Living Philosophy: A Historical Introduction to Philosophical Ideas [2 ed.] 9780190628703

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LIVING PHILOSOPHY A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS

SECOND EDITION

LEWIS VAUGHN

New York I Ox fo rd Universii:y Press

Oxford Univcrslry Pl'css i, a department of 1hc University of Oxford. 11 furchers 1hc Univcrsi1y's ohjcc1ivc of excellence In research, scholarship, ancl educat ion h)• publi,hing worlclwidc. Oxford i, a rcgi,icrcd 11·:1clc mark of Oxford University J>ress in the UK :ind certain other countries. Publi,hcd in the United States of America by Oxford Univcr..iry Pre» 198 Madl!on Avenue, New York, NY I00 l6, United Smtc. ol' Amcrka. © 201R, 2015 hy Oxford Universi1y Pre•~

For tides covered by Section 11 2 of the US Higher Education Opporruniry Acr, please visit www.oup.com/us/hc for the lateSt information about pridug and alternate formats. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprod uced, stored in a rctl'icval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any mc:ms, wi1hou1 1he prior pcrmi>,ion in writi ng of Oxford Univcr,ity Pre», or :1> exprc.s.ly pcrmhtcd by law, by license. or under terms agrci.-d with the appropl'ia1c reproduction rig.hrs organii,n-ion. Jnquiric, concerning reproduction out,5idc 1he scope of the above should be > IJcparcmcnt, Oxford University Pres., , a1 the addre,s aoovc. You must 1101 circul.u c this wmk i11 :iny ocher form .md you mun lmpoic thl, s.1me condition 011 any acquircr. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Pnblicotion Oa111 Names: Vaughn, Lewis, author. '11tle: Uving philosophy: a historical l1111'oductiot1 10 philosophical ideas/ Lewi> Vaughn. Oc.crlptlon: Second Edit ion. I New Vo1k: Oxf0t Or do our minds constitute reality? Axiol,ogy is rhe smdy of value, includi ng borl1 aesthetic value and moral value. The study of moral value is known as ethics. Ethics involves inquil'ies into the nature of moral judgmenrs, virntcs, values, obligations, rncll theories. Quesrions of inreresc: What makes an acrion righr (or wrong)? What rhi11g5 are intrinsically good? What is the good life? W h:it gives life me:111ing? What makes someone good (or bad)? What moral principles should guide our acrions and choices? Which is rhc best moral theory? ls, killing ever morally permissible? If so, why? A re morn I standards objcc1 ivc or subjective? ls an action right merely because a culture endorses it? Docs morality depend on God? W hat makes a sociCt)' jusr? Logic is the study of correct reasoning. Q uestions of i111ercsc: What are the rules for drawing correct inferences? \'v'hat is the natu re and structure of deductive arg ume1m? How c:i n proposirio,rn l or prcdic:ire logic be used ro cvaluare arg111nenrs? Upon what logical principles docs reaso ni ng depend? Docs logic describe how the world is-or jusc how our minds work? Can conclusions reached tluo ugh inductive logic be mtionally jusrificd? In addition to rhese divisions, there are subd iv is ions of philosophy whose job is to exam ine critically the assum prions and principles char underlie orher fields. Thus we have rhe philosophy of science, rhc philosophy oflaw, rhc philosophy of marhcmatics, the philosophy of history, rhe ph ilosophy oflang11age, and many ochers. W hen rhose laboring in :1 discipline begin quc~tioning its most basic idea~- icleas that defin e it~ subject m:trtcr and principles of inquir)'- philosophy, the most clemcnrnl mode of invcstigarion, steps in. Although this text covers mostly Western philosoph)', it's imporcam to keep in mind rh~u non-\'v'cstcrn civilizarions have also prod uced distinctive traditions of philosophical inquiry, some of which arose thousands of years ago. (Sec Chapter 6: "Easrern ·1houghr.") Chin:1, Japan, and India have been especially fruirful ground for provocative ideas and unique perspectives on philosophical issues rhm concern horh Easr nnd West. 1n the past, Western philosophers rook lirrlc norice of nonWestern thoughL, bUL that has changed. Studyi ng the philosophic.ii tradition~ of non-Wcst,crn cultul'cs- a field called "world phtlosophy"-scems more worthwhile than ever in our age of globalization and increasing cultural diversity.

cpisicmology ' Jhe

ph ilosoph ical ~tudy of knowledge.

axiology ' )he study of ~ luc, including both aesthetic va lue .ancl 111or.1I

value. ct hics llic m,dy of

morali t)' using rhe methods of philo,01,1hy.

logic ·Ihe s1udy of correct rca~oning.

•· I hc,c'• ., c racic m e thod Q uc.uion-

and•nnLaro, trans. B. Jowcn (New York: I lcar>1 's In1crna1lon:1l Llbr.try, 1914), 268-271.

to Int errupt me on this account. For I am more than seventy years of age, and appearing now for th e first t ime In a court of law, I am quite a stranger to the language of t he place; and t herefore I would have you regard me as if I were really a stranger, whom you wou ld excu se If he spoke i n his nat ive tongue, and after the fashion of his cou ntry: Am I making an unfair request of you? Never mind the manner, which may or may not be good; but

65

66

CHAPTER 3

Socrates: An Examined life

Plato: Apology

13. What is the mi sunderstanding lhat Socrates says has led to his tarnished reputation?

14. What does Aristophanes have 10 do with Socrates' repulation?

''I\Xl) hile I have li fo and .ircngth I , hall never u·.uc from t lu: prat l ice and 1e,1ching of

ph ilo,ophy." Socr:nr~

think only of the truth of my words, and give heed to that: let the speaker speak tru ly and the Judge decide Justly.... I w ill begin at t he b eginning, and ask what Is the accusation which has given rise to the slander of me, and In fact has encouraged Meletu s to prefer this charge against me. Well, what do the slanderers say? They shall be my p rosecutors, and I will sum up their words In an affidavit: 'Socrates Is an evil-doer, and a curious person, who searches Into things under the earth and In heaven, and he makes the worse appear the better cause; and he teaches the aforesaid doctrines to others.' Such Is the nature of the accusation: it Is just w hat you have yourselves seen In the comedy of Aristophanes, who has Introduced a man whom he call s Socrates, going about and saying that he walks in air, and talking a deal of nonsense concerning matters of w hich I do not pretend to know either much or little- not that I mean to sp eak disparagingly of any one who is a st udent o f natural philosophy. I should be very so rry if Meletus cou ld b ring so grave a charge again st me. But the simple truth is, 0 Athenian s, that I have nothin g to do w ith physical speculation s. Very many of those here present are witnesses to the truth of this, and to them I appeal. Speak t hen, you w ho have heard me, and tell your neighbours whether any of you have ever known me hold forth in few words or In many upon such matters. . . . You hear t heir answer. And from what th ey say of th is part of the charge you will be able to j udge of the truth of the rest. As little foundation is there for the report that I am a teacher, and take money; this accusation ha s no more truth in it than the other. Alt hough, if a man were really able to instruct mankind, to receive money for giving instruction would, In my opinion, be an honour to him. There Is Gorglas of Leontium, and Prodlcus of Ceos, and Hlpplas of Ells, who go the round of the cities, and are able to persuade the young men to leave thei r own citizens by whom they might be taught for nothing, and come to them whom they not only pay, but are thankful If they may be all owed to pay them . .. . I dare say, Athenians, that some one among you wil l reply, 'Yes, Socrates, but wha t Is the origin of th ese accusations which are brought against you; there mu st have been something strange which you have been doing? All these rumours and this talk about you would never have arisen if you had been like other men: tell us, then, what is the cause of them, for we should be sorry to j udge hastily o f you .' Now I regard this as a fair challenge, and I will endeavour to explain to you t he reason why I am called wise and have such an evil fame. Please to attend th en. And although some of you may th ink that I am joking, I declare that I will tell you the entire truth. Men of Athens, this reputat ion of mine has come of a certain sort of wisdom wh ich I possess. If you ask me what kind of w isdom, I reply, w isdom such as may perhaps be attained by man, for to that extent I am inclined to believe that I am w ise; w hereas t he persons of whom I was speakin g have a superhumani wisdom, w hich I may fail to describe, becau se I have it not myself; and he who says th at I have, speaks falsely, and is ta king away my character. And here, 0 men of Athens, I must beg you not to interrupt me, even If I seem t o say someth ing extravagant. For the word which I will speak is not mine. I will refer you to a witness who is worthy of credit; that witness shall b e the God o f Delphi- he w ill tell you about my wisdom, If I have any, and o f what sort It Is. You must have known Chaerephon; h e was early a friend of mine, and also a friend of yours, for he shared In the recent exile of the people, and returned with you. Well, Chaerephon, as you know, was very Impetu ous In all his doings, and he went to Delphi and boldly asked the oracle to tell him whether- as I was saying, I must beg you not to Interrupt- he asked the oracle to tell him whether any one was wi ser than I was, and the Pythian prophetess answered, that t here was no man wiser. Chaerephon Is dead himself; but his brother, who Is In court, will confirm the t ruth of what I am saying.

Socrates' Trial and Death

Why do I mention this? Because I am going to explain to you why I have such an evil name. When I heard the answer, I said to myself, What can the god mean? and what is the interpreta tion of his ridd le? for I know that I have no wisdom, small or great. What then can he m ean when he says that I am the wisest of men? And yet he Is a god, and cannot lie; that would be against his nature. After long consideration, I thought of a method of trying the question. I reflected that If I could only find a man wiser than myself, then I might go to the god with a refutation in my hand. I should say to him, 'Here Is a man who is wiser than I am; but you said that I was the wisest.' Accordingly I went to one who had the reputation of wisdom, aind observed him- his name I need not mention; he was a politician whom I selected for examination- and the result was as follows: When I began to talk with him, I could not help thinking that he was not really wise, although he was thought wise by many, and still wiser by himself; and thereupon I tried to explain to him that he thought himself wise, but was not really wise; and the consequence was that he hated me, and his enmity was shared by several who were present and heard me. So I left him, saying to myself, as I went away: Well, although I do not suppose that either of us knows anything rea lly beautiful and good, I am better off than he is- for he knows nothing, and th inks that he knows; I neither know nor think that I know. In this latter particular, then, I seem to have slightly the advantage of him. Then I went to another who had still higher pretensions to wisdom, and my conclusion was exactly the same. Whereupon I made another enemy of him, and of many others besides him. Then I went to one man after another, being not unconscious of the enmity which I provoked, and I lamented and feared this: But necessity was laid upon me,- the word of God, I thought, ought to be considered first. And I sa id to myself, Go I must to all who appear to know, and find ou t the meaning of the oracle. And I swear to you, Athenians, by the dog I swear!- for I must tell you the truth- the result of my mission was Just this: I found that the men most In repute were all but the most foolish; and that others less esteemed were really wiser and better. I will tell you the tale of my wanderings and of the "Herculean" labours, as I may call them, which I endured only to find at last the oracle Irrefutable. After the politicians, I went to the poets; trag le, dlthyramblc, and all sorts. And there, I said to myself, you will be Instantly detected; now you will find out that you are more ignorant than they are. Accordingly, I took them some of the most elaborate passages in their own writings, and asked what was the m eaning of them-thinking that they would teach me something. Will you believe m e? I am almost ashamed to con fess the truth, but I must say that there is hardly a person present who wou ld not have t alked better about their poetry tha n they did themselves. Then I knew that not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and Inspiration; they are like diviners or soothsayers who also say many fine things, but do not understand the meaning of them. The poets appeared to me to be much in th e sa me case; and I further observed th at upon the strength of their poetry they believed themselves to be the wisest of men in other things in which they were not wise. So I departed, conceivi ng myself to be superior to them for the same reason t hat I was superior to the politicians.... This inquisition has led to my having many enemies of the worst and most dangerous kind, and has given occasion also to many calumnies. And I am called wise, for my hearers always Imagine t hat I myself possess the wisdom which I find wanting In others: but the truth Is, 0 men of Athens, that God only Is wise; and by his answer he Intends to show that the wisdom of men is worth little or nothing; he Is not speaking of Socrates, he Is only using my name lby way of Illustration, as If he said, He, O men, Is the wisest, w ho, like Socrates, knows that his wisdom is in truth worth nothing. And so I go about the world, obedient to the god, and search and make enquiry Into the wisdom of any one, whether citizen or stranger, w ho appears to be wise; and if he Is not wise, then In vindication of the oracle

67

15. What does Socrates say Is the reason for his "evil name' ?

16. Why does Socrates think he knows more than the people who claim to have wisdom?

•·1111> ,n.111 hc,c !Socr.11c,] i, ,o hi,.11 re, hi, way, ,o uml\ual. th,11, ,c.1rch J\ you m ig ht , you'll never find anyone cl,c, ,1l ive or dead. who'~ even rcmorrly like him." -Alcibiades

68

CHAPTER 3

Socrates: An Examined Life

~r I-IEN AND NOW Your Examined/ Unexamined Life

1r there i~nnyrhing from Socra1es rhm is npplicable 10 chc 1wenry-fi rsr ccmmy, iris his ad monirion co live an cxn rnlncd life. Do you live such a lifc? ' n1c following srncemenrs express some fund amental bellefs- bcllefs drnt cou ndess people hold bu1 mny never h:1vc t hough1 much about. Read c,lth Matcmc111 and ~elect the ones th,u you si11cc1cly bclicl'C. 1 hen 1ccall if you hal'c ever scriomly quc~doncd lhc~c beliefs. (Pas~ing thouglm and idle revelry do nol coum.) Uc honc~1. 'lhis little cxpcrlmc111 could be very revealing- and helpful a~ you think abou1 your life and va lues. I . God exists :rnd watches over me.

2. God somccimcs an&wcrs prnycrs.

3. lhcrc is a heaven. 4. l h:,ve both a body and an immortal soul. 5. My emotions arc nor unde r my conrrol; they just happen.

6. It is wrong to crit icize other cuhures. 7. lr is wrong ro judge other people's actio ns. 8. The moral principles rhac I was raised to believe are rhe right ones. 9. Political conscrva1ivcs arc wrong ahout mos1 i~s ucs.

10. Polhical llbcrab :trc wrong about mo~l Issues. 11. l make free choi ces; all my decisions are up no me. 12. I ca n come co know some things by faith alo11c.

13. My emotions ac·e my bc~t guide to whm is mor:i lly right or wrong. 14 . People arc basically bad. 15. People arc basically good.

Plato: Apology

17. What Is Socrates' explanation for the oracle's pronouncement about him?

I show him that he Is not wise; and my occupation quite absorbs me, and I have rno time to give eit her to any public matter of interest or to any concern of my own, but I am in utter poverty by reason of my devotion t o the god. There isanother thing: Young m en of the richer classes, who have not much to d o, come about m e of t heir own accord; they like to hear the pretenders exa mined, and they often imitate m e, and proceed to examin e o thers; there are plenty of persons, as they quickly dis• cover, who think that they know something, but really kn ow little or nothing; and then those who are examined by them lnsteadl of being angry with themselves arc angry with m e: This confounded Socrates, they say, this vlllalnous misleader of youth!- and then If somebody asks them, Why, what evil does he practise or teach? they do not know, and cannot tell; but in order that they may not appear to be at a loss, they repeat the ready•mad,e charges which are used against all philosophers about teaching things up in the clouds and under the ea rth, and having no gods, and making the worse appear the better cause; for they d o not like to confess that thei r pretence of knowledg e has been d etected - which Is the truth; and as they are numerous and ambit ious and energetic, and are drawn up in battle array

Socrates' Trial and Death 69

and have persuasive tongues, they have filled your ears w ith their loud and Inveterate ca lumnies. And this Is the reason why my three accusers, Meletus and Anytus and Lycon, have set upon me; Meletus, who has a quarrel with me on behalf of the poets; Anytus, on behalf of the craftsmen and politicians; Lycon, on behalf of the rhetoricians: and as I said at the beginning, I cannot expect to get rid of such a mass of calumny all In a moment. And this, 0 men of Athens, ls the truth and the whole truth; I have concealed nothing, I have dissembled nothing. And yet, I know that my plainness of speech makes them hate me, and what is their hatred but a proof that I am speaking the truth?-Hence has arisen the prejudice against me; and this ls the reason of It, as you will find out either In this or In any futu re enquiry. I have said enough in my defence against the first class of my accusers; I turn to the second class. They are headed by Meletus, that good man and true lover of his country, as he calls himself.... He says that I am a doer of evil, and corrupt the youth; but I say, 0 men of Athens, that Meletus Is a doer of evil, in that he pretends to be in earnest when he is only in jest, and is so eager to bring men to trial from a pretended zeal and interest about matters in which he real ly never had the smallest interest. And th e truth of this I will endeavour to prove to you. Come hither, Meletus, and let me ask a question of you. You think a great deal about the improvement of youth? Yes, I do. Tell the judges, then, who is their improver; for you must know, as yoL1have taken the pains to discover th eir corrupter, and arc citing and accusing me before them. Speak, then, and tell the Judges who their Improver ls.-Observe, Meletus, that you are silent, and have nothing to say. But Is not this rather disgraceful, and a very considerable proof of what I was saying, that you have no Interes t In the matter? Speak up, friend, and tell us who their Improver Is. The laws. But that, my good sir, Is not my meaning. I want to know who the person Is, who, In the first place, knows the laws. The Judges, Socrates, who are present in court. What, do you mean to say, Meletus, that they are able to instruct and Improve youth? Certainly they are. What, all of them, or some only and not others? All of them. By the goddess Here, that Is good news! There are plenty of Improvers, then. And what do you say of the audience-do they improve th em? Yes, they do. And the senators? Yes, the senators improve them, But perhaps the members of the assembly corrupt them?- or do they too improve them? They improve them. Then every Athenian Improves and elevates th em; al I with the exception of myself; and I alone am their corrupter? Is tha t what you affirm? That Is what I stou tly affirm.... And now, Meletus, I will ask you another question- by Zeus I will: Which Is better, to live among bad citizens, or among good ones? Answer, friend, I say; the question Is one which may be easily answered. Do not the good do their neighbours good, and the bad do them evil? Certainly.

"People t hink 1hc world need, a republic, J nd rhcy rhi nk ir needs a

new 1ocia I order, and a new rdigion, but it never occur, m anyonc I ha1 wha1 1hc world rcall) need,, confu,cd J> ir is by muth lc.1rni ng, I, .1 new Socr:atc'i,"

Soren KlerkcgaJrd

18. Why docs Socrotcs say that Meletus is a doer of evil?

70

CHAPTER 3

Socrates: An Examined Life

Plato: Apology

19. What Is the contradiction that Socrates s,ees In Meletus' opinion about corrupting the young?

"Philosophy ask, rhc simple c1ue11ion. whar is ir

all ,1bout?'" - Alfred North \Vhitchca.l

And is there any one who would rather be Injured than benefited by those who five with him? Answer, my good friend, the law requires you to answer- does any one like to be Injured? Certainly not. And when you accuse me of ,corrupting and deteriorating the youth, do you allege that I corrupt them Intentionally or unintentionally? Intentionally, I say. But you have just admitted that the good do thei r neighbours good, and evil do them evil. Now, is that a truth which your superior wisdom has recognized thus early in life, and am I, at my age, in such darkness and ignorance as not to know that if a man wit h whom I have to live is corrupted by me, I am very likely to be harmed by him; and yet' I corrupt him, and intentionally, too - so you say, although neither I nor any other human being is ever likely to be convinced by you. But either I do not corrupt them, or I corrupt them un intentionally; and on either view of the case you lie. If my offence is unintentional, the law has no cognizance of unintentional offences: you ought to have taken me privately, and warned and admonished me; for if I had been better advised, I should have left off doing what I only did unintentionally-no doubt I shou ld; but you would have nothing to say to me and refused to teach me. And now you bring me up in t his court, which is a place not of instruction, but of punishment. It w ill be very clear to you, Athenians, as I was saying, that Mclctus has no care at all, great or small, about the matter. But still I should like to know, Meletus, in what I am af• firmed to corrupt the young. I suppose you mean, as I Infer from your Indictment, tha t I teach them not to acknowledge the gods which the state acknowledges, but some other new divinities or spiritual agencies In their stead. These arc the lessons by which I corrupt the youth, as you say. Yes, that I say emphatically. Then, by the gods, Meletus, of whom we are speaking, tell me and the court, In somewhat plainer terms, what you mean! for I do not as yet understand whether you affirm that I teach other men t o acknowledge some gods, and th erefore that I do believe In gods, and am not an entire atheist-this you do not lay to my charge-bu t on ly you say that they are not the same gods which the city recognizes-the charge is that they are different gods. Or, do you mean tha t I am an atheist simply, and a teacher of atheism? I mean the latter- that you are a complet e atheist. What an extraordinary statemen t! Why do you think so, Meletus? Do you mean t hat I do not believe in the godhead of the sun or moon, like other men? I assure you, j udges, that he does not: for he says that the sun is stone, and the moon earth . Friend Meletus, you think that you are accusing Anaxagoras: and you have but a bad opinion of the judges, if you fancy them illiterate to such a degree as not t o know that these doctrines are found in the books of Anaxagoras the Clazomenian, which are full of them. And so, forsooth, t he youth :arc said to be taught them by Socrates, when there arc not Infrequently exhibitions of them al the theatre (price of admission one drachma at the most); and they might pay their money, and laugh at Socrates If he pretends to father these extraordinary views. And so, Melet,us, you rea lly think that I do not believe in any god? I swear by Zeus that you believe absolutely In none at all. Nobody will believe you, Meletus, and I am pretty sure that you do not believe yourself. I cannot help thinking, men of Athens, that Meletus is reckless and impudent, and that he has written this Indictment In a spirit of mere wantonness and youthfu l bravado. Has he

Socrates' Trial and Death

not compounded a riddle, t hinking to try me? He said to himselr: I shall see whether t he wise Socrates will discover my racetlous contradiction, or whether I shall be able to deceive him and th e rest or them. For he certainly does appear to me to contradict him self in the Indictment as much as If he said that Socrates Is guilty of not believing In the gods, and yet of believing them- but this Is not like a person who Is In earnest. ... Some one will say: And are you not ashamed, Socrates, or a course or life which Is likely to bring you to an untimely end? To him I may fairly answer: There you are mistaken: a man who Is good for anything ought not to calculate the ch ance of living or dying; he ought only to consider whether in doing anything he is doing right or w rong- acting the part of a good man or of a bad .. . [l)f you say to me, Socrates, this ti me we w ill not mind Anytus, and you sha ll be let off, but upon one condition, that you are not to enquire and speculate in this way any more, and t hat if you are caught doing so again you shall die- if this was the condition on which you let me go, I should reply: Men of Athens, I honour and love you; but I shall obey God rather than you, and while I have life and streng th I shall never cease from the practice and teaching of philosophy, exhorting any one whom I meet and saying to him after my manner: You, my friend-a citizen of the great and mighty and wise city of Athens-are you not ashamed or heaping up the greatest amount or money and honour and reputation, and caring so little about wisdom and truth and the greatest improvement or the soul, which you never regard or heed at all? And ir the person w ith whom I am arguing, says: Yes, but I do care; then I do not leave him or let him go at once; but I p roceed to interrogate and examine and cross-examine him, and If I think that he has no virtue in him, but only says that he has, I reproach him w ith undervaluing the greater, and overvaluing th e less. And I shall repea t the same words to every one whom I meet, young and old, citizen and alien, but especially to the citizens. Inasmuch as they are my brethren. For know that this Is the command or God; and I believe that no greater good has ever happened In the sta te t han my service to the God. For I do nothing bu t go about persuading you all, old and young alike, not to take thought for your persons or your properties, but first and chiefly to care about the greatest improvement of the soul. I tell you that virtue is not given by money, but that from virtue comes money and every o ther good of man, public as well as private. This is my teaching, and if this is the doctrine which corrupts the youth, I am a mischievous person. But 1r any one says t hat this is not my teaching, h e is speaking an untruth. Wherefore, 0 men of Athens, I say to you, do as Anytus bids or not as Anytus bids, and eit her acquit me or not; but whichever you do, understand that I shall never alter my ways, not even If I have to die many t imes.... [The vote is taken and he is found guilty by 281 votes to 220.) And so he proposes death as the penalty. And w h at shal l I propose on my part, 0 men of Athens? Clearly that which is my due. And what is my due? What return shall be made to the man w ho has never had the wit to be idle during his whole life; but has been ca reless of what the many care for- wealth, and ramily interests, and military offices, and speaking i n the assembly, and mag istracies, and plots, and parties. Reflecting that I was really too honest a man to be a politician and live, I did not go where I could do no good to you or to myself; but where I could do the greatest good privately to every one of you, thither I went, and sought to persuade every man among you that he must look to himself, and seek virtue and wisdom before he looks to his private Interests, and look to the state before he looks to the Interests of the state; and that this should be th e order which he observes l1n all hi s actions, What shall be done to such a one? Doubtless some good thing, 0 men or Athens, If he has his reward; and th e good should be of a kind suitable to him.

71

20. Wh;;it is the contradic• tion regarding the gods that Socrates says Meletus has put forth?

2 1. What error does Socra tes. accuse the Athenians of committing? How Is the Jury likely to react to Socra tos.' clalin7

"He whn is not contented

wit h what he has, wou ld not be coutcm cd wlch what he wou ld like to have."

Socram

22. Why does Socrates say that he Is arguing for the Athenians' sakel

72

CHAPTER 3

Socrates: An Examined Life

Plato: Apology

Figure 3.7 The death of Socrates.

23. What Is Socrates' counterproposal regarding sentencing? How is the jury likely to react to this suggestion? 24. According 10 Socrates, what is the greatest good of man? Why does he insist t hat the unexamined life is not worth living?

"And whai, Socracc,, i, rhc food of rhc soul!

Surely. I said. knowledge is t he food of the ,out.• -Pla,o

25. Why does Socrates say that death Is probably a good?

What wou ld be a reward suitable to a poor man who Is your b enefac tor, and who desires leisure that he may instruct you? There can be no rewa rd so fitting as maintenance In the Prytaneum [free meals for life a t sta te expense), 0 men of Athens, a reward which he d eserves far more than t he ci tizen who has won t he prize at Olympia In the horse or chariot race, whet her the chariots were drawn by two horses or by many. For I am in want, and he has enough; and he only gives you the ap pearance of happiness, and I give you t h e reality. And If I am to estimate the penalty fairly, I should say t hat maintenance In the Prytaneum is the just return.. . . Some one will say: Yes, Socra tes, but cannot you hold your tongue, and then you may go Into a foreign city, and no one will interfere with you? Now I have great difficu lty In making you understand my answer to this. For If I t ell you t hat to do as you s.ay would be a disobed ience to the God, and t herefore that I cannot hold my tongue, yo,u wlll not believe that I am serious; and if I say again that daily to discourse about virtue, and of those ot her t hings about which you hear me examining myself and others, is the greatest good of man, and that the unexamined life is not worth living, you are stlll les:s likely to beli eve me. Yet I say w hat is true, although a t hing of wh ich it is hard for me to fPersuade you. Also, I have never been accus tomed to think that I deserve to suffer any harm. Had I money I might have estimated the offence at what I was able to pay, and not have been much the worse. But I have none, and therefore I must ask you to proportion th e fin e to my mea ns. Well, p erhaps I could afford a mina, and therefore I propose that penalty: Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus, my friends here, bid me say thirty m inae, and they will b e t he sureties. Let th irty minae be t he p enalty; for which su m the y w ill be ample security to you. [2nd vote: The jury decides for the death penal ty by a vote of 360 to 141.] Not much t im e w ill be gained, 0 Athenians, in return for th e evil name which you will get from the detractors of t he city, who w ill say that you killed Socrates, a wise man; for

Review Notes

they will ca ll me wise, even although I am not wise, when they want to reproach you. If you had waited a little w hile, your desire would have been fulfilled in the course of nature. For I am far advanced In years, as you may perceive, and not far from death.... The difficulty, my friends, Is not to avoid death, but to avoid unrighteousness; for that runs faster than death. I am old and move slowly, and the slower runner has overtaken me, and my accusers are keen and quick, and the faster runner, who Is unrighteousness, has overtaken them. And now I depart hence condemned by you to suffer the penalty of death-they too go their ways condemned by the truth to suffer the penalty of villainy and wrong; and I must abide by my award-let them abide by theirs. I suppose that these thi ngs may be regarded as fated-and I think that they are well. .. .s

73

"11 wast he firsr and most ,triking d1ar:1c1cri>1 i~ of Sou .nc, never Io hcuunc ht•ntccl in cH!11of c.1p,1cities or facultic• . Po,sc11.ing a soul is like po,~c,.ing a skill, A carpcmcr's .kill i11 1101 some pan of him, rc,ponslblc for his 11killcd acts; , imi• larly, :1 livl ng trcawrc', ,1 11 hn:ttor 01· soul is not p,ll'l of it, rc,ponslblc for It, living activities.

Accord ingly we needn't ask if the ,oul and body are one, juM as we ne~dn'r ask if ears and hea ring are one, or (to use Aristotle's exam ple) if a piece of wax and the wax's shape are one. And rhe perennial philosophical questin of hw the body and soul inreract is moor. What are some of the key differences between the soul as conceived of in the major Western religions and Aristotle's soul? Jooarhan Ban1e., Ar/J101/e: A \lery Shon lmrod,mlon (Oxford: Oxford University Pres,, 2000), 106- 107.

124

CHAPTER S

Aristotle: Reason and Nature

WRITING AND REASONING

CHAPTER 5

1. l low does Arisrorle's theory of knowledge difler from Plaro's? In each theory, what is rhe role ofsense experience? What are Plam's and Aristotle's arrkudes toward rhe everyday world? Which arricude is more reasonable? Why~ 2. \'m Muslim nrrhodoxy, a mo,rc

1ha1 rc,ulccd, at one poinr, in hb being pcr~ecurcd by thcamhori •

Figure 8 .13 Averro~s (1 126 1198).

rie~. He rejected idea, in Ncoplatonism, cook :1 skeptica l view of Plaronic forms, and :macked Avicenna's cosmological a rgument. He also arrived at some non-Christian views, holding that the world is eterna l (not created at a moment in t ime) and that all minds arc 0111c and eternal (as opposed to heing individual immorrnl souls), He insists that if the Kora n appears m contain contradictions, the discrcp• ancies can he reconciled via a hctrcr grasp of philo,ophy,

8.5 HILDEGARD OF BINGEN As we've seen, after the fall of Rome, philo~ophy was. practiced under the auspices of the Church, and philosophy was largely a Christian affair. Tc was also a male affa ir. Boch culture and religion sa id ir must be so. Generall y only men could ger a good educaciori, which could be acquired only through chc Church- and without education, no one was likely 10 do philosophy. l n such an inhospitable envi ronment, what chance did a woman have of doing philosophy? Slim, perhaps-but a few women neverrheless beat rhe odds and produced imporrnnr phi losophical wrirings rhac deserve much more scholarly arrenrion rhan they have received so far. Probably rhc most remarkable woman philosophcr-rhcologian of the era was H ildegard of" Bingen (I 098 1179). She was one of rhe Ii rs1 religious mystics in rhe Wesr, and her endeavor~ and writing~ (including her philo~ophy) were often Inspired and guided by her lifelong involvement in Chris tian mysticism. (Mysticisn:1 is belief in rhe alleged abiliry ro access, rhrough rranccs or visions, divi ne knowledge rhar is unanainable through sense experience or reason.) She was born in a small town in Germany co a noble Germa n family, rhe tenth of ten children. Ar eight yea rs old, she was given over to rhe Church where she received a religious cducnrion, including training in Larin. She lacer wrote rhac ir was as a young girl Iha1 she s1:i n ed ro experience visions. Some scholarship suggests that her

mysticis m 'lhc bdicf In I he alleged abllity 10 access, t h rough era nee; or vbion,, , llvi ne knowledge rh.11 is u11,111.1in.1blc rh rough 'icn-;c cxpcricncc

or rca~on .

20 2

CHAPTER 8

The Medieval Period

visions arose from migraines, a serious ailment known co produce some of the kinds of visual effects and physical symptoms that Hildegard described. In any case, the extraordinary experiences led Hildegard ro the philosophical and theological insights that she wrote down and preached. Perhaps he r ma in conrribution in philosophy is in erhics, bur like many ocher rhinkcrs of rhe pa~r she nlso wrore nbour narurol science and medicine. Shc composcd poeuy and liturgical music, wrote a musical morality play, and established two convcms where ancient philosophical manuscripts were copied and women learned Larin. ln a rime when female inrellecrs were generally ig nored by Church officials, H ildegard earned rhe respect of monks, a rchbishops, emperors, and even popes. She preached publicly (even going 011 prc:1chi11g cours). corrcspo11dcd prolifically, a11d attracted followers, including some fonatical ones. (ll1e movie Visions depicts her life, and her rn11sic is now available on C D.) Mose of her most imporcanc writings :ire found in rhrrcc major works. ln the fust, Sl'ivirl! ("Kuow the Ways of the Lord"), she elaborates C h:riscian cosmology and Church doctrine. In the second, "1l1c IRook of Life's Mcrirs," she prescnrs her chcory of ethics as an .1llegorical confficr between rhiny-tive vices ;111d their Fig ure 8,14 Hildegard of Bingen (1098-1 179). associnced virrucs, dcr:iiling pc1rn nee and punishmcnr for each. Tn her allegory, vices .1re hideous bur rempti ng, while vircues are wise :u1

is and can use chis knowledge to appraise a particular instance of courage. As Plato secs it, the truly real world is the world of the Forms- the domain of the perfect and everlasting. With knowledge of rhe really real, we can understand the "less real " realm of rhe imperfect and transitory. How is it, Plato asks, that we seem to have knowledge of rhe Forms, however dimly, even though our senses can rcll us norhing ahour rhcm? O ur sense experience can acquaint us only wi1h material objects, bur the Forms arc nor ma1crial. [e's as if these universals were al ready in ou1· minds wailing co be u 11covercd. Plato's answerand the an~wcr of most other rationalises-is the doctrine of i111111tt! knowledge: at birch our minds come equipped with conceptual content, ideas about the world that we can know a priori. In Plaro's version of this view, knowledge of the Forms is prescm :it rhc very beginning of our lives, inscribed in onr mi nds (our immorrnl souls) in a previous exis1ence. We are born with 1his knowledge. Accessing this knowledge then is a 111:mcr of using reason to rectt/L whar we previously knew in another life. Many rhinkcrs reject Plato's notion of a preexisting scare in which we acqu ire knowledge, and they arc skeptical or the cla im that we arc born with knowledge. But the idea of innate knowledge in some form is still altractive to rationalist phi loso• phers, for it would expla in how we could possess knowledge without relying on sense experience. In any case, both rationalists and empiricists must provide an explanation of how we seem ro know logical and mathematical truths (and perhaps scientific m ,rhs) rh:it we do nor arrive :u r hrough our senses.

9.3 DESCARTES' DOUBT "Hamler did rhink a i;reat many th ings; does it follow 1ha1 he cxi~rcd?" -J:iako I lim ikka

Oddly enough, Descartes begins his quest for knowledge by first plunging imo skepticism. He sees char a greac many rhings he choughc he knew appea r now to be false. So he decides to "raze everything to the ground and begin again" from a firm foun • darion, doubting all beliefs exccpr those rhar arc "certain and indubitable," beliefs rhar cannot possibly be false. Only beliefs that are cenain can coum as knowledge, he says. If he has reason to doubt any of them, they are nor knowledge. I Terc he is ar rhc Starr of his quest:

Rene Descartes: Meditations on First Philosophy It is now some years since I detected how many were the false beliefs that I had from my earliest youth admitted as true, and how doubtful was everything I had since constructed on this basis; and from that ti me Iwas convinced that I must once for all sNlously undertake to rid myself of all the opinions which I had formerly accepted, and commence to build anew from the foundation, If I wanted to establish any firm and permanent structure In the sciences. But as this en1erprlse appeared to be a very great one, I waited until I had attained an age so mature tha1 I could nor hope that ac any later date I should be better fitted to ex• ecute my design. This reason caused me to delay so long that I should feel that I was doing

Descartes' Doubt 219

wrong were I to occupy In deliberation th e time that yet remains to me for action. To -day, then, since very opportunely for the plan I have in view I have delivered my mind from every care [and am happily agitated by no pa ssions] and since I have procured for myself an assured leisure in a peaceable retirement, I shall at last seriously and freely address myselr to the general upheaval of all my former opinions. Now for this object It Is not necessary that I should show that all of these are false- I shall perhaps never arrive at this end. But inasmuch as reason already persuades me that I ought no less carefully to withhold my assent from mat ters which are not entirely certain and indubitable than from those which appear to me manifestly to be false, If I am able to find in each one some reason to doubt, this will suffice to justify my rejecting the whole. And for that end it will not be requisite that I should examine each in particular, which would be an endless undertaking; for owing to the fact that th e destruction of the foundations of necessity brings with It the downfall of the rest o f the edifice, I shall only in the first place attack those principles upon which all my form er opinions res ted.'

"1\ II ou, lrnowlcdgc hJ1 le. origins l11 our 11erstp1 lom." - l.('(11w d o ,I., Vinti

Desca rres soon finds reason ro doubt all beliefs based on sense experience, arriving ar rhis conclusion via his famous dream argument. He norcs rhar "there are no cert:tin indications by which we may clearly distinguish wakeful ness from asleep." 2 Our dreams can seem like reality, and in dreams we often don'r know we arc dreaming. So iris possible rhac we arc dream ing now, he mys, and rhar whar we rake robe the real wo rld is in fact 1101 real at all. More to the point, it is po~siblc that our sense experience- by which we presume 10 know material reality- is just a dream. If so, we can't be certain about anythi ng we chin k we know through our senses. 'I hcrefore, sense experience can yield no knowledge. All that up to the present time I have accepted as most true and certain I have learned ei ther from the senses or through th e senses; but it Is sometimes proved to me that th ese senses are deceptive, and It Is wiser not to trust entirely to any thing by which we have on ce been deceived. But it may be that although the senses sometimes deceive us concerning things which are hardly perceptible, or very far away, there are yet many others to be met with as to wh ich we cannot reasonably have any doubt, although we recognise them by their means. For example, there is the fac t that I am here, seated by t he fire, attired in a dressing gown, having this paper in my hands and other similar matters . ... At the same time I must remember that I am a man, and that consequently I am in the habit of sleeping, and in my dreams representing to myself the same things or sometimes even less probable things, than do those who are insane in their waking moments. How often has it happened to me that in the night I dreamt that I found myself in thi s particular place, that I was dressed and seated near the fire, wh ilst in reality I was lying undressed in bedl At this moment It docs indeed seem to me that It is with eyes awake that I am looking at this paper; th at this head which I move is not asleep, that it ls deliberately and of set purpose that I ex tend my hand and perceive it: what happens in sleep does not appear so clear nor so distinct as does all this. But In thinking over this I remind myself that on many occasions I have In sleep been deceived by similar Illusions, and In dwelling carefully on this reflection I see so manifestly that there are no certain indications by which we may clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep that I am lost in as tonishment. And my astonishment is such tha t it ls almost capable or persuading me that I now dream. 3

Rene Descartes: Medlra rlons on Flrsr Philosophy

5 . Is there any way you can tell whether you are awake or dreaming? Is Descartes right that he cannot tell the difference? Explain.

6 . Is there any way you can determine whether you are living In the Matrix? Can you tell whether an evil genius Is systema,lcally deceiving you? Why or why not?

220

CHAPTER 9

Descartes: Doubt and Certainty

Af1t:r d1is insight, Descartes discovers that his skepticism goes even deeper. Suppose, he says, chat an evil gen ius or god has set out co syscematically deceive me. 1l1is being could delude me about every kind of thought I could possibly have. I can't be sure that this is not the case. I can't be certain char all my thoughts arc not rhc work of an evil entity chat infuses my mind with false sensations and ideas, making an

Living in the Matrix De.,canc.,' evil-genim scenario is rhe forerun• ner of some similar what-if rales mid by philosophers and mhers in our own times. In o ne of them, you arc nor ar rhe mercy ofa mal icious demon; yuu arc inMead a brain in a ,•at ofchc:micah in a laboraco1y. Your brain i~ hnrdwi1cd m a compu1cr. which n hrillinnc (hut probably ern1.y) ~cientisr b IL~ing ro give you experiences that ore indisringulshnhlc from rhose you mi_ght hnvc if you were not a wired-up marinating brain. 11,e que~lion is, I low could you ever be cc1min thar you a,c nol ~ud, .J brain in .J vat? 'I he ~:ime ~on of q ue~rlon arbc~ about du: predicament of human~ in the movie 'Jiu Matrix. lnrelligenr com purers have enslaved rhe human race, encasing everyone in pods and elecrronically feeding simularions of rhe real world inro their brains. As Christopher Grau says:

Figure 9.5 The movie The Morri1< raises troubling ques• tlons about the real and the unreal and whelher we can distinguish the two.

l11csc crca1u1·cs have fed Nco [d,c movie's prorngonis1) a simulation rha1 he could 11'1 possibly help bur rnkc as rhc real thing. What's worse, ic isn't clear how any of us ca n know with ccrrnin1y I har we arc not in a position simil:1r 10 Nco before his "rebirth," •. . A viewer of 71,e Matrix i~ nnlll rnlly led to wonder: how u as he wil l. But Locke says if the govcrnrne111 violates che rights of citizens, it is 110 longer lcgirima1.c, obligations co it arc voided, and the people have :t righr to dissolve it- to initi:11e rebellion. Locke's insistence on chc righc co rebel against a govcrnmcm chac misuses irs power is echoed clca dy in rhc Declaration of lndepc:ndence: We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.- That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,- That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute a new Government.•

10.2 LOCKE

Figure 10.4 John Locke (1632 1704).

ln addition co his political writing, John Locke also advanced a theur)' of knowlt:mc du: frame of' 1hc workl h.,vc 1101 ,1 11y , uh,i\l cncc wh ho111 a mind." Gt-orgc Berkeley

enti rely distinct from them, wherein they exist, or, which is t he same thin g, whereby they are perceived; for the existence of an Idea consists In being perceived. Ill. Tha t neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the Imagination, exist without the mind, ts what every body w ill allow. And (to me) it seems no less evident that the various sensations or Ideas Imprinted on the sense, however blended or combined together (that Is, whatever objects they compose), cannot exist otherwise than In a mind perceiving them. I think an Intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this, by any one that shall attend to what Is meant by t h e term exist, when applled to sensible things. The table I write on, I say, exists, that is, I see and feel It; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was an odour, that is, it was smelled; there was a sound, that is to say, it was heard; a colour or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the like expressions. For as to what Is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things w ithout any relation to t heir being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their esse est percipi, nor is it possible they should have any existence, out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them. IV. It is Indeed an opinion stran gely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word sensible objects have an existence natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever t his principle may be en tert ained in the world; yet whoever shall find in hi s heart to ca ll it in question, may, If I mistake not, perceive It to Involve a manifest contradic tion. For what are the foremen tioned objects but the things we perceive by sense, and what do we perceive besides our own Ideas or sensations; and Is It not plainly repugnant th at any one of these or any combina tion of them should cmica11 rc,volu•

t ion hronght ahour hy Kant was, I think, the 1110,1 imporrnnt ,i11glc turning poi111 in the his•

rory of philosophy.~ 8t)'lll1

Mig,'C

[l)f we seek an example from the understanding in its quite ordinary employment, the proposition, 'every alteration must have a cause,' will serve our purpose. In the latter case, Indeed, tha vary concapt of a causa so manlfostly contains the concept of a nacesslty of con• nection with an effect and of the strict universality of the rule, that the concept would be altogether lost if we attempted to derive It, as Hume has done, from a repeated association of that which happens with that which precedes, and from a custom of connecting repre• sentatlons, a custom originating in this repeated association, and constituting therefore a merely subjective necessity.2

The Knowledge Revolution 267

So Kant's epistemology is neither entirely empiricist nor fully r:u'ionalisr. He departs radically from trad ition by find ing a third way- one thaL secs merit and error in both theories of knowledge. 111 Iinc with Lhe empiricists, he holds that all knowledge has its origins in experience, buc char does n't mean experience alo ne is the source of all our knowledge. With a nod to the rationalists, he maintains that experience by ir.selfis blind, b11t that doesn't mea n we can acqu ire knowledge of the world through reason alone. Kanr says thar Plaro rook this l:mcr roure and, like a dove Lrying LO fly in empty ~pace wiLh no air resblance, found hi mself trying to reason about reality with no 1':lw material (expel'icncc) ro reason about: There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins wi th experience. For how should our faculty of knowledge be awakened Into action did not objects affecting our senses partly of themselves produce representations, partly arouse the activity of our understanding to compare these representations, and, by combining or separating them, work up the raw material of the sensible Impressions Into that knowledge of objects which Is entitled experience? In th e order of time, therefore, we have no knowledge antecedent to experience, and with experience all our knowledge begins. But though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience. For It may well be that even our empirical knowledge is made up of what we receive through impressions and of what our own faculty of knowledge (sensi ble impressions serving merely as the occasion) supplies from itself. If our facu lty of knowledge makes any such add ition, it may be that we are not in a position to distinguish it from the raw material, until with long practice of attention we have become skilled in separating it. This, then, Is a question which at least calls for closer examination, and does not allow of any off-han d answer:- whether there is any knowledge that is thus Independent of experi ence and even of all Impressions of the senses. Such knowledge Is entitled a priori, and distinguished from the empirical, which has Its SOU1rces a posteriori, that Is, In experience.... Mathema tics gives us a shining example of how far, Independently of experience, we can progress In a priori knowledge. ... Misled by such a proof of the power of reason, the demand for the extension of knowledge recognises no limits. The light dove, cleaving the air in her free night, and feeli ng its resistance, might imagine that its night would be still easier In empty space. It was thus that Plato left the world of th e senses, as setti ng too narrow limits to the unders tanding, and ventured out beyond It on the wings of the ideas, In the empty space of the pure understanding. He did not observe that with all his efforts he made no advance-meeting no resistance that migh t, as it were, serve as a support upon which he could take a stand; to which he could apply his powers, and so set his understandIng In motion. 3

But Kanr cannot simply assert that symhetic a priori knowledge is possible and leave it at char. He musr show how ir's poss'ible. His scarri ng poinr is che premise (which he t hought obvious) t hat science and mathemat ics do give us necessary, un iversal knowledge abou t the wo rld. From t here he argues rhal something musr therefore be fundamcnrally wron g with both emp iricism and rationa lism because t hese rh cories fo il ro explai n how t his ki nd of knowledge is possible. ln Hume's empiricism , he says, sense ex peri ence c an shine no light on lhe outer

1 . Contemporary scientists assen that In the realm of subatomic particles, some events are not c.aused. Does this fact give the lie to Kant's claim that the law of cause and effecl Is a synthetic a priori truth?

Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason

"1l1c wish to talk IO C:od is absurd. \Ve can no1 rnlk to o ne we can not comprehend-a nd we

cannot comprehend God;

we can only believe in him."

- lmmanud K.am

2 . What Is the point Kant is making with the example of a dove flying in empty space? Who do you think Is closer to the truth regarding the nature of a priori truth- Plato or Kant?

268

CHAPTER ff 1

Kant's Revolution

"A nd seeing ignorn nee is the cur.e of GoJ, knowlcusc the wins whcrcwi1 h we fly to hc.1,.cn " Wlll i,1111 Sh~kc11>e,arc

3 , What Is Kant's Copernican revolution? Is hi s theory or knowledge more p lausible than rationalism or empiricism 7 Explain.

Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason

.. Sp.ic.:e nnd lime .ire du~

frnmcwork wil'hin which the mind is co1111raincd 10 construc1 its cxpcri