the inner enemy within man, for one cannot straightway do that one wants to do, without having tried out and exercised one’s powers. But the decision to do this must be made all at once and completely, since a disposition (animus) to surrender at times to vice, in order to break away from it gradually would itself be impure and even vicious and so could bring about no virtue.’1 The equivalent term for ethics in Sanskrit is dharma that determines the duty of each person. Dharma is an intelligible concept in spite of its ubiquity, ambiguity and multivalent character. It seems to be a link between ways of living, ways of seeing, ways of relating to life’s ultimate issues. It may be puzzling because the richness and ambiguity of the word ‘dharma’ are interwoven. It is suggested that if one is in dilemma, one can look for solution in the authoritative texts like the Vedas, if not satisfied with the answers one can go for smŗti-ṥāstra and even then remains dissatisfied one can look into the conduct of good persons and lastly, if one still remains in dilemma, one should follow one’s heart approval. Veda smŗti sadācāra svasa ca priyamātmanḥ Etaccaturvidharāhu sākṣāta dharmasya lakṣaṇam//2 The last option is a deviation from the other three options provided in the moral theory. Ethical life is a preparation for what completely transcends the rules and develops a kind of insight. This insight allows taking a leap from the known to the unknown domain. I do not deny the prescriptive rules as such followed by a social system. What I would like to emphasize is that one can evolve oneself by practicing the rules and can take decision according to one’s choice without harming the others. It is so inherent in one’s system that it becomes one’s part of

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__________________________________________________________________ life. One might call it virtue ethics where one transcends from mere commitment to duty and finally to virtue that combines both reason and passion together. Moral decision is not a mere rational decision because then it becomes mechanical submission to the rules. It is neither passionate something because in that case it becomes blind submission. Moral decision is, therefore, the combination of the two elements. It is a sudden leap from the grammatical rules to the new horizon. It cannot be described but it happens. Just as an artist learns the grammatical rules of musical notations but later on he composes his own way of presenting the musical piece, similarly ethical decision is taken with innovative ways, within the rules yet beyond rules. This way of thinking can be developed by recognizing one’s own system. Aristotle calls it ‘golden mean’, a course between extremes. For example, courage is a mean between rashness and cowardice. It is defined as: that which is equidistant from each of the extremes---neither excessive nor deficient. ‘Virtue of character is a mean, and in what sense it is so; that sit is a mean between two vices, one of excess and other of deficiency: and that it is such because it is the sort of thing able to hit the mean in feelings and actions. This is why it is hard to be good, because in each case it is hard to find the middle point, for instance, not everyone can find the centre of a circle, but only the person with knowledge. So too anyone can get angry or give and spend money--- these are easy: but doing them in relation to the right person in the right amount, at the right time, with right aim in view, and in the right way--- that is not something anyone can do, nor is it easy. This is why excellence in these things is rare, praiseworthy and noble.’3 Right conduct is rare and praiseworthy and noble. No doubt it is difficult to do because everybody’s capacity is not equal. The conditions that justify the getting angry depend on how we ought to show anger and against whom and on what occasion, and for how long. In fact we do sometimes praise those who are deficient in anger and we applaud hot tempered for what we call their manliness It is difficult to give a formula how wide a divergence is reprehensible. No more indeed is any other matter of direct observation easy to define. Such questions of degree depend on the particular circumstances and can only be judged by intuition. Moral goodness is a middle state, between two vices, one a vice of deficiency and other is the vices of overindulgence. It holds the position in virtue of its quality of aiming to hit the middle point in emotions and in action. Although it is difficult to hit the middle point in situation yet it is the only way to accomplish one’s ethical conduct. For instance, anybody can get angry - that is easy enough: and so is giving and spending money, but to bestow our money on the proper amount and at the proper time and for the proper motive and in the proper manner -

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__________________________________________________________________ all this is not within. Just as it requires a mathematician to find the centre of a circle so it requires an expert to take a moral decision. With rigorous practice and training it becomes part of a person’s habit reflecting its character. In the Bhagavadgita when Arjuna is in a dilemma whether to fight one’s own kith and kin or put off the weapons. Aho vat mahat pāpam kartum vyavasthitā vayam/ Yadrājyasukhalobhena hantum svajanamudyataḥ//4 Krishna, as a friend, advises him in many ways not to lay off the weapon, but ultimately he left it to Arjuna to decide his own course of action. And he says: ‘Yathā icchasi tathā kuru’. Do as you wish to do5.Thus it is left to the moral agent to take one’s own decision. It is regarded as the deep cave which lies in oneself. One has to find out one’s own solution. The ever elusive nature of moral decision (dharma) is revealed which does not follow rule but it governs from above. The secret lies within oneself which one can see oneself and no one else can see. One may call it intuitive but it is not something mysterious, it is achieved through hard practice and a rigorous course of action. The natural inclination of the heart of the good person becomes the authority as the decisive factor. It is not out of blind faith that the decision is taken. The decision is the result of the rational enquiry or investigation. The rationality plays the role prior to this leap of faith/natural inclination. The decision is supported by the rational authority of the moral agent. ‘What is to be done?’ If such a doubt arises with regard to a conflict of dharmas – the text supplies the resolution. An assembly of not less than ten persons, or if not available, not less than three persons should deliberate and reach a decision on dharma, and that dharma should not be transgressed6 ‘daṥāvarā vā pariṣadyaṁ dharmaṁ parikalpyet/ Tryavaāa vāpi vŗttastha taṁ dharmaṁ na vicālayet//’7 In verse 54 of the same text supplies the selection procedure for these ten members. The ten members’ assembly will be constituted by three scholars versed in three Vedas, one logician (haituka, verse in hetuvidya), one dialectician or arguer (Tarki versed in tarka, dialectics or hypothetical reasoning), one expert in semantics and etymology (nairukta), one scholar of the dharma sastra and three laymen from different groups, one celibate student (a young man studying under a teacher) and one householder (a married man) and one retired into the forest after leading a full family life.8 ‘Traividyo hetukastarko nairukto dharmapathakaḥ/ trayascaṥramiṇaḥ pȗrve pariṣatsyād daṥāvarā// 9

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__________________________________________________________________ This seems to be a good combination of people whose collective wisdom will usually be an effective way to decide the dharma in a more democratic frame in matters of dispute. However, practical resolution of such conflicts does not always prioritise according to the same pattern.10 In the final analysis the onus lies on the subject who strives towards happiness which is nothing but the inclination. Since inclination is blind, he limits his inclination by reason and the capacity to restrain and overcome his inclination is freedom of will. If one asks the nature and function of this capacity one is completely in the dark. It is beyond the capability of speculative reason. If one searches oneself, one finds within oneself the answer yet it remains incomprehensible. Since there is no ‘holiday’ from morality, one is 24hrs under the moral obligation, the process of which can never be ratiocinated. The so called rational justification comes only afterwards. It is an after-thought which is put under the prescriptive rules. Thus I conclude with Mahābhārata: Tarka’pratiṣthaḥ ṥrutayo vibhinnā, naikomuniryasya matam pramāṇaṁ/ Dharmasya tattvam nihitam guhāyāṁ,mahājano yena gato sa panthāḥ// 11 The ways of morality (dharma) are unknown to us. It is difficult to establish through reason since there are as many views as there are scholars. It remains unrevealed to us forever. But then how one should behave? The answer given is--one should follow the path of the elders.

Notes 1

Mary Gregor, trans. and ed., The Metaphysics of Morals, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 221. 2 Satyakam Sastri, trans., Manu Samhita, (Dehati pustaka Bhandar, 1943), 110. 3 Roger Crisp, ed., Nichomachean Ethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 36. 4 Sree Kanaihyalal Joshi, trans., The Bhagavadgita, (Howkhamba Orientalia: Varanasi, 1977), I.45. 5 Ibid., 18.63 6 Purusottam Billimoria, ed., Indian Ethics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 89. 7 Sastri, Manu Samhita, 53. 8 Billimoria, Indian Ethics, 89. 9 Sastri, Manu Samhita, 54. 10 Billimoria, Indian Ethics, 89. 11 Aranyaka Parva, trans., The Mahabharata, 3-314-119.

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Bibliography Billimoria, Purusottam, ed. Indian Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Crisp, Roger, ed. Nichomachean Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Gregor, Mary, trans. and ed. The Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Kanaihyalal Joshi, Sree, trans. The Bhagavadgita. Varanasi: Howkhamba Orientalia, 1977. Parva, Aranyaka, trans. The Mahabharata. 3-314-119. Sastri, Satyakam, trans. Manu Samhita. Dehati pustaka Bhandar, 1943. Madhu Kapoor, Department of Philosophy, Vivekananda College, Thakurpukur, Kolkata-700063. My field of interest is both Indian and Classical Western Philosophy. My thesis work is on ‘Word and Word-meaning’, a work based on Gadadhara’s Saktivada. I am very interested in Philosophy of Language (Indian). Sometimes it brings a blend of poetry as well.

Aspects of a Morally Responsible Practice Eva Buddeberg Abstract In our increasingly complex world, the following question is raised urgently: How can we act in a responsible way? But what exactly do we ask for when we expect each another to act responsibly? Demands for a responsible practice are usually made in specific spheres and meeting them often requires drawing on expert knowledge. Unlike applied sciences that attempt to answer such questions for their respective area of application, philosophy is expected to explicate a general concept of responsibility. With such a general concept in hand we can then reflect on those context-transcendent criteria that ought to guide responsible social practices in general. In this way philosophy may provide guidance both for new and familiar contexts and fields of application. In my chapter, I will defend such a general concept of responsibility and argue that acting responsibly means that all those who are potentially affected by an action can accept this course of action as justified because the actor anticipates and is willing to give reasons for his way of acting which are intersubjectively acceptable. Against this backdrop, I will then describe three general aspects which should be taken into account in every concrete answer to the question of how to act responsibly: First, a responsible practice has to be connected to an intersubjectively valid standard: justice. For only with reference to this standard, claims made by those affected by an action can be compared and evaluated. Furthermore, acting responsibly requires on the side of the actor to refrain from judging in various forms so that he can consider both his own interests and the claims of others. This process, finally, requires a framework of communicative interactions in which these others and their claims are involved as much as possible. Key Words: Discursive responsibility, context-transcendent criteria of a responsible practice, justification, justice, communication, abstention of judgment. ***** Demands for responsible practice are usually raised in specific spheres, and meeting them often requires drawing on expert knowledge. Whereas applied sciences attempt to address such questions for their respective areas of application, it is the task of philosophy to explicate a general concept of responsibility. On the basis of such a general concept, we can then reflect on those context-transcendent criteria that ought to guide responsible social practices in general. As a result, philosophy may provide guidance both for new and familiar contexts and fields of application.

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__________________________________________________________________ 1. Responsibility as Practice of Justification1 The concept I would like to defend posits responsibility as a language-based relation of accountability which always features at least three elements: A human subject has to account for his way of acting to an authority which or who, in turn, holds the subject accountable by demanding reasons for his actions. The subject of responsibility is a person insofar as the capacity to act and to speak can be ascribed to him, for persons can explicate and justify their actions with reasons only because they dispose of language. Every person can potentially be the subject of responsibility. Someone is effectively responsible wherever, in a concrete discursive network of relations and interactions, he has to give reasons for his actions or wherever it is anticipated that this can be claimed of him. People are responsible for their actions. Yet singular actions can only be seemingly and artificially isolated from the complex net of facts, events, subjective convictions and desires. In rather standardised situations, the object of responsibility can be easily identified as an action and its consequences – whereas the different intentions and reasons for the action can always be added and enlarge what at first glance appears to be a simple action into a whole complex of actions. It is in light of a social reality we refer to as ‘modernity,’ which is regarded as becoming more and more complex and therefore diverse, that the object of responsibility itself is increasing. Finally, it is hard to say that anything cannot become the object of a claim to justification; rather, everything by which actors expose themselves to the regard and questioning of (potentially) affected others can become part of what they have to justify to them. Actors have to potentially justify themselves to all others who are or may be affected by their actions. However, it is not possible to determine conclusively who that might be and to what extent those persons have a concrete ‘right to justification’.2 If the context of an action or its interpretation changes and someone therefore asks anew for reasons, the bearer of responsibility has to answer once again. Being responsible therefore means in retrospect to fulfil the obligating claim which human beings tie up with all actions: that they can be justified by offering reasons which are intersubjectively comprehensible and acceptable. Being prospectively responsible means guiding one's actions in a manner that allows for this demand to be met. Therefore, all parties concerned have to be able to come to an understanding about the motives, intentions and reasons guiding their actions within the framework of discourses of justification. 2. Prerequisites of a Morally Responsible Practice I will now describe three general aspects, which should be taken into account in every concrete answer to the question of how to act responsibly:

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__________________________________________________________________ A. Justice In the discourses of justification pertaining to a responsible practice, the comparison between various particular claims is assumed, including both the claims of other persons and one’s own claims. In order to evaluate and decide which of them must be considered and to what degree, an intersubjectively valid measure is required – justice. However, this central concept of practical philosophy as well as of everyday life is often regarded as being both unclear and complex and, moreover, it varies according to the context of application. But at the core of a generally shared basic understanding, this concept is related to the attributes of impartiality3, balanced judgement4 and authority5 in judging or, negatively rephrased, to the claim to the avoidance of arbitrariness6. A responsible practice, committed in this sense to justice, should therefore transcend the different subjective standpoints and claims as well as the reasons brought forth to defend them to a superordinate perspective which ideally compromises between the claims of all persons concerned.7 Those persons must on the one hand be treated as morally equal, but at the same time the extent to which they are concerned by an action must be taken into account. A just evaluation of claims and resulting actions has equally to consider the different contexts in which they can be seen and therefore also their various respective modes of justification. The kind of context in which an action occurs is neither an objective fact nor arbitrarily determinable. Often, a context and its scope are assumed as a distinct and clear reference frame and put into question only if the evaluation of an action and the claims that have to be considered therefore turn out to be problematic. Nonetheless, every action is subject to a moral principle of justification insofar as in every situation every person can at first demand justifications and this claim can only be rejected with good reasons. Every actor in a social context must be at least potentially able to justify why in individual cases he does not justify his actions. Thus no one can be rightfully exempted from this kind of obligation; hence my thesis is that we as human beings are potentially concerned with all other human beings, each of whom already affects us as soon as we encounter him.8 Based on that general provision, human beings are additionally obliged to justify their actions to particular others according to the respective context and particular relations. In reality, actions are seldom completely justified since the appropriate consideration of all claims and interests hardly ever succeeds, but it is possible to speak of a gradually different realisation of justice. Actions are all the more just the more comprehensively they can be justified to all those concerned with or affected by them. Therefore, it is not possible to determine in advance what is just in individual cases, but it has to be ascertained in discourses of justification, which have to be pursued each time anew. Hence, on the application level responsibility and justice are closely entangled: Whereas responsible acting demands people to justify their actions with reasons

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__________________________________________________________________ while taking into account others and their claims and interests, justice is the measure by which the relevance of the different claims is evaluated in a discourse of justification. No action can be just if the actor does not understand himself as responsible to every particular other affected by his actions. Otherwise he has to disregard particular interests, at least temporarily, in order to be able to respond and thus to act responsibly at all. He has to alternate between the view of the totality of all parties concerned and the view of particular segments of the field of action or of individual interests in such a way that taking the one perspective does not come at the cost of the other. Both must be mediated. B. Refraining from Judging Thus, it seems important for every practice of responsibility guided by justice that persons be able to step back from the immediacy of the situation and refrain for the moment from judging so that they can weigh the different, possibly conflicting or competing claims against one another. It thereby also has to be examined how these claims can be realised at all given intersubjectively valid, potentially conflicting norms and objective framework conditions. In order to attain a just evaluation of the situation for the claims of all participants, the capacity to adopt different perspectives and to alternate between them without losing sight of the others is necessary. Thereby, every actor certainly always remains bound to his own perspective. However, as an actor and therefore a human being he is not only reacting on external stimuli, he also possesses the capacity to reflect upon his actions and thereby to step back from his own perspective of them. Furthermore, every actor has by his different social roles and by the very fact that he lives in different and changing contexts, diverse subjective perspectives and simultaneously the capacity to switch from one to the other at his disposal. In order to act responsively and justly with respect to others, actors must have sufficiently developed this capacity for intermittent dissociation such that they are able to provisionally adopt the perspectives of others in addition to their own. Beyond that, they must also be capable of bracketing these perspectives in order to be able to evaluate the situation from a superordinate standpoint that is most widely intersubjectively shared. The change of perspective claimed here should not result in adopting the position of a ‘neutral observer’, since such an observer simply judges ‘in the light of his own individual understanding of the world and of himself’9, instead of communicating with others. In order to minimise the risk of being trapped in his own claims of adjudicating the claims of others ‘paternalistically’ a direct inclusion of others is required. These others are to contribute their own perspectives with the aim of complementing the diverse particular views with an intersubjectively shared one, or at least with some aspects principally apt to reaching consensus.10 From such an intersubjectively shared perspective, the standpoints that have to be considered can be more easily evaluated impartially as here all of the relevant

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__________________________________________________________________ others have their say and judge together the (relative) legitimacy of the particular claims. In juxtaposition to other convictions and claims that, from a subjective perspective, are deemed to be absolute, it is also possible to qualify one’s own position so that a compromise, a conciliation, or better yet, an agreement can be obtained even in clashes of interests that seem prima facie irreconcilable. Thereby is not only cognitive understanding important, but also considering that the normative claims of other subjects can be appraised in terms of their moral weight only if at the same time the particular views […] are also understood.11 For in order to understand at all, which ‘value a particular interest has for a concrete person’, it is equally necessary ‘to comprehend his individual life ideals and modes of orientation’.12 This requires, beyond the cognitive role-adoption, ‘a certain degree of reciprocal empathy’.13 Therefore, what is implied with empathy is the actor’s willingness to temporarily suspend the affective evaluation of his own claims and interests. By linguistic means or by manners of speaking emphasising the merely thetic character of our assertations as well as registers of speech to which the bracketing of validity is inherent, a person can indeed present his claims; nevertheless, the claim of validity or entitlement related to them is hereby suspended in its absoluteness. By these relativising gestures, the person indicates his distance with respect to his own claims and therefore can more openly defer to those of others. If all participants are ready and able to bracket their own claims, this relativisation of one’s own perspective will result in a better understanding of the other’s perspective and in a more peaceable atmosphere, and this will contribute to a diffusion of conflicts seeming at first antagonistic. Nevertheless, the attempt at weighing interests provisionally, impersonally and without an immediate pressure to act does not preclude an eventual failure. Three cases seems to me of special relevance: a) a lack of rational reflection: for instance, if we in principle care more about our own interests and reasons without justifying this prioritisation; b) a lack of empathy: if we are not sufficiently ready or able to understand the perspectives, thoughts, feelings and reasons of others because we are too committed to our own and take them to be ‘objectively correct’; c) a lack of pragmatism and of the capacity to reduce complexity: if we do not succeed in balancing the different perspectives in a way that allows us to act. C. Communicative Interactions In order for the actor to be able to justify his actions to others possibly concerned with them, he has to include them with their claims according to norms which are recognised as valid and appropriate to the situation. For this purpose in conversation with these others he has to show the willingness to reveal the motives

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__________________________________________________________________ and aims of his actions so that they can come to an understanding, for only in communicating with others is it possible to decide if and how the actor’s behaviour might affect the interests and lives of others.14 On the one side, the actor himself can hereby explain his motives, intentions etc. which allows others to get a better understanding and evaluation of his acting in general. On the other side, the actor can hereby come to know of the others’ attitudes toward his actions, what possible consequences they might have, intended or otherwise, that he might have disregarded but should be included in future actions. Thus verbal communication must be understood not as a closed sphere separate from that of acting, but as accompanying, sustaining and penetrating human actions15 both beforehand as well as during consequent communication. Regarding the situation in modern industrial societies, one of the main areas of both interest and great difficulty consists in the fact that human actions can more and more frequently affect future generations with whom a real communication is impossible. Likewise, a direct dialogue with people in distant continents who possibly suffer from the environmental damage produced in industrialised regions or elsewhere does not actually take place in most cases. But that does not mean that under these conditions no mode of communication would be possible and reasonable. For one thing, with modern means of communication, the potential for better information flow as well as for real communication has permanently increased. In addition, language, due to its inherent capacity for adopting attitudes, also allows a fictive communication with imaginary partners of dialogue and the anticipation of, in principle, an unlimited number of objections. However, what is important is that the hypothetical status of those dialogues remains in mind. This hypothetical status must remain present in them such that, although they have all along sought to anticipate the possible objections of others, they nonetheless always remain open to corrections and revisions stemming from real communication with the others. However, even in situations in which reaching an understanding is really intended, it is often not possible to obtain an agreement or even an acceptable compromise. For often people are only insufficiently or not at all capable of articulating their own claims, needs or attitudes in a way that is comprehensible for others. On the contrary, they often find it difficult to engage with the others’ statements, and the willingness to include the interests of others as comprehensively as possible in one’s own action cannot be taken as self-evident. So it is possible that differences cannot be dissolved for these or for other reasons. In such cases, it is only possible to search for compromises acceptable for all participants or for arrangements to avoid each other to the point that the life and acting of the one does not affect the others anymore so that it is no longer necessary to justify oneself with regard to them. Verbal communication is certainly always imperfect and therefore also in a certain way insufficient, – however, this begs the question of what alternatives are

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__________________________________________________________________ at our disposal to include others as peacefully and equitably as possible in our actions. For language implies the idea of understanding16 and understanding inversely requires language. Even where we speak of a ‘wordless’ understanding, this occurrence is interpreted as a ‘wordless language’ or reflected in a metaconversation. Thus language in any shape is essential for the mediation of positions as well as for critique or doubts. Thereby different modes of verbal communication should be distinguished which are not equally suitable to maintaining or promoting responsible acting. The form of language in which understanding is explicitly the aim is the argumentative discourse as Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas have described it. They presuppose that the very structure of communication allows for nothing else but the stronger argument and excludes any kind of coercion.17 Admittedly, this is an ideal construction18 which in reality is never realised in this form. Nevertheless, we presuppose in every real situation of discussion, indeed in every communication, as a regulative idea that peaceful understanding might be possible. Against this background of a principal willingness of understanding it is not only valid that different forms or modes of language are differently suitable for that purpose. Rather the specific performance of understanding is also very much dependent upon the context in which it takes place because the claims to be provided at a time call for different forms of communication. For instance, while in the legal realm arguments should hold priority due to their assumed aspiration to pertain as generally and as emotionally neutral as possible, other forms of communication have their place in private relations, since much broader ethical claims are at stake which also include the consideration of feelings and moods. Hereby the question of in which context we have to justify ourselves and which linguistic form should therefore be adequate can be interpreted and answered differently depending on the perspective.19 Verbal communication with others, the bracketing of one’s own perspective and the attempt to take other perspectives, as well as justice as a discourse of justification have all been developed here as three aspects of a responsible practice. However, as I have tried to point out, the three correlate inherently with one another. For a just consideration of all those who are concerned with an action, the bracketing of one’s own claims and the consideration of the claims of others is always necessary and we have the best access to those claims by including as directly as possible these others by means of verbal communication. This chapter is not at all intended to exhaust the current topic – further aspects, for instance, the formation of appropriate social institutions20 should be considered in greater detail.

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Notes 1

A more detailed version of the considerations presented here can be found in Eva Buddeberg, Verantwortung im Diskurs: Grundlinien einer rekonstruktivhermeneutischen Konzeption moralischer Verantwortung im Anschluss an Hans Jonas, Karl-Otto Apel und Emmanuel Lévinas (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2011). 2 Rainer Forst, Contexts of Justice: Political Philosophy beyond Liberalism and Communitarism, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 170. 3 Forst, Contexts of Justice, XI; Stefan Gosepath, Gleiche Gerechtigkeit. Grundlagen eines liberalen Egalitarismus: Grundlagen eines liberalen Egalitarismus, (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2004), 36ff.; Otfried Höffe, Politische Gerechtigkeit: Grundlegung einer kritischen Philosophie von Recht und Staat. Erweiterte Neuausgabe, (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2002), 43f. 4 Forst, Contexts of Justice, XI. 5 Ibid. 6 Rainer Forst, The Right to Justification: Elements of a Constructivist Theory of Justice (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 2. 7 In the following two sections I will further explain how such an intersubjective perspective can be gained. 8 Buddeberg, Verantwortung im Diskurs, especially Chapter III.2.2. 9 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Remarks on Discourse Ethics’, in Justification and Application (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: MIT Press, 1994), 19111, 48. 10 Cf. also Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 146; Habermas, ‘Remarks on Discourse Ethics’, 48. 11 Axel Honneth, ‘The other of justice. Habermas and the ethical challenge of postmodernism’, in The Cambridge Companion to Habermas, ed. Stephen K. White (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 289-323. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid., 303. 14 For Hans-Georg Gadamer, it is part of every true conversation ‘that each person opens himself to the other, truly accepts his point of view as valid and transposes himself into the other to such an extent that he understands not the particular individual but what he says.’ (Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (London, New York: Continuum, 1975), 387. 15 Cf. for the concept of communicative action, besides Jürgen Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action. See also his article titled ‘Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action’. 16 Cf. for the concept of verbal communication, Gadamer, Truth and Method, 443.

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__________________________________________________________________ 17

Cf. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society, (London: Heinemann, 1984), 25. 18 Sic et Non, Dialog mit Karl-Otto Apel; Viewed June 2012. http://www.sicetnon.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=PagEd&file=index&to pic_id=81&page_id=157. 19 Seyla Benhabib underlies that ‘situations’ cannot be described as ‘envelopes and golden finches […] nor like apples ripe for grading.’ Seyla Benhabib, ‘The Generalized and Concrete Other,’ Situating the Self. Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 1992), 148-177. 20 Buddeberg, Verantwortung im Diskurs, especially Chapter III.4.

Bibliography Benhabib, Seyla. Situating the Self. Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992. Buddeberg, Eva. Verantwortung im Diskurs: Grundlinien einer rekonstruktivhermeneutischen Konzeption moralischer Verantwortung im Anschluss an Hans Jonas, Karl-Otto Apel und Emmanuel Lévinas. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2011. Forst, Rainer. Contexts of Justice: Political Philosophy beyond Liberalism and Communitarism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. Forst, Rainer. The Right to Justification: Elements of a Constructivist Theory of Justice. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Truth and Method. London, New York: Continuum, 1975. Stefan Gosepath, Gleiche Gerechtigkeit. Grundlagen eines liberalen Egalitarismus: Grundlagen eines liberalen Egalitarismus. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2004. Habermas, Jürgen. ‘Remarks on Discourse Ethics’, in Justification and Application. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: MIT Press, 1994, 19111. Jürgen Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action: Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society. London: Heinemann, 1984.

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__________________________________________________________________ Höffe, Otfried. Politische Gerechtigkeit: Grundlegung einer kritischen Philosophie von Recht und Staat. Erweiterte Neuausgabe,. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2002. Honneth, Axel. ‘The Other of Justice. Habermas and the Ethical Challenge of Postmodernism’. In The Cambridge Companion to Habermas, edited by Stephen K. White, 289-323. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Sic et Non, Dialog mit Karl-Otto Apel. Viewed June 2012. http://www.sicetnon.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=PagEd&file=index&to pic_id=81&page_id=157. Eva Buddeberg is Akademische Rätin a. Z. at the Department of Political Philosophy and Political Theory at the Goethe-University, Frankfurt. Her main interest lies in practical philosophy, french philosophy, discourse ethics, phenomenology, philosophy of religion and philosophy of language.

Section 2 Poverty, Justice and the Environment

Ethical Consumerism, Personal Responsibility and Systemic Problems Ornaith O’Dowd Abstract Our personal lives intersect with systemic problems of various sorts in various ways. One point of intersection with many such problems, from climate disruption to exploitation of workers, is consumer choice. In this chapter, I examine some objections from the left to ethical consumerism as a way of framing our personal responsibilities with respect to systemic problems. Some objections focus on the effects of our identifying as consumers (for example, those with more spending power will be able to make certain ethical consumer choices not open to others whereas participation in collective political action depends much less on spending power; identifying as consumers promotes a narrow and distorted view of human agency and the good life); others on the likelihood of ethical consumerism distracting time, attention, and energy from more meaningful, comprehensive, and effective ways of seeking change (especially through participation in collective political action). I argue that while we should understand ourselves as citizens or political agents rather than as consumers when we seek change, and that participation in collective political action should be prioritised over individual consumer action, our personal moral responsibilities do include consumer choices since we ought to (a) avoid exacerbating systemic problems, (b) seek to ameliorate systemic problems even if in small ways, (c) seek congruence between our characters, our political commitments, and our personal lifestyles, insofar as is reasonable. Key Words: Consumerism, ethics, responsibility. ***** Our personal lives intersect with systemic problems-- racism, poverty, inequality, climate disruption—in various ways, depending on specifics about the problem, our social location, and so on. One point of intersection of particular relevance in the Global North is ‘ethical consumerism,’ the idea that individual consumer decisions have at least some (and perhaps considerable) moral significance. In this chapter, I focus on critiques from the left, broadly speaking, of ‘ethical consumerism’ as a way of framing our personal responsibilities with respect to these problems. These critiques fall into two main categories: those focused on the effects of our identifying as consumers and those focused on the likelihood of ethical consumerism making positive change less likely because it distracts or misleads. I argue that these critiques are substantially correct and suggest that there are limits and dangers to ethical consumerism. However, at the

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__________________________________________________________________ same time, I do not think this entails that we ought not bring ethical considerations into our consumption choices, even if the importance of these choices should not be overstated. We ought to (a) avoid making systemic problems worse, (b) seek to ameliorate systemic problems, even if in small ways, and (c) seek congruence between our characters, political and moral commitments, and personal lifestyles as far as is reasonable. ‘Ethical consumerism’ or ‘political consumerism’ is now an influential way of thinking about the responsibilities of individuals with respect to systemic problems; ‘fair trade’ and ‘eco-friendly’ products are increasingly popular. In the context of the (at least perceived) decline of the nation-state in a (more-)globalized world, the decline of faith and interest in participation in unions, political parties, and other such collectives, as well as pervasive consumerism, 1 it is perhaps not surprising that shopping has become a space for living out moral and political values. Ethical consumerism can take different forms, including organized boycotts (e.g. anti-apartheid activists’ boycott of South African goods), individual ‘boycotts’ (deciding not to buy product x for ethical reasons), and ‘buycotting’ (choosing to purchase certain products rather than others for ethical reasons, for example, choosing ‘fair trade’ coffee, free-range eggs, or ‘eco-friendly’ laundry detergent). What are the assumptions behind ethical consumerism? On some views, it entails a belief in ‘consumer sovereignty’-- i.e. that consumers’ demands should trump producers’ needs.2 There are suggestions (both theoretical and empirical) of a correlation between ethical consumerism and a preference for individual action as a means of activism.3 Discussions of ethical consumerism often use the metaphor of consumers’ choice to buy certain products as ‘voting.’ The idea of the ‘citizen-consumer hybrid’ that underlies this metaphor, as Josee Johnson argues, papers over a serious ‘ideological tension’ between the two; one is based on self-interest, the other on collective responsibility.4 But these assumptions are arguably entailed only by a particular form of ethical consumerism, namely, the idea that consumer choice is an important way of making a difference as an individual, is highly morally significant, and (in more optimistic versions) might be an acceptable alternative to more ‘traditional’ forms of activism such as protests, working in organizations/campaigns, taking part in electoral politics, doing media activism, civil disobedience, and so on. Here the distinction between, say, and organized boycott campaign and an individual’s ‘buycotting’ behavior is relevant, since the former shares more features with traditional activism than the latter and indeed might be considered a form of activism.5 The first objection I shall discuss is that ethical consumption is largely the preserve of the better-off. Those with greater spending power end up with a greater capacity to make ‘ethical’ choices as they shop. It is certainly prima facie

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__________________________________________________________________ disturbing to think that being moral should in any way depend on one’s material resources. The obvious objection is that one’s moral obligation to shop ethically is relative to one’s economic ability to do so; the richer one is, the greater one’s obligation to shop ethically. It seems a reasonable enough point that privilege gives rise to certain moral responsibilities. Nevertheless, we are left in a situation where the poorer one is, the more one is effectively forced to be complicit in major structural injustices (e.g. exploitation of garment workers, unfair trade practices in food).6 To focus on the differing moral obligations of richer and poorer consumers without attending to the social context that has created this difference of moral possibility is to ignore a significant moral dimension of the issue. What does it say about a society if it is structured in such a way that ethical action is a luxury item, and a mere ‘option’? Ethical consumerism depends on spending power to a far greater extent than does citizenship or what I shall call political agency. 7 Political agency is simply the capacity to act politically; this is a wider concept than citizenship, since one can be politically active in states of which one is not a citizen. Political agency requires certain material supports; first, it requires the material and social conditions of agency simpliciter, such as food, shelter, emotional nurturance, and so on, and second, it requires a range of material and social conditions including access to education, information, means of communication, transport, and freedom from systematic harassment, shaming, belittlement, and so on. Thus, we cannot say that ability to engage in ethical consumerism is affected substantially by material conditions and the ability to exercise political agency is not. But this is less a comforting thought about ethical consumerism and more a discomfiting thought about political agency. Nevertheless, ethical consumerism is more dependent on spending power than political agency and of course is conceptually centered on spending power in a way political agency is not. A second objection also concerns the effects of identifying as consumers, even ‘ethical’ ones. The basic idea here is that identifying only or primarily (or even substantially) as consumers promotes a narrow, distorted view of human agency and the good life. Arguably, it doesn’t help if consumerism is lightly dusted with ethics because the idea of self as consumer is damaging; our conceptual space for imagining our selves and the ways in which we might act (individually or collectively) are unacceptably limited if we grant the premise that our purchases are a large part of who we are. This does not entail rejecting a modest ‘ethical consumerism’ that says merely ‘when you consume, do so ethically’; this sort of view does not involve seeing oneself only, primarily, or even perhaps substantially as a consumer rather than as moral or political agent. But putting any emphasis on it does run that risk. A third, different sort of objection to ethical consumerism is that, as a way of framing personal responsibilities vis a vis systemic problems, it takes time, energy, and attention away from the proper focus, namely, collective political action.8 The

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__________________________________________________________________ time and energy one spends consuming ‘ethically’ could, on this view, be better spent asking those questions and perhaps organizing campaigns about issues such as child labor, union-busting, pollution, climate change, and so on. But at least some forms of campaigning might be vulnerable to similar objections-- writing a letter to a parliamentarian about worker rights, writing a blog post advocating reparations to former colonies, or going to a demonstration against a corporation accused of environmental destruction might well make no difference. The question is ‘what does it mean to be part of a movement?’ Is writing a blog post or sharing an article or graphic on a social network different in this respect than deciding to buy only fair trade coffee or environmentally-friendly cleaning products? Boycotts are an interesting case since they straddle the two categories: organizing, or even being part of, a boycott for political purposes is arguably more effective as activism than writing that blog post or even attending (another) demonstration. However, it depends on its size-- my taking part in a boycott that hardly anyone has ever heard of isn’t very effective; but being part of a mass boycott might just be. Similarly, attending one more permitted, fenced-in march that’s organized so as not to disrupt anything isn’t very effective (at least directly; it serves purposes of morale-boosting, getting people together, etc), but being part of something like Occupy Wall Street might just be. And that seems relevant to what counts as being part of a movement. Perhaps the likelihood of making a difference is not the only criterion for distinguishing which activities might count as being part of a movement; much depends on how we see ourselves – as engaged in a collective political project or a private ‘humanitarian’ one. A rather stronger version of this objection is that ethical consumerism makes genuine change less likely by distorting our view of systemic problems and encouraging (or at least allowing) the belief that no further action is necessary. For example, if one buys fair trade coffee, bananas, and so on, one may form the belief that one is thereby making a sufficient contribution to the fight against global poverty and that if enough consumers in the global North do the same, the problem of global poverty and inequality will be solved or at least substantially ameliorated. This belief is surely encouraged by a lot of advertising for (and discourse about) fair trade products. This belief arguably makes it less likely that one will entertain the idea that more radical change is needed to solve the problems of global inequality and poverty; it allows one to ignore as irrelevant the historical conditions that have brought unfair-trade coffee, bananas, and so on to supermarkets in the global North. It is all-too-tempting for the ethical consumer to believe that there is an easy answer: instead of, say, acknowledging the case for reparations replacing debt and SAPs, she can buy the same stuff, have the same level of comfort, and not have to go to much trouble (although some trouble-ethical consumerism does often involve some research, extra money, etc), while ‘making a difference.’9 It shouldn’t be a matter of consumers choosing fair trade or

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__________________________________________________________________ eco-friendly products; rather, the question should be why are there unfair-trade and ecologically harmful products allowed on the shelves at all? Focusing on ethical consumerism at all is not only a symptom of privilege but a kind of validation of it-- the idea here is that there is something wrong with our main concern being the moral purity of privileged residents of the global North. (In character terms, this may manifest itself in a kind of moral narcissism, obsessiveness, smugness, or self-absorption.10) Indeed, my even writing a chapter about ethical consumerism might be vulnerable to this critique; I may not have thought to do so had I not been in a position of sufficient privilege that ethical consumerism was a (somewhat) realistic option for me and the people around me. Surely, this kind of critique might run, I should stop prioritizing my own moral purity and instead ask what needs to happen to make the world as just and sustainable as possible? Firstly, one cannot outrun one’s privilege; whatever a privileged person does will be an expression of her privilege. So here, for example, I cannot ignore the fact that my privilege puts me in the position of writing this chapter; I cannot but act from within my privilege, even when I am challenging it. Secondly, one can object that narcissistic focus on one’s own moral perfection is not the only way of being concerned with what one ought to do with respect to systemic problems or ethical consumerism. It is true, I think, that the most pressing moral concern is addressing issues like climate disruption and global inequality directly; asking ‘what needs to change, systemically?’ and engaging in collective political action. But each of us also has to act; when we do our groceries, we inevitably have to make a choice.11 We can say that it is not the most important question and that there are moral risks in over-emphasizing it but none of that in fact tells us what to do. Now, it seems reasonable to suppose that there are some choices in life that are genuinely morally indifferent. Is it a matter of moral indifference whether I get the fair trade coffee or the unfair trade coffee? Not quite, in my view-- but not, as we have seen, because it is as important as other things I might do to be part of struggles for social justice, and not because it is going to make a major (or even appreciable) contribution to such struggles, and not because it is going to absolve me of responsibility with respect to the systemic problems that put unfair trade coffee on the shelves in the first place. At a minimum, we should avoid exacerbating such problems if it is relatively easy for us to do so; I certainly won’t solve the issue of unfair trade in coffee by buying this fair trade coffee but surely I ought not make any contribution to the problem if it costs only a little more to buy the fair trade coffee. Second, there are several ways in which my ‘ethical consumption’ might ameliorate such problems (in a small way) instead of running the risk of bad faith, distortion, or distraction: first, it might be true that there is a (miniscule bit) less pollution in the river because I made a certain choice in cleaning product. It is not

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__________________________________________________________________ much, but it is (slightly) better than nothing. This is the least important way (and if that is all you do, you have nothing much to feel superior about!). Making at least some ‘ethical’ consumer choices can, instead of creating a false sense of being off the hook, get one thinking about the wider issues and facilitate activism-- as long as the correct analysis is there. Such choices can serve as entrypoints for discussion among friends, colleagues, family, and neighbors of the wider issues-- the legacy of colonialism, climate disruption, worker rights, etc. and thus can be-- if framed appropriately-- part of consciousness-raising. (Of course one could discuss these issues with smug self-righteousness-- but avoiding that would be part of ‘appropriate framing.’) Ethical consumerism can also be the starting point for mass actions such as boycotts.12 A slightly different reason for ethical consumerism is that we ought to seek some congruence among our characters, our political commitments, and our personal lifestyles. I specify only ‘some’ congruence because seeking ‘perfect’ congruence risks the kind of narcissism and misunderstanding of the real issues (and waste of time and energy) discussed above. The most important parts of that congruence of elements are things other than ‘ethical consumerism.’ But it would be problematic if, for example, someone who claimed to be deeply committed to the fight against climate disruption led a flagrantly unsustainable life (driving the biggest, least fuel-efficient car, refusing to ever take public transport, dumping waste carelessly). This does not demand environmental perfection-- and this can be part of the conversation one has with people about one’s activism-- because the social context in which we live makes it impossible to live sustainably (especially if one has other priorities, e.g. caring for one’s children on a tight budget). One can say ‘we can do a bit, especially if we are relatively well-off-- and I’ve gone a certain distance-- but we hit the limits of what individual consumers can do quite quickly. And it is at that point that systemic change is required-- requiring collective political action.’ Relatedly, certain forms of ethical consumerism might have value as ‘experiments in living’ –signposts of what should be normal for everyone (e.g. ‘I buy from a CSA that has ecologically sustainable practices, good labor practices, good animal welfare standards, sliding scale for members, etc-- this should be a model for an alternative to factory farming!’). However, like all the reasons I have given for ethical consumerism, the caveat entered is: do it, where possible, but without illusions.

Notes 1

That is, a tendency to think of ourselves primarily as consumers rather than as, say, citizens, moral agents, or workers.

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__________________________________________________________________ 2

Gavin Fridell, ‘Fair-Trade Coffee and Commodity Fetishism: The Limits of Market-driven Social Justice’, Historical Materialism 15 (2007): 9. 3 Jeremy Youde, ‘Ethical Consumerism or Reified Neoliberalism? Product (RED) and Private Funding for Public Goods’, New Political Science 31 (2009): 15-17. 4 Josee Johnston, ‘The Citizen-Consumer Hybrid: Ideological Tensions and the Case of Whole Foods Market’, Theory and Society (2008): 231. 5 We might well ask whether the person whose involvement in an organized boycott extends only to not buying the boycotted products is doing something significantly different to the individual ‘ethical consumer.’ The difference, such as it is, seems to lie in being part of a movement; the meaning of this is examined further below. 6 Johnston, ‘Citizen-Consumer Hybrid’, 256-257. 7 For a fuller discussion, see chapter four of Ornaith O’Dowd, ‘The Responsibilities of Reason: Kant and Care’ (Ph.D. diss., CUNY Graduate Center, 2011). 8 Iris Marion Young, ‘Responsibility and Global Labor Justice’, Journal of Political Philosophy 12 (2004): 386. 9 Some systemic problems connected with consumption are not amenable to any sort of ethical consumerism; gentrification is a case in point, since the privileged ‘consumer’ of real estate is always going to be either furthering de facto segregation or displacing less-privileged residents. 10 Fridell, ‘Fair Trade Coffee and Commodity Fetishism’, 10-11. 11 There is also some moral reason to engage in some minimal level of what one might call ‘moral self care’—succumbing to guilt and moral despair is dangerous, since it may lead someone to simply give up on trying to live well. However, moral self care does not mean (1) prioritizing one’s own moral purity over the concerns of others or (2) ignoring one’s own privilege and complicity in systemic problems. 12 Youde, ‘Ethical Consumerism’, 15; Johnston, ‘Citizen-Consumer Hybrid’, 241.

Bibliography Fridell, Gavin. ‘Fair-Trade Coffee and Commodity Fetishism: The Limits of Market-Driven Social Justice’, Historical Materialism 15 (2007): 79-104. Johnston, Josee. ‘The Citizen-Consumer Hybrid: Ideological Tensions and the Case of Whole Foods Market’, Theory and Society 37 (2008): 229-270. O’Dowd, Ornaith. ‘The Responsibilities of Reason: Kant and Care’. Ph.D. diss, CUNY Graduate Center, 2011.

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__________________________________________________________________ Youde, Jeremy. ‘Ethical Consumerism or Reified Neoliberalism? Product (RED) and Private Funding for Public Goods’, New Political Science 31 (2009): 201-220. Young, Iris Marion, ‘Responsibility and Global Labor Justice’ Journal of Political Philosophy 12 (2004): 365-388. Ornaith O’Dowd is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the College of Charleston. Her research interests are mainly in ethics, social and political philosophy, and feminist philosophy; her doctoral dissertation explored care in the context of Kantian ethics.

Global Justice: What Do We Owe to the Poor? Makoto Usami Abstract In the past decade, a growing number of authors, notably Thomas Pogge, have maintained that citizens in economically advanced societies are responsible for impoverishing populations in the developing world. Iris Marion Young proposes the social connection model of responsibility, which asserts that these citizens participate in networks that give rise to global structural injustices. While Pogge’s argument for the existence of citizens’ responsibility has been the subject of widespread debate, only a few efforts have been made to scrutinise the solidity of Young’s perspective. To plug this gap in the literature, this chapter assesses the pertinence of Young’s view. A more traditional view than those of Pogge and Young considers extreme and extensive poverty as indicating a lack of respect for the human rights of those living in less-developed countries. The rights theorists of global justice, however, have paid scant attention to philosophical observations concerning redistribution within the borders of a society. To remedy this shortcoming, this chapter endeavours to develop the theory that citizens in affluent societies bear a duty correlative to the subsistence right of the global needy, by exploring sufficientarianism, which is one of the primary views on domestic redistribution. To begin with, I make a distinction between the responsibility-based theory and the right-based theory of global justice. This is followed by a close examination of Young’s social connection model as a significant version of the former position. I then offer a right-based argument that invokes the sufficientarian idea of the human right to live above the threshold of safe and healthy subsistence. Key Words: Global poverty, responsibility, right to subsistence, social connection model, sufficientarianism. ***** 1. Two Theories of Global Justice In the past four decades, numerous studies on the ideal of global justice have sought to respond to worldwide problems, notably extreme and extensive poverty in the developing world. A recent noticeable trend is the development of what may be called the responsibility-based theory, whose central claim is that we—citizens in affluent societies—owe them—destitute people in less-developed countries—a moral duty, responsibility or liability. A classical work on this theory is Peter Singer’s seminal essay, which addresses the consequentialist principle that one has a moral duty to prevent something bad from occurring if it is in one’s power to do so without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. 1 From this principle follows the claim that we ought to prevent famines from occurring

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__________________________________________________________________ abroad by making contributions to anti-poverty non-governmental organisations. During the past decade or so, several arguments for our responsibility towards the global poor, which are nonetheless very different from Singer’s view, have been developed. A prominent figure in this new trend is Thomas Pogge, who contends that the current schemes of international economy and politics systematically impoverish populations in developing countries. 2 These schemes are instituted and implemented on the initiative of the governments of economically advanced societies, which seek to advance their citizens’ interests on their behalf. Based on these observations, Pogge concludes that we are all liable for violating a negative duty not to harm others, unless we take action towards institutional reforms of the world order. Another responsibility-based thinker is Iris Marion Young.3 She argues that we take part in causal networks that bring about structural injustices such as homelessness within our own societies and the presence of sweatshop workers out of the borders. We all get involved in these networks by participating in a booming housing market or by purchasing commodities produced in sweat factories. To highlight the moral implications of our involvement in producing structural injustices, Young attempts to develop the social connection model of responsibility, according to which we are not to blame for our involvement but are required to participate in collective action. If it were cogent, the social connection model would radically challenge our conventional perception of moral responsibility. Notwithstanding the significant implications it might have, Young’s view, unlike Pogge’s, has not been scrutinised.4 To plug this gap in the literature, this chapter assesses the pertinence of her theory. If a close look at Young’s responsibility-based view reveals its difficulties—as I argue below—then it seems worthwhile to explore some alternative.5 I suggest that we address what I call the right-based theory, which claims that we owe the global needy duties correlative to their economic human rights. Rights theorists of justice beyond borders, however, have paid scant attention to philosophical observations concerning redistribution in a domestic setting. Particularly suitable for the right-based approach to world poverty seems to be sufficientarianism. Sufficientarianism, which emerges from criticism of egalitarianism, argues that every member of a society should have enough to live above some reasonably defined threshold and that equality taken as the minimisation of difference between individuals plays no role above the threshold. By introducing sufficientarian concepts and ideas that are originally presented in relation to domestic redistribution into the context of global redistribution, I elaborate the right-based argument that we owe the global poor a duty correlative to their human right to the resources necessary to live above the threshold of subsistence.

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__________________________________________________________________ 2. Social Connection Model Examined In this section, Young’s social connection model of responsibility is closely examined. To illustrate what she calls structural injustice, Young offers the imaginary story of Sandy, a single mother working as a sales clerk. 6 Evicted from her apartment, Sandy looks for a better place but in vain, and she ultimately faces the prospect of homelessness. Structural injustice exists when social processes put some groups of people under systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and exercise their capacities on the one hand, and enable others to dominate or to have a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising their capacities on the other. 7 Injustice of this kind occurs as a consequence of numerous individuals and institutions acting to pursue their own goals and interests mostly within the limits of rules and norms. Young develops a distinction, which she reads Hannah Arendt as implying, between guilt attributable to persons who commit crimes and wrongs and responsibility assignable to ‘persons whose active or passive support for governments, institutions, and practices enables culprits to commit crimes or wrongs’. 8 Structural injustice falls within the realm of responsibility, not that of moral guilt or financial liability. As a paradigmatic example of global structural injustices, Young takes the case of sweatshop workers in less-developed countries. 9 These workers, typically teenage girls, often work for ten to sixteen hours per day in a peak season, in an extremely hot room with insufficient lighting, excessive noise and blocked exit. Multiple factors allow such situations to arise and proliferate: lack of formal employment contracts, the disadvantaged position of female workers and jobhunters, inadequate systems of workplace-safety law and policy, government inaction on labour conditions, competitive international markets for garments and shoes in which price-reducing pressures usually function, big businesses that are indifferent to workers’ situations in relation to the commodities they sell and consumers in affluent societies who enthusiastically seek low-priced goods. By Young’s account, we are all involved in transnational processes that give rise to the health-threatening conditions of sweatshop labourers. She insists that we are not to blame but are required to participate in collective action to remedy structural injustices. What one should note in assessing the robustness of Young’s argument is that she does not aim to offer a general solution for global poverty. Her discussion on sweat factories is meant to show that structural injustice frequently extends beyond national borders. If it were intended to provide such a solution, her discussion would suffer from its limited scope. For example, consider people with severe disabilities who are excluded from the labour market in a developing country: there seem to be no causal links between them and us similar to those existing in the case of sweatshop workers. Therefore, her argument could not cover the poverty faced by people with disabilities.

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__________________________________________________________________ Keeping in mind that its scope would be limited if it were interpreted as a general prescription for world poverty, let us look closely at Young’s discussion on the social connection model. Imagine a fourteen-year-old girl, Sananda, who works in a sweatshop in suburban Mumbai. Young would say that we owe Sananda the moral responsibility to participate in collective action to improve her situation. Three mutually related questions can be raised here. The first is: Who are ‘we’? It is very likely, for instance, that Sandy regularly buys her children clothes produced in foreign sweatshops. Suppose that one day she buys her little daughter a T-shirt sewn by Sananda. Does Sandy then owe any responsibility to Sananda? Young notes that consumers with low incomes may be less able than those with high incomes to spend more on commodities that would help improve the conditions of sweatshop labourers. However, she never suggests that low-income consumers might be discharged of responsibility because of their financial limitations. This comprehensive attribution of responsibility seems objectionable for two reasons in particular. The first has to do with the recognisability of causal links. Sandy is presumably ill-educated; perhaps she does not read books or magazine articles on sweatshop workers in distant countries; she may have no friends or relatives who inform her about such topics. The second reason to question the blanket assignment of responsibility concerns the avoidability of results. After all, Sandy cannot help buying cheap goods produced through the process of exploitation of workers. Her children grow and continually need new clothes, but she cannot afford more expensive garments produced under fairer labour conditions. Because of Sandy’s limited recognisability and avoidability, the moral demandingness of Young’s position would encounter the same criticism that Singer’s view has long faced: every citizen is required to be a moral hero. Young might respond to these objections by stressing that one has discretion in performing one’s responsibility. Her possible response leads to the second question: What act of responsibility should we do for the sake of those working in sweat factories? Theoretically, Sandy has a great variety of options that might help, along with others’ acts, to improve Sananda’s situation: organising assemblies of the anti-sweatshop movement; distributing flyers in front of the Gap, Nike and Disney stores; complaining to these companies by making phone calls; persuading her colleagues to join the movement; and lamenting the situation of sweatshop labourers to her close friends and relatives, while continuing to buy the goods they produced. What is Sandy specifically supposed to do? On the one hand, it would be almost impossible for her to lead the anti-sweatshop movement due to her limited recognisability and avoidability. On the other, it would be a tiny contribution for Sandy to lament the sweatshop workers’ situation without making any changes to her purchasing behaviour. Young does not provide any answer to—or even any clue for answering—the question of how each of us should choose a specific action. The last question I want to pose is conceptual: What is the nature of the responsibility we owe to the global poor? Particularly relevant here is a distinction

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__________________________________________________________________ between what can be called guilt responsibility and what I call role responsibility. The sentence ‘the drunk driver was responsible for that car accident’ refers to the former type of responsibility, while ‘the doctor was responsible for ten patients’ invokes the latter. Guilt responsibility is backward-looking in the sense that it is attributed to a person or a group of persons whose past acts caused injury or damage. Responsibility of this type provides grounds for moral condemnation, financial reparation or legal punishment. By contrast, role responsibility is forward-looking in that it stems from an ongoing role that the agent voluntarily undertook or shoulders in a relevant social practice. It keeps obliging a person or a group to perform actions demanded by the role. Of course, if one does damage to another by neglecting one’s role responsibility, one bears guilt responsibility. Young’s notion of responsibility is an awkward mixture of these conceptually separate conceptions. It allegedly flows from citizens’ past (and present) acts of participating in the causal networks that give rise to structural injustice, but obliges the participants to take collective action without blaming them. This Janus-like notion of responsibility seems to be an artificial device intended only to lead to her proposed progressive action. It is also noteworthy that the idea of guilt responsibility prevents limitless personal burden and protects the realm of individual liberty by clearly discriminating a responsibility-bearer from others. This is the case with role responsibility as well. Young’s social connection model deviates from both of these two standard forms of responsibility in asserting the blanket distribution of responsibility across all citizens. In so doing, it makes itself vulnerable to the moral-hero objection that has dogged Singer’s view. 3. The Right to Subsistence As the close look at Young’s responsibility-based view has revealed its difficulties, it may be worthwhile to explore, as an alternative, the possibilities of the right-based theory. Many authors, notably Henry Shue, have based their arguments upon the idea of human rights or the similar notion of basic rights, and these concepts have recently been supported by some responsibility-based theorists. 10 In focusing on the issue of transnational economic justice, however, they pay scant attention to sufficientarianism, which is advanced in the context of domestic redistribution. In this section, I endeavour to develop a version of the right-based theory by examining several aspects of sufficientarianism. According to one critic, sufficientarianism consists of two theses: the positive thesis affirms that everyone has enough to maintain a standard of living above a reasonable threshold, and the negative thesis denies that equality or priority has any role to play above the threshold. 11 It is incorrect, however, to characterise sufficientarianism as excluding the idea of priority because some sufficientarians make use of this idea.12 I here focus on the positive thesis, which seems helpful to the purpose of elaborating the right-based theory. There are some questions

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__________________________________________________________________ concerning this thesis, three of which I single out. The first concerns the measure of sufficiency. Harry Frankfurt argues against egalitarianism and puts forward sufficientarianism in terms of income, regarding a person’s income as an index of her welfare.13 Roger Crisp and Robert Huseby explicitly address this position in welfarist terms. 14 Nonetheless, welfarism suffers from several paradoxes and problems. A paradox particularly relevant to world poverty is the adaptive preference formation, which refers to the fact that one tends to appreciate meagre options where feasible alternatives are severely limited.15 It is at times observed that those deprived or discriminated against are satisfied with their poor situation. Because welfarism is not capable of excluding adaptively formed preferences from the amalgamating procedure, a more promising approach may be its major rival, that is, resourcism.16 What is apt in the context of global distributive justice might be the concept of the right to food, safe drinking water, shelter and access to medical care. The second question is this: Where should the threshold be set? For Frankfurt, saying that a person has enough money means that she is content, or it is reasonable for her to be content, with having no more money than she already has. 17 Basing sufficiency on the notion of an impartial spectator inspired by compassion, Crisp cites his intuition that eighty years of high-quality life is enough and plausibly more than enough. 18 These high standards of living cannot offer any feasible solution for world poverty. A more suggestive view is Huseby’s proposal of two sufficiency levels, according to which the maximal sufficiency threshold equals a level of welfare with which a person is content, and the minimal threshold involves measures of subsistence. 19 What the right-based theory demands is to secure for every person on the globe the threshold of the minimum means of safe and healthy subsistence. In this respect, my right-based view may be called subsistentarianism rather than sufficientarianism. The last question considers how individuals living at distinct economic levels below the threshold should be treated. Although most sufficientarians do not inquire into this significant issue, Huseby discusses the treatment of those who live between his maximal and minimal thresholds. He says that they have absolute priority over those staying above the maximal line and that priority works with weighted aggregation among them. To illustrate his point, suppose that a group of rich people, R, exists above the maximal threshold. Suppose further that one medium group, MH, is better off than another, ML, between the maximal and minimal lines. In Huseby’s view, both MH and ML hold priority over R, and ML over MH, although ML’s priority to MH fades as the number of ML members becomes smaller in comparison with that of MH people and as the quantity of the benefits gained by these members decreases. He suggests that a group of poor people remaining below the minimal threshold, P, has strong priority. However, he does not clarify what strong priority denotes, except to say that by it he means

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__________________________________________________________________ something less than absolute priority and more than straightforward weighted aggregation. Given that nearly one billion people currently live below the World Bank’s poverty line of US $1.25 per day, it is of crucial importance to explore the question of how to treat those who remain at various levels of poverty below the threshold of minimum safety and health. The subsistence right supports pure priority as opposed to priority coupled with aggregation. This is in part because the very idea of a right involves more or less the force to restrict aggregative calculation and because such a fundamental right as the subsistence right should employ this force to the fullest. Suppose that one tenth of the whole population in a developing country, PL, live far below the threshold of safe and healthy subsistence, while four tenth, PH, remain slightly below it. Further suppose that the current budget of an international organisation allows for either the policy of raising PL’s living standard to the threshold or that of improving PH’s, but it cannot afford both. The subsistence-right argument claims that the entire budget should be devoted to PL (and then demands the budget be expanded for the sake of PH). As I argue elsewhere at length, our duty correlative to the subsistence right of the global needy does not oblige us to directly participate in collective action intended to remedy distributive injustice.20 The government, which is to act in the name of its citizens, bears an obligation to promote the subsistence right of those living in poor countries on behalf of its own citizens. In so doing, it can reduce the moral burden on its citizens and protect the realm of individual freedom. My version of the right-based theory is thus immune from the moral-hero criticism faced by Young. 4. Conclusion My aim in this chapter was to meet two challenges. The first was to examine a powerful version of the responsibility-based theory—Young’s social connection model. Based on my negative assessment of her model, I then turned to the second charge of developing a form of the right-based theory by exploring some issues surrounding sufficientarianism. I recognise that this form requires further explication and elaboration. Nevertheless, even my abbreviated discussion, I hope, shows that a right-based approach to global justice is more promising than a responsibility-based one.

Notes 1

Peter Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972): 229-243.

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Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity, 2008). 3 Iris Marion Young, Responsibility for Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 4 Sympathetic discussions of Young’s works can be found in Ann Ferguson and Mechthild Nagel, eds., Dancing with Iris: The Philosophy of Iris Marion Young (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). For a critical examination of Pogge’s position, see Alison M. Jaggar, ed., Thomas Pogge and His Critics (Cambridge: Polity, 2010). 5 I elsewhere identify difficulties encountered by Pogge’s version of the responsibility-based theory. Makoto Usami, ‘Global Justice: Redistribution, Reparation, and Reformation’, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie Beiheft 109 (2007): 165-167. 6 Young, Responsibility for Justice, 43-44. 7 Ibid., 52. 8 Ibid., 91-92. 9 Ibid., 126-127. 10 Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Alan Gewirth, Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 197-217; James W. Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights, 2nd ed. (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2007), 137-152. For a responsibility-based theorist’s utilisation of the concept of human rights, see Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights. 11 Paula Casal, ‘Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough’, Ethics 117 (2007): 297-303. 12 For the idea of priority, see Derek Parfit, ‘Equality or Priority?’ in The Ideal of Equality, ed. Matthew Clayton and Andrew Williams (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 100-106. 13 Harry G. Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 134-158. 14 Roger Crisp, ‘Equality, Priority, and Compassion’, Ethics 113 (2003): 745-763; Robert Huseby, ‘Sufficiency: Restated and Defended’, Journal of Political Philosophy 18 (2010): 178-197. 15 E.g., Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 109-140. 16 E.g., Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), 11-119. 17 Frankfurt, Importance of What We Care About, 152. 18 Crisp, ‘Equality, Priority, and Compassion’, 755-763. 19 Huseby, ‘Sufficiency’, 180-182.

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__________________________________________________________________ 20

Usami, ‘Global Justice’, 167-169.

Bibliography Casal, Paula. ‘Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough’. Ethics 117 (2007): 296-326. Crisp, Roger. ‘Equality, Priority, and Compassion’. Ethics 113 (2003): 745-763. Dworkin, Ronald. Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000. Elster, Jon. Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Frankfurt, Harry G. The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Ferguson, Ann and Mechthild Nagel, eds. Dancing with Iris: The Philosophy of Iris Marion Young. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. Gewirth, Alan. Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. Huseby Robert. ‘Sufficiency: Restated and Defended’. Journal of Political Philosophy 18 (2010): 178-197. Jaggar, Alison M. ed. Thomas Pogge and His Critics. Cambridge: Polity, 2010. Nickel, James W. Making Sense of Human Rights. 2nd ed. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2007. Parfit, Derek. ‘Equality or Priority?’ In The Ideal of Equality, edited by Matthew Clayton and Andrew Williams, 81-125. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Pogge, Thomas. World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Polity, 2008. Shue, Henry. Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy. 2nd ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.

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__________________________________________________________________ Singer, Peter. ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972): 229-243. Usami, Makoto. ‘Global Justice: Redistribution, Reparation, and Reformation’. Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie Beiheft 109 (2007): 162-169. Young, Iris Marion. Responsibility for Justice. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Makoto Usami, Professor of Law and Philosophy, Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan.

Thou Shalt Take Care of Your Own Waste: Rural Practices in a Global Metropolis and their Implications Kin-Ling Tang Abstract This chapter discusses how, in the name of ‘hygiene’ and modernity, practices and ways of living friendly to the environment and nature are being driven away. The fact that the rural, where many such practices are found, is represented as ‘backward’ and ‘inferior’ to the urban order, only aggravates the situation. As a case study, the chapter discusses the installation of a centralised sewerage system to replace the septic tank in Mui Wo, a rural township on Lantau Island, Hong Kong, and its implications. To function well, the septic tank requires a responsible way of living. However, with more residents from the transnational capitalist class relocating to Mui Wo in search of a ‘greener’ lifestyle, the septic tank cannot support the modern pace and way of life. This is also one of the reasons why developmentalism is so rampant today – people no longer take responsibility for what they produce. Dirt is a matter of out of place (Mary Douglas). The septic tank system is ‘out of place’ not because it is unhygienic, but because it does not conform to the idea of ‘modern’ living. This chapter discusses how the dominant system is chasing away elements that cannot be fitted into the prevalent order. It argues that filth can be enriching – to the soil and to our experiences. This is true for many practices common in the rural setting like composting and the use of manure as fertilizer. The chapter also argues that facing the onset of modernization, the rural has its own negotiations to make. In Mui Wo, one village managed to keep its septic tanks because of Fengshui, or the claim to Fengshui – something which is regarded as ‘superstitious’ by government bureaucrats, but is actually a way for villagers to negotiate with modern development. Key Words: Hygiene, modernity, dirt, pollution, rural development, urbanization, transnational capitalist class. ***** 1. Dirt as Matter of out of Place Difference is an important theme in representation. From the anthropological approach, culture depends on giving things meaning by assigning them to different positions within a classificatory system. The marking of difference is thus the basis of that symbolic order which we call culture.1 Any system, conservative in nature, is always subject to challenges. According to Mary Douglas, pollution and dangers are markers to warn transgressors who threaten to upset system boundaries. ‘Dirt’ is also symbolic, a matter of out of place.

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__________________________________________________________________ [Dirt] implies two conditions: a set of ordered relations and a contravention of that order. Dirt then, is never a unique, isolated event. Where there is dirt there is system. Dirt is the by-product of a systematic ordering and classification of matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements. 2 Following the argument of Douglas, if dirt is a matter of out of place, development, through bulldozing elements that are out of place by measure of the dominant system, is the effort to exclude dirt such that a certain order can be upheld. However, in some cases, the structural view alone cannot explain why something is dirt in a given time and place, and not in others. Douglas has already noted the relativity of the concept of dirt: orange juice is not dirt in itself or when stored in a container, but becomes so when it is spilled over onto the desk. As for the time dimension, think of the septic tank that has been in use for years in the rural areas of Hong Kong. It was not dirt in the past, but the same septic tank design has nowadays become dirt. Having said this, when there emerge other priorities (in the name of Feng Shui for instance), the centralised sewerage system becomes dirt. In the case of Mui Wo on Lantau, which is the largest outlying island of Hong Kong, if we follow Douglas’ framework, either we see Hong Kong at large as the paradigm and how Mui Wo and its local indigenous people are polluting and their practices ‘dirt’; or we see Mui Wo as the paradigm and how urban Hong Kong threatens to transgress local boundaries. However, in reality the two entities are not in such a binary opposition. In using the concept of dirt to analyse the building of a centralised sewerage system in Mui Wo, I find that at times the urban / global is the established order while practices in Mui Wo become dirt, and at other times it is the other way round. I think this dynamics can only be accounted for if we understand Mui Wo as a rural township in a largely urban setting (Hong Kong at large), which in turn is subject to forces of globalisation. In other words, as I see it, there are at least three orders that are at work here. What are the outcomes when the three orders intersect with each other? Based on Douglas’ insightful framework, I suggest we further consider the functioning of power and stereotype. I will also use the concept of global modernity to understand their interactions. 2. Stereotype Hall understands power in representation in the Foucauldian sense: [It includes] the power to represent someone or something in a certain way, within a certain ‘regime of representation’. It includes the exercise of symbolic power through representational

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__________________________________________________________________ practices. Stereotyping is a key element in the exercise of symbolic violence.3 Similarly, in Orientalism, Edward Said discusses how the representation of ‘Orient’ as backward and inferior in Europe and by Europeans is a matter of power and domination.4 Hall’s discussion of stereotyping and Said’s Orientalism focus on representation of differences along racial and national lines. However, differences do exist internally among people of the same race and nation. Between different social groups, there are also unequal power relations, in many cases no less severe than inequalities among different races. The framework of Douglas deals with internal differences, but while she did not assume any social system to be static, pollution behaviour is mainly seen on a single, individual basis. What if dirt and pollution come from an entire social group? When two or more groups with different cultures and practices interact in a specific historical setting, what is dirt and what is cleanliness? With the paradigm expanded to include differences internal to an organised society, discussions about stereotypes and Orientalism can help us here. With this, power can also be put into the picture. Together with the idea of dirt, this would also help me understand the issues surrounding the building of a centralised sewerage system in Mui Wo. In putting forward his argument of global modernity, Arif Dirlik notes that globalisation has been accompanied by the return of traditions that have given rise to not only ‘clashes between civilisations’ but also cultural divisions internal to socalled civilisations as well as nations.5 China is a site to this phenomenon as the country becomes more integrated into the global economy, by which a layer of middle-class has emerged along the coastal regions, standing in sharp contrast to poorer regions in the centre and the West. Edward Friedman has noted how the major economic beneficiaries of economic reforms in China utilise stereotyped notions of backwardness with reference to the populations of the disadvantaged regions to ‘legitimate to themselves the suffering of those at the bottom percentiles of income distribution’.6 The kind of stereotype used by urban elites to distinguish themselves from the poorer masses is not new. Much earlier, the Chinese coastal elite internalised imperialist notions of Chinese ‘lack’, but they projected it on the lower classes and the interior. According to Ruth Rogaski, the Boxer Uprising that happened in around 1898-1900 and its aftermath saw the consolidation of weisheng as hygienic modernity, a central gauge of civilisational superiority, and the reconfiguration of weisheng as a marker of Chinese inferiority. Weisheng, or hygiene, became a science instructed by foreigners. Soon Chinese elites also used Weisheng to mark their difference from the peasants and the urban poor.7

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__________________________________________________________________ 3. Rural/Urban Encounter While the rural is much stereotyped, the ‘pristine’, ‘natural’ environment that it provides conforms to yet another set of ideas about ‘ideal living’, especially in the light of pollution of all sorts in urban Hong Kong. This is why many urban dwellers, myself included, have sought to find ‘refuge’ in a rural village in the first place. In this case, very often the rural is being developed to make it conform to a set of ideas acceptable by the urbanites. When asked why a centralised sewerage system is necessary in Mui Wo, the Environmental Protection Officer responsible for the project said in an interview that as the population in Mui Wo increases and more houses are built, a centralised sewerage system is needed to cope with the rising demand. Also, in the eyes of the government, the rural ought to be on a par with the urban: ‘Urbanised areas in Hong Kong have already sewerage pipes in place, and so we think the Islands and the New Territories should also reach the urban standard,’ said the officer. The implication here is that the urban represents the standard. Without a centralised sewerage system, the rural represents dirt in the dominant system. With sewerage pipes, Mui Wo and other rural areas would conform more to the idea of a place for ‘modern living’. It is important to note that the government is not the only agent behind all such development moves. The so-called ‘transnational capitalist class’ is also instrumental in adding impetus to developmentalism in the community. This term captures many characteristics of an emergent class in Mui Wo that transcends national and racial differences. Through the presence of this class, both the urban order and forces of globalisation are brought into interaction with the local order. Transnational capitalist class is a term used by Leslie Sklair to understand one important building block in the globalisation process. Sklair understands ‘transnational’ as forces, processes, and institutions that cross borders but that do not derive their power and authority from the state, and the ‘capitalist class’ as ‘those who own and control the major means of production, distribution, and exchange through their ownership and control of money and other forms of capital’.8 In other words, under this definition, the ‘capitalist class’ constitutes not only those who actually own the means of production, but also those with ownership and control of other types of capital, notably political, organisational, cultural, and knowledge capital. This new class is composed of corporate executives and their local affiliates, globalising bureaucrats and politicians, globalising professionals, and consumerist elites. 9 In the culture-ideology sphere, the transnational capitalist class across countries have more in common with each other than they have with their noncapitalist compatriots.10 This goes back to Dirlik’s argument that globalisation gives rise to not only ‘clashes between civilisations’, but also cultural divisions internal to nations or civilisations.11

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__________________________________________________________________ 4. Scenery, but not the Smell Please Mui Wo is today home to many members of the transnational capitalist class, who are attracted to the place because of its relative greenery and tranquillity compared to urban Hong Kong. Meanwhile, the place is associated with all sorts of ‘backwardness’ by urban standards. Many of the newly built or renovated houses have big glass windows that look onto the surroundings, but at the same time are equipped with a number of air-conditioners. While enjoying a nice landscape outside, one is seated inside an air-conditioned interior space, chasing away such inconveniences as heat and humidity, smells and insects. We can understand such gentrification as a ‘dirt-avoidance’ process: drive away the dirt and retain the purity, and one has an order that conforms to a certain idea of ‘ideal living’. Many have also arrived to live in Mui Wo without any knowledge about the septic tank widely used in village houses – that is, until problems arise. A septic tank is a small-scale waste treatment system and is common in rural areas throughout the world. Its operating principles are simple: septic tanks separate solid waste from liquids. The solid waste is stored in the septic tank and treated by anaerobic bacteria. The liquids, on the other hand, are dispersed throughout the soil on the property by a mechanism known as leaching.12 For all its simplicity, the septic tank is a proven, efficient system for treating human waste for a small population. The major problems associated with the septic tank lie not in its design but in its use and maintenance. To keep its efficiency, the septic tank has to be cleared of its solid waste when necessary. Also, the septic tank cannot be overloaded. The Environmental Protection Department (EPD) suggests the following ways to avoid overloading the septic tank system and to save water: ‘Do not waste any water; use water sensibly. Do not flush your toilet unnecessarily. Take a brief shower instead of a bath. Use washing machine only when fully loaded.’ To avoid blockage, the EDP also suggests only a small amount of soft toilet paper should be deposited into the system. Not too much oil and chemicals should be used either. 13 In other words, the septic tank system requires a non-wasteful way of living – which in a way, promotes a more environmental friendly way of living. As such, I find it not without irony that it is the EPD who has initiated the abolishment of the septic tank in favour of a centralised system. A couple of years ago, at least two houses in the village where I am living repeatedly saw their septic tanks overflow. In the most dramatic case, one house had its septic tank overflow on Christmas Eve. The three-storey house contains three households, one on each level. At that time, the landlord, who resided on the top floor, was away on vacation with his wife and two children in the UK, his native country. The family living on the ground floor, who is a French-Indonesian couple with their toddler son, was having a few stay-home guests from France. The middle floor is home to a single lady from New Zealand. The residents in this house preferred putting up with the situation for about 10 days than clearing up the

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__________________________________________________________________ septic tank themselves or hiring someone to do it, until the landlord returned from the UK to fix the problem. When the house had another overflow in its septic tank after the above incident, the landlord concerned invited his neighbour next door, who is an indigenous resident, to advise on the situation. I was there to act as their interpreter. Englishman (E): I don’t understand. I have been here for four years. This used to be fine. But this year the septic tank often blocks. It’s okay for me to clear once every year, but once every month…! Indigenous resident (I): …the system cannot hold it any more… you know, ladies use too much toilet paper… (If) you flush every time you go to the toilet... a lot of water (will go into the septic tank)… you shouldn’t flush every single time… At this point, I translated the first point made by the indigenous resident, i.e. they might have used too much toilet paper. E: (shrugs) They are Western ladies, how can you expect them to use less tissue paper? In the end, I did not translate the second point made by the indigenous resident, i.e., one does not have to flush the toilet every time after use, as this goes against my own training from a very young age. Also, at that time I also flushed every time after visiting the toilet in my own village house and this did not cause any problem to the septic tank. To think back, ‘Orientalism’ works at two levels here. On the one hand, I was aware of a stereotyped view of ‘us’ – the indigenous resident and me as ‘Chinese’ – by a Westerner. We are the ‘other’ to the Englishman, who is also acutely aware of this, since he immediately attributed the (abundant) use of hygienic products to cultural differences. On the other hand, the indigenous resident is also the ‘other’ to me. In doubting his advice against flushing the toilet every time after use, I was thinking if this was related to his hygiene habits as an indigenous resident. I was aware of the differences between us. As an urbanite deep down, I am also a product of the internal cultural divisions and that I am also having a stereotyped view of the indigenous resident. Later, I realised the aforementioned French-Indonesian couple operated three loads of machine washing every day which might have been the cause behind the overflow of their septic tank. In other words, it is again the modern hygienic practice that renders the septic tank malfunctioning.

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__________________________________________________________________ While the septic tank is the local order as represented by the indigenous resident’s familiarity and ease when dealing with it, when encountering the global and urban orders and their associated Orientalist stereotypes, unequal power relations render the septic tank as ‘dirt’. The Englishman was relieved to learn that the government was building the centralised sewerage system. He, who owns a few properties in Mui Wo and a business in the Philippines, together with other members of the transnational capitalist class, is giving additional weight to the ideology of development. The workings of the septic tank (e.g. not to use the washing machine frequently) do not fit the Weisheng modernity. The fewer the number of residents who understand and support the way of life assumed and required by the septic tank – thus leading a more restrained way of life, the more powerful the discourse surrounding the centralised sewerage system becomes. The septic tank system is ‘out of place’ not because it is unhygienic, but because it does not conform to the idea of ‘modern’ living by global and urban standards. 5. When Fengshui Has Its Say In the intersecting of the rural with the urban and global order, due to unequal power relations, the rural is often represented as ‘dirt’ against the dominant system(s). However, there exist instances when the rural order is the dominant system, and elements from outside this system are represented as danger and subsequently rejected. In my study of the centralised sewerage system in Mui Wo, one of the villages, Tai Tei Tong, has rejected the extension of the central sewerage pipes into the village. In contrast to most other major villages in Mui Wo, Tai Tei Tong is composed mainly of local Chinese residents, many of whom are also indigenous residents. It was said that a few elderly residents fell ill ever since the machinery had arrived at the entrance of the village. Many residents believed the machinery spoiled the Fengshui there. Protest banners were mounted in the village to demand the sewerage works to stop, accusing such works of causing ‘unsettling effects for the young and the old alike’. The village then asked the government to allocate a sum in the order of HK$500,000 – 600,000 to settle the ‘Dun Fu’, which is a ceremony to appease the gods, as a condition for the works to proceed, but the amount exceeded the ceiling of HK$20,000 allowed by the government for Fengshuirelated arrangements. As a result, the works at Tai Tei Tong stopped, and the village will not be connected to the central sewerage facilities and will continue to use the septic tanks. In the eyes of government officers, residents’ concerns were just ‘superstition’. Without the necessity of buying into the Fengshui claims, the basic argument is that every segment of society has its world view and claims to difference within the global order. These claims, which are based on rural traditions, when intersecting with the urban and global order, are far from ‘backward looking’. Indeed, using the

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__________________________________________________________________ concept of ‘residual culture’ as proposed by Raymond Williams 14 to understand these claims, they can be progressive – in the case of Mui Wo, they have kept a place of ‘dirt’. As Douglas has pointed out, dirt, like the weeds and lawn cuttings that have been turned into compost, can be enriching to our experience as well as to the soil.15 It reminds us that there exist alternatives in the modern, homogeneous space.

Notes 1

Stuart Hall, ‘The Spectacle of the Other’, in Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices, ed. Stuart Hall (London: Sage, 1997), 236. 2 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger (London and New York: Routledge, 1984), 36. 3 Hall, ‘The Spectacle of the Other’, 259. 4 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 2003). 5 Arif Dirlik, Global Modernity: Modernity in the Age of Global Capitalism (Boulder, London: Paradigm Publishers, 2007), 30. 6 Edward Friedman, ‘Jiang Zemin’s Successors and China’s Growing Rich-Poor Gap’, in China Under Hu Jintao, ed. T. J. Cheng, Jacques deLisle, and Deborah Brown (Singapore: World Scientific Publishers, 2006), 100. 7 Ruth Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treatyport China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). 8 Leslie Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class (Malden: Blackwell, 2001), 17. 9 Ibid., 4. 10 Ibid., 12. 11 Dirlik, Global Modernity, 30. 12 ‘Septic tanks’, Viewed 20 March 2012, http://septictank.org/. 13 ‘Environment Protection Department - Guidance Notes on Discharges from Village Houses’ last modified 9 March 2010, Viewed 20 March 2012, http://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/english/environmentinhk/water/guide_ref/guide_wpc_ dv.html. 14 Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1977). 15 Douglas, Purity and Danger, 163.

Bibliography Dirlik, Arif. Global Modernity: Modernity in the Age of Global Capitalism. Boulder, London: Paradigm Publishers, 2007.

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__________________________________________________________________ Douglas, Mary. Purity and Danger. London and New York: Routledge, 1984. Friedman, Edward. ‘Jiang Zemin’s Successors and China’s Growing Rich-Poor Gap’. In China Under Hu Jintao, edited by T. J. Cheng, Jacques deLisle, and Deborah Brown , 97-133. Singapore: World Scientific Publishers, 2006. Hall, Stuart. ‘The Spectacle of the Other’. In Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices, edited by Stuart Hall, 223-279. London: Sage, 1997. Rogaski, Ruth. Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in TreatyPort China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004. Said, Edward W. Orientalism. London: Penguin, 2003. Sklair, Leslie. The Transnational Capitalist Class. Malden: Blackwell, 2001. Williams, Raymond. Marxism and Literature. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1977. Kin-Ling Tang is PhD Candidate in Cultural Studies at The Chinese University of Hong Kong. Her research interests are on space and rural-urban relations. She is writing her thesis on rural-urban encounter in the age of global capitalism.

Section 3 Workplace

Citizenship and Public Administration: Competition or Participation? The Italian Case Umberto Buratti Abstract The relationship between citizens and Public Administration in Italy has been conflicting ever since 1861. High costs and a slow bureaucracy have exacerbated citizens’ distrust in the public system, which in turn has become increasingly selfreferential. Politics has also been playing a major role, with governments taking either the side of the citizens or of the public administration at convenience. The reforms adopted over the last twenty years were aimed at bringing the public sector closer to the private one. Competition has so far been considered the best strategy to curb inefficiency and waste in the public sector. The last reform introduced in 2009 gave Italian citizens the opportunity to gain better control over the public sector. But does competition provide for the best solution to the problems of the Italian Public Administration? Over the last twenty years, inefficiency, maladministration and corruption have not reduced. Competition alone is unlikely to provide for an economically effective solution. Moreover, the ongoing conflict between citizens and Public Administration raises ethical concerns and weakens the democratic process. Are there alternative solutions? Is it possible to shift from a conflict-based competition towards a responsible participation? Would this be an economically and ethically viable solution? What role could new technologies play? Could e-democracy contribute to increasing the efficiency of the Public Administration? Key Words: Citizenship, public administration, e-democracy, competition, participation, civil servants’ ethics, public ethics, maladministration, Ttrust, democratic process. ***** Our attempt is to make the relationship between Public bodies and citizenry - or to be precise - «the customer», as harmonious as possible. This cannot be repeated too often.1 The basic word I-Thou can be spoken only with one’s whole being. The concentration and fusion into a whole being can never be accomplished by me, can never be accomplished without me. I require a Thou to become; becoming I, I say Thou. All actual life is encounter.2

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__________________________________________________________________ 1. An Everyday Relation In Italy, citizens are in daily contact with those working in the Public Sector. In point of fact, there is no need to go to public agencies to be granted public services. This is because public transport, education, electricity and water supply are all state-run services, the provision of which is regulated by a complex set of rules. Nevertheless, the supply of services on the part of the government somehow downplays their significance, mostly for public benefits that are often taken for granted, particularly in the case of essential services. Accordingly, the lack of public aid – or major shortcomings in public assistance – are seen as a social injustice or a serious issue to be solved. Indeed, such a demand for justice hides a more profound link between the individual and the State, the boundaries of which are often unclear. An underlying and hidden ‘sociality’ exists – in the sense of a range of social relations – which is ready to reveal itself in different ways (one’s political choice, the perception of public employment, the claims of both individuals and civil servants). Clearly, sociality should take account of a number of variables: the expectations of both citizens and public employees, the reason of State, and the fragmented international scenario. This state of affairs leads to an oversimplification of the question, with the need to cope with it – by defending the role of the State or arguing in favour of the abolition of public services – which is pivotal. This also results in the forming of alliances and the emergence of shared viewpoints that before would have been unthinkable. For instance, both Mill’s liberalism and Marx’s socialism consider the state-run system as an obstacle to remove. On the other hand, those who take a more moderate view try to deal with both the claims of citizenry and civil servants at an institutional level, granting something to both parties, without however decisively tackling the question. The strained relationship between the two parties seems to hide more relevant factors that are worth highlighting. 2. A ‘Double’ Sociality The sociality masked within everyday relations with Public Administration is twofold, with the two ambits of these relations that are regarded as distinct and only marginally interdependent. On the one side, a relationship between the citizens and the State exists; on the other side, a link between public employers and employees emerges. Due to the fact that these relationships are two-tiered, similar discussions and debates are often dealt with separately. The distinction is even more apparent among academics. In this sense, the citizen-state relationship is investigated within the context of several disciplines – e.g. politology and political philosophy – whereas the link between civil servants and public agencies is looked into by experts in law and organizational studies. Further, the everyday nature of this relation reveals the deep bond between the actors. Indeed, the daily contact with those operating in the public sector and the

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__________________________________________________________________ services provided by the state allow individuals to gain a perception of the establishment, and, in turn, to build up a common identity. The sense of belonging is thus attained under these circumstances, rather than at the time of a public event – e.g. elections – and this aspect is further strengthened by their engagement in decision-making and the quality of the services supplied. The relationship between public employees and Public Administration, on the other hand, is a complex one and not based solely on bureaucracy. Besides being employed by public agencies, public servants are that ‘part of the state’ individuals interface with. As a result, public employment cannot only be defined considering the foregoing two-way relationship, as their duties also involve making contact with the citizenry, somehow reasserting what is stated in Art. 98 of the Italian Constitution: ‘civil servants are exclusively at the service of the Nation’.3 The relation under examination here is ‘double’ in the sense that it is seen as the two sides of the same coin. Civil servants are present in the relationship between the State and the citizens, with the latter who also play a role in public employment. Needless to say, such interplay cannot be separated. 3. The Leviathan and the Administrative Apparatus The images and the words used to describe the foregoing relationships is the most effective way to become familiar with the interplay mentioned above. The definitions of State, citizenry and public employment are closely intertwined, with one evoking the other. The Leviathan is deemed to be one of the most intense representations of this picture, as embodying a powerful state which makes use of force in order to avoid bellum omnium contra omnes (war of everyone against everyone). Representatives of government advocate the recourse to force in order to build up civic society and ensure the co-existence of individuals, who otherwise are doomed to become homini lupi. Equally powerful should be the administrative apparatus that operates and supervises at different levels. In Weber’s words, the administration can be likened to a small army which is comprised of a multitude of officials who operate as part of a larger system.4 A sense of modernity arises in all its intensity. The administrative machine functions as though it would be a human being, where the brawn and the brain are separated. The management, that is the head, has a very complex function and is in charge of decision-making. The administrative system, the body, simply executes and takes order. The faster the coordination between them, the more efficient the running of the system. In other words, the more pressure exerted through control of management over the administration, the more rapid and adequately services are supplied. The disruptive power of the Leviathan and the administrative apparatus is such that it goes beyond the boundaries of the first modernity. The reshaping of

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__________________________________________________________________ sovereign power and its main features, which now comprise traits that are typical of democracy, has certainly affected its original framework. This kind of sovereignty is still relevant today and some of its main elements can also be found in the Italian Constitution. More specifically, Art. 97 (the principle of impartiality and the rigid organizational system) and Art. 98 (the service provided by civil servants to the Nation on an exclusive basis) seem to have a modern dimension.5 .

4. Different Perspectives There are other images and words that seem to question the relationship between a powerful management and a sound and operative administrative system. There seems to be something odd with regard to the citizenry and public employment, as the role of the individuals appears to have been downplayed, if not disappeared. This is because the inability of individuals to co-exist with their own kind leads to loose sociality – originally viewed as conflicting – that will be given back to them from the above, e.g. the State. As a result, the sense of citizenship is only felt over the elections on an on and off basis. The growth of the State in terms of size and engagement does not result in an increasing role of the individual. While ‘public goods’ are provided from the above, the relationship with management and the administrative system in the public sector is not perfectly balanced. Like many of the characters of Kafka, individuals wander confused and feel disoriented at the time of dealing with the State that might have multiple faces or no face at all. Equally complex is the situation within the public sector. The attempt to keep up with the myth of efficient and fast administrative apparatus causes the daily working activities to be repetitive, which is similar to a production chain in the auto industry. The difference lies in the outcome, in the sense that which is manufactured is a range of protocols and folders. In this connection the expression that has been coined to describe such activity is significant: ‘desk Taylorism’. Suddenly, the administrative apparatus seems to be fragile and surrounded by hypocrisy. In order to function properly, the administrative machine needs the contribution of all those concerned, which often translates into codes of practices or disciplinary rules that cause the officials to become more and more performance-related, producing several limitations in hierarchical terms. Accordingly, the sociality hidden in the everyday relations brings about some controversial issues that question the picture of a powerful management and effective administrative machine in the public sector. This picture is also aggravated by the role of the individuals – that is minimized – and the increasing alienation of the civil servants. Because of this conflict, the distance between the elements of this interplay clearly emerges, almost leading to a point of no return. The sense of estrangement felt by the citizenry negatively affects its perception of public employment and produces contrasting views with regard to the work of public agencies, which seem

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__________________________________________________________________ to operate to fulfill goals other than the common ones. In the same vein, the exclusion of the citizenry makes the public system more and more self-referential, thus losing sight of its ultimate goal. The rift in the perception of the State as a powerful and tried entity leads to the setting of new words and images, the aim of which is to fill the vacuum with the citizens and public employment. The foregoing words and images, although significant, are often characterized by a certain level of controversy. 5. Is it the Death of the Leviathan? The means to fight such a powerful State are: reforms, decentralization and free access to documentation that are controlled by public servants. In order to overturn the assumption the centralized State is distant from its citizens; new momentum to local administrations should be given. In the 1990s, the main reforms in the Public Sector made an attempt to bring the State and citizenry closer to each other. Now, this aim can be successfully achieved with the support of new information technologies. The keyword is transparency. The image of a powerful Leviathan is now replaced by an equally powerful image of a more transparent State, a glass house, with no secrets and dark sides. In this ‘new building’, the gap between citizenry and State is significantly reduced, for citizens can have access to relevant information and become aware of recent developments in the public administration at any moment. The end of State ‘privacy’ opens up to a new citizen-state relationship. The exercise of democracy and citizenship that have so far been limited to the right to vote is now encouraged by e-democracy. As occurs in the case of the Leviathan, the new model has fervent supporters and becomes the guiding principle of law. There is now a possible alternative to the powerful State. Despite the enthusiasm that often characterizes digital democracy discourse, it is, however, necessary to take into account different perspectives. Empirical data reveal that – at least in Italy – information technology is still at an experimental stage, thus undermining the effective development of e-democracy. Once again, the images provided in the literature are to be taken as a warning sign of an underestimation of the power of new technologies, also taking into account Orwell and Huxley. If the digitalization of the public administration system is a mere reproduction of the real one, the citizen-state distance is by no means reduced. In the same vein, the levels of transparency in the running of a State can be embodied by a powerful Leviathan. Assuming that the digitalization of the public administration system leads to higher levels of democracy is risky, and such an equation is in need of a further analysis. Also in this case, the death of the Leviathan must not be taken for granted. 6. Is it the End of the Administrative Apparatus? A number of models have been introduced which include new images taken

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__________________________________________________________________ from public employment, with a view to counter the increasingly self-referential power of the Public Sector. Autonomy, management, responsibility and then, assessment, evaluation, performance provide for the language, values and culture of civil servants, now and in the years to come. The attempt to move away from an ideally perfect administrative apparatus towards a completely modern system is uncertain, and this is particularly apparent in certain special reforms. In the 1990s, after an initial – yet partial – opening towards increased levels of responsibility on the part of civil servants, a dramatic change occurred, with Legislative Decree No. 150/2009 that provides for a strong hierarchical organization that is typical of the past. Inefficiencies are not seriously tackled and it seems that minor reforms could bring about change and mark a fresh start. The reform, however, accounts for a radical change in the citizen-state relationship. The administrative apparatus is run similarly to private businesses and citizens are regarded as both ‘users’ and ‘consumers’. The rights of the citizens, long denied because of shortcomings in the public administration system, become similar to consumers’ rights. In this connection, it is significant that we speak of class action, to refer to action taken against Public Administration in the event of a disservice. The transformation of the State into a company, as well as that of the citizen into a customer, further widens the distance between these two poles. Citizens and public servants are now placed one against the other. 7. Bringing Citizens and Civil Servants Closer to Each Other: Competition or Participation? The images and the words used to describe a centralized State and a powerful public apparatus as compared to the myths of modernity become less effective if considered as an alternative. Transparency could merely reproduce reality in a virtual world and a different organization of the work of civil servants on the basis of merit, and performance assessment does not overcome the idea of a ‘mechanic’ apparatus, thus only providing for minor changes. Despite the attempt to reduce the distance between citizenry and State, a lot remains to be done. A closer analysis shows that the power of State has never been questioned and still matters in every organizational change. Rather than an effort to rethink the public administration system, the only effort that has been made is that of reorganizing the system without questioning the conceptual categories at the basis of the system itself, also reviewing the role of both citizens and civil servants. Once again, this stalemate situation is evident in the language used. As for the relationship between citizens and institutions, the declared goal is that of bringing the latter closer to the former. On the contrary, as for work in the public sector, the aim is that of bringing citizens and civil servants closer to each other in terms of competition that is potentially conflicting.

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__________________________________________________________________ In either case, the various players do not know each other, since attempts are made to bring closer to the citizens a State that conceptually remains far from them. Similarly, civil servants are seen as ‘strangers’ by citizens. No real participation and responsibility is possible within this conceptual framework. Citizens and civil servants are strangers among strangers. It is modernity that again characterizes this view, even in seemingly post-modern perspectives. 8. The Original Sin of Modernity The notion of ‘strangers’ underlying the ‘new’ images describing the State and the Public Administration system shows that ‘living together’ is still considered as a consequence rather than as a human primary reality and that human beings are not by nature inclined to it. From this point of view, sociality is intended as an unwanted necessity created by a system of institutions that safeguard the individuals, originally regarded as potential enemies. Within this framework, the State has been again considered a distinct entity, and civil servants have necessarily become strangers, since they belong to a different and external institution as compared to citizens. Despite the reforming processes’ attempts to reduce the distance, their link remains weak, contingent and artificial. No progress beyond modernity has really been made. Hobbes is not that far as it may seem. In contrast, it is by going beyond the assumption at the basis of modern thinking – that is human beings are not naturally inclined to living together – that new actions can be taken. No progress will ever be made until the human relationships are considered as naturally derived from a superior entity. Only the awareness of a different nature of human relationships regarded as basic - the I and Thou pointed out by Buber - opens up to new paths, providing for a closer relationship beyond competition and towards a real participation and responsibility.

Notes 1

Renato Brunetta, Rivoluzione in corso. Il dovere di cambiare dalla parte dei cittadini (Milano: Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, 2009), 106. 2 Martin Buber, I and Thou (London: Continuum, 2004), 17. 3 Senato della Repubblica, Constitution of the Italian Republic, Viewed on 10 March 2012. http://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf 4 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (California: University of California Press, 1978) 5 Senato della Repubblica, Constitution.

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Bibliography Bianco, Magda, and Napolitano, Giulio. The Italian Administrative System since 1861. A Source of Competitive Disadvantage. Viewed 10 March 2012. http://www.bancaditalia.it/studiricerche/convegni/atti/storicointernazionale/interventi/qse-24.pdf. Brunetta, Brunetta. Rivoluzione in corso. Il dovere di cambiare dalla parte dei cittadini. Milano: Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, 2009. Buber, Martin. I and Thou. London: Continuum, 2004. Hobbes ,Thomas. Leviathan. Bristol: Thoemmes Continuum, 2003. Jemolo, Carlo Arturo. ‘La politica e l’amministrazione’. In La crisi dello Stato moderno, edited by Jemolo Carlo Arturo. Bari: Laterza, 1954. Melis, Guido, ‘The Irresistible Rise of Monsù Travet: the Bureaucrat in Italian Literature from 19th to the 20th Century’. Jahrbuch für Europäische Verwaltungsgeschichte 6 (1994): 99-120. Senato della Repubblica, Constitution of the Italian Republic, Viewed on 10 March 2012. http://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/ituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf. Sepe, Stefano, Mazzone, Laura, Portelli, Ignazio, and Vetritto, Giovanni. Lineamenti di storia dell’amministrazione italiana 1861-2006. Roma: Carrocci Editore, 2007. Riva, Franco. Dialogo e libertà. Etica, Democrazia, Socialità.Troina: Città Aperta Edizioni, 2003. Vandelli, Luciano. ‘Il pubblico impiegato nella rappresentazione letteraria’. Lavoro e Diritto, XV, 3 (2001): 377-399. Weber, Max. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. California: University of California Press, 1978. Umberto Buratti Ph.D. Candidate, International Doctoral School in Human Development and Labour Market Law, University of Bergamo, Italy. The school is

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__________________________________________________________________ promoted by Adapt - Association of International and Comparative Studies in the fields of Labour Law and Industrial Relations – and CQIA. Currently his research is focused on relationship between Bureaucracy and Democracy and he’s developing a project on Ethics in the Public Administration. The main topics of his research are: Participation, Responsibility, Transparency, E-democracy, HR Management and Labour Relations in the Public Sector.

The Meaning of Being an Ethical Psychologist: Second Year’s Psychology Students’ Perspective Klaudija Pauliukeviciute and Kristina Zardeckaite-Matulaitiene Abstract Professional ethics is a science highly related to personal experience, and not only to theoretical knowledge of the profession. If we want to reach a higher quality of teaching students professional ethics we need to take into account the experience they already have. The aim of this study was to explore the notions of being an ethical psychologist held by psychology students. 64 full-time second year psychology students at Vytautas Magnus University participated in this study. In the beginning of the second year of their studies they wrote an essay ‘What does it mean to be an ethical psychologist for me?’. Content analysis was used as a method of data analysis. The results confirmed the findings of the quantitative studies about the hierarchy of important factors related to the ethical behaviour of psychologist. It was revealed that ‘confidentiality’ is the main feature defining an ethical psychologist. ‘Moral values’ including honour, tolerance, care of others, etc. was the second feature describing the meaning of being ethical professionally. The third theme of the ethical behaviour of psychologist included ‘serving to others’. The last pattern concerned the legislation of this profession (‘working ethically means working according to the laws’). To sum up, our results showed that experiential patterns of the students reflect 4 general principles of the professional ethics of psychologists (respect, competence, responsibility and integrity). Key Words: Professional ethics, confidentiality, moral obligations, psychology students. ***** 1. Introduction Assigning importance the definition of ethics and morality is understandable and logical while studying the ethics of psychologists, but students’ personal understanding of these words is even more important. The term positive ethics 1 means that the study of ethics is more than a series of rules you must follow to avoid punishment. Behaving ethically is not just a matter of following rules. According to Sharon Anderson and Mitchell Handelsman2 professionals are motivated to do good work and actualize their highest moral and ethical selves. We suggest that it is valuable to stimulate students’ understanding of positive ethics while teaching professional ethics. Behaving ethically and growing toward ethical excellence are complex processes which involve adapting to a new culture – the culture of psychotherapy3 or psychology. Ethical acculturation4 consists of two

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__________________________________________________________________ components – a person who studies and a profession of psychologist or psychotherapist. The process of ethical acculturation is easier if previous knowledge of students is actualised and new information is attached to it. Various researchers emphasize the importance of ethical sensitivity56, or ethical mindfulness7 in the ethical decision-making process. This ethical sensitivity is formed using disposable feelings of morality and leads to the development of a professional identity because of the acculturation process. Even though the code of professional ethics slightly differs in various countries, all of them include four basic principles: the Principle of Respect, the Principle of Competence, the Principle of Responsibility, and the Principle of Integrity. But knowledge of those principles is not sufficient for real behaviour in a particular work situation, because professional knowledge is needed alongside personal ethics. The ethical code could not be understood without interpretations, since the code does not provide direct answers as to what to do with ethical dilemmas. Because of that analysis, recognition and considerations of ethical issues are so important in the learning process8. Kenneth Pope9 is of the opinion that personal relations with the law and the ethical code’s norms are obligatory for ethical behaviour of a psychologist. Our study was aimed to explore the notions of being an ethical psychologist held by the psychology students in Vytautas Magnus University. 2. Method 64 full-time second year psychology students at Vytautas Magnus University participated in this study. 11 of them were male and 53 female. All of them had already studied three subjects in psychology: General Psychology, History of Psychology and Personality Psychology. Students wrote an essay ‘What does it mean to be an ethical psychologist for me?’. Content analysis was used as a method of data analysis. 3. Results A. Confidentiality is the Most Important Feature of the Ethical Work of a Psychologist. Content analysis of the essays showed that most of the students (N=56) considered confidentiality to be the most essential feature of professional ethics. For some students (N=6) the definition of being ethical started from the idea that psychologists must follow the codex of professional ethics, and later mentioning aspects of ethical work related to the ethical code. For others (N=4) confidentiality is directly related to respecting the client and caring for the clients’ well-being (psychologist should be ‘reliable in stressful situations, be helpful and not share with others information coming from the clients’, ‘not communicating what he or she heard from the clients’, ‘feeling appreciation because of the client’s letting to get inside of him or her and not publicizing what he found out form the clients’). Some students relate confidentiality with both client’s and psychologist’s well-

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__________________________________________________________________ being (if people would find out that a psychologist was not confidential they ‘would stop seeing this psychologist or even worse they would resign psychological help at all’). Some other issues are related to confidentiality also, e.g., psychologist-client relationship, effectiveness of this relationship, trust in relationships, morality and moral commitment. Students believed that clients have a right to ‘confidentiality’. As example they quoted Irvin D. Yalom novels on counselling, where he wrote ‘opposite for the reality client’s features or problems – that no one could recognise’. The well-being of the society in relation to confidentiality was mentioned in two essays. Confidentiality should promote the professional attractiveness and trustworthiness of a psychologist; because of that more people could seek for help to psychologist and consequently the well-being of the society would increase. Only one female student mentioned that sometimes confidentiality could be a serious dilemma for the psychologist. She gives an example of a child asking the psychologist not to tell its parents about his or her inappropriate behaviour. In that case, the psychologist needs to decide what to do and which the least harmful behaviour would be . B. Professional Competence as the Second Value of the Psychologist’s Ethical Work Professional competence as a value of ethical work of a psychologist was mentioned in 54 essays. The context of the importance of professional competence is very broad. It starts from the idea that psychologists must accept to steadily raise his or her professional competence and ends with idea that psychologists must not exceed his professional competence and not malpractice. 32 students wrote about competence as a value related to ‘self-criticism as regards my own attitudes, needs and values’, ‘honesty and criticism concerning my knowledge and professional skills’, ‘regular self-questioning ‘am I behaving right’’, ‘doubt about everything and self-verification’, and ‘responsibility for the utilisation of methods affecting the client and society’. Another aspect of competence was an ‘active social position’ (N=5): ‘social responsibility for development of well-being of the society, active participation in scientific field, deepening their own knowledge, implementation of various studies which could be useful for other psychologists’, ‘public information about the psychologists’ work’, ‘struggle with the public opinion that says that persons could come to the psychologist only when it is very bad’, ‘not be silent when a colleague is not working according to ethical principles’, ‘active and adequate reaction to everyday situations according to the profession even when not in the workplace’. Some students (N=10) mentioned that competence meets various practical activities of psychologist and high standards of their performance. For some students (N=12) ‘competence’ is related to the appropriate education, a diploma confirming the right to have professional practice, as well as the obligation to life-long learning and refreshing one’s professional knowledge. ‘The conscientious psychologist...[should help to evaluate

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__________________________________________________________________ cases]...where a psychologist feels instable due to his or her lack of knowledge, is doubtful and there is high chance to rather harm than help’. Some students (N=15) recommended a psychologist to recourse to more experienced colleagues, to direct clients to them, to discuss with them professional ethical dilemmas in order to find a solution in situations when you do not know what to do. For one female student ‘competence’ relates to an intrinsic equilibrium. C. Moral Values: Aspects of Ethical Work of a Psychologist Another group of aspects concerning the ethical work of a psychologist is moral values (honesty is mentioned by 46 students, honour – 46, responsibility – 41, tolerance – 34). Honesty is disclosed as a part of the competence: ‘honestly valued professional competence’, ‘honestly acknowledge that you can’t / do not know how /are not able to help’. Also, students (N=28) often mentioned the commitment ‘to be honest to yourself and to the client’, ‘do not mix your own and the client’s problems’, ‘do not give false hope to the clients’, ‘do not take bribes’, ‘to refuse client’s presents’, ‘to know yourself well and to stop subjectivity’. Honour – ‘honouring other people and their rights’, ‘be respectful, polite, and not abusing’. Do not use clients for your own social life enrichment (N=11): ‘not making friends with clients’, ‘not overstepping professional communication’, ‘not seeking to get close to the client’. An important aspect of honour, according to some students, is opposing clients’ well-being against the professional ambitions of the psychologist (N=8). Usually, students disclose this aspect of honour using long examples from their own experience or popular literature where psychologists didn’t pay attention to the clients’ needs or well-being. Instead, they used him or her for their own theory, results or image consolidation. Responsibility is usually associated with the relationship between the client and the psychologist or between the psychologist and the society. Responsibility could be expressed by preparing for the work day, utilisation of appropriate methods, and making ethical decisions. Tolerance is also mentioned as very important moral value. The notion of tolerance is described as reaching from the tolerance for the clients’ differences up to empathy for and adjustment to the client’s needs: ‘can accept people from all levels, and not only accept but help them, ‘sensitive to the cultural, ethnic and other differences’, ‘tolerant to various groups of clients’. ‘Differences of the clients should not be considered as an obstacle seeking the main aim of the psychologist work... Exceptionality should be accepted without prejudice and should not stand for fulfilment of the goals of the work’. Assurance of the client’s well-being is for many students an important aspect of the ethical work of a psychologist (N=40). Even though a client’s well-being is related to the earlier mentioned moral values, confidentiality and competence, students often separate client’s well-being as a single/independent value. Care for the client’s well-being is related to the following of the ethical codex (N=8). It is argued that well-being of the client should dominate over personal and professional ambitions of psychologist, it is

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__________________________________________________________________ ‘not enough to be good person in order to assure client’s well-being’. Sometimes, care for a client’s well-being is related to the observation of duties and obligations, ‘not remaining silent when a colleague is not following ethical norms’, respecting boundaries of ethical behaviour. Another important aspect of ethical behaviour of the psychologist related to the client’s well-being is not offering your own opinion (N=38): ‘not offer his or her opinion in order to show harm of such behaviour’, ‘not telling what the client should do and how this should be understand [because he or she doesn’t know what is the best for the client]’. D. Characteristics of Ethical Behaviour of a Psychologist We could distinguish characteristics of psychologist’s ethical behaviour related to professional work. The importance of accuracy and listening while working with clients is mentioned quite often (N=21): ‘listen to the client and check accuracy, do not assert’, ‘ask clients and check accuracy’, ‘be cautious with interpretations’, ‘do not offer your own opinion’. The principle of equity is also important: ‘both are equal [psychologist and client], because of that [the psychologist] is not telling the client what to do or how to solve the problem’. Two female students mention Freud and psychoanalysis as an example of unethical behaviour, where the psychotherapist as an expert interprets the client’s behaviour and is asserting, not seeking collaboration. Other characteristics of ethical behaviour mentioned in the essays are empathy (N=12), sensitivity to the clients’ problems (N=7), and capacity to sympathise (N=5). Also, two female students mentioned that the psychologist ‘creates scientific methods in order to help people’, and ‘creates methods oriented towards the client’s well-being’. Some students (N=2) answering the question ‘what does it means to them to be an ethical psychologist’ tell their life stories, for example when they saw unethical behaviour of the psychologist being a client or share the story read in popular literature (N=2). Sometimes ethical behaviour is related to politeness, culture, humanity (N=5), capacity to solve their own problems (N=6), capacity to analyse yourself (N=5), telling the truth and not lying (N=4), knowing to stay objective (N=8), and inherent skills and features like musical abilities (N=2). E. Other Issues of Ethical Work of a Psychologist Describing ethical aspects of a psychologist’s work students often mention such issues as ethical codex (N=6), serving people or society (N=8), calling (N=6), or faith in what you do (N=12). A Psychologist’s work is often compared to the work of a priest (N=5), but also other comparisons are made, e.g. an ethical psychologist is like a soldier, that is serving people and protecting their interests. Four students described a psychologist’s work as testing when you need to choose the lesser of two evils. Two students who had chosen economics as second major described difficulties a psychologist could meet in the business world. They thought that ethical behaviour of a psychologist is not always compatible with business logic.

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__________________________________________________________________ ‘Ethical indecency resembles water: its physical features change according to the circumstances, but its chemical composition remains the same’, - one female student stated. Students often wrote that an ethical codex limits psychologists, and were of the opinion that this situation made for personal difficulties (N=16). The limitations could be various, usually related to confidentiality: ‘[not allowing] to share your own working activities’, ‘high emotional load’, but could also be related to the moderation process when you need to moderate interests of different people. Students write that it is very important for a psychologist to have: ‘a strong spine’, ‘strong stance vis-a-vis your own values’, ‘strong morals and values’. Students mentioned that a psychologist ‘lives several lives. The first one – his or her own personal life, and the other ones – his or her clients...’. Seldom students (N=2) mentioned that a psychologist works according to laws and that knowing laws is important. Often students complained that they hadn’t read the ethical codex yet (N=15), they did not know how to interpret it, they guessed that such issues as competence and confidentiality should be mentioned in the ethical codex (N=12), and declared that they knew little about the speciality of a psychologist (N=9). 4. Discussion and Conclusions A Psychologist working with a client is confronted with three dimensions of ethical behaviour at work: morality, professional ethics and legal norms. The proper balance among these three dimensions is very important, because morality is a very subjective dimension, professional ethics doesn’t cover all questions a psychologist meets in his or her work and doesn’t give an answer as to how to behave in a particular situation, and the law punishes but doesn’t explain. In ancient times, imparting knowledge was directly related to the development of moral values, but this idea doesn’t apply for modern times. It is important to develop moral values and to establish connections between them and professional knowledge, rather than only teaching students principles of ethical code. Confidentiality – the most mentioned feature of being ethical– is a part of the first ethical principle – the principle of respect. This principle consists of general respect, privacy and confidentiality, informed consent and freedom of consent and self-determination10. It is not surprising that students regard confidentiality as example of an ethical psychologist’s behaviour. Clients also mention confidentiality as a leading norm of a psychologist’s ethical behaviour and believe that 100 percent confidentiality should be kept in the client–psychologist relationship11. Kitchener and Anderson12 found that only 20% of the clients think that confidential information could and should be revealed if necessary, and 74% of the clients think that confidentiality should never be breached. We think that confidentiality of client–psychologist relationships is the most referred to ethical theme both in scientific and popular literature.

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__________________________________________________________________ Another feature of a psychologist’s ethical behaviour often mentioned by the students is competence. The principle of competence is elaborated as follows: ethical awareness, being aware of limits of competence, being aware of limits of procedures, obligation of continuing self-development, and awareness of selfincapability. It is repeated constantly during the studies that students’ shouldn’t exceed the limits of their competence, because good intentions are not enough for effective work. Awareness of limits of competence reduces the possibility of subjective moral evaluation. This feature is closely related to another principle which students mention very often – the principle of responsibility, defined as general responsibility, promotion of high standards, avoidance of harm, continuity of care, extended responsibility and resolving dilemmas. Competence is related to the students’ speciality. ‘This principle addresses the more technical aspects of a psychologist’s practice. It is concerned with how a psychologist makes use of the knowledge and skills that have been developed as a result of initial training, subsequent practice and further training as part of continuing professional development’13. Students often mentioned honesty and accuracy as parts of the ethical principle of integrity. More seldom students mention such standards of professional work as straightforwardness and openness to one’s own motives, conflicts of interests and conflicts with colleagues, even though those features of the psychologist’s work are also parts of the principle of integrity. But it is difficult to assess the amount of strength you need to tell the truth without real work experience. Lack of students’ work experience could also be related to the fact, that they rarely mentioned the importance of legal knowledge for being an ethical psychologist. Lack of legal knowledge is related to a worse recognition of professional limitations, which alongside burnout and addictions could lead towards the bad ending of professional work, harmful for both the client and the professional.

Notes 1

Mitchell M. Handelsman, Michael C. Gottlieb, and Samuel Knapp, ‘Training Ethical Psychologists: An Acculturation Model’, Professional Psychology: Research and Practice 36 (2005): 59-65. 2 Sharon K. Anderson, and Mitchell M. Handelsman, Ethics for Psychotherapists and Counselors: A Proactive Approach (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 1-13. 3 Anderson and Handelsman, Ethics for Psychotherapists and Counselors, 4. 4 Handelsman, Gottlieb, and Knapp, ‘Training Ethical Psychologists’, 59-65. 5 Elizabeth R. Welfel, Ethics in Counseling and Psychotherapy: Standards, Research and Emerging Issues (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1998), 10-59.

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__________________________________________________________________ 6

William S. West, ‘Some Ethical Dilemmas in Counseling and Counseling Research,’ British Journal of Guidance and Counseling 30.3 (2002): 261-268. 7 Tim Bond, Standards and Ethics for Counseling in Action (London: Sage, 2000), 33-75. 8 West, ‘Some Ethical Dilemmas in Counseling’, 265. 9 Kenneth Pope and Melba Vasquez, Ethics in Psychotherapy and Counseling: A Practical Guide (San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons, 2007), 8-29. 10 Geoff Lindsay, Caper Koene, Haldor Øvreeide, and Fredi Lang, Ethics for European Psychologists (Washington: Hogrefe and Huber Pub, 2008), 53. 11 Ellen T. Luepker, Record Keeping in Psychotherapy and Counseling. Protecting Confidentiality and the Professional Relationship (NY and Hove: BrunnerRoutledge, 2002), 43-61. 12 Karen S. Kitchener and Sharon K. Anderson, ‘Ethical Issues in Counseling Psychology: Old Themes, New Problems’. Handbook of Counseling Psychology, eds. Steven D. Brown and Robert W. Lent (Canada, Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 2000), 52-55, 61-64, 66-67. 13 Lindsay, et al., Ethics for European Psychologists, 53-153.

Bibliography Anderson, Sharon K., and Handelsman, Mitchell M. Ethics for Psychotherapists and Counselors. A Proactive Approach. Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. Bond, Tim. Standards and Ethics for Counseling in Action (2nd ed.). London: Sage, 2000. Handelsman, Mitchell M., Gottlieb, Micael C., and Knapp, Samel. ‘Training Ethical Psychologists: An Acculturation Model’. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice 36 (2005): 59-65. Kitchener, Karen S., and Anderson, Sharon K. ‘Ethical Issues in Counseling Psychology: Old Themes, New Problems’. Handbook of Counseling Psychology, 3rd edition. Canada, Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 2000. Lindsay, Geoff, Caper Koene, Haldor, Øvreeide and Fredi Lang. Ethics for European Psychologists. NC: Hogrefe and Huber Pub, 2008. Luepker, Ellen T. Record Keeping in Psychotherapy and Counselling. Protecting Confidentiality and the Professional Relationship. NY and Hove, Brunner: Routledge, 2002.

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__________________________________________________________________ Pope, Kenneth, Vasquez, Melba. Ethics in Psychotherapy and Counselling: A Practical Guide (3rd ed.). London: Wiley, 2007. Welfel, Elizabeth R. Ethics in Counselling and Psychotherapy: Standards, Research and Emerging Issues. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1998. West, William S. ‘Some Ethical Dilemmas in Counselling and Counselling Research’. British Journal of Guidance And Counselling 30.3 (2002): 261-268. Klaudija Pauliukeviciute is a lecturer at the General Psychology Department of Vytautas Magnus University (Kaunas, Lithuania. [email protected]). She is interested in counselling psychology and ethical issues of counselling and psychotherapy. Kristina Zardeckaite-Matulaitiene is a lecturer at the General Psychology Department of Vytautas Magnus University (Kaunas, Lithuania. [email protected]). She is interested in gender differences and various aspects of interpersonal communication in different contexts, including ethical issues of professional practice of psychology students.

Employees’ Attitudes toward Ethical Behaviour at Work: Impact of Their Individual Characteristics Kristina Zardeckaite-Matulaitiene, Aukse Endriulaitiene and Justina Naujokaitiene Abstract Ethical behaviour at work is a very important area of research in organizations because it is related both to effectiveness of the organizations’ and its employees’ wellbeing. The aim of this study was to investigate whether employees’ attitude towards ethical behaviour is related to their individual characteristics (age, gender, work experience, cognitive competences and empathy). 252 Lithuanian employees (90 men and 162 women; mean age 32.10) from different organizations participated in this study. Most of them were working in medium size private capital service organizations. A self-report questionnaire consisting of scales measuring attitudes towards ethical behaviour (recognition of ethical dilemmas, approval of ethical decisions, and intentions of ethical behaviour), three cognitive competencies (consistency of risk perception, resistance to the framing effect, and resistance to sunk cost effects), empathy and some demographic questions were used in this cross-sectional survey. The results showed that neither differences in gender nor work experience played on attitudes towards ethical behaviour at work, but rather that age differences influenced these attitudes. The results revealed also that empathy was a significant predictor for the recognition of ethical dilemmas, while resistance to the framing effect predicted both approval of ethical decisions and intentions of ethical behaviour. Key Words: Attitude towards ethical behaviour, cognitive competences, empathy. ***** 1. Introduction Scientists’ interestin ethical decision making in organizations increased in recent decades.1 Concerns about ethics in organizations have generated both theoretical and empirical studies in the area of ethical behaviour and ethical decision-making. Various researchers proposed different theoretical frameworks of ethical behaviour and the ethical decision making process.2,3,4,5,6 But all of them confirmed the importance of cognitive development for ethical behaviour which is influenced by various individual and organizational factors. Still, the individual decision to act ethically starts from the recognition of ethical dilemmas, followed by the evaluation about ethical/non ethical aspects of behaviour. The process ends with the intention to act ethically or not.

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__________________________________________________________________ While theoretical concepts of ethical behaviour in organizations propose a continuum of this behaviour, empirical studies usually target only ethical decisionmaking peculiarities. Research shows that differences in gender, age, and work experience influence employees’ ethical decisions. However, the findings are not unequivocal. Irene Roozen, Patrick De Pelsmacker, Frank Bostyn7 , as well asAzize Ergeneli and Semra Arikan8 have found no gender differences in ethical decision-making or intention towards ethical behaviour. Others state that women better recognize ethical dilemmas, intend more to behave ethically and are more prone to take ethical decisions than men.9,10,11,12 Age differences in ethical behaviour are not very clear, either. Irene Roozen, et al. state that older employees’ behaviour is less ethical.13 Nevertheless, others declare contrary results.14 Similar controversies were found as regards ethical behaviour of employees with different work experience.15,16,17,18 Ethical behaviour and ethical decisions are related to a person’s cognitive and emotional competences. Usually three cognitive competences - risk perception, resistance to the framing effect, and resistance to the sunk cost effect – are analyzed in decision-making studies, but their importance for ethical decisions is not fully evaluated yet. 19,20,21Research focusing on the relations between risk perception and ethical behaviour are inconsistent and depend on risk perception measurement. John Cherry and John Fraedrich suggest that employees who perceive higher risk better recognise ethical dilemmas and take ethical decisions.22 William Shafer and William Kerler, Larry Killough state the contrary – if an employee perceives higher risks, then he or she will be more prone to decide unethically. 2324 The importance of resistance to the framing or sunk cost effect for ethical behaviour can be predicted by experimental studies (usually using scenarios) in decision-making. Connie Bateman, John Fraedrich and Rajesh Iyer found that true framing effects occur for subjects prone to decide unethically or who have lower intentions to behave ethically. 25 M.G. Fennema and Jon Perkins found that the sunk cost effect was related to worse decision-making.26 While cognitive competences are related to a person’s ability to evaluate someone’s behaviour as ethical or unethical and to make ethical decisions, empathy could be understood as motivational factor for ethical behaviour. Usually, cognitive and emotional aspects of empathy are studied in scientific research. Cognitive empathy as possibility to understand other person s’ points of view is more related to ethical decisions than emotional empathy, the latter of which is defined as emotional reaction to others’ experiences. Jennifer Mencl and Douglas May found that cognitive empathy was positively related to higher intentions to act ethically and to take ethical decisions.27 Our study was aimed to investigate how individual characteristics of employees are related to their attitudes towards ethical behaviour at work. Based on previous studies we have chosen marketing ethics scenarios as a measure of attitudes towards ethical behaviour. We used three indicators measuring attitudes towards

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__________________________________________________________________ ethical behaviour at work: recognition of ethical dilemmas, approval of ethical decisions and intentions towards ethical behaviour. Based on previous research we hypothesized that females would better recognise ethical dilemma, would approve more ethical decisions and would demonstrate higher intentions of ethical behaviour than males.28,29,30 Similarly to gender aspects we expected that older employees and employees with longer work experience would better recognise ethical dilemmas, would approve more ethical decisions and would demonstrate higher intentions towards ethical behaviour, too. We proposed that both cognitive competences of decision making and empathy might be important in predicting attitudes towards ethical behaviour at work. Based on previous research we hypothesized that higher level of empathy, higher consistency of risk perception, higher resistance to the framing and to sunk cost effect would be related to a better recognition of ethical dilemmas, higher approval of ethical decisions and higher intentions towards ethical behaviour.31,32,33 While previous studies confirmed relations between ethical behaviour and cognitive competencies, or ethical behaviour and empathy, they give no clear answers about the interactive effect of these indicators predicting ethical behaviour of employees. In order to find out which of the individual characteristics – empathy or cognitive competencies – are more important for attitudes towards ethical behaviour, we intended to investigate the importance of three cognitive competences (consistency of risk perception, higher resistance to the framing effect and resistance to sunk the cost effect) and empathy for all three levels of ethical behaviour (recognition, approval and intension) at work. 2. Method A. Sample A cross-sectional survey with a self-administered questionnaire was conducted with a sample of employees working in various organizations in Lithuania. The total sample was 252 subjects (90 males, 162 females; mean age 32.10, SD=9.75). More detailed information about the subjects is presented in Table 1. Table 1: Socio-demographics of respondents Indicators Education High school College University Family status Single Married

Number of subjects (252) 38 29 185 76 120

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__________________________________________________________________ Living with a partner Divorced Work tenure (in years) Up to 1 year 1-3 years 3-6 years 6-16 years 16-25 years More than 25 years Work tenure in current position (in years) Up to 1 year 1-3 years 3-6 years 6-16 years 16-25 years More than 25 years Type of organisation Production Service Private capital Land-office Size of organization Small (till 50 employees) Medium (50-150 employees) Large (150 and more employees)

37 19 18 55 69 50 33 26 61 96 49 30 9 7 20 232 207 45 93 94 65

It can be seen that most of our subjects have received higher education, are married and work in medium size private capital service organizations. For further statistical analysis subjects were divided into two groups by work tenure and work tenure in current position using mean. B. Instruments We used 4 marketing ethics scenarios based on Anusorn Sinaghpakdi, Scott Vitell, C.P. Rao and David Kurtz survey in order to evaluate 3 levels of ethical behaviour (recognition, approval and intention. 34 All instructions and assessment procedures were used as the authors suggested (for complete information about the material see Wandi Bruine de Bruin, Andrew Parker, Baruch Fischhoff).35 Higher scores indicate higher levels of ethical behaviour. Three Decision-Making Competencies (consistency in risk perception, resistance to framing and resistance to sunk costs) out of seven were used in the study.36

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__________________________________________________________________ Mark H. Davis Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) was used as a measure of empathy (28 items, Cronbach α – 0.72) with the Likert scale from 1 to 6 (where 1 – completely disagree, 6 – completely agree).37 Higher scores indicate higher level of empathy. 3. Results A. Socio-Demographical Differences in Attitude towards Ethical Behaviour at Work In order to find out if employees with different socio-demographical features have different attitudes towards ethical behaviour at work we compared the mean ranks of ethical behaviour attitudes of different socio-demographical groups using Mann-Whitney U and Chi square tests (see Table 2). Table 2: Socio-demographic differences in attitudes towards ethical behaviour of employees Recognition of ethical dilemma Gender Male Female Age Younger (≤ 29 yrs old) Older (>29 yrs old) Education level Lower than higher Higher General work tenure Up to 60 months 61 month and more Work tenure in current position Up to 35 months 36 months and more Type of organisation Private capital Land-office Type of organisation Production Service Size of organization Small Medium

Mean rank

Z

p

128.81 125.22

-0.38

0.705

119.02 134.00

-1.65

0.099

113.95 131.05

-1.67

0.096

123.75 128.34

-0.51

0.612

117.30 136.15

-2.08

0.038

119.75 157.53

-3.19

0.001

140.68 125.28

-0.92

0.358

111.31 138.68

7.051

0.029

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Employees’ Attitudes toward Ethical Behaviour at Work

__________________________________________________________________ Large Approval of ethical behaviour Gender Male Female Age Younger (≤ 29 yrs old) Older (>29 yrs old) Education level Lower than higher Higher General work tenure Up to 60 months 61 month and more Work tenure in current position Up to 35 months 36 months and more Type of organisation Private capital Land-office Type of organisation Production Service Size of organization Small Medium Large Intention of ethical behaviour Gender Male Female Age Younger (≤ 29 yrs old) Older (>29 yrs old) Education level Lower than higher Higher General work tenure Up to 60 months

130.62 Mean rank

Z

p

122.13 128.93

-0.71

0.476

138.00 112.26

-2.81

0.005

138.04 122.32

-1.52

0.129

130.35 121.48

-0.97

0.331

132.09 120.64

-1.25

0.211

126.76 125.31

-0.12

0.904

109.88 127.93

-1.07

0.286

129.92 120.02 130.97

1.202

0.548

Mean rank

Z

p

118.54 130.92

-1.297

0.195

137.58 112.74

-2.72

0.007

137.24 122.61

-1.41

0.158

-1.40

0.161

132.27

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__________________________________________________________________ 61 month and more Work tenure in current position Up to 35 months 36 months and more Type of organisation Private capital Land-office Type of organisation Production Service Size of organization Small Medium Large

119.47 136.17 116.35

-2.12

0.030

126.76 125.31

-0.417

0.677

117.45 127.28

-0.58

0.561

3.992

0.136

132.48 114.72 134.98

The comparison of the mean ranks shows that subjects having longer work experience in current positions (p=0.038), working in land offices (p=0.01) and in medium size organizations (p=0.029) better recognise ethical dilemmas than those who work in current position for a shorter time, and work in private capital, small or large size organizations. No other socio-demographical characteristics of employees was related to the recognition of ethical dilemmas. Higher approval of ethical behaviour was found only in younger employees compared to older ones (p=0.005). Gender, education, work tenure or organisational variables were not related to this type of ethical behaviour. Higher intentions to behave ethically were expressed by younger subjects (p=0.007) and employees working in their current position for shorter periods of time (p=0.030) compared to older ones and working in their current position for a longer time. There were no other significant sociodemographic differences regarding intentions of ethical behaviour. B. Correlations between Cognitive Competences, Empathy and Measures of Attitude towards Ethical Behaviour at Work In order to find out if cognitive competences and empathy of employees are related to their attitudes towards ethical behaviour at work, nonlinear correlation analysis using Spearman ρ coefficient was applied (see Table 3).

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Employees’ Attitudes toward Ethical Behaviour at Work

__________________________________________________________________ Table 3: Spearman correlations between cognitive competencies, empathy and three levels of attitude towards ethical behaviour at work Recognition of ethical dilemma Consistency of risk perception Resistance to the framing effect Resistance to the sunk cost effect Empathy Approval of ethical behaviour Consistency of risk perception Resistance to the framing effect Resistance to the sunk cost effect Empathy Intention of ethical behaviour Consistency of risk perception Resistance to the framing effect Resistance to the sunk cost effect Empathy

ρ -0.11 0.04 0.09 0.090

p 0.820 0.524 0.167 0.153

ρ 0.03 0.09 -0.01 -0.088

p 0.659 0.152 0.933 0.164

ρ 0.059 -0.06 -0.09 -0.027

p 0.348 0.317 0.158 0.670

The results in Table 3 show unexpected results – none of cognitive competences or empathy were significantly related to any of the indicators of attitudes towards ethical behaviour at work. Finally, in order to investigate the predictive importance of cognitive competencies and empathy to the attitudes of ethical behaviour at work, three separate multinomial stepwise regression analyses were conducted using each level of attitudes towards ethical behaviour at work (recognition, approval and intention) as the dependent variables. Three cognitive competencies and empathy with other levels of attitudes towards ethical behaviour were used as the independent variables in each regression model. All regression models were statistically significant (for recognition of ethical dilemma F(2)=7.064, p